[Congressional Bills 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 468 Engrossed in House (EH)]
In the House of Representatives, U.S.,
October 7, 2002.
Resolved,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This resolution may be cited as the ``Transatlantic Security and NATO
Enhancement Resolution of 2002''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The House of Representatives makes the following findings:
(1) Since 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has
played an essential role in guaranteeing the security, freedom, and
prosperity of the United States and its partners in the Alliance.
(2) NATO, founded on the principles of democracy, individual
liberty, and the rule of law, has proved to be an indispensable
instrument for forging a trans-Atlantic community of nations working
together to safeguard the freedom and common heritage of its peoples and
promoting stability in the North Atlantic area.
(3) NATO is the only institution that promotes a uniquely
transatlantic perspective and approach to issues concerning the security
of North America and Europe and remains the only multilateral security
organization demonstrably capable of conducting effective military
operations and preserving security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic
region.
(4) The security, freedom, and prosperity of the United States
remain linked to the security of the countries of Europe.
(5) NATO remains the most visible and significant embodiment of
United States engagement in Europe and therefore membership in NATO
remains a vital national security interest of the United States.
(6) NATO enhances the security of the United States by providing an
integrated military structure and a framework for consultations on
political and security concerns of members which could impact the
Alliance.
(7) The security of NATO member countries is inseparably linked to
that of the whole of Europe, and the consolidation and strengthening of
democratic and free societies on the entire continent is of direct and
material importance to the NATO Alliance and its partners.
(8) The sustained commitment of the member countries of NATO to a
mutual defense has been a major contributing factor in the democratic
transformation of Central and Eastern Europe.
(9) Members of the Alliance can and should play a critical role in
addressing the security challenges of the post-Cold War era and in
creating the stable environment needed for Central and Eastern Europe to
successfully complete political and economic transformation.
(10) NATO should remain the core security organization of the
evolving Euro-Atlantic architecture in which all countries enjoy the
same freedom, cooperation, and security.
(11) NATO's military force structure, defense planning, command
structures, and force goals must be sufficient for the collective self-
defense of its members, and should be capable of projecting power when
the security of a NATO member is threatened, and provide a basis for ad
hoc coalitions of willing partners among NATO members to defend common
values and interests.
(12) NATO must act to address new post-Cold War risks emerging from
outside the treaty area in the interests of preserving peace and
security in the Euro-Atlantic area, including--
(A) risks from rogue states and non-state actors possessing
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and their means of
delivery;
(B) transnational terrorism and disruption of the flow of
vital resources; and
(C) conflicts outside the treaty area stemming from
unresolved historical disputes and the actions of undemocratic
governments and sub-state actors who reject the peaceful
settlement of disputes.
(13) All NATO members should commit to improving their respective
defense capabilities so that NATO can project power decisively and
sustain operations over distance and time.
(14) The requirements to provide collective defense, to project
power, and to sustain operations dictate that European NATO members
possess military capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long
distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate
jointly with the United States in high-intensity conflicts.
(15) NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative, which is intended to
improve the defense capabilities of the European Allies, particularly
the deployability, mobility, sustainability, and interoperability of
Alliance forces, must continue to be pursued by all members of the
Alliance in order to develop balanced capabilities.
(16) With a few exceptions, European members of NATO have been
deficient in maintaining required military capabilities and providing
defense spending at levels adequate to meet these capability shortfalls.
Failure of the European NATO members to achieve the goals established
through the Defense Capabilities Initiative could weaken support for the
Alliance in the United States over the long term.
(17) Members of the Alliance must also recognize that the campaign
against new and emerging threats to the security of the Alliance
requires other non-military capabilities and efforts to be effective.
Thus, the need to enhance intelligence-sharing and cooperation, both
bilaterally between Alliance members and partners and within the
Alliance collectively, the facilitation of enhanced coordination among
Alliance member's law enforcement agencies, and improved police and
judicial cooperation and information exchanges are critical to the
overall effort.
(18) NATO has embarked upon an historic mission to share its
benefits and patterns of consultation and cooperation with other nations
in the Euro-Atlantic area through both enlargement and active
partnership.
(19) NATO has enlarged its membership on four different occasions
since 1949.
(20) The NATO summit meeting to be held in the fall of 2002 in
Prague will provide an historic opportunity to chart a course for NATO
in the new millennium by reaffirming the importance of NATO to the
collective security of the Euro-Atlantic region, by addressing new
threats, developing new capabilities, and by extending invitations to
additional countries of Europe to become members of the Alliance.
(21) The governments of NATO member countries have stated that
enlargement of the Alliance is a further step toward the Alliance's
basic goal of enhancing security and extending stability throughout the
Euro-Atlantic region.
(22) The enlargement process of NATO helps to avert conflict,
because the very prospect of membership serves as an incentive for
aspiring members to resolve disputes with their neighbors and to push
ahead with reform and democratization.
(23) The Partnership for Peace, created in 1994 under United States
leadership, has fostered cooperation between NATO and the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, and offers a path to future membership in
the Alliance.
