[House Document 108-92]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
108th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document
108-92
EMERGENCY REGARDING PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
__________
COMMUNICATION
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
A 6-MONTH PERIODIC REPORT ON THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO THE
PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THAT WAS DECLARED IN
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12938 OF NOVEMBER 14, 1994, PURSUANT TO 50 U.S.C.
1703(c) AND 50 U.S.C. 1641(c)
July 7, 2003.--Referred to the Committee on International Relations and
ordered to be printed
The White House,
Washington, July 3, 2003.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: Consistent with section 204(c) of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703(c),
and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C.
1641(c), I transmit herewith a 6-month periodic report prepared
by my Administration on the national emergency with respect to
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that was
declared in Executive Order 12938 of November 14, 1994.
Sincerely,
George W. Bush.
Periodic Report to Congress on the National Emergency Regarding
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
This report to the Congress addresses the developments over
the past 6 months concerning the national emergency with
respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD)--nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons--and the means
of delivering such weapons, that was declared in Executive
Order 12938 on November 14, 1994, as amended by Executive Order
13094 of July 28, 1998. This report is submitted pursuant to
section 204(c) of the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 1703(c), and section 401(c) of the
National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1641(c). It reports actions
taken and expenditures incurred pursuant to the emergency
declaration only during the period of November 13, 2002 through
May 14, 2003.
To address the dangers posed by the proliferation of WMD
and their delivery systems, on November 14, 1994, President
Clinton issued Executive Order 12938, declaring a national
emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). On July 28, 1998, President Clinton,
pursuant to the provisions of IEEPA, issued E.O. 13094 to amend
E.O. 12938 in order to respond more effectively to the
worldwide threat of WMD proliferation. Under section 202(d) of
the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the national
emergency terminates on the anniversary date of its declaration
unless, within the 90-day period period to each anniversary
date, the President publishes a Continuation of Emergency
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Federal Register
and transmits the notice to the Congress. The national
emergency was extended on November 14, 1995; November 12, 1996;
November 13, 1997; November 12, 1998; November 10, 1999;
November 12, 2000; November 9, 2001; and November 12, 2002.
Weapons of mass destruction in the hands of potential
adversary states and terrorists are among the top threats to
U.S. security in the Post-Cold War world. In such hands, these
weapons pose direct threats to the United States and its
forces, friends, and allies.
This Administration has given a high priority to dealing
with the threat of WMD and missile proliferation. The September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. and
subsequent anthrax crimes reinforce theimportance of efforts to
prevent the proliferation of these weapons, especially to terrorists
and countries that harbor terrorists. Likewise, arrests in Europe
during the second half of 2002 lend support to the validity of our
concerns that terrorists are actively plotting to conduct chemical and
biological attacks.
Additional information on nuclear, missile and/or chemical
and biological weapons nonproliferation efforts may be found in
the following reports: (a) the most recent annual Report on the
Proliferation of Missiles and Essential Components of Nuclear,
Biological and Chemical Weapons, provided to Congress pursuant
to Section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as
the ``Nonproliferation Report;'' (b) the most recent semi-
annual Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions, provided to Congress pursuant to
Section 721 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1997; (c) the most recent annual report entitled
``Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control and Disarmament
Act, 22 U.S.C. 2593a; (d) the most recent report on Nuclear
Nonproliferation Policy in South Asia, provided pursuant to
Public Law 102-391, Section 585; (e) the most recent Report on
Regional Nonproliferation in South Asia, submitted pursuant to
Section 620F(c) of Foreign Assistance Act; (f) the most recent
Nuclear Nonproliferation Report known as the ``Section 601
Report,'' submitted pursuant to Section 601 of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-242), as amended by
the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994; (g) the most
recent semiannual report on proliferation-related transfers to
Iran, submitted pursuant to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of
2000; and (h) the most recent report on Libya sanctions,
provided pursuant to Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996,
section 5(b).
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the
cornerstone of the global effort to halt nuclear proliferation.
The second meeting of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for
the 2005 NPT Review Conference took place in Geneva from April
28 to May 9, 2003. NPT Parties used the session to address the
Treaty's central tenets: nonproliferation; disarmament; and
peaceful nuclear cooperation. PrepCom IItransmitted to PrepCom
III (to be held in 2004) a factual summary of the session produced by
the Chair.
The primary U.S. objective leading up to and at PrepCom II
was to make clear to responsible NPT Parties the threat to the
Treaty and global security posed by those NPT Parties in
noncompliance with, or threatening noncompliance with, their
nonproliferation obligations. Close consultations with the
PrepCom Chair began in June 2002 and continued throughout
PrepCom II. The United States consulted actively with a wide
range of NPT Parties in Washington, New York, Geneva, and
capitals in an effort to make clear the depth of U.S. concern
about the threat posed by noncompliance. The United States was
generally successful in achieving its PrepCom II objective.
More than 40 Parties addressed the compliance issue in their
PrepCom statements, including specific references to DPRK and
Iranian actions, and the Chair devoted a significant portion of
his Factual Summary to the compliance issue.
The United States will continue to highlight the importance
of compliance as the Parties turn their attention to PrepCom
III, which will convene on April 26, 2004 in New York. PrepCom
III, unlike PrepCom I (2002) and II, is charged with attempting
to make consensus recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference
on ways to strengthen the NPT's implementation and achieve its
universality.
