[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
REVITALIZING U.S.-ASEAN RELATIONS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 17, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-30
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina AMI BERA, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
PAUL COOK, California TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
TED S. YOHO, Florida DINA TITUS, Nevada
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois NORMA J. TORRES, California
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
Wisconsin TED LIEU, California
ANN WAGNER, Missouri
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
TED S. YOHO, Florida, Chairman
DANA ROHRABACHER, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio AMI BERA, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DINA TITUS, Nevada
MO BROOKS, Alabama GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
ANN WAGNER, Missouri
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Amy Searight, Ph.D., senior adviser and director, Southeast Asia
Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies........ 7
Mr. Walter Lohman, director, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage
Foundation..................................................... 17
Zachary M. Abuza, Ph.D., professor, National War College......... 26
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Ted S. Yoho, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the
Pacific: Prepared statement.................................... 4
Amy Searight, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.......................... 10
Mr. Walter Lohman: Prepared statement............................ 19
Zachary M. Abuza, Ph.D.: Prepared statement...................... 28
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 54
Hearing minutes.................................................. 55
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 56
REVITALIZING U.S.-ASEAN RELATIONS
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WEDNESDAY, MAY 17, 2017
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Yoho
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Yoho. The subcommittee will come to order.
Members present will be permitted to submit written
statements to be included in the official hearing record.
Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5
calendar days to allow statements, questions, and extraneous
material for the record, subject to length limitations and the
rules.
Good afternoon, everybody. As we wait for other members to
come in, I look forward to hearing from you.
Still in the early days of a new administration, at a
tumultuous time in the international affairs and especially in
Asia, we find ourselves at a point of international uncertainty
about U.S. policies for engaging with the 10 nations of the
Association of the Southeast Asian Nations, better known as
ASEAN. With that in mind, we have convened this hearing to
evaluate U.S.-ASEAN policies and form a set of recommendations
that we can deliver to the administration for U.S. relations
with this important partner.
As 2017 is ASEAN's 50th anniversary and the 40th
anniversary of U.S.-ASEAN relations, this is a particularly
important year to review our engagement with ASEAN and continue
improving the relationship. ASEAN is Southeast Asia's premier
multilateral grouping made up of Brunei, Burma, Cambodia,
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, and Vietnam. Collectively, the group makes up the
world's third largest population and the fifth largest economy.
ASEAN is a critical diplomatic, economic, and security partner
for the United States.
U.S.-ASEAN engagement has trended upwards for years, and it
remains strong and has a bright outlook. In 2015, the U.S.-
ASEAN relationship was elevated to a strategic partnership. And
2016 marked two important firsts: The first U.S.-ASEAN summit
at Sunnylands and the first ever visiting of a sitting U.S.
President to Laos.
Our economic connection is also significant, as ASEAN is
the fourth largest good export market for the United States,
and we are ASEAN's fourth largest trading partner. As the
second fastest growing economy in Asia and with a combined
economy of $2\1/2\ billion,\1\ the importance of ASEAN as a
market for the U.S. is considerable.
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\1\ This number is actually $2\1/2\ trillion and is corrected by
the chairman later in the hearing.
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As a security partner, ASEAN is also invaluable. The
grouping is strategically located astride some of the world's
most critical sea lanes, and shares the U.S. pursuit of
regional stability through rules, order, and peaceful dispute
settlement.
ASEAN includes two U.S. treaty allies: Thailand and the
Philippines. Despite the hugely important interest we share, we
have come to a period of uncertainty in U.S. relationships.
Part of this is the natural period of recalculation that comes
with any new administration, but has been exasperated because
the rebalance to Asia was, in some respects, a one-legged
stool.
Our strategy for engaging Asia, particularly Southeast
Asia, relied so heavily on the TPP that when the United States
withdrew, there was not much of a policy left. Uncertainties
have been heightened further by instability in the region, lack
of clarity about the administration's America First rhetoric,
and the increasing competition from China and initiatives like
its One Belt, One Road policy which challenges U.S. influence
in the Asia-Pacific region.
The administration has done fairly extensive early outreach
to many Asian partners, which should be commended on, but most
of these conversations have revolved around the nuclear menace
from North Korea. But our partnership with ASEAN is broader
than that, a fact that some promising recent statements have
recognized.
Vice President Pence spoke extensively about U.S.-ASEAN
security and economic cooperation during a recent visit to the
ASEAN secretariat in late April. The Vice President should be
applauded for this visit and the announcement he made that
President Trump will attend East Asia Summit, the U.S.-ASEAN
Summit, and the APEC economic leaders meeting. As we all hear
from one witness, on the diplomatic front in Southeast Asia, 80
percent of success is showing up.
Secretary of State Tillerson also addressed U.S.-ASEAN
relations in a recent speech declaring the intent to resolidify
our relationships with ASEAN on a number of security and trade
issues and clarifying that America First does not mean that our
national security and economic prosperity comes at the expense
of others.
This leadership has been helpful, but we have yet to hear a
complete policy that will give our ASEAN partners a better
sense of how the United States will gauge going forward. Our
influence and interests in Asia are at stake. The nations of
ASEAN are walking a tightrope between the power centers of the
United States and China. If the United States withdraws from
Asia, ASEAN won't be able to stay standing. A monopolar Asia
would mean less opportunity for the United States to undertake
valuable economic and security cooperation with ASEAN. In
short, we need a plan.
With that, to help us toward this goal, we are privileged
to be joined by the expert panel this afternoon. I thank the
witnesses for joining us and members of the subcommittee for
their participation.
Without objection, the witnesses' written statements will
be entered into the hearing.
I now turn to our ranking member for any remarks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Yoho follows:]
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Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I welcome this hearing on ASEAN. ASEAN is a very diverse
area geopolitically. Indonesia and the Philippines have
practiced democracy for many years; Vietnam and Laos never
have. I am concerned with ASEAN issues in general, but
particularly trade, terrorism, and the negative effects of the
President's proposed 2018 budget cuts to State Department and
USAID.
Mr. Chairman, as you point out, this is a very important
market. Our trade relationship is big. It is important, and I
might add, extremely unfair. We have seen an increase in our
trade deficit with ASEAN every year since 2006. It now stands
at well over $83 billion. That means that if we had balanced
trade with ASEAN, we would have well more than 1 million
American jobs.
Now, given our somewhat tight job and labor market, that
would mean a rapid increase in wages in this country. But we
don't have fair or balance trade with ASEAN, most notably with
Vietnam, where not only do we have to compete against 40-cent-
an-hour labor, but we are told that if we open up, we will get
free access to Vietnam's markets. Well, Vietnam doesn't have
freedom, Vietnam doesn't have markets. We have almost a $32
billion trade deficit with Vietnam, which is not the result of
free economics. It is not the result of free trade.