(24) At the Washington Summit of the NATO Alliance in April 1999,
the NATO heads of state and government issued a communique declaring
``[we] pledge that NATO will continue to welcome new members in a
position to further the principles of the [North Atlantic] Treaty and
contribute to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area''.
(25) In 1999 NATO launched a Membership Action Plan designed to help
interested Partnership for Peace countries prepare for membership by
offering advice and assistance on programs and membership-related
issues.
(26) The Membership Action Plan establishes certain political,
economic, social, and military-related goals that aspiring candidate
nations are expected to meet, including the peaceful resolution of
territorial disputes, respect for democratic procedures and the rule of
law, human rights, democratic control of the military and other military
reforms, and a commitment to stability and well-being through economic
liberty and social justice.
(27) In May 2000 in Vilnius, Lithuania, nine nations of Europe
issued a statement (later joined by a tenth) declaring that their
countries will cooperate in jointly seeking NATO membership in the next
round of NATO enlargement and since then have taken concrete steps to
demonstrate this commitment, including their participation in
Partnership for Peace activities and their commitment to the concept of
the Membership Action Plan.
(28) On June 15, 2001, in a speech in Warsaw, Poland, President
George W. Bush stated ``[all] of Europe's new democracies, from the
Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the same
chance for security and freedom--and the same chance to join the
institutions of Europe''.
(29) The enlargement of the NATO Alliance to include as full and
equal members additional democracies in Europe will serve to reinforce
stability and security in Europe by fostering their integration into the
structures which have created and sustained peace in Europe since 1945.
(30) As new members of NATO assume the responsibilities of Alliance
membership, the costs of maintaining stability in Europe will be shared
more widely. The concurrent assumption of greater responsibility and
development of greater capabilities by new members of NATO will further
reinforce burdensharing.
(31) The membership of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland has
strengthened NATO's ability to perform the full range of NATO missions
by providing bases, airfields, and transit rights for NATO forces during
Operation Allied Force in the Balkans, by their contributions of
military forces to NATO missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and by their
support for Operation Enduring Freedom.
(32) The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, due to their similar
recent history, have bolstered NATO's capability to integrate former
communist nations into a community of democracies and have served as
mentors to other countries that aspire to join NATO.
(33) In supporting NATO enlargement all candidate countries must be
fully aware of the costs and responsibilities of NATO membership,
including the obligation set forth in Article X of the North Atlantic
Treaty that new members be able to contribute to the security of the
North Atlantic area, and further to ensure that all countries admitted
to NATO are capable of assuming those costs and responsibilities.
(34) For those candidate countries that receive an invitation to
join NATO at the Prague Summit, the process of joining NATO does not end
with the invitation but rather with meeting the full responsibilities of
a NATO member, including the completion of issues identified by the
Membership Action Plan, which will continue beyond Prague.
(35) In considering the enlargement of NATO at Prague and in issuing
invitations to the candidate countries who have made significant
progress toward achieving their objectives in the Membership Action Plan
established by NATO, there is a recognition that each country invited to
join NATO should accede on a common date but before the date on which
the next announced NATO summit is to take place.
(36) The countries that will be invited to begin accession
negotiations with NATO at the NATO summit in Prague should not be the
last such countries invited to join NATO and there should be a
continuing process and progress toward the admission of additional
democracies in Europe beyond 2002 depending on the degree to which those
countries meet the criteria set forth in NATO's Membership Action Plan.
(37) The process of NATO enlargement entails the consensus agreement
of the governments of all 19 NATO member countries and ratification in
accordance with their constitutional procedures.
SEC. 3. COOPERATION BETWEEN NATO AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
The House of Representatives makes the following findings:
(1) The admission into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
of new members from countries in Eastern and Central Europe, such as the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, will not threaten any other
country.
(2) Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has attached particular
importance to the development of constructive and cooperative relations
with the Russian Federation in order to overcome remaining vestiges of
confrontation and competition in order to strengthen mutual trust and
cooperation between NATO and the Russian Federation.
(3) In 1994, building on previous efforts at cooperation, Russia
joined the Partnership for Peace Program, further enhancing the emerging
NATO-Russian Federation dialogue.
(4) On May 27, 1997, in an expression of strong commitment to work
together to build a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic
area, the heads of state and government of NATO and the Russian
Federation signed the ground-breaking ``Founding Act on Mutual
Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian
Federation''.
(5) On March 18, 1998, the Russian Federation formally established
its mission to NATO and appointed a senior military representative to
facilitate military and defense-related cooperation between NATO and the
Russian Federation.
(6) Since 1998, NATO and the Russian Federation have worked
cooperatively with each other in the Balkans and elsewhere setting the
stage for the ability of an enlarged NATO to continue the cooperative
spirit embodied in the Founding Act.
(7) On May 28, 2002, in an historic step toward the Alliance's long-
standing goal of building a secure, cooperative, and democratic Euro-
Atlantic area, NATO took the decisive and substantial step of deepening
the NATO-Russian Federation relationship by establishing the new NATO-
Russia Council.