The United States will continue to meet all of its
obligations under the NPT and notes that the conclusion of the
Moscow Treaty for the reduction of strategic nuclear warheads
demonstrates that the United States continues to meet its
obligations under the nuclear disarmament-related provisions of
Article VI of the NPT.
North Korea's violation of the NPT and disabling of IAEA
seals and cameras at Yongbyon, its expulsion of IAEA
inspectors, its January 2003 notice of its intention to
withdrawal from the NPT, and its restarting of the 5 MW (e)
Yongbyon reactor--subsequent to its admission in October 2002
of a covert uranium enrichment program--further underscore the
nuclear proliferation challenges faced by the United States and
the international community.
Iranian compliance with the NPT also remains of primary
concern. We assess Iran's nuclear program is aimed at
developing the capability to produce fissile material for use
in nuclear weapons. Recently disclosed nuclear-
relatedfacilities under construction at Natanz and Arak, for instance,
would help Iran produce weapons-usable fissile material. The magnitude
and completeness of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle programs are so
disproportionate to its stated intention of developing a strictly
civilian nuclear energy program that we are persuaded they are designed
to support a clandestine nuclear weapons program. The IAEA is
undertaking a rigorous examination of Iran's nuclear program and is
expected to report its findings soon to the IAEA Board of Governors.
The United States is increasingly concerned over statements
by Libyan leaders about Arab nations' right to pursue nuclear
weapons as well as Libya's development of its nuclear
infrastructure.
International Atomic Energy Agency: The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), inter alia, verifies the
compliance of non-nuclear weapons states with their NPT
safeguards obligations. During this reporting period, the
United States continued to provide significant technical and
financial resources to support IAEA safeguards activities.
The IAEA safeguards system helps deter or detect diversion
of nuclear materials. However, it has become increasingly clear
that the IAEA safeguards agreements have limitations that
impede its ability to detect undeclared activities. The
discovery after the Persian Gulf War of Iraq's extensive covert
nuclear activities led to an effort to strengthen the IAEA
safeguards system's ability to detect undeclared nuclear
material and activities. The United States, along with a large
number of other IAEA members, negotiated in the mid-1990s
substantial safeguards strengthening measures, including the
use of environmental sampling techniques, expansion of the
information related to nuclear activities which states are
required to declare, and expansion of IAEA access rights. Those
measures are embodied in a Model Additional Protocol, approved
in 1997. With these measures, the IAEA's capability to detect
and assess a state's undeclared nuclear activity was
substantially enhanced. As of June 2003, this Protocol had been
signed by 73 states and has entered into force for 35
countries.
During the reporting period, the IAEA proposed a biennium
budget for CY2004-2005 that includes a real increase for
safeguards funding of around $21.5 million. The United States
has engaged in substantial diplomatic activity over the past 6
months in support of this increase. The IAEA and
otherinternational organizations have been subject to stringent budget
levels by the United States and other major donor nations for around 15
years. However, the United States has decided that the IAEA is
justified in seeking this increase, in view of a substantial growth in
its safeguards responsibilities over that period. The IAEA Director-
General has warned that the IAEA cannot continue to provide credible
safeguards under such financial limitations. The IAEA plays an
essential role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and deserves
these additional funds in order to fulfill its verification
responsibilities under the NPT.
The Zangger Committee: The purpose of the 35-nation NPT
Exporters (Zangger) Committee (ZC) is to harmonize
implementation of the NPT's requirement to apply IAEA
safeguards to exports to non-nuclear-weapon states of (a)
source or special fissionable material, and (b) equipment or
material especially designed or prepared for the processing,
use or production of special fissionable material. The
Committee maintains and updates a list of equipment and
materials that may only be exported if safeguards are applied
to the recipient facility (called the ``Trigger List'' because
such exports trigger the requirement for safeguards).
All of the NPT nuclear weapons states, including China, are
members of the ZC. However, China is the only member of the ZC
that is not also a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),
which requires full-scope safeguards (FSS) as a condition of
nuclear supply to non-nuclear weapons states. China has not
been willing to accept the FSS policy, but its export control
lists are comparable, if not virtually identical, to the NSG's.
The ZC, because of its link to the NPT, is in a unique
position to engage NPT-party non-member critics of the
nonproliferation regimes, such as Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia,
and Mexico, and to present supplier government views to NPT
meetings. It will continue to take the lead on possible Trigger
List additions. The ZC is not currently able to control
radioactive sources because most of these have no significance
for nuclear weapons or fuel cycle activities. The ZC will be
considering whether and how to expand its mandates for possible
coverage. The ZC took the lead in developing supplier consensus
to add enrichment, reprocessing, heavy water production
equipment, and most recently, plutonium separation equipment
and technology to the Trigger List.