Wall Street can repeat that over and over again, because
they can make a lot of money jacking up the trade deficit and
minimizing their demand for American labor. But the fact is the
decisions on whether to make major purchases of American goods
or instead those from Europe are political decisions made in
Hanoi by the Vietnamese Communist Party. To say that we can't
sell in Vietnam because our goods aren't good, because our
workers aren't good is an attack against America completely
unjustified by the facts.
These are political decisions made in Hanoi which
understands that the American foreign policy establishment will
look the other way as they run a huge trade deficit with us.
They know Europe will not look the other way, so they buy from
Europe and, I might add, Asia.
The combatting terrorism. ASEAN countries face local and
international terrorism. There are over a dozen armed radical
Islamic groups in the region. We have seen al-Qaeda's influence
through JI and its affiliates, which are responsible for the
2002 Bali attacks. While JI's influence has waned, other
groups, including ISIS, are growing. Malaysia is seeing a
significant increase in cyber recruitment for jihadist
organizations. Southern Philippines have six small groups who
have pledged their loyalty to ISIS. We have the Mujahedeen,
Indonesia, Timor, MIT group who has pledged its support for
ISIS. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses what we can
do to help our ASEAN allies deal with this threat, both to
themselves and to the world.
Finally, we deal with trying to maintain America's global
leadership with the 2018 budget proposal. The State Department
USAID maintains programs in ASEAN countries which are critical,
and provide clean water, combat climate change, fight
proliferation of AIDS, fight counter-violent extremism and
terrorism. For example, in Malaysia, we have planned
counterterrorism transnational crime initiatives countering
weapons of mass destruction proliferation programs; similar
efforts in Thailand and other ASEAN countries.
We are working against climate change to which ASEAN
countries are uniquely vulnerable. Without U.S. development,
health, climate, and security assistance, the ASEAN region will
be a less stable area. But it will certainly be a less pro-
American area if we cut back our diplomatic efforts. That is
why 120 three- and four-star generals and admirals have written
to House leadership in February urging the U.S. to maintain a
robust foreign affairs budget.
We have challenges in ASEAN around the world, and I look
forward to learning from our panelists how we can best deal
with those challenges. I thank you.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Ranking Member, and I look forward to
having that. And I remember the remarks of General Mattis. He
said: If you cut that foreign aid, we are going to have to
spend that in ammunition, and I know we don't want that.
And so with us today, we are thankful to be joined today by
Dr. Amy Searight, senior adviser and director of the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Southeast Asia Program. We
look forward to hearing from you.
Mr. Walter Lohman, director of the Asia Study Center at the
Heritage Foundation. And Dr. Zachary Abuza, professor at the
National War College.
We thank the panel for joining us today to share their
experience and expertise. Our goal is it to take the
information that you give us, and as we have in the past, we
have directed foreign policy that we can pass on to the State
Department or the President to direct our pivot to Asia, and we
look forward to hearing from you on that. And we have had that
in the past and have done that with Chairman Royce in the full
committee. It is so important with your input here, because
that hopefully will lead to some policies that will make us all
stronger and more secure.
Being the chairman of this committee, one of my goals and
my ultimate goal is it to reach out to that whole Asia-Pacific
region and strengthen our relationships with all those
countries, focus on economic and trade and national security so
that we can keep doing what we do.
So, Dr. Searight, if you would, press the red button to
talk and make sure your microphone is there. And we will try to
hold you to 5 minutes, thank you.
STATEMENT OF AMY SEARIGHT, PH.D., SENIOR ADVISER AND DIRECTOR,
SOUTHEAST ASIA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES
Ms. Searight. Thank you.
Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, and distinguished
members of the committee, it is an honor to be before you here
today to discuss the future of U.S. security relations with
Southeast Asia.
This year marks the 50th anniversary of the founding of
ASEAN and the 40th anniversary of U.S.-ASEAN relations, making
it a natural time to take stock of U.S. ties with Southeast
Asia and consider ways to improve relations with this
increasingly important region.
Southeast Asia is an integral part of the larger Asia
Pacific that will play a key role in propelling the U.S.
economy in the decades ahead. ASEAN is at the heart of Asian
economic integration efforts, and also brings together Asia-
Pacific leaders every year to discuss strategic issues at its
diplomatic meetings and summits.
Located at the crossroads between east and south Asia and
the Pacific and Indian Oceans, Southeast Asia is also
increasingly a region--an arena in which geopolitical rivalries
between the United States, China, Japan, and India play out.
ASEAN centrality in the regional architecture also gives it
an important normative role to play, and its promotion of norms
and rules, including the peaceful resolution of disputes and
respect for international law, in turn help to uphold the
rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.
The strategic rebalance to Asia built on an already strong
base to further strengthen key relationships and build new
partnerships. Enhanced defense cooperation agreements with both
the Philippines and Singapore allow for greater rotational
access for U.S. Forces to facilities in those two countries.
The defense relationships with Malaysia and Indonesia are as
strong as they have ever been. The rebalance expanded U.S.
strategic options in mainland Southeast Asia, with Vietnam
emerging as an important partner and Burma being incorporated
back into the international community.
Concerns about Chinese actions in the South China Sea have
created a growing demand signal from many Southeast Asian
countries for an expanded U.S. security presence in the region.
U.S. freedom of navigation operations, or FONOPs, in the South
China Sea are quietly welcomed by most Southeast Asian
countries, even those whose excessive maritime claims are
challenged along with those of China.
There is an increasing demand in Southeast Asia for
assistance with maritime security capacity building, which has
led to the refocusing of existing U.S. security assistance
programs, such as the Foreign Military Financing and Excess
Defense Articles programs toward maritime security. New
programs, such as the Southeast Asia maritime security
initiative, have been created to augment existing programs and
fill gaps to improve the effectiveness of U.S. maritime
capacity building efforts with allies and partners in Southeast
Asia.
The case for continued high-level and intensive engagement
with Southeast Asia is compelling, and members of both the
executive and legislative branches should not hesitate to make
that case to the American people. Our allies and partners watch
our strategic messages and policy pronouncements very closely,
and often shape their policies with an eye on those of the
United States.
Given this dynamic, it is important that the U.S.
Government issue clear and consistent strategic messages,
particularly on issues like disputes in the South China Sea,
and avoid inconsistent execution of policies, which can lead to
confusion and undercut the perception of our resolve.
Moving forward, FONOPs and routine presence operations
should be executed on a regular basis in the South China Sea to
demonstrate our resolve to fly, sail, and operate wherever
international law allows.
U.S. defense relationships in Southeast Asia are strong,
and it is all too easy to fall into the trap of focusing on
military solutions to security challenges to the exclusion of
economic and diplomatic approaches. This is a mistake, as
Southeast Asian countries view security through the lens of
economic growth and integration, and they place a high priority
on both their economic and political relationship with the
United States.
The U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership is a
step in the wrong direction on this front, and Washington will
need to devise and promote other ideas and vehicles for
economic engagement with Southeast Asia in order for U.S
leadership in the region to remain credible in the long run.
