[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6067 Introduced in House (IH)]
112th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 6067
To enhance the security of the Western Hemisphere and bolster regional
capacity and cooperation to counter current and emerging threats, to
promote cooperation in the Western Hemisphere to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, to secure
universal adherence to agreements regarding nuclear nonproliferation,
and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 29, 2012
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen (for herself, Mr. McKeon, Mr. Chabot, Mr. Mack, Mr.
Burton of Indiana, Mr. Rivera, Mr. Diaz-Balart, Mr. McCaul, Mrs.
Schmidt, Mr. Duncan of South Carolina, Mr. Turner of New York, and Mr.
Bilirakis) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on the
Judiciary, Financial Services, and Oversight and Government Reform, for
a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the
committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To enhance the security of the Western Hemisphere and bolster regional
capacity and cooperation to counter current and emerging threats, to
promote cooperation in the Western Hemisphere to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, to secure
universal adherence to agreements regarding nuclear nonproliferation,
and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Western Hemisphere
Security Cooperation Act of 2012''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Statement of policy relating to Iran, Hezbollah, and other
foreign terrorist organizations.
Sec. 103. Statement of policy relating to certain international
agreements.
Sec. 104. Notifications relating to travel by Cuban Government
officials within or to the United States.
Sec. 105. Preventing oil benefits, land expropriation, and terrorism
expansion.
Sec. 106. Amendments to annual country reports on terrorism.
Sec. 107. Amendments to international drug control certification
procedures.
Sec. 108. Amendment to international narcotics control strategy report.
Sec. 109. International Law Enforcement Academy in San Salvador, El
Salvador.
Sec. 110. United States efforts in the Western Hemisphere.
Sec. 111. Amendments to the Department of State Rewards Program.
Sec. 112. Establishment of a Western Hemisphere Regional Coordination
Center.
Sec. 113. Transfer of funds to the Central American Regional Security
Initiative.
Sec. 114. Administration of security assistance programs for Central
American countries.
Sec. 115. Restriction on assistance for the Guatemalan Army.
TITLE II--NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Sec. 201. Findings.
Sec. 202. Statement of policy regarding the proliferation of weapons-
related nuclear, chemical, and biological
materials, technology, and facilities.
Sec. 203. Statement of policy regarding the small quantities protocol.
Sec. 204. Securing adherence to agreements regarding nuclear
nonproliferation by countries in the
Western Hemisphere.
Sec. 205. Halting the proliferation of nuclear fuel fabrication.
Sec. 206. Cooperation with the Proliferation Security Initiative.
Sec. 207. Establishment of the Western Hemisphere Nonproliferation
Partnership Initiative.
Sec. 208. Foreign policy controls.
Sec. 209. Limitation on arms transfers.
Sec. 210. Restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting
the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba.
TITLE III--ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
Sec. 301. Actions regarding the Organization of American States.
TITLE IV--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Sec. 401. Prohibitions on engagement with certain Western Hemisphere
countries.
Sec. 402. Report.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
Except as otherwise provided, in this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations.
(2) Nonhumanitarian assistance.--The term ``nonhumanitarian
assistance'' means--
(A) any assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 (including programs under title IV of chapter 2
of part I of such Act, relating to the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation), other than--
(i) disaster relief assistance, including
any assistance under chapter 9 of part I of
such Act;
(ii) assistance which involves the
provision of food (including monetization of
food) or medicine; and
(iii) assistance for refugees;
(B) sales, or financing on any terms, under the
Arms Export Control Act; and
(C) financing under the Export-Import Bank Act of
1945.
(3) State sponsor of terrorism.--The term ``state sponsor
of terrorism'' means a country the government of which has been
determined by the Secretary of State, for purposes of section
6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in
effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act),
section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40
of the Arms Export Control Act, or any other provision of law,
is a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts
of international terrorism.
TITLE I--COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
SEC. 101. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) In 2004, a Lebanese individual, having entered the
United States illegally from Mexico, was charged with
supporting Hezbollah financially and was described by the
United States Attorney as a ``fighter, recruiter and
fundraiser''.
(2) In December 2006, the Department of the Treasury
designated nine individuals and two entities as part of a
network that is ``a major financial artery to Hezbollah in
Lebanon'' and announced an effort to target Hezbollah
fundraising in the tri-border area of Brazil, Argentina, and
Paraguay.
(3) In 2007, the Chavez regime established routine civilian
airline flights between Venezuela and designated State Sponsors
of Terrorism, Iran, and Syria.
(4) In November 2007, Interpol's General Assembly agreed to
issue red capture notices for the arrest of a Hezbollah leader
and five former senior Iranian officials charged by Argentina
in the 1994 Argentine Mutual Jewish Association (AMIA)
terrorist attack, in which 85 innocent people were killed and
300 more were wounded.
(5) In February 2008, Director of National Intelligence
Mike McConnell reported to Congress in his presentation of the
Intelligence Community's Annual Threat Assessment that the
governments of Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, ``to varying
degrees, have engaged in sharply anti-U.S. rhetoric, aligned
with Venezuela and Cuba--and increasingly Iran--on
international issues, and advocated measures that directly
clash with U.S. initiatives''.
(6) In February 2008, a United States Federal law-
enforcement official shared, ``We've known for some time that
Islamic extremists groups were gaining momentum and exploiting
the region . . . Iran is no exception--now with Cuba and
Venezuela, the door is open.''.
(7) Venezuela has concluded nearly 200 bilateral agreements
with Iran on military cooperation, the sharing of intelligence,
expanding financial cooperation, and initiating cultural
exchanges, among others.
(8) According to United States intelligence officials, Iran
possesses the potential to use its close relationship with
Venezuela to facilitate the smuggling of people, drugs, and
weapons into the Western Hemisphere through terrorist proxy
groups.
(9) In March 2008, the Colombian army led a raid against
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and seized computers
containing documents that suggest evidence of $300,000,000 in
payments to the extremist organization from the Venezuelan
Government, high-level contacts by the FARC with officials from
Ecuador and Venezuela, and efforts by the FARC to obtain 50
kilograms of uranium.
(10) In June 2008, the Department of the Treasury
designated two Venezuela-based supporters of Hezbollah, Ghazi
Nasr al Din and Fawzi Kan'an, along with two travel agencies
owned and controlled by Kan'an, explaining it is ``extremely
troubling to see the Government of Venezuela employing and
providing safe harbor to Hezbollah facilitators and
fundraisers''.
(11) In October 2008, the Department of the Treasury
designated Banco Internacional de Desarollo, C.A., a financial
institution located in Venezuela, to be owned or controlled by
or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, the Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI). EDBI
was designated for its role in helping Iran violate United
Nations sanctions and handle its illicit transactions.
