[House Hearing, 105 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1999
_______________________________________________________________________
HEARINGS
BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida, Chairman
JOSEPH M. McDADE, Pennsylvania JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania
BOB LIVINGSTON, Louisiana NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
JERRY LEWIS, California W. G. (BILL) HEFNER, North Carolina
JOE SKEEN, New Mexico MARTIN OLAV SABO, Minnesota
DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio JULIAN C. DIXON, California
HENRY BONILLA, Texas PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, Jr.,
Washington
ERNEST J. ISTOOK, Jr., Oklahoma
RANDY ``DUKE'' CUNNINGHAM,
California
NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Livingston, as Chairman of the Full
Committee, and Mr. Obey, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full
Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.
Kevin M. Roper, David F. Kilian, Alicia Jones, Juliet Pacquing,
Gregory J. Walters, Patricia Ryan, Doug Gregory, Paul W. Juola, Tina
Jonas, Steven D. Nixon,
David L. Norquist, and Betsy Phillips, Staff Assistants
Jennifer Mummert and Sherry L. Young, Administrative Aides
________
PART 2
Page
Commanders in Chief:
Central Command and European Command........................... 1
Special Operations Command..................................... 133
Pacific Command and United States Forces, Korea................ 211
Testimony of Members of Congress and Other Interested Individuals
and Organizations................................................. 337
________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
77-604 WASHINGTON : 2002
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
BOB LIVINGSTON, Louisiana, Chairman
JOSEPH M. McDADE, Pennsylvania DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin
C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida SIDNEY R. YATES, Illinois
RALPH REGULA, Ohio LOUIS STOKES, Ohio
JERRY LEWIS, California JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania
JOHN EDWARD PORTER, Illinois NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky MARTIN OLAV SABO, Minnesota
JOE SKEEN, New Mexico JULIAN C. DIXON, California
FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia VIC FAZIO, California
TOM DeLAY, Texas W. G. (BILL) HEFNER, North Carolina
JIM KOLBE, Arizona STENY H. HOYER, Maryland
RON PACKARD, California ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia
SONNY CALLAHAN, Alabama MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
JAMES T. WALSH, New York DAVID E. SKAGGS, Colorado
CHARLES H. TAYLOR, North Carolina NANCY PELOSI, California
DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
ERNEST J. ISTOOK, Jr., Oklahoma ESTEBAN EDWARD TORRES, California
HENRY BONILLA, Texas NITA M. LOWEY, New York
JOE KNOLLENBERG, Michigan JOSE E. SERRANO, New York
DAN MILLER, Florida ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut
JAY DICKEY, Arkansas JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
JACK KINGSTON, Georgia JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts
MIKE PARKER, Mississippi ED PASTOR, Arizona
RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey CARRIE P. MEEK, Florida
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina
MICHAEL P. FORBES, New York CHET EDWARDS, Texas
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, Jr., ROBERT E. (BUD) CRAMER, Jr.,
Washington Alabama
MARK W. NEUMANN, Wisconsin
RANDY ``DUKE'' CUNNINGHAM,
California
TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
ZACH WAMP, Tennessee
TOM LATHAM, Iowa
ANNE M. NORTHUP, Kentucky
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
James W. Dyer, Clerk and Staff Director
(ii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1999
----------
Tuesday, March 17, 1998.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND AND COMMANDER IN
CHIEF, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
WITNESSES
GENERAL ANTHONY C. ZINNI, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES CENTRAL
COMMAND, U.S. MARINE CORPS
GENERAL WESLEY K. CLARK, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN
COMMAND, U.S. ARMY
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order. This afternoon
we are very happy to welcome General Wesley Clark, Commander in
Chief of the United States European Command, and General
Anthony Zinni, Commander in Chief of the United States Central
Command.
We thought we would take the opportunity to have both of
you appear before the Committee together inasmuch as you have
done this before. Your respective commands are continuous, your
geographical responsibilities are immense and growing, and
between the two of you, you seem to own most of the pressing
operational problems faced by the U.S. forces today.
General Clark, you are leading our forces deployed in the
Balkans as they help to create a self-sustaining peace in that
region. We are proud of the achievements of the troops under
your command to date, and a number of us visited with you and
your troops just this past week, and we cannot tell you how
impressed we were with the conduct and accomplishments of those
soldiers. But we do have questions and concerns about the
purpose of what seems to be an indefinite presence in Bosnia.
You are also dealing with the not inconsequential matter of
NATO expansion and the committee is interested in what this
development means to you as the regional CINC.
General Zinni, you need to worry about backing up American
diplomacy in the Persian Gulf and the long-term containment of
a brutal and oppressive Iraqi regime. As we sit here today, you
are leading a significant force in the Gulf that may have to
act if Saddam Hussein does not comply with the latest U.N.
agreement concerning their weapons of mass destruction program.
We are also proud of what your troops have accomplished today
and as we visited with you and some of your troops in October
in the region, and again very, very proud of the way they
conduct themselves and the accomplishments and what you have
been able to do there.
In addition to issues dealing with your respective
commands, some of the key questions the Committee would like to
address are:
Are the resources at your disposal for each of your
contingencies sufficient?
What would be the impact to your commands of not having a
timely disposition of the fiscal year 1998 emergency
supplemental or even having to offset it as some have
suggested?
And what are the effects on the readiness and morale of
forces under your command as you face near constant deployments
in your operating areas?
The hearing is closed this afternoon and so we are looking
forward to a very candid discussion today with you on these
issues. After you briefly summarize your statements, which will
be placed in their entirety in the record, we will then proceed
to questioning.
Now I would like to yield to Mr. Murtha.
Remarks of Mr. Murtha
Mr. Murtha. Let met add my welcome to these two
distinguished gentleman and say to General Zinni, the Chief of
the Egyptian Armed Forces was very complimentary about your
work.
Of course, General Clark, the Secretary of Defense has
commented a number of times. I understand you are pushing to
try to get an expansion into Macedonia, more forces in
Macedonia, and I like that idea. I was the one that recommended
we put troops there in the first place, because I felt we
needed a buffer there, we needed to show them we are serious
about what is going on over there. So I look forward to hearing
your testimony.
One other thing I will add. I remember during the Beirut
crisis what a difficult thing it was to coordinate that little
area there because it is so close to each other's area of
responsibility. So I know how important it is. I think the
Chairman is absolutely right in having both of you in, because
there is close responsibility and such a need for coordination
between the two commands.
Mr. Young. Okay, General Clark, we will start with you,
sir. As I said, your entire statement will be placed in the
record, and then you should get geared up for some good
questions.
Summary Statement of General Clark
General Clark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
thank you and the members of this Committee for your great
support of all of our service members and their families in our
command in Europe. I would also like to thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today and describe the
contributions of the command to our affairs and interests in
Europe, Africa and the Middle East.
It is a time of historic opportunity and challenge in
Europe. The threat of massive attack across the inter-German
border has been replaced by a plethora of other problems,
including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, environmental
degradation, refugee migration, and, most importantly, the
instability in the region fueled by ethnic and regional
conflict.
EUROPEAN COMMAND THREATS
We believe we have to deal with these concerns and we have
to deal with them early, before they become more serious
problems. So the strategy that the U.S. European Command is
pursuing today is a strategy focused on shaping the
international environment to address these more ambiguous
challenges and to prevent conflicts before they arise.
We also recognize we have to be ready to respond quickly
with appropriate force to deal with the conflict and to defeat
an aggressor. Maintaining our readiness ensures we canrespond
with sufficient trained and ready forces for any future operation, and
our superb forces are engaged today in Bosnia, Africa, and in support
of current operations in CENTCOM.
BOSNIA OPERATION
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, we believe our efforts are
continuing to show the progressive markers of success, thanks
to the great work of our soldiers and the support of our
allies. I visit our troops in Bosnia and assess the situation
on the ground personally several times each month. I was there
last Thursday. Troop morale was good. The situation in Brcko
was well in hand, and I think we are making progress.
The progress, of course, is necessary, but the progress
also requires continued military presence. Our forces there are
deterring renewed conflict, they are helping maintain a secure
environment, and they are supporting the implementation of the
accords, to the point that we can achieve a self-sustaining
normalization.
Planning is well under way for our part of the follow-on
force. Of course, funding for that force is a key part of what
we will be discussing today.
NATO EXPANSION
NATO remains the foundation for our engagement in Europe.
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are eagerly awaiting
parliamentary ratification of their succession into this great
organization. I visited each country in the last month, met
with their leadership, many of their top units. They have
waited many, many years for this historic moment and this great
opportunity to join the West. Their troops are surprisingly
effective. Their leaders are committed. They want to dedicate
the resources, they want to join us, and I believe they will
make significant and meaningful contributions to the alliance.
PERSONNEL ISSUES
For the men and women in our command, the missions
continue, operational tempo is high, and I think all the people
in the United States should be very proud of the work of our
service members and their families over there. They are keeping
their readiness sharp in the face of a lot of challenges.
Force protection is our highest priority, Mr. Chairman,
because our most precious resource is the soldiers, sailors,
airmen, marines, civilian employees and their families, but we
also have to be concerned about quality of life, because that
directly impacts our readiness, our retention. It impacts
family life, morale, and our mission accomplishment.
Our biggest quality-of-life problem is the deplorable
conditions of our barracks and housing in Europe. We have got
some 11,000 family quarters that were built in the early 1950s
that have never been renovated. Everything from electrical
problems to sewage leaks and other things are coming out as a
consequence. This is a problem associated with the shortage of
construction and major repair funds. That is compounded by an
even more critical shortage of real property maintenance funds.
We really need the supplemental funding and we need an
offset supplemental. If we don't have this, we will be forced
to divert money from already inadequate operations and
maintenance accounts to cover the shortfall.
SUMMARY
Today, U.S. European Command is smaller, leaner and
probably more heavily tasked than at any time in our history. I
think our men and women are up to the challenge. They are doing
a great job, but we do need resources. We need the current
force structure and we need sufficient operations
infrastructure and quality-of-life funding to meet our urgent
needs. With the continued help and leadership of this
committee, we will get the job done over there.
Again, thank you very much for the opportunity to be here,
and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The statement of General Clark follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. General Clark, thank you very much. Let me turn
now to General Zinni. Then we will get to the questions.
Summary Statement of General Zinni
General Zinni. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a brief
opening statement. First I thought I would give a brief wrap-up
of the situation as it stands today. I think everyone knows
that UNSCOM is inspecting. We have had an intrusive inspection,
and their normal routine inspections are ongoing. We monitor
those very closely. So far we have seen cooperation. I think it
is going to take a test of time to ensure that we do have the
compliance and cooperation that is desired. Until we are
assured of that, the current force levels should remain in
place. ------. I would say that these troops have come to me in
a fine state of readiness, with high morale. I have no assigned
forces, so I draw on CINCs like General Clark and the other
CINCs that are my force providers. I do know they pay a big
cost to keep these forces out in the Gulf and to keep our
interests protected.
I am keenly aware, through my service components, of those
costs. I am very appreciative of the fact that thesupplemental
has been voted out of your subcommittees, and I back up General Clark's
statements that this is critical for us to be able to keep going.
I would also like to mention very briefly something that
may have been misunderstood, and that is the support we have
had from our allies in the Gulf. I think a lot of focus and
misrepresentation was maybe misleading in giving the impression
that they were not supportive. ------.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of General Zinni follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much. Excuse me just one
second.
I would like to recognize Mr. Livingston, the Chairman of
the Appropriations Committee.
SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET REQUEST
Mr. Livingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief.
Gentleman, I apologize for just bouncing in and out. You
all are in charge of some very, very significant problems
facing this Country, and as Chairman of the Appropriations
Committee, I just want to tell you we want to work with you to
try to get through these immediate problems that you are
facing, at least give you the money and the wherewithal that
you need to do it. We are going to be, with the help of the
Chairman here, launching the path for our supplemental, and it
is my great hope that we will get it through the Congress with
as little controversy and fanfare as possible. But we want you
and the troops that you lead and represent to have the
wherewithal that they need to do the job that we are so proud
of.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. General Zinni, as you mentioned, this
subcommittee has reported out a supplemental without offsets.
That is the first time in a number of years we have done that.
We hope we are going to be able to maintain this position
through the consideration by the full committee and by the
House and by the full Congress, because we all recognize the
serious problems that we are causing by offsetting these
extensive contingencies from the regular budgets of the
services.
So we keep our fingers crossed that we can maintain the
position that the subcommittee took on last week.
Now, because we have such important visitors, I know all
the members have a lot of questions, I don't want to run out of
time before we get to Mr. Cunningham again like we have done
the past several times, so we are going to adhere strictly to
the 5-minute rule and get a chance to go around the table a
couple of times if we do that.
I would like to yield now, since I have had a chance to
visit with both of you in your areas of responsibility and more
recently in personal conversations, I will yield my time to Mr.
Lewis for 5 minutes.
SITUATION IN THE GULF REGION
Mr. Lewis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General Clark
and General Zinni, thank you very much for making the effort to
get here. We know the difficulty that you are facing these
days, and we appreciate this effort.
General Zinni, you have been quoted as saying that it is
only a matter of time until Saddam Hussein breaks the latest
agreement with the United Nations. Can you elaborate more on
that view for the Committee?
General Zinni. Sir, I think if you look back from the end
of the Gulf War until now, ------. I think as long as sanctions
and the pressure are on, he is not going to be happy with that,
and we will see a return to that pattern shortly.
U.S. FORCES READINESS IN THE GULF
Mr. Lewis. General, in view of that, how long can you hold
the present force in the Gulf together at readiness rates
significant to conduct air strikes should they become
necessary?
General Zinni. ------. We have proven that we can get
there. I was extremely proud about how the flow of forces went.
Again, I attribute this to my supporting CINCs that have
provided the forces and CINCs like Transportation Command. ----
--.
IRAQI THREAT ASSESMENT
Mr. Lewis. General, update the Committee as to the status
of the threat posed by the Iraqi regime, and in your answer
would you include the following: the Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction program; the state of conventional force
modernization; and recent activities in support of
international terrorism.
General Zinni. Sir, I will take the conventional forces
first. I think Saddam Hussein would have modernized his forces
by now had he been allowed to do so without the sanctions. He
is running some equipment that is getting a little old. ------.
Mr. Lewis. Well, if the UNSCOM mission was to fail and we
did nothing, how long would it take the Iraqis to fully
reconstitute the WMD development program?
General Zinni. Sir, I would say if they were left with no
monitoring and no inspection. ------.
Mr. Lewis. Okay. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Lewis. Mr. Murtha.
DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES
Mr. Murtha. Do we have any problem with coordination of
deployment? I know when we had a problem in Zaire, the troops
had to land in the Congo because of some problems of
coordination. Are there any problems like that of coordination,
we deploy our troops? It is a very small deployment, but it
always worried me that there was a problem of coordination
there. Do we have any kind of problem like that now?
General Clark. We have no problem that I know of,
Congressman, but before any deployment, we have got to be sure
that we have the permission of the countries that we have to
overfly, the countries we have to stage in, and there are
varying degrees of diplomatic sensitivity with every one of
these deployments. So every on is a case in itself.
Mr. Murtha. Wouldn't we get the deployment for the troops
on the airplanes out and movement out before we landed?
General Clark. Absolutely.
Mr. Murtha. Yet in this case, we thought we were going to
Zaire and we landed in the Congo.
General Clark. I can't address that issue. Those troops
were down there before I was the commander, and they didn't
stay very long. I just don't have the information on that.
Mr. Murtha. So at any rate, you don't know of any
coordination problems there actually are now?
General Clark. No, I don't. In fact, I tell you our
coordination for our European allies for work in Africa is
better now than it ever has been.
KOSOVO
Mr. Murtha. Let me mention two other things, not questions.
One, I know you and I differ on these war criminals, but I have
a great concern about being aggressive with the war criminals.
I think it has worked out very well the way it is working now.
But my caution--and the Chairman and myself and Mr.
Livingston and Mr. Obey met with the national security team,
and we told them the same thing. Our concern is what happened
in Somalia and the danger of being aggressive and reaction and
the vulnerability of our troops in a place like Brcko. So I
just always feel it is necessary to caution you, as I did
General Joulwan before you took over, about my concern about
it.
The other was Kosovo. We have had a long concern about
Kosovo. For 2 or 3 years we expected that place to flare up,
and it hasn't until just recently. How serious is the problem
in Kosovo and what do you see happening there?
General Clark. I think the problem in Kosovo is very
serious. I see it getting progressively worse because, over
time, the opinion among the Albanians has been progressively
radicalized. Their opposition to Serbian dominance has been
strengthened. They are building support networks in Western
Europe. Those Albanians and that support is now returning. They
have also contacted Iran for support. At the same time, Russian
diplomacy is now strongly in support of Milosevic. So we are
heading toward a much more difficult period in Kosovo.
BALKAN WAR CRIMINALS
With respect to the war criminals, Congressman, I hope you
don't believe everything you read in the press about me on that
subject. Sometimes my friend Bob Gelbard gets carried away
about this. We have done nothing there that we haven't
thoroughly looked at very carefully, worked through all of the
possible outcomes, measured the risk, made sure we were totally
capable of handling not only the action but the consequences,
and we have seen the payoff from the very limited actions we
have taken. We now have people talking to us and wanting to
surrender because they know that they are in danger.
We are casting a big, big shadow over there. There is one
thing those people in Bosnia understand, and the rest of that
region of the world; they understand force and they understand
the United States and they respect us, and they are a little
bit afraid of us. We sure want to keep them that way.
Mr. Murtha. There is no question in my mind without the
deployment of the United States, leadership of the United
States forces and deployment of our forces, this fighting would
still be going on. It has been an impressive success up to this
point. I just am always concerned we will go too far because of
our enthusiasm in trying to get rid of these war criminals. All
of us deplore it, but we are just worried that we could have
some casualties, unnecessarily, if we go too far, too fast.
General Clark. Yes, sir, I understand.
Mr. Young. Mr. Skeen.
Mr. Skeen. I yield my time.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hefner.
SANCTIONS UPDATE
Mr. Hefner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The sanctions. I think
that is probably what Saddam would like to have, the sanctions
lifted, and we are fighting a battle on PR for sanctions as far
as the people go. But it seems what you are telling us is that
as long as the sanctions stay in place, even prohibiting him
from modernizing his forces and what have you, even though he
is probably using the money that he is allowed to sell oil for
his own agenda, but the people are suffering. Do we need to
keep the sanctions?
General Zinni. Sir, if I could answer that in two parts.
First, if he used the Oil for Food program properly--and there
is a lot of propaganda value for him contending that the
bureaucracy set up deliberately is done sothe food won't get to
the people, when actually he is the cause--if he used that properly, he
would be able to care for his people.
In terms of the sanctions, if the sanctions were lifted, --
----.
Mr. Hefner. Well, one other question. When we were on the
borderline of doing a strike against Iraq, at the last moment
they reached an agreement. Were you fairly well satisfied that
the targets that you had targeted would have been effective? I
don't know the magnitude of what it would have been, but do you
feel like it would have been effective in putting some, in down
home talk, some ``hurt'' on Saddam Hussein if you did a strike?
General Zinni. Yes, sir. Our mission was twofold. One was
to diminish his ability to threaten his neighbors. So obviously
those kinds of forces that we can identify, see, target, that
would present those kinds of opportunity for him, Republican
Guards, others, we can obviously target and diminish
significantly. ------.
INFRASTRUCTURE
Mr. Hefner. One other question about Bosnia. I have been
real impressed by the job we have been able to do there, and we
don't see the carnage every night on television about children.
But is one of the keys to making this an ongoing successful
operation is investment in infrastructure? We asked that
question here the other day: when you make investments in
infrastructure; where people can have jobs. Is that a big part
of the success?
General Clark. Yes, sir, it is. It is a very big part of
the success.
Mr. Hefner. How is it coming?
General Clark. It is coming, I would say on a scale of zero
to 10, it is about a 4. The reason it is not better is twofold.
First, because there is still a lot of corruption in the
political systems, particularly in the Federation side, between
the Bosnians and the Croats. There has been an awful lot of
funds diverted into private party coffers that could have gone
to infrastructure funding. Secondly, because some countries
haven't ponied up their full share of the infrastructure
funding.
So we are making headway. One of the key challenges,
though, that we are going to be facing is to bring refugees
home. They have to have jobs. To have jobs there has got to be
the investment in the basic power industry. You have to get
that restarted. They have to open up lines of communication.
That means roads and bridges have got to be put in. And it is
going to take a lot of international civilian effort to do
that. These aren't things the United States Armed Forces can
do.
Mr. Hefner. I thank you, gentleman. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Nethercutt. Mr. Nethercutt just recently
returned from the region, General Clark. He had a chance to
visit with you there at SFOR headquarters.
EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, General.
General Zinni, I have heard you talk about sanctions with
regard to Iraq, and I know we have seen reports that the oil is
coming out of that country and perhaps money is coming back in
surreptitiously. I am wondering to what extent you feel we have
the ability to tighten sanctions, and, if so, what should we
do? To what extent is the oil smuggling helping the
modernization effort of Saddam Hussein?
General Zinni. ------.
IRANIAN POLICY
Mr. Nethercutt. With regard to Iran and President Khatemi
reaching out and appearing to be a moderate and seeking some
measure of peace or relationship with the United States, to
what extent do you see that as a pretext for their continuing
modernization efforts? Do you see an inconsistency there that
you can talk about here?
General Zinni. I believe there are two leadership factions
in Iran now. ------.
Mr. Nethercutt. Are you worried about their military
capability at this point?
General Zinni. ------.
THE DANGERS OF FUNDAMENTALISM
Mr. Young. Mr. Cunningham.
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good that I
have got both of you here representing Europe and theIraq-Iran
area, because my major concern is the fundamentalists movements all
over the planet. I feel that in many cases, the Mujahedin and Hamas
from Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan have moved into Bosnia, and with the
United States, the continuation of us arming and training the Muslims,
I feel if we pulled out today there would be conflict, whether it is
Kosovo or somewhere else; but if we stay, with an increasing movement
of Izetbegovic and Silajdzic toward Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan, that
when we do pull out, and if we keep arming, then we are inviting
disaster even more so in the future, because then it is going to be the
fundamentalists that they go after. And we are not talking just Muslim,
we are talking hard-core, well trained, experienced individuals that
are infiltrating the whole area in great numbers.
Do you agree with that?
General Clark. I would say this, Congressman, that we are
not going to prevent Islamic arms reaching Bosnia by stopping
our Train and Equip program. We put our Train and Equip program
in place. I don't have anything to do with it in my current
position, by the way, but it was put in place as matter of U.S.
national policy, because we wanted to drive out Iranian and
Fundamentalist influence, and at the same time provide a basis
for a sure answer and confidence among both Bosnian and Bosnian
and Croat populace living in the Federation that they would no
longer be subjected to Serb long-range artillery attacks that
we were defenseless against. That is why Train and Equip was
put in. I think it is serving that purpose.
But to further reduce Iranian and Fundamentalist influence,
we have to take a different tactic. We have got to identify
those people that are there, we have got to confront them, and
we have got to get them out. There were actions under way to do
that. A number of them have left. We haven't broken all of the
ties with the leadership, clearly. We know Izetbegovic and
Solidavich continue to go back there, they are receiving a lot
of money from not only Iran, but countries like Qatar, and they
are still connected.
Now, we are not going to see real light at the end of the
tunnel in Bosnia until we get a new generation of leadership in
there, and that includes a new generation of leadership there
among the Muslim group, people that are committed to
implementing the Dayton agreements and implementing a multi-
ethnic Bosnia.
Mr. Cunningham. I guess my real question is, do you think
it is a danger for us to continue dumping our arms in there and
training, that when we do pull out, then this is going to be
like a wave coming back at the surge?
General Clark. No, sir, I do not think it is a danger. I
think it would be a mistake for us to stop the Train and Equip
program. I think we want to follow through with that and use
that as its leverage to build a democratic force and a western-
oriented force inside the Federation and take other measures to
diminish the Fundamentalist influence.
INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES
Mr. Cunningham. Okay. Do you have a pretty good, in both
Iraq and Bosnia, pretty good coordination with our intelligence
services? We had CIA brief us. Do you work pretty candidly with
those agents and do they have enough forces in the country?
General Zinni. Yes, sir. Obviously we have a representative
in our headquarters. All the intelligence agencies are tied in
with us and tied together. We feel we have a good picture. I
would like to see more HUMINT Intelligence on the ground in
both places. I think that is where we are woefully inadequate
in both countries, Iran and Iraq.
Mr. Cunningham. Do you have any compartmentalization
problems, where you are getting the different conflicts, we had
problems, we couldn't find out where it was, where it was
coming from, the information? Are you getting pretty well-
versed information?
General Zinni. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, I have been
to CIA headquarters several times and received briefings I felt
were more than adequate. Additionally, some degree of
compartmentalization of intelligence is required to protect
human and technical sources.
General Clark. I think we are doing very well in Bosnia. --
----. General Shinseki gets it on the ground in Bosnia, I get
it in my headquarters in Belgium, and I think it is a very good
connection.
Mr. Cunningham. I don't know, do I have a minute, or is
that it? That is it.
Mr. Young. You are going to get a second chance, though.
Mr. Visclosky.
U.S. BASING RIGHTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Zinni, as
far as the basing in Saudi Arabia and Turkey, apparently as far
as a strike against Iraq, we would not be allowed to base
planes and personnel in those countries. Is there any progress
being made as far as the basing issue?
General Zinni. ------.
TURKEY
Mr. Visclosky. What about Turkey?
General Clark. With respect to Turkey, in the EUCOM AOR, we
have an operation flying from there, operation Northern Watch.
The Turks accommodated an expansion of that program so we could
keep roughly 12 hours a day in the skies to deny the no-fly
zone north of the 36th parallel. They gave strong indications
they didn't want to support strikes down there; on the other
hand, they have been cooperative in many other areas. We have
multiple interconnections and dialogues going on with Turkey.
We didn't need to launch strikes from Turkey to support General
Zinni's program. Had we done so and had we put the pressure on,
we might well have gotten the answer we wanted.
Mr. Visclosky. For both gentlemen, is that a change? Is
there a subtle change going on? Is that a deterioration of what
their position may have been, even if it is 1 out of 8 or 9
maybe in the end we could have, is that a deterioration, or has
that been constant?
General Zinni. ------.
General Clark. If I could answer with respect to Turkey,I
think we should be very concerned about our relationship with Turkey. I
think Turkey is a country that is on the brink of descending into chaos
right now. They are trying to cope with the increasing growth of
fundamentalism. They have been excluded from the European Union because
of their non-democratic constitution, and frankly because of the
prejudices of a number of European countries against their workers.
They are feeling isolated and beset, including under attack from us
because of their human rights policies, and they are having a very hard
time coping right now. There are those who are more familiar than I
with the situation in Iran in the early 1970s, who see overtones of the
same destabilizing constellation of forces that converged in Iraq. They
see them moving toward Turkey now.
COMPOSITION OF FORCE STRUCTURE
Mr. Visclosky. Would either of you believe that we should
be looking at restructuring some of our forces because of, at
least in the case of Turkey now, these developments? Is there
something we should be looking ahead to as far as a change in
the force structure?
General Clark. With respect to Turkey, I don't see it as a
force structure issue, I see it as an issue for American
diplomacy and our ability to persuade our NATO allies that the
European Union has a vital interest in Turkey as well, and has
to avoid the tendency to draw Europe's southeastern boundary
along the perimeter of the Greek islands off Turkey's Aegean
coast. I think it is a matter for diplomacy at this stage, and
there is only a limited amount we can do, even with military
dialogue, and nothing with force structure.
General Zinni. Sir, I feel in our region we have kept the
force posture very flexible. ------. We have Operation Southern
Watch running out of several countries there, but we view that
only in terms of as long as sanctions are on and that
particular sanction is maintained. We have tried not to get
many fixed installations and we have tried to spread the wealth
and our presence out there. I think I would recommend we
continue that kind of flexibility. ------.
LENGTH OF CURRENT DEPLOYMENTS
Mr. Young. Generals, as we proceed with this supplemental,
we are going to get hit with a lot of questions from a lot of
Members who think we should not be facing down Saddam, who
think we should not be in Bosnia, and they are concerned about
what we might be thinking about doing in Kosovo.
My general question is going to be what do you see in the
future. How long are we going to be deployed in your respective
regions? The question becomes fairly important to me after our
visit last week, General Clark. We had a very interesting
session in Brcko. After having seen all of the stability in the
country because of your forces there, but in Brcko the Dayton
agreement had not been implemented, and now there has been an
announcement it will be put off until 1999. Our delegation had
an interesting experience. We had a version of a town meeting
in Brcko with a group of folks that represented different
organization, and they were Muslims and Serbs.
It started off in a very friendly way and people were
smiling and we were exchanging questions and answers. But 10 or
15 minutes into the session, our guests were standing and
shaking their fists at each other and shouting. I am not sure
what they were saying, but it was loud.
In view of this tension that existed there, are we going to
have difficulty ever establishing a situation where they are
going to get along without the presence of our troops there?
The same thing, General Zinni, in your region. We watched
Saddam cheating and then retreating, and then cheating and then
retreating. We deployed and then we withdraw.
Both of you, just tell us what you see in the future as to
our presence, because we are going to get bombarded with those
kinds of questions when this supplemental gets on the floor.
BOSNIA
General Clark. I can't comment on the specifics of your
town hall meeting there, Mr. Chairman, because I don't know
exactly who was there. I was in Brcko on Thursday with the
Secretary General and we met the three mayors, and it was a
much different atmosphere. But a lot of the inter-ethnic strife
in Bosnia at least is contrived. It is contrived by political
forces who profit from ethnic division and tension, and who
exploit the people there to serve their own personal interests
and political gain and financial aggrandizement. We know that.
We have seen new leadership come to the fore in the
Republic of Sprska. As we see new leadership in the Federation,
I think we are going to see a different attitude on the part of
the people there. Many of the people in Brcko are refugees from
Sarajevo. They have been invited to return now to Sarajevo.
President Izetbegovic has become increasingly more
accommodating on the refugee return issue, and I think that is
going to diffuse tensions also.
On the other hand, we shouldn't underestimate the
importance of Brcko symbolically. This was the last peace not
resolved at Dayton. It was the tie breaker that got us the
Dayton agreement. The agreement had collapsed until Milosevic
agreed to arbitration. We were never able to agree on what
Brcko consisted of. We couldn't draw a map on it. It is going
to be hotly contested. We couldn't have a decision made with
the new government because that would have undercut them
entirely in their efforts.
We shall be looking at what to do in the November-December
time frame. But again and again when I go to Bosnia, I am
impressed by the fact when you talk to people, they just want
to get on with their lives. These people have had enough of
conflict, they have had enough of division, and let alone they
will go back to their homes and reestablish their relationships
and businesses and other things, and we will have peace in
there.
So I don't see this as an endless commitment. I see it as
rather something we have got to work the process here, we have
got to get the balance of forces right, and then we have got to
let the good aspects of human nature take over, which they will
in that region.
General Zinni. Sir, two-thirds of the world's oil is in my
part of the world, plus a large percentage of the natural gas
and other energy sources. ------ and General Clark also has the
other partof the Caspian Basin, the Caucasus, with equal
amounts of energy.
Access to this region is going to be critical to us in the
future, to the markets and to the energy sources. The transit
through this region, the Suez Canal, Strait of Hormuz, the Bab
al-Mandab, these are narrow straits that we require freedom of
navigation through, and overflight of. Instability in this
region, as was mentioned by Mr. Cunningham, can spread
throughout the world. It isn't confined to any kind of
religious or ethnic problems that blow up. It seems to scatter
to the winds, be it terrorism, fundamentalism or whatever. ----
--. Just the general instability in this region that can spread
is a concern. The number of border, ethnic, and religious
disputes, along with fights over water which will be the fuel
of war in the future, more so than oil in this region, do not
look good. So I see the important of this region for us to be
great for a long time to come.
Mr. Young. General Zinni, I think maybe I wasn't specific
enough in my question as it related to you. I was actually
talking about the increased deployments that we have seen just
in the recent weeks. I certainly agree with what you said about
the importance of our presence in that region, but I wonder
about the increased force.
General Zinni. ------.
Mr. Young. Mr. Murtha.
Mr. Murtha. No further questions.
Mr. Young. Mr. Lewis.
IRAN UPDATE
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Clark, not a
question, but your general description of the region and
comments regarding Turkey especially have piqued my interest
and I think the Committee should focus in a special way on
those problems.
But, General Zinni, you too pointing to just how vital this
region is to us, economically and otherwise, causes me to want
to extend some of the questions of Mr. Nethercutt relative to
Iran. Last May, a relatively moderate government theoretically
was elected, and yet you say the hardliners are still in
control.
What is your assessment of the intentions of the new regime
and do you believe that we have any genuine--do we have a
change to improve relations with Iranians?
General Zinni. ------.
Mr. Lewis. Knowing where our friends and opportunities are
has always been difficult in the region, the need for Intel,
especially HUMINT, is good comments as well.
Would you update the Committee on the current status of
Iran's efforts to first acquire weapons of mass destruction and
offensive missile capability and further support of terrorist
activities?
General Zinni. ------.
Mr. Lewis. Finally, General Zinni, given the slight changes
in the environment in Iran, has there been a change in the
military-to-military relationships with that country?
General Zinni. ------.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hefner.
BOSNIA ECONOMICS
Mr. Hefner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a brief
comment or question. As I am listening to your explanations, it
would seem to me that the overriding key--you talked about the
town hall meetings where the people are shouting at each other,
if they have jobs and their kids are going to school and there
is some peaceful existence--is how much of a part of this whole
conflict is economics?
General Clark. It wasn't the major part initially, but it
is going to be probably the major part in restoring harmony in
the country. If we had the job opportunities right now, we
could bring the refugees home, we being the international
community, not SFOR but the international community could bring
these refugees home much more quickly. As it is when you fly
over communities there, you see that 5 out of 6 factories are
shut down. In Brcko, for example, really the only industry
going in Brcko is the alcoholic beverage industry and the bars
at night, because the river ports are not open, there is no
commerce allowed by President Tudjman into Croatia if you are a
Serb.
This has been a real problem for them. The electric power
industry doesn't work, or the water works, so they don't get
water flowing through the tap a lot of the time. They need a
lot of investment. They need jobs, and this is what is going to
really bring this country back.
Mr. Hefner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Skeen.
LANDMINES IN BOSNIA
Mr. Skeen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Zinni and
General Clark, this may seem like a very small problem, but how
heavy is the land mine situation in Bosnia and Kosovo and
Serbia?
General Clark. There are a lot of land mines in Bosnia. I
can't address the situation in Serbia. There are some there, no
doubt, along the border with Macedonia, but they are not widely
scattered yet because there hasn't been open fighting. In
Bosnia there are several million land mines which are still
there.
We have a demining process that is under way. We require
each of the former warring factions to demine a particular set
of acreage each month. If they don't, they don't get to train
their armed forces. We are also providing demining training for
them. There is also a U.N. effort to do this. But it is going
to take many years to get the mines out.
Really the farmers have discovered the effective way to get
the mines out. They send a herd of goats or sheep across the
countryside, and after that is repeated a few times, that is
the way they know it is safe to walk in the fields.
Mr. Skeen. I read it feels like that is an insult to the
herd.
General Clark. I can understand that, sir.
Mr. Skeen. But it is an ongoing problem and I know it has
been a big problem. The reason I ask is because we have a
development going on in my particular district to locate mines,
both plastic and metal and so forth.
General Clark. I think it is very important we do that. It
needs to be funded and encouraged and we need to get those
developments in place over there.
Mr. Skeen. Sheep, if we could export ours over there, we
would sure like to have the address.
General Clark. Well, there are not enough sheep to do the
job. It is not reliable. But I comment on that because when I
was in Brcko Thursday, I looked out from the Humvee as we were
driving by and we watched a herd of sheep being driven across
this minefield where we will not walk. And so that is the way
it is being done on the ground, hands on, by the local people.
Mr. Skeen. Thank you very much for that answer to that
great problem.
Mr. Young. Mr. Nethercutt.
NATO EXPANSION
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Clark, the expansion of NATO is something that is
under consideration in the Senate and we may get some of that
over here with regard to the funding requirements.
The administration has indicated that the total cost of
expansion for NATO members will be $1.5 billion. There is some
suggestion that perhaps that may be low. What is your sense of
that? How much do you expect the expansion of NATO to cost? Is
the $1.5 billion a good figure or what are you able to say at
this point?
General Clark. I think, first of all, I have to tell you my
headquarters, my NATO headquarters did this study, so I stand
by the $1.5 billion figure as a preliminary estimate.
I have asked for an additional program to be added that
would add to the cost of expansion. I would like to be able to
affirm their interoperability readiness. That means a computer-
assisted exercise simulation program similar to what we use for
the United States Armed Forces that we could put in place for
these Polish, Hungarian, and Czech forces to come in. That is a
marginal increment to the bill. But by and large, it is going
to be in the $1.5 billion range.
That is the common funding that all the existing NATO
members and the new members will share. Of course, they have
several billion dollars of additional expenses of their own. We
have gone through the NATO force goals process with them. I
visited their Presidents and their Defense Ministers. They have
assured me they are going to pay their billings, they are going
to scope the resourcing up so they can be effective
contributors to security so there will be costs, but I think
for the common infrastructure funding, the $1.5 billion cost is
a good cost.
I will tell you also that we are in a dispute with our
European allies who believe that the $1.5 billion should be
absorbed by the ongoing infrastructure budget rather than be an
incremental to the existing budget. I don't know how that is
going to come out. It could be we don't pay anything extra for
these countries. That is certainly the way the French would
like it.
Mr. Nethercutt. General Zinni, on a more personal issue for
me, we have a constituent by the name of Don Hutchings who was
kidnapped in Kashmir in 1995. For the record, I don't expect
you to know this at this point, wondering if you have heard
anything. A group called Al Faran captured him, he is an
American citizen, and we are worried that we don't know where
he is. I don't know if you know anything more. If you do, sir,
for the record I would appreciate you submitting it, or if you
have something now, that would be great.
General Zinni. I am aware of the case, sir. I have no new
information, but I will check with the Pakistanis to see if
they have any insights.
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky.
DEMINING
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Clark, just to get back to mining for one second, I
had asked the Secretary of Defense last week about whether
people are actively still laying mines in Bosnia. He indicated
he did not believe that that was the case, he had no
information. You are closer to this, and I am not looking to
try to trap him, but you are closer to the situation. Do you
have a sense that that may be happening?
General Clark. We don't see that going on. I can't swear
that nobody has ever laid one, but in general it is not going
on.
U.S. BASING IN EUROPE
Mr. Visclosky. Okay. General Clark, on the European basing,
with the drawdown and the situation you face, any sense as to
whether or not the Europeans want your footprint to grow larger
again or smaller than it is today? Do you have any basing
situations that need to be addressed one way or the other?
General Clark. Well, we are adjusting some of our basing.
For example, we are going to try to improve our in-transit
capabilities to support deployments through the theater, so we
are looking to get to move out of, for example, Rhein Main Air
Base and get an expansion of one of our other bases there that
can handle a better load 24 hours a day. But in general, the
Poles, Hungarians and Czechs, of course, would be very happy if
we based forward in their countries.
We are under considerable pressure to keep open the
facility in Hungary that we have right now. When I was in
Poland they were hinting around about how much they would like
to have a NATO headquarters in Poland, and that means a U.S.
presence in Poland. We don't have any intention of doing that.
I think we are solid where we are right now.
What we need to do is concentrate on our infrastructure
money as best we can on improving the quality of life of our
single service members and their families in this region. It
would take an extra $275 million per year between now and 2010
to meet the standards that the Department of Defense has given
us for our family housing in this theater. No money was
invested for 6 years at all by any of the services in Europe in
family housing. This was because we thought the payment in kind
program, which was going to give the German reimbursement as we
turned over facilities, was going to cover it. We thought we
could invest all of our money into the infrastructure
installations we were going to keep back in the United States
and we simply didn't step up and take care of our people in
Europe. So we are woefully underfunded historically for
infrastructure in family quarters and troop billets in the
EUCOM AOR.
Mr. Visclosky. Is the $275 million you mentioned over and
above any budget allocation you currently have?
General Clark. It is.
Mr. Visclosky. That would be through the year 2010, to get
current in that year?
General Clark. That is right.
Mr. Visclosky. I appreciate your comments. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Young. General, are we talking about the need for new
construction or real property maintenance on existing housing,
or both?
General Clark. There are enough SETS; it is the question of
how it could be most economically done. In general the way it
is preferred to be done, is as a whole neighborhood renewal
program, where you take the buildings down. Most of buildings
over there are stairwell-type living, so you are living three
or four floors high, two families on a stairwell, and you have
to take the whole building down. You have to start with the
plumbing and electrical wiring which has not been fixed. You
probably add a little bit of space on the outside so they have
got a second or half-bath addition to the apartments, and this
is between $100,000 and $200,000 per dwelling on average.
Construction costs over there run 40 percent higher than they
do in the United States, as you know. In general, we would be
talking about the existing buildings and then really working
them over.
Mr. Young. Mr. Cunningham.
CHINESE INVOLVEMENT WITH IRAN/IRAQ WMD PROGRAMS
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Generals, there is a straight dichotomy in Iran and Iraq,
they are bitter enemies, but yet they help each other from time
to time, especially with the Fundamentalist groups.
We had reports of different countries, i.e., China, of
shipping in chemical and biological weapons and nuclear
materials. We are talking about sanctions out, but coming
across the border, is there much still coming in to boost up
their capability?
General Zinni. ------.
Mr. Cunningham. The reason I ask, it was reported that
COSCO, Chinese shipping, was stopped with chemical and
biological weapons and nuclear components heading for Iran,
which much of it would end up in Iraq. I didn't know if
intelligence helped you with that at all.
You are both talking about the economics, but if you look
at Northern Ireland, you look at Russia, you look at the Middle
East, Bosnia, all of those, I think if the economy was good
there like it was in the United States, we wouldn't have
anywhere near the problem. The problem we have is there is not
enough money in all the world to help one of those, let alone
all.
We go in investing, I grant you can break out your
checkbook and pay for it if you want, but we deal in $16
billion, looking at an extension of Somalia aid and Bosnia
through the current time, which you are well aware of comes out
of O&M, and the additional forecast costs $35 billion, and you
have OPTEMPO that is high, you have 1970s equipment. These are
all nice things we do to pay for these, but how do we plan on
paying for these? Do you have any ideas, without cutting more
military?
I am just trying to give you an idea of what we have to
look at every day, because the President could have just raised
his budget authority on his budget and we would not have an
emergency supplemental. In my opinion, he didn't want to
identify politically the domestic cuts it would take to change
that budget. He wants Congress to do it or break the budget. It
is going to be difficult to pay for all this, though.
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC STATUS
General Clark. Congressman, I think in some respect you are
into a ``pay me now'' or ``pay me later'' situation here. The
things we are doing over there are cost effective in the long
term, I believe, in terms of preventing conflict and in terms
of extending American influence.
If we look at the situation in Europe today, for example,
where we have got 50 percent of our direct U.S. investment and
30 percent of our exports and 3 million U.S. jobs, stability
there is very, very important to us. A twitch, a problem in
Europe, compounds itself many times over in terms of its impact
at home on our GDP, on our welfare. So I think that the several
billion dollars that we are putting forth to support the
mission on Bosnia could be justified on economic grounds alone.
I would say though with respect to the jobs problem there,
of course, it is clear that the United States Government is not
going to finance the recovery of those economies. Those people
have to recover themselves. What we need to do is give them the
opportunity to do so. I am convinced they will.
Mr. Cunningham. I agree. I worked on a farm once, and I was
going to make a Persian cat and a Siamese cat friends. I had
them on each side of me. I brought them together and they
started fighting, and I brought them closer, and they got
tense; I got them that far apart, and I didn't have a shirt on,
I ended up in a bloody mess.
I don't think in my lifetime we are going to see the Middle
East or in Bosnia a real peace. I think we have got to keep
working that way, just like we are in Russia. But for us to
continue making investments, with the old equipment we have and
the retention rate, and just looking at the military side of
it, and then to stay in a balanced budget--the reason our
economy is doing well in my opinion now economically, to bust
that and to make those kinds of investments, you say it may be
``pay me later'' or ``pay me now,'' but I see it as a disaster
all the way if we stay there a long time.
And I do disagree on the issue of continuing arming the
Muslims. There we are adding claws to one side where the other
has had its claws pulled, and when we pull out, the claws are
going to come out and we are going to end up back in there.
GULF BURDENSHARING
General Zinni. Sir, I would just say the reliance on Middle
East oil is growing. This country's reliance is growing. In a
few years it could be up as high as 25 percent. More
importantly to us, and it affects the global economy, countries
like Japan and areas like Western Europe, it is growing
significantly higher. If the access to that energy is lost or
controlled by a hegemony in an area that is completely chaotic
or instability reigns, it would be disastrous for the world's
economy and ours too. It is a case of pay me now or pay me
later.
I would say one thing at this point. There is burdensharing
out there. ------.
Mr. Cunningham. Wasn't it just in the hundreds of thousands
of dollars in the case of Saudi Arabia?
General Zinni. Hundreds of millions. Contributory
negligence.
Mr. Cunningham. We are paying billions. There is a little
delta there. ------.
Mr. Young. Generals, we appreciate your being here and we
appreciate all of the responses to our questions. I wonder if
either or both of you have anything you would like to say that
we forgot to ask about?
General Clark. Well, I would like to thank the Committee
for the very astute questions. I do feel that in Europe, we are
at a very important juncture, and it is a question of whether
the United States is going to continue to present American
leadership in this part of the world and derive the benefits
that come from that leadership, or whether we are going to halt
right here and give those who, for whatever reason, view
themselves as our competitors and adversaries the chance to
exploit that halt at this time.
Obviously I certainly am a strong proponent of American
leadership. I believe that people in the region respect us and
need us, and I think it is in our own self-interests, economic
as well, that we continue to develop our influence and enhance
our ability to affect events in that part of the world.
So I just underscore my appreciation for the support of the
Committee on the supplemental and wish you the best as you try
to get this to the floor, Mr. Chairman. I think it is very
important to our country.
General Zinni. Two short points, Mr. Chairman. I arrived in
the Gulf as Kofi Anan was leaving after having arranged the
diplomatic agreement with Iraq. Everywhere I went, I was
congratulated immediately, a hand was outstretched, and they
felt this was a victory for the United States. Diplomacy was
impossible without American resolve and American might behind
it. That wasn't lost on any of the leaders in the region, and
they clearly saw it as a direct win for us.
I would also say that following that, if that wasn't good
enough to make me feel pretty proud, I visited all our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen and
civilians that work out there, and were on the edge ready to go
into action, and I couldn't have been prouder.
So for all those young people that make up our Armed
Forces, I would just say that they are the ones that pulled
this off without a shot being fired.
Mr. Young. Well, I hope that both of you will express to
your troops as you visit with them that the members of this
Committee admire the job that they do. We understand the
sacrifice that they have to make to do these jobs, and we
understand the important answer, as they do, of the mission
that they are sent to.
If you extend that message for us, we would appreciate it
because we are very, very proud of them.
This Committee stands very strong in support of all of our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, merchant
marines, everybody involved in the effort.
We appreciate your being available to visit with the
Committee this afternoon. I know you have extremely important
responsibilities in other parts of the world. Thank you again
for coming. God bless you. The Committee is adjourned until 10
o'clock tomorrow when we will have the senior enlisted
personnel of each of the services and we will talk about
quality of life issues.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the
answers thereto follow:]
Command Operations
Question. In addition to issues dealing with your respective
commands, some of the key questions the Committee would like to address
are: Are the resources at your disposal for each of your contingencies
sufficient?
EUCOM Answer. Under current law, combatant commanders such as
USCINCEUR are not tasked to provide the resources necessary for
contingency operations. Rather, combatant commanders issue mission
directives to subordinate units to participate in particular
operations, and these subordinate units then draw upon their parent
Services for resources to accomplish these missions.
Contingency planning within the Joint Operations Planning and
Execution System involves the combatant commander's headquarters staff
working closely with the Service component commanders' staffs. This
cooperation results in plans which recognize the fiscal constraints
within which each Service must work. Should resource constraints cause
operational restrictions, this would be manifested as military risk in
the proposed course of action. I would then either accept that risk, or
request of the Secretary of Defense the additional resources necessary
to conduct the operation in a manner which had acceptable risks.
Fortunately, our components have received assurances from their
parent Services that everything will be done to provide full after-the-
fact reimbursement for validated contingency obligations, pending
receipt of the supplemental appropriation. Service commitment to
contingency requirements has ensured adequate support for all mission
safety, force protection and quality of life requirements. This support
takes visual form as well: the best cold weather clothing; up-armored
vehicles to reduce potential loss of life and limb in mined areas; and
doctors and medical staffs with the latest deployable technology. You
and the American people, both in spirit and dollars, show the soldiers
the ultimate support that you care about them and their families'
welfare. Good morale makes ``life in the mud'' tolerable, service to
the Nation enduring and assures mission success. To date, we have the
ability to fund additional expenses through the third quarter of this
fiscal year before we must receive additional contingency funding.
CENTCOM Answer. Yes. Each of the Services has allocated sufficient
resources to support the various contingencies in Central Command's
Area of Responsibility.
Question. What would be the impact to your commands of not having a
timely disposition of the fiscal year 1998 emergency supplemental or
even having to offset it as some have suggested?
EUCOM Answer. The supplemental appropriation is critical to our
ability to continue funding contingency operations within the area of
responsibility. Our baseline budgets cannot support both mandatory
mission readiness training requirements and contingency support. The
primary impact of not having timely disposition would be the
combination of decreased levels of quality of like support to the
deployed force and a deferral of important training and quality of life
initiatives back at the home station. Both of these impacts would cause
uncertainty among the force as to the commitment of our government to
their mission and to the welfare of their family members at home.
Every USEUCOM service component estimates its total contingency
operations will cost more than has been distributed to date, leaving a
significant shortfall should the supplemental appropriation not be
forthcoming. At our current pace, we will have to start canceling
training events in the third and fourth quarters to ensure adequate
cash flow to continue contingency support. Cancellation of training
events will degrade readiness.
Finally, any offsets to our current annual funding program at this
late time in the fiscal year would have an out of proportion effect.
Most base support functions are fixed costs that will have been
obligated going into the fourth quarter. The only flexibility left at
that point in the year is through decrements to the training program.
Fourth quarter decrements will cause serious readiness problems
throughout the force.
CENTCOM Answer. Quick approval of the emergency supplemental
appropriation for this fiscal year is essential. Without the additional
funding, the services will shortly begin using funds that had been
allocated for training in the third and fourth quarters. The end result
will be a decrease in readiness for forces not just in the U.S., but
overseas as well.
Question. What are the effects on the readiness and morale of
forces under your command as you face near constant deployments in your
operating areas?
EUCOM Answer. ------.
Morale. From an equal opportunity standpoint, the morale within
Bosnia and the United States Forces in Europe remains positive. Senior
leaders continue to focus on accomplishment of real world missions that
are making a difference in the lives of people in a troubled region.
Focused training, caring for soldiers and the provision of the highest
standard quality of life are positively impacting each soldier, sailor,
airman and marine in the USEUCOM AOR. Equally important is support for
military equal opportunity programs by reinforcing the zero tolerance
for discrimination and sexual harassment policy. We firmly believe that
a positive equal opportunity environment directly corresponds to
positive morale for the men and women assigned to Europe. The morale of
our troops is continually assessed through aggressive climate
assessment programs. The process entails both a qualitative and
quantitative assessment of various factors which positively impact
morale within the European command. Another insight into morale is
retention. We believe retention is another indicator of morale. In
EUCOM, our retention program performs well against service goals.
USAREUR exceeded re-enlistment objectives for both first-termers and
mid-careerists for all four quarters of FY-97. USAFE exceeded re-
enlistment objectives for all re-enlistment categories. USAFE re-
enlisted 69.8 percent of first-termers against a goal of 55 percent; 89
percent of second-termers against a goal of 75 percent and 95.8 percent
career airmen against a goal of 95 percent. NAVEUR re-enlisted 31
percent of eligible first-termers against an objective of 38 percent.
NAVEUR exceeded objectives for mid-termers, re-enlisting 77 percent
against a goal of 54 percent, and careerists, re-enlisting 82 percent
against a goal of 62 percent.
Leadership continues to make strides towards improving quality of
life in theater, particularly for deployed personnel. Spirits are high
as we continue to execute the national security strategy through a
series of regional engagement activities. Our servicemen and women in
Bosnia understand the importance of their mission to regional stability
and are focused for success. The Morale, Welfare, and Recreation
structure continues to improve Quality of Life of deployed personnel.
Commercial telephone service has made it much easier for them to keep
in touch with their ``home bases.'' They enjoy modern aerobics/fitness
equipment, reading rooms, TV/VCR rooms, and opportunities for weekly
religious events. There is also an established special circuit for
professional entertainment/USO shows. The Army and Air Force Exchange
provides direct operating exchanges, food, alternations and barber
services. These initiatives have provided outlets for members to spend
time relaxing, getting/staying fit, and fulfilling spiritual needs.
Along with force protection, Quality of Life remains at the top of
USCINCEUR's Priority List.
Adequate funding for quality of life facilities, services and
programs for military and civilian personnel and their families in the
European Theater continues to be USECOM's top resourcing priority.
Given the numerous contingency operations tasked to USAREUR, resourcing
QOL programs is critical to mission readiness and a significant part of
a total integrated mission support package. Efficiency savings and
reprogramming will not provide for continual upgrade of equipment or
the programs necessary to sustain program vitality. Within USAFE, the
Air Force Central NAF construction program is healthy again, and we
envision no problems in meeting the demand for facility projects in
USAFE. However, we are concerned about the poor funding outlook for APF
projects. Because of the limited dollars made available to USAFE, no
MWR projects are within MILCON Total Obligated Authority (TOA) beyond
FY-97. USAFE is continuing its Funding Opportunities for Communities in
USAFE (FOCUS) Program in FY-98. This program was a success in FYs 96
and 97 because it allowed QOL programs to compete for mission dollars.
In FY 97 the USAFE Commander funded dorm furnishings, Armed Forces
Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) 97 connection costs, library
automation, equipment and furnishings, Command Development Center
playgrounds, Airmen Leadership Schools and completion of remaining
postal upgrades.
CENTCOM Answer. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has no permanently
assigned forces. The services and other unified commands all provide
forces, as complete units and as individuals, to our Area of
Responsibility (AOR). The forces that are being provided to me are in
an exceptional state of readiness and high morale. This has been
especially true during the recent crisis with Iraq. I am aware that the
services and other commanders in chief pay a price in providing CENTCOM
these forces.
Commanders are working hard to sustain their readiness as much as
possible. However, given the realities of the region and wide-ranging
training requirements that units have, it can be difficult. In
particular, aircrews conducting Operation SOUTHERN WATCH have limited
training opportunities, while Army and Marine Corps units operating in
Kuwait have much greater training opportunities. The brigade from the
3rd Infantry Division that deployed to Kuwait will soon go through a
Combat Training Center (CTC) equivalent exercise using equipment they
drew from prepositioned stocks in that country.
We are taking steps to keep the morale of deployed forces high.
Permanent facilities are being constructed at Prince Sultan Air Base
and local commanders are taking steps to ensure our personnel stay in
touch with their families.
NATO Expansion
Question. In the next few weeks the Senate will vote on the
ratification of the ``accession protocol'' to expand the membership of
NATO. The new member states of NATO are proposed to be Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic. While the costs and strategic logic of the
expansion have been and will continue to be debated, the Committee has
some questions concerning the military implications of increasing the
size of NATO at the present time. General Clark, what are your views on
the military implications of NATO expansion, as both SACEUR and
Commander in Chief of the United States European Command?
EUCOM Answer. From a military perspective, NATO enlargement creates
the opportunity to combat the greatest threats which we face in Europe
today: political, economic and military instability. Expanding NATO
further will greatly enhance and broaden military stability in the
region. NATO expansion increases our Strategic Depth. As stability
increases, the potential for US forces to be called upon to fight in
this theater decreases. Beyond the manpower and equipment increases we
gain, adding the Czechs, Poles and Hungarians brings in three new
allies who have already proved themselves as they stood with us in the
Gulf War, Bosnia and in our most recent crisis with Iraq. I am
confident that these three nations so painfully aware of the
consequences of lost freedom will stand firm with us in defense of
freedom throughout NATO and Europe.
Question. Any changes in the military mission of NATO as a result
of expansion?
EUCOM Answer. The military mission of NATO will not change as a
result of expansion. NATO always has been and will remain a defensive
alliance. Alliance policy calls for the maintenance of a military
capability sufficient to prevent war and to provide for effective
defense and overall capability to successfully manage crises affecting
the security of its members. The primary role of Alliance military
forces remains unchanged: to guarantee the security and territorial
integrity of member states.
Question. Your estimate of the costs to EUCOM in particular and the
US in general resulting from expansion?
EUCOM Answer. It is best to think of enlargement costs in three
categories. First is the cost borne by new members for their own
national security and contributions to the Alliance--this is no cost to
the US. The second category includes expenses borne by all members to
enhance their own contributions to the alliance in support of
accession. As NATO adapts from a static defense to emphasize more
mobile operational concepts in support of out-of-area contingencies,
the operational and strategic deployability of forces has to be
strengthened. Fulfilling existing force goals will fully prepare all
current members for the strategic requirements of NATO enlargement.
This second cost can be viewed as the normal modernization expenditures
that a nation incurs over its defense planning cycles. The third
category of costs consists of NATO common-funded accounts. These
include headquarters operating costs, common operations and
maintenance, and the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP). Each NATO
member contributes a percentage to the NATO NSIP budget, and as the
alliance grows the infrastructure will increase. This is the one area
that will require additional U.S. funding to support enlargement.
NATO's estimate of the cost associated for the NSIP budget is $1.5
billion over a 10-year period. In addition, SHAPE has requested $200
million to conduct interoperability training over that same period to
enhance the training standards of all Alliance members--this is totally
independent of NATO expansion. If the additional funds for
interoperability training are approved, the total NSIP increase will be
$1.7 billion. The U.S. share of the costs should be approximately $40
million per year for 10 years. Additional costs to USEUCOM will be
negligible.
Question. Changes necessitated to the NATO command and control
structure?
EUCOM Answer. The military implications of enlargement are
positive. The three prospective new members will contribute a combined
total of nearly 300,000 troops, over 3,000 tanks, and over 500 fighter
aircraft. I have visited all three countries in 1998, and can assure
you their leadership is committed, and their troops are sharp and
motivated--they are eager to join NATO. All three have contributed
units to the Implementation and Stabilization Forces in Bosnia, which
has increased their interoperability for NATO forces. They have been a
part of over 100 Partnership for Peace (PfP), and bilateral exercises.
Poland and the Czech Republic also contributed forces to the Gulf War
Coalition, and Hungary has served as a vital staging area for NATO
forces in Bosnia. They will make a meaningful, significant, and
immediate military contribution to the Alliance.
The Command and Control for the Alliance will remain essentially
the same under NATO's current Integrated Command Structure. Changes to
NATO's Command and Control structure are not a result of NATO
enlargement. While future internal adaptation is possible, it will be
more a result of NATO's just concluded Long-Term Study, and the
changing European strategic environment.
Question. What are your views on additional expansion of NATO in
the future?
EUCOM Answer. This is a political not military decision. If the
political leaders of the alliance propose additional members in the
future, as SACEUR, I will provide the military advice to the Alliance
on military requirements of the new members, plus the effects new
members would have on the overall collective security of NATO.
Question. Have there been changes in the level and quality of
military-to-military cooperation with the Russians since the decision
to expand NATO?
EUCOM Answer. During calendar years 1997 and 1998 the Russian
military elected not to actively engage the United States European
Command via the annual military-to-military contact program executed
between our two nations. Although USEUCOM nominated between 30-35 mil-
to-mil events for the Russians' consideration each year, the Russians
only selected two to three events. They subsequently pulled out from at
least one event during each year. While bilateral mil-to-mil contacts
with USEUCOM have been minimal, Russian participation in these events
with other unified combatant commands (e.g., USPACOM and USACOM) has
ranged from 10-12 events per command per year. The small number of
events with USEUCOM could possibly be tied to their continuing
dissatisfaction with NATO enlargement or with the fact that they have
decided to engage the United States military in Europe under the
auspices of the NATO Partnership for Peace program. U.S.-Russian
cooperation within the framework of the NATO IFOR/SFOR operation in
Bosnia, however, has been positive. In April 1998 we completed a
comprehensive Marshall Center-hosted conference in Moscow, on NATO-
Russian military cooperation and lessons learned in Bosnia. This was an
excellent professional military exchange and dialogue-anticipate future
engagement opportunities evolving between Russian and NATO forces.
Question. Expansion will mean a quantitative change in NATO's
collective defense responsibilities: 15 percent more European territory
and a nearly 400 mile move eastward to the Polish-Belorussian border.
What new capabilities and equipment are necessary for EUCOM in
order to participate in the collective defense of the new NATO members?
EUCOM Answer. ------.
Question. What exactly is NATO defending against today?
EUCOM Answer. No large-scale conventional threat to NATO in the
near term is foreseen. However, the threats and risks to the Alliance
are varied. The nations of the Alliance are faced with regional
instability, Islamic extremism, nationalism state-sponsored terrorism,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, and
economic and political instability. The strength of NATO has always
been based on collective defense. NATO must not become a collective
security organization. ------.
Question. What do you believe are appropriate out-of-area
operations for NATO to undertake in the future?
EUCOM Answer. The conduct of out-of-area operations would be a
political, not military, decision made by the North Atlantic Council
(NAC). Each Alliance member has a Permanent Representative on the NAC.
All members must agree by consensus to conduct any operations, whether
they be in or out of theater. As Supreme Allied Commander, I am
responsible for providing military advice to the NAC, and planning
possible Allied Command Europe military operations--I would receive
both guidance and political authority from the NAC. Additionally, SHAPE
HQ, which is under SACUR's command, has the responsibility for
identifying the military capabilities, and ensuring the force readiness
requirements needed to contribute to crisis management, peace support,
humanitarian aid, and the protection of vital interests of the
Alliance.
Bosnia Operation
Question. On December 18, 1997, President Clinton announced that he
had agreed in principle that U.S. forces should participate in a Bosnia
peacekeeping force after the mandate of the current SFOR expires.
Decisions made recently by NATO planners have led to the requirement
for approximately 6900 U.S. military personnel (as opposed to 8500 in
SFOR) to remain in Bosnia until the achievement of a self-sustaining
peace in the region. In his certification to Congress that the
continued presence of U.S. forces, after June 30, 1998 is required, the
President notes several ``benchmarks'' which must be achieved prior to
the ultimate withdrawal of forces from the region. They include, the
establishment of judicial reforms, the dismantling of pre-Dayton
institutions, the regulation of the media, free market reforms, the
conduct of free elections, and a whole host of other political, civic
and economic goals. Does the pursuit of these goals, in fact,
constitute nation building by U.S. forces?
EUCOM Answer. U.S. and NATO forces are supporting the civil
implementation effort in Bosnia by providing a secure environment and
freedom of movement throughout the country to allow the massive civil
implementation effort to move forward. In addition, U.S. and NATO civil
affairs officers liaise with civil implementation organizations. The
value of having civil affairs officers in close liaison with civil
implementation organizations is that they often push through
bureaucratic barriers, thus allowing for a higher rate of progress.
Finally, U.S. and NATO forces provide assistance to the civil effort by
providing logistic support and security only when it does not interfere
with primary mission tasks.
The tasks cited above are all military tasks which are approved in
the current NATO plan for the employment of military force in Bosnia.
Question. How are the troops under your command in Bosnia equipped
to achieve these ``benchmark'' goals as described in the President's
certification?
Answer. U.S. and NATO forces are highly equipped to provide the
secure environment and freedom of movement necessary for the attainment
of these ``benchmark'' goals. Without a strong military presence on the
ground in Bosnia, civil implementation of the Dayton Accord would fail
since continued competing agendas of the factions would prevent any
progress. Civil affairs officers are highly trained functional area
experts who provide a much needed focus to the pursuit of civil,
economic and political goals. Finally, the most powerful tool that our
forces have is the respect that they muster from all the parties in
Bonsia.
Violence in Kosovo
Question. Hostilities have recently flared in the Serbian province
of Kosovo, where ethnic Albanians constitute 90 percent of the
population. Serbian government forces have cracked down on Albanian
separatists and civilians have been killed. Recent statements by
administration officials suggest that consideration is being given to
increasing force levels in Macedonia and even possibly deploying to
Kosovo. General, what contingency planning are you engaged in with
regard to the situation in Kosovo?
EUCOM Answer. There is no political guidance to plan for any
military intervention in Kosovo, nor is there any instruction to either
the NATO staff or the U.S. European Command Staff to conduct any
planning for military intervention in Kosovo.
Question. If troops were deployed in that region, what do you
understand your mission would be?
EUCOM Answer. Though NATO and U.S. military staffs are carefully
monitoring the situation in Kosovo, there is no political guidance to
intervene in Kosovo with military force. No mission has been defined.
Question. Would forces be detached from those participating in SFOR
if deployment to Kosovo was ordered?
EUCOM Answer. Current NATO planning for the continuing SFOR mission
does not address deploying forces from the SFOR into the region. The
United Nations Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) in the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia does not authorize the use of those forces for
intervention in Kosovo. The UNPREDEP mandate under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter and authorized under UN Security Council Resolution 983 of
31 March 1995 (with subsequent mandate extensions) only establishes a
monitoring force on the disputed border between the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
Iraq
Question. General Zinni, you are said to be an expert regarding
Arab ``man in the street'' opinion. What are the present perceptions of
the Gulf State nations with respect to U.S. policy towards Iraq?
CENTCOM Answer. I am no expert, but there are concerns in the Arab
world over the impact of sanctions on the Iraqi people. Arab popular
opinion tends to connect the effects of sanctions on the Iraqi people
with the UN and U.S. policies, not Saddam Hussein's failure to comply
with UN resolutions and look after the needs of his own population. The
stalled Middle East Peace Process creates the perception of a double
standard in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. I
believe most Arabs in the region understand that our military presence
helps regional stability.
Iraq--Potential Airstrikes
Question. Airstrikes against Iraq were narrowly avoided last month
after UN Secretary General Kofi Annan persuaded Saddam Hussein to fully
cooperate in granting access to UN inspectors who are examining the
Iraqis' Weapons of Mass Destruction program (WMD). According to an
article in Aviation Week (2/16/98), ``Saudi Arabia has decided not to
allow U.S. Air Force aircraft stationed there to shift to nearby
countries such as Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, or Qatar to carry out attacks
against Iraq--at least for now.'' The article also stated that
according to Air Force officials, ``morale among the Saudi-based U.S.
units has plummeted with the news that after seven years of deployments
and training, they may be excluded from any future air campaign against
Iraq.'' General Zinni, are these reports accurate? Under what agreement
with the U.S. can the Saudis block the transfer of U.S. Air Force
aircraft out of the country to other bases in the Gulf region? Has any
headway been made to get the Saudis to reverse their stance on this
issue since the article was published? What is the state of readiness
and morale of air personnel based in Saudi Arabia?
CENTCOM Answer. There is no agreement where the Saudis could block
the transfer of U.S. aircraft. The Saudis ------. This arrangement is
consistent with arrangements we have with any government that allows us
to station combat assets on its soil. We did not plan to relocate any
of our combat aircraft from Saudi Arabia to any other country in the
Gulf.
Saudi Arabia continues to support international efforts to enforce
UN Security Council Resolutions. During the recent crisis the Saudi
government provided U.S. forces with all support that U.S. Central
Command asked for. The friendship between our two countries remains
strong and I see no reason to readdress our current bi-lateral
agreements.
While morale has certainly not plummeted, we acknowledge that it is
something that needs improvement and we have taken positive steps to do
so. Our deployed forces conducting Operation SOUTHERN WATCH and DESERT
THUNDER are living under very austere conditions and in many cases have
deployed to the region for the second or third time. At Prince Sultan
Airbase fixed facilities are being built and units should move into
them by the end of the year. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR)
opportunities have been increased and personnel are able to keep in
touch with families back home through e-mail and free phone calls.
Our forces in the region realize that their job is an important one
and train very hard, often under adverse circumstances, to hone their
combat skills. They take great pride in their capabilities and
readiness. Furthermore, they realize that often the critical aspect of
our military capability and readiness is its deterrent value. Our
troops are ready. They continue to train with their Gulf allies to
conduct their missions as a part of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH.
Budget Priorities and Deficiencies
Question. Do you feel the interests and needs of your Commands have
been adequately addressed in the fiscal year 1999 budget request?
EUCOM Answer. The fiscal year 1999 budget request meets the needs
of USEUCOM Commands, with a few exceptions. Additional funding of $16.1
million for engagement activities, $1.125 million for command and
control communications, and $275 million for family housing and
barracks renovation is required.
Additional engagement funding of $16.1 million is required for
fiscal year 1999. Engagement is the key component of our theater
strategy toward regional peace and stability. It is a long-term
investment, the return on which is often difficult to quantify, and if
successful, may never be fully recognized. Systematic underfunding of
engagement activities threatens our ability to provide stability.
--Military liaison teams must be established in the new Unified
Command Plan-directed countries of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine ($400
thousand).
--Essential USEUCOM Headquarters support to Partnership for Peace
activities must be funded ($1.1 million).
--Humanitarian assistance activities in Africa must be funded ($684
thousand).
--USEUCOM Headquarters joint exercise participation in Moldova,
Georgia and Ukraine must be funded ($100 thousand).
--The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in
Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, provides defense education to civilian
and military personnel of the United States, NATO, European nations and
the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union. As the OPTEMPO
in the European theater increases, funding is needed to renovate vacant
German barracks to provide additional student billets. In addition, a
larger and state-of-the-art lecture hall is needed to provide visual
information capabilities for instructors, students, and conference
attendees. It is essential to raise the quality and quantity of the
existing infrastructure to a level commensurate with those of
equivalent DoD and NATO educational institutions. (Student billets: $5
million; lecture hall and associated communication/electronic
equipment: $8 million)
--Force protection improvement requirements at our military liaison
team locations must be funded ($1.2 million).
Modifications to the non-strategic nuclear force command and
control Regency network must be funded to ensure its viability ($1.125
million).
Housing construction and maintenance requires an additional $361
million per year over the next 10 years to eliminate inadequate housing
throughout USEUCOM. Since the drawdown, there has been near zero
investment in European infrastructure. USEUCOM is trying to play catch-
up with a steadily failing infrastructure. The situation is aggravated
by overseas housing funding that does not keep pace with CONUS housing,
a much higher cost ofconstruction/maintenance, and fair share
apportions that include ``payment-in-kind'' funds from the host nation
that never meet projections. USEUCOM full house appropriations
committee/national security subcommittee supports the Secretary of
Defense's initiative to eliminate inadequate housing by 2010 and
requests that funding be provided in steady and consistent amounts to
support this initiative.
While not a fiscal year 1999 funding issue, one of USEUCOM's top
priorities, the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), needs
support for future program funding. MEADS is a replacement for HAWK and
PATRIOT systems and provides NATO a lower-tier, hit-to-kill, point
defense capability for protecting both NATO territory and forces
operating out-of-area. MEADS requires \1/3\ of the airlift that an
equivalent PATRIOT unit requires and unlike Patriot systems, can be
moved by C-130 aircraft. MEADS is important to USEUCOM because it is an
active defense, trilateral, Theater Missile Defense initiative between
the U.S., Germany, and Italy. Additionally, this burden sharing may
inspire Turkey and Netherlands to become partners, further
strengthening the alliance and U.S. leadership. MEADS is only funded
through fiscal year 1999. $1 billion is needed during fiscal years
2000-2005 to ensure the commitment of our allies to assist in the
completion of a capability we urgently need.
CENTCOM Answer. Yes. As the Commander-in-Chief of a Unified
Command, I submit my requirements to the Joint Staff and Department of
Defense (DoD) through my Integrated Priority List (IPL). The Fiscal
Year 1999 budget, as well as the Future Year Defense Program (FYDP)
supports Central Command's IPL.
Question. What is your assessment of the major shortfalls in
personnel, training, equipment and maintenance for those units under
your day-to-day command as well as those that would be assigned to you
in a war time situation?
EUCOM Answer. ------.
The Services have made great strides capturing readiness for low-
density, high-demand assets. What requires more attention is the
support force assets that are constantly tapped for continuing
operations. Military police, transportation units, movement control
teams, intelligence analysts and headquarters elements are constantly
on the road or supporting deployments while at home bases, resulting in
long hours which are difficult to capture. Because low density/high
demand asset tracking for the Services counts days away from home
station (temporary duty), we may miss a large portion of the tail in
the tooth-to-tail element of an operation. These support force assets
are required by all operations that are experiencing equally high, but
more difficult to capture, TEMPO rates. We need more accurate ways of
identifying readiness costs that focus on additional indicators beyond
just ``a night away from home'' to better capture the readiness impact
of high TEMPO on the entire force. ------.
Basing facilities. USEUCOM, a forward-deployed force operating at
the highest TEMPO of any Unified Command, has less than adequate
facilities for its troops. 23% of USAREUR's maintenance facilities and
18% of its operational facilities are substandard for daily operations.
It would require $3.4 billion to bring operational facilities to
standard and $450 million for maintenance facilities. 60% of USAREUR's
28K barracks spaces require renovation to meet Department of Defense
standards. Finally, 88% of USAREUR's 24K housing units and 70% of
USAFE's 10.5K housing units require renovation. It is important for
Congress to support USEUCOM's forward-deployed force with adequate
facilities--several program budget decisions cut funding in this area
during the most recent budget cycle. ------.
5. Wartime Assigned Forces. USEUCOM is not a major theater war
CINC. The two Ft. Riley brigades designated to deploy with USAREUR's
divisions to any major theater war are USACOM assets and are monitored
and tracked by that unified command. Should either brigade not meet the
criteria for deploying MTW forces, it would fall on USACOM to resolve
the shortfall. USEUCOM does not have oversight over their readiness
shortfalls.
On a day-to-day basis, USEUCOM does use assets from other theaters,
thereby moderating the TEMPO of ongoing operations. The 2ACR from Ft.
Polk, LA, for example, is currently in Bosnia supporting peacekeeping
operations. The reserves also provide forces to make up theater
shortfalls. In each case, however, the unified command supplying forces
is responsible for ensuring they are trained and ready to execute
assigned tasking prior to arrival. USACOM personnel proceeding to or
returning from Bosnia, for instance, process through Ft. Benning, GA.
This ensures standardization in preparing troops for the Bosnia
environment prior to deploying overseas.
CENTCOM Answer. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has no units
assigned under our day-to-day command. The forces that have been
provided to us for operations such as Operation SOUTHERN WATCH and
Maritime Intercept Operations have deployed to the theater in a high
state of readiness with all their equipment. The forces that have been
deployed for Operation DESERT THUNDER have also arrived in a similar
high state of readiness.
Question. What are the top ten items on your most recent integrated
priority list? How do your top ten priorities differ from last year and
why?
EUCOM Answer. ------.
CENTCOM Answer. My Integrated Priority List (IPL) emphasizes
maintaining and improving capabilities, rather than asking for specific
systems or programs. Capabilities I am most interested in improving are
Force Deployment and In-Theater Sustainability, Theater Missile
Defense, In-Theater Force Application, Force Protection, Intelligence
Collection, Command and Control, and Joint Readiness.
Since taking command of U.S. Central Command last year, we have
conducted a major review of our regional strategy and requirements to
execute that strategy. At the same time, the Department of Defense
reorganized the process through which it receives priorities from
unified commanders. The result was an updated list of priorities that I
believe accurately reflects our requirements.
Year 2000 Computer Problem
Question. One of the problems that we face as we enter the next
century is older computers that are only programmed to remember the
last two digits in a year. Thus they remember ``1997'' as simply
``97''. The year 2000, however, will be saved as ``00'', the same as
the year 1900. This can lead to calculation errors and system failures.
How serious is this problem for your Command? What would be the impact
if your Mission Critical Systems were not corrected by the year 2000?
EUCOM Answer. The impact could be very serious. Every mission and
function that we perform could be impacted, but until the Joint or
Service program managers tell us how extensive the technical problems
are, the functional users cannot fully assess the impact.
The Services have oversight for US European Command Component
Commands. Each service recently reported that they are on track with
their respective Service Year 2000 Action Plans (Source: 24-26 March
1998 Joint Staff Year 2000 Working Group hosted by the Joint Staff J6).
I am currently polling my component commanders for their assessments to
be completed in May 1998, but these assessments will be an interactive
process.
At the Headquarters we are strictly users, not developers, of joint
Mission Critical Systems. These systems are the responsibility of
Service and Agency program managers. We report these systems quarterly
to the Joint Staff and we have identified our Top 20 priorities for the
warfighter. We are counting on all fixes to be delivered by the
December 98 deadline. (Deadline is mandated in the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Year 2000 Action Plan (March 1998, Version 2.0)). Our job after
that is to test the fixes and develop contingency plans if the fixes
are incomplete.
CENTCOM Answer. This is a large problem being handled within the
DoD as a team effort headed up by the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence). Each
DoD Component, including US Central Command, must correct the systems
they are responsible for. Of the 468 systems we use in US Central
Command, we are responsible for correcting 17. We are taking action to
make our 17 systems year 2000 compliant by the end of this year. If any
systems we use, including our Mission Critical Systems, still have
problems by the year 2000, we do not expect catastrophic failures. We
will be able to carry out our mission.
Question. What testing do you plan to do to ensure that your
warfighting systems are fully compliant prior to the year 2000?
EUCOM Answer. All USEUCOM warfighting systems are provided by a
Service or a joint agency. We will support Service and Agency testing
efforts fully. Service and Agency-provided systems must be tested and
fielded to us by Dec 1998 (Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff Year 2000
Action Plan, March 1998, Version 2.0 and DoD Year 2000 Management Plan,
April 1997, Version 1.0). For all our systems, we will perform our own
functional testing after the fixes are delivered.
We fully support DoD-wide testing. I applaud the Assistant
Secretary of Defense C3I for marking 1999 to be used as a systems test
year. Our success in conducting functional testing relies heavily on
the Services and Agencies completing and fielding system fixes to us by
the December 1998 deadline (Deadline is mandated in the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Year 2000 Action Plan (March 1998, Version 2.0)).
CENTCOM Answer. We will test software we developed by setting the
clocks ahead and performing off-line operational tests. We will also
perform software interface tests between and among the other software-
dependent warfighting systems that we use.
Question. What steps have our coalition partners taken to ensure
that their warfighting systems are Year 2000 compliant? Are you
comfortable that our allies will have their systems corrected in time?
EUCOM Answer. I am not comfortable at this time because I do not
have a lot of insight into their actions. However, the Joint Staff and
SHAPE are currently working this issue. The Joint Staff is working with
the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the State Department to
gather information on the status of our coalition partners.
Additionally SHAPE and NATO are accelerating their efforts and have
recently formed a working group. We rely heavily on our coalition
partners, who generally have resource constraints and equipment that is
older and more susceptible to year 2000 problems.
CENTCOM Answer. We do not know the extent of our coalition
partners' efforts to identify and correct year 2000 problems with their
various systems. However, we do not believe they are expending much
effort in this area. Many of our allies are using American systems
obtained through an open Foreign Military Sales case. The United States
has a responsibility to inform the country of any known problems and
the steps we are taking to resolve those problems.
Question. Would you consider conducting some of your training
exercises with ``the clocks turned forward'' to ensure that your
systems are ready? Do you believe this would be a valuable test to see
if your critical computer systems will be ready for the year 2000? If
not, why not?
EUCOM Answer. Fixes, replacement systems, or workarounds must be in
place prior to any functional user testing. It would be counter-
productive to test systems that are still being analyzed and revised by
Service or Joint Agency program managers.
It is important that we not lose sight of the fact that the
prerequisite to testing is identifying, fixing and fielding. Most of
our systems, and certainly our major systems, are under the management
of a Service Executive Agent or Joint Agency program manager. We, as
functional users, must validate the fixes they deliver to us.
We fully support efforts for testing year 2000 fixes, first at the
program manager's lab, then at the functional user site. Training
exercises may provide excellent opportunities for user testing in some
cases, but they are not the only method of test available.
However, we caution that our exercises should not lose focus on the
original training objectives. Training objectives should not be
sacrificed to identify problems that should be found and corrected by
the responsible Service or Agency for the system. Training exercises
should only be used to validate delivered fixes.
Resources to correct the Year 2000 problem are very scarce. We
encourage any actions that would provide additional resources to the
Service and Agency efforts to fix the systems we use.
CENTCOM Answer. Turning the clocks ahead to see what happens during
an exercise would have limited value. During exercises we use
operational systems. Thus, turning the clocks ahead during exercises
could impact real world operations. Alternatively, a carefully designed
scenario, utilizing systems isolated from the real world, could be
effectively and safely used to determine if critical systems are ready
for the year 2000.
Question. Have you begun developing contingency plans in case your
Mission Critical Systems are not year 2000 compliant?
EUCOM Answer. We are primarily users of Service and Joint Systems.
Contingency plans cannot be developed at our level until we know if
there is a problem and how great the problem is. To date, no specific
problems have been published to facilitate our contingency planning but
each Service has provided guidance to their Components for the
completion of contingency plans based on the Service-set criteria.
We are working with the Joint Staff to obtain the Service and
Agency statements of compliance or definitions of problems we will
encounter. This data will allow our functional users to develop the
necessary contingency plans. As specific system problems are provided,
we will assess them in light of our specific needs and develop
contingency plans as appropriate.
CENTCOM Answer. We expect to be year 2000 compliant this year. This
gives us an additional year to clean up any systems that we may have
missed. We do not expect any year 2000 related problems to cause
catastrophic failures.
JCS Exercises
Question. In the Quadrennial Defense Review the Department of
Defense announced plans to reduce the number of man-days required for
joint exercises by 15 percent in order to reduce the high PERSTEMPO
rates. Have either of your Commands experienced a reduction in Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises?
EUCOM Answer. Yes. Program management and execution actions
undertaken since the Quadrennial Defense Review in May 1997 have made
significant changes (e.g., in 18 percent reduction in the number of
exercises and more than 25 percent reduction in man-days devoted to
exercise participation). This reduced level of exercise participation
is expected to continue to comply with the Chairman's guidance. Actions
taken include reducing the number, scope, duration, and participation
levels for specific exercises; combining, merging, and linking
exercises across USEUCOM and Military Service lines; and placing
greater emphasis on staff and headquarters exercises, simulations, and
improved communications and computer technologies to reduce personnel
demands.
CENTCOM Answer. Yes, Central Command (CENTCOM) has experienced a
reduction in JCS exercise. From fiscal year 1996 to 1998, CENTCOM's JCS
exercise program was reduced from 39 to 37 exercises. In addition, the
1999 exercise program is being reduced to 34 and the 2000 program to
32. In total, our JCS exercise program has been reduced by seven
exercises over a four-year period.
In order to meet the QDR man-day reduction requirements, CENTCOM
conducted a comprehensive review of the JCS exercise program to
identify additional ways to reduce exercise Personnel Tempo
(PERSTEMPO). Some of the initiatives used to achieve the reduction in
PERSTEMPO were: increased use of deployed in-theater forces to conduct
exercises, rescheduling and combining smaller exercises to result in
more complex Joint exercises, and Command Post Exercises (CPX)
utilization of model distributive simulation. From 1996 to 2000 we will
have reduced JCS exercise PERSTEMPO by thirty-two percent.
Question. If you have experienced a reduction in JCS exercises has
this had a noticeable effect on your PERSTEMPO rates?
EUCOM Answer. HQ USEUCOM tabulates individual PERSTEMPO (as opposed
to numbers of personnel in-theater at a given point) for shore-based
personnel assigned to USAREUR, USAFE and USNAVEUR. Based on the
PERSTEMPO statistics reported by EUCOM theater components for October
1996 through January 1998, we have not experienced a noticeable
decrease in theater PERSTEMPO. From October, 1996 through January 1997,
13,120 EUCOM Component personnel returned from participation in an
exercise. From October 1997 through January 1998, 32,014 returned from
exercises and field maneuvers.
On average, from October 1996 through January 1998, 13 percent of
EUCOM's assigned personnel were deployed or TDY at all times. Apart
from those participating in Operation Joint Guard, PERSTEMPO drops only
during the winter holiday season (December-February).
At this point, we can tabulate individual PERSTEMPO with confidence
only for EUCOM Component personnel. While a high OPTEMPO may produce a
high PERSTEMO for individuals involved in those operations, that
PERSTEMPO ``calculation'' accounts for about 70 percent-75 percent of
the ``day away'' from home station reported by EUCOM components.
CENTCOM Answer. Since we are a command with no assigned forces,
Central Command (CENTCOM) must rely on the Services to calculate and
track Operational and Personnel Tempo (OPSTEMPO/PERSTEMPO) rates. We do
not have visibility of all the deployments for units and individuals
during an entire year. However, we are sensitive to the PERSTEMPO
currently experienced in the force and clearly our operational and
exercise requirements affect the OPSTEMPO/PERSTEMPO. Consequently, we
are committed to helping reduce OPSTEMPO/PERSTEMPO. In fiscal year 1997
we reduced our exercise program by 11 exercises which resulted in a
savings of 160,800 man-days.
Question. How do you determine that the right mix of exercise is
being conducted?
EUCOM Answer. USEUCOM is guided in the exercises we conduct based
on deficiencies we identify in our after-action reports and the needs
of the theater as delineated in Theater Security Planning System. We
combine these two elements with input from the Service components to
craft an exercise program that is geared to enhanced readiness and
interoperability.
CENTCOM Answer. Each year I receive an assessment brief from my
Component Commanders that provide their assessment of their warfighting
abilities. This assessment provides my staff with detailed information
on what areas of the respective Components warfighting abilities are
trained and which areas require additional training. My staff then
plans and coordinates exercises designed to fulfill the Component
requirements, Central Command's ``Theater Engagement Plan,'' and Host
Nation requirements. These include: battlestaff exercises, warfighting
functional exercises, Joint Task Force/Combined Task Force exercises,
sub-regional multi-lateral exercises, or country specific bilateral
exercises that best support the Component Commander's training
requirements.
Question. What portion of the exercises that you conduct are
primarily to train US forces for their wartime mission and what portion
is for regional engagement?
EUCOM Answer. USECOM schedules Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises to
meet training needs, enhance joint interoperability, support readiness
and refine interoperability with allies and partners. In the course of
conducting these exercises we meet engagement strategies but do not
schedule exercises for engagement purposes.
CENTCOM Answer. Our JCS exercise program at U.S. Central Command
from FY95 to FY00 totals 183 exercises, of which 50 are primarily for
regional engagement and 133 are designed to train U.S. forces in their
wartime missions.
Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund
Question. With congressional support, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff established the Combating Terrorism Readiness
Initiative Fund. How much did your Command receive from this fund in
fiscal year 1997 and what were the funds used for?
EUCOM Answer. USEUCOM received $1.86 million in Combating Terrorism
Readiness Initiative Fund funding for fiscal year 1997.
$200,000 funded Close Circuit Television Upgrades for Headquarters,
U.S. Navy Europe, United Kingdom.
$618,000 funded the following three projects for Headquarters, U.S.
Navy Europe, United Kingdom: (1) Special Project R12-94 (hardening of
Headquarters, U.S. Navy Europe) ($600,000); (2) the purchase of one (1)
X-Ray Machine for the post office ($10,000); and (3) a contract to
update as-built drawings for the alarm system ($8,000) of Headquarters,
U.S. Navy Europe building.
$158,000 funded the following three projects at Naval Air Station
Sigonella: (1) an upgrade to the intrusion detection system ($72,000)
for the base; (2) a repair of the electronic security system for
protection of the flightline perimeter ($36,000); and (3) the purchase
of three (3) Explosive Ordnance Disposal response backpacks containing
Explosive Ordnance Disposal tools.
$98,000 funded communication upgrades for Naval Support Activity
NAPLES Security Department, Italy.
$790,000 funded the construction of two Pass and Identification
facilities at the Capodochino Compound, NSA Naples, Italy.
In addition, in fiscal year 1997, Headquarters U.S. European
Command received $777,000 in force protection funding; U.S. Army Europe
received $5,500,000; U.S. Air Force received $3,400,000; and U.S. Navy
Europe received $351,000.
CENTCOM Answer. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) received $948,000 in
fiscal year 1997 to establish and support initial operating costs of
the Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC).
The Joint Rear Area Coordinator is my overall coordinating
authority for force protection within the CENTCOM Area of
Responsibility (AOR). The primary mission of the JRAC is to conduct
risk assessments of Department of Defense units and personnel and to
determine their vulnerability to terrorist attack. The JRAC is
responsible for ensuring force protection measures are adequate for the
security of all forces assigned.
A portion of the $948,000 was used to purchase furnishings and
equipment for the new JRAC offices, as well as some specialized
equipment used to conduct vulnerability assessments. The remainder of
the funding, was spent on travel--first, to allow JRAC personnel to
attend antiterrorism training, then for them to conduct vulnerability
assessments in theater.
Question. How much has your Command requested from the fund this
year, fiscal year 1998?
EUCOM Answer. Currently, Headquarters US European Command (HQ
USEUCOM) is processing 37 projects totaling $3,387,000. Project
submissions cover such force protection items as communications
equipment, X-Ray machines, hand-held explosive detectors, vehicle
barriers, and minor construction.
In addition, in fiscal year 1998, HQ USEUCOM received $848,000 in
force protection funding; U.S. Army Europe received $18,881,000; U.S.
Air Force Europe received $1,704,000; and U.S. Navy Europe received
approximately $6,500,000. Force Protection funds are included in base
operations funding. Also as a result of Program Budget Decision 098R,
Department of the Army was directed to fund $1,300,000 in U.S. Army
force protection requirements, and the Department of the Navy was
directed to fund $300,000 in U.S. Navy Europe force protection
requirements.
CENTCOM Answer. In fiscal year 1998 we have requested and received
$1,193,838 from the combating terrorism initiative fund. The funds were
used to buy vehicle-mounted VHF radios, pagers, and upgrade existing
radios for personnel stationed in Saudi Arabia.
This initiative significantly enhances the U.S. Defense
Representative's capability to notify, in an emergency, several
Department of Defense organizations in Saudi Arabia. Seven hundred non-
combatants in the U.S. Military Training Mission, the Ordnance Program
Division, the Defense Contracting Material Command, and the Office of
the Program Manager for the Saudi Arabian National Guard benefit from
this improved capability.
Question. What are the top ten force protection priorities for your
Command in fiscal year 1999? Have these items been fully funded in the
Services' budget requests? If these items are not fully funded, what
will be the specific impact on your ability to protect the forces under
your command?
EUCOM Answer. ------.
CENTCOM Answer. Our force protection priorities are included in my
Integrated Priority List (IPL). These priorities are reflected under
tow main areas: ------.
Access to Bases in Southwest Asia
Question. General Zinni, during the recent crisis with Iraq, both
Saudi Arabia and Turkey made clear that they were unwilling to allow
U.S. forces to use bases in their countries for offensive missions
against Iraq. The Committee also understands the U.S. currently is
working to resolve base access issues with Oman and Kenya. What is the
status of base access discussions with these countries? Is the level of
local support for a U.S. military presence in your region declining?
CENTCOM Answer. Our access agreement with Oman runs through 2000.
The government of Oman was highly supportive of U.S. Central Command's
(CENTCOM) requirements in response to Operation DESERT THUNDER, ------.
Our access agreement with Kenya was renewed last year and runs through
2000 as well. The relationship between our countries continues to be a
strong one. They have willingly accepted U.S. military forces in
support of humanitarian operations in Africa.
Support for our military presence in the region remains strong.
Turkey and Saudia Arabia recognize the role played by a strong U.S.
military presence in the region, and they were supportive in allowing
that force to be built up. However, they wanted to ensure every
possible diplomatic solution to the crisis was explored.
Question. How would you change your force structure if you had
fewer forward bases to operate from?
CENTCOM Answer. In dealing with Iraqi sanctions enforcement,
without access to facilities of the Gulf Cooperation Council states, --
----. Our access to bases during times of crisis will be based on our
peacetime engagement with our coalition partners in the region. The
efforts we make in building relations, creating a shared regional
strategy, and incorporating host nation cultural concerns into our
operations is essential.
Question. What steps can be taken to prevent or offset the reduced
access to forward bases?
CENTCOM Answer. The key is to not lost access. Efforts at reaching
a consensus and relationship building will pay great dividends. It is
critical to engage our coalition partners on a continual basis to
ensure a shared perspective of the threat to achieve shared regional
objectives.
With respect to our dual-containment policy in the region, should
access be lost or unacceptable restrictions be placed on key bases, and
alternative force structure would be required to enforce UN resolutions
or support military operations. ------.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.
Questions submitted by Mr. Dicks and the answers thereto
follow:]
Weapons Inspections
Question. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and Iraqi Prime Minister
Tariq Aziz signed an accord on February 23 to defuse the crisis over
weapons inspector access to eight ``presidential sites.'' In the deal,
which has been endorsed by he U.S., Iraq has pledged unrestricted
access for the inspectors who are charged with dismantling Iraq's
biological; chemical and ballistic missiles. Are the weapons inspectors
being allowed access to all ``sensitive sites'' at this point?
CENTCOM Answer. The 23 February Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
stated Iraq would allow access to all presidential sites and access to
sensitive sites as previously agreed to. Under these agreements, the UN
Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors were allowed access to both
presidential sites and sensitive sites. Iraq invoked modalities to
limit the number of inspectors allowed into several sensitive sites,
and, while not blocking inspectors, lodged several protests to further
curtail UNSCOM operations at the presidential sites.
Question. How many ``sensitive sites'' have been visited by UN
inspectors since the accord was signed?
CENTCOM Answer. As of mid-April, UN inspectors have visited eight
Iraqi declared sensitive sites since the Memorandum of Understanding
was signed. More of these inspections are likely in the future.
Additionally, UN Special Commission inspectors and UN diplomats visited
eight Iraqi declared presidential sites.
Question. Have ``sensitive site'' inspections turned up any
evidence of WMD production or R&D?
CENTCOM Answer. The recent inspection of sensitive sites did not
yield any evidence of Weapons of Mass Destruction or Research and
Development. However, the chief inspector believed ------.The eight
presidential sites were declared in advance and no proscribed materials
were discovered. These initial visits were a baseline inspection only
and future, short-notice presidential site missions, such as aerial
overflight, photography, and computer searches, and may lodge even
stronger protests during follow-on visits.
Question. Are you concerned that in the months between the time the
Iraqi government halted UN weapons inspections and the time the accord
was signed, that critical WMD evidence was relocated away from
``sensitive sites'' or from other potential inspector sites?
CENTCOM Answer. The delay certainly allowed Iraq ample opportunity
to move Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) related materials and
documents. Iraq's tampering with monitoring cameras and removal of
dual-use equipment from certain locations provided a clear example of
Iraq's intent to protect key equipment. Until late February 1998,
Iraq's presidential sites provided locations to conceal prohibited
materials. The 23 February Kofi Annan/Tariq Aziz agreement probably
forced Baghdad to relocate materials from the presidential locations to
other sites, possibly private residences or burial locations.
Question. If so, do we have good intelligence suggesting where the
WMD-related material may have been moved?
CENTCOM Answer. ------.
Iraq Outlook
Question. Are the forces that will remain in the Gulf adequate to
quickly and decisively strike Iraq if Saddam does not comply with UN
accords?
CENTCOM Answer. The forces that will remain in the Gulf are there
simply to continue OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH (OSW) and to ensure the
credible defense of Kuwait. However, ------. Such a strike would cause
significant damage to Saddam's regime by destroying key security,
command and control (C2), air defense, and weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) facilities.
Question. Is there any military capability you do not have
available to you at this time that could have value-added in terms of
meeting our military and strategic objectives in your region?
CENTCOM Answer. All the currently fielded military technologies
available are at my disposal.
Question. What is your judgement of how this will play out? Is a
military confrontation with Saddam inevitable or is it possible that
the recent threat of force by the U.S. has convinced the Iraqi
government to comply with the UN weapons inspection resolutions?
CENTCOM Answer. I believe that Saddam will continue to test
coalition resolve. His goal is to get the sanctions lifted, and exploit
perceived divisions in the coalition.
I do not believe confrontation with Saddam Hussein is inevitable.
It is important however, that the U.S. and members of the coalition be
able to respond effectively should diplomacy fail.
Question. In your judgement, how long will the current force build-
up have to remain in the Gulf? At what point, assuming Saddam continues
to comply with UN resolutions, might we be able to start reducing force
levels in the Central region?
CENTCOM Answer. I expect the current force structure ------.
We will continue to size our force structure to reflect the threat.
I do not want to maintain American forces in the region any longer than
necessary.
Question. Would you agree with General Ryan's assessment--that we
had base access in Saudi Arabia and other areas but that access did not
necessarily translate into permission to operate our forces from an
offensive posture?
CENTCOM Answer. General Ryan ------. We asked eight other things of
the Saudi Arabian government to include the use of reconnaissance,
intelligence, surveillance and battle management aircraft based in
Saudi Arabia. They approved all eight requests.
Early in this crisis, ------.
Base Access
Question. If this were true, how would we have used ground-based
tactical aircraft in the most recent scenario?
CENTCOM Answer. Our plans ------.
Question. Isn't it true that because of our inability to get basing
access, the bulk of the air campaign would have had to be performed by
Naval aircraft deployed on carriers?
CENTCOM Answer. ------.
Question. Are you concerned that the assumptions that OSD has made
on forward basing are somewhat suspect given the recent situation in
the Gulf?
CENTCOM Answer. I consider the assumptions contained in our
regional war plans to be valid. Access to facilities in the region is
based on a shared perspective of the threat. If our coalition partners
perceive their national interests to be at stake, access will be
granted. U.S. interests and national objectives are not always
identical to those of our coalition partners. The key to ensuring
access is engaging our coalition partners to build a common perspective
of the threat to achieve shared regional objectives. Consultations and
relationship building are the elements to ensuring timely access to
bases in the region.
Strategy of Assassination
Question. As you know, there have been calls in Congress and in
some elements of the foreign policy community to pursue an
assassination attempt against Saddam Hussein. I am not one who agrees
that this is a reasonable or responsible policy. What is your general
view of the notion of pursuing an assassination attempt against Saddam?
CENTCOM Answer. I would not entertain any notion of pursuing an
assassination attempt against Saddam. Such an effort is contrary to the
U.S. policy implementing international laws that prohibit
assassinations. Our obligations to the UN and various international
treaties oblige us to refrain from using force in this way.
Question. Are we damaging ourselves from a public-relations
standpoint in the Arab community by pursuing this line of discussion?
CENTCOM Answer. Yes.
Question. Even if we accept that an assassination attempt is sound
policy, what in your judgment is the likelihood that we could be
successful in carrying such a policy out?
CENTCOM Answer. I would not agree with the premise of the question.
Assassination is contrary to U.S. policy and practice and I would not
want to speculate further.
Saddam's Strength
Question. There have been conflicting reports over the relative
strength of Saddam's regime in his country and throughout the middle-
east region. How would you currently characterize Saddam's strength in
Iraq?
CENTCOM Answer. I do not believe that time is on Saddam's side,
provided current sanctions can be maintained. His military faces the
block obsolescence of many of their weapon systems in the near future.
His security services maintain a climate of fear, which works to
prevent overt opposition, but he faces the constant threat of
assassination. Having said that, ------.
Question. Is he stronger or weaker than before the coalition build-
up in the Gulf?
CENTCOM Answer. Iraq's military strength and his ability to
threaten his neighboring countries has steadily decreased since the end
of Operation DESERT STORM. This has not changed during the recent
crisis. The sanctions imposed by the UN have prevented Saddam Hussein
from modernizing his military. His equipment is getting old and repair
parts are becoming increasingly hard to get.
Question. How is Saddam currently perceived in the Arab community?
Is he viewed in a more sympathetic light since the build-up of
Coalition forces in the Gulf?
CENTCOM Answer. I believe that most Arabs recognize that the
agreement negotiated by Kofi Annan was a retreat by Iraq from an
untenable position, and that it was made possible by the forces we
deployed to the region.
Question. How would you forecast Saddam's long-term viability both
in Iraq and in the Arab community?
CENTCOM Answer. Saddam will govern Iraq for the foreseeable future.
His regime is currently stable, and he is feared and respected. There
is little internal threat to Saddam's regime. As long as he ------.
Question. Is U.S. policy in Iraq strengthening or weakening Iraqi
opposition efforts to overthrow Saddam's regime. Are there changes we
could or should make in U.S. policy to facilitate or augment those
efforts?
CENTCOM Answer. The Iraqi opposition is badly divided and
fragmented, ------. The opposition based outside the country is not in
a position to bring effective pressure to bear against the regime and
internal opposition is difficult given the pervasive control of the
ruthless security services. I believe that our best course is to work
to enforce sanctions, and deny the regime the possibility of
reconstructing its WMD programs. I do not believe that time is on
Saddam's side as long as sanctions remain in place. We have made clear
that Iraq would be better off without Saddam, and that his departure is
the only long-term answer, but we have stopped short of making his
overthrow an objective of our strategy. I believe that is the right
approach.
Iran
Question. In your statement, you mention that Iran remains
potentially the most dangerous long-term threat to peace and stability
in the Central Region. I would agree with that. The election last May
of President Khatami, a moderate, progressive leader by Iranian
standards, was a positive sign. However, as you know, Iranian
Presidents have limited power and the real sources of power in that
country continue to pursue the development of WMD and offensive
missiles as well as justify terrorism as a means of achieving its
objectives. In your judgment, what is the significance of the election
of President Khatemi? Does his rise to power signal a desire by the
Iranian people for a more progressive, tolerant political system? If
so, in your judgment, will that translate into action on the part of
the Iranian government to pursue more progressive, tolerant policies?
CENTCOM Answer. Iran is at a crossroads and the desire of Iranians
for change is clear. To what degree and at what rate that desire for
change results in increased and permanent freedoms remains unknown.
Indicators of positive change are evident. President Khatami is moving
forward on his vision of an Islamic Republic that emphasizes economic
development, social justice, less intervention in citizen's private
lives, and reduced censorship. Iran's social demographics and economic
needs will continue to drive reform. Recent events reflect this: press
reporting is freer than at any time since the revolution, increased
diplomatic visits, the Presidents' future visit to the UN, and the
growing rapprochement with the GCC. In addition, we are seeing
increased professionalism in their navy. Conservative religious leaders
continue to oppose reforms through institutions controlled by
conservatives that manipulate the political system, promote the
development of weapons of mass destruction, as well as support
terrorist groups.
Iranian Missile Production
Question. There have been a number of reports alleging that the
Iranian government is engaged in a crash program to field two medium-
range missiles, Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 within the next year or two. The
missiles could have enough range to hit targets throughout the Middle
East and a longer-range version may eventually be able to target
Europe. Recent reports have further alleged that the Russians are
carrying out secret missile technology transfers to Iran to assist them
in that effort. How would PAC-3, our most mature Theater Missile
Defense system in its current configuration, fare against a Shahab-3 or
Shahab-4 missile?
CENTCOM Answer. Based on available data, the Patriot Program Office
has assessed performance capability for the PAC-3 system against these
threats. ------.
Question. How would a fully configured PAC-3 fare against that same
threat?
CENTCOM Answer. ------.
Question. What can you tell us about Arrow's capacity to meet the
Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 threat?
CENTCOM Answer. ------.
Theater Missile Defense
Question. Can you provide a general assessment of the missile
threat of would be aggressors in your region at this time?
CENTCOM Answer. The general trend is the development of longer
range, higher velocity missiles. Pakistan's recent test launch of a
medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) confirmed the presence of these
missiles in the region. ------.
Other trends are the use of forward, underground or bunkered
missile facilities, and the general hardening of strategic missile
infrastructure. Also, countries are acquiring many vehicles from the
former Soviet Union suitable for use as mobile launchers. Such
developments will greatly enhance overall missile force mobility and
operational flexibility. A similar trend is seen in efforts to acquire
solid missile technology that will significantly reduce the logistical
requirements and signature of these systems.
Question. Do you believe we ought to be putting more resources
behind deploying TMD capability more quickly than currently planned?
CENTCOM Answer. I feel the forces deployed and systems being
developed are appropriate to answer the threat we face today and in the
future. ------. System commonality adds value to our relationship with
the host nations. The development process must include Foreign Military
Sales (FMS), training, exercises, system upgrades and operations.
Seamless interoperability adds flexibility and common ground from which
to plan and operate. In addition, ------.
Question. In your judgement, which TMD systems should be considered
highest priority?
CENTCOM Answer. The current Theater Missile Defense (TMD) core
programs, PAC-3, THAAD and Navy Area Defense are most essential to U.S.
Central Command's (CENTCOM) near-term air and missile defense
capability. These systems represent the best capability against the
existing threat in the short term. Additionally, ------. Airborne Laser
Technology and Aegis Theater-Wide Defense systems will eventually
provide UPPER TIER defense capabilities. ------. When integrated into a
robust Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and Intelligence
(C4I) architecture, these LOWER and UPPER TIER weapons and evolving
sensors will address CENTCOM's requirement for a near leak-proof
defense against the evolving TBM threat. However, the near term core
programs should not be delayed in order to fund long term systems.
Question. Are there any TMD programs that, in your judgement, are
underfunded or that ought to be accelerated?
CENTCOM Answer. Theater Missile Defense programs I identified in
U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM) Integrated Priority List (IPL) are
being addressed adequately, and their progress to operational
capability is satisfactory.
Question. General, one of the things you and I have discussed is
the threat from the Russian-made NOVATOR Missile. Can you give the
subcommittee an overview on both the capability and availability of
this missile in the Central region?
CENTCOM Answer. ------.
Swing Strategy
Question. Would you please discuss the risks placed on your mission
by the strategy of ``swinging'' high-value assets such as bombers and
Joint STARS between theaters?
CENTCOM Answer. Swing, or dual-apportioned, forces are high-
value,low-density forces that are committed to the first of two Major
Theater Wars (MTWs). The decision to ``swing'' forces will be made by
the National Command Authorities upon execution of the second of two
MTWs. ------.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Dicks.]
Tuesday, March 3, 1998.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
WITNESSES
GENERAL PETER J. SCHOOMAKER, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES SPECIAL
OPERATIONS COMMAND, UNITED STATES ARMY
COMMANDER TIM BOSILJEVAC, UNITED STATES NAVY
MAJOR ERIC WELLER, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, AIR NATIONAL GUARD
CAPTAIN CURTIS HUBBARD, UNITED STATES ARMY
MAJOR CHRIS BAILEY, UNITED STATES ARMY
SERGANT FIRST CLASS LARRY REIS, UNITED STATES ARMY
CAPTAIN BEAUDETTE, UNITED STATES ARMY
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order.
This afternoon, the Committee, in closed session, will hear
testimony from General Peter J. Schoomaker, United States Army,
Commander is Chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command.
General Schoomaker has brought with him a number of the troops
who actually do the missions, who will report firsthand about
some of the operations they have been involved in since our
last hearing 2 years ago.
This is the General's first appearance before the Committee
as Commander in Chief, although he has been here before and he
has been involved in the modern era of Special Operations from
its rebirth in the 1970s. In fact, he was a member of the
hostage rescue team sent into Iran in April of 1980, which led
to the creation of the Special Operations Command 10 years ago.
As the world changes, so does the threat, and many of the
threats we face require the forces under your command to be
prepared to respond at a moment's notice. You have mentioned to
us how may many opportunities that you and your forces have to
do the things that you do best. We will hear about some of
those today.
The Cold War has been replaced by threats from rogue
nations, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and the growing
availability of weapons of mass destruction, all of which are
in many ways more dangerous and unpredictable. Our special ops
forces are being called upon more each day to control these
problems.
We appreciate the work that all of you do. We recognize the
delicacy of some of the things that you do and the threat to
the lives of those conducting these operations. We are very
proud of what you do, and it is just unfortunate that the
general public never hears about most of the good things that
you do for obvious reasons.
We would like to hear about some of those today, General,
and we hope that when this hearing is finished that you will
have an opportunity to, as you visit with your troops, to let
then know how proud we are of the work that you do.
Mr. Murtha, I will ask you for any opening statement.
Mr. Murtha. I have none at this time, Mr. Chairman
Mr. Young. General, please proceed. Your entire statement
will be placed in the record along with your biography and you
may summarize it as you wish, and then I would suspect we would
have quite a few questions for you and the gentlemen that you
have with you.
Summary Statement of General Schoomaker
General Schoomaker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, I am honored
to appear before you today on behalf of the 46,000 soldiers,
sailors and airmen of the U.S. Special Operations Command. As I
mentioned to year earlier, the last time I was in this room, I
was sitting in this chair right there with General Lindsay, as
a matter of fact, when he came up here for his first testimony
and I was one of these young guys here. So that is 10 years
ago.
USSOCOM--STATE OF THE COMMAND
Time and again this past year, members of our special
operations forces, SOF, performed superbly in a variety of
challenges around the world. Success was due in large part to
the strong support of Congress, and the Administration and the
American people. But more importantly, we succeeded because of
quality people, outstanding leadership, and the ability to
adopt and persevere in an environment characterized by change
and uncertainty.
SOF units, both under my command here in the United States
and those assigned to the geographic Commanders in Chief, are
trained and ready, capable of fulfilling all of our assigned
missions. Our tempo of operations is high. This past year we
deployed SOF teams to 144 countries, conducted 17 actual crisis
response operations around the world, completed 224 Joint
Combined Exercises for Training in JCETS, 98 countries,
conducted 194 counter drug missions in 20-plus locations,
andconducted humanitarian demining missions in 11 countries.
USSOCOM--BUDGET REQUEST
I might point out that we conducted all of these missions
for less than 1.4 percent of the entire DoD budget and
personnel. Actually, USSOCOM's discretionary spending is less
than one percent of the DoD budget, when military pay, which is
budgeted by the services, is removed from the equation.
While this makes SOF a pretty good bang for the buck for
the American taxpayer, this relatively small amount of
discretionary funds leads us leverage to other sources of
funding to do our SOF missions. Our leveraging efforts have
paid big dividends in mission areas, such as humanitarian
demining, the African Crisis Response Initiative, and the
counter drug programs, all 3 of which you will hear about
during our operator vignettes that will take place here in just
a few moments.
SOF plays a major role in all three efforts and that
participation, to a large extent, is funded by sources other
than Major Force Program-11. One area in which we have not been
as successful in the leveraging of other sources of funding is
base operations support. The USSOCOM budget does not provide
base operations support for SOF. As budgets across the
department of Defense have become tighter, USSOCOM has come
under pressure to pay for enlist this kind of support without a
corresponding major increase in program funds. Base operations
funds directly affect the readiness of all of our service
members, and I would urge the committee to support the
Department's request for full funding.
Our high tempo of operations requires us to manage
carefully, but the morale of the force is high because our men
and women are fully engaged in the types of missions for which
they volunteered and were trained. As with the other unified
commands, USSOCOM provides an operational environment,
characterized by accelerating geopolitical change, rapid
technological advancement, evolving threats, strained resources
and potential new roles. These factors require innovative
thinking and new ways to shape change if we are to provide the
widest array of options in protecting America's interests. The
truth is, business as usual will not provide the capabilities
we need to deal with the transactional and asymmetrical threats
of tomorrow.
We realize that USSOCOM must embrace and institutionalize
the process of change in a disciplined manner, which will allow
us to remain the most capable and relevant special operation
force in existence. Consequently, our organization, force
structure, platforms, equipment and missions must and will
continuously evolve to meet the needs of the Nation and seize
the opportunities brought about by change.
SUMMARY
Finally, I can think of no more valuable partner for our
special operations forces than Congress. We truly value your
leadership, advice and assistance, as we prepare now to meet
the many difficult challenges ahead. As I mentioned, we in fact
are a creature of Congress in terms of creation in USSOCOM,
which we appreciate.
[The statement of General Schoomaker follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
DEPLOYMENT VIGNETTES
General Schoomaker. Thank you Mr. Chairman, for the
opportunity to make these brief remarks. Accompanying me today
are operators from our components who will briefly describe
deployments they have participated in during the past year.
These are representative of the types of activities in USSOCOM
is involved in every day. The first operator who will speak to
you is Commander Tim Bosiljevac. Tim is a Navy SEAL who
recently participated in counter drug operations in Colombia.
[Clerk's note.--The Committee was unable to print the
photographs described in the following vignettes.]
COLOMBIA COUNTER DRUG OPERATION
Commander Bosiljevac. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate this opportunity today, and although I am sitting in
this chair, in 10 years I do not expect to be sitting in that
chair. Nonetheless this is a novel opportunity as a Navy SEAL
to get out of my wet suit and put on dry clothes, and I
appreciate that very much.
I am from Emporia, Kansas,and I can assure you that is a
pretty good drop zone for parachuting, pretty flat and devoid
of trees. I have a Bachelor of Science Degree in political
science, a Master of Arts in history, and I have about 20 years
experience in the military, most of that in maritime special
operations and also counterterrorism and rescue.
Some of the experiences I have had are the: Achille Lauro
ship hijacking, Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, and operations
in Somalia. I would like to brief you this afternoon on another
experience I had just this last year when I commanded a 10-man
SEAL unit on a counternarcotics joint planning assistance team
JPAT, to the country of Colombia. We do many things all around
the world. A lot of our operations deal with training and
training with foreign forces in an exercise environment. JPATs
are a little bit different. JPATs are few and far between, but
in JPATs we actually go forward into operational bases out in
the sticks of many of these countries and we train and assist
and advise forces which are actually conducting combat
operations, in this case, against narco terrorists.
We conduct in Southern Command about 8 of these JPATs per
year in the country of Colombia, 6 of those being accomplished
by Army Special Forces and another 2 by Navy SEALs. The one I
am going to talk to you about occurred in late spring of 1997.
To give you a little bit of background, sir, in October
1996 we conducted one of these JPATS in San Jose del Guaviare.
It was highly successful. At the end of the 4-week JPAT,
approximately a half million dollars worth of coca paste and
precursor chemicals was captured and destroyed. The U.S.
Southern Command and the military in Bogota desired to
replicate that success. They set us up for our 1997 JPAT in a
Colombian air base in the southern part of Colombia, Tres
Esquinas. This is much like the Cajun country of Colombia.
Highly rough terrain, only one road in and out of the base.
Everything else, as you can see by these photographs, moves
pretty much by river.
When we conduct these operations, these JPATs, we go down
and train and live with them on a daily basis in these forward
base areas with these forces and we assist them in planning
operations. But we do not leave those bases and conduct the
operations with the forces. We had 4 weeks to conduct this
mission, this JPAT. The first 2 weeks we dedicated mainly to
training the force. These were forces that already had very
good soldiering skills. We hopefully enhanced them a little bit
more. A couple of photos we highlight some of that training.