Things are easier on the diplomatic front in Southeast Asia
where, in the words of Woody Allen, 80 percent of success is
showing up. There is no substitute for high-level participation
and ASEAN-centered regional meetings, which is why the
President's announcement that he will attend the East Asia
Summit in the Philippines, the U.S.-ASEAN Summit, and the APEC
forum in Vietnam this November is so important.
Reinvigorating restrained alliances with the Philippines
and Thailand will be job number one for the administration.
With the Philippines, the United States should strive to
preserve the alliance to the greatest extent possible, while
taking a firm position on human rights excesses of the Duterte
administration.
In Thailand, the United States should explore whether the
new Constitution and the tentative preparation for elections in
the wake of the royal transition provide an opportunity to
begin resetting ties without rewarding the military government.
The Departments of State and Defense should immediately resume
dialogues with Thailand on issues of mutual strategic interest.
The United States has several enduring advantages that lead
Southeast Asia to continue to turn to it as a security partner
of choice, including the world's best military, high
favorability ratings among most local populations, and a less
threatening foreign policy than that of China. Given these
advantages, Washington can continue to play the long game in
Asia, confident that chinese adventurism is likely to push many
states to turn to the United States for support.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Searight follows:]
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Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Dr. Searight.
Mr. Lohman.
STATEMENT OF MR. WALTER LOHMAN, DIRECTOR, ASIAN STUDIES CENTER,
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. Lohman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Sherman, Ms.
Gabbard. Thank you for having me to testify here today. I
appreciate the time that all of you put into the work of this
subcommittee. I know especially Southeast Asia is not the
easiest thing to get attention to, and the work that you have
put into it is very admirable and very important.
I am particularly glad that you're taking a closer look at
the economic component of our policy in Southeast Asia. It is
every bit as important as the other elements. In fact, it may
be more important than the other elements.
I want to make five points here in my summary.
First, if the strategic goal of the United States in the
Asia Pacific is to prevent a single power, today China, from
gaining dominance, it cannot accomplish this on its own, and it
cannot do it with only a negative agenda. Our efforts to push
back on objectionable Chinese behavior in the South China Sea,
for instance, must have a positive context, and economic
engagement is perfect for that. In fact, ASEAN is best equipped
to deal with economic issues.
Number two, whatever you may read in the headlines, the
states of Southeast Asia are most interested in economics, not
in conflict. The region is very economically diverse: High-
income countries and developed economies and low to high
middle-income countries. Some of these countries have severe
development problems, some are stuck in the middle-income trap,
others are headed in that direction. Most are in serious need
of infrastructure investment. But they are all more than
interested in making money than settling political scores with
their neighbors.
Number three, foreign economic involvement in ASEAN is also
very diverse. The U.S. does not have a dominant share of the
market, but neither does China or any other single country.
This is often overlooked when we hear about China being the
region's leading trading partner. It is the region's largest
trading partner, but the statement oversimplifies things. And
we can talk about that a little bit in Q&A if you would like.
Number four, China is leveraging its economic engagement in
the region far more effectively than the U.S. is. They are
making it attractive for countries in the region to set aside
concerns about China's creeping political dominance in exchange
for the promise of economic benefits, perhaps to the region and
individual countries' detriment in the long-term.
Number five, security guarantees, military presence, and
diplomacy are not enough. The U.S. must be much more visibly
and formally involved in the economic life of the region. And
you are looking for ideas, I just have a few ideas to offer you
in this regard.
Number one, we should develop new high standard FTAs. There
are several countries in the region that would be good
candidates for this. We have tried with Malaysia and Thailand
several years ago to no avail. Those are things that we can
pursue again.
The second thing is we need to develop options for less
developed countries in the region, things that are less than
full-blown FTAs. Everything we do doesn't have to be a complete
gold standard FTA. Something that Congress can do, actually,
without necessarily the aid of the administration, at least not
as a recommendation for the administration, but something you
can do is look at models like the SAVE Act. There was a bill
introduced in both houses several years ago called the SAVE
Act, which would allow Filipino apparel made with American
fabric to enter the United States duty free. It is a win-win
for both sides.
We need to coordinate better with global partners; Japan in
particular, because Japan actually is very big on
infrastructure and they are good at it. We don't do
infrastructure abroad so well. We can work with the Europeans
much more. They are natural partners. They are people that
agree with us on values. We have a lot of synergy economically
with them.
We need to make a better show of what American companies
are already doing in the region, and help give them entre to
foreign leaders that they need to see in order to make
investments in the region.
The U.S. should be involved with as many ASEAN meetings as
possible, especially those involving trade, like the Economic
Ministers Meeting which happens every year. It will happen this
year in September, in the fall anyway. Bob Lighthizer should be
at that meeting.
Then finally, we should prioritize the U.S.-ASEAN Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement and ASEAN assistance programs.
And we can talk about that more too, if you would like. But
there were several options that both the Bush administration
and Obama put on the table during their times in office, and
this administration needs to develop their own suite of
assistance programs for ASEAN.
The way the U.S. prevents China from advancing toward a
dominant position in the region is not just by pushing back on
bad behavior, but by staying energetically engaged across the
whole range of interests and keeping the region open to all
comers. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lohman follows:]
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----------
Mr. Yoho. Thank you for that. I want to--I really want to
go back to that when we get to the questioning part because, I
mean, you both are hitting on something very, very strategic.
Dr. Abuza, I look forward to hearing from you.
STATEMENT OF ZACHARY M. ABUZA, PH.D., PROFESSOR, NATIONAL WAR
COLLEGE
Mr. Abuza. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for having me,
and also Mr. Sherman, Representative Gabbard, thank you very
much for your----
Mr. Yoho. Can I get you to bring your microphone a little
closer maybe? Thank you.
Mr. Abuza. I have to begin with the disclaimer that I am
here in my own capacity. I do not represent the views of the
Department of Defense or the National War College.
Here, in Southeast Asia, when we are talking about peace
and prosperity, there is so much that we need to talk about in
terms of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. Southeast Asia
and the United States plays a very important role in dealing
with all of these. And that is a role that China can never or
will never play in the region. So this is an important counter
comparative advantage that we have.
The news in Southeast Asia is actually quite good. I cannot
think of a region that has had such successful counterterrorism
operations. You can look to a country like Indonesia. They have
had some of the most successful counterterrorism in the world
at the same time that they have helped to consolidate their
democracy and rule of law. That is something that we really
need to take into consideration.
I won't go into all the details of the successes that we
have seen. I am going to focus on a couple concerns that I have
down the pike, and you can read more into my written
statements.
The first is there are a lot of Southeast Asians who would
like to get to Iraq and Syria. There is no shortage there, but
it is a logistical issue. There are backlogs. The good news is
that we are getting a lot of cooperation within the region
amongst the security services.
The second thing that really concerns me is that compared
to Jemaah Islamiyah, the al-Qaeda-based group, the pathways to
recruitment into IS in Southeast Asia are much more diverse. In
Indonesia, they follow traditional networks that JI relied on,
but in Malaysia, you will see that they--also much more online
recruitment. IS is able to recruit across the socioeconomic
spectrum.