At its April 10, 2003 meeting, the ZC members welcomed the
chair's announcement of inauguration of the ZC website hosted
by the Austrian Government. The ZC also discussed elements that
might be incorporated in the updated understandings
(guidelines), including physical protection and the IAEA
Additional Protocol. The Committee again discussed the
application of Belarus for membership. The United States is
still not prepared to join a consensus for acceptance of
Belarus because of concern regarding that Government's
commitment to nonproliferation. The Committee also continued
discussion of possible outreach activities with non-member NPT
Party countries, particularly Non-Aligned Movement countries.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group: The NSG was formed in 1974
following the Indian nuclear explosion, which demonstrated how
nuclear technology and materials transferred for peaceful
purposes could be misused. The NSG Guidelines, first published
in 1978, require for exports of nuclear materials and
equipment: (1) formal recipient government assurances
confirming IAEA safeguards and no nuclear explosive use; (2)
adequate physical protection; and (3) particular caution in the
transfer of sensitive facilities, technology, and weapons-
usable materials.
In 1992, the NSG added FSS as a condition of nuclear supply
to non-clear weapons states, and established dual-use
guidelines and a control list. In 1995, the NSG added controls
on nuclear technology for items of the Trigger List (items
which trigger the requirement for IAEA safeguards).
NSG Chairmanship rotates annually. The Republic of Korea is
the current chair and Sweden will assume the chairmanship in
May 2004. Japan's Mission in Vienna serves as the NSG Point of
Contract. The NSG Consultative Group (GC), currently chaired by
the United States, meets at least twice a year under the
mandate of the plenary.
The NSG is considering how to make more transparent a
``Common Understanding'' on the safety and grandfathering
exceptions to the full-scope safeguards supply policy, in order
to prevent new problems like those created by the Russian
nuclear supply to India. It is also considering making the
Additional Protocol a condition of supply, incorporating catch-
all control provisions in the dual-use guidelines, and expanded
information sharing on denials of Trigger List items, as is
currently done for nuclear-related dual-use exports.
South Asia Nuclear: During the reporting period, India and
Pakistan have continued to pursue their respective nuclear
weapons programs and to increase their stockpiles of fissile
material. Both maintain active ballistic missile programs and
have flight-tested short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.
The United States continued to raise its nuclear proliferation-
related concerns with Indian and Pakistani officials, calling
on them to: maintain their nuclear testing moratoria, not
assemble nuclear weapons, bring an early end to the production
of fissile material, limit flight-tests of ballistic missiles,
resume their bilateral dialogue, and bring their export
controls in line with international standards to prevent
transfers of sensitive goods or technologies to other
countries.
We have made progress with India and Pakistan to bring
their export control system and practices in line with
international standards. Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf
held nonproliferation and security talks in Washington with
delegations from both countries in February 2003, during which
Indian and Pakistani officials signaled their willingness to
cooperate on export control reform. Indian officials outlined a
number of steps they were planning to take to close loopholes
in their export control laws and regulations and agreed to
dates for a series of cooperative activities under the State
Department's Export Control and Related Border Security
Assistance (EXBS) program. Later in February, the EXBS program
hosted a delegation of senior Pakistani export control
officials to discuss best practices and chart a program of
training activities to assist Pakistan to strengthen its export
control system. We are now working with Pakistan on the content
and timing of a number of activities in the areas of licensing
and enforcement.
North Korea Nuclear: In October 2002, Assistant Secretary
of State James Kelly advised the North Koreans that we had
recently acquired information that indicated North Korea had
embarked on a covert uranium enrichment program for nuclear
weapons. The DPRK acknowledged it has a covert uranium
enrichment program and has since lifted the freeze on its
plutonium production facilities at Yongbyon. North Korea's
nuclear weapons program is a violation of the Agreed Framework,
the NPT, North Korea's IAEA Safeguards agreement, and the Joint
North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula. The United States has called on the DPRK to take
immediate steps to eliminate its nuclear weapons program,
including its uranium enrichment program. completely,verifiably
and irreversibly, and has been consulting closely with Congress,
friends, and allies on next steps to address this grave violation of
North Korea's international commitments and threat to the future of the
NPT.
Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea was to receive
500,000 tons of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) annually, purchased
through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
(KEDO). The U.S. contribution covers HFO and KEDO's
administrative expenses. The United States and other members of
the KEDO board decided in November 2002 to suspend shipments of
HFO in light of North Korea's pursuit of a nuclear weapons
program. Congress provided up to $5 million for KEDO's
administrative account in FY03, should the President decide it
is vital to the national security interests of the United Sates
to so contribute. No part of this funding would go to fund
heavy fuel oil shipments or light water reactor construction.
The Administration is seeking no funds for HFO for 2004.
During the reporting period, the DPRK announced it was
lifting the freeze on its plutonium production facilities. It
cut IAEA seals and disabled IAEA monitoring cameras at the
``frozen'' facilities, and expelled the IAEA inspectors at
Yongbyon. Subsequently, on January 10, 2003, the DPRK announced
it was withdrawing from the NPT, and in February, the DPRK
restarted its 5Mwe reactor at Yongbyon.
In late April, North Korea engaged in multilateral talks
with China and the United States in Beijing. At this meeting,
North Korea declared that it has nearly completed the
successful reprocessing of the 8,000 spent fuel rods at the
Yongbyon facility. It also indicated that it possessed nuclear
weapons, and threatened to demonstrate or transfer nuclear
weapons or fissile material beyond North Korea's borders.
During these talks, the United States made clear our objective
remains the complete, verifiable, and irreversible elimination
of the North Korean nuclear weapons program. The United States
also stressed that the multilateral talks must be expanded to
include other concerned parties, above all the Republic of
Korea and Japan. We are consulting with friends and allies on
next steps.