This is combat medical training, sir, and this is prisoner
handling techniques.
During the first 2 weeks, we also dedicated a certain
amount of the force in assisting, planning, and targeting for
missions that they would conduct during the final 2 weeks of
our stay.
While the Colombians had very good human intelligence, our
forces provided a little bit of technical assistance through
our experience. We had personnel stationed in a 4 base in
Panama, Naval Special Warfare Unit-8, adjacent to Howard Air
Force Base. Those personnel would ride aboard U.S. Navy P-3
aircraft conducting primarily surveillance and air interdiction
of counternarcotics in missions over Colombia over many hours.
As a secondary mission our personnel will direct aircraft over
areas of interest in order to research targeting and extraction
information.
Once the aircraft landed back in Panama, those digital
photographs taken by our personnel on board would be converted
into data files. Those would be sent via satellite
communications link to our forward base at Tres Esquinas where
we would bring them up on laptop computers. We would review
that information, those photographs, with the host nation
leadership and assist them in planning, the detailed planning
of these operations.
Now, during our 4 weeks in Tres Esquinas, the host nation
conducted 4 combat raids, and as you can see here, sir, in each
case, coca fields were found, labs were found, coca paste was
found, seized and all destroyed. We had very good success down
there. During our 4 weeks, we estimated approximately $280,000
worth of coca paste, precursor chemicals, and equipment was
found and destroyed.
So, although we provided good technical assistance, we also
felt a large part of our success when combined with the
technological assistance that we gave them, was the importance
of our physically being out there, sharing conditions with them
in these forward camps, being able to work with them every day,
providing a very strong working relationship and rapport with
them, sir. I will be followed by Major Eric Weller.
BOSNIA EC-130 OPERATION
Mr. Young. Thank you for an excellent presentation.
Major Weller. Sir, my name is Major Eric Weller. I come
from Boiling Springs, Pennsylvania. I graduated from
Shippensburg State University with a degree in criminology. I
have had 17 years military experience as a guardsman. I fly
with the 193rd Special Operations Wing out of Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania. We fly six EC-130 aircraft. They are unique
aircraft. Our primary mission, sir, is psychological operations
or broadcasting radio and TV programs, and a secondary mission
of jamming operations.
While with this unit, I have had the opportunity to deploy
during the invasion of Grenada, Panama, desert shield-desert
storm, Sea signal in Haiti, and the operation I would like to
talk to you about today, JOINT GUARD in Bosnia.
Back in the August 1997 time frame, it was determined that
one of the Serbian factions had pretty much taken over control
of the Serbian media. They were broadcasting anti-SFOR or
stabilization force propaganda which pretty much put the SFOR
ground forces in harm's way.
Also during that time, they had pretty much taken over, or
had not parlayed the equity within the other Serbianfactions in
regards to the upcoming elections in the October, November time frame.
That faction was in the Pale area, by the way, held by Mr. Vladimir
Karanovich.
Anyway, General Shinseki from SFOR asked our unit to come
over, give capabilities briefings, let them know what we could
do, and figure out how we could work ourselves in the media
compliance plan, called the Bosanova plan. This plan was about
a 5 or 6-year plan. The first pillar was basically peaceful
interdiction ultimately working up to destruction of radio and
TV stations. In that plan, we again supplemented the 4th
Psychological Operations Group with radio and TV broadcasts and
we were also called upon to stand alert for additional command
and control type jamming and radio and TV type jamming.
Upon receiving our execution order from the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, we were told to do something that we normally
don't do, which was open up the deployment to the worldwide
media. Consequently, our deployment was broadcast on CNN
International and every other major news organization that you
can think of. They followed our planes across the pond into
Brindisi, where we bedded down with the other Air Force Special
Operations Command or AFSOC forces.
While in theater, we did fly some radio and TV missions and
also stood alert for potential jamming missions. After the
elections, it was determined that things had quieted down
enough that we were able to redeploy.
One of the things, though, about the deployment I wanted to
point out was that it in itself was a PSYOPS campaign. By the
time we had gotten into theater, it was determined that the
Pale Serbs had pretty much come into compliance with the Dayton
Peace Accords.
On our redeployment, the other thing I wanted to point out,
was that we were still held on a 96-hour string, which means
that we have 96 hours to get back in the theater if we are
needed. While in theater we flew about 55 missions,
approximately 5 hours each, logging approximately 250 hours on
our aircraft.
Sir, that concludes my portion of the briefing. I will be
followed by Captain Hubbard.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much.
NAMIBIA DEMINING
Captain Hubbard. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman.
My name is Captain Curtis Hubbard. I am originally from
Boone, North Carolina, which by the way Mr. Hefner knows where
it is, although he is not here today. I graduated from the
University of Miami with a degree in music education, which
usually gets a roaring response from most of the generals in my
chain of command. I graduated from there and went to officer
basic course at Fort Sill as an artillery man and eventually
spent time in the 82nd Airborne Division for artillery before
coming to Special Forces. I have been on the team almost 2
years, I speak some French, and I have done 4 OCONUS
deployments to Africa. I would like to talk about the most
recent 2 I have done, which are both demining related.
Demining Operations started in 1995 for my unit, but it has
been going on concurrently throughout the whole world through
the special operations, specifically the Middle East, Africa,
Europe, Asia, and I would like to deal specifically with
southern Africa because that is where my battalion, our area of
responsibility is. We are currently in Mozambique, Rwanda, and
this summer we will be going to Zimbabwe for the first time.
In our demining program, the most important thing for one
to remember is that it is a ``train the trainer'' program,
meaning that we go over and we teach the Namibians to teach
Namibians, and that supports our end-state, which is a self-
sustaining, in place demining program, which means we can leave
it, work ourselves out of a job and go home and we know that
the work is still being done. I selected pictures today that
hopefully represent this with the Americans in the background
teaching the instructors, who then again are teaching the
soldiers how to do this.
Namibia specifically has a unique mine problem. As I said,
we went there first in 1995 and we went again this year in
September, and we just went back again. I got home about 2
weeks ago from the most recent mission. We have trained two
companies, we call them conventional deminers, which is a
standard probing, and that is using mine detectors. Namibia has
a unique mine situation after their guerrilla war 8 years ago.
The South Africans, had mines along the power lines coming
south from the border of Angola. That was the main power for
all of southern Namibia.
What happened after the war, was they scooped all of these
mines up and put them in piles around the pylons, these high
tension power lines. So instead of a 1-dimensional mine problem
you now have a 3-dimensional mine problem. So the guys at Fort
Belvoir helped us out and developed something called a berm
processor, which looks like a potato-picker but works like a
flour sifter. That is the only way I can describe it. It takes
up about the size of the square in the middle of this room. It
scoops out the dirt, the dirt falls through, exposing the mines
on top of the ground. Our last mission was integrating this
with the conventional mine field clearing operations.
Namibia is about \9/10\ complete with their conventional
mine fields and we are expecting about 2 years from now they
should be completely done. Ambassador Ward is supporting a
program for a regional demining school in the area, which will
bring the whole southern region of Africa together in a
demining school, and hopefully will reduce some of us going
over there all the time.
There are many obvious, and some not so obvious, demining
benefits for us. The obvious ones are we are saving lives,
returning the land to civilians, and just generally helping
spread U.S. influence throughout the region. Some of the less
obvious that deal with ODA commanders and their teams directly,
is that we are a force multiplier on the ground. The way we are
really helpful is by knowing the country and its people, and
the only way to get to know them, and you can't learn that from
books, you have to be in country with the people, working with
them, as much out of 365 days out of the year as you can. The
demining program has helped with that significantly because we
are in there a lot more, working with the soldiers.
There are other reasons, though--not so obvious reasons,
and that is we are there to help out in contingency or crisis
situations. For example, the C-141 that took me on the
September demining mission was involved in a tragic midair
collision with a German passenger--well, it was a military
passenger--plane. So I got a change of mission within the first
48 hours on the ground of conducting search and rescue
operations at that point. So we were able to establish the
first communications link back to the United States as well as
our command in Europe, and help out in thatsituation. We had
people in the air looking for sites, looking for survivors, and we were
also on the boats picking up the debris. So we were able to react to
things very quickly and be helpful.
In conclusion, I would like to say this is a worthwhile SOF
mission and we will have lasting results in southern Africa, as
well as the country that was close to my heart, Namibia. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Captain Hubbard, thank you very much.
NAMIBIA PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
Major Bailey. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. My name is
Major Chris Bailey and I am the executive officer for the Third
Psychological Operations battalion. I have a Bachelor's Degree
in engineering from Idaho State University and a Master in
International Relations from Troy State. I am strongly familiar
with the French language. I currently hail from Goldsboro,
North Carolina. I have experience with psychological operations
for 10 years now, 10 out of the 13 years that I have been on
active duty, and some of the assignments that I have been
involved are Operation JUST CAUSE, Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm, Operation PROVIDE REFUGE out in the Republic of
the Marshall Islands; recently Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and
JOINT GUARD, and I just completed a command tour where I was
responsible for providing psychological operations support to
Haiti, as well as demining and mining awareness programs in
Central America.
In 1995, Psychological Operations went to Namibia to
reinforce the information side of the Special Forces program
that Captain Hubbard was just talking about. The objective was
to work with the Namibian government to provide a national
campaign of information to advise and assist the local
population in identifying, avoiding and reporting mine problems
throughout their northern areas. We have also got an unexploded
ordinance, which Captain Hubbard did not mention, which I
believe is going to be a more long-term issue, but I believe in
the long run the 2-year program that he discussed regarding
Ambassador Ward's program is going to pretty much solve that.
In 1995 we went over there and we conducted the program and
we used the Namibian Administration of Information and
Broadcasting to assist us with the dissemination part of that
program. Right over here to my left I have a few products that
were actually produced during that time frame. The national
theme and national logo that they used is ``don't touch it,
report it,'' and then of course you have this Namibian triangle
with a small kid saying, avoid it. This was actually used on
several of the promotional products that were bought during
that time frame. Baseball caps, T-shirts, soccer balls, things
that were actually issued to the children as a constant
reminder to not touch and avoid.
Additionally, we used a poster that we set up in the local
population centers, post offices, police stations, as well as
schools, and this actually gives you photographs of ordnance
and what not to touch and also some mines.
Over here we have an insert that was used in the national
press, The Namibian, which is their multi-lingual newspaper
that covers Africans, Oshiuambo and English, which goes
throughout the country as a constant reminder. Furthermore, the
PSYOP team, on the ground at that time prepared public service
announcements, all of which are currently running today,
television and radio broadcasts, which leads us to our mission
this last summer.
They had an ongoing program and it had some effect, but it
lost momentum, so the objective of our program this last summer
was to reenergize that program and work the self-sustaining
piece that again Captain Hubbard mentioned where we get them
back on their feet and give them the tools to continue.
We started our program with a 2-week block of instruction.
I had a Reserve psychological operations broadcast specialist
with me, I had a civilian technical cultural analyst with me, I
had two PSYOP soldiers with me, and myself, and we worked with
The Ministries of Information and broadcasting, the Ministries
of Defense, and the National Police Force, and trained them on
computer graphics techniques using up-to-date computer graphics
software and peripherals, and then we moved on from there into
media integration and planning.
We also worked a 2-year straw man plan with the National
Demining Committee that when we left was fairly complete. They
were still on the table working that out with the committee as
well as Ambassador Ward and the host nation country team.
During that same time I was working product procurement. We
procured $195,000 worth of promotional products using State
Department demining money, similar to what we had purchased in
the last event. The purchase, though a one-time purchase, would
apply to products that were developed as a result of the
training that we provided, so the students that we taught would
actually produce new logos and new symbols. I have a T-shirt
here that was actually one of these products. I couldn't bring
everything, but everything from rulers to baseball caps to
pencils, to soccer balls, shorts, things that would have
lasting value and be seen over a broad expanse were produced.
And then they would be distributed using that 2-year plan
instead of a 1-time shotgun blast.
Sir, in conclusion, I would like to say that this has been
a very successful program. I have been excited about the amount
of energy that the embassy has put into this. The nation has a
commitment and the national ministries have a commitment to
this, and I really have enjoyed working the program, and I
appreciate the opportunity to brief you this afternoon.
Mr. Young. Major, thank you very much. We appreciate you
being here.
Major Bailey. I will be followed by Sergeant First Class
Reis.
SENEGAL-ACRI OPERATION
Sergeant Reis. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman.
My name is Sergeant First Class Larry Reis, and I was born
and raised in Santa Maria, California. I have been in the
military now for approximately 10 years, during which I served
at the First Cavalry Division out of Fort Hood, Texas, the 82nd
Airborne Division in which I participated in Operation Desert
Shield and Desert Storm, and for the past 4 years I have been
assigned to the Special Forces.
During that time I was deployed to Haiti for Operation
restore, uphold and maintain democracy. I have also conducted
training in France, Mali and Senegal. I am a static-line
jumpmaster and also completed the survival escape, resistance
and envade, better known as the SERE course. In am Operations
Intelligence qualified, and I have a good working knowledge of
the French language.
My team and I deployed to Senegal as part of the African
Crisis Response Initiative, or better known as ACRI, on 20
July, 1997. Upon arriving in Senegal, we set up our operational
base and began the preparation process of theSenegalese forces.
During the preparation process of an 800-man Sengalese battalion, we
issued each soldier nonlethal individual equipment consisting of boots,
uniforms, canteens and various other field equipment. Organizational
equipment was also issued at this time, consisting primarily of
communications and mine detection equipment.
As depicted by this picture here, sir, we also had a U.S.
Army optometrist conduct eye examinations and issue eyeglasses
as needed, and necessary vaccinations were also conducted at
this time. With the conclusion of the preparation process of
the Senegalese forces, we moved into the training portion of
our mission, which was actually broken down into 4 phases,
phase 1 being the basic U.N. task phase.
The basic U.N. task phase emphasized tasks that every U.N.
soldier should know, and some of those tasks were the
organization and the operation of the United Nations,
peacekeeping principles, and the code of conduct of U.N.
personnel.
During this time we also took the time to go ahead
evaluated the Senegalese tactics to enable us to identify
future training requirements by assessing their strengths and
their weaknesses, which moves us into phase 2, which was the
small unit tactics phase, sir. This phase, what emphasized
force protection measures, measures to protect themselves and
other measures to protect the other folks.
Then we moved into phase 3 of our operation known as the
Peacekeeping Operation phase. The peacekeeping operation phase
emphasized responsibilities while in a peacekeeping mission
posture. Some of the tasks conducted were things such as the
organization and the operation of a checkpoint, securing a
route, convoy security, the moving of dislocated civilians, and
also the identifying and processing of detained personnel.
At the end of each of these tasks, a practical exercise was
conducted to determine the soldiers' ability to conduct each of
these tasks. If they were not capable of conducting it, we
would retrain them and they would keep going until they did
pass it.
Then we moved into phase 4 which was known as the training
exercise phase, a situation which is depicted by these two
pictures here. I would like to point out also, the equipment
that we were given, this picture here is a soldier setting up
for a situational training exercise. He is using actual
equipment that we had provided him, such as the computer, 2-
programmable hand-held Motorola radios that we gave him to use
for command and control, and this picture shows him actually
running the operations that we were giving him at that time,
sir.
Now, a situational training exercise was conducted on the
operation to give the Senegalese a realistic, practical
exercise to learn by. It was just like a training environment.
We gave them a situation to deal with and they dealt with them,
and we were there to help them and assist them in any way
possible.
After that we moved into a field training exercise. This
exercise was conducted to give the Senegalese a chance to plan
and train for tasks that we taught them. And after that, we
gave the Senegalese task force commander a mission tasking
statement which enabled him to train and conduct a simulated
peacekeeping mission unilaterally, with minimal assistance from
United States forces.
At the conclusion of the FTX we moved into the critique
portion. We critiqued the Senegalese performance during the FTX
and pointed out their strengths and weaknesses. The Senegalese
were deemed capable of conducting such operations by receiving
a 70 percent go in all operations that they conducted.
We then held a graduation ceremony and redeployed to Fort
Bragg on 25 September, 1997. I would like to point out that I
am redeploying back over to Senegal in 7 days to conduct the
second portion of the ACRI concept, which is the sustainment
phase for the Senegalese forces.
This concludes my portion of the brief and I will be
followed by Captain Beaudette.
Mr. Young. Sergeant, thank you very much.
General Schoomaker. I would point out that by giving them
the eyeglasses improved their shooting.
SIERRA LEONE OPERATION
Captain Beaudette. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman.
I am Captain Beaudette, currently assigned as the assistant
operation officer for Third Special Forces Group based at Fort
Bragg. My hometown is Canton, Connecticut. I have been in
Special Forces for the past 3 years now, 2 years of which I
served as a commander on an operational detachment. I am a
native French speaker. I have had the opportunity to travel
within approximately 12 countries within our area of
responsibility.
Two recent operations I have been involved with, sir, are
joint task force Nobel Obelisk in which we assisted in the
noncombatant evacuation of the U.S. embassy and staff, along
with the approximately 2,500 American citizens and third
country nationals. The second operation is Operation firm
response which was the following week, where we assisted again
in the noncombatant evacuation of the U.S. embassy and staff.
It was primarily a French-run operation, and I served as the
member of the EUCOM survey and assessment team and again had
the opportunity to work as a liaison to the French Foreign
Legion since they had two regiments on the ground.
The photos here depict joint task force Nobel Obelisk. We
had been conducting joint, combined and exchange training in
the country of Sierra-Leone for approximately 4 weeks, when on
Sunday morning our compound erupted in gunfire. We were
conducting our morning physical training. Immediate actions
were taken to establish a defensive perimeter, and we gained
contact with our higher headquarters based out of Europe and
also our group headquarters at Fort Bragg.
We tried to establish contact with the embassy and staff as
quickly as possible, which difficult, in that it was a Sunday
morning and the embassy personnel again were caught at the
residential compounds and were isolated from the chancellary
building.
In the second photo, Ms. Ann Wright, was the deputy chief
of mission. The ambassador had left for home leave the week
prior.
Some of the tasks which we accomplished in support of the
operation were the conduct of initial planning for the
evacuation. We had the ability to conduct advanced
reconnaissance of the NEO site itself, the landing zones, and
we moved the embassy staff and personnel down to the actual NEO
location. In addition, we provided security at the 2
residential compounds while we were there. Both compounds had
been broken into the first night prior to ourarrival from our
training location. We also had the opportunity to go down to the
chancellery and recover 2 young Marine guards who had been isolated
from the rest of the embassy staff. This photo here depicts the team
prior to our departure from the actual NEO location.
The main role, I should say, of our detachment in the
operations was real-time tactical communications ultimately
between the embassy and higher headquarters, both back in
Washington, as well as our higher headquarters back in Germany,
and that due to the fact that they were caught at the
residential area, they didn't have the appropriate
communications gear, but we were able to provide that.
The last photo depicts a detachment getting ready to
conduct a special reconnaissance mission, back ashore from the
USS KEARSARGE. We were initially tasked to evacuate 175 people
from Freetown, and that number ballooned to 2,500 because of
the mission requirements.
At the conclusion of the exercise, the operational
detachment went back ashore in Senegal. The team and I had to
go back to Europe and debrief the commander of SOCEUR, and that
afternoon I again had the opportunity to redeploy to
Brazzaville, Congo and assist in Operation firm response,
another similar type operation, this time managed by the
French.
Sir, this concludes the vignettes.
Mr. Young. Captain, thank you very much.
I wanted to repeat what I had said earlier. It is just
really too bad that each of you and your teams and your
services and the country doesn't get much recognition for all
of the good things that you are doing in many, many different
parts of the world. For those of us who know about it, just
understand that we are very, very proud of each of you and the
good work that you do.
If you have any quick questions for the operators who have
testified, we will do that first, and then we will go to a
round of 5-minute questions. The reason we are going to have to
adhere strictly to the time, because then we want to go to a
higher level of classification, to discuss some other
activities and special operations that we can't at this level
of classification.
So let's just----
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Chairman, I want to know how it is that a
Marine, 2 Marines, when there were 2 out there isolated and you
happened to rescue those 2 Marines?
Captain Beaudette. Sir, they were caught conducting shift
change. The coup actually erupted downtown in Freetown and one
Marine had come to relieve his buddy.
Mr. Murtha. Two of them. How many enemy were there? I mean
two was plenty to take care of.
Mr. Dicks. Do the Marines speak French?
Mr. Young. All right. Mr. Hobson.
Mr. Hobson. I have one question to the last briefer here.
It is very interesting, the fact that you went over to do
one mission and while were you there, you had to do another
mission. Do you feel--I am sure you are going to say yes to
this, but your training was not as a crew to do the mission
that you wound up doing. So do you feel you were actually
prepared for that, and are your crews, your teams trained in
that some of your mission could change and you have to become
proactive, because all the rest of them you were in a special
mission. This one switched on you all of a sudden.
Captain Beaudette. Yes sir. The primary purpose of the
Joint Combined Exchange Training or one of the purposes, is our
training as well as that of the host nation. That being the
case, we bring along all of the equipment which we would
require to conduct any type of operation. It is an excellent
opportunity for us to get within our assigned area of
responsibility, and for the team members to practice language,
the cross-cultural communication that is so important to us, as
well as to employ some of our weapons systems, practice some of
the communications means which we use during the operation. So
in the 4 weeks prior, we had ample time and opportunity to
train on these types of systems, the JCET being just a small
piece of what we do. So, yes, sir, I will answer that I felt
that we were--that we were prepared, that we had brought the
appropriate amount of equipment, as well as the appropriate
amount and types of ammunition in order to be successful in any
type of mission, and I think that--you know, I was very proud
of my soldiers that it somewhat exemplified or illustrated the
flexibility which they have to go from a training-specific
mission to a contingency operation.
Mr. Hobson. Thank you. That is very interesting.
General Schoomaker. Mr. Hobson, if I could just add, the
most important thing that we have in Special Operations is our
people. There is no question about it. We talk about training
for certainty and educating for uncertainty, and that is what
we feel makes us so relevant today and what is the most
important piece that we are going to have to be relevant
tomorrow. Of the 17 crises that we responded to this year, we
were in place in 8 of those doing something else at the time
that the crises erupted and were able to do the kinds of things
that he depicted there.
RESERVE FORCES
Mr. Dicks. I was interested, didn't one of the soldiers say
that they were in the reserves?
Major Weller. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. The Guard, National Guard.
I would just like to ask you, how is it for guardsmen in
the Special Forces? How do you fit in? How is your rating?
Major Weller. We think it is great. Special Operations
takes care of us. We get the appropriate training that we need.
Each guardsman in the flying business is afforded 48 flying
training periods per year. We have more than enough flying
time. And as I have mentioned, we are deployed all over the
world, so I mean we feel that we are right up to snuff with the
active duty from our side.
Mr. Dicks. What percentage of the Special Forces are Guard
and Reserve?
General Schoomaker. I probably should answer that. Thirty
percent of USSOCOM, 30 percent of the 46,000 that we have are
Reserve component, 65 percent are on active duty, and then 5
percent are civilian. So it is a very important piece of our
force. And as I had mentioned to you before, for instance in
Bosnia, today we have nearly 800 people actually in Bosnia-
Herzegovina right now as we speak and about 500 of those are
from the Reserve components.
Mr. Dicks. I just wanted to raise that point because you
know at a time when we are having difficulties, I think the
Special Forces are a real example of total force operating
together, using guardsman.
Mr. Young. A follow-up on that. What does that do toyour
civilian career and your ability to make a living?
Major Weller. I work full-time for the unit right now, sir.
I just started working for the unit about a year ago. Prior to
that, I worked as a civil servant for the Department of the
Army and the Department of the Navy. So I didn't have any
problem at all getting off from work.
Mr. Young. What about others who are reservists or
guardsmen. Are you aware of problems that these extra
deployments would have with their civilian activity?
Major Weller. Well, sir, we rarely have any problems. We
are in close contact with their employers. The employers show,
you know, a very high sense of patriotism. We are in constant
touch with them explaining to them in general what we are doing
and how their support actually supports the Government of the
United States.
Mr. Young. Any other questions for the briefers?
Mr. Sabo. Maybe this fits for what you have in mind for the
second round.
Mr. Young. We are going to give you 5 minutes for the
second round.
DEMINING MISSIONS
Mr. Sabo. What percentage of your time is spent on mine
clearing and why mine clearing is assigned the responsibility
of Special Forces?
General Schoomaker. We ran 11 demining missions this year.
The primary reason why we run them is because we are provided
money out of the State Department for humanitarian demining
that allows us to leverage that money and take the teams that
would be going into those areas for their normal missions and
allows us to preserve our own O&M money to do other things. So
we see it as an ability to leverage, putting our people in
there, doing the kinds of things that Special Forces do.
Special Forces are trainers, whether we are in an
Unconventional Warfare (UW) environment, where we are raising
and training guerilla forces or whether we are in a foreign
internal defense environment where we are helping host nation
forces develop democratic ideals within their military, or
teaching professionalism to their NCO corps. These are the very
same skills that we are doing here.
So what we are doing is we are leveraging; in this resource
constrained environment we have other means of getting in and
doing useful things. And we think it is a pretty smart way to
do business. I might say that there are 3 programs that we are
doing this in. The humanitarian demining is one of them, the
counter drug program where we are using MFP 11 money to do
counter drug types of training missions, and then there is the
ACRI, which again, is a State Department program. It puts our
Special Forces operators into their target countries, gives
them cultural awareness, gives them knowledge of the local
surroundings, and improves their language capabilities as they
deal with the people, and so that is really what it is about.
Mr. Young. Okay. Are there other quick questions for this
part of the hearing?
EMPLOYER'S SUPPORT
Mr. Nethercutt. Just one quick question, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I have a question regarding the civilian
employers of Guard and Reserve members. Do you sense that the
employers who are supporting the Guard and Reserve part of the
Special Forces are tolerant with these deployments, or are they
impatient? Is there something we should do relative to meeting
their needs so that they can help you all meet yours?
General Schoomaker. Do you want to answer any part of that?
Because I have an opinion on it, and you can answer it.
Major Weller. Again, like I said before, sir, we are in
close contact with the employers. Their commander personnally
calls and writes them letters, explains again how their support
to us helps us support Special Operations.
General Schoomaker. My response would be there is no
standard answer. There are fits and starts, but I think in
general we are extremely well supported. We have to make sure
that we communicate to the employers and that we do things that
make them feel good about their employees doing it.
Now, what we are doing, for instance, with the PSRC, the
Presidential Selective Reserve Callup, that is for 270 days, we
are asking somebody to leave their employment. Of course, this
is--when you go to PSRC, this is not voluntary, so it throws
certain things in there that help tell the story to the
employer. It is not like the employee is volunteering to leave
work to go off to Africa, but it is something that we need to
continue to work.
I will tell you, with 30 percent of our force in the Guard
and Reserve, this is a very, very important piece of this
force. What is unique about USSOCOM, when Congress initiated
USSOCOM--USSOCOM is the only place that the Guard and Reserve,
or actually the Reserves, are assigned to me. This is different
than anywhere else. Of course, the Guard is assigned to the
governor until federalized, but when they are federalized they
come to me. So it is a very unique relationship found nowhere
else.
I have to tell you that if it wasn't for our Reserve
components, we would not be able to fulfill our civil affairs
mission, for instance, where we are using real people that run
fire stations, policemen, lawyers, and judges. You can't
maintain those skills on active duty. That is why 24 of our 25
civil affairs battalions are in the Reserve component, and it
is necessary for us to maintain that.
Mr. Nethercutt. My sense is that we need to be careful
about not having the employers lose faith. They can only do
without employees for so long, so I think there is a need to be
sensitive to their needs.
General Schoomaker. The rule is we will never go back to
the same person twice for the same contingency.
Mr. Nethercutt. I see.
Mr. Young. Mr. Cunningham.
SURVIVAL, ESCAPE, RESIST AND EVADE (SERE) TRAINING
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
In the SERE school, 9 days of SERE can become very
realistic, cold. I had a my jaw cracked in SERE school in
Warner Springs. But have you had to make any changes with women
in the military going through SERE school as far as any
specific training?
Captain Hubbard. I know I had a female in my class. There
are certain things that they remove them, from not like lesser
training, but what I am saying there are certain times when
they were issuing their pajamas or something like that.
Obviously, all the guys in one group get their pajamas issued.
Mr. Cunningham. I am talking about specific training or
maybe problems that they would enter versus, you know, a male
that was taken prisoner or special ops.
Captain Hubbard. That is exactly the same; exactly thesame.
Mr. Cunningham. Exactly the same, okay.
It is interesting that all of you speak French. They have a
socialist-communist government over there in France. You may
need that more than you really know.
One of the other things that I found that was interesting
was that in your broadcast in Bosnia, I come from a different
mind. The Serbians, if you don't know history, fought with the
United States as an ally, the Muslims fought with Nazi Germany
during that time period. But was any of your radio broadcast--
maybe this is not the place to do it. We may have to wait until
the later session, but maybe you can answer it later,
General.------.
Mr. Young. Maybe you might want to pursue that when we go
into a different level of classification.
FISCAL YEAR 1999 BUDGET REQUEST
Mr. Cunningham. Yes, sir. I say I will delay that.
Mr. Young. Okay. Any other quick questions for this part of
the hearing? If not, we will go into the regular 5-minute
section, and I am going to use about 2 minutes of my 5 minutes
right away, because I have to ask this question.
General, your budget is handled differently than the other
services. Your budget request for fiscal year 1999 is
$506,260,000.
General Schoomaker. That is for procurement, I believe.
Mr. Young. That is $130,879,000 below the 1998 appropriated
level for the same procurement. Two years ago your predecessor
said that an appropriate level of procurement funding would be
at $700 million per year to ensure the fielding of critically
needed weapons systems. Now we are $130 million below that,
just below last year's level. Where do we stand? Are we going
to be able to do what you have to do?
General Schoomaker. We are doing what we have to do. Of
course my predecessor is still my boss, you know, General
Shelton, so obviously he is exactly right. Actually, I think
there are two answers to this. One of them is there have been
some things that work in 1999, and DIRCM is a good example,
what is it $60 million that we have had to push. That is the
joint program that we have with the U.K. on the IR
countermeasures that they are going to go on SOF airplanes.
There are some things like that that we have moved. But I think
that the thing that we have to look at is what we are
leveraging off of other services. So our big programs like the
CV-22 and ASDS are being managed by the Services, and in the
case of the CV-22, 85 percent of the cost is being borne by the
Navy and the Air Force. So in fact, we are reaping the directed
benefit of an additional $2 to $500 million, depending on which
year you look at across the FYDP; it goes on top of what you
are talking about.
So I think obviously we could use more money very well. But
the truth of the matter is, right now we are putting about 20
to 24 percent away into modernization and I think that is about
right in terms of percentage.
Mr. Young. If you had your druthers, though, would you go
to the $700 million?
General Schoomaker. Well, of course.
Mr. Young. If you had the $700 million, what would you be
procuring that you are not going to be able to procure with
this budget?
General Schoomaker. Well, I think there are several things,
and I probably ought to provide you something for the record,
you know, with specifics in it if it would be okay.
Mr. Young. Also, you might indicate if any of your programs
that are ongoing, if you are having to slip any of them in
order to stay within this budget.
General Schoomaker. We are slipping more out of necessity
because of the program as opposed to the slipping as a result
of the financial problem. But I can provide you with a long
list of things that you know, given an unlimited pile of money
that we would pursue, and quite frankly, I think, you know,
maybe some of this ought to go to a later piece of the session
here, but there are some things we are calling flagship
capabilities, many of which are advanced technology that we
certainly would be pursuing, would pursue with more money.
UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS
Mr. Young. General, in previous years, we have had extra
money over and above the President's budget request. This year,
unless some miracle happens, we are not going to have any extra
money, but we will squeeze as much as we can to do the best we
can to provide what you need, because we understand the
importance of your missions.
I have a lot more questions. I am going to give you some in
writing and ask you to respond, but to try to stay within the
time constraints and get to the next part of our hearing.
[The information follows:]
The following chart displays USSOCOM's unfunded requirements (UFR)
for Fiscal Year 1999. Dollars are shown in millions.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Priority and UFR O&M Proc RDT&E Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 COUNTERPROLIFERATION/WMD..................... $7.65 $5.09 $7.81 $20.55
2 ADVANCED SEAL DELIVERY SYSTEM................ .............. .............. 9.70 9.70
3 SAP.......................................... .............. .............. 1.07 1.07
4 SPEAR-BALCS.................................. .............. 4.30 0.50 4.80
5 LANGUAGE TRAINING............................ 1.60 .............. .............. 1.60
6 MH-47E....................................... .............. 41.50 .............. 41.50
7 SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE....................... .............. .............. 25.00 25.00
8 SILENT SHIELD................................ .............. 5.00 .............. 5.00
9 M4A1 MODS.................................... .............. 2.47 .............. 2.47
10 RAMS........................................ .............. 6.00 .............. 6.00
11 AC-130 LOW LIGHT LEVEL TV................... .............. 2.36 .............. 2.36
12 SYMPATHETIC DETONATOR....................... .............. .............. 2.00 2.00
Total..................................... $9.25 $66.72 $46.08 $122.05
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Young. Mr. Murtha.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
Mr. Murtha. Any problems in these deployments with your
rules of engagement?
General Schoomaker. I would say no. Let me just ask, are
there any problems from what you have experienced? No.
I will tell you, in the past we have had problems, and the
problems are very conservative kinds of attitudes in terms of
what level of risk we should take. I will tell you now that for
special operators to do their job we must accept some risk, and
we are not going to be able to go out and engage at the level
that we are and make the difference that we are making if we
are doing it from a foxhole peering out through a slit. So if
you take a look at where we are in places like Sri Lanka where
there is a significant threat, in places like Bosnia where we
have Joint Commission Observers, JCOs, little teams living in
the villages, basically unarmed, living amongst the factions,
we cannot be effective without that level.
And quite frankly we fared very well. You remember from
Haiti we had one Special Forces soldier shot. You might
remember we had a JCO here in the last year that was stabbed up
in Bosnia. But on the whole we have done pretty well because we
train to the rigid awareness, you know force protection, threat
awareness, situational awareness kinds of things, and then we
back that up with rules of engagement that allow us to defend
ourself and to take whatever action is necessary to preserve
the force.
SOF FORCES SELECTION PROCESS
Mr. Murtha. How do you select the members of the Special
Forces?
General Schoomaker. Each piece of our special operation
force has a different kind of selection program. I can talk to
some of the compartmented areas later if you're interested, but
Special Forces and SEALs, for instance, are good examples. The
SEALs have their Basic Underwater Demolition School (BUDS) out
in Coronado. They have a very high attrition rate in that. I
would say, 70 to 80 percent.
Here, we've got it; 70 percent.
Mr. Murtha. 70, 80 percent per year?
General Schoomaker. Attrition, 30 percent pass out of
each----
Mr. Murtha. I see, in the school itself.
General Schoomaker. This is for the Navy SEALs, and BUDS,
30 percent pass. They go from there into more advanced training
where 80 percent of that 30 percent pass.
So what we're really saying is from the original population
I guess that would be 24 percent. In the Army Special Forces
now you're dealing with a little more mature soldier because
you're bringing NCO's across now that have already had some
time under their belt in the Army. Through the Special Forces
assessment selection 45 percent pass muster through that
assessment and selection 80 percent of those pass the
qualification.
Mr. Murtha. Well, what I'm asking though, the initial
selection process, are they all volunteers?
General Schoomaker. All volunteer. Our entire force is all
volunteer; there's nobody that's not.
Mr. Murtha. And anybody can apply or you look for language
specialists, demolition specialists and so forth, just depends
on what you need, and then you take the volunteers that fit
that criteria; is that the idea?
General Schoomaker. Obviously we're looking for people with
special skills and characteristics, but in general what we're
looking for are volunteers that say, yes, I want to be a SEAL,
I want to be a Special Forces Soldier, I want to be a Ranger,
and then they go through the process, and what we are looking
for are those people that are trainable. So it's intelligence
assessment, a psychological assessment, a physical assessment,
and then a socialization assessment where we determine whether
or not they are trainable, and once they pass through that
assessment selection they then go through the training, and of
course there is some attrition, but there's a much higher
success rate there. But when they graduate out the other end in
Special Forces for instance, they must have a basic language
skill.
And so there is a 2-year investment in these folks just to
get them basically qualified to start being an effective member
of a team.
SOF RETENTION
Mr. Murtha. Can you see any difference in the last 10 years
in the number of people that are reinlisting in special
operations?
General Schoomaker. I don't know about the last 10 years,
but I can tell you that in our special operations forces in
general our retention in the enlisted ranks leads all of the
services. We do very well there.
Now we have some anecdotal problems, you know the SEAL
lieutenants for instance we're having some problem retaining
them in the numbers that----
Mr. Murtha. What I'm driving at is the rate or tempo of
operations hasn't made any difference. I keep looking for
weaknesses that are going to come about because people have
been deployed so much, and Bosnia, another possible story. Have
special operations people been divorced four times, been
divorced three times and married four times. But you're able to
retain them. The deployment or tempo of operation has not made
a difference in your ability to retain.
General Schoomaker. It has made a difference for some
people, but in general what it has done is made a difference in
a positive way. The people who join special operations want to
do things, and one of the most common things I get from the
SEALs is you know we're not killing enough people, you know
we're not going out and doing those kinds of things, we're
doing too much, some of what you've heard here, ``handing out
the cup cake kinds of things,'' and that's not what people come
in to be a SEAL for.
Special Forces, it's the same thing. I've explained that
obviously we're teachers, but we're also warriors, and so these
people, the very best people we get, are coming in here to do
the kinds of things that they think Special Forces should do.
So in general it's a positive trend. In the Reserves, I can
promise you that we looked very hard at what the impact of
these deployments to Bosnia were, and the good news is that our
retention is pretty good as a result of people that are
actually coming to the reserve units that are being used.
So I hope that's not kind of talking out both sides of my
mouth. I think that we're on a positive trend there with some,
like I said, anecdotal problems, some isolated kinds of
problems.
The important thing is that these assessment selection
programs are very important, and one of the things that is most
important is we have got to make sure that we're also getting
people that have the right kind of values, the core values, and
so we look very hard.
SOMALIA REVISITED
Mr. Murtha. One of the most courageous acts I've seen was
in Somalia where your commander took full responsibility, gave
me a handwritten letter to give to the President, and he said I
didn't need more tanks, I didn't need more this, I take full
responsibility. His career was gone because of that, but I was
really impressed by the fact that he took the responsibility
for what happened. I've always been impressed by that.
General Schoomaker. I know who it is you're talking about,
and he's a very good friend of mine, and that's the kind of
person he is. And I will tell you that in the business we're in
you've got to understand the psychology of a fist fight. You
know this is not something that you're going to be able to do
from the sidelines, and so we are going to run in the future
into heaven casualties if we're doing our job.
Mr. Young. Mr. Lewis.
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to have my lack of
questions at this point reflected any lack of interest in the
work of these gentleman. The work of our special operations
forces is very important, and insofar as I'm concerned
significant to the national defense as any we have. I need to
go to another session however, and so I yield back my time.
Mr. Young. Mr. Sabo? Mr. Nethercutt?
SEAL RETENTION
Mr. Nethercutt. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Quickly, General, I'm
interested in your comments about SEAL qualified lieutenants.
Your statement indicates that you have a significant retention
problem. To what you do you attribute that? What are you doing
to make sure you do retain these people in the future?
General Schoomaker. Well, first of all, we're very
concerned about it and we're working it very hard. We are
running, not only engaging RAND Corporation and running of a
very indepth study of the whole thing, but we're also our own
internal OPTEMPO survey and should have the results of that in
April. So we are looking at it.
As I travel, and I mentioned to somebody here I only spent
2 days at home last months you know because I'm trying to get
around to everybody. I asked these people this and the answers
are all over the board. Everybody says, you know, it's not
money yet. We need the money, but money is not going to solve
the problem. The problem that we need to make sure we address
is they've got to be doing meaningful things; that's what they
come in for.
Unfortunately, part of the problem is there that are some
people that come in with no intention, I mean of staying. They
come in because they want to be a SEAL and they want to do it
for 4, 5 years, and then they want to go back to Harvard
Business School and they want to be successful, and they want
to be able to put SEAL on their resume. And you know that's a
fact. And there are others that quite frankly--you know the
OPTEMPO effect.
So it's all over the place. We're taking it very seriously,
and we're working on it.
YEAR 2000 COMPUTER PROBLEM
Mr. Nethercutt. Let me just ask you a little different
subject but it also addresses to your readiness, the year 2000
computer problem. To what extent are you addressing that in
your command and what are the consequences if we're not ready?
I assume we will be ready.
General Schoomaker. We are going to be ready on that. We're
taking it very seriously. We're putting about $11 million
against it this year. We are very dependent upon technology, as
you know, and I'll tell you that in our special operations
helicopters for instance there are more line of computer code
in those than there are in the space shuttle. It's the most
advanced systems that are flying right now, and they're very
dependent upon making sure that we do solve these kinds of
problems.
So we're working at it very hard.
Mr. Nethercutt. Do you have plans to conduct some exercises
that will test your preparedness or readiness for the Y2K
problem?
General Schoomaker. We are doing some of that, but I've
heard the notion that we need a major exercise to kind of sort
this out. The fact of the matter is we're not ready yet to do
that because we're fixing the problems. But I think at some
point in time it makes some sense to run, and of course we run
a lot of this simulation and CPX kinds of things and that's
basically what we have to do.
So I'm generally supportive, but now is not the time. It's
too early.
Mr. Nethercutt. You feel confident you'll be ready.
General Schoomaker. I'm told, you know I'm into this pretty
heavy because I really do believe it's our future, but I am
told that we have confidence that we're going to do all right.
Now we are also very dependent on some much bigger systems
out there, I don't really know how well we're doing here in the
main frame, in the big architecture. But in our business I can
tell you that we are moving pretty smartly on this.
Mr. Nethercutt. Have you a target date for the change over,
or is that decided yet?
General Schoomaker. I don't know the answer to that
question, and I'd have to----
Mr. Nethercutt. All right, sir.
General Schoomaker. I'd be glad to look into it and give it
to you on the record.
Mr. Nethercutt. I think the Committee might appreciate
having some timetable expectation if there is one. It would be
helpful to us to have a sense that you know when it's going to
be operational.
General Schoomaker. All right sir.
[The information follows:]
The United States Special Operations Command's (USSOCOM)
target date to have our mission critical information technology
(IT) systems Year 2000 compliant is March 1999. As IT systems
are certified, we intend to systematically integrate them into
the USSOCOM enterprise. The time remaining until December 31,
1999, will allow us to continue to test USSOCOM's mission
critical IT systems against our support systems and be prepared
for ``hiccups'' or any possible system failure.
DEPLOYMENT IMPACTS ON FAMILY
Mr. Nethercutt. Just one final question if I may with
regard to the soldiers here today. Are your families all right
with your service and, you know, everything all right basically
on the home front as far as you all are concerned. Do you see
anything in the--among your colleagues or your fellow soldiers
that give you concern about the family side of your service?
Commander Bosiljevac. I've been married 23 years, sir, and
I'm blessed, I've got a good family. But there are daily
problems that you have to deal with. I'm in a command position
right now, 230-man unit, and you definitely have to take care
of family problems up front. You have to be very--you have to
pay particular attention to details on that side just as much
as your regular responsibilities.
Major Bailey. Last year I was deployed 262 days, sir. My
wife had full access to the checking account, and she was
thrilled.
Mr. Nethercutt. That's good testimony, sir. Thank you. That
says a lot. Thank you all very much for your service and your
testimony.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky.
SOF SUBMARINE PLATFORMS
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
General, does the Special Operations Command intend to
replace the King Kamehameha?
Should I withdraw my question?
General Schoomaker. No, let me see how I can answer.
The Kamehameha's has been extended, the service life has
been extended. We are in the throes right now of looking at a
couple of alternatives on whether the Los Angeles class boats
are going to do the job, you know what other kinds of
alternatives we're going to come up with.
So I probably would need to give you a better answer than
that and get the right people to look at it, but I think right
now--in fact I was just on the Kamehameha here two weeks ago,
and it's in good shape, and it is being well used. But I don't
think it's affordable, to be honest with you.
Mr. Visclosky. That ship.
General Schoomaker. No, no, to replace it. You know, unless
we come up with--there are some options that we have that may
make it affordable, you know in terms of what we do, but it's a
concern for us in terms of getting into something you know
that--of that magnitude.
Mr. Visclosky. You are going to have four excess Tridents
soon--is that one of the options you're looking at?
General Schoomaker. One of the options is Trident.
Mr. Visclosky. Would that potentially be affordable for
you?
Mr. Schoomaker. Well, the problem is we've got to work very
hard. It may look nice up front but when it comes time to
refuel that thing it may be a different story, and so we really
need to be careful about what piece of this we get into.
But I had a brief conversation with Jay Johnson, Admiral
Johnson, on this, and of course he's looking very carefully at
it.
There are some other problems too, and that is in the arms
limitations treaties and things in terms of what he can keep
and how all this is going to work. So it's not a simple
problem.
ADVANCED SEAL DELIVERY SYSTEM
Mr. Visclosky. From my perspective you have a serious
problem as far as getting people in, getting people out and the
affordability of any system you design.
So I think all of us would want to be helpful on that.
General Schoomaker. I will be glad to look into it and give
you more detail on that, but of course you know another piece
of this equation is how many ASDSs we're going to buy.
Mr. Visclosky. I appreciate what you do for a living, and
Commander, I'm dying to know what nationality you are.
Commander Bosiljevac. Croatian and Polish, sir.
[The information follows:]
As far as the numbers of Trident, this would be more appropriately
answered by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Johnson. However, as
far as an option we are looking at, as long as the Trident is
available, the answer is yes. The Trident submarine could replace
existing submarine capabilities that are reaching the end of service
life.
The Trident provides a very high end capability for special
operations forces (SOF). Its capability for enhanced support to SOF far
exceeds any current or planned SSN capability for SOF. The ability to
host 66 personnel for 90 days, with the personnel having dedicated
berthing, mission planning areas, and exercise equipment supersedes any
current converted SSN. This allows SOF to maintain a clandestine
presence near a crisis point for a longer period than they can aboard a
smaller attack submarine. Wet tube storage will provide a means for the
storage of various equipment that will be accessible to divers locking
out of the Dry Deck Shelter or 9-man lock-out chamber. Communications
suite will be compatible with Very Low Frequency, Low Frequency, High
Frequency, and Satellite Communications. The strike missile system in
particular may be able to provide on-call, high volume, weapon delivery
capability to SOF operations. This type of platform has broad
applications for SOF. After refueling, the Trident serves as a long-
term investment for the Navy and USSOCOM due to its expected 20-year
life after the conversion.
The costs associated with converting two Tridents for Strike/SOF's
use is approximately $977 million. The Navy has stated that the USSOCOM
fair share of the conversion would be about $160 million. This amount
exceeds any other previously funded SOF submarine conversion costs.
USSOCOM's current Total Obligation Authority (TOA) would not afford the
opportunity to achieve this 21st Century capability.
Mr. Young. Mr. Cunningham.
REMARKS OF MR. CUNNINGHAM
Mr. Cunningham. General, are you any relation to Steve
Shoemaker with the Blue Angels?
General Schoomaker. No, I'm not.
Mr. Cunningham. Not at all. Okay, thank you.
First of all--Navy guy, I understand.
You know I'd like to tell you that, like the Chairman said,
and it's not just words, I think you know that we're proud of
each and every one of you and that we may joke about football
or Air force or other things, but everybody on both sides of
the aisle in this body is in full support of you and want to
try and help you do, you know, the things that you need to do
and finance you, which in my opinion is way below what it
should be. It saddens us, but just think in your own mind how
many of you thought about the difficulties that you have gone
through whether it's the family, the OPTEMPO, the family
separation, the lack of equipment, the things that--I know when
I was in the service I thought of getting out sometimes, and
quite often the benefits of staying in, the family and the
security kept me in, but as those things erode that's what this
Committee is trying to help, and our hands are tied a little
bit. There's many of us feel that the emergency supplemental
bill cannot be taken out of DOD. When you got a budget as low
as 1950, you just can't survive and keep doing the things. I
came here about 7 years ago, and the testimony before our
Committee, I was previously on the authorization side, was the
military nearing a hollow force. I don't know what it takes to
get there after 7 years of continual cuts and increase in
OPTEMPO and everything, but I understand where you have to come
from, General. But we're trying to help as much as we can, and
I think one of the things since the--I think the President said
he wants an emergency supplemental to help that's not taken out
of DOD. I don't know where he's going to pay for it, but we
support that.
I differ a little bit from my good friend, Jack Murtha, who
is my very good friend, maybe not differ but maybe a difference
of opinion. I don't think in Somalia that you can change from a
humanitarian mission to going after General Aideed and at the
same time draw down your forces so weak and make yourself
vulnerable to the potential enemy and then deny armor on 3
different occasions that they didn't need armor or that it was
the General's--I'm not saying that Jack thought it was the
General's fault. I think he's very supportive of that. But I
think there was a lot of extenuating circumstances there in
which this government put your troops in that I hope we never
have to do from putting--in another administration, putting
Marines in a place and allow them to be shelled on the coast
without being able to attack. I mean it's both sides of the
aisle on this thing.
But we're proud of you, and we'll do everything we can to
help you, and I want to congratulate the young men and the
young women under your command. Thank you.
General Schoomaker. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. The Committee will recess now and reconvene
shortly in an executive session with the witness. This part of
the hearing is adjourned.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the
answers thereto follow:]
Personnel Tempo
Question. Personnel tempo is defined as the time an individual is
deployed from home port or station. What is the average monthly or
annual deployment time, by component, of SOF personnel?
Answer. Each of the Services have a slightly different
interpretation and definition of personnel tempo which prompted USSOCOM
to clarify the definition in order to bring continuity to the reporting
of its components. USSOCOM defines a Deployed Duty Day (DDY) as any
continuous 24-hour period during which one is conducting official
duties requiring them to remain over night away from their permanent
domicile. A DDY does not include garrison duty, leave, unauthorized
absences, or medical Temporary Duty (TDY). Within this uniform context,
USSOCOM's Fiscal Year 1997 component annual average personnel tempo is:
Air Force Special Operations Command: 63 DDY per year.
U.S. Army Special Operations Command: 79 DDY per year.
Navy Special Warfare Command: 105 DDY per year.
Question. How has this increased with more and more deployments in
support of ``military operations other than war''?
Answer. The annual deployment time by component, calculated in man-
years for fiscal year (FY) 1997 is
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOF Component Army Navy USAF Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operations...................................... 1281 539 596 2416
Training........................................ 1344 492 354 2190
Other........................................... 96 25 24 145
---------------------------------------------------------------
Total man-years........................... 2721 1056 974 4751
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total SOF Deployments are relatively constant, with only a 3.0
percent increase between FY 1996 and FY 1997. FY 1996 was 4,613 man-
years and FY 1997 was 4,751 man-years.
While the total deployments remain relatively constant--the
specific activities change with requirements. For example, when the 3rd
Special Forces Group was committed to operations in Haiti, they
canceled participation in Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercises and Joint
Combined Exchange Training. Similar changes have occurred in support of
Bosnia.
Question. What are the skill speciality areas in each service that
are experiencing the high personnel tempo rates?
Answer. Below are the Fiscal Year 1997 top five personnel skills
experiencing high personnel tempo rates from each special operations
component.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Code Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Naval Special Warfare Command
849X...................................... SEAL Team Corpsman
5326...................................... SEAL Team Enlisted
1130...................................... SEAL Team Officer
5323...................................... SEAL Enlisted, Special
Delivery Vehicle
1130...................................... SEAL Officer, Special
Delivery Vehicle
Air Force Special Operations Command
X1T2X1.................................... Pararescue (Special Tactics
Teams)
J1C2X1.................................... Combat Controller (Special
Tactics Teams)
011S3E.................................... MC-130P Pilot
011S3B.................................... MH-60G Pilot
012S4J.................................... MC-130E Navigator
United States Army Special Operations Command
39B....................................... PSYOPS Officer
39C....................................... Civil Affairs Officer
18D....................................... SF Medic
25R....................................... Visual Equip OP/Maint
18C....................................... SF Engineer
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. What actions have you pursued to reduce personnel tempo
rates?
Answer. We are working with the geographic CINCs and Services to
reduce the OPTEMPO of our Navy SEALs and Air Force Special Tactics
Teams. Recently, we managed to decrease the SEAL requirement in the
Pacific by about 20 percent, and an initiative is now underway in the
Southern Command to provide similar relief. The Special Tactics Teams'
OPTEMPO problems are being alleviated by increasing recruiting efforts
and by shifting some of their non-SOF functions and activities to the
Air force. The Air Force is experiencing aircrew shortages and USSOCOM
is linked to both the problem and the Air Force's solution.
The solution for high tempo of our Civil Affairs (CA) units has
already been demonstrated in Haiti and Bosnia. Access to our reserve
component CA units will reduce active component OPTEMPO to a reasonable
level. Since the reserve units have oft-needed expertise that is not
found in the active force, access to these reserve forces becomes even
more critical. Programming additional active forces is not the answer,
in my estimation, because our younger active component officers and
NCOs cannot replicate the skills and experience of the long-serving
reservists.
The Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up (PSRC) plays a critical
role in accessing our reserve component assets, especially CA and
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) units. This has proven important in
Haiti and is essential to the conduct of CA activities in Bosnia. PSRC
not only takes the pressure off the active component OPTEMPO, but also
recognizes the value of the reservists' contribution and the U.S.
government's commitment to the operation at hand. Finally, it relieves
the pressure of civilian re-employment concerns once the deployment has
concluded.
That said, however, we must also guard against the equal threat of
such heavy utilization of reserve forces that we affect the civilian
occupations of our people. Our concern with over-utilizing the reserves
is tempered by the fact that we currently have exhausted our allocation
of the FY97 Temporary Tour of Active Duty accounts, the dollars needed
to pay reservists salaries and allowances during those deployments.
This of course puts pressure back on the active force.
These readiness issues have the highest visibility in USSOCOM to
ensure we do not ``break the force.''
Question. Have you increased the use of Reserve component
personnel? What capabilities, or skill specialties are in the Reserve
components that cannot be found in the active forces?
Answer. The United States Special Operations Command continues to
rely heavily on the Reserve components, in particular the Army Reserve
Civil Affairs (CA) units and to a lesser extent the Army Reserve
Psychological Operations Units. The active component has limited assets
available in these unique units with 97 percent of CA units and 85
percent of Psychological Operations Units residing in the United States
Army Reserve. The majority of the CA structure is in the Reserve
Component because many of the skills needed to accomplish their
missions are derived primarily from the Reservists' civilian employment
and expertise. I would be infeasible to try to train or maintain these
skills in the active component. Further, the Air National Guard and Air
Reserve maintain high personnel tempo. The Commando SOLO aircraft
provides a unique capability found only in the Air National Guard.
Question. What percent of your commitments last year were in
support of ``military operations other than war'' rather than part of
your normal operations?
Answer. Fiscal year 1997 saw support of ``military operations other
than war'' at 50 percent of our total man-day deployments. Operations
were all operational deployments and include JOINT GUARD, NORTHERN
WATCH, SOUTHERN WATCH, DESERT THUNDER, Joint Task Force (JTF)-SWA, SAFE
BORDER, JTF-BRAVO. JTF-Full Accounting, US Support Group Haiti,
Humanitarian Demining missions, Counter Drug missions, Naval Special
Warfare personnel afloat, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, and
humanitarian missions (Kenya Assessment, C-141 SAR, etc.). Training
utilized 47 percent of SOF deployment man-days. Training includes Joint
Chiefs of Staff Exercises, Joint and Combined Exercises and Training,
unit training, and individual training/schools. ``Other'' was 3 percent
of SOF deployment man-days. Other deployments include conferences,
command visits, and predeployment site surveys.
Question. Of your worldwide deployments last year, what was the
peak number of personnel, countries, and missions supported with SOF
forces?
Answer. During fiscal year 1997, the peak week for SOF deployments
was 6,780 personnel deployed to 85 countries, while conducting 520
missions.
Personnel Issues
Question. What is your fiscal year 1999 budget request and funded
end strength for SOF personnel? How does this compare to fiscal year
1998?
Answer. The fiscal year 1999 SOF end strength is budgeted for
46,134 military and civilians, compared to 46,107 in fiscal year 1998.
This minor difference is due to programmed increases in support of our
Advanced SEAL Delivery System.
Question. Please give the Committee an overview of the size of your
forces. What is the mix of active, Reserve, and civilian end strength,
and what percent do they represent of your total force? Have your
forces remained relatively stable?
Answer. Fiscal year 1999's SOF end strength is 46,134 military and
civilian. Of this number, 64 percent are active military, 30 percent
are Reserve and National Guard, and the remaining 6 percent are
civilian. This resources HQ USSOCOM, six theater Special Operations
Commands, the three Service components and the Joint Special Operations
Command. Over the past several years, SOF force structure and end
strength has remained relatively stable. Adjustments have primarily
been made to accommodate fielding of modernized equipment such as the
MK-V Special Operations Craft and Patrol Coastal ships.
Question. At what percent are SOF units resourced for personnel and
equipment? Are you experiencing any manpower shortages in either active
duty or Reserve units?
Answer. Resourcing for personnel and equipment in special
operations units is programmed and budgeted at 100 percent of
authorizations. The one exception to this is the Reserve Civil Affairs
(CA) which are resourced at 90 percent of required personnel. This is a
legacy from the original cross-walk of funding from the Army. However,
resourcing at 90 percent has not proven to be a significant detriment
to operational capability, as additional regional CINC Civil Affairs
support teams have been resourced in the Reserves.
Generally, SOF enjoy high retention rates, both officer and
enlisted, in comparison to Service averages. Where SOF was below the
Service average, it was often due to the small number of SOF personnel
in a category which skews the percentage rate either high or low.
However, we are experiencing shortfalls in some Navy and Air Force
specialties. An increase in resignations of Navy SEAL lieutenants has
compounded a mid-grade officer shortage first identified in fiscal year
1996.
Recruiting shortfalls in the Air Force Combat Controller and
Pararescue career fields aggravates the current low inventory in these
specialties. The low inventory contributes to high deployment rates,
which in turn affects retention.
The Services and USSOCOM are working aggressively to address these
issues.
USSOCOM units are adequately resourced with equipment overall.
There are some impacts being noticed by our AFSOC component due to Air
Force, Joint Staff, and OSD on these issues. We are making progress in
fielding our SOF unique equipment systems and are working within the
budget resource constraints that have been provided. Difficult trade-
off decisions have been made as we move toward the 21st Century.
Question. SOCOM identifies and coordinates with the military
Services on special pay initiatives. Is there any new pay initiatives
for SOF forces in the military personnel budgets for fiscal year 1999?
Provide for the record a list of your common special and incentive pays
(i.e., selective reenlistment bonus, aviation continuation pay,
hazardous duty incentive pay) and the amount budgeted for each in
fiscal year 1999 for SOF forces.
Answer. There are no new pay initiatives for SOF forces in the
military personnel budgets for fiscal year 1999.
The common special pays for SOF are: selective reenlistment bonus;
special duty assignment pay; hazardous duty incentive pays for
parachute; dive, and demolition; foreign language proficiency; hostile
fire/imminent danger; and aviation continuation pay.
During the annual budget preparation, USSOCOM and the Services use
Service-developed aggregate pay factors to program/budget for military
personnel (MILPERS). The pay factor includes basic pay, allowances,
special pays, etc. Although USSOCOM uses its Major Force Program (MFP)-
11 total obligation authority to POM for MILPERS, the Services are
responsible for MILPERS budgeting. Military pay is not appropriated in
MFP-11; it is appropriated directly to the Services without a specific
MFP or budget activity identity. Once appropriated by Congress, the
Services control and execute MILPERS including special pays for USSOCOM
personnel.
Question. Do you have any unfunded shortfalls related to your
fiscal year 1999 personnel request?
Answer. For fiscal year 1999, there were no unfunded personnel
requirement shortfalls. Any additional personnel requirements
determined to be valid in fiscal year 1999 were funded internally to
USSOCOM. However, with the continued increase in the operational and
personnel tempo, personnel requirement could increase in the future.
Question. Are you experiencing any recruiting and retention
problems? What is the average retention rate of officers and enlisted,
by Service?
Answer. Generally, Special Operations Forces (SOF) enjoy high
retention rates, for both officer and enlisted, in comparison to
Service averages. Where SOF was below the Service average, often it was
due to the small number of SOF personnel in a category which may skew
the percentage rate either high or low.
We are experiencing some shortfalls in several Service
specialities. A significant increase in resignation of Navy SEAL
Lieutenants compounds a mid-grade officer shortage identified in Fiscal
Year 1996. Retention of junior officers must be returned to previous
levels if we are to rebuild required inventories of more senior
officers.
Recruiting shortfalls in the Air Force Combat Controller and
Pararescue career fields aggravates the current low inventory in these
specialities. The low inventory contributes to high deployment rates,
which in turn affects retention.
The Services and USSOCOM are working aggressively to address both
issues.
Assessment and Selection Process
Question. The assessment and selection process for Special
Operations Forces is among the most thorough and exhaustive of any
military organization in the world. Can you give us a brief synopsis of
the assessment and selection process for each type of specialty the
Command has?
Answer. Army Special Forces soldiers are recruited from both
officers and enlisted members serving in the Army. The Special Forces
Assessment and Selection (SFAS) course is 23 days. After successful
completion of SFAS, personnel then attend the Special Forces
Qualification Course (SFOC), which takes between 48-85 weeks to
complete, depending on the specialty.
Navy members may enter the SEAL training pipeline by direct
accession or lateral transfer from the fleet. Enlisted recruits and
lateral transfers may attend a one week Basic Underwater Demolition/
SEAL (BUD/S) screening course at the Recruit Training Center Great
Lakes, Michigan. Once accepted for attendance at BUD/S, members may
receive 4-6 weeks of physical fitness training and indoctrination prior
to commencing the actual BUD/S course. Officers and enlisted attend the
same six month BUD/S course and three weeks of Basic Airborne Training.
Additional rate training may be provided depending on the members
source rating.
Air Force members enter Combat Control Team (CCT) or Pararescue
(PJ) training by direct accession or from cross-training from other Air
Force career areas. Upon successful completion of a 10-week
indoctrination course, an additional 45-62 weeks of training is
provided depending on the specialty.
Question. What are the attrition rates for each specialty?
Answer. Approximately 45 percent of those who attend the Army's
Special Forces Assessment and Selection course pass and continue on to
the Special Forces Qualification course (SFQC). Of those who continue
with SFQC, approximately 80 percent pass and are assigned to Special
Forces units.
Navy Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) attribution currently
averages 70 percent.
Air Force Combat Controller/Pararescue attrition currently averages
85 percent from the indoctrination course. However, those who complete
the course have a 95 percent success rate through the remainder of the
training.
Question. How are those troops who do not make it through the
process treated when they are returned to their regular units?
Answer. Special Operations Forces (SOF) training is recognized by
the Services to be extremely demanding. Personnel who are unable to
complete initial SOF training are reassigned by their Service without
negative impact on their career.
Question. Once a special operations force member makes it through
the process, how long will he remain with the Special Operations unit
to which he is assigned?
Answer. Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel remain assigned
to SOF units for the remainder of their career. Tour lengths for
individual assignments vary from 3-5 years.
Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Units
Question. The active and Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological
(PSYOP) Operations units support contingency operations, JCS exercises,
combat training center developments, disaster relief efforts and
humanitarian programs. Most of these units reside largely in the
Reserve Components. General, what are your active and Reserve and
strength numbers for the Civil Affairs and PSYOP units, by Service?
Answer. The Civil Affairs and PSYOP units are all in Army Special
Operations Command, with the exception of the 193rd Special Operations
Wing (SOW) and the 193rd Special Operations Squadron (SOS), which are
in the Air National Guard. The 193rd SOW and 193rd SOS are manned at
825 personnel and are also considered PSYOP units. Army Civil Affairs
consist of 1 active battalion of 208 personnel and 3 Reserve Commands
having 9 Brigades and 24 Battalions consisting of 4,928 personnel. Army
PSYOP consists of 1 active PSYOP Group and 5 active Battalions with
1,144 personnel. Reserve PSYOP consists of 2 Groups and 8 Battalions
with 2,582 personnel.
Question. Given the nature of their business, Civil Affairs and
PSYOP units might be required to be in country for months prior to,
during or after some military action. What is the average number of
days active duty units are deployed during the year? What is the
personnel tempo for the Reserve units? Do you consider this personnel
tempo excessive? If so, what actions are you taking to solve this
problem?
Answer. USSOCOM has only one active duty Civil Affairs (CA)
Battalion and one Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Group. Personnel
from the 96th CA Battalion were deployed on average 93 days each during
Fiscal Year (FY) 1997. Personnel from the 4th PSYOP Group were deployed
on average 75 days each during FY 1997. The personnel tempo for the
Reserves is not tracked by this command. Further it is difficult to
quantify Reserve tempo because their availability should not be assumed
and their use should be exercised judiciously. This personnel tempo,
while high, is not considered excessive for the active forces as it
does not exceed the USSOCOM threshold of 180 deployed duty days per
year, nor the Global Military Force Policy on Low Density/High Demand
thresholds.
Question. If Civil Affairs and PSYOP units are in high demand for
contingencies and other deployments, do you believe a redesign of the
active/Reserve forces capabilities is needed? Are the capabilities of
the active and Reserve units mixed correctly? How does Special
Operations Command determine its needs in these areas?
Answer. The organizational designs of both the Reserve Civil
Affairs (CA) and PSYOP units are based on the operational capabilities
the units are required to have during peace and war. The high demands
for the units for contingencies and other deployments has minimal to no
effect on required capabilities. Both unit types are continuously
reviewed to determine exactly what capabilities they require. Most
recently, PSYOP units have been redesigned to more readily capture the
capabilities of Reserve and active personnel. Additionally, CA has been
reorganized and reapportioned by the U.S. Army Special Operations
Command based on the new Unified Command Plan. Future PSYOP redesigns
will most likely be based on technological advances. Based on the
DESERT STORM/DESERT SHIELD experience and peacetime engagement
activities since, the active and Reserve unit mix and capabilities
inherent in each appears to be about right for both Civil Affairs and
PSYOP. The need for these types of units is determined through the
USSOCOM Strategic Planning Process, which is capabilities based and
examines force requirements generated by wargaming scenarios provided
by defense planners.
Question. Is standing up more units in the active forces an option
to help relieve personnel tempo or adjust to changing priorities? How
many years does it take to stand up a new unit and get the personnel
trained?
Answer. The standing up of more active units could only relieve the
personnel tempo if personnel could be recruited and trained in
sufficient quantities to fill these new units. Indications are, though,
that this may not be possible considering the recruiting base is
shrinking as the Services draw down. Also, some units are based on
platforms and there are no additional platforms to stand up additional
units. Further, specialty skills like those in civil affairs can only
be found in the Reserves. The bottom line is that the mix between
active and Reserve units provides the capabilities required and without
a significant shift in the fiscal and personnel environment, standing
up additional active units may not be possible. The time required to
stand up a new unit varies depending on the type of unit, equipment
required, and the level and type of training required. This time ranges
from two years for a Civil Affairs active unit to four or five years
for a Special Forces Group or Special Operations Aviation Squadron. SOF
units cannot be rapidly assembled due to their complex training and
specialized equipment requirements.
Question. Given the continued operations in Bosnia, are you
concerned about active and Reserve unit rotations and our ability to
meet the mission requirements without having to call the same units
twice?
Answer. We are concerned about Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological
Operations (PSYOP) personnel in Army Reserve units if the force
structure requirements for the low-density, high-demand personnel in
these units are not reduced for the SFOR forward operating force.
Currently, in accordance with draft Statement of Requirements (SOR) 11,
SFOR is proposing a reduction of the U.S. PSYOP commitment to
approximately 54 soldiers and the CA commitment to approximately 79. We
think we can sustain this level of commitment with existing Contingency
Operation Temporary Tour of Active Duty (COTTAD) authority that allows
volunteers to serve repetitive tours. All of our CA and PSYOP units
have mobilized personnel for deployment to Bosnia. Current SFOR
estimates on the active component side is for a Special Forces company
that we can sustain barring any other unforeseen contingency by
rotation of forces.
Question. If the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) does
not allow the Department to activate Reservists for a second 270 day
tour for the Bosnia operation, do you have enough Reserve component
assets to meet your projected requirements?
Answer. Under current Statement of Requirements (SOR) levels,
USSOCOM can support a sixth CA rotation with no significant problems.
Beginning with a seventh rotation, some specific rank or skill
requirements may become difficult to fill. Currently, the draft SOR 11
will significantly reduce SOF CA requirements. If implemented, this
will extend the number of rotations that can be supported under PSRC.
Operating TEMPO (OPTEMPO) and Deployments
Question. Special Operations Forces (SOF) deployments have
increased at a dramatic pace since the Command was established 10 years
ago. Can you give us a brief synopsis of major SOCOM deployments over
the past two years, and what is the forecast for fiscal year 1999?
Answer. During fiscal year 1996, SOF personnel supported operation
UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti), Operation PACIFIC HAVEN (Guam), Operation
SOUTHERN WATCH (Iraq), Operation ABLE SENTRY (Macedonia), Operation
JOINT GUARD (Bosnia-Herzegovina), Operation NORTHERN WATCH/PROVIDE
COMFORT (Northern Iraq), and Operation SAFE BORDER (Peru, Ecuador).
During fiscal year 1997, SOF supported 17 operations. Specific
details follow:
1. Operation FIRM RESPONSE (Congo).------
2. Operation NOBEL OBELISK (Sierra Leone). ------ initially
deployed to Camp Benguema Training Center, Sierra Leone, for a Joint
and Combined Exchange Training (JCET) (leadership) with host nation
military personnel. During the period ---- instituted communications
with SOCEUR & American Embassy, Freetown, established security at the
embassy, planned and coordinated for a Non-combatant Evacuation
Operation (NEO), conducted reconnaissance of potential hazardous
landing zones, received the evacuation force, and provided security for
the ambassador.
3. Operation GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE (Rwanda). Beginning 14 November
1996, the ------ deployed to the Great Lakes Region of Eastern Zaire in
support of a multinational humanitarian intervention force to
facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid by civilian relief
organizations and the voluntary repatriation of refugees or displaced
persons from Zaire to Rwanda. CA and PSYOPS were instrumental in
convincing the Rwandan refugees to return home and the AC-130 gunship
was invaluable in locating and counting the numerous groups of refugees
for the Combined Joint Task Force Commander (14 November through 14
December 1996).
4. Operation SILVER WAKE (Albania). ------ was originally in
Albania to provide Military Liaison Team support to host nation
military in order to develop and coordinate military-to-military
contacts to encourage the democratic orientation of the Albanian
military and defense establishments. When the security situation began
to deteriorate in Albania, he reported to American Embassy Tirana and
offered his assistance. ------ reviewed and assisted with the update of
the Embassy Emergency Action Plan, confirmed the surveys of evacuation
helicopter landing zones, marked the landing zones for the initial
arrival of the evacuation force and acted as the ambassador's military
advisor throughout the crisis. Throughout the evening and early morning
hours of 12-13 March 97 continuous gunfire rocked the capital city of
Tirana, Albania. The situation became critical when mobs raided and
looted the country's noncommissioned officer's academy of weapons and
ammunition less than a kilometer from the American Residential
Compound. The Ambassador requested and received permission to conduct
an ordered evacuation of all Americans from the country of Albania on
13 Mar 97.
5. Operation ASSURED LIFT (Liberia). A ------ personnel deployed
French speaking Liaison Coordination Elements (LCE) to forward
operating locations at Bamako, Mali, Abidjan, Ivory Coast, Accra,
Ghana, and Roberts International Airport, Liberia. Each LCE coordinated
and supported the marshaling, on-load and offload of host nation
military personnel. These LCE assisted host nation militaries in Ghana,
Mali, and Cote D'Ivore in rapidly moving critical military forces to
Monrovia, Liberia, to reinforce ECOMG (Economic Community of West
African States cease-fire Monitoring Group). In response to an outbreak
of intense factional fighting in and around Monrovia, Liberia, during
14 February to 7 March 1997, the U.S. agreed to provide immediate
assistance in strengthening ECOMOG security around Monrovia.
6. Operation HIGH FLIGHT (Namibia). On 13 September 1996, an U.S.
Air Force C-141 and a German Air Force TU-154 collided and crashed off
the coast of Namibia. Due to limited personnel and communications
capability American Embassy Windhoek requested the assistance of ODA
392, 3rd SFG, that had deployed to conduct training and provide
logistics assistance in support of Namibian humanitarian demining
operations. The SOF demining team, led by Captain Hubbard, played a key
role in getting the information flowing and supporting the deployment
of JTF HIGH FLIGHT. Additionally, SOCEUR deployed two MC-130 aircraft
from 352nd SOG and a command element within hours of the reported loss
to provide initial command of the Search and Rescue (SAR) JTF and begin
personnel recovery operations.
7. Operation NORTHERN WATCH (Northern Iraq). The ------ supported
the U.S. effort in support of this operation to provide Combat SAR
(CSAR) and helicopter refueling support from Turkey for the United
Nations' sponsored No-Fly-Zone over Northern Iraq. For the period ----
-- SOF air assisted with the ongoing Operation NORTHERN WATCH at
Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, due to lack ofsufficient, available, and
capable convention air assets to perform the CSAR mission over Northern
Iraq.
8. Operation JOINT GUARD (Bosnia-Herzegovina). The ------ provided
special operations, CA, and PSYOP in support of NATO stabilization
Force to deter hostilities and promote a stable environment in Bosnia-
Herzegovina from 20 December 1996 to present in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia, Italy, and Germany.
9. Operation ABLE SENTRY (Macedonia). The ------ have provided
smaller rotational elements attached to conventional forces in support
of the United Nations mission in Skopje, Macedonia.
10. Operation BEVEL EDGE (Cambodia). A Special Operations Command-
Pacific (COMSOCPAC) led JTF deployed to an intermediate staging base at
Utapao, Thailand, 8-21 July 1997 to prepare to conduct a NEO of
American citizens in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The NEO did not take place
as the situation stabilized. Participating units under ------ .
11. Operation SOUTHERN WATCH (IRAQ). ------ with aircrews and
maintenance support packages to Al Kharj, Saudi Arabia, on 4 October
1996 at the conclusion of Operation Desert Strike expanding the no-fly
zone. The ------ provided 24 hour refueling to HH60G helicopters
supporting the CSAR mission for aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone over
Iraq during the periods ------.
12. Operation SOUTHERN WATCH (IRAQ). The ------ provide individual
augmentation to CJTF Southwest Asia (SWA) in Saudi Arabia. ------ These
billets are tasked as 179-day recurring rotations. As a result of the
Khobar Towers bombing, and on the recommendation of the ``Downing
Report,'' U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) requested individual
augmentation to CJTF SWA staff to effectively plan, coordinate, and
implement force protection initiatives in the USCENTCOM area of
operations.
13. Operation MARATHON PACIFIC (GTMO & Wake Island). USSOCOM
deployed CA and PSYOP personnel in support of a CINC U.S. Atlantic
Command (CINCUSACOM) mission to provide humanitarian assistance to
Chinese migrants intercepted off the United States Eastern coast. The
package consisted of ------.
14. Operation PACIFIC HAVEN (Guam). ------ personnel provided
support to the JTF at Anderson AFB, Guam, to conduct humanitarian
assistance operations to receive, shelter, process, and provide care
and security for Kurdish Foreign Service Nationals (KFSN) and their
families during the period 20 September 1996--30 April 1997.
15. Operation SAFE BORDER (Peru and Ecuador). The ------ when
Brazil assumed control of the support requirement. The 7th SFG deploys
personnel on a six month rotational basis to verify adherence to the
cease-fire agreement between Ecuador and Peru to include strict
observance of the Demilitarized Zone established in August 1995.
16. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti). USSOCOM deployed a total of
------ soldiers to Haiti during fiscal year 1997 in support of USACOM's
and then Southern Command's (after 1 June 1997) ongoing efforts to help
Haiti reestablish its infrastructure.
17. USSOCOM, at the request of the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S.
European Command (USCINCEUR) and at the direction of the Secretary of
Defense, has provided U.S.-based SOF in support of military operations
in the Bosnia Theater of Operations. These operations support the
Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) and are conducted under the authorization of
the Secretary of Defense, who currently retains the disclosure
authority for all release of information to the above question.
Respectfully request that queries on this subject be referred to the
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The following operations do not have an established end date and
SOF support may continue into fiscal year 1999: ABLE SENTRY
(Macedonia), SOUTHERN WATCH (Iraq), and SAFE BORDER (Peru and Ecuador).
Question. What percentage of the time are SOCOM forces deployed on
training and on missions?
Answer. During fiscal year 1997, SOF were deployed 50 percent of
the time on Operations (i.e. JOINT GUARD, NORTHERN WATCH, SOUTHERN
WATCH, DESERT THUNDER, Joint Task Force (JTF)-SWA, SAFE BORDER, JTF-
BRAVO, JTF-Full Accounting, US Support Group Haiti, Humanitarian
Demining missions, Counter Drug missions, Naval Special Warfare
personnel afloat, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, and humanitarian
missions (Kenya Assessment, C-141 SAR); 47 percent on training (i.e JCS
Exercises, JCETs, unit training, and individual training or schools);
and 3 percent on other deployments to include conferences, command
visits, and predeployment site surveys.
Question. How do mission deployment levels impact training and
readiness?
Answer. The morale and retention of special operations forces has
remained high despite our consistently high OPTEMPO. We believe this is
because the troops are conducting significant missions, making a
difference to the Nation and they're proud to be involved. However,
USSOCOM has taken the initiative to ensure a ready force for the future
by studying the effects of high tempo on our forces. One initiative is
a PERSTEMPO Impact Survey to be completed in April 1998. This will
focus on special operations forces (SOF) morale, families, professional
development, training, retention, and personnel readiness. Another is a
Joint Medic Review study, initiated as a way to address growing
retention concerns about our SOF medics. A life-cycle approach was used
to compare each SOF medical specialty from initial recruitment to final
attrition. Both Army Special Forces Medics and Air Force Pararescuemen
had shortages in operating strength caused by increases in
authorizations not matched by increases in recruiting. The National
Defense Research Institute/RAND has also been tasked to conduct a SOF
recruiting study with particular emphasis on improving minority
representation of SOF units. Emphasis upon recruiting is a multi-year
effort, given the extensive training required and resulting long lead-
time.
SOF is committed to remain ahead of potential problems caused by
the high employment rate of our troops. By developing a baseline for
future comparisons, determining how high PERSTEMPO affects the soldier
and how this may manifest itself (morale, retention, etc.), SOF can
develop innovative thinking and new ways to shape change.
Question. Are there Special Forces units which are deployed more
frequently than is prudent?
Answer. Some of our units are deployed more frequently than we
believe is prudent for the long-term health of the organization. The
Special Tactics Squadrons, the Special Operations Squadrons from the
Air Force Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare SEAL, SEAL
Delivery Vehicle Teams and Patrol Coastal Ships, and the Army Civil
Affairs and Psychological Operations units routinely experience
significantly high unit tempo over the quarterly reporting period.
These units have experienced high tempo on the bounds of prudent usage
and USSOCOM has taken steps to document, analyze and temper the
situation.
Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Unit
Question. There are no funds in the fiscal year 1998 appropriations
bill nor the fiscal 1999 budget for U.S. Forces to remain in Bosnia
beyond the June 1998 pull out date. What is the current complement of
Special Operations Forces in Bosnia and will they remain beyond June
1998?
Answer. On 20 March 1998, there are ------ conducting the Special
Operations Force mission in support of OPERATION JOINT GUARD.
Accordingly, ------ conducting direct support of the mission from
Brindisi, Italy, and the remaining personnel at the various
headquarters at SHAPE, Special Operations Command Europe, Croatia and
Hungary. An actual breakout of he force package is as follows: ------.
We are currently planning for a Follow-on Force mission and have
included our force package figures in the NATO Statement of Requirement
(SOR 11). The other Contributing Nations are reviewing this document
and we expect to make the final adjustments to the force figures during
the 7-8 April 1998 Force Generation Conference. Based on the
commitments from the other nations, the U.S. SOF contribution should be
------.
Bosnia Implementation Force (IFOR) Cost Estimates
Question. What are the additional costs required for them to stay
in Bosnia? Will these funds be in the supplemental request?
Answer. USSOCOM estimates it will cost $8.7 million for the fourth
quarter of fiscal year 1998 for SOF to remain in Bosnia. This would
bring the total estimate for fiscal year 1998 to $34.4 million. The
Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) covers $28.5
million of that amount. This leaves a shortfall of $5.9 million, which
is included in the contingency supplemental submission.
In addition to the costs to remain in Bosnia, USSOCOM estimates a
fiscal year 1998 cost of $1.6 million or Operation Deliberate Guard.
This cost estimate is covered in the DoD contingency supplemental
submission.
Question. Since many of the Special Operation Forces currently in
Bosnia are Reservists, what will be the impact of continuing the
Special Operation missions there?
Answer. USSOCOM can continue to support operations in Bosnia with
Reserve Component personnel without any adverse impact, providing
certain adjustments are effected. These adjustments include: decreasing
the Civil Affairs (CA) and PSYOP requirements as currently planned in
Statement of Requirements 11, extension of Presidential Selective
Reserve Call-up (PSRC) authority beyond 30 June 98, and use of
Contingency Operation Temporary Tour of Active Duty (COTTAD) authority
to deploy volunteers on second tours.
Question. Would the Special Operations Command be able to support
an extension of the current Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up for
the Bosnia mission?
Answer. Yes. In fact, the continued support of Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations units to Bosnia is heavily dependent on the
extension of the Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up (PSRC)
authority. USSOCOM can support a sixth rotation with no significant
problems. Beginning with a seventh rotation, some specific rank or
skill requirements may become difficult to fill.
Question. Will reserve units who have been tasked to provide
personnel in the past be required to provide the same personnel for an
extension of the mission?
Answer. No. Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up (PSRC) rules
prohibit a soldier from being mobilized for the same operation for more
than 270 days. Technically, a soldier could be mobilized for 180 days
and return for an additional 90 days. However, legal review of this
rule has indicated that Congressional intent was not to have soldiers
return for a second tour. A soldier could, however, volunteer to return
to the same operation under Contingency Operation Temporary Tour of
Active Duty (COTTAD) authority for a maximum of 170 days.
USSOCOM Modernization Programs
Question. Your budget request for procurement for fiscal year 1999
is $506.260 million, $130.879 million below the 1998 appropriated
level. Two years ago, General Henry Shelton, then Commander in Chief,
United States Special Operations Command, and now Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, testified that ``An appropriate level of procurement
funding would be at $700 million per year to ensure the fielding for
critically needed weapon systems.'' Is the procurement request for
fiscal year 1999 adequate to ensure the fielding of critically needed
weapons systems?
Answer. Within our severe fiscal constraints, we have been able to
establish a program that, while minimal, will keep key programs on
track. We are also seeking opportunities to leverage other technologies
to augment our minimal procurement program.
Question. What programs originally funded in fiscal year 1999 are
now funded in later years?
Answer. There are three programs which fit this category. These
programs include: the Directional Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM),
where $60 million in procurement moved to Fiscal Year 2000 (FY00), the
Patrol Coastal Forward Looking Infrared Radar (PC FLIR), where $8
million procurement moved to FY00, and, the Advanced Seal Delivery
System (ASDS), where $44.8 million (Procurement and Operations &
Maintenance) where reprogrammed to Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT&E).
Question. Why have they slipped?
Answer. For the Directional Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM),
testing has slipped approximately nine months. This slip is the result
of a development slip. For the Patrol Coastal Forward Looking Infrared
Radar (PC FLIR), the slippage is due to resource constraints. The
Advanced Seal Delivery System (ASDA) funding was recolored due to cost
and schedule slip of the prototype ASDS.
Question. Are there additional costs to the program because of
these delays?
Answer. For Directional Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM) and the
Patrol Coastal Forward Looking Infrared Radar (PC FLIR) there are no
additional costs associated with the delays. For the Advanced Seal
Delivery System (ASDS), there are costs associated with the delays.
$44.8 million of procurement and Operations and Maintenance were
realigned to Research, Development, Test and Evaluation in fiscal year
1999. This impacts the quantity of ASDS that can be procured.
Question. Do you have shortfalls relating to your 1999 procurement
request?
Answer. Yes. The following items related to procurement are on our
fiscal year 1999 unfunded requirement (UFR) list.
[In millions of dollars]
Priority and UFR Procurement amount
1 Counterproliferation........................................... $5.09
4 SPEAR-BALCS.................................................... 4.3
6 MH-47E Helicopter.............................................. 41.5
8 Silent Shield.................................................. 5
9 M4A1 Carbine Modifications..................................... 2.47
10 Remote Activating Munitions System............................ 6
11 AC-130 Low Light Level TV..................................... 2.36
CV-22 Aircraft
Question. The Special Operations variant of the V-22 is the CV-22
which will provide long-range infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply
missions for SOF forces. It fulfills a critical USSOCOM capability
shortfall. What is the cost to the Special Operations Command for
developing the CV-22?
Answer. The CV-22 will cost USSOCOM $3.8 million in fiscal year
1999. The majority of development costs for the CV-22 are funded by the
Department of the Navy. The Navy is developing the baseline MV-22
aircraft for the United States Marine Corps (USMC) and the initial CV-
22 modifications. USSOCOM is funding a follow-on pre-planned product
improvement (P3I) that incorporates CV-22 capability not available in
the baseline aircraft development program. The P3I program includes the
integration of a defensive infrared countermeasures capability,
additional flare & chaff dispensers, the AVR-2A laster warning
receiver, and other modifications. USSOCOM CV-22 Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding is programmed to begin in fiscal
year 2000 (FY00).
USSOCOM is funding the procurement of the Special Operations Forces
(SOF) unique equipment on the CV-22 (about 15 percent of the total
aircraft procurement cost) and the United States Air Force (USAF) is
funding the procurement of the common MV-22 aircraft and components
(about 85 percent).
Question. What capabilities will it have that the V-22 will not?
Answer. The CV-22 will have four significant additional
capabilities: the electronic warfare Suite of Integrated Radio
Frequency Countermeasures (SIRFC) being developed by the Army for the
Apache Longbow; the Multi-mission Advanced Tactical Terminal (MATT),
which provides near real-time offboard sensor information for improved
situational awareness and threat avoidance; the terrain following/
terrain avoidance APQ-174D radar; and additional fuel tanks for
extended range. There are also other avionics improvements, such as
improved functionality for the digital map and survivor tracking.
Question. What defensive capabilities will it have?
Answer. The CV-22 will have extensive defensive capabilities. The
Suite of Integrated Radio Frequency Countermeasures (SIRFC) integrates
on-board and off-board sensor information to display current threat
status and provides electronic jamming capability. Chaff and flares are
available in multiple dispensers both fore and aft on the aircraft. An
infrared countermeasures capability will be added as part of the Pre-
planned Product Improvement (P3I) to defeat infrared missiles.
Question. Will the CV-22 be able to transport any of your current
land transportation vehicles?
Answer. The CV-22 can only transport motorcycles and modified All-
Terrain Vehicles that are in the current SOF inventory. USSOCOM plans
to procure Light Strike Vehicles in conjunction with the United States
Marine Corps that will fit inside V-22 aircraft.
Advanced Seal Delivery System
Question. The Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) was originally
scheduled for Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in 1997. The Navy and
the contractor have had significant problems meeting its schedule. What
is the current IOC?
Answer. The Advanced Seal Delivery System (ASDS) will deliver to
the Fleet in June 1999. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is
scheduled three months after delivery, currently September 1999. After
delivery to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, we have scheduled three months of
operator work-ups with the host submarine (USS Greeneville SSN-772).
Upon completion of these work-ups, IOC will be achieved.
Question. What has been the cost growth to the program to date?
Answer. The total projected Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT&E) contract cost of producing the first ASDS is $169
million. The negotiated cost of the original fiscal year 1994 (FY94)
contract, prior to redesign and structural modifications, was $62
million (a difference of $107 million). The Latest Revised Estimate
(LRE) by the prime contractor to complete the lead ASDS vehicle under
the rebaselined program is $169.6 million then Year Dollars (TY$). The
total cost for completion of the lead vehicle (contractor and other
government costs) is projected to be approximately $218 million (TY$).
This total includes other costs such as government-furnished equipment,
engineering support, life cycle support, planning yard support, and the
hydrodynamic test program that will define the host submarine submerged
operating envelope.
Question. Are there sufficient funds in the future years defense
program (FYDP) to procure the six vessels which are required?
Answer. The fiscal year 1998-2003 (FY98-03) FYDP currently does not
contain sufficient funds to acquire total of six ASDS. Presently,
USSOCOM is evaluating the overall force requirement for ASDS from an
affordability standpoint.
Question. How much would have to be added to procure six vessels?
Answer. A total of $164.2 million would have to be added to the
program across the future year's defense program (FYDP) to procure all
six ASDS.
Question. The hull manufacturer has gone out of business. Are there
sufficient other hull manufacturers to continue the program?
Answer. Yes. Northrop-Grumman, the prime contractor for the
Advanced Seal Delivery System (ASDS), has negotiated a fixed-price
contract with Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics for the
follow-on pressure hulls.
Information Warfare
Question. One potential and very serious dilemma we must face is
that an adversary might disrupt or manipulate our military information
systems, thereby eliminating one of the best advantages we possess over
our adversaries. What role is the Special Operations Command playing in
the Department's efforts to address this threat?
Answer. USSOCOM is decisively engaged in addressing the
asymmetrical information warfare threat posed to the United States. I
have combined our intelligence, communications, automation, and
information warfare specialists into an Intelligence and Information
Operations Center. This center pulls together all the elements
necessary to respond to the information warfare threat. Information
operations is a Special Operations Forces (SOF) principle mission. For
several key areas of information operations, such as psychological
operations and civil affairs, SOF are uniquely suited for this mission.
Currently, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and National
Security Agency (NSA) form the center of gravity for information
warfare to create solutions for protecting our information systems.
USSOCOM works with DISA and NSA. This partnership has resulted in five
vulnerability and penetration testing assistance visits at USSOCOM
recently, such as EPIC CHALLENGE. USSOCOM also works closely with other
agencies, such as Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence
Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency and National Reconnaissance
Office, and participates in Department working groups on IO. USSOCOM
initiated a set of Information Conditions (INFOCONs). These INFOCONS
establish procedures for our internal information systems users and
system administrators to respond to different levels of threat.
Question. How vulnerable are your information systems to disruption
or manipulation?
Answer. USSOCOM systems continue to evolve to protect them from
external disruption or manipulation. By employing state-of-the-art
systems and techniques, such as the Joint Intrusion Device developed by
Defense Information Systems Agency, we are able to protect our critical
information and command systems. We have deployed a defense in depth
concept that allows our systems administration personnel to identify
and successfully thwart information attacks. On a daily basis, USSOCOM
systems are probed and attacked. Thus far, our systems have remained
protected from penetration. Through numerous assistance visits and
exercises, we have been able to strengthen our defensive posture, train
our information professionals in recognizing and responding to attacks,
and develop new techniques against future potential adversaries.
Question. What steps are you taking to reduce a potential
adversary's ability to use information warfare?
Answer. USSOCOM is working closely with other agencies to develop
new methods and techniques for reducing an adversarie's ability. To do
this we must protect both the information systems and the information.
We take every step necessary to protect our mission critical
information systems from both external adversaries and internal
threats. The key to this is the redundancy built into our system. This
capability allows us to retrieve information so that if one source is
denied us we can continue from another source. By having alternate
means, we greatly reduce the ability of an adversary to deny us the
required information. Testing of both primary and alternate systems is
conducted both in training and exercise scenarios.
Question. What measures can we take to diminish or eliminate our
risks?
Answer. We must not only protect our information systems, but also
educate the Special Operation Forces warriors using those systems. Our
networks have been continuously probed and each incident is taken very
seriously. We have separate systems, so that we can isolate systems
under attack and perform damage control. A continuous training program
to ensure systems administrators are technologically current,
understand possible threats, and verify the functioning of our
reporting and response systems is another vital defense. At a national
level we need an integrated effort, both government and the public
sector. A large portion of our information infrastructure is contracted
from commercial sources. The Report of the President's Commission on
Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP), released in October 1997,
discusses these critical vulnerability and protection issues.
Question. If the necessary protections are not in place, what are
the consequences?
Answer. The consequences of this asymmetrical threat are extremely
serious. While popular books and magazines highlight total collapses of
electronic commerce or other industries, more serious to the warfighter
is the loss of confidence in the information we use to make decisions.
The information age has improved our ability to see events as they
unfold--our sensors feed us a constant stream of information--also that
decision-makers can quickly and accurately respond. Any distrust as to
the accuracy and validity of the information may cause doubts--doubt
that can lead to paralysis in our decision-making cycle. A prolonged
paralysis may lead to a total shutdown of our information systems and
our ability to maintain dominant battle space knowledge. The timely,
accurate flow of information is crucial to the success of SOF's ability
to shape the international environment.
Counter-Terrorism
Question. The terrorist threat is one of the most serious to U.S.
civilian and military personnel. Special Operations forces provide the
means to deter or defeat terrorist attacks against u.S. interests
wherever they may occur. Where are the principle terrorist threats
located today?
Answer. USSOCOM is concerned about terrorism on a worldwide basis.
We are concerned about the terrorism threat to Special Operation Forces
(SOF) deployments and diplomatic facilities/presence worldwide. We are
also concerned about the non-governmental pressure that may require us
to conduct non-combatant evacuation operations. The following countries
pose a continuing threat based on the presence of representatives of
State Sponsors of Terrorism (as designated by the U.S. Department of
State), the presence of terrorist groups, the indication of intentions
for anti-American activities and/or violence by these groups, the
existence and usage of centers for terrorist training, and the
existence of working intelligence and logistic support networks in
countries that include: ------.
Question. What role does the Special Operations Command play in our
overall Counter-terrorism program?
Answer. ------.
Question. How do Special Operations forces train to conduct
counter-terrorism missions?
Answer. ------.
Question. Do they train with foreign counterparts?
Answer. ------.
Question. In which Countries do they train?
Answer. ------.
Question. In his annual report, the Secretary of Defense stated
that Special Operations forces provided support to the Department of
Justice for the conduct of four extraditions during 1997 resulting in
the return of known and suspected terrorists from overseas to U.S.
Courts for trial. Who were the suspected terrorists which were returned
and from which countries?
Answer. ------.
Question. Have Special Operations Forces been involved in
assessments of force protection measures for theater commanders to
ensure that appropriate measures have been taken to protect against
possible terrorists incidents?
Answer. SOF expertise in assessing the threat and protecting the
force is continuously tapped by the Regional Commanders in Chief
(CINCs). Over the last year SOF has provided force protection
assessment support to numerous areas including Bosnia, Pakistan, Korea,
Colombia, and Peru. Our support includes augmentation to CINC level
assessment teams and the formulation of SOF specific teams. SOF force
protection assessment methodology concentrates on three main areas: the
threat--its existence, history, capabilities, intentions, and
targeting; host nation ability to provide defense to the site (most SOF
units utilize Host Nation Facilities for billeting and training); and
the units own Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection plan. Other areas
surveyed include the flow of timely force protection information,
structural integrity of the site, and stand-off from public areas. SOF
will continue to support the Regional CINCs in all aspects of force
protection for both SOF and conventional forces.
Military Operations Other Than War
Question. There has been a dramatic increase in operations other
than war since the Special Operations Command was established 10 years
ago. These operations are a natural extension of the SOF mission. What
operations other than war have Special Operations Forces been involved
in for the last two years? Please give us some examples of what your
forces are doing in places like Bosnia and Southwest Asia.
Answer. During fiscal year 1996, SOF personnel supported operation
UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti), Operation PACIFIC HAVEN (Guam), Operation
SOUTHERN WATCH (Iraq), Operation ABLE SENTRY (Macedonia), Operation
JOINT GUARD (Bosnia-Herzegovina), Operation NORTHERN WATCH/PROVIDE
COMFORT (Northern Iraq), and Operation SAFE BORDER (Peru, Ecuador).
During fiscal year 1997, SOF supported 17 operations. Specific
details follow:
1. Operation FIRM RESPONSE (Congo). ------.
2. Operation NOBEL OBELISK (Sierra Leone). ------ initially
deployed to Camp Benguema Training Center, Sierra Leone, for a Joint
and Combined Exchange Training (JCET) (leadership) with host nation
military personnel. During the period ------ instituted communications
with SOCEUR & American Embassy, Freetown, established security at the
embassy, planned and coordinated for a Non-combatant Evacuation
Operation (NEO), conducted reconnaissance of potential hazardous
landing zones, received the evacuation force, and provided security for
the ambassador.
3. Operation GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE (Rwanda). Beginning 14 November
1996, the ------ deployed to the Great Lakes Region of Eastern Zaire in
support of a multinational umanitarian intervention force to facilitate
the delivery of humanitarian aid by civilian relief organizations and
the voluntary repatriation of refugees or displaced persons from Zaire
to Rwanda. CA and PSYOPS were instrumental in convincing the Rwandan
refugees to return home and the AC-130 gunship was invaluable in
locating and counting the numerous groups of refugees for the Combined
Joint Task Force Commander (14 November through 14 December 1996).
4. Operation SILVER WAKE (Albania). ------ was originally in
Albania to provide Military Liaison Team support to host nation
military in order to develop and coordinate military-to-military
contacts to encourage the democratic orientation of the Albanian
military and defense establishments. When the security situation began
to deteriorate in Albania, he reported to American Embassy Tirana and
offered his assistance. ------ reviewed and assisted with the update of
the Embassy Emergency Action Plan, confirmed the surveys of evacuation
helicopter landing zones, marked the landing zones for the initial
arrival of the evacuation force and acted as the ambassador's military
advisor throughout the crisis. Throughout the evening and early morning
hours of 12-13 March 97 continuous gunfire rocked the capital city of
Tirana, Albania. The situation became critical when mobs and raided and
looted the country's noncommissioned officer's academy of weapons and
ammunition less than a kilometer from the American Residential
Compound. The Ambassador requested and received permission to conduct
an ordered evacuation of all Americans from the country of Albania on
13 Mar 97.
5. Operation ASSURED LIFT (Liberia). ------ deployed French
speaking Liaison Coordination Elements (LCE) to forward operating
locations at Bamako, Mali, Abidjan, Ivory Coast, Accra, Ghana, and
Roberts International Airport, Liberia. Each LCE coordinated and
supported the marshaling, on-load and offload of host nation military
personnel. These LCE assisted host nation militaries in Ghana, Mali,
and Cote D'Ivore in rapidly moving critical military forces to
Monrovia, Liberia, to reinforce ECOMOG (Economic Community of West
African States cease-fire Monitoring Group). In response to an outbreak
of intense factional fighting in and around Monrovia, Liberia, during
14 February to 7 March 1997, the U.S. agreed to provide immediate
assistance in strengthening ECOMOG security around Monrovia.
6. Operation HIGH FLIGHT (Namibia). On 13 September 1996, an U.S.
Air Force C-141 and a German Air Force TU-154 collided and crashed off
the coast of Namibia. Due to limited personnel and communications
capability American Embassy Windhoek requested the assistance of ODA
392, 3rd SFG, that had deployed to conduct training and provide
logistics assistance in support of Namibian humanitarian demining
operations. The SOF demining team, led by Captain Hubbard, played a key
role in getting the information flowing and supporting the deployment
of JTF HIGH FLIGHT. Additionally, SOCEUR deployed two MC-130 aircraft
from 352nd SOG and a command element within hours of the reported loss
to provide initial command of the Search and Rescue (SAR) JTF and begin
personnel recovery operations.
7. Operation NORTHERN WATCH (Northern Iraq). ------ supported the
U.S. effort in support of this operation to provide Combat SAR (CSAR)
and helicopter refueling support from Turkey forthe United Nation's
sponsored No-Fly-Zone over Northern Iraq. For the period ------ SOF air
assisted with the ongoing Operation NORTHERN WATCH at Incirlik Air
Base, Turkey, due to lack of sufficient, available, and capable
conventional air assets to perform the CSAR mission over Northern Iraq.
8. Operation JOINT GUARD (Bosnia-Herzegovina). The ------ provided
special operations, CA and PSYOP in support of NATO Stabilization Force
to deter hostilities and promote a stable environment in Bosnia--
Herzegovina from 20 December 1996 to present in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia, Italy, and Germany.
9. Operation ABLE SENTRY (Macedonia). The ------ maintained a four
man team while PSYOP and Special Forces Battalions have provided
smaller rotational elements attache to conventional forces in support
of the United Nations mission in Skopje, Macedonia.
10. Operation BEVEL EDGE (Cambodia). A special operations Command-
Pacific (COMSOCPAC) led JTF deployed to an intermediate a staging base
at Utapao, Thailand, 8-21 July 1997 to prepare to conduct a NEO of
American citizens in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The NEO did not take place
as the situation stabilized. Participating units under ------.
11. Operation SOUTHERN WATCH (IRAQ). The ------ with aircrews and
maintenance support packages to Al Kharj, Saudi Arabia, on 4 October
1996 at the conclusion of Operation Desert Strike expanding the no-fly
zone. The ------ provided 24 hours refueling to HH60G helicopters
supporting the CSAR mission for aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone over
Iraq during the periods ------ .
12. Operation SOUTHERN WATCH (IRAQ). The ------ . These billets are
tasked as 179-day recurring rotations. As a result of the Khobar Towers
bombing, and on the recommendation of the ``Downing Report,'' U.S.
Central Command (USCENTCOM) requested individuals augmentation to CJTP
SWA Staff to effectively plan, coordinates, and implement force
protection initiatives in the USCENTCOM area of operations.
13. Operations MARATHON PACIFIC (GTMO & Wake Island). USSOCOM
deployed CA and PSYOP personnel in support of a CINC U.S. Atlantic
Command (CINCUSACOM) mission to provide humanitarian assistance to
Chinese migrants intercepted off the United States Eastern coast. The
package consisted of ------ .
14. Operation PACIFIC HAVEN (Guam). The ------ personnel provided
support to the JTF at Anderson AFB, Guam, to conduct humanitarian
assistance operations to receive, shelter, process, and provide care
and security for Kurdish Foreign Service National (KFSN) and their
families during the period 20 September 1996--30 April 1997.
15. Operation SAFE BORDER (Peru and Ecuador). The ------ when
Brazil assumed control of the support requirement. The 7th SFG deploys
personnel on a six month rotational basis to verify adherence to the
ceases-fire agreement between Ecuador and Peru to include strict
observances of the Demilitarized Zone established in August 1995.
16. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti) USSOCOM deployed a total of
------ soldiers to Haiti during fiscal year 1997) ongoing efforts to
help Haiti reestablish it's infrastructure.
17. USSOCOM, at the request of the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S.
European Command (USCINCEUR) and at the direction of the Secretary of
Defense, has provided U.S.-based SOF in support of military operations
in the Bosnia Theater of Operations. These operations support the
Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) and are conducted under the authorization of
the Secretary of Defense, who currently retains the disclosure
authority for all release of information to the above question.
Respectfully request that queries on this subject be referred to the
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
During fiscal year 1997, SOF also participated in the following
OOTW missions: Counter Drug missions in 21 countries; humanitarian
demining training missions in 11 countries; and African Crisis Response
Initiative (ACRI) training missions in 7 countries.
Question. What has the increased cost to the budget for these
operations?
Answer. Many special operations missions and collateral activities
inherently fall into the category of military operations other than
war. The fiscal year 1999 USSOCOM budget contains funding for our
participation in scheduled deployments and training for psychological,
civil affairs, counter drug, demining, humanitarian assistance and
foreign internal defense missions. The increased cost to USSOCOM is
related to our participation in contingency operations other than war.
USSOCOM spent $36.8 million for contingency operations in fiscal 1997.
In fiscal year 1998 we estimate spending a total of $55.0 million, and
in fiscal year 1999 we estimate a total of $49.8 million will be
expended for contingency operations.
Question. Have these missions affected training and readiness?
Answer. Military operations other than war over extended time
periods subject units to a variety of conditions often dictated by the
host country, geography, weather, and facilities. Training is often
restricted in regard to availability of ranges, operating times, flight
restrictions, and training infrastructure. Additionally, the geography
and weather can significantly affect training opportunities
particularly when coupled with political constraints. Once training has
been curtailed, readiness follows. Training is resumed upon rotation of
the units/personnel involved, but is limited in effectiveness if the
deployments are extensive. The effect upon unit readiness is heightened
when the unit is also considered Low Density. In this respect most SOF
units/personnel are considered Low Density/High Demand under the
Department's Global Military Force Policy (GMFP). Readiness is impacted
once the units exceed their Steady State limitations as defined in the
GMFP.
The readiness of USSOCOM active component units is high and the
overall readiness of the force is stable; on par with historical
levels. Reserve component unit readiness is comparable with the
Services, and making slow, but continual improvement. Our biggest
challenge lies in recruiting and maintaining a trained force. There are
some isolated equipment shortages. The greatest threat to current
readiness in Fiscal year 1998 is a shortage of qualified and trained
personnel. We can expect degradations in readiness if we are unable to
mitigate personnel shortfalls through various initiatives in the coming
year.
Overall, USSOCOM forces are ready to execute the National Military
Strategy. The risk of two Major Regional Contingencies (MRC) remains
moderate to high. The impact of contingency operations increases the
two-MRC risk due to stress on our scarce assets, lost training
opportunities, and concerns about our ability to rapidly disengage and
reconstitute forces needed to support the MRCs. Continued readiness
depends on the resourcing of several training and recruiting
initiatives, and significantly reducing isolated parts and equipment
shortfalls.
Question. What measures has U.S. Special Operations Command taken
to integrate capabilities and training for operations other than war
into the fiscal year 1999 budget request?
Answer. Military operations other than war (OOTW) encompass a wide
range of activities where the military instrument of national power is
used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually
associated with war. With this in mind, a good percentage of special
operations missions and collateral activities inherently fall into this
category and must be budgeted for and trained to during exercises and
deployments. Special operations missions and collateral activities in
this category include: PSYOP, foreign internal defense (FID), CA,
coalition support, counterdrug (CD) activities, countermine activities,
humanitarian assistance, and security assistance.
USSOCOM employs several means to ensure SOF are trained and ready
across this spectrum of missions. USSOCOM Service components conduct
Service-unique individual, collective, and sustainment training;
support institutional training; and participate in readiness exercises
for units required to perform these missions. SOF assigned to theater
CINC Special Operations Commands participate in joint combined exchange
training and Chairman-directed exercises specifically tailored to train
joint mission essential tasks in these areas. Operationally, ``train-
the-trainer'' deployments of special operations forces in support of
demining, CD, and FID operations also serve to further refine skills
applicable to the military OOTW environment. Headquarters USSOCOM
budgets for special operations capabilities and training in these
activities but also receives funding from the Departments of Defense
and State.
The fiscal year 1999 budget estimate for special operations
educational institution activities is $101 million. This equates to
fifteen percent of USSOCOM's O&M support budget. Institutional training
for military OOTW is accomplished at the United States John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and
the Air Force Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field, Florida.
These schools provide training across a variety of topics. Courses
offered include, but are not limited to: regional studies, CA, PSYOP,
FID, and civil-military strategy. During the qualification phase of
training, Special Forces soldiers train to military occupational
specialties that directly contribute to skills required in the military
OOTW environment. These military occupational specialties include
engineering, medical, and communications career fields, with all
Special Forces soldiers receiving language training.
The fiscal year 1999 budget estimate for special operations
participation in Chairman-directed exercises is $14.6 million, with
resources being provided by the Department of Defense. SOF
participation in Chairman-directed exercisesis hosted by the theater-
Commanders in Chief with SOF accomplishing training across a large
spectrum of special operations missions. There are 235 Chairman-
directed exercises programmed for fiscal year 1999. Of these, SOF are
scheduled to participate in 85, with mission essential task training in
CA, PSYOP, and FID slated for 53 of these exercises (62 percent).
The fiscal year 1999 budget estimate for Joint Combined Exchange
Training (JCET) is approximately $17 million in MFP-11 funds. JCET
trains SOF in a variety of mission essential tasks while improving
language proficiency, cultural awareness/immersion, and
interoperability with coalition forces. The preponderance of resources
is provided to United States Army Special Operations Command forces (71
percent). JCETs are split between all theaters with Special Operations
Command Europe, Pacific, and South taking the greatest share of these
resources (24 percent, 33 percent, and 25 percent respectively).
An excellent example of a FID ``train-the-trainer'' program is the
African Crises Response Initiative (ACRI). This State Department funded
program provides SOF who work within Africa to create highly effective,
rapid-deployable peacekeeping units, which can operate jointly in the
event of humanitarian crisis or a traditional peacekeeping operation.
The fiscal year 1999 State Department budget estimate for the ACRI is
$20 million dollars.
Two other examples of special operations activities which pertain
to the military OOTW environment are demining and CD operations. The
demining activities of SOF are also based on a ``train-the-trainer''
concept and focus on training host nation forces to conduct demining
operations. The fiscal year 1999 demining budget is estimated at $25
million with resources primarily provided by the State Department. In
the area of counterdrug operations, the special operations forces
mission is to provide support to regional combatant commanders and
other United States' government agencies to support assigned
counterdrug missions, within statutory limits and as approved by the
Secretary of Defense. The fiscal year 1999 budget for counterdrug
operations is approximately $23 million with the majority of funding
provided by DOD Drug Enforcement Policy and Support programs.
In summary, SOF's missions frequently occur in the OOTW
environment. SOF's training and capabilities are well focused in this
area for fiscal year 1999. In conjunction with Chairman-provided
resources and State Department funds, the USSOCOM has integrate
adequate capabilities and training for OOTW into the fiscal year 1999
budget request. Given the current pace of special operations
participation in these activities, it is probable that special
operations forces will maintain this requirement well into the future.
Year 2000 Computer Problem
Question. One of the problems that we face as we enter the next
century is older computers that are only programmed to remember the
last two digits in a year. Thus they remember `1997' as simply `97'.
The year 2000, however, will be saved as `00', the same as the year
1900. This can lead to calculation errors and system failures. How
serious is this problem for your Command? What would be the impact if
your Mission Critical Systems were not corrected by the year 2000?
Answer. We have identified 37 mission critical systems, 73 internal
applications, 13 devices, and over 700 commercial off the shelf and
government off the shelf hardware and software products that are
subject to malfunction or failure as a result of the year 2000 problem.
I am confident USSOCOM will continue to be able to perform its primary
mission, but potentially at a significantly degraded level. Our
deployed forces may be denied automated command, control,
communications, intelligence, positioning, and imagery that we rely on
during strategic and tactical operations. The SOF warrior, because of
the nature of the mission, is probably one of the most demanding users
of information technology. My forces are capable of adjusting to these
changes when required, but at a cost of increased risk of detection,
and decreased mission effectiveness.
Question. Do you know of any plans to conduct Joint Chiefs of Staff
Exercises next year with the clocks turned forward to identify any
uncorrected year 2000 computer problems? Do you believe this would be a
valuable test to see if the warfighting automation systems will be
ready for the year 2000?
Answer. Yes, the Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration
(JWID) exercise and other proposed Joint exercises will assess our
Information Technology systems for year 2000 compliance. A joint
exercise to ``test run'' our mission critical systems is a good way to
see exactly whether our mission critical systems are ready for the year
2000 and beyond. However, we must also ensure safeguards are in place
so we can recover our systems if we do discover problems. In an
exercise test environment we can isolate those systems that experience
interrupted operational failures or experience any slow corruption of
data as a result of year 2000 related issues. This type of exercise may
save a lot of time, effort, and money.
Question. Have you begun developing contingency plans in case your
Mission Critical Systems are not year 2000 compliant?
Answer. Yes. Contingency planning to conduct daily operations in
the event of an emergency are standard practices within USSOCOM. Each
program manager has the responsibility to ensure their systems are
assessed for potential failures, to identify points of risk, and
document remedial strategies in the system contingency plan. Every
functional center within USSOCOM has the responsibility to develop
contingency plans depicting how they will conduct their day to day
operations without the mission critical system to support them if those
systems were to fail. We are also incorporating specific year 2000
related risk assessments and contingency plans to mitigate the
consequences of data processing failures on our mission critical
systems. These contingency plans will ensure USSOCOM is mission-capable
through the millennium change.
Question. Overall, are you confident that this problem will be
solved before the year 2000?
Answer. Yes, I am confident we will solve this problem for our
mission critical systems before the year 2000. However, we must not
fool ourselves by thinking there will not be some system ``hiccups.''
We can certify each system and application individually and
systematically integrate these systems during implementation. But once
all these systems start to interface, there may be some areas we will
have to go back and fix. We are planning for these hiccups and are
developing plans to have computer emergency response teams (CERT)
available to assist those systems and personnel that experience any
malfunctions.
Counterproliferation
Question. In May 1995, the Secretary of Defense directed the
CINCSOC ``to assume the responsibility for organizing, training,
equipping, and otherwise preparing U.S. special operations forces to
conduct operations in support of U.S. government counterproliferation
objectives.''--General Schoomaker, what type of forces and capabilities
do you have to carry out the counterproliferation mission?
Answer. The boundaries of counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) are still not completely defined. Asymmetrical
threats in the form of WMD can come from terrorists groups, rogue
elements and transnational groups, as well as nation states. ------.
Question. DOD Directive 2060.2, subject: Department of Defense
Counterproliferation Implementation, dated July 9, 1996, states that
accomplishment of the counterproliferation mission ``may require
coordination with other U.S. Government Agencies.''--Which agencies
have you worked with? What type of support do you need from these
agencies?
Answer. The conduct of operations in support of U.S. Government
Counterproliferation objectives is by definition, an Interagency
process. USSOCOM has developed close working relationships and
coordinated efforts with: ------.
The FBI is Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for domestic WMD incidents.
USSOCOM serves in a supporting role during domestic response to WMD
incidents on US soil. ------. (Approval for USSOCOM involvement on US
soil rests with the President, based on the joint recommendation of the
SECDEF and the Attorney General.) ------. State Department is the Lead
Federal Agency (LFA) for OCONUS WMD incidents. As such the conduct of
SOF operations in support of U.S. Government CP objectives, OCONUS, are
conducted in support of and in coordination with the State Department.
USSOCOM requires intelligence support from a variety of agencies to
include the ------.
We have trained extensively within the interagency in an effort to
increase the level of comfort with the complex relationships developed.
Question. Is the intelligence community able to provide you with
timely intelligence support?
Answer. Timeliness and quality of intelligence has always been an
operational challenge. This challenge becomes even more critical
considering the complexity of counterproliferation (CP) issues.