Another thing that is very different is their use of women.
JI never used women in this role or in any role in terrorism.
IS has employed women as key recruiters, indoctrinators, and
more recently, attempted suicide bombers.
Third, although there have only been a few, three or four,
Indonesian suicide bombers in Iraq and Syria, there have been
seven or eight Malaysians. The genie is out of the bottle, and
this does play into the hagiography that trickles back into
Southeast Asia.
Speaking about trickle backs, Southeast Asians are starting
to trickle back. There were an estimated 1,000, 1,200 Southeast
Asians who went to Iraq and Syria. That is down dramatically.
They weren't all combatants. They brought a lot of their family
members, wives and children, enough that they opened up their
own school, Bahasa language school. But they are starting to
trickle back.
Malaysia has tools at its disposal to deal with this. They
can arrest people, detain them without trial, which is
problematic in other ways. Indonesia does not. And that is
something they are debating now. It is something that we need
to be concerned about in terms of their own consolidation of
democracy.
Let me move on, though, to what I consider the biggest
concerns, and that is the security situation in the southern
Philippines. Since the collapse of the peace process with the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the southern Philippines has
once again become kind of a black hole for Southeast Asia, not
just a domestic security concern, but one that impacts the
entire region. There a number of different groups, small cells
that have pledged allegiance to IS. Most of this has been for
marketing tools or I would say rather than a pure affiliation
and command and control. But it is important to note that the
southern Philippines once again is attracting militants from
around the region to train and regroup, including Bangladesh.
The last thing that I would focus on is the rise of the Abu
Sayyaf once again, and not just the kidnappings that we have
seen and the gruesome beheadings of Westerners. What is really
impacting this is the maritime kidnappings. Since March of last
year, there have been 19 separate maritime operations going
after fishing boats, barges, tramp steamers in the region. This
has really impacted regional trade, and it is showing no signs
of ending.
The last point that I would be concerned about and what we
need to work with our ASEAN partners on is the desperate
situation of the Rohingya in Bangladesh. This is a situation
that is ripe for exploitation. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Abuza follows:]
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----------
Mr. Yoho. Thank you all for the great testimony. It such an
important area, and as we have seen, we know that whole
theater--there is 85 percent of the world trade goes through
the South China Sea. With the pivot that we supposedly had to
the Asia-Pacific area, it didn't happen the way it should have.
We look forward to this administration clarifying its America
First policy. I think what we see with that, we can't be first
if we don't help our neighbors and our partners. And I think
that is what you will see coming out here.
I misspoke when I did my opening testimony. When we were
talking about the size of that region being the third most
populous with, I think it is 600 and some--630 million people,
it is the fifth largest economy, and I said it was $2\1/2\
billion; it is $2\1/2\ trillion. Just a mistake of a few zeros.
But it is such a large area.
Then I guess some of my questions are, the first one, in
your experience, what would be a way to rein in the trade and
the trust or to get that trade back that we lost with the
anticipated TPP, which wasn't going to pass the House?
Everybody wants to blame this administration, but it wasn't
going to pass the House and the Senate the way it was prior to
that.
I am glad, Mr. Lohman, you brought up strong free trade
agreements. I am happy to say we have done letters of strong
free trade agreements already with Taiwan, Japan, and Vietnam
out of this committee. One of them came out of another
committee we did jointly, because we see that as a way of
making that relationship stronger. I think the bilateral or
even multiple bilaterals or trilaterals. What are your thoughts
on that and how would you expound on that? And what countries
would you pick?
Because if you look at like South Korea, South Korea is one
of our largest trading partners. And then we have other trading
partners. When I look at that and I try to figure out why does
South Korea become so successful at trading, and then you see
like Vietnam and some of the other countries becoming stronger
in trade with us, what is it about their government, about
their rule of law, about their society that allows one country
to become successful and large trading partners where the
others don't? Who would you target initially?
Mr. Lohman. Well, we have already targeted the freest
economy in the region, which is Singapore. And I will point out
that Singapore is the only country in the region that the
United States runs a trade surplus with.
Mr. Yoho. Right.
Mr. Lohman. It is the only country that we also have a free
trade agreement with. So I do think free trade agreements are a
vehicle to sit down and work through these issues with the
countries in question. If you are not sitting with them and
talking about these problems, you are not going to address
them.
Now, you could argue about the substance of those
agreements and how tough our negotiators are, but if you don't
sit down and talk with them, you are not going to fix anything.
I do think Vietnam is a good candidate. Vietnam signed on
to the TPP, and by all accounts they are going ahead and making
the reforms that were required by TPP anyway. So they certainly
see a connection between economic freedom and prosperity and
becoming a free trade partner.
Malaysia is a good candidate. Like I said, we got maybe 90
percent of the way there or 85 percent of the way there during
the Bush administration. We couldn't close the deal.
Thailand, you know, there are some political things we want
to think about with regard to Thailand, but still Thailand
would be a good example.
But as I pointed out in my testimony, I think there are
things that we could do that are not full-blown trade
agreements. FTAs take years to accomplish, very complicated,
they are very costly in domestic political terms for some of
these countries. We could do much smaller things that would
benefit our profile in the region and economically would
benefit both of us. That is why I point to the SAVE Act, not
necessarily for the Philippines, though it could be for the
Philippines; not necessarily for textiles, although it could be
textiles. But that idea of a limited agreement on certain
sectors that would benefit both sides.
Mr. Yoho. Dr. Abuza, do you want to weigh in on that?
Mr. Abuza. I am no expert in trade. But let me make one
point about the TPP: I am agnostic on that as a trade
agreement. I can't even pretend to understand the complexity of
it. But countries like Vietnam really viewed the TPP, or
Singapore viewed the TPP, in many ways as the Obama
administration did, much more than a trade deal; that it was a
strategic anchor, something that committed the United States to
the region.
And now that the Trump administration has taken that off
the table, it really did lasting damage to the perception of
United States reliability in the region.
I just got back from Vietnam and had very high-level
meetings across the government, the Communist Party, the
military. They are just agog because they really wonder what
that says about how long our commitment to the peace and
stability in the region over the long term.
Mr. Yoho. Point made. And that is why it is so important to
have this meeting, so we can figure out what is the best way to
go. I think the free trade agreement--because we want them to
know that we are back, that we are here, that we are going to
be strong allies. I think we are going to have time, if you
guys have time, to do two rounds of questioning. I want to come
back to you Dr. Searight.
But at this time, I am going to turn it over to my ranking
member, Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Dr. Abuza, countries that want to run up huge
trade surpluses with us, in effect, take our jobs, will always
tell us that, boy, if you give us all the jobs, or better yet,
tell people not to notice that we are taking all the jobs, we
will be great military strategic partners. We really need you
involved.