(12) In May 2010, for the fifth year in a row, the
Department of State determined, pursuant to section 40A of the
Arms Export Control Act, that Venezuela was not cooperating
fully with United States antiterrorism efforts.
(13) In February 2011, the Department of the Treasury
identified the Lebanese Canadian Bank as a financial
institution of ``primarily money laundering concern'' under
section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, for its role in
facilitating the money laundering activities of an
international narcotics trafficking network with ties to
Hezbollah. This network is involved in moving illicit drugs and
money laundering from South America to Europe and the Middle
East through West Africa.
(14) In April 2011, General Douglas Fraser, General of U.S.
Southern Command, testified before Congress that there are
``growing opportunities for military-to-military connections''
between Iran and Venezuela and that there are ``flights between
Iran and Venezuela on a weekly basis and visas are not required
for entrance into Venezuela or Bolivia or Nicaragua''.
(15) In October 2011, the Drug Enforcement Administration
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation charged two individuals
for suspected participation in an Iranian Qods Force plot to
murder the Saudi Arabian Ambassador on United States soil.
(16) In December 2011, Univision aired a documentary titled
The Iranian Threat that exposed a plan to launch a cyber attack
against the United States Government and nuclear facilities
involving Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela.
(17) In January 2012, the Venezuelan Consul General in
Miami, was declared persona non grata by the Department of
State for her participation in a cyber attack and was expelled
from the United States.
(18) A 2012 Drug Enforcement Administration report
identified 38 percent of the organizations on the Foreign
Terrorist Organizations list as having possible ties to the
drug trade, underscoring the fact that the fight against
terrorism must also include a corresponding fight against
illicit drugs.
(19) In January 2012, Director of National Intelligence
James R. Clapper reported to Congress in his presentation of
the Intelligence Community's Annual Threat Assessment that
``some Iranian officials have changed their calculus and are
now willing to conduct an attack in the United States''.
(20) In January 2012, Henry Rangel Silva became the Defense
Minister of Venezuela. The Department of Treasury had
previously designated Silva a ``drug kingpin'' in 2008 due to
his involvement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia.
(21) In March 2012, General Douglas Fraser, General of U.S.
Southern Command, testified before Congress that ``connections
with Hezbollah and Hamas who have been in the region for a
number of years primarily still focused on supporting,
conducting illicit activity to provide funding support and
logistic support back to parent organizations within the Middle
East''.
(22) The Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism of the
Organization of American States (OAS) commits all State parties
to establish domestic regulatory institutions that eradicate
the financing of terrorist offenses, cooperate with fellow
signatories to control borders, provide mutual legal assistance
in counterterrorism efforts and prosecution of terrorist
offenses, and conform to all other stipulations of the
convention designed to prevent, punish, and eliminate terrorist
offenses.
(23) The countries within the Western Hemisphere that have
ratified the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism of the
OAS are Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago,
the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
SEC. 102. STATEMENT OF POLICY RELATING TO IRAN, HEZBOLLAH, AND OTHER
FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.
It shall be the policy of the United States to--
(1) undertake a whole-of-government approach to deny Iran,
or its proxies such as Hezbollah, or any other foreign
terrorist organization, agent, or instrumentality of either,
the resources to engage in activities that--
(A) threaten United States national security, its
interests, and its allies;
(B) provide safe haven within the territories and
boundaries of countries within the Western Hemisphere;
and
(C) provide financial support in order to carry out
illicit activities around the globe; and
(2) deter foreign investments and cooperation of countries
within the Western Hemisphere that would enhance the ability of
Iran, or any agent or instrumentality thereof, to develop
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.
SEC. 103. STATEMENT OF POLICY RELATING TO CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS.
To enhance the security of the Western Hemisphere and bolster
regional capacity to counter terrorism, it shall be the policy of the
United States to promote the signing, ratification, and implementation
by all countries in the Western Hemisphere of the following:
(1) OAS AG/RES. 1840 (XXXII-O/02) Inter-American Convention
Against Terrorism.
(2) Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 Recommendations
on Money Laundering (ML) and 9 Special Recommendations (SR) on
Terrorist Financing (TF).
(3) The 1963 ICAO Convention on Offences and Certain Other
Acts Committed on Board Aircraft.
(4) The 1970 ICAO Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.
(5) The 1971 ICAO Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.
(6) The 1973 United Nations Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Person, including Diplomatic Agents.
(7) The 1979 United Nations International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages.
(8) The 1988 ICAO Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil
Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.
(9) The 1988 IMO Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.
(10) The 1988 IMO Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf.
(11) The 1991 ICAO Convention on the Marking of Plastic
Explosives for the Purpose of Detection.
(12) The 1997 United Nations International Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.
(13) The 1999 United Nations International Convention for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
(14) The 2001 United Nations S/Res/1373 Creation of Counter
Terrorism Committee (CTC).
(15) The 2005 United Nations S/Res/1624 Prohibition of
incitement to commit terrorist act or acts.
(16) The 2010 ICAO Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation.
SEC. 104. NOTIFICATIONS RELATING TO TRAVEL BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS WITHIN OR TO THE UNITED STATES.
(a) Travel Within United States.--The Secretary of State shall
notify the appropriate congressional committees not less than 15 days
prior to granting approval for travel by any Cuban official assigned to
the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, DC or the Cuban United
Nations Missions in New York, New York outside a 25-mile radius of the
Cuban Interests Section in Washington, DC or the Cuban United Nations
Missions in New York, New York, respectively.
(b) Travel to the United States.--The Secretary of State shall
notify the appropriate congressional committees not less than 15 days
prior to issuing a visa for travel of any Cuban Government official to
the United States
(c) Matters To Be Included.--Each notification required under
subsection (a) and (b) shall include the following:
(1) The name and rank of the Cuban official for which the
travel is approved.
(2) The expected dates, destination, and purpose of the
travel.
(3) A separate certification that the travel does not pose
a threat to United States interests and policy priorities and
the travel has been approved by the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Assistant Secretary of State for
Diplomatic Security, and the head of any other relevant
department or agency. The certification may be provided in a
classified annex to the notification if applicable.
SEC. 105. PREVENTING OIL BENEFITS, LAND EXPROPRIATION, AND TERRORISM
EXPANSION.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States to--
(1) undertake the necessary measures to deny the Government
of Cuba, the Cuban Communist Party, or any agent or
instrumentality of either, the financial resources to engage in
activities that threaten--
(A) United States national security, its interests,
and its allies;
(B) Florida's marine environment, including the
most extensive living coral reef system in North
American waters and the third largest in the world;
(C) the environment and natural resources of the
submerged lands located off Cuba's coast; and
(D) to prolong the dictatorship that oppresses the
Cuban people; and
(2) deter foreign investments that would enhance the
ability of the Government of Cuba, or any agent or
instrumentality thereof, to develop its petroleum resources.