The greatest CP intelligence challenge is the inability of the
national intelligence community to meet Special Operations Forces (SOF)
level of detail requirements. ------.
Human intelligence (HUMINT) provides the fine-grain intelligence
required to support SOF. ------. USSOCOM has just recently identified
detailed HUMINT collection requirements which will increase the focus
on CP. Of all the intelligence disciplines, HUMINT has the least
capability to surge during crisis periods. Consequently, the necessary
long term HUMINT relationships must be previously established to ensure
mission success. Additionally, HUMINT reporting timeliness are
historically longer than for the other intelligence disciplines.
Imagery intelligence (IMINT) support generally is good, however the
current constellation limitations and competing requirements,
especially during crises, mitigate against the near full-time coverage
necessary to meet SOF CP collection needs. ------.
Additionally, denial and deception procedures by proliferators
frequently make coverage which is available of limited value.
Developing measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) may
significantly improve CP intelligence collection in a few years.
Timeliness of MASINT data analysis and dissemination is another area
that requires improvement. Space-based MASINT provides the standoff,
but is not yet capable of meeting USSOCOM's biological and chemical
weapons-related requirements. USSOCOM, and the Department and
intelligence community, has developed an initiative to improve
USSOCOM's Special Reconnaissance Capabilities (SRC) against ``hard
target'' requirements. The DOD-wide initiative, with USSOCOM as
Executive Agent, will focus on specific sensors and related
technologies to improve SOF SRC and augment traditional intelligence
collection means.
Question. Do you have adequate resources to accomplish your
counterproliferation mission?
Answer. SOF offer carefully measured, surgical counterproliferation
(CP) options not available elsewhere and represent an alternative whose
use can ------. USSOCOM continues its efforts to meet the ever-
increasing threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by pursuing a
robust, interagency program to enhance its capabilities. Where
possible, we leverage resources from existing programs, and collaborate
with others' mutually beneficial programs. An example of this is our
work with ------.
Projected resources are adequate to accomplish a reduced set of
near-term objectives. For instance, depending on the structural make-up
of a ------. The boundaries of CP of WMD are still not completely
defined. We are pursuing several avenues within CP to insure we are
prepared, when called upon, to deter, detect and monitor, or interdict
WMD and their associated technologies and equipment, regardless of the
environment or situation. Key in this effort are our initiatives in the
area of CP Explosive Ordnance Disposal (CP EOD). These skills allow our
operators to detect, disable or render ineffective a variety of
weaponized WMD to include improvised devices. We also continue to
improve our counterforce capabilities in HDBT and maritime
interdiction.
Additionally, ------ responsibilities to continue in the future.
All of these efforts and capabilities are extremely resource intensive.
Even so, it is necessary to continually upgrade and refine our efforts
in order to maintain capabilities commensurate with the escalating
challenges.
Our unfinanced requirements list provides details concerning the
amount of additional resources required to increase USSOCOM CP
capabilities. A total of $20.55 million has been identified as a fiscal
year 1999 shortfall.
Question. Do you know what role the National Guard plays in the
implementation of DOD counterproliferation activities and programs? Has
there been coordination between you and the National Guard Bureau on
counterproliferation matters?
Answer. ------.
Question. Is the intelligence community able to provide you with
timely intelligence support?
Answer. ------.
Question. Do you have adequate resources to accomplish your
counterproliferation mission?
Answer. ------.
Question. General Schoomaker, the current crisis in Iraq has
highlighted how difficult it is to target and destroy weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) facilities by air strikes alone. If not very soon,
then undoubtedly someday in the near future, possibly somewhere other
than in Iraq, we are going to find ourselves in a situation where we
need to go in and destroy, not just seriously diminish a WMD production
facility on the ground. What does SOCOM need to insure that when that
day comes we are as ready as we can possibly be?
Answer. The United States Special Operations Command continues its
efforts to meet the ever-increasing threat of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) by pursuing a robust program to enhance its
capabilities. ------. Where possible, we leverage off of existing
programs, and collaborate with other agencies' and commands' mutually
beneficial programs. ------.
Maintaining this capability commensurate with the increasing threat
is the challenge. Projected resources are adequate to accomplish a
reduced set of near-term objectives. ------. The maintenance of all of
these efforts and capabilities is extremely resource intensive and ----
--.
Bosnia Mission
Question. General Schoomaker, what is the current role of special
operations forces in Bosnia? How many SOF personnel are deployed in
support of the Bosnia operation?
Answer. The SOF mission for Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR/JOINT GUARD
has been to conduct special operations, civil affairs (CA) and
psychological operations (PSYOP) in support of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization Stabilization Force, formerly Implementation Force,
to deter hostilities and promote a stable environment in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. This has been accomplished by attaching SOF forces to
designated North Atlantic Treaty Organization and non-North Atlantic
Treaty Organization units. ------. This Special Operation Force
presence has proven to improve coordination, minimize
misunderstandings, and save lives.
Civil Affairs/Civil Military Cooperation Center provides the
Stabilization Force with the capability to conduct Civil Military
Operations in support of Supreme Allied Commander Europe's
implementation of the peace agreement. The Civil Military Operations
Center promotes cooperation between the civilian population and various
agencies and national governments. Civil Affairs personnel work to
leverage capabilities of Non-governmental Organizations, International
Organizations, national governments. They facilitate parallel unified
civilian effort in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
peace plan for regional stabilization and are prepared to respond to
humanitarian, public safety, and public health contingencies. ------.
Question. I understand that special mission units (SMUs) have been
deployed to Bosnia for highly sensitive and risky operations. Can you
tell us what these operations are? What is the chain of command in
authorizing such operations?
Answer. USSOCOM, at the request of the Commander-in-Chief of the
U.S. European Command (USCINCEUR) and at the direction of the Secretary
of Defense, has provided U.S.-based SOF in support of military
operations in the Bosnia Theater of Operations. These operations
support the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) and are conducted under the
authorization of the Secretary of Defense, who currently retains the
disclosure authority for all release of information to the above
question. Respectfully request that queries on this subject be referred
to this Office of the Secretary of Defense.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
Wednesday, March 4, 1998.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND AND COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES FORCES, KOREA
WITNESSES
ADMIRAL JOSEPH W. PRUEHER, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES PACIFIC
COMMAND, U.S. NAVY
GENERAL JOHN H. TILELLI, JR., COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA,
U.S. ARMY
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order.
Pursuant to a vote in the Committee last week, this hearing
is closed so that we might have the opportunity to discuss any
classified material that any of us would like to discuss.
Today we are very happy to welcome Admiral Joseph Prueher,
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, and General John
Tilelli, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, Republic
of Korea and the U.S. Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces,
Korea.
It is good to see you both again and to have you visit with
the Committee. We enjoyed our previous visits and look forward
to an exciting hearing today.
We understand the area of your responsibility. We know how
extensive it is, including 50 percent of the earth's surface
and 60 percent of the world's population; and, from a military
perspective, it includes five of the seven U.S. mutual defense
treaties and seven of the world's largest armed forces. That is
a bunch. You do such a good job at it. We are really proud of
what you do and what the people that work under you do.
In that region, we maintain a continuous presence of
approximately 100,000 military personnel performing missions
ranging from assisting in humanitarian demining to guarding the
dangerous intra-Korean border.
Some of the issues that we would like to hear about today,
and we will be asking questions about, include the current
situation in North Korea; the economic problems in South Korea
and Japan and how they affect those nations' ability to
maintain their security commitments; the recent change of
government in South Korea; and the continued military
modernization being undertaken by China.
Your prepared statements will be placed in the record, and
please summarize them in any way that you wish. As you might
expect, there will be a lot of questions then from the members
who are extremely interested in what you do and how you do it.
Mr. Murtha.
Remarks of Mr. Murtha
Mr. Murtha. Let me just welcome two of the finest officers
in the Naval and Army service, and we appreciate you coming.
I just made a trip--the Chairman went one way and I went
the other way--to Korea and the Pacific, and I am always
impressed about how far it is out there and what a large area
of responsibility you have and the tensions that exist. But I
was also impressed by the quality of the troops and the morale
and how well things were going. So I appreciate when you have
to come back here. It is a long way home.
Admiral Prueher. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Young. Admiral Prueher, we will hear from you first, I
understand, and then we will go to General Tilelli.
Summary Statement of Admiral Prueher
Admiral Prueher. All right, sir. Thank you very much.
You have covered our region, but it is an honor to be here
before the Committee, and we thank you for the opportunity to
represent the men and women of the Pacific Command.
What I would like to do today is give a quick update on our
assessment of the security position in the Asian Pacific.
Because of the economic crisis in Asia, I would like to talk a
little bit about the logic train for our activities and what we
are doing, the issues ahead, some of our priorities, and then
spend a little time talking about readiness.
I would like to point out one example of what we are doing
that I think will make things coalesce a bit.
STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC
Our strategy in the Pacific is important because of what is
going on economically. It is based on two premises. The first
of those is trying to work the economic part, the political
part and the military part in concert to try to work and
advance them at the same pace and not get one too far ahead of
the other. It works out well that way, and we work it hard that
way.
The other premise is the fact that security, especially
military security, underlies the stable conditions which allow
the economies to work. Madeleine Albright talked about how the
economic system rests on political order, which in turn depends
on military security, which is the same way of saying that. So
we are in a region that is at peace but not conflict-free, and
military security is what we are trying to provide for our
Nation and the region.
You have heard Secretary Cohen talk about ``shape, respond
and prepare'' from the QDR. We translate it in our theater and
into preventive defense, crisis response and, in addition, the
ability to fight and win a major conflict which, if it should
occur, would most likely be in General Tilelli's theater in
Korea.
FORCES IN PACIFIC COMMAND
Now each of these things requires credible military forces
which can respond in a quick way, and this is what we do. This
is the essence of what we do. These ready, forward-deployed,
properly positioned forces are what we are about.
I would like to tip my hat to the 300,000 men and women in
the Pacific Command and upon whose shoulders I ride. I couldn't
do anything, and none of us could, without them. They are just
excellent. They really are. I hope when you come out there you
will see them and be very proud of them like we are.
AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
The focus of our effort. What are the big pieces we are
focused on here for the future? I am going to talk about five
of them.
The first is Japan, preserving our pivotal security
relationship in the Pacific. It is a strong one. Things are
working well with Japan. It is not trouble-free, but the
biggest things we are working right now, one is Okinawa issues
and the other is the defense guidelines where Japan is trying
to determine their role in security in the Pacific.
The second, and a big issue that is talked about
everywhere, is that of China. What are we doing with China? It
is the backdrop for all of our discussions. I will save more
for Q's and A's, but, basically, we are building a very healthy
military-to-military relationship with China in the context of
our overall relationship. It is moving at a slow rate, but that
is the way it should be moving, at a slow rate, as we build
some understanding and build confidence.
My thoughts as to what we are doing with China is we are
trying to lay foundations for the future of the relationship.
We have talked with the senior PLA leadership and, China's
President; and what we are doing is we are building this so we
can accommodate both differences as well as things on which we
agree without having the whole thing fall apart all the time.
So that is number two.
Number three is India. India is a very large country, the
largest democracy in the world, the second largest population.
We expect it to exceed China's population in the next century.
Quite frankly, we don't do a lot militarily with India. It is a
modest mil-to-mil relationship, and we are building that. It is
not urgent, but it is important for the future, and we are
trying not to take our eye off the ball in South Asia.
The fourth one from the PACCOM point of view, is we are
trying to help create the conditions for General Tilelli in
which he can work to create a noncataclysmic resolution on the
Korean peninsula. As you all well know, Korea is the only
nation to which the United States has one of our four-stars
assigned full-time, which is tremendously important to us.
General Tilelli in his three hats and his staff do a great job
there, and he will cover Korea in some detail.
The fifth item that we are concerned about is the impact of
the economic or the financial crisis in East Asia on the
security relationships. I would like to make the point that
this economic crisis is, in fact, a security crisis, if we
don't handle it well. It is important because there are some
opportunities associated with this crisis as well, and I point
out the Chinese word for crisis incorporates two characters--
one is danger, the other is opportunity--and that is exactly
where we are with this economic crisis that exists in East Asia
right now.
THAILAND
I said I would give an example of our preventive defense
that we are doing with the other nations. I would like to use
Thailand as that example. Thailand is a treaty ally. They have
been steadfast since the Vietnam days. They have been on our
side. They have allowed us to base there. We have fought side
by side. They have allowed us to stage our aircraft going to
the Persian Gulf, going to the Arabian Gulf through Thailand
despite some outside pressure, and they have been a strong U.N.
player throughout. They are a good friend of the United States,
and they look to us. They are going through a period of both
political and economic instability that is one of the worst in
East Asia and Southeast Asia.
About 4 or 5 months ago, there was a situation where the
government--Prime Minister Chavalit was falling, and there was
some corruption. The military leaders there and the military--
the head of the Royal Thai Armed Forces is a general named
Mongon Ampornpisit, and he is a friend of ours, and he is also
an IMET graduate. He and General Chetta, who is the head of the
Army were under a lot of pressure to take over the government,
to run it, to stop the democratic processes. And Mongon and
Chetta, together, really held Thailand together through that
period. They stood fast behind the government and behind the
democratic process.
Now, they have had an election. They have elected a new
prime minister. They are swallowing the IMF pill and hope that
it is the right prescription. But they are working it hard, and
the level of pain in Thailand is such that the senior military
people, for example, are taking a 20 percent pay cut. It is a
shared burden in Thailand, but they are somewhat cheerfully all
going about this, because they believe that the IMF is the
right medicine and that they will get back on the beam.
It is a tribute, I think, to what militaries do in a
democracy. It is what we have been trying to work on in this
region and in other regions of the world, too, to build
democracies. It is a strong democracy with a responsible
military. The notion or the idea that their senior military
people trained with the United States, that they are inculcated
with our ideals, is very important, and I think it is a tribute
to them, and it will be important for the long-haul.
READINESS
I would like to shift now to talk a little bit about
readiness. Readiness is something we all discuss at some
length. We all have anecdotes, I have a lot of them, and I am
sure each of you do as you travel around the region. But I
would like to define readiness for a geographic CINC.
Fundamentally, for a military commander, it is having the right
forces at the right place at the right time and prepared to
fight the right war.
Now, under that umbrella, we look at six different things.
The first is qualified personnel. The second is combat capable
equipment. The third is the appropriate level of maintenance
and spares. The fourth is training of these people to use the
equipment. The fifth is tactics, which is different from
training. It is with sophisticated tactics that our people--
that we can capitalize on both the equipment and the people's
capabilities. The sixth point that we look at very carefully is
the ability to move these forces, the hardware and the support
equipment, to the right place, to be able to lift it to be at
the right place at the right time.
Those are the issues that we have, and that is what we look
at and what we mean at the CINCs level when we talk about
readiness. We measure each of these things, each of these six.
But in the conversations with readiness, people talk about
it at three separate levels, tactical, operational and
strategic. Where we get the anecdotes is at the tactical or the
individual unit level. So we look at readiness at those levels:
Can the airplane fly? Can the ship get underway? Can the tank
run and shoot? Those are the types of things we look at for
readiness.
The next level up of aggregation, from that or the tactical
level, is the operational level where we aggregate units into
carrier battle groups or divisions or joint task forces, and
then we look at an aggregate level of readiness there with
additional command and control parts to it.
Then, when we get up to the CINCs level, we aggregate it
even farther to the strategic level where we pull all of those
things together, and then we look at the ability to move it
from one place to another and to be able to work. So it is a
hierarchy of things.
So sometimes what we will say, what I will tell you later,
is that the PACOM forces are ready. But that does not mean that
they are not individuals or units that don't have deficiencies,
they do. But, overall, the units are ready; and that is that
hierarchy that we are talking about. Overall, our forces are
ready. We are ready at the large level to do our mission.
Now, can we do it as quickly as we might like? Can we do it
on time? Right now, the answer is not as quickly as we would
like. General Tilelli will tell you more about that.
We have a carrier battle group gone out of the western
Pacific that is in the Gulf. Now, what we could do if the
situation warranted, we could bring another carrier battle
group from the West Coast of the United States and have it
there. We could bring other forces, but we have done what we
consider to be prudent risk in this, and we have brought some
other forces in, but not a lot, to accommodate the situation in
Korea. Because, in our assessment, the likelihood of a conflict
is not high right now. But we need to look at that
continuously.
Our readiness management systems, the acronyms are SORTS
and JMRR, these systems, I would give them a grade of about a
C. They are not very good. It is a hard thing to do, to measure
these gradations of readiness. But we are working on the
systems, the joint staff is working on the systems, OSD is, as
are we, to get a better handle on measuring readiness and
making it more predictive.
We can discuss much more of this if you would like in
questions and answers, but the bottom line about readiness is
that this is the context in which we discuss it. Our forces are
ready. There is some risk involved, and General Tilelli will
talk about that more, but because of time delay right now,
should something happen in Korea, we incur some additional
risk, and we think it is acceptable to take at this point.
SUMMARY
So I would like to conclude, Mr. Chairman, with a thanks to
your Committee for you all, for your travel into AOR. I hope
that more people will do it more. Thank you very much for your
support for what we do. It is great to work with you and for
you with our mission. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Admiral, thank you very much. As Mr. Murtha and
I have both said, we are very proud of the work that you all do
and the way that you keep our interests protected in your part
of the world.
[The statement of Admiral Prueher follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. General Tilelli, we are happy to have you back
again, sir, and we will be glad to hear from you at this time.
Then we will be prepared to bombard you with very in-depth and
interesting questions.
Summary Statement of General Tilelli
General Tilelli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished
Committee members. It is again my distinct honor to be here and
represent the men and women who serve in Korea.
Let me start by thanking you for the continued support of
our forces. As Mr. Murtha saw when he was in Korea, there is
absolute progress as a function of the support that you have
given us in the last 5 years as far as quality of life of the
men and women who are serving there. Soldiers, sailors, airmen
and Marines and civilians of the United States forces
absolutely benefit from your support. You enable me and us in
the United States to achieve our theater mission of deterring
aggression. We have done that successfully, maintaining
readiness, and that is the key to the next element which is, if
there is conflict, to be prepared to fight and win, and,
hopefully, we will not have to do that.
To accomplish our mission, my strategy is clear: One,
strong forward presence. They are the forces that are in place,
the 37,000 forces that are in the Republic of Korea and those
in the Pacific that feed the theater very quickly; secondly, a
very vibrant exercise program; and, thirdly, the tenets of
power projection. If we can't get the forces there on time, we
take additional risk and we suffer additional losses.
NORTH KOREAN THREAT
So in my mind's eye, we focus a lot on the economic turmoil
and the economic turbulence in the Asian area. We focus on the
food shortage in North Korea. But I must say, there is still a
significant military threat north of the demilitarized zone.
The massive military machine of the DPRK and the North Korean
regime is real and has not gone away. They continue to muddle
through, despite past predictions of imminent collapse and
their desperate situation. In the South it is very
disconcerting when we see the contrast of military operations
and a very large military on one hand and the humanitarian
support that is provided in terms of food on the other hand.
While we are all touched by this human suffering brought
about by the breakdown in their economic system, we also look
across the DMZ at an enemy that is fully prepared. The North's
winter training cycles of the last 2 years have been robust and
very active; and, right now, they are engaged in the final
stages of their winter training cycle.
Chemical weapons and other theater ballistic missile
research and development continue unabated. These actions are
indicative of a nation that is willing to sacrifice everything,
to include its general population, to maintain its trump card,
which is a significant military; and that military is a viable
instrument of its national power and may be the only one it has
left.
Many intelligent people have predicted, through evaluation,
that the situation in the North is dire and the Kim regime is
destined to collapse in the near future. I will not predict a
collapse in the North, because I believe the regime is much
more resilient than we sometimes give it credit for. I will say
the possibility of collapse in itself is also troubling in that
it also causes us challenges, not only for the United States
but for the Republic of Korea.
ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINES MORATORIUM
One of the issues that I feel it is important that I
address to you as a part of my ability to meet the threat in
the event of conflict is the moratorium on antipersonnel land
mines. As you know, the President and the Department of Defense
have a plan to replace these weapons between now and 2006, and
I support the plan and have been involved in devising that plan
with the Chairman and the Joint Staff.
However, the fiscal year 1996 Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act places a prohibition on the use of land
mines, other than along the demilitarized zone, beginning in
February of 1999. Under this moratorium, I will not be allowed
to use remotely placed, self-destructing SMART mines to help
block penetrations and shape the battlefield. By remotely
emplaced, I mean air or artillery delivered, other than along
the demilitarized zones.
These systems are a critical component of my overall
campaign plan. They are technologically advanced, reliable and
not responsible for the humanitarian crisis that we say the
indiscriminate use of older mines causes.
I submit to you that until we can find a suitable
alternative in accordance with the President and the Department
of Defense's directive, I ask that you look at or relook at
that legislation, which would synchronize with the 2006
administration policy on use of antipersonnel land mines.
ALLIANCE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The cornerstone of our ability to defend and deal with
contingencies is the strength of the Republic of Korea, ROK,
and U.S. alliance, and many of you have seen that. It is a
strong, vibrant and evolving alliance. It is a model, as far as
I am concerned, for other alliances around the world. But, as
you know, this is a time of unprecedented change in the
Republic of Korea; and I will address those issues during
question and answer period, Mr. Chairman.
First, we as Americans should take pride in the emergence
of the Republic of Korea as a full-fledged democracy. The
recent inauguration of Kim Dae Jung marked the first time that
an opposition party assumed leadership through a civilian-to-
civilian transfer.
We in the Combined Forces Command, at the same time,
continue to be committed to being prepared and ready. In the
Combined Forces Command it has been my great privilege to
command a unique and outstanding military organization. It is a
organization that epitomizes the Goldwater-Nichols reforms. We
are joint and combined every day, and we support all of the
tenets of Goldwater-Nichols.
The duration of our involvement in Korea causes many not
serving there to think that the status quo in Korea remains,
but this is far from the truth. We face a threat that has a
very large conventional force and also possesses asymmetric
threats--namely, Special Operation forces and chemical weapons
and the missiles to deliver them. But, at the same time, we
have a modernized, well-trained force that stands ready on
freedom's frontier.
RESOURCES
While the resources are strained, I would be less than
candid if I said we had everything we needed. The ROK and the
U.S. governments support the Command sufficiently to ensure
that we are capable of deterring aggression and to fight and
win if the North miscalculates and attacks. In short, my
current operations and maintenance funding is adequate to
accomplish the operational mission. But I accept some risks, as
my current fiscal year 1998 funding levels maintain operational
and unit readiness. On the other hand, in order to meet these
standards, I accept shortages in my base operations, which
directly accounts for quality of life of my service members.
The fiscal year 1999 profile projections of my OPTEMPO and
operational readiness are at levels where I still can maintain
adequate levels of readiness where I am comfortable; but, at
the same time, we still are strained in the base operations
areas.
QUALITY OF LIFE ISSUES
Transitioning to that issue, let me talk about quality of
life of the service members, their families, the few families
we have in country and the civilians of the command. I consider
it critical not only for their welfare but also for their
ability to accomplish our mission.
First, again, I express our appreciation for your Military
Construction, MILCON, support. That has helped, and it will
continue to help. But, as we address the issue, we must keep in
mind that these outstanding young men and women--and they are
outstanding, the quality of our troops. The men and women who
serve has not changed. These are the people who would bear the
burden of combat and who wake up each day to the reality that
one of the most threatening situations in the world is just
outside their doors. They perform their mission every day,
their Personnel Tempo, which in my lingo means they are away
from home for 365 days, since they are on a short tour and
hardship tour in Korea. They serve on this hardship tour
admirably and with great character and courage. They are still
the best our country has, and they deserve our best support.
We are making progress. I have said that. The return of
MILCON funding after the hiatus, the last 4 years in MILCON
funding is making a difference, as is the Korean host nation
funding support. However, the problems are not solved.
The infrastructure is overdue for a major recapitalization
and overhaul, and it will take us years to meet the Department
of Defense standard. And I am not looking to meet that standard
immediately. I am trying to get my troops into what I call
adequate quality of life. But I still have a significant number
of personnel living in inadequate facilities that many of you
have seen during your visits to theater.
I ask that we build on the progress that you and your ROK
counterparts have made, and I want to assure you that I will do
my best to spend those resources most effectively and
efficiently and will not waste those resources and I will put
them on bases and camps that have the greatest long-term
utility.
SUMMARY
In closing, I submit to you that this is a time when we
must remain stalwart beside our allies, and the turmoil of the
economic situation must not be allowed to grow into a security
situation. Security, in fact, has been the greatest asset that
the Republic of Korea has had over the last 40-plus years in
the tremendous economic growth that it had success in up until
the recent turmoil.
During this time of turbulence, we have the opportunity to
reinforce our position as the honest broker in the region. The
next few years will prove pivotal in the security environment
in the Republic of Korea and potentially in Northeast Asia. The
agreed framework to dismantle the nuclear program in the North
appears to be working. The four-party talks are just beginning.
These are positive signs, and we think we are moving in the
right direction. However, the time line for resolution is still
debatable.
For the foreseeable future, we must remain vigilant and
strong; and, for the long term, we must remain engaged. Because
the area is too important for us not to be engaged. Your
support is vitally important to me.
Again, I thank you for that; and I am prepared to answer
your questions or the questions that you raised, Mr. Chairman,
or any others.
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much. I think all of us
would agree that, since we know something about our operation,
that you are not wasting the money over there. You are getting
a lot for the dollar that is made available to you.
[The statement of General Tilelli follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
STRAIN FROM OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS
Mr. Young. I want to ask a general question of both of you.
As we support the indefinite extension of the NATO mission
in Bosnia, or whatever that operation might be and for however
long it might last, and the deployment of U.S. forces to the
Persian Gulf, that are obviously going to be there longer than
some of us expected--and General Tilelli, I read some comments
that you had made about the fact that you lost the carrier
battle group, and I think the Air Force is tying to make up for
that vacancy by assigning some additional F-15s there--how long
can we continue? General, you used the word ``strain.'' How
long are you going to be able to continue this strain without
breaking something really bad?
General Tilelli. That is a very difficult question to
answer. I mean, the fact that we are in a strained resource
environment down at the unit level or at the component level
and the commanders are in an environment where they are always
balancing the Operational Tempo, which equates to readiness,
and the base operations, which equates to quality of life, and
the priority always goes to the Operation OPTEMPO to keep that
readiness high, or must go to Operation OPTEMPO in my mind,
especially to Korea. So the consequence is you are not doing
some of the infrastructure repair and maintenance that you
should be doing to not only recapitalize but to maintain your
facilities so you don't have water main breaks and electric
outages, et cetera, et cetera.
So, over time, you don't know how long it is going to take
for that piece of the puzzle to break, where you really have to
put in a larger investment than you want to, than you would
have had to if you had continued to support it all along.
So that is the strain at the Operation and Maintenance
dollar level that I talked about, and base operations is the
short end at this point.
Mr. Young. What about in the overall Pacific region that
you have responsibility for? You have to be feeling the strain
in places other than Korea.
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir, we are. The strain comes in--
just an example, we have some of our assets out of the Pacific
theater that are involved in Europe as we do global sourcing.
We will have aircraft--an aircraft squadron will deploy to
either Incirlik, for Operation Northern Watch or to Southern
Watch. That occurs from time to time.
Right now, from a naval point of view, there are 60 ships
in the Gulf, in the Arabian Gulf. There are 17 coalition ships,
43 U.S. ships, of which 24 are out of the Pacific Command. Now,
this is--some of this is normal because CENTCOM doesn't own
assets of their own, so we expect to do that some.
But the strain comes in increased deployment time. It comes
also in terms of opportunity costs. With the Independence
carrier battle group, the fact that they are there in the Gulf,
they would be underway probably anyway. But they are not doing
work for us in our theater of being proximate to Korea should
they be needed or doing exercises with other nations that we--
or training and interoperability training that we would be
getting in our theater. So it is an opportunity cost. We have
had to cancel several events that they could not participate
in.
We have the electronic support aircraft, the EA-6Bs, that
would normally be stationed in Iwakuni in support of General
Tilelli for contingencies are not there. They are both at
Aviano, and they are also at Southern Watch. They are
distributed there.
How long can this go on? That is a tough question. Because
if--I think--if the nation needs it, if we are at war, some of
these, the 6-month deployment cycles and things like that can
go away. But for now--this seems to be almost a routine--we are
incorporating it in our routine operations. So the Chief, Naval
Operations-CNO has said, talking about ships in the Gulf, that
we could support that indefinitely, as long as we are willing
to pay the cost in the Mediterranean or in the Pacific Command.
For us, a maritime theater, the cost is high. It is a gradual
erosion of our interaction with other countries. We could not
respond to a crisis as easily.
The last time in the China-Taiwan Straits 2 years ago we
were able to respond in 3 days with a carrier battle group that
happened to be coming out of Manila. Now, the soonest we could
respond would be 14 days to a similar type crisis should one
arise.
So I can't really give you a time line on how long we can
stand the strain, but we are eroding our base of preventive
medicine that we are dealing with in the Pacific.
TWO SIMULTANEOUS MAJOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES
Mr. Young. And if we had two Major Regional Contingencies,
MRCs, simultaneously, we would be in deep trouble, wouldn't we?
Admiral Prueher. We would be heavily strained. We could--I
still think, General Tilelli and I have talked, we could still
do it, but, again, the risk factor would go up; and, as General
Tilelli has pointed out, the time lag to do the second MRC
would cause increased loss of life.
General Tilelli. Mr. Chairman, if I could just interject, I
think the key as we think about two Major Theater Wars--MTWs,
it really is, in my view, is not associated with winning or
losing. I think we win. If you are the second MTW, you win. The
issue becomes the time it takes to get the forces that the
second MTW needs there. Therefore, airlift and sealift are very
important for our national security and national military
strategy.
Secondarily, when we talk about time, especially in the
Korean theater without the flow in a timely way, I am taking
greater numbers of casualties. That is, in a real sense, as you
raise the risk you mitigate that with time and casualties, and
that is the only way you can do that. That is the only
opportunity you have. And not a good solution, by the way, none
that I like.
Mr. Young. So the cost would be higher?
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Especially in terms of loss of life?
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir.
SPARE PARTS
Mr. Young. You mentioned infrastructure overhaul, and I
think we understand what you are talking about there as far as
your infrastructure, but what about your ability to fight, your
spare parts? Is your equipment usable today?
I know when we sit in this room we are often told that it
is not that big a problem, but if you go out into the field and
you visit people that are actually operational, they will tell
you, we have airplanes sitting over here that we have taken
parts from and some of the parts we get from the depots don't
work when they get here. From the field viewpoint, the
Committee has increased funding for spare parts almost every
year in recent years, and we want to make that problem go away,
but it seems like the more we spend the more the problem still
exists.
So from the standpoint of those of you in the field, what
is happening with spare parts, the cannibalization of airplanes
or any other types of equipment?
General Tilelli. Mr. Chairman, let me talk about the
Republic of Korea. I am indeed fortunate because I am a high-
priority area, so the consequence is I have very high readiness
rates and very high readiness rates and very high personnel
rates. And I know that not only from reports but by talking to
commanders at all levels. And I think when Mr. Murtha was there
recently he saw that the kids in the field they train hard, are
ready to fight, and maintain good readiness.
The parts flow to me seems, in my theater, both for the
preponderant forces which are Army and Air Force's, seems to be
on track with no great time lags from request to delivery or
ship time. So I am in a relatively good position for those
areas that you talk about.
Admiral Prueher. In my comments about readiness we talked
about the tactical or the unit level, the operational level and
then the strategic level; and I think most of the people you
talk to in this room are thinking about the strategic level and
some of the other things that we can do. When you go out and
you talk to people that are turning wrenches and replacing
parts and working on things, flying airplanes or ships or
tanks, they see the problem in a different way. I would----
Someone just mentioned over lunchtime, it is sort of like
the unemployment rate. We have the lowest unemployment rate,
but if you happen to ask somebody that is standing in the line,
you get a different answer than you do from the statistician.
So what we have with the parts issue, there are forward-
deployed units not only in Korea but the forward-deployed ones
in the area at pretty peak readiness. They don't have major
problems forward for that.
On the turnarounds, as people are back in the United
States, I think if you asked Admiral Gahman from Atlantic
Command, ACOM, he would have a little bit of a different
answer. Because they are the people that are on the turnaround
that are not forward deployed, and they have a problem.
We have been pulling to try and get some data. I will give
a percentage on cannibalization rates which you all understand.
If you have to take a part out of an airplane or tank and put
it in another one instead of taking it off a shelf, you are
cannibalizing it. It requires extra maintenance actions,
timing, money, all of those things.
In PACAF, our Pacific Air Forces, the cannibalization rate
in 1995 was 6.6 percent, which is about right for--actually,
you would like it to be very low. This year, in 1997, it was
15.9 percent cannibalization rate. So we have had two and a
half times thes previous rate. It is a parametric indicator of
the parts problem that we are talking about in PACAF, and we
are trying hard to put together the actual data and not to try
to skew the data to make a case but just find out how bad is
this problem.
Mr. Young. Well, the reason I raise this issue is because I
have talked with a lot of officers who have the responsibility
to keep airplanes flying, for example.
While Mr. Murtha had his group in Korea, I had another
group in the Gulf area. And at the Prince Sultan Air Base I was
told that their overall records look pretty good on the
availability of airplanes for flight, but that the way they
kept from having hangar queens, that when they got to about the
25th day of one plane being down because they took parts, they
took parts from airplane B to put back into airplane A so that
airplane A didn't get on the cannibalization list as a hangar
queen. And the 30 days began to run on airplane B. So when the
25th day on airplane B came up, they robbed another airplane.
So their overall records look good, but they were just
constantly changing parts.
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir. Our measuring system is probably
not quite right if we are driving that kind of activity.
Mr. Young. We will keep trying to get the spare parts there
on time so they don't have to do that.
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Mr. Murtha.
Mr. Murtha. About 12 years ago when another gentleman from
Florida was Chairman of the Committee, after a presentation by
one of the four-stars I called Admiral Crowe and I said, it is
the worst presentation I have ever seen in my life, and I am
embarrassed. The guy didn't answer a question.
You may remember it, Bill. It was one of the worst we ever
heard.
Well, last year after the presentation, I called General
Shalikashvili and I said, that it was one of the best
presentations. Admiral Prueher made one of the finest,
sophisticated, comprehensive presentations I have ever heard to
this Committee, and I reiterate that today. I appreciate your
comprehensive knowledge of such a large area and what you bring
to this Committee.
I will say about General Tilelli, I never got a more
straightforward--I mean, he gets up in the morning and he
works, and he makes sure that we work. We had a delightful
visit, but he made sure that I saw what I needed to see so I
can come back and report to the Chairman and the Committee the
deficiencies and, at the same time, the progress that has been
made in Korea.
So I really don't have any questions. I just have nothing
but compliments for both of you and the fine work that you are
doing out there.
Admiral Peueher. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Young. Mr. Lewis.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, General, we very much appreciate you being here
and the effort that is required to travel back for this
hearing.
Admiral, in outlining the region quickly at the beginning
of your remarks, you talked about both China and some military
circumstances, India, what we know and don't know about their
military condition. International Military Education and
Training--IMET was mentioned when you referred to a General in
Thailand earlier. I am not sure whether we have IMET programs
that affect either of those other two countries, China or
India. Do we have?
Admiral Prueher. We do not have one with China. We have a
small program with India under $500,000 per year.
Mr. Lewis. The reason I am asking this question is that I
remember the days when we were focusing upon problems in Latin
America I spent a good deal of energy looking at the role of
IMET and the impact it had upon attitudes of their officer
corps and how we saw the values of IMET in dealing with other
countries over time.
It seems to me that that kind of exposure and training of
military leaders from countries like India and China are pretty
critical items for consideration. If we don't have one with
India, which is going to be the largest country in the world,
if it is not already. They are not doing the kind of population
control China is doing and clearly are spending a large amount
of their budget in the volatility, vis-a-vis Pakistan.
Admiral Prueher. Right.
Mr. Lewis. Why don't we pursue these programs?
Admiral Prueher. Well, the IMET programs with China is
something, as we move along with China, it is a little delicate
to push them too fast.
Mr. Lewis. Of course.
Admiral Prueher. So we are working at a lot of
intersections outside the IMET program with China.
We have an increasingly robust relationship with China,
though it does not include getting them to our defense
universities or at Leavenworth or places like that that the
IMET program would bring. That is downstream in our process. We
just aren't there yet.
Mr. Lewis. Well, in connection with that specifically, I
have spent a good deal of time looking at China; and one of the
items that continues to come into my imagination is that we
really need to be thinking about 2025 every bit as much as
1999. Developing economic relations, university relations,
political relations, et cetera, the more of the personalized
kind of exposure we have to young officer corps, it is just
invaluable; and I would hope that we would really be talking
that through.
Admiral Prueher. Mr. Lewis, I couldn't agree more. In the
last year we have come a long way with China, less far with
India. But the meeting with President Jiang Zemin, Chi Hoatian
their defense minister, and coming soon to the United States
will be General Zhang Warnian, who is their senior PLA General,
and a variety of others--Fu Quanyou, who is their chairman
equivalent. We have been working back and forth with them this
last year. In fact, in the travelogue world, I was in China in
December and January.
We are working it really hard. We have agreed at the level
of their most senior leadership that we do need to have these
interactions, and they should not just be amongst us because we
will be gone shortly, and we are pushing it down. There are
several initiatives going on. We are not to the IMET stage yet.
We have the Asia Pacific Center, which is in Honolulu,
where we have invited the Chinese to come. They have not yet
accepted that, but they will.
I would like to take the opportunity to comment about IMET
with Indonesia, which we talked about last year here. The
example I gave with General Mongkon in Thailand--and this may
be a little bit off the track of your interests--but the point
we made with General Mongkon on the fact that he is an IMET
graduate, in Indonesia we have not had an IMET program for the
last 6 years, and we have issues with Indonesia on human rights
and things like that. My view is that this is exactly the wrong
tack to take, to cut them off from exposure to our processes,
as opposed to that we should try to get their leadership into
our processes.
RELATIONS WITH INDIA
Mr. Lewis. Admiral, let's discuss India for a moment. I
know that we don't have a lot of in-depth communication with
their military that we should. I mean, after all, their officer
corps doesn't just speak English, the British were there for
200 years, and there is a lot of potential problems--not just a
Pakistan-India relationship.
Currently, economically, our exchange relative to software
people is incredible. There is not any doubt that there are
several natural avenues, but I wonder if we don't have
preconceived notions that are cutting off avenues of
communications. I think we really need to be developing a good
relationship. Because they are a huge force, and they could be
a dangerous force.
Admiral Prueher. We are. Ambassador Chandra, India's
ambassador to the U.S., was just at our headquarters last week;
and we made a visit to India to try to set this up last year.
They are--after watching what we have been doing with China,
India is now energized a little bit to open up some more,
because they were, you know, a Soviet Cold War partner. So that
is sort of the baggage that we are working with right now.
Mr. Lewis. Probably our baggage as much as theirs.
Admiral Prueher. That is right. Exactly. I have some
anecdotes that I won't take up the Committee's time with, but
we are working that.
And General Reimer is going to India. We will go along
because they are in our Area of Responsibility--AOR. We will
try to get the same type of setup going where we start to work
these interactions. But it has been dormant for a while, and
just in the last year we have been getting it off the ground.
Mr. Lewis. When is General Reimer going?
Admiral Prueher. I believe in the fall or the spring.
Mr. Lewis. Why don't you let me know?
Admiral Prueher. I will. I will get back to you on that.
ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINE MORATORIUM
Mr. Lewis. General Tilelli, you were talking about a couple
of things that captured my imagination when you talked about
the battlefield and remotely placed landmines and legislation
impacting you ability to shape the battlefield and then you
talked about special forces across the line that have
deliverable weapons of mass destruction, all of that raised a
number of concerns.
When that language went forward relative to landmines, was
there not some consultation with people like yourself relative
to these possible impacts?
General Tilelli. Sir, in fiscal year 1996, when that
legislation went forward, it was a fiscal year 1996 Foreign
Operations Appropriation Act. I can't answer who consultation
occurred with. Now, certainly, since then, all of us have been
consulted and collaborated with by both the Department of
Defense and the Chairman and the joint staffs.
Mr. Lewis. Foreign Operations is an Appropriations
subcommittee, and its language or its impact is limited to a
year at a time, I think. Is that language just being renewed
every year?
General Tilelli. This moratorium goes into effect in
February of 1999. So I think for the use of remotely emplaced,
Anti-Personnel Landmines--APL, I think that carried forward.
Mr. Lewis. I wonder if staff would help me examine that.
Normally, our language lasts for a year and doesn't go forward.
I am just curious about it.
General Tilelli. It is a reintroduction on a year-by-year
basis.
ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
Mr. Lewis. On a year-by-year basis in foreign ops. Well
then, we do have to look at that very carefully. You have
authorization language in foreign ops that affects a
battlefield, for God's sakes, and that is a significant item.
We ought to at least examine it.
If I could shift back for a moment, I understand that the
suicides have quadrupled in Thailand in recent months; and it
has been suggested that that is a reflection--people jumping
out of windows, kind of like Wall Street in 1930--that is a
reflection of the economic condition there.
Can you give me a feeling for what kinds of instability
that you see as a direct result of economic crises that could
bring us to the point of having to exercise ourselves in a
confrontational sense in some way?
Admiral Prueher. Well, I was in Thailand last week, in
Bangkok, and I had the opportunity to meet with the Prime
Minister Chuan and the Foreign Minister Surin and then the
General that I mentioned, General Mongkon, who I always see
when I go there. I had not heard the figure about suicides.
In Thailand itself, I think the people there are very
concerned about the city-poor; the poor people in the
countryside will be okay. Their standard of living is modest,
and it is slightly more modest, but they will have food,
clothing and shelter. So the situation in Thailand I think is--
they have hard times ahead, but it is stable.
Now, is the question region-wide?
Mr. Lewis. It really is region-wide. I was thinking earlier
on about the Chinese devaluation potential.
Admiral Prueher. Right. The Chinese have said they will
not devalue, so that is--hopefully, they won't get pressed into
doing that.
The types of security issues that we see there are, with
the economic instability, primarily in South Korea, Indonesia
and Thailand, but the currency or banking crisis has occurred,
and that happened very quickly. Now it is transitioning into a
trade crisis as they try to export their way out of
devaluation. And the growth rates and the optimism that was
there is not there now. So what we have is economic
instability. The worst is in Indonesia.
When I talked earlier about the confluence of military,
economic and political, what we are trying to do is show--and
that was the nature of my trip to Thailand, Singapore and to
Manila--is to show that the U.S. presence, Secretary Cohen's
statement of we are there in good times and bad, is that we are
there to buttress the military security piece so that that does
not exacerbate the economic insecurity.
So this is what we are working on. There are all sorts of
shaping, sizing, scoping, adjusting, timing of things that we
are doing to work with the nations so that they can grapple
with this economic correction, which they need to go through. I
mean, there were a lot of bad loans and overoptimism, a
nonsustainable growth rate.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks.
TWO SIMULTANEOUS MAJOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES
Mr. Dicks. I want to go back to this issue that was raised,
General Tilelli, in your memo that was leaked inside the Air
Force.
In a memo sent this week to the Pentagon, the Commander-in-
Chief of U.S. Forces Korea warned that, with the threatened
action in Iraq and the attendant diversion of forces from Korea
to back it up, his ability to defeat a limited warning attack
by North Korea is at risk. The concerns expressed by General
John Tilelli cast doubt on the Defense Department's ability to
carry out the national military strategy of the last 5 years to
fight and win in two major theaters of war at once.
Do you believe our strategy of swinging high-value assets
between theaters is realistic in scenarios involving little or
no warning?
General Tilelli. I think it is realistic, but it is very
difficult, and at the same time----
Mr. Dicks. How can it be both?
General Tilelli. No, you can swing forces. The issue
becomes--and if you are talking the two MTW scenario, if you
are using or apportioning the same forces, the second MTW is
going to have to wait for those forces to be swung. So the
consequence of that is you elevate the risk, and the risk
elevation may equate to a number of things. It may equate to
the kind of things it takes to be successful in defending, the
amount of terrain that you lose that you are defending if you
are the second MTW, the length of time it takes for you to be
able to go on the offense, and the number of casualties that,
in fact, you will take while awaiting the forces that you
absolutely need to accomplish one or more of the phases of your
campaign plan.
Mr. Murtha. There is one other thing too, if the gentleman
will yield, sustainment is the big problem, sustaining the
forces is the big problem in this whole scenario.
General Tilelli. And there are some high value items such
as PGM, Precision-Guided Munitions, that truly, the second MTW
will not have as many as they might need. So it truly is--you
elevate the risk in a very candid way, in my assessment. What
you are seeing there is not a--not to be flippant, but that
falls in the category, sir, of not believing everything you
read. I never sent a memo to the Chairman that said much of
that. That was a staff assessment from one staff to the other,
which was a very appropriate assessment, by the way. And that
was--and a very appropriate assessment, because it is the staff
responsibility and commander's responsibility to share
assessments.
But the fact is, in my very candid opinion and we have done
this, we have done it in a number of ways, if I am the second
major theater of war, I believe I will win, and I believe I
will achieve the objectives if Korea is the second MTW.
Mr. Dicks. But it will be as lot tougher. You will take a
lot more causalities.
General Tilelli. That is exactly how you mitigate, you
mitigate a lack of resources by the time it takes, the
harshness of the fight, and the number of casualties. And I
mean it would be frivolous of me to say that or for Admiral
Prueher to say that if you take resources from me today that I
require to fight, then it is less risk than it was when I had
those resources. It absolutely increases the risk.
Mr. Dicks. I don't know how this got into the public
domain, but I think it is very useful for the people up here on
Capitol Hill who have the ultimate responsibility under the
Constitution to know that, we are going to swing assets from
one area of the world to another area, and still be as
effective militarily.
Let me go on and read a little bit more of what this says.
Despite these stopgap measures, Tilelli says that during the
first phase of a battle, the denial phase, the absence of
ammunition sustainment ships places our abilities to sustain
defensive forces at very high risk, according to the document.
The combined shortfalls in Patriot, Army tactical missile
systems, Hellfire and TOW missiles and 120 millimeter main gun
tank rounds will severely impact our ability to defend Seoul.
He warns that if our forces are diverted from the Pacific
Theater to support the operation in Iraq, military flexible
deterrent options using in-theater assets will be reduced.
Relying on out-of-theater forces to support the deterrence
posture would entail delays of personnel and equipment,
compromising his position.
And then it goes on to say that the memo, however, is far
from those who are using the Quadrennial Defense Review--QDR
plan of fighting 2 major theaters of warfare, Iraq and North
Korea, in most planning documents is impossible to support
under the defense budgets over the last decade. The military
argues that a primary enabler of the plan is the ability to
swing high value assets like bombers and JSTARS aircraft
between theaters as they are needed. Tilelli's memo points to
the Achilles heel of the plan. It only works when there is
adequate warning of an attack. Because Korea is so far removed
from the majority of U.S. forces in a limited warning scenario,
if assets are not in theater, precious days could be lost in
answering an attack with overwhelming force.
B-2 BOMBER
Now, I think that is very helpful. This gentleman has been
concerned about the adequacy of our bomber force. I happen to
think that bringing assets from outside of the theater, if they
are long-range bombers that can drop these precision-guided
munitions, would be very useful in a no-warning scenario. And
even in the QDR where they did everything they could possible
to say we don't need B-2s, they had to admit that in the early
warning, in a surprise attack or a no-warning attack, the most
effective system you would have would be long-range bombers.
Now, if you don't have all of these other things that are
mentioned in this memo--I mean it certainly seems to me that
having a bomber force that could come from outside of the
theater in support would be of some use, especially if they can
get there in a matter of hours, and especially if you don't
have your aircraft carrier there. Admiral?
Admiral Prueher. May I address it, Congressman Dicks, in
part because my responsibility in this case is to support
General Tilelli and to provide him the assets that he needs to
fight. Not in this case, but period.
Mr. Dicks. You mentioned in your statement we are short in
6 areas, 6 substantive areas.
Admiral Prueher. Right. And there are a couple of things
that bear--General Tilelli, when assets have gone and then
light in the theater, for example, EW aircraft, that is another
scarcity, but the--what he has increased is the Intel
surveillance and the reconnaissance effort so he gets a longer
lead time, so we can have as much lead time as we can get to
move assets into the theater.
The other thing on the logistic sustainment ships is we
have been using----
Mr. Dicks. You know, it is one thing that is so easily
said, Admiral, but remember what happened in the Gulf War. We
had 2 days of operational warning and we really didn't act,
because we didn't think Saddam was going to do it. I mean it is
one thing to have indications; it is another thing to take
decisive steps. Sometimes you can't get the National Command
Authority's attention. In that case they couldn't get the
deputies' group together to have a meeting. So they didn't make
a decision, and all of these things didn't flow. So I mean you
know, it is one thing to say we are going to have indications
and warnings, it is another thing to be able to act on them.
Admiral Prueher. I am trying to work my way around to sort
of supporting your position.
Mr. Dicks. Well, let me give you one more opportunity.
Admiral Prueher. The other issue on sustainment ships that
we talked about, sustainment ships, we are using, we have 14
sustainment ships in the Gulf right now, and they have been
used as a U.S. presence indicator in the Gulf for quite a
while, and some of these are ones that would normally be in our
theater where we have made a conscious decision, though General
Tilelli and I argues against it, but to keep them there because
that was the highest and best use of those ships during this
time period. So that is another part, and they are quite a long
steaming distance from Korea.
Lift is a critical component for us, it is one of those 6
items on our list. Both strategic airlift and sealift are vital
in our area where the distances are so large. The point about
bombers, we have also, in addition to moving the squadron of F-
15s into Korea to partly account for the lack of aircraft
carriers, we have also flown some B-52 missions to targets in
South Korea, and just to exercise that.
So your point about bombers and the condition where we find
ourselves is certainly, it is a valid point. We could use them
in this type of condition.
If I could just finish with one point. The reason we are
where we are right now is, in talking with General Hugh Shelton
and talking with the Secretary of Defense, the situation where
we find ourselves is our assessment is the likelihood of
conflict in Korea is very low right now. The likelihood of
conflict in our area is low. We have kept some assets there,
but it is--we are squirming because we have to look very
carefully right now because we do have so many assets in The
Gulf.
Mr. Dicks. Admiral.
General Tilelli. The other thing I mentioned, sir, and you
know this because you have heard the war plan brief, in a real
sense, the preponderance of the force that fights in Korea
comes from off the peninsula.
Mr. Dicks. Right.
General Tilelli. So the longer it takes for that force to
close, the longer it is going to take me to initially defend
and then go on the offensive against the North, and the
consequence of that will be, or potentially will be, a loss of
some of the key and decisive terrain that we hope to keep, and
certainly more casualties.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS
Mr. Dicks. ------.
[Clerk's note.--The classified discussion was removed.]
Mr. Young. Mr. Hobson.
JOINT SURVEILLANCE TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM (JSTARS)
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, as I sit here, I get awful nervous when you
start talking about B-52s and C-141s, those things. I don't
think we have enough C-17s to do all this stuff. The sealift is
old and a lot of them not there. It is a real--I knew Norm was
going to get around to the B-2 before he got done.
Mr. Dicks. It took me a long time to set it up.
Mr. Hobson. I know, but that is a long-term problem that I
don't see a lot of planning for.
I just have one question I would like to ask you, General.
The National Defense Panel has two formal reports and in
testimony before the Congress has questioned the Quadrennial
Defense Review's reduction in the number of JSTARS and further
stated that 13 JSTARS is not enough. Would you please discuss
the importance of JSTARS to your theater and indicate how many
are needed to support your operation?
General Tilelli. Sir, first, we had the first JSTARS
deployment to Korea in the October-November time frame during
an exercise. One, we learned as much from JSTARS as it learned
from us in the operational tactics, techniques and procedures,
plus the wiring from air to ground. So that was very
successful. We had a second deployment that occurred here
during the winter training cycle and subsequent to that, the
JSTARS has been redeployed. So JSTARS, as a function of the
terrain and the compartmentalization and the heavy movement of
vehicles from north to south, as a battle management platform
and as a platform, that gives me indicators of moving targets
is very important to the Republic of Korea fight.
To quantify the number required for the Republic of Korea
and the single orbit which would give me coverage of about 24
hours a day, I think the number is 5, and I would have to
provide you that for the record, but that is just for my area
of operations, and it is also for my area of operations without
any backup. So in my view JSTARS is one of those elements, and
I briefed Congressman Murtha when he was there, JSTARS is one
of those elements that is critical to my fight if we ever go to
conflict.
Mr. Hobson. Did you want to comment, Admiral?
Admiral Prueher. On the JSTARS issue in the theater?
Mr. Hobson. Yes.
Admiral Prueher. Well, there are a lot of potential areas
that, for example, if things started going awry, well, it could
be anywhere, but say we wanted to look at a variety of things,
it could be forest fires or whatever in Indonesia, JSTARS could
be a type of platform that could work there. We will need I
think at some time over the South China Sea the ability to put
a platform; a surveillance and a management platform there
would be a very handy thing to have. But Korea is the main spot
in our theater.
Mr. Hobson. I guess my point is that I think the 13 number
may not be enough. We may need to look at that, because there
are a lot of things we have to look at, but that may be one and
we need to find out the relative, I guess, priority of that as
we look out.
Admiral Prueher. And there are a number of things going on
now in surveillance. One of the key things that General Tilelli
mentioned about JSTARS is that what it was not originally
intended to do, I don't think, is the battle management aspect
of it. There are other platforms that can look and see the
types of movement that JSTARS can pick up and the battle
management piece is very important. But there are other,
Umanned Aeriel Vehicles--UAVs and things like that that we
might use just for the data collection piece.
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky.
INDIA'S MILITARY
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, in your testimony you indicated that India and the
Indian military is focused inwardly at the current time. From
the Indian government's point of view, from the military's
point of view, what is their role today, the Indian military
role?
Admiral Prueher. They have--India-Pakistan, there is a
steady low-level conflict going on in the Siachen Glacier, one
of the strangest wars in the world, but it continues.
Mr. Visclosky. So they actually are engaged?
Admiral Prueher. They are engaged. Periodically there is a
helicopter that gets shot down from one side or the other, and
there is a level of activity that goes on all the time there on
the Indian-Pakistan border. It is near Jammu and Kashmir.
Primarily the Indian military orients, the Army orients
toward border protection, as does their air force. They are not
thinking about a power projection force. Their Chief of Naval
Operations--CNO, Admiral Bagwat, is trying to build a more
powerful Navy thatwill have the ability to be dominant in the
Indian Ocean, which they probably will do.
They do not work jointly, as we do. The services in India
don't work together at all. Also, in our country, we breathe
India-Pakistan almost always in the same breath. My take and
most people's take from visiting India is they look much more
to the east to China for both the long-term threat and also to
the east, to Southeast Asia, for the long-term economic trade
that they would have.
Mr. Visclosky. Are there occasional hostilities between the
Chinese and the Indians?
Admiral Prueher. There are low-level border disputes and
they have largely not had--they haven't had clashes that I know
of lately, but the border is contested along there in the
mountains.
Mr. Visclosky. Do they serve a domestic political role as
well?
Admiral Prueher. They do. But someone pointed out earlier
that India has gone through 4 weeks of elections and they have
600 million people vote and they have had some demonstrations,
but largely it has been peaceful in India. But they do use
their military for internal security, the Army.
DEFENSE AGAINST CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACKS
Mr. Visclosky. You also had mentioned in your testimony
that in conjunction with U.S. Forces, Korea, the U.S. Pacific
Command has generated a list of near-term fixes to close the
gap in our capability to defend against chemical and biological
attacks.
Is that in your budget request?
Admiral Prueher. There are some in the budget request.
Well, the Services' budget requests, we--that comes via the
services and yes, it is. There is chemical equipment and
antichemical equipment in the budgets, in the service's budget
requests. Our requests were for near-term fixes.
Mr. Visclosky. Are you fully funded for at least the near
term fixes in your request to the Committee, or is there a
shortfall?
Admiral Prueher. I will have to provide the answer on
whether we are fully funded or not. I know some of those things
are fairly simple, like plastic sheeting and stuff like that. I
will have to find out whether we are fully funded. I will get
that answer to you, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay, I am just concerned if we are talking
about near-term fixes and we are not even fully funded to
protect your people in the near term, that certainly I think
causes all of us some concern here.
Admiral Prueher. Well, that has been a steady effort, and I
know U.S. Forces, Korea has gotten the antichemical suits for
our troops and are getting the new ones, but there are some
other odds and ends of things that I will have to find out the
answer for you.
Mr. Visclosky. General, perhaps I should ask you also.
General Tilelli. Sir, from the standpoint of the U.S.
forces, the individual protective gear, we are getting that as
scheduled. We are also activating a chemical decontamination
outfit with 5 companies that will provide us greater
decontamination capability for some of our large facilities.
Some of the--we are also, as we speak, they are starting to
distribute, they begin the Army, some of the new individual
protective gear. On the ROK side, the Republic of Korea side,
as we fight this thing, I have to be concerned with them, and
they have greater problems with their forces in the rear than
their forces that are engaged initially.
Some of the areas that we are working on that require fixes
that we don't quite understand are protection and
decontamination of large areas. For example, our ADOPS and our
seaports. And also, one of the things that we have just done
and are doing and have been funded to do is to field the gear
for the mission essential personnel who work in ports, drive
trucks, and the Korean service corps, who also provide us
logistic support in the rear.
So we have gotten a lot of near-term fixes, some we don't
understand how to fix yet, and some of the collective
protective systems we are still assessing. But there has been
an emphasis. The money that the Department of Defense has
received has been parceled out to the field. I think parceled
out in priority.
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEAN-UP OF U.S. BASES IN JAPAN
Mr. Visclosky. Okay. As far as some of the environmental
cleanup of U.S. bases in Japan, is there a controversy or
outstanding question as to who will pick up the cost, the U.S.
or the Japanese government?
Admiral Prueher. There is not a controversy. On the base
cleanup, there is a legal position where the agreement we
signed, we are not legally bound to pay for base cleanup. As an
environmental steward, we claim to be an environmental example
in the world or try to be an environmental example. This is
under discussion because we need to do a responsible thing, and
we are working with the lawyers on who does provide base
cleanup. I would not describe it as a controversy, but it is a
discussion topic.
Mr. Young. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Visclosky. I am happy to yield.
Mr. Young. Admiral and General, Speaker Gingrich and
Minority Leader Gephardt have asked me to take a substantial
group to Bosnia tomorrow, and in 1 minute I have a meeting with
those folks and some people with the State Department. So I am
going to excuse myself. Mr. Lewis will preside.
But I want to thank you very much for an exceptional
hearing this afternoon and the way you just responded to us
openly and honestly and directly, and we appreciate that very
much. Thank you for yielding, Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In conclusion on that, is that an open question as to how
the cleanup will be made?
Admiral Prueher. That is correct. It is not an open
question legally, from a legal standpoint, but it is one we
want to discuss to make sure we are doing the right thing with
it on the base cleanup.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much.
Admiral Prueher. With respect to chemical defense
requirements I was told we had the information and all the
near-term things are fully funded.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay, good, good.
Admiral Prueher. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay. Thank you.
BURDENSHARING
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Nethercutt, do you have questions?
Mr. Nethercutt. Gentlemen, welcome. I am delighted to have
you here and thank you for your service and for your testimony
here today.
Both of you testified briefly on the Asian crisis and the
economic situation there. My question is whether you feel the
Asian currently problems are going to have an impact on the
burden-sharing obligations of Japan and Korea, and if so, if
our budget request for fiscal year 1999 adequate to meet any
deficiency there might be? What is your assessment of that?
Admiral Prueher. I can take the Japan part, and I think it
would be better if General Tilelli took the Korean part.
In Japan, they are slightly different. In Japan the
services are provided by labor contracts, and it is in yen, so
the real issue is purchasing power. So the devaluation will not
impact our--the host Nation's support for us. There are
pressures on it, but the Japanese have said they will pay it.
The other thing is if the amount they are going to pay is above
the 75 percent level that we look for, but it is a nonproblem.
If you look at the track of dollar value over the last 3 years,
the dollar value of that support has decreased, but the
purchasing power has increased, and we have the same amount of
support that we had before. That part is not a problem in
Japan.
Mr. Nethercutt. You expect no pressure on us as a result of
any of that?
Admiral Prueher. I don't expect pressure on us. In fact,
Secretary Cohen has made the point with them that this is not
just money, this is a strategic issue for us. Now, I don't
think he is talking just strategic with the committees.
Mr. Nethercutt. I understand.
General Tilelli. Sir, from the ROK, Republic of Korea side,
we are in a unique situation. First, Secretary Cohen made the
same comments, that burden-sharing is a strategic issue and it
is an international agreement and promise that the Republic of
Korea must keep. The Minister of National Defense of the
Republic of Korea and the President have stated openly and
publicly that they would keep their promise of purchasing power
associated with the burdensharing agreement for fiscal year
1998.
The unique situation we are in is this is the last year of
the burdensharing agreement, and we go into new negotiations
this year which I think will be tougher, but again, I believe
that the ROK government is keenly aware of how important
burdensharing is not only to the U.S. forces, but to the U.S.
people in general, and will deal in good faith as we look at
fiscal year 1999 and out.
So it is my current view now, in the absence of any facts
for 1999 and out, to say that I think we can at least be
optimistic that we will be at about the same level or a little
bit better in purchasing power, but not--we will not attain the
goals that have been set by the Congress and we will not attain
the goals that have been set by Japan.
We are, I think, number 2 as far as burdensharing in the
Republic of Korea, but number 2 doesn't reach number 1 at this
point.
KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION
Mr. Nethercutt. What about the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization--KEDO? They are going to fund
construction of 2 light water reactors in the north. Will the
Asian currency problem impact that at all?
General Tilelli. Kim da Jung, the President inaugurated
last Thursday, has stated that KEDO is very important and that
the Korean will keep their commitment to KEDO.
Now, the fact is that most of KEDO is paid for in won, so
the devaluation of the won does not have a great impact on
their ability to pay. At the same time, there have been some
initiatives by the Korean government to try to get some
additional help in paying that, but it is really a--and I won't
say long-term issue, it is amid-term issue rather than an
immediate issue, because it is progressive payments rather than
a $5 billion or $5.7 million payment. It is on a continuum
rather than this year, next year or the year after.
So it is my belief that they understand it is in their best
interests that KEDO go forward and that they will do their best
to keep it up the way they said they would.
Admiral Prueher. There are--on KEDO there are a number of
contributors to it, some of which are symbolic amongst the
Southeast Asian nations, but one very substantial contributoris
Singapore, and again we were just there last Sunday, and they intend to
continue with their contributions, so the crisis isn't expected to
unfold.
General Tilelli. If I could just interject, it is also very
important that we continue to send a heavy oil commitment that
we have made for the KEDO environment, so there is no, no seam
that North Korea might exploit.
FOOD SHORTAGES IN NORTH KOREA
Mr. Nethercutt. What about their food shortage problems in
the north? Recent reports say they were running out, they have
a couples of weeks left, I guess. How do you assess that
relative to their military posture as well? What is your sense
of it?
General Tilelli. Let me try to answer that, and I say try
because it is a very opaque society. It is very difficult to
get hard and fast information on whether we are looking at
progressive malnutrition, pockets of starvation, or what
exactly is the circumstances.
We know that the general population is not getting the
amount of food that they have had in the past. We knew when we
assessed last year that sometime in early spring that they
would run out of the food as a function of their poor harvest
last year. We at the same time know that their military is
getting more than their fair share of constrained resources. As
we look at the winter training cycle that is going on right
now, it is a relatively robust winter training cycle. At the
same time, the country or the regime is saying, we will run out
of food in 2 weeks. They have a very active winter training
cycle with lots of forces out in the field.
So we are getting contrary information, to be quite frank.
I would assess that the truth lies somewhere between 2 weeks
and the late spring where they are going to start having food
shortages, but that is truly a wild assessment on my part
rather than based on much fact.
We know that the World Food Program has assessed that they
need far more this year from the humanitarian standpoint than
they needed last year, almost double. I think $378 million
worth this year. And many countries have subscribed to help in
the humanitarian effort.
Admiral Prueher. An interesting point is to contrast the
apparent direness of the food shortage with the most robust
winter training cycle that they have had in 3 years that is
going on as we speak.
Mr. Nethercutt. Is there a redirection of that food aid to
the military?
General Tilelli. That is difficult to track in a real sense
because of the opaqueness of the society, Congressman. As you
look at it, you have different sources of food. One is the
indigenous growth. The second is a food aid that they get from
China that doesn't count against the humanitarian food aid, and
the third tranche, if you will, is the food aid. So to say that
this great--this pocket of rice or corn is going to the
military versus another I think is very, very difficult. But we
do know for a fact that their military is getting a higher
quantity of food in total number of grams per day than is the
civilian population at large.
Mr. Nethercutt. Assuming that it is a 2-week supply, would
the international, humanitarian organizations be able to meet
this expected shortfall?
General Tilelli. I don't know how quickly it could kick in,
to be frank with you, sir.
Mr. Nethercutt. I see.
Admiral Prueher. The International Food Organization has
never failed to answer the bell if they felt it was really
getting that short. I think there is very little thought that
it is actually a 2-week supply.
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you very much, both of you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
FREQUENCY SPECTRUM PROBLEMS
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Nethercutt.
On the point you were just talking about, my staff just
pulled up an item that is very interesting showing that the GDP
of North Korea at $21 billion in a country the size of
Mississippi, and the GDP of South Korea is $647 billion, the
size of Indiana, and yet North Korea spends 23 percent on
defense, the other spends 3.3 percent. That is interesting.
In our briefing book there is a very important, but
sensitive question I would appreciate your responding to.
According to the U.S. Army, there is a conflict between the
frequencies used by Patriot missile systems and those used by
South Korean government and commercial activities. How does
this conflict limit our ability to train or operate the Patriot
system?
General Tilelli. During peacetime we work our way through
it. I think the frequency spectrum issue is a greater issue
than in the Republic of Korea. The issue in the Republic of
Korea is instead of having the bands of frequency associated
with just the civilian or military, it is an integrated band of
civilian and military. So the consequence is that as you
increase the number of civilian requirements and you start
peeling away that band width for civilian requirements like
digital telephones, you start running into conflict.
We have been able to work through the peacetime requirement
in the Republic of Korea. It does become an issueas we look at
band width requirements with a large number of forces flowing and we
are working with the ministry of communications to resolve some of
those wartime issues.
On the other hand, Mr. Chairman, I would say that the
frequency spectrum problem in my view is a problem not only
associated with the Republic of Korea, but we have the same
issues right here in the United States of America as we sell
off band width that was previously sole-use military that is
now sold to commercial enterprises. Admiral Prueher was talking
a little bit about that today.
Admiral Prueher. The overall frequency spectrum issue is
one that as we have had bandwidth that has been exclusively
military, for military use, weapons systems, communications,
things like that. We are seeing now in various nations--and I
think it is occurring in our Congress too--there is, in order
to make money, people are selling off bandwidths, so that now,
for example, an additional exercise cost, if we go to
Australia, they want to charge for bandwidth, to use that part
of the frequency spectrum, or else it is closed because they
have already sold it. This is the issue that occurs in Korea,
but it also occurs worldwide; our military bandwidth just
shrinks and shrinks.
Mr. Lewis. Well what does it do relative to your ability to
operate the Patriot system?
General Tilelli. Well, you are either blocked out or get
interfered with. We have been able to work through the
Armistice issue with the ROK government, so during Armistice
and our Patriots are up every day, it is not a matter that they
are waiting to be up, they are up every day, because we are not
in a peacetime environment, we are in an Armistice environment
where we have to keep our 50 percent Patriots up. They are
operating and they are okay, but it does become a larger issue
when you start to flow forces for conflict.
Mr. Lewis. Admiral, you suggest that being in Australia you
might have a problem in the region and a problem in relation to
the same thing. This is a serious business. Even if there is a
cost factor involved, we ought to know about that, but we sure
can't ignore them.
Admiral Prueher. No, that's right, and it is not just our
theater, this is a worldwide issue.
Mr. Lewis. That's right. You indicated that it was being
discussed earlier. Is it being discussed at the highest level
and are we seeking a solution?
Admiral Prueher. Absolutely, absolutely. Well, our military
solution is don't sell off our bandwidths, but it is a
congressional national group above the military that is
discussing this. I think there are people in Congress working
it.
Mr. Lewis. It is pretty obvious that the people who are
most interested in the questions that swirl around the selling
of bandwidths could care less in terms of their priorities
about some difficulties, and yet this is pretty fundamental. I
would hope that the SECDEF is talking about this with somebody
at the highest level.
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir, he is, he is.
General Tilelli. The other thing, Mr. Chairman, I think we
have to give a little bit of clarity to it. This is not only a
Patriot issue, this is an issue of anything that requires a
frequency spectrum to operate to include all of our
communications. So it is an issue that we have taken up with
the Joint Staff. Both the Chairman and the Secretary are aware
of this one.
Mr. Lewis. Well, I would hope that somebody where those
high level discussions are taking place will keep our staff
informed so that we know when we need to get involved to help.
I would think that maybe the Intelligence community would know
a little bit about this. This is a pretty significant potential
problem.
Admiral Prueher. We will make sure that occurs, sir.
CHINESE-INDIAN RELATIONS
Mr. Lewis. Okay. Thank you.
Earlier we were talking about China and India's military,
and you referred just as an aside to the former India-Soviet
relation.
What are the relations at a military level between China
and India at this point? There is a huge border and a lot of
sensitive territorial considerations, and so forth. I am also
interested in the relationship between India and Russia as
well, but I am more interested in the India-China question.
Admiral Prueher. It is not, it is not a friendly
relationship, but they have a dialogue that goes on, and
basically, it is a counter proliferation issue for us, as we
tend to watch Pakistan and look at the India-Pakistan issue.
China tends to align somewhat with India to stand off in that
regard.
So they don't have a military-to-military relationship;
they have border discussions and they have political
discussions back and forth.
Mr. Lewis. They ought to be communicating in depth with
each other.
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir. One of the things that we have
been working with China on is to tell the senior leadership
that they need to talk to the other nations in the region as
well as us and tell them what they are up to. This is not easy
for them to do. They are not accustomed to doing that. So
everybody wonders, there is uncertainty as to what China is an
when there is uncertainty people think the worst, and the worst
might be true, but it might not too. So they are, in fact,
opening up.
China has had a summit with us, with Japan and with Russia
in a 3-month period. They are trying to stabilize their
borders, and they are traveling around a lot, and if you track
the people that go to Beijing, or are there, there are people
beating down the door, usually commercial ones, but also
increasingly defense ones. Japan and China, which is an
important relationship, Chi Hoatian just went to Japan and now
Natsukawa in Japan is going to go visit the chairman
counterpart, who is Fu Quanyou in China, sorry, but you know,
Hashimoto visited China, that is starting to work, it is
starting to work. They are having a dialogue.
Mr. Lewis. It has been a long time since I have spent any
significant amount of time in India, I have never been to China
personally, but in the mid-1960s there was almost a love fest
going on between India and China at the highest level and
growing warmth of relationship, in spite of obvious problems
and difficulties. Over time, that has changed very
significantly. They are serious competitors in any number of
ways and I can't help but worry about that competitive
circumstance. It would help helpful if the military was
communicating in some depth.
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir.
ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
Mr. Lewis. You started to talk a little bit about Indonesia
and Thailand and the trade war implications of their trying to
trade their way out of economic difficulties. Could you expand
on your perspective?
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir. I will launch into my economist
mode, which is very treacherous.
Mr. Lewis. You are dealing with generals and economists, so
go ahead.
Admiral Prueher. That's right. As I said before, I think
the currency or banking crisis occurred and created a real
vacuum for capital in the East Asian region. It caused the
devaluation, which was worse in Indonesia, Thailand and South
Korea. Their tendency with the devaluation, their only way out
of it is to export cheeper goods, which they are starting to
do. They come on our market, a good deal for our consumers, but
it increases our trade deficit, creates a problem in that
regard.
Our biggest worry right now in the long haul is Indonesia
because there is so much that we don't know. The other part is
Indonesia is a big country, the 4th largest nation in the world
in terms of population. It is a very complex society. It has
over 17,000 islands, 2,500 of them are inhabited, but it is a
hard place to govern. It has a volatile population, ------ and
they also have had a devaluation of the rupiah of about 300
percent, versus the dollar and they have had fires, they have
all sorts of pressures on them for political instability. The
ABRI, the military there has been a force for stability, it is
different than ours. They have what is called Dwi Fungsi, I
think we talked about it last year, but they have a political
function as well, this is a traditional-by-design feature.
The burning question right now with the political
instability with Suharto, and Former Vice President Mondale
just made a trip there to try to look at the economics, but the
succession issue for Suharto is prominent in the region. ----
--. Our burning question is can ABRI, will they and can they
maintain stability like the Thai military was able to do in
Thailand,can they bring that off in Indonesia. I really, I
really don't know the answer to that question, but we are in touch with
General Wiranto, who is the head of their military, a very good man,
but there is a lot we don't know right now.
So Indonesia is a big question mark in our area and the
biggest source of instability. Again, we are working it
economically, and politically. Stape Ray is as capable an
ambassador as the United States has anywhere, so we are working
all of those frames in Indonesia, sir.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you. Mr. Cunningham.
NUCLEAR CARRIERS IN JAPAN
Mr. Cunningham. Joe, I will still meet you at 15,000 feet.
I have a little advantage, in I worked for Admiral Brown on
the 7th fleet staff and was basically responsible for the
defense in TEAM SPIRIT, Cobra Gold, Tanget Flash and the rest,
and what I would like to do is ask some questions to see the
delta between then and now and maybe what some of the
differences are.
I know when we had negotiations with Japan, one of my
interests was that we are going to go to an all nuclear carrier
force,. We have closed our bases in the Philippines and are
trying to work out an agreement with them. Now our closest
place is Guam, which in looking at it in TEAM SPIRIT, it takes
a long time to get forces there. Are we going to have a problem
with Japan in the future with nuclear carriers like we have
them support us there? We had Midway and we had others. But is
that going to be a problem which could affect, you know, the
defense of Korea if it comes up?
Admiral Prueher. We think not. INDEPENDENCE leaves this
summer from Japan and is replaced again by KITTY HAWK. ----
--. There will surely be demonstrations and things like that,
but the government of Japan, at least the LDP, the current
government, thinks it will be a nonproblem.
IMPACT OF FINANCIAL CRISIS ON CONTINGENCIES
Mr. Cunningham. Do you foresee, either one of you, with the
crisis of the devaluation of the dollar in Asia, any support
from our allies if we do get into conflict? We have limited
dollars available, and it is harder to fund our armed forces.
Have any of the countries suggested that they may have a
problem supporting us if something happens in Korea or China or
the other problem areas?
Admiral Prueher. They have not suggested that, but they are
very cash poor right now, and--one, we don't really think we
are at a time in the near future where we are going to get into
a foray in either Korea or China. We hope not, so the subject
hasn't come up too much, and we are tapering back on a number
of exercises and rescoping a bunch of things to accommodate the
fact that they are very cash poor right now. I had mentioned
earlier before you get here in Thailand the situation is such
that they are taking pay cuts and in a variety of things in
their military in order to do their piece of trying to deal
with the economic crisis.
ADEQUACY OF FORCES AND SUPPLIES
Mr. Cunningham. I know Mr. Murtha has expressed concern
with us, and I apologize for being late, I was up on the floor,
and I don't know if the question of Bosnia and Iraq drawing
assets away came up, one of the problems we had even when we
were fully loaded, when you went to other portions of the
world, for example, the number of AMRAAMS needed to meet your
commitments weren't there, the number of SPARROWS, the number
of sorties and the flight time. Is that going to be affected? I
know the Army's tanks, they are only going to redo about a
third of them, and your next issue of a new weapons system
isn't until like 2020, and I can imagine the drawdown that that
would have, especially in Korea in that terrain where there is
so much required.
Do you see a potential hollow force scenario with all of
our commitments ongoing and our equipment problems that we
have, and are we having to cross-deck in the Navy? I know that
the Army is having some problems with retention just like the
other services. Do you see a real problem coming up with that
if we don't change direction a little bit?
Admiral Prueher. I think both of us can comment on that. We
are all very nervous about it. We have talked about the
readiness issue. The idea of enough sustainment ammunition is
one factor, and right now I would say in our theater we are--we
have sent the INDEPENDENCE battle group to the Gulf, so we are
thin, and also the sustainment ships are there. If we get a
sense of higher urgency, we need to start getting some of that
stuff back and start flowing some assets from the continental
U.S. That is sort of the near-term piece. I think we can answer
the near-term bell.
All of us with gray hair have been through the 1970s and
the hollow force part. That is not where we are right now.
However, we also are nervous about the trend lines of our--not
our forward deployed forces, which are fine, but the forces
back home, the follow-on forces or the first-to-flow forces are
having a harder time than they were with parts and supplies,
and we are tracking that and we are concerned about it.
However, the data, in order to make informed expenditures to
correct the problems, the data are hard to come by to say just
exactly where we----
Mr. Cunningham. Do you have enough AMRAAMS and AIM-9s and
these kinds of things?
Admiral Prueher. We have enough in theater. We do.
Mr. Cunningham. If something would break out, and I knowone
of the big problems we had when I worked in coordination, the commander
was always upset at the Navy because he could only have excess sorties,
and if you want to commit naval power in an engagement like that, the
excess sorties are defined as only those sorties not required to defend
the boat. That would be limited if your ammunition is limited.
General Tilelli. We have done far better than that in our
integrated tasking order. We now have sorted out with the fleet
commander a number of sorties that he would absolutely provide
day-by-day. The issue become with the void of not having the
carrier in the Pacific right now, it is just a shortage of
aircraft. About 35-plus aircraft shortage, a function of the
carrier being gone, plus our electronic warfare aircraft, our
EA-6Bs
Mr. Cunningham. Yes, sir. I also understand the problems of
going north of Cheju-do even though we have them there. But the
logistics, once you change the logistics going the other way, I
can't imagine doing a TEAM SPIRIT. It would be a nightmare just
trying to get the bottoms in the holes and the different things
there if we had a conflict elsewhere.
Admiral Prueher. We have gradually, over the last year or
so, because of what has been going on in the Gulf and the
relative tranquility in the Pacific, our command authorities,
we have shifted some sustainability assets and propositioning
ships that have remained in the Gulf and we reevaluate every 6
months whether they should come back or not.
RESERVE COMPONENTS
Mr. Cunningham. General, do we still use--I know when we
were actively working the exercises, we used a lot of the
reserves, and I know that it had been difficult to do those
exercises without the support of those reserves, and in many
cases they have been drawn down as well. What about the
effectiveness, both for exercise and/or real components? And
again, just a reserve component. If we are other places, not
just Bosnia, not just Iraq, but let's just say Iraq goes away
and you have forces in Bosnia, you are still nervous because of
the requirements, I would imagine. But the reserve forces, are
they adequate to supply you with the additional people that you
need?
General Tilelli. Well, certainly the reserve component is
fully integrated into my war fighting campaign plan. So the
consequence of that is that we not only train with them, they
know who they are and when they would come on the flow. During
Armistice time, we have reserve individuals and units taking
part in not only exercises, but also in working on the
peninsula for us of all services. So I think the reserve
component is fully integrated into the Korean scenario, if you
will.
EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL
If I can digress one moment, one of the things that no one
has asked or we haven't talked about, anyway, one of the pieces
about Bosnia and Southwest Asia that is very important to us,
because again, we are dealing with a top line, and that is the
emergency supplemental and the approval of that to pay for the
fiscal year 1998, because as you are dealing with a top line,
if you don't get that supplemental, the money is going to come
out of somewhere and where it is going to come out of are the
forces and the operations and maintenance dollars that we have
which are tight right now. So that is another variable of the
whole issue here that we had discussed, but money is real also
when it comes in the context of as you get closer to the end of
the year, when you cancel a training opportunity or cancel an
event, it is an event missed that denigrates readiness.
Mr. Cunningham. I think that has been universal among all
of the services, the supplemental, and I would say that none of
us want to take it out of defense; I don't think we can take it
out of defense. But if you look at the President's budget, it
doesn't give you much wiggle room to find dollars elsewhere. I
can find dollars elsewhere, I can tell you exactly where I
would take them from, but we might have a problem with a vote
on the floor with that.
F-18E/F AIRCRAFT
The last thing I would like to cover, Mr. Chairman, is the
F-18E/F, with the extended range, I don't even know if you are
still having intercepts exercises or what, but I know the F-
18E/F, and this is kind of a pitch, General, that coming back
on a boat, when you only have one pass at the deck and you are
with pitching decks and minimum visibility and you know that
you go into water, you are going in dressed in a survival suit
and you are probably not going to make it back to the boat, but
it gives you 3,000, 4,000 pounds more fuel, and several looks
at that deck. It is going to mean survival for them, time over
target for what your requirements are. The reason I ask you is
those excess sorties, if you have an airplane that can sit up
there for a longer time, it is just going to enhance it, and
many of us are very supportive of that with the Air Force F-22
with its stealth requirements, and I just think it is a total
package.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Murtha, for whatever closing comments he may have.
Mr. Murtha. Chairman Lewis reminded me of something about
your predecessor, General Tilelli, and I want you to know,
Admiral Prueher, we are glad, we feel comfortable, now that we
have General Tilelli over there.
Admiral Prueher. I had mentioned to General Tilelli my
first hearing with General Luck he brought a shovel in here and
I thought what is this? What is going on with this?
Mr. Young. We have gone through most of the priority
questions. If you gentlemen would assist us with responses for
the record, that would be very helpful. In the meantime, we
appreciate very much you being here. We know you don't just
have a tough schedule, but serious responsibilities. It is
great to be with you. With that, we will adjourn the hearing.
Thank you.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the
answers thereto follow:]
Priorities and Deficiencies
Question. Do you feel the interests and needs of the Pacific
Command have been adequately addressed in the fiscal year 1999 budget
request?
Answer. The President's Budget adequately meets the needs of
Pacific Command. It provides sufficient support of training, exercises,
supplies and other essentials to accomplish our mission. Given the
level of available resources, and barring additional unforeseen
contingency operation costs, the fiscal year 1999 budget strikes an
appropriate balance in spending toward current and future defense
requirements. It also provides an adequate quality of life for most of
our uniformed personnel and their families throughout the Pacific.
Exceptions exist in high cost areas and where facilities have
deteriorated. Increased support will be needed in the future,
especially for real property maintenance and improvement.
Question. What is your assessment of the major shortfalls in:
personnel, training, equipment and maintenance for those units under
your day-to-day command as well as those that would be assigned to you
in a wartime situation?
Answer. U.S. Pacific Command forward deployed forces are ready, but
we do have some concern in each of these areas.
Pacific Command components have some significant personnel
shortages. Pacific Fleet is short 1900 personnel in key technical
ratings, and finds it necessary to ``crossdeck'' sailors in some
specialties to fully man deploying ships. Pacific Air Forces are
experiencing Air Force-wide pilot manning problems. Other components
and sub-unified commands also have shortages in a variety of skills.
Efforts are underway to fill these requirements where possible. For
example, the Department of the Army is undertaking recruiting and
assignment initiatives to eliminate most of the theater's shortage in
infantry.
Training in U.S. Pacific Command is in generally good shape,
especially among forward-based and deployed forces. However, without
supplemental reimbursement for costs incurred in contingency
operations, training will be substantially curtailed during the fourth
quarter of this fiscal year due to lack of funds. Further, Pacific
Fleet has insufficient funds to send desired numbers of sailors to
professional development training courses that improve their abilities
to perform at sea.
Funding shortfalls are also affecting readiness due to parts
shortages and deferred maintenance, especially among aviation units.
Pacific Fleet has had to direct redistribution of many parts from Naval
Air Stations to deployed units. As a result, the readiness of Pacific
Fleet's non-deployed aircraft has declined significantly over the past
two years which has severely constrained flight training and lowered
morale of affected personnel. Similarly, Pacific Air Forces have
consumed substantial percentages of their contingency stocks of spare
parts and have had to cannibalize parts from some aircraft. The present
cannibalization rate for F-16s has approximately doubled from some
aircraft. The present cannibalization rate for F-16s has approximately
doubled from a rate of 6.6% in fiscal year 1995.
Pacific Command components are maintaining high readiness of
forward-based and deployed forces, but at the expense of other units.
The readiness of West Coast naval forces is illustrative. They deploy
at historically normal levels of readiness, but are attaining
proficiency much later in their pre-deployment training than in past
years.
Additional forces that would be assigned to U.S. Pacific Command in
wartime are experiencing similar problems.
Top Priorities
Question. What are the top ten items on your most recent integrated
priority list?
Answer. I intentionally did not rank the 26 items on my most recent
Integrated Priority List (FY00-05 IPL). These items are all critical
and the difference in importance between them was not significant
enough to adopt a rank-ordered list. USCINCPAC's fiscal year 2000-05
Integrated Priority List is provided below: ------.
Changes in Priorities
Question. How do your top ten priorities differ from last year and
why?
Answer. ------.
Priorities and Deficiencies
Question. In your view, are present levels of investment funding
contained in the department's future year defense plan sufficient to
address the long-term recapitalization requirements of today's forces?
Answer. Yes. The President's fiscal year 1999 budget request
includes $48.7 billion for procurement. Procurement is projected to
reach $61.3 billion in fiscal year 2001, achieving the $60 billion goal
previously set by the Clinton Administration. This higher modernization
spending is essential to the future readiness and battlefield
superiority of U.S. forces. The fiscal year 1999 budget begins
implementation of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) plan for
transforming U.S. defense strategy and military forces. The QDR
provides a sound direction for long-term modernization. It also strikes
an appropriate balance between near-term modernization. It also strikes
an appropriate balance between near-term requirements and the need for
improved future capabilities. However, if savings projected in the
President's Budget from the Defense Reform Initiative, including the
reductions in infrastructure, are not achieved, recapitalization and
modernization will require additional funding.
Asian Economic Crisis
Question. We are all well aware of the current economic problems
plaguing the Asian region. Once robust economies remain fragile, the
debt crisis is not solved, currencies are being devalued, stock markets
are performing poorly and liquidity problems are crippling regional
trade. Admiral Prueher, as theater commander of the region that
includes these troubled economies, what difficulties or threats are
posed to the Pacific Command as a result of the current situation? In
your answer please discuss the impact of the crisis on the following:
pending foreign military sales; the ability of Pacific Rim nations to
participate in joint training exercises; and the force modernization
programs of regional allies.
Answer. The immediate threat posed to Pacific Command is that the
current financial crisis could progress into a security crisis. We have
already seen civil disturbances within Indonesia. Relations between
Indonesia and its neighbors are being effectively managed as the region
handles the economic refugees. The economic outlook has improved
slightly. Indonesia remains vulnerable to a resurgence of rioting and
civil disturbances as shortages of food and fuel grip the country. We
are watching this situation closely and are conducting appropriate
planning to protect U.S. interests should a crisis arise.
Over a long term, reduced ability to provide for self-defense and
the potential for regional friction increases the importance of
sustaining U.S. military presence and engagement programs. Our analysis
of the impact of the Asian financial crisis has focused primarily on
the hardest hit countries: Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the
Philippines, and South Korea. The financial crisis has caused each of
the countries to delay or curtail force modernization programs. To
date, Thailand is the only one of these countries to request the
termination of a major foreign military sale program, the purchase of
F/A-18 aircraft. Participation in combined training continues, but at a
somewhat reduced scale. No joint training exercises have been canceled
but we have worked with each nation to tailor bilateral exercises and
exchanges to meet their needs. USCINCPAC is working closely with each
country to ensure we remain engaged and emerge from this crisis with an
even closer relationship.
Question. Do you perceive any linkage between overall levels of
military cooperation in the theater and U.S. support for the IMF
package?
Answer. I do not perceive a direct linkage. Military cooperation is
driven primarily by the realities of financial austerity and not by
negotiations for IMF funding. My recent visits to countries in the
region indicate defense establishments recognize the short-term need
for IMF programs and the importance of structural reforms for long-term
prosperity. Across the board, the militaries recognize the original
source of their economic problems lies in government and financial
institutions and solutions will come from those quarters. This
professional willingness to ``stay in the barracks'' and take the IMF
medicine represents a positive trend in regional political development,
and reinforces investor confidence in Asia's long-term growth
potential. Regional military leaders realize erosion in international
support to the crisis--such as withdrawal of IMF programs--places
regional growth and stability at risk.
Question. What is your perception of ``man in the street''
attitudes in the region with regard to U.S. roles and responsibilities
in the resolution of the crisis?
Answer. The economic success of the Asia-Pacific region in the
1980's and 1990's brought increasing prosperity to the populations of
these countries. Increased prosperity raised expectations, but it did
not always increase understanding of the complicated nature of
financial markets, the global trading system, exchange rates, etc. The
suddenness and severity of the economic downturn in the region caught
the ``man in the street'' by surprise and found him struggling to
understand what was happening to his standard of living and future
prospects. Initially, some blamed Western financial systems and the
U.S. for their difficulties. For the most part, Asian leaders have
acted responsibly to address the financial crisis in their respective
countries. Editorial opinion and public opinion have generally been
less nationalistic than expected. People throughout Asia look to the
U.S. in their nationalistic than expected. People throughout Asia look
to the U.S. in their time of trouble for the leadership and forward
presence that have helped bring peace and stability to the region for
the past 50 years.
North Korean Threat
Question. General Tilelli, what is your current estimate of the
threat posed by North Korea? In your answer please discuss the North
Korea weapons of mass destruction program, the readiness and morale of
forces, the status of conventional arms modernization, and support
provided to international terrorist activities?
Answer. Considering the massive military forces, enormous
quantities of artillery, rocket systems, tanks, Surface to Surface
Missiles (SSMs), chemical weapons, special operations forces, and other
key components of military might, we assess North Korea has built and
maintains the capability to inflict enormous destruction on the South
through large-scale combat operations. However, viewing readiness as
both a state of preparation and ability to conduct full scale joint
operations in a coherent, effective, and sustained fashion, we assess
that North Korean forces are deficient to a degree. This deficiency is
primarily due to the ------. The primary cause of the reduced training
tempo has been a shortage of fuel and other materials and conservation
measures applied throughout the 1990s. ------. Although overwhelming
economic problems are severely limiting the pace of improvements to
readiness, we believe the force remains capable of conducting
unsophisticated corps and below movements, limited operations, and
integrating low levels of air and naval support with ground activity.
The most significant force modernization trend has been the gradual
shift, since the early 1980s, of military combat power toward the
forward area. Of specific concern is the continuing forward deployment
of long-range artillery and multiple rocket launcher (MRL) systems to
underground facilities and hardened sites within 15 kilometers of the
Demilitarized Zone. Operational exploitation forces and front line
corps with supporting artillery are positioned so far forward now that
they could launch an attack with very limited warning. ------. North
Korea has conducted its own terrorist attacks executed by trained
agents of the regime. The most recent incident was the 1987 bombing of
Korean Air Lines Flight 858 in which all 115 on board were killed. The
North formally renounced international terrorism in the early 1990s.
Although the North will continue to provide military weaponry and
associated training to military forces of consumer nations, it does not
directly support international terrorism. Any terrorist activity in
which it engages will likely be carried out by its own agents. At this
time, it would be counter-productive for the North to carry out any
terrorist activity as it would be detrimental to their efforts to
garner international support to help solve their current economic and
food crisis.
In summary despite continuing economic problems and the resultant
negative impact on its military readiness, North Korea still retains an
adequate capability to inflict tremendous damage on the ROK through
large-scale combat operations. Although capable of conducting terrorist
attacks, any reporting linking them to international terrorism would be
contrary to their national goals in gaining international aid.
1994 Agreed Framework on North Korea's Nuclear Program
Question. Update the Committee as to the status of efforts to
implement the terms of the 1994 agreed framework to dismantle North
Korea's nuclear program.
Answer. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK)
graphite-moderate nuclear reactors and related facilities remain
frozen. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has maintained a
continuous presence at the Yongbyon nuclear facility and has continued
with inspection activities related to verifying and monitoring the
freeze in the DPRK according to the terms of the Agreed Framework. The
U.S. and the DPRK are continuing to cooperate in safely storing the
DPRK spent nuclear fuel. Canning of the 8,000 spent fuel rods is nearly
complete. The canned fuel rods have been placed under IAEA seals and
surveillance. Work continues on cleaning, and storing loose rods and
rod fragments from the spent fuel basin.
Groundbreaking for the construction of the Light Water Reactors
(LWRs) took place on 19 August 1997. The Republic of Korea (ROK) is
supplying most of the personnel involved in the initial construction at
the reactor site. The installation in 1997 of mail and phone links
between the LWR site and the ROK represents the first such direct ties
between the North and South since the Korean War. Continued
construction is jeopardized by the failure of the U.S., ROK, and Japan
to reach funding commitments.
Heavy fuel oil (HFO) deliveries remain a persistent challenge, and
it is complicated by the result of lower-than-anticipated contributions
from the international community and higher-than anticipated oil and
shipping costs. Korean peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)
has a $47 million debt. If the debt is not retired soon, it may effect
future funding and/or HFO deliveries.
The LWR project has not reached sufficient progress to trigger the
DPRK's requirement to come into full compliance with its safeguards
agreement with the IAEA. ``When a significant portion of the LWR
project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components,''
the DPRK is to permit the IAEA to verify the accuracy and completeness
of DPRK's initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.
Differences between the two sides remain.
Four Party Talks
Question. What is your assessment of the North Korean willingness
to fully engage in the four-way talks to bring about a permanent
settlement on the peninsula?
Answer. The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) does not
appear willing to engage in the Four Party Talks on terms compatible to
the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK) at this time. The DPRK's
insistence on negotiating U.S. troop withdrawals was expected and
remains an obstacle. The DPRK has also expressed a fundamentally
different view of any eventual peace treaty, insisting on a U.S.-DPRK
treaty which excludes the ROK as a party. The DPRK wants some of the
benefits that the Four Party Talks offer (direct talks with the U.S.
and food aid), but it has been unwilling to take incremental measures
to reduce tension between the opposing military forces. Additionally,
there is no indication that the DPRK is prepared to recognize the ROK's
right to coexist. Whatever progress is achieved, it will be a long-term
and complicated process.
South Korea
Question. The South Koreans have recently elected a new government
headed by former dissident Kim Dae Jung. This represents the first time
that an opposition party in South Korea has assumed leadership through
a civilian to civilian transfer of power. General Tilelli, how do you
characterize the new administrations commitment to the ROK-US alliance?
Answer. On numerous occasions President Kim has publicly stated his
strong commitment to the Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance. Throughout
his career he has consistently supported United States Forces Korea
(USFK), and at graduation ceremonies at service academies this year he
affirmed the need for USFK presence even after unification.
Question. Have you had the opportunity to develop a strong
relationship with President Kim Dae Jung?
Answer. I have met with the President several times. I think we
have a good relationship. I look forward to working with him in the
future.
Question. Do you foresee any change in the military to military
relationship with the South Koreans?
Answer. Change is a normal consequence of any relationship, but the
changes I see ahead are positive and relate to force improvements,
enhanced integrated training, and technological development that will
further strengthen our military partnership.
Chinese Military Power
Question. Admiral Prueher, can you please discuss the power
projection capabilities of China's armed forces. In particular, could
they effectively move against Taiwan or the Spratly Islands if the U.S.
didn't intervene?
Answer. China has limited naval power projection capability and is
incapable of effectively conducting a full-scale amphibious invasion of
Taiwan or supporting a long-term occupation of the Spratly Islands. Its
capability is limited by significant deficiencies in technology,
training, tactics, and personnel throughout all Chinese armed forces,
accentuated by the lack of military air and sea lift capacity.
Operations against Taiwan's lightly defended coastal islands are within
the PLA's capability. These islands along the PRC's coast are
vulnerable to Chinese artillery, short-range ballistic missiles, and
air strikes.
The PRC's predominant power projection capability lies in its
ballistic missile force. These missiles include the CSS-5 (range:
1800km/972nm) and CSS-2 (range: 2800km/1512nm) intermediate-range
missiles, and CSS-6 (range: 600km/324nm) short-range ballistic missile.
China's short-range ballistic missiles are currently assessed to be
targeted solely against Taiwan. Beijing is making quantitative and
qualitative upgrades to its missile force, and is developing new types
of missiles that will improve its targeting capabilities in the region.
Additionally, China's ICBM force of CSS-4 missiles (range: 13,000km/
7,019nm) can strike Alaska, Hawaii, and most of the Continental U.S.
However, its primary nuclear mission is deterrence and retaliation if
attacked.
Question. What is the status of China's modernization program? How
is it being viewed in the region? How does that affect U.S. interests?
Answer. I would like to answer your questions in reverse order. At
the present time we do not see China as a threat to U.S. security
interests nor do we want China to view the United States as a threat.
China shares our mutual interests and concerns for a stable, peaceful
world. Their primary interests at this time are internal...how to feed,
clothe, shelter and provide jobs and energy to 1.3 billion people.
Nonetheless, China is a legitimate nuclear power and has a limited
ability to threaten portions of the United States. However, their
ballistic missiles are primarily a deterrent force as their stated
nuclear policy is ``no first use.'' In the conventional realm, the PRC
does not have the capability to project power much beyond its borders.
Leaders in the region view China through different lens and worry
about their intentions. However, the Chinese are borrowing a chapter
from our book on engagement and have embarked upon a program of high
level diplomatic and military visits, and port calls. The Chinese
leadership is clearly making greater efforts through confidence-
building measures to allay regional concerns.
China's modernization is focused on air and maritime power
projection capabilities and ballistic missile improvements. The Chinese
Air Force has purchased some high performance Su-27/FLANKER
interceptors from Russia and is building more advanced versions of its
indigenous fighters. They are also developing the F-10 fighter (F-16 C/
D equivalent). The Chinese Navy has received three Russian KILO
submarines and is building limited numbers of newer, more capable
surface combatants and submarines. China continues to modernize its
ballistic missile force, focusing on improved accuracy, mobility, and
reliability. China's military modernization program has yet to
adequately address shortfalls in command, control, communications,
intelligence, logistics, maintenance and training.
Many have expressed concerns about capabilities and intentions,
especially as China's forces modernize. We believe it will be 15-20
years before China is capable of projecting power with the ability to
challenge the United States conventionally and that is only if they
make all the right choices and investments.
Question. Has there been any change in the last year in China's
export of weapons? What are they selling and whom are they selling it
to?
Answer. ------.
--Iran took delivery in 1997 of over $310 million in equipment,
including FT-7 trainer aircraft, ballistic missile technology, and air
defense command and control equipment. China pledged to stop selling
anti-ship cruise missiles and production technology to Iran. However,
Chinese companies probably will continue to provide production
technology.
--Burma took delivery of $210 million of equipment in 1997
including fighter aircraft, tanks, armored infantry fighting vehicles
and field artillery. Deliveries continue into 1998.
--Military deliveries to Pakistan fell from $434 million in 1993 to
$60 million in 1997 and included LY-60 naval surface-to-air missiles.
The decline is not a long-term trend as relations remains strong. China
provides assistance to Pakistan's ballistic missile program and both
cooperate on main battle tank and trainer aircraft developments.
Additionally, Islamabad plans on buying a large number of FC-1 fighter
aircraft from China.
--China made a major $186 million sale of a battalion of 155mm
self-propelled artillery to Kuwait in late 1997. Kuwait's purchase was
a reward for Chinese diplomatic acquiescence in Desert Storm and to
elicit backing in the UN on Iraq issues. ------.
Question. Admiral Prueher, in last year's testimony, you referred
to Hong Kong as ``a harbinger of China's ability to integrate into the
global community as a responsible player''. Based on what you have seen
so far, what is your reaction to China's behavior?
Answer. I am encouraged so far by China's adherence to the ``One
Country, Two Systems'' policy enacted to handle the Hong Kong
reversion. While the relationship is still very young, the Beijing and
Hong Kong Special Autonomous Region (SAR) governments seem to have
agreed to a legitimate delineation of powers beneficial to Hong Kong's
special status. As an example, Beijing recently decided to retain the
head of the New China News Agency (NCNA) as the senior representative
of the central government in the SAR, vice posting an official envoy.
This announcement speaks well for Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa and
leaves him as the senior government official in the SAR.
There will surely be growing pains associated with this new
relationship, to include perhaps over-reactions or ultra-conservative
policies issued by the HK and SAR government itself. As Hong Kong and
Beijing become more comfortable working with each other, I expect we
will see less self-imposed restrictions from the SAR legislature.
U.S. Pacific Command's relations with Hong Kong have continued
virtually unabated since the reversion. Seventh Fleet continues to
conduct periodic port calls to the SAR with no Beijing interference.
This past December, USPACOM and U.S. Coast Guard forces joined in the
annual Hong Kong Search and Rescue Exercise. U.S. forces have
participated in this event for the past 26 years. Being a Hong Kong-
hosted event, the People's Liberation Army was also invited to
participate but chose to observe only. This is a demonstration of
Beijing's sincerity in upholding the delineation of responsibilities
agreed to under the ``One Country, Two Systems'' formula.
Chinese Misperceptions
Question. A recent report from the Defense Department's Office of
Net Assessment warns that ``China's leadership holds a number of
dangerous misperceptions that may well cause serious political friction
or even military conflict with the United States.'' Admiral Prueher, do
you agree with the report that China's leadership holds dangerous
misperceptions about the United States?
Answer. Several ``dangerous misperceptions'' noted by the Office of
Net Assessment are well-documented by the Intelligence Community. While
some Chinese military writers portray the United States as militarily
weak, most military officers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) hold
the U.S. defense establishment in high regard.
Some senior Chinese Community Party and military leaders believe
the United States wants to prevent the rise of a more powerful China
and that the world is transitioning to a multipolar one in which the
U.S. would gradually lose its status as the sole superpower. These
concerns have not prevented Beijing from fostering closer political and
defense ties with Washington in pursuit of its strategic agenda. The
Chinese hope that dialogue will reduce the potential for conflict
between the United States and China as Beijing's power and influence
grow.
Another ``misperception'' noted in the report, overestimating U.S.
military weakness, is somewhat overstated. The capabilities
demonstrated by the U.S.-led coalition during Desert Storm demonstrated
to Beijing that its military would be deficient against an adversary
with precision-guided weapons, cruise missiles, and stealth aircraft.
The Persian Gulf War and the Taiwan Straight crisis in 1996 underscored
the need to improve the PLA's ability to win ``local wars under high-
technology conditions'' and provided impetus for ongoing military
modernization program.
Question. A Washington Post article on this story notes that the
Chinese apparently consider you, Admiral Prueher, to be the individual
they prefer to deal with and have allowed you ``unparalleled access to
Chinese defense establishments.'' Is this accurate? If so, who do you
believe the Chinese are more comfortable dealing with you and how has
this improved relationship assisted you in your mission?
Answer. I do not agree with the characterization of my access as
``unparalleled.'' China has extended increased openness and access to
all senior U.S. military leaders as the political atmosphere between
our nations has improved. The Chinese place great importance in
personal relationships. Personal ties among senior military leaders
throughout the theater help to prevent misunderstandings and can be
especially useful in crises. By contrast, during the Taiwan Straits
crisis in March 1996, we have no basis upon which to open discussions
about intentions with Chinese military leaders.
Access to senior Chinese leaders enables USCINCPAC to build trust,
confidence, and transparency in this relationship. Continued dialogue
is important in promoting and advancing U.S. security interests
including: regional security cooperation; arms control and
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction; environmental
security; and a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Our principal
objective is to maintain regional peace and stability. China will play
a major role in this mutual interest.
Question. Do you believe the access you are getting to China's
military is commensurate with the access that we are giving to their
military leadership?
Answer. A major objective of our military-to-military program with
China is to increase their transparency. We see transparency as a key
component of regional stability by increasing trust through awareness.
Transparency is necessary to quell tensions and distrust throughout he
region of China's modernization efforts.
With transparency the goal, there are two ways to structure
military-to-military programs with the People's Liberation Army (PLA)--
using strict reciprocity or rough parity. Strict reciprocity measures
the degree of transparency in terms of what is received versus shown.
Strict reciprocity guarantees a poor outcome. Strict reciprocity is
seen in Beijing as demanding, to which the Chinese leadership cannot
comply and expect to survive the reaction within their party. In many
cases, the Chinese are unable to show similar facilities or
capabilities. Demanding reciprocity builds walls in front of our
ultimate transparency goal.
Rough parity, however, focuses on the effort. Progress is defined
as seeing something new. The trend is the key and U.S. efforts should
be to increase the pace of transparency. My experience indicates the
``rough parity'' approach is more successful in achieving transparency
than ``strict reciprocity.''
Transparency--not reciprocity--is the objective we seek.
Transparency can only be achieved at China's pace. There are many
examples that show proponents of rough parity have seen increased
transparency, as if the PLA seems to base a visitor's access on their
stance. Supporting the rough parity approach in our military-to-
military contacts will foster greater transparency in the future.
Question. What steps do you recommend to reduce the risk of
friction or conflict between the U.S. and China that could occur due to
misperceptions?
Answer. Continuous engagement is key to reducing the likelihood of
conflict. Two nations whose militaries are comfortable with each other
have an inherent mechanism to reduce the potential for misperceptions.
Communication is essential, mutual understanding is the outcome, and
trust is the ultimate goal. I have stressed with every Chinese leader I
have met, military and civilian, the need to establish and maintain our
lines of communication. I have also requested these lines be used not
only for discussing the easy topics on which we already agree, but to
bring up the harder issues where our points of view diverge.
Tlhe U.S.-PRC military relationship is approaching the point at
which disagreements can be aired without concern for the effect on the
overall relationship. This must continue. My December 1997 trip into
China pushed this message with encouraging success. Through a multi-
faceted program of seminars, confidence-building measures and senior-
level discussions, I proposed establishing a framework by which mutual
understanding was effected at all levels. Through our efforts and those
of OSD, the 1998 contact program reaches more of the PLA and deeper
into their ranks than any year previous.
The Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) provides the
formal framework missing in the U.S.-PRC relationship to reduce the
chance of miscalculation when our naval and/or air operations occur in
close proximity. This agreement was signed by Secretary Cohen and
Minister Chi in January and provides for Annual Meetings, Working
Groups and Special Meetings to discuss anything that increases safety
and decreases the risk of an incident between our two forces. Pacific
Command is the designated Executive Agent for implementation of this
agreement. Our first annual meeting is scheduled for July in Beijing.
India's Elections/Military Power
Question. Admiral Prueher, India has just completed Parliamentary
elections that have been marred by violence and are expected to produce
a divided government. Do you have any concerns about this election or
how it might affect India's defense policy or internal stability?
Answer. India elections typically result in sporadic violence,
since appeals to caste, religion, and ethnicity by politicians often
inflame tensions. This year's polling generally was viewed as free and
fair, with less violence than previous elections.
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leads an unwieldy, 13-party
coalition government that will be consumed with maintaining its fragile
majority, a condition which mitigates against it embarking on drastic
policy shifts. BJP campaign rhetoric called for openly declaring
nuclear weapons, strengthening the military, and accelerating ballistic
missile development and deployment. This should not be dismissed
outright as merely electioneering propaganda, but ideological
differences within the BJP, the need to get agreement from coalition
partners, and domestic program priorities make it unlikely we will see
any significant changes in these areas soon.
BJP domestic policies are unlikely to threaten India's internal
stability. In a bid to calm non-Hindu minorities, Prime Minister
Vajpayee has stressed his government will not pursue programs inimical
to India's many diverse communities.
The BJP government wants to establish solid and enduring ties to
the U.S. We look forward to working with the government to promote
continued progress in our bilateral defense relations.
Question. What are the implications of the religious, cultural, and
other divisions within India for its long-term stability?
Answer. India contends with many internal challenges that result
from enduring poverty, the inequities of caste, underdevelopment, poor
access to education, and endemic corruption. Despite such enormous
handicaps, the country manifests a remarkable resilience, best
demonstrated by its unwavering commitment to democracy. More devolution
of power from New Delhi to the states is the current trend. This is a
healthy development and does not suggest India's long-term stability is
threatened. In fact, just the opposite may result as regional and local
authorities gain power to influence decisions. Additionally, support
for continued economic liberalization exists across all major political
parties in India, and these reforms will help alleviate poverty and
improve living standards for all.
India's tolerance of diversity is one of its greatest historical
characteristics. Appeals to religious, cultural, and ethnic sentiments
by politicians, tribal leaders, and caste chieftains can provoke sudden
communal violence, but not lasting anarchy. Flare-ups, while remarkably
violent, usually are localized and short-lived. India's daily level of
violence is simply a result of tension that exists when diverse
communities live in close quarters under conditions of poverty and
scarcity. It does not suggest in any way that the country is
fragmenting.
Indonesia
Question. Are you concerned about the response of The People's
Republic of China--PRC to the prospect of Indonesians rioting against
or otherwise maltreating the ethnic Chinese minority in Indonesia?
Answer. The PRC regards the treatment of Indonesia's ethnic Chinese
citizens as an internal matter for the Indonesian authorities.
Beijing's only comment on the recent unrest has been to express the
view that the rioting against the ethnic Chinese is a temporary
phenomenon. The PRC prefers to be a positive influence. For example,
its recent announcement to provide $3 million in aid to Indonesia was
made without mention of anti-Chinese unrest. The PRC will not comment
further unless there is a significant escalation in the violence, and
Beijing perceives the Indonesian authorities are not responding
adequately to stem the violence. In this event, PRC actions would be
limited to public statements against the violence and/or demarches to
the Indonesian Government.
In contrast, Beijing has publicly expressed concern for the safety
of its 1,000-2,000 PRC citizens in Indonesia and has stated that the
PRC Embassy in Jakarta is prepared to provide assistance to PRC
citizens during the current instability. The need for assistance will
not be great since many PRC citizens have departed Indonesia already.
Should the violence escalate, the number of PRC citizens remaining in
Indonesia will be quite small.
Question. What if any, are the security implications of not
supporting the International Monetary Fund--IMF package proposed for
Indonesia?
Answer. As a non-economist, I am not qualified to judge the merits
of the IMF package in its entirety. However, even with IMF support, the
situation is serious but will become even more dire without support.
Indonesia's economic security is significant to U.S. strategic
interests and to regional stability. Instability in Indonesia can
spread to the larger region.
We are witnessing a growing potential for security problems
resulting from the harshest economic environment Indonesia has faced in
thirty years. These problems include immigration, potential for
expanded piracy, civil unrest and food security.
Immigration of Indonesians to Malaysia and deportations from
Malaysia and Singapore are continuing. Illegal immigrations are
complicating diplomatic and security relations between Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore, and could affect relations with Australia.
Immigration of refugees add to the traditional problem of high seas
piracy, which together increase the cost of commerce and stall economic
recovery. Although civil unrest in Indonesia has been largely confined
to university campuses, it has strong potential to grow. Reports
indicate that labor and Islamic organizations are evaluating ways to
join the students' moreover, unrest has an explosive ethnic factor to
it. Indonesia's ethnic Chinese have historically been a target during
periods of economic duress.
On top of these issues, Indonesia faces a potential major food
shortage. The devaluation of the rupiah increased four-fold the cost of
imported foodstuffs, and the country's worst drought in a century has
stunted annual food production. Recurring food shortages present the
possibility of a major international humanitarian and/or disaster
relief mission sometime in the future. International promises of food
relief have been linked to continued IMF program implementation.
We can not overstate Indonesia's strategic importance to U.S.
interests in the Asia-Pacific, nor the combined impact the above
security problems could have on the region's stability. With the
world's fourth largest population and a location astride Asia's
dominant shipping lanes linking Asia and the Arabian Gulf, events in
Indonesia affect the entire East Asian region. Clearly, Indonesia is an
example of a strategic and pivotal country where political stability,
economic prosperity, and regional security intertwine. Prolonged
economic hardship will have wide ranging security implications.
Question. What have been the effects and implications of U.S.
restrictions on arms transfer to Indonesia? Is the bilateral U.S.-
Indonesian military relationship suffering as a result?
Answer. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and the International Military
Education and Training program (IMET) are major tools the U.S. has in
shaping military-to-military relations with any country's armed forces.
These avenues represent our best opportunity to shape and influence
behavior, doctrine, and interoperability--Indonesia is no exception.
U.S. restrictions on arms transfer and IMET limit our ability to fully
engage and influence the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI). It is in U.S.
interests to have a comprehensive security relationship with Indonesia
without these restrictions.
Restrictions force Indonesia to look elsewhere to modernize its
armed forces and to train its leaders. The F-16 sale is just one
example. Even though Congress authorized Expanded IMET (E-IMET) in
1996, Indonesia refrained from taking advantage of the excellent
opportunity to train in the U.S. On a positive note, the new ABRI
Commander, General Wiranto, is seriously considering using E-IMET this
year because of the value he places on training with the U.S. military.
A stable and friendly Indonesia is strategically important to the
United States. As the dominant country in Southeast Asia, it has
enormous influence within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Within Indonesia, the ABRI is the
most important national institution. Restricting our military-to-
military relationship limits our opportunity to advance our interests
and to promote democratic values among the ABRI.
U.S.-Philippines Military Accord
Question. The Committee understands that the U.S. and the
Philippines have recently concluded an agreement that would allow for
the resumption of joint military exercises. When is the agreement
scheduled to go into effect?
Answer. The Visiting Forces Agreement will go into effect upon
ratification by the Philippine Senate. We expect the Philippine Senate
will consider the agreement during their next legislative session in
July 1998. We are optimistic that they will ratify it. No further
action is required on behalf of the U.S. Government, although some
entry procedures for DoD personnel remain to be clarified with the
Government of the Philippines. Until the agreement goes into effect
only visits/exchange involving twenty or less U.S. personnel will
occur.
Question. What are the legal protections for U.S. troops in the new
agreement?
Answer. The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) covers DoD military and
civilian personnel visiting the Philippines on official business. The
agreement provides substantial legal protections for covered U.S.
personnel. The agreement will ease the entry and exit procedures as
well as tax liability for our personnel on official business.
Furthermore, in the important area of criminal jurisdiction, the
Government of the Philippines agrees to automatically waive their
primary right to criminal jurisdictional upon U.S. request in cases of
particular importance to the Philippine government. The U.S. will
exercise criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed between U.S.
personnel. Equally important, the agreement allows the U.S. military to
determine if an offense was committed during the performance of
official duties, and then exercise jurisdiction over such offenses.
Finally, custody of U.S. personnel resides with the U.S. military upon
our request.
Philippiines Status of Forces Agreement
Question. What type of joint exercises and activities do you
foresee as a result of this agreement?