So you tell us Vietnam really wants us involved and they
are disappointed with TPP. Are they willing to enter into an
agreement with us that mandates balanced trade flows as an
essential element of such trade agreement or are they only in
favor of a strategic military alliance, as long as they get to
take more of our jobs?
And am I--you know, it is possible you have had no
discussion on this, but is there any evidence that they are
willing to have balanced trade because they want us so involved
in their region?
Mr. Abuza. Again, I----
Mr. Sherman. If you don't know, you don't know. I will
regard that as a rhetorical question, and I will move on to Mr.
Lohman, unless--you are for the SAVE Act. Obviously, that would
help to some degree those who make fabric in the United States.
It would cost us jobs among those who make garments here in the
United States. Every analysis I saw, and there weren't many,
said it would cost us jobs and increase our trade deficit.
Are you aware of any study that says that that Act would
increase jobs in America or reduce our trade deficit, or are
you just philosophically in favor of such a bill?
Mr. Lohman. No. But I do recall studies by retailers of the
United States.
Mr. Sherman. Oh, yes, retailers are in favor of cheap
imports, yes.
Mr. Lohman. But retailers also provide jobs. Working at
Walmart is not----
Mr. Sherman. If you believe that the way we can increase
jobs in America is to reduce our manufacturing and make it up
by having more malls----
Mr. Lohman. We were just talking about a tiny bit of----
Mr. Sherman. Well, obviously, the SAVE Act is not the most
important piece of legislation ever submitted to Congress. It
will have a slight effect one way or the other. And that effect
will be negative on jobs in the manufacturing sectors of the
United States.
But I want to move on to an area where Dr. Abuza has more
background, and that is the Christian Governor of Jakarta, who
was found guilty on charges of blasphemy. It is one thing to
have terrorists to cooperate with the Government in Jakarta to
deal with terrorist groups that they are dedicated to opposing.
It is another thing when the government engages in what can
only be called an act of terrorism against one of the leaders
of its own government.
What can be done to deal with this outrageous 2-year
sentence and to be done with the idea of if not the level of
freedom of religion that we have here in the United States, at
least not the--this level of oppression?
Mr. Abuza. The blasphemy laws actually have been on the
books for a number of decades. It actually was enacted under
Suharto.
Mr. Sherman. Uh-huh.
Mr. Abuza. It has been increasingly abused. It was there
for many years. But certainly, since you have had the rise of
democracy since 1998, you have also had the rise of Islamist
politics in Indonesia. I just hate to say it, but there is good
politics in this, and no one seems to be willing to stand up
and defend religious minorities right now. There are just not
votes in it.
I am very concerned right now----
Mr. Sherman. Is the average Indonesian citizen aware of the
adverse effect that can have on Indonesia's relationship with
the rest of the world?
Mr. Abuza. Indonesia has this wonderful tradition of
pluralism, syncretic Islam, but that is changing. It is a less
tolerant place. There is more fundamental Islam Wahhabism or
Salafism is growing in the country.
Mr. Sherman. If I could interrupt, is one of the reasons
for that funding of extremist ideological--not terrorism but
ideological Islam out of Saudi Arabia and the Wahhabi movement?
Mr. Abuza. That has been a very important part of this. The
Saudis have a foundation in a university, known as LIPIA, that
continues to fund scholarships and madrasas. Yes, this is
happening all the time. And it is not just them, it is from
other Gulf States.
But one point, American--you know, after Suharto fell and
you had free speech and democracy restored, in many ways the
pendulum swung too far, and you had the rise of what are often
referred to as anti-vice organizations. They are basically
Islamist vigilante groups. The most prominent one is the FPI
right now that led these mass demonstrations starting in
December against the Christian Governor of Jakarta, Ahok.
I think the Indonesians, their democracy is fairly well
consolidated now. I think it is time that we start to put a
little more pressure on them to say, listen, every country that
has free speech also has some limits on free speech, and
incitements of violence is not protected free speech. They have
got to start to address this or this is going to be part and
parcel of the 2019 Presidential election.
Mr. Sherman. I yield back.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
Ms. Gabbard from Hawaii.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Abuza, I want to follow up on Congressman Sherman's
questioning and some of your statements about how ISIS is
recruiting across the socioeconomic spectrum, in particular
focusing on women where that hasn't occurred before. What are
their tools for recruitment? Because this evidence of
recruiting across the socioeconomic spectrum is something that
is, unfortunately, kind of dismissed often when people talk
about who are ISIS' recruits most likely to be. So if you can
expand on that a little bit.
Mr. Abuza. So during the period of Jemaah Islamiyah in the
2000s, the best determinant of who became a member were who
your father was, who your brother was, what madrasa you studied
at, and what mosque you attended. You were tied to the
community, and it was a very slow and gradual process.
What they found--the security forces in Malaysia and
Tunisia found is that because IS does so much of their
recruitment online, it is given a special role for women to
play as recruiters, as indoctrinators, people actually goading
people to go and travel. Southeast Asian women who have
traveled to Iraq and Syria to serve as nurses, who are to marry
jihadists over there have played really important roles on
social media in leading this charge.
The Malaysian police have really found that almost every
major cell that they have disrupted had a woman as one of the
key recruiters, indoctrinators, or money people. So they are
just being empowered in different ways.
Recently, in Indonesia, the authorities arrested a woman
who had already been recruited to be a suicide bomber. That
would have been a first in Southeast Asia. So the precedent is
there.
Ms. Gabbard. If the promise is not money, it is not
security, it is not stability, what is the promise? What is the
message they are using for recruiting?
Mr. Abuza. It is commitment to the cause. It is a pure
ideologically driven commitment to forward the glory of Islam.
Ms. Gabbard. So how is it that I think you mentioned in
Indonesia, you mentioned great progress or gains in
counterterrorism. How do you match that with your other
statement about the rise of Wahhabism and extremism within
Indonesia that is having these other impacts, of course,
politically as was mentioned, but also with the increasing
numbers of people who would be receptive to ISIS recruitment?
Mr. Abuza. The numbers of Wahhabis in Southeast Asia is
probably about 10 percent, but it is growing. There is a debate
within the counterterrorism field that people in the Salafi
community might be the best antidote as long as they are
quietest and they are not espousing violence. They simply have
their social agenda. I personally am not so convinced of that,
but it is one that you do hear a lot, that these are the people
best able to challenge the ideology of ISIS.
Ms. Gabbard. Are you aware of any examples of that in the
world?
Mr. Abuza. Well, let me give you a different example. So
since 2010, JI as a militant terrorist organization has really
been defunct, and the Indonesian Government has given members
of JI inordinate amount of space to go out, proselytize, run
their mosques, run their madrasas, engage, as long as they are
not targeting civilians or engaging in violence.
You know, it makes me think, is this just a tactical good
time to lie low as they watch their strategic rival IS take the
abuse, take the punishment, get the arrests, and they are
waiting in the wings to pick up the pieces in another few
years? So I am not sure this is the best thing to do. Our best
hope is that Indonesia's very rich civil society in moderate
Muslims are able to withstand this cultural invasion of
Wahhabism.