Iran Nuclear: Despite its status as an NPT Party, Iran is
aggressively pursuing a costly effort to acquire sensitive
nuclear capabilities, including uranium enrichment, that only
make sense as part of a surreptitious nuclear weapons
program,not for energy-related purposes. Such an indigenous fuel cycle
is not necessary to meet Iran's declared desire to have a civil nuclear
power program to generate electricity, given Russia's offer to provide
fresh fuel for the lifetime of the Bushehr reactor, Iran's only nuclear
power reactor foreseeable for the next decade. Iran's claims to need
nuclear power to meet its energy needs are also highly suspect, in
light of Iran's abundant oil and natural gas resources.
Until recently, virtually all of Iran's sensitive nuclear
activities were secret, and many remain so. Iran's recent
disclosures were made only because it had no choice, but were
also accompanied by a specious cover story.
Iran is trying to legitimize as ``peaceful and
transparent'' its ambitious pursuit of nuclear fuel cycle
capabilities that would give it the capability to produce
fissile material for nuclear weapons. This includes uranium
mining and extraction, uranium conversion and enrichment,
reactor fuel fabrication, heavy water production, and
``management'' of spent fuel--a euphemism for reprocessing
spent fuel to recover plutonium.
Iran's claim of transparency in its nuclear program is
false. Until February 2003, Iran was the only state with an
IAEA safeguards agreement that had not accepted the IAEA
Board's 1992 call to declare new nuclear facilities prior to
construction, i.e., ``early declaration.'' Iran's stalling
allowed it to build a well-advanced, sophisticated nuclear
infrastructure in secret, including the huge uranium enrichment
facility at Natanz, without IAEA knowledge or input on
effective safeguards. Iran only acknowledged the uranium
enrichment plant under construction at Natanz, and the heavy
water production plant under construction at Arak, after their
existence was made public by an Iranian opposition group.
In August 2002, that group publicly revealed the existence
of what was confirmed to be a gas centrifuge enrichment plant
under construction at Natanz, and a heavy water production
plant under construction at Arak. In February 2003, IAEA
Director General ElBaradei and his senior safeguards staff
visited Iran to examine these sites and undertake a more
rigorous examination of Iran's nuclear program. The IAEA is
continuing monthly inspections of Iran's program. As the IAEA
has characterized, Iran's nuclear program appears to be
significantly more advanced than the IAEA had previously known,
while the Iranian regime has recently publicly acknowledged
anambitious (and extremely costly) pursuit of indigenous fuel-cycle
capabilities, including enrichment and reprocessing.
It is highly unlikely that Iran could have achieved such an
apparent state of technical progress in its gas centrifuge
enrichment program without having conducted experiments with
nuclear material, an activity which Iranian officials deny.
Such experiments would be a serious violation of Iran's IAEA
safeguards obligations. The Director General is expected to
provide a detailed report of inspections in Iran to the next
IAEA Board of Governors meeting in June 2003.
The United States has played the leading role in developing
and maintaining a broad international consensus against
assisting Iran's foreign procurement efforts. The United States
denies Iran access to U.S. nuclear technology and material, and
China and all major Western suppliers have agreed not to
provide sensitive nuclear technology to Iran. A number of
supplier states have abandoned potentially lucrative sales to
Iran's nuclear program. Russia remains the most significant,
but not only, exception to this virtual embargo on nuclear
cooperation with Iran. The Administration is actively engaged
with Russia in an attempt to resolve differences over the
nature and scope of Russian cooperation with Iran's nuclear
programs. In addition, we are concerned that some interactions
between Chinese and Iranian entities may run counter to
Beijing's bilateral commitments to the United States.
The United States is engaged intensively, at senior levels,
with the Russian Government regarding Russia's nuclear
cooperation with Iran. Russia has been assisting Iran in
nuclear areas since at least 1995, including with the
construction of the Bushehr-1 light water reactor. The United
States has urged Russia to suspend all nuclear cooperation with
Iran until concerns about the Iranian nuclear program are fully
resolved.
The United States believes that Iran must immediately halt
its pursuit of a full nuclear fuel cycle capability and
verifiably abandon its weapons ambitions.
Iraq Nuclear: On November 8, 2002, the U.N. Security
Council unanimously passed UNSCR 1441, which gave Iraq a final
opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations. UNSCR
1441 called for Iraq to file a ``currently accurate, full, and
complete'' declaration of its WMD and missile programs, and for
``full and immediate'' cooperation by Iraq with
weaponsinspectors. Finally, the resolution warned of ``serious
consequences'' should Iraq fail to comply with its disarmament
obligations. Thus, UNSCR was designed to test the Iraqi regime's
commitment to abandon WMD and illegal missile efforts.
In the wake of Iraq's refusal to voluntarily disarm,
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM began on March 19, 2003 with the
primary goal of disarming Iraq. Key objectives of military
action are to locate, defeat, secure, disable, and dispose of
Iraqi WMD, infrastructure, and scientific and engineering
expertise; redirect select dual-use facilities and key
personnel; and prevent reconstitution and proliferation.