SEC. 4. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD NATO.
The House of Representatives declares the following to be the policy of the
United States:
(1) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should remain the
primary institution through which European and North American allies
address security issues of transatlantic concern.
(2) The member states of NATO should reaffirm, at the Prague Summit
in the fall of 2002, the continued importance of NATO, renew their
commitment to strengthen the transatlantic partnership, reinforce unity
within NATO, maintain a vigorous capability to carry out collective
defense, and harmonize security policies and strategies for
transatlantic affairs.
(3) At the Prague Summit, the Alliance, while maintaining collective
defense as its core function, should as a fundamental Alliance task,
continue to strengthen national and collective capacities to respond to
new threats wherever such threats occur, including from abroad.
(4) The Alliance, in addition to the strategic concept adopted by
the Allies at the summit meeting held in Washington in 1999, must
recognize the need to develop new capabilities, and agree to consider
acting upon the threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and terrorism by intensifying consultations among political
and military leaders, and by developing comprehensive capabilities to
counter these threats to the international community.
(5) The Alliance should make clear commitments to remedy shortfalls
in areas such as logistics, strategic airlift, command and control,
modern strike capabilities, adequate shared intelligence, and the other
requirements identified by NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative
necessary to provide the ability to carry out the full range of NATO's
missions.
(6) The Alliance must ensure a more equitable sharing of
contributions to the NATO common budgets and to overall national defense
expenditures and capability-building.
(7) The President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of
Defense should fully use their offices to encourage the NATO allies to
commit the resources necessary to upgrade their capabilities to rapidly
deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended
periods of time, and operate jointly with the United States in high
intensity conflicts, thus making such NATO allies more effective
partners.
(8) The member states of NATO should commit to enhanced
intelligence-sharing, law enforcement, police, and judicial cooperation,
and expanded information exchanges within and among Alliance members in
order to meet the challenges of new and emerging threats.
SEC. 5. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
It is the sense of the House of Representatives that--
(1) while maintaining its essential and inherent right to make its
own decisions, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should seek
to strengthen its relations with the Russian Federation as an essential
partner in building long-term peace in Europe, and to that end, the new
NATO-Russia Council, in which member states and the Russian Federation
will work as equal partners on mutually-agreed matters, should be
welcomed and supported;
(2) while retaining its primary commitment to collective defense,
NATO enlargement should be carried out in such a manner as to underscore
to the Russian Federation that NATO enlargement will enhance the
security of all countries in Europe, including the Russian Federation;
and
(3) in seeking to demonstrate NATO's defensive and security-
enhancing intentions to the Russian Federation, it is essential that
neither fundamental United States security interests in Europe nor the
effectiveness and flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance be
jeopardized.
SEC. 6. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO NATO ENLARGEMENT AND DESIGNATION OF COUNTRIES
ELIGIBLE FOR NATO.
It is the sense of the House of Representatives that--
(1) at the Summit to be held in Prague in the fall of 2002, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should extend invitations for
accession negotiations to any appropriate candidate country that meets
the objectives and targets for NATO membership as outlined in the
Membership Action Plan process established by NATO in 1999, including--
(A) a commitment to the basic principles and values set out
in the Washington Treaty;
(B) the capability to contribute to collective defense and
the Alliance's full range of missions; and
(C) a firm commitment to contribute to stability and
security, especially in regions of crisis and conflict, and to
be willing and able to assume the responsibilities of NATO
membership;
(2) the candidate countries of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia should be commended on the significant progress
such countries have made thus far in political and economic liberty and
military reform necessary for meeting the objectives for prospective
members of NATO as set out in their own Membership Action Plans;
(3) each candidate country, despite recognized Membership Action
Plan deficiencies requiring further refinement, could in its own way
contribute to stability, freedom, and peace in Europe as a whole, as
many of such countries have done thus far in the Balkans and in
Afghanistan, and would make a positive contribution toward furthering
the goals of NATO should it become a NATO member country;
(4) having made significant progress in reforming their societies
and their military forces, and having developed reasonable, affordable,
and sustainable plans to be able to work within the Alliance structure
and to contribute positively to the collective defense of the Alliance
and other NATO missions, the candidate countries of Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia have met in a
satisfactory manner, the criteria established by NATO in the Membership
Action Plan process, would likely make a positive contribution to NATO,
and should be invited to begin the accession process to join the
Alliance at the Prague summit;
(5) with respect to candidate countries invited to join NATO, such
countries should accede on a common date before the next announced NATO
summit is to take place;
(6) after the Prague summit those candidate countries invited to
join the Alliance should continue to participate in the Membership
Action Plan until accession, and the accession process should take into
account work conducted under the Membership Action Plan; and
(7) the process of NATO enlargement should continue beyond the
inclusion of such candidate countries invited to join NATO at Prague, to
include those candidate countries not so invited at Prague as well as
other democratic European countries which may express interest in
joining the Alliance, and which agree to utilize the Membership Action
Plan to facilitate such NATO enlargement.
Attest:
Clerk.