(b) Exclusion From the United States of Aliens Who Contribute to
the Ability of Cuba To Develop Petroleum Resources Located Off Cuba's
Coast.--
(1) In general.--The Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6021 et seq.) is
amended by inserting after section 401 the following:
``SEC. 402. EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED STATES OF ALIENS WHO CONTRIBUTE
TO THE ABILITY OF CUBA TO DEVELOP PETROLEUM RESOURCES
LOCATED OFF CUBA'S COAST.
``(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and
the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United
States, any alien who the Secretary of State determines is a person
who--
``(1) is an officer or principal of an entity, or a
shareholder who owns a controlling interest in an entity, that,
on or after the date of the enactment of the Western Hemisphere
Security Cooperation Act of 2012, has made or makes an
investment that equals or exceeds $1,000,000 (or any
combination of investments that in the aggregate equals or
exceeds $1,000,000 in any 12-month period), that contributes to
the enhancement of the ability of the Government of Cuba, or
any agent or instrumentality thereof, to develop petroleum
resources of the submerged lands located off Cuba's coast; or
``(2) is a spouse, minor child, or agent of a person
described in paragraph (1).
``(b) Waiver.--The Secretary of State may waive the application of
subsection (a) if the Secretary certifies and reports to the
appropriate congressional committees, on a case-by-case basis, that the
admission to the United States of a person described in subsection
(a)--
``(1) is necessary for critical medical reasons or for
purposes of litigation of an action under title III of this
Act; or
``(2) is appropriate if the requirements of sections 204,
205, and 206 of this Act have been satisfied.
``(c) Definitions.--In this subsection:
``(1) Agent and instrumentality.--The terms `agent' and
`instrumentality' shall include the Cuban Communist Party.
``(2) Develop.--The term `develop', with respect to
petroleum resources, means the exploration for, or the
extraction, refining, or transportation by pipeline or other
means of, petroleum resources.
``(3) Investment.--The term `investment' means any of the
following activities if such activity is undertaken pursuant to
an agreement, or pursuant to the exercise of rights under such
an agreement, that was or is entered into with the Government
of Cuba (or any agency or instrumentality thereof) or a
nongovernmental entity in Cuba, on or after the date of the
enactment of the Western Hemisphere Security Cooperation Act of
2012:
``(A) The entry into a contract that includes
responsibility for the development of petroleum
resources of the submerged lands located off Cuba's
coast, or the entry into a contract providing for the
general supervision and guarantee of another person's
performance of such a contract.
``(B) The purchase of a share of ownership,
including an equity interest, in such development.
``(C) The entry into a contract providing for the
participation in royalties, earnings, or profits in
such development, without regard to the form of the
participation.
``(D) The entry into, performance, or financing of
a contract to sell or purchase goods, services, or
technology related to such development.
``(4) Petroleum resources.--The term `petroleum resources'
includes petroleum and natural gas resources, petroleum by
products, and liquified natural gas.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996
is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 401
the following:
``Sec. 402. Exclusion from the United States of aliens who contribute
to the ability of Cuba to develop petroleum
resources located off Cuba's coast.''.
(3) Effective date.--The amendments made by this subsection
shall apply to aliens seeking admission to the United States on
or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(c) Imposition of Sanctions and Prohibition on Facilitation of
Development of Cuba's Petroleum Resources.--
(1) In general.--If the President determines that a person
has, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, made an
investment that equals or exceeds $1,000,000 (or any
combination of investments that in the aggregate equals or
exceeds $1,000,000 in any 12-month period) that contributes to
the enhancement of the ability of the Government of Cuba, or
any agent or instrumentality thereof, to develop petroleum
resources of the submerged lands located off Cuba's coast, or
has made an investment of any amount of money that contributes
to such an enhancement and has trafficked in confiscated United
States property, the President shall impose two or more of the
following sanctions:
(A) Prohibition on loans and guarantees.--Prohibit
the issuance by the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation, the Export-Import Bank of the United
States, or any other United States instrument of any
loan, guarantee, insurance, extension of credit, or
participation in the extension of credit in connection
with the export of any goods or services to any
sanctioned person.
(B) Export sanction.--Prohibit the issuance by the
United States Government of any specific license and or
other specific permission or authority to export any
goods or technology to a sanctioned person under--
(i) the Export Administration Act of 1979
(as continued in effect under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act);
(ii) the Arms Export Control Act;
(iii) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or
(iv) any other statute that requires the
prior review and approval of the United States
Government as a condition for the export or
reexport of goods or services.
(C) Prohibitions on financial institutions.--The
following prohibitions may be imposed against a
sanctioned person that is a financial institution:
(i) Prohibition on designation as primary
dealer.--Prohibit the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System and the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York from designating, or
permitting the continuation of any prior
designation of, such financial institution as a
primary dealer in United States Government debt
instruments.
(ii) Prohibition on service as a repository
of government funds.--Prohibit such financial
institution from serving as agent of the United
States Government or serving as repository for
United States Government funds.
The imposition of either sanction under subparagraph
(A) or (B) shall be treated as one sanction for
purposes of this section, and the imposition of both
such sanctions shall be treated as two sanctions for
purposes of this section.
(D) Procurement sanction.--Prohibit the United
States Government from procuring, or entering into any
contract for the procurement of, any goods or services
from a sanctioned person.
(2) Termination of sanctions.--Sanctions imposed pursuant
to paragraph (1) shall terminate if the President determines
and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that
the requirements of sections 204, 205, and 206 of the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22
U.S.C. 6064, 6065, and 6066) have been satisfied.
(3) Prohibition on facilitation by united states persons of
cuba's ability to develop petroleum resources.--It shall be
unlawful for any United States person to provide materials,
technical equipment, or other assistance that contributes to
the enhancement of Cuba's ability to develop petroleum
resources of the submerged lands located off Cuba's coast.
(4) Reports by secretary of state.--For each of the fiscal
years 2013, 2014, and 2015, the Secretary of State shall submit
to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate a report relating to--
(A) investments that equal or exceed $1,000,000 (or
any combination of investments that in the aggregate
equals or exceeds $1,000,000 in any 12-month period)
that contribute to the enhancement of the ability of
the Government of Cuba, or any agent or instrumentality
thereof, to develop petroleum resources of the
submerged lands located off Cuba's coast, including
information relating to the values of such investments,
the identity of the persons making such investments,
and proposed investments that would satisfy such
criteria, and information relating to any sanctions
that have been imposed pursuant to subsection (a) as a
result of such investments; and
(B) investments of any amount of money, in
conjunction with trafficking in confiscated United
States property, that contribute to such an
enhancement, including information relating to the
values of such investments, the identity of the persons
making such investments, and the identity of such
confiscated property, and information relating to any
sanctions that have been imposed pursuant to paragraph
(1) as a result of such investments.