Exploitation/elimination of WMD will take place concurrent with
military operations when possible. However, this is a time-
consuming task; the Iraqi regime may well have hidden WMD to
thwart coalition forces' efforts to capture WMD. We remain
concerned about WMD ``leakage'' and are focused on ensuring
that no WMD or WMD-related materiel leaves Iraq.
Libya Nuclear: An NPT party with full-scope IAEA
safeguards, Libya retains its long-standing nuclear weapons
ambitions and continues to develop its nuclear infrastructure.
There is increasing concern over statements by Libyan leader
Muamar Qhadafi that Arab countries have the right to pursue
nuclear weapons as a deterrent against other weapons in the
region. Our concerns are sharpened when considered in the
context of Libya's development of its nuclear infrastructure
and an ongoing pattern of suspicious Libyan procurement
attempts of nuclear related material and technology. The
suspension of U.N. sanctions in 1999 has provided Libya the
means to enhance that infrastructure.
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI)
Regulations: The export control regulations issued under the
EPCI remain fully in force and continue to be administered by
the Department of Commerce, in consultation with other
agencies, in order to control the export of items with
potential use in WMD or missile programs. In particular, EPCI
is being applied to items with potential use in chemical or
biological weapons or unmanned delivery system for WMD.
Chemical Weapons Convention: Chemical weapons continue to
pose a serious threat to the security of the United States and
our allies. On April 29, 1997, the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (known as the
Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC) entered into force, with 87
of the CWC's 165 signatories as original States Parties--
including the United States, which ratified the Convention on
April 25, 1997. As of the end of this reporting period, 151
countries have become States Parties.
The implementing body for the CWC--the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)--carries out the
verification provisions of the CWC, and its Technical
Secretariat presently has a staff of approximately 500
international civil servants, including about 200 inspectors
trained and equipped to inspect military and industrial
facilities throughout the world. To date, the OPCW has
conducted over 1,400 routine inspections at over 580 sites in
51 countries. No challenge inspections have yet taken place.
The OPCW maintains an inspector presence at operational
chemical weapon destruction facilities. Due to the significant
level of chemical weapon destruction activity in the United
States, U.S. facilities have hosted approximately one-third of
OPCW inspections and two-thirds of total inspection days.
The United States is determined to seek full implementation
of and compliance with the CWC. This includes submission of
accurate and complete declarations for all States Parties and
compliance with the CWC's inspection provisions. The United
States pursues compliance with the Convention through several
means, including bilateral consultations and site visits,
consistent with Article IX of the CWC, with several States
Parties that it believes may not be meeting their commitments.
In addition, the United States is actively taking steps to
strengthen the OPCW's ability to implement effectively the CWC,
including a $2 million voluntary contribution to the OPCW made
in FY 2002 as a follow-up to the recent, much-needed change in
OPCW leadership.
We are continuing our work to ensure that countries that
refuse to become party to the CWC are increasingly isolated
politically. Under the CWC, States Parties are prohibited from
transferring certain key chemicals to non-Parties. The relevant
treaty provisions are specifically designed to penalize
countries that refuse to become party to the CWC.
Biological Weapons Convention: The United States agreed in
1994 to participate in an Ad Hoc Group to negotiate a Protocol
to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) that would
``strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation
of the Convention.'' On July 25, 2001, after a thorough United
States Government policy review, the United States announced
that the approach embodied in the draft Protocol is not capable
of strengthening the BWC. ``The traditional approach [facility
investigations and declarations] that has worked well for many
other types of weapons is not a workable structure for
biological weapons.'' On November 1, 2001, the Administration
offered a number of alternative measures that would contribute
to combating the threat of biological weapons proliferation and
in strengthening the BWC. The resumed RevCon in November 2002
adopted a work program for the period until the next RevCon in
2006. Under that work program, the BWC States Parties will
discuss, and promote effective action on, several of the
practical measures proposed by the United States. The United
States is actively engaged in preparing for the first annual
meeting of States Parties in August 2003, preceded by a meeting
of experts. The items to be addressed are national
implementation measures and biosecurity, and we are hopeful
that the August 2003 meeting will result in encouraging
national efforts that could contribute to reducing the BW
threat.
In addition, the United States is pursuing measures to
combat the biological weapons threat on multiple fronts in a
number of forums such as NATO's Defense Group on Proliferation,
the Global Health Security Action Group, and the World Health
Organization.
Australia Group: The United States continues to be a
leading participant in the 33-member Australia Group (AG)
chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation regime. At the
June 3-6, 2002 AG Plenary Session, the Group significantly
expanded its export controls and strengthened its ability to
counter both nation-state and terrorist chemical and biological
weapons efforts. Responding to the terrorist events of
September 11, 2001, AG participants adopted common export
control guidelines that include chemical and biological
terrorism as an explicit focus of the regime.
Participants also adopted the U.S.-proposed gameplan on
regional nonproliferation and the Group agreed that members are
to have ``catch-all'' and intangible technology controls, the
first multilateral nonproliferation regime to do so. The
AGcontrol lists were amended to include technology for the development
and production of listed biological agents and equipment, and to add
eight new biological toxins. To better combat biological weapons
proliferation, the Group reduced the control level for listed
fermenters from 100 to 20 liters and decided to require licenses for
exports of biological agents to all countries, including other AG
members (except for intra-EU trade).