Indonesian Islam really is syncretic. It has been on the
back foot in the past few years just because some of it is
anger toward the United States. For example, the war in Iraq in
2003 was wildly unpopular in Indonesia. That certainly did not
help moderates in the country. But I really--I do believe that
there is a rich cultural resilience in Indonesia.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Yoho. If we do have the time, we can go around a second
round.
I just want to go back to the U.S. trade. I think Singapore
is a good example. If you look at how we started--and my goal
is to have this with other countries in there as you talked
about. The U.S.-Singapore trade of FTA goes into effect in
2004. Trade surplus in 2003 was $1.4 billion. Today it is $9.1
billion. Our goal is to have balanced trade as important as it
is free trade agreements. If we can repeat that model over and
over again, I feel us building stronger, a stronger alliance
and unity in that area to stave off China, because we see what
China is doing in the South China Sea.
The reports, and we already have known this, that they are
weaponizing those islands. And of course, there is a cause and
effect. They are doing that, now Vietnam wants to do it. If
Vietnam does it, the next country is going to want to do it,
and it builds, it creates an instability in that area where we
really should be focusing on the economic trades.
Dr. Searight, you were talking about--you testified about
the inconsistent execution of policies with an on again, off
again FONOPs being the best example. How do we best solve this?
What specifically should the administration do differently?
I commend them for going down there and putting an
emphasis, Mike Pence and President Trump going down there. So I
would like to hear what your thoughts are on that.
Ms. Searight. Well, I do think engagement as we saw with
the Vice President's trip is very important. But I would say
that when it comes to being clear and consistent on key issues,
like the South China Sea, I think it is very important for this
administration to devise a strategy to really put some thought
and effort into thinking through what our core interests are
and what options we have and how to weave that together into a
real strategy, and then go out with allies and partners,
ideally, and articulate our interests and our approach and
have--and then as I said in my testimony, things like freedom
of navigation operations and routine presence operations. I
think it is very important to be consistent in executing them
and to be very clear about the reason why we do things like
freedom of navigation operations. It is because we have a core
interest in freedom of navigation. We should do it
consistently, regularly wherever international law allows and
not buy into the Chinese narrative that conducting freedom of
navigation operations is provocative by having a consistent
baseline of regularly executing them like clockwork and not
pulling them down and ratcheting them back up or thumping our
chests before or after we do them, but just be very low key and
consistent. I think that would go a long way in demonstrating
our resolve and upholding a core principle to the United
States.
Mr. Yoho. Let me ask you this, because what we see is an
aggressive China. Mr. Lohman, you were talking about the U.S.
can't accomplish this on its own; we need multiple nations and
the cooperation of them. China is doing what they can and they
are leveraging their economic clout, and they are doing that
because they can, they are cash rich. We are distracted, our
foreign policy--I have been a critic of it for the last 20, 30
years. I think we are way off course, and we really need to
focus.
But when we see an aggressive China claiming areas that
historically have been kind of sovereign areas or open areas,
and then you have the arbitration court ruling against them on
their claim to the South China Sea. Yet the world stood by
while they built island after island, over 4,000 acres,
building military complexes and runways. We know what they are
doing and we know what the intent is, but yet the world stood
by, we stood by.
How do you stop that at this point and what effect will
that have on the ASEAN countries? Because we know China is
trying to partner up with them too. We saw what the Philippines
did, and they don't like what China is doing, but they are
like, well, we are going turn a blind eye to it. If we all turn
a blind eye to it, they are going to rule that area. What are
your thoughts on that?
Ms. Searight. Well, I do think it is very difficult to roll
back the things that China has done, and it is also going to be
very difficult to stop them from further developing these
outposts and militarizing them. I think it is important for the
United States to demonstrate commitment to staying engaged.
Again, as is often said the United States does not take a side
in a particular dispute, but it does take a very strong
position on how the dispute should be resolved. They should be
resolved according to noncoercion and respect for the rule of
law, which is why the arbital tribunal ruling is so important.
We basically--the United States stands for a rules-based
order that allows countries to make choices freely and not be
bullied by other countries. I think just continuing to express
those principles and backing them up by high-level, consistent,
strategic engagement across the range of government tools is
really important.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you. I want to question, and whoever feels
best to answer this, we are talking about the specific areas
and specific sectors, whether it be infrastructure, telecoms,
energy, et cetera, that you believe could serve as an
opportunity for greater economic cooperation between the U.S.
and the ASEAN countries. If you could pick a sector, would it
be energy, telecoms, semiconductors? What would it be, just
real briefly, if you can answer that?
Mr. Lohman. Well, I think the most crying need in ASEAN is
infrastructure, transportation and the like. Energy is a big
issue for them. The United States companies aren't that big on
doing infrastructure abroad, but we do have partners that do
it. The Japanese, for instance, they have very serious plans
for infrastructure investments in Southeast Asia, and they are
making those investments, so we can coordinate with them more
on that. Energy, we have a little bit better position to do
energy investments, but those are also things we could partner
on in the region.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. We will go back to Mr. Sherman. Second
round.
Mr. Sherman. Yes. To listen to the United States on these
little islets in the South China Sea, you would think that this
was the only maritime dispute in the world. There is no oil on
these islets. They are just an excuse for two nationalistic
governments, the U.S. and Beijing, and perhaps some others, to
beat their chests and find something to fight about.
But there is a maritime dispute that actually is a maritime
dispute for practical reasons, and that is the one between East
Timor and Australia. Should we--and are any of our witnesses
familiar with that dispute?
Okay. I will just make the point that it illustrates the
fact that the U.S. has chosen and our foreign policy
establishment has chosen to ignore dozens of important maritime
disputes, but it meets the needs of both the U.S. and Chinese
military establishments to wildly exaggerate the importance of
the little islets in the South China Sea. I don't know if Mr.
Lohman has a background on that.
Mr. Lohman. I could just comment on the comparison. I mean,
the South China Sea, so much attention is focused on it because
it is so important strategically.
Mr. Sherman. I will back off that. The exaggeration, you
perhaps are unfamiliar with my comments in this room, so I will
bore my colleagues.
Yes, trillions of dollars of trade goes through the South
China Sea, almost all of it in and out of Chinese ports, and if
China had the strategic power that they are alleged to be
seeking, they could blockade their own ports. In addition,
there is some oil from the Middle East that goes through some
of the disputed areas, which could at a cost of less than 1
cent a gallon to Japanese consumers be routed far away from
that. So it does meet the needs of those that want to see an
expansion of military tension or at least military expenditures
to say that we are protecting trillions of dollars of free
trade. That is all--you know, as I say, it is in and out of
Chinese ports.
So whereas there really is oil in the disputed territory,
and natural gas too, between the Timor and Australia, but since
no one can use that dispute to justify an increase in
nationalistic passions or Pentagon expenditures, no one in this
room has looked at it, except I looked at it just a little bit.