(5) Assessments of environmental impacts of development of
cuba's petroleum resources.--
(A) In general.--Not later than one year after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually
thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Secretary of the Interior and the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency,
shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations
and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of
the Senate a report containing an assessment of the
impact that the development of Cuba's petroleum
resources has had on the environment and natural
resources of the submerged lands located off Cuba's
coast and Florida's marine environment.
(B) Use of environmental impact statements.--In
preparing the assessment, the Secretary of State shall
use as a model environmental impact statements prepared
pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.).
(6) Definitions.--In this subsection--
(A) the terms ``appropriate congressional
committees'', ``confiscated'', ``person'',
``property'', and ``traffics'' have the meaning given
such terms in section 4 of the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C.
6023), except that the term ``person'' shall also
include, for purposes of this subsection, a foreign
subsidiary of a person and United States subsidiary of
a foreign person;
(B) the terms ``develop'', ``investment'', and
``petroleum resources'' have the meaning given such
terms in section 402(c) of such Act, as added by
subsection (b) of this section; and
(C) the terms ``agent'' and ``instrumentality''
shall include the Cuban Communist Party.
SEC. 106. AMENDMENTS TO ANNUAL COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM.
(a) In General.--Section 140(b) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f(b)) is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (4)(D), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (5), by striking the period at the end and
inserting a semicolon;
(3) by redesignating the second paragraph (3) and the
second paragraph (4) as paragraphs (6) and (7), respectively;
(4) in paragraph (6), as so redesignated, by striking
``and'' at the end;
(5) in paragraph (7), as so redesignated, by striking the
period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and
(6) by adding after such paragraph (7) the following new
paragraphs:
``(8) a comprehensive assessment of all United States
assistance available to combat terrorism in each country that
is a subject of such report; and
``(9) with respect to countries in the Western Hemisphere
that are the subjects of such report, the level in each such
country of threat posed by radical Islamist terrorism.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this subsection shall
apply with respect to each report required to be transmitted to
Congress under section 140 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 on or after the date of the enactment of
this Act
SEC. 107. AMENDMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL CERTIFICATION
PROCEDURES.
Section 706 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year
2003 (Public Law 107-228; 22 U.S.C. 2291j-1) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (2)--
(A) in subparagraph (A)(ii); by striking ``and'' at
the end;
(B) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as
subparagraph (C);
(C) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the
following new subparagraph:
``(B) designate each country, if any, identified in
such report in which a link has been determined to
exist between illicit drug trafficking organizations
and a designated foreign terrorist organization and
that has failed demonstrably, during the previous 12
months, to make substantial efforts--
``(i) to adhere to its obligations under
international counterterrorism agreements; and
``(ii) to implement effective
counterterrorism measures, including action on
such issues as the rule of law, denying safe
haven to terrorists, financing and money
laundering, and law enforcement; and''; and
(D) in subparagraph (C), as so redesignated, by
inserting before the period at the end the following:
``under subparagraph (A) or (B)'';
(2) in paragraph (3)--
(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``or'' at the
end;
(B) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking the period
at the end and inserting ``; or''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new
subparagraph:
``(C) subsequent to the designation being made
under paragraph (2)(B), the country has made
substantial efforts--
``(i) to adhere to its obligations under
international counterterrorism agreements; and
``(ii) to implement effective
counterterrorism measures, including action on
such issues as the rule of law, denying safe
haven to terrorists, financing and money
laundering, and law enforcement.'';
(3) by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (9); and
(4) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following new
paragraph:
``(8) Bilateral agreements.--If a country designated under
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (2) does not receive a
determination under subparagraphs (B) or (C) of paragraph (3),
the Secretary of State shall negotiate with such country a
bilateral agreement describing actions to be taken by the
United States and such country to satisfy such determinations
during the one year period following such a designation. Such a
bilateral agreement should include a needs assessment, a
bilateral action plan, the provision of United States training
and assistance, the use of International Law Enforcement
Academy facilities in the region, and an exchange of model laws
and best practices.''.
SEC. 108. AMENDMENT TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT.
Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2291h(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(9) A separate section that contains information relating
to any links between drug trafficking organizations, or money
laundering and terrorists, terrorist acts, or designated
foreign terrorist organizations (as such term is used in
section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1189)), and any actions taken by the United States Government
or foreign government to address such links.''.
SEC. 109. INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY IN SAN SALVADOR, EL
SALVADOR.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in San Salvador, El
Salvador, should continue to serve as a critical component of United
States regional counterterrorism efforts.
(b) Negotiation.--The Secretary of State shall coordinate with the
heads of other appropriate United States Government agencies to ensure
that counterterrorism, including radical Islamist extremism within the
Western Hemisphere, nonproliferation, prison reform, prison fire
safety, prison corrections training, the threat of gang violence, and
border security courses are instituted as part of the core curriculum
at the International Law Enforcement Academy in San Salvador.
SEC. 110. UNITED STATES EFFORTS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.
(a) Determination.--For any country in the Western Hemisphere that
the President has determined--
(1) is engaged in military cooperation with a state sponsor
of terrorism,
(2) is engaged in nonmarket-based trade with a state
sponsor of terrorism,
(3) is carrying out policies that threaten United States
national security interests, or
(4) is not fully cooperating with United States
counterterrorism or nonproliferation efforts,
the President is authorized to impose any of the sanctions described in
subsection (b).
(b) Sanctions.--For any country in the Western Hemisphere with
respect to which the President has made a determination in accordance
with subsection (a), the President is authorized to--
(1) suspend United States nonhumanitarian foreign
assistance to the government of that country; and
(2) prohibit the sale, provision, or transfer of articles,
including the issuance of any specific license or grant of any
other specific permission or authority to export any goods or
technology under--
(A) the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as
continued in effect under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act);
(B) the Arms Export Control Act;
(C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or
(D) any other statute that requires the prior
review and approval of the United States Government as
a condition for the export or re-export of goods or
services.