Answer. Once the Philippine Senate ratifies the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) we plan to resume medium-scale exercises in support of
the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty as well as U.S. Naval port
visits.
The U.S.-Philippine exercise program is designed to reinforce the
treaty by mutual defense cooperation. It consists of bilateral training
and modest field exercises in staff planning, small unit tactics, use
of weapons and special operations. Since 1996 these activities have
been limited to 20 U.S. personnel per event, due to the absence of a
status of forces agreement (SOFA). Following ratification of the VFA we
plan to conduct a schedule of events similar to that conducted prior to
the lapse in SOFA, by expanding existing training events (conducted 3-6
times per year and involving less than 100 U.S. personnel) and resuming
annual BALIKATAN field exercises (involving approximately 400 U.S.
personnel). Additionally, we plan to resume port visits to the
Philippines of up to 30 ships per year.
U.S.-Japan Security Alliance
Question. Can you please update the Committee on the most recent
changes to the `Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation'? In
particular, how does it expand Japan's role in an Asian conflict? How
does the new arrangement effect your operations? What has been the
reaction in the region to this new agreement?
Answer. The September 1997 issuance of the revised ``Guidelines for
U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation'' was designed to re-orient the U.S.-
Japan Security relationship from a Cold War focus to one that allows
both countries to meet the regional and international challenges of the
21st Century. Both countries are in the process of implementing the
Guidelines. For Japan, this involves preparing legislation to change
their laws to allow greater participation in peacekeeping, humanitarian
assistance/disaster relief, and maritime intercept operations. Japan
has also emphasized improving provisions of the existing Acquisition
and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in order to meet the challenges of
both peacetime and contingency operations, particularly in terms of
rear area support to U.S. forces. Finally, the U.S. and Japan have
established a Bilateral Planning Committee, an effort that will allow
for bilateral contingency planning.
Except for provisions regarding the defense of Japan, the
Guidelines are not intended to commit the Japan Self Defense Force
(JSDF) to actual combat in an Asian conflict. What they will do is
allow for critical Japanese support, primarily in rear area support and
in activities adjacent to a combat area. Efforts such as maritime
interdiction, search and rescue, patrolling, and minesweeping will
complement U.S. effort by allowing our forces to focus more on direct
combat operations. These new arrangements, once fully implemented, have
the potential to significantly reduce the operational and logistics
challenges we currently face in the region.
Understandably, there has been some regional concern over
perceptions of a rearmed Japan. We have reassured governments in the
region that the Guidelines are not aimed at any specific country and
are not a guise for Japanese rearmament.
U.S. Marines in Okinawa
Question. The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was
established in 1995 to reduce the burden of the U.S. military presence
on the people of Okinawa. As part of this process, the United States is
to return Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to Japan after Japan
provides a suitable replacement facility that meets U.S. operational
requirements. The replacement is to be a sea-based facility with an
availability date of about 7 to 10 years at a cost of $4 billion.
Admiral, what is the status to the SACO process and what is the
likelihood of the U.S. maintaining its military presence at Okinawa?
Why is a U.S. military presence at Okinawa important? If the U.S. is
forced to leave Okinawa, what are the basing alternatives?
Answer. I am satisfied with the overall progress that has been
accomplished in implementing SACO. In three of the four categories:
SOFA, Training and Operational Procedures, and Noise Reduction
Initiatives, there has been either completion or significant progress.
The fourth category of land return has proved to be the most difficult
with progress in only one of eleven issues. This is primarily due to
the Government of Japan'-GOJ's continuing difficulty in resolving
Futenma's relocation.
There are no plans to change our current military posture on
Okinawa. Along with other forces in the region, the physical presence
of our forces on Okinawa underscores our commitment to the defense of
Japan. Additionally, Okinawa's location and facilities provide our
forward forces a unique power projection capability vital to our
Pacific Military Strategy.
Okinawa's superb strategic location, exceptional facilities, and
the Government of Japan's generous funding support cannot be replicated
elsewhere. Should the strategic situation in the Pacific change, we
will evaluate the strategic environment and make the appropriate
decision at that time, together with our Japanese allies.
Question. What is the status of the sea-based facility? According
to the GAO, maintenance funding responsibility between the U.S. and
Japan for the sea-based facility remains uncertain. Current
arrangements call for Japan to provide bases, while the United States
pays for the maintenance of these facilities. GOA and DoD have
estimated that the annual maintenance costs for the sea-based facility
could be $200 million. In contrast, the average annual maintenance cost
of the MCAS at Futenma is $2.8 million. Have the Japanese offered to
pay the maintenance costs for the sea-based facility?
Answer. U.S.-Japanese negotiations to develop a replacement for
Futenma Air Station are on hold while the Government of Japan-GOJ
continues its effort to obtain the support of the Okinawa prefectural
government for the proposed sea-based facility--SBF. To date, the GOJ
has been unable to convince Okinawa's Governor Ota to reconsider his
opposition to the SBF. We believe there will be little change on this
issue through the summer as Okinawa enters a busy local election period
that culminates with a gubernational election in November.
The estimated maintenance costs associated with the SBF are of
great concern to us. I must point out, though, the facility has not
been designed yet and therefore an accurate estimate of maintenance
costs is speculative at best. In my view, imposing these costs on us
would not meet Japan's commitment to fund replacement of Futenma's
capabilities. DoD has raised this issue with the GOJ, but preliminary
discussions have been inconclusive. However, the GOJ indicated a
willingness to negotiate these costs once they have resolved the larger
issue of the SBF in Okinawa.
Question. If Japan declines to assume the operations and
maintenance costs of the sea-based facility, what are our options?
Answer. First of all I want to emphasize my confidence in our
ability to resolve this issue with the Government of Japan. Our current
position is that the Japanese must assume these costs, as we simply
cannot afford the estimated maintenance costs of this type of facility.
If this issue remains unresolved we may have to exercise our option of
informing the Government of Japan that the proposed sea-based facility
is not acceptable to the U.S., and that we will maintain the status quo
by remaining at Futenma.
Question. Shouldn't an agreement be reached on this issue before
construction of the facility begins?
Answer. Yes. There should be an agreement on responsibility for
maintenance costs in place prior to the beginning of any construction
for this facility.
Foreign Currency Fluctuation and Burdensharing
Question. The Department of Defense recently announced that it
would base Korean burdensharing calculations on outdated foreign
currency exchange rates used during initial formulation of the DOD
budget request; before the recent fall in the value of Pacific Rim
currencies. This change will result in the U.S. foregoing a windfall in
burdensharing of roughly $260 million. Gentlemen, under what authority
has DOD revised its burdensharing calculations with Korea?
Answer. The legal authority to negotiate, conclude, and revise
defense cost-sharing agreements derives from the President's
constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations, and as Commander
in Chief, under Article II of the Constitution, as exercised by the
Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense respectively, and from the
U.S.--Korea Mutual Defense Treaty. In addition, the Congress added in
1993 section 2350j to title 10 of the U.S. Code to authorize the
Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Secretary of State,
to accept cash contributions from any country or regional organization.
This provision relating to ``burdensharing'' authorizes such
contributions to be available to pay costs related to compensation for
Department of Defense (DOD) local national employees, military
construction projects, and DOD supplies and services.
When United States Forces, Korea (USFK) budgeted for fiscal year
1998, it used a fixed ratio that was determined by the Under Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller) of 907.6 won to the dollar to calculate the
dollar value of its won-based expenses. If the Republic of Korea (ROK)
were required to make most of its 1998 cost-sharing contribution in
dollars, as required by the 1995-1998 U.S.-ROK Special Measures
Agreement (SMA), the Defense Department would realize a significant
windfall in paying these won-based expenses because of the dramatic
depreciation of the Korean won. To prevent this windfall, the State and
Defense Departments and the ROK are discussing an adjustment to the SMA
that would require the ROK to satisfy the same amount of DOD won-based
expenses, but in won instead of dollars. Under the amended payment
arrangement, the government of the Republic of Korea will provide a
value, in purchasing power terms, equal to that originally envisioned
in the SMA's provisions for the cost-sharing contribution of the
Government of the Republic of Korea. In this way, the Department of
Defense will neither suffer a financial penalty nor realize a profit
from the Korean economic crisis.
Question. Are there other instances of such a change in policy?
Answer. Revising the 1996 multi-year Special Measures Agreement
(SMA) between the Republic of Korea and the United States was not a
policy-driven process. Last year's Asian financial market crisis took
its toll on the Korean economy. This crisis, which halved the value of
the Korean won relative to the dollar, had major cost-sharing
implications. The Secretary of Defense was determined to find a way to
preserve the value of our agreement while taking into account the
impact of the financial crisis on the value of the won. This cost-
sharing issue has not affected our strong security relationship with
the Republic of Korea, which remains central to the stability of the
Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. The Department is aware of no
other instances of amending cost-sharing arrangements.
Question. Have any U.S. allies offered to make similar currency
related concession during past downturns of the dollar?
Answer. The Department is aware of no other instances whereby U.S.
allies supporting forward-deployed forces (in the Gulf Cooperation
Council, NATO, and East Asia Pacific regions) made adjustments to cost-
sharing arrangement.
In the East Asia Pacific area of responsibility, Japan's cost-
sharing contributions, as outlined in the current Special Measures
Agreement between the United States and Japan, are made in Japanese
yen, not U.S. dollars.
Question. Does the decline in Asian currencies provide the U.S. an
opportunity to repair and upgrade our facilities in Asia at a lower
cost?
Answer. The current won devaluation provides limited savings to the
U.S. taxpayer for the repair and upgrade of facilities in Korea.
Inflation, higher construction bids, and the services' corresponding
funding cuts offset these as shown below:
--A 10% local inflation rate.
--A 40% increase in local fuel costs.
--A 50% increase in the cost of construction materials.
--A volatile fluctuation of the Won has raised the risk of
contractors, resulting in higher bids.
--A reduced base in contractors bidding. (This reduction caused by
the high number of construction contractors who have gone into
receivership).
Cost for renovating a 3-story concrete block building to the DOD
1+1 standard in September 96 was $1.38 million and the Government
estimate for a similar project in FY98 is $1.8 million. On the other
hand, cost of a 2-story metal skin barracks renovation averaged
$504,000 in Fiscal Year 97, but is expected to drop to $450,000 in
fiscal Year 98 despite local inflation.
United States Forces Korea (USFK) does not realize any significant
economic gain as a result of the current Asian economic situation. In
general, USFK maintains the same level of purchasing power for all Won
based contracts, since all disbursements are obligated at the Office of
the Secretary of Defense established budget (exchange) rate. Therefore,
any savings are returned to the Department of Defense Foreign Currency
Fluctuation Account and never realized by USFK.
Question. What are your priorities for repairs and upgrades and how
has the expected cost of those projects changed over the last year?
Answer. Our priorities for repairs and upgrades have not changed.
They are barracks, war fighting operational facilities, and
infrastructure upgrades. Repair and upgrade costs have decreased,
though insignificantly, in some areas of work, while increased in
others. The won devaluation has been offset by increased construction
and fuel costs, and higher construction bids due to risks in the
current contracting environment that creates an uncertain future.
Furthermore, service component funding cuts based on won devaluation
eliminates any real gain in the number of repair and upgrade projects.
Year 2000 Computer Problem
Question. One of the problems that we face as we enter the next
century is older computers that are only programmed to remember the
last two digits in a year. Thus they remember `1997' as simply `97'.
The year 2000, however will be saved as `00', the same as the year
1900. This can lead to calculation errors and systems failures. How
serious is the problem for your Command? What would be the impact if
your Mission Critical Systems were not corrected by the year 2000?
Answer. This issue is receiving urgent attention throughout U.S.
Pacific Command. All components and functional areas are affected. Our
emphasis is not only on information management but also to ensure that
our logistical, medical, base infrastructure and weapons systems are
ready for the transition.
Pacific Command Headquarters has one unique mission critical
command and control system that is affected. Fixes to this system will
be completed by December 98. We also have three other unique systems,
but these are non-mission critical C4 systems. They will be fixed by
March 99.
The services are responsible for fixing and testing the majority of
the theater's affected systems. I established a command-wide working
group to serve as a focal point to coordinate component, service and
Pacific Command efforts.
The impact of not correcting Year 2000 problems is significant, but
cannot be fully determined at this time. The potential ranges from loss
of training value due to confusion in an exercise to temporary
interruptions of command and control that could result in life-
threatening mishaps. We will continue to work aggressively with the
Joint Staff, our components, the services, the Defense Information
Systems Agency and system providers to implement fixes, and to prepare
contingency plans where appropriate.
Question. Do you know of any plans to conduct JCS Exercises next
year with `the clocks turned forward; to identify any uncorrected year
2000 computer problems? Do you believe this would be a valuable test to
see if your critical computer systems will be ready for the year 2000?
Answer. The Joint Staff and the Secretary of Defense's staff are
assessing the feasibility of an integrated exercise to test systems for
these problems sometime in 1999. A broad test would be of value only as
corrective actions near completion. Resources to address the Year 2000
issue are scarce. Individual systems are tested after software fixes
are made. A premature major exercise could divert some of the resources
and effort away from working-in-progress needed to correct Year 2000
problems.
Question. Have you begun developing contingency plans in case your
Mission Critical Systems are ot year 2000 compliant?
Anwer. Yes. In addition to making appropriate fixes to our systems,
we are developing contingency plans for our headquarters' systems.
Pacific Command's components are also preparing contingency plans based
on guidance from their respective services. We are working closely with
the Joint Staff and Defense agencies as they coordinate and integrate
this effort.
Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund (CBTRIF)
Question. With Congressional support the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff established the Combating Terrorism Readiness
Initiative Fund. How much did PACOM receive from this fund in fiscal
year 1997 and what were the funds used for?
Answer. In fiscal year 1997, Pacific Command received $4.82 million
(including $2.49 million for U.S. Forces Korea) from this fund. We used
the funds to reduce the risks of terrorist attack, based on priorities
established following theater-wide vulnerability assessments. Most of
the money was spent to enhance physical security systems in forward
locations.
The largest fiscal year 1997 expenditures were:
Pacific Fleet.................... 625,000 Portable metal detectors
and X-ray scanners for
aircraft carriers
Marine Forces pacific............ 309,000 Metal detectors, sensor
lights, mobile
communications systems,
military working dogs
for III Marine
Expeditionary Force
(MEF)
............................... 120,000 Information security
system for I MEF
U.S. Forces Korea................ 320,000 Perimeter wall of
Yongsan Army Garrison
............................... 55,000 Security monitoring
system for Yongsan Army
Garrison
Headquarters, Pacific Command.... 100,000 Computer and video
training equipment for
headquarters and
component command
Question. How much has PACOM requested from the fund for fiscal
year 1998?
Answer. To date, Pacific Command has requested $6.44 million in
CBTRIF funds for fiscal year 1998 (including $3.56 million for U.S.
Forces Korea). Of the $6.44 million, the Joint Staff has approved $1.77
million, disapproved $75 thousand, and is still considering the
remainder. We are also reviewing additional requests from Pacific
Command component commanders totaling $3.66 million. We are working
closely with the Joint Staff to expedite their consideration.
Approved fiscal year 1998 requests include:
Pacific Fleet.................... $498,500 Construct a barrier wall
and window treatment
for Bachelor Enlisted
Quarters, Atsugi, Japan
............................... 178,000 Vehicle barricade
systems for housing
areas in Combined Fleet
Activity, Sasebo, Japan
............................... 306,000 Vehicle barricade
systems for gates to
Combined Fleet
Activity, Sasebo, Japan
............................... 80,000 Access and egress
control system for HQ,
Commander Naval Forces
Korea
Marine Forces Pacific............ 480,000 Expanded explosive
detector for III Marine
Expeditionary Forces
Force Protection
Question. What are the top ten force protection priorities for
PACOM in fiscal year 1999? Have these items been fully funded in the
services' budget requests? If these items are not fully funded, what
will be the specific impact on your ability to protect the forces under
your command?
Answer. Pacific Command establishes theater force protection
priorities in concert with its components following vulnerability
assessments. Services fund requirements based on availability of funds.
Unfunded requirements represent some risk and are candidates for future
funding. With some particular exceptions, the probability of attack
upon U.S. personnel or facilities is low throughout the Pacific
Theater. The top ten priorities on Pacific Command's fiscal year 1999
Force Protection Integrated Priority List are:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Funding status Funded required
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Manpower for Installation Fully............. $95.30
Security (Pacific Fleet).
2. Antiterrorism Personnel....... Partial........... $2.26 million
$4.04 million
Impact: Commands' development and
implementation of comprehensive
antiterrorism programs will not
progress as rapidly as desired.
Installation security forces are
not to be fully manned
3. Installation Vulnerability Partial........... $297 thousand
Assessments. $391 thousand
Impact: Pacific Command and U.S.
Army Pacific assessment programs
are only partially funded.
Pacific Command's Antiterrorism
Division will be unable to
conduct independent assessments
of Defense Attache and Security
Assistance Offices throughout
the theater as required by DOD
guidance. U.S. Army Pacific will
be unable to assess three of
nine vulnerability assessments
at installations in Japan
4. Antiterrorism/Force Protection Partial........... $274 thousand
Training. $525 thousand
Impact: Antiterrorism programs in
Pacific Command will be
developed and implemented at a
slower pace than planned.
Components may not have
sufficient instructors to
conduct required training. Unit
Force Protection Officers may be
inadequately trained to execute
their responsibilities and
duties
5. Pipeline/Fuel Tank Farm Unfunded.......... $800 thousand
Protection (U.S. Army Pacific).
Impact: This pipeline provides
overland bulk distribution of
petroleum, oils and lubricants
for U.S. forces on Okinawa.
Without the physical security
upgrades to augment Japanese
contract security guards, the
pipeline is at some risk
6. Barriers (Pacific Air Forces). Unfunded.......... $170 thousand
Impact: Degrades ability of
security forces to control
vehicle access to critical areas
and facilities
7. Physical Security improvements Unfunded.......... $780 thousand
(Marine Forces Pacific).
Impact: Camp Butler Okinawa will
be unable to procure equipment
and physical security upgrades.
Equipment includes expanded
explosive detection systems,
metal detectors, portable
concrete barriers and riot gear
8. Electronic Security System Fully............. $1.11 million
(Pacific Fleet).
9. Restricted Area Lighting for Unfunded.......... $840 thousand
Bases (Pacific Air Forces).
Impact: Existing restricted area
and airfield lighting fails to
meet security requirements at
Elemndorf, Kunsan and Misawa
Airbases
10. Physical security upgrades to Unfunded.......... $450 thousand
three Ammunition Storage
facilities in Japan (U.S. Army
Pacific).
Impact: Warfighting supplies are
at greater risk to terrorist
acts
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Joint Exercises
Question. In the Quadrennial Defense Review the Department of
Defense announced plans to reduce the number of man-days required for
joint exercises by 15% in order to reduce high PERSTEMPO rates. Has
PACOM experienced a reduction in its JCS exercises? If so, has this had
a noticeable effect on your PERSTEMPO rates?
Answer. USPACOM has reduced its joint exercise man-days to comply
with the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) mandate. We have reduced man-
days primarily by reducing exercise length and number of participants,
rather than reducing the number of exercises.
Joint exercises account for about five percent of USPACOM
PERSTEMPO, so the reduction is expected to reduce overall theater
PERSTEMPO by only one to two percent.
Question. How do you determine that the right mix of exercises is
being conducted?
Answer. The U.S. Pacific Command Joint Exercise Program is designed
to train U.S., allied and friendly forces in essential skills necessary
to conduct military options ranging from Humanitarian Assistance/
Disaster Relief (HA/DR) to Major Theater War (MTW). Our exercises are
designed to train USPACOM and JTF staffs in conducting joint and
multinational operations, enhance joint interoperability among service
components, and integrate the supporting CINCs and interagency
organizations. Regional engagement and presence, essential elements of
our national and theater engagement strategies, are byproducts of these
exercises.
The Joint Mission Essential Task List provides the full array of
military task where we must be proficient. Each exercise is designed to
accomplish a certain number of training objectives, which are derived
from these tasks. By comparing exercise training objectives with
required tasks, Pacific Command can assess whether its exercise program
is meeting theater training objectives.
The Chairman's Joint Training System also governs the structure of
the exercise program. This requirements-based training ensures mission
requirements are balanced with scarce resources. It forces us to
analyze the tasks, identify the appropriate training audience, and set
the training frequencies.
Question. What portion of the exercises that you conduct is
primarily to train U.S. forces for their wartime mission and what
portion is for regional engagement?
Answer. Pacific Command's Joint Exercise Program consists of 18 to
20 exercises annually. All but two of these exercises are conducted
primarily as training for wartime missions. Where possible, we also
incorporate regional engagement objectives into exercises. For example,
the purpose of annual COBRA GOLD exercises in Thailand is to prepare
Pacific Command's joint forces to fight in a Southeast Asian
environment in support of treaty obligations. This exercise also
promotes interoperability with the military forces of a key treaty
ally. Additionally, when opportunities permit during the exercise, some
U.S. forces conduct small civic and humanitarian projects resulting in
additional training that also directly supports a regional engagement
objectives.
POW/MIAS
Question. The Committee understands that there are currently 2,097
Americans unaccounted for in southeast Asia and that Joint Task Force-
Full Accounting has been working hard to address this issue. Could you
please summarize the results of their work over the last years?
Answer. In Fiscal Year 1997 Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-
FA) conducted 11 joint field activities (JFAs) in Southeast Asia (5 in
both Vietnam and Laos and 1 in Cambodia).
JTF-FA investigated 235 cases (163 Vietnam, 55 in Lass, and 17 in
Cambodia) and excavated 49 sites (34 in Vietnam, 12 in Laos, and 3 in
Cambodia).
These efforts resulted in the repatriation of 31 remains believed
to be those of unaccounted-for Americans. During 1997, the remains of
35 Americans were officially identified. JTF-FA also responded to 484
next-of-kin requests and forwarded 905 reports to next-of-kin via the
Services' casualty affairs offices.
Thus far in 1998, JTF-FA has investigated 66 cases (49 in Vietnam,
13 in Laos, and 4 in Cambodia) and excavated 19 sites (7 in Vietnam, 8
in Laos, and 4 in Cambodia).
Additionally, 21 remains have been repatriated and 9 remains
identified as previously unaccounted-for Americans.
Currently, 2,090 Americans are still unaccounted for.
Question. Has the Vietnam government been cooperative during these
investigations?
Answer. The Vietnamese government has continued to cooperate well
with the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) during these
investigations. The Vietnamese have improved their advance work in
preparation for joint field activities (JFAs), provided better access
to military sensitive areas, and approved the extension of JFAs to
allow teams to complete excavations. The field teams are also receiving
better cooperation at the provincial level. Vietnamese citizens
continue to come forward individually, often providing information
critical to the success of individual investigations and recoveries.
The Vietnamese government continues to support trilateral
investigations as evidence by the 21 Vietnamese witnesses that have
supported investigations in Laos.
Based on a U.S. request, the Vietnamese are focusing their efforts
on conducting more unilateral investigations. During 1997, JTF-FA
adjusted the schedule of JFAs to permit Vietnam and Laos to concentrate
on unilateral investigations. During two specified unilateral periods,
the Vietnamese conducted 56 investigations relating to losses involving
unaccounted-for Americans. During the 50th JFA (21 April--23 May 1998),
the Vietnamese will field one additional team to conduct unilateral
investigations. This is the first time the Vietnamese will have
conducted unilateral investigations concurrently with joint teams
during a major field activity. The unilateral investigations have
resulted in the development of new leads for joint investigations.
Question. Do you have any news from the current investigation going
on now in Vietnam?
Answer. Joint Task Force-Full Accounting's (JTF-FA) 49th joint
field activity (JFA) concluded a series of investigations and remains
recovery operations in Vietnam on 21 March 1998. JTF-FA team,
consisting of 112 U.S. personnel, investigated 49 cases and excavated 7
sites.
On 28-29 March 1998, a joint forensic team examined eleven remains
recovered or received during the 49th JFA, retaining five sets for
further examination at the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory
in Hawaii.
The operation was very successful with investigation and recovery
teams operating throughout the entire country off Vietnam. The
Vietnamese advance work was excellent: key witnesses were made
available, and land compensation issues were resolved prior to the
arrival of the field teams.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
Thursday, March 19, 1998.
TESTIMONY OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND OTHER INTERESTED INDIVIDUALS AND
ORGANIZATIONS
----------
HIGH MOBILITY MULTIPURPOSE WHEELED VEHICLE
WITNESS
HON. TIM ROEMER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order.
This morning, the Committee will hear testimony from
Members of Congress and from witnesses outside of the Congress.
The Committee has basically completed the hearing process for
the fiscal year 1999 period. We have heard from all the service
secretaries and the chiefs of each service. All of the regional
commanders in chiefs have appeared.
Yesterday, we had a hearing on the quality of life from the
perspectives of the Sergeant Majors of the Army and Marine
Corps, the Chief Petty Officer of the Navy and Chief Master
Sergeant of the Air Force.
We also conducted a hearing on readiness yesterday with the
vice chiefs of each service and the assistant commandant of the
Marine Corps, and now we are going to hear from Members of
Congress who do not serve on this subcommittee and those of you
who represent organizations and institutions who support our
men and women in uniform.
Many of you here today have testified before, but for those
who are here for the first time, let me explain how we proceed.
Each of your prepared statements will appear totally in the
published hearing volume, and we ask that you summarize your
testimony in 5 minutes or less, inasmuch as we have over 40
witnesses scheduled to appear today.
That may seem like a short period of time, but it is
consistent with the 5-minute rule the Committee works under.
Throughout the year, through all of our hearings, each Member
of this Committee has to express his thoughts and ask questions
in 5-minute intervals or less. Many members will be coming in
and out today because they are working in other subcommittees
on the supplemental appropriations bill. So while they are not
here at the moment, you will see most of them sometime during
the hearing.
Before we get started, I just wanted to relate some
personal experiences we had during the last year visiting our
troops in the field. Some of us have been to Bosnia as many as
three times in the last 6 months, traveled throughout Southwest
Asia, visiting our troops in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait,
checking on force protection measures that have been put into
place since the Khobar Towers bombing. Mr. Murtha has led a
group to Korea.
So between the two of us and all of our members, we have
covered most of the major hot spots in the world, and we have
gotten to see firsthand what we have been told about in this
room.
What we find are well-trained, highly motivated, dedicated
men and women who are proud of their Country and who welcome
the opportunity to make a contribution to our national
security.
I bring this up only because many of you in this room have
devoted a great deal of time and effort to making sure our
troops have what they need in the way of equipment, training,
to make sure their quality of life is what it should be and to
ensure that their families are taken care of during the time
they are deployed so far away from home.
Things aren't perfect yet, but we are not done yet. So
together all of us and each of the Members of this Committee
will continue to work to do the best we can for these
outstanding men and women who go in harm's way for our Country.
Now I would like to recognize a very distinguished Member
of Congress, Mr. Tim Roemer, from Indiana, who stays in close
touch with the Chairman and the Members of this Committee on
issues of vital concern to our national security effort.
Congressman Roemer, we are happy to recognize you, sir.
Statement of Congressman Roemer
Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I want to ask
unanimous consent for my entire statement to be entered into
the record.
Mr. Young. Without objection, that will be done.
Mr. Roemer. I just want to speak from the heart to you for
a couple of minutes and then answer any questions you might
have.
First of all, on behalf of the 558,000 people that I
represent and roughly 1,260 workers that work in the three
plants making the two-and-a-half-ton truck, the HMMWV and the
Sea Snake Supersonic Missile, we want to express our thanks to
you and the Committee for your help in bolstering our defense
efforts in this country and improving the quality of life for
our military personnel and in maintaining good, high-paying
jobs for people in this country.
If not for your help and your dedication, Mr. Chairman, and
the people on this Committee, we might be in some trouble back
home in Indiana.
I am here to talk to you about three different programs and
thank you for your help and continue to seek out your support,
three important programs for the national security of this
country.
First of all, you mentioned that many members here on this
Committee have traveled to Bosnia. You probably saw the HMMWV,
which is made in Mishawaka, Indiana, over there.
Last year, three soldiers in Bosnia walked away unharmed,
unhurt after their HMMWV ran over a 14-pound antitank land
mine. Now, that was an uparmored HMMWV. It is working
beautifully. There are no complaints from the Army. The Army
continually comes before Congress and does not ask for enough
money to fund this program, even though it is working
beautifully.
We have to come before your Committee and ask for a plus-
up, which we are asking again today, based upon the performance
of the HMMWV, the safety of the HMMWV and the need and the
requirement of the HMMWV throughout the world for the safety of
our troops, as evidenced from that latest example in Bosnia.
Secondly, when we talk about not only performance of the
HMMWV but efficiency, we make and remanufacture a two-and-a-
half-ton truck back in South Bend, Indiana. The two-and-a-half-
ton truck actually remanufactures 20-year-old trucks.
There is nothing sexy about this program, Mr. Chairman. I
wish I was in here to talk about an F-22 or something that I
had a big diagram of. These trucks keep our men and women safe.
They deliver personnel and supplies to our troops in the field.
We saved operations and support--O&S $500 million
remanufacturing these trucks; and I know you are looking for
savings in this tight budget as well, too.
This is a very, very effective and efficient program,
making something that our troops need, and I would ask your
support on that program.
Thirdly, I ask your support for a program that has worked
well in the past. Allied Signal is the only U.S. supplier of
supersonic sea skimming targets. Interestingly enough, we are
competing with the Navy, with Russian-made missiles.
Now, I have had brief conversations and long conversations
with you about this before, but for us to have competition with
Russian-made missiles when the Russians could be making the MA-
31, selling it to Iraq or Iran or in the Middle East or to
North Korea, we subsidize then the Russians making those
missiles that go to other unfriendly countries that may be
aimed at our personnel. That is one concern I have.
Secondly, if Allied Signal doesn't stay in this business
and we lose our industrial base and we don't have a U.S.
supplier in this field, that is a big concern.
Thirdly, Mr. Chairman, I know you are very, very sensitive
to this, we have 150 U.S. taxpayers that have made this missile
that are very, very dedicated to the safety and the security of
this Country. I don't think 150 people should be thrown out of
jobs when I know the Russian Duma, if they had their votes,
they would vote, I am sure, within Russia, to buy the MA-31 and
not to buy our Sea Snake or Vandal Missile. I think we should
do the same thing here; employ our people to get a good system.
If we want to reverse gear and get access to the MA-31 for
reasons of knowing what might be coming at us, I certainly
understand putting some money forward on that concern; but not
to put out a U.S. supplier and not to hurt our industrial base.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I say to you, in all due respect, I
want to help you make sure that not only these kinds of
programs are supported within the budget but the quality of
life for our personnel is supported within this budget; that
our personnel have good quality child care; that our personnel
live in good quality housing; and that our personnel in the
military forces not be forced to be on food stamps. And if that
takes bipartisan efforts to get you a little bit more money, I
am supportive of that and would look forward to working with
you on that.
Mr. Young. Congressman, thank you very much.
As you know, the Committee has--thanks to much of your
persuasive effort and the work of Mr. Hobson, who we appointed
as a special subcommittee of the subcommittee to deal with the
truck issues, we have raised the budget request substantially
in the last couple of years for the remanufacturing and the
purchase of the new vehicles. We recognize, and most of our
witnesses that have been here this year have told us, without
question, they need trucks. They need their trucks repaired;
and, without the trucks, they can't function.
So we appreciate your support and thank you very much for
being here.
Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. As you and I have discussed many times, we don't
have the extra money in our budget this year that we have had
in previous years. We are working on that. We are attempting to
get leadership and the membership to give us a little more
realistic budget number, so we will count on your help for
that.
Mr. Roemer. Well, Mr. Chairman, I just want to say my
personal thanks to Mr. Hobson, who has been such a champion on
the HMMWV and the two-and-a-half-ton truck as well, too, as
other Members of this Committee have been.
I heard Mr. Cunningham on the radio this morning on the C-
SPAN radio program talking about his strong fighting for
adequate defense dollars; and if we can get that money for
roads and bridges in this country for better security
internally, certainly we can fight for our troops overseas.
I thank you again for all your help on these programs.
Mr. Young. Thank you for being here this morning, Tim.
Mr. Roemer. Thank you.
[The statement of Congressman Roemer follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Thursday, March 19, 1998.
DYSTROPHIC EPIDERMOLYSIS BULLOSA RESEARCH ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
WITNESSES
MIRIAM FEDER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DYSTROPHIC EPIDER-MOLYSIS BULLOSA
RESEARCH ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
MARY BETH SHERIDAN, PARENT
Introduction
Mr. Young. Next I would like to recognize Miriam Feder,
Executive Director of the Dystrophic Epidermolysis Bullosa
Research Association; and Mary Beth Sheridan and her husband,
who are parents of a child with this disease; and would like to
welcome you now. Your entire statements will be placed in the
record, and we would ask that you would summarize them this
morning.
Thank you for being here.
Incidentally, Mrs. Sheridan and her husband and daughter
are from the Tampa Bay area, which I have the privilege of
representing; and we are happy to have you all here.
Statement of Mrs. Sheridan
Mrs. Sheridan. Thank you for having us here.
Mr. Chairman and the Members of the Subcommittee, thank you
for inviting me to appear before your committee. My name is
Mary Beth Sheridan. I live in Tampa, Florida; and my little
angel is Samantha.
My pregnancy was the most wonderful experience in my life.
I loved being pregnant. Going through the delivery was
frightening, as I am sure it is for all new moms. When the
doctor pulled my baby from my womb, she had no skin on her left
hand. As the nurses and doctors touched and looked, huge
blisters formed all over my child before their eyes. I
recognized fear in their eyes and I was awake, as I was awake
for the delivery.
I will never forget the terror I felt when I realized that
these professionals did not know what was happening to my baby.
After a painful and emotional 6 weeks of waiting, worrying
and suffering, my husband and I discovered that our beautiful
baby was born with a dreadful genetic disorder called
Epidermolysis Bullosa, otherwise known as EB.
At a national EB registry in Chapel Hill, Samantha was
diagnosed with Recessive Dystrophc EB. We were somewhat
relieved, because the first diagnosis was the lethal form of
Junctional EB.
The pain and suffering that our baby endured we could not
believe possible. We could not conceive just how hard everyday
life would be for our beautiful daughter, Samantha. We learned
that the genetic disorder that Samantha was born with was
excruciatingly painful. The slightest touch to her skin causes
painful blisters to form which have to be burst and drained to
prevent infection. Often the skin heals slowly, and she has
open wounds to deal with. She lost her fingernails and toenails
at about 3 months of age.
Her body is wounded and blistered from head to toe. She
couldn't even wear the softest of clothes until she was 5
months old. Some days she can't eat because her mouth and her
throat are so full of blisters her throat is so narrow that she
can't even swallow milk. Managing her diet is very challenging,
because proper nutrition is important for her immune system in
order to fight off constant infection, which is so common for
these children.
As an infant, we can only lift our baby by the buttocks
with a sheepskin cushioning her underneath. Can you imagine
what it is like not to be able to cuddle or to hold to your
breast your own child or grandchild? We will always have to be
careful because our touch can cause severe blistering or even
denude our child's skin.
Now Samantha is three, and there are days she can't walk
because her little feet are so badly blistered that we have to
carefully carry her. She isn't able to run and play with the
other children, and it is hard for a 3-year-old to understand
her limitations. She wants so desperately to be like the other
children.
The painful burning and itching from healing and the
blistering is unbearable for our little girl. Her skin itches
so badly that she just tears it off sometimes. There seems to
be no relief from medication or creams. We have to bathe and
bandage her every day, which sometimes takes 2 to 4 hours. This
is also a painful procedure as the water burns her open wounds
and the bandages stick to her skin.
There are so many aspects of this horrific disease that it
can only be described as just sad; and, as a mother, I just
want somebody to find a cure. There are many terrible nights
that Samantha doesn't sleep but cries in pain. And, for me, my
greatest challenge is just getting through the day.
Samantha is beautiful, bright and adds joy to our life with
her sense of humor, her courage and her spirit. And I know God
has given her these gifts, and we appreciate them.
If only one child on this earth was affected by this
disease, EB, in my opinion, it would be too many. The reality
is that over 100,000 Americans suffer from EB, and there are
too many children who endure the suffering as my child does.
I ask you for your support of EB research, to help all the
children suffering today so they can reach their potential as
healthy, productive Americans.
Thank you so much for having us today.
Mr. Young. Mrs. Sheridan, thank you very much for being
here.
As you know, this disease causes wounds similar to the
wounds caused by certain types of chemicals, and so we have
funded a modest program through the Department of Defense to
study the causes and to see if we can help find a cure for this
disease or prevention for the disease.
We appreciate your being here. We understand the suffering
that all of you go through, and especially Samantha; and we
just pray for the day that we can find a way to stop this
terrible disease.
Mrs. Sheridan. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much for being here today.
Mrs. Sheridan. Thank you.
[The statement of Mrs. Sheridan follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. Now, Ms. Feder, were you going to make a
statement?
Statement of Ms. Feder
Ms. Feder. Yes, I will summarize.
I am the Executive Director of DebRA, and I want the
Committee and Mr. Chairman to know the appreciation for this
opportunity to appear before the House Appropriations
Subcommittee on National Security and ask for your continued
support for the DOD research initiative in EB.
As you know, over 100,000 Americans and their families are
very grateful that in fiscal year 1998 the DOD Appropriations
Act included $1 million for the study of wound treatment using
EB as a model.
As you know, EB is a group of skin diseases characterized
by fragility and easy blistering of the skin and other
epithelia including the eyes and the airways. The blisters
often lead to infection and cause premature death. In its most
severe form, the blisters lead to chronic, unremitting wound
healing which results in extensive scarring of the affected
area.
Extraordinary answers have recently been made in our
knowledge of the structure and function of the skin, and EB has
been the centerpiece of skin disease research and appears to be
the most appropriate for gene therapy. We are looking forward
to trial within the next 5 years.
How could EB research benefit the Army? Well, the wounds
caused by EB closely resemble the wounds caused by chemical
weapons, chemical vesicants. EB represents the natural model to
study the cause and consequences of blistering caused by
vesicants, trauma and other conditions relevant to military
medicine.
Dr. Robert Burgeson of Harvard was awarded a $625,000 grant
by the Army, and he is presently investigating enhanced models
for skin regeneration and wound healing. Dr. Burgeson's work
shows great promise for EB and for the treatment of blistering
caused by exposure to chemical weapons.
In normal skin, the basement membranes are composed of
independent but associated networks of type IV collagen and
laminins. Laminin 5 is essential to basement membrane stability
and the key bridging molecule that bonds the necessary
components of the skin. In EB, type IV collagens and laminins,
including subunits of laminin 5, are mutated; and the basement
membrane changes in the skin in sulfur mustard-induced
vesication mimics those of the Junctional form of EB.
Sulfur mustard gas causes denuding of the skin and slows
wound healing. In addition to being toxic to the most common
cell in the skin, sulfur mustard causes separation of the
epithelium from the underlying basement membrane zone, from the
underneath part of the skin to the most important part of the
functioning part of our skin. The phenotype observed is
strikingly similar to that observed in patients with specific
forms of EB.
The ability of sulfur mustard to crosslink these laminins
has already been documented. Many scientific aspects still have
to be investigated, but the studies clearly indicate that the
basement membrane molecules can be alkylated by sulfur mustard.
Alkylation means that the proteins in these cells are actually
changed to misfire, not to function with the sulfur mustard.
Dr. Burgeson and his colleagues are conducting studies on
mice with laminin 5 genetically enhanced grafts on wound
surfaces. The animal studies strongly suggest a potential of
benefit of laminin 5 when applied to extensively burned
patients. In collaboration with Japanese scientists, an amount
of laminin 5 was made available for human tests. In the cases
tried so far, the pretreated, the genetically treated grafts,
showed favorable results.
We believe that the DOD's research initiative in EB will
foster a better understanding of wound healing, the impact of
vesicants on the skin, eyes and airways and on the behavior of
healthy skin. EB serves as a natural model for skin
regeneration.
An additional $1 million in DOD-sponsored EB research could
be used to provide answers to the following problems: improving
our understanding of the molecular genetics of blistering;
increasing our knowledge of the role of collagen in blistering;
developing more successful treatments, such as gene therapy;
and perfecting the novel technologies for gene delivery, and
this is what we really have to be working on, which will affect
all gene delivery systems.
Once again, thank you for this opportunity to speak today;
and we hope that you share in our optimism about this important
initiative and urge your continuing funding in fiscal year
1999. Thank you.
Mr. Young. I want to thank both of you for being here
today. The Committee will do the very best it can with the
limited resources; and I would say, again, that our budget
numbers do not give us much room for adding any money over the
President's budget this year. But we will do the very best we
can. We understand the problems and thank you both for being
here.
Mrs. Sheridan. Thank you.
Ms. Feder. Thank you.
[The statement of Ms. Feder follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Thursday, March 19, 1998.
ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
WITNESSES
HON. LOUISE SLAUGHTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF
NEW YORK
NATHAN ROBFOGEL, VICE PRESIDENT FOR UNIVERSITY RELATIONS, ROCHESTER
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
NABIL NASR, PROFESSOR OF ENGINEERING, ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY; DIRECTOR, NATIONAL CENTER FOR REMANUFACTURING AND
RESOURCE RECOVERY
Introduction
Mr. Young. Next I would like to introduce a very
distinguished member of the Rules Committee, Congresswoman
Louise Slaughter of New York. She is here to introduce our next
witness.
Louise, we are very, very happy to have you here this
morning. Usually, I am sitting at the table talking to you at
the Rules Committee. Now we are happy to have you here at our
Committee.
Statement of Congresswoman Slaughter
Mrs. Slaughter. Well, I certainly appreciate your letting
me come this morning; and Mr. Skeen and Mr. Hobson, Mr.
Cunningham, it is a pleasure to be here with you this morning.
You may or may not remember, but last year we came here
with a proposal to try to do something about remanufacturing;
and you were very gracious and did give us $2 million for that
project. We promised you that, if you did, we would be good
stewards of it; and we are here to tell you this morning that
we have been. So I am very pleased, but I thank you most
profoundly for taking that chance on us last year and including
us in the budget.
I would like to introduce this morning Mr. Nathan Robfogel
and Dr. Nabil Nasr, who is the head of the National Center for
Remanufacturing and Resource Recovery.
Mr. Robfogel is the Vice President for University Relations
at the Rochester Institute of Technology; and Mr. Robfogel will
describe for you in a moment the commitment that RIT is making
in this particular field and the outlines of the cooperative
research program with the Office of Naval Research, which is
going really well.
Dr. Nasr and his fellow research scientists at RIT have
been in close contact with officials of the Office of Naval
Research since the enactment of last year's appropriations
bill. They are making great progress in developing research
that will benefit the Department of Defense.
Dr. Nasr is the leading scientist in the field of
remanufacturing in the Nation and can answer any detailed
questions the subcommittee might have about the research
program.
I was particularly encouraged to learn that the Office of
Naval Research has indicated that it is planning to introduce
RIT to the manufacturing technology officials in each of the
military services. There appears to be strong recognition
within the Department of Defense that learning how to better
apply the process of remanufacturing to defense systems is
critical under our present budgetary conditions; and we are
very much aware of that, Mr. Chairman.
We often hear the Members of the Congress and the Pentagon
talking about the affordability of new systems. RIT is prepared
to help the military services to better maintain and advance
the systems that they already have and can't afford to replace
with an expensive new system.
RIT wants to continue its cooperative research program
through the Office of Naval Research in fiscal year 1999 in the
amount of $2 million, and I am hopeful that the subcommittee
will look favorably on this request and include this amount in
the fiscal year 1999 National Security Appropriations bill.
Thank you most kindly, Mr. Chairman; and may I introduce
Mr. Robfogel?
Mr. Young. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Congresswoman Slaughter follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
1Mr. Young. We want to welcome all of you here and state
that the statements, your entire statements, will be placed in
the record; and we would ask that you condense and summarize
them to about 5 minutes or less if you can. We have a very long
list of witnesses today.
Statement of Mr. Robfogel
Mr. Robfogel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am Nathan Robfogel, Vice President for University
Relations at RIT. I am here today with Dr. Nasr, who is a
Professor of Engineering at the University and who is the
Director of our National Center for Remanufacturing and
Resource Recovery.
Mr. Chairman, before I begin, I would first like to thank
Congresswoman Slaughter for her introduction and her strong
support of RIT; in particular, our manufacturing technology and
our remanufacturing research program. She has been a great
champion for all of our efforts and the efforts to help U.S.
manufacturers.
I would also like to join Congresswoman Slaughter in
thanking you and the subcommittee for your inclusion of $2
million in last year's National Security Appropriations bill
for our cooperative remanufacturing research program with the
Office of Naval Research.
Mr. Chairman, understanding the extreme time constraints
that you are under, I would like to just summarize our
testimony and refer you and the subcommittee to our formal
written testimony for further details.
First, as Congresswoman Slaughter has said, RIT is fully
committed as a University in helping our Nation's manufacturing
industry compete in a global marketplace. We have built a
157,000 square foot state-of-the-art manufacturing research and
education facility, and that is the only one of its kind in our
Nation. Our engineering, imaging and other colleges work
collaboratively with industry to solve manufacturing problems
with this facility.
Several years ago, RIT researchers, led by my colleague,
Dr. Nasr, began looking into methods and practices of
remanufacturing--the process of taking a used product,
disassembling it, refurbishing its parts and remanufacturing it
into like-new condition.
Recently, RIT has become the national leader in
remanufacturing research and education. We have established,
under Dr. Nasr's leadership, the National Center for
Remanufacturing and Resource Recovery and are currently working
with the Argonne National Laboratory and the Department of
Energy, the Office of Naval Research, Environmental Protection
Agency, and a number of major U.S. manufacturing companies such
as Kodak, Xerox and Detroit Diesel.
Our work with Detroit Diesel, which remanufactures engines
for the Marine Corps Light Armored Vehicle, make it clear to
this old Marine and to the rest of us that the military and its
defense contractors would benefit greatly from a comprehensive
applied research program in manufacturing.
Mr. Chairman, the Department of Defense is, in fact, the
world's largest remanufacturer. Some examples of the weapons
systems currently remanufactured--and I will just list a few:
the B-52 Bomber, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Marine Corps
Light Armored Vehicle, the AV-8B Attack Aircraft, the SH-60F
ASW and the Phalanx Close-in Weapons System.
Why is the remanufacturing of these systems so important to
the Pentagon? For the following reasons, Mr. Chairman:
First, remanufacturing saves significant costs involved in
design and production of new systems.
Secondly, remanufacturing allows the insertion of new
technology faster and more efficiently than new systems.
Remanufacturing does not require the same amount of
resources needed for manufacturing of new systems, thereby
resulting in significant cost savings.
And, finally, remanufacturing of existing systems can be
done much closer or in some cases at point of use, thereby
resulting in significant cost savings.
Mr. Chairman, ONR is very interested in what we have to
offer to the Navy manufacturing technology program and, in
fact, has indicated that they want to introduce our program to
the other military services.
Mr. Chairman, our research project with ONR funded in last
year's bill will focus on enhancing the Navy's ability to
transfer remanufacturing know-how and technologies within and
outside of its facilities to fully exploit the benefits of
remanufacturing.
In year two of the project, which will utilize fiscal year
1999 dollars we are requesting today, the RIT project team will
collect detailed information on remanufacturing activities,
capabilities and technologies from DOD depots. The information
will be assembled into a searchable computerized clearinghouse.
The data will be analyzed in order to develop broad
recommendations for improvement of remanufacturing practices.
Mr. Chairman, Dr. Nasr and the National Center have
developed a multiyear plan of research cooperation and support
of ONR remanufacturing priorities. I am submitting with the
testimony a copy of the detailed proposal that we have
submitted to ONR relating to the use of fiscal year 1998
funding and a program for subsequent years.
In fiscal year 1999, RIT is requesting that the
subcommittee include another $2 million appropriation in ONR to
fund year two of this very vital program.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing us this opportunity
to testify. My colleague, Dr. Nasr, has all the answers, if you
have some questions; and I will back him up as sufficiently as
my credentials would permit me to.
Thank you for your time.
Mr. Young. Well, I would like to say that most--the biggest
question we would have for him is, how can we get the extra
money to take care of all of these programs that we are talking
about today?
And I would like to respond that the Committee is well
aware of the success of many of the remanufacturing programs,
and we understand we do get a lot for the dollar invested
there, and we appreciate your calling that to our attention
today.
And, Representative Slaughter, thank you very much for
bringing them.
Mrs. Slaughter. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your
graciousness. We appreciate your listening to us this morning.
You are very kind to have us in. Thank you.
Mr. Young. For your constituents, I would tell them that
you are a very important one to listen to.
As a member of the Rules Committee, she plays a major role
in the legislative process here in the House.
Mrs. Slaughter. You are always a pleasure to work with.
Mr. Young. Thank you.
Mrs. Slaughter. You were saying----
Mr. Cunningham. He is okay for a Marine.
Mr. Young. General Krulak told us there are no old Marines.
Mrs. Slaughter. Absolutely no old Marines at all.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. We appreciate you being
here this morning. Thank you.
Mrs. Slaughter. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Robfogel follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
NATIONAL COALITION FOR OSTEOPOROSIS AND RELATED BONE DISEASES
WITNESSES
SANDRA RAYMOND, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL OSTEO- POROSIS FOUNDATION
(NOF)
COMMANDER CHARLES SCOTT, U.S. NAVY
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to welcome next Sandra Raymond, the
Executive Director of the National Coalition for Osteoporosis
and Related Bone Diseases.
She is accompanied by Commander Charles Scott and his son
Nick. Commander Scott suffers from multiple myeloma, which is a
cancer of the bone marrow.
Ms. Raymond, your prepared statement will appear in the
permanent record; and we would ask that you summarize it at
this time.
Statement of Ms. Raymond
Ms. Raymond. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I will summarize my testimony. But I do want to say that
Commander Scott is here today, and his personal story, I think,
really lays out the real cost of bone disease to the military.
On behalf of myself and the Coalition, I want to sincerely
thank you, Mr. Chairman, and your colleagues on the committee
for the $10 million you appropriated for bone disease research
in the fiscal year 1997 DOD budget. This money has been put to
good use, and it is worth every appropriated dollar.
The DOD received 88 proposals, out of which they were only
able to fund 12 outstanding proposals; and those projects are
enumerated in our testimony that you have received today.
This is not an extension of the NIH research program,
because the DOD bone disease research program aims to enhance
military readiness by improving the bone health of young men
and women who are in the military.
The research addresses the important issue of stress
fractures, which are among the most frequent injuries that take
men and women off duty in the Army. According to the Army, the
minimum time away from significant duty for a male or female
soldier who develops a stress fracture is 6 to 8 weeks. Stress
fractures are very slow to heal, and full recovery takes as
long as 12 weeks.
You know, most of us think of stress fractures--that stress
failures heal and that the integrity of bone is maintained, but
that is not true. If a stress fracture goes untreated and if it
occurs in the same bone, you can have a full fracture; and that
full fracture may cause complete disability. It may cause
costly surgery and rehabilitation. And it is very, very costly
to the military.
An estimated 10 to 15 percent of women recruits experience
stress fractures during this 8 weeks of basic training. With an
increased number of women in the military, these stress
fractures can only increase.
One training intervention research project, which was
conducted among 22,000 recruits in the U.S. Marine Corps in San
Diego, showed that as much as $4.5 million could have been
saved by reducing stress fractures. So the DOD research program
is addressing these problems.
For example, one project will examine oral contraceptives
in bone health in female runners. Another will investigate
treatments which increase the rates of healing stress
fractures.
There are many other projects which are being conducted
under the DOD research program. It may be that what we learn
from DOD research will greatly contribute to bringing bone
diseases under control. Because osteoporosis and other related
bone diseases, such as Paget's disease, Osteogenesis Imperfecta
and multiple myeloma, are serious threats to the public health.
These diseases cause loss of independence, they cause
disability, they cause death, and they are extremely costly to
the medical system in the United States and to the military.
By discovering how we can build peak bone mass in military
recruits we will not only build a strong Nation in terms of
defense but also we are going to be able to extend our life and
extend and withstand the stresses of an extended life span. We
are today urging you to appropriate a modest $20 million in
appropriations for bone disease research in fiscal year 1999.
[The statement of Ms. Raymond follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Raymond. Commander Scott.
Statement of Commander Scott
Commander Scott. Gentlemen, as you heard, my name is
Commander Charles Scott. I am a Naval aviator, experimental
test pilot, aeronautical engineer and Persian Gulf veteran.
In December, 1996, after suffering a broken back, I was
diagnosed with multiple myeloma, which is a complex cancer of
the bone marrow that invades and destroys bone. As a result of
this disease, I have severe osteoporosis.
Each year, 14,000 new cases of myeloma are diagnosed. The
occurrence of myeloma has increased dramatically in the past
decade. The average life expectancy from the time of diagnosis
is three-and-a-half years, and there is no cure for this
disease.
I demonstrate the tangible cost of bone disease to the
military. The Navy has paid over $9 million to train me in the
highly technical fields in which I am qualified. This
investment by the taxpayers of this country is in jeopardy due
to my bone disease and cancer.
We are asking for $20 million for bone disease research. If
the research resulting from the Department of Defense Bone
Health and Military Medical Readiness Research Program could
help me recover my health and put me back into a flying status,
nearly one half of the amount we are requesting from you today
could be recovered.
By understanding the mechanisms of bone destruction in
myeloma, we can learn how the dynamic equilibrium of bone
damage and bone healing actually works.
In myeloma patients, bone damage is dramatically increased
but, more importantly, bone repair is almost completely
blocked. Myeloma bone disease cripples 50,000 Americans in the
prime of their lives. All Americans will benefit from increased
knowledge of what can make bones heal and become stronger.
Research focusing on the reduction of tumor burden, causative
factors and better treatments will benefit everyone suffering
the debilitating effects of bone disease and myeloma.
Reduction in military readiness, our ability to fight and
win wars, runs the gamut from the new recruit who fails to
complete basic training on time due to a bone fracture to the
seasoned veteran like me whose career is cut short by a
debilitating bone disease.
Thank you.
Mr. Young. We want to thank you very much for being here
and for your statements.
Mr. Cunningham is our in-house expert on Naval aviation,
having been, I believe, the first ace in the Vietnam War. He
has a little knowledge about this problem, and I have asked him
to comment on this.
Mr. Cunningham. Well, I was also a former coach at a high
school and college level.
You know, the Speaker of the House has insisted that we
increase funding for medical research at National Institute of
Health--NIH.
Another area that I would encourage you to look at,
although you have your particular problem, but especially in
fractures and stress fractures, sports medicine has got a vast
knowledge. I mean, they're professionals, it is in their best
interest to look at, A, how to prevent it, the diet, and also,
if you have a stress failure, how to fix that, and I would turn
you in that direction.
The third thing I would mention is, with the limited budget
which is as low as the 1950s, procurement has been cut 70
percent. We can't buy parts smart. We can't do the things that
actually save money. Because you need an airplane to go to
Bosnia--we have got in some cases only one airplane in the
squadron because we don't have parts to go forward. And we are
fighting this battle, and I support it and understand what your
problem is.
But I also would like you to know the Chairman's problem
that we are having, and we can't do the smart things because of
a limited budget. But we are sympathetic, and we will see what
you can do. And God bless you being a Navy fighter pilot.
Commander Scott. Coming from a procurement background, I
certainly understand and appreciate the constraints.
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you.
Mr. Young. We thank you very much, and we certainly
understand the problem. Believe me, we could find a lot of ways
to spend a lot more money on medical research. This Committee
has taken the lead in a lot of medical research programs,
including the establishment of a bone marrow registry for
transplants. I understand that you had a transplant.
Commander Scott. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. But yours was anatologist, as I understand.
Commander Scott. Yes.
Mr. Young. So this Committee has taken a strong lead on
medical issues, and we appreciate your being here to back us
up.
As Mr. Cunningham said and as I have said, money is going
to be really tight this year. All I can say is, we will do the
best we can.
Commander Scott. Thank you.
Ms. Raymond. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Thank you again for being here.
----------
Thursday, March 19, 1998.
BRAIN INJURY ASSOCIATION
WITNESS
MARTIN B. FOIL, JR., CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, BRAIN INJURY ASSOCIATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to recognize now Mr. Martin Foil,
who is the voluntary Chairman of the Brain Injury Association.
The Members will remember, he is a constituent and good
friend of Congressman Hefner, who normally introduces him with
a very nice introduction. But Congressman Hefner is not able to
be here this morning, and I probably won't be able to do as
good a job.
But we appreciate all the time that you volunteer, Mr.
Foil, for this very important matter; and your statement will
be placed in the record, and I would ask that you summarize it
for us.
Statement of Mr. Foil
Mr. Foil. Thank you, Chairman Young, and good morning, and
all the members of the National Security Subcommittee. Thank
you.
We are sorry that Bill is not here this morning. We are
well aware that he is retiring, and all of his constituents are
going to miss him, and we who come before you will miss him as
well. He has been a good friend to the Brain Injury Association
and to our cause.
My name is Martin Foil, and I come before you as a father
of Philip Foil, a young man with a severe brain injury. I do
serve as a voluntary Chairman of the Brain Injury Association.
I am also the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Tuscarora
Yarns in Mt. Pleasant, North Carolina.
I receive no compensation from the Association or from the
programs I am testifying about here today. Rather, I contribute
considerable sums of my own money to the Brain Injury
Association to help improve the lives of persons with brain
injury. I am here, Mr. Chairman, simply because I do care about
the 9 million Americans living with brain injury and their
families.
The Defense and Veterans Head Injury Program, or DVHIP, and
the Violence and Brain Injury Project are collaborative efforts
among the DOD and the Veterans Affairs and the Brain Injury
Association.
Together, we not only serve Active duty military personnel
but we are an important resource to veterans and civilian
populations as well. Over 7,000 military people a year suffer
brain injury in peacetime.
Our programs, therefore, are exemplar cases of dual-use
funding; and I am pleased to report to you, Mr. Chairman, that
our collaborative efforts continue to pay off. We do this by
increasing the return to work rate of military personnel and
improving the efficiency of the medical services provided. By
doing this, DOD realizes significant cost savings.
We have also had many accomplishments this year, including
expanding of our Patient Registry Treatment and Referral
Network.
Our Brain Resource Center, developed by our Association, is
now available in over 60 locations across the country,
including select DOD and Veterans' Administration--VA hospitals
as well as civilian facilities.
Our toll-free help line continues to receive at least
15,000 calls a year helping military personnel and civilians
with brain injury and their caregivers.
We have increased our prevention and educational programs
to include something we call the brain building basics. This is
a violence, prevention and brain injury awareness program for
low literacy adults, including incarcerated populations.
Our HeadSmart Schools Program is now being used in 21
States, over 106 schools, 141,000 children, of whom 36,000 are
children of the military. We have schools in 12 military
installations.
Through the Brain Injury Association, we are embarking on
research of neurobehavioral problems following brain injury
that will help to return military personnel to work. Included
in this kind of research are FMRI studies to evaluate outcomes
and concussions in sports.
Brain injury is, however, a silent epidemic; and, as such,
it is the single largest killer and the cause of disability
among our young people. We need to learn more about the brain,
and we need to do more to prevent brain injury.
Our efforts continue to help our Nation's military
readiness by helping service members get appropriate care and
return to work. We need your support, Mr. Chairman, for $8.5
million in funding so that the DVHIP and VBIP and the Brain
Injury Association can carry on this unique partnership. This
has been a very successful program, and we are proud of our
association together.
I am happy, Mr. Chairman, to answer any questions. Thank
you and God bless you for allowing me here again this year.
Mr. Young. Mr. Foil, thank you very much. We appreciate
that.
I wanted to mention that the University of Florida has a
very aggressive brain injury program, and we do help with that.
I would also tell you that the Chairman of this
Subcommittee will miss Mr. Hefner as much as his constituents.
He has been a good friend and a very good Member of this
Committee.
Mr. Foil. He is a fine man, and we all will miss him.
Mr. Young. We appreciate you being here. Thank you very
much.
Mr. Foil. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Foil follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
THE FLEET RESERVE ASSOCIATION
WITNESS
MASTER CHIEF JOE BARNES, USN (RET.), DIRECTOR, LEGISLATIVE PROGRAMS,
THE FLEET RESERVE ASSOCIATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. Next I would like to welcome Master Chief Joe
Barnes, who is the Director of Legislative Programs for the
Fleet Reserve Association. Chief Barnes represents 160,000
enlisted sea service personnel who are serving or have served
in the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard.
Master Chief, your prepared statement will be made a part
of the Committee's permanent record, in that statement, which
we have read, it says, military readiness is now at code
yellow. You also warn of the pending damage to the Nation's
defense establishment if the fiscal year 1999 defense budget is
approved in its present form.
I will say amen to that. We recognize the serious
shortfalls in many areas in the President's budget.
Unfortunately, his top number is the same as the top number
that we are dealing with. So we are going to have to work
around that the best we can. But we appreciate your being here,
and we would like to recognize you to summarize your statement.
Statement of Master Chief Barnes
Master Chief Barnes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
present the Fleet Reserve Association's--FRA--priorities
regarding personnel issues for 1999.
I also wish to express appreciation to you and members of
the subcommittee for your strong support of the men and women
serving in our uniformed services. Thanks to your efforts, they
have seen significant quality of life improvements.
Our country and its uniformed services face many
challenges, not the least of which is turmoil in distant parts
of the world that threatens our national interests. Inadequate
defense funds, insufficient manpower, declining recruiting and
retention rates, widening pay comparability, crumbling
infrastructure and disenfranchised older retirees add to these
challenges.
These and other issues are addressed in our complete
statement, and in the interest of time I will focus only on
several key points.
Compared to 1989, DOD funding in fiscal year 1999 will have
dropped approximately $40 billion. This dramatic reduction
helped to balance the budget, generate a projected surplus and
free up money for other government programs. Notable is an
increase by next year of over $208 billion compared to 1989 in
Department of Health and Human Services funding.
Keeping in mind the challenges discussed above, it seems
those most deserving of consideration in the reallocation of
government spending are the men and women who are now sharing
the sacrifices and hardships of serving in the Armed Forces.
In addition to these major challenges, additional personnel
cuts are planned, not because the workload has decreased but
because money saved from the personnel account is sorely needed
for procurement and modernization.
OPTEMPO has significantly increased and reduced manpower
levels have led to longer deployments as well as family
problems, instability, stress and falling retention rates.
Next year's mission demands will be greater than in 1998,
and the Navy can ill afford to lose 18,000 more personnel as
recommended in the QDR, and the Marine Corps should not be
mandated to further reduce manpower below the pre-1998 levels.
Annual military pay raises always trail 15 months behind
the applicable employment cost index data, and each year the
pay gap grows wider and now stands at 13.5 percent.
FRA again draws your attention to the decline in pay
ratios. Prior to the all-volunteer force, the ratio between
senior enlisted personnel and new recruits was 4.6 to 1 and now
it is 2.6 to 1, indicating nearly a 44 percent decline.
Hopefully, Congress hasn't forgotten the need in 1981 to
raise the pay of its senior enlisted members. At that time,
many were voting with their feet. FRA urges larger pay
adjustments to narrow the pay gap in accordance with the latest
full ECI data immediately prior to the effective date of the
pay raise and a gradual pay increase for senior enlisted
personnel to bring it to a level commensurate with their
leadership roles.
Regarding health care, improvements are needed in the
TRICARE program; along with enactment of full Medicare
subvention; a broader mail order pharmaceutical drug program;
and, finally, a major priority is a test program to the Federal
Employees Health Benefit Program option for older
beneficiaries.
Confusion over the three military retirement plans is a
concern for uniformed service members pondering career
decisions. Second and third term enlistees are discovering that
the retirement program they may look forward to provides
significantly less financially than the previous two programs,
yet they must pay the same amount for health care for
themselves and their families.
FRA believes Congress should repeal the 1986 Military
Retirement Reform Act.
Mr. Chairman, FRA shipmates appreciate your untiring
commitment and support of personnel now serving and those who
have served in the past. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. Master Chief Barnes, thank you very much. We
always appreciate your excellent testimony; and, as you know,
we work with you to do the best we can to make good things
happen; and we thank you for being here this morning.
Master Chief Barnes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Master Chief Barnes follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
FORT ATKINSON CEMETERY
WITNESS
HON. DOUG BEREUTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF
NEBRASKA
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to recognize now one of our
distinguished colleagues from the great State of Nebraska,
Congressman Doug Bereuter. Doug serves on the Banking and
Financial Services Committee and the International Relations
Committee, where he chairs the Asia and Pacific Subcommittee
and, in his usual aggressive way, does an excellent job there.
Congressman, your prepared statement will be placed in the
record; and we would ask that you summarize it.
Statement of Congressman Bereuter
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Mr.
Cunningham and members of the Committee. I appreciate you
seeing me at this point. Because of an emergency, Chairman
Gilman will not be able to handle the next bill; and I will
have to do that.
I would want to bring to your attention a request for a
quarter million dollars. I know you don't often deal in a
request of that size.
In summarizing, let me tell you this. The first fort west
of the Missouri River in the United States is located in my
district. It was eventually called Fort Atkinson. The first
winter the troops were located there shortly after Lewis and
Clark had gone up the river and had met the Indians for the
first time at what is called Council Bluff.
The Missouri cantonment, over 200 troops died the first
winter. As far as I know, it is the largest area of unmarked
American military graves in the United States. Today, we don't
know exactly where these officers and men are buried.
There are other civilians that were buried as well, not on
the fort but an area north of it. I am sorry to tell you that
that area is cultivated today. It is farmed. We have had
difficulty getting access.
We need to use ground-sensing radar to find out exactly
where it is. We can take it down to within a 15- to 20-acre
site, and what I am asking for is site planning money; if
necessary, leasing; and preparation for memorializing these
graves of these 200-plus soldiers of what was the most--it was
actually the largest military establishment in the United
States at one time.
It is adjacent to a State historical park which is called
Fort Atkinson, named after an early Army officer that helped
explore the Missouri River territory and Nebraska territory and
Dakota territory. It is my expectation, once we locate these
graves with the assistance of the appropriate component of the
U.S. military, that we would arrange to have land purchased;
and I would think it would be the preference of the Federal
Government to transfer the land to the State historical park.
But I do think that proper recognition and memorialization
of these 200-plus American servicemen from the 1820 to 1827 era
is appropriate. And that is my request, a very unusual one; and
I think it is probably the first request I have ever made
before this Committee. It has nothing to do with my Asia and
Pacific Committee assignment.
I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.
Mr. Cunningham. I don't really have any questions for the
issue. I understand the issue, and I know the Chairman is
trying to wade through the priorities on it. A lot of our
foundation is on history.
When you say transfer of land you are actually asking for
money. I am not quite clear on the reasoning behind, the
expanse of money required if we transfer the land to bring up
these 200 or more.
Mr. Bereuter. I don't think it is appropriate to move the
graves. What we are asking for now is investigation money. Part
of that equipment is in the hands of the Smithsonian
Institution. Part of it is in the hands of the Army, the DOD.
We would like to find out precisely where these graves are, as
much as possible after this century and a half, and prepare a
site plan and memorialization of it.
We think it is--because of the noncooperation of the
landowner, it is going to be necessary to lease the ground for
a period of 3 to 6 months for that purpose. Then it would be my
expectation to either go to the State of Nebraska or the
Department of Interior Appropriations Subcommittee, Ralph
Regula's subcommittee, and request an additional 10, 15, 20
acres, whatever it might be, to add to Fort Atkinson.
I don't think the Federal Government would expect to
establish a Federal cemetery and would not want the property to
be under its control. So I would think it is logical at some
subsequent action, when we determine exactly where these graves
are and what kind of markers should be placed there and what
kind of visitation arrangements to the site should be there,
then I would think we would go for the additional purchase.
Or what the landowners would prefer is a land swap. I don't
know if that can be arranged.
I will tell you one thing more. This will be the site of
one of the three most important ceremony--festivity sites in
the Lewis and Clark expedition. In 2004, this is where the--one
of three sites will be for the Lewis and Clark expedition
bicentennial. It happens to be----
Mr. Cunningham. Has there been any attempt for a foundation
to be set up for--a funding foundation, private?
Mr. Bereuter. No. But I think probably the acquisition can
be handled by the Nebraska Game and Parks Foundation.
The problem is, we need at this point the expertise of the
military; and we think it is appropriate that they help find
those graves of American military men from that era.
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Congressman Bereuter follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
NON COMMISSIONED OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WITNESS
SERGEANT MAJOR MICHAEL F. OUELLETTE, USA (RET.), DIRECTOR OF
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, NON COMMISSIONED OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Introduction
Mr. Cunningham. Our next witness from the Non Commissioned
Officers Association is Sergeant Major Michael Ouellette. I
look forward to your testimony, Sergeant Major.
Statement of Sergeant Major Ouellette
Sergeant Major Ouellette. Good morning, Mr. Cunningham, and
thank you very much. On behalf of the Non Commissioned Officers
Association--NCOA, it is always nice to be given an opportunity
to appear before this subcommittee; and I, on behalf of NCOA, I
would like to thank all the members, especially the Chairman
who I thank constantly, for the efforts in past years to assist
military people and retirees.
I would tell you that we are--we still need help in those
areas, but we would be far off the pace if it had not been for
the efforts over the years to protect COLAs for retirees, to
provide pay raises, money for pay raises for the special
deployment pays and all of those items that come up to improve
the welfare of military men and retirees and, of course,
promote recruiting and retention.
Mr. Cunningham, I would just like to summarize. We have
submitted our statement.
I think there are a lot of issues. I don't think that this
Committee in 1 year is going to solve all of the problems. I do
think, though, that there should be a real attempt to try to
bring military pay up to par, as Mr. Barnes talked about.
I think the best way to start that, though, within reason,
is just to assure full employment cost index pay raises every
year. We came close to doing that last year; and, at the very
end, that provision fell out of the authorization bill.
So in the area of health care, Mr. Cunningham, you hear
that all the time. The problems--and there are many problems
with health care. Are we going to--do you have the money to fix
all of the areas during the course of any one year? The Non
Commissioned Officers association sure doesn't think so. But we
do think that probably selecting one thing and maybe
prescription--opening the mail order prescription drug program
to all retirees would be a major step forward.
That is the way this Committee has progressed over the
years. You haven't solved all the problems every year, but you
keep nipping at it.
On behalf of NCOA and our President, Chuck Jackson, Mr.
Cunningham, we--and the staff of the subcommittee, we certainly
appreciate all the things that you have done and look forward
to those things that you are able to do within the budgetary
restraints during--for the fiscal year 1999 program.
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you, Sergeant Major.
I think it is pretty much a bipartisan issue on taking care
of our veterans, and you know we look forward to--the
subvention bill was written by the veterans in my district and
submitted, and it took a long time.
I would tell you that J.C. Watts, Mr. Thornberry and myself
have a health care bill that I would like NCOA to take a look
at. I think it will save dollars in the long run and will
greatly benefit our military--the Chairman heard testimony of
all the service chiefs before, and one of the big things for
retention was loss of their benefits and they could do better
on the outside. So I know the Chairman is very concerned about
that, and we thank you for your testimony.
Sergeant Major Ouellette. All right, Mr. Cunningham. Thank
you very much.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for all you have done.
Mr. Young. Thank you. I am sorry that I missed your
testimony, but I just got the second vote that Mr. Cunningham
is going to have to go get now. Voting does interfere with our
Committee work.
Sergeant Major Ouellette. All right. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Young. We always appreciate you being here. We always
appreciate the support you give us when it is time to take this
bill to the floor and to the Committee.
Sergeant Major Ouellette. Likewise, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Thank you, sir.
[The statement of Sergeant Major Ouellette follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
WITNESS
ROCKY MORRILL, PRESIDENT, LOCAL #1156, MECHANICSBURG, PENNSYLVANIA,
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to recognize next Mr. Rocky
Morrill, President of the American Federation of Government
Employees, Local 1156, from Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania.
As a representative of 300,000 employees of the Department
of Defense, we are interested in what you have to say about
things of importance to them.
Statement of Mr. Morrill
Mr. Morrill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and subcommittee
members. I appreciate the opportunity to speak before you.
I am president of the American Federation of Government
Employees, Local 1156, at Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. The
American Federation of Government Employees represents more
than 600,000 Federal employees serving worldwide, including
300,000 employees at DOD.
I would like to begin my testimony by thanking the
subcommittee for this opportunity to testify on National
Security Appropriations.
While there are many important issues affecting DOD
employees which this subcommittee will consider, I will limit
my statement today to what I consider to be the most important
issue, the use of in-house personnel ceilings by DOD officials
to contract out work, often at higher cost because of the
absence of public/private competition.
DOD, the Department the American people rely on to
safeguard their future, is experiencing in-house staff
shortages. On March 16th, 1995, the personnel directors of the
four branches of the Armed Forces told the Senate Armed
Services Personnel Subcommittee that civilian personnel
ceilings, not workload, cost or readiness concerns are forcing
them to send work to contractors that could have been performed
more cheaply in-house.
Also in March, 1995, GAO reported that the personnel
ceilings set by OMB frequently have the effect of encouraging
agencies to contract out regardless of the results of cost,
policy or high-risk studies. And the DOD Inspector General
noted in a 1995 report the goal of downsizing the Federal
workforce is widely perceived as placing DOD in a position of
having to contract for services regardless of what is more
desirable and cost-effective.
Moreover, I have attached to my testimony three internal
documents which suggest that DOD managers are instructing
subordinates to manage by personnel ceilings and then contract
out the work.
The second document imposes a not-to-be-exceeded ceiling
and insists that work performed by employees under the GS-12
level be contracted out.
We shouldn't be surprised that much contracting out
occurring because of personnel ceilings is wasteful. After all,
there is no public/private competition. Federal employees
aren't given opportunities to compete in such situations,
simply because there aren't enough of them to do the work.
Clearly, DOD should be required to manage by budgets. If it
has work to do and money is authorized and appropriated to do
that work, then the DOD should be able to use Federal employees
if in-house performance is to the benefit of the warfighters
and the taxpayers.
We all know that the DOD civilian workforce is going to get
smaller. We all know that there is going to be contracting out.
But DOD should not be imposing arbitrary personnel ceilings and
foreclosing the option of the in-house performance of important
work, especially if contractors are less efficient, even if not
always successful.
At my own base, we have the base communications office,
already streamlined, has implemented cost-savings incentives
and has saved the government documented savings of $500,000
that continues through each fiscal year. Additionally, this
timely organization has backlogged projects that have the
potential for significantly larger savings. No contractor will
duplicate or exceed the efficiencies or economies demonstrated
by this organization.
I present the documentation of the director of this base
communications office that goes into further detail.
We appreciate the Committee's efforts to prevent DOD from
managing by personnel ceilings by the inclusion of prohibitions
in recent defense appropriations bills, and we urge that a
similar prohibition be included in this year's funding measure.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I would be happy
to answer any questions.
Mr. Young. Well, thank you very much for being here, and we
appreciate the opportunity to work with you on this issue. We
recognize the importance of the civilian workers in the
Department of Defense and the important role that they play.
Thank you for being here today.
Mr. Morrill. Thank you, sir.
[The statement of Mr. Morrill follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
NATIONAL MILITARY FAMILY ASSOCIATION
WITNESS
SYDNEY T. HICKEY, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, THE
NATIONAL MILITARY FAMILY ASSOCIATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like next to recognize Mrs. Sydney
Hickey, Associate Director of Government Relations of the
National Military Family Association. Mrs. Hickey is no
stranger to this Committee. She and her organization do a
really great job of standing up for the families of the men and
women who serve our great Nation. And I might also say they
publish a great newsletter which I find very informative.
Mrs. Hickey, we are very happy to have you back again. Your
entire statement will be placed in the record, and I would ask
that you summarize it for us.
Statement of Ms. Hickey
Ms. Hickey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and thank
you for letting NMFA again express its views. In grateful
recognition of your kind remarks, I will be less than 2
minutes.
We would like to reiterate again the gratitude of military
families for the concern shown by the members of this
Committee.
We have eight main items in our written testimony, which I
will simply list:
A continued stress placed upon the force and their families
by long workdays and weeks, as well as the frequent
deployments;
Two, the distress of families that their leaders continue
to voice little concern about compensation programs that
decrease their buying power and appear more concerned about
cutting costs than the family's quality of life;
Three, the privatization or outsourcing of vital family
service functions and the fear that such contracts will go the
way of the new parent support program contract;
The implementation of the family housing privatization
initiatives without full consideration of the effects on
military families and the surrounding civilian communities. Our
fear here is that this Subcommittee may be asked to fund the
full impact aid program rather than simply the supplemental.
The viability of the military community upon which we have
historically depended for our support under privatization and
outsourcing;
The continuing problems with our health care system years
after the initial implementation of TRICARE, and the fact that
we still do not have a solution for our over-65s;
A plea for the Committee's assistance in ascertaining if
military families everywhere are paying the lion's share of the
reduced provider payments under TRICARE Prime, as the exhibit
included in our testimony shows;
And, finally, our deep concern that policies and actions
that produce negative experiences for the family, military
family, of today will have a profound and equally negative
effect on the military force of the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Thank you for being here, and you know that we always look
forward to working with you and receiving your newsletter to
keep up to date on what you are doing.
Ms. Hickey. Thank you very much, sir.
[The statement of Ms. Hickey follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
NATIONAL MILITARY AND VETERANS ALLIANCE
WITNESS
COLONEL CHARLES C. PARTRIDGE, U.S. ARMY (RET.), NATIONAL MILITARY AND
VETERANS ALLIANCE
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like now to welcome Colonel Charles
Partridge in his capacity as spokesman for the National
Military and Veterans Alliance. Colonel Partridge is also the
legislative counsel for another important group, the National
Association for Uniformed Services. The Alliance represents 15
military and veterans organizations with 3.5 million members.
We appreciate the support that your organization has always
given us when we try to do the best we can for our Nation's
security. Your prepared statement is an excellent summary of
where you think we stand with regard to military health care,
and I might say this Subcommittee has spent considerable time
this year on the subject of military health and health care for
the families, some of the problems that have evolved, and we
look forward to hearing from you, sir.
Statement of Colonel Partridge
Colonel Partridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and we want to
thank you for all you have done over the years in military
health care. Just year after year after year, you and this
subcommittee have stood up. If it hadn't been for you, military
health care would have been underfunded in the past years by
almost three-quarters of a billion dollars; and we really
appreciate your help there.
As you know, we have supported the Department of Defense in
establishing the TRICARE program; and we worked hard to help
them with that. We worked hard with them on the Medicare
subvention issue, which Mr. Cunningham mentioned earlier was
drafted years ago from a man in his district; and we would like
to see, of course, Medicare subvention expanded just as rapidly
and quickly as possible.
We are also concerned, as I know you are, with the deep and
continuing cuts in the end strength, particularly medical end
strength, where it is down by about 30 to 35 percent. Military
hospitals are being closed as part of the BRAC--Base
Realignment and Closure--business, which we understand. That is
necessary.
What has concerned us is that, with all of these reductions
and cuts going on in the medical system, the Department of
Defense has not come up with a plan that would take care of all
of their beneficiaries. We know that the TRICARE program with
subvention will take care of a large number, and we know that
increasing coordination with the VA, between DOD and VA, is
going to help.
Even with all of that, though, there are people that are
falling through the cracks, particularly Medicare-eligible
retirees. And we--that is why we are proposing the Federal
Employees Health Benefits plan. And our--what we need is a plan
that works, that is a proven program, we know it works, and we
believe that it would cover some 30 percent of military
retirees over 65 who now have no other option. The other 70
percent would get their care somewhere else.
And we would--we understand there is an additional
legislative proposal in the works that would--that could begin
this program next year. We understand that the current bills
that are being considered would not begin for several years,
and we would like to see these older retirees getting this
benefit in the next year. Then, as the Department develops
their own alternatives, they can opt out of that into something
else. But, for now, we would like to see something started next
year, start them enrolling next year even if it is on a modest
scale.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Colonel, thank you very much. You know of our
commitment to making these things happen.
Colonel Partridge. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Also, I might tell you that a recent hearing we
had with the Surgeons General I had discovered several
recruiting posters that weren't all that old that promised, for
those who spend enough time to retire in uniform, that they
would have health care for life.
Colonel Partridge. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Many have said that that was not the case, but
we found these old recruiting posters, and we are doing the
best we can to keep faith with the people who believed that
when they signed up.
Thank you for being here today, sir.
Colonel Partridge. Thank you, sir.
[The statement of Colonel Partridge follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
DISABLED MILITARY RETIREES
WITNESS
EDITH G. SMITH, CITIZEN ADVOCATE FOR DISABLED MILITARY RETIREES
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to invite Mrs. Edith Smith to come
to the witness table now. Mrs. Smith is a long-time friend of
this Committee and has been a tireless advocate for our
Nation's disabled military retirees, and she has spent a lot of
time with the Members of the Committee in this great effort.
Mrs. Smith, we are always happy to hear from you. Your
entire statement will be in the record, and we would ask that
you summarize it.
Statement of Mrs. Smith
Mrs. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am Edith Smith, the wife of a disabled retired Marine,
who is very grateful to you, Mr. Young, and to Mr. Murtha and
to the members of this subcommittee for rising up and leading
the fight to protect the disabled military retiree by restoring
their earned CHAMPUS benefit as second payer to Medicare in
1991.
Members of this subcommittee may remember the courageous
testimony of your constituent Terry Cox that led to the
immediate implementation of your legislation by the Department
of Defense in 1992. The weak link, however, in your legislation
is with DOD in its implementation of this dual-coverage
benefit. For more than 6 years, DOD has not accomplished a data
match with--the Health Care Financing Activity--HCFA for your
legislation. The data match is required to identify and notify
Medicare-eligible beneficiaries under age 65 of their change in
eligibility for CHAMPUS.
I am here today to plead for understanding and relief for
any retirees under 65 who have not been informed of the unique
requirement to enroll in Medicare B in order to remain in their
CHAMPUS benefit, which is now known as TRICARE.
I would like to describe the crisis faced by these disabled
retirees with two real-life examples of young retirees who
believed they were covered by CHAMPUS until age 65, as are all
other military retirees.
One is a disabled retiree from Michigan, afflicted with
Huntington's disease. He learned of the Part B requirement
after the enrollment period had closed, 4 days too late. His
request for equitable relief was denied, and he was tragically
left without outpatient insurance for the next 15 months.
Two weeks ago, he was diagnosed with recurrence of cancer.
Had his CHAMPUS coverage not been taken away, would he have
gone to the doctor earlier? Would his cancer have been detected
sooner?
Another disabled military retiree signed up for TRICARE
Prime at Madigan Army Hospital, uninformed by the military of
his need to buy Part B. He died; and his widow suffered a
recoupment attempt by TRICARE of nearly $200,000 last year, not
once but twice in the same year, simply because this couple did
not know about the Medicare B requirement.
As DOD expands its managed care subvention demonstrations
and programs such as TRICARE senior, the disabled appear to
have been cherry-picked and left basically alone to fend for
themselves.
If DOD cannot coordinate one data match with HCFA in 25
years for the Active duty family members who are disabled, how
can they coordinate eight data systems for Medicare over-65s to
begin the TRICARE senior demonstration by 1 July?
For 10 years, Medicare eligibles have received a DEERS
letter of notification, detailing the switch from CHAMPUS to
Medicare at age 65. But this doesn't happen for the disabled
under 65s. Mr. Chairman, these disabled beneficiaries deserve
this important notification letter as well.
DEERS is now working on the data match, but it will not be
completed in time for the disabled retirees to enroll in Part B
by this year's closing date of March 31st.
Disabled beneficiaries not currently enrolled in Part B
will find themselves at risk of ruin emotionally, physically
and financially, because they will have no outpatient insurance
until July 1st, 1999, unless Congress presses DOD to take
protective measures regarding equitable relief waivers.
If eligibility requirements for TRICARE were equal to those
for the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program--FEHBP, these
gaps in medical coverage for the disabled would not exist.
Disabled Federal civilian retirees enrolled in FEHBP have a
voluntary choice to purchase Medicare B but the disabled
military retired beneficiaries do not.
My husband and I are concerned that military personnel are
viewed as second-class citizens by our employer, the Federal
Government. Military professionals have earned a legitimate
employer-provided health benefit such as FEHBP, which the
Congress provides to Federal civilian retirees.
Mr. Chairman, I have submitted my full statement for the
record; and I appreciate the opportunity to speak this morning.
If you have any questions, I would be happy to answer them.
Mr. Young. Ms. Smith, we are always happy to hear from you.
I still remember the help you gave us when the Andy Cox case
was before us.
Mrs. Smith. Yes. I mentioned Terry and talked to her last
night, and she asked that I relay her best wishes to you and
their appreciation as well for what you have done.
Mr. Young. And she, Mrs. Cox, appeared in one of our
hearings.
Mrs. Smith. That is right.
Mr. Young. I am sure you know that.
Mrs. Smith. Yes.
Mr. Young. And made a very good presentation.
Thank you very much for being here today. We appreciate all
the good work that you do.
Mrs. Smith. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cunningham. Let me say, Mrs. Smith, also, I am a
military retiree, and I don't consider you a second-class
citizen.
Mrs. Smith. Thank you.
Mr. Cunningham. I am one.
Mrs. Smith. Maybe we can work on this for the data match.
[The statement of Mrs. Smith follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
THE RETIRED ENLISTED ASSOCIATION
WITNESS
CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT MARK H. OLANOFF, USAF (RET.), LEGISLATIVE
DIRECTOR, THE RETIRED ENLISTED ASSOCIATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. Our next witness is retired Chief Master
Sergeant Mark Olanoff, who is the Legislative Director for the
Retired Enlisted Association.
Chief, we are glad to have you here. You represent more
than 100,000 members and auxiliary of the Retired Enlisted
Association, and we are particularly interested in your views
on health care for military retirees since 61 percent of your
members are over the age of 65.
We will place your entire statement in the record and ask
that you summarize it at this point.
Statement of Sergeant Olanoff
Sergeant Olanoff. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First, I would like to let you know that, you know, I have
not testified here before, but I have read a lot about what you
have done personally and what this Committee has done for
military retirees, especially the ones that are the majority of
my membership; and we deeply appreciate what you do.
Although my statement discusses many issues, I will focus
my summary remarks on retired military health care.
We are not here to ask you for a new weapons system. We are
here to reclaim our employer-sponsored health care. Our
solutions include a combination of TRICARE, DOD and VA
subvention, and the option of the Federal Employee Health Plan
that you, your staffers and every other Federal employee has;
and we state that it should be unequivocal for any military
retiree, regardless of their age.
Mr. Chairman, I am going to refer to some attachments that
I have put into the record, so I will have to do a little bit
of reading. I just want to remind you, and you mentioned it
already, about the promise. Most of the information that I have
seen since I have been here, up until 1993 the United States
Army was still publishing that poster that guaranteed the
health care for life, and I can tell you----
Mr. Young. That was the date on the one that I found.
Sergeant Olanoff. Yes, sir. And just so you are aware of
it, you know that, prior to 1956, this country had the
equivalent of lifetime health care for military retirees
because the law that was passed in 1956 actually took it away
from us, because it created space-available health care.
Unfortunately, this message was distorted over a period of
time, and many of my members today still believe that that
promise was made and it was guaranteed.
I have a couple items that I am going to add that I have
not put into the record, and I will put them in the record. My
letter says that I have a week to do that. This information, I
just received.
Mr. Young. That is fine. We will be happy to include any
items that you want in the record.
Sergeant Olanoff. Thank you, sir.
The Acting Secretary of DOD Health Affairs, Mr.
Christoferson, testified before the Senate Committee on March
the 11th; and he reiterated the DOD's commitment to health care
for our over-65 people. However, there is one question and fact
that I want to bring up that was answered that you probably
have not seen this, but Senator Kempthorne's Committee asked
him about what their position is on FEHBP and how would they
implement it?
His answer was that the Department has consistently opposed
proposals to offer FEHBP because of the high cost and its
potential effect on medical readiness; and in parenthesis he
says, if substantial numbers of beneficiaries were no longer
seen within the military health system.
Well, sir, the first thing I can say to that is that I
receive many phone calls, and I am sure your staff does, that
these people are being turned away. So we don't see how this is
going to have any an impact on military readiness.
And I state in the attachments that I have given to you
from the General Accounting Office--GAO their--the numbers
don't match up. For example, the GAO stated there is 1.2
million of our people. They also state in another report that
Medicare subvention will only help 75,000 people, and they also
go on to say that DOD is currently taking care of approximately
300,000 of our people. So when you subtract 300,000 from 1.2
million, that leaves 900,000 left; and I am here to tell you
that if I could get you to put a law into this appropriations
bill that eliminated the words ``space available'' and all
those 900,000 people started coming back, I do not think the
Department of Defense could take care of all of those people.
There is also some testimony that has come out of the
authorizing committee which, unfortunately, we were unable to
participate in, concerning that enlisted personnel do not want
to pay for health care. Well, sir, I have some data which I
recently received since we are a member of the military
coalition, that is not--that I have not attached but I will
attach, of a survey that was done in 1996 of all the members of
the military coalition. That survey indicates that 66 percent
of all enlisted personnel have some type of Medicare
supplement. They are paying money for health care somehow.
And out of those 66 percent, based on the survey in which
the individuals were asked, how much are you paying for health
care specifically--and if these numbers are needed we can
provide them--but the chart that I have that was produced by
the military coalition indicates that of the Medicare-eligible
retirees over 65, 32 and a half percent of these people would
benefit with FEHBP because the costs that they are currently
paying equals what FEHBP would cost, or more.
So I hope we can dispel the myth that enlisted personnel do
not pay for their health care when it is not provided, because
I think they do.
The last thing I would like to discuss with you, sir, is
some congressional language and mandates that were given to the
Department of Defense.
In fiscal year 1997, the national--the fiscal year 1997
Defense Authorization Act instructed the Department of Defense
to conduct a study of FEHBP and cost available--and costs. In
last year's conference report from the authorizers, they
directed the Secretary to come up with a plan to expand TRICARE
by March the 1st, 1998.
There was also a sense of the Congress resolution that was
put in by Senator Cleland which says, we owe these people
health care even though it is not in the law, and we have an
obligation to take care of these people. And he says, we need
to do that within 2 years of the date that this was signed.
Finally, your Committee, based on your leadership, put in a
request, two requests. The first one was you directed them to
prepare a plan by March the 1st, 1998, to fully implement
subvention which, unfortunately, has not started because of
some administrative things, but we do believe that subvention
will work. And you directed them to come up with a plan so it
could be completed quicker. And, finally, you put a requirement
to them to submit a legislative proposal for FEHBP for a
demonstration project.
I am sure that you are aware, sir, that there are currently
48 Senators and 189 House Members who have signed on to the
legislation that has been pushed by us and other military
associations. I can only say that, in my opinion, it appears to
me that all of these mandates that have come out from these
reports, I have not seen any of these reports and I don't think
you have seen any of these reports, and I believe it is now
time to stop the rhetoric, the report language, the sense of
the Congress, and come up with a plan and oversee and make sure
that that agency does come up with a plan. Because our people
truly have believed in that promise, and I was also told that
promise in 1967 when I enlisted in the military.
So we would like to thank you for the time here, and
anything that you can do to help us we would really appreciate
it.
Mr. Young. Well, I appreciate your testimony; and for your
first time here I would like to say you made a very impressive
statement to the Committee.
As I mentioned, we have had numerous meetings with the
medical folks at the Secretary of Defense's office, as well as
the Surgeons General, trying to keep the pressure on to have
them comply with the directions we put in the appropriations
bill last year.
I know you understand that we are not the authorizers, so
we are not supposed to deal with the basic law, but sometimes
we get around that with language in the appropriations bill.
Sergeant Olanoff. Yes.
Mr. Young. And my last comment is, as a father of a young
man who is enlisted in the United States military, I understand
what you are saying about the fact that they do pay. In fact, I
get a bill every once in a while from him wanting a little bit
of supplement to his rather low salary.
Mr. Cunningham is wanting to make a comment on this issue
as well.
Mr. Cunningham. I thank you. And I also would like you to
take a look at this bill that does exactly what you want on
FEHBP. It deals with TRICARE and the eligibility for it. Even
this--it seems like we just spot each year little changes and
what we want is a seamless system for our veterans, and I would
appreciate if you would take a look at this.
We are going to submit this thing. We think it is far
better than the current legislation that is already in, and we
are asking for different retiree groups to take a look at it.
If you don't like it, don't support it.
But I would also say the very first subvention bill came in
2 years before I was a Member of Congress. I was asked to pick
it up by the veterans and pushed it through. A lot of that is
OSD, because they wouldn't implement it. But some of it is
politics, on just the ability to get selected as a ``pilot''
site it--which hospital got it.
I know I was involved in that. We slowed down the process.
We are going to speed it up and we want to thank you for your
testimony.
Sergeant Olanoff. Thank you very much, Mr. Cunningham.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Bonilla wanted to make a comment as well,
sir.
Mr. Bonilla. I thank the Chairman.
I just want to reiterate, I happen to represent an area
with a high retiree population. I have got a wonderful
community called Air Force Village II in my congressional
district. I hear about these problems all the time, and it is
frankly a very sad situation where we have military retirees
nowadays that have to wait 6 months sometimes to get an
appointment. When they get there, they have to wait 6 to 9
hours, and they wonder where--where is the commitment that was
made to them when they put 30 years in for our country? And it
is a sad situation.
So all the points you are making are taken to heart; and,
rest assured, there are a lot of us that, if you followed any
of the testimony we have had in this Subcommittee in recent
days and weeks, you know that a lot of us are on your side on
this issue.
I would ask one quick question, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Yes.
Mr. Bonilla. I have a question about those participating in
Medicare Part B, because there is a problem with them
participating in the subvention program. Can you comment on
that just briefly, please?
Sergeant Olanoff. The only comment, sir, is that there
are--I think Virginia Torres probably knows the number--I think
it is about 7 percent of the people did not enroll in Medicare
Part B because at the time they were advised that, because all
of these military facilities were available, that you would
waste your money by paying Medicare Part B.
So there are a few of our members that would be affected
that, if they are not in Medicare Part B right now, they would
not be eligible to apply for the test of Medicare subvention.
Mr. Bonilla. Well, keep tooting the horn for us out there;
and, rest assured, there are a lot of us that are listening to
this problem.
Sergeant Olanoff. Mr. Bonilla, I didn't see you walk in. We
know you are a cosponsor, and there are many in this
Subcommittee that are, and hopefully we will get some help, and
we will get these problems solved.
Mr. Bonilla. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Sergeant Olanoff follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Thursday, March 19, 1998.
UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE AND DENTISTRY OF NEW JERSEY
WITNESSES
HON. DONALD M. PAYNE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF
NEW JERSEY
RUSS MOLLOY, DIRECTOR OF GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE
AND DENTISTRY OF NEW JERSEY
BETTY GALLO, CANCER INSTITUTE OF NEW JERSEY
Introduction
Mr. Young. Our next witness is going to be introduced by a
very distinguished colleague of ours. I would like to invite
Congressman Donald Payne of the great State of New Jersey to
come to the witness table and introduce his guests.
Statement of Congressman Payne
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much, Chairman Young. It is not
often I have the opportunity to come before this august group,
but it is certainly a privilege and to Mr. Cunningham, Mr.
Bonilla.
I would like to take a few moments this morning to
introduce two very special people from my State of New Jersey,
Mr. Russ Molloy, who is the Director of Government Relations at
the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, which
is headquartered in my district; and Ms. Betty Gallo, with the
Cancer Institute of New Jersey.
UMDNJ, which is our State medical school, is unique because
New Jersey is probably one of the only States that has simply
one medical school and, therefore, it does a tremendous amount
of coordinating. Although we have two or three outlets, it is
one school; and, therefore, we believe that we are able to do
more with the allocations that we have because we don't have
competing medical schools; and so for that I am very proud.
Mr. Molloy is here to tell us about the International
Center for Public Health, a strategic initiative to create a
world-class infectious disease research and treatment complex
at the University Heights Science Park in Newark, which is also
being developed.
Accompanying him, Mr. Molloy, is a good friend of mine, Ms.
Betty Gallo, who is the wife of the late Congressman Dean
Gallo. Dean Gallo and I served in county government many years
ago, before he came to Washington, preceding me by several
terms, but we worked closely together when we were in county
government with youth organizations. YMCA, he was very fond of.
We became very good friends. On different sides of the aisle,
but we had many more things in common.
So it is my pleasure to introduce Ms. Betty Gallo.
Dean was diagnosed in February of 1992 with prostate cancer
in the advanced stage and sadly passed away in November of
1994.
Ms. Gallo is a national advocate for prostate cancer and is
currently on the staff of the Cancer Institute of New Jersey,
which received the NCI designation as a comprehensive clinic
cancer center just last year.
So, Mr. Chairman, once again, I appreciate the opportunity
to appear before you and to introduce the witnesses to speak
about this very crucial issue of importance to New Jersey.
Thank you.
Mr. Young. Don, thank you very much.
We welcome both of you; and, as Congressman Payne has said,
I think everybody in the past loved Dean Gallo. He was a very
special person.
Mrs. Gallo. Thank you.
Mr. Young. We sorely miss him. We are happy to hear from
both of you this morning. Whoever would like to go first, go
forth.
Statement of Mr. Molloy
Mr. Molloy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Yes, I would like to personally express the University's
thanks to Congressman Payne. He has been a wonderful friend to
the University and to the State of New Jersey, and we
appreciate his attendance today.
I would like to briefly give you a background about two
priority projects that the University of Medicine and Dentistry
is pursuing that really relate specifically to the national
security of the United States.
Just a bit of background on UMDNJ. The University, as
Congressman Payne just noted, is the largest public health
sciences university in the United States. We have three medical
schools, all within our umbrella. We are the only institution
that has that; and, therefore, we don't have that competitive
nature of having schools fight against each other.
We also have schools of dentistry, nursing, health-related
professions and biomedical sciences. We also happen to have, in
Congressman Payne's district, one of the largest acute care
hospitals in the State of New Jersey. We are affiliated with
three core teaching hospitals, the largest behavioral health
care delivery system in the State of New Jersey, and we are
affiliated with well over 100 academic and health care
institutions statewide. So we are clearly--we are a State
agency. We are a public entity, and we are statewide in nature
and operation.
Initially, let me just touch base on the International
Center for Public Health. I testified last year before this
Committee that we were moving forward; and there has been some
truly dramatic changes in this project, both positive and
negative.
On the negative side, I think--I don't have to tell this
committee about the problems of infectious disease. It is on
the front page of every paper almost weekly now. Clearly, this
issue about what happens to national--international security
forces with infectious disease is becoming a very prevalent
discussion topic. The deployment of U.S. troops to new
geographic areas within the increasingly global economy have
contributed to this resurgence in infectious microbes.
Rapid and repeated exposure to these types of diseases can
arise in any part of the world, and it is a reality for both
military personnel and to the common U.S. citizen. By the year
2000, well over 400 million people will engage in international
travel and the issue of connection with infectious disease and
its spread arises therefrom.
New Jersey is unique because we are surrounded by eight
international seaports and airports, so our access to the
international field is enormous. We, therefore, propose the
creation of an International Center for Public Health as a
direct response to this looming crisis.
Within the University Heights Science Park, which is this
50-acre development project that Congressman Payne mentioned
earlier, it is a linkage between four academic institutions
within the City of Newark and private partners, including the
major corporations, Prudential, Bell Atlantic, and public
service electric and gas. They have tied together this proposal
to link three core tenents into a single anchor facility.
It is the International Center for Public Health, which
combines the Public Health Research Institute of New York,
which will be relocating from Manhattan into New Jersey; the
New Jersey Medical School, our medical school; National
Tuberculosis Center at the University--it is one of three model
TB centers in the country that are funded by the CDC--and our
Medical School's Department of Microbiology and Molecular
Genetics.
What we are doing is bringing together these three core
tenents to create a nexus, a connection that allows this
research to really expand.
Each of these groups have already gotten millions upon
millions of dollars in support for their research, both from
public and private sources; and we seek your support to pull
together and finalize this project.
Since I appeared last year, in October, a memorandum of
understanding was signed by the State of New Jersey and the
partners in this project; and the State has committed $60
million towards the overall cost of $78 million in both loan
and grant funds towards the development of this institution.
The State recognizes the enormous value and potential this
facility has; and we are appearing before you today, as I did
last year, to try to complete this project.
The secondary, if I may--Mrs. Gallo has already been
introduced to the Committee. Just to give you an overview of
what we are attempting to do.
The Cancer Institute of New Jersey, as Congressman Payne
mentioned, is the only NCI-designated clinical cancer facility
in the State of New Jersey. As we have discussed earlier, with
the International Center for Public Health, the key is to put
together the right experts to deal with the particular problem.
Prostate cancer, you will hear, I believe, later on from
the National Coalition on Prostate Cancer, is clearly an
enormous problem. Mrs. Gallo lost her husband to it. If anybody
is rediagnosed, if you get a recurrence of prostate cancer, it
is always fatal. What we are attempting to do is to bring
together a unique consortium of extraordinarily talented
individuals to go forward to create the Gallo Prostate Cancer
Institute, which is designed to do something quite dramatic. It
is designed to actually cure prostate cancer.
The Cancer Institute itself has been concentrating on
efforts to develop new ways to treat this devastating disease.
Currently, patients are enrolled in five different clinical
trials for advanced prostate cancer. And since we have the NCI
designation, anyone with a recurrent disease can immediately be
brought in to these advanced therapies and we can basically do
experimental therapies right now.
We are bringing in a series of focus groups so that we can
bring together the basic scientists looking at the core of the
problem, along with clinicians and physician-researchers so
they can work together and collaborate, which is now becoming
the catchword for all future research in this area. We have to
get enough people together to focus on this problem.
The Gallo Prostate Cancer Institute will be incorporated
into the Cancer Institute of New Jersey's statewide network so
that we have immediate statewide presence with all of our
affiliated hospitals with the Cancer Institute so that citizens
within the State and within the metropolitan region can
immediately access these goals--these new therapies and new
treatments.
We have already recruited investigators from sister
research institutes in the region in New Jersey to study this
issue. Clearly, we are--the issue about its impact not only on
the male population in general but on the African American
population is a critical component of this research. New Jersey
stands as a unique facility to try to address this issue
specifically.
With the establishment of the Gallo Prostate Cancer
Institute, collaborative research such as the projects that I
have just mentioned will be expanded. We can then also
effectively recruit all of the national and international
recognized scientists to focus on this research.
We expect to raise substantial private funds and public
funds through corporate and other resources, and we also ask
your support to secure whatever funds we can to facilitate the
establishment of this critically important resource.
This Committee is renowned for its efforts in biomedical
research; and we, on behalf of the University, want to thank
you for your efforts in the past. You have already taken major
steps in prostate cancer, and we encourage you to continue that
support.
I want to thank you for the time.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. We appreciate your
testimony. You know this Committee has invested substantial
sums in addition to the other funding provided by other
Committees, so we understand the seriousness of the problem.
Mrs. Gallo, did you want to make a statement?
Statement of Mrs. Gallo
Mrs. Gallo. The only statement I would like to say, Mr.
Chairman, is I appreciate the time to come here today; and I
just want to let you know that I am very committed to this,
because of Dean dying from prostate cancer.
You were not aware that when he was diagnosed in February
of 1992, he was in the advanced stages. His PSA, which is--
normally 1 to 4 is a normal PSA; his was 883. It was already
into his bones. His prognosis was 3 to 6 months at that time.
But being that we had the National Institutes of Health here in
Washington, he was able to go there and get a protocol called
Seromon which helped prolong his life for two and a half years
with a good quality of life.
That is why it is so important that with the--when an NCI
designate such as the Cancer Institute is able to get
information on clinical trials and, again, with our affiliates
kind of give them out to each of the communities so they--
people can stay in their communities but still have access to
these clinical trials through the Cancer Institute.
This Gallo Center would be in memory of Dean in the sense
that he did die of prostate cancer as a few colleagues here in
Congress already have, and I just feel that it is a real great
thing for what Dean had stood for and being able to help the
people in the State of New Jersey, who he so much cared about.
I am kind of trying to continue on his work.
Again, I just thank you.
Mr. Young. Well, thank you very much.
Congressman Payne, thank you for bringing the witnesses to
us today. We appreciate it.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Molloy. Thank you, sir.
[The statement of Mr. Molloy follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES
WITNESS
MAJOR GENERAL ROGER W. SANDLER, AUS (RET.), EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, RESERVE
OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to welcome back to the Committee
for another appearance General Roger Sandler, who is the
Executive Director of the Reserve Officers Association.
General, your statements are always very comprehensive; and
your entire statement will be placed in the record.
You point out that more than 106,000 Reservists were
deployed to Southwest Asia during Desert Shield and Desert
Storm. This last week, Mr. Bonilla and I had the privilege of
visiting with a number of Army Reservists at Camp McGovern,
just outside of Brcko in Bosnia; and I would have to tell you
that they are shoulder to shoulder with their Active duty
counterparts. You can't tell them apart. They are all doing a
really good job. Many of them would rather be back home, but
they understand the importance of what they are doing. So we
are happy to hear from you today.
One of the things they talked to us about, while we were
there, was the Ready Reserve Mobilization Income Insurance
Program and the problems that exist there. We think we fixed
that in the supplemental, which this Subcommittee reported out
of here last Thursday.
So we are happy to hear from you at this time, sir. It is
always good to have you back.
Statement of General Sandler
General Sandler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Cunningham,
Mr. Bonilla. Thank you very much.
We at the Reserve Officers Association certainly appreciate
what this committee has done, what you have done personally,
over the years in support of the Reserve components.
Let me just perhaps amend what I was going to say earlier
and just talk about the fact that I was also in Bosnia
recently, and that very subject was broached to me. The people
are only getting 5 percent of what they had originally
contracted for in the mobilization income insurance.
Now I realize we are putting forth a supplemental to
perhaps make up the difference so they will get 100 percent of
the benefit that is owed, but I would also tell you that they
are telling me that they would like to see that insurance
program reinstated in some fashion. Of course, we understand
that there was a problem in the manner in which it was designed
and the manner in which it was implemented, but perhaps we
could figure out some way in which we can do the same kind of a
program but with a more intellectual approach to how it is
implemented.
Let me just move on that, since the Gulf war, some
245,000--in which some 245,000 Reserve component personnel were
involuntarily mobilized, only 160,000, as you indicated, had
gone to the Gulf but considerably more were mobilized. There
has been a continuing levy on the demands of our Reservists in
northern Iraq, Haiti and in Bosnia.
It is our firm belief that the seamless integration of
which you just spoke of Reserve and Active components is at
least apparent in the operational contingencies; and, as a
result, the ROA feels that there needs to be a continued
recognition of the increased need to fund mission training in
modernization.
There have been approximately 17,000 Reservists of all
components mobilized for the Bosnia contingency. This shows no
sign of abating in the near future. There are inhibitors to
saving money, by not having enough contingency money available
to support extending Reservists on Active duty after they have
completed their 270-day statutory tour. We have many Reservists
who have indicated an interest in extending; but, because of a
lack of funding, they have not been able to do that. What that
really means is that we spend more money mobilizing a new
individual to take that person's place and paying the
transportation for the individual to come home and another bit
of transportation for a new person to go into theater and
thereby also interrupting the continuity of effort.
If we have got people who are willing to stay, then we
ought to consider figuring out ways to fund that.
I was on that trip to EUCOM, U.S./European Command, and
that short trip to both Hungary and Bosnia. I discovered that,
while I was there, that only the Air Force has made a sincere
attempt in providing this contingency type money so that they
could fly missions, in many cases--most cases, as a matter of
fact--with volunteers. And it really is important, in my
judgment, in the judgment of the leadership in EUCOM, that the
other services, particularly the Army but also the Navy, Mr.
Cunningham, that they also would come up with some way of--in
which they could fence money to pay for contingency operations.
We recommend that the Army and the Navy receive an increase
in their share of the DOD budget. I realize there is a lid on
the amount of the DOD budget, but they ought to get a larger
share. The Army itself has only had about 24 percent of the
budget for--almost historically, and they just need to figure
out a way, and perhaps this Committee could help direct their
efforts in that regard. If they want to use Reserve forces for
these contingencies, they need to have a pool of money to do
that.
Our feeling is that the Air Force has done a wonderful job,
and money ought not come from the Air Force to fund the Army or
the Navy. It ought to come perhaps from DOD overhead in various
and sundry headquarters around the world.
I will just touch again on the mobilization insurance
program. These folks are getting the 5 percent. They are
getting along just fine. You know, they realize that there is a
problem, but they do indicate very strongly to their
leadership, which was transmitted to me and also personally to
me by the individual soldiers with whom I spoke, that they
would like to see that reinstated.
So I would like this Committee to give strong consideration
to figuring out a way, and we would be delighted to work with
you on that, a way in which mobilization income insurance could
be reinstated.
My final comment, Mr. Chairman, is on the equipping and
training of the forces. As you know, long-term investment is
being sacrificed in order to maintain short-term readiness. We
need both. The Reserve components need to have sufficient money
to train the force. The Navy Reserve, in particular, has
reduced their annual training to 12 days in order to shift
funding to other requirements. They have also allowed a greater
number of exemptions from their annual training for the purpose
of saving and shifting money.
Fifteen percent of the officers in the Naval Reserve and as
many as 25 percent of the enlisted Naval personnel will not
perform any annual training. The statutory annual training days
are 14. Yet DOD has been given the authority to reduce that in
the event that they have been requested by the service. In this
case, the Navy did request it and were granted the authority to
reduce it to 12. They are the only service that is training
their people with 12 days annual training and allowing so many
exemptions from annual training.
We would also recommend that section 1301(a), Title 31,
U.S. Code--and I will provide that to you in a written form--be
broadened to allow reimbursement to the Reserve personnel
accounts without reprogramming. This was done on a very limited
basis previously. We would like to see it broadened so that the
contingency ops that are being supported by the Reserve
components could be reimbursed. This would assist in recouping
money back in those accounts.
Finally, this year, DOD--this is the year that DOD has been
waiting for, the year that their procurement lists were
expected to cover the needs of the Reserve components as well.
Well, they don't.
We request that you review the requirements in our
statement for the record and fund those high-priority items
listed. We believe that the $1.363 billion requested by DOD
falls short by at least a half a billion dollars.
Whatever amount is authorized, we recommend that the money
be allocated to miscellaneous accounts rather than line items
so that the services have the greatest amount of flexibility.
Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you very much for your
personal attention. Members of the Committee, thank you so
much. If you have any questions, I would be delighted to answer
them.
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much for being here.
The Members of this Committee recognize that we are being
forced to do more with less. We are wearing out troops. We are
wearing out equipment. We are not making that long-term
investment that you suggested. This Committee is trying to do
something about it that, but we are being hindered this year by
the lack of room in the budget.
General Sandler. Right.
Mr. Young. We are really going to have to get down to brass
tacks and work hard to do the things that have to be done.
General Sandler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. We appreciate your testimony today.
General Sandler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cunningham. General, I know that all the groups come in
here, but I have extreme hope. I look at the future and the
direction we are going--and this is not political, but a
balanced budget that gives us low interest rates, I mean, that
gives you more money in your pockets and the people that you
are talking about and the contingencies, when we--I think every
group in here, we could give them the dollars, but when you
have got to take out $16 billion for the extension in Somalia,
Haiti and Bosnia, and we are looking at staying in Bosnia,
which is going to be more, that is what really puts a clamp on
us. Because you only get about one of four dollars back, even
in a supplemental.
General Sandler. Right.
Mr. Cunningham. But I have extreme hope in the direction we
are going, and I think it is going to get better, and we will
do everything in a bipartisan way in this Committee to make
sure that that happens, sir.
General Sandler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. General, again, thank you very much for being
here with us. We always appreciate your testimony, sir.
General Sandler. Thank you.
[The statement of General Sandler follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
THE MILITARY COALITION
WITNESS
COMMANDER VIRGINIA TORSCH, MSC, USNR, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, GOVERNMENT
RELATIONS, THE RETIRED OFFICERS ASSOCIATION ON BEHALF OF THE
MILITARY COALITION
Introduction
Mr. Young. Now I would like to welcome Commander Virginia
Torsch of the Military Coalition. The Coalition consists of 25
military and veterans organizations, representing approximately
5 million members of the uniformed services, officers and
enlisted, Active, Reserve, veterans and retired, plus families
and survivors.
The Coalition does an excellent job of informing this
Committee of the collective thinking of the organizations; and
on those occasions that we need help with getting our
legislation supported throughout the Congress, the Coalition
has always been very helpful; and we appreciate that very much.
Commander, welcome to you. Your entire statement is
included in the record, and we would like to have you summarize
it.
Statement of Commander Torsch
Commander Torsch. Okay. Thank you very much, sir.
I would like to express my deepest appreciation to you and
your distinguished members of this Subcommittee for holding
these important hearings and for allowing us to present our
concerns. In fact, I think Mark Olanoff stole much of my
thunder, but I will reiterate--probably much of what he said
you will hear again in my statement.
We are particularly grateful for your leadership in
directing DOD to submit a test to allow the Medicare-eligible
uniformed services beneficiaries to enroll in the Federal
Employees Health Benefits Program.
I want to point out that we are very committed to making
TRICARE a better health care plan. I have detailed extensively
some of the problems with that program in my written testimony,
so I won't go over those; but I do want to say that I want to
thank this committee for being instrumental in ensuring that
many of these problems have been resolved or at least
ameliorated. We would like to express our deepest appreciation
for your Committee's role in working with and trying to fix
TRICARE, make it a better plan.
I also want to say that one of the most critical steps
towards restoring equity in the health care benefit for older
retirees was taken last year, with the enactment of legislation
for the Medicare subvention test and the Balanced Budget Act of
1997.
Again, the Coalition deeply appreciates the subcommittee's
leadership in getting this very important legislation enacted,
and we are optimistic that the test will prove that subvention
is a win/win provision for all concerned. However, we do have a
major concern that many subvention supporters believe
subvention is the solution. This is not the case at all. In
fact, when you look at TRICARE Senior, even if it is expanded
nationwide, when combined with DOD's level of effort, it will
only benefit about 30 to 40 percent of the Medicare-eligible
population.
Thus, to honor the lifetime health care commitment that
many have already previously testified to and which we in the
Coalition believe is a firm commitment to retirees, we believe
an additional option must be provided to the have-nots and the
lock-outs and that is to offer these beneficiaries the option
of enrolling in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program.
We realize that the principal argument being made currently
against FEHBP 65 is its price tag, both to DOD and to the
beneficiary. We took--the concern of the high cost to the
beneficiary was one that the Coalition took a good hard look at
and before we concluded that it would be a viable option for
beneficiaries, we conducted a health care cost survey in 1996.