Dr. Abuza, which countries in the ASEAN region are most
likely to have this influx of ISIS fighters as they trickle
back? And a related question is, should we be doing more in the
area of broadcasting to reach out to the populations,
particularly Islamic populations, in Southeast Asia?
Mr. Abuza. In sheer numbers, Indonesia has the largest
numbers of Southeast Asians.
Mr. Sherman. Are they from any particular part of
Indonesia, Aceh, or anywhere else?
Mr. Abuza. It is concentrated in three different islands:
Central Sulawesi, Java, and parts of Sumatra. On a per capita
basis, Malaysia has far more members who have gone there. It
tends to concern me because I don't think that Malaysia has the
social resilience to deal with an attack the way Indonesia
does. You know, you think about the January 2016 IS attack in
Jakarta. That was up and running--the shop was up and running
the next day. The Indonesians moved on. I think any attack in
Malaysia would just be--I think the government would overreact.
I think it would just cause a lot more problems there.
In terms of people coming back, we have to think about,
because the countries have gotten very good about sharing
flight manifests, Malaysians traveling through Indonesia to go
to Turkey and vice versa, we have got to work closely with
Thailand and other countries that these people would be
transiting through.
Mr. Sherman. What about our broadcasting efforts? Any
comment on that?
Mr. Abuza. We should support this, but this is stuff that
should be done by the Malaysian and Indonesian Governments.
They have both set up countermessaging centers with the United
States' assistance. In some ways I am angry and disappointed
that we allowed it to be two different bilateral centers rather
than kind of forging more regional cooperation in this. And I
hope that the United States----
Mr. Sherman. But it shouldn't be a voice of America. It
should be the voice of Indonesia or a voice of Malaysia?
Mr. Abuza. There are things that we do. I am a huge fan of
something that Radio Free Asia does called BenarNews. One of
the things that they are focusing on is saying a lot of this
militancy just doesn't get good coverage in their countries,
and so they engage in fairly long-form journalism to go into a
little more detail about these operations. I think that is
wonderful bang for the U.S. taxpayer buck.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Yoho. I will next got to Mr. Scott Perry from
Pennsylvania.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Keeping with the line of questioning Mr. Sherman was just
going through, how do you characterize the risk of ISIS or just
the radical Islamist terrorism, if you will, those
organizations in Southeast Asia? Like, how do you characterize
the risk, if you could?
Mr. Abuza. Manageable.
Mr. Perry. Manageable?
Mr. Abuza. Yes. The threat is there. I don't want to
overstate it. I think we will see political violence as a fact
of life in Southeast Asia for some time to come. I don't see
that going away. But I have a lot of confidence in the security
services in the region. They have done a very good job.
Compared to where they were in 2001, 2002, they have been
very proactive and involved. They have not overreacted. I think
they have very good intelligence on the ground. More and more,
there is better cooperation between the governments that no
longer--you know, 2002, 2003, any intelligence sharing really
required the intervention of senior political leaders to make
it happen just because the security services tended to be very
mistrustful of one another. That is not the case now. There is
just a lot of routine sharing of information cooperation
between them, so it is a manageable threat.
Mr. Perry. So while they are individually and maybe
collaboratively managing the threat, is there anything that
organizations such as ASEAN is doing or should be doing? I just
want to get a little more granularity to what Mr. Sherman--and
is there a different cultural awareness or viewpoint toward the
radicalism or fundamentalism, I mean, especially in places like
Malaysia, as you noted, the largest Muslim country in the area?
I mean, is there a different cultural viewpoint regarding
security than, say, what we have or Europe has in this regard?
Mr. Abuza. They take security very seriously because they
are concerned about economic growth and prosperity, and it is
very hard to attract foreign investment when the bombs are
going off. So your first question was about the----
Mr. Perry. About other organizations, what they are doing,
what they should be doing. Is there a collaborative effort or
is it essentially individual nation efforts in collaboration?
Mr. Abuza. ASEAN as an umbrella organization holds annual
chief of police and chief of intelligence and chief of defense
meetings, so there is that level of coordination that ASEAN can
do. It breeds familiarity, working relationships. But ASEAN
itself does not get involved in actual security operations.
Mr. Perry. Okay. Let me shift gears here a little bit. I
don't know if I have enough time to talk about China. Just in
referring to the good gentleman from California's assertions,
maybe I will put it that way--I happen to believe that the
Chinese construction of the islands and militarization and
provocative actions are problematic, not from the standpoint of
two nationalistic governments, but I don't think the United
States wants to do any more than it has to or should to
maintain sea lanes and keep everything open in that regard and
safe. But I think China is doing what they are doing, and we
are going to be forced to react, not that we want to. We don't
want to send the military. We don't want to do any of this
stuff, but I don't think we can let them just continue to be
engaged in that activity, because I think it will beget more
and more difficult activity to deal with. So let me just make
that statement.
Now recently, the President invited the Thai Prime Minister
and the President of the Philippines to the White House to
discuss cooperation regarding North Korea. I am just wondering,
you know, as China is, I think, an 80 percent trading partner
with North Korea, somebody has got to do the other 20 percent I
suppose. But what role can you see these countries playing in
addition to maybe other ASEAN members to counter North Korea?
Do they have a functional role, the Philippines, Thailand? Do
they have a functional role in North Korea in this regard?
Anybody.
Ms. Searight. You know, it is interesting that Thailand and
the Philippines do trade with North Korea. They are ranked
fourth and fifth respectively in terms of imports from North
Korea, and many countries in the region have diplomatic
relations with North Korea. So there certainly is more that
many of these countries can do to really enforce sanctions and
perhaps curtail diplomatic efforts. Also, ASEAN as a group, as
a grouping, having ASEAN support for putting out strong
statements criticizing North Korean provocations I think is
very important, and I think we have seen even more backbone
recently among ASEAN countries to really put out tough
statements because of the poisoning of Kim Jong-un's brother in
Malaysia. And so Malaysia, Vietnam, you know, many of these
countries are quite upset to get pulled into this----
Mr. Perry. With the chairman's indulgence just for a final
followup here, the harsh rhetoric, so to speak, I guess it is
nice, so to speak, from our standpoint. We like to see that
isolationism but do you think it affects the leader of North
Korea tangibly? He doesn't seem to be affected by any of that.
In my opinion, it looks like only tangible things. He almost
revels in being a pariah and being downcast by his neighbors or
anybody else.
Ms. Searight. Well, I think the regime does depend to some
extent on having access to a number of countries and being able
to----
Mr. Perry. Yeah, but the harsh statements alone----
Ms. Searight. Right. That is not going to be sufficient. It
is not a sufficient condition. But can I make one other point,
which is, I think it is a little bit unfortunate that the
framing of the President's phone calls and invitations to these
leaders to come to Washington, the narrative that emerged with
this was all about building a coalition against North Korea. I
don't think that was the primary motivation. North Korea is an
important issue that the President should talk to these
countries about, but it is one of many, many of the other
issues that we have been talking about today. Economics,
security relationships, counterterrorism, are more important to
these countries and their interests and to the dynamics in the
region than focusing on North Korea.