SEC. 111. AMENDMENTS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE REWARDS PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--Section 36 of the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(2), by inserting ``serious violations
of international humanitarian law, transnational organized
crime,'' after ``international narcotics trafficking,'';
(2) in subsection (b)--
(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by
striking ``Attorney General'' and inserting ``heads of
other relevant departments or agencies'';
(B) in paragraphs (4) and (5), by striking
``paragraph (1), (2), or (3)'' each place it appears
and inserting ``paragraph (1), (2), (3), (8), (9),
(10), or (11)'';
(C) in paragraph (6)--
(i) by inserting ``or transnational
organized crime group'' after ``terrorist
organization''; and
(ii) by striking ``or'' at the end;
(D) in paragraph (7)--
(i) in the matter preceding subparagraph
(A), by striking ``, including the use by the
organization of illicit narcotics production or
international narcotics trafficking'' and
inserting ``or transnational organized crime
group, including the use by such organization
or group of illicit narcotics production or
international narcotics trafficking'';
(ii) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``or
transnational organized crime'' after
``international terrorism''; and
(iii) in subparagraph (B)--
(I) by inserting ``or transnational
organized crime group'' after
``terrorist organization''; and
(II) by striking the period at the
end and inserting a semicolon; and
(E) by adding at the end the following new
paragraphs:
``(8) the arrest or conviction in any country of any
individual wanted on terrorism charges pursuant to red notices
duly issued by Interpol, if such reward would help advance
United States interests or the interests of United States
allies in the global struggle against international terrorism;
``(9) the arrest or conviction in any country of any
individual for participating in, primarily outside the United
States, transnational organized crime;
``(10) the arrest or conviction in any country of any
individual conspiring to participate in or attempting to
participate in transnational organized crime; or
``(11) the arrest or conviction in any country, or the
transfer to or conviction by an international criminal tribunal
(including a hybrid or mixed tribunal), of any foreign national
accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide, as
defined under the statute of such tribunal.'';
(3) in subsection (e)(1), by striking the last sentence;
and
(4) in subsection (k)--
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (5) and (6) as
paragraphs (7) and (8), respectively; and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following
new paragraphs:
``(5) Transnational organized crime.--The term
`transnational organized crime' means--
``(A) racketeering activity (as such term is
defined in section 1961 of title 18, United States
Code) that involves at least one jurisdiction outside
the United States; or
``(B) any other criminal offense punishable by a
term of imprisonment of at least four years under
Federal, State, or local law that involves at least one
jurisdiction outside the United States and that is
intended to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial
or other material benefit.
``(6) Transnational organized crime group.--The term
`transnational organized crime group' means a group of persons
that includes one or more citizens of a foreign country, exists
for a period of time, and acts in concert with the aim of
engaging in transnational organized crime.''.
(b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section or the
amendments made by this section shall be construed as authorizing the
use of any activity precluded under the American Servicemembers'
Protection Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-206).
SEC. 112. ESTABLISHMENT OF A WESTERN HEMISPHERE REGIONAL COORDINATION
CENTER.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States to--
(1) carry out a comprehensive and integrated approach to
United States counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and
nonproliferation efforts, both domestically and abroad; and
(2) seek to engage leaders of the governments of countries
in the Western Hemisphere to develop a comprehensive
multilateral strategy to counter current and emerging threats
and prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons.
(b) Purpose.--A Western Hemisphere Regional Coordination Center
shall serve as a joint operational facility dedicated to coordinating
efforts, capacity, and intelligence among participating countries to
counter current and emerging threats and prevent the proliferation of
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons throughout the Western
Hemisphere.
(c) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall negotiate with the
leaders of the governments of other countries of the Western Hemisphere
on a bilateral or multilateral basis, as appropriate, international
agreements under which such governments work in partnership to
establish a center to be known as the ``Western Hemisphere Regional
Coordination Center'' (RCC).
(d) Participation of United States Government Agencies.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of
Defense, shall determine which departments and agencies of the
United States Government, including the Department of Defense,
the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security,
the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, the
Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, are necessary to ensure the establishment and
operation of the RCC. The Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of
Defense, shall negotiate agreements with the heads of such
agencies to ensure their full participation and cooperation in
such establishment and operation.
(2) Assignment of regional attaches and advisors.--The
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, may transfer
to the RCC regional attaches and advisors serving at United
States diplomatic and consular missions in the Western
Hemisphere.
(e) Structure.--
(1) Management of the rcc.--It is the sense of Congress
that the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary
of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, should be
responsible for the management of the RCC, including
development of the budget, priorities, and programs of the RCC.
(2) Staffing and duties.--
(A) In general.--The RCC shall have one United
States Director, at least one but not more than two
United States Deputy Directors, and one host country
General Director. The United States Director and United
States Deputy Directors may be employees of any of the
United States national security agencies and shall be
chosen by the Secretary of State, in consultation with
the Director of National Intelligence and Secretary of
Defense. The Director and Deputy Directors of the RCC
shall keep the Chief of Mission of the United States
Embassy in the host country of the RCC fully informed
of activities and operations of such RCC.
(B) Staff of foreign countries.--It is the sense of
Congress that the Secretary of State should seek to
ensure that staff of the RCC who are representatives of
governments of other countries of the Western
Hemisphere are comprised of individuals who are members
of vetted units of such governments that are approved
by the United States Government.
(f) United States Contributions.--The United States should
contribute existing funds, personnel, and other resources to the RCC in
order to avoid duplicative efforts to maximize the presence of the
United States to improve regional security and cooperation within the
Western Hemisphere.
SEC. 113. TRANSFER OF FUNDS TO THE CENTRAL AMERICAN REGIONAL SECURITY
INITIATIVE.
For fiscal year 2013 and each subsequent fiscal year, 50 percent of
the amount of funds made available for ``Development Assistance'' to
carry out environmental programs and 50 percent of the amount of funds
made available for the Global Climate Change Fund for the Western
Hemisphere may be transferred to, and merged with, funds made available
for ``International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement'' to carry
out the Central American Regional Security Initiative.
SEC. 114. ADMINISTRATION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR CENTRAL
AMERICAN COUNTRIES.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) According to the Government Accountability Office
report dated July 2010 regarding the Merida Initiative,
Department of State officials at posts in Central American
countries expressed frustration with the Narcotics Affairs
Section (NAS) of the United States Embassy in Mexico City
serving as the account manager for International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement funds destined for Central America
because ``it adds an extra layer'' to an already complex
funding process.
(2) Some Department of State officials at posts in Central
America stated that this situation has created a bottleneck on
the progress of bilateral procurement and training.
(3) United States officials at posts in three Central
American countries noted that returning funds to embassy
control would speed up procurement, and facilitate travel,
training, and exchange programs.
(b) Requirement.--For fiscal year 2013 and each subsequent fiscal
year, funds made available for ``International Narcotics Control and
Law Enforcement'' to carry out security assistance programs for any
country of Central America may be administered only through the United
States embassy for such Central American country.
SEC. 115. RESTRICTION ON ASSISTANCE FOR THE GUATEMALAN ARMY.
(a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report that narrowly defines
Guatemala's strategy for addressing--
(1) border security and external threats;
(2) respect for human rights;
(3) cooperation with civilian investigations and
prosecutions of cases involving current and retired officers
and with the International Commission against Impunity in
Guatemala (CICIG); and
(4) public disclosure of all military archives pertaining
to the internal armed conflict.
(b) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate.
TITLE II--NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
SEC. 201. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) Venezuela and Iran have established extensive
political, military, and economic cooperation.
(2) Venezuela, under the government of Hugo Chavez, has
publicly supported Iran's development of a capacity to enrich
uranium, which many observers believe is part of a nuclear
weapons program.
