[Senate Treaty Document 107-8]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
107th Congress Treaty Doc.
SENATE
2d Session 107-8
_______________________________________________________________________
THE MOSCOW TREATY
__________
MESSAGE
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS, SIGNED AT MOSCOW ON MAY
24, 2002
June 20, 2002.--Treaty was read the first time, and together with the
accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and
ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
99-118 WASHINGTON : 2002
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
The White House, June 20, 2002.
To the Senate of the United States:
I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the
Senate to ratification, the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive
Reductions, signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002 (the ``Moscow
Treaty'').
The Moscow Treaty represents an important element of the
new strategic relationship between the United States and
Russia. It will take our two nations along a stable,
predictable path to substantial reductions in our deployed
strategic nuclear warhead arsenals by December 31, 2012. When
these reductions are completed, each country will be at the
lowest level of deployed strategic nuclear warheads in decades.
This will benefit the peoples of both the United States and
Russia and contribute to a more secure world.
The Moscow Treaty codifies my determination to break
through the long impasse in further nuclear weapons reductions
caused by the inability to finalize agreements through
traditional arms control efforts. In the decade following the
collapse of the Soviet Union, both countries' strategic nuclear
arsenals remained far larger than needed, even as the United
States and Russia moved toward a more cooperative relationship.
On May 1, 2001, I called for a new framework for our strategic
relationship with Russia, including further cuts in nuclear
weapons to reflect the reality that the Cold War is over. On
November 13, 2001, I announced the United States plan for such
cuts--to reduce our operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads to a level of between 1700 and 2200 over the next
decade. I announced these planned reductions following a
careful study within the Department of Defense. That study, the
Nuclear Posture Review, concluded that these force levels were
sufficient to maintain the security of the United States. In
reaching this decision, I recognized that it would be
preferable for the United States to make such reductions on a
reciprocal basis with Russia, but that the United States would
be prepared to proceed unilaterally.
My Russian counterpart, President Putin, responded
immediately and made clear that he shared these goals.
President Putin and I agreed that our nations' respective
reductions should be recorded in a legally binding document
that would outlast both of our presidencies and provide
predictability over the longer term. The result is a Treaty
that was agreed without protracted negotiations. This Treaty
fully meets the goals I set out for these reductions.
It is important for there to be sufficient openness so that
the United States and Russia can each be confident that the
other is fulfilling its reductions commitment. The Parties will
use the comprehensive verification regime of the Treaty on the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the
``START Treaty'') to provide the foundation for confidence,
transparency, and predictability in further strategic offensive
reductions. In our Joint Declaration on the New Strategic
Relationship between the United States and Russia, President
Putin and I also decided to establish a Consultative Group for
Strategic Security to be chaired by Foreign and Defense
Ministers. This body will be the principal mechanism through
which the United States and Russia strengthen mutual
confidence, expand transparency, share information and plans,
and discuss strategic issues of mutual interest.
The Moscow Treaty is emblematic of our new, cooperative
relationship with Russia, but it is neither the primary basis
for this relationship nor its main component. The United States
and Russia are partners in dealing with the threat of terrorism
and resolving regional conflicts. There is growing economic
interaction between the business communities of our two
countries and ever-increasing people-to-people and cultural
contacts and exchanges. The U.S. military has put Cold War
practices behind it, and now plans, sizes, and sustains its
forces in recognition that Russia is not an enemy, Russia is a
friend. Military-to-military and intelligence exchanges are
well established and growing.
The Moscow Treaty reflects this new relationship with
Russia. Under it, each Party retains the flexibility to
determine for itself the composition and structure of its
strategic offensive arms, and how reductions are made. This
flexibility allows each Party to determine how best to respond
to future security challenges.
There is no longer the need to narrowly regulate every step
we each take, as did Cold War treaties founded on mutual
suspicion and an adversarial relationship.
In sum, the Moscow Treaty is clearly in the best interests
of the United States and represents an important contribution
to U.S. national security and strategic stability. I therefore
urge the Senate to give prompt and favorable consideration to
the Treaty, and to advise and consent to its ratification.
George W. Bush.
LETTER OF SUBMITTAL
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The Secretary of State,
Washington.
The President,
The White House.
Mr. President: I have the honor to submit to you the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation
on Strategic Offensive Reductions (the Moscow Treaty), signed
at Moscow on May 24, 2002.