Participants also continued to agree that full compliance
with the CWC and BWC by all countries will be a key to
achieving a permanent global ban on chemical and biological
weapons, and that the States Parties to these Conventions must
take steps to ensure that their national activities support
these goals. The Group reaffirmed its commitment to continue
its active outreach program of briefings for non-AG countries,
and to promote regional consultations on export controls and
nonproliferation to further raise awareness and understanding
of national policies in these areas.
During the February 2003 Australia Group intersessional
meeting in Paris, AG partners agreed to discuss the following
topics at the June 2003 plenary: strengthened outreach to non-
AG countries; adding additional chemicals and biological agents
to the AG control list; new formats for information sharing on
a variety of export and other control topics; and overall
enhancements to the AG partnership.
Sanctions/Interdiction: During the reporting period, we
continued to examine closely intelligence and other information
concerning trade in material and technology related to chemical
and biological weapons.
In February, 2003, pursuant to the Chemical and Biological
Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, the United
States imposed sanctions on NEC Engineers Private, Ltd. (an
Indian company originally based in India but also operating in
the Middle East and Eurasia) ahd Hans Raj Shiv (an Indian
citizen previously residing in India and believed to be in the
Middle East) for knowingly and materially contributing to
Iraq's CBW program. Shiv was previously sanctioned in July 2002
pursuant to the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992.
In March 2003, the United States imposed sanctions on the
Indian entity Protech Consultants Private Ltd, as well as the
Jordanian national Mohammed Al-Khatib, under the Iran-IraqArms
Nonproliferation Act of 1992 for their knowing and material
contribution to Iraq's CBW program.
The United States continues to cooperate with its AG
partners and other like-minded countries in stopping shipments
and exchanges of chemical and biological weapons proliferation
concern.
CBW Country Issues: Iran continues to seek precursors and
production technology to create a more advanced and self-
sufficient CW infrastructure, and continues actively to pursue
BW capabilities. Evidence suggests that Syria and Libya
continue to make improvements to their chemical weapons
infrastructure and both are pursuing offensive biological
weapons research and development. North Korea has a dedicated,
national-level effort to achieve a biological warfare
capability and has developed and produced, and may have
weaponized, biological warfare agents. North Korea is also
assessed as having a long-standing offensive chemical weapons
program, which includes the ability to produce bulk quantities
of nerve, blister, blood, and choking agents. Sudan has
received foreign assistance in the development of a chemical
weapons program and may be actively pursuing a more advanced
capability. The United States believes that Cuba has at least a
limited, developmental, offensive biological warfare research
and development effort; Cuba has provided dual-use
biotechnology to rogue states. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM is
underway to disarm Iraq's CBW program.
WMD-CAPABLE MISSILES
Export Controls: The United States rigorously controls
exports that could contribute to unmanned delivery systems
(ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial
vehicles) for WMD, and monitors closely activities of potential
missile proliferation concern.
Missile Technology Control Regime: During the reporting
period, the 33 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
Partners continued to share information about proliferation
problems with each other and with other potential supplier,
consumer, and transshipment states. The Partners also
emphasized the need for implementing effective export control
systems. In January 2003, the Partners amended the MTCR
Guidelines to make preventing terrorists from acquiring WMD
delivery systems a specific focus of the Regime.
In April 2003, the MTCR held an intersessional Technical
Experts Meeting (TEM) in Vienna to discuss new proposals and
additions to strengthen control of MTCR Annex items. In
addition, the MTCR held an intersessional meeting in Paris in
May 2003 to discuss regional nonproliferation outreach to
nonmembers, transparency, and other issues of priority
nonproliferation concern. These discussions will result in
decisions at the September 2003 Plenary, which will be held in
Buenos Aires.
International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation: The United States is one of 102 subscribing
states to the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic
Missile Proliferation (ICOC--or ``The Hague Code of Conduct''),
which was launched on November 25-26, 2002. The ICOC creates a
widely subscribed international predisposition against
ballistic missile proliferation. It consists of a broad set of
principles, general commitments, and modest confidence building
measures. It is a voluntary political commitment, not a treaty,
and is open for subscription by all countries. The ICOC
supplements, but does not supplant, the important work of the
MTCR.
Such a large and diverse group of subscribing countries
(including countries in Africa, the EU, South America, Central
Asia, and the Pacific) shows that there is widespread support
for the ICOC and objectives of (1) stemming the proliferation
of WMD capable delivery systems; and (2) encouraging countries
to voluntarily cooperate to address missile proliferation. It
should be noted, however, that several countries with programs
of missile proliferation concern have not subscribed to the
ICOC.
The ICOC Launching Conference was extremely successful and
was followed by the first meeting of Subscribing States on
November 26, 2002. The Subscribers agreed to hold an ad-hoc
technical intersessional meeting (scheduled for June 23, 2003)
to further elaborate issues relating to the Code's
implementation, including pre-launch notifications and
Subscribing States' annual declarations on space and ballistic
missile policies.