(3) In May 2005, Chavez stated that he was seeking
assistance from Iran to establish a nuclear program in
Venezuela.
(4) On February 4, 2006, Venezuela was one of only three
countries to vote against a resolution by the Board of
Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA,
to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council for
violating its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
(5) On February 15, 2006, the Speaker of the Iranian
parliament, Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel, stated that his government
was prepared to discuss providing technical assistance to a
Venezuelan nuclear program.
(6) On a visit to Iran in February 2008, Abel El Zabayar, a
member of Venezuela's National Assembly and Mining Commission,
stated that Iran will ``practically give away'' its civilian
nuclear technology and that ``if relations with Iran lead to
sharing nuclear technology with us, we would then give it away
to our brothers in Latin America once we are successful.''.
(7) El Zabayar stated that Venezuela had taken steps toward
establishing a civilian nuclear program and that cooperation in
this area was being discussed with the Governments of Iran and
Belarus.
(8) Venezuela reportedly has large deposits of uranium ore
in the Guiana Shield region.
(9) In October 2009 Hugo Chavez stated Venezuela was
``working with several countries, with Iran, with Russia'' in
their exploration for uranium.
(10) In December 2009, Iran and Ecuador signed a mining
agreement that establishes a framework for potential uranium
cooperation.
(11) In 1985 the Brazilian government announced that it had
terminated a clandestine nuclear weapons program run by the
military since 1975.
(12) In August 2005 a former high-ranking Brazilian nuclear
official stated that the military had continued to develop
elements of a nuclear weapons program into the 1990s.
(13) On November 20, 2007, Brazilian General Jose Benedito
de Barros Moreira publicly called for Brazil to develop the
technological capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons.
(14) The centrifuges at Brazil's Resende uranium enrichment
plant can be reconfigured to produce highly enriched uranium in
quantities sufficient to produce several nuclear weapons
annually.
(15) Brazil has denied inspectors from the IAEA full access
to its uranium enrichment centrifuges at Resende on the grounds
that it is protecting commercial secrets.
(16) The standoff with the IAEA was resolved only by the
IAEA agreeing to limit its verification methods to indirect
inspections without direct inspection of the centrifuges, which
many nonproliferation experts fear could be used as a precedent
by Iran and other countries to prevent IAEA inspectors from
examining their suspect nuclear facilities.
(17) A prototype nuclear reactor is being developed at the
Armar Research Center for use in Brazil's nuclear-powered
submarine program.
(18) On February 24, 2008, the Governments of Argentina and
Brazil agreed to begin negotiations regarding the joint
development of a nuclear reactor and construction of a uranium
enrichment plant.
(19) In February 2008, President Christina Kirchner of
Argentina and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil agreed to the
establishment of a joint uranium enrichment plant.
(20) In 2010 Brazil facilitated a joint declaration for
Iran to send uranium to Turkey for enrichment. After the
announcement, Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorin stated
``in our view, the agreement eliminates any ground for
sanctions against Iran.''.
(21) In 2011 Brazil expanded its uranium enrichment
capacity to an industrial level.
(22) Until 1990 the Argentine Government conducted a
clandestine nuclear weapons program.
(23) In December 1985 Argentina and Iran signed a nuclear
cooperation agreement in which Argentina agreed to supply Iran
with highly enriched uranium.
(24) In 1987 and 1988 Argentina signed three agreements
with Iran for converting a nuclear reactor to use enriched
uranium, for building pilot plants for uranium-dioxide
conversion and fuel fabrication.
(25) Assistance by Argentina to the Iranian nuclear program
was reduced, but not terminated, following pressure by the
United States.
(26) Several countries in Latin America, including Brazil
and Argentina, have not signed and implemented an Additional
Protocol which provides IAEA inspectors with enhanced access to
nuclear facilities.
(27) Some Western Hemisphere countries have not ratified
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
their Destruction, also referred to as The Chemical Weapons
Convention.
(28) Several countries in Latin America have not signed and
ratified The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on their Destruction (also referred to as the
Biological Weapons Convention).
SEC. 202. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS-
RELATED NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS,
TECHNOLOGY, AND FACILITIES.
(a) In General.--To enhance the prevention of the proliferation of
weapons-related nuclear, chemical, and biological materials,
technology, and facilities, it shall be the policy of the United States
to--
(1) promote the negotiation and implementation by all
countries of--
(A) a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and
(B) an Additional Protocol to the safeguards
agreement;
(2) secure guarantees by all countries of unrestricted
access by IAEA personnel to all nuclear-related materials and
facilities in territories under the control of the host
country;
(3) promote the implementation by all countries of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 which was amended on
April 20, 2011, by United Nations Security Council Resolution
1977 and which reaffirms that the proliferation of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery
constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and
extends the mandate of the Resolution 1540 Committee for a
period of 10 years to 2021;
(4) promote the accession to and ratification and
implementation of--
(A) the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (also
referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention);
(B) the 1980 IAEA Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material;
(C) the 2005 United Nations International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism; and
(D) the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction
(also referred to as the Biological Weapons
Convention).
(b) Additional Protocol Defined.--In this section, the term
``Additional Protocol'' means the Protocol Additional to an agreement
between a country and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the
Application of Safeguards.
SEC. 203. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOL.
(a) In General.--Because a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) sets
aside many of the operative provisions of a general safeguards
agreement, the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
to verify that nuclear materials and facilities in a country with an
SQP are not being diverted for illicit purposes is significantly
impaired. For this reason, it shall be the policy of the United States
to--
(1) oppose the negotiation by the IAEA of an SQP for any
country that did not have an SQP as of January 1, 2012; and
(2) encourage every country with an SQP to withdraw
formally from or renegotiate that agreement for the purpose of
increasing transparency and eliminating any exemption or
provision that could restrict the ability of the IAEA to verify
that a country's nuclear materials and facilities are not being
diverted to impermissible uses.
(b) Countries Described.--For purposes of subsection (a)(1), as of
January 1, 2012, the countries with an SQP are the following: Antigua &
Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, St. Kitts and Nevis, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, and
the United States.
SEC. 204. SECURING ADHERENCE TO AGREEMENTS REGARDING NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION BY COUNTRIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.
(a) In General.--The President shall use all available political,
economic, and diplomatic tools to ensure that each country in the
Western Hemisphere--
(1) has signed and implemented a comprehensive safeguards
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
(2) has signed and implemented an Additional Protocol to
its safeguards agreement;
(3) guarantees unrestricted access for IAEA personnel to
all nuclear-related facilities;
(4) has implemented the provisions of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1540;
(5) has acceded to, ratified, and fully implemented the
conventions referred to in section 202(a)(4);
(6) does not negotiate with the IAEA an SQP if that country
did not have an SQP as of January 1, 2012; and
(7) withdraws formally from or renegotiates an SQP
agreement if a country has such an agreement.