INTRODUCTION
The Moscow Treaty marks a new era in the relationship
between the United States and Russia. This short, legally
binding document codifies in a flexible manner both countries'
commitment to make deep strategic offensive reductions. It
facilitates the transition from strategic rivalry to a genuine
strategic partnership based on the principles of mutual
security, trust, openness, cooperation and predictability. The
Moscow Treaty is one important element of a new strategic
framework, which involves a broad array of cooperative efforts
in political, economic and security areas.
BACKGROUND
The Moscow Treaty codifies the deep reductions that you
announced during the November 2001 Washington/Crawford Summit
and President Putin announced at that time and a month later.
It reflects the shared desire to conclude a legally binding
document that would outlast both of your presidencies and to
provide openness and predictability over the longer term in
this important area of the U.S.-Russian relationship. The
transition to a relationship based on mutual trust and
cooperation enabled us to conclude an agreement in months, not
years. At the same time, the Treaty affords flexibility to each
Party to meet unforeseen future contingencies, while avoiding
unnecessary restrictions on either Party's forces or
activities.
REDUCTION REQUIREMENTS
The United States and Russia both intend to carry out
strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels
consistent with their national security requirements and
alliance obligations, and reflecting the new nature of their
strategic relations. The Treaty requires the United States and
Russia to reduce and limit their strategic nuclear warheads to
1700-2200 each by December 31, 2012, a reduction of nearly two-
thirds below current levels. The United States intends to
implement the Treaty by reducing its operationally deployed
strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-2200 through removal of
warheads from missiles in their launchers and from heavy bomber
bases, and by removing some missiles, launchers, and bombers
from operational service.
For purposes of this Treaty, the United States considers
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to be reentry
vehicles on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in
their launchers, reentry vehicles on submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in their launchers onboard
submarines, and nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers or
stored in weapons storage areas of heavy bomber bases. In
addition, a small number of spare strategic nuclear warheads
(including spare ICBM warheads) are located at heavy bomber
bases. The United States does not consider these spares to be
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. In the
context of this Treaty, it is clear that only ``nuclear''
reentry vehicles, as well as nuclear armaments, are subject to
the 1700-2200 limit.
RELATIONSHIP TO START
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) continues in
force unchanged by this Treaty. In accordance with its own
terms, START will remain in force until December 5, 2009,
unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement or extended.
START's comprehensive verification regime will provide the
foundation for confidence, transparency and predictability in
further strategic offensive reductions. As noted in the May 24
Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship, other
supplementary measures, including transparency measures, may be
agreed in the future.
BILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION COMMISSION
The Treaty establishes a Bilateral Implementation
Commission (BIC), a diplomatic consultative forum that will
meetat least twice a year to discuss issues related to
implementation of the Treaty. The BIC will be separate and distinct
from the Consultative Group for Strategic Security, established by the
Joint Declaration of May 24, which will be chaired by Foreign and
Defense Ministers with the participation of other senior officials.
ENTRY INTO FORCE; DURATION; RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL
The Treaty will enter into force on the date of the
exchange of instruments of ratification. It is to remain in
force until December 31, 2012, and may be extended by agreement
of the Parties or superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement.
The Treaty also provides that each Party, in exercising its
national sovereignty, may withdraw from the Treaty upon three
months' written notice to the other Party.
STATUS OF START II TREATY
The START II Treaty, which was signed in 1993, and to which
the Senate gave its advice and consent in 1996, never entered
into force because Russia placed unacceptable conditions on its
own ratification of START II. Russia's explicit linkage of
START II to preservation of the ABM Treaty and entry into force
of several agreements, signed in 1997, which related to ABM
Treaty succession and ABM/TMD demarcation, made it impossible
for START II to enter into force. With signature of the Moscow
Treaty, the United States and Russia have now taken a decisive
step beyond START II.
CONCLUSION
Accompanying this report is an article-by-article analysis
of the Treaty. By deeply reducing operationally deployed
strategic nuclear warheads while preserving each Party's
flexibility to meet unforeseen future contingencies, the Moscow
Treaty will enhance the national security of the United States.
I strongly recommend its transmission to the Senate for advice
and consent to ratification at the earliest possible date.
Respectfully submitted,
Colin L. Powell.
Enclosures: As stated.