[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 939 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
118th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 939
To counter the spread of the LOGINK logistics information platform, and
for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
March 22, 2023
Mr. Cotton introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To counter the spread of the LOGINK logistics information platform, and
for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Securing Maritime Data from
Communist China Act of 2023''.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee
on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on
Finance of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee
on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Homeland Security,
and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives.
(2) LOGINK.--The term ``LOGINK'' means the public, open,
shared logistics information network known as the National
Public Information Platform for Transportation and Logistics by
the Ministry of Transport of the People's Republic of China.
(3) Critical infrastructure.--The term ``critical
infrastructure'' has the meaning given the term in section
721(a) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C.
4565(a)).
SEC. 3. COUNTERING THE SPREAD OF LOGINK.
(a) Prohibitions.--
(1) Contracting prohibition.--
(A) In general.--The Department of Defense may not
enter into or renew any contract with any entity that
uses--
(i) LOGINK;
(ii) any logistics platform controlled by,
affiliated with, or subject to the jurisdiction
of the Chinese Communist Party or the
Government of the People's Republic of China;
or
(iii) any logistics platform that shares
data with a system described in clause (i) or
(ii).
(B) Applicability.--Subparagraph (A) applies with
respect to any contract entered into or renewed on or
after the date that is 2 years after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
(2) Ports and critical infrastructure ban.--
(A) In general.--Beginning on the date that is 2
years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
President shall--
(i) prohibit any entity which owns or
operates a port in the United States from using
or sharing data with a system described in
clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph (1)(A); and
(ii) prohibit any entity which owns or
operates other critical infrastructure in the
United States, as the President considers
appropriate, from using or sharing data with a
system described in such clauses.
(B) Implementation; penalties.--
(i) Implementation.--The President may
exercise the authorities provided to the
President under sections 203 and 205 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to the extent necessary
to carry out this paragraph.
(ii) Penalties.--A person that violates,
attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or
causes a violation of a prohibition described
in subparagraph (A) or any regulation, license,
or order issued to carry out that subparagraph
shall be subject to the penalties set forth in
subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person
that commits an unlawful act described in
subsection (a) of that section.
(b) Negotiations With Allies and Partners.--
(1) Negotiations required.--The President shall enter into
negotiations with United States allies and partners, including
those described in paragraph (3), if the President determines
that ports or other entities operating within the jurisdiction
of such allies and partners are using an entity described in
subsection (a)(1)(A).
(2) Elements.--As part of the negotiations described in
paragraph (1), the President shall--
(A) urge governments to require entities within
their countries to terminate their use of LOGINK and
other platforms described in subsection (a)(1)(A);
(B) describe the threats posed by LOGINK and other
platforms described in subsection (a)(1)(A) to United
States military and strategic interests and the
implications this threat may have for the presence of
United States military forces in such countries;
(C) urge governments to cooperate with the United
States to counter attempts by the People's Republic of
China at international standards-setting bodies to
spread LOGINK and other platforms described in
subsection (a)(1)(A); and
(D) attempt to establish through multilateral
entities, bilateral or multilateral trade negotiations,
military cooperation, and other relevant engagements or
agreements a prohibition on the use of LOGINK and other
platforms described in subsection (a)(1)(A).
(3) Allies and partners.--The countries and entities with
which the President shall conduct the negotiations described in
this subsection include, but are not limited to--
(A) Japan;
(B) The Republic of Korea;
(C) The Philippines;
(D) Australia;
(E) North Atlantic Treaty Organization members; and
(F) European Union members.
SEC. 4. REPORT.
Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the President shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees describing--
(1) the efforts made by the United States Government thus
far in the negotiations described in section 3(b), including
whether the United States Government has raised such
negotiations in multilateral trade and technology discussions
and negotiations;
(2) the actions taken by the governments of allies and
partners pursuant to the negotiation priorities described in
section 3(b);
(3) the possible effects that the contracting prohibition
under section 3(a)(1) and the port and other critical
infrastructure prohibition under section 3(a)(2) may have on
United States military operations; and
(4) the possible effects that the port and other critical
infrastructure prohibition under section 3(a)(2) may have on
the commercial operations of United States ports and other
critical infrastructure.
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