(b) Sanctions.--For any Western Hemisphere country that has not
satisfied all of the requirements specified in subsection (a), the
President is authorized to--
(1) suspend United States nonhumanitarian foreign
assistance to the government of that country; and
(2) prohibit the sale, provision, or transfer of articles,
including the issuance of any specific license or grant of any
other specific permission or authority to export any goods or
technology under--
(A) the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as
continued in effect under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act);
(B) the Arms Export Control Act;
(C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or
(D) any other statute that requires the prior
review and approval of the United States Government as
a condition for the export or re-export of goods or
services.
SEC. 205. HALTING THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR FUEL FABRICATION.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States to oppose the development or acquisition by any country of a
capacity to fabricate nuclear fuel if such country did not have such
capacity as of January 1, 2012.
(b) Prevention of Capacity To Fabricate Nuclear Fuel.--The
President shall use all available political, economic, and diplomatic
tools, and shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the United
States in all international organizations and associations of which it
is a member, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to prevent the development or
acquisition by any country of a capacity to fabricate nuclear fuel if
such country did not have such capacity as of January 1, 2012.
(c) Nuclear Technical Cooperation With the IAEA.--The President
shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to
use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to
block the allocation of funds for any IAEA development, environmental,
or nuclear science assistance or activity to a country the government
of which--
(1) the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of
section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as
continued in effect under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act), section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, or any other
provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism;
(2) is actively cooperating with a government as described
in paragraph (1);
(3) is under investigation for a breach of or noncompliance
with its IAEA obligations or the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations; or
(4) is in violation of its IAEA obligations or the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
SEC. 206. COOPERATION WITH THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) From its inception on May 31, 2003, the Proliferation
Security Initiative, also referred to as the PSI, has
repeatedly demonstrated its effectiveness in preventing the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
(2) In his February 11, 2004, address at the National
Defense University regarding additional measures to enhance
global efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction President Bush proposed that ``the work of the
Proliferation Security Initiative be expanded to address more
than shipments and transfers. Building on the tools we've
developed to fight terrorists, we can take direct action
against proliferation networks. We need greater cooperation not
just among intelligence and military services, but in law
enforcement, as well. PSI participants and other willing
nations should use the Interpol and all other means to bring to
justice those who traffic in deadly weapons, to shut down their
labs, to seize their materials, to freeze their assets. We must
act on every lead. We will find the middlemen, the suppliers
and the buyers.''.
(3) The number of countries participating in PSI has
steadily increased, thereby greatly enhancing its
effectiveness.
(4) Many countries in the Western Hemisphere formally or
informally cooperate with the PSI.
(5) Expanded law enforcement cooperation throughout the
Western Hemisphere, including by means of greater coordination
of policies, improved communications, and enhanced capabilities
would significantly promote the objectives of the PSI.
(b) Sense of Congress Concerning Strengthening Cooperation
Regarding Nonproliferation.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) it is in the national security interest of the United
States to establish comprehensive cooperation to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological materials in
the Western Hemisphere; and
(2) the Secretary of State should seek to secure the formal
or informal cooperation by Western Hemisphere countries for the
purpose of securing the goals of the Proliferation Security
Initiative announced by the President on May 31, 2003.
SEC. 207. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE NONPROLIFERATION
PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State is authorized, in
consultation with relevant United States Government agencies, to
negotiate with the leaders of the governments of countries in the
Western Hemisphere on a bilateral or multilateral basis, as
appropriate, international agreements under which such governments work
in partnership to establish an initiative to be known as the ``Western
Hemisphere Nonproliferation Partnership Initiative'' (NPI).
(b) Purpose.--
(1) In general.--The NPI shall--
(A) encourage the establishment of contacts and
cooperative relationships, including the sharing of
intelligence, between the responsible individuals and
agencies of each participant country with their
counterparts in the United States Government and in
other participating countries; and
(B) encourage bilateral and multilateral support,
cooperation, and coordination of national programs and
efforts to promote effective and in-depth cooperation
to counter the illicit acquisition or trade of weapons-
related nuclear, chemical, or biological materials,
technology, or facilities.
(2) Cooperative programs.--The cooperative programs
referred to under paragraph (1)(B) shall include the following:
(A) Training for government officials and agents
from participating countries regarding the development
and operation of NPI programs.
(B) Assistance in developing a comprehensive legal
and regulatory framework in each country, as
appropriate, to enable the establishment and effective
implementation of export controls and the capacity to
track nuclear, chemical, and biological materials,
equipment, technology, and facilities.
(C) Provision of equipment, development of
infrastructure, and the acquisition of other resources
required by participating countries to effectively
carry out the tasks referred to in subparagraphs (A)
and (B).
SEC. 208. FOREIGN POLICY CONTROLS.
(a) Terrorist States.--Section 6(j)(4) of the Export Administration
Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(4)) is amended--
(1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking
``the Speaker'' and inserting ``the chairman of the Committee
on Foreign Affairs''; and
(2) in subparagraph (B)--
(A) in clause (i), by striking ``6-month period;
and'' and inserting ``36-month period;'';
(B) in clause (ii), by striking the period at the
end and inserting a semicolon; and
(C) by adding after clause (ii) the following:
``(iii) that government is not a `country
of proliferation concern' as defined in section
1055(g)(2) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (50
U.S.C. 2371(g)(2)); and
``(iv) that government has provided
assurances that it will not knowingly
facilitate, directly or indirectly, the
proliferation of nuclear materials, items, or
technology in the future.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Foreign assistance act of 1961.--Section 620A(c) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371(c)) is amended--
(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by
striking ``the Speaker'' and inserting ``the chairman
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs''; and
(B) in paragraph (2)--
(i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``6-
month period; and'' and inserting ``36-month
period;'';
(ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking the
period at the end and inserting a semicolon;
and
(iii) by adding after subparagraph (B) the
following:
``(C) that government is not a `country of
proliferation concern' as defined in section 1055(g)(2)
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2010 (50 U.S.C. 2371(g)(2)); and
``(D) that government has provided assurances that
it will not knowingly facilitate, directly or
indirectly, the proliferation of nuclear materials,
items, or technology in the future.''.
(2) Arms export control act.--Section 40(f)(1) of the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(f)(1)) is amended--
(A) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by
striking ``the Speaker'' and inserting ``the chairman
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs''; and
(B) in subparagraph (B)--
(i) in clause (i), by striking ``6-month
period; and'' and inserting ``36-month
period;'';
(ii) in clause (ii), by striking the period
at the end and inserting a semicolon;
(iii) by adding after clause (ii) the
following:
``(iii) that government is not a `country
of proliferation concern' as defined in section
1055(g)(2) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (50
U.S.C. 2371(g)(2)); and
``(iv) that government has provided
assurances that it will not knowingly
facilitate, directly or indirectly, the
proliferation of nuclear materials, items, or
technology in the future.''.