That survey revealed that 32 percent of enlisted retirees who
are 65 and older and 41 percent of officers are already paying
substantially higher costs in supplemental care, and they would
be economically better off with FEHBP than under their current
health care coverage. That represents a significant population
who would benefit from FEHBP.
While the Coalition would prefer to have FEHBP 65 enacted
nationwide, we recognize that a limited test may be necessary
to take the guesswork out of the real cost of this option. For
this reason, we strongly urge this committee to pass at least a
test of FEHBP 65 along the lines spelled out in the current
House Bill 1766.
This bipartisan bill, which now has 190 cosponsors in the
House, and its Senate companion bill S. 1344 has 37 cosponsors,
would authorize a demonstration of FEHBP 65 in two geographic
areas, one including a TRICARE primary with military treatment
facilities and another area without such facilities; and it
would include no more than 25,000 Medicare-eligible service
beneficiaries in each area.
Based on the participation rate, we believe accurate data
could be derived to predict the cost of extending the program
nationwide; and I want to point out that this test initiative
has been scored by CBO as only costing $68 million each year.
The demonstration proposed by H.R. 1766 is consistent with your
committee's guidance in the fiscal year 1998 Defense
Appropriations Act, which directed DOD to submit FEHBP test
legislation to Congress this year.
We believe this should not be too problematic for DOD since
last year, in a report to Congress, Dr. Martin, who was then
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs,
indicated DOD would support a limited test of FEHBP 65 in non-
Prime areas. The Coalition is anxiously awaiting DOD's proposal
but is concerned that DOD is dragging its feet in developing
the plan.
Timing is critical because the Office of Personnel
Management has indicated to us that even with FEHPB 65
legislation enacted this summer, enrollment for the
demonstration could not begin until November, 1999, with
implementation in January, 2000. It would be a travesty if the
test slipped beyond that date.
It is truly ironic that, despite their many sacrifices,
retired service members lose their military health insurance at
age 65. Please keep in mind that those hit hardest by Congress'
and DOD's actions are the retirees who fought in World War II,
Korea and Vietnam and then won the Cold War. The latter victory
alone is saving the government many, many billion dollars in
reduced defense spending every year. These retirees have
already paid the premiums for equal coverage, not just in money
but in services sacrificed, including many who paid the
ultimate sacrifice.
Mr. Chairman, the Coalition respectfully requests and
strongly recommends that this Committee include funding to
conduct a demonstration of FEHBP 65 in its markup of the
Defense Appropriations bill.
I thank you, again, for the opportunity to address this
Subcommittee; and this concludes my testimony.
Mr. Young. Commander, thank you very much; and we, I say
again, do appreciate the position of the Coalition and the help
that you have always given us. We recognize the difficult
problem of getting DOD to move sometimes, but we are not the
authorizing committees, but we are trying to use the pressure
that we can to develop a test plan.
Commander Torsch. We much appreciate that, sir.
Mr. Young. Thank you again for being here.
Commander Torsch. Thank you.
[The statement of Commander Torsch follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
NATIONAL BREAST CANCER COALITION
WITNESS
FRANCES M. VISCO, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL BREAST CANCER COALITION
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to introduce next Ms. Fran Visco,
who is President of the National Breast Cancer Coalition.
The Coalition represents 400 member organizations and more
than 40,000 individual women, their families and friends. She
and the Coalition have been very instrumental in making sure
that this Committee and our colleagues in the Senate are well
aware of the needs here, and we appreciate that very much. We
have been able to add substantial money over the President's
budget for this effort for breast cancer research.
This year, the money is going to be very difficult to come
by. I have to warn everybody of that, because we don't have the
budget room that we had in previous years. But, anyway, Fran,
we are always glad to see you.
Ms. Visco. Thank you.
Mr. Young. We are always glad to hear you. It is always
nice to know that you are out there in the hallway during our
markup to give us the support that we need to get this job
done.
Statement of Ms. Visco
Ms. Visco. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Cunningham.
I want to come here today just to bring you up-to-date on
the program and to, again, offer my thanks to you, to the
Committee, for your ongoing support of this incredible program
and to pledge that we will work with you in any way necessary
to make certain that we have significant funding to continue.
I am here once again as a breast cancer survivor and on
behalf of the 2.6 million women living in this country with
breast cancer and in memory of the more than a quarter of a
million women who have died of breast cancer since this program
began. We truly believe, and we know that you agree with us,
that this program has brought about hope and has brought about
scientific discoveries that means that those numbers will
significantly change in the future.
Over the past year, this program once again has made
history. Last fall, the Era of Hope, Department of Defense
breast cancer research meeting occurred here in Washington,
D.C. For the first time ever, a major biomedical research
program, funded with taxpayer dollars, issued a report to the
Nation on what happened with those dollars.
It was an unbelievable meeting. It was unbelievable not
just because it was the first-ever report to the Nation but
also because it was unique in that it was really a
collaboration in partnership between women with breast cancer
and the scientific community. I want to tell you some of what I
heard at that meeting.
New researchers came up to me to tell me that, because of
this program, they think about their research differently. It
has changed the way they do their medical research.
Established scientists came up to me and said, why aren't
all of our programs run like this?
Very recently, an extremely well-known, internationally
well-known breast cancer scientist said to me, you--meaning
this program and the activists--have changed the way we think.
You have brought us out of our ivory towers; you have changed
our world.
This program has brought about not just more money for
breast cancer research, it hasn't just brought in new people to
the field, but it has changed the way scientists are doing
their research. And that has ramifications not just for me, for
a woman with breast cancer, but for all women, all women in the
military, all women everywhere, and all men also, because these
scientists focus on other areas. This program has set a model.
I also want to point out to you that, over the past year,
the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences
has issued a report. They evaluated this program, and they gave
it a four-star rating. They said the program is unbelievable
and must continue.
I want to thank you not just for continuing to fund the
program but also for respecting the integrity of the program. I
know that, working together, we have had a difficult time at
times protecting this program and recognizing this importance
of peer review and recognizing the unusual, incredible system
we have set up. You have really been a leader in making certain
that that system remains, and that is the system that has
captured the imagination of the scientific community and of
activists, and that is the system that has brought about
incredible results.
I don't think I need to take up much more of your time. You
know how important this program is and how successful it is,
and you know that you will hear from us and that we will
continue to work with you to make certain this program
continues.
But I do want to bring you one report, and it is just an
example of many. Very soon, there is a therapy that will be
submitted to the Food and Drug Administration for approval, and
that therapy will probably be made available to millions of
women in this country. It will be a very new, unusual, first
biologic for breast cancer treatment. That therapy is here
because the scientists who came up with the initial discovery
got funding from the Department of Defense Breast Cancer
Research Program when no one else would fund him.
That is a specific, concrete example of what we have done.
And I have told you that the change in the scientific community
is another example of what we have done.
I want to thank you for working with us to bring all of
this about. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. Well, Fran, we really appreciate you and the
good work that you do; and I hope that you know that and
believe that.
Ms. Visco. Yes.
Mr. Young. This is a very important crusade that we are all
on. It is very threatening to many, many, many women in our
country.
Ms. Visco. Yes, I know you know that.
Mr. Young. It is always good to see you. Thank you for
being here again.
Ms. Visco. Thank you.
Mr. Young. We look forward to seeing you in the hallway
during markup time.
Ms. Visco. Thanks.
[The statement of Ms. Visco follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NURSE ANESTHETISTS
WITNESS
RON VAN NEST, CRNA, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, NURSE ANESTHESIA PROGRAM,
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NURSE ANESTHETISTS
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to now welcome Ron Van Nest, the
Assistant Director of the Nurse Anesthesia Program at
Georgetown University. Mr. Van Nest represents 27,000 certified
anesthetists in the United States, including 600 in the
military services.
Mr. Van Nest, your prepared statement will appear in the
record; and we would like you to summarize it in your oral
testimony.
Statement of Mr. Van Nest
Mr. Van Nest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Incidentally, I understand you have some of your
students with you today; and I wanted to make the room aware of
that.
Mr. Van Nest. Yes, sir. Thank you very much for your
patience in them coming in.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before this Committee today. My name is Ronald Van Nest, and I
am a certified registered nurse anesthetist, a CRNA.
I served in the United States Navy for 30 years, and I was
a member of the American Association of Nurse Anesthetists
Federal Services Committee for the last 3 of those years. At
that time, I also held the position of Nurse Anesthesia
Consultant to the Navy Surgeon General. I am retired from the
Navy Nurse Corps and currently am an instructor in a Nurse
Anesthesia Program at a local university, as you mentioned,
Georgetown; and my students, as you mentioned, are here to
cheer me on, I hope.
I am testifying today on behalf of the American Association
of Nurse Anesthetists, the AANA, which represents more than
27,000 CRNAs, including 600 that serve in the Armed Forces.
My testimony here today will touch on the status of CNRAs
in the military and how effective utilization of those CRNAs
could result in considerable cost savings for the Department of
Defense, without any sacrifice in quality.
First, I would like to thank this Committee for its
continued support of the efforts of the Department of Defense
to recruit and retain qualified nurse anesthetists. The AANA
particularly thanks this Committee for your support of special
pay programs for CRNAs and strongly recommends their
continuation as an important recruitment and retention tool to
ensure that our Federal services can meet their medical
mission.
CRNAs save the Department of Defense a considerable amount
of money, without any sacrifice in quality of care. Nurse
anesthetists, while providing the same services as physician
anesthesiologists, are far less costly for the services to
educate and retain. Data indicates that as many as 10 highly
qualified CRNAs may be educated for the cost of training one
anesthesiologist.
It is true that cost effectiveness means nothing if the
quality is not there, but let me stress that numerous studies
have shown that there is no significant difference in outcomes
between the two providers. Both providers receive similar
training in anesthesia. One started that training as a
physician, the other as a nurse.
The services also spend far less in bonus money for CRNAs
as compared to anesthesiologists. Anesthesiologists receive far
more types and amounts of bonus money. If a nurse anesthetist
and a physician start in the anesthesia training at the same
time, in 8 years the nurse anesthetist will have received
$69,000 in special pays, while the anesthesiologist will have
received a quarter of a million dollars. The Department of
Defense could provide even more cost-effective care with more
appropriate utilization of its anesthesia providers.
The three services are currently operating at most medical
treatment facilities with approximately two CRNAs for every one
anesthesiologist. But isn't it ironic that during World War II,
when nurse anesthesia training was little more than 4 months,
and mostly on-the-job training at that, that their ratio was 17
CRNAs to one anesthesiologist? Compare that to today when
anesthesia is far safer, with sophisticated technology and
computerized monitors and alarms.
With nurse anesthetists educated at the Master's Degree
level, we find that CRNAs are being supervised and at ratios of
2 to 1 and in some cases even one to one.
On many military operational missions today, it is a CRNA
that is deployed with combat units or aboard aircraft carriers
as the sole anesthesia provider with anesthesiologist present.
I personally served as the sole anesthesia provider for a
population of 5,000 at our base in Keflavik, Iceland, for 2
years; and I also served as a sole anesthesia provider on an
aircraft carrier for 4 months. If such practice models are
acceptable in some settings, then there is no reason they
should not be acceptable in urban military treatment
facilities.
I would recommend that this Committee direct the Department
of Defense to utilize their anesthesia providers in the most
cost-effective manner, prohibiting strict ratio requirements
for urban facilities that only drive up the cost and do nothing
to enhance the quality of care.
In conclusion, AANA thanks this Committee again for its
support of military nurse anesthetists through the incentive
special pay and board certification pay. AANA believes that
more appropriate utilization of CRNAs in the military is of
critical concern and is an area that could be examined for
increased cost savings.
I thank the Committee members for their consideration on
these issues, and I will be happy to answer any of your
questions.
Mr. Young. Mr. Van Nest, thank you very much for being here
with us today.
We certainly understand--those of us who have gone through
some more serious surgeries understand the importance of what
it is that you do, and we appreciate your being here today.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Van Nest. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Cunningham. And let me just say about the last witness,
the only thing I disagree with, it shouldn't be just civilian.
The nurse's role should be expanded in a lot of other areas
besides just the one that he mentioned. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Van Nest follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Thursday, March 19, 1998.
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
WITNESS
DR. PHILIP FURMANSKI, DEAN, FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCE, CHAIRMAN AND
PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF BIOLOGY, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
Introduction
Mr. Cunningham. Next we will hear from Dr. Philip
Furmanski, Dean, Faculty of Arts and Science, New York
University. We welcome your testimony, Doctor.
Statement of Mr. Furmanski
Mr. Furmanski. Thank you, Mr. Cunningham.
My name is Philip Furmanski, and I am speaking on behalf of
New York University as Dean of its Faculty of Arts and Science.
I appreciate very much this opportunity to discuss with you
an initiative which addresses national goals for enlisting
university-based scientific research to catalyze technologic
innovation and strengthen national defense and military
preparedness. Our project will advance national security
interests through enhanced scientific understanding of brain
development and activity.
We believe that a national investment into research on the
mind and brain will repay itself many times over. To put my
remarks into a larger context, I would like to thank this
committee for its recognition that broad-based university
research over the years has been one of the cornerstones of our
national security efforts.
Research support provided by the Department of Defense has
been crucial to advancing new discoveries on campus with
important military and civilian applications.
For example, by its investment in research into computers,
communications and networking technology, the Department has
spurred the development of an entire civilian industry
generating millions of jobs and billions of tax dollars.
I would like today to present to you another possible
investment by the Department into research that will push the
frontiers of understanding of how the brain develops and
functions and how we can enhance our ability to learn, think,
remember and work as productive members of society.
At NYU, we are undertaking to do this by establishing a
Center for Cognition, Learning, Emotion and Memory Studies.
This Center will not only carry out research but will also act
to help train the next generation of interdisciplinary brain
scientists. Research in this Center will substantially expand
what we know about the neurodynamics of learning and memory;
the brain's perception, its acquisition and storage of
information; the neurobiology of fear and its impact on
learning and performance; and information processing in the
brain and, by extension, in computers and other machines.
These studies will have enormous applications in the
training and performance of military personnel and for the
development of new technologies.
As one example, our research has implications for
instruction, including those in the military, in the classroom,
as well as in hands-on use of sophisticated machinery and
weaponry. The more we know about how peopleprocess and retain
information, the better we can design such training programs and target
them to individuals with different levels of preparedness.
Our research can identify different learning styles and
suggest how instruction can accommodate those styles and how
learning technologies and simulated learning environments can
be harnessed to improve motivation and increase retention and
memory.
Second, our neurological research on emotion has
implications for improving performance under the high-stress
conditions that characterize military operations. Our research
in the neurobiology of fear is examining the brain systems that
malfunction, for example, in anxiety phobias, panic attacks and
post-traumatic stress disorders. These studies will help us
understand the source of fear and other emotions, how they are
triggered by circumstance, why they are hard to control, and of
the greatest practical importance, how emotions can
incapacitate, undermine attentiveness and weaken memory.
Ultimately, our research will generate clues for preventing and
treating emotional disorders on a very broad and wide scale.
Finally, our vision psychologists and computer vision
researchers are working together to investigate intelligence
and information processing in neural systems and in their
machine analogues in the computer data imaging, processing and
retrieval areas.
These kinds of studies have far-reaching implications,
first, for our understanding in improving the human capacity to
perceive and respond to visual cues; and, second, for
developing computer technologies to process and monitor large
displays of information which obviously have implications in
the military and in civilian areas as well.
To establish this interdisciplinary Center, NYU is seeking
support to expand research programs, attract investigators from
the disparate disciplines that are required and provide the
technical resources necessary to create a premier, world-class
scientific enterprise.
As you know, traditional funding sources cannot underwrite
the establishment of a cross-disciplinary area of scientific
study, particularly one that includes research and teaching and
reaches across the fields so disparate as computer science,
cognitive science, biomedicine, psychology and education.
New York University is well positioned to create and
operate this major national cross-disciplinary research and
training center. The largest private university in the United
States, with over 49,000 students and 13 schools, NYU has
outstanding researchers and well-established strengths in
neurobiology, cognitive science, neuromagnetism, behavioral
science, mathematics, computer science, educational psychology
and the like. With these strengths, NYU will create a
distinctive center that will produce a new understanding of the
brain and new ways of using that knowledge to meet our national
goals.
Our faculty are already widely recognized for their
research on memory, learning and motivation. NYU is
internationally known for its studies in vision, a key input to
learning; and NYU is the leader in new studies on the
neurobiology of emotion and its connections to learning, memory
and perception.
Parenthetically, I should say that much of this work has
been featured very prominently in media venues such as the New
York Times, Time Magazine and the networks.
As we complete what has been called the Decade of the
Brain, NYU, through this new center, is poised for leadership
in accomplishing the aims of this important initiative and the
goals central to this Committee's priorities.
NYU is in a special position among universities to bring
these strengths in so many very different disciplines together
to attack these crucial issues and then to disseminate the
results for the benefit of the American people.
I know, Mr. Cunningham, that many members of this Committee
have played a leading role in supporting brain research and
related issues concerning education, their application to
children, as well as those aspects that relate to the military;
and, for that, I would like to express my very deep
appreciation, both as a university administrator and as a
scientist myself.
Mr. Cunningham, this concludes my testimony. I thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today.
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you, Doctor. You need to have me
testify before your hospital and your university. This tape has
some 36 Surface-to-Air Missiles--SAMS fired at me while engaged
with 22 MiGs. Fear has an advantage by forcing the mind to
work, but uncontrolled fear makes you vulnerable.
Those studies are very worthwhile, and I thank you for your
testimony.
Mr. Furmanski. Thank you very much. Thank you.
Mr. Cunningham. I just got this tape the day before
yesterday, and it makes the hair on my neck stand up.
Mr. Furmanski. I imagine so.
[The statement of Mr. Furmanski follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Thursday, March 19, 1998.
NATIONAL PROSTATE CANCER COALITION
WITNESS
JAY H. HEDLUND, PRESIDENT AND CEO, THE NATIONAL PROSTATE CANCER
COALITION
Introduction
Mr. Cunningham. Our next witness, the National Prostate
Cancer Coalition, Jay Hedlund, President. Mr. Hedlund.
Statement of Mr. Hedlund
Mr. Hedlund. Mr. Cunningham, thank you for the opportunity
to be here today.
I am Jay Hedlund, President of the National Prostate Cancer
Coalition, a nationwide grass-roots advocacy organization
dedicated to the mission of ending prostate cancer as a serious
health concern for men and their families.
In addition to individual survivors, family members,
researchers, medical professionals, the National Prostate
Cancer Coalition members include the American Cancer Society,
the American Foundation of Urologic Disease, CaP CURE, national
survivor support groups like US TOO International, Man to Man
and PAACT, and numerous State and local survivor groups.
A fundamental objective of the Coalition is to increase
Federal funding for prostate cancer research commensurate with
the terrible impact of this deadly disease.
I am pleased to have the opportunity to provide testimony
in support of the prostate cancer research programs conducted
by the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command at Ft.
Detrick and the U.S. Army Center for Prostate Disease Research
at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. And on behalf of the more
than one million American men who are living with their
diagnosis of prostate cancer, and their families, I want to
thank this Committee for the terrific leadership that it has
given to the effort to fund basic and clinical research into
prostate cancer.
The commitment of this Committee to fund prostate cancer
research has given important new momentum to the drive to find
a cure for this epidemic, which we firmly believe research can
and will do.
I know that prostate cancer has touched this institution
and the Appropriations Committee. Former members Silvio Conte
and George O'Brien died of prostate cancer, Dean Gallo as well.
His wife Betty, who appeared before you earlier today, is a
member of the National Prostate Cancer Coalition Board and a
tireless advocate for prostate cancer research.
Fortunately, a number of other members of the institution
on the House and Senate side who have been touched by the
disease have had much better outcomes from their treatment, and
that is what we want to see for many more Americans as well.
We urge the Committee to substantially increase the
commitment they have made to prostate cancer in the last 2
years, in fiscal 1997 and 1998, with the establishment of the
new program at Ft. Detrick.
Prostate cancer has been left behind for too long to the
terrible impact on millions of Americans. Annually, more
Americans are diagnosed with prostate cancer than with any
other nonskin cancer. Last year, 209,000 Americans were
diagnosed with prostate cancer; and 41,800 American men died of
prostate cancer. Prostate cancer is the second leading cause of
cancer death among American men, just behind lung cancer.
African Americans have the highest prostate cancer incident
rates in the world, and their mortality rates are double that
of Caucasian men.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cunningham, prostate cancer comprises
more than 15 percent of all nonskin cancer cases that are
diagnosed but receives less than 4 percent of the Federal
research funds, cancer research funds.
I would like to make three brief points regarding the DOD's
involvement with prostate cancer research, particularly to
focus on the peer review program at Ft. Detrick, although we
strongly support the terrific program that is run by Colonel
David McLeod at Walter Reed as well.
First, the appropriation of $45 million each year in fiscal
years 1997 and 1998, through the work of this subcommittee,
although relatively modest, served to increase by more than 50
percent the total Federal commitment to prostate cancer
research. This has come at a critical time when momentum has
been building in the----
Mr. Cunningham. I am sorry to interrupt you, but if you
could hold, I have got 1 minute to make this vote.
Mr. Hedlund. Okay. I don't want you to miss that vote.
Mr. Cunningham. The Chairman is not back yet. He will let
you continue.
Mr. Hedlund. I would be glad to. Don't miss a vote,
absolutely.
Mr. Cunningham. All right.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hedlund, why don't you go ahead and proceed.
Mr. Hedlund. Okay, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
I won't go over the earlier part of my testimony, but I
wanted to express the regards of our Chairman, Bob Samuels,
from the Tampa Bay area, who you know and who is very
appreciative of the leadership that you and this Committee have
given to prostate cancer.
I wanted to make three points regarding the DOD's
involvement in prostate cancer, particularly focusing on the
new peer review program at Ft. Detrick, although in no way--I
very much want to stress how important we think the quality
work is that is being done by Colonel David McLeod over at
Walter Reed as well and don't want to neglect that program.
But, first, the appropriation of $45 million both in fiscal
years 1997 and 1998 through the work of this subcommittee,
although relatively modest, served to increase by more than 50
percent the total Federal research commitment to prostate
cancer.
This has come at a critical time when important research
funded by outside organizations, like CaP CURE, the American
Cancer Society, the American Foundation of Urologic Disease and
others, as well as research at the National Institutes of
Health, have built important momentum in the area of prostate
cancer research. That momentum, we believe, must be sustained
by the commitment of significant public resources if we are
going to achieve the needed breakthroughs in diagnosis,
treatment, cure and prevention of prostate cancer.
This Committee has also given important leadership in the
effort to accelerate the time period from appropriation to
distribution of research money to scientists. With the help of
this Committee, the Ft. Detrick program has expedited the
fiscal year 1997 schedule by several months and will award
initial grants, we understand, in the next 4 to 6 weeks. They
will use some of the fiscal year 1998 appropriations to fund
grant proposals received in the fiscal year 1997 cycle and will
cut in half the time taken from the fiscal year 1997 cycle for
the schedule--for the--between the receipt in appropriations
and distribution of scientists for the fiscal year 1999 money.
We think that both General Blanck and Colonel Rich and
their colleagues have been very responsive in this regard in
accelerating the program without sacrificing quality of
performance.
Second, we believe--the NPCC believes that the highly
focused, goal-directed program of basic and clinical research
into prostate cancer was very much needed, and that the peer
review program at Ft. Detrick in its first year has proven that
it will make a substantial contribution to fight to find a
cure.
I was just very struck by the terrific testimony that Fran
Visco gave earlier of the terrific progress that has been made
in the breast cancer program up at Ft. Detrick, and we see that
this program is being built in the model of that program and
can have the same kind of substantial impact that that program
has had.
The broad agency announcement that they issued really drew
in a large number of quality proposals. It gives evidence that
the program will attract new researchers into the field. Their
streamlined approach at getting research dollars into the field
will enable them to nimbly build on some of the breakthroughs
and some of the exciting research areas that are coming. We
believe that, with a continuing commitment of resources, that
they will make a substantial contribution in the comprehensive
research fight against prostate cancer.
Finally, we believe that they are positioned well to add
significantly to what is going on in prostate cancer research.
About a year, a year and a half ago, the National Prostate
Cancer Coalition gathered scientists and researchers to develop
an agenda of prostate cancer research; and they identified more
than $250 million of worthwhile prostate cancer research
projects that were going unfunded in 1997 simply due to lack of
public or private funds. We believe that the peer review
program at Ft. Detrick is really going to--has a promise of
filling a tremendous research need that exists in the prostate
cancer world to help us find a cure.
In sum, the Ft. Detrick program has attracted quality
proposals, has only been able to fund a fraction of those
through the fiscal year 1997 appropriation. It is structured in
a way that will be attractive to the most innovative
researchers who are making exciting progress in finding
breakthroughs for prostate cancer. We believe that Colonel Rich
has built a strong and promising program that deserves a
substantial increase in its appropriation for fiscal year 1999;
and, along with the program that Colonel McLeod has at Walter
Reed, we strongly urge this Committee to do whatever it can to
substantially increase its commitment to prostate cancer for
fiscal year 1999.
Saying that, I fundamentally want to thank the leadership
of this Committee for giving great hope and tangible benefits
to the millions of Americans whose lives are touched by
prostate cancer.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much for your statement, sir. We
appreciate your being here today. You know of our concern about
the issues that you have mentioned.
Mr. Hedlund. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Hedlund follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
WITNESS
CYRUS M. JOLLIVETTE, VICE PRESIDENT FOR GOVERNMENT RELATIONS,
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to introduce next Mr. Cyrus
Jollivette, who is the Vice President of Government Relations
at the University of Miami.
In his prepared statement, Cyrus requests funding for
several projects, including the Navy's Atlantic test range and
oceanographic research vessel and the University's high-
priority Cancer Prevention, Control and Treatment Initiatives.
Cyrus, that statement becomes a part of our record; and we
would like you to proceed with your oral testimony.
Statement of Mr. Jollivette
Mr. Jollivette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. It is always good to see you.
Mr. Jollivette. It is good to see you too, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cunningham, also.
Thank you very much for allowing me to appear before you
today on behalf of my colleagues at the University of Miami.
As you indicated, Mr. Chairman, we have included in our
earlier statement a request for support of four initiatives
that come within the purview of this Committee: first, the
South Florida Ocean Measurements Center in coordination with
the Navy, Florida Atlantic University and NOVA university;
next, support for a request that is coming from the University
of Southern Mississippi for a new fishery, oceanography
research ship for research programs in the Southeast,
Mississippi and Texas; continuation of funding for the North-
South Center; and, finally, support for the University of
Miami's Cancer Prevention, Control and Treatment Initiatives.
I would like to talk about the Ocean Measurements Center
first and the unique partnership that exists between academic
scientists from three Florida universities and the Navy, which
provides the opportunity to meet the significant need for
science and technology development efforts in the near shore
environment.
The Navy test range in Florida is a unique location in that
it is the nearest approach of the continental shelf to the
shore along the entire Atlantic seaboard. Our scientists and
ocean engineers are increasing their understanding of the near
shore acoustic environment and pursuing development of AUV
sonar and other related technologies.
We ask that you provide $2.75 million to continue this
private program in fiscal year 1999. My colleagues and I are
convinced that this consistently funded, long-term partnership
provides the best benefit to the Navy and the scientific
community.
Second, we respectfully urge you to fund the proposal put
forward by the Institute of Marine Scientists at the University
of Southern Mississippi for the construction of a Class III
research ship for the southeastern U.S., Mississippi and Texas.
A Class III ship, as you know, is approximately 190 feet in
length. We agree that a new fisher-oceanography research ship,
with the capability to conduct complex, interdisciplinary
research in the shallow water regions of the Gulf Coast and the
Intra-America Sea, is vital to support our academic research
programs.
The existing Southeast Consortium for Oceanographic
Research, known as SECOR, would operate the ship as a part of
the UNOLS fleet; and UNOLS does support this arrangement that
provides dock-side facilities in Texas and Florida and
coordinates instrumentation use and marine technician support
among the SECOR members. SECOR members now include three of the
ship-operations institutions in the Southeast and the Gulf, the
University of Miami, the University of Texas and Texas A&M. The
University of Southern Mississippi will be added very soon.
My colleagues and I believe strongly that only through
resource sharing can we effectively manage costly ship
operations. Support of this project will benefit all academic
institutions in the southeastern U.S. and the Gulf of Mexico.
Now, about the North-South Center at the University of
Miami. Its mission is to promote better relations and to serve
as a catalyst for change among the United States, Canada and
the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean. Our goal is to
find viable solutions to the problems confronting the nations
of the Western Hemisphere.
In the last decade, the North-South Center has been engaged
in promoting and sponsoring research and dialogue on inter-
American security issues. Among other issues, the Center has
conducted an extensive research program on drug trafficking in
the hemisphere, studied and promoted dialogue on the crisis in
Cuba, Panama and Haiti and has engaged in research in civil
military relations, conflict resolution and security
cooperation.
The relocation of the U.S. Southern Command to Miami has
afforded an enhanced role for the North-South Center in
security issues. My colleagues have figured prominently in
discussions of the future of civil-military relations in the
hemisphere. Our Center is committed to advancing the state of
security cooperation in the Americas. It serves as a bridge
between government officials, dedicated to enhancing regional
security, and academic and other civil society experts who have
devoted their professional lives to analyzing the hemisphere's
critical security issues.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me turn to health matters and
the University's focus on cancer. The disease does not spare
anyone based upon age, sex, ethnic background or socioeconomic
status. We know that basic research will eventually lead to the
causes and hopefully cures of this dreaded disease. However,
research already has given us the tools for prevention and
early detection that will reduce the suffering until cures can
be found.
My colleagues at the University School of Medicine seek to
apply these tools in a variety of settings for prevention,
control and treatment, especially in multiethnic, diverse
minority populations.
This translational approach to biomedical research, that
is, applying the basic scientific knowledge we have already
gained to populations in clinical settings, is a key component
of our research at the University of Miami. By applying this
knowledge, we can reduce the morbidity, mortality and improve
the quality of life for all. We are convinced our special
expertise in this area, in pediatric cancer, in breast cancer,
in prostate cancer and other areas referred to will greatly
assist the Department of Defense.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to
appear today. My colleagues and I hope it won't be difficult
for you to fund these initiatives in what is a difficult budget
year.
Thank you.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. We always appreciate the
dialogue that we have with you and the good work that is done
at the university.
Mr. Jollivette. Thank you very much. We appreciate your
confidence and support.
[The statement of Mr. Jollivette follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
LOVELACE RESPIRATORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
WITNESS
JOE L. MAUDERLY, SENIOR SCIENTIST AND DIRECTOR OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, THE
LOVELACE RESPIRATORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to now welcome Dr. Joe Mauderly of
the Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute from Albuquerque,
New Mexico. The Institute currently performs some work for the
Air Force and the Army, as well as a number of other Federal
agencies.
Doctor, your entire statement will be placed in the record;
and I would ask that you summarize it at this point.
Statement of Mr. Mauderly
Mr. Mauderly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to discuss how our Institute can meet some
important existing needs of the Department of Defense, as well
as our support in the past.
Lovelace is an independent, nonprofit institute in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, conducting research on respiratory
disease and risk from inhaled toxic materials in the workplace
and the environment. Lovelace also leases the privatized
government-owned inhalation toxicology research facility on
Kirkland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, which is the Nation's
best-equipped facility for studies of inhaled materials.
Lovelace has a track record of supporting the Department of
Defense. It produced much of the information that placed the
health risk of nuclear weapons production and deployment in
their proper context and by virtue of that helped to win the
Cold War.
Lovelace is working to place our understanding of illnesses
potentially related to Gulf War activities on a stronger
scientific basis than it often has been in the past.
Together with Sandia National Laboratories, we are
developing methods for the remote detection of airborne
biological agents. We are working with another company on a new
plasma technology for destroying chemical and biological agents
without air contamination, which has been an important problem.
We are also determining the toxicity of depleted uranium
fragments from armor-piercing munitions.
Now Lovelace proposes to work with the Department to meet
its research needs in four specific areas that I would like to
discuss briefly.
The first is establishing a cooperative agreement for
conducting toxicological research. It is becoming increasingly
apparent to both Lovelace and the Army in particular, also
other services, that the Institute is well-matched to a number
of current research needs, a spectrum of needs, particularly in
the toxicology area. Lovelace seeks a cooperative agreement
with the Department to facilitate the conduct of this work in a
cost-effective manner.
The second area is using the National Environmental
Respiratory Center to address the Department's concern for the
inhalation of multiple air contaminants. Now the health risks
of breathing multiple air contaminants and pollutant mixtures
is a difficult issue that until now has received very little
attention. The Department needs to understand these risks from
inhaling mixtures of air contaminants, from sequential
exposures to various air contaminants and from combinations of
occupational exposures and nonoccupational exposures such as
cigarette smoke.
The National Environmental Respiratory Center is being
established this year at Lovelace by EPA to address the health
risk of mixtures and combined exposures to inhaled materials.
Lovelace proposes that the Department participate in this
activity to meet information needs specific to its issues, as
well as the environmental issues of concern to EPA.
The third area is in the reduction of chemical and
biological threats. The development of new technologies to
reduce these important threats requires multidisciplinary
research. Better detection and countermeasures will require
integrated research involving electronics, chemistry, aerosols,
lung injury and infectious disease.
Now, no single institution is expert in all of these
fields. However, together, Lovelace, Sandia National
Laboratories and the University of New Mexico are expert in all
of these areas; and they propose to work together to develop
new ways to deal with these threats. The focus of this work
would be on remote detection of airborne agents, personnel
protection, threat neutralization and treatment of affected
individuals.
The final area is improved treatment of disabling
respiratory diseases. As you have heard this morning, the
Department has military employees and civilian workers with
many kinds of disabling diseases, including lung diseases.
Those destructive respiratory diseases, such as severe
emphysema, have been thought to be incurable; and treatment
consists just largely of trying to maintain quality of life for
the patients.
Other diseases, such as lung cancer, are possible to cure
in some instances but are usually fatal; and more than twice as
many women will die of lung cancer this year as breast cancer;
more than twice as many men will die of lung cancer this year
than prostate cancer.
Together with its Senior Fellows that it supports in other
institutions, Lovelace is now making breakthroughs in the
treatment and cure of these intractable diseases. A remarkable
example is the work of Lovelace Fellows Drs. Don and Gloria
Massaro at Georgetown University Medical School, who have now
produced results suggesting that emphysema might actually be
reversed by treatment with analogues of Vitamin A; and this has
been done in animals at this time.
Another example of our work is to deliver anti-cancer drugs
directly to the lung and airway surfaces by inhalation, a route
that has not yet been used. Supporting research aimed at
treating and potentially curing disabling respiratory disease
is well within the scope of the Department's health concerns.
I thank you again for the opportunity to present this
information.
Mr. Young. Doctor, thank you very much.
I know that Mr. Skeen will be pleased to read your
testimony. He is very interested in the work in Albuquerque and
all of New Mexico. Thank you for being here.
Mr. Mauderly. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Mauderly follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
JOSLIN DIABETES CENTER
WITNESS
KENNETH E. QUICKEL, JR., M.D., PRESIDENT, JOSLIN DIABETES CENTER
Introduction
Mr. Young. Mr. Nethercutt, Dr. Quickel is our next witness.
Mr. Nethercutt. The Committee welcomes Dr. Kenneth Quickel,
President of the Joslin Diabetes Center of Boston,
Massachusetts. His center participates in a joint VA/DOD
diabetes research project.
I am certainly well aware of what you do, Doctor, and
certainly welcome you here today. I have a special interest in
diabetes and have been delighted to have a chance to work with
you. Your prepared statement will be made a part of the record,
and we are happy to have you summarize your testimony at this
time.
Statement of Dr. Quickel
Dr. Quickel. Thank you, Mr. Nethercutt. I want to record
our sincere thanks to the chairman and the entire Committee and
especially to you for your support of a fairly unique
partnership that we are endeavoring to establish with the
Department of Defense and the VA system, with your help.
The Joslin demonstration project will Institute some pilot
programs for the detection of diabetes, the prevention of it
and the care of people with diabetes in two regions, first in
Hawaii through the Tripler Army Medical Center and the second
in Boston's VA hospitals.
The project has a very strong emphasis on telemedicine and
computer-based care of individuals with diabetes, and these
strategies fit very well with the military's and VA's
distributed systems, which depend on those technologies. So
there is a unique and excellent marriage between what we can
bring to the table and what they need, and their patient base.
We at Joslin want to thank you and the Committee for your
support.
I have two objectives today. The first is to give you a
little brief status report on the status of the project and the
second is to focus on next year's funding of the project.
There are two objectives in the project. The first is a
screening for diabetes among Department of Defense and VA
personnel and patients, and the second is to implement
strategies to improve diabetes care in the Department of
Defense and the VA system in New England and Hawaii.
We have now reached an understanding, with the excellent
support of personnel that we have come to know in the
Department of Defense and the VA system, concerning how to
establish a work plan, how to put the systems in place as we
had intended over this coming year.
By September, we will have completed a phase 1 setup and
validation stage and a phase 2 implementation of the broad
program in the VA hospitals in New England. We are well along
the way to accomplishing that now.
By September, we also will have completed the phase 1 setup
and validation at Tripler and be prepared to implement
subsequently there. And also by September, we will have
accessed--deployed equipment and staffing in three remote sites
selected throughout New England, which will then feed into the
VA system. And later we will do the same thing in Hawaii and in
the Pacific.
In year 2, what we intend to do is to accomplish several
objectives. The first is to begin actually providing care to
people with diabetes that feed into those two regions, the VA
and the military, in Boston and in Honolulu. The second is to
begin to screen for diabetes broadly throughout those regions,
using some unique strategies that we have developed. And the
third is that over that period of time we will endeavor to
improve the metabolic control of individuals throughout the
regions that we serve. Subsequently, of course, we hope to
spread beyond that.
Mr. Nethercutt. Doctor, let me interrupt you, if you would,
and ask you, what are the techniques----
Dr. Quickel. Sure.
Mr. Nethercutt [continuing]. Very briefly, of screening
that you have developed?
Dr. Quickel. Well, the first technique is the use of a
light source to actually shine into the pupil of the eye, and
by measuring refraction of light that uniquely occurs in people
with diabetes, you can actually screen for the presence of
diabetes without drawing blood. It is a totally unique
strategy. And the advantage of that is that you can do it in
large numbers of people. You can do it in a drugstore. You can
do it extremely simply without having to handle bloods and draw
bloods.
The second strategy is to image--to obtain a digital image
of the back of the eye so we can screen for the leading cause
of blindness in diabetes. And the third strategy is a computer-
based method of instructing individuals with diabetes how to
care for themselves and provide support for their care. So you
can create a broad program to do all of those things.
Mr. Nethercutt. Is the eye screening, example number one,
available today? Or is that something you will be developing
over the next few years?
Dr. Quickel. It is live and working today. And we are
presently, as I speak, transmitting images from Chinatown in
Boston to our center across on the other side of town. What we
want to do is to take it out to broader areas, because we think
it is a strategy that is ideally adapted to telemedicine across
the Pacific or throughout New England or in any other widely
dispersed area.
Mr. Nethercutt. That's great. Forgive me for interrupting.
I appreciate having that for the record.
Dr. Quickel. That is all right.
To date, we have spent about $1.5 million on this phase of
the project and have not yet been able to free up the
appropriated funds from the Department of Defense. And this has
been a particular challenge for a tax exempt organization and
for me, who has to face a board periodically and justify those
expenditures.
We were not, frankly, aware that at each stage as the money
came out it would get a little bit peeled off to support the
development activities of other agencies. And as a result we
will, over the next 2 years, probably have made unexpected
assessments within the Department of Defense and the VA system
of about $2 million, that will not actually pay for the system
to go into place.
The $4 million budget we submitted last year is probably
going to result in about $3 million of funding for the project
and it was fairly bare bones. With the support of the
Department of Defense and especially the Army, we are
submitting a request for next year of $6.4 million in order to
be able to cover those unanticipated losses and be able to
accomplish the goals that I have outlined here today.
Once again, I think we have a wonderful opportunity for a
unique partnership between what essentially is a private
research institution and a large Federal agency that marries
what we can do and what they need uniquely, and if we can do it
well perhaps we can benefit people even beyond the Department
of Defense.
Thank you very much for allowing us to testify.
Mr. Nethercutt. Well, thank you very much for your
testimony. And Joslin does wonderful work and I certainly thank
you for your dedication to this project and also your work to
help improve human health. Thank you very much.
Dr. Quickel. Thank you.
[The statement of Dr. Quickel follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
FEDERATION OF BEHAVIORAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE SCIENCES
WITNESS
DAVID JOHNSON, PH.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FEDERATION OF BEHAVIORAL,
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE SCIENCES
Introduction
Mr. Nethercutt. Our next witness is Dr. David Johnson,
Executive Director of the Federation of Behavioral,
Psychological and Cognitive Sciences. Dr. Johnson's group
represents 17 scientific societies and some 150 university
graduate departments.
Your prepared statement will appear in the record, sir, and
you may summarize it at this time. Thanks for being here.
Statement of Dr. Johnson
Dr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Nethercutt.
Normally when I speak to the Subcommittee about--when I
speak before this Subcommittee, I am coming to talk about the
basic or 6.1 behavioral research budget. But I am going to
spend most of my time today on a proposed cut to applied and
advanced development or 6.2 and 6.3 research, and I am going to
talk about that because those cuts would destroy the behavioral
research program at the Air Force.
Most applied and advanced development work on manpower,
personnel and training is managed by the Armstrong Lab at
Brooks Air Force Base in San Antonio. Behavioral research and
development--R&D there is funded this year at $11 million. The
1999 budget request would reduce funding to $3 million. That
will kill the program.
If 6.2 and 6.3, that is, the development of research into
products, goes by the wayside, the 6.1 program will quickly
follow suit since it will be left as the front end of a
pipeline that doesn't lead anywhere.
If the Air Force abandons human performance research, what
will it lose? It will lose its ability to adapt personnel to
new skill requirements; to maintain readiness in the face of an
increasingly diverse personnel pool; to maintain strength and
quality while continuing to downsize; to incorporate usability
planning into new system designs; and to meet the increasing
demand for distributed training. It will even lose its ability
to adapt its personnel to the changing nature of warfare. That
is really pretty fundamental and it is a lot to lose.
The handicap this R&D faces under the current pressure to
cut research is that the service it provides is to the whole
Air Force, indeed in many cases to the whole of the Armed
Services. That means in practicality that no one owns it in the
way that each major command knows in detail what hardware
development it must have.
In contrast, the commands understand the importance of
behavioral research only when something goes wrong. For
example, the military, NASA and the FAA are partners in a
massive modernization of air traffic control terminals. Human
factors were not taken adequately into account in the early
planning of the terminals with the result that air traffic
controllers found they couldn't use the new terminals. That has
prompted costly retrofits that could have been avoided if human
factors research knowledge had been incorporated in the initial
design.
We are strongly urging this Committee to stop the
devastation of the Air Force manpower, personnel and training
R&D program. We ask this Committee to recommend explicitly a
funding level of $11 million for the behavioral research
programs of the Armstrong Lab. We ask you, in addition, to
support the administration's request for $12.567 million for
6.1 behavioral research at the Air Force.
Let me turn briefly to the behavioral research budgets of
the Army and the Navy. Both of these budgets are also under
stress. And I want to thank this Committee for its role last
year in saving the Army Research Institute--ARI. Congress
appropriated $21 million for those programs for fiscal 1998.
Unfortunately, to date I understand ARI has received only $13
million of this appropriation, and that is severely impacting
the flow of research. The request for next year, $16.7 million,
is a large cut from the appropriated fiscal year 1998 amount.
We ask the Committee to maintain ARI at $21 million, its
appropriated fiscal year 1998 level.
We also ask that the Committee support the administration
request of $49.69 million for the 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 behavioral
and bioengineering programs at the Office of Naval Research.
In closing, however, it is important to mention that ONR,
ARI and AFOSR budgets have been severely impacted by
withholding of significant amounts of funds to help pay for
unbudgeted nonresearch costs such as the cost of supporting our
current efforts in the Persian Gulf. Those unanticipated cuts,
amounting to 15 percent in the current fiscal year for
behavioral research at ONR, wreak havoc with research programs.
We hope that the Committee will continue working to improve our
means of responding to unplanned costly events like the Persian
Gulf and Bosnia.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you very much Doctor. We will do the
best we can and we appreciate you being here to testify.
Dr. Johnson. Thank you.
[The statement of Dr. Johnson follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
WITNESS
WILLIAM STRICKLAND, PH.D., AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
Introduction
Mr. Nethercutt. The Committee now welcomes Dr. William
Strickland of the American Psychological Association. Dr.
Strickland is also a graduate of the Air Force Academy. I was
particularly interested in the portion of your prepared
statement, Doctor, which points out that the Air Force loses a
fighter squadron a year through accidents, 80 percent of which
involve human error.
You also say this happens not because we don't have the
world's best pilots but because we have allowed hardware and
software to get too far ahead of human ware.
We all know the next generation systems are going to be
even more challenging than those we fly now, so we are
interested in your views on where we go in the future. So I am
happy to tell you your prepared statement will be made a part
of the record and you may summarize it as best you can.
Statement of Dr. Strickland
Dr. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Nethercutt.
Mr. Nethercutt. Yes, sir.
Dr. Strickland. As you say, I am representing today the
American Psychological Association, a professional and
scientific organization of 155,000 people, many of whom conduct
behavioral research relevant to the military.
This statement addresses two main issues, the continuing
need to invest in psychological research in the Department of
Defense and the particular need to sustain support for the
human systems programs in the Air Force.
Our military is facing a host of new challenges. Our forces
are downsizing, women are playing an increasingly prominent
role and constant deployments have become a way of life. Modern
weapons systems and the availability of information technology
have dramatically changed the way our forces fight. What hasn't
changed is that success still depends on people, at every level
in every unit.
Behavioral research answers questions at the heart of
military operations. Who should be recruited? How should they
be selected and assigned? What job should they be trained for?
How should they be trained? How can they maintain their skills?
What should the human system interface look like? How should
systems be operated for maximum efficiency, effectiveness and
safety?
Answering these questions requires serious investment in
behavioral research, and currently that investment is
appalling. Personnel and training costs account for one-third
of DOD's total budget, yet DOD invests less than 1 percent of
its science and technology budget in personnel and training
research. For every $4 we spend on equipment, we spend a dollar
in R&D to make it better. For every $4 we spend on people, we
invest less than 3 cents to do the same task.
APA supports the DOD request for $12.6 million for Air
Force basic behavioral research. We are very concerned,
however, about the significant cuts you just heard about that
are proposed for behavioral 6.2 and 6.3 R&D at Brooks Air Force
Base. The FY 99 request would reduce the development side of
behavioral R&D from $11 million to $3 million. Product
development in the behavioral research pipeline will be
eliminated.
What does the Air Force get for its modest current
investment? The answer is, essential tools that will allow the
Air Force to operate effectively with fewer people, with
changing and complex technical jobs in a rapidly changing
environment.
Answers to tomorrow's critical questions, who should be
trained? Where? When? How? Who has the skills? Who could
develop the skills to do totally new kinds of jobs? Which
recruits have the aptitude for cooperative work?
The customer for this R&D is the Air Force of tomorrow. The
people in that future Air Force are not the voices you hear in
the clamor over short-term budget decisions, but Congress must
ensure that their voice is heard.
APA urges the Committee to include specific language in the
FY 1999 appropriation that would restore $9.84 million to the
6.2 and 6.3 funding at Brooks Air Force Base. This would only
maintain programs at their 1997 level.
APA is also grateful for this subcommittee's leadership in
restoring funds to the Armored Research Institute in FY 98.
Last year's proposed cut would have crippled ARI's research.
Once again, we ask for your help. Despite ARI's strong record
in funding research essential to the training and performance
of Army personnel, the Institute's funding continues to erode.
The 1999 request is $16 million, a substantial cut from the
currently appropriated $21.4 million. We urge the subcommittee
to continue support for ARI.
ARI conducts behavioral research on such topics as
recruiting, including minority recruiting, personnel testing
and evaluation, training and retraining, and leadership. While
the Army seeks to cope with downsizing, to solve problems of
sexual harassment and to establish workplaces that bring out
the best from a diverse workplace, studies done for the Army by
scientists who understand how the Army works will be critical
in helping the Army to plan and execute change.
I refer the Committee to the APA statement for our
association's complete recommendations.
In closing, please remember that behavioral research can
continue to provide the foundation for tremendous savings
through increased personnel efficiency and productivity.
Increasingly sophisticated weapons systems place more, not
fewer, demands on human operators. We must ensure that military
personnel are at least as well prepared as their machines to
meet the future. This requires a sustained investment in human
oriented research.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you very much, sir, for being here
today and we appreciate your testimony.
Dr. Strickland. Thank you.
[The statement of Dr. Strickland follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF OTOLARYNGOLOGY--HEAD AND NECK SURGERY, INC.
WITNESS
JOHN R. WILLIAMS, DIRECTOR, CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS, AMERICAN ACADEMY
OF OTOLARYNGOLOGY--HEAD AND NECK SURGERY, INC.
Introduction
Mr. Nethercutt. The Committee now welcomes John Williams of
the American Academy of Otolaryngology--Head and Neck Surgery.
The academy and the physicians who belong to it are
dedicated to the care and treatment of patients with disorders
of the ears, noses and throat and related structures of the
head and neck. Your prepared statement will be made a part of
the official record of the Committee, sir.
Your statement represents an interesting perspective on
tobacco availability in the military, as well as skin cancer,
ultraviolet--UV radiation and noise reduction. Mr. Williams, we
are glad to have you here.
Statement of Mr. Williams
Mr. Williams. Once again, my name is John Williams. I am
Director of Congressional Relations here for the American
Academy of Otolaryngology--Head and Neck Surgery. I am here
today in place of Dr. Michael Maves, Executive Vice President
of the academy, who was unable to be here due to a family
illness.
As you mentioned, the American academy of Otolaryngology--
Head and Neck Surgery is the largest medical society of
physicians with over 10,000 members dedicated to the care and
treatment of patients with disorders of the ears, nose, throat
and related structures of the head and neck. We are more
commonly referred to as ENT physicians.
We have testified before the Committee over the last
several years about some matters that I am going to discuss in
this testimony, and deeply appreciate the courtesy with which
the Committee has reviewed our views.
Today I would like to briefly reiterate three of these
issues of importance to our membership. The first is tobacco
use in the military. The American Academy has been opposed to
tobacco for many decades. We are the physicians who, again,
care for most of the patients with cancer of the head and neck
and we see the harmful effects of tobacco use among our
patients every day.
All over the news, you see reports of tobacco companies
finally admitting to the adverse effect of tobacco users. We
also know that there can be a significant impact on
individuals, especially children, who happen to be in the
vicinity of toxic smoke from tobacco products used by others.
We are pleased to see that the Department of Defense
announced a policy ban of smoking in all DOD work facilities
worldwide. This far-reaching initiative makes DOD workplaces
free from harmful secondhand smoke as well, thus, will improve
the overall health of military personnel. We do know, however,
that many military--many in the military have substituted
tobacco smoking with smokeless tobacco to avoid disciplinary
actions where smoking itself is prohibited.
Smokeless tobacco is also a very serious medical--has very
serious medical effects upon the oral cavity. Even with all the
scientific information we now have about negative impacts of
smoking and secondhand smoke on individuals, we find that the
tobacco use is still indirectly encouraged by the military
through the subsidized sale of tobacco products at military
commissaries and PXs where cigarettes and other tobacco
products can be bought at a much lower price than otherwise
would be charged outside.
The academy has expressed its concern that the DOD would
likely not ban the sale of tobacco products in the commissary
system. However, we strongly support the concept of bringing
tobacco prices at least to the parity where civilian prices
would help cut down on its use.
The next of that is--the next issue of importance to our
membership is the--is that of skin cancer and UV radiation.
Three years ago, the American Academy indicated its strong
support for environmental--indicated its strong support to the
Environmental Protection Agency and the National Weather
Service in developing a nationwide UV index to alert members to
the public dangers of excessive radiation to the sun and
potentially resulting in skin cancers, especially to the head
and neck and other immune systems.
Our academy members deal with medical problems of the head
and neck where many of these skin cancers occur. We urge that
this Committee consider how it might participate with the
Department of Defense in ensuring that all personnel and their
families are educated in this regard.
One excellent instrument of this education is the UV index,
widely made available by the National Weather Service and
private weather reporting companies.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me talk about the issue of noise
reduction. Our academy has long been concerned about the effect
of excessive noise in the structures of the ear, particularly
those noises which are extremely excessive. We know that noise
is a necessary part frequently of--part frequently of daily
military life, particularly so in wartime. Nevertheless, we
believe that many of the noise effects in military personnel
can be reduced by appropriate noise reducing and prevention
activities.
Finally, I would just like to thank you for your time and
be happy to answer any questions that you may have.
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you very much for being here, Mr.
Williams. We appreciate having your testimony today.
[The statement of Mr. Williams follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
RESEARCH SOCIETY ON ALCOHOLISM
WITNESS
DR. MICHAEL CHARNESS, CHIEF OF NEUROLOGY, BROCKTON/WEST ROXBURY VA
MEDICAL CENTER AND ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF NEUROLOGY AT HARVARD
MEDICAL SCHOOL
Introduction
Mr. Nethercutt. Our next witness is Dr. Michael Charness
representing the Research Society on Alcoholism. Dr. Charness
makes the point in his written statement that heavy drinking in
the military is 40 percent more prevalent than in the civilian
sector and that as a result there is a 24.5 percent
productivity loss in the E-1 to E-3 pay grades.
We are interested in your views on this subject, sir, and
we are happy to say your prepared statement will be made a part
of the record. We welcome you today and please summarize your
testimony.
Statement of Dr. Charness
Dr. Charness. Thank you very much. I am Chief of Neurology
at the Brockton/West Roxbury VA Medical Center and am also
associated with Harvard Medical School. I conduct basic
research on how alcohol changes the function of brain cells,
and I also care for alcoholics whose drinking has damaged their
brains and their muscles and nerves. I appreciate very much the
opportunity to appear here before you today on behalf of the
Research Society on Alcoholism.
We are a professional research society whose 1,200 members
conduct most of the basic clinical and psychosocial research on
alcoholism and alcohol abuse that is conducted in this country.
I am here to discuss drinking in the military, which I believe
is a serious problem that compromises the defense of the
Nation.
One in 10 Americans will suffer from alcoholism or alcohol
abuse. The cost to this country is $100 billion annually.
Alcohol is a factor in 50 percent of all homicides, 40 percent
of all motor vehicle fatalities, 30 percent of all suicides and
30 percent of all accidental deaths.
In the military, the costs of alcohol abuse and alcoholism
are likely to be enormous. Nearly 1 in 5 military personnel
engages in heavy drinking, a rate which is almost double that
of the civilian population.
In 1990, 23 percent of deaths in the United States Air
Force were related to alcohol. There is a human face attached
to each of these statistics. As physicians, we see men, women
and children who are paralyzed in car accidents caused by drunk
drivers. We see accomplished men and women who will never
remember another new experience because drinking has damaged
their brains. We see frightened and abused children who grow up
in homes with abusive alcoholic parents.
Many talented and dedicated people in the Department of
Defense are working hard to reduce drinking in the military,
but current prevention and treatment programs are simply not
good enough.
Only research halts the promise of change. Alcohol research
is presently conducted primarily at the National Institute of
Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism and within the Department of
Veterans Affairs. This effort is severely underfunded in
proportion to the magnitude of the problem and, moreover,
neither NIAAA nor the VA focus their research efforts on
prevention and treatment issues that are specific to the needs
of the military.
While the high rates of use and abuse of alcohol in the
military are alarming, the good news is that we are poised at a
time of unprecedented opportunities in research. For the first
time, scientists have identified discrete regions of the human
genome that contribute to the inheritance of alcoholism. Two
new medications, Naltrexone and Acamprosate have proven
effective in reducing drinking and are undergoing large-scale
clinical trials. The development of more effective drug
therapies for alcoholism awaits an improved understanding of
how alcohol affects brain function.
Alcohol research has now reached a critical juncture and
the scientific opportunities are numerous. With the support of
this subcommittee and the Congress, we believe that we can
achieve significant advances in alcohol research that will
reduce heavy drinking in the military.
Research society on alcoholism urges the Department of
Defense to take the lead on initiating what the Department of
Veterans Affairs calls a new broad cooperative research program
on alcoholism. We also urge that the Department of Defense
establish with NIAAA research programs on the epidemiology,
causes, prevention and treatment of alcoholism.
This request balances the morbidity, mortality and huge
economic costs of heavy drinking in the military with the
abundance of research opportunities for improving the
prevention and treatment of alcohol abuse and alcoholism. I
thank you.
Mr. Nethercutt. Let me ask you, Doctor, to what extent do
you get information from the National Institutes of Health on
the issue of alcoholism?
Dr. Charness. NIAAA is very helpful. They have a program of
public education that involves sending out information to
virtually all the physicians in the country.
Mr. Nethercutt. Do you rely on that aspect of NIH or that
Institute?
Dr. Charness. I think that the treatment committee in
particular does. As a researcher, I get it from the horse's
mouth.
Mr. Nethercutt. I understand. Thank you, sir, very much.
Dr. Charness. Thank you.
[The statement of Dr. Charness follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF TROPICAL MEDICINE AND HYGIENE
WITNESS
PHILIP K. RUSSELL, M.D., PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL HEALTH, SCHOOL OF
HYGIENE AND PUBLIC HEALTH, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
Introduction
Mr. Nethercutt. The Committee will now hear from Dr. Phil
Russell of Johns Hopkins University, representing the American
Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene.
As Dr. Russell points out in his written statement, U.S.
soldiers will continue to be deployed in regions of the world
where the threats of infectious disease exist. That written
statement that you have prepared will be made a part of the
record, Dr. Russell, and you may summarize it at this time.
Welcome.
Statement of Dr. Russell
Dr. Russell. Thank you, Mr. Nethercutt. It is my privilege
to present the testimony on behalf of the American Society of
Tropical Medicine and Hygiene. In order to emphasize the
written testimony, I would like to focus on three points. The
first you mentioned is the emerging infectious disease issue.
The Nation as a whole is beginning to recognize the growing
problems and increasing threat of emerging infectious diseases.
Social and behavioral changes, environmental changes and
microbial evolution are all contributing to an increasing risk
to our entire population and most especially to the military.
Deployed military forces, because of the nature of military
operations, have throughout history been at especially high
risk to infectious diseases.
In response, military medical research programs have been
specifically directed at protecting the armed forces through
development of vaccines, drugs and other preventive measures.
Although there have been notable successes and great advances
in military preventive medicine in recent years, the threat
remains and the threat continues to change and increase as
disease producing organisms evolve and as the environment in
which these organisms produce disease continues to change.
The current epidemics of dengue, cholera, Rift Valley fever
and malaria now ongoing in several tropical countries would all
be extremely serious hazards if military deployment in those
areas were necessary. The threat is increasing, yet the Army
and Navy medical research organizations have had to deal with
severe restrictions in both personnel and budget in recent
years. I urge the Committee to look at this and to reverse this
downward trend.
The second issue I would like to address is the value of
military medical research structure in drug and vaccine
development. Military scientists have been world leaders in
several areas of tropical medicine for many years, and they
continue to do very high quality and important research. The
exciting development with a new malaria vaccine which has
protected volunteers and is moving into field trials is an
outstanding example. However, there are several potential new
products that are not advancing or are moving ahead very slowly
because of lack of funds and shortage of scientific personnel.
The third area I would like to call to your attention is
the network of overseas medical research laboratories operated
by the Army and the Navy.
These are extremely valuable medical research, public
health and military assets. They provide unparalleled
opportunities for training of military and civilian scientists
in tropical medical research and for that reason are highly
valued by the civilian academic community, as well as the
military scientists. They provide excellent opportunities for
collaboration between military and academic scientists in
research as well as in training of junior scientists.
These laboratories can potentially provide an outstanding
surveillance network to monitor emerging infectious disease
problems in critical parts of the world. They have done so at
many times in the past and have provided medical experts with
up-to-date knowledge and research capability needed to address
epidemics in civilian populations in their region. The recent
examples include dengue epidemics in Peru and RVF epidemics in
east Africa. Additional funding is urgently needed to enable
these laboratories to achieve their potential for dealing with
the emerging infectious disease threat.
Perhaps the greatest and most obvious value of these
laboratories is their capacity to conduct field trials of drugs
and vaccines. Anti-malarial drugs, hepatitis A and Japanese
encephalitis vaccines are examples of products which have been
licensed in the country on the basis of trials done by these
laboratories at the overseas sites.
As we move forward with new vaccines for dengue, malaria,
diarrheal diseases and hopefully HIV, the value of these
laboratories as a basis for field trials will become even
greater. They need and they deserve additional support.
In conclusion, I want to thank the Committee for their past
support for these programs and on behalf of the society request
your continued support of DOD infectious disease research
programs. This is critically important given the resurgent and
emerging infectious disease threats which exist today. We are
pleased that the administration's request does not cut current
funding levels but we see that there are still many unmet needs
and opportunities, and failure to act will result in health
care cost increases downstream and threaten the effectiveness
of future troop deployments.
Thank you for your consideration of our request, sir.
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you for making the request. I would
just ask, are these emerging infectious diseases--generally
fatal or are they only debilitating?
Dr. Russell. Both. Dengue, for example, is just a very
serious disease with little threat of death to military
populations. Rift Valley fever and malaria, on the other hand,
are potentially fatal.
Mr. Nethercutt. Sure. I understand. Well, thank you very
much for your testimony.
[The statement of Dr. Russell follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Thursday, March 19, 1998.
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES
WITNESS
GENE D. BLOCK, VICE PROVOST FOR RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
Introduction
Mr. Nethercutt. Our next witness is Gene Block, Vice
Provost for Research at the University of Virginia. He is
appearing today on behalf of the Association of American
Universities, in support of DOD University research.
Your prepared statement notes, sir, that DOD basic research
funding has been used several times in the last few years to
provide offsets for unrelated new expenditures in supplemental
appropriations bills.
As you may know, we marked up a supplemental bill to pay
for Bosnia and our support forces in the Persian Gulf last week
right here in this Committee without offsets.
So I encourage your association to let others in the
Congress know of your views because there are many members who
believe we should offset that supplemental. And you are right,
we may have to use R&D funding as an offset.
Your prepared statement will appear in the record of the
Committee, and we are delighted to have you summarize it at
this time.
Statement of Mr. Block
Mr. Block. Thank you very much. As you mentioned, my name
is Gene Block. I am the Vice Provost for the University of
Virginia for Research, and I am also the Director of the
National Science Foundation Center for Biological Timing. In
addition, my academic background is in neurobiology. I am
specifically interested in biological clocks and I am partially
funded by a grant from the Air Force Office of Scientific
Research.
I am testifying today on behalf of the Association of
American Universities, representing 62 premier research
universities in the United States and Canada, and the National
Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges,
representing 195 public institutions of higher education across
the United States.
I have provided you with a copy of my written testimony,
and I will not read that. I will just highlight some of the
important issues.
Let me emphasize verbally how important I believe it is for
your Subcommittee to provide adequate funding this year for
basic and applied research at the Department of Defense. As you
know, basic and applied research are funded under program
elements 6.1 and 6.2 in the research, development, testing and
evaluation section of the Department of Defense appropriation.
The Army, the Navy, the Air Force and defense-wide account
under the Office of the Secretary all receive separate
appropriations for these programs. Universities play the
largest role in basic defense research, receiving more than 60
percent of this funding. That is program element 6.1. They also
receive substantial funding for applied defense research and
advanced technology development, program 6.2 and 6.3
respectively.
The department's budget request would provide a total of
$1.11 billion for defense 6.1 programs in FY 99, including
programs funded under the Office of the Secretary of the
Defense as well as the Navy, Army and Air Force research
programs.
This represents an increase of 6.6 percent over the final
funding levels of FY 98. According to the defense--the
department's RTD&E programs report, applied research would
receive a total of $3.02 billion, an increase of .8 percent
over FY 98. I believe these budget projections represent a
realistic and appropriate estimate of what will be needed to
carry out a vigorous research program in the coming year, and I
hope you will approve them for the FY 99 appropriation.
As you are aware, many crucial defense technologies have
emerged from fundamental research conducted on American
University campuses. Among these are radar, nuclear power,
digital computers, semiconductor electronics, lasers,
fiberoptics, night vision, inertial guidance, a global
positioning system, stealth and other advanced materials,
computer networking. As you remember, Advanced Research
Projects Agency Net--ARPANet was actually the forerunner of our
current Internet and computer-based visualization systems for
training and planning and for conducting operations.
With future threats to the national security so uncertain,
maintaining technological superiority will require a strong and
continuing research effort. The Armed Forces today must not
only be ready to fight in conventional regional wars such as
the Gulf War but must be ready to undertake peacekeeping
missions in hostile situations and defend against
unconventional threats such as terrorism, biological and
chemical agents and computer sabotage.
Supporting university research benefits DOD in many ways.
It produces important advances in knowledge. It helps keep top
scientists and engineers involved in defense research. Not
least, the students who get hands-on research training and
become highly qualified scientists and engineers of the future
will go on to work in academia, industry and Federal
laboratories.
DOD is the third largest Federal funder of university
research after the National Institutes of Health, and the
National Science Foundation. The funds are awarded under
competitive merit review procedures to assure high quality.
Nearly 350 universities and colleges sponsor DOD research and
development.
Unfortunately, last year, the science and technology budget
of DOD hit a 35-year low after adjusting for inflation. Basic
research is down by $350 million in just the lasts 5 years.
While the University of Virginia has actually seen an increase
in DOD funding in the past year, I am concerned that other
colleagues in the scientific community will find resources
drying up for promising areas of inquiry.
In particular, I'm concerned about the effect that
shrinking funding will have on those disciplines that are most
heavily funded by the department since other sources of support
may not easily be found to keep these disciplines healthy.
At this point I would just like to speak very briefly about
some projects funded through DOD support at the University of
Virginia. We received $10 million in defense, Department of
Defense grants and contracts between July 1, 1996 and June 30
1997. These funds supported 69 projects. DOD funds provide
critical support for broad areas of fundamental research at our
university. The results of this research are paying important
dividends for the government and the public as well, and I'd
like to just very briefly mention 3 areas to show you the
diversity and the interesting research going on.
One is in the area of biological timing research. A grant
from the Air Force office of scientific research supports
studies on the ability of the biological clock to adjust to
changes in time cycles associated with transmeridian flights
such as experienced by military flights across time zones or
even in rotating shift work scheduling. The research performed
in my laboratory and the laboratory of Dr. Michael Menaker
employs state of the art continuous monitoring of electrical
neural signals from the biological clock. This allows us to
give insights into the functioning of the biological clock, and
this should help us eventually be able to reduce fatigue during
extended military operations, improve safety and productivity
in the civilian work force. So this is work going on,
biological work being supported by the Air Force.
The Office of Naval Research supports engineering research
on directed vapor deposition of thermal barrier coatings. The
hot section combustor components of today's high performance
aircraft engines operate close to the melting point of the
materials of which they are made. Professor Haydn Wadley at the
University of Virginia Department of Material Science has
invented and patented a revolutionary new technology for
coating these components with thin, thermally plated ceramics.
These coatings can be applied with a new technology at one-
tenth the cost of competing technologies. By engineering their
composition and structure the coatings can be twice as
effective as the existing coatings that are being used. This
will dramatically increase the thrust and fuel efficiency of
engines that exploit them. As a result, military aircraft from
the F-22 to the Global Hawk would be able to extend their
mission duration and range.
And finally I even have a little sample here, the third
example of research going on at UVA, this is supported by
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency--DARPA. These are
smart air jell sensors for biological agent detection. Arguably
the greatest threat posed to the security of our nation's
citizens is from the biological attack by a terrorist group.
The ease of biological agents synthesis and the relatively
simple technologies needed for the dispersal in urban
environments and their near absence of effective methods of
rapid detection create a real risk for biological agents.
Professors Norris and Brinizer of the University of Virginia
Mechanical, Air, Space and Nuclear Engineering Departments, in
conjunction with the Pacific Sierra Research Corporation, are
developing a smart biological censor that exploits the unique
internal structure of aerojels. Aerojels are novel ultraporous
polymer materials that contain enormous concentrations of
interlinked pores. The minute pores can be engineered to match
the size and shape of molecules of biological warfare agents.
When attached to micro unmanned air vehicles the aerogel
sensors have the capacity to continuously monitor the
atmosphere, thereby providing an alert to potential biohazards.
This technology will have tremendous nonmilitary applications
as well.
What I wanted to point out is the tremendous diversity of
the types of research supported by DOD and the importance that
this plays actually in the university research program.
I want to thank you again for the opportunity to testify,
and I'd be happy to answer questions.
Mr. Nethercutt. I want to say thank you very much, sir, for
being here. We appreciate your testimony. We'll do the best we
can on your request.
[The statement of Mr. Block follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
OVARIAN CANCER NATIONAL ALLIANCE
WITNESS
ANN KOLKER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, OVARIAN CANCER NATIONAL ALLIANCE
Introduction
Mr. Nethercutt. The Committee is happy to welcome our next
witness, Ann Kolker. Ms. Kolker is the Executive Director of
the Ovarian Cancer National Alliance. The Ovarian Cancer
National Alliance is a young organization and was founded just
last summer by Ms. Kolker.
Ms. Kolker. Among others.
Mr. Nethercutt. Among others. Because this Committee is
interested in the health of women in our military, we provided
$10 million in last year's appropriation for research for this
deadly disease that effects 1 in 55 women. Your prepared
statement is an excellent summary of the issues regarding the
ovarian cancer research. It will be made part of the record of
the Committee, and we're delighted to have you summarize it as
you wish.
Statement of Ms. Kolker
Ms. Kolker. Thank you very much and thank you for providing
the opportunity to testify, and a special thank you to Chairman
Young and also to Representative Murtha for including and last
year increasing critically needed funds for the ovarian cancer
research in the congressional special interest research
program.
I'm Ann Kolker, a founder, one of many and now the
Executive Director of the Ovarian Cancer National Alliance. As
Congressman Nethercutt noted, the alliance is a new
organization formed last summer. It's the creation of leaders
from the growing number of ovarian cancer groups across the
country. These groups united to establish an umbrella group,
the alliance, in order to have a coordinated effort that will
put ovarian cancer policy, education, research issues squarely
on our national agenda. Our statement today marks our first
public appearance on Capitol Hill.
I also serve as a consumer representative on the
Integration Panel of the DOD ovarian cancer research program
and, as members of this Committee are aware, this program is
still in its first funding cycle. So there is no track record
yet for it as there is for the breast cancer research program.
We look to the success of that effort, described earlier today
by Fran Visco, to inform the expansion of the ovarian cancer
program.
On behalf of the alliance, I have a straightforward
message. Ovarian cancer research has been drastically
underfunded to date and it's urgent that policy makers expand
resources devoted to this disease. The goal must be to increase
in a significant way the ovarian cancer survival rate, which is
so poor that this disease has the unwelcome distinction of
being the deadliest of the female cancers.
Ovarian cancer is truly life threatening. More than 50
percent of the women who have it die within 5 years of
diagnosis, and that's because in at least 70 percent of the
cases women aren't diagnosed until the cancer has reached an
advanced stage when it is often too late to cure. But when
women are diagnosed in the first stage, which unfortunately
occurs in less than 1 quarter of cases, the survival rate is
over 90 percent. I was fortunate to be diagnosed in this stage.
As is the case with many other cancers, a key to improved
survival is early detection, and for ovarian cancer a critical
component of early detection is a better understanding of key
scientific aspects of the disease. This will happen only if
research is increased substantially.
The creation of the ovarian cancer research program several
years ago and last year's expanded appropriations of $10
million were important steps in that direction. Today we ask
you to consider a significant funding increase and broadening
the requirements for potential applicants who are now, as
you're aware, restricted to comprehensive cancer centers.
Increasing funding for research will go a long way toward
helping improve the poor survival rate.
Knowledge about key aspects of ovarian cancer is so limited
that diagnostic tools are too often imprecise and there is no
simple reliable screening mechanism. We need a screening tool
that is as simple and as successful as the pap smear is for
cervical cancer, the mammogram is for breast cancer and the PSA
is for prostate cancer. Even with their limitations, these
tests have dramatically improved early detection and spared
many people with cervical, breast and prostate cancer the early
death sentence that so many women with ovarian cancer face.
Thus, for the alliance the development of a screening tool
that is affordable, reliable and easy to administer is a top
priority. This lifesaving tool will only be found when more
research dedicated explicitly to ovarian cancer is available,
and we hope that this committee will--the funds that this
Committee makes available will play an important role in
ultimately producing that tool.
However, until that tool is available early detection of
ovarian cancer will continue to elude too many women and their
families. Thousands and thousands of women will needlessly
continue to die, and it's our strong hope that the research
funded through this important program will ultimately yield a
screening instrument. 183,000-plus women who currently live
with ovarian cancer, our sisters, our daughters, our
granddaughters and millions of at-risk women around the country
and all of our families and loved ones look to your support for
increasing the resources dedicated to this lethal disease.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. Ms. Kolker, thank you very much.
Several of us on this Committee have had personal
experiences with this terrible disease and understand the
importance. Thank you very much for----
Ms. Kolker. I'm sorry to hear that, and I hope that the
money that comes from this Committee will help those, as well
as the many women who are associated with the alliance.
Mr. Young. Thank you for a very impressive statement.
[The statement of Ms. Kolker follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
JOINT POLICY BOARD FOR MATHEMATICS
WITNESS
JAMES CROWLEY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SOCIETY FOR INDUSTRIAL AND APPLIED
MATHEMATICS
Introduction
Mr. Young. We would like to welcome now Mr. James Crowley,
who was the Executive Director of the Society for Industrial
and Applied Mathematics, located in Philadelphia. Mr. Crowley
is here today representing the Joint Policy Board for
Mathematics, a collaborative effort of three professional
societies, SIAM, the American Mathematical Society and the
Mathematical Association of America. Mr. Crowley is a former
Air Force officer and chief scientist at the Air Force Systems
Command at Andrews Air Force Base.
Mr. Crowley your statement will be placed in the record in
its entirety, and we would ask that you summarize it at this
time.
Statement of Mr. Crowley
Mr. Crowley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity
to comment on the fiscal year 1999 appropriations for DOD.
Today I'd like to address DOD's investment in basic research,
or 6.1 as it's known to DOD.
As I noted in my written statement and as you noted just
before, I served 22 years as an Air Force officer and so I'm
familiar with the importance of basic research to the defense
mission. I've seen firsthand how the results of basic research
were incorporated into defense technologies and systems for the
ultimate benefit of our defense forces, the American taxpayers
and our national security. I'm very concerned though, Mr.
Chairman, that the buying power of DOD support for basic
research has dropped dramatically in recent years, by 18
percent since 1994, and I included a chart in my written
statement that shows this. Moreover, these funding levels are
well below historical levels of investment and defense basic
research. Those past investments played a critical role in
enabling today's DOD to meet the Nation's defense needs through
superior and cost effective military technologies which are
even more important with the constrained operational budgets
today.
The reduced budgets have had a staggering effect on DOD
research agencies' ability to maintain the strength of their
programs. In the mathematical and computational sciences, for
example, the scope of promising research that DOD has
identified as relevant to its mission have been curtailed and
whole thrusts of research have had to have been eliminated in
some programs. The opportunities lost are not insignificant.
Mr. Chairman, the funding erosion of DOD's basic research
programs must be stemmed if we are going to achieve our
national security objectives into the future. We urge the
subcommittee to begin restoring the buying power of defense
basic research by fully funding DOD's request for basic
research. We must start reversing the downward funding trend,
and enacting the relatively modest proposed increase for fiscal
year 1999 would be a crucial first step.
Let me say a few words about what basic research means to
DOD. You are no doubt aware of the importance of long term
fundamental research. I would also point out that some of the
research supported through the 6.1 account is not as long term
as you might think. In many cases university researchers have
been brought in for special expertise to help solve real-time
scientific and technical challenges, and this raises a critical
point. By engaging the Nation's research universities and
defense-related problems, DOD ensures itself access not only to
today's researchers and the latest discoveries, but also to
graduate students whose involvement in defense-related research
areas helps guarantee the production of mathematicians,
scientists and engineers who can contribute to meeting defense
needs in the future, to tackling the long term research
problems and being available to DOD to call on for more
immediate ones.
Let me illustrate my remarks about DOD's investment in
basic research and its contributions to the national defense
with a few examples. You are no doubt familiar with the rapid
advances in computer hardware. Computer speed doubles every
1\1/2\ years. Equally important is the fact that new and
improved mathematical algorithms, which are the basis of all
computer software, also contribute to this remarkable trend. In
fact, the computer hardware would be useless without equally
sophisticated advances in mathematical modeling and algorithm
development.
Let me cite a couple of cases in which DOD support has
facilitated breakthroughs in this area. Research in the past 25
years, much of it funded by DOD, led to the development of
mathematical techniques underlying computer programs that can
easily manipulate geometric objects. The techniques form the
basis for modern CAD/CAM packages to make rapid prototyping and
computer aided design possible. These tools are used by defense
contractors to cut the development time and cost for new
aircraft and other major DOD purchases.
And in addition, simulation based upon mathematical models
is becoming an important component of design. For example,
mathematics can be used to model or predict how radar waves
behave when scattered off of surfaces such as aircraft bodies.
Advances in the developments of computational algorithms that
design the testing of stealth technology in simulation; that
is, on computers, before any actual development begins.
More recently, a DOD initiative and modeling simulation and
control of fabrication processes for thin films promises to
deliver new, more reliable and economical processing techniques
for these thin films, which are critically important for new
and advanced electronic components for such examples as high
performance microwave filters for wireless and aerospace
communications. These thin films are not easy to manufacture
and the computational model and simulation will be critical to
obtain the uniformity that is necessary to obtain the device
properties.
I have chosen just a few examples, but clearly research in
mathematics, algorithms, computing and all other areas of
science for that matter have played and will continue to play a
critical role in new technologies ranging from smart weapons to
advanced aircraft design.
This concludes my testimony. I appreciate the opportunity
to talk to you about the impact of defense basic research, but
let me also thank you for taking the time to speak last year at
the DOD Demonstration Day, which was entitled ``Basic Research
in the National Defense,'' sponsored by the Association of
American Universities. I hope you're able to join us again at
this year's event that's going to be held on April 29.
Again thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would be pleased to
answer any questions you might have.
Mr. Young. Mr. Crowley, thank you very much, and your
statement is very thorough and we appreciate that, and we thank
you for being here today and we believe in basic research. We
would like to get a little basic research into how to get more
money to pay for some of these programs that we've heard about
today that are not included in the President's budget. So what
I can tell you is we'll do the best we can.
Thank you very much sir.
[The statement of Mr. Crowley follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CENTER
WITNESS
JANE WEISENBERG, DIRECTOR OF AMBULATORY SERVICES, CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL
AND HEALTH CENTER, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
Introduction
Mr. Young. I'd like to welcome Jane Weisenberg, Director of
Ambulatory Services in San Diego, California. Ms. Weisenberg
has appeared before the Committee in support of the new parents
support program which is operating at 29 army installations
worldwide as well as several Navy installations and is intended
to help prevent child abuse, something that we're all certainly
supportive about and concerned about. We're happy to hear from
you today, and your statement has been placed in the record and
you may summarize it as you wish.
Statement of Ms. Weisenberg
Ms. Weisenberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairperson, and other
Members of the Committee.
I have to say I really do appreciate the stamina that you
all have to listen to all of our testimonies, and I got a
flavor of that since I did get to appear last. The written
testimony was submitted by Blair Sadler, the CEO and President
of Children's Hospital. He really wanted to be here today, but
he was detained with emergency business in San Diego. So he
asked me to represent him and I have to say I'm truly honored
to be here.
I thank you for being supportive of the new parent support
program over the last years. My testimony today is applicable
to the Marine Corps New Parent Support Program in terms of you
have helped over 11,000 military families since your support in
1993.
I would also like to welcome you all if you're interested
in seeing firsthand the new parent support program we are
operating on all Marine Corps installations worldwide,
including the newest site at Miramar.
There continues to be a critical need for family support
programs for military personnel. Last year I attended an event
celebrating the 222nd birthday of the Marine Corps. A videotape
was shown where General Krulak described the essence of the
Marine Corps. He used the Battle of Bella Wood as the pivotal,
essential and defining moment of the reputation of the Marine
Corps. He portrayed the spirit of honor, courage and commitment
as fierce, independent and unconditionally committed to
victory. I was moved by his presentation where bayonets were
drawn and men died in battle. Then I sat back in my chair and I
thought how challenging it is to reconcile the fighting spirit
of the Marine Corps with the nurturing, caring and loving that
is needed to sustain a family relationship and raise a child.
There are risk factors related to military life where
parenting starts at a young age. There is physical isolation
and some remote locations, there is separation from family and
friends, there is unknown resources and support systems in
unfamiliar communities, there is frequent moves, there is
difficulty in stretching a paycheck to meet the housing and
other expenses, there is the uncertainty of peace and war. The
new parent support program addresses these issues with the
overall goal of strengthening military families and preventing
family violence through the use of home visitation by nurses
and social workers and prevention activities such as Daddy's
Baby Boot Camp.
The program makes a difference in peoples' lives. Consider
a staff sergeant with his young wife who is five months
pregnant, anemic, thin, unhealthy, 2 children, a son 4 years
old who is moderately autistic, a son 19 months old. The wife
feels overwhelmed by the care of an autistic child. They have
recently transferred to their new location. The husband states
the wife's housekeeping skills are poor and beginning to become
a problem for him. He goes to the family services for
counseling and is referred to the new parent support program.
The problems identified are that a 19-month-old child is
nonverbal, the household was not using speech with the
children, they were all communicating by sign language, there's
financial difficulties that do not allow the mother to get her
eyes cared for so she may not get glasses, therefore she's
unable to get a driver's license in a new State and is unable
to drive. The mother was not on the women-infant children
supplemental food program and neither were the 2 children.
A home visitor, a trained social worker, went to the home,
did an assessment of this family situation. Some of the
interventions included having the Lions Club pay for glasses
for mom which resulted in her being able to take a driver's
test and have access to transportation, both mom and children
were put on WIC, and mom is no longer anemic, she's getting
appropriate prenatal care, and her pregnancy is progressing
smoothly. A speech therapist goes into the home twice a week.
The household has become more verbal and speech has improved
for both of the children. The Child Abuse Prevention
Association provided the family with gift certificates to buy
clothing in their thrift shop, the home visitor worked with mom
and dad around their own organizational skills so they could
develop a family routine. They also have the family apply and
receive Social Security for the autistic child. The family is
using the money to provide opportunities to enhance the child's
skills and development. They also are now enrolled in a food
share program. The day-to-day stressors are under control, and
thanks to the early intervention this family can now be
prevented from having more serious consequences of their
situation. It's really your support that made a difference in
the life of this family and many, many others.
The need continues for programs aimed at assisting military
families. Programs such as the new parent support program on
all Marine Corps installations plays an important role in
military readiness by insuring the stability of military
families. Congress has generously provided support for the
Marine Corps' new parent support program and in light of this
subcommittee's previous support for new parent support and
other family advocacy initiatives, we request funding of $5.6
million to continue this program into the FY '99--through the
FY '99 appropriations bill.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and other members of the Committee
for your support.
Mr. Young. Ms. Weisenberg, I have a quick question for you.
If a reservist or a guardsman is called for active duty,
are they eligible for this program?
Ms. Weisenberg. All active duty military are eligible. They
usually receive services by first going to the family service
center on that installation. They can also be referred by
community agencies or self-referrals.
Mr. Young. I visited just last week in Bosnia with a
reservist from my district who had been called up and his wife
is expecting momentarily their third child, and he's going to
be in Bosnia while she's in St. Petersburg having the baby.
Ms. Weisenberg. So she's not near a Marine Corps
installation.
Mr. Young. No, and he's not in the Marine Corps, he's in
the Army.
Ms. Weisenberg. He is and she's not. That is an interesting
situation.
Mr. Young. And the closest we have is MacDill Air Force
Base but that's a joint command there.
Ms. Weisenberg. I think that's a very interesting
situation. I'd be happy to follow up and see what happens in
that type of situation, but that's a perfect example where the
husband in this case is off in Bosnia and the wife is the one
that needs assistance.
Mr. Young. Well, thank you very much for being here today,
we appreciate your support of the program and your willingness
to travel all the way from San Diego to be here to visit with
us today, and again I apologize for you being at the end of the
line.
Ms. Weisenberg. I have to say it was a very interesting
morning and a good use of my time. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much.
That I think is the end of our witness list. The Committee
is adjourned until the call of the chair.
[The statement of Ms. Weisenberg follows:]
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1999
----------
Tuesday, March 17, 1998.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND AND COMMANDER IN
CHIEF, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
WITNESSES
GENERAL ANTHONY C. ZINNI, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES CENTRAL
COMMAND, U.S. MARINE CORPS
GENERAL WESLEY K. CLARK, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN
COMMAND, U.S. ARMY
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order. This afternoon
we are very happy to welcome General Wesley Clark, Commander in
Chief of the United States European Command, and General
Anthony Zinni, Commander in Chief of the United States Central
Command.
We thought we would take the opportunity to have both of
you appear before the Committee together inasmuch as you have
done this before. Your respective commands are continuous, your
geographical responsibilities are immense and growing, and
between the two of you, you seem to own most of the pressing
operational problems faced by the U.S. forces today.
General Clark, you are leading our forces deployed in the
Balkans as they help to create a self-sustaining peace in that
region. We are proud of the achievements of the troops under
your command to date, and a number of us visited with you and
your troops just this past week, and we cannot tell you how
impressed we were with the conduct and accomplishments of those
soldiers. But we do have questions and concerns about the
purpose of what seems to be an indefinite presence in Bosnia.
You are also dealing with the not inconsequential matter of
NATO expansion and the committee is interested in what this
development means to you as the regional CINC.
General Zinni, you need to worry about backing up American
diplomacy in the Persian Gulf and the long-term containment of
a brutal and oppressive Iraqi regime. As we sit here today, you
are leading a significant force in the Gulf that may have to
act if Saddam Hussein does not comply with the latest U.N.
agreement concerning their weapons of mass destruction program.
We are also proud of what your troops have accomplished today
and as we visited with you and some of your troops in October
in the region, and again very, very proud of the way they
conduct themselves and the accomplishments and what you have
been able to do there.
In addition to issues dealing with your respective
commands, some of the key questions the Committee would like to
address are:
Are the resources at your disposal for each of your
contingencies sufficient?
What would be the impact to your commands of not having a
timely disposition of the fiscal year 1998 emergency
supplemental or even having to offset it as some have
suggested?
And what are the effects on the readiness and morale of
forces under your command as you face near constant deployments
in your operating areas?
The hearing is closed this afternoon and so we are looking
forward to a very candid discussion today with you on these
issues. After you briefly summarize your statements, which will
be placed in their entirety in the record, we will then proceed
to questioning.
Now I would like to yield to Mr. Murtha.
Remarks of Mr. Murtha
Mr. Murtha. Let met add my welcome to these two
distinguished gentleman and say to General Zinni, the Chief of
the Egyptian Armed Forces was very complimentary about your
work.
Of course, General Clark, the Secretary of Defense has
commented a number of times. I understand you are pushing to
try to get an expansion into Macedonia, more forces in
Macedonia, and I like that idea. I was the one that recommended
we put troops there in the first place, because I felt we
needed a buffer there, we needed to show them we are serious
about what is going on over there. So I look forward to hearing
your testimony.
One other thing I will add. I remember during the Beirut
crisis what a difficult thing it was to coordinate that little
area there because it is so close to each other's area of
responsibility. So I know how important it is. I think the
Chairman is absolutely right in having both of you in, because
there is close responsibility and such a need for coordination
between the two commands.
Mr. Young. Okay, General Clark, we will start with you,
sir. As I said, your entire statement will be placed in the
record, and then you should get geared up for some good
questions.
Summary Statement of General Clark
General Clark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
thank you and the members of this Committee for your great
support of all of our service members and their families in our
command in Europe. I would also like to thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today and describe the
contributions of the command to our affairs and interests in
Europe, Africa and the Middle East.
It is a time of historic opportunity and challenge in
Europe. The threat of massive attack across the inter-German
border has been replaced by a plethora of other problems,
including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, environmental
degradation, refugee migration, and, most importantly, the
instability in the region fueled by ethnic and regional
conflict.
EUROPEAN COMMAND THREATS
We believe we have to deal with these concerns and we have
to deal with them early, before they become more serious
problems. So the strategy that the U.S. European Command is
pursuing today is a strategy focused on shaping the
international environment to address these more ambiguous
challenges and to prevent conflicts before they arise.
We also recognize we have to be ready to respond quickly
with appropriate force to deal with the conflict and to defeat
an aggressor. Maintaining our readiness ensures we canrespond
with sufficient trained and ready forces for any future operation, and
our superb forces are engaged today in Bosnia, Africa, and in support
of current operations in CENTCOM.
BOSNIA OPERATION
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, we believe our efforts are
continuing to show the progressive markers of success, thanks
to the great work of our soldiers and the support of our
allies. I visit our troops in Bosnia and assess the situation
on the ground personally several times each month. I was there
last Thursday. Troop morale was good. The situation in Brcko
was well in hand, and I think we are making progress.
The progress, of course, is necessary, but the progress
also requires continued military presence. Our forces there are
deterring renewed conflict, they are helping maintain a secure
environment, and they are supporting the implementation of the
accords, to the point that we can achieve a self-sustaining
normalization.
Planning is well under way for our part of the follow-on
force. Of course, funding for that force is a key part of what
we will be discussing today.
NATO EXPANSION
NATO remains the foundation for our engagement in Europe.
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are eagerly awaiting
parliamentary ratification of their succession into this great
organization. I visited each country in the last month, met
with their leadership, many of their top units. They have
waited many, many years for this historic moment and this great
opportunity to join the West. Their troops are surprisingly
effective. Their leaders are committed. They want to dedicate
the resources, they want to join us, and I believe they will
make significant and meaningful contributions to the alliance.
PERSONNEL ISSUES
For the men and women in our command, the missions
continue, operational tempo is high, and I think all the people
in the United States should be very proud of the work of our
service members and their families over there. They are keeping
their readiness sharp in the face of a lot of challenges.
Force protection is our highest priority, Mr. Chairman,
because our most precious resource is the soldiers, sailors,
airmen, marines, civilian employees and their families, but we
also have to be concerned about quality of life, because that
directly impacts our readiness, our retention. It impacts
family life, morale, and our mission accomplishment.
Our biggest quality-of-life problem is the deplorable
conditions of our barracks and housing in Europe. We have got
some 11,000 family quarters that were built in the early 1950s
that have never been renovated. Everything from electrical
problems to sewage leaks and other things are coming out as a
consequence. This is a problem associated with the shortage of
construction and major repair funds. That is compounded by an
even more critical shortage of real property maintenance funds.
We really need the supplemental funding and we need an
offset supplemental. If we don't have this, we will be forced
to divert money from already inadequate operations and
maintenance accounts to cover the shortfall.
SUMMARY
Today, U.S. European Command is smaller, leaner and
probably more heavily tasked than at any time in our history. I
think our men and women are up to the challenge. They are doing
a great job, but we do need resources. We need the current
force structure and we need sufficient operations
infrastructure and quality-of-life funding to meet our urgent
needs. With the continued help and leadership of this
committee, we will get the job done over there.
Again, thank you very much for the opportunity to be here,
and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The statement of General Clark follows:]
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Mr. Young. General Clark, thank you very much. Let me turn
now to General Zinni. Then we will get to the questions.
Summary Statement of General Zinni
General Zinni. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a brief
opening statement. First I thought I would give a brief wrap-up
of the situation as it stands today. I think everyone knows
that UNSCOM is inspecting. We have had an intrusive inspection,
and their normal routine inspections are ongoing. We monitor
those very closely. So far we have seen cooperation. I think it
is going to take a test of time to ensure that we do have the
compliance and cooperation that is desired. Until we are
assured of that, the current force levels should remain in
place. ------. I would say that these troops have come to me in
a fine state of readiness, with high morale. I have no assigned
forces, so I draw on CINCs like General Clark and the other
CINCs that are my force providers. I do know they pay a big
cost to keep these forces out in the Gulf and to keep our
interests protected.
I am keenly aware, through my service components, of those
costs. I am very appreciative of the fact that thesupplemental
has been voted out of your subcommittees, and I back up General Clark's
statements that this is critical for us to be able to keep going.
I would also like to mention very briefly something that
may have been misunderstood, and that is the support we have
had from our allies in the Gulf. I think a lot of focus and
misrepresentation was maybe misleading in giving the impression
that they were not supportive. ------.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of General Zinni follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much. Excuse me just one
second.
I would like to recognize Mr. Livingston, the Chairman of
the Appropriations Committee.
SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET REQUEST
Mr. Livingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief.
Gentleman, I apologize for just bouncing in and out. You
all are in charge of some very, very significant problems
facing this Country, and as Chairman of the Appropriations
Committee, I just want to tell you we want to work with you to
try to get through these immediate problems that you are
facing, at least give you the money and the wherewithal that
you need to do it. We are going to be, with the help of the
Chairman here, launching the path for our supplemental, and it
is my great hope that we will get it through the Congress with
as little controversy and fanfare as possible. But we want you
and the troops that you lead and represent to have the
wherewithal that they need to do the job that we are so proud
of.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. General Zinni, as you mentioned, this
subcommittee has reported out a supplemental without offsets.
That is the first time in a number of years we have done that.
We hope we are going to be able to maintain this position
through the consideration by the full committee and by the
House and by the full Congress, because we all recognize the
serious problems that we are causing by offsetting these
extensive contingencies from the regular budgets of the
services.
So we keep our fingers crossed that we can maintain the
position that the subcommittee took on last week.
Now, because we have such important visitors, I know all
the members have a lot of questions, I don't want to run out of
time before we get to Mr. Cunningham again like we have done
the past several times, so we are going to adhere strictly to
the 5-minute rule and get a chance to go around the table a
couple of times if we do that.
I would like to yield now, since I have had a chance to
visit with both of you in your areas of responsibility and more
recently in personal conversations, I will yield my time to Mr.
Lewis for 5 minutes.
SITUATION IN THE GULF REGION
Mr. Lewis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General Clark
and General Zinni, thank you very much for making the effort to
get here. We know the difficulty that you are facing these
days, and we appreciate this effort.
General Zinni, you have been quoted as saying that it is
only a matter of time until Saddam Hussein breaks the latest
agreement with the United Nations. Can you elaborate more on
that view for the Committee?
General Zinni. Sir, I think if you look back from the end
of the Gulf War until now, ------. I think as long as sanctions
and the pressure are on, he is not going to be happy with that,
and we will see a return to that pattern shortly.
U.S. FORCES READINESS IN THE GULF
Mr. Lewis. General, in view of that, how long can you hold
the present force in the Gulf together at readiness rates
significant to conduct air strikes should they become
necessary?
General Zinni. ------. We have proven that we can get
there. I was extremely proud about how the flow of forces went.
Again, I attribute this to my supporting CINCs that have
provided the forces and CINCs like Transportation Command. ----
--.
IRAQI THREAT ASSESMENT
Mr. Lewis. General, update the Committee as to the status
of the threat posed by the Iraqi regime, and in your answer
would you include the following: the Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction program; the state of conventional force
modernization; and recent activities in support of
international terrorism.
General Zinni. Sir, I will take the conventional forces
first. I think Saddam Hussein would have modernized his forces
by now had he been allowed to do so without the sanctions. He
is running some equipment that is getting a little old. ------.
Mr. Lewis. Well, if the UNSCOM mission was to fail and we
did nothing, how long would it take the Iraqis to fully
reconstitute the WMD development program?
General Zinni. Sir, I would say if they were left with no
monitoring and no inspection. ------.
Mr. Lewis. Okay. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Lewis. Mr. Murtha.
DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES
Mr. Murtha. Do we have any problem with coordination of
deployment? I know when we had a problem in Zaire, the troops
had to land in the Congo because of some problems of
coordination. Are there any problems like that of coordination,
we deploy our troops? It is a very small deployment, but it
always worried me that there was a problem of coordination
there. Do we have any kind of problem like that now?
General Clark. We have no problem that I know of,
Congressman, but before any deployment, we have got to be sure
that we have the permission of the countries that we have to
overfly, the countries we have to stage in, and there are
varying degrees of diplomatic sensitivity with every one of
these deployments. So every on is a case in itself.
Mr. Murtha. Wouldn't we get the deployment for the troops
on the airplanes out and movement out before we landed?
General Clark. Absolutely.
Mr. Murtha. Yet in this case, we thought we were going to
Zaire and we landed in the Congo.
General Clark. I can't address that issue. Those troops
were down there before I was the commander, and they didn't
stay very long. I just don't have the information on that.
Mr. Murtha. So at any rate, you don't know of any
coordination problems there actually are now?
General Clark. No, I don't. In fact, I tell you our
coordination for our European allies for work in Africa is
better now than it ever has been.
KOSOVO
Mr. Murtha. Let me mention two other things, not questions.
One, I know you and I differ on these war criminals, but I have
a great concern about being aggressive with the war criminals.
I think it has worked out very well the way it is working now.
But my caution--and the Chairman and myself and Mr.
Livingston and Mr. Obey met with the national security team,
and we told them the same thing. Our concern is what happened
in Somalia and the danger of being aggressive and reaction and
the vulnerability of our troops in a place like Brcko. So I
just always feel it is necessary to caution you, as I did
General Joulwan before you took over, about my concern about
it.
The other was Kosovo. We have had a long concern about
Kosovo. For 2 or 3 years we expected that place to flare up,
and it hasn't until just recently. How serious is the problem
in Kosovo and what do you see happening there?
General Clark. I think the problem in Kosovo is very
serious. I see it getting progressively worse because, over
time, the opinion among the Albanians has been progressively
radicalized. Their opposition to Serbian dominance has been
strengthened. They are building support networks in Western
Europe. Those Albanians and that support is now returning. They
have also contacted Iran for support. At the same time, Russian
diplomacy is now strongly in support of Milosevic. So we are
heading toward a much more difficult period in Kosovo.
BALKAN WAR CRIMINALS
With respect to the war criminals, Congressman, I hope you
don't believe everything you read in the press about me on that
subject. Sometimes my friend Bob Gelbard gets carried away
about this. We have done nothing there that we haven't
thoroughly looked at very carefully, worked through all of the
possible outcomes, measured the risk, made sure we were totally
capable of handling not only the action but the consequences,
and we have seen the payoff from the very limited actions we
have taken. We now have people talking to us and wanting to
surrender because they know that they are in danger.
We are casting a big, big shadow over there. There is one
thing those people in Bosnia understand, and the rest of that
region of the world; they understand force and they understand
the United States and they respect us, and they are a little
bit afraid of us. We sure want to keep them that way.
Mr. Murtha. There is no question in my mind without the
deployment of the United States, leadership of the United
States forces and deployment of our forces, this fighting would
still be going on. It has been an impressive success up to this
point. I just am always concerned we will go too far because of
our enthusiasm in trying to get rid of these war criminals. All
of us deplore it, but we are just worried that we could have
some casualties, unnecessarily, if we go too far, too fast.
General Clark. Yes, sir, I understand.
Mr. Young. Mr. Skeen.
Mr. Skeen. I yield my time.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hefner.
SANCTIONS UPDATE
Mr. Hefner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The sanctions. I think
that is probably what Saddam would like to have, the sanctions
lifted, and we are fighting a battle on PR for sanctions as far
as the people go. But it seems what you are telling us is that
as long as the sanctions stay in place, even prohibiting him
from modernizing his forces and what have you, even though he
is probably using the money that he is allowed to sell oil for
his own agenda, but the people are suffering. Do we need to
keep the sanctions?
General Zinni. Sir, if I could answer that in two parts.
First, if he used the Oil for Food program properly--and there
is a lot of propaganda value for him contending that the
bureaucracy set up deliberately is done sothe food won't get to
the people, when actually he is the cause--if he used that properly, he
would be able to care for his people.
In terms of the sanctions, if the sanctions were lifted, --
----.
Mr. Hefner. Well, one other question. When we were on the
borderline of doing a strike against Iraq, at the last moment
they reached an agreement. Were you fairly well satisfied that
the targets that you had targeted would have been effective? I
don't know the magnitude of what it would have been, but do you
feel like it would have been effective in putting some, in down
home talk, some ``hurt'' on Saddam Hussein if you did a strike?
General Zinni. Yes, sir. Our mission was twofold. One was
to diminish his ability to threaten his neighbors. So obviously
those kinds of forces that we can identify, see, target, that
would present those kinds of opportunity for him, Republican
Guards, others, we can obviously target and diminish
significantly. ------.
INFRASTRUCTURE
Mr. Hefner. One other question about Bosnia. I have been
real impressed by the job we have been able to do there, and we
don't see the carnage every night on television about children.
But is one of the keys to making this an ongoing successful
operation is investment in infrastructure? We asked that
question here the other day: when you make investments in
infrastructure; where people can have jobs. Is that a big part
of the success?
General Clark. Yes, sir, it is. It is a very big part of
the success.
Mr. Hefner. How is it coming?
General Clark. It is coming, I would say on a scale of zero
to 10, it is about a 4. The reason it is not better is twofold.
First, because there is still a lot of corruption in the
political systems, particularly in the Federation side, between
the Bosnians and the Croats. There has been an awful lot of
funds diverted into private party coffers that could have gone
to infrastructure funding. Secondly, because some countries
haven't ponied up their full share of the infrastructure
funding.
So we are making headway. One of the key challenges,
though, that we are going to be facing is to bring refugees
home. They have to have jobs. To have jobs there has got to be
the investment in the basic power industry. You have to get
that restarted. They have to open up lines of communication.
That means roads and bridges have got to be put in. And it is
going to take a lot of international civilian effort to do
that. These aren't things the United States Armed Forces can
do.
Mr. Hefner. I thank you, gentleman. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Nethercutt. Mr. Nethercutt just recently
returned from the region, General Clark. He had a chance to
visit with you there at SFOR headquarters.
EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, General.
General Zinni, I have heard you talk about sanctions with
regard to Iraq, and I know we have seen reports that the oil is
coming out of that country and perhaps money is coming back in
surreptitiously. I am wondering to what extent you feel we have
the ability to tighten sanctions, and, if so, what should we
do? To what extent is the oil smuggling helping the
modernization effort of Saddam Hussein?
General Zinni. ------.
IRANIAN POLICY
Mr. Nethercutt. With regard to Iran and President Khatemi
reaching out and appearing to be a moderate and seeking some
measure of peace or relationship with the United States, to
what extent do you see that as a pretext for their continuing
modernization efforts? Do you see an inconsistency there that
you can talk about here?
General Zinni. I believe there are two leadership factions
in Iran now. ------.
Mr. Nethercutt. Are you worried about their military
capability at this point?
General Zinni. ------.
THE DANGERS OF FUNDAMENTALISM
Mr. Young. Mr. Cunningham.
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good that I
have got both of you here representing Europe and theIraq-Iran
area, because my major concern is the fundamentalists movements all
over the planet. I feel that in many cases, the Mujahedin and Hamas
from Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan have moved into Bosnia, and with the
United States, the continuation of us arming and training the Muslims,
I feel if we pulled out today there would be conflict, whether it is
Kosovo or somewhere else; but if we stay, with an increasing movement
of Izetbegovic and Silajdzic toward Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan, that
when we do pull out, and if we keep arming, then we are inviting
disaster even more so in the future, because then it is going to be the
fundamentalists that they go after. And we are not talking just Muslim,
we are talking hard-core, well trained, experienced individuals that
are infiltrating the whole area in great numbers.
Do you agree with that?
General Clark. I would say this, Congressman, that we are
not going to prevent Islamic arms reaching Bosnia by stopping
our Train and Equip program. We put our Train and Equip program
in place. I don't have anything to do with it in my current
position, by the way, but it was put in place as matter of U.S.
national policy, because we wanted to drive out Iranian and
Fundamentalist influence, and at the same time provide a basis
for a sure answer and confidence among both Bosnian and Bosnian
and Croat populace living in the Federation that they would no
longer be subjected to Serb long-range artillery attacks that
we were defenseless against. That is why Train and Equip was
put in. I think it is serving that purpose.
But to further reduce Iranian and Fundamentalist influence,
we have to take a different tactic. We have got to identify
those people that are there, we have got to confront them, and
we have got to get them out. There were actions under way to do
that. A number of them have left. We haven't broken all of the
ties with the leadership, clearly. We know Izetbegovic and
Solidavich continue to go back there, they are receiving a lot
of money from not only Iran, but countries like Qatar, and they
are still connected.
Now, we are not going to see real light at the end of the
tunnel in Bosnia until we get a new generation of leadership in
there, and that includes a new generation of leadership there
among the Muslim group, people that are committed to
implementing the Dayton agreements and implementing a multi-
ethnic Bosnia.
Mr. Cunningham. I guess my real question is, do you think
it is a danger for us to continue dumping our arms in there and
training, that when we do pull out, then this is going to be
like a wave coming back at the surge?
General Clark. No, sir, I do not think it is a danger. I
think it would be a mistake for us to stop the Train and Equip
program. I think we want to follow through with that and use
that as its leverage to build a democratic force and a western-
oriented force inside the Federation and take other measures to
diminish the Fundamentalist influence.
INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES
Mr. Cunningham. Okay. Do you have a pretty good, in both
Iraq and Bosnia, pretty good coordination with our intelligence
services? We had CIA brief us. Do you work pretty candidly with
those agents and do they have enough forces in the country?
General Zinni. Yes, sir. Obviously we have a representative
in our headquarters. All the intelligence agencies are tied in
with us and tied together. We feel we have a good picture. I
would like to see more HUMINT Intelligence on the ground in
both places. I think that is where we are woefully inadequate
in both countries, Iran and Iraq.
Mr. Cunningham. Do you have any compartmentalization
problems, where you are getting the different conflicts, we had
problems, we couldn't find out where it was, where it was
coming from, the information? Are you getting pretty well-
versed information?
General Zinni. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, I have been
to CIA headquarters several times and received briefings I felt
were more than adequate. Additionally, some degree of
compartmentalization of intelligence is required to protect
human and technical sources.
General Clark. I think we are doing very well in Bosnia. --
----. General Shinseki gets it on the ground in Bosnia, I get
it in my headquarters in Belgium, and I think it is a very good
connection.
Mr. Cunningham. I don't know, do I have a minute, or is
that it? That is it.
Mr. Young. You are going to get a second chance, though.
Mr. Visclosky.
U.S. BASING RIGHTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Zinni, as
far as the basing in Saudi Arabia and Turkey, apparently as far
as a strike against Iraq, we would not be allowed to base
planes and personnel in those countries. Is there any progress
being made as far as the basing issue?
General Zinni. ------.
TURKEY
Mr. Visclosky. What about Turkey?
General Clark. With respect to Turkey, in the EUCOM AOR, we
have an operation flying from there, operation Northern Watch.
The Turks accommodated an expansion of that program so we could
keep roughly 12 hours a day in the skies to deny the no-fly
zone north of the 36th parallel. They gave strong indications
they didn't want to support strikes down there; on the other
hand, they have been cooperative in many other areas. We have
multiple interconnections and dialogues going on with Turkey.
We didn't need to launch strikes from Turkey to support General
Zinni's program. Had we done so and had we put the pressure on,
we might well have gotten the answer we wanted.
Mr. Visclosky. For both gentlemen, is that a change? Is
there a subtle change going on? Is that a deterioration of what
their position may have been, even if it is 1 out of 8 or 9
maybe in the end we could have, is that a deterioration, or has
that been constant?
General Zinni. ------.
General Clark. If I could answer with respect to Turkey,I
think we should be very concerned about our relationship with Turkey. I
think Turkey is a country that is on the brink of descending into chaos
right now. They are trying to cope with the increasing growth of
fundamentalism. They have been excluded from the European Union because
of their non-democratic constitution, and frankly because of the
prejudices of a number of European countries against their workers.
They are feeling isolated and beset, including under attack from us
because of their human rights policies, and they are having a very hard
time coping right now. There are those who are more familiar than I
with the situation in Iran in the early 1970s, who see overtones of the
same destabilizing constellation of forces that converged in Iraq. They
see them moving toward Turkey now.
COMPOSITION OF FORCE STRUCTURE
Mr. Visclosky. Would either of you believe that we should
be looking at restructuring some of our forces because of, at
least in the case of Turkey now, these developments? Is there
something we should be looking ahead to as far as a change in
the force structure?
General Clark. With respect to Turkey, I don't see it as a
force structure issue, I see it as an issue for American
diplomacy and our ability to persuade our NATO allies that the
European Union has a vital interest in Turkey as well, and has
to avoid the tendency to draw Europe's southeastern boundary
along the perimeter of the Greek islands off Turkey's Aegean
coast. I think it is a matter for diplomacy at this stage, and
there is only a limited amount we can do, even with military
dialogue, and nothing with force structure.
General Zinni. Sir, I feel in our region we have kept the
force posture very flexible. ------. We have Operation Southern
Watch running out of several countries there, but we view that
only in terms of as long as sanctions are on and that
particular sanction is maintained. We have tried not to get
many fixed installations and we have tried to spread the wealth
and our presence out there. I think I would recommend we
continue that kind of flexibility. ------.
LENGTH OF CURRENT DEPLOYMENTS
Mr. Young. Generals, as we proceed with this supplemental,
we are going to get hit with a lot of questions from a lot of
Members who think we should not be facing down Saddam, who
think we should not be in Bosnia, and they are concerned about
what we might be thinking about doing in Kosovo.
My general question is going to be what do you see in the
future. How long are we going to be deployed in your respective
regions? The question becomes fairly important to me after our
visit last week, General Clark. We had a very interesting
session in Brcko. After having seen all of the stability in the
country because of your forces there, but in Brcko the Dayton
agreement had not been implemented, and now there has been an
announcement it will be put off until 1999. Our delegation had
an interesting experience. We had a version of a town meeting
in Brcko with a group of folks that represented different
organization, and they were Muslims and Serbs.
It started off in a very friendly way and people were
smiling and we were exchanging questions and answers. But 10 or
15 minutes into the session, our guests were standing and
shaking their fists at each other and shouting. I am not sure
what they were saying, but it was loud.
In view of this tension that existed there, are we going to
have difficulty ever establishing a situation where they are
going to get along without the presence of our troops there?
The same thing, General Zinni, in your region. We watched
Saddam cheating and then retreating, and then cheating and then
retreating. We deployed and then we withdraw.
Both of you, just tell us what you see in the future as to
our presence, because we are going to get bombarded with those
kinds of questions when this supplemental gets on the floor.
BOSNIA
General Clark. I can't comment on the specifics of your
town hall meeting there, Mr. Chairman, because I don't know
exactly who was there. I was in Brcko on Thursday with the
Secretary General and we met the three mayors, and it was a
much different atmosphere. But a lot of the inter-ethnic strife
in Bosnia at least is contrived. It is contrived by political
forces who profit from ethnic division and tension, and who
exploit the people there to serve their own personal interests
and political gain and financial aggrandizement. We know that.
We have seen new leadership come to the fore in the
Republic of Sprska. As we see new leadership in the Federation,
I think we are going to see a different attitude on the part of
the people there. Many of the people in Brcko are refugees from
Sarajevo. They have been invited to return now to Sarajevo.
President Izetbegovic has become increasingly more
accommodating on the refugee return issue, and I think that is
going to diffuse tensions also.
On the other hand, we shouldn't underestimate the
importance of Brcko symbolically. This was the last peace not
resolved at Dayton. It was the tie breaker that got us the
Dayton agreement. The agreement had collapsed until Milosevic
agreed to arbitration. We were never able to agree on what
Brcko consisted of. We couldn't draw a map on it. It is going
to be hotly contested. We couldn't have a decision made with
the new government because that would have undercut them
entirely in their efforts.
We shall be looking at what to do in the November-December
time frame. But again and again when I go to Bosnia, I am
impressed by the fact when you talk to people, they just want
to get on with their lives. These people have had enough of
conflict, they have had enough of division, and let alone they
will go back to their homes and reestablish their relationships
and businesses and other things, and we will have peace in
there.
So I don't see this as an endless commitment. I see it as
rather something we have got to work the process here, we have
got to get the balance of forces right, and then we have got to
let the good aspects of human nature take over, which they will
in that region.
General Zinni. Sir, two-thirds of the world's oil is in my
part of the world, plus a large percentage of the natural gas
and other energy sources. ------ and General Clark also has the
other partof the Caspian Basin, the Caucasus, with equal
amounts of energy.
Access to this region is going to be critical to us in the
future, to the markets and to the energy sources. The transit
through this region, the Suez Canal, Strait of Hormuz, the Bab
al-Mandab, these are narrow straits that we require freedom of
navigation through, and overflight of. Instability in this
region, as was mentioned by Mr. Cunningham, can spread
throughout the world. It isn't confined to any kind of
religious or ethnic problems that blow up. It seems to scatter
to the winds, be it terrorism, fundamentalism or whatever. ----
--. Just the general instability in this region that can spread
is a concern. The number of border, ethnic, and religious
disputes, along with fights over water which will be the fuel
of war in the future, more so than oil in this region, do not
look good. So I see the important of this region for us to be
great for a long time to come.
Mr. Young. General Zinni, I think maybe I wasn't specific
enough in my question as it related to you. I was actually
talking about the increased deployments that we have seen just
in the recent weeks. I certainly agree with what you said about
the importance of our presence in that region, but I wonder
about the increased force.
General Zinni. ------.
Mr. Young. Mr. Murtha.
Mr. Murtha. No further questions.
Mr. Young. Mr. Lewis.
IRAN UPDATE
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Clark, not a
question, but your general description of the region and
comments regarding Turkey especially have piqued my interest
and I think the Committee should focus in a special way on
those problems.
But, General Zinni, you too pointing to just how vital this
region is to us, economically and otherwise, causes me to want
to extend some of the questions of Mr. Nethercutt relative to
Iran. Last May, a relatively moderate government theoretically
was elected, and yet you say the hardliners are still in
control.
What is your assessment of the intentions of the new regime
and do you believe that we have any genuine--do we have a
change to improve relations with Iranians?
General Zinni. ------.
Mr. Lewis. Knowing where our friends and opportunities are
has always been difficult in the region, the need for Intel,
especially HUMINT, is good comments as well.
Would you update the Committee on the current status of
Iran's efforts to first acquire weapons of mass destruction and
offensive missile capability and further support of terrorist
activities?
General Zinni. ------.