Sanctions: On March 24, 2003, the United States imposed
Category I missile sanctions on the North Korean entity
Changgwang Sinyong Corporation for the knowing transfer of
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I items from
North Korea that ``substantially contributed'' to an
MTCRCategory I program in Pakistan. Also on March 24, the United States
imposed penalties on the Pakistani governmental entity Khan Research
Laboratories (KRL), under Executive Order 12938, as amended, for making
a material contribution to a WMD-capable missile program by receiving
transfers from Changgwang. The sanctions on the North Korean and
Pakistani entities were for a specific missile-related transfer. These
sanctions do not pertain to any other activity, including nuclear-
related ones.
South Asia Missile: India has an extensive, largely
indigenous ballistic missile development and production
program. Nevertheless, India's ballistic missile program have
benefited from the acquisition of foreign material, equipment
and technology, which it continues to acquire.
Pakistan also has an active ballistic missile program and,
during the last several years, has received considerable
assistance from Chinese and North Korean entities in these
efforts. Continued development of nuclear-capable ballistic
missiles by both India and Pakistan raises the prospect that
more sophisticated and possibly destabilizing capabilities will
be fielded in the coming years. Such an arms race constitutes a
threat to regional and international security. Both India and
Pakistan conducted missile tests during this reporting period.
The United States continued to urge India and Pakistan to
exercise restraint in their missile programs.
DPRK Missile: Although the DPRK has maintained its
September 1999, voluntary moratorium on flight tests of long-
range ballistic missiles, it has been extremely active in the
research, development, testing, deployment, and export of
missiles and related materials, equipment, and technologies.
The DPRK also is working to increase the capability of its
missile systems. During a September 2002 meeting with Japanese
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, DPRK President Kim Jong-il
stated that North Korea would maintain its long-range ballistic
missile flight-test moratorium until after 2003. However, the
DPRK has since announced it may reconsider its offer to extend
the moratorium.
During his October 2002 visit to North Korea, Assistant
Secretary of State James Kelly expressed serious U.S. concerns
about the negative impact of the DPRK's missile- and WMD-
related activities on regional and global peace and stability,
for the North's relations with the United States and its
neighbors, and for its own future. Making progress on these
issues remains a high priority for this Administration.
Iran Missile: Iran has substantial missile inventories and
an indigenous ballistic missile production capability. In
recent years, North Korean, Russian, and Chinese entities have
continued to supply Iran with a wide variety of missile-related
goods, technology, and expertise. The United States continues
to pursue a high-level dialogue with Russia aimed at finding
ways to cut off the continuing flow of sensitive goods and
expertise to Iran's ballistic missile development and nuclear
weapons programs. The Russian Government has created
institutional foundations to implement its nonproliferation
commitments and passed laws to punish wrongdoers. It also has
passed new export control legislation and adopted implementing
regulations to tighten government control over sensitive
technologies and continued a dialogue with the United States
aimed at strengthening export control practices at Russian
aerospace firms. However, while there has been some movement,
we remain concerned that Russian entities continue to supply
missile technology and equipment to Iran. The United States has
also imposed sanctions against Chinese and North Korean
entities under both the AECA and the Iran Nonproliferation Act
for their assistance to the Iranian missile program.
Other Countries: A number of other countries also are
pursuing missile programs. Iraq exceeded the U.N. range limit
of 150 km with its existing ballistic missiles and sought to
develop specialized facilities, which would suggest that it
intended to develop a medium-range ballistic missile
capability, largely through foreign assistance in rebuilding
its missile production capability. Iraq also developed its
unmanned aerial vehicle capability as a delivery system for
biological and, perhaps, chemical agents. Libya is continuing
to seek technology and assistance for its missile program from
foreign sources. Syria continues to acquire missile-related
equipment and materials and has received considerable foreign
production assistance.
VALUE OF NONPROLIFERATION EXPORT CONTROLS
United States national export controls--both those
implemented pursuant to multilateral nonproliferation regimes
and those implemented unilaterally--play an important part in
impeding the proliferation of WMD and missiles.
As noted in this report, however, export controls are just
one of a number of tools the United States uses to achieve its
nonproliferation objectives. Global nonproliferation
treatiesand multilateral nonproliferation regimes, interdiction of
shipments of proliferation concern, sanctions, redirection and
elimination efforts, and robust U.S. military, intelligence, and
diplomatic capabilities all work in conjunction with export controls
and export control assistance as part of our overall nonproliferation
strategy.
Export controls are a critical part of nonproliferation
because every emerging WMD and missile program seeks materials,
equipment, and technologies from other countries. Proliferators
look to other sources because needed items are unavailable
within their countries, because indigenously produced items are
of substandard quality or insufficient quantity, and/or because
imported items can be obtained more quickly and cheaply than
domestically produced ones. Increased focus has been put on
encouraging transit/transshipment countries to adopt new and/or
strengthened export controls consistent with international
nonproliferation norms as a means to halt transfers of WMD-
useful materials, equipment, and technologies. Export controls
have their limitations, however; export controls have a limited
ability to address the growing problem of secondary
proliferation (e.g., transfers between countries such as the
DPRK and Iran).
It is important to note that proliferators seek for their
WMD and missile programs both items on multilateral lists (such
as gyroscopes controlled on the MTCR Annex and nerve gas
precursors controlled on the AG list) and unlisted items (such
as lower-level machine tools and very basic chemicals). In
addition, many of the items of interest to proliferators are
inherently dual-use. For example, key precursors and
technologies used in the production of fertilizers or
pesticides also can be used to make missile propellant and
chemical weapons; vaccine production technology can be used to
produce biological weapons.
The most obvious value of export controls is in impeding or
denying proliferators and terrorists access to key pieces of
equipment and technology for use in their WMD and/or missile
programs. In large part, U.S. national export controls--and
similar controls of our AG, MTCR, and NSG partners--are aimed
at denying proliferators and terrorists access to the largest
sources of the best material, equipment, and technology. If
denied, proliferators might then turn to non-regime suppliers
to seek less capable items. Moreover, in many instances, U.S.
and regime controls and associated efforts have
forcedproliferators to engage in complex clandestine procurements,
taking time and money away from their WMD and missile programs.
United States national export controls and those of our
regime partners also have played an important role in
increasing over time the critical mass of countries applying
nonproliferation export controls. For example: the seven-member
MTCR of 1987 has grown to 33 member countries; the NSG adopted
full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply and extended new
controls to nuclear-related dual-use items; several non-member
countries have committed unilaterally to apply export controls
consistent with one or more of the regimes; and most of the
members of the nonproliferation regimes have applied national
``catch-all'' controls similar to those under the U.S. EPCI.
(Export controls normally are tied to a specific list of items,
such as the MTCR Annex. ``Catch-all'' controls provide a legal
basis to control exports of items not on a list, when it is
believed that those items could be destined for WMD and/or
missile programs.)
The United States maintains a global Export Control and
Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program to assist
over 30 countries to prevent transfers of sensitive goods to
end-users of proliferation concern, and strengthen their export
control systems. Assistance is focused on helping weapons-
source countries and transit/transshipment countries along
high-risk smuggling routes to develop effective export and
related border controls. The EXBS program is funded and managed
by the State Department's Bureau of Nonproliferation and draws
on expertise from a number of U.S. agencies and the private
sector. The program assists governments in strengthening their
export controls by improving their legal and regulatory
frameworks, licensing processes, border control and
investigative capabilities, outreach to industry, and
interagency coordination.
This program has placed 21 program advisors in 14 countries
to assist the coordination of export control/border security
activities. The program continues to register successes: new
cooperative relationships have been established with key
transit/transshipment and potential supplier states; a number
of countries have adopted, or are adopting, export and
transshipment control laws and regulations, including ``catch-
all'' controls and controls on arms brokering, largely based on
U.S. advice; the EXBS program has contributed to a significant
increase of border security capabilities in former Soviet
states, and Central and SouthernEurope; and various countries'
enforcement agencies have used U.S. equipment and training to interdict
the movement of arms, related items, and radioactive materials across
the borders.
Finally, export controls play an important role in enabling
and enhancing legitimate trade. They provide a means to permit
dual-use exports to proceed under circumstances where, without
export control scrutiny, the only prudent course would be to
prohibit them. They help build confidence between countries
applying similar controls that, in turn, results in increased
trade. Each of the WMD and missile nonproliferation regimes,
for example, has a ``no undercut'' policy committing each
member not to make an export that another has denied for
nonproliferation reasons and notified to the rest--unless it
first consults with the original denying country. Not only does
this policy make it more difficult for proliferators to get
items from regime members, it also establishes a ``level
playing field'' for exporters.
THREAT REDUCTION AND NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE TO THE FORMER SOVIET
STATES
The President has made clear repeatedly that his
Administration is committed to strong, effective cooperation
with Russia and the other former Soviet states to reduce WMD
and prevent their proliferation. Programs geared towards the
former Soviet states include the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program (CTR), Department of Energy nuclear nonproliferation
programs, and State Department programs, including the Science
and Technology Centers in Russia and Ukraine. These programs
seek to reduce weapons and materials of mass destruction,
secure those which remains, and redirect former Soviet WMD
scientists towards peaceful projects and away from rogue states
and terrorists.
Under the relevant legislation, CTR assistance may be
provided to the independent states of the former Soviet Union
only if the President (whose authority has been delegated to
the Secretary of State) certifies to Congress, for each fiscal
year, that the proposed recipient country is committed to
certain courses of action. Beginning in FY 2003, Congress gave
the President the authority to waive CTR (as well as FREEDOM
Support Act Title V) certification requirements for any
recipient state if he certifies to Congress that the waiver is
important to the national security interests of the United
States and submits a report.
The Secretary of State did not certify Russia for CTR and
FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) Title V assistance for FY 2002 and FY
2003 because of concerns regarding Russia's commitment to
complying with all relevant arms control agreements and
foregoing any military modernization program that exceeds
legitimate defense requirements. In January 2003, the President
exercised his authority to waive the CTR and FSA Title V
certification requirements for Russia for FY 2003, and new
obligations for Russia under CTR and FSA Title V have resumed.
The Secretary subsequently certified the following
countries for CTR and FSA Title V assistance for FY 2003:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan on February 19, 2003; Ukraine and Kazakhstan on
March 19, 2003; ;and Moldova on April 5, 2003.
EXPENDITURES
Pursuant to Section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act
(50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), there were no specific expenditures
incurred, which are directly attributable to the exercise of
authorities conferred by the declaration of the national
emergency in Executive Order 12938, as amended, during the
reporting period from November 13, 2002 through May 14, 2003.