So North Korea is an important issue. It should be
discussed. ASEAN plays an important role in, again, kind of
pointing out normative statements against North Korea and
convening other powers to build a coalition, but it is not the
main issue between these countries.
Mr. Yoho. All right. Thank you.
I am going to give the ranking member a few seconds here to
clarify a statement, then we will go to Ms. Gabbard.
Mr. Sherman. I want to make it clear, China's actions in
the South China Sea are wrongful. They are important. They are
just not quite as important as everybody else thinks they are.
I yield back.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
Ms. Gabbard.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
I would like to follow up on the topic of North Korea. Dr.
Searight, I represent Hawaii, and every time North Korea
conducts another missile launch, another missile test, and
every time my constituents see and hear about their continuing
increased capabilities, we become more and more concerned about
the threat that is posed. So even as some of the ASEAN
countries may not think that North Korea is a very important
issue, it is to our country.
Beyond sanctions, beyond the ASEAN countries enforcing
sanctions and beyond making statements, do you and to others on
the panel, how do you feel ASEAN as a whole can be most
effective in moving North Korea toward the ultimate objective
of denuclearization?
Ms. Searight. Well, again, I think ASEAN does have a role
to play. It is a convener of leaders in the region. It plays a
very important coordinating role and a normative role in really
articulating the expected rules and norms of behavior. There is
work that individual countries can do to toughen some
sanctions, I think, but I don't think ASEAN is the key to
dealing with the North Korea situation. I mean, I think other
countries in Northeast Asia, starting with China, but working
with Japan and South Korea, our allies, and Europe, is
ultimately going to be more important, and Russia as well.
Mr. Abuza. I do think Southeast Asian countries do play a
role in this. If you think about what keeps this regime alive,
the funding they rely on, this often comes through Southeast
Asia, through unregulated banking across the region. We
certainly could put more pressure on them and more cooperation
with their financial intelligence units to go after North
Korean money laundering. A lot of precursors for the drugs,
methamphetamines that are produced by the North Korean regime,
are made in Southeast Asia or India and transit through
Southeast Asia. I can think of several cases in which these
were seized in Southeast Asian ports in the past, so we could
get more cooperation in port security there.
The Proliferation Security Initiative, the interdiction of
North Korean vessels at sea, we can get more support from
Southeast Asian nations to help with this in terms of the types
of training we do with their navies. These could be scenarios
that we could do. I will leave it at that.
Ms. Gabbard. You know, for a long time now, everyone has
talked about China kind of being the strongest leverage point
in getting North Korea to change their behavior, come to the
table, or whatever the case may be, but even with China's kind
of heightened criticism of North Korea's antics and North Korea
appearing to thumb their nose at China, what impact do you
think that has on the current path forward that our State
Department is taking? And, secondly, given the heightened U.S.-
Russia tensions, what is Russia's role likely to be here? Is it
to share the objective that we have in denuclearization or to
perhaps work more with North Korea?
Mr. Lohman. Well, I think when the administration was
considering this policy of really pressing the Chinese--
actually, not so much pressing them, but relying on them to
take a lead on this North Korea issue, had they called in
almost any expert in town and asked them whether this would
work, they would have been told, no, it won't work. The Chinese
won't do this of their own volition, and they won't do it for
you.
The only way the Chinese are going to do anything on this,
and their cooperation is absolutely essential, the only way
they are going to do anything is through a great deal of
pressure: Third-party sanctions on their companies, calling on
them to crack down on the interaction that they do have with
North Korea that is already prohibited by the U.N. Security
Council. That is the only way to get cooperation from the
Chinese.
Ms. Gabbard. Nothing else. Thank you.
Mr. Perry [presiding]. Well, the ranking member is done.
Maybe I do have a final question here since I am here in the
chair.
So the implications of Chinese economic activities in the
area, including the Belt and Road Initiative, the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank, and other Chinese efforts to
promote infrastructure development within ASEAN, as these
expand, these initiatives, what are the implications to
American foreign policy in the region with those, if you have
any thoughts?
Mr. Lohman. Well, first of all, I think that we
underestimate our own resources. We have more resources than
the Chinese do to invest in the region, trade with the region.
It is just that the decisions are made in boardrooms in the
United States. They are not centralized like they are in
Beijing. We are a much bigger investor in Southeast Asia than
the Chinese are. The EU is bigger than all of us. Japan is
bigger than China. So I think we underestimate how much we do
have there.
That said, I think the OBOR project is real. Some of the
coverage of it, some of the commentary that it is going to go
away, that it is really not all it is cracked up to be, I think
is misguided. It may not spend $1 trillion in total, but if it
spends $\1/2\ trillion, that is still a lot, right? I think
ultimately the challenge it presents the United States is that
it causes other countries in the region to soft pedal their
political concerns because they have an opportunity to bring in
this investment.
The Chinese play it up so much. They bring Duterte to
Beijing. They give him $24 billion in investment. It doesn't
matter that they are a relatively small investor in the
Philippines in the overall scheme of things. They are grabbing
the headlines. They are creating the narrative, and I think
that will cause the countries in the region to back off on the
things that are most important or that are important, like
South China Sea. That is why Philippines backed up, because
they are interested in that investment, and it is not really
worth the trouble to press the Chinese so hard if they can also
get benefits by staying quiet about it. I think it is similar
to what has happened in Malaysia. Throughout the region there
is that dynamic.
Mr. Yoho. I wanted to come back to the South China Sea and
what China is doing, because we see that threat. We see them
pushing there, and we did back out of the TPP, however it was
done. I think the biggest difference and, yes, there are some
other disputes there. If you look at East Timor and Australia,
that is a combined population of about 24-, 25 million people.
I don't think a large part of the trade for the world goes
through there. With China claiming the nine-dash lines as their
area, I think this is a concern for all of us.
I think they are playing it smart. They are not engaged all
over the world in conflicts as we are and as we have been. We
are distracted. We have got the Middle East. We have got what
is going on in North Korea. As you brought up, China has the
biggest influence that could help resolve this problem. This is
a problem that is not just our problem. This is not the Korean
Peninsula problem or the Asia Pacific theater. This is a world
problem. I agree with the Brigadier General that we don't want
to go to war. We don't want to fight anybody. We just want to
have, like I said in the beginning of this, develop economic
and trade, and we all have a hand in national security with the
way the world is today. That is something we all benefit from,
and we all should work to strive to get that.
So with that, does anybody else have any comments,
questions, closing?
Well, with that, I just want to tell you how much I
appreciate you being here. I look forward to talking to you
down the road and getting input from you. And if it is okay, we
will reach out to you periodically.
And with that, this meeting is going to adjourn. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:51 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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