Mr. Lewis. Finally, General Zinni, given the slight changes
in the environment in Iran, has there been a change in the
military-to-military relationships with that country?
General Zinni. ------.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hefner.
BOSNIA ECONOMICS
Mr. Hefner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a brief
comment or question. As I am listening to your explanations, it
would seem to me that the overriding key--you talked about the
town hall meetings where the people are shouting at each other,
if they have jobs and their kids are going to school and there
is some peaceful existence--is how much of a part of this whole
conflict is economics?
General Clark. It wasn't the major part initially, but it
is going to be probably the major part in restoring harmony in
the country. If we had the job opportunities right now, we
could bring the refugees home, we being the international
community, not SFOR but the international community could bring
these refugees home much more quickly. As it is when you fly
over communities there, you see that 5 out of 6 factories are
shut down. In Brcko, for example, really the only industry
going in Brcko is the alcoholic beverage industry and the bars
at night, because the river ports are not open, there is no
commerce allowed by President Tudjman into Croatia if you are a
Serb.
This has been a real problem for them. The electric power
industry doesn't work, or the water works, so they don't get
water flowing through the tap a lot of the time. They need a
lot of investment. They need jobs, and this is what is going to
really bring this country back.
Mr. Hefner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Skeen.
LANDMINES IN BOSNIA
Mr. Skeen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Zinni and
General Clark, this may seem like a very small problem, but how
heavy is the land mine situation in Bosnia and Kosovo and
Serbia?
General Clark. There are a lot of land mines in Bosnia. I
can't address the situation in Serbia. There are some there, no
doubt, along the border with Macedonia, but they are not widely
scattered yet because there hasn't been open fighting. In
Bosnia there are several million land mines which are still
there.
We have a demining process that is under way. We require
each of the former warring factions to demine a particular set
of acreage each month. If they don't, they don't get to train
their armed forces. We are also providing demining training for
them. There is also a U.N. effort to do this. But it is going
to take many years to get the mines out.
Really the farmers have discovered the effective way to get
the mines out. They send a herd of goats or sheep across the
countryside, and after that is repeated a few times, that is
the way they know it is safe to walk in the fields.
Mr. Skeen. I read it feels like that is an insult to the
herd.
General Clark. I can understand that, sir.
Mr. Skeen. But it is an ongoing problem and I know it has
been a big problem. The reason I ask is because we have a
development going on in my particular district to locate mines,
both plastic and metal and so forth.
General Clark. I think it is very important we do that. It
needs to be funded and encouraged and we need to get those
developments in place over there.
Mr. Skeen. Sheep, if we could export ours over there, we
would sure like to have the address.
General Clark. Well, there are not enough sheep to do the
job. It is not reliable. But I comment on that because when I
was in Brcko Thursday, I looked out from the Humvee as we were
driving by and we watched a herd of sheep being driven across
this minefield where we will not walk. And so that is the way
it is being done on the ground, hands on, by the local people.
Mr. Skeen. Thank you very much for that answer to that
great problem.
Mr. Young. Mr. Nethercutt.
NATO EXPANSION
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Clark, the expansion of NATO is something that is
under consideration in the Senate and we may get some of that
over here with regard to the funding requirements.
The administration has indicated that the total cost of
expansion for NATO members will be $1.5 billion. There is some
suggestion that perhaps that may be low. What is your sense of
that? How much do you expect the expansion of NATO to cost? Is
the $1.5 billion a good figure or what are you able to say at
this point?
General Clark. I think, first of all, I have to tell you my
headquarters, my NATO headquarters did this study, so I stand
by the $1.5 billion figure as a preliminary estimate.
I have asked for an additional program to be added that
would add to the cost of expansion. I would like to be able to
affirm their interoperability readiness. That means a computer-
assisted exercise simulation program similar to what we use for
the United States Armed Forces that we could put in place for
these Polish, Hungarian, and Czech forces to come in. That is a
marginal increment to the bill. But by and large, it is going
to be in the $1.5 billion range.
That is the common funding that all the existing NATO
members and the new members will share. Of course, they have
several billion dollars of additional expenses of their own. We
have gone through the NATO force goals process with them. I
visited their Presidents and their Defense Ministers. They have
assured me they are going to pay their billings, they are going
to scope the resourcing up so they can be effective
contributors to security so there will be costs, but I think
for the common infrastructure funding, the $1.5 billion cost is
a good cost.
I will tell you also that we are in a dispute with our
European allies who believe that the $1.5 billion should be
absorbed by the ongoing infrastructure budget rather than be an
incremental to the existing budget. I don't know how that is
going to come out. It could be we don't pay anything extra for
these countries. That is certainly the way the French would
like it.
Mr. Nethercutt. General Zinni, on a more personal issue for
me, we have a constituent by the name of Don Hutchings who was
kidnapped in Kashmir in 1995. For the record, I don't expect
you to know this at this point, wondering if you have heard
anything. A group called Al Faran captured him, he is an
American citizen, and we are worried that we don't know where
he is. I don't know if you know anything more. If you do, sir,
for the record I would appreciate you submitting it, or if you
have something now, that would be great.
General Zinni. I am aware of the case, sir. I have no new
information, but I will check with the Pakistanis to see if
they have any insights.
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky.
DEMINING
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Clark, just to get back to mining for one second, I
had asked the Secretary of Defense last week about whether
people are actively still laying mines in Bosnia. He indicated
he did not believe that that was the case, he had no
information. You are closer to this, and I am not looking to
try to trap him, but you are closer to the situation. Do you
have a sense that that may be happening?
General Clark. We don't see that going on. I can't swear
that nobody has ever laid one, but in general it is not going
on.
U.S. BASING IN EUROPE
Mr. Visclosky. Okay. General Clark, on the European basing,
with the drawdown and the situation you face, any sense as to
whether or not the Europeans want your footprint to grow larger
again or smaller than it is today? Do you have any basing
situations that need to be addressed one way or the other?
General Clark. Well, we are adjusting some of our basing.
For example, we are going to try to improve our in-transit
capabilities to support deployments through the theater, so we
are looking to get to move out of, for example, Rhein Main Air
Base and get an expansion of one of our other bases there that
can handle a better load 24 hours a day. But in general, the
Poles, Hungarians and Czechs, of course, would be very happy if
we based forward in their countries.
We are under considerable pressure to keep open the
facility in Hungary that we have right now. When I was in
Poland they were hinting around about how much they would like
to have a NATO headquarters in Poland, and that means a U.S.
presence in Poland. We don't have any intention of doing that.
I think we are solid where we are right now.
What we need to do is concentrate on our infrastructure
money as best we can on improving the quality of life of our
single service members and their families in this region. It
would take an extra $275 million per year between now and 2010
to meet the standards that the Department of Defense has given
us for our family housing in this theater. No money was
invested for 6 years at all by any of the services in Europe in
family housing. This was because we thought the payment in kind
program, which was going to give the German reimbursement as we
turned over facilities, was going to cover it. We thought we
could invest all of our money into the infrastructure
installations we were going to keep back in the United States
and we simply didn't step up and take care of our people in
Europe. So we are woefully underfunded historically for
infrastructure in family quarters and troop billets in the
EUCOM AOR.
Mr. Visclosky. Is the $275 million you mentioned over and
above any budget allocation you currently have?
General Clark. It is.
Mr. Visclosky. That would be through the year 2010, to get
current in that year?
General Clark. That is right.
Mr. Visclosky. I appreciate your comments. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Young. General, are we talking about the need for new
construction or real property maintenance on existing housing,
or both?
General Clark. There are enough SETS; it is the question of
how it could be most economically done. In general the way it
is preferred to be done, is as a whole neighborhood renewal
program, where you take the buildings down. Most of buildings
over there are stairwell-type living, so you are living three
or four floors high, two families on a stairwell, and you have
to take the whole building down. You have to start with the
plumbing and electrical wiring which has not been fixed. You
probably add a little bit of space on the outside so they have
got a second or half-bath addition to the apartments, and this
is between $100,000 and $200,000 per dwelling on average.
Construction costs over there run 40 percent higher than they
do in the United States, as you know. In general, we would be
talking about the existing buildings and then really working
them over.
Mr. Young. Mr. Cunningham.
CHINESE INVOLVEMENT WITH IRAN/IRAQ WMD PROGRAMS
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Generals, there is a straight dichotomy in Iran and Iraq,
they are bitter enemies, but yet they help each other from time
to time, especially with the Fundamentalist groups.
We had reports of different countries, i.e., China, of
shipping in chemical and biological weapons and nuclear
materials. We are talking about sanctions out, but coming
across the border, is there much still coming in to boost up
their capability?
General Zinni. ------.
Mr. Cunningham. The reason I ask, it was reported that
COSCO, Chinese shipping, was stopped with chemical and
biological weapons and nuclear components heading for Iran,
which much of it would end up in Iraq. I didn't know if
intelligence helped you with that at all.
You are both talking about the economics, but if you look
at Northern Ireland, you look at Russia, you look at the Middle
East, Bosnia, all of those, I think if the economy was good
there like it was in the United States, we wouldn't have
anywhere near the problem. The problem we have is there is not
enough money in all the world to help one of those, let alone
all.
We go in investing, I grant you can break out your
checkbook and pay for it if you want, but we deal in $16
billion, looking at an extension of Somalia aid and Bosnia
through the current time, which you are well aware of comes out
of O&M, and the additional forecast costs $35 billion, and you
have OPTEMPO that is high, you have 1970s equipment. These are
all nice things we do to pay for these, but how do we plan on
paying for these? Do you have any ideas, without cutting more
military?
I am just trying to give you an idea of what we have to
look at every day, because the President could have just raised
his budget authority on his budget and we would not have an
emergency supplemental. In my opinion, he didn't want to
identify politically the domestic cuts it would take to change
that budget. He wants Congress to do it or break the budget. It
is going to be difficult to pay for all this, though.
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC STATUS
General Clark. Congressman, I think in some respect you are
into a ``pay me now'' or ``pay me later'' situation here. The
things we are doing over there are cost effective in the long
term, I believe, in terms of preventing conflict and in terms
of extending American influence.
If we look at the situation in Europe today, for example,
where we have got 50 percent of our direct U.S. investment and
30 percent of our exports and 3 million U.S. jobs, stability
there is very, very important to us. A twitch, a problem in
Europe, compounds itself many times over in terms of its impact
at home on our GDP, on our welfare. So I think that the several
billion dollars that we are putting forth to support the
mission on Bosnia could be justified on economic grounds alone.
I would say though with respect to the jobs problem there,
of course, it is clear that the United States Government is not
going to finance the recovery of those economies. Those people
have to recover themselves. What we need to do is give them the
opportunity to do so. I am convinced they will.
Mr. Cunningham. I agree. I worked on a farm once, and I was
going to make a Persian cat and a Siamese cat friends. I had
them on each side of me. I brought them together and they
started fighting, and I brought them closer, and they got
tense; I got them that far apart, and I didn't have a shirt on,
I ended up in a bloody mess.
I don't think in my lifetime we are going to see the Middle
East or in Bosnia a real peace. I think we have got to keep
working that way, just like we are in Russia. But for us to
continue making investments, with the old equipment we have and
the retention rate, and just looking at the military side of
it, and then to stay in a balanced budget--the reason our
economy is doing well in my opinion now economically, to bust
that and to make those kinds of investments, you say it may be
``pay me later'' or ``pay me now,'' but I see it as a disaster
all the way if we stay there a long time.
And I do disagree on the issue of continuing arming the
Muslims. There we are adding claws to one side where the other
has had its claws pulled, and when we pull out, the claws are
going to come out and we are going to end up back in there.
GULF BURDENSHARING
General Zinni. Sir, I would just say the reliance on Middle
East oil is growing. This country's reliance is growing. In a
few years it could be up as high as 25 percent. More
importantly to us, and it affects the global economy, countries
like Japan and areas like Western Europe, it is growing
significantly higher. If the access to that energy is lost or
controlled by a hegemony in an area that is completely chaotic
or instability reigns, it would be disastrous for the world's
economy and ours too. It is a case of pay me now or pay me
later.
I would say one thing at this point. There is burdensharing
out there. ------.
Mr. Cunningham. Wasn't it just in the hundreds of thousands
of dollars in the case of Saudi Arabia?
General Zinni. Hundreds of millions. Contributory
negligence.
Mr. Cunningham. We are paying billions. There is a little
delta there. ------.
Mr. Young. Generals, we appreciate your being here and we
appreciate all of the responses to our questions. I wonder if
either or both of you have anything you would like to say that
we forgot to ask about?
General Clark. Well, I would like to thank the Committee
for the very astute questions. I do feel that in Europe, we are
at a very important juncture, and it is a question of whether
the United States is going to continue to present American
leadership in this part of the world and derive the benefits
that come from that leadership, or whether we are going to halt
right here and give those who, for whatever reason, view
themselves as our competitors and adversaries the chance to
exploit that halt at this time.
Obviously I certainly am a strong proponent of American
leadership. I believe that people in the region respect us and
need us, and I think it is in our own self-interests, economic
as well, that we continue to develop our influence and enhance
our ability to affect events in that part of the world.
So I just underscore my appreciation for the support of the
Committee on the supplemental and wish you the best as you try
to get this to the floor, Mr. Chairman. I think it is very
important to our country.
General Zinni. Two short points, Mr. Chairman. I arrived in
the Gulf as Kofi Anan was leaving after having arranged the
diplomatic agreement with Iraq. Everywhere I went, I was
congratulated immediately, a hand was outstretched, and they
felt this was a victory for the United States. Diplomacy was
impossible without American resolve and American might behind
it. That wasn't lost on any of the leaders in the region, and
they clearly saw it as a direct win for us.
I would also say that following that, if that wasn't good
enough to make me feel pretty proud, I visited all our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen and
civilians that work out there, and were on the edge ready to go
into action, and I couldn't have been prouder.
So for all those young people that make up our Armed
Forces, I would just say that they are the ones that pulled
this off without a shot being fired.
Mr. Young. Well, I hope that both of you will express to
your troops as you visit with them that the members of this
Committee admire the job that they do. We understand the
sacrifice that they have to make to do these jobs, and we
understand the important answer, as they do, of the mission
that they are sent to.
If you extend that message for us, we would appreciate it
because we are very, very proud of them.
This Committee stands very strong in support of all of our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, merchant
marines, everybody involved in the effort.
We appreciate your being available to visit with the
Committee this afternoon. I know you have extremely important
responsibilities in other parts of the world. Thank you again
for coming. God bless you. The Committee is adjourned until 10
o'clock tomorrow when we will have the senior enlisted
personnel of each of the services and we will talk about
quality of life issues.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the
answers thereto follow:]
Command Operations
Question. In addition to issues dealing with your respective
commands, some of the key questions the Committee would like to address
are: Are the resources at your disposal for each of your contingencies
sufficient?
EUCOM Answer. Under current law, combatant commanders such as
USCINCEUR are not tasked to provide the resources necessary for
contingency operations. Rather, combatant commanders issue mission
directives to subordinate units to participate in particular
operations, and these subordinate units then draw upon their parent
Services for resources to accomplish these missions.
Contingency planning within the Joint Operations Planning and
Execution System involves the combatant commander's headquarters staff
working closely with the Service component commanders' staffs. This
cooperation results in plans which recognize the fiscal constraints
within which each Service must work. Should resource constraints cause
operational restrictions, this would be manifested as military risk in
the proposed course of action. I would then either accept that risk, or
request of the Secretary of Defense the additional resources necessary
to conduct the operation in a manner which had acceptable risks.
Fortunately, our components have received assurances from their
parent Services that everything will be done to provide full after-the-
fact reimbursement for validated contingency obligations, pending
receipt of the supplemental appropriation. Service commitment to
contingency requirements has ensured adequate support for all mission
safety, force protection and quality of life requirements. This support
takes visual form as well: the best cold weather clothing; up-armored
vehicles to reduce potential loss of life and limb in mined areas; and
doctors and medical staffs with the latest deployable technology. You
and the American people, both in spirit and dollars, show the soldiers
the ultimate support that you care about them and their families'
welfare. Good morale makes ``life in the mud'' tolerable, service to
the Nation enduring and assures mission success. To date, we have the
ability to fund additional expenses through the third quarter of this
fiscal year before we must receive additional contingency funding.
CENTCOM Answer. Yes. Each of the Services has allocated sufficient
resources to support the various contingencies in Central Command's
Area of Responsibility.
Question. What would be the impact to your commands of not having a
timely disposition of the fiscal year 1998 emergency supplemental or
even having to offset it as some have suggested?
EUCOM Answer. The supplemental appropriation is critical to our
ability to continue funding contingency operations within the area of
responsibility. Our baseline budgets cannot support both mandatory
mission readiness training requirements and contingency support. The
primary impact of not having timely disposition would be the
combination of decreased levels of quality of like support to the
deployed force and a deferral of important training and quality of life
initiatives back at the home station. Both of these impacts would cause
uncertainty among the force as to the commitment of our government to
their mission and to the welfare of their family members at home.
Every USEUCOM service component estimates its total contingency
operations will cost more than has been distributed to date, leaving a
significant shortfall should the supplemental appropriation not be
forthcoming. At our current pace, we will have to start canceling
training events in the third and fourth quarters to ensure adequate
cash flow to continue contingency support. Cancellation of training
events will degrade readiness.
Finally, any offsets to our current annual funding program at this
late time in the fiscal year would have an out of proportion effect.
Most base support functions are fixed costs that will have been
obligated going into the fourth quarter. The only flexibility left at
that point in the year is through decrements to the training program.
Fourth quarter decrements will cause serious readiness problems
throughout the force.
CENTCOM Answer. Quick approval of the emergency supplemental
appropriation for this fiscal year is essential. Without the additional
funding, the services will shortly begin using funds that had been
allocated for training in the third and fourth quarters. The end result
will be a decrease in readiness for forces not just in the U.S., but
overseas as well.
Question. What are the effects on the readiness and morale of
forces under your command as you face near constant deployments in your
operating areas?
EUCOM Answer. ------.
Morale. From an equal opportunity standpoint, the morale within
Bosnia and the United States Forces in Europe remains positive. Senior
leaders continue to focus on accomplishment of real world missions that
are making a difference in the lives of people in a troubled region.
Focused training, caring for soldiers and the provision of the highest
standard quality of life are positively impacting each soldier, sailor,
airman and marine in the USEUCOM AOR. Equally important is support for
military equal opportunity programs by reinforcing the zero tolerance
for discrimination and sexual harassment policy. We firmly believe that
a positive equal opportunity environment directly corresponds to
positive morale for the men and women assigned to Europe. The morale of
our troops is continually assessed through aggressive climate
assessment programs. The process entails both a qualitative and
quantitative assessment of various factors which positively impact
morale within the European command. Another insight into morale is
retention. We believe retention is another indicator of morale. In
EUCOM, our retention program performs well against service goals.
USAREUR exceeded re-enlistment objectives for both first-termers and
mid-careerists for all four quarters of FY-97. USAFE exceeded re-
enlistment objectives for all re-enlistment categories. USAFE re-
enlisted 69.8 percent of first-termers against a goal of 55 percent; 89
percent of second-termers against a goal of 75 percent and 95.8 percent
career airmen against a goal of 95 percent. NAVEUR re-enlisted 31
percent of eligible first-termers against an objective of 38 percent.
NAVEUR exceeded objectives for mid-termers, re-enlisting 77 percent
against a goal of 54 percent, and careerists, re-enlisting 82 percent
against a goal of 62 percent.
Leadership continues to make strides towards improving quality of
life in theater, particularly for deployed personnel. Spirits are high
as we continue to execute the national security strategy through a
series of regional engagement activities. Our servicemen and women in
Bosnia understand the importance of their mission to regional stability
and are focused for success. The Morale, Welfare, and Recreation
structure continues to improve Quality of Life of deployed personnel.
Commercial telephone service has made it much easier for them to keep
in touch with their ``home bases.'' They enjoy modern aerobics/fitness
equipment, reading rooms, TV/VCR rooms, and opportunities for weekly
religious events. There is also an established special circuit for
professional entertainment/USO shows. The Army and Air Force Exchange
provides direct operating exchanges, food, alternations and barber
services. These initiatives have provided outlets for members to spend
time relaxing, getting/staying fit, and fulfilling spiritual needs.
Along with force protection, Quality of Life remains at the top of
USCINCEUR's Priority List.
Adequate funding for quality of life facilities, services and
programs for military and civilian personnel and their families in the
European Theater continues to be USECOM's top resourcing priority.
Given the numerous contingency operations tasked to USAREUR, resourcing
QOL programs is critical to mission readiness and a significant part of
a total integrated mission support package. Efficiency savings and
reprogramming will not provide for continual upgrade of equipment or
the programs necessary to sustain program vitality. Within USAFE, the
Air Force Central NAF construction program is healthy again, and we
envision no problems in meeting the demand for facility projects in
USAFE. However, we are concerned about the poor funding outlook for APF
projects. Because of the limited dollars made available to USAFE, no
MWR projects are within MILCON Total Obligated Authority (TOA) beyond
FY-97. USAFE is continuing its Funding Opportunities for Communities in
USAFE (FOCUS) Program in FY-98. This program was a success in FYs 96
and 97 because it allowed QOL programs to compete for mission dollars.
In FY 97 the USAFE Commander funded dorm furnishings, Armed Forces
Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) 97 connection costs, library
automation, equipment and furnishings, Command Development Center
playgrounds, Airmen Leadership Schools and completion of remaining
postal upgrades.
CENTCOM Answer. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has no permanently
assigned forces. The services and other unified commands all provide
forces, as complete units and as individuals, to our Area of
Responsibility (AOR). The forces that are being provided to me are in
an exceptional state of readiness and high morale. This has been
especially true during the recent crisis with Iraq. I am aware that the
services and other commanders in chief pay a price in providing CENTCOM
these forces.
Commanders are working hard to sustain their readiness as much as
possible. However, given the realities of the region and wide-ranging
training requirements that units have, it can be difficult. In
particular, aircrews conducting Operation SOUTHERN WATCH have limited
training opportunities, while Army and Marine Corps units operating in
Kuwait have much greater training opportunities. The brigade from the
3rd Infantry Division that deployed to Kuwait will soon go through a
Combat Training Center (CTC) equivalent exercise using equipment they
drew from prepositioned stocks in that country.
We are taking steps to keep the morale of deployed forces high.
Permanent facilities are being constructed at Prince Sultan Air Base
and local commanders are taking steps to ensure our personnel stay in
touch with their families.
NATO Expansion
Question. In the next few weeks the Senate will vote on the
ratification of the ``accession protocol'' to expand the membership of
NATO. The new member states of NATO are proposed to be Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic. While the costs and strategic logic of the
expansion have been and will continue to be debated, the Committee has
some questions concerning the military implications of increasing the
size of NATO at the present time. General Clark, what are your views on
the military implications of NATO expansion, as both SACEUR and
Commander in Chief of the United States European Command?
EUCOM Answer. From a military perspective, NATO enlargement creates
the opportunity to combat the greatest threats which we face in Europe
today: political, economic and military instability. Expanding NATO
further will greatly enhance and broaden military stability in the
region. NATO expansion increases our Strategic Depth. As stability
increases, the potential for US forces to be called upon to fight in
this theater decreases. Beyond the manpower and equipment increases we
gain, adding the Czechs, Poles and Hungarians brings in three new
allies who have already proved themselves as they stood with us in the
Gulf War, Bosnia and in our most recent crisis with Iraq. I am
confident that these three nations so painfully aware of the
consequences of lost freedom will stand firm with us in defense of
freedom throughout NATO and Europe.
Question. Any changes in the military mission of NATO as a result
of expansion?
EUCOM Answer. The military mission of NATO will not change as a
result of expansion. NATO always has been and will remain a defensive
alliance. Alliance policy calls for the maintenance of a military
capability sufficient to prevent war and to provide for effective
defense and overall capability to successfully manage crises affecting
the security of its members. The primary role of Alliance military
forces remains unchanged: to guarantee the security and territorial
integrity of member states.
Question. Your estimate of the costs to EUCOM in particular and the
US in general resulting from expansion?
EUCOM Answer. It is best to think of enlargement costs in three
categories. First is the cost borne by new members for their own
national security and contributions to the Alliance--this is no cost to
the US. The second category includes expenses borne by all members to
enhance their own contributions to the alliance in support of
accession. As NATO adapts from a static defense to emphasize more
mobile operational concepts in support of out-of-area contingencies,
the operational and strategic deployability of forces has to be
strengthened. Fulfilling existing force goals will fully prepare all
current members for the strategic requirements of NATO enlargement.
This second cost can be viewed as the normal modernization expenditures
that a nation incurs over its defense planning cycles. The third
category of costs consists of NATO common-funded accounts. These
include headquarters operating costs, common operations and
maintenance, and the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP). Each NATO
member contributes a percentage to the NATO NSIP budget, and as the
alliance grows the infrastructure will increase. This is the one area
that will require additional U.S. funding to support enlargement.
NATO's estimate of the cost associated for the NSIP budget is $1.5
billion over a 10-year period. In addition, SHAPE has requested $200
million to conduct interoperability training over that same period to
enhance the training standards of all Alliance members--this is totally
independent of NATO expansion. If the additional funds for
interoperability training are approved, the total NSIP increase will be
$1.7 billion. The U.S. share of the costs should be approximately $40
million per year for 10 years. Additional costs to USEUCOM will be
negligible.
Question. Changes necessitated to the NATO command and control
structure?
EUCOM Answer. The military implications of enlargement are
positive. The three prospective new members will contribute a combined
total of nearly 300,000 troops, over 3,000 tanks, and over 500 fighter
aircraft. I have visited all three countries in 1998, and can assure
you their leadership is committed, and their troops are sharp and
motivated--they are eager to join NATO. All three have contributed
units to the Implementation and Stabilization Forces in Bosnia, which
has increased their interoperability for NATO forces. They have been a
part of over 100 Partnership for Peace (PfP), and bilateral exercises.
Poland and the Czech Republic also contributed forces to the Gulf War
Coalition, and Hungary has served as a vital staging area for NATO
forces in Bosnia. They will make a meaningful, significant, and
immediate military contribution to the Alliance.
The Command and Control for the Alliance will remain essentially
the same under NATO's current Integrated Command Structure. Changes to
NATO's Command and Control structure are not a result of NATO
enlargement. While future internal adaptation is possible, it will be
more a result of NATO's just concluded Long-Term Study, and the
changing European strategic environment.
Question. What are your views on additional expansion of NATO in
the future?
EUCOM Answer. This is a political not military decision. If the
political leaders of the alliance propose additional members in the
future, as SACEUR, I will provide the military advice to the Alliance
on military requirements of the new members, plus the effects new
members would have on the overall collective security of NATO.
Question. Have there been changes in the level and quality of
military-to-military cooperation with the Russians since the decision
to expand NATO?
EUCOM Answer. During calendar years 1997 and 1998 the Russian
military elected not to actively engage the United States European
Command via the annual military-to-military contact program executed
between our two nations. Although USEUCOM nominated between 30-35 mil-
to-mil events for the Russians' consideration each year, the Russians
only selected two to three events. They subsequently pulled out from at
least one event during each year. While bilateral mil-to-mil contacts
with USEUCOM have been minimal, Russian participation in these events
with other unified combatant commands (e.g., USPACOM and USACOM) has
ranged from 10-12 events per command per year. The small number of
events with USEUCOM could possibly be tied to their continuing
dissatisfaction with NATO enlargement or with the fact that they have
decided to engage the United States military in Europe under the
auspices of the NATO Partnership for Peace program. U.S.-Russian
cooperation within the framework of the NATO IFOR/SFOR operation in
Bosnia, however, has been positive. In April 1998 we completed a
comprehensive Marshall Center-hosted conference in Moscow, on NATO-
Russian military cooperation and lessons learned in Bosnia. This was an
excellent professional military exchange and dialogue-anticipate future
engagement opportunities evolving between Russian and NATO forces.
Question. Expansion will mean a quantitative change in NATO's
collective defense responsibilities: 15 percent more European territory
and a nearly 400 mile move eastward to the Polish-Belorussian border.
What new capabilities and equipment are necessary for EUCOM in
order to participate in the collective defense of the new NATO members?
EUCOM Answer. ------.
Question. What exactly is NATO defending against today?
EUCOM Answer. No large-scale conventional threat to NATO in the
near term is foreseen. However, the threats and risks to the Alliance
are varied. The nations of the Alliance are faced with regional
instability, Islamic extremism, nationalism state-sponsored terrorism,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, and
economic and political instability. The strength of NATO has always
been based on collective defense. NATO must not become a collective
security organization. ------.
Question. What do you believe are appropriate out-of-area
operations for NATO to undertake in the future?
EUCOM Answer. The conduct of out-of-area operations would be a
political, not military, decision made by the North Atlantic Council
(NAC). Each Alliance member has a Permanent Representative on the NAC.
All members must agree by consensus to conduct any operations, whether
they be in or out of theater. As Supreme Allied Commander, I am
responsible for providing military advice to the NAC, and planning
possible Allied Command Europe military operations--I would receive
both guidance and political authority from the NAC. Additionally, SHAPE
HQ, which is under SACUR's command, has the responsibility for
identifying the military capabilities, and ensuring the force readiness
requirements needed to contribute to crisis management, peace support,
humanitarian aid, and the protection of vital interests of the
Alliance.
Bosnia Operation
Question. On December 18, 1997, President Clinton announced that he
had agreed in principle that U.S. forces should participate in a Bosnia
peacekeeping force after the mandate of the current SFOR expires.
Decisions made recently by NATO planners have led to the requirement
for approximately 6900 U.S. military personnel (as opposed to 8500 in
SFOR) to remain in Bosnia until the achievement of a self-sustaining
peace in the region. In his certification to Congress that the
continued presence of U.S. forces, after June 30, 1998 is required, the
President notes several ``benchmarks'' which must be achieved prior to
the ultimate withdrawal of forces from the region. They include, the
establishment of judicial reforms, the dismantling of pre-Dayton
institutions, the regulation of the media, free market reforms, the
conduct of free elections, and a whole host of other political, civic
and economic goals. Does the pursuit of these goals, in fact,
constitute nation building by U.S. forces?
EUCOM Answer. U.S. and NATO forces are supporting the civil
implementation effort in Bosnia by providing a secure environment and
freedom of movement throughout the country to allow the massive civil
implementation effort to move forward. In addition, U.S. and NATO civil
affairs officers liaise with civil implementation organizations. The
value of having civil affairs officers in close liaison with civil
implementation organizations is that they often push through
bureaucratic barriers, thus allowing for a higher rate of progress.
Finally, U.S. and NATO forces provide assistance to the civil effort by
providing logistic support and security only when it does not interfere
with primary mission tasks.
The tasks cited above are all military tasks which are approved in
the current NATO plan for the employment of military force in Bosnia.
Question. How are the troops under your command in Bosnia equipped
to achieve these ``benchmark'' goals as described in the President's
certification?
Answer. U.S. and NATO forces are highly equipped to provide the
secure environment and freedom of movement necessary for the attainment
of these ``benchmark'' goals. Without a strong military presence on the
ground in Bosnia, civil implementation of the Dayton Accord would fail
since continued competing agendas of the factions would prevent any
progress. Civil affairs officers are highly trained functional area
experts who provide a much needed focus to the pursuit of civil,
economic and political goals. Finally, the most powerful tool that our
forces have is the respect that they muster from all the parties in
Bonsia.
Violence in Kosovo
Question. Hostilities have recently flared in the Serbian province
of Kosovo, where ethnic Albanians constitute 90 percent of the
population. Serbian government forces have cracked down on Albanian
separatists and civilians have been killed. Recent statements by
administration officials suggest that consideration is being given to
increasing force levels in Macedonia and even possibly deploying to
Kosovo. General, what contingency planning are you engaged in with
regard to the situation in Kosovo?
EUCOM Answer. There is no political guidance to plan for any
military intervention in Kosovo, nor is there any instruction to either
the NATO staff or the U.S. European Command Staff to conduct any
planning for military intervention in Kosovo.
Question. If troops were deployed in that region, what do you
understand your mission would be?
EUCOM Answer. Though NATO and U.S. military staffs are carefully
monitoring the situation in Kosovo, there is no political guidance to
intervene in Kosovo with military force. No mission has been defined.
Question. Would forces be detached from those participating in SFOR
if deployment to Kosovo was ordered?
EUCOM Answer. Current NATO planning for the continuing SFOR mission
does not address deploying forces from the SFOR into the region. The
United Nations Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) in the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia does not authorize the use of those forces for
intervention in Kosovo. The UNPREDEP mandate under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter and authorized under UN Security Council Resolution 983 of
31 March 1995 (with subsequent mandate extensions) only establishes a
monitoring force on the disputed border between the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
Iraq
Question. General Zinni, you are said to be an expert regarding
Arab ``man in the street'' opinion. What are the present perceptions of
the Gulf State nations with respect to U.S. policy towards Iraq?
CENTCOM Answer. I am no expert, but there are concerns in the Arab
world over the impact of sanctions on the Iraqi people. Arab popular
opinion tends to connect the effects of sanctions on the Iraqi people
with the UN and U.S. policies, not Saddam Hussein's failure to comply
with UN resolutions and look after the needs of his own population. The
stalled Middle East Peace Process creates the perception of a double
standard in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. I
believe most Arabs in the region understand that our military presence
helps regional stability.
Iraq--Potential Airstrikes
Question. Airstrikes against Iraq were narrowly avoided last month
after UN Secretary General Kofi Annan persuaded Saddam Hussein to fully
cooperate in granting access to UN inspectors who are examining the
Iraqis' Weapons of Mass Destruction program (WMD). According to an
article in Aviation Week (2/16/98), ``Saudi Arabia has decided not to
allow U.S. Air Force aircraft stationed there to shift to nearby
countries such as Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, or Qatar to carry out attacks
against Iraq--at least for now.'' The article also stated that
according to Air Force officials, ``morale among the Saudi-based U.S.
units has plummeted with the news that after seven years of deployments
and training, they may be excluded from any future air campaign against
Iraq.'' General Zinni, are these reports accurate? Under what agreement
with the U.S. can the Saudis block the transfer of U.S. Air Force
aircraft out of the country to other bases in the Gulf region? Has any
headway been made to get the Saudis to reverse their stance on this
issue since the article was published? What is the state of readiness
and morale of air personnel based in Saudi Arabia?
CENTCOM Answer. There is no agreement where the Saudis could block
the transfer of U.S. aircraft. The Saudis ------. This arrangement is
consistent with arrangements we have with any government that allows us
to station combat assets on its soil. We did not plan to relocate any
of our combat aircraft from Saudi Arabia to any other country in the
Gulf.
Saudi Arabia continues to support international efforts to enforce
UN Security Council Resolutions. During the recent crisis the Saudi
government provided U.S. forces with all support that U.S. Central
Command asked for. The friendship between our two countries remains
strong and I see no reason to readdress our current bi-lateral
agreements.
While morale has certainly not plummeted, we acknowledge that it is
something that needs improvement and we have taken positive steps to do
so. Our deployed forces conducting Operation SOUTHERN WATCH and DESERT
THUNDER are living under very austere conditions and in many cases have
deployed to the region for the second or third time. At Prince Sultan
Airbase fixed facilities are being built and units should move into
them by the end of the year. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR)
opportunities have been increased and personnel are able to keep in
touch with families back home through e-mail and free phone calls.
Our forces in the region realize that their job is an important one
and train very hard, often under adverse circumstances, to hone their
combat skills. They take great pride in their capabilities and
readiness. Furthermore, they realize that often the critical aspect of
our military capability and readiness is its deterrent value. Our
troops are ready. They continue to train with their Gulf allies to
conduct their missions as a part of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH.
Budget Priorities and Deficiencies
Question. Do you feel the interests and needs of your Commands have
been adequately addressed in the fiscal year 1999 budget request?
EUCOM Answer. The fiscal year 1999 budget request meets the needs
of USEUCOM Commands, with a few exceptions. Additional funding of $16.1
million for engagement activities, $1.125 million for command and
control communications, and $275 million for family housing and
barracks renovation is required.
Additional engagement funding of $16.1 million is required for
fiscal year 1999. Engagement is the key component of our theater
strategy toward regional peace and stability. It is a long-term
investment, the return on which is often difficult to quantify, and if
successful, may never be fully recognized. Systematic underfunding of
engagement activities threatens our ability to provide stability.
--Military liaison teams must be established in the new Unified
Command Plan-directed countries of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine ($400
thousand).
--Essential USEUCOM Headquarters support to Partnership for Peace
activities must be funded ($1.1 million).
--Humanitarian assistance activities in Africa must be funded ($684
thousand).
--USEUCOM Headquarters joint exercise participation in Moldova,
Georgia and Ukraine must be funded ($100 thousand).
--The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in
Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, provides defense education to civilian
and military personnel of the United States, NATO, European nations and
the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union. As the OPTEMPO
in the European theater increases, funding is needed to renovate vacant
German barracks to provide additional student billets. In addition, a
larger and state-of-the-art lecture hall is needed to provide visual
information capabilities for instructors, students, and conference
attendees. It is essential to raise the quality and quantity of the
existing infrastructure to a level commensurate with those of
equivalent DoD and NATO educational institutions. (Student billets: $5
million; lecture hall and associated communication/electronic
equipment: $8 million)
--Force protection improvement requirements at our military liaison
team locations must be funded ($1.2 million).
Modifications to the non-strategic nuclear force command and
control Regency network must be funded to ensure its viability ($1.125
million).
Housing construction and maintenance requires an additional $361
million per year over the next 10 years to eliminate inadequate housing
throughout USEUCOM. Since the drawdown, there has been near zero
investment in European infrastructure. USEUCOM is trying to play catch-
up with a steadily failing infrastructure. The situation is aggravated
by overseas housing funding that does not keep pace with CONUS housing,
a much higher cost ofconstruction/maintenance, and fair share
apportions that include ``payment-in-kind'' funds from the host nation
that never meet projections. USEUCOM full house appropriations
committee/national security subcommittee supports the Secretary of
Defense's initiative to eliminate inadequate housing by 2010 and
requests that funding be provided in steady and consistent amounts to
support this initiative.
While not a fiscal year 1999 funding issue, one of USEUCOM's top
priorities, the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), needs
support for future program funding. MEADS is a replacement for HAWK and
PATRIOT systems and provides NATO a lower-tier, hit-to-kill, point
defense capability for protecting both NATO territory and forces
operating out-of-area. MEADS requires \1/3\ of the airlift that an
equivalent PATRIOT unit requires and unlike Patriot systems, can be
moved by C-130 aircraft. MEADS is important to USEUCOM because it is an
active defense, trilateral, Theater Missile Defense initiative between
the U.S., Germany, and Italy. Additionally, this burden sharing may
inspire Turkey and Netherlands to become partners, further
strengthening the alliance and U.S. leadership. MEADS is only funded
through fiscal year 1999. $1 billion is needed during fiscal years
2000-2005 to ensure the commitment of our allies to assist in the
completion of a capability we urgently need.
CENTCOM Answer. Yes. As the Commander-in-Chief of a Unified
Command, I submit my requirements to the Joint Staff and Department of
Defense (DoD) through my Integrated Priority List (IPL). The Fiscal
Year 1999 budget, as well as the Future Year Defense Program (FYDP)
supports Central Command's IPL.
Question. What is your assessment of the major shortfalls in
personnel, training, equipment and maintenance for those units under
your day-to-day command as well as those that would be assigned to you
in a war time situation?
EUCOM Answer. ------.
The Services have made great strides capturing readiness for low-
density, high-demand assets. What requires more attention is the
support force assets that are constantly tapped for continuing
operations. Military police, transportation units, movement control
teams, intelligence analysts and headquarters elements are constantly
on the road or supporting deployments while at home bases, resulting in
long hours which are difficult to capture. Because low density/high
demand asset tracking for the Services counts days away from home
station (temporary duty), we may miss a large portion of the tail in
the tooth-to-tail element of an operation. These support force assets
are required by all operations that are experiencing equally high, but
more difficult to capture, TEMPO rates. We need more accurate ways of
identifying readiness costs that focus on additional indicators beyond
just ``a night away from home'' to better capture the readiness impact
of high TEMPO on the entire force. ------.
Basing facilities. USEUCOM, a forward-deployed force operating at
the highest TEMPO of any Unified Command, has less than adequate
facilities for its troops. 23% of USAREUR's maintenance facilities and
18% of its operational facilities are substandard for daily operations.
It would require $3.4 billion to bring operational facilities to
standard and $450 million for maintenance facilities. 60% of USAREUR's
28K barracks spaces require renovation to meet Department of Defense
standards. Finally, 88% of USAREUR's 24K housing units and 70% of
USAFE's 10.5K housing units require renovation. It is important for
Congress to support USEUCOM's forward-deployed force with adequate
facilities--several program budget decisions cut funding in this area
during the most recent budget cycle. ------.
5. Wartime Assigned Forces. USEUCOM is not a major theater war
CINC. The two Ft. Riley brigades designated to deploy with USAREUR's
divisions to any major theater war are USACOM assets and are monitored
and tracked by that unified command. Should either brigade not meet the
criteria for deploying MTW forces, it would fall on USACOM to resolve
the shortfall. USEUCOM does not have oversight over their readiness
shortfalls.
On a day-to-day basis, USEUCOM does use assets from other theaters,
thereby moderating the TEMPO of ongoing operations. The 2ACR from Ft.
Polk, LA, for example, is currently in Bosnia supporting peacekeeping
operations. The reserves also provide forces to make up theater
shortfalls. In each case, however, the unified command supplying forces
is responsible for ensuring they are trained and ready to execute
assigned tasking prior to arrival. USACOM personnel proceeding to or
returning from Bosnia, for instance, process through Ft. Benning, GA.
This ensures standardization in preparing troops for the Bosnia
environment prior to deploying overseas.
CENTCOM Answer. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has no units
assigned under our day-to-day command. The forces that have been
provided to us for operations such as Operation SOUTHERN WATCH and
Maritime Intercept Operations have deployed to the theater in a high
state of readiness with all their equipment. The forces that have been
deployed for Operation DESERT THUNDER have also arrived in a similar
high state of readiness.
Question. What are the top ten items on your most recent integrated
priority list? How do your top ten priorities differ from last year and
why?
EUCOM Answer. ------.
CENTCOM Answer. My Integrated Priority List (IPL) emphasizes
maintaining and improving capabilities, rather than asking for specific
systems or programs. Capabilities I am most interested in improving are
Force Deployment and In-Theater Sustainability, Theater Missile
Defense, In-Theater Force Application, Force Protection, Intelligence
Collection, Command and Control, and Joint Readiness.
Since taking command of U.S. Central Command last year, we have
conducted a major review of our regional strategy and requirements to
execute that strategy. At the same time, the Department of Defense
reorganized the process through which it receives priorities from
unified commanders. The result was an updated list of priorities that I
believe accurately reflects our requirements.
Year 2000 Computer Problem
Question. One of the problems that we face as we enter the next
century is older computers that are only programmed to remember the
last two digits in a year. Thus they remember ``1997'' as simply
``97''. The year 2000, however, will be saved as ``00'', the same as
the year 1900. This can lead to calculation errors and system failures.
How serious is this problem for your Command? What would be the impact
if your Mission Critical Systems were not corrected by the year 2000?
EUCOM Answer. The impact could be very serious. Every mission and
function that we perform could be impacted, but until the Joint or
Service program managers tell us how extensive the technical problems
are, the functional users cannot fully assess the impact.
The Services have oversight for US European Command Component
Commands. Each service recently reported that they are on track with
their respective Service Year 2000 Action Plans (Source: 24-26 March
1998 Joint Staff Year 2000 Working Group hosted by the Joint Staff J6).
I am currently polling my component commanders for their assessments to
be completed in May 1998, but these assessments will be an interactive
process.
At the Headquarters we are strictly users, not developers, of joint
Mission Critical Systems. These systems are the responsibility of
Service and Agency program managers. We report these systems quarterly
to the Joint Staff and we have identified our Top 20 priorities for the
warfighter. We are counting on all fixes to be delivered by the
December 98 deadline. (Deadline is mandated in the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Year 2000 Action Plan (March 1998, Version 2.0)). Our job after
that is to test the fixes and develop contingency plans if the fixes
are incomplete.
CENTCOM Answer. This is a large problem being handled within the
DoD as a team effort headed up by the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence). Each
DoD Component, including US Central Command, must correct the systems
they are responsible for. Of the 468 systems we use in US Central
Command, we are responsible for correcting 17. We are taking action to
make our 17 systems year 2000 compliant by the end of this year. If any
systems we use, including our Mission Critical Systems, still have
problems by the year 2000, we do not expect catastrophic failures. We
will be able to carry out our mission.
Question. What testing do you plan to do to ensure that your
warfighting systems are fully compliant prior to the year 2000?
EUCOM Answer. All USEUCOM warfighting systems are provided by a
Service or a joint agency. We will support Service and Agency testing
efforts fully. Service and Agency-provided systems must be tested and
fielded to us by Dec 1998 (Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff Year 2000
Action Plan, March 1998, Version 2.0 and DoD Year 2000 Management Plan,
April 1997, Version 1.0). For all our systems, we will perform our own
functional testing after the fixes are delivered.
We fully support DoD-wide testing. I applaud the Assistant
Secretary of Defense C3I for marking 1999 to be used as a systems test
year. Our success in conducting functional testing relies heavily on
the Services and Agencies completing and fielding system fixes to us by
the December 1998 deadline (Deadline is mandated in the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Year 2000 Action Plan (March 1998, Version 2.0)).
CENTCOM Answer. We will test software we developed by setting the
clocks ahead and performing off-line operational tests. We will also
perform software interface tests between and among the other software-
dependent warfighting systems that we use.
Question. What steps have our coalition partners taken to ensure
that their warfighting systems are Year 2000 compliant? Are you
comfortable that our allies will have their systems corrected in time?
EUCOM Answer. I am not comfortable at this time because I do not
have a lot of insight into their actions. However, the Joint Staff and
SHAPE are currently working this issue. The Joint Staff is working with
the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the State Department to
gather information on the status of our coalition partners.
Additionally SHAPE and NATO are accelerating their efforts and have
recently formed a working group. We rely heavily on our coalition
partners, who generally have resource constraints and equipment that is
older and more susceptible to year 2000 problems.
CENTCOM Answer. We do not know the extent of our coalition
partners' efforts to identify and correct year 2000 problems with their
various systems. However, we do not believe they are expending much
effort in this area. Many of our allies are using American systems
obtained through an open Foreign Military Sales case. The United States
has a responsibility to inform the country of any known problems and
the steps we are taking to resolve those problems.
Question. Would you consider conducting some of your training
exercises with ``the clocks turned forward'' to ensure that your
systems are ready? Do you believe this would be a valuable test to see
if your critical computer systems will be ready for the year 2000? If
not, why not?
EUCOM Answer. Fixes, replacement systems, or workarounds must be in
place prior to any functional user testing. It would be counter-
productive to test systems that are still being analyzed and revised by
Service or Joint Agency program managers.
It is important that we not lose sight of the fact that the
prerequisite to testing is identifying, fixing and fielding. Most of
our systems, and certainly our major systems, are under the management
of a Service Executive Agent or Joint Agency program manager. We, as
functional users, must validate the fixes they deliver to us.
We fully support efforts for testing year 2000 fixes, first at the
program manager's lab, then at the functional user site. Training
exercises may provide excellent opportunities for user testing in some
cases, but they are not the only method of test available.
However, we caution that our exercises should not lose focus on the
original training objectives. Training objectives should not be
sacrificed to identify problems that should be found and corrected by
the responsible Service or Agency for the system. Training exercises
should only be used to validate delivered fixes.
Resources to correct the Year 2000 problem are very scarce. We
encourage any actions that would provide additional resources to the
Service and Agency efforts to fix the systems we use.
CENTCOM Answer. Turning the clocks ahead to see what happens during
an exercise would have limited value. During exercises we use
operational systems. Thus, turning the clocks ahead during exercises
could impact real world operations. Alternatively, a carefully designed
scenario, utilizing systems isolated from the real world, could be
effectively and safely used to determine if critical systems are ready
for the year 2000.
Question. Have you begun developing contingency plans in case your
Mission Critical Systems are not year 2000 compliant?
EUCOM Answer. We are primarily users of Service and Joint Systems.
Contingency plans cannot be developed at our level until we know if
there is a problem and how great the problem is. To date, no specific
problems have been published to facilitate our contingency planning but
each Service has provided guidance to their Components for the
completion of contingency plans based on the Service-set criteria.
We are working with the Joint Staff to obtain the Service and
Agency statements of compliance or definitions of problems we will
encounter. This data will allow our functional users to develop the
necessary contingency plans. As specific system problems are provided,
we will assess them in light of our specific needs and develop
contingency plans as appropriate.
CENTCOM Answer. We expect to be year 2000 compliant this year. This
gives us an additional year to clean up any systems that we may have
missed. We do not expect any year 2000 related problems to cause
catastrophic failures.
JCS Exercises
Question. In the Quadrennial Defense Review the Department of
Defense announced plans to reduce the number of man-days required for
joint exercises by 15 percent in order to reduce the high PERSTEMPO
rates. Have either of your Commands experienced a reduction in Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises?
EUCOM Answer. Yes. Program management and execution actions
undertaken since the Quadrennial Defense Review in May 1997 have made
significant changes (e.g., in 18 percent reduction in the number of
exercises and more than 25 percent reduction in man-days devoted to
exercise participation). This reduced level of exercise participation
is expected to continue to comply with the Chairman's guidance. Actions
taken include reducing the number, scope, duration, and participation
levels for specific exercises; combining, merging, and linking
exercises across USEUCOM and Military Service lines; and placing
greater emphasis on staff and headquarters exercises, simulations, and
improved communications and computer technologies to reduce personnel
demands.
CENTCOM Answer. Yes, Central Command (CENTCOM) has experienced a
reduction in JCS exercise. From fiscal year 1996 to 1998, CENTCOM's JCS
exercise program was reduced from 39 to 37 exercises. In addition, the
1999 exercise program is being reduced to 34 and the 2000 program to
32. In total, our JCS exercise program has been reduced by seven
exercises over a four-year period.
In order to meet the QDR man-day reduction requirements, CENTCOM
conducted a comprehensive review of the JCS exercise program to
identify additional ways to reduce exercise Personnel Tempo
(PERSTEMPO). Some of the initiatives used to achieve the reduction in
PERSTEMPO were: increased use of deployed in-theater forces to conduct
exercises, rescheduling and combining smaller exercises to result in
more complex Joint exercises, and Command Post Exercises (CPX)
utilization of model distributive simulation. From 1996 to 2000 we will
have reduced JCS exercise PERSTEMPO by thirty-two percent.
Question. If you have experienced a reduction in JCS exercises has
this had a noticeable effect on your PERSTEMPO rates?
EUCOM Answer. HQ USEUCOM tabulates individual PERSTEMPO (as opposed
to numbers of personnel in-theater at a given point) for shore-based
personnel assigned to USAREUR, USAFE and USNAVEUR. Based on the
PERSTEMPO statistics reported by EUCOM theater components for October
1996 through January 1998, we have not experienced a noticeable
decrease in theater PERSTEMPO. From October, 1996 through January 1997,
13,120 EUCOM Component personnel returned from participation in an
exercise. From October 1997 through January 1998, 32,014 returned from
exercises and field maneuvers.
On average, from October 1996 through January 1998, 13 percent of
EUCOM's assigned personnel were deployed or TDY at all times. Apart
from those participating in Operation Joint Guard, PERSTEMPO drops only
during the winter holiday season (December-February).
At this point, we can tabulate individual PERSTEMPO with confidence
only for EUCOM Component personnel. While a high OPTEMPO may produce a
high PERSTEMO for individuals involved in those operations, that
PERSTEMPO ``calculation'' accounts for about 70 percent-75 percent of
the ``day away'' from home station reported by EUCOM components.
CENTCOM Answer. Since we are a command with no assigned forces,
Central Command (CENTCOM) must rely on the Services to calculate and
track Operational and Personnel Tempo (OPSTEMPO/PERSTEMPO) rates. We do
not have visibility of all the deployments for units and individuals
during an entire year. However, we are sensitive to the PERSTEMPO
currently experienced in the force and clearly our operational and
exercise requirements affect the OPSTEMPO/PERSTEMPO. Consequently, we
are committed to helping reduce OPSTEMPO/PERSTEMPO. In fiscal year 1997
we reduced our exercise program by 11 exercises which resulted in a
savings of 160,800 man-days.
Question. How do you determine that the right mix of exercise is
being conducted?
EUCOM Answer. USEUCOM is guided in the exercises we conduct based
on deficiencies we identify in our after-action reports and the needs
of the theater as delineated in Theater Security Planning System. We
combine these two elements with input from the Service components to
craft an exercise program that is geared to enhanced readiness and
interoperability.
CENTCOM Answer. Each year I receive an assessment brief from my
Component Commanders that provide their assessment of their warfighting
abilities. This assessment provides my staff with detailed information
on what areas of the respective Components warfighting abilities are
trained and which areas require additional training. My staff then
plans and coordinates exercises designed to fulfill the Component
requirements, Central Command's ``Theater Engagement Plan,'' and Host
Nation requirements. These include: battlestaff exercises, warfighting
functional exercises, Joint Task Force/Combined Task Force exercises,
sub-regional multi-lateral exercises, or country specific bilateral
exercises that best support the Component Commander's training
requirements.
Question. What portion of the exercises that you conduct are
primarily to train US forces for their wartime mission and what portion
is for regional engagement?
EUCOM Answer. USECOM schedules Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises to
meet training needs, enhance joint interoperability, support readiness
and refine interoperability with allies and partners. In the course of
conducting these exercises we meet engagement strategies but do not
schedule exercises for engagement purposes.
CENTCOM Answer. Our JCS exercise program at U.S. Central Command
from FY95 to FY00 totals 183 exercises, of which 50 are primarily for
regional engagement and 133 are designed to train U.S. forces in their
wartime missions.
Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund
Question. With congressional support, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff established the Combating Terrorism Readiness
Initiative Fund. How much did your Command receive from this fund in
fiscal year 1997 and what were the funds used for?
EUCOM Answer. USEUCOM received $1.86 million in Combating Terrorism
Readiness Initiative Fund funding for fiscal year 1997.
$200,000 funded Close Circuit Television Upgrades for Headquarters,
U.S. Navy Europe, United Kingdom.
$618,000 funded the following three projects for Headquarters, U.S.
Navy Europe, United Kingdom: (1) Special Project R12-94 (hardening of
Headquarters, U.S. Navy Europe) ($600,000); (2) the purchase of one (1)
X-Ray Machine for the post office ($10,000); and (3) a contract to
update as-built drawings for the alarm system ($8,000) of Headquarters,
U.S. Navy Europe building.
$158,000 funded the following three projects at Naval Air Station
Sigonella: (1) an upgrade to the intrusion detection system ($72,000)
for the base; (2) a repair of the electronic security system for
protection of the flightline perimeter ($36,000); and (3) the purchase
of three (3) Explosive Ordnance Disposal response backpacks containing
Explosive Ordnance Disposal tools.
$98,000 funded communication upgrades for Naval Support Activity
NAPLES Security Department, Italy.
$790,000 funded the construction of two Pass and Identification
facilities at the Capodochino Compound, NSA Naples, Italy.
In addition, in fiscal year 1997, Headquarters U.S. European
Command received $777,000 in force protection funding; U.S. Army Europe
received $5,500,000; U.S. Air Force received $3,400,000; and U.S. Navy
Europe received $351,000.
CENTCOM Answer. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) received $948,000 in
fiscal year 1997 to establish and support initial operating costs of
the Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC).
The Joint Rear Area Coordinator is my overall coordinating
authority for force protection within the CENTCOM Area of
Responsibility (AOR). The primary mission of the JRAC is to conduct
risk assessments of Department of Defense units and personnel and to
determine their vulnerability to terrorist attack. The JRAC is
responsible for ensuring force protection measures are adequate for the
security of all forces assigned.
A portion of the $948,000 was used to purchase furnishings and
equipment for the new JRAC offices, as well as some specialized
equipment used to conduct vulnerability assessments. The remainder of
the funding, was spent on travel--first, to allow JRAC personnel to
attend antiterrorism training, then for them to conduct vulnerability
assessments in theater.
Question. How much has your Command requested from the fund this
year, fiscal year 1998?
EUCOM Answer. Currently, Headquarters US European Command (HQ
USEUCOM) is processing 37 projects totaling $3,387,000. Project
submissions cover such force protection items as communications
equipment, X-Ray machines, hand-held explosive detectors, vehicle
barriers, and minor construction.
In addition, in fiscal year 1998, HQ USEUCOM received $848,000 in
force protection funding; U.S. Army Europe received $18,881,000; U.S.
Air Force Europe received $1,704,000; and U.S. Navy Europe received
approximately $6,500,000. Force Protection funds are included in base
operations funding. Also as a result of Program Budget Decision 098R,
Department of the Army was directed to fund $1,300,000 in U.S. Army
force protection requirements, and the Department of the Navy was
directed to fund $300,000 in U.S. Navy Europe force protection
requirements.
CENTCOM Answer. In fiscal year 1998 we have requested and received
$1,193,838 from the combating terrorism initiative fund. The funds were
used to buy vehicle-mounted VHF radios, pagers, and upgrade existing
radios for personnel stationed in Saudi Arabia.
This initiative significantly enhances the U.S. Defense
Representative's capability to notify, in an emergency, several
Department of Defense organizations in Saudi Arabia. Seven hundred non-
combatants in the U.S. Military Training Mission, the Ordnance Program
Division, the Defense Contracting Material Command, and the Office of
the Program Manager for the Saudi Arabian National Guard benefit from
this improved capability.
Question. What are the top ten force protection priorities for your
Command in fiscal year 1999? Have these items been fully funded in the
Services' budget requests? If these items are not fully funded, what
will be the specific impact on your ability to protect the forces under
your command?
EUCOM Answer. ------.
CENTCOM Answer. Our force protection priorities are included in my
Integrated Priority List (IPL). These priorities are reflected under
tow main areas: ------.
Access to Bases in Southwest Asia
Question. General Zinni, during the recent crisis with Iraq, both
Saudi Arabia and Turkey made clear that they were unwilling to allow
U.S. forces to use bases in their countries for offensive missions
against Iraq. The Committee also understands the U.S. currently is
working to resolve base access issues with Oman and Kenya. What is the
status of base access discussions with these countries? Is the level of
local support for a U.S. military presence in your region declining?
CENTCOM Answer. Our access agreement with Oman runs through 2000.
The government of Oman was highly supportive of U.S. Central Command's
(CENTCOM) requirements in response to Operation DESERT THUNDER, ------.
Our access agreement with Kenya was renewed last year and runs through
2000 as well. The relationship between our countries continues to be a
strong one. They have willingly accepted U.S. military forces in
support of humanitarian operations in Africa.
Support for our military presence in the region remains strong.
Turkey and Saudia Arabia recognize the role played by a strong U.S.
military presence in the region, and they were supportive in allowing
that force to be built up. However, they wanted to ensure every
possible diplomatic solution to the crisis was explored.
Question. How would you change your force structure if you had
fewer forward bases to operate from?
CENTCOM Answer. In dealing with Iraqi sanctions enforcement,
without access to facilities of the Gulf Cooperation Council states, --
----. Our access to bases during times of crisis will be based on our
peacetime engagement with our coalition partners in the region. The
efforts we make in building relations, creating a shared regional
strategy, and incorporating host nation cultural concerns into our
operations is essential.
Question. What steps can be taken to prevent or offset the reduced
access to forward bases?
CENTCOM Answer. The key is to not lost access. Efforts at reaching
a consensus and relationship building will pay great dividends. It is
critical to engage our coalition partners on a continual basis to
ensure a shared perspective of the threat to achieve shared regional
objectives.
With respect to our dual-containment policy in the region, should
access be lost or unacceptable restrictions be placed on key bases, and
alternative force structure would be required to enforce UN resolutions
or support military operations. ------.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.
Questions submitted by Mr. Dicks and the answers thereto
follow:]
Weapons Inspections
Question. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and Iraqi Prime Minister
Tariq Aziz signed an accord on February 23 to defuse the crisis over
weapons inspector access to eight ``presidential sites.'' In the deal,
which has been endorsed by he U.S., Iraq has pledged unrestricted
access for the inspectors who are charged with dismantling Iraq's
biological; chemical and ballistic missiles. Are the weapons inspectors
being allowed access to all ``sensitive sites'' at this point?
CENTCOM Answer. The 23 February Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
stated Iraq would allow access to all presidential sites and access to
sensitive sites as previously agreed to. Under these agreements, the UN
Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors were allowed access to both
presidential sites and sensitive sites. Iraq invoked modalities to
limit the number of inspectors allowed into several sensitive sites,
and, while not blocking inspectors, lodged several protests to further
curtail UNSCOM operations at the presidential sites.
Question. How many ``sensitive sites'' have been visited by UN
inspectors since the accord was signed?
CENTCOM Answer. As of mid-April, UN inspectors have visited eight
Iraqi declared sensitive sites since the Memorandum of Understanding
was signed. More of these inspections are likely in the future.
Additionally, UN Special Commission inspectors and UN diplomats visited
eight Iraqi declared presidential sites.
Question. Have ``sensitive site'' inspections turned up any
evidence of WMD production or R&D?
CENTCOM Answer. The recent inspection of sensitive sites did not
yield any evidence of Weapons of Mass Destruction or Research and
Development. However, the chief inspector believed ------.The eight
presidential sites were declared in advance and no proscribed materials
were discovered. These initial visits were a baseline inspection only
and future, short-notice presidential site missions, such as aerial
overflight, photography, and computer searches, and may lodge even
stronger protests during follow-on visits.
Question. Are you concerned that in the months between the time the
Iraqi government halted UN weapons inspections and the time the accord
was signed, that critical WMD evidence was relocated away from
``sensitive sites'' or from other potential inspector sites?
CENTCOM Answer. The delay certainly allowed Iraq ample opportunity
to move Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) related materials and
documents. Iraq's tampering with monitoring cameras and removal of
dual-use equipment from certain locations provided a clear example of
Iraq's intent to protect key equipment. Until late February 1998,
Iraq's presidential sites provided locations to conceal prohibited
materials. The 23 February Kofi Annan/Tariq Aziz agreement probably
forced Baghdad to relocate materials from the presidential locations to
other sites, possibly private residences or burial locations.
Question. If so, do we have good intelligence suggesting where the
WMD-related material may have been moved?
CENTCOM Answer. ------.
Iraq Outlook
Question. Are the forces that will remain in the Gulf adequate to
quickly and decisively strike Iraq if Saddam does not comply with UN
accords?
CENTCOM Answer. The forces that will remain in the Gulf are there
simply to continue OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH (OSW) and to ensure the
credible defense of Kuwait. However, ------. Such a strike would cause
significant damage to Saddam's regime by destroying key security,
command and control (C2), air defense, and weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) facilities.
Question. Is there any military capability you do not have
available to you at this time that could have value-added in terms of
meeting our military and strategic objectives in your region?
CENTCOM Answer. All the currently fielded military technologies
available are at my disposal.
Question. What is your judgement of how this will play out? Is a
military confrontation with Saddam inevitable or is it possible that
the recent threat of force by the U.S. has convinced the Iraqi
government to comply with the UN weapons inspection resolutions?
CENTCOM Answer. I believe that Saddam will continue to test
coalition resolve. His goal is to get the sanctions lifted, and exploit
perceived divisions in the coalition.
I do not believe confrontation with Saddam Hussein is inevitable.
It is important however, that the U.S. and members of the coalition be
able to respond effectively should diplomacy fail.
Question. In your judgement, how long will the current force build-
up have to remain in the Gulf? At what point, assuming Saddam continues
to comply with UN resolutions, might we be able to start reducing force
levels in the Central region?
CENTCOM Answer. I expect the current force structure ------.
We will continue to size our force structure to reflect the threat.
I do not want to maintain American forces in the region any longer than
necessary.
Question. Would you agree with General Ryan's assessment--that we
had base access in Saudi Arabia and other areas but that access did not
necessarily translate into permission to operate our forces from an
offensive posture?
CENTCOM Answer. General Ryan ------. We asked eight other things of
the Saudi Arabian government to include the use of reconnaissance,
intelligence, surveillance and battle management aircraft based in
Saudi Arabia. They approved all eight requests.
Early in this crisis, ------.
Base Access
Question. If this were true, how would we have used ground-based
tactical aircraft in the most recent scenario?
CENTCOM Answer. Our plans ------.
Question. Isn't it true that because of our inability to get basing
access, the bulk of the air campaign would have had to be performed by
Naval aircraft deployed on carriers?
CENTCOM Answer. ------.
Question. Are you concerned that the assumptions that OSD has made
on forward basing are somewhat suspect given the recent situation in
the Gulf?
CENTCOM Answer. I consider the assumptions contained in our
regional war plans to be valid. Access to facilities in the region is
based on a shared perspective of the threat. If our coalition partners
perceive their national interests to be at stake, access will be
granted. U.S. interests and national objectives are not always
identical to those of our coalition partners. The key to ensuring
access is engaging our coalition partners to build a common perspective
of the threat to achieve shared regional objectives. Consultations and
relationship building are the elements to ensuring timely access to
bases in the region.
Strategy of Assassination
Question. As you know, there have been calls in Congress and in
some elements of the foreign policy community to pursue an
assassination attempt against Saddam Hussein. I am not one who agrees
that this is a reasonable or responsible policy. What is your general
view of the notion of pursuing an assassination attempt against Saddam?
CENTCOM Answer. I would not entertain any notion of pursuing an
assassination attempt against Saddam. Such an effort is contrary to the
U.S. policy implementing international laws that prohibit
assassinations. Our obligations to the UN and various international
treaties oblige us to refrain from using force in this way.
Question. Are we damaging ourselves from a public-relations
standpoint in the Arab community by pursuing this line of discussion?
CENTCOM Answer. Yes.
Question. Even if we accept that an assassination attempt is sound
policy, what in your judgment is the likelihood that we could be
successful in carrying such a policy out?
CENTCOM Answer. I would not agree with the premise of the question.
Assassination is contrary to U.S. policy and practice and I would not
want to speculate further.
Saddam's Strength
Question. There have been conflicting reports over the relative
strength of Saddam's regime in his country and throughout the middle-
east region. How would you currently characterize Saddam's strength in
Iraq?
CENTCOM Answer. I do not believe that time is on Saddam's side,
provided current sanctions can be maintained. His military faces the
block obsolescence of many of their weapon systems in the near future.
His security services maintain a climate of fear, which works to
prevent overt opposition, but he faces the constant threat of
assassination. Having said that, ------.
Question. Is he stronger or weaker than before the coalition build-
up in the Gulf?
CENTCOM Answer. Iraq's military strength and his ability to
threaten his neighboring countries has steadily decreased since the end
of Operation DESERT STORM. This has not changed during the recent
crisis. The sanctions imposed by the UN have prevented Saddam Hussein
from modernizing his military. His equipment is getting old and repair
parts are becoming increasingly hard to get.
Question. How is Saddam currently perceived in the Arab community?
Is he viewed in a more sympathetic light since the build-up of
Coalition forces in the Gulf?
CENTCOM Answer. I believe that most Arabs recognize that the
agreement negotiated by Kofi Annan was a retreat by Iraq from an
untenable position, and that it was made possible by the forces we
deployed to the region.
Question. How would you forecast Saddam's long-term viability both
in Iraq and in the Arab community?
CENTCOM Answer. Saddam will govern Iraq for the foreseeable future.
His regime is currently stable, and he is feared and respected. There
is little internal threat to Saddam's regime. As long as he ------.
Question. Is U.S. policy in Iraq strengthening or weakening Iraqi
opposition efforts to overthrow Saddam's regime. Are there changes we
could or should make in U.S. policy to facilitate or augment those
efforts?
CENTCOM Answer. The Iraqi opposition is badly divided and
fragmented, ------. The opposition based outside the country is not in
a position to bring effective pressure to bear against the regime and
internal opposition is difficult given the pervasive control of the
ruthless security services. I believe that our best course is to work
to enforce sanctions, and deny the regime the possibility of
reconstructing its WMD programs. I do not believe that time is on
Saddam's side as long as sanctions remain in place. We have made clear
that Iraq would be better off without Saddam, and that his departure is
the only long-term answer, but we have stopped short of making his
overthrow an objective of our strategy. I believe that is the right
approach.
Iran
Question. In your statement, you mention that Iran remains
potentially the most dangerous long-term threat to peace and stability
in the Central Region. I would agree with that. The election last May
of President Khatami, a moderate, progressive leader by Iranian
standards, was a positive sign. However, as you know, Iranian
Presidents have limited power and the real sources of power in that
country continue to pursue the development of WMD and offensive
missiles as well as justify terrorism as a means of achieving its
objectives. In your judgment, what is the significance of the election
of President Khatemi? Does his rise to power signal a desire by the
Iranian people for a more progressive, tolerant political system? If
so, in your judgment, will that translate into action on the part of
the Iranian government to pursue more progressive, tolerant policies?
CENTCOM Answer. Iran is at a crossroads and the desire of Iranians
for change is clear. To what degree and at what rate that desire for
change results in increased and permanent freedoms remains unknown.
Indicators of positive change are evident. President Khatami is moving
forward on his vision of an Islamic Republic that emphasizes economic
development, social justice, less intervention in citizen's private
lives, and reduced censorship. Iran's social demographics and economic
needs will continue to drive reform. Recent events reflect this: press
reporting is freer than at any time since the revolution, increased
diplomatic visits, the Presidents' future visit to the UN, and the
growing rapprochement with the GCC. In addition, we are seeing
increased professionalism in their navy. Conservative religious leaders
continue to oppose reforms through institutions controlled by
conservatives that manipulate the political system, promote the
development of weapons of mass destruction, as well as support
terrorist groups.
Iranian Missile Production
Question. There have been a number of reports alleging that the
Iranian government is engaged in a crash program to field two medium-
range missiles, Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 within the next year or two. The
missiles could have enough range to hit targets throughout the Middle
East and a longer-range version may eventually be able to target
Europe. Recent reports have further alleged that the Russians are
carrying out secret missile technology transfers to Iran to assist them
in that effort. How would PAC-3, our most mature Theater Missile
Defense system in its current configuration, fare against a Shahab-3 or
Shahab-4 missile?
CENTCOM Answer. Based on available data, the Patriot Program Office
has assessed performance capability for the PAC-3 system against these
threats. ------.
Question. How would a fully configured PAC-3 fare against that same
threat?
CENTCOM Answer. ------.
Question. What can you tell us about Arrow's capacity to meet the
Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 threat?
CENTCOM Answer. ------.
Theater Missile Defense
Question. Can you provide a general assessment of the missile
threat of would be aggressors in your region at this time?
CENTCOM Answer. The general trend is the development of longer
range, higher velocity missiles. Pakistan's recent test launch of a
medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) confirmed the presence of these
missiles in the region. ------.
Other trends are the use of forward, underground or bunkered
missile facilities, and the general hardening of strategic missile
infrastructure. Also, countries are acquiring many vehicles from the
former Soviet Union suitable for use as mobile launchers. Such
developments will greatly enhance overall missile force mobility and
operational flexibility. A similar trend is seen in efforts to acquire
solid missile technology that will significantly reduce the logistical
requirements and signature of these systems.
Question. Do you believe we ought to be putting more resources
behind deploying TMD capability more quickly than currently planned?
CENTCOM Answer. I feel the forces deployed and systems being
developed are appropriate to answer the threat we face today and in the
future. ------. System commonality adds value to our relationship with
the host nations. The development process must include Foreign Military
Sales (FMS), training, exercises, system upgrades and operations.
Seamless interoperability adds flexibility and common ground from which
to plan and operate. In addition, ------.
Question. In your judgement, which TMD systems should be considered
highest priority?
CENTCOM Answer. The current Theater Missile Defense (TMD) core
programs, PAC-3, THAAD and Navy Area Defense are most essential to U.S.
Central Command's (CENTCOM) near-term air and missile defense
capability. These systems represent the best capability against the
existing threat in the short term. Additionally, ------. Airborne Laser
Technology and Aegis Theater-Wide Defense systems will eventually
provide UPPER TIER defense capabilities. ------. When integrated into a
robust Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and Intelligence
(C4I) architecture, these LOWER and UPPER TIER weapons and evolving
sensors will address CENTCOM's requirement for a near leak-proof
defense against the evolving TBM threat. However, the near term core
programs should not be delayed in order to fund long term systems.
Question. Are there any TMD programs that, in your judgement, are
underfunded or that ought to be accelerated?
CENTCOM Answer. Theater Missile Defense programs I identified in
U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM) Integrated Priority List (IPL) are
being addressed adequately, and their progress to operational
capability is satisfactory.
Question. General, one of the things you and I have discussed is
the threat from the Russian-made NOVATOR Missile. Can you give the
subcommittee an overview on both the capability and availability of
this missile in the Central region?
CENTCOM Answer. ------.
Swing Strategy
Question. Would you please discuss the risks placed on your mission
by the strategy of ``swinging'' high-value assets such as bombers and
Joint STARS between theaters?
CENTCOM Answer. Swing, or dual-apportioned, forces are high-
value,low-density forces that are committed to the first of two Major
Theater Wars (MTWs). The decision to ``swing'' forces will be made by
the National Command Authorities upon execution of the second of two
MTWs. ------.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Dicks.]
Tuesday, March 3, 1998.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
WITNESSES
GENERAL PETER J. SCHOOMAKER, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES SPECIAL
OPERATIONS COMMAND, UNITED STATES ARMY
COMMANDER TIM BOSILJEVAC, UNITED STATES NAVY
MAJOR ERIC WELLER, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, AIR NATIONAL GUARD
CAPTAIN CURTIS HUBBARD, UNITED STATES ARMY
MAJOR CHRIS BAILEY, UNITED STATES ARMY
SERGANT FIRST CLASS LARRY REIS, UNITED STATES ARMY
CAPTAIN BEAUDETTE, UNITED STATES ARMY
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order.
This afternoon, the Committee, in closed session, will hear
testimony from General Peter J. Schoomaker, United States Army,
Commander is Chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command.
General Schoomaker has brought with him a number of the troops
who actually do the missions, who will report firsthand about
some of the operations they have been involved in since our
last hearing 2 years ago.
This is the General's first appearance before the Committee
as Commander in Chief, although he has been here before and he
has been involved in the modern era of Special Operations from
its rebirth in the 1970s. In fact, he was a member of the
hostage rescue team sent into Iran in April of 1980, which led
to the creation of the Special Operations Command 10 years ago.
As the world changes, so does the threat, and many of the
threats we face require the forces under your command to be
prepared to respond at a moment's notice. You have mentioned to
us how may many opportunities that you and your forces have to
do the things that you do best. We will hear about some of
those today.
The Cold War has been replaced by threats from rogue
nations, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and the growing
availability of weapons of mass destruction, all of which are
in many ways more dangerous and unpredictable. Our special ops
forces are being called upon more each day to control these
problems.
We appreciate the work that all of you do. We recognize the
delicacy of some of the things that you do and the threat to
the lives of those conducting these operations. We are very
proud of what you do, and it is just unfortunate that the
general public never hears about most of the good things that
you do for obvious reasons.
We would like to hear about some of those today, General,
and we hope that when this hearing is finished that you will
have an opportunity to, as you visit with your troops, to let
then know how proud we are of the work that you do.
Mr. Murtha, I will ask you for any opening statement.
Mr. Murtha. I have none at this time, Mr. Chairman
Mr. Young. General, please proceed. Your entire statement
will be placed in the record along with your biography and you
may summarize it as you wish, and then I would suspect we would
have quite a few questions for you and the gentlemen that you
have with you.
Summary Statement of General Schoomaker
General Schoomaker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, I am honored
to appear before you today on behalf of the 46,000 soldiers,
sailors and airmen of the U.S. Special Operations Command. As I
mentioned to year earlier, the last time I was in this room, I
was sitting in this chair right there with General Lindsay, as
a matter of fact, when he came up here for his first testimony
and I was one of these young guys here. So that is 10 years
ago.
USSOCOM--STATE OF THE COMMAND
Time and again this past year, members of our special
operations forces, SOF, performed superbly in a variety of
challenges around the world. Success was due in large part to
the strong support of Congress, and the Administration and the
American people. But more importantly, we succeeded because of
quality people, outstanding leadership, and the ability to
adopt and persevere in an environment characterized by change
and uncertainty.
SOF units, both under my command here in the United States
and those assigned to the geographic Commanders in Chief, are
trained and ready, capable of fulfilling all of our assigned
missions. Our tempo of operations is high. This past year we
deployed SOF teams to 144 countries, conducted 17 actual crisis
response operations around the world, completed 224 Joint
Combined Exercises for Training in JCETS, 98 countries,
conducted 194 counter drug missions in 20-plus locations,
andconducted humanitarian demining missions in 11 countries.
USSOCOM--BUDGET REQUEST
I might point out that we conducted all of these missions
for less than 1.4 percent of the entire DoD budget and
personnel. Actually, USSOCOM's discretionary spending is less
than one percent of the DoD budget, when military pay, which is
budgeted by the services, is removed from the equation.
While this makes SOF a pretty good bang for the buck for
the American taxpayer, this relatively small amount of
discretionary funds leads us leverage to other sources of
funding to do our SOF missions. Our leveraging efforts have
paid big dividends in mission areas, such as humanitarian
demining, the African Crisis Response Initiative, and the
counter drug programs, all 3 of which you will hear about
during our operator vignettes that will take place here in just
a few moments.
SOF plays a major role in all three efforts and that
participation, to a large extent, is funded by sources other
than Major Force Program-11. One area in which we have not been
as successful in the leveraging of other sources of funding is
base operations support. The USSOCOM budget does not provide
base operations support for SOF. As budgets across the
department of Defense have become tighter, USSOCOM has come
under pressure to pay for enlist this kind of support without a
corresponding major increase in program funds. Base operations
funds directly affect the readiness of all of our service
members, and I would urge the committee to support the
Department's request for full funding.
Our high tempo of operations requires us to manage
carefully, but the morale of the force is high because our men
and women are fully engaged in the types of missions for which
they volunteered and were trained. As with the other unified
commands, USSOCOM provides an operational environment,
characterized by accelerating geopolitical change, rapid
technological advancement, evolving threats, strained resources
and potential new roles. These factors require innovative
thinking and new ways to shape change if we are to provide the
widest array of options in protecting America's interests. The
truth is, business as usual will not provide the capabilities
we need to deal with the transactional and asymmetrical threats
of tomorrow.
We realize that USSOCOM must embrace and institutionalize
the process of change in a disciplined manner, which will allow
us to remain the most capable and relevant special operation
force in existence. Consequently, our organization, force
structure, platforms, equipment and missions must and will
continuously evolve to meet the needs of the Nation and seize
the opportunities brought about by change.
SUMMARY
Finally, I can think of no more valuable partner for our
special operations forces than Congress. We truly value your
leadership, advice and assistance, as we prepare now to meet
the many difficult challenges ahead. As I mentioned, we in fact
are a creature of Congress in terms of creation in USSOCOM,
which we appreciate.
[The statement of General Schoomaker follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
DEPLOYMENT VIGNETTES
General Schoomaker. Thank you Mr. Chairman, for the
opportunity to make these brief remarks. Accompanying me today
are operators from our components who will briefly describe
deployments they have participated in during the past year.
These are representative of the types of activities in USSOCOM
is involved in every day. The first operator who will speak to
you is Commander Tim Bosiljevac. Tim is a Navy SEAL who
recently participated in counter drug operations in Colombia.
[Clerk's note.--The Committee was unable to print the
photographs described in the following vignettes.]
COLOMBIA COUNTER DRUG OPERATION
Commander Bosiljevac. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate this opportunity today, and although I am sitting in
this chair, in 10 years I do not expect to be sitting in that
chair. Nonetheless this is a novel opportunity as a Navy SEAL
to get out of my wet suit and put on dry clothes, and I
appreciate that very much.
I am from Emporia, Kansas,and I can assure you that is a
pretty good drop zone for parachuting, pretty flat and devoid
of trees. I have a Bachelor of Science Degree in political
science, a Master of Arts in history, and I have about 20 years
experience in the military, most of that in maritime special
operations and also counterterrorism and rescue.
Some of the experiences I have had are the: Achille Lauro
ship hijacking, Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, and operations
in Somalia. I would like to brief you this afternoon on another
experience I had just this last year when I commanded a 10-man
SEAL unit on a counternarcotics joint planning assistance team
JPAT, to the country of Colombia. We do many things all around
the world. A lot of our operations deal with training and
training with foreign forces in an exercise environment. JPATs
are a little bit different. JPATs are few and far between, but
in JPATs we actually go forward into operational bases out in
the sticks of many of these countries and we train and assist
and advise forces which are actually conducting combat
operations, in this case, against narco terrorists.
We conduct in Southern Command about 8 of these JPATs per
year in the country of Colombia, 6 of those being accomplished
by Army Special Forces and another 2 by Navy SEALs. The one I
am going to talk to you about occurred in late spring of 1997.
To give you a little bit of background, sir, in October
1996 we conducted one of these JPATS in San Jose del Guaviare.
It was highly successful. At the end of the 4-week JPAT,
approximately a half million dollars worth of coca paste and
precursor chemicals was captured and destroyed. The U.S.
Southern Command and the military in Bogota desired to
replicate that success. They set us up for our 1997 JPAT in a
Colombian air base in the southern part of Colombia, Tres
Esquinas. This is much like the Cajun country of Colombia.
Highly rough terrain, only one road in and out of the base.
Everything else, as you can see by these photographs, moves
pretty much by river.
When we conduct these operations, these JPATs, we go down
and train and live with them on a daily basis in these forward
base areas with these forces and we assist them in planning
operations. But we do not leave those bases and conduct the
operations with the forces. We had 4 weeks to conduct this
mission, this JPAT. The first 2 weeks we dedicated mainly to
training the force. These were forces that already had very
good soldiering skills. We hopefully enhanced them a little bit
more. A couple of photos we highlight some of that training.
This is combat medical training, sir, and this is prisoner
handling techniques.
During the first 2 weeks, we also dedicated a certain
amount of the force in assisting, planning, and targeting for
missions that they would conduct during the final 2 weeks of
our stay.
While the Colombians had very good human intelligence, our
forces provided a little bit of technical assistance through
our experience. We had personnel stationed in a 4 base in
Panama, Naval Special Warfare Unit-8, adjacent to Howard Air
Force Base. Those personnel would ride aboard U.S. Navy P-3
aircraft conducting primarily surveillance and air interdiction
of counternarcotics in missions over Colombia over many hours.
As a secondary mission our personnel will direct aircraft over
areas of interest in order to research targeting and extraction
information.
Once the aircraft landed back in Panama, those digital
photographs taken by our personnel on board would be converted
into data files. Those would be sent via satellite
communications link to our forward base at Tres Esquinas where
we would bring them up on laptop computers. We would review
that information, those photographs, with the host nation
leadership and assist them in planning, the detailed planning
of these operations.
Now, during our 4 weeks in Tres Esquinas, the host nation
conducted 4 combat raids, and as you can see here, sir, in each
case, coca fields were found, labs were found, coca paste was
found, seized and all destroyed. We had very good success down
there. During our 4 weeks, we estimated approximately $280,000
worth of coca paste, precursor chemicals, and equipment was
found and destroyed.
So, although we provided good technical assistance, we also
felt a large part of our success when combined with the
technological assistance that we gave them, was the importance
of our physically being out there, sharing conditions with them
in these forward camps, being able to work with them every day,
providing a very strong working relationship and rapport with
them, sir. I will be followed by Major Eric Weller.
BOSNIA EC-130 OPERATION
Mr. Young. Thank you for an excellent presentation.
Major Weller. Sir, my name is Major Eric Weller. I come
from Boiling Springs, Pennsylvania. I graduated from
Shippensburg State University with a degree in criminology. I
have had 17 years military experience as a guardsman. I fly
with the 193rd Special Operations Wing out of Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania. We fly six EC-130 aircraft. They are unique
aircraft. Our primary mission, sir, is psychological operations
or broadcasting radio and TV programs, and a secondary mission
of jamming operations.
While with this unit, I have had the opportunity to deploy
during the invasion of Grenada, Panama, desert shield-desert
storm, Sea signal in Haiti, and the operation I would like to
talk to you about today, JOINT GUARD in Bosnia.
Back in the August 1997 time frame, it was determined that
one of the Serbian factions had pretty much taken over control
of the Serbian media. They were broadcasting anti-SFOR or
stabilization force propaganda which pretty much put the SFOR
ground forces in harm's way.
Also during that time, they had pretty much taken over, or
had not parlayed the equity within the other Serbianfactions in
regards to the upcoming elections in the October, November time frame.
That faction was in the Pale area, by the way, held by Mr. Vladimir
Karanovich.
Anyway, General Shinseki from SFOR asked our unit to come
over, give capabilities briefings, let them know what we could
do, and figure out how we could work ourselves in the media
compliance plan, called the Bosanova plan. This plan was about
a 5 or 6-year plan. The first pillar was basically peaceful
interdiction ultimately working up to destruction of radio and
TV stations. In that plan, we again supplemented the 4th
Psychological Operations Group with radio and TV broadcasts and
we were also called upon to stand alert for additional command
and control type jamming and radio and TV type jamming.
Upon receiving our execution order from the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, we were told to do something that we normally
don't do, which was open up the deployment to the worldwide
media. Consequently, our deployment was broadcast on CNN
International and every other major news organization that you
can think of. They followed our planes across the pond into
Brindisi, where we bedded down with the other Air Force Special
Operations Command or AFSOC forces.
While in theater, we did fly some radio and TV missions and
also stood alert for potential jamming missions. After the
elections, it was determined that things had quieted down
enough that we were able to redeploy.
One of the things, though, about the deployment I wanted to
point out was that it in itself was a PSYOPS campaign. By the
time we had gotten into theater, it was determined that the
Pale Serbs had pretty much come into compliance with the Dayton
Peace Accords.
On our redeployment, the other thing I wanted to point out,
was that we were still held on a 96-hour string, which means
that we have 96 hours to get back in the theater if we are
needed. While in theater we flew about 55 missions,
approximately 5 hours each, logging approximately 250 hours on
our aircraft.
Sir, that concludes my portion of the briefing. I will be
followed by Captain Hubbard.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much.
NAMIBIA DEMINING
Captain Hubbard. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman.
My name is Captain Curtis Hubbard. I am originally from
Boone, North Carolina, which by the way Mr. Hefner knows where
it is, although he is not here today. I graduated from the
University of Miami with a degree in music education, which
usually gets a roaring response from most of the generals in my
chain of command. I graduated from there and went to officer
basic course at Fort Sill as an artillery man and eventually
spent time in the 82nd Airborne Division for artillery before
coming to Special Forces. I have been on the team almost 2
years, I speak some French, and I have done 4 OCONUS
deployments to Africa. I would like to talk about the most
recent 2 I have done, which are both demining related.
Demining Operations started in 1995 for my unit, but it has
been going on concurrently throughout the whole world through
the special operations, specifically the Middle East, Africa,
Europe, Asia, and I would like to deal specifically with
southern Africa because that is where my battalion, our area of
responsibility is. We are currently in Mozambique, Rwanda, and
this summer we will be going to Zimbabwe for the first time.
In our demining program, the most important thing for one
to remember is that it is a ``train the trainer'' program,
meaning that we go over and we teach the Namibians to teach
Namibians, and that supports our end-state, which is a self-
sustaining, in place demining program, which means we can leave
it, work ourselves out of a job and go home and we know that
the work is still being done. I selected pictures today that
hopefully represent this with the Americans in the background
teaching the instructors, who then again are teaching the
soldiers how to do this.
Namibia specifically has a unique mine problem. As I said,
we went there first in 1995 and we went again this year in
September, and we just went back again. I got home about 2
weeks ago from the most recent mission. We have trained two
companies, we call them conventional deminers, which is a
standard probing, and that is using mine detectors. Namibia has
a unique mine situation after their guerrilla war 8 years ago.
The South Africans, had mines along the power lines coming
south from the border of Angola. That was the main power for
all of southern Namibia.
What happened after the war, was they scooped all of these
mines up and put them in piles around the pylons, these high
tension power lines. So instead of a 1-dimensional mine problem
you now have a 3-dimensional mine problem. So the guys at Fort
Belvoir helped us out and developed something called a berm
processor, which looks like a potato-picker but works like a
flour sifter. That is the only way I can describe it. It takes
up about the size of the square in the middle of this room. It
scoops out the dirt, the dirt falls through, exposing the mines
on top of the ground. Our last mission was integrating this
with the conventional mine field clearing operations.
Namibia is about \9/10\ complete with their conventional
mine fields and we are expecting about 2 years from now they
should be completely done. Ambassador Ward is supporting a
program for a regional demining school in the area, which will
bring the whole southern region of Africa together in a
demining school, and hopefully will reduce some of us going
over there all the time.
There are many obvious, and some not so obvious, demining
benefits for us. The obvious ones are we are saving lives,
returning the land to civilians, and just generally helping
spread U.S. influence throughout the region. Some of the less
obvious that deal with ODA commanders and their teams directly,
is that we are a force multiplier on the ground. The way we are
really helpful is by knowing the country and its people, and
the only way to get to know them, and you can't learn that from
books, you have to be in country with the people, working with
them, as much out of 365 days out of the year as you can. The
demining program has helped with that significantly because we
are in there a lot more, working with the soldiers.
There are other reasons, though--not so obvious reasons,
and that is we are there to help out in contingency or crisis
situations. For example, the C-141 that took me on the
September demining mission was involved in a tragic midair
collision with a German passenger--well, it was a military
passenger--plane. So I got a change of mission within the first
48 hours on the ground of conducting search and rescue
operations at that point. So we were able to establish the
first communications link back to the United States as well as
our command in Europe, and help out in thatsituation. We had
people in the air looking for sites, looking for survivors, and we were
also on the boats picking up the debris. So we were able to react to
things very quickly and be helpful.
In conclusion, I would like to say this is a worthwhile SOF
mission and we will have lasting results in southern Africa, as
well as the country that was close to my heart, Namibia. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Captain Hubbard, thank you very much.
NAMIBIA PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
Major Bailey. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. My name is
Major Chris Bailey and I am the executive officer for the Third
Psychological Operations battalion. I have a Bachelor's Degree
in engineering from Idaho State University and a Master in
International Relations from Troy State. I am strongly familiar
with the French language. I currently hail from Goldsboro,
North Carolina. I have experience with psychological operations
for 10 years now, 10 out of the 13 years that I have been on
active duty, and some of the assignments that I have been
involved are Operation JUST CAUSE, Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm, Operation PROVIDE REFUGE out in the Republic of
the Marshall Islands; recently Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and
JOINT GUARD, and I just completed a command tour where I was
responsible for providing psychological operations support to
Haiti, as well as demining and mining awareness programs in
Central America.
In 1995, Psychological Operations went to Namibia to
reinforce the information side of the Special Forces program
that Captain Hubbard was just talking about. The objective was
to work with the Namibian government to provide a national
campaign of information to advise and assist the local
population in identifying, avoiding and reporting mine problems
throughout their northern areas. We have also got an unexploded
ordinance, which Captain Hubbard did not mention, which I
believe is going to be a more long-term issue, but I believe in
the long run the 2-year program that he discussed regarding
Ambassador Ward's program is going to pretty much solve that.
In 1995 we went over there and we conducted the program and
we used the Namibian Administration of Information and
Broadcasting to assist us with the dissemination part of that
program. Right over here to my left I have a few products that
were actually produced during that time frame. The national
theme and national logo that they used is ``don't touch it,
report it,'' and then of course you have this Namibian triangle
with a small kid saying, avoid it. This was actually used on
several of the promotional products that were bought during
that time frame. Baseball caps, T-shirts, soccer balls, things
that were actually issued to the children as a constant
reminder to not touch and avoid.
Additionally, we used a poster that we set up in the local
population centers, post offices, police stations, as well as
schools, and this actually gives you photographs of ordnance
and what not to touch and also some mines.
Over here we have an insert that was used in the national
press, The Namibian, which is their multi-lingual newspaper
that covers Africans, Oshiuambo and English, which goes
throughout the country as a constant reminder. Furthermore, the
PSYOP team, on the ground at that time prepared public service
announcements, all of which are currently running today,
television and radio broadcasts, which leads us to our mission
this last summer.
They had an ongoing program and it had some effect, but it
lost momentum, so the objective of our program this last summer
was to reenergize that program and work the self-sustaining
piece that again Captain Hubbard mentioned where we get them
back on their feet and give them the tools to continue.
We started our program with a 2-week block of instruction.
I had a Reserve psychological operations broadcast specialist
with me, I had a civilian technical cultural analyst with me, I
had two PSYOP soldiers with me, and myself, and we worked with
The Ministries of Information and broadcasting, the Ministries
of Defense, and the National Police Force, and trained them on
computer graphics techniques using up-to-date computer graphics
software and peripherals, and then we moved on from there into
media integration and planning.
We also worked a 2-year straw man plan with the National
Demining Committee that when we left was fairly complete. They
were still on the table working that out with the committee as
well as Ambassador Ward and the host nation country team.
During that same time I was working product procurement. We
procured $195,000 worth of promotional products using State
Department demining money, similar to what we had purchased in
the last event. The purchase, though a one-time purchase, would
apply to products that were developed as a result of the
training that we provided, so the students that we taught would
actually produce new logos and new symbols. I have a T-shirt
here that was actually one of these products. I couldn't bring
everything, but everything from rulers to baseball caps to
pencils, to soccer balls, shorts, things that would have
lasting value and be seen over a broad expanse were produced.
And then they would be distributed using that 2-year plan
instead of a 1-time shotgun blast.
Sir, in conclusion, I would like to say that this has been
a very successful program. I have been excited about the amount
of energy that the embassy has put into this. The nation has a
commitment and the national ministries have a commitment to
this, and I really have enjoyed working the program, and I
appreciate the opportunity to brief you this afternoon.
Mr. Young. Major, thank you very much. We appreciate you
being here.
Major Bailey. I will be followed by Sergeant First Class
Reis.
SENEGAL-ACRI OPERATION
Sergeant Reis. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman.
My name is Sergeant First Class Larry Reis, and I was born
and raised in Santa Maria, California. I have been in the
military now for approximately 10 years, during which I served
at the First Cavalry Division out of Fort Hood, Texas, the 82nd
Airborne Division in which I participated in Operation Desert
Shield and Desert Storm, and for the past 4 years I have been
assigned to the Special Forces.
During that time I was deployed to Haiti for Operation
restore, uphold and maintain democracy. I have also conducted
training in France, Mali and Senegal. I am a static-line
jumpmaster and also completed the survival escape, resistance
and envade, better known as the SERE course. In am Operations
Intelligence qualified, and I have a good working knowledge of
the French language.
My team and I deployed to Senegal as part of the African
Crisis Response Initiative, or better known as ACRI, on 20
July, 1997. Upon arriving in Senegal, we set up our operational
base and began the preparation process of theSenegalese forces.
During the preparation process of an 800-man Sengalese battalion, we
issued each soldier nonlethal individual equipment consisting of boots,
uniforms, canteens and various other field equipment. Organizational
equipment was also issued at this time, consisting primarily of
communications and mine detection equipment.
As depicted by this picture here, sir, we also had a U.S.
Army optometrist conduct eye examinations and issue eyeglasses
as needed, and necessary vaccinations were also conducted at
this time. With the conclusion of the preparation process of
the Senegalese forces, we moved into the training portion of
our mission, which was actually broken down into 4 phases,
phase 1 being the basic U.N. task phase.
The basic U.N. task phase emphasized tasks that every U.N.
soldier should know, and some of those tasks were the
organization and the operation of the United Nations,
peacekeeping principles, and the code of conduct of U.N.
personnel.
During this time we also took the time to go ahead
evaluated the Senegalese tactics to enable us to identify
future training requirements by assessing their strengths and
their weaknesses, which moves us into phase 2, which was the
small unit tactics phase, sir. This phase, what emphasized
force protection measures, measures to protect themselves and
other measures to protect the other folks.
Then we moved into phase 3 of our operation known as the
Peacekeeping Operation phase. The peacekeeping operation phase
emphasized responsibilities while in a peacekeeping mission
posture. Some of the tasks conducted were things such as the
organization and the operation of a checkpoint, securing a
route, convoy security, the moving of dislocated civilians, and
also the identifying and processing of detained personnel.
At the end of each of these tasks, a practical exercise was
conducted to determine the soldiers' ability to conduct each of
these tasks. If they were not capable of conducting it, we
would retrain them and they would keep going until they did
pass it.
Then we moved into phase 4 which was known as the training
exercise phase, a situation which is depicted by these two
pictures here. I would like to point out also, the equipment
that we were given, this picture here is a soldier setting up
for a situational training exercise. He is using actual
equipment that we had provided him, such as the computer, 2-
programmable hand-held Motorola radios that we gave him to use
for command and control, and this picture shows him actually
running the operations that we were giving him at that time,
sir.
Now, a situational training exercise was conducted on the
operation to give the Senegalese a realistic, practical
exercise to learn by. It was just like a training environment.
We gave them a situation to deal with and they dealt with them,
and we were there to help them and assist them in any way
possible.
After that we moved into a field training exercise. This
exercise was conducted to give the Senegalese a chance to plan
and train for tasks that we taught them. And after that, we
gave the Senegalese task force commander a mission tasking
statement which enabled him to train and conduct a simulated
peacekeeping mission unilaterally, with minimal assistance from
United States forces.
At the conclusion of the FTX we moved into the critique
portion. We critiqued the Senegalese performance during the FTX
and pointed out their strengths and weaknesses. The Senegalese
were deemed capable of conducting such operations by receiving
a 70 percent go in all operations that they conducted.
We then held a graduation ceremony and redeployed to Fort
Bragg on 25 September, 1997. I would like to point out that I
am redeploying back over to Senegal in 7 days to conduct the
second portion of the ACRI concept, which is the sustainment
phase for the Senegalese forces.
This concludes my portion of the brief and I will be
followed by Captain Beaudette.
Mr. Young. Sergeant, thank you very much.
General Schoomaker. I would point out that by giving them
the eyeglasses improved their shooting.
SIERRA LEONE OPERATION
Captain Beaudette. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman.
I am Captain Beaudette, currently assigned as the assistant
operation officer for Third Special Forces Group based at Fort
Bragg. My hometown is Canton, Connecticut. I have been in
Special Forces for the past 3 years now, 2 years of which I
served as a commander on an operational detachment. I am a
native French speaker. I have had the opportunity to travel
within approximately 12 countries within our area of
responsibility.
Two recent operations I have been involved with, sir, are
joint task force Nobel Obelisk in which we assisted in the
noncombatant evacuation of the U.S. embassy and staff, along
with the approximately 2,500 American citizens and third
country nationals. The second operation is Operation firm
response which was the following week, where we assisted again
in the noncombatant evacuation of the U.S. embassy and staff.
It was primarily a French-run operation, and I served as the
member of the EUCOM survey and assessment team and again had
the opportunity to work as a liaison to the French Foreign
Legion since they had two regiments on the ground.
The photos here depict joint task force Nobel Obelisk. We
had been conducting joint, combined and exchange training in
the country of Sierra-Leone for approximately 4 weeks, when on
Sunday morning our compound erupted in gunfire. We were
conducting our morning physical training. Immediate actions
were taken to establish a defensive perimeter, and we gained
contact with our higher headquarters based out of Europe and
also our group headquarters at Fort Bragg.
We tried to establish contact with the embassy and staff as
quickly as possible, which difficult, in that it was a Sunday
morning and the embassy personnel again were caught at the
residential compounds and were isolated from the chancellary
building.
In the second photo, Ms. Ann Wright, was the deputy chief
of mission. The ambassador had left for home leave the week
prior.
Some of the tasks which we accomplished in support of the
operation were the conduct of initial planning for the
evacuation. We had the ability to conduct advanced
reconnaissance of the NEO site itself, the landing zones, and
we moved the embassy staff and personnel down to the actual NEO
location. In addition, we provided security at the 2
residential compounds while we were there. Both compounds had
been broken into the first night prior to ourarrival from our
training location. We also had the opportunity to go down to the
chancellery and recover 2 young Marine guards who had been isolated
from the rest of the embassy staff. This photo here depicts the team
prior to our departure from the actual NEO location.
The main role, I should say, of our detachment in the
operations was real-time tactical communications ultimately
between the embassy and higher headquarters, both back in
Washington, as well as our higher headquarters back in Germany,
and that due to the fact that they were caught at the
residential area, they didn't have the appropriate
communications gear, but we were able to provide that.
The last photo depicts a detachment getting ready to
conduct a special reconnaissance mission, back ashore from the
USS KEARSARGE. We were initially tasked to evacuate 175 people
from Freetown, and that number ballooned to 2,500 because of
the mission requirements.
At the conclusion of the exercise, the operational
detachment went back ashore in Senegal. The team and I had to
go back to Europe and debrief the commander of SOCEUR, and that
afternoon I again had the opportunity to redeploy to
Brazzaville, Congo and assist in Operation firm response,
another similar type operation, this time managed by the
French.
Sir, this concludes the vignettes.
Mr. Young. Captain, thank you very much.
I wanted to repeat what I had said earlier. It is just
really too bad that each of you and your teams and your
services and the country doesn't get much recognition for all
of the good things that you are doing in many, many different
parts of the world. For those of us who know about it, just
understand that we are very, very proud of each of you and the
good work that you do.
If you have any quick questions for the operators who have
testified, we will do that first, and then we will go to a
round of 5-minute questions. The reason we are going to have to
adhere strictly to the time, because then we want to go to a
higher level of classification, to discuss some other
activities and special operations that we can't at this level
of classification.
So let's just----
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Chairman, I want to know how it is that a
Marine, 2 Marines, when there were 2 out there isolated and you
happened to rescue those 2 Marines?
Captain Beaudette. Sir, they were caught conducting shift
change. The coup actually erupted downtown in Freetown and one
Marine had come to relieve his buddy.
Mr. Murtha. Two of them. How many enemy were there? I mean
two was plenty to take care of.
Mr. Dicks. Do the Marines speak French?
Mr. Young. All right. Mr. Hobson.
Mr. Hobson. I have one question to the last briefer here.
It is very interesting, the fact that you went over to do
one mission and while were you there, you had to do another
mission. Do you feel--I am sure you are going to say yes to
this, but your training was not as a crew to do the mission
that you wound up doing. So do you feel you were actually
prepared for that, and are your crews, your teams trained in
that some of your mission could change and you have to become
proactive, because all the rest of them you were in a special
mission. This one switched on you all of a sudden.
Captain Beaudette. Yes sir. The primary purpose of the
Joint Combined Exchange Training or one of the purposes, is our
training as well as that of the host nation. That being the
case, we bring along all of the equipment which we would
require to conduct any type of operation. It is an excellent
opportunity for us to get within our assigned area of
responsibility, and for the team members to practice language,
the cross-cultural communication that is so important to us, as
well as to employ some of our weapons systems, practice some of
the communications means which we use during the operation. So
in the 4 weeks prior, we had ample time and opportunity to
train on these types of systems, the JCET being just a small
piece of what we do. So, yes, sir, I will answer that I felt
that we were--that we were prepared, that we had brought the
appropriate amount of equipment, as well as the appropriate
amount and types of ammunition in order to be successful in any
type of mission, and I think that--you know, I was very proud
of my soldiers that it somewhat exemplified or illustrated the
flexibility which they have to go from a training-specific
mission to a contingency operation.
Mr. Hobson. Thank you. That is very interesting.
General Schoomaker. Mr. Hobson, if I could just add, the
most important thing that we have in Special Operations is our
people. There is no question about it. We talk about training
for certainty and educating for uncertainty, and that is what
we feel makes us so relevant today and what is the most
important piece that we are going to have to be relevant
tomorrow. Of the 17 crises that we responded to this year, we
were in place in 8 of those doing something else at the time
that the crises erupted and were able to do the kinds of things
that he depicted there.
RESERVE FORCES
Mr. Dicks. I was interested, didn't one of the soldiers say
that they were in the reserves?
Major Weller. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. The Guard, National Guard.
I would just like to ask you, how is it for guardsmen in
the Special Forces? How do you fit in? How is your rating?
Major Weller. We think it is great. Special Operations
takes care of us. We get the appropriate training that we need.
Each guardsman in the flying business is afforded 48 flying
training periods per year. We have more than enough flying
time. And as I have mentioned, we are deployed all over the
world, so I mean we feel that we are right up to snuff with the
active duty from our side.
Mr. Dicks. What percentage of the Special Forces are Guard
and Reserve?
General Schoomaker. I probably should answer that. Thirty
percent of USSOCOM, 30 percent of the 46,000 that we have are
Reserve component, 65 percent are on active duty, and then 5
percent are civilian. So it is a very important piece of our
force. And as I had mentioned to you before, for instance in
Bosnia, today we have nearly 800 people actually in Bosnia-
Herzegovina right now as we speak and about 500 of those are
from the Reserve components.
Mr. Dicks. I just wanted to raise that point because you
know at a time when we are having difficulties, I think the
Special Forces are a real example of total force operating
together, using guardsman.
Mr. Young. A follow-up on that. What does that do toyour
civilian career and your ability to make a living?
Major Weller. I work full-time for the unit right now, sir.
I just started working for the unit about a year ago. Prior to
that, I worked as a civil servant for the Department of the
Army and the Department of the Navy. So I didn't have any
problem at all getting off from work.
Mr. Young. What about others who are reservists or
guardsmen. Are you aware of problems that these extra
deployments would have with their civilian activity?
Major Weller. Well, sir, we rarely have any problems. We
are in close contact with their employers. The employers show,
you know, a very high sense of patriotism. We are in constant
touch with them explaining to them in general what we are doing
and how their support actually supports the Government of the
United States.
Mr. Young. Any other questions for the briefers?
Mr. Sabo. Maybe this fits for what you have in mind for the
second round.
Mr. Young. We are going to give you 5 minutes for the
second round.
DEMINING MISSIONS
Mr. Sabo. What percentage of your time is spent on mine
clearing and why mine clearing is assigned the responsibility
of Special Forces?
General Schoomaker. We ran 11 demining missions this year.
The primary reason why we run them is because we are provided
money out of the State Department for humanitarian demining
that allows us to leverage that money and take the teams that
would be going into those areas for their normal missions and
allows us to preserve our own O&M money to do other things. So
we see it as an ability to leverage, putting our people in
there, doing the kinds of things that Special Forces do.
Special Forces are trainers, whether we are in an
Unconventional Warfare (UW) environment, where we are raising
and training guerilla forces or whether we are in a foreign
internal defense environment where we are helping host nation
forces develop democratic ideals within their military, or
teaching professionalism to their NCO corps. These are the very
same skills that we are doing here.
So what we are doing is we are leveraging; in this resource
constrained environment we have other means of getting in and
doing useful things. And we think it is a pretty smart way to
do business. I might say that there are 3 programs that we are
doing this in. The humanitarian demining is one of them, the
counter drug program where we are using MFP 11 money to do
counter drug types of training missions, and then there is the
ACRI, which again, is a State Department program. It puts our
Special Forces operators into their target countries, gives
them cultural awareness, gives them knowledge of the local
surroundings, and improves their language capabilities as they
deal with the people, and so that is really what it is about.
Mr. Young. Okay. Are there other quick questions for this
part of the hearing?
EMPLOYER'S SUPPORT
Mr. Nethercutt. Just one quick question, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I have a question regarding the civilian
employers of Guard and Reserve members. Do you sense that the
employers who are supporting the Guard and Reserve part of the
Special Forces are tolerant with these deployments, or are they
impatient? Is there something we should do relative to meeting
their needs so that they can help you all meet yours?
General Schoomaker. Do you want to answer any part of that?
Because I have an opinion on it, and you can answer it.
Major Weller. Again, like I said before, sir, we are in
close contact with the employers. Their commander personnally
calls and writes them letters, explains again how their support
to us helps us support Special Operations.
General Schoomaker. My response would be there is no
standard answer. There are fits and starts, but I think in
general we are extremely well supported. We have to make sure
that we communicate to the employers and that we do things that
make them feel good about their employees doing it.
Now, what we are doing, for instance, with the PSRC, the
Presidential Selective Reserve Callup, that is for 270 days, we
are asking somebody to leave their employment. Of course, this
is--when you go to PSRC, this is not voluntary, so it throws
certain things in there that help tell the story to the
employer. It is not like the employee is volunteering to leave
work to go off to Africa, but it is something that we need to
continue to work.
I will tell you, with 30 percent of our force in the Guard
and Reserve, this is a very, very important piece of this
force. What is unique about USSOCOM, when Congress initiated
USSOCOM--USSOCOM is the only place that the Guard and Reserve,
or actually the Reserves, are assigned to me. This is different
than anywhere else. Of course, the Guard is assigned to the
governor until federalized, but when they are federalized they
come to me. So it is a very unique relationship found nowhere
else.
I have to tell you that if it wasn't for our Reserve
components, we would not be able to fulfill our civil affairs
mission, for instance, where we are using real people that run
fire stations, policemen, lawyers, and judges. You can't
maintain those skills on active duty. That is why 24 of our 25
civil affairs battalions are in the Reserve component, and it
is necessary for us to maintain that.
Mr. Nethercutt. My sense is that we need to be careful
about not having the employers lose faith. They can only do
without employees for so long, so I think there is a need to be
sensitive to their needs.
General Schoomaker. The rule is we will never go back to
the same person twice for the same contingency.
Mr. Nethercutt. I see.
Mr. Young. Mr. Cunningham.
SURVIVAL, ESCAPE, RESIST AND EVADE (SERE) TRAINING
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
In the SERE school, 9 days of SERE can become very
realistic, cold. I had a my jaw cracked in SERE school in
Warner Springs. But have you had to make any changes with women
in the military going through SERE school as far as any
specific training?
Captain Hubbard. I know I had a female in my class. There
are certain things that they remove them, from not like lesser
training, but what I am saying there are certain times when
they were issuing their pajamas or something like that.
Obviously, all the guys in one group get their pajamas issued.
Mr. Cunningham. I am talking about specific training or
maybe problems that they would enter versus, you know, a male
that was taken prisoner or special ops.
Captain Hubbard. That is exactly the same; exactly thesame.
Mr. Cunningham. Exactly the same, okay.
It is interesting that all of you speak French. They have a
socialist-communist government over there in France. You may
need that more than you really know.
One of the other things that I found that was interesting
was that in your broadcast in Bosnia, I come from a different
mind. The Serbians, if you don't know history, fought with the
United States as an ally, the Muslims fought with Nazi Germany
during that time period. But was any of your radio broadcast--
maybe this is not the place to do it. We may have to wait until
the later session, but maybe you can answer it later,
General.------.
Mr. Young. Maybe you might want to pursue that when we go
into a different level of classification.
FISCAL YEAR 1999 BUDGET REQUEST
Mr. Cunningham. Yes, sir. I say I will delay that.
Mr. Young. Okay. Any other quick questions for this part of
the hearing? If not, we will go into the regular 5-minute
section, and I am going to use about 2 minutes of my 5 minutes
right away, because I have to ask this question.
General, your budget is handled differently than the other
services. Your budget request for fiscal year 1999 is
$506,260,000.
General Schoomaker. That is for procurement, I believe.
Mr. Young. That is $130,879,000 below the 1998 appropriated
level for the same procurement. Two years ago your predecessor
said that an appropriate level of procurement funding would be
at $700 million per year to ensure the fielding of critically
needed weapons systems. Now we are $130 million below that,
just below last year's level. Where do we stand? Are we going
to be able to do what you have to do?
General Schoomaker. We are doing what we have to do. Of
course my predecessor is still my boss, you know, General
Shelton, so obviously he is exactly right. Actually, I think
there are two answers to this. One of them is there have been
some things that work in 1999, and DIRCM is a good example,
what is it $60 million that we have had to push. That is the
joint program that we have with the U.K. on the IR
countermeasures that they are going to go on SOF airplanes.
There are some things like that that we have moved. But I think
that the thing that we have to look at is what we are
leveraging off of other services. So our big programs like the
CV-22 and ASDS are being managed by the Services, and in the
case of the CV-22, 85 percent of the cost is being borne by the
Navy and the Air Force. So in fact, we are reaping the directed
benefit of an additional $2 to $500 million, depending on which
year you look at across the FYDP; it goes on top of what you
are talking about.
So I think obviously we could use more money very well. But
the truth of the matter is, right now we are putting about 20
to 24 percent away into modernization and I think that is about
right in terms of percentage.
Mr. Young. If you had your druthers, though, would you go
to the $700 million?
General Schoomaker. Well, of course.
Mr. Young. If you had the $700 million, what would you be
procuring that you are not going to be able to procure with
this budget?
General Schoomaker. Well, I think there are several things,
and I probably ought to provide you something for the record,
you know, with specifics in it if it would be okay.
Mr. Young. Also, you might indicate if any of your programs
that are ongoing, if you are having to slip any of them in
order to stay within this budget.
General Schoomaker. We are slipping more out of necessity
because of the program as opposed to the slipping as a result
of the financial problem. But I can provide you with a long
list of things that you know, given an unlimited pile of money
that we would pursue, and quite frankly, I think, you know,
maybe some of this ought to go to a later piece of the session
here, but there are some things we are calling flagship
capabilities, many of which are advanced technology that we
certainly would be pursuing, would pursue with more money.
UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS
Mr. Young. General, in previous years, we have had extra
money over and above the President's budget request. This year,
unless some miracle happens, we are not going to have any extra
money, but we will squeeze as much as we can to do the best we
can to provide what you need, because we understand the
importance of your missions.
I have a lot more questions. I am going to give you some in
writing and ask you to respond, but to try to stay within the
time constraints and get to the next part of our hearing.
[The information follows:]
The following chart displays USSOCOM's unfunded requirements (UFR)
for Fiscal Year 1999. Dollars are shown in millions.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Priority and UFR O&M Proc RDT&E Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 COUNTERPROLIFERATION/WMD..................... $7.65 $5.09 $7.81 $20.55
2 ADVANCED SEAL DELIVERY SYSTEM................ .............. .............. 9.70 9.70
3 SAP.......................................... .............. .............. 1.07 1.07
4 SPEAR-BALCS.................................. .............. 4.30 0.50 4.80
5 LANGUAGE TRAINING............................ 1.60 .............. .............. 1.60
6 MH-47E....................................... .............. 41.50 .............. 41.50
7 SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE....................... .............. .............. 25.00 25.00
8 SILENT SHIELD................................ .............. 5.00 .............. 5.00
9 M4A1 MODS.................................... .............. 2.47 .............. 2.47
10 RAMS........................................ .............. 6.00 .............. 6.00
11 AC-130 LOW LIGHT LEVEL TV................... .............. 2.36 .............. 2.36
12 SYMPATHETIC DETONATOR....................... .............. .............. 2.00 2.00
Total..................................... $9.25 $66.72 $46.08 $122.05
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Young. Mr. Murtha.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
Mr. Murtha. Any problems in these deployments with your
rules of engagement?