SEC. 209. LIMITATION ON ARMS TRANSFERS.
(a) In General.--No letter of offer to sell major defense equipment
to a foreign government of the Western Hemisphere may be issued
pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) and no
license to export major defense equipment to a foreign government of
the Western Hemisphere may be issued pursuant to such Act in a fiscal
year until the President makes the certification required under
subsection (b) for such fiscal year.
(b) Certification.--The certification required by this section is a
certification by the President that the foreign government of the
Western Hemisphere--
(1) is not carrying out policies aimed at undermining
United States national security interests; and
(2) is cooperating fully with United States
nonproliferation efforts.
(c) Waiver.--The President may waive the prohibition under
subsection (b) with respect to a specific transaction if the President
determines that such transaction is important to the national security
interests of the United States.
SEC. 210. RESTRICTIONS ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH COUNTRIES ASSISTING
THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF VENEZUELA OR CUBA.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any
international agreement, no agreement for cooperation between the
United States and the government of any country that is assisting the
nuclear or biological program of Venezuela or Cuba or transferring
advanced conventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba may be
submitted to the President or to Congress pursuant to section 123 of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), no such agreement may
enter into force with such country, no license may be issued for export
directly or indirectly to such country of any nuclear material,
facilities, components, or other goods, services, or technology that
would be subject to such agreement, and no approval may be given for
the transfer or retransfer directly or indirectly to such country of
any nuclear material, facilities, components, or other goods, services,
or technology that would be subject to such agreement, until the
President determines and reports to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate that the government of the country that is assisting the
nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced
conventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba--
(1) has suspended all nuclear assistance to Venezuela or
Cuba and all transfers of advanced conventional weapons and
missiles to Venezuela or Cuba; and
(2) is committed to maintaining such suspension until
Venezuela or Cuba has implemented measures that would permit
the President to make the determination described in paragraph
(1).
(b) Rules of Construction.--The restrictions described in
subsection (a)--
(1) shall apply in addition to all other applicable
procedures, requirements, and restrictions required by the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and any other law; and
(2) shall not be construed as affecting the validity of
agreements for cooperation that are in effect on the date of
the enactment of this Act.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Agreement for cooperation.--The term ``agreement for
cooperation'' has the meaning given that term in section 11 b.
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014 b.).
(2) Assisting the nuclear program of venezuela or cuba.--
The term ``assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba''
means the intentional transfer to Venezuela or Cuba by a
government, or by a person subject to the jurisdiction of a
government with the knowledge and acquiescence of such
government, of goods, services, or technology listed on the
Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear
Material, Equipment and Technology (published by the
International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular
INFCIRC/254/Rev. 3/Part 1, and subsequent revisions) or
Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment,
Material, and Related Technology (published by the
International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular
INFCIR/254/Rev. 3/Part 2, and subsequent revisions).
(3) Country that is assisting the nuclear program of
venezuela or cuba or transferring advanced conventional weapons
or missiles to venezuela or cuba.--The term ``country that is
assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba or
transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to
Venezuela or Cuba'' means--
(A) Russia; and
(B) any other country determined by the President
to be assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or
Cuba or transferring advanced conventional weapons or
missiles to Venezuela or Cuba.
(4) Transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles
to venezuela or cuba.--The term ``transferring advanced
conventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba'' means
the intentional transfer to Venezuela or Cuba by a government,
or by a person subject to the jurisdiction of a government with
the knowledge and acquiescence of such government, of goods,
services, or technology listed on--
(A) the Wassenaar Arrangement list of Dual Use
Goods and Technologies and Munitions list of July 12,
1996, and subsequent revisions; or
(B) the Missile Technology Control Regime Equipment
and Technology Annex of June 11, 1996, and subsequent
revisions.
TITLE III--ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
SEC. 301. ACTIONS REGARDING THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES.
(a) Declaration Regarding Terrorism.--The Secretary of State shall
direct the United States Representative to the Organization of American
States (OAS) to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States
at the OAS to move for a declaration at the first meeting of Member
States of the OAS convened after the date of the enactment of this Act
calling on countries to systematically deny the use of their
territories by terrorists or terrorist organizations.
(b) Transfer of Funds for United States Voluntary Contributions to
the OAS.--
(1) In general.--For fiscal year 2013 and each subsequent
fiscal year, 50 percent of the amount of funds made available
for United States assessed contributions to the OAS may be
transferred to, and merged with, funds made available for
United States voluntary contributions to the OAS.
(2) Use of funds.--
(A) In general.--For fiscal year 2013 and each
subsequent fiscal year, it is the sense of Congress
that the United States Representative to the OAS should
allocate funds made available for United States
voluntary contributions to the OAS so as to give
priority to contributions to the organizations
specified in subparagraph (B).
(B) Organizations specified.--The organizations
referred to in subparagraph (A) are the following:
(i) The OAS Inter-American Committee
Against Terrorism (CICTE).
(ii) The OAS Inter-American Drug Abuse
Control Commission (CICAD).
(iii) The OAS Fund for Strengthening
Democracy.
(iv) The Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights.
(c) Prohibition on United States Contribution.--
(1) In general.--No contributions by the United States may
be made to the OAS if Cuba is admitted as an active Member
State to the OAS or participates at the Summit of the Americas
with the consent of the OAS unless the Secretary of State
determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional
committees that a democratically elected government in Cuba has
been established.
(2) Definition.--In this subsection, the term
``democratically elected government in Cuba'', in addition to
meeting the requirements of section 205(a) of the Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C.
6065(a)), means a government which meets the requirements of
section 206 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 6066).
TITLE IV--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
SEC. 401. PROHIBITIONS ON ENGAGEMENT WITH CERTAIN WESTERN HEMISPHERE
COUNTRIES.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as weakening or removing any
prohibitions on United States engagement with or assistance to any
country in the Western Hemisphere that the Secretary of State has
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism for a minimum of five
consecutive years.
SEC. 402. REPORT.
(a) In General.--For each of the fiscal years 2013, 2014, and 2015,
the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on the activities carried out to achieve the
objectives described in titles I and II that describe--
(1) the extent to which each such objective has been
achieved;
(2) the steps taken by the United States and countries in
the Western Hemisphere in the preceding calendar year to
accomplish such objectives;
(3) the extent of cooperation by other countries in the
Western Hemisphere toward achieving such objectives; and
(4) the steps the United States will take in the current
calendar year to accomplish such objectives.
(b) Preparation and Form of Report.--The report required under
subsection (a) shall rely on public information to the extent possible,
and may include a classified annex, if necessary.
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