General Schoomaker. I would say no. Let me just ask, are
there any problems from what you have experienced? No.
I will tell you, in the past we have had problems, and the
problems are very conservative kinds of attitudes in terms of
what level of risk we should take. I will tell you now that for
special operators to do their job we must accept some risk, and
we are not going to be able to go out and engage at the level
that we are and make the difference that we are making if we
are doing it from a foxhole peering out through a slit. So if
you take a look at where we are in places like Sri Lanka where
there is a significant threat, in places like Bosnia where we
have Joint Commission Observers, JCOs, little teams living in
the villages, basically unarmed, living amongst the factions,
we cannot be effective without that level.
And quite frankly we fared very well. You remember from
Haiti we had one Special Forces soldier shot. You might
remember we had a JCO here in the last year that was stabbed up
in Bosnia. But on the whole we have done pretty well because we
train to the rigid awareness, you know force protection, threat
awareness, situational awareness kinds of things, and then we
back that up with rules of engagement that allow us to defend
ourself and to take whatever action is necessary to preserve
the force.
SOF FORCES SELECTION PROCESS
Mr. Murtha. How do you select the members of the Special
Forces?
General Schoomaker. Each piece of our special operation
force has a different kind of selection program. I can talk to
some of the compartmented areas later if you're interested, but
Special Forces and SEALs, for instance, are good examples. The
SEALs have their Basic Underwater Demolition School (BUDS) out
in Coronado. They have a very high attrition rate in that. I
would say, 70 to 80 percent.
Here, we've got it; 70 percent.
Mr. Murtha. 70, 80 percent per year?
General Schoomaker. Attrition, 30 percent pass out of
each----
Mr. Murtha. I see, in the school itself.
General Schoomaker. This is for the Navy SEALs, and BUDS,
30 percent pass. They go from there into more advanced training
where 80 percent of that 30 percent pass.
So what we're really saying is from the original population
I guess that would be 24 percent. In the Army Special Forces
now you're dealing with a little more mature soldier because
you're bringing NCO's across now that have already had some
time under their belt in the Army. Through the Special Forces
assessment selection 45 percent pass muster through that
assessment and selection 80 percent of those pass the
qualification.
Mr. Murtha. Well, what I'm asking though, the initial
selection process, are they all volunteers?
General Schoomaker. All volunteer. Our entire force is all
volunteer; there's nobody that's not.
Mr. Murtha. And anybody can apply or you look for language
specialists, demolition specialists and so forth, just depends
on what you need, and then you take the volunteers that fit
that criteria; is that the idea?
General Schoomaker. Obviously we're looking for people with
special skills and characteristics, but in general what we're
looking for are volunteers that say, yes, I want to be a SEAL,
I want to be a Special Forces Soldier, I want to be a Ranger,
and then they go through the process, and what we are looking
for are those people that are trainable. So it's intelligence
assessment, a psychological assessment, a physical assessment,
and then a socialization assessment where we determine whether
or not they are trainable, and once they pass through that
assessment selection they then go through the training, and of
course there is some attrition, but there's a much higher
success rate there. But when they graduate out the other end in
Special Forces for instance, they must have a basic language
skill.
And so there is a 2-year investment in these folks just to
get them basically qualified to start being an effective member
of a team.
SOF RETENTION
Mr. Murtha. Can you see any difference in the last 10 years
in the number of people that are reinlisting in special
operations?
General Schoomaker. I don't know about the last 10 years,
but I can tell you that in our special operations forces in
general our retention in the enlisted ranks leads all of the
services. We do very well there.
Now we have some anecdotal problems, you know the SEAL
lieutenants for instance we're having some problem retaining
them in the numbers that----
Mr. Murtha. What I'm driving at is the rate or tempo of
operations hasn't made any difference. I keep looking for
weaknesses that are going to come about because people have
been deployed so much, and Bosnia, another possible story. Have
special operations people been divorced four times, been
divorced three times and married four times. But you're able to
retain them. The deployment or tempo of operation has not made
a difference in your ability to retain.
General Schoomaker. It has made a difference for some
people, but in general what it has done is made a difference in
a positive way. The people who join special operations want to
do things, and one of the most common things I get from the
SEALs is you know we're not killing enough people, you know
we're not going out and doing those kinds of things, we're
doing too much, some of what you've heard here, ``handing out
the cup cake kinds of things,'' and that's not what people come
in to be a SEAL for.
Special Forces, it's the same thing. I've explained that
obviously we're teachers, but we're also warriors, and so these
people, the very best people we get, are coming in here to do
the kinds of things that they think Special Forces should do.
So in general it's a positive trend. In the Reserves, I can
promise you that we looked very hard at what the impact of
these deployments to Bosnia were, and the good news is that our
retention is pretty good as a result of people that are
actually coming to the reserve units that are being used.
So I hope that's not kind of talking out both sides of my
mouth. I think that we're on a positive trend there with some,
like I said, anecdotal problems, some isolated kinds of
problems.
The important thing is that these assessment selection
programs are very important, and one of the things that is most
important is we have got to make sure that we're also getting
people that have the right kind of values, the core values, and
so we look very hard.
SOMALIA REVISITED
Mr. Murtha. One of the most courageous acts I've seen was
in Somalia where your commander took full responsibility, gave
me a handwritten letter to give to the President, and he said I
didn't need more tanks, I didn't need more this, I take full
responsibility. His career was gone because of that, but I was
really impressed by the fact that he took the responsibility
for what happened. I've always been impressed by that.
General Schoomaker. I know who it is you're talking about,
and he's a very good friend of mine, and that's the kind of
person he is. And I will tell you that in the business we're in
you've got to understand the psychology of a fist fight. You
know this is not something that you're going to be able to do
from the sidelines, and so we are going to run in the future
into heaven casualties if we're doing our job.
Mr. Young. Mr. Lewis.
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to have my lack of
questions at this point reflected any lack of interest in the
work of these gentleman. The work of our special operations
forces is very important, and insofar as I'm concerned
significant to the national defense as any we have. I need to
go to another session however, and so I yield back my time.
Mr. Young. Mr. Sabo? Mr. Nethercutt?
SEAL RETENTION
Mr. Nethercutt. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Quickly, General, I'm
interested in your comments about SEAL qualified lieutenants.
Your statement indicates that you have a significant retention
problem. To what you do you attribute that? What are you doing
to make sure you do retain these people in the future?
General Schoomaker. Well, first of all, we're very
concerned about it and we're working it very hard. We are
running, not only engaging RAND Corporation and running of a
very indepth study of the whole thing, but we're also our own
internal OPTEMPO survey and should have the results of that in
April. So we are looking at it.
As I travel, and I mentioned to somebody here I only spent
2 days at home last months you know because I'm trying to get
around to everybody. I asked these people this and the answers
are all over the board. Everybody says, you know, it's not
money yet. We need the money, but money is not going to solve
the problem. The problem that we need to make sure we address
is they've got to be doing meaningful things; that's what they
come in for.
Unfortunately, part of the problem is there that are some
people that come in with no intention, I mean of staying. They
come in because they want to be a SEAL and they want to do it
for 4, 5 years, and then they want to go back to Harvard
Business School and they want to be successful, and they want
to be able to put SEAL on their resume. And you know that's a
fact. And there are others that quite frankly--you know the
OPTEMPO effect.
So it's all over the place. We're taking it very seriously,
and we're working on it.
YEAR 2000 COMPUTER PROBLEM
Mr. Nethercutt. Let me just ask you a little different
subject but it also addresses to your readiness, the year 2000
computer problem. To what extent are you addressing that in
your command and what are the consequences if we're not ready?
I assume we will be ready.
General Schoomaker. We are going to be ready on that. We're
taking it very seriously. We're putting about $11 million
against it this year. We are very dependent upon technology, as
you know, and I'll tell you that in our special operations
helicopters for instance there are more line of computer code
in those than there are in the space shuttle. It's the most
advanced systems that are flying right now, and they're very
dependent upon making sure that we do solve these kinds of
problems.
So we're working at it very hard.
Mr. Nethercutt. Do you have plans to conduct some exercises
that will test your preparedness or readiness for the Y2K
problem?
General Schoomaker. We are doing some of that, but I've
heard the notion that we need a major exercise to kind of sort
this out. The fact of the matter is we're not ready yet to do
that because we're fixing the problems. But I think at some
point in time it makes some sense to run, and of course we run
a lot of this simulation and CPX kinds of things and that's
basically what we have to do.
So I'm generally supportive, but now is not the time. It's
too early.
Mr. Nethercutt. You feel confident you'll be ready.
General Schoomaker. I'm told, you know I'm into this pretty
heavy because I really do believe it's our future, but I am
told that we have confidence that we're going to do all right.
Now we are also very dependent on some much bigger systems
out there, I don't really know how well we're doing here in the
main frame, in the big architecture. But in our business I can
tell you that we are moving pretty smartly on this.
Mr. Nethercutt. Have you a target date for the change over,
or is that decided yet?
General Schoomaker. I don't know the answer to that
question, and I'd have to----
Mr. Nethercutt. All right, sir.
General Schoomaker. I'd be glad to look into it and give it
to you on the record.
Mr. Nethercutt. I think the Committee might appreciate
having some timetable expectation if there is one. It would be
helpful to us to have a sense that you know when it's going to
be operational.
General Schoomaker. All right sir.
[The information follows:]
The United States Special Operations Command's (USSOCOM)
target date to have our mission critical information technology
(IT) systems Year 2000 compliant is March 1999. As IT systems
are certified, we intend to systematically integrate them into
the USSOCOM enterprise. The time remaining until December 31,
1999, will allow us to continue to test USSOCOM's mission
critical IT systems against our support systems and be prepared
for ``hiccups'' or any possible system failure.
DEPLOYMENT IMPACTS ON FAMILY
Mr. Nethercutt. Just one final question if I may with
regard to the soldiers here today. Are your families all right
with your service and, you know, everything all right basically
on the home front as far as you all are concerned. Do you see
anything in the--among your colleagues or your fellow soldiers
that give you concern about the family side of your service?
Commander Bosiljevac. I've been married 23 years, sir, and
I'm blessed, I've got a good family. But there are daily
problems that you have to deal with. I'm in a command position
right now, 230-man unit, and you definitely have to take care
of family problems up front. You have to be very--you have to
pay particular attention to details on that side just as much
as your regular responsibilities.
Major Bailey. Last year I was deployed 262 days, sir. My
wife had full access to the checking account, and she was
thrilled.
Mr. Nethercutt. That's good testimony, sir. Thank you. That
says a lot. Thank you all very much for your service and your
testimony.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky.
SOF SUBMARINE PLATFORMS
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
General, does the Special Operations Command intend to
replace the King Kamehameha?
Should I withdraw my question?
General Schoomaker. No, let me see how I can answer.
The Kamehameha's has been extended, the service life has
been extended. We are in the throes right now of looking at a
couple of alternatives on whether the Los Angeles class boats
are going to do the job, you know what other kinds of
alternatives we're going to come up with.
So I probably would need to give you a better answer than
that and get the right people to look at it, but I think right
now--in fact I was just on the Kamehameha here two weeks ago,
and it's in good shape, and it is being well used. But I don't
think it's affordable, to be honest with you.
Mr. Visclosky. That ship.
General Schoomaker. No, no, to replace it. You know, unless
we come up with--there are some options that we have that may
make it affordable, you know in terms of what we do, but it's a
concern for us in terms of getting into something you know
that--of that magnitude.
Mr. Visclosky. You are going to have four excess Tridents
soon--is that one of the options you're looking at?
General Schoomaker. One of the options is Trident.
Mr. Visclosky. Would that potentially be affordable for
you?
Mr. Schoomaker. Well, the problem is we've got to work very
hard. It may look nice up front but when it comes time to
refuel that thing it may be a different story, and so we really
need to be careful about what piece of this we get into.
But I had a brief conversation with Jay Johnson, Admiral
Johnson, on this, and of course he's looking very carefully at
it.
There are some other problems too, and that is in the arms
limitations treaties and things in terms of what he can keep
and how all this is going to work. So it's not a simple
problem.
ADVANCED SEAL DELIVERY SYSTEM
Mr. Visclosky. From my perspective you have a serious
problem as far as getting people in, getting people out and the
affordability of any system you design.
So I think all of us would want to be helpful on that.
General Schoomaker. I will be glad to look into it and give
you more detail on that, but of course you know another piece
of this equation is how many ASDSs we're going to buy.
Mr. Visclosky. I appreciate what you do for a living, and
Commander, I'm dying to know what nationality you are.
Commander Bosiljevac. Croatian and Polish, sir.
[The information follows:]
As far as the numbers of Trident, this would be more appropriately
answered by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Johnson. However, as
far as an option we are looking at, as long as the Trident is
available, the answer is yes. The Trident submarine could replace
existing submarine capabilities that are reaching the end of service
life.
The Trident provides a very high end capability for special
operations forces (SOF). Its capability for enhanced support to SOF far
exceeds any current or planned SSN capability for SOF. The ability to
host 66 personnel for 90 days, with the personnel having dedicated
berthing, mission planning areas, and exercise equipment supersedes any
current converted SSN. This allows SOF to maintain a clandestine
presence near a crisis point for a longer period than they can aboard a
smaller attack submarine. Wet tube storage will provide a means for the
storage of various equipment that will be accessible to divers locking
out of the Dry Deck Shelter or 9-man lock-out chamber. Communications
suite will be compatible with Very Low Frequency, Low Frequency, High
Frequency, and Satellite Communications. The strike missile system in
particular may be able to provide on-call, high volume, weapon delivery
capability to SOF operations. This type of platform has broad
applications for SOF. After refueling, the Trident serves as a long-
term investment for the Navy and USSOCOM due to its expected 20-year
life after the conversion.
The costs associated with converting two Tridents for Strike/SOF's
use is approximately $977 million. The Navy has stated that the USSOCOM
fair share of the conversion would be about $160 million. This amount
exceeds any other previously funded SOF submarine conversion costs.
USSOCOM's current Total Obligation Authority (TOA) would not afford the
opportunity to achieve this 21st Century capability.
Mr. Young. Mr. Cunningham.
REMARKS OF MR. CUNNINGHAM
Mr. Cunningham. General, are you any relation to Steve
Shoemaker with the Blue Angels?
General Schoomaker. No, I'm not.
Mr. Cunningham. Not at all. Okay, thank you.
First of all--Navy guy, I understand.
You know I'd like to tell you that, like the Chairman said,
and it's not just words, I think you know that we're proud of
each and every one of you and that we may joke about football
or Air force or other things, but everybody on both sides of
the aisle in this body is in full support of you and want to
try and help you do, you know, the things that you need to do
and finance you, which in my opinion is way below what it
should be. It saddens us, but just think in your own mind how
many of you thought about the difficulties that you have gone
through whether it's the family, the OPTEMPO, the family
separation, the lack of equipment, the things that--I know when
I was in the service I thought of getting out sometimes, and
quite often the benefits of staying in, the family and the
security kept me in, but as those things erode that's what this
Committee is trying to help, and our hands are tied a little
bit. There's many of us feel that the emergency supplemental
bill cannot be taken out of DOD. When you got a budget as low
as 1950, you just can't survive and keep doing the things. I
came here about 7 years ago, and the testimony before our
Committee, I was previously on the authorization side, was the
military nearing a hollow force. I don't know what it takes to
get there after 7 years of continual cuts and increase in
OPTEMPO and everything, but I understand where you have to come
from, General. But we're trying to help as much as we can, and
I think one of the things since the--I think the President said
he wants an emergency supplemental to help that's not taken out
of DOD. I don't know where he's going to pay for it, but we
support that.
I differ a little bit from my good friend, Jack Murtha, who
is my very good friend, maybe not differ but maybe a difference
of opinion. I don't think in Somalia that you can change from a
humanitarian mission to going after General Aideed and at the
same time draw down your forces so weak and make yourself
vulnerable to the potential enemy and then deny armor on 3
different occasions that they didn't need armor or that it was
the General's--I'm not saying that Jack thought it was the
General's fault. I think he's very supportive of that. But I
think there was a lot of extenuating circumstances there in
which this government put your troops in that I hope we never
have to do from putting--in another administration, putting
Marines in a place and allow them to be shelled on the coast
without being able to attack. I mean it's both sides of the
aisle on this thing.
But we're proud of you, and we'll do everything we can to
help you, and I want to congratulate the young men and the
young women under your command. Thank you.
General Schoomaker. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. The Committee will recess now and reconvene
shortly in an executive session with the witness. This part of
the hearing is adjourned.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the
answers thereto follow:]
Personnel Tempo
Question. Personnel tempo is defined as the time an individual is
deployed from home port or station. What is the average monthly or
annual deployment time, by component, of SOF personnel?
Answer. Each of the Services have a slightly different
interpretation and definition of personnel tempo which prompted USSOCOM
to clarify the definition in order to bring continuity to the reporting
of its components. USSOCOM defines a Deployed Duty Day (DDY) as any
continuous 24-hour period during which one is conducting official
duties requiring them to remain over night away from their permanent
domicile. A DDY does not include garrison duty, leave, unauthorized
absences, or medical Temporary Duty (TDY). Within this uniform context,
USSOCOM's Fiscal Year 1997 component annual average personnel tempo is:
Air Force Special Operations Command: 63 DDY per year.
U.S. Army Special Operations Command: 79 DDY per year.
Navy Special Warfare Command: 105 DDY per year.
Question. How has this increased with more and more deployments in
support of ``military operations other than war''?
Answer. The annual deployment time by component, calculated in man-
years for fiscal year (FY) 1997 is
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOF Component Army Navy USAF Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operations...................................... 1281 539 596 2416
Training........................................ 1344 492 354 2190
Other........................................... 96 25 24 145
---------------------------------------------------------------
Total man-years........................... 2721 1056 974 4751
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total SOF Deployments are relatively constant, with only a 3.0
percent increase between FY 1996 and FY 1997. FY 1996 was 4,613 man-
years and FY 1997 was 4,751 man-years.
While the total deployments remain relatively constant--the
specific activities change with requirements. For example, when the 3rd
Special Forces Group was committed to operations in Haiti, they
canceled participation in Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercises and Joint
Combined Exchange Training. Similar changes have occurred in support of
Bosnia.
Question. What are the skill speciality areas in each service that
are experiencing the high personnel tempo rates?
Answer. Below are the Fiscal Year 1997 top five personnel skills
experiencing high personnel tempo rates from each special operations
component.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Code Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Naval Special Warfare Command
849X...................................... SEAL Team Corpsman
5326...................................... SEAL Team Enlisted
1130...................................... SEAL Team Officer
5323...................................... SEAL Enlisted, Special
Delivery Vehicle
1130...................................... SEAL Officer, Special
Delivery Vehicle
Air Force Special Operations Command
X1T2X1.................................... Pararescue (Special Tactics
Teams)
J1C2X1.................................... Combat Controller (Special
Tactics Teams)
011S3E.................................... MC-130P Pilot
011S3B.................................... MH-60G Pilot
012S4J.................................... MC-130E Navigator
United States Army Special Operations Command
39B....................................... PSYOPS Officer
39C....................................... Civil Affairs Officer
18D....................................... SF Medic
25R....................................... Visual Equip OP/Maint
18C....................................... SF Engineer
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. What actions have you pursued to reduce personnel tempo
rates?
Answer. We are working with the geographic CINCs and Services to
reduce the OPTEMPO of our Navy SEALs and Air Force Special Tactics
Teams. Recently, we managed to decrease the SEAL requirement in the
Pacific by about 20 percent, and an initiative is now underway in the
Southern Command to provide similar relief. The Special Tactics Teams'
OPTEMPO problems are being alleviated by increasing recruiting efforts
and by shifting some of their non-SOF functions and activities to the
Air force. The Air Force is experiencing aircrew shortages and USSOCOM
is linked to both the problem and the Air Force's solution.
The solution for high tempo of our Civil Affairs (CA) units has
already been demonstrated in Haiti and Bosnia. Access to our reserve
component CA units will reduce active component OPTEMPO to a reasonable
level. Since the reserve units have oft-needed expertise that is not
found in the active force, access to these reserve forces becomes even
more critical. Programming additional active forces is not the answer,
in my estimation, because our younger active component officers and
NCOs cannot replicate the skills and experience of the long-serving
reservists.
The Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up (PSRC) plays a critical
role in accessing our reserve component assets, especially CA and
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) units. This has proven important in
Haiti and is essential to the conduct of CA activities in Bosnia. PSRC
not only takes the pressure off the active component OPTEMPO, but also
recognizes the value of the reservists' contribution and the U.S.
government's commitment to the operation at hand. Finally, it relieves
the pressure of civilian re-employment concerns once the deployment has
concluded.
That said, however, we must also guard against the equal threat of
such heavy utilization of reserve forces that we affect the civilian
occupations of our people. Our concern with over-utilizing the reserves
is tempered by the fact that we currently have exhausted our allocation
of the FY97 Temporary Tour of Active Duty accounts, the dollars needed
to pay reservists salaries and allowances during those deployments.
This of course puts pressure back on the active force.
These readiness issues have the highest visibility in USSOCOM to
ensure we do not ``break the force.''
Question. Have you increased the use of Reserve component
personnel? What capabilities, or skill specialties are in the Reserve
components that cannot be found in the active forces?
Answer. The United States Special Operations Command continues to
rely heavily on the Reserve components, in particular the Army Reserve
Civil Affairs (CA) units and to a lesser extent the Army Reserve
Psychological Operations Units. The active component has limited assets
available in these unique units with 97 percent of CA units and 85
percent of Psychological Operations Units residing in the United States
Army Reserve. The majority of the CA structure is in the Reserve
Component because many of the skills needed to accomplish their
missions are derived primarily from the Reservists' civilian employment
and expertise. I would be infeasible to try to train or maintain these
skills in the active component. Further, the Air National Guard and Air
Reserve maintain high personnel tempo. The Commando SOLO aircraft
provides a unique capability found only in the Air National Guard.
Question. What percent of your commitments last year were in
support of ``military operations other than war'' rather than part of
your normal operations?
Answer. Fiscal year 1997 saw support of ``military operations other
than war'' at 50 percent of our total man-day deployments. Operations
were all operational deployments and include JOINT GUARD, NORTHERN
WATCH, SOUTHERN WATCH, DESERT THUNDER, Joint Task Force (JTF)-SWA, SAFE
BORDER, JTF-BRAVO. JTF-Full Accounting, US Support Group Haiti,
Humanitarian Demining missions, Counter Drug missions, Naval Special
Warfare personnel afloat, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, and
humanitarian missions (Kenya Assessment, C-141 SAR, etc.). Training
utilized 47 percent of SOF deployment man-days. Training includes Joint
Chiefs of Staff Exercises, Joint and Combined Exercises and Training,
unit training, and individual training/schools. ``Other'' was 3 percent
of SOF deployment man-days. Other deployments include conferences,
command visits, and predeployment site surveys.
Question. Of your worldwide deployments last year, what was the
peak number of personnel, countries, and missions supported with SOF
forces?
Answer. During fiscal year 1997, the peak week for SOF deployments
was 6,780 personnel deployed to 85 countries, while conducting 520
missions.
Personnel Issues
Question. What is your fiscal year 1999 budget request and funded
end strength for SOF personnel? How does this compare to fiscal year
1998?
Answer. The fiscal year 1999 SOF end strength is budgeted for
46,134 military and civilians, compared to 46,107 in fiscal year 1998.
This minor difference is due to programmed increases in support of our
Advanced SEAL Delivery System.
Question. Please give the Committee an overview of the size of your
forces. What is the mix of active, Reserve, and civilian end strength,
and what percent do they represent of your total force? Have your
forces remained relatively stable?
Answer. Fiscal year 1999's SOF end strength is 46,134 military and
civilian. Of this number, 64 percent are active military, 30 percent
are Reserve and National Guard, and the remaining 6 percent are
civilian. This resources HQ USSOCOM, six theater Special Operations
Commands, the three Service components and the Joint Special Operations
Command. Over the past several years, SOF force structure and end
strength has remained relatively stable. Adjustments have primarily
been made to accommodate fielding of modernized equipment such as the
MK-V Special Operations Craft and Patrol Coastal ships.
Question. At what percent are SOF units resourced for personnel and
equipment? Are you experiencing any manpower shortages in either active
duty or Reserve units?
Answer. Resourcing for personnel and equipment in special
operations units is programmed and budgeted at 100 percent of
authorizations. The one exception to this is the Reserve Civil Affairs
(CA) which are resourced at 90 percent of required personnel. This is a
legacy from the original cross-walk of funding from the Army. However,
resourcing at 90 percent has not proven to be a significant detriment
to operational capability, as additional regional CINC Civil Affairs
support teams have been resourced in the Reserves.
Generally, SOF enjoy high retention rates, both officer and
enlisted, in comparison to Service averages. Where SOF was below the
Service average, it was often due to the small number of SOF personnel
in a category which skews the percentage rate either high or low.
However, we are experiencing shortfalls in some Navy and Air Force
specialties. An increase in resignations of Navy SEAL lieutenants has
compounded a mid-grade officer shortage first identified in fiscal year
1996.
Recruiting shortfalls in the Air Force Combat Controller and
Pararescue career fields aggravates the current low inventory in these
specialties. The low inventory contributes to high deployment rates,
which in turn affects retention.
The Services and USSOCOM are working aggressively to address these
issues.
USSOCOM units are adequately resourced with equipment overall.
There are some impacts being noticed by our AFSOC component due to Air
Force, Joint Staff, and OSD on these issues. We are making progress in
fielding our SOF unique equipment systems and are working within the
budget resource constraints that have been provided. Difficult trade-
off decisions have been made as we move toward the 21st Century.
Question. SOCOM identifies and coordinates with the military
Services on special pay initiatives. Is there any new pay initiatives
for SOF forces in the military personnel budgets for fiscal year 1999?
Provide for the record a list of your common special and incentive pays
(i.e., selective reenlistment bonus, aviation continuation pay,
hazardous duty incentive pay) and the amount budgeted for each in
fiscal year 1999 for SOF forces.
Answer. There are no new pay initiatives for SOF forces in the
military personnel budgets for fiscal year 1999.
The common special pays for SOF are: selective reenlistment bonus;
special duty assignment pay; hazardous duty incentive pays for
parachute; dive, and demolition; foreign language proficiency; hostile
fire/imminent danger; and aviation continuation pay.
During the annual budget preparation, USSOCOM and the Services use
Service-developed aggregate pay factors to program/budget for military
personnel (MILPERS). The pay factor includes basic pay, allowances,
special pays, etc. Although USSOCOM uses its Major Force Program (MFP)-
11 total obligation authority to POM for MILPERS, the Services are
responsible for MILPERS budgeting. Military pay is not appropriated in
MFP-11; it is appropriated directly to the Services without a specific
MFP or budget activity identity. Once appropriated by Congress, the
Services control and execute MILPERS including special pays for USSOCOM
personnel.
Question. Do you have any unfunded shortfalls related to your
fiscal year 1999 personnel request?
Answer. For fiscal year 1999, there were no unfunded personnel
requirement shortfalls. Any additional personnel requirements
determined to be valid in fiscal year 1999 were funded internally to
USSOCOM. However, with the continued increase in the operational and
personnel tempo, personnel requirement could increase in the future.
Question. Are you experiencing any recruiting and retention
problems? What is the average retention rate of officers and enlisted,
by Service?
Answer. Generally, Special Operations Forces (SOF) enjoy high
retention rates, for both officer and enlisted, in comparison to
Service averages. Where SOF was below the Service average, often it was
due to the small number of SOF personnel in a category which may skew
the percentage rate either high or low.
We are experiencing some shortfalls in several Service
specialities. A significant increase in resignation of Navy SEAL
Lieutenants compounds a mid-grade officer shortage identified in Fiscal
Year 1996. Retention of junior officers must be returned to previous
levels if we are to rebuild required inventories of more senior
officers.
Recruiting shortfalls in the Air Force Combat Controller and
Pararescue career fields aggravates the current low inventory in these
specialities. The low inventory contributes to high deployment rates,
which in turn affects retention.
The Services and USSOCOM are working aggressively to address both
issues.
Assessment and Selection Process
Question. The assessment and selection process for Special
Operations Forces is among the most thorough and exhaustive of any
military organization in the world. Can you give us a brief synopsis of
the assessment and selection process for each type of specialty the
Command has?
Answer. Army Special Forces soldiers are recruited from both
officers and enlisted members serving in the Army. The Special Forces
Assessment and Selection (SFAS) course is 23 days. After successful
completion of SFAS, personnel then attend the Special Forces
Qualification Course (SFOC), which takes between 48-85 weeks to
complete, depending on the specialty.
Navy members may enter the SEAL training pipeline by direct
accession or lateral transfer from the fleet. Enlisted recruits and
lateral transfers may attend a one week Basic Underwater Demolition/
SEAL (BUD/S) screening course at the Recruit Training Center Great
Lakes, Michigan. Once accepted for attendance at BUD/S, members may
receive 4-6 weeks of physical fitness training and indoctrination prior
to commencing the actual BUD/S course. Officers and enlisted attend the
same six month BUD/S course and three weeks of Basic Airborne Training.
Additional rate training may be provided depending on the members
source rating.
Air Force members enter Combat Control Team (CCT) or Pararescue
(PJ) training by direct accession or from cross-training from other Air
Force career areas. Upon successful completion of a 10-week
indoctrination course, an additional 45-62 weeks of training is
provided depending on the specialty.
Question. What are the attrition rates for each specialty?
Answer. Approximately 45 percent of those who attend the Army's
Special Forces Assessment and Selection course pass and continue on to
the Special Forces Qualification course (SFQC). Of those who continue
with SFQC, approximately 80 percent pass and are assigned to Special
Forces units.
Navy Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) attribution currently
averages 70 percent.
Air Force Combat Controller/Pararescue attrition currently averages
85 percent from the indoctrination course. However, those who complete
the course have a 95 percent success rate through the remainder of the
training.
Question. How are those troops who do not make it through the
process treated when they are returned to their regular units?
Answer. Special Operations Forces (SOF) training is recognized by
the Services to be extremely demanding. Personnel who are unable to
complete initial SOF training are reassigned by their Service without
negative impact on their career.
Question. Once a special operations force member makes it through
the process, how long will he remain with the Special Operations unit
to which he is assigned?
Answer. Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel remain assigned
to SOF units for the remainder of their career. Tour lengths for
individual assignments vary from 3-5 years.
Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Units
Question. The active and Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological
(PSYOP) Operations units support contingency operations, JCS exercises,
combat training center developments, disaster relief efforts and
humanitarian programs. Most of these units reside largely in the
Reserve Components. General, what are your active and Reserve and
strength numbers for the Civil Affairs and PSYOP units, by Service?
Answer. The Civil Affairs and PSYOP units are all in Army Special
Operations Command, with the exception of the 193rd Special Operations
Wing (SOW) and the 193rd Special Operations Squadron (SOS), which are
in the Air National Guard. The 193rd SOW and 193rd SOS are manned at
825 personnel and are also considered PSYOP units. Army Civil Affairs
consist of 1 active battalion of 208 personnel and 3 Reserve Commands
having 9 Brigades and 24 Battalions consisting of 4,928 personnel. Army
PSYOP consists of 1 active PSYOP Group and 5 active Battalions with
1,144 personnel. Reserve PSYOP consists of 2 Groups and 8 Battalions
with 2,582 personnel.
Question. Given the nature of their business, Civil Affairs and
PSYOP units might be required to be in country for months prior to,
during or after some military action. What is the average number of
days active duty units are deployed during the year? What is the
personnel tempo for the Reserve units? Do you consider this personnel
tempo excessive? If so, what actions are you taking to solve this
problem?
Answer. USSOCOM has only one active duty Civil Affairs (CA)
Battalion and one Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Group. Personnel
from the 96th CA Battalion were deployed on average 93 days each during
Fiscal Year (FY) 1997. Personnel from the 4th PSYOP Group were deployed
on average 75 days each during FY 1997. The personnel tempo for the
Reserves is not tracked by this command. Further it is difficult to
quantify Reserve tempo because their availability should not be assumed
and their use should be exercised judiciously. This personnel tempo,
while high, is not considered excessive for the active forces as it
does not exceed the USSOCOM threshold of 180 deployed duty days per
year, nor the Global Military Force Policy on Low Density/High Demand
thresholds.
Question. If Civil Affairs and PSYOP units are in high demand for
contingencies and other deployments, do you believe a redesign of the
active/Reserve forces capabilities is needed? Are the capabilities of
the active and Reserve units mixed correctly? How does Special
Operations Command determine its needs in these areas?
Answer. The organizational designs of both the Reserve Civil
Affairs (CA) and PSYOP units are based on the operational capabilities
the units are required to have during peace and war. The high demands
for the units for contingencies and other deployments has minimal to no
effect on required capabilities. Both unit types are continuously
reviewed to determine exactly what capabilities they require. Most
recently, PSYOP units have been redesigned to more readily capture the
capabilities of Reserve and active personnel. Additionally, CA has been
reorganized and reapportioned by the U.S. Army Special Operations
Command based on the new Unified Command Plan. Future PSYOP redesigns
will most likely be based on technological advances. Based on the
DESERT STORM/DESERT SHIELD experience and peacetime engagement
activities since, the active and Reserve unit mix and capabilities
inherent in each appears to be about right for both Civil Affairs and
PSYOP. The need for these types of units is determined through the
USSOCOM Strategic Planning Process, which is capabilities based and
examines force requirements generated by wargaming scenarios provided
by defense planners.
Question. Is standing up more units in the active forces an option
to help relieve personnel tempo or adjust to changing priorities? How
many years does it take to stand up a new unit and get the personnel
trained?
Answer. The standing up of more active units could only relieve the
personnel tempo if personnel could be recruited and trained in
sufficient quantities to fill these new units. Indications are, though,
that this may not be possible considering the recruiting base is
shrinking as the Services draw down. Also, some units are based on
platforms and there are no additional platforms to stand up additional
units. Further, specialty skills like those in civil affairs can only
be found in the Reserves. The bottom line is that the mix between
active and Reserve units provides the capabilities required and without
a significant shift in the fiscal and personnel environment, standing
up additional active units may not be possible. The time required to
stand up a new unit varies depending on the type of unit, equipment
required, and the level and type of training required. This time ranges
from two years for a Civil Affairs active unit to four or five years
for a Special Forces Group or Special Operations Aviation Squadron. SOF
units cannot be rapidly assembled due to their complex training and
specialized equipment requirements.
Question. Given the continued operations in Bosnia, are you
concerned about active and Reserve unit rotations and our ability to
meet the mission requirements without having to call the same units
twice?
Answer. We are concerned about Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological
Operations (PSYOP) personnel in Army Reserve units if the force
structure requirements for the low-density, high-demand personnel in
these units are not reduced for the SFOR forward operating force.
Currently, in accordance with draft Statement of Requirements (SOR) 11,
SFOR is proposing a reduction of the U.S. PSYOP commitment to
approximately 54 soldiers and the CA commitment to approximately 79. We
think we can sustain this level of commitment with existing Contingency
Operation Temporary Tour of Active Duty (COTTAD) authority that allows
volunteers to serve repetitive tours. All of our CA and PSYOP units
have mobilized personnel for deployment to Bosnia. Current SFOR
estimates on the active component side is for a Special Forces company
that we can sustain barring any other unforeseen contingency by
rotation of forces.
Question. If the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) does
not allow the Department to activate Reservists for a second 270 day
tour for the Bosnia operation, do you have enough Reserve component
assets to meet your projected requirements?
Answer. Under current Statement of Requirements (SOR) levels,
USSOCOM can support a sixth CA rotation with no significant problems.
Beginning with a seventh rotation, some specific rank or skill
requirements may become difficult to fill. Currently, the draft SOR 11
will significantly reduce SOF CA requirements. If implemented, this
will extend the number of rotations that can be supported under PSRC.
Operating TEMPO (OPTEMPO) and Deployments
Question. Special Operations Forces (SOF) deployments have
increased at a dramatic pace since the Command was established 10 years
ago. Can you give us a brief synopsis of major SOCOM deployments over
the past two years, and what is the forecast for fiscal year 1999?
Answer. During fiscal year 1996, SOF personnel supported operation
UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti), Operation PACIFIC HAVEN (Guam), Operation
SOUTHERN WATCH (Iraq), Operation ABLE SENTRY (Macedonia), Operation
JOINT GUARD (Bosnia-Herzegovina), Operation NORTHERN WATCH/PROVIDE
COMFORT (Northern Iraq), and Operation SAFE BORDER (Peru, Ecuador).
During fiscal year 1997, SOF supported 17 operations. Specific
details follow:
1. Operation FIRM RESPONSE (Congo).------
2. Operation NOBEL OBELISK (Sierra Leone). ------ initially
deployed to Camp Benguema Training Center, Sierra Leone, for a Joint
and Combined Exchange Training (JCET) (leadership) with host nation
military personnel. During the period ---- instituted communications
with SOCEUR & American Embassy, Freetown, established security at the
embassy, planned and coordinated for a Non-combatant Evacuation
Operation (NEO), conducted reconnaissance of potential hazardous
landing zones, received the evacuation force, and provided security for
the ambassador.
3. Operation GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE (Rwanda). Beginning 14 November
1996, the ------ deployed to the Great Lakes Region of Eastern Zaire in
support of a multinational humanitarian intervention force to
facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid by civilian relief
organizations and the voluntary repatriation of refugees or displaced
persons from Zaire to Rwanda. CA and PSYOPS were instrumental in
convincing the Rwandan refugees to return home and the AC-130 gunship
was invaluable in locating and counting the numerous groups of refugees
for the Combined Joint Task Force Commander (14 November through 14
December 1996).
4. Operation SILVER WAKE (Albania). ------ was originally in
Albania to provide Military Liaison Team support to host nation
military in order to develop and coordinate military-to-military
contacts to encourage the democratic orientation of the Albanian
military and defense establishments. When the security situation began
to deteriorate in Albania, he reported to American Embassy Tirana and
offered his assistance. ------ reviewed and assisted with the update of
the Embassy Emergency Action Plan, confirmed the surveys of evacuation
helicopter landing zones, marked the landing zones for the initial
arrival of the evacuation force and acted as the ambassador's military
advisor throughout the crisis. Throughout the evening and early morning
hours of 12-13 March 97 continuous gunfire rocked the capital city of
Tirana, Albania. The situation became critical when mobs raided and
looted the country's noncommissioned officer's academy of weapons and
ammunition less than a kilometer from the American Residential
Compound. The Ambassador requested and received permission to conduct
an ordered evacuation of all Americans from the country of Albania on
13 Mar 97.
5. Operation ASSURED LIFT (Liberia). A ------ personnel deployed
French speaking Liaison Coordination Elements (LCE) to forward
operating locations at Bamako, Mali, Abidjan, Ivory Coast, Accra,
Ghana, and Roberts International Airport, Liberia. Each LCE coordinated
and supported the marshaling, on-load and offload of host nation
military personnel. These LCE assisted host nation militaries in Ghana,
Mali, and Cote D'Ivore in rapidly moving critical military forces to
Monrovia, Liberia, to reinforce ECOMG (Economic Community of West
African States cease-fire Monitoring Group). In response to an outbreak
of intense factional fighting in and around Monrovia, Liberia, during
14 February to 7 March 1997, the U.S. agreed to provide immediate
assistance in strengthening ECOMOG security around Monrovia.
6. Operation HIGH FLIGHT (Namibia). On 13 September 1996, an U.S.
Air Force C-141 and a German Air Force TU-154 collided and crashed off
the coast of Namibia. Due to limited personnel and communications
capability American Embassy Windhoek requested the assistance of ODA
392, 3rd SFG, that had deployed to conduct training and provide
logistics assistance in support of Namibian humanitarian demining
operations. The SOF demining team, led by Captain Hubbard, played a key
role in getting the information flowing and supporting the deployment
of JTF HIGH FLIGHT. Additionally, SOCEUR deployed two MC-130 aircraft
from 352nd SOG and a command element within hours of the reported loss
to provide initial command of the Search and Rescue (SAR) JTF and begin
personnel recovery operations.
7. Operation NORTHERN WATCH (Northern Iraq). The ------ supported
the U.S. effort in support of this operation to provide Combat SAR
(CSAR) and helicopter refueling support from Turkey for the United
Nations' sponsored No-Fly-Zone over Northern Iraq. For the period ----
-- SOF air assisted with the ongoing Operation NORTHERN WATCH at
Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, due to lack ofsufficient, available, and
capable convention air assets to perform the CSAR mission over Northern
Iraq.
8. Operation JOINT GUARD (Bosnia-Herzegovina). The ------ provided
special operations, CA, and PSYOP in support of NATO stabilization
Force to deter hostilities and promote a stable environment in Bosnia-
Herzegovina from 20 December 1996 to present in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia, Italy, and Germany.
9. Operation ABLE SENTRY (Macedonia). The ------ have provided
smaller rotational elements attached to conventional forces in support
of the United Nations mission in Skopje, Macedonia.
10. Operation BEVEL EDGE (Cambodia). A Special Operations Command-
Pacific (COMSOCPAC) led JTF deployed to an intermediate staging base at
Utapao, Thailand, 8-21 July 1997 to prepare to conduct a NEO of
American citizens in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The NEO did not take place
as the situation stabilized. Participating units under ------ .
11. Operation SOUTHERN WATCH (IRAQ). ------ with aircrews and
maintenance support packages to Al Kharj, Saudi Arabia, on 4 October
1996 at the conclusion of Operation Desert Strike expanding the no-fly
zone. The ------ provided 24 hour refueling to HH60G helicopters
supporting the CSAR mission for aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone over
Iraq during the periods ------.
12. Operation SOUTHERN WATCH (IRAQ). The ------ provide individual
augmentation to CJTF Southwest Asia (SWA) in Saudi Arabia. ------ These
billets are tasked as 179-day recurring rotations. As a result of the
Khobar Towers bombing, and on the recommendation of the ``Downing
Report,'' U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) requested individual
augmentation to CJTF SWA staff to effectively plan, coordinate, and
implement force protection initiatives in the USCENTCOM area of
operations.
13. Operation MARATHON PACIFIC (GTMO & Wake Island). USSOCOM
deployed CA and PSYOP personnel in support of a CINC U.S. Atlantic
Command (CINCUSACOM) mission to provide humanitarian assistance to
Chinese migrants intercepted off the United States Eastern coast. The
package consisted of ------.
14. Operation PACIFIC HAVEN (Guam). ------ personnel provided
support to the JTF at Anderson AFB, Guam, to conduct humanitarian
assistance operations to receive, shelter, process, and provide care
and security for Kurdish Foreign Service Nationals (KFSN) and their
families during the period 20 September 1996--30 April 1997.
15. Operation SAFE BORDER (Peru and Ecuador). The ------ when
Brazil assumed control of the support requirement. The 7th SFG deploys
personnel on a six month rotational basis to verify adherence to the
cease-fire agreement between Ecuador and Peru to include strict
observance of the Demilitarized Zone established in August 1995.
16. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti). USSOCOM deployed a total of
------ soldiers to Haiti during fiscal year 1997 in support of USACOM's
and then Southern Command's (after 1 June 1997) ongoing efforts to help
Haiti reestablish its infrastructure.
17. USSOCOM, at the request of the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S.
European Command (USCINCEUR) and at the direction of the Secretary of
Defense, has provided U.S.-based SOF in support of military operations
in the Bosnia Theater of Operations. These operations support the
Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) and are conducted under the authorization of
the Secretary of Defense, who currently retains the disclosure
authority for all release of information to the above question.
Respectfully request that queries on this subject be referred to the
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The following operations do not have an established end date and
SOF support may continue into fiscal year 1999: ABLE SENTRY
(Macedonia), SOUTHERN WATCH (Iraq), and SAFE BORDER (Peru and Ecuador).
Question. What percentage of the time are SOCOM forces deployed on
training and on missions?
Answer. During fiscal year 1997, SOF were deployed 50 percent of
the time on Operations (i.e. JOINT GUARD, NORTHERN WATCH, SOUTHERN
WATCH, DESERT THUNDER, Joint Task Force (JTF)-SWA, SAFE BORDER, JTF-
BRAVO, JTF-Full Accounting, US Support Group Haiti, Humanitarian
Demining missions, Counter Drug missions, Naval Special Warfare
personnel afloat, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, and humanitarian
missions (Kenya Assessment, C-141 SAR); 47 percent on training (i.e JCS
Exercises, JCETs, unit training, and individual training or schools);
and 3 percent on other deployments to include conferences, command
visits, and predeployment site surveys.
Question. How do mission deployment levels impact training and
readiness?
Answer. The morale and retention of special operations forces has
remained high despite our consistently high OPTEMPO. We believe this is
because the troops are conducting significant missions, making a
difference to the Nation and they're proud to be involved. However,
USSOCOM has taken the initiative to ensure a ready force for the future
by studying the effects of high tempo on our forces. One initiative is
a PERSTEMPO Impact Survey to be completed in April 1998. This will
focus on special operations forces (SOF) morale, families, professional
development, training, retention, and personnel readiness. Another is a
Joint Medic Review study, initiated as a way to address growing
retention concerns about our SOF medics. A life-cycle approach was used
to compare each SOF medical specialty from initial recruitment to final
attrition. Both Army Special Forces Medics and Air Force Pararescuemen
had shortages in operating strength caused by increases in
authorizations not matched by increases in recruiting. The National
Defense Research Institute/RAND has also been tasked to conduct a SOF
recruiting study with particular emphasis on improving minority
representation of SOF units. Emphasis upon recruiting is a multi-year
effort, given the extensive training required and resulting long lead-
time.
SOF is committed to remain ahead of potential problems caused by
the high employment rate of our troops. By developing a baseline for
future comparisons, determining how high PERSTEMPO affects the soldier
and how this may manifest itself (morale, retention, etc.), SOF can
develop innovative thinking and new ways to shape change.
Question. Are there Special Forces units which are deployed more
frequently than is prudent?
Answer. Some of our units are deployed more frequently than we
believe is prudent for the long-term health of the organization. The
Special Tactics Squadrons, the Special Operations Squadrons from the
Air Force Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare SEAL, SEAL
Delivery Vehicle Teams and Patrol Coastal Ships, and the Army Civil
Affairs and Psychological Operations units routinely experience
significantly high unit tempo over the quarterly reporting period.
These units have experienced high tempo on the bounds of prudent usage
and USSOCOM has taken steps to document, analyze and temper the
situation.
Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Unit
Question. There are no funds in the fiscal year 1998 appropriations
bill nor the fiscal 1999 budget for U.S. Forces to remain in Bosnia
beyond the June 1998 pull out date. What is the current complement of
Special Operations Forces in Bosnia and will they remain beyond June
1998?
Answer. On 20 March 1998, there are ------ conducting the Special
Operations Force mission in support of OPERATION JOINT GUARD.
Accordingly, ------ conducting direct support of the mission from
Brindisi, Italy, and the remaining personnel at the various
headquarters at SHAPE, Special Operations Command Europe, Croatia and
Hungary. An actual breakout of he force package is as follows: ------.
We are currently planning for a Follow-on Force mission and have
included our force package figures in the NATO Statement of Requirement
(SOR 11). The other Contributing Nations are reviewing this document
and we expect to make the final adjustments to the force figures during
the 7-8 April 1998 Force Generation Conference. Based on the
commitments from the other nations, the U.S. SOF contribution should be
------.
Bosnia Implementation Force (IFOR) Cost Estimates
Question. What are the additional costs required for them to stay
in Bosnia? Will these funds be in the supplemental request?
Answer. USSOCOM estimates it will cost $8.7 million for the fourth
quarter of fiscal year 1998 for SOF to remain in Bosnia. This would
bring the total estimate for fiscal year 1998 to $34.4 million. The
Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) covers $28.5
million of that amount. This leaves a shortfall of $5.9 million, which
is included in the contingency supplemental submission.
In addition to the costs to remain in Bosnia, USSOCOM estimates a
fiscal year 1998 cost of $1.6 million or Operation Deliberate Guard.
This cost estimate is covered in the DoD contingency supplemental
submission.
Question. Since many of the Special Operation Forces currently in
Bosnia are Reservists, what will be the impact of continuing the
Special Operation missions there?
Answer. USSOCOM can continue to support operations in Bosnia with
Reserve Component personnel without any adverse impact, providing
certain adjustments are effected. These adjustments include: decreasing
the Civil Affairs (CA) and PSYOP requirements as currently planned in
Statement of Requirements 11, extension of Presidential Selective
Reserve Call-up (PSRC) authority beyond 30 June 98, and use of
Contingency Operation Temporary Tour of Active Duty (COTTAD) authority
to deploy volunteers on second tours.
Question. Would the Special Operations Command be able to support
an extension of the current Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up for
the Bosnia mission?
Answer. Yes. In fact, the continued support of Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations units to Bosnia is heavily dependent on the
extension of the Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up (PSRC)
authority. USSOCOM can support a sixth rotation with no significant
problems. Beginning with a seventh rotation, some specific rank or
skill requirements may become difficult to fill.
Question. Will reserve units who have been tasked to provide
personnel in the past be required to provide the same personnel for an
extension of the mission?
Answer. No. Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up (PSRC) rules
prohibit a soldier from being mobilized for the same operation for more
than 270 days. Technically, a soldier could be mobilized for 180 days
and return for an additional 90 days. However, legal review of this
rule has indicated that Congressional intent was not to have soldiers
return for a second tour. A soldier could, however, volunteer to return
to the same operation under Contingency Operation Temporary Tour of
Active Duty (COTTAD) authority for a maximum of 170 days.
USSOCOM Modernization Programs
Question. Your budget request for procurement for fiscal year 1999
is $506.260 million, $130.879 million below the 1998 appropriated
level. Two years ago, General Henry Shelton, then Commander in Chief,
United States Special Operations Command, and now Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, testified that ``An appropriate level of procurement
funding would be at $700 million per year to ensure the fielding for
critically needed weapon systems.'' Is the procurement request for
fiscal year 1999 adequate to ensure the fielding of critically needed
weapons systems?
Answer. Within our severe fiscal constraints, we have been able to
establish a program that, while minimal, will keep key programs on
track. We are also seeking opportunities to leverage other technologies
to augment our minimal procurement program.
Question. What programs originally funded in fiscal year 1999 are
now funded in later years?
Answer. There are three programs which fit this category. These
programs include: the Directional Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM),
where $60 million in procurement moved to Fiscal Year 2000 (FY00), the
Patrol Coastal Forward Looking Infrared Radar (PC FLIR), where $8
million procurement moved to FY00, and, the Advanced Seal Delivery
System (ASDS), where $44.8 million (Procurement and Operations &
Maintenance) where reprogrammed to Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT&E).
Question. Why have they slipped?
Answer. For the Directional Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM),
testing has slipped approximately nine months. This slip is the result
of a development slip. For the Patrol Coastal Forward Looking Infrared
Radar (PC FLIR), the slippage is due to resource constraints. The
Advanced Seal Delivery System (ASDA) funding was recolored due to cost
and schedule slip of the prototype ASDS.
Question. Are there additional costs to the program because of
these delays?
Answer. For Directional Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM) and the
Patrol Coastal Forward Looking Infrared Radar (PC FLIR) there are no
additional costs associated with the delays. For the Advanced Seal
Delivery System (ASDS), there are costs associated with the delays.
$44.8 million of procurement and Operations and Maintenance were
realigned to Research, Development, Test and Evaluation in fiscal year
1999. This impacts the quantity of ASDS that can be procured.
Question. Do you have shortfalls relating to your 1999 procurement
request?
Answer. Yes. The following items related to procurement are on our
fiscal year 1999 unfunded requirement (UFR) list.
[In millions of dollars]
Priority and UFR Procurement amount
1 Counterproliferation........................................... $5.09
4 SPEAR-BALCS.................................................... 4.3
6 MH-47E Helicopter.............................................. 41.5
8 Silent Shield.................................................. 5
9 M4A1 Carbine Modifications..................................... 2.47
10 Remote Activating Munitions System............................ 6
11 AC-130 Low Light Level TV..................................... 2.36
CV-22 Aircraft
Question. The Special Operations variant of the V-22 is the CV-22
which will provide long-range infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply
missions for SOF forces. It fulfills a critical USSOCOM capability
shortfall. What is the cost to the Special Operations Command for
developing the CV-22?
Answer. The CV-22 will cost USSOCOM $3.8 million in fiscal year
1999. The majority of development costs for the CV-22 are funded by the
Department of the Navy. The Navy is developing the baseline MV-22
aircraft for the United States Marine Corps (USMC) and the initial CV-
22 modifications. USSOCOM is funding a follow-on pre-planned product
improvement (P3I) that incorporates CV-22 capability not available in
the baseline aircraft development program. The P3I program includes the
integration of a defensive infrared countermeasures capability,
additional flare & chaff dispensers, the AVR-2A laster warning
receiver, and other modifications. USSOCOM CV-22 Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding is programmed to begin in fiscal
year 2000 (FY00).
USSOCOM is funding the procurement of the Special Operations Forces
(SOF) unique equipment on the CV-22 (about 15 percent of the total
aircraft procurement cost) and the United States Air Force (USAF) is
funding the procurement of the common MV-22 aircraft and components
(about 85 percent).
Question. What capabilities will it have that the V-22 will not?
Answer. The CV-22 will have four significant additional
capabilities: the electronic warfare Suite of Integrated Radio
Frequency Countermeasures (SIRFC) being developed by the Army for the
Apache Longbow; the Multi-mission Advanced Tactical Terminal (MATT),
which provides near real-time offboard sensor information for improved
situational awareness and threat avoidance; the terrain following/
terrain avoidance APQ-174D radar; and additional fuel tanks for
extended range. There are also other avionics improvements, such as
improved functionality for the digital map and survivor tracking.
Question. What defensive capabilities will it have?
Answer. The CV-22 will have extensive defensive capabilities. The
Suite of Integrated Radio Frequency Countermeasures (SIRFC) integrates
on-board and off-board sensor information to display current threat
status and provides electronic jamming capability. Chaff and flares are
available in multiple dispensers both fore and aft on the aircraft. An
infrared countermeasures capability will be added as part of the Pre-
planned Product Improvement (P3I) to defeat infrared missiles.
Question. Will the CV-22 be able to transport any of your current
land transportation vehicles?
Answer. The CV-22 can only transport motorcycles and modified All-
Terrain Vehicles that are in the current SOF inventory. USSOCOM plans
to procure Light Strike Vehicles in conjunction with the United States
Marine Corps that will fit inside V-22 aircraft.
Advanced Seal Delivery System
Question. The Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) was originally
scheduled for Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in 1997. The Navy and
the contractor have had significant problems meeting its schedule. What
is the current IOC?
Answer. The Advanced Seal Delivery System (ASDS) will deliver to
the Fleet in June 1999. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is
scheduled three months after delivery, currently September 1999. After
delivery to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, we have scheduled three months of
operator work-ups with the host submarine (USS Greeneville SSN-772).
Upon completion of these work-ups, IOC will be achieved.
Question. What has been the cost growth to the program to date?
Answer. The total projected Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT&E) contract cost of producing the first ASDS is $169
million. The negotiated cost of the original fiscal year 1994 (FY94)
contract, prior to redesign and structural modifications, was $62
million (a difference of $107 million). The Latest Revised Estimate
(LRE) by the prime contractor to complete the lead ASDS vehicle under
the rebaselined program is $169.6 million then Year Dollars (TY$). The
total cost for completion of the lead vehicle (contractor and other
government costs) is projected to be approximately $218 million (TY$).
This total includes other costs such as government-furnished equipment,
engineering support, life cycle support, planning yard support, and the
hydrodynamic test program that will define the host submarine submerged
operating envelope.
Question. Are there sufficient funds in the future years defense
program (FYDP) to procure the six vessels which are required?
Answer. The fiscal year 1998-2003 (FY98-03) FYDP currently does not
contain sufficient funds to acquire total of six ASDS. Presently,
USSOCOM is evaluating the overall force requirement for ASDS from an
affordability standpoint.
Question. How much would have to be added to procure six vessels?
Answer. A total of $164.2 million would have to be added to the
program across the future year's defense program (FYDP) to procure all
six ASDS.
Question. The hull manufacturer has gone out of business. Are there
sufficient other hull manufacturers to continue the program?
Answer. Yes. Northrop-Grumman, the prime contractor for the
Advanced Seal Delivery System (ASDS), has negotiated a fixed-price
contract with Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics for the
follow-on pressure hulls.
Information Warfare
Question. One potential and very serious dilemma we must face is
that an adversary might disrupt or manipulate our military information
systems, thereby eliminating one of the best advantages we possess over
our adversaries. What role is the Special Operations Command playing in
the Department's efforts to address this threat?
Answer. USSOCOM is decisively engaged in addressing the
asymmetrical information warfare threat posed to the United States. I
have combined our intelligence, communications, automation, and
information warfare specialists into an Intelligence and Information
Operations Center. This center pulls together all the elements
necessary to respond to the information warfare threat. Information
operations is a Special Operations Forces (SOF) principle mission. For
several key areas of information operations, such as psychological
operations and civil affairs, SOF are uniquely suited for this mission.
Currently, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and National
Security Agency (NSA) form the center of gravity for information
warfare to create solutions for protecting our information systems.
USSOCOM works with DISA and NSA. This partnership has resulted in five
vulnerability and penetration testing assistance visits at USSOCOM
recently, such as EPIC CHALLENGE. USSOCOM also works closely with other
agencies, such as Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence
Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency and National Reconnaissance
Office, and participates in Department working groups on IO. USSOCOM
initiated a set of Information Conditions (INFOCONs). These INFOCONS
establish procedures for our internal information systems users and
system administrators to respond to different levels of threat.
Question. How vulnerable are your information systems to disruption
or manipulation?
Answer. USSOCOM systems continue to evolve to protect them from
external disruption or manipulation. By employing state-of-the-art
systems and techniques, such as the Joint Intrusion Device developed by
Defense Information Systems Agency, we are able to protect our critical
information and command systems. We have deployed a defense in depth
concept that allows our systems administration personnel to identify
and successfully thwart information attacks. On a daily basis, USSOCOM
systems are probed and attacked. Thus far, our systems have remained
protected from penetration. Through numerous assistance visits and
exercises, we have been able to strengthen our defensive posture, train
our information professionals in recognizing and responding to attacks,
and develop new techniques against future potential adversaries.
Question. What steps are you taking to reduce a potential
adversary's ability to use information warfare?
Answer. USSOCOM is working closely with other agencies to develop
new methods and techniques for reducing an adversarie's ability. To do
this we must protect both the information systems and the information.
We take every step necessary to protect our mission critical
information systems from both external adversaries and internal
threats. The key to this is the redundancy built into our system. This
capability allows us to retrieve information so that if one source is
denied us we can continue from another source. By having alternate
means, we greatly reduce the ability of an adversary to deny us the
required information. Testing of both primary and alternate systems is
conducted both in training and exercise scenarios.
Question. What measures can we take to diminish or eliminate our
risks?
Answer. We must not only protect our information systems, but also
educate the Special Operation Forces warriors using those systems. Our
networks have been continuously probed and each incident is taken very
seriously. We have separate systems, so that we can isolate systems
under attack and perform damage control. A continuous training program
to ensure systems administrators are technologically current,
understand possible threats, and verify the functioning of our
reporting and response systems is another vital defense. At a national
level we need an integrated effort, both government and the public
sector. A large portion of our information infrastructure is contracted
from commercial sources. The Report of the President's Commission on
Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP), released in October 1997,
discusses these critical vulnerability and protection issues.
Question. If the necessary protections are not in place, what are
the consequences?
Answer. The consequences of this asymmetrical threat are extremely
serious. While popular books and magazines highlight total collapses of
electronic commerce or other industries, more serious to the warfighter
is the loss of confidence in the information we use to make decisions.
The information age has improved our ability to see events as they
unfold--our sensors feed us a constant stream of information--also that
decision-makers can quickly and accurately respond. Any distrust as to
the accuracy and validity of the information may cause doubts--doubt
that can lead to paralysis in our decision-making cycle. A prolonged
paralysis may lead to a total shutdown of our information systems and
our ability to maintain dominant battle space knowledge. The timely,
accurate flow of information is crucial to the success of SOF's ability
to shape the international environment.
Counter-Terrorism
Question. The terrorist threat is one of the most serious to U.S.
civilian and military personnel. Special Operations forces provide the
means to deter or defeat terrorist attacks against u.S. interests
wherever they may occur. Where are the principle terrorist threats
located today?
Answer. USSOCOM is concerned about terrorism on a worldwide basis.
We are concerned about the terrorism threat to Special Operation Forces
(SOF) deployments and diplomatic facilities/presence worldwide. We are
also concerned about the non-governmental pressure that may require us
to conduct non-combatant evacuation operations. The following countries
pose a continuing threat based on the presence of representatives of
State Sponsors of Terrorism (as designated by the U.S. Department of
State), the presence of terrorist groups, the indication of intentions
for anti-American activities and/or violence by these groups, the
existence and usage of centers for terrorist training, and the
existence of working intelligence and logistic support networks in
countries that include: ------.
Question. What role does the Special Operations Command play in our
overall Counter-terrorism program?
Answer. ------.
Question. How do Special Operations forces train to conduct
counter-terrorism missions?
Answer. ------.
Question. Do they train with foreign counterparts?
Answer. ------.
Question. In which Countries do they train?
Answer. ------.
Question. In his annual report, the Secretary of Defense stated
that Special Operations forces provided support to the Department of
Justice for the conduct of four extraditions during 1997 resulting in
the return of known and suspected terrorists from overseas to U.S.
Courts for trial. Who were the suspected terrorists which were returned
and from which countries?
Answer. ------.
Question. Have Special Operations Forces been involved in
assessments of force protection measures for theater commanders to
ensure that appropriate measures have been taken to protect against
possible terrorists incidents?
Answer. SOF expertise in assessing the threat and protecting the
force is continuously tapped by the Regional Commanders in Chief
(CINCs). Over the last year SOF has provided force protection
assessment support to numerous areas including Bosnia, Pakistan, Korea,
Colombia, and Peru. Our support includes augmentation to CINC level
assessment teams and the formulation of SOF specific teams. SOF force
protection assessment methodology concentrates on three main areas: the
threat--its existence, history, capabilities, intentions, and
targeting; host nation ability to provide defense to the site (most SOF
units utilize Host Nation Facilities for billeting and training); and
the units own Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection plan. Other areas
surveyed include the flow of timely force protection information,
structural integrity of the site, and stand-off from public areas. SOF
will continue to support the Regional CINCs in all aspects of force
protection for both SOF and conventional forces.
Military Operations Other Than War
Question. There has been a dramatic increase in operations other
than war since the Special Operations Command was established 10 years
ago. These operations are a natural extension of the SOF mission. What
operations other than war have Special Operations Forces been involved
in for the last two years? Please give us some examples of what your
forces are doing in places like Bosnia and Southwest Asia.
Answer. During fiscal year 1996, SOF personnel supported operation
UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti), Operation PACIFIC HAVEN (Guam), Operation
SOUTHERN WATCH (Iraq), Operation ABLE SENTRY (Macedonia), Operation
JOINT GUARD (Bosnia-Herzegovina), Operation NORTHERN WATCH/PROVIDE
COMFORT (Northern Iraq), and Operation SAFE BORDER (Peru, Ecuador).
During fiscal year 1997, SOF supported 17 operations. Specific
details follow:
1. Operation FIRM RESPONSE (Congo). ------.
2. Operation NOBEL OBELISK (Sierra Leone). ------ initially
deployed to Camp Benguema Training Center, Sierra Leone, for a Joint
and Combined Exchange Training (JCET) (leadership) with host nation
military personnel. During the period ------ instituted communications
with SOCEUR & American Embassy, Freetown, established security at the
embassy, planned and coordinated for a Non-combatant Evacuation
Operation (NEO), conducted reconnaissance of potential hazardous
landing zones, received the evacuation force, and provided security for
the ambassador.
3. Operation GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE (Rwanda). Beginning 14 November
1996, the ------ deployed to the Great Lakes Region of Eastern Zaire in
support of a multinational umanitarian intervention force to facilitate
the delivery of humanitarian aid by civilian relief organizations and
the voluntary repatriation of refugees or displaced persons from Zaire
to Rwanda. CA and PSYOPS were instrumental in convincing the Rwandan
refugees to return home and the AC-130 gunship was invaluable in
locating and counting the numerous groups of refugees for the Combined
Joint Task Force Commander (14 November through 14 December 1996).
4. Operation SILVER WAKE (Albania). ------ was originally in
Albania to provide Military Liaison Team support to host nation
military in order to develop and coordinate military-to-military
contacts to encourage the democratic orientation of the Albanian
military and defense establishments. When the security situation began
to deteriorate in Albania, he reported to American Embassy Tirana and
offered his assistance. ------ reviewed and assisted with the update of
the Embassy Emergency Action Plan, confirmed the surveys of evacuation
helicopter landing zones, marked the landing zones for the initial
arrival of the evacuation force and acted as the ambassador's military
advisor throughout the crisis. Throughout the evening and early morning
hours of 12-13 March 97 continuous gunfire rocked the capital city of
Tirana, Albania. The situation became critical when mobs and raided and
looted the country's noncommissioned officer's academy of weapons and
ammunition less than a kilometer from the American Residential
Compound. The Ambassador requested and received permission to conduct
an ordered evacuation of all Americans from the country of Albania on
13 Mar 97.
5. Operation ASSURED LIFT (Liberia). ------ deployed French
speaking Liaison Coordination Elements (LCE) to forward operating
locations at Bamako, Mali, Abidjan, Ivory Coast, Accra, Ghana, and
Roberts International Airport, Liberia. Each LCE coordinated and
supported the marshaling, on-load and offload of host nation military
personnel. These LCE assisted host nation militaries in Ghana, Mali,
and Cote D'Ivore in rapidly moving critical military forces to
Monrovia, Liberia, to reinforce ECOMOG (Economic Community of West
African States cease-fire Monitoring Group). In response to an outbreak
of intense factional fighting in and around Monrovia, Liberia, during
14 February to 7 March 1997, the U.S. agreed to provide immediate
assistance in strengthening ECOMOG security around Monrovia.
6. Operation HIGH FLIGHT (Namibia). On 13 September 1996, an U.S.
Air Force C-141 and a German Air Force TU-154 collided and crashed off
the coast of Namibia. Due to limited personnel and communications
capability American Embassy Windhoek requested the assistance of ODA
392, 3rd SFG, that had deployed to conduct training and provide
logistics assistance in support of Namibian humanitarian demining
operations. The SOF demining team, led by Captain Hubbard, played a key
role in getting the information flowing and supporting the deployment
of JTF HIGH FLIGHT. Additionally, SOCEUR deployed two MC-130 aircraft
from 352nd SOG and a command element within hours of the reported loss
to provide initial command of the Search and Rescue (SAR) JTF and begin
personnel recovery operations.
7. Operation NORTHERN WATCH (Northern Iraq). ------ supported the
U.S. effort in support of this operation to provide Combat SAR (CSAR)
and helicopter refueling support from Turkey forthe United Nation's
sponsored No-Fly-Zone over Northern Iraq. For the period ------ SOF air
assisted with the ongoing Operation NORTHERN WATCH at Incirlik Air
Base, Turkey, due to lack of sufficient, available, and capable
conventional air assets to perform the CSAR mission over Northern Iraq.
8. Operation JOINT GUARD (Bosnia-Herzegovina). The ------ provided
special operations, CA and PSYOP in support of NATO Stabilization Force
to deter hostilities and promote a stable environment in Bosnia--
Herzegovina from 20 December 1996 to present in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia, Italy, and Germany.
9. Operation ABLE SENTRY (Macedonia). The ------ maintained a four
man team while PSYOP and Special Forces Battalions have provided
smaller rotational elements attache to conventional forces in support
of the United Nations mission in Skopje, Macedonia.
10. Operation BEVEL EDGE (Cambodia). A special operations Command-
Pacific (COMSOCPAC) led JTF deployed to an intermediate a staging base
at Utapao, Thailand, 8-21 July 1997 to prepare to conduct a NEO of
American citizens in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The NEO did not take place
as the situation stabilized. Participating units under ------.
11. Operation SOUTHERN WATCH (IRAQ). The ------ with aircrews and
maintenance support packages to Al Kharj, Saudi Arabia, on 4 October
1996 at the conclusion of Operation Desert Strike expanding the no-fly
zone. The ------ provided 24 hours refueling to HH60G helicopters
supporting the CSAR mission for aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone over
Iraq during the periods ------ .
12. Operation SOUTHERN WATCH (IRAQ). The ------ . These billets are
tasked as 179-day recurring rotations. As a result of the Khobar Towers
bombing, and on the recommendation of the ``Downing Report,'' U.S.
Central Command (USCENTCOM) requested individuals augmentation to CJTP
SWA Staff to effectively plan, coordinates, and implement force
protection initiatives in the USCENTCOM area of operations.
13. Operations MARATHON PACIFIC (GTMO & Wake Island). USSOCOM
deployed CA and PSYOP personnel in support of a CINC U.S. Atlantic
Command (CINCUSACOM) mission to provide humanitarian assistance to
Chinese migrants intercepted off the United States Eastern coast. The
package consisted of ------ .
14. Operation PACIFIC HAVEN (Guam). The ------ personnel provided
support to the JTF at Anderson AFB, Guam, to conduct humanitarian
assistance operations to receive, shelter, process, and provide care
and security for Kurdish Foreign Service National (KFSN) and their
families during the period 20 September 1996--30 April 1997.
15. Operation SAFE BORDER (Peru and Ecuador). The ------ when
Brazil assumed control of the support requirement. The 7th SFG deploys
personnel on a six month rotational basis to verify adherence to the
ceases-fire agreement between Ecuador and Peru to include strict
observances of the Demilitarized Zone established in August 1995.
16. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti) USSOCOM deployed a total of
------ soldiers to Haiti during fiscal year 1997) ongoing efforts to
help Haiti reestablish it's infrastructure.
17. USSOCOM, at the request of the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S.
European Command (USCINCEUR) and at the direction of the Secretary of
Defense, has provided U.S.-based SOF in support of military operations
in the Bosnia Theater of Operations. These operations support the
Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) and are conducted under the authorization of
the Secretary of Defense, who currently retains the disclosure
authority for all release of information to the above question.
Respectfully request that queries on this subject be referred to the
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
During fiscal year 1997, SOF also participated in the following
OOTW missions: Counter Drug missions in 21 countries; humanitarian
demining training missions in 11 countries; and African Crisis Response
Initiative (ACRI) training missions in 7 countries.
Question. What has the increased cost to the budget for these
operations?
Answer. Many special operations missions and collateral activities
inherently fall into the category of military operations other than
war. The fiscal year 1999 USSOCOM budget contains funding for our
participation in scheduled deployments and training for psychological,
civil affairs, counter drug, demining, humanitarian assistance and
foreign internal defense missions. The increased cost to USSOCOM is
related to our participation in contingency operations other than war.
USSOCOM spent $36.8 million for contingency operations in fiscal 1997.
In fiscal year 1998 we estimate spending a total of $55.0 million, and
in fiscal year 1999 we estimate a total of $49.8 million will be
expended for contingency operations.
Question. Have these missions affected training and readiness?
Answer. Military operations other than war over extended time
periods subject units to a variety of conditions often dictated by the
host country, geography, weather, and facilities. Training is often
restricted in regard to availability of ranges, operating times, flight
restrictions, and training infrastructure. Additionally, the geography
and weather can significantly affect training opportunities
particularly when coupled with political constraints. Once training has
been curtailed, readiness follows. Training is resumed upon rotation of
the units/personnel involved, but is limited in effectiveness if the
deployments are extensive. The effect upon unit readiness is heightened
when the unit is also considered Low Density. In this respect most SOF
units/personnel are considered Low Density/High Demand under the
Department's Global Military Force Policy (GMFP). Readiness is impacted
once the units exceed their Steady State limitations as defined in the
GMFP.
The readiness of USSOCOM active component units is high and the
overall readiness of the force is stable; on par with historical
levels. Reserve component unit readiness is comparable with the
Services, and making slow, but continual improvement. Our biggest
challenge lies in recruiting and maintaining a trained force. There are
some isolated equipment shortages. The greatest threat to current
readiness in Fiscal year 1998 is a shortage of qualified and trained
personnel. We can expect degradations in readiness if we are unable to
mitigate personnel shortfalls through various initiatives in the coming
year.
Overall, USSOCOM forces are ready to execute the National Military
Strategy. The risk of two Major Regional Contingencies (MRC) remains
moderate to high. The impact of contingency operations increases the
two-MRC risk due to stress on our scarce assets, lost training
opportunities, and concerns about our ability to rapidly disengage and
reconstitute forces needed to support the MRCs. Continued readiness
depends on the resourcing of several training and recruiting
initiatives, and significantly reducing isolated parts and equipment
shortfalls.
Question. What measures has U.S. Special Operations Command taken
to integrate capabilities and training for operations other than war
into the fiscal year 1999 budget request?
Answer. Military operations other than war (OOTW) encompass a wide
range of activities where the military instrument of national power is
used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually
associated with war. With this in mind, a good percentage of special
operations missions and collateral activities inherently fall into this
category and must be budgeted for and trained to during exercises and
deployments. Special operations missions and collateral activities in
this category include: PSYOP, foreign internal defense (FID), CA,
coalition support, counterdrug (CD) activities, countermine activities,
humanitarian assistance, and security assistance.
USSOCOM employs several means to ensure SOF are trained and ready
across this spectrum of missions. USSOCOM Service components conduct
Service-unique individual, collective, and sustainment training;
support institutional training; and participate in readiness exercises
for units required to perform these missions. SOF assigned to theater
CINC Special Operations Commands participate in joint combined exchange
training and Chairman-directed exercises specifically tailored to train
joint mission essential tasks in these areas. Operationally, ``train-
the-trainer'' deployments of special operations forces in support of
demining, CD, and FID operations also serve to further refine skills
applicable to the military OOTW environment. Headquarters USSOCOM
budgets for special operations capabilities and training in these
activities but also receives funding from the Departments of Defense
and State.
The fiscal year 1999 budget estimate for special operations
educational institution activities is $101 million. This equates to
fifteen percent of USSOCOM's O&M support budget. Institutional training
for military OOTW is accomplished at the United States John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and
the Air Force Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field, Florida.
These schools provide training across a variety of topics. Courses
offered include, but are not limited to: regional studies, CA, PSYOP,
FID, and civil-military strategy. During the qualification phase of
training, Special Forces soldiers train to military occupational
specialties that directly contribute to skills required in the military
OOTW environment. These military occupational specialties include
engineering, medical, and communications career fields, with all
Special Forces soldiers receiving language training.
The fiscal year 1999 budget estimate for special operations
participation in Chairman-directed exercises is $14.6 million, with
resources being provided by the Department of Defense. SOF
participation in Chairman-directed exercisesis hosted by the theater-
Commanders in Chief with SOF accomplishing training across a large
spectrum of special operations missions. There are 235 Chairman-
directed exercises programmed for fiscal year 1999. Of these, SOF are
scheduled to participate in 85, with mission essential task training in
CA, PSYOP, and FID slated for 53 of these exercises (62 percent).
The fiscal year 1999 budget estimate for Joint Combined Exchange
Training (JCET) is approximately $17 million in MFP-11 funds. JCET
trains SOF in a variety of mission essential tasks while improving
language proficiency, cultural awareness/immersion, and
interoperability with coalition forces. The preponderance of resources
is provided to United States Army Special Operations Command forces (71
percent). JCETs are split between all theaters with Special Operations
Command Europe, Pacific, and South taking the greatest share of these
resources (24 percent, 33 percent, and 25 percent respectively).
An excellent example of a FID ``train-the-trainer'' program is the
African Crises Response Initiative (ACRI). This State Department funded
program provides SOF who work within Africa to create highly effective,
rapid-deployable peacekeeping units, which can operate jointly in the
event of humanitarian crisis or a traditional peacekeeping operation.
The fiscal year 1999 State Department budget estimate for the ACRI is
$20 million dollars.
Two other examples of special operations activities which pertain
to the military OOTW environment are demining and CD operations. The
demining activities of SOF are also based on a ``train-the-trainer''
concept and focus on training host nation forces to conduct demining
operations. The fiscal year 1999 demining budget is estimated at $25
million with resources primarily provided by the State Department. In
the area of counterdrug operations, the special operations forces
mission is to provide support to regional combatant commanders and
other United States' government agencies to support assigned
counterdrug missions, within statutory limits and as approved by the
Secretary of Defense. The fiscal year 1999 budget for counterdrug
operations is approximately $23 million with the majority of funding
provided by DOD Drug Enforcement Policy and Support programs.
In summary, SOF's missions frequently occur in the OOTW
environment. SOF's training and capabilities are well focused in this
area for fiscal year 1999. In conjunction with Chairman-provided
resources and State Department funds, the USSOCOM has integrate
adequate capabilities and training for OOTW into the fiscal year 1999
budget request. Given the current pace of special operations
participation in these activities, it is probable that special
operations forces will maintain this requirement well into the future.
Year 2000 Computer Problem
Question. One of the problems that we face as we enter the next
century is older computers that are only programmed to remember the
last two digits in a year. Thus they remember `1997' as simply `97'.
The year 2000, however, will be saved as `00', the same as the year
1900. This can lead to calculation errors and system failures. How
serious is this problem for your Command? What would be the impact if
your Mission Critical Systems were not corrected by the year 2000?
Answer. We have identified 37 mission critical systems, 73 internal
applications, 13 devices, and over 700 commercial off the shelf and
government off the shelf hardware and software products that are
subject to malfunction or failure as a result of the year 2000 problem.
I am confident USSOCOM will continue to be able to perform its primary
mission, but potentially at a significantly degraded level. Our
deployed forces may be denied automated command, control,
communications, intelligence, positioning, and imagery that we rely on
during strategic and tactical operations. The SOF warrior, because of
the nature of the mission, is probably one of the most demanding users
of information technology. My forces are capable of adjusting to these
changes when required, but at a cost of increased risk of detection,
and decreased mission effectiveness.
Question. Do you know of any plans to conduct Joint Chiefs of Staff
Exercises next year with the clocks turned forward to identify any
uncorrected year 2000 computer problems? Do you believe this would be a
valuable test to see if the warfighting automation systems will be
ready for the year 2000?
Answer. Yes, the Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration
(JWID) exercise and other proposed Joint exercises will assess our
Information Technology systems for year 2000 compliance. A joint
exercise to ``test run'' our mission critical systems is a good way to
see exactly whether our mission critical systems are ready for the year
2000 and beyond. However, we must also ensure safeguards are in place
so we can recover our systems if we do discover problems. In an
exercise test environment we can isolate those systems that experience
interrupted operational failures or experience any slow corruption of
data as a result of year 2000 related issues. This type of exercise may
save a lot of time, effort, and money.
Question. Have you begun developing contingency plans in case your
Mission Critical Systems are not year 2000 compliant?
Answer. Yes. Contingency planning to conduct daily operations in
the event of an emergency are standard practices within USSOCOM. Each
program manager has the responsibility to ensure their systems are
assessed for potential failures, to identify points of risk, and
document remedial strategies in the system contingency plan. Every
functional center within USSOCOM has the responsibility to develop
contingency plans depicting how they will conduct their day to day
operations without the mission critical system to support them if those
systems were to fail. We are also incorporating specific year 2000
related risk assessments and contingency plans to mitigate the
consequences of data processing failures on our mission critical
systems. These contingency plans will ensure USSOCOM is mission-capable
through the millennium change.
Question. Overall, are you confident that this problem will be
solved before the year 2000?
Answer. Yes, I am confident we will solve this problem for our
mission critical systems before the year 2000. However, we must not
fool ourselves by thinking there will not be some system ``hiccups.''
We can certify each system and application individually and
systematically integrate these systems during implementation. But once
all these systems start to interface, there may be some areas we will
have to go back and fix. We are planning for these hiccups and are
developing plans to have computer emergency response teams (CERT)
available to assist those systems and personnel that experience any
malfunctions.
Counterproliferation
Question. In May 1995, the Secretary of Defense directed the
CINCSOC ``to assume the responsibility for organizing, training,
equipping, and otherwise preparing U.S. special operations forces to
conduct operations in support of U.S. government counterproliferation
objectives.''--General Schoomaker, what type of forces and capabilities
do you have to carry out the counterproliferation mission?
Answer. The boundaries of counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) are still not completely defined. Asymmetrical
threats in the form of WMD can come from terrorists groups, rogue
elements and transnational groups, as well as nation states. ------.
Question. DOD Directive 2060.2, subject: Department of Defense
Counterproliferation Implementation, dated July 9, 1996, states that
accomplishment of the counterproliferation mission ``may require
coordination with other U.S. Government Agencies.''--Which agencies
have you worked with? What type of support do you need from these
agencies?
Answer. The conduct of operations in support of U.S. Government
Counterproliferation objectives is by definition, an Interagency
process. USSOCOM has developed close working relationships and
coordinated efforts with: ------.
The FBI is Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for domestic WMD incidents.
USSOCOM serves in a supporting role during domestic response to WMD
incidents on US soil. ------. (Approval for USSOCOM involvement on US
soil rests with the President, based on the joint recommendation of the
SECDEF and the Attorney General.) ------. State Department is the Lead
Federal Agency (LFA) for OCONUS WMD incidents. As such the conduct of
SOF operations in support of U.S. Government CP objectives, OCONUS, are
conducted in support of and in coordination with the State Department.
USSOCOM requires intelligence support from a variety of agencies to
include the ------.
We have trained extensively within the interagency in an effort to
increase the level of comfort with the complex relationships developed.
Question. Is the intelligence community able to provide you with
timely intelligence support?
Answer. Timeliness and quality of intelligence has always been an
operational challenge. This challenge becomes even more critical
considering the complexity of counterproliferation (CP) issues.
The greatest CP intelligence challenge is the inability of the
national intelligence community to meet Special Operations Forces (SOF)
level of detail requirements. ------.
Human intelligence (HUMINT) provides the fine-grain intelligence
required to support SOF. ------. USSOCOM has just recently identified
detailed HUMINT collection requirements which will increase the focus
on CP. Of all the intelligence disciplines, HUMINT has the least
capability to surge during crisis periods. Consequently, the necessary
long term HUMINT relationships must be previously established to ensure
mission success. Additionally, HUMINT reporting timeliness are
historically longer than for the other intelligence disciplines.
Imagery intelligence (IMINT) support generally is good, however the
current constellation limitations and competing requirements,
especially during crises, mitigate against the near full-time coverage
necessary to meet SOF CP collection needs. ------.
Additionally, denial and deception procedures by proliferators
frequently make coverage which is available of limited value.
Developing measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) may
significantly improve CP intelligence collection in a few years.
Timeliness of MASINT data analysis and dissemination is another area
that requires improvement. Space-based MASINT provides the standoff,
but is not yet capable of meeting USSOCOM's biological and chemical
weapons-related requirements. USSOCOM, and the Department and
intelligence community, has developed an initiative to improve
USSOCOM's Special Reconnaissance Capabilities (SRC) against ``hard
target'' requirements. The DOD-wide initiative, with USSOCOM as
Executive Agent, will focus on specific sensors and related
technologies to improve SOF SRC and augment traditional intelligence
collection means.
Question. Do you have adequate resources to accomplish your
counterproliferation mission?
Answer. SOF offer carefully measured, surgical counterproliferation
(CP) options not available elsewhere and represent an alternative whose
use can ------. USSOCOM continues its efforts to meet the ever-
increasing threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by pursuing a
robust, interagency program to enhance its capabilities. Where
possible, we leverage resources from existing programs, and collaborate
with others' mutually beneficial programs. An example of this is our
work with ------.
Projected resources are adequate to accomplish a reduced set of
near-term objectives. For instance, depending on the structural make-up
of a ------. The boundaries of CP of WMD are still not completely
defined. We are pursuing several avenues within CP to insure we are
prepared, when called upon, to deter, detect and monitor, or interdict
WMD and their associated technologies and equipment, regardless of the
environment or situation. Key in this effort are our initiatives in the
area of CP Explosive Ordnance Disposal (CP EOD). These skills allow our
operators to detect, disable or render ineffective a variety of
weaponized WMD to include improvised devices. We also continue to
improve our counterforce capabilities in HDBT and maritime
interdiction.
Additionally, ------ responsibilities to continue in the future.
All of these efforts and capabilities are extremely resource intensive.
Even so, it is necessary to continually upgrade and refine our efforts
in order to maintain capabilities commensurate with the escalating
challenges.
Our unfinanced requirements list provides details concerning the
amount of additional resources required to increase USSOCOM CP
capabilities. A total of $20.55 million has been identified as a fiscal
year 1999 shortfall.
Question. Do you know what role the National Guard plays in the
implementation of DOD counterproliferation activities and programs? Has
there been coordination between you and the National Guard Bureau on
counterproliferation matters?
Answer. ------.
Question. Is the intelligence community able to provide you with
timely intelligence support?
Answer. ------.
Question. Do you have adequate resources to accomplish your
counterproliferation mission?
Answer. ------.
Question. General Schoomaker, the current crisis in Iraq has
highlighted how difficult it is to target and destroy weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) facilities by air strikes alone. If not very soon,
then undoubtedly someday in the near future, possibly somewhere other
than in Iraq, we are going to find ourselves in a situation where we
need to go in and destroy, not just seriously diminish a WMD production
facility on the ground. What does SOCOM need to insure that when that
day comes we are as ready as we can possibly be?
Answer. The United States Special Operations Command continues its
efforts to meet the ever-increasing threat of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) by pursuing a robust program to enhance its
capabilities. ------. Where possible, we leverage off of existing
programs, and collaborate with other agencies' and commands' mutually
beneficial programs. ------.
Maintaining this capability commensurate with the increasing threat
is the challenge. Projected resources are adequate to accomplish a
reduced set of near-term objectives. ------. The maintenance of all of
these efforts and capabilities is extremely resource intensive and ----
--.
Bosnia Mission
Question. General Schoomaker, what is the current role of special
operations forces in Bosnia? How many SOF personnel are deployed in
support of the Bosnia operation?
Answer. The SOF mission for Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR/JOINT GUARD
has been to conduct special operations, civil affairs (CA) and
psychological operations (PSYOP) in support of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization Stabilization Force, formerly Implementation Force,
to deter hostilities and promote a stable environment in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. This has been accomplished by attaching SOF forces to
designated North Atlantic Treaty Organization and non-North Atlantic
Treaty Organization units. ------. This Special Operation Force
presence has proven to improve coordination, minimize
misunderstandings, and save lives.
Civil Affairs/Civil Military Cooperation Center provides the
Stabilization Force with the capability to conduct Civil Military
Operations in support of Supreme Allied Commander Europe's
implementation of the peace agreement. The Civil Military Operations
Center promotes cooperation between the civilian population and various
agencies and national governments. Civil Affairs personnel work to
leverage capabilities of Non-governmental Organizations, International
Organizations, national governments. They facilitate parallel unified
civilian effort in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
peace plan for regional stabilization and are prepared to respond to
humanitarian, public safety, and public health contingencies. ------.
Question. I understand that special mission units (SMUs) have been
deployed to Bosnia for highly sensitive and risky operations. Can you
tell us what these operations are? What is the chain of command in
authorizing such operations?
Answer. USSOCOM, at the request of the Commander-in-Chief of the
U.S. European Command (USCINCEUR) and at the direction of the Secretary
of Defense, has provided U.S.-based SOF in support of military
operations in the Bosnia Theater of Operations. These operations
support the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) and are conducted under the
authorization of the Secretary of Defense, who currently retains the
disclosure authority for all release of information to the above
question. Respectfully request that queries on this subject be referred
to this Office of the Secretary of Defense.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
Wednesday, March 4, 1998.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND AND COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES FORCES, KOREA
WITNESSES
ADMIRAL JOSEPH W. PRUEHER, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES PACIFIC
COMMAND, U.S. NAVY
GENERAL JOHN H. TILELLI, JR., COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA,
U.S. ARMY
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order.
Pursuant to a vote in the Committee last week, this hearing
is closed so that we might have the opportunity to discuss any
classified material that any of us would like to discuss.
Today we are very happy to welcome Admiral Joseph Prueher,
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, and General John
Tilelli, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, Republic
of Korea and the U.S. Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces,
Korea.
It is good to see you both again and to have you visit with
the Committee. We enjoyed our previous visits and look forward
to an exciting hearing today.
We understand the area of your responsibility. We know how
extensive it is, including 50 percent of the earth's surface
and 60 percent of the world's population; and, from a military
perspective, it includes five of the seven U.S. mutual defense
treaties and seven of the world's largest armed forces. That is
a bunch. You do such a good job at it. We are really proud of
what you do and what the people that work under you do.
In that region, we maintain a continuous presence of
approximately 100,000 military personnel performing missions
ranging from assisting in humanitarian demining to guarding the
dangerous intra-Korean border.
Some of the issues that we would like to hear about today,
and we will be asking questions about, include the current
situation in North Korea; the economic problems in South Korea
and Japan and how they affect those nations' ability to
maintain their security commitments; the recent change of
government in South Korea; and the continued military
modernization being undertaken by China.
Your prepared statements will be placed in the record, and
please summarize them in any way that you wish. As you might
expect, there will be a lot of questions then from the members
who are extremely interested in what you do and how you do it.
Mr. Murtha.
Remarks of Mr. Murtha
Mr. Murtha. Let me just welcome two of the finest officers
in the Naval and Army service, and we appreciate you coming.
I just made a trip--the Chairman went one way and I went
the other way--to Korea and the Pacific, and I am always
impressed about how far it is out there and what a large area
of responsibility you have and the tensions that exist. But I
was also impressed by the quality of the troops and the morale
and how well things were going. So I appreciate when you have
to come back here. It is a long way home.
Admiral Prueher. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Young. Admiral Prueher, we will hear from you first, I
understand, and then we will go to General Tilelli.
Summary Statement of Admiral Prueher
Admiral Prueher. All right, sir. Thank you very much.
You have covered our region, but it is an honor to be here
before the Committee, and we thank you for the opportunity to
represent the men and women of the Pacific Command.
What I would like to do today is give a quick update on our
assessment of the security position in the Asian Pacific.
Because of the economic crisis in Asia, I would like to talk a
little bit about the logic train for our activities and what we
are doing, the issues ahead, some of our priorities, and then
spend a little time talking about readiness.
I would like to point out one example of what we are doing
that I think will make things coalesce a bit.
STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC
Our strategy in the Pacific is important because of what is
going on economically. It is based on two premises. The first
of those is trying to work the economic part, the political
part and the military part in concert to try to work and
advance them at the same pace and not get one too far ahead of
the other. It works out well that way, and we work it hard that
way.
The other premise is the fact that security, especially
military security, underlies the stable conditions which allow
the economies to work. Madeleine Albright talked about how the
economic system rests on political order, which in turn depends
on military security, which is the same way of saying that. So
we are in a region that is at peace but not conflict-free, and
military security is what we are trying to provide for our
Nation and the region.
You have heard Secretary Cohen talk about ``shape, respond
and prepare'' from the QDR. We translate it in our theater and
into preventive defense, crisis response and, in addition, the
ability to fight and win a major conflict which, if it should
occur, would most likely be in General Tilelli's theater in
Korea.
FORCES IN PACIFIC COMMAND
Now each of these things requires credible military forces
which can respond in a quick way, and this is what we do. This
is the essence of what we do. These ready, forward-deployed,
properly positioned forces are what we are about.
I would like to tip my hat to the 300,000 men and women in
the Pacific Command and upon whose shoulders I ride. I couldn't
do anything, and none of us could, without them. They are just
excellent. They really are. I hope when you come out there you
will see them and be very proud of them like we are.
AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
The focus of our effort. What are the big pieces we are
focused on here for the future? I am going to talk about five
of them.
The first is Japan, preserving our pivotal security
relationship in the Pacific. It is a strong one. Things are
working well with Japan. It is not trouble-free, but the
biggest things we are working right now, one is Okinawa issues
and the other is the defense guidelines where Japan is trying
to determine their role in security in the Pacific.
The second, and a big issue that is talked about
everywhere, is that of China. What are we doing with China? It
is the backdrop for all of our discussions. I will save more
for Q's and A's, but, basically, we are building a very healthy
military-to-military relationship with China in the context of
our overall relationship. It is moving at a slow rate, but that
is the way it should be moving, at a slow rate, as we build
some understanding and build confidence.
My thoughts as to what we are doing with China is we are
trying to lay foundations for the future of the relationship.
We have talked with the senior PLA leadership and, China's
President; and what we are doing is we are building this so we
can accommodate both differences as well as things on which we
agree without having the whole thing fall apart all the time.
So that is number two.
Number three is India. India is a very large country, the
largest democracy in the world, the second largest population.
We expect it to exceed China's population in the next century.
Quite frankly, we don't do a lot militarily with India. It is a
modest mil-to-mil relationship, and we are building that. It is
not urgent, but it is important for the future, and we are
trying not to take our eye off the ball in South Asia.
The fourth one from the PACCOM point of view, is we are
trying to help create the conditions for General Tilelli in
which he can work to create a noncataclysmic resolution on the
Korean peninsula. As you all well know, Korea is the only
nation to which the United States has one of our four-stars
assigned full-time, which is tremendously important to us.
General Tilelli in his three hats and his staff do a great job
there, and he will cover Korea in some detail.
The fifth item that we are concerned about is the impact of
the economic or the financial crisis in East Asia on the
security relationships. I would like to make the point that
this economic crisis is, in fact, a security crisis, if we
don't handle it well. It is important because there are some
opportunities associated with this crisis as well, and I point
out the Chinese word for crisis incorporates two characters--
one is danger, the other is opportunity--and that is exactly
where we are with this economic crisis that exists in East Asia
right now.
THAILAND
I said I would give an example of our preventive defense
that we are doing with the other nations. I would like to use
Thailand as that example. Thailand is a treaty ally. They have
been steadfast since the Vietnam days. They have been on our
side. They have allowed us to base there. We have fought side
by side. They have allowed us to stage our aircraft going to
the Persian Gulf, going to the Arabian Gulf through Thailand
despite some outside pressure, and they have been a strong U.N.
player throughout. They are a good friend of the United States,
and they look to us. They are going through a period of both
political and economic instability that is one of the worst in
East Asia and Southeast Asia.
About 4 or 5 months ago, there was a situation where the
government--Prime Minister Chavalit was falling, and there was
some corruption. The military leaders there and the military--
the head of the Royal Thai Armed Forces is a general named
Mongon Ampornpisit, and he is a friend of ours, and he is also
an IMET graduate. He and General Chetta, who is the head of the
Army were under a lot of pressure to take over the government,
to run it, to stop the democratic processes. And Mongon and
Chetta, together, really held Thailand together through that
period. They stood fast behind the government and behind the
democratic process.
Now, they have had an election. They have elected a new
prime minister. They are swallowing the IMF pill and hope that
it is the right prescription. But they are working it hard, and
the level of pain in Thailand is such that the senior military
people, for example, are taking a 20 percent pay cut. It is a
shared burden in Thailand, but they are somewhat cheerfully all
going about this, because they believe that the IMF is the
right medicine and that they will get back on the beam.
It is a tribute, I think, to what militaries do in a
democracy. It is what we have been trying to work on in this
region and in other regions of the world, too, to build
democracies. It is a strong democracy with a responsible
military. The notion or the idea that their senior military
people trained with the United States, that they are inculcated
with our ideals, is very important, and I think it is a tribute
to them, and it will be important for the long-haul.
READINESS
I would like to shift now to talk a little bit about
readiness. Readiness is something we all discuss at some
length. We all have anecdotes, I have a lot of them, and I am
sure each of you do as you travel around the region. But I
would like to define readiness for a geographic CINC.
Fundamentally, for a military commander, it is having the right
forces at the right place at the right time and prepared to
fight the right war.
Now, under that umbrella, we look at six different things.
The first is qualified personnel. The second is combat capable
equipment. The third is the appropriate level of maintenance
and spares. The fourth is training of these people to use the
equipment. The fifth is tactics, which is different from
training. It is with sophisticated tactics that our people--
that we can capitalize on both the equipment and the people's
capabilities. The sixth point that we look at very carefully is
the ability to move these forces, the hardware and the support
equipment, to the right place, to be able to lift it to be at
the right place at the right time.
Those are the issues that we have, and that is what we look
at and what we mean at the CINCs level when we talk about
readiness. We measure each of these things, each of these six.
But in the conversations with readiness, people talk about
it at three separate levels, tactical, operational and
strategic. Where we get the anecdotes is at the tactical or the
individual unit level. So we look at readiness at those levels:
Can the airplane fly? Can the ship get underway? Can the tank
run and shoot? Those are the types of things we look at for
readiness.
The next level up of aggregation, from that or the tactical
level, is the operational level where we aggregate units into
carrier battle groups or divisions or joint task forces, and
then we look at an aggregate level of readiness there with
additional command and control parts to it.
Then, when we get up to the CINCs level, we aggregate it
even farther to the strategic level where we pull all of those
things together, and then we look at the ability to move it
from one place to another and to be able to work. So it is a
hierarchy of things.
So sometimes what we will say, what I will tell you later,
is that the PACOM forces are ready. But that does not mean that
they are not individuals or units that don't have deficiencies,
they do. But, overall, the units are ready; and that is that
hierarchy that we are talking about. Overall, our forces are
ready. We are ready at the large level to do our mission.
Now, can we do it as quickly as we might like? Can we do it
on time? Right now, the answer is not as quickly as we would
like. General Tilelli will tell you more about that.
We have a carrier battle group gone out of the western
Pacific that is in the Gulf. Now, what we could do if the
situation warranted, we could bring another carrier battle
group from the West Coast of the United States and have it
there. We could bring other forces, but we have done what we
consider to be prudent risk in this, and we have brought some
other forces in, but not a lot, to accommodate the situation in
Korea. Because, in our assessment, the likelihood of a conflict
is not high right now. But we need to look at that
continuously.
Our readiness management systems, the acronyms are SORTS
and JMRR, these systems, I would give them a grade of about a
C. They are not very good. It is a hard thing to do, to measure
these gradations of readiness. But we are working on the
systems, the joint staff is working on the systems, OSD is, as
are we, to get a better handle on measuring readiness and
making it more predictive.
We can discuss much more of this if you would like in
questions and answers, but the bottom line about readiness is
that this is the context in which we discuss it. Our forces are
ready. There is some risk involved, and General Tilelli will
talk about that more, but because of time delay right now,
should something happen in Korea, we incur some additional
risk, and we think it is acceptable to take at this point.
SUMMARY
So I would like to conclude, Mr. Chairman, with a thanks to
your Committee for you all, for your travel into AOR. I hope
that more people will do it more. Thank you very much for your
support for what we do. It is great to work with you and for
you with our mission. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Admiral, thank you very much. As Mr. Murtha and
I have both said, we are very proud of the work that you all do
and the way that you keep our interests protected in your part
of the world.
[The statement of Admiral Prueher follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. General Tilelli, we are happy to have you back
again, sir, and we will be glad to hear from you at this time.
Then we will be prepared to bombard you with very in-depth and
interesting questions.
Summary Statement of General Tilelli
General Tilelli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished
Committee members. It is again my distinct honor to be here and
represent the men and women who serve in Korea.
Let me start by thanking you for the continued support of
our forces. As Mr. Murtha saw when he was in Korea, there is
absolute progress as a function of the support that you have
given us in the last 5 years as far as quality of life of the
men and women who are serving there. Soldiers, sailors, airmen
and Marines and civilians of the United States forces
absolutely benefit from your support. You enable me and us in
the United States to achieve our theater mission of deterring
aggression. We have done that successfully, maintaining
readiness, and that is the key to the next element which is, if
there is conflict, to be prepared to fight and win, and,
hopefully, we will not have to do that.
To accomplish our mission, my strategy is clear: One,
strong forward presence. They are the forces that are in place,
the 37,000 forces that are in the Republic of Korea and those
in the Pacific that feed the theater very quickly; secondly, a
very vibrant exercise program; and, thirdly, the tenets of
power projection. If we can't get the forces there on time, we
take additional risk and we suffer additional losses.
NORTH KOREAN THREAT
So in my mind's eye, we focus a lot on the economic turmoil
and the economic turbulence in the Asian area. We focus on the
food shortage in North Korea. But I must say, there is still a
significant military threat north of the demilitarized zone.
The massive military machine of the DPRK and the North Korean
regime is real and has not gone away. They continue to muddle
through, despite past predictions of imminent collapse and
their desperate situation. In the South it is very
disconcerting when we see the contrast of military operations
and a very large military on one hand and the humanitarian
support that is provided in terms of food on the other hand.
While we are all touched by this human suffering brought
about by the breakdown in their economic system, we also look
across the DMZ at an enemy that is fully prepared. The North's
winter training cycles of the last 2 years have been robust and
very active; and, right now, they are engaged in the final
stages of their winter training cycle.
Chemical weapons and other theater ballistic missile
research and development continue unabated. These actions are
indicative of a nation that is willing to sacrifice everything,
to include its general population, to maintain its trump card,
which is a significant military; and that military is a viable
instrument of its national power and may be the only one it has
left.
Many intelligent people have predicted, through evaluation,
that the situation in the North is dire and the Kim regime is
destined to collapse in the near future. I will not predict a
collapse in the North, because I believe the regime is much
more resilient than we sometimes give it credit for. I will say
the possibility of collapse in itself is also troubling in that
it also causes us challenges, not only for the United States
but for the Republic of Korea.
ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINES MORATORIUM
One of the issues that I feel it is important that I
address to you as a part of my ability to meet the threat in
the event of conflict is the moratorium on antipersonnel land
mines. As you know, the President and the Department of Defense
have a plan to replace these weapons between now and 2006, and
I support the plan and have been involved in devising that plan
with the Chairman and the Joint Staff.
However, the fiscal year 1996 Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act places a prohibition on the use of land
mines, other than along the demilitarized zone, beginning in
February of 1999. Under this moratorium, I will not be allowed
to use remotely placed, self-destructing SMART mines to help
block penetrations and shape the battlefield. By remotely
emplaced, I mean air or artillery delivered, other than along
the demilitarized zones.
These systems are a critical component of my overall
campaign plan. They are technologically advanced, reliable and
not responsible for the humanitarian crisis that we say the
indiscriminate use of older mines causes.
I submit to you that until we can find a suitable
alternative in accordance with the President and the Department
of Defense's directive, I ask that you look at or relook at
that legislation, which would synchronize with the 2006
administration policy on use of antipersonnel land mines.
ALLIANCE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The cornerstone of our ability to defend and deal with
contingencies is the strength of the Republic of Korea, ROK,
and U.S. alliance, and many of you have seen that. It is a
strong, vibrant and evolving alliance. It is a model, as far as
I am concerned, for other alliances around the world. But, as
you know, this is a time of unprecedented change in the
Republic of Korea; and I will address those issues during
question and answer period, Mr. Chairman.
First, we as Americans should take pride in the emergence
of the Republic of Korea as a full-fledged democracy. The
recent inauguration of Kim Dae Jung marked the first time that
an opposition party assumed leadership through a civilian-to-
civilian transfer.
We in the Combined Forces Command, at the same time,
continue to be committed to being prepared and ready. In the
Combined Forces Command it has been my great privilege to
command a unique and outstanding military organization. It is a
organization that epitomizes the Goldwater-Nichols reforms. We
are joint and combined every day, and we support all of the
tenets of Goldwater-Nichols.
The duration of our involvement in Korea causes many not
serving there to think that the status quo in Korea remains,
but this is far from the truth. We face a threat that has a
very large conventional force and also possesses asymmetric
threats--namely, Special Operation forces and chemical weapons
and the missiles to deliver them. But, at the same time, we
have a modernized, well-trained force that stands ready on
freedom's frontier.
RESOURCES
While the resources are strained, I would be less than
candid if I said we had everything we needed. The ROK and the
U.S. governments support the Command sufficiently to ensure
that we are capable of deterring aggression and to fight and
win if the North miscalculates and attacks. In short, my
current operations and maintenance funding is adequate to
accomplish the operational mission. But I accept some risks, as
my current fiscal year 1998 funding levels maintain operational
and unit readiness. On the other hand, in order to meet these
standards, I accept shortages in my base operations, which
directly accounts for quality of life of my service members.
The fiscal year 1999 profile projections of my OPTEMPO and
operational readiness are at levels where I still can maintain
adequate levels of readiness where I am comfortable; but, at
the same time, we still are strained in the base operations
areas.
QUALITY OF LIFE ISSUES
Transitioning to that issue, let me talk about quality of
life of the service members, their families, the few families
we have in country and the civilians of the command. I consider
it critical not only for their welfare but also for their
ability to accomplish our mission.
First, again, I express our appreciation for your Military
Construction, MILCON, support. That has helped, and it will
continue to help. But, as we address the issue, we must keep in
mind that these outstanding young men and women--and they are
outstanding, the quality of our troops. The men and women who
serve has not changed. These are the people who would bear the
burden of combat and who wake up each day to the reality that
one of the most threatening situations in the world is just
outside their doors. They perform their mission every day,
their Personnel Tempo, which in my lingo means they are away
from home for 365 days, since they are on a short tour and
hardship tour in Korea. They serve on this hardship tour
admirably and with great character and courage. They are still
the best our country has, and they deserve our best support.
We are making progress. I have said that. The return of
MILCON funding after the hiatus, the last 4 years in MILCON
funding is making a difference, as is the Korean host nation
funding support. However, the problems are not solved.
The infrastructure is overdue for a major recapitalization
and overhaul, and it will take us years to meet the Department
of Defense standard. And I am not looking to meet that standard
immediately. I am trying to get my troops into what I call
adequate quality of life. But I still have a significant number
of personnel living in inadequate facilities that many of you
have seen during your visits to theater.
I ask that we build on the progress that you and your ROK
counterparts have made, and I want to assure you that I will do
my best to spend those resources most effectively and
efficiently and will not waste those resources and I will put
them on bases and camps that have the greatest long-term
utility.
SUMMARY
In closing, I submit to you that this is a time when we
must remain stalwart beside our allies, and the turmoil of the
economic situation must not be allowed to grow into a security
situation. Security, in fact, has been the greatest asset that
the Republic of Korea has had over the last 40-plus years in
the tremendous economic growth that it had success in up until
the recent turmoil.
During this time of turbulence, we have the opportunity to
reinforce our position as the honest broker in the region. The
next few years will prove pivotal in the security environment
in the Republic of Korea and potentially in Northeast Asia. The
agreed framework to dismantle the nuclear program in the North
appears to be working. The four-party talks are just beginning.
These are positive signs, and we think we are moving in the
right direction. However, the time line for resolution is still
debatable.
For the foreseeable future, we must remain vigilant and
strong; and, for the long term, we must remain engaged. Because
the area is too important for us not to be engaged. Your
support is vitally important to me.
Again, I thank you for that; and I am prepared to answer
your questions or the questions that you raised, Mr. Chairman,
or any others.
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much. I think all of us
would agree that, since we know something about our operation,
that you are not wasting the money over there. You are getting
a lot for the dollar that is made available to you.
[The statement of General Tilelli follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
STRAIN FROM OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS
Mr. Young. I want to ask a general question of both of you.
As we support the indefinite extension of the NATO mission
in Bosnia, or whatever that operation might be and for however
long it might last, and the deployment of U.S. forces to the
Persian Gulf, that are obviously going to be there longer than
some of us expected--and General Tilelli, I read some comments
that you had made about the fact that you lost the carrier
battle group, and I think the Air Force is tying to make up for
that vacancy by assigning some additional F-15s there--how long
can we continue? General, you used the word ``strain.'' How
long are you going to be able to continue this strain without
breaking something really bad?
General Tilelli. That is a very difficult question to
answer. I mean, the fact that we are in a strained resource
environment down at the unit level or at the component level
and the commanders are in an environment where they are always
balancing the Operational Tempo, which equates to readiness,
and the base operations, which equates to quality of life, and
the priority always goes to the Operation OPTEMPO to keep that
readiness high, or must go to Operation OPTEMPO in my mind,
especially to Korea. So the consequence is you are not doing
some of the infrastructure repair and maintenance that you
should be doing to not only recapitalize but to maintain your
facilities so you don't have water main breaks and electric
outages, et cetera, et cetera.
So, over time, you don't know how long it is going to take
for that piece of the puzzle to break, where you really have to
put in a larger investment than you want to, than you would
have had to if you had continued to support it all along.
So that is the strain at the Operation and Maintenance
dollar level that I talked about, and base operations is the
short end at this point.
Mr. Young. What about in the overall Pacific region that
you have responsibility for? You have to be feeling the strain
in places other than Korea.
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir, we are. The strain comes in--
just an example, we have some of our assets out of the Pacific
theater that are involved in Europe as we do global sourcing.
We will have aircraft--an aircraft squadron will deploy to
either Incirlik, for Operation Northern Watch or to Southern
Watch. That occurs from time to time.
Right now, from a naval point of view, there are 60 ships
in the Gulf, in the Arabian Gulf. There are 17 coalition ships,
43 U.S. ships, of which 24 are out of the Pacific Command. Now,
this is--some of this is normal because CENTCOM doesn't own
assets of their own, so we expect to do that some.
But the strain comes in increased deployment time. It comes
also in terms of opportunity costs. With the Independence
carrier battle group, the fact that they are there in the Gulf,
they would be underway probably anyway. But they are not doing
work for us in our theater of being proximate to Korea should
they be needed or doing exercises with other nations that we--
or training and interoperability training that we would be
getting in our theater. So it is an opportunity cost. We have
had to cancel several events that they could not participate
in.
We have the electronic support aircraft, the EA-6Bs, that
would normally be stationed in Iwakuni in support of General
Tilelli for contingencies are not there. They are both at
Aviano, and they are also at Southern Watch. They are
distributed there.
How long can this go on? That is a tough question. Because
if--I think--if the nation needs it, if we are at war, some of
these, the 6-month deployment cycles and things like that can
go away. But for now--this seems to be almost a routine--we are
incorporating it in our routine operations. So the Chief, Naval
Operations-CNO has said, talking about ships in the Gulf, that
we could support that indefinitely, as long as we are willing
to pay the cost in the Mediterranean or in the Pacific Command.
For us, a maritime theater, the cost is high. It is a gradual
erosion of our interaction with other countries. We could not
respond to a crisis as easily.
The last time in the China-Taiwan Straits 2 years ago we
were able to respond in 3 days with a carrier battle group that
happened to be coming out of Manila. Now, the soonest we could
respond would be 14 days to a similar type crisis should one
arise.
So I can't really give you a time line on how long we can
stand the strain, but we are eroding our base of preventive
medicine that we are dealing with in the Pacific.
TWO SIMULTANEOUS MAJOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES
Mr. Young. And if we had two Major Regional Contingencies,
MRCs, simultaneously, we would be in deep trouble, wouldn't we?
Admiral Prueher. We would be heavily strained. We could--I
still think, General Tilelli and I have talked, we could still
do it, but, again, the risk factor would go up; and, as General
Tilelli has pointed out, the time lag to do the second MRC
would cause increased loss of life.
General Tilelli. Mr. Chairman, if I could just interject, I
think the key as we think about two Major Theater Wars--MTWs,
it really is, in my view, is not associated with winning or
losing. I think we win. If you are the second MTW, you win. The
issue becomes the time it takes to get the forces that the
second MTW needs there. Therefore, airlift and sealift are very
important for our national security and national military
strategy.
Secondarily, when we talk about time, especially in the
Korean theater without the flow in a timely way, I am taking
greater numbers of casualties. That is, in a real sense, as you
raise the risk you mitigate that with time and casualties, and
that is the only way you can do that. That is the only
opportunity you have. And not a good solution, by the way, none
that I like.
Mr. Young. So the cost would be higher?
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Especially in terms of loss of life?
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir.
SPARE PARTS
Mr. Young. You mentioned infrastructure overhaul, and I
think we understand what you are talking about there as far as
your infrastructure, but what about your ability to fight, your
spare parts? Is your equipment usable today?
I know when we sit in this room we are often told that it
is not that big a problem, but if you go out into the field and
you visit people that are actually operational, they will tell
you, we have airplanes sitting over here that we have taken
parts from and some of the parts we get from the depots don't
work when they get here. From the field viewpoint, the
Committee has increased funding for spare parts almost every
year in recent years, and we want to make that problem go away,
but it seems like the more we spend the more the problem still
exists.
So from the standpoint of those of you in the field, what
is happening with spare parts, the cannibalization of airplanes
or any other types of equipment?
General Tilelli. Mr. Chairman, let me talk about the
Republic of Korea. I am indeed fortunate because I am a high-
priority area, so the consequence is I have very high readiness
rates and very high readiness rates and very high personnel
rates. And I know that not only from reports but by talking to
commanders at all levels. And I think when Mr. Murtha was there
recently he saw that the kids in the field they train hard, are
ready to fight, and maintain good readiness.
The parts flow to me seems, in my theater, both for the
preponderant forces which are Army and Air Force's, seems to be
on track with no great time lags from request to delivery or
ship time. So I am in a relatively good position for those
areas that you talk about.
Admiral Prueher. In my comments about readiness we talked
about the tactical or the unit level, the operational level and
then the strategic level; and I think most of the people you
talk to in this room are thinking about the strategic level and
some of the other things that we can do. When you go out and
you talk to people that are turning wrenches and replacing
parts and working on things, flying airplanes or ships or
tanks, they see the problem in a different way. I would----
Someone just mentioned over lunchtime, it is sort of like
the unemployment rate. We have the lowest unemployment rate,
but if you happen to ask somebody that is standing in the line,
you get a different answer than you do from the statistician.
So what we have with the parts issue, there are forward-
deployed units not only in Korea but the forward-deployed ones
in the area at pretty peak readiness. They don't have major
problems forward for that.
On the turnarounds, as people are back in the United
States, I think if you asked Admiral Gahman from Atlantic
Command, ACOM, he would have a little bit of a different
answer. Because they are the people that are on the turnaround
that are not forward deployed, and they have a problem.
We have been pulling to try and get some data. I will give
a percentage on cannibalization rates which you all understand.
If you have to take a part out of an airplane or tank and put
it in another one instead of taking it off a shelf, you are
cannibalizing it. It requires extra maintenance actions,
timing, money, all of those things.
In PACAF, our Pacific Air Forces, the cannibalization rate
in 1995 was 6.6 percent, which is about right for--actually,
you would like it to be very low. This year, in 1997, it was
15.9 percent cannibalization rate. So we have had two and a
half times thes previous rate. It is a parametric indicator of
the parts problem that we are talking about in PACAF, and we
are trying hard to put together the actual data and not to try
to skew the data to make a case but just find out how bad is
this problem.
Mr. Young. Well, the reason I raise this issue is because I
have talked with a lot of officers who have the responsibility
to keep airplanes flying, for example.
While Mr. Murtha had his group in Korea, I had another
group in the Gulf area. And at the Prince Sultan Air Base I was
told that their overall records look pretty good on the
availability of airplanes for flight, but that the way they
kept from having hangar queens, that when they got to about the
25th day of one plane being down because they took parts, they
took parts from airplane B to put back into airplane A so that
airplane A didn't get on the cannibalization list as a hangar
queen. And the 30 days began to run on airplane B. So when the
25th day on airplane B came up, they robbed another airplane.
So their overall records look good, but they were just
constantly changing parts.
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir. Our measuring system is probably
not quite right if we are driving that kind of activity.
Mr. Young. We will keep trying to get the spare parts there
on time so they don't have to do that.
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Mr. Murtha.
Mr. Murtha. About 12 years ago when another gentleman from
Florida was Chairman of the Committee, after a presentation by
one of the four-stars I called Admiral Crowe and I said, it is
the worst presentation I have ever seen in my life, and I am
embarrassed. The guy didn't answer a question.
You may remember it, Bill. It was one of the worst we ever
heard.
Well, last year after the presentation, I called General
Shalikashvili and I said, that it was one of the best
presentations. Admiral Prueher made one of the finest,
sophisticated, comprehensive presentations I have ever heard to
this Committee, and I reiterate that today. I appreciate your
comprehensive knowledge of such a large area and what you bring
to this Committee.
I will say about General Tilelli, I never got a more
straightforward--I mean, he gets up in the morning and he
works, and he makes sure that we work. We had a delightful
visit, but he made sure that I saw what I needed to see so I
can come back and report to the Chairman and the Committee the
deficiencies and, at the same time, the progress that has been
made in Korea.
So I really don't have any questions. I just have nothing
but compliments for both of you and the fine work that you are
doing out there.
Admiral Peueher. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Young. Mr. Lewis.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, General, we very much appreciate you being here
and the effort that is required to travel back for this
hearing.
Admiral, in outlining the region quickly at the beginning
of your remarks, you talked about both China and some military
circumstances, India, what we know and don't know about their
military condition. International Military Education and
Training--IMET was mentioned when you referred to a General in
Thailand earlier. I am not sure whether we have IMET programs
that affect either of those other two countries, China or
India. Do we have?
Admiral Prueher. We do not have one with China. We have a
small program with India under $500,000 per year.
Mr. Lewis. The reason I am asking this question is that I
remember the days when we were focusing upon problems in Latin
America I spent a good deal of energy looking at the role of
IMET and the impact it had upon attitudes of their officer
corps and how we saw the values of IMET in dealing with other
countries over time.
It seems to me that that kind of exposure and training of
military leaders from countries like India and China are pretty
critical items for consideration. If we don't have one with
India, which is going to be the largest country in the world,
if it is not already. They are not doing the kind of population
control China is doing and clearly are spending a large amount
of their budget in the volatility, vis-a-vis Pakistan.
Admiral Prueher. Right.
Mr. Lewis. Why don't we pursue these programs?
Admiral Prueher. Well, the IMET programs with China is
something, as we move along with China, it is a little delicate
to push them too fast.
Mr. Lewis. Of course.
Admiral Prueher. So we are working at a lot of
intersections outside the IMET program with China.
We have an increasingly robust relationship with China,
though it does not include getting them to our defense
universities or at Leavenworth or places like that that the
IMET program would bring. That is downstream in our process. We
just aren't there yet.
Mr. Lewis. Well, in connection with that specifically, I
have spent a good deal of time looking at China; and one of the
items that continues to come into my imagination is that we
really need to be thinking about 2025 every bit as much as
1999. Developing economic relations, university relations,
political relations, et cetera, the more of the personalized
kind of exposure we have to young officer corps, it is just
invaluable; and I would hope that we would really be talking
that through.
Admiral Prueher. Mr. Lewis, I couldn't agree more. In the
last year we have come a long way with China, less far with
India. But the meeting with President Jiang Zemin, Chi Hoatian
their defense minister, and coming soon to the United States
will be General Zhang Warnian, who is their senior PLA General,
and a variety of others--Fu Quanyou, who is their chairman
equivalent. We have been working back and forth with them this
last year. In fact, in the travelogue world, I was in China in
December and January.
We are working it really hard. We have agreed at the level
of their most senior leadership that we do need to have these
interactions, and they should not just be amongst us because we
will be gone shortly, and we are pushing it down. There are
several initiatives going on. We are not to the IMET stage yet.
We have the Asia Pacific Center, which is in Honolulu,
where we have invited the Chinese to come. They have not yet
accepted that, but they will.
I would like to take the opportunity to comment about IMET
with Indonesia, which we talked about last year here. The
example I gave with General Mongkon in Thailand--and this may
be a little bit off the track of your interests--but the point
we made with General Mongkon on the fact that he is an IMET
graduate, in Indonesia we have not had an IMET program for the
last 6 years, and we have issues with Indonesia on human rights
and things like that. My view is that this is exactly the wrong
tack to take, to cut them off from exposure to our processes,
as opposed to that we should try to get their leadership into
our processes.
RELATIONS WITH INDIA
Mr. Lewis. Admiral, let's discuss India for a moment. I
know that we don't have a lot of in-depth communication with
their military that we should. I mean, after all, their officer
corps doesn't just speak English, the British were there for
200 years, and there is a lot of potential problems--not just a
Pakistan-India relationship.
Currently, economically, our exchange relative to software
people is incredible. There is not any doubt that there are
several natural avenues, but I wonder if we don't have
preconceived notions that are cutting off avenues of
communications. I think we really need to be developing a good
relationship. Because they are a huge force, and they could be
a dangerous force.
Admiral Prueher. We are. Ambassador Chandra, India's
ambassador to the U.S., was just at our headquarters last week;
and we made a visit to India to try to set this up last year.
They are--after watching what we have been doing with China,
India is now energized a little bit to open up some more,
because they were, you know, a Soviet Cold War partner. So that
is sort of the baggage that we are working with right now.
Mr. Lewis. Probably our baggage as much as theirs.
Admiral Prueher. That is right. Exactly. I have some
anecdotes that I won't take up the Committee's time with, but
we are working that.
And General Reimer is going to India. We will go along
because they are in our Area of Responsibility--AOR. We will
try to get the same type of setup going where we start to work
these interactions. But it has been dormant for a while, and
just in the last year we have been getting it off the ground.
Mr. Lewis. When is General Reimer going?
Admiral Prueher. I believe in the fall or the spring.
Mr. Lewis. Why don't you let me know?
Admiral Prueher. I will. I will get back to you on that.
ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINE MORATORIUM
Mr. Lewis. General Tilelli, you were talking about a couple
of things that captured my imagination when you talked about
the battlefield and remotely placed landmines and legislation
impacting you ability to shape the battlefield and then you
talked about special forces across the line that have
deliverable weapons of mass destruction, all of that raised a
number of concerns.
When that language went forward relative to landmines, was
there not some consultation with people like yourself relative
to these possible impacts?
General Tilelli. Sir, in fiscal year 1996, when that
legislation went forward, it was a fiscal year 1996 Foreign
Operations Appropriation Act. I can't answer who consultation
occurred with. Now, certainly, since then, all of us have been
consulted and collaborated with by both the Department of
Defense and the Chairman and the joint staffs.
Mr. Lewis. Foreign Operations is an Appropriations
subcommittee, and its language or its impact is limited to a
year at a time, I think. Is that language just being renewed
every year?
General Tilelli. This moratorium goes into effect in
February of 1999. So I think for the use of remotely emplaced,
Anti-Personnel Landmines--APL, I think that carried forward.
Mr. Lewis. I wonder if staff would help me examine that.
Normally, our language lasts for a year and doesn't go forward.
I am just curious about it.
General Tilelli. It is a reintroduction on a year-by-year
basis.
ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
Mr. Lewis. On a year-by-year basis in foreign ops. Well
then, we do have to look at that very carefully. You have
authorization language in foreign ops that affects a
battlefield, for God's sakes, and that is a significant item.
We ought to at least examine it.
If I could shift back for a moment, I understand that the
suicides have quadrupled in Thailand in recent months; and it
has been suggested that that is a reflection--people jumping
out of windows, kind of like Wall Street in 1930--that is a
reflection of the economic condition there.
Can you give me a feeling for what kinds of instability
that you see as a direct result of economic crises that could
bring us to the point of having to exercise ourselves in a
confrontational sense in some way?
Admiral Prueher. Well, I was in Thailand last week, in
Bangkok, and I had the opportunity to meet with the Prime
Minister Chuan and the Foreign Minister Surin and then the
General that I mentioned, General Mongkon, who I always see
when I go there. I had not heard the figure about suicides.
In Thailand itself, I think the people there are very
concerned about the city-poor; the poor people in the
countryside will be okay. Their standard of living is modest,
and it is slightly more modest, but they will have food,
clothing and shelter. So the situation in Thailand I think is--
they have hard times ahead, but it is stable.
Now, is the question region-wide?
Mr. Lewis. It really is region-wide. I was thinking earlier
on about the Chinese devaluation potential.
Admiral Prueher. Right. The Chinese have said they will
not devalue, so that is--hopefully, they won't get pressed into
doing that.
The types of security issues that we see there are, with
the economic instability, primarily in South Korea, Indonesia
and Thailand, but the currency or banking crisis has occurred,
and that happened very quickly. Now it is transitioning into a
trade crisis as they try to export their way out of
devaluation. And the growth rates and the optimism that was
there is not there now. So what we have is economic
instability. The worst is in Indonesia.
When I talked earlier about the confluence of military,
economic and political, what we are trying to do is show--and
that was the nature of my trip to Thailand, Singapore and to
Manila--is to show that the U.S. presence, Secretary Cohen's
statement of we are there in good times and bad, is that we are
there to buttress the military security piece so that that does
not exacerbate the economic insecurity.
So this is what we are working on. There are all sorts of
shaping, sizing, scoping, adjusting, timing of things that we
are doing to work with the nations so that they can grapple
with this economic correction, which they need to go through. I
mean, there were a lot of bad loans and overoptimism, a
nonsustainable growth rate.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks.
TWO SIMULTANEOUS MAJOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES
Mr. Dicks. I want to go back to this issue that was raised,
General Tilelli, in your memo that was leaked inside the Air
Force.
In a memo sent this week to the Pentagon, the Commander-in-
Chief of U.S. Forces Korea warned that, with the threatened
action in Iraq and the attendant diversion of forces from Korea
to back it up, his ability to defeat a limited warning attack
by North Korea is at risk. The concerns expressed by General
John Tilelli cast doubt on the Defense Department's ability to
carry out the national military strategy of the last 5 years to
fight and win in two major theaters of war at once.
Do you believe our strategy of swinging high-value assets
between theaters is realistic in scenarios involving little or
no warning?
General Tilelli. I think it is realistic, but it is very
difficult, and at the same time----
Mr. Dicks. How can it be both?
General Tilelli. No, you can swing forces. The issue
becomes--and if you are talking the two MTW scenario, if you
are using or apportioning the same forces, the second MTW is
going to have to wait for those forces to be swung. So the
consequence of that is you elevate the risk, and the risk
elevation may equate to a number of things. It may equate to
the kind of things it takes to be successful in defending, the
amount of terrain that you lose that you are defending if you
are the second MTW, the length of time it takes for you to be
able to go on the offense, and the number of casualties that,
in fact, you will take while awaiting the forces that you
absolutely need to accomplish one or more of the phases of your
campaign plan.
Mr. Murtha. There is one other thing too, if the gentleman
will yield, sustainment is the big problem, sustaining the
forces is the big problem in this whole scenario.
General Tilelli. And there are some high value items such
as PGM, Precision-Guided Munitions, that truly, the second MTW
will not have as many as they might need. So it truly is--you
elevate the risk in a very candid way, in my assessment. What
you are seeing there is not a--not to be flippant, but that
falls in the category, sir, of not believing everything you
read. I never sent a memo to the Chairman that said much of
that. That was a staff assessment from one staff to the other,
which was a very appropriate assessment, by the way. And that
was--and a very appropriate assessment, because it is the staff
responsibility and commander's responsibility to share
assessments.
But the fact is, in my very candid opinion and we have done
this, we have done it in a number of ways, if I am the second
major theater of war, I believe I will win, and I believe I
will achieve the objectives if Korea is the second MTW.
Mr. Dicks. But it will be as lot tougher. You will take a
lot more causalities.
General Tilelli. That is exactly how you mitigate, you
mitigate a lack of resources by the time it takes, the
harshness of the fight, and the number of casualties. And I
mean it would be frivolous of me to say that or for Admiral
Prueher to say that if you take resources from me today that I
require to fight, then it is less risk than it was when I had
those resources. It absolutely increases the risk.
Mr. Dicks. I don't know how this got into the public
domain, but I think it is very useful for the people up here on
Capitol Hill who have the ultimate responsibility under the
Constitution to know that, we are going to swing assets from
one area of the world to another area, and still be as
effective militarily.
Let me go on and read a little bit more of what this says.
Despite these stopgap measures, Tilelli says that during the
first phase of a battle, the denial phase, the absence of
ammunition sustainment ships places our abilities to sustain
defensive forces at very high risk, according to the document.
The combined shortfalls in Patriot, Army tactical missile
systems, Hellfire and TOW missiles and 120 millimeter main gun
tank rounds will severely impact our ability to defend Seoul.
He warns that if our forces are diverted from the Pacific
Theater to support the operation in Iraq, military flexible
deterrent options using in-theater assets will be reduced.
Relying on out-of-theater forces to support the deterrence
posture would entail delays of personnel and equipment,
compromising his position.
And then it goes on to say that the memo, however, is far
from those who are using the Quadrennial Defense Review--QDR
plan of fighting 2 major theaters of warfare, Iraq and North
Korea, in most planning documents is impossible to support
under the defense budgets over the last decade. The military
argues that a primary enabler of the plan is the ability to
swing high value assets like bombers and JSTARS aircraft
between theaters as they are needed. Tilelli's memo points to
the Achilles heel of the plan. It only works when there is
adequate warning of an attack. Because Korea is so far removed
from the majority of U.S. forces in a limited warning scenario,
if assets are not in theater, precious days could be lost in
answering an attack with overwhelming force.
B-2 BOMBER
Now, I think that is very helpful. This gentleman has been
concerned about the adequacy of our bomber force. I happen to
think that bringing assets from outside of the theater, if they
are long-range bombers that can drop these precision-guided
munitions, would be very useful in a no-warning scenario. And
even in the QDR where they did everything they could possible
to say we don't need B-2s, they had to admit that in the early
warning, in a surprise attack or a no-warning attack, the most
effective system you would have would be long-range bombers.
Now, if you don't have all of these other things that are
mentioned in this memo--I mean it certainly seems to me that
having a bomber force that could come from outside of the
theater in support would be of some use, especially if they can
get there in a matter of hours, and especially if you don't
have your aircraft carrier there. Admiral?
Admiral Prueher. May I address it, Congressman Dicks, in
part because my responsibility in this case is to support
General Tilelli and to provide him the assets that he needs to
fight. Not in this case, but period.
Mr. Dicks. You mentioned in your statement we are short in
6 areas, 6 substantive areas.
Admiral Prueher. Right. And there are a couple of things
that bear--General Tilelli, when assets have gone and then
light in the theater, for example, EW aircraft, that is another
scarcity, but the--what he has increased is the Intel
surveillance and the reconnaissance effort so he gets a longer
lead time, so we can have as much lead time as we can get to
move assets into the theater.
The other thing on the logistic sustainment ships is we
have been using----
Mr. Dicks. You know, it is one thing that is so easily
said, Admiral, but remember what happened in the Gulf War. We
had 2 days of operational warning and we really didn't act,
because we didn't think Saddam was going to do it. I mean it is
one thing to have indications; it is another thing to take
decisive steps. Sometimes you can't get the National Command
Authority's attention. In that case they couldn't get the
deputies' group together to have a meeting. So they didn't make
a decision, and all of these things didn't flow. So I mean you
know, it is one thing to say we are going to have indications
and warnings, it is another thing to be able to act on them.
Admiral Prueher. I am trying to work my way around to sort
of supporting your position.
Mr. Dicks. Well, let me give you one more opportunity.
Admiral Prueher. The other issue on sustainment ships that
we talked about, sustainment ships, we are using, we have 14
sustainment ships in the Gulf right now, and they have been
used as a U.S. presence indicator in the Gulf for quite a
while, and some of these are ones that would normally be in our
theater where we have made a conscious decision, though General
Tilelli and I argues against it, but to keep them there because
that was the highest and best use of those ships during this
time period. So that is another part, and they are quite a long
steaming distance from Korea.
Lift is a critical component for us, it is one of those 6
items on our list. Both strategic airlift and sealift are vital
in our area where the distances are so large. The point about
bombers, we have also, in addition to moving the squadron of F-
15s into Korea to partly account for the lack of aircraft
carriers, we have also flown some B-52 missions to targets in
South Korea, and just to exercise that.
So your point about bombers and the condition where we find
ourselves is certainly, it is a valid point. We could use them
in this type of condition.
If I could just finish with one point. The reason we are
where we are right now is, in talking with General Hugh Shelton
and talking with the Secretary of Defense, the situation where
we find ourselves is our assessment is the likelihood of
conflict in Korea is very low right now. The likelihood of
conflict in our area is low. We have kept some assets there,
but it is--we are squirming because we have to look very
carefully right now because we do have so many assets in The
Gulf.
Mr. Dicks. Admiral.
General Tilelli. The other thing I mentioned, sir, and you
know this because you have heard the war plan brief, in a real
sense, the preponderance of the force that fights in Korea
comes from off the peninsula.
Mr. Dicks. Right.
General Tilelli. So the longer it takes for that force to
close, the longer it is going to take me to initially defend
and then go on the offensive against the North, and the
consequence of that will be, or potentially will be, a loss of
some of the key and decisive terrain that we hope to keep, and
certainly more casualties.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS
Mr. Dicks. ------.
[Clerk's note.--The classified discussion was removed.]
Mr. Young. Mr. Hobson.
JOINT SURVEILLANCE TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM (JSTARS)
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, as I sit here, I get awful nervous when you
start talking about B-52s and C-141s, those things. I don't
think we have enough C-17s to do all this stuff. The sealift is
old and a lot of them not there. It is a real--I knew Norm was
going to get around to the B-2 before he got done.
Mr. Dicks. It took me a long time to set it up.
Mr. Hobson. I know, but that is a long-term problem that I
don't see a lot of planning for.
I just have one question I would like to ask you, General.
The National Defense Panel has two formal reports and in
testimony before the Congress has questioned the Quadrennial
Defense Review's reduction in the number of JSTARS and further
stated that 13 JSTARS is not enough. Would you please discuss
the importance of JSTARS to your theater and indicate how many
are needed to support your operation?
General Tilelli. Sir, first, we had the first JSTARS
deployment to Korea in the October-November time frame during
an exercise. One, we learned as much from JSTARS as it learned
from us in the operational tactics, techniques and procedures,
plus the wiring from air to ground. So that was very
successful. We had a second deployment that occurred here
during the winter training cycle and subsequent to that, the
JSTARS has been redeployed. So JSTARS, as a function of the
terrain and the compartmentalization and the heavy movement of
vehicles from north to south, as a battle management platform
and as a platform, that gives me indicators of moving targets
is very important to the Republic of Korea fight.
To quantify the number required for the Republic of Korea
and the single orbit which would give me coverage of about 24
hours a day, I think the number is 5, and I would have to
provide you that for the record, but that is just for my area
of operations, and it is also for my area of operations without
any backup. So in my view JSTARS is one of those elements, and
I briefed Congressman Murtha when he was there, JSTARS is one
of those elements that is critical to my fight if we ever go to
conflict.
Mr. Hobson. Did you want to comment, Admiral?
Admiral Prueher. On the JSTARS issue in the theater?
Mr. Hobson. Yes.
Admiral Prueher. Well, there are a lot of potential areas
that, for example, if things started going awry, well, it could
be anywhere, but say we wanted to look at a variety of things,
it could be forest fires or whatever in Indonesia, JSTARS could
be a type of platform that could work there. We will need I
think at some time over the South China Sea the ability to put
a platform; a surveillance and a management platform there
would be a very handy thing to have. But Korea is the main spot
in our theater.
Mr. Hobson. I guess my point is that I think the 13 number
may not be enough. We may need to look at that, because there
are a lot of things we have to look at, but that may be one and
we need to find out the relative, I guess, priority of that as
we look out.
Admiral Prueher. And there are a number of things going on
now in surveillance. One of the key things that General Tilelli
mentioned about JSTARS is that what it was not originally
intended to do, I don't think, is the battle management aspect
of it. There are other platforms that can look and see the
types of movement that JSTARS can pick up and the battle
management piece is very important. But there are other,
Umanned Aeriel Vehicles--UAVs and things like that that we
might use just for the data collection piece.
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky.
INDIA'S MILITARY
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, in your testimony you indicated that India and the
Indian military is focused inwardly at the current time. From
the Indian government's point of view, from the military's
point of view, what is their role today, the Indian military
role?
Admiral Prueher. They have--India-Pakistan, there is a
steady low-level conflict going on in the Siachen Glacier, one
of the strangest wars in the world, but it continues.
Mr. Visclosky. So they actually are engaged?
Admiral Prueher. They are engaged. Periodically there is a
helicopter that gets shot down from one side or the other, and
there is a level of activity that goes on all the time there on
the Indian-Pakistan border. It is near Jammu and Kashmir.
Primarily the Indian military orients, the Army orients
toward border protection, as does their air force. They are not
thinking about a power projection force. Their Chief of Naval
Operations--CNO, Admiral Bagwat, is trying to build a more
powerful Navy thatwill have the ability to be dominant in the
Indian Ocean, which they probably will do.
They do not work jointly, as we do. The services in India
don't work together at all. Also, in our country, we breathe
India-Pakistan almost always in the same breath. My take and
most people's take from visiting India is they look much more
to the east to China for both the long-term threat and also to
the east, to Southeast Asia, for the long-term economic trade
that they would have.
Mr. Visclosky. Are there occasional hostilities between the
Chinese and the Indians?
Admiral Prueher. There are low-level border disputes and
they have largely not had--they haven't had clashes that I know
of lately, but the border is contested along there in the
mountains.
Mr. Visclosky. Do they serve a domestic political role as
well?
Admiral Prueher. They do. But someone pointed out earlier
that India has gone through 4 weeks of elections and they have
600 million people vote and they have had some demonstrations,
but largely it has been peaceful in India. But they do use
their military for internal security, the Army.
DEFENSE AGAINST CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACKS
Mr. Visclosky. You also had mentioned in your testimony
that in conjunction with U.S. Forces, Korea, the U.S. Pacific
Command has generated a list of near-term fixes to close the
gap in our capability to defend against chemical and biological
attacks.
Is that in your budget request?
Admiral Prueher. There are some in the budget request.
Well, the Services' budget requests, we--that comes via the
services and yes, it is. There is chemical equipment and
antichemical equipment in the budgets, in the service's budget
requests. Our requests were for near-term fixes.
Mr. Visclosky. Are you fully funded for at least the near
term fixes in your request to the Committee, or is there a
shortfall?
Admiral Prueher. I will have to provide the answer on
whether we are fully funded or not. I know some of those things
are fairly simple, like plastic sheeting and stuff like that. I
will have to find out whether we are fully funded. I will get
that answer to you, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay, I am just concerned if we are talking
about near-term fixes and we are not even fully funded to
protect your people in the near term, that certainly I think
causes all of us some concern here.
Admiral Prueher. Well, that has been a steady effort, and I
know U.S. Forces, Korea has gotten the antichemical suits for
our troops and are getting the new ones, but there are some
other odds and ends of things that I will have to find out the
answer for you.
Mr. Visclosky. General, perhaps I should ask you also.
General Tilelli. Sir, from the standpoint of the U.S.
forces, the individual protective gear, we are getting that as
scheduled. We are also activating a chemical decontamination
outfit with 5 companies that will provide us greater
decontamination capability for some of our large facilities.
Some of the--we are also, as we speak, they are starting to
distribute, they begin the Army, some of the new individual
protective gear. On the ROK side, the Republic of Korea side,
as we fight this thing, I have to be concerned with them, and
they have greater problems with their forces in the rear than
their forces that are engaged initially.
Some of the areas that we are working on that require fixes
that we don't quite understand are protection and
decontamination of large areas. For example, our ADOPS and our
seaports. And also, one of the things that we have just done
and are doing and have been funded to do is to field the gear
for the mission essential personnel who work in ports, drive
trucks, and the Korean service corps, who also provide us
logistic support in the rear.
So we have gotten a lot of near-term fixes, some we don't
understand how to fix yet, and some of the collective
protective systems we are still assessing. But there has been
an emphasis. The money that the Department of Defense has
received has been parceled out to the field. I think parceled
out in priority.
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEAN-UP OF U.S. BASES IN JAPAN
Mr. Visclosky. Okay. As far as some of the environmental
cleanup of U.S. bases in Japan, is there a controversy or
outstanding question as to who will pick up the cost, the U.S.
or the Japanese government?
Admiral Prueher. There is not a controversy. On the base
cleanup, there is a legal position where the agreement we
signed, we are not legally bound to pay for base cleanup. As an
environmental steward, we claim to be an environmental example
in the world or try to be an environmental example. This is
under discussion because we need to do a responsible thing, and
we are working with the lawyers on who does provide base
cleanup. I would not describe it as a controversy, but it is a
discussion topic.
Mr. Young. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Visclosky. I am happy to yield.
Mr. Young. Admiral and General, Speaker Gingrich and
Minority Leader Gephardt have asked me to take a substantial
group to Bosnia tomorrow, and in 1 minute I have a meeting with
those folks and some people with the State Department. So I am
going to excuse myself. Mr. Lewis will preside.
But I want to thank you very much for an exceptional
hearing this afternoon and the way you just responded to us
openly and honestly and directly, and we appreciate that very
much. Thank you for yielding, Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In conclusion on that, is that an open question as to how
the cleanup will be made?
Admiral Prueher. That is correct. It is not an open
question legally, from a legal standpoint, but it is one we
want to discuss to make sure we are doing the right thing with
it on the base cleanup.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much.
Admiral Prueher. With respect to chemical defense
requirements I was told we had the information and all the
near-term things are fully funded.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay, good, good.
Admiral Prueher. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay. Thank you.
BURDENSHARING
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Nethercutt, do you have questions?
Mr. Nethercutt. Gentlemen, welcome. I am delighted to have
you here and thank you for your service and for your testimony
here today.
Both of you testified briefly on the Asian crisis and the
economic situation there. My question is whether you feel the
Asian currently problems are going to have an impact on the
burden-sharing obligations of Japan and Korea, and if so, if
our budget request for fiscal year 1999 adequate to meet any
deficiency there might be? What is your assessment of that?
Admiral Prueher. I can take the Japan part, and I think it
would be better if General Tilelli took the Korean part.
In Japan, they are slightly different. In Japan the
services are provided by labor contracts, and it is in yen, so
the real issue is purchasing power. So the devaluation will not
impact our--the host Nation's support for us. There are
pressures on it, but the Japanese have said they will pay it.
The other thing is if the amount they are going to pay is above
the 75 percent level that we look for, but it is a nonproblem.
If you look at the track of dollar value over the last 3 years,
the dollar value of that support has decreased, but the
purchasing power has increased, and we have the same amount of
support that we had before. That part is not a problem in
Japan.
Mr. Nethercutt. You expect no pressure on us as a result of
any of that?
Admiral Prueher. I don't expect pressure on us. In fact,
Secretary Cohen has made the point with them that this is not
just money, this is a strategic issue for us. Now, I don't
think he is talking just strategic with the committees.
Mr. Nethercutt. I understand.
General Tilelli. Sir, from the ROK, Republic of Korea side,
we are in a unique situation. First, Secretary Cohen made the
same comments, that burden-sharing is a strategic issue and it
is an international agreement and promise that the Republic of
Korea must keep. The Minister of National Defense of the
Republic of Korea and the President have stated openly and
publicly that they would keep their promise of purchasing power
associated with the burdensharing agreement for fiscal year
1998.
The unique situation we are in is this is the last year of
the burdensharing agreement, and we go into new negotiations
this year which I think will be tougher, but again, I believe
that the ROK government is keenly aware of how important
burdensharing is not only to the U.S. forces, but to the U.S.
people in general, and will deal in good faith as we look at
fiscal year 1999 and out.
So it is my current view now, in the absence of any facts
for 1999 and out, to say that I think we can at least be
optimistic that we will be at about the same level or a little
bit better in purchasing power, but not--we will not attain the
goals that have been set by the Congress and we will not attain
the goals that have been set by Japan.
We are, I think, number 2 as far as burdensharing in the
Republic of Korea, but number 2 doesn't reach number 1 at this
point.
KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION
Mr. Nethercutt. What about the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization--KEDO? They are going to fund
construction of 2 light water reactors in the north. Will the
Asian currency problem impact that at all?
General Tilelli. Kim da Jung, the President inaugurated
last Thursday, has stated that KEDO is very important and that
the Korean will keep their commitment to KEDO.
Now, the fact is that most of KEDO is paid for in won, so
the devaluation of the won does not have a great impact on
their ability to pay. At the same time, there have been some
initiatives by the Korean government to try to get some
additional help in paying that, but it is really a--and I won't
say long-term issue, it is amid-term issue rather than an
immediate issue, because it is progressive payments rather than
a $5 billion or $5.7 million payment. It is on a continuum
rather than this year, next year or the year after.
So it is my belief that they understand it is in their best
interests that KEDO go forward and that they will do their best
to keep it up the way they said they would.
Admiral Prueher. There are--on KEDO there are a number of
contributors to it, some of which are symbolic amongst the
Southeast Asian nations, but one very substantial contributoris
Singapore, and again we were just there last Sunday, and they intend to
continue with their contributions, so the crisis isn't expected to
unfold.
General Tilelli. If I could just interject, it is also very
important that we continue to send a heavy oil commitment that
we have made for the KEDO environment, so there is no, no seam
that North Korea might exploit.
FOOD SHORTAGES IN NORTH KOREA
Mr. Nethercutt. What about their food shortage problems in
the north? Recent reports say they were running out, they have
a couples of weeks left, I guess. How do you assess that
relative to their military posture as well? What is your sense
of it?
General Tilelli. Let me try to answer that, and I say try
because it is a very opaque society. It is very difficult to
get hard and fast information on whether we are looking at
progressive malnutrition, pockets of starvation, or what
exactly is the circumstances.
We know that the general population is not getting the
amount of food that they have had in the past. We knew when we
assessed last year that sometime in early spring that they
would run out of the food as a function of their poor harvest
last year. We at the same time know that their military is
getting more than their fair share of constrained resources. As
we look at the winter training cycle that is going on right
now, it is a relatively robust winter training cycle. At the
same time, the country or the regime is saying, we will run out
of food in 2 weeks. They have a very active winter training
cycle with lots of forces out in the field.
So we are getting contrary information, to be quite frank.
I would assess that the truth lies somewhere between 2 weeks
and the late spring where they are going to start having food
shortages, but that is truly a wild assessment on my part
rather than based on much fact.
We know that the World Food Program has assessed that they
need far more this year from the humanitarian standpoint than
they needed last year, almost double. I think $378 million
worth this year. And many countries have subscribed to help in
the humanitarian effort.
Admiral Prueher. An interesting point is to contrast the
apparent direness of the food shortage with the most robust
winter training cycle that they have had in 3 years that is
going on as we speak.
Mr. Nethercutt. Is there a redirection of that food aid to
the military?
General Tilelli. That is difficult to track in a real sense
because of the opaqueness of the society, Congressman. As you
look at it, you have different sources of food. One is the
indigenous growth. The second is a food aid that they get from
China that doesn't count against the humanitarian food aid, and
the third tranche, if you will, is the food aid. So to say that
this great--this pocket of rice or corn is going to the
military versus another I think is very, very difficult. But we
do know for a fact that their military is getting a higher
quantity of food in total number of grams per day than is the
civilian population at large.
Mr. Nethercutt. Assuming that it is a 2-week supply, would
the international, humanitarian organizations be able to meet
this expected shortfall?
General Tilelli. I don't know how quickly it could kick in,
to be frank with you, sir.
Mr. Nethercutt. I see.
Admiral Prueher. The International Food Organization has
never failed to answer the bell if they felt it was really
getting that short. I think there is very little thought that
it is actually a 2-week supply.
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you very much, both of you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
FREQUENCY SPECTRUM PROBLEMS
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Nethercutt.
On the point you were just talking about, my staff just
pulled up an item that is very interesting showing that the GDP
of North Korea at $21 billion in a country the size of
Mississippi, and the GDP of South Korea is $647 billion, the
size of Indiana, and yet North Korea spends 23 percent on
defense, the other spends 3.3 percent. That is interesting.
In our briefing book there is a very important, but
sensitive question I would appreciate your responding to.
According to the U.S. Army, there is a conflict between the
frequencies used by Patriot missile systems and those used by
South Korean government and commercial activities. How does
this conflict limit our ability to train or operate the Patriot
system?
General Tilelli. During peacetime we work our way through
it. I think the frequency spectrum issue is a greater issue
than in the Republic of Korea. The issue in the Republic of
Korea is instead of having the bands of frequency associated
with just the civilian or military, it is an integrated band of
civilian and military. So the consequence is that as you
increase the number of civilian requirements and you start
peeling away that band width for civilian requirements like
digital telephones, you start running into conflict.
We have been able to work through the peacetime requirement
in the Republic of Korea. It does become an issueas we look at
band width requirements with a large number of forces flowing and we
are working with the ministry of communications to resolve some of
those wartime issues.
On the other hand, Mr. Chairman, I would say that the
frequency spectrum problem in my view is a problem not only
associated with the Republic of Korea, but we have the same
issues right here in the United States of America as we sell
off band width that was previously sole-use military that is
now sold to commercial enterprises. Admiral Prueher was talking
a little bit about that today.
Admiral Prueher. The overall frequency spectrum issue is
one that as we have had bandwidth that has been exclusively
military, for military use, weapons systems, communications,
things like that. We are seeing now in various nations--and I
think it is occurring in our Congress too--there is, in order
to make money, people are selling off bandwidths, so that now,
for example, an additional exercise cost, if we go to
Australia, they want to charge for bandwidth, to use that part
of the frequency spectrum, or else it is closed because they
have already sold it. This is the issue that occurs in Korea,
but it also occurs worldwide; our military bandwidth just
shrinks and shrinks.
Mr. Lewis. Well what does it do relative to your ability to
operate the Patriot system?
General Tilelli. Well, you are either blocked out or get
interfered with. We have been able to work through the
Armistice issue with the ROK government, so during Armistice
and our Patriots are up every day, it is not a matter that they
are waiting to be up, they are up every day, because we are not
in a peacetime environment, we are in an Armistice environment
where we have to keep our 50 percent Patriots up. They are
operating and they are okay, but it does become a larger issue
when you start to flow forces for conflict.
Mr. Lewis. Admiral, you suggest that being in Australia you
might have a problem in the region and a problem in relation to
the same thing. This is a serious business. Even if there is a
cost factor involved, we ought to know about that, but we sure
can't ignore them.
Admiral Prueher. No, that's right, and it is not just our
theater, this is a worldwide issue.
Mr. Lewis. That's right. You indicated that it was being
discussed earlier. Is it being discussed at the highest level
and are we seeking a solution?
Admiral Prueher. Absolutely, absolutely. Well, our military
solution is don't sell off our bandwidths, but it is a
congressional national group above the military that is
discussing this. I think there are people in Congress working
it.
Mr. Lewis. It is pretty obvious that the people who are
most interested in the questions that swirl around the selling
of bandwidths could care less in terms of their priorities
about some difficulties, and yet this is pretty fundamental. I
would hope that the SECDEF is talking about this with somebody
at the highest level.
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir, he is, he is.
General Tilelli. The other thing, Mr. Chairman, I think we
have to give a little bit of clarity to it. This is not only a
Patriot issue, this is an issue of anything that requires a
frequency spectrum to operate to include all of our
communications. So it is an issue that we have taken up with
the Joint Staff. Both the Chairman and the Secretary are aware
of this one.
Mr. Lewis. Well, I would hope that somebody where those
high level discussions are taking place will keep our staff
informed so that we know when we need to get involved to help.
I would think that maybe the Intelligence community would know
a little bit about this. This is a pretty significant potential
problem.
Admiral Prueher. We will make sure that occurs, sir.
CHINESE-INDIAN RELATIONS
Mr. Lewis. Okay. Thank you.
Earlier we were talking about China and India's military,
and you referred just as an aside to the former India-Soviet
relation.
What are the relations at a military level between China
and India at this point? There is a huge border and a lot of
sensitive territorial considerations, and so forth. I am also
interested in the relationship between India and Russia as
well, but I am more interested in the India-China question.
Admiral Prueher. It is not, it is not a friendly
relationship, but they have a dialogue that goes on, and
basically, it is a counter proliferation issue for us, as we
tend to watch Pakistan and look at the India-Pakistan issue.
China tends to align somewhat with India to stand off in that
regard.
So they don't have a military-to-military relationship;
they have border discussions and they have political
discussions back and forth.
Mr. Lewis. They ought to be communicating in depth with
each other.
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir. One of the things that we have
been working with China on is to tell the senior leadership
that they need to talk to the other nations in the region as
well as us and tell them what they are up to. This is not easy
for them to do. They are not accustomed to doing that. So
everybody wonders, there is uncertainty as to what China is an
when there is uncertainty people think the worst, and the worst
might be true, but it might not too. So they are, in fact,
opening up.
China has had a summit with us, with Japan and with Russia
in a 3-month period. They are trying to stabilize their
borders, and they are traveling around a lot, and if you track
the people that go to Beijing, or are there, there are people
beating down the door, usually commercial ones, but also
increasingly defense ones. Japan and China, which is an
important relationship, Chi Hoatian just went to Japan and now
Natsukawa in Japan is going to go visit the chairman
counterpart, who is Fu Quanyou in China, sorry, but you know,
Hashimoto visited China, that is starting to work, it is
starting to work. They are having a dialogue.
Mr. Lewis. It has been a long time since I have spent any
significant amount of time in India, I have never been to China
personally, but in the mid-1960s there was almost a love fest
going on between India and China at the highest level and
growing warmth of relationship, in spite of obvious problems
and difficulties. Over time, that has changed very
significantly. They are serious competitors in any number of
ways and I can't help but worry about that competitive
circumstance. It would help helpful if the military was
communicating in some depth.
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir.
ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
Mr. Lewis. You started to talk a little bit about Indonesia
and Thailand and the trade war implications of their trying to
trade their way out of economic difficulties. Could you expand
on your perspective?
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir. I will launch into my economist
mode, which is very treacherous.
Mr. Lewis. You are dealing with generals and economists, so
go ahead.
Admiral Prueher. That's right. As I said before, I think
the currency or banking crisis occurred and created a real
vacuum for capital in the East Asian region. It caused the
devaluation, which was worse in Indonesia, Thailand and South
Korea. Their tendency with the devaluation, their only way out
of it is to export cheeper goods, which they are starting to
do. They come on our market, a good deal for our consumers, but
it increases our trade deficit, creates a problem in that
regard.
Our biggest worry right now in the long haul is Indonesia
because there is so much that we don't know. The other part is
Indonesia is a big country, the 4th largest nation in the world
in terms of population. It is a very complex society. It has
over 17,000 islands, 2,500 of them are inhabited, but it is a
hard place to govern. It has a volatile population, ------ and
they also have had a devaluation of the rupiah of about 300
percent, versus the dollar and they have had fires, they have
all sorts of pressures on them for political instability. The
ABRI, the military there has been a force for stability, it is
different than ours. They have what is called Dwi Fungsi, I
think we talked about it last year, but they have a political
function as well, this is a traditional-by-design feature.
The burning question right now with the political
instability with Suharto, and Former Vice President Mondale
just made a trip there to try to look at the economics, but the
succession issue for Suharto is prominent in the region. ----
--. Our burning question is can ABRI, will they and can they
maintain stability like the Thai military was able to do in
Thailand,can they bring that off in Indonesia. I really, I
really don't know the answer to that question, but we are in touch with
General Wiranto, who is the head of their military, a very good man,
but there is a lot we don't know right now.
So Indonesia is a big question mark in our area and the
biggest source of instability. Again, we are working it
economically, and politically. Stape Ray is as capable an
ambassador as the United States has anywhere, so we are working
all of those frames in Indonesia, sir.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you. Mr. Cunningham.
NUCLEAR CARRIERS IN JAPAN
Mr. Cunningham. Joe, I will still meet you at 15,000 feet.
I have a little advantage, in I worked for Admiral Brown on
the 7th fleet staff and was basically responsible for the
defense in TEAM SPIRIT, Cobra Gold, Tanget Flash and the rest,
and what I would like to do is ask some questions to see the
delta between then and now and maybe what some of the
differences are.
I know when we had negotiations with Japan, one of my
interests was that we are going to go to an all nuclear carrier
force,. We have closed our bases in the Philippines and are
trying to work out an agreement with them. Now our closest
place is Guam, which in looking at it in TEAM SPIRIT, it takes
a long time to get forces there. Are we going to have a problem
with Japan in the future with nuclear carriers like we have
them support us there? We had Midway and we had others. But is
that going to be a problem which could affect, you know, the
defense of Korea if it comes up?
Admiral Prueher. We think not. INDEPENDENCE leaves this
summer from Japan and is replaced again by KITTY HAWK. ----
--. There will surely be demonstrations and things like that,
but the government of Japan, at least the LDP, the current
government, thinks it will be a nonproblem.
IMPACT OF FINANCIAL CRISIS ON CONTINGENCIES
Mr. Cunningham. Do you foresee, either one of you, with the
crisis of the devaluation of the dollar in Asia, any support
from our allies if we do get into conflict? We have limited
dollars available, and it is harder to fund our armed forces.
Have any of the countries suggested that they may have a
problem supporting us if something happens in Korea or China or
the other problem areas?
Admiral Prueher. They have not suggested that, but they are
very cash poor right now, and--one, we don't really think we
are at a time in the near future where we are going to get into
a foray in either Korea or China. We hope not, so the subject
hasn't come up too much, and we are tapering back on a number
of exercises and rescoping a bunch of things to accommodate the
fact that they are very cash poor right now. I had mentioned
earlier before you get here in Thailand the situation is such
that they are taking pay cuts and in a variety of things in
their military in order to do their piece of trying to deal
with the economic crisis.
ADEQUACY OF FORCES AND SUPPLIES
Mr. Cunningham. I know Mr. Murtha has expressed concern
with us, and I apologize for being late, I was up on the floor,
and I don't know if the question of Bosnia and Iraq drawing
assets away came up, one of the problems we had even when we
were fully loaded, when you went to other portions of the
world, for example, the number of AMRAAMS needed to meet your
commitments weren't there, the number of SPARROWS, the number
of sorties and the flight time. Is that going to be affected? I
know the Army's tanks, they are only going to redo about a
third of them, and your next issue of a new weapons system
isn't until like 2020, and I can imagine the drawdown that that
would have, especially in Korea in that terrain where there is
so much required.
Do you see a potential hollow force scenario with all of
our commitments ongoing and our equipment problems that we
have, and are we having to cross-deck in the Navy? I know that
the Army is having some problems with retention just like the
other services. Do you see a real problem coming up with that
if we don't change direction a little bit?
Admiral Prueher. I think both of us can comment on that. We
are all very nervous about it. We have talked about the
readiness issue. The idea of enough sustainment ammunition is
one factor, and right now I would say in our theater we are--we
have sent the INDEPENDENCE battle group to the Gulf, so we are
thin, and also the sustainment ships are there. If we get a
sense of higher urgency, we need to start getting some of that
stuff back and start flowing some assets from the continental
U.S. That is sort of the near-term piece. I think we can answer
the near-term bell.
All of us with gray hair have been through the 1970s and
the hollow force part. That is not where we are right now.
However, we also are nervous about the trend lines of our--not
our forward deployed forces, which are fine, but the forces
back home, the follow-on forces or the first-to-flow forces are
having a harder time than they were with parts and supplies,
and we are tracking that and we are concerned about it.
However, the data, in order to make informed expenditures to
correct the problems, the data are hard to come by to say just
exactly where we----
Mr. Cunningham. Do you have enough AMRAAMS and AIM-9s and
these kinds of things?
Admiral Prueher. We have enough in theater. We do.
Mr. Cunningham. If something would break out, and I knowone
of the big problems we had when I worked in coordination, the commander
was always upset at the Navy because he could only have excess sorties,
and if you want to commit naval power in an engagement like that, the
excess sorties are defined as only those sorties not required to defend
the boat. That would be limited if your ammunition is limited.
General Tilelli. We have done far better than that in our
integrated tasking order. We now have sorted out with the fleet
commander a number of sorties that he would absolutely provide
day-by-day. The issue become with the void of not having the
carrier in the Pacific right now, it is just a shortage of
aircraft. About 35-plus aircraft shortage, a function of the
carrier being gone, plus our electronic warfare aircraft, our
EA-6Bs
Mr. Cunningham. Yes, sir. I also understand the problems of
going north of Cheju-do even though we have them there. But the
logistics, once you change the logistics going the other way, I
can't imagine doing a TEAM SPIRIT. It would be a nightmare just
trying to get the bottoms in the holes and the different things
there if we had a conflict elsewhere.
Admiral Prueher. We have gradually, over the last year or
so, because of what has been going on in the Gulf and the
relative tranquility in the Pacific, our command authorities,
we have shifted some sustainability assets and propositioning
ships that have remained in the Gulf and we reevaluate every 6
months whether they should come back or not.
RESERVE COMPONENTS
Mr. Cunningham. General, do we still use--I know when we
were actively working the exercises, we used a lot of the
reserves, and I know that it had been difficult to do those
exercises without the support of those reserves, and in many
cases they have been drawn down as well. What about the
effectiveness, both for exercise and/or real components? And
again, just a reserve component. If we are other places, not
just Bosnia, not just Iraq, but let's just say Iraq goes away
and you have forces in Bosnia, you are still nervous because of
the requirements, I would imagine. But the reserve forces, are
they adequate to supply you with the additional people that you
need?
General Tilelli. Well, certainly the reserve component is
fully integrated into my war fighting campaign plan. So the
consequence of that is that we not only train with them, they
know who they are and when they would come on the flow. During
Armistice time, we have reserve individuals and units taking
part in not only exercises, but also in working on the
peninsula for us of all services. So I think the reserve
component is fully integrated into the Korean scenario, if you
will.
EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL
If I can digress one moment, one of the things that no one
has asked or we haven't talked about, anyway, one of the pieces
about Bosnia and Southwest Asia that is very important to us,
because again, we are dealing with a top line, and that is the
emergency supplemental and the approval of that to pay for the
fiscal year 1998, because as you are dealing with a top line,
if you don't get that supplemental, the money is going to come
out of somewhere and where it is going to come out of are the
forces and the operations and maintenance dollars that we have
which are tight right now. So that is another variable of the
whole issue here that we had discussed, but money is real also
when it comes in the context of as you get closer to the end of
the year, when you cancel a training opportunity or cancel an
event, it is an event missed that denigrates readiness.
Mr. Cunningham. I think that has been universal among all
of the services, the supplemental, and I would say that none of
us want to take it out of defense; I don't think we can take it
out of defense. But if you look at the President's budget, it
doesn't give you much wiggle room to find dollars elsewhere. I
can find dollars elsewhere, I can tell you exactly where I
would take them from, but we might have a problem with a vote
on the floor with that.
F-18E/F AIRCRAFT
The last thing I would like to cover, Mr. Chairman, is the
F-18E/F, with the extended range, I don't even know if you are
still having intercepts exercises or what, but I know the F-
18E/F, and this is kind of a pitch, General, that coming back
on a boat, when you only have one pass at the deck and you are
with pitching decks and minimum visibility and you know that
you go into water, you are going in dressed in a survival suit
and you are probably not going to make it back to the boat, but
it gives you 3,000, 4,000 pounds more fuel, and several looks
at that deck. It is going to mean survival for them, time over
target for what your requirements are. The reason I ask you is
those excess sorties, if you have an airplane that can sit up
there for a longer time, it is just going to enhance it, and
many of us are very supportive of that with the Air Force F-22
with its stealth requirements, and I just think it is a total
package.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Murtha, for whatever closing comments he may have.
Mr. Murtha. Chairman Lewis reminded me of something about
your predecessor, General Tilelli, and I want you to know,
Admiral Prueher, we are glad, we feel comfortable, now that we
have General Tilelli over there.
Admiral Prueher. I had mentioned to General Tilelli my
first hearing with General Luck he brought a shovel in here and
I thought what is this? What is going on with this?
Mr. Young. We have gone through most of the priority
questions. If you gentlemen would assist us with responses for
the record, that would be very helpful. In the meantime, we
appreciate very much you being here. We know you don't just
have a tough schedule, but serious responsibilities. It is
great to be with you. With that, we will adjourn the hearing.
Thank you.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the
answers thereto follow:]
Priorities and Deficiencies
Question. Do you feel the interests and needs of the Pacific
Command have been adequately addressed in the fiscal year 1999 budget
request?
Answer. The President's Budget adequately meets the needs of
Pacific Command. It provides sufficient support of training, exercises,
supplies and other essentials to accomplish our mission. Given the
level of available resources, and barring additional unforeseen
contingency operation costs, the fiscal year 1999 budget strikes an
appropriate balance in spending toward current and future defense
requirements. It also provides an adequate quality of life for most of
our uniformed personnel and their families throughout the Pacific.
Exceptions exist in high cost areas and where facilities have
deteriorated. Increased support will be needed in the future,
especially for real property maintenance and improvement.
Question. What is your assessment of the major shortfalls in:
personnel, training, equipment and maintenance for those units under
your day-to-day command as well as those that would be assigned to you
in a wartime situation?
Answer. U.S. Pacific Command forward deployed forces are ready, but
we do have some concern in each of these areas.
Pacific Command components have some significant personnel
shortages. Pacific Fleet is short 1900 personnel in key technical
ratings, and finds it necessary to ``crossdeck'' sailors in some
specialties to fully man deploying ships. Pacific Air Forces are
experiencing Air Force-wide pilot manning problems. Other components
and sub-unified commands also have shortages in a variety of skills.
Efforts are underway to fill these requirements where possible. For
example, the Department of the Army is undertaking recruiting and
assignment initiatives to eliminate most of the theater's shortage in
infantry.
Training in U.S. Pacific Command is in generally good shape,
especially among forward-based and deployed forces. However, without
supplemental reimbursement for costs incurred in contingency
operations, training will be substantially curtailed during the fourth
quarter of this fiscal year due to lack of funds. Further, Pacific
Fleet has insufficient funds to send desired numbers of sailors to
professional development training courses that improve their abilities
to perform at sea.
Funding shortfalls are also affecting readiness due to parts
shortages and deferred maintenance, especially among aviation units.
Pacific Fleet has had to direct redistribution of many parts from Naval
Air Stations to deployed units. As a result, the readiness of Pacific
Fleet's non-deployed aircraft has declined significantly over the past
two years which has severely constrained flight training and lowered
morale of affected personnel. Similarly, Pacific Air Forces have
consumed substantial percentages of their contingency stocks of spare
parts and have had to cannibalize parts from some aircraft. The present
cannibalization rate for F-16s has approximately doubled from some
aircraft. The present cannibalization rate for F-16s has approximately
doubled from a rate of 6.6% in fiscal year 1995.
Pacific Command components are maintaining high readiness of
forward-based and deployed forces, but at the expense of other units.
The readiness of West Coast naval forces is illustrative. They deploy
at historically normal levels of readiness, but are attaining
proficiency much later in their pre-deployment training than in past
years.
Additional forces that would be assigned to U.S. Pacific Command in
wartime are experiencing similar problems.
Top Priorities
Question. What are the top ten items on your most recent integrated
priority list?
Answer. I intentionally did not rank the 26 items on my most recent
Integrated Priority List (FY00-05 IPL). These items are all critical
and the difference in importance between them was not significant
enough to adopt a rank-ordered list. USCINCPAC's fiscal year 2000-05
Integrated Priority List is provided below: ------.
Changes in Priorities
Question. How do your top ten priorities differ from last year and
why?
Answer. ------.
Priorities and Deficiencies
Question. In your view, are present levels of investment funding
contained in the department's future year defense plan sufficient to
address the long-term recapitalization requirements of today's forces?
Answer. Yes. The President's fiscal year 1999 budget request
includes $48.7 billion for procurement. Procurement is projected to
reach $61.3 billion in fiscal year 2001, achieving the $60 billion goal
previously set by the Clinton Administration. This higher modernization
spending is essential to the future readiness and battlefield
superiority of U.S. forces. The fiscal year 1999 budget begins
implementation of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) plan for
transforming U.S. defense strategy and military forces. The QDR
provides a sound direction for long-term modernization. It also strikes
an appropriate balance between near-term modernization. It also strikes
an appropriate balance between near-term requirements and the need for
improved future capabilities. However, if savings projected in the
President's Budget from the Defense Reform Initiative, including the
reductions in infrastructure, are not achieved, recapitalization and
modernization will require additional funding.
Asian Economic Crisis
Question. We are all well aware of the current economic problems
plaguing the Asian region. Once robust economies remain fragile, the
debt crisis is not solved, currencies are being devalued, stock markets
are performing poorly and liquidity problems are crippling regional
trade. Admiral Prueher, as theater commander of the region that
includes these troubled economies, what difficulties or threats are
posed to the Pacific Command as a result of the current situation? In
your answer please discuss the impact of the crisis on the following:
pending foreign military sales; the ability of Pacific Rim nations to
participate in joint training exercises; and the force modernization
programs of regional allies.
Answer. The immediate threat posed to Pacific Command is that the
current financial crisis could progress into a security crisis. We have
already seen civil disturbances within Indonesia. Relations between
Indonesia and its neighbors are being effectively managed as the region
handles the economic refugees. The economic outlook has improved
slightly. Indonesia remains vulnerable to a resurgence of rioting and
civil disturbances as shortages of food and fuel grip the country. We
are watching this situation closely and are conducting appropriate
planning to protect U.S. interests should a crisis arise.
Over a long term, reduced ability to provide for self-defense and
the potential for regional friction increases the importance of
sustaining U.S. military presence and engagement programs. Our analysis
of the impact of the Asian financial crisis has focused primarily on
the hardest hit countries: Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the
Philippines, and South Korea. The financial crisis has caused each of
the countries to delay or curtail force modernization programs. To
date, Thailand is the only one of these countries to request the
termination of a major foreign military sale program, the purchase of
F/A-18 aircraft. Participation in combined training continues, but at a
somewhat reduced scale. No joint training exercises have been canceled
but we have worked with each nation to tailor bilateral exercises and
exchanges to meet their needs. USCINCPAC is working closely with each
country to ensure we remain engaged and emerge from this crisis with an
even closer relationship.
Question. Do you perceive any linkage between overall levels of
military cooperation in the theater and U.S. support for the IMF
package?
Answer. I do not perceive a direct linkage. Military cooperation is
driven primarily by the realities of financial austerity and not by
negotiations for IMF funding. My recent visits to countries in the
region indicate defense establishments recognize the short-term need
for IMF programs and the importance of structural reforms for long-term
prosperity. Across the board, the militaries recognize the original
source of their economic problems lies in government and financial
institutions and solutions will come from those quarters. This
professional willingness to ``stay in the barracks'' and take the IMF
medicine represents a positive trend in regional political development,
and reinforces investor confidence in Asia's long-term growth
potential. Regional military leaders realize erosion in international
support to the crisis--such as withdrawal of IMF programs--places
regional growth and stability at risk.
Question. What is your perception of ``man in the street''
attitudes in the region with regard to U.S. roles and responsibilities
in the resolution of the crisis?
Answer. The economic success of the Asia-Pacific region in the
1980's and 1990's brought increasing prosperity to the populations of
these countries. Increased prosperity raised expectations, but it did
not always increase understanding of the complicated nature of
financial markets, the global trading system, exchange rates, etc. The
suddenness and severity of the economic downturn in the region caught
the ``man in the street'' by surprise and found him struggling to
understand what was happening to his standard of living and future
prospects. Initially, some blamed Western financial systems and the
U.S. for their difficulties. For the most part, Asian leaders have
acted responsibly to address the financial crisis in their respective
countries. Editorial opinion and public opinion have generally been
less nationalistic than expected. People throughout Asia look to the
U.S. in their nationalistic than expected. People throughout Asia look
to the U.S. in their time of trouble for the leadership and forward
presence that have helped bring peace and stability to the region for
the past 50 years.
North Korean Threat
Question. General Tilelli, what is your current estimate of the
threat posed by North Korea? In your answer please discuss the North
Korea weapons of mass destruction program, the readiness and morale of
forces, the status of conventional arms modernization, and support
provided to international terrorist activities?
Answer. Considering the massive military forces, enormous
quantities of artillery, rocket systems, tanks, Surface to Surface
Missiles (SSMs), chemical weapons, special operations forces, and other
key components of military might, we assess North Korea has built and
maintains the capability to inflict enormous destruction on the South
through large-scale combat operations. However, viewing readiness as
both a state of preparation and ability to conduct full scale joint
operations in a coherent, effective, and sustained fashion, we assess
that North Korean forces are deficient to a degree. This deficiency is
primarily due to the ------. The primary cause of the reduced training
tempo has been a shortage of fuel and other materials and conservation
measures applied throughout the 1990s. ------. Although overwhelming
economic problems are severely limiting the pace of improvements to
readiness, we believe the force remains capable of conducting
unsophisticated corps and below movements, limited operations, and
integrating low levels of air and naval support with ground activity.
The most significant force modernization trend has been the gradual
shift, since the early 1980s, of military combat power toward the
forward area. Of specific concern is the continuing forward deployment
of long-range artillery and multiple rocket launcher (MRL) systems to
underground facilities and hardened sites within 15 kilometers of the
Demilitarized Zone. Operational exploitation forces and front line
corps with supporting artillery are positioned so far forward now that
they could launch an attack with very limited warning. ------. North
Korea has conducted its own terrorist attacks executed by trained
agents of the regime. The most recent incident was the 1987 bombing of
Korean Air Lines Flight 858 in which all 115 on board were killed. The
North formally renounced international terrorism in the early 1990s.
Although the North will continue to provide military weaponry and
associated training to military forces of consumer nations, it does not
directly support international terrorism. Any terrorist activity in
which it engages will likely be carried out by its own agents. At this
time, it would be counter-productive for the North to carry out any
terrorist activity as it would be detrimental to their efforts to
garner international support to help solve their current economic and
food crisis.
In summary despite continuing economic problems and the resultant
negative impact on its military readiness, North Korea still retains an
adequate capability to inflict tremendous damage on the ROK through
large-scale combat operations. Although capable of conducting terrorist
attacks, any reporting linking them to international terrorism would be
contrary to their national goals in gaining international aid.
1994 Agreed Framework on North Korea's Nuclear Program
Question. Update the Committee as to the status of efforts to
implement the terms of the 1994 agreed framework to dismantle North
Korea's nuclear program.
Answer. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK)
graphite-moderate nuclear reactors and related facilities remain
frozen. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has maintained a
continuous presence at the Yongbyon nuclear facility and has continued
with inspection activities related to verifying and monitoring the
freeze in the DPRK according to the terms of the Agreed Framework. The
U.S. and the DPRK are continuing to cooperate in safely storing the
DPRK spent nuclear fuel. Canning of the 8,000 spent fuel rods is nearly
complete. The canned fuel rods have been placed under IAEA seals and
surveillance. Work continues on cleaning, and storing loose rods and
rod fragments from the spent fuel basin.
Groundbreaking for the construction of the Light Water Reactors
(LWRs) took place on 19 August 1997. The Republic of Korea (ROK) is
supplying most of the personnel involved in the initial construction at
the reactor site. The installation in 1997 of mail and phone links
between the LWR site and the ROK represents the first such direct ties
between the North and South since the Korean War. Continued
construction is jeopardized by the failure of the U.S., ROK, and Japan
to reach funding commitments.
Heavy fuel oil (HFO) deliveries remain a persistent challenge, and
it is complicated by the result of lower-than-anticipated contributions
from the international community and higher-than anticipated oil and
shipping costs. Korean peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)
has a $47 million debt. If the debt is not retired soon, it may effect
future funding and/or HFO deliveries.
The LWR project has not reached sufficient progress to trigger the
DPRK's requirement to come into full compliance with its safeguards
agreement with the IAEA. ``When a significant portion of the LWR
project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components,''
the DPRK is to permit the IAEA to verify the accuracy and completeness
of DPRK's initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.
Differences between the two sides remain.
Four Party Talks
Question. What is your assessment of the North Korean willingness
to fully engage in the four-way talks to bring about a permanent
settlement on the peninsula?
Answer. The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) does not
appear willing to engage in the Four Party Talks on terms compatible to
the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK) at this time. The DPRK's
insistence on negotiating U.S. troop withdrawals was expected and
remains an obstacle. The DPRK has also expressed a fundamentally
different view of any eventual peace treaty, insisting on a U.S.-DPRK
treaty which excludes the ROK as a party. The DPRK wants some of the
benefits that the Four Party Talks offer (direct talks with the U.S.
and food aid), but it has been unwilling to take incremental measures
to reduce tension between the opposing military forces. Additionally,
there is no indication that the DPRK is prepared to recognize the ROK's
right to coexist. Whatever progress is achieved, it will be a long-term
and complicated process.
South Korea
Question. The South Koreans have recently elected a new government
headed by former dissident Kim Dae Jung. This represents the first time
that an opposition party in South Korea has assumed leadership through
a civilian to civilian transfer of power. General Tilelli, how do you
characterize the new administrations commitment to the ROK-US alliance?
Answer. On numerous occasions President Kim has publicly stated his
strong commitment to the Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance. Throughout
his career he has consistently supported United States Forces Korea
(USFK), and at graduation ceremonies at service academies this year he
affirmed the need for USFK presence even after unification.
Question. Have you had the opportunity to develop a strong
relationship with President Kim Dae Jung?
Answer. I have met with the President several times. I think we
have a good relationship. I look forward to working with him in the
future.
Question. Do you foresee any change in the military to military
relationship with the South Koreans?
Answer. Change is a normal consequence of any relationship, but the
changes I see ahead are positive and relate to force improvements,
enhanced integrated training, and technological development that will
further strengthen our military partnership.
Chinese Military Power
Question. Admiral Prueher, can you please discuss the power
projection capabilities of China's armed forces. In particular, could
they effectively move against Taiwan or the Spratly Islands if the U.S.
didn't intervene?
Answer. China has limited naval power projection capability and is
incapable of effectively conducting a full-scale amphibious invasion of
Taiwan or supporting a long-term occupation of the Spratly Islands. Its
capability is limited by significant deficiencies in technology,
training, tactics, and personnel throughout all Chinese armed forces,
accentuated by the lack of military air and sea lift capacity.
Operations against Taiwan's lightly defended coastal islands are within
the PLA's capability. These islands along the PRC's coast are
vulnerable to Chinese artillery, short-range ballistic missiles, and
air strikes.
The PRC's predominant power projection capability lies in its
ballistic missile force. These missiles include the CSS-5 (range:
1800km/972nm) and CSS-2 (range: 2800km/1512nm) intermediate-range
missiles, and CSS-6 (range: 600km/324nm) short-range ballistic missile.
China's short-range ballistic missiles are currently assessed to be
targeted solely against Taiwan. Beijing is making quantitative and
qualitative upgrades to its missile force, and is developing new types
of missiles that will improve its targeting capabilities in the region.
Additionally, China's ICBM force of CSS-4 missiles (range: 13,000km/
7,019nm) can strike Alaska, Hawaii, and most of the Continental U.S.
However, its primary nuclear mission is deterrence and retaliation if
attacked.
Question. What is the status of China's modernization program? How
is it being viewed in the region? How does that affect U.S. interests?
Answer. I would like to answer your questions in reverse order. At
the present time we do not see China as a threat to U.S. security
interests nor do we want China to view the United States as a threat.
China shares our mutual interests and concerns for a stable, peaceful
world. Their primary interests at this time are internal...how to feed,
clothe, shelter and provide jobs and energy to 1.3 billion people.
Nonetheless, China is a legitimate nuclear power and has a limited
ability to threaten portions of the United States. However, their
ballistic missiles are primarily a deterrent force as their stated
nuclear policy is ``no first use.'' In the conventional realm, the PRC
does not have the capability to project power much beyond its borders.
Leaders in the region view China through different lens and worry
about their intentions. However, the Chinese are borrowing a chapter
from our book on engagement and have embarked upon a program of high
level diplomatic and military visits, and port calls. The Chinese
leadership is clearly making greater efforts through confidence-
building measures to allay regional concerns.
China's modernization is focused on air and maritime power
projection capabilities and ballistic missile improvements. The Chinese
Air Force has purchased some high performance Su-27/FLANKER
interceptors from Russia and is building more advanced versions of its
indigenous fighters. They are also developing the F-10 fighter (F-16 C/
D equivalent). The Chinese Navy has received three Russian KILO
submarines and is building limited numbers of newer, more capable
surface combatants and submarines. China continues to modernize its
ballistic missile force, focusing on improved accuracy, mobility, and
reliability. China's military modernization program has yet to
adequately address shortfalls in command, control, communications,
intelligence, logistics, maintenance and training.
Many have expressed concerns about capabilities and intentions,
especially as China's forces modernize. We believe it will be 15-20
years before China is capable of projecting power with the ability to
challenge the United States conventionally and that is only if they
make all the right choices and investments.
Question. Has there been any change in the last year in China's
export of weapons? What are they selling and whom are they selling it
to?
Answer. ------.
--Iran took delivery in 1997 of over $310 million in equipment,
including FT-7 trainer aircraft, ballistic missile technology, and air
defense command and control equipment. China pledged to stop selling
anti-ship cruise missiles and production technology to Iran. However,
Chinese companies probably will continue to provide production
technology.
--Burma took delivery of $210 million of equipment in 1997
including fighter aircraft, tanks, armored infantry fighting vehicles
and field artillery. Deliveries continue into 1998.
--Military deliveries to Pakistan fell from $434 million in 1993 to
$60 million in 1997 and included LY-60 naval surface-to-air missiles.
The decline is not a long-term trend as relations remains strong. China
provides assistance to Pakistan's ballistic missile program and both
cooperate on main battle tank and trainer aircraft developments.
Additionally, Islamabad plans on buying a large number of FC-1 fighter
aircraft from China.
--China made a major $186 million sale of a battalion of 155mm
self-propelled artillery to Kuwait in late 1997. Kuwait's purchase was
a reward for Chinese diplomatic acquiescence in Desert Storm and to
elicit backing in the UN on Iraq issues. ------.
Question. Admiral Prueher, in last year's testimony, you referred
to Hong Kong as ``a harbinger of China's ability to integrate into the
global community as a responsible player''. Based on what you have seen
so far, what is your reaction to China's behavior?
Answer. I am encouraged so far by China's adherence to the ``One
Country, Two Systems'' policy enacted to handle the Hong Kong
reversion. While the relationship is still very young, the Beijing and
Hong Kong Special Autonomous Region (SAR) governments seem to have
agreed to a legitimate delineation of powers beneficial to Hong Kong's
special status. As an example, Beijing recently decided to retain the
head of the New China News Agency (NCNA) as the senior representative
of the central government in the SAR, vice posting an official envoy.
This announcement speaks well for Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa and
leaves him as the senior government official in the SAR.
There will surely be growing pains associated with this new
relationship, to include perhaps over-reactions or ultra-conservative
policies issued by the HK and SAR government itself. As Hong Kong and
Beijing become more comfortable working with each other, I expect we
will see less self-imposed restrictions from the SAR legislature.
U.S. Pacific Command's relations with Hong Kong have continued
virtually unabated since the reversion. Seventh Fleet continues to
conduct periodic port calls to the SAR with no Beijing interference.
This past December, USPACOM and U.S. Coast Guard forces joined in the
annual Hong Kong Search and Rescue Exercise. U.S. forces have
participated in this event for the past 26 years. Being a Hong Kong-
hosted event, the People's Liberation Army was also invited to
participate but chose to observe only. This is a demonstration of
Beijing's sincerity in upholding the delineation of responsibilities
agreed to under the ``One Country, Two Systems'' formula.
Chinese Misperceptions
Question. A recent report from the Defense Department's Office of
Net Assessment warns that ``China's leadership holds a number of
dangerous misperceptions that may well cause serious political friction
or even military conflict with the United States.'' Admiral Prueher, do
you agree with the report that China's leadership holds dangerous
misperceptions about the United States?
Answer. Several ``dangerous misperceptions'' noted by the Office of
Net Assessment are well-documented by the Intelligence Community. While
some Chinese military writers portray the United States as militarily
weak, most military officers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) hold
the U.S. defense establishment in high regard.
Some senior Chinese Community Party and military leaders believe
the United States wants to prevent the rise of a more powerful China
and that the world is transitioning to a multipolar one in which the
U.S. would gradually lose its status as the sole superpower. These
concerns have not prevented Beijing from fostering closer political and
defense ties with Washington in pursuit of its strategic agenda. The
Chinese hope that dialogue will reduce the potential for conflict
between the United States and China as Beijing's power and influence
grow.
Another ``misperception'' noted in the report, overestimating U.S.
military weakness, is somewhat overstated. The capabilities
demonstrated by the U.S.-led coalition during Desert Storm demonstrated
to Beijing that its military would be deficient against an adversary
with precision-guided weapons, cruise missiles, and stealth aircraft.
The Persian Gulf War and the Taiwan Straight crisis in 1996 underscored
the need to improve the PLA's ability to win ``local wars under high-
technology conditions'' and provided impetus for ongoing military
modernization program.
Question. A Washington Post article on this story notes that the
Chinese apparently consider you, Admiral Prueher, to be the individual
they prefer to deal with and have allowed you ``unparalleled access to
Chinese defense establishments.'' Is this accurate? If so, who do you
believe the Chinese are more comfortable dealing with you and how has
this improved relationship assisted you in your mission?
Answer. I do not agree with the characterization of my access as
``unparalleled.'' China has extended increased openness and access to
all senior U.S. military leaders as the political atmosphere between
our nations has improved. The Chinese place great importance in
personal relationships. Personal ties among senior military leaders
throughout the theater help to prevent misunderstandings and can be
especially useful in crises. By contrast, during the Taiwan Straits
crisis in March 1996, we have no basis upon which to open discussions
about intentions with Chinese military leaders.
Access to senior Chinese leaders enables USCINCPAC to build trust,
confidence, and transparency in this relationship. Continued dialogue
is important in promoting and advancing U.S. security interests
including: regional security cooperation; arms control and
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction; environmental
security; and a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Our principal
objective is to maintain regional peace and stability. China will play
a major role in this mutual interest.
Question. Do you believe the access you are getting to China's
military is commensurate with the access that we are giving to their
military leadership?
Answer. A major objective of our military-to-military program with
China is to increase their transparency. We see transparency as a key
component of regional stability by increasing trust through awareness.
Transparency is necessary to quell tensions and distrust throughout he
region of China's modernization efforts.
With transparency the goal, there are two ways to structure
military-to-military programs with the People's Liberation Army (PLA)--
using strict reciprocity or rough parity. Strict reciprocity measures
the degree of transparency in terms of what is received versus shown.
Strict reciprocity guarantees a poor outcome. Strict reciprocity is
seen in Beijing as demanding, to which the Chinese leadership cannot
comply and expect to survive the reaction within their party. In many
cases, the Chinese are unable to show similar facilities or
capabilities. Demanding reciprocity builds walls in front of our
ultimate transparency goal.
Rough parity, however, focuses on the effort. Progress is defined
as seeing something new. The trend is the key and U.S. efforts should
be to increase the pace of transparency. My experience indicates the
``rough parity'' approach is more successful in achieving transparency
than ``strict reciprocity.''
Transparency--not reciprocity--is the objective we seek.
Transparency can only be achieved at China's pace. There are many
examples that show proponents of rough parity have seen increased
transparency, as if the PLA seems to base a visitor's access on their
stance. Supporting the rough parity approach in our military-to-
military contacts will foster greater transparency in the future.
Question. What steps do you recommend to reduce the risk of
friction or conflict between the U.S. and China that could occur due to
misperceptions?
Answer. Continuous engagement is key to reducing the likelihood of
conflict. Two nations whose militaries are comfortable with each other
have an inherent mechanism to reduce the potential for misperceptions.
Communication is essential, mutual understanding is the outcome, and
trust is the ultimate goal. I have stressed with every Chinese leader I
have met, military and civilian, the need to establish and maintain our
lines of communication. I have also requested these lines be used not
only for discussing the easy topics on which we already agree, but to
bring up the harder issues where our points of view diverge.
Tlhe U.S.-PRC military relationship is approaching the point at
which disagreements can be aired without concern for the effect on the
overall relationship. This must continue. My December 1997 trip into
China pushed this message with encouraging success. Through a multi-
faceted program of seminars, confidence-building measures and senior-
level discussions, I proposed establishing a framework by which mutual
understanding was effected at all levels. Through our efforts and those
of OSD, the 1998 contact program reaches more of the PLA and deeper
into their ranks than any year previous.
The Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) provides the
formal framework missing in the U.S.-PRC relationship to reduce the
chance of miscalculation when our naval and/or air operations occur in
close proximity. This agreement was signed by Secretary Cohen and
Minister Chi in January and provides for Annual Meetings, Working
Groups and Special Meetings to discuss anything that increases safety
and decreases the risk of an incident between our two forces. Pacific
Command is the designated Executive Agent for implementation of this
agreement. Our first annual meeting is scheduled for July in Beijing.
India's Elections/Military Power
Question. Admiral Prueher, India has just completed Parliamentary
elections that have been marred by violence and are expected to produce
a divided government. Do you have any concerns about this election or
how it might affect India's defense policy or internal stability?
Answer. India elections typically result in sporadic violence,
since appeals to caste, religion, and ethnicity by politicians often
inflame tensions. This year's polling generally was viewed as free and
fair, with less violence than previous elections.
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leads an unwieldy, 13-party
coalition government that will be consumed with maintaining its fragile
majority, a condition which mitigates against it embarking on drastic
policy shifts. BJP campaign rhetoric called for openly declaring
nuclear weapons, strengthening the military, and accelerating ballistic
missile development and deployment. This should not be dismissed
outright as merely electioneering propaganda, but ideological
differences within the BJP, the need to get agreement from coalition
partners, and domestic program priorities make it unlikely we will see
any significant changes in these areas soon.
BJP domestic policies are unlikely to threaten India's internal
stability. In a bid to calm non-Hindu minorities, Prime Minister
Vajpayee has stressed his government will not pursue programs inimical
to India's many diverse communities.
The BJP government wants to establish solid and enduring ties to
the U.S. We look forward to working with the government to promote
continued progress in our bilateral defense relations.
Question. What are the implications of the religious, cultural, and
other divisions within India for its long-term stability?
Answer. India contends with many internal challenges that result
from enduring poverty, the inequities of caste, underdevelopment, poor
access to education, and endemic corruption. Despite such enormous
handicaps, the country manifests a remarkable resilience, best
demonstrated by its unwavering commitment to democracy. More devolution
of power from New Delhi to the states is the current trend. This is a
healthy development and does not suggest India's long-term stability is
threatened. In fact, just the opposite may result as regional and local
authorities gain power to influence decisions. Additionally, support
for continued economic liberalization exists across all major political
parties in India, and these reforms will help alleviate poverty and
improve living standards for all.
India's tolerance of diversity is one of its greatest historical
characteristics. Appeals to religious, cultural, and ethnic sentiments
by politicians, tribal leaders, and caste chieftains can provoke sudden
communal violence, but not lasting anarchy. Flare-ups, while remarkably
violent, usually are localized and short-lived. India's daily level of
violence is simply a result of tension that exists when diverse
communities live in close quarters under conditions of poverty and
scarcity. It does not suggest in any way that the country is
fragmenting.
Indonesia
Question. Are you concerned about the response of The People's
Republic of China--PRC to the prospect of Indonesians rioting against
or otherwise maltreating the ethnic Chinese minority in Indonesia?
Answer. The PRC regards the treatment of Indonesia's ethnic Chinese
citizens as an internal matter for the Indonesian authorities.
Beijing's only comment on the recent unrest has been to express the
view that the rioting against the ethnic Chinese is a temporary
phenomenon. The PRC prefers to be a positive influence. For example,
its recent announcement to provide $3 million in aid to Indonesia was
made without mention of anti-Chinese unrest. The PRC will not comment
further unless there is a significant escalation in the violence, and
Beijing perceives the Indonesian authorities are not responding
adequately to stem the violence. In this event, PRC actions would be
limited to public statements against the violence and/or demarches to
the Indonesian Government.
In contrast, Beijing has publicly expressed concern for the safety
of its 1,000-2,000 PRC citizens in Indonesia and has stated that the
PRC Embassy in Jakarta is prepared to provide assistance to PRC
citizens during the current instability. The need for assistance will
not be great since many PRC citizens have departed Indonesia already.
Should the violence escalate, the number of PRC citizens remaining in
Indonesia will be quite small.
Question. What if any, are the security implications of not
supporting the International Monetary Fund--IMF package proposed for
Indonesia?
Answer. As a non-economist, I am not qualified to judge the merits
of the IMF package in its entirety. However, even with IMF support, the
situation is serious but will become even more dire without support.
Indonesia's economic security is significant to U.S. strategic
interests and to regional stability. Instability in Indonesia can
spread to the larger region.
We are witnessing a growing potential for security problems
resulting from the harshest economic environment Indonesia has faced in
thirty years. These problems include immigration, potential for
expanded piracy, civil unrest and food security.
Immigration of Indonesians to Malaysia and deportations from
Malaysia and Singapore are continuing. Illegal immigrations are
complicating diplomatic and security relations between Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore, and could affect relations with Australia.
Immigration of refugees add to the traditional problem of high seas
piracy, which together increase the cost of commerce and stall economic
recovery. Although civil unrest in Indonesia has been largely confined
to university campuses, it has strong potential to grow. Reports
indicate that labor and Islamic organizations are evaluating ways to
join the students' moreover, unrest has an explosive ethnic factor to
it. Indonesia's ethnic Chinese have historically been a target during
periods of economic duress.
On top of these issues, Indonesia faces a potential major food
shortage. The devaluation of the rupiah increased four-fold the cost of
imported foodstuffs, and the country's worst drought in a century has
stunted annual food production. Recurring food shortages present the
possibility of a major international humanitarian and/or disaster
relief mission sometime in the future. International promises of food
relief have been linked to continued IMF program implementation.
We can not overstate Indonesia's strategic importance to U.S.
interests in the Asia-Pacific, nor the combined impact the above
security problems could have on the region's stability. With the
world's fourth largest population and a location astride Asia's
dominant shipping lanes linking Asia and the Arabian Gulf, events in
Indonesia affect the entire East Asian region. Clearly, Indonesia is an
example of a strategic and pivotal country where political stability,
economic prosperity, and regional security intertwine. Prolonged
economic hardship will have wide ranging security implications.
Question. What have been the effects and implications of U.S.
restrictions on arms transfer to Indonesia? Is the bilateral U.S.-
Indonesian military relationship suffering as a result?
Answer. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and the International Military
Education and Training program (IMET) are major tools the U.S. has in
shaping military-to-military relations with any country's armed forces.
These avenues represent our best opportunity to shape and influence
behavior, doctrine, and interoperability--Indonesia is no exception.
U.S. restrictions on arms transfer and IMET limit our ability to fully
engage and influence the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI). It is in U.S.
interests to have a comprehensive security relationship with Indonesia
without these restrictions.
Restrictions force Indonesia to look elsewhere to modernize its
armed forces and to train its leaders. The F-16 sale is just one
example. Even though Congress authorized Expanded IMET (E-IMET) in
1996, Indonesia refrained from taking advantage of the excellent
opportunity to train in the U.S. On a positive note, the new ABRI
Commander, General Wiranto, is seriously considering using E-IMET this
year because of the value he places on training with the U.S. military.
A stable and friendly Indonesia is strategically important to the
United States. As the dominant country in Southeast Asia, it has
enormous influence within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Within Indonesia, the ABRI is the
most important national institution. Restricting our military-to-
military relationship limits our opportunity to advance our interests
and to promote democratic values among the ABRI.
U.S.-Philippines Military Accord
Question. The Committee understands that the U.S. and the
Philippines have recently concluded an agreement that would allow for
the resumption of joint military exercises. When is the agreement
scheduled to go into effect?
Answer. The Visiting Forces Agreement will go into effect upon
ratification by the Philippine Senate. We expect the Philippine Senate
will consider the agreement during their next legislative session in
July 1998. We are optimistic that they will ratify it. No further
action is required on behalf of the U.S. Government, although some
entry procedures for DoD personnel remain to be clarified with the
Government of the Philippines. Until the agreement goes into effect
only visits/exchange involving twenty or less U.S. personnel will
occur.
Question. What are the legal protections for U.S. troops in the new
agreement?
Answer. The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) covers DoD military and
civilian personnel visiting the Philippines on official business. The
agreement provides substantial legal protections for covered U.S.
personnel. The agreement will ease the entry and exit procedures as
well as tax liability for our personnel on official business.
Furthermore, in the important area of criminal jurisdiction, the
Government of the Philippines agrees to automatically waive their
primary right to criminal jurisdictional upon U.S. request in cases of
particular importance to the Philippine government. The U.S. will
exercise criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed between U.S.
personnel. Equally important, the agreement allows the U.S. military to
determine if an offense was committed during the performance of
official duties, and then exercise jurisdiction over such offenses.
Finally, custody of U.S. personnel resides with the U.S. military upon
our request.
Philippiines Status of Forces Agreement
Question. What type of joint exercises and activities do you
foresee as a result of this agreement?
Answer. Once the Philippine Senate ratifies the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) we plan to resume medium-scale exercises in support of
the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty as well as U.S. Naval port
visits.
The U.S.-Philippine exercise program is designed to reinforce the
treaty by mutual defense cooperation. It consists of bilateral training
and modest field exercises in staff planning, small unit tactics, use
of weapons and special operations. Since 1996 these activities have
been limited to 20 U.S. personnel per event, due to the absence of a
status of forces agreement (SOFA). Following ratification of the VFA we
plan to conduct a schedule of events similar to that conducted prior to
the lapse in SOFA, by expanding existing training events (conducted 3-6
times per year and involving less than 100 U.S. personnel) and resuming
annual BALIKATAN field exercises (involving approximately 400 U.S.
personnel). Additionally, we plan to resume port visits to the
Philippines of up to 30 ships per year.
U.S.-Japan Security Alliance
Question. Can you please update the Committee on the most recent
changes to the `Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation'? In
particular, how does it expand Japan's role in an Asian conflict? How
does the new arrangement effect your operations? What has been the
reaction in the region to this new agreement?
Answer. The September 1997 issuance of the revised ``Guidelines for
U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation'' was designed to re-orient the U.S.-
Japan Security relationship from a Cold War focus to one that allows
both countries to meet the regional and international challenges of the
21st Century. Both countries are in the process of implementing the
Guidelines. For Japan, this involves preparing legislation to change
their laws to allow greater participation in peacekeeping, humanitarian
assistance/disaster relief, and maritime intercept operations. Japan
has also emphasized improving provisions of the existing Acquisition
and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in order to meet the challenges of
both peacetime and contingency operations, particularly in terms of
rear area support to U.S. forces. Finally, the U.S. and Japan have
established a Bilateral Planning Committee, an effort that will allow
for bilateral contingency planning.
Except for provisions regarding the defense of Japan, the
Guidelines are not intended to commit the Japan Self Defense Force
(JSDF) to actual combat in an Asian conflict. What they will do is
allow for critical Japanese support, primarily in rear area support and
in activities adjacent to a combat area. Efforts such as maritime
interdiction, search and rescue, patrolling, and minesweeping will
complement U.S. effort by allowing our forces to focus more on direct
combat operations. These new arrangements, once fully implemented, have
the potential to significantly reduce the operational and logistics
challenges we currently face in the region.
Understandably, there has been some regional concern over
perceptions of a rearmed Japan. We have reassured governments in the
region that the Guidelines are not aimed at any specific country and
are not a guise for Japanese rearmament.
U.S. Marines in Okinawa
Question. The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was
established in 1995 to reduce the burden of the U.S. military presence
on the people of Okinawa. As part of this process, the United States is
to return Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to Japan after Japan
provides a suitable replacement facility that meets U.S. operational
requirements. The replacement is to be a sea-based facility with an
availability date of about 7 to 10 years at a cost of $4 billion.
Admiral, what is the status to the SACO process and what is the
likelihood of the U.S. maintaining its military presence at Okinawa?
Why is a U.S. military presence at Okinawa important? If the U.S. is
forced to leave Okinawa, what are the basing alternatives?
Answer. I am satisfied with the overall progress that has been
accomplished in implementing SACO. In three of the four categories:
SOFA, Training and Operational Procedures, and Noise Reduction
Initiatives, there has been either completion or significant progress.
The fourth category of land return has proved to be the most difficult
with progress in only one of eleven issues. This is primarily due to
the Government of Japan'-GOJ's continuing difficulty in resolving
Futenma's relocation.
There are no plans to change our current military posture on
Okinawa. Along with other forces in the region, the physical presence
of our forces on Okinawa underscores our commitment to the defense of
Japan. Additionally, Okinawa's location and facilities provide our
forward forces a unique power projection capability vital to our
Pacific Military Strategy.
Okinawa's superb strategic location, exceptional facilities, and
the Government of Japan's generous funding support cannot be replicated
elsewhere. Should the strategic situation in the Pacific change, we
will evaluate the strategic environment and make the appropriate
decision at that time, together with our Japanese allies.
Question. What is the status of the sea-based facility? According
to the GAO, maintenance funding responsibility between the U.S. and
Japan for the sea-based facility remains uncertain. Current
arrangements call for Japan to provide bases, while the United States
pays for the maintenance of these facilities. GOA and DoD have
estimated that the annual maintenance costs for the sea-based facility
could be $200 million. In contrast, the average annual maintenance cost
of the MCAS at Futenma is $2.8 million. Have the Japanese offered to
pay the maintenance costs for the sea-based facility?
Answer. U.S.-Japanese negotiations to develop a replacement for
Futenma Air Station are on hold while the Government of Japan-GOJ
continues its effort to obtain the support of the Okinawa prefectural
government for the proposed sea-based facility--SBF. To date, the GOJ
has been unable to convince Okinawa's Governor Ota to reconsider his
opposition to the SBF. We believe there will be little change on this
issue through the summer as Okinawa enters a busy local election period
that culminates with a gubernational election in November.
The estimated maintenance costs associated with the SBF are of
great concern to us. I must point out, though, the facility has not
been designed yet and therefore an accurate estimate of maintenance
costs is speculative at best. In my view, imposing these costs on us
would not meet Japan's commitment to fund replacement of Futenma's
capabilities. DoD has raised this issue with the GOJ, but preliminary
discussions have been inconclusive. However, the GOJ indicated a
willingness to negotiate these costs once they have resolved the larger
issue of the SBF in Okinawa.
Question. If Japan declines to assume the operations and
maintenance costs of the sea-based facility, what are our options?
Answer. First of all I want to emphasize my confidence in our
ability to resolve this issue with the Government of Japan. Our current
position is that the Japanese must assume these costs, as we simply
cannot afford the estimated maintenance costs of this type of facility.
If this issue remains unresolved we may have to exercise our option of
informing the Government of Japan that the proposed sea-based facility
is not acceptable to the U.S., and that we will maintain the status quo
by remaining at Futenma.
Question. Shouldn't an agreement be reached on this issue before
construction of the facility begins?
Answer. Yes. There should be an agreement on responsibility for
maintenance costs in place prior to the beginning of any construction
for this facility.
Foreign Currency Fluctuation and Burdensharing
Question. The Department of Defense recently announced that it
would base Korean burdensharing calculations on outdated foreign
currency exchange rates used during initial formulation of the DOD
budget request; before the recent fall in the value of Pacific Rim
currencies. This change will result in the U.S. foregoing a windfall in
burdensharing of roughly $260 million. Gentlemen, under what authority
has DOD revised its burdensharing calculations with Korea?
Answer. The legal authority to negotiate, conclude, and revise
defense cost-sharing agreements derives from the President's
constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations, and as Commander
in Chief, under Article II of the Constitution, as exercised by the
Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense respectively, and from the
U.S.--Korea Mutual Defense Treaty. In addition, the Congress added in
1993 section 2350j to title 10 of the U.S. Code to authorize the
Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Secretary of State,
to accept cash contributions from any country or regional organization.
This provision relating to ``burdensharing'' authorizes such
contributions to be available to pay costs related to compensation for
Department of Defense (DOD) local national employees, military
construction projects, and DOD supplies and services.
When United States Forces, Korea (USFK) budgeted for fiscal year
1998, it used a fixed ratio that was determined by the Under Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller) of 907.6 won to the dollar to calculate the
dollar value of its won-based expenses. If the Republic of Korea (ROK)
were required to make most of its 1998 cost-sharing contribution in
dollars, as required by the 1995-1998 U.S.-ROK Special Measures
Agreement (SMA), the Defense Department would realize a significant
windfall in paying these won-based expenses because of the dramatic
depreciation of the Korean won. To prevent this windfall, the State and
Defense Departments and the ROK are discussing an adjustment to the SMA
that would require the ROK to satisfy the same amount of DOD won-based
expenses, but in won instead of dollars. Under the amended payment
arrangement, the government of the Republic of Korea will provide a
value, in purchasing power terms, equal to that originally envisioned
in the SMA's provisions for the cost-sharing contribution of the
Government of the Republic of Korea. In this way, the Department of
Defense will neither suffer a financial penalty nor realize a profit
from the Korean economic crisis.
Question. Are there other instances of such a change in policy?
Answer. Revising the 1996 multi-year Special Measures Agreement
(SMA) between the Republic of Korea and the United States was not a
policy-driven process. Last year's Asian financial market crisis took
its toll on the Korean economy. This crisis, which halved the value of
the Korean won relative to the dollar, had major cost-sharing
implications. The Secretary of Defense was determined to find a way to
preserve the value of our agreement while taking into account the
impact of the financial crisis on the value of the won. This cost-
sharing issue has not affected our strong security relationship with
the Republic of Korea, which remains central to the stability of the
Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. The Department is aware of no
other instances of amending cost-sharing arrangements.
Question. Have any U.S. allies offered to make similar currency
related concession during past downturns of the dollar?
Answer. The Department is aware of no other instances whereby U.S.
allies supporting forward-deployed forces (in the Gulf Cooperation
Council, NATO, and East Asia Pacific regions) made adjustments to cost-
sharing arrangement.
In the East Asia Pacific area of responsibility, Japan's cost-
sharing contributions, as outlined in the current Special Measures
Agreement between the United States and Japan, are made in Japanese
yen, not U.S. dollars.
Question. Does the decline in Asian currencies provide the U.S. an
opportunity to repair and upgrade our facilities in Asia at a lower
cost?
Answer. The current won devaluation provides limited savings to the
U.S. taxpayer for the repair and upgrade of facilities in Korea.
Inflation, higher construction bids, and the services' corresponding
funding cuts offset these as shown below:
--A 10% local inflation rate.
--A 40% increase in local fuel costs.
--A 50% increase in the cost of construction materials.
--A volatile fluctuation of the Won has raised the risk of
contractors, resulting in higher bids.
--A reduced base in contractors bidding. (This reduction caused by
the high number of construction contractors who have gone into
receivership).
Cost for renovating a 3-story concrete block building to the DOD
1+1 standard in September 96 was $1.38 million and the Government
estimate for a similar project in FY98 is $1.8 million. On the other
hand, cost of a 2-story metal skin barracks renovation averaged
$504,000 in Fiscal Year 97, but is expected to drop to $450,000 in
fiscal Year 98 despite local inflation.
United States Forces Korea (USFK) does not realize any significant
economic gain as a result of the current Asian economic situation. In
general, USFK maintains the same level of purchasing power for all Won
based contracts, since all disbursements are obligated at the Office of
the Secretary of Defense established budget (exchange) rate. Therefore,
any savings are returned to the Department of Defense Foreign Currency
Fluctuation Account and never realized by USFK.
Question. What are your priorities for repairs and upgrades and how
has the expected cost of those projects changed over the last year?
Answer. Our priorities for repairs and upgrades have not changed.
They are barracks, war fighting operational facilities, and
infrastructure upgrades. Repair and upgrade costs have decreased,
though insignificantly, in some areas of work, while increased in
others. The won devaluation has been offset by increased construction
and fuel costs, and higher construction bids due to risks in the
current contracting environment that creates an uncertain future.
Furthermore, service component funding cuts based on won devaluation
eliminates any real gain in the number of repair and upgrade projects.
Year 2000 Computer Problem
Question. One of the problems that we face as we enter the next
century is older computers that are only programmed to remember the
last two digits in a year. Thus they remember `1997' as simply `97'.
The year 2000, however will be saved as `00', the same as the year
1900. This can lead to calculation errors and systems failures. How
serious is the problem for your Command? What would be the impact if
your Mission Critical Systems were not corrected by the year 2000?
Answer. This issue is receiving urgent attention throughout U.S.
Pacific Command. All components and functional areas are affected. Our
emphasis is not only on information management but also to ensure that
our logistical, medical, base infrastructure and weapons systems are
ready for the transition.
Pacific Command Headquarters has one unique mission critical
command and control system that is affected. Fixes to this system will
be completed by December 98. We also have three other unique systems,
but these are non-mission critical C4 systems. They will be fixed by
March 99.
The services are responsible for fixing and testing the majority of
the theater's affected systems. I established a command-wide working
group to serve as a focal point to coordinate component, service and
Pacific Command efforts.
The impact of not correcting Year 2000 problems is significant, but
cannot be fully determined at this time. The potential ranges from loss
of training value due to confusion in an exercise to temporary
interruptions of command and control that could result in life-
threatening mishaps. We will continue to work aggressively with the
Joint Staff, our components, the services, the Defense Information
Systems Agency and system providers to implement fixes, and to prepare
contingency plans where appropriate.
Question. Do you know of any plans to conduct JCS Exercises next
year with `the clocks turned forward; to identify any uncorrected year
2000 computer problems? Do you believe this would be a valuable test to
see if your critical computer systems will be ready for the year 2000?
Answer. The Joint Staff and the Secretary of Defense's staff are
assessing the feasibility of an integrated exercise to test systems for
these problems sometime in 1999. A broad test would be of value only as
corrective actions near completion. Resources to address the Year 2000
issue are scarce. Individual systems are tested after software fixes
are made. A premature major exercise could divert some of the resources
and effort away from working-in-progress needed to correct Year 2000
problems.
Question. Have you begun developing contingency plans in case your
Mission Critical Systems are ot year 2000 compliant?
Anwer. Yes. In addition to making appropriate fixes to our systems,
we are developing contingency plans for our headquarters' systems.
Pacific Command's components are also preparing contingency plans based
on guidance from their respective services. We are working closely with
the Joint Staff and Defense agencies as they coordinate and integrate
this effort.
Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund (CBTRIF)
Question. With Congressional support the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff established the Combating Terrorism Readiness
Initiative Fund. How much did PACOM receive from this fund in fiscal
year 1997 and what were the funds used for?
Answer. In fiscal year 1997, Pacific Command received $4.82 million
(including $2.49 million for U.S. Forces Korea) from this fund. We used
the funds to reduce the risks of terrorist attack, based on priorities
established following theater-wide vulnerability assessments. Most of
the money was spent to enhance physical security systems in forward
locations.
The largest fiscal year 1997 expenditures were:
Pacific Fleet.................... 625,000 Portable metal detectors
and X-ray scanners for
aircraft carriers
Marine Forces pacific............ 309,000 Metal detectors, sensor
lights, mobile
communications systems,
military working dogs
for III Marine
Expeditionary Force
(MEF)
............................... 120,000 Information security
system for I MEF
U.S. Forces Korea................ 320,000 Perimeter wall of
Yongsan Army Garrison
............................... 55,000 Security monitoring
system for Yongsan Army
Garrison
Headquarters, Pacific Command.... 100,000 Computer and video
training equipment for
headquarters and
component command
Question. How much has PACOM requested from the fund for fiscal
year 1998?
Answer. To date, Pacific Command has requested $6.44 million in
CBTRIF funds for fiscal year 1998 (including $3.56 million for U.S.
Forces Korea). Of the $6.44 million, the Joint Staff has approved $1.77
million, disapproved $75 thousand, and is still considering the
remainder. We are also reviewing additional requests from Pacific
Command component commanders totaling $3.66 million. We are working
closely with the Joint Staff to expedite their consideration.
Approved fiscal year 1998 requests include:
Pacific Fleet.................... $498,500 Construct a barrier wall
and window treatment
for Bachelor Enlisted
Quarters, Atsugi, Japan
............................... 178,000 Vehicle barricade
systems for housing
areas in Combined Fleet
Activity, Sasebo, Japan
............................... 306,000 Vehicle barricade
systems for gates to
Combined Fleet
Activity, Sasebo, Japan
............................... 80,000 Access and egress
control system for HQ,
Commander Naval Forces
Korea
Marine Forces Pacific............ 480,000 Expanded explosive
detector for III Marine
Expeditionary Forces
Force Protection
Question. What are the top ten force protection priorities for
PACOM in fiscal year 1999? Have these items been fully funded in the
services' budget requests? If these items are not fully funded, what
will be the specific impact on your ability to protect the forces under
your command?
Answer. Pacific Command establishes theater force protection
priorities in concert with its components following vulnerability
assessments. Services fund requirements based on availability of funds.
Unfunded requirements represent some risk and are candidates for future
funding. With some particular exceptions, the probability of attack
upon U.S. personnel or facilities is low throughout the Pacific
Theater. The top ten priorities on Pacific Command's fiscal year 1999
Force Protection Integrated Priority List are:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Funding status Funded required
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Manpower for Installation Fully............. $95.30
Security (Pacific Fleet).
2. Antiterrorism Personnel....... Partial........... $2.26 million
$4.04 million
Impact: Commands' development and
implementation of comprehensive
antiterrorism programs will not
progress as rapidly as desired.
Installation security forces are
not to be fully manned
3. Installation Vulnerability Partial........... $297 thousand
Assessments. $391 thousand
Impact: Pacific Command and U.S.
Army Pacific assessment programs
are only partially funded.
Pacific Command's Antiterrorism
Division will be unable to
conduct independent assessments
of Defense Attache and Security
Assistance Offices throughout
the theater as required by DOD
guidance. U.S. Army Pacific will
be unable to assess three of
nine vulnerability assessments
at installations in Japan
4. Antiterrorism/Force Protection Partial........... $274 thousand
Training. $525 thousand
Impact: Antiterrorism programs in
Pacific Command will be
developed and implemented at a
slower pace than planned.
Components may not have
sufficient instructors to
conduct required training. Unit
Force Protection Officers may be
inadequately trained to execute
their responsibilities and
duties
5. Pipeline/Fuel Tank Farm Unfunded.......... $800 thousand
Protection (U.S. Army Pacific).
Impact: This pipeline provides
overland bulk distribution of
petroleum, oils and lubricants
for U.S. forces on Okinawa.
Without the physical security
upgrades to augment Japanese
contract security guards, the
pipeline is at some risk
6. Barriers (Pacific Air Forces). Unfunded.......... $170 thousand
Impact: Degrades ability of
security forces to control
vehicle access to critical areas
and facilities
7. Physical Security improvements Unfunded.......... $780 thousand
(Marine Forces Pacific).
Impact: Camp Butler Okinawa will
be unable to procure equipment
and physical security upgrades.
Equipment includes expanded
explosive detection systems,
metal detectors, portable
concrete barriers and riot gear
8. Electronic Security System Fully............. $1.11 million
(Pacific Fleet).
9. Restricted Area Lighting for Unfunded.......... $840 thousand
Bases (Pacific Air Forces).
Impact: Existing restricted area
and airfield lighting fails to
meet security requirements at
Elemndorf, Kunsan and Misawa
Airbases
10. Physical security upgrades to Unfunded.......... $450 thousand
three Ammunition Storage
facilities in Japan (U.S. Army
Pacific).
Impact: Warfighting supplies are
at greater risk to terrorist
acts
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Joint Exercises
Question. In the Quadrennial Defense Review the Department of
Defense announced plans to reduce the number of man-days required for
joint exercises by 15% in order to reduce high PERSTEMPO rates. Has
PACOM experienced a reduction in its JCS exercises? If so, has this had
a noticeable effect on your PERSTEMPO rates?
Answer. USPACOM has reduced its joint exercise man-days to comply
with the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) mandate. We have reduced man-
days primarily by reducing exercise length and number of participants,
rather than reducing the number of exercises.
Joint exercises account for about five percent of USPACOM
PERSTEMPO, so the reduction is expected to reduce overall theater
PERSTEMPO by only one to two percent.
Question. How do you determine that the right mix of exercises is
being conducted?
Answer. The U.S. Pacific Command Joint Exercise Program is designed
to train U.S., allied and friendly forces in essential skills necessary
to conduct military options ranging from Humanitarian Assistance/
Disaster Relief (HA/DR) to Major Theater War (MTW). Our exercises are
designed to train USPACOM and JTF staffs in conducting joint and
multinational operations, enhance joint interoperability among service
components, and integrate the supporting CINCs and interagency
organizations. Regional engagement and presence, essential elements of
our national and theater engagement strategies, are byproducts of these
exercises.
The Joint Mission Essential Task List provides the full array of
military task where we must be proficient. Each exercise is designed to
accomplish a certain number of training objectives, which are derived
from these tasks. By comparing exercise training objectives with
required tasks, Pacific Command can assess whether its exercise program
is meeting theater training objectives.
The Chairman's Joint Training System also governs the structure of
the exercise program. This requirements-based training ensures mission
requirements are balanced with scarce resources. It forces us to
analyze the tasks, identify the appropriate training audience, and set
the training frequencies.
Question. What portion of the exercises that you conduct is
primarily to train U.S. forces for their wartime mission and what
portion is for regional engagement?
Answer. Pacific Command's Joint Exercise Program consists of 18 to
20 exercises annually. All but two of these exercises are conducted
primarily as training for wartime missions. Where possible, we also
incorporate regional engagement objectives into exercises. For example,
the purpose of annual COBRA GOLD exercises in Thailand is to prepare
Pacific Command's joint forces to fight in a Southeast Asian
environment in support of treaty obligations. This exercise also
promotes interoperability with the military forces of a key treaty
ally. Additionally, when opportunities permit during the exercise, some
U.S. forces conduct small civic and humanitarian projects resulting in
additional training that also directly supports a regional engagement
objectives.
POW/MIAS
Question. The Committee understands that there are currently 2,097
Americans unaccounted for in southeast Asia and that Joint Task Force-
Full Accounting has been working hard to address this issue. Could you
please summarize the results of their work over the last years?
Answer. In Fiscal Year 1997 Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-
FA) conducted 11 joint field activities (JFAs) in Southeast Asia (5 in
both Vietnam and Laos and 1 in Cambodia).
JTF-FA investigated 235 cases (163 Vietnam, 55 in Lass, and 17 in
Cambodia) and excavated 49 sites (34 in Vietnam, 12 in Laos, and 3 in
Cambodia).
These efforts resulted in the repatriation of 31 remains believed
to be those of unaccounted-for Americans. During 1997, the remains of
35 Americans were officially identified. JTF-FA also responded to 484
next-of-kin requests and forwarded 905 reports to next-of-kin via the
Services' casualty affairs offices.
Thus far in 1998, JTF-FA has investigated 66 cases (49 in Vietnam,
13 in Laos, and 4 in Cambodia) and excavated 19 sites (7 in Vietnam, 8
in Laos, and 4 in Cambodia).
Additionally, 21 remains have been repatriated and 9 remains
identified as previously unaccounted-for Americans.
Currently, 2,090 Americans are still unaccounted for.
Question. Has the Vietnam government been cooperative during these
investigations?
Answer. The Vietnamese government has continued to cooperate well
with the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) during these
investigations. The Vietnamese have improved their advance work in
preparation for joint field activities (JFAs), provided better access
to military sensitive areas, and approved the extension of JFAs to
allow teams to complete excavations. The field teams are also receiving
better cooperation at the provincial level. Vietnamese citizens
continue to come forward individually, often providing information
critical to the success of individual investigations and recoveries.
The Vietnamese government continues to support trilateral
investigations as evidence by the 21 Vietnamese witnesses that have
supported investigations in Laos.
Based on a U.S. request, the Vietnamese are focusing their efforts
on conducting more unilateral investigations. During 1997, JTF-FA
adjusted the schedule of JFAs to permit Vietnam and Laos to concentrate
on unilateral investigations. During two specified unilateral periods,
the Vietnamese conducted 56 investigations relating to losses involving
unaccounted-for Americans. During the 50th JFA (21 April--23 May 1998),
the Vietnamese will field one additional team to conduct unilateral
investigations. This is the first time the Vietnamese will have
conducted unilateral investigations concurrently with joint teams
during a major field activity. The unilateral investigations have
resulted in the development of new leads for joint investigations.
Question. Do you have any news from the current investigation going
on now in Vietnam?
Answer. Joint Task Force-Full Accounting's (JTF-FA) 49th joint
field activity (JFA) concluded a series of investigations and remains
recovery operations in Vietnam on 21 March 1998. JTF-FA team,
consisting of 112 U.S. personnel, investigated 49 cases and excavated 7
sites.
On 28-29 March 1998, a joint forensic team examined eleven remains
recovered or received during the 49th JFA, retaining five sets for
further examination at the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory
in Hawaii.
The operation was very successful with investigation and recovery
teams operating throughout the entire country off Vietnam. The
Vietnamese advance work was excellent: key witnesses were made
available, and land compensation issues were resolved prior to the
arrival of the field teams.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
Thursday, March 19, 1998.
TESTIMONY OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND OTHER INTERESTED INDIVIDUALS AND
ORGANIZATIONS
----------
HIGH MOBILITY MULTIPURPOSE WHEELED VEHICLE
WITNESS
HON. TIM ROEMER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order.
This morning, the Committee will hear testimony from
Members of Congress and from witnesses outside of the Congress.
The Committee has basically completed the hearing process for
the fiscal year 1999 period. We have heard from all the service
secretaries and the chiefs of each service. All of the regional
commanders in chiefs have appeared.
Yesterday, we had a hearing on the quality of life from the
perspectives of the Sergeant Majors of the Army and Marine
Corps, the Chief Petty Officer of the Navy and Chief Master
Sergeant of the Air Force.
We also conducted a hearing on readiness yesterday with the
vice chiefs of each service and the assistant commandant of the
Marine Corps, and now we are going to hear from Members of
Congress who do not serve on this subcommittee and those of you
who represent organizations and institutions who support our
men and women in uniform.
Many of you here today have testified before, but for those
who are here for the first time, let me explain how we proceed.
Each of your prepared statements will appear totally in the
published hearing volume, and we ask that you summarize your
testimony in 5 minutes or less, inasmuch as we have over 40
witnesses scheduled to appear today.
That may seem like a short period of time, but it is
consistent with the 5-minute rule the Committee works under.
Throughout the year, through all of our hearings, each Member
of this Committee has to express his thoughts and ask questions
in 5-minute intervals or less. Many members will be coming in
and out today because they are working in other subcommittees
on the supplemental appropriations bill. So while they are not
here at the moment, you will see most of them sometime during
the hearing.
Before we get started, I just wanted to relate some
personal experiences we had during the last year visiting our
troops in the field. Some of us have been to Bosnia as many as
three times in the last 6 months, traveled throughout Southwest
Asia, visiting our troops in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait,
checking on force protection measures that have been put into
place since the Khobar Towers bombing. Mr. Murtha has led a
group to Korea.
So between the two of us and all of our members, we have
covered most of the major hot spots in the world, and we have
gotten to see firsthand what we have been told about in this
room.
What we find are well-trained, highly motivated, dedicated
men and women who are proud of their Country and who welcome
the opportunity to make a contribution to our national
security.
I bring this up only because many of you in this room have
devoted a great deal of time and effort to making sure our
troops have what they need in the way of equipment, training,
to make sure their quality of life is what it should be and to
ensure that their families are taken care of during the time
they are deployed so far away from home.
Things aren't perfect yet, but we are not done yet. So
together all of us and each of the Members of this Committee
will continue to work to do the best we can for these
outstanding men and women who go in harm's way for our Country.
Now I would like to recognize a very distinguished Member
of Congress, Mr. Tim Roemer, from Indiana, who stays in close
touch with the Chairman and the Members of this Committee on
issues of vital concern to our national security effort.
Congressman Roemer, we are happy to recognize you, sir.
Statement of Congressman Roemer
Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I want to ask
unanimous consent for my entire statement to be entered into
the record.
Mr. Young. Without objection, that will be done.
Mr. Roemer. I just want to speak from the heart to you for
a couple of minutes and then answer any questions you might
have.
First of all, on behalf of the 558,000 people that I
represent and roughly 1,260 workers that work in the three
plants making the two-and-a-half-ton truck, the HMMWV and the
Sea Snake Supersonic Missile, we want to express our thanks to
you and the Committee for your help in bolstering our defense
efforts in this country and improving the quality of life for
our military personnel and in maintaining good, high-paying
jobs for people in this country.
If not for your help and your dedication, Mr. Chairman, and
the people on this Committee, we might be in some trouble back
home in Indiana.
I am here to talk to you about three different programs and
thank you for your help and continue to seek out your support,
three important programs for the national security of this
country.
First of all, you mentioned that many members here on this
Committee have traveled to Bosnia. You probably saw the HMMWV,
which is made in Mishawaka, Indiana, over there.
Last year, three soldiers in Bosnia walked away unharmed,
unhurt after their HMMWV ran over a 14-pound antitank land
mine. Now, that was an uparmored HMMWV. It is working
beautifully. There are no complaints from the Army. The Army
continually comes before Congress and does not ask for enough
money to fund this program, even though it is working
beautifully.
We have to come before your Committee and ask for a plus-
up, which we are asking again today, based upon the performance
of the HMMWV, the safety of the HMMWV and the need and the
requirement of the HMMWV throughout the world for the safety of
our troops, as evidenced from that latest example in Bosnia.
Secondly, when we talk about not only performance of the
HMMWV but efficiency, we make and remanufacture a two-and-a-
half-ton truck back in South Bend, Indiana. The two-and-a-half-
ton truck actually remanufactures 20-year-old trucks.
There is nothing sexy about this program, Mr. Chairman. I
wish I was in here to talk about an F-22 or something that I
had a big diagram of. These trucks keep our men and women safe.
They deliver personnel and supplies to our troops in the field.
We saved operations and support--O&S $500 million
remanufacturing these trucks; and I know you are looking for
savings in this tight budget as well, too.
This is a very, very effective and efficient program,
making something that our troops need, and I would ask your
support on that program.
Thirdly, I ask your support for a program that has worked
well in the past. Allied Signal is the only U.S. supplier of
supersonic sea skimming targets. Interestingly enough, we are
competing with the Navy, with Russian-made missiles.
Now, I have had brief conversations and long conversations
with you about this before, but for us to have competition with
Russian-made missiles when the Russians could be making the MA-
31, selling it to Iraq or Iran or in the Middle East or to
North Korea, we subsidize then the Russians making those
missiles that go to other unfriendly countries that may be
aimed at our personnel. That is one concern I have.
Secondly, if Allied Signal doesn't stay in this business
and we lose our industrial base and we don't have a U.S.
supplier in this field, that is a big concern.
Thirdly, Mr. Chairman, I know you are very, very sensitive
to this, we have 150 U.S. taxpayers that have made this missile
that are very, very dedicated to the safety and the security of
this Country. I don't think 150 people should be thrown out of
jobs when I know the Russian Duma, if they had their votes,
they would vote, I am sure, within Russia, to buy the MA-31 and
not to buy our Sea Snake or Vandal Missile. I think we should
do the same thing here; employ our people to get a good system.
If we want to reverse gear and get access to the MA-31 for
reasons of knowing what might be coming at us, I certainly
understand putting some money forward on that concern; but not
to put out a U.S. supplier and not to hurt our industrial base.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I say to you, in all due respect, I
want to help you make sure that not only these kinds of
programs are supported within the budget but the quality of
life for our personnel is supported within this budget; that
our personnel have good quality child care; that our personnel
live in good quality housing; and that our personnel in the
military forces not be forced to be on food stamps. And if that
takes bipartisan efforts to get you a little bit more money, I
am supportive of that and would look forward to working with
you on that.
Mr. Young. Congressman, thank you very much.
As you know, the Committee has--thanks to much of your
persuasive effort and the work of Mr. Hobson, who we appointed
as a special subcommittee of the subcommittee to deal with the
truck issues, we have raised the budget request substantially
in the last couple of years for the remanufacturing and the
purchase of the new vehicles. We recognize, and most of our
witnesses that have been here this year have told us, without
question, they need trucks. They need their trucks repaired;
and, without the trucks, they can't function.
So we appreciate your support and thank you very much for
being here.
Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. As you and I have discussed many times, we don't
have the extra money in our budget this year that we have had
in previous years. We are working on that. We are attempting to
get leadership and the membership to give us a little more
realistic budget number, so we will count on your help for
that.
Mr. Roemer. Well, Mr. Chairman, I just want to say my
personal thanks to Mr. Hobson, who has been such a champion on
the HMMWV and the two-and-a-half-ton truck as well, too, as
other Members of this Committee have been.
I heard Mr. Cunningham on the radio this morning on the C-
SPAN radio program talking about his strong fighting for
adequate defense dollars; and if we can get that money for
roads and bridges in this country for better security
internally, certainly we can fight for our troops overseas.
I thank you again for all your help on these programs.
Mr. Young. Thank you for being here this morning, Tim.
Mr. Roemer. Thank you.
[The statement of Congressman Roemer follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Thursday, March 19, 1998.
DYSTROPHIC EPIDERMOLYSIS BULLOSA RESEARCH ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
WITNESSES
MIRIAM FEDER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DYSTROPHIC EPIDER-MOLYSIS BULLOSA
RESEARCH ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
MARY BETH SHERIDAN, PARENT
Introduction
Mr. Young. Next I would like to recognize Miriam Feder,
Executive Director of the Dystrophic Epidermolysis Bullosa
Research Association; and Mary Beth Sheridan and her husband,
who are parents of a child with this disease; and would like to
welcome you now. Your entire statements will be placed in the
record, and we would ask that you would summarize them this
morning.
Thank you for being here.
Incidentally, Mrs. Sheridan and her husband and daughter
are from the Tampa Bay area, which I have the privilege of
representing; and we are happy to have you all here.
Statement of Mrs. Sheridan
Mrs. Sheridan. Thank you for having us here.
Mr. Chairman and the Members of the Subcommittee, thank you
for inviting me to appear before your committee. My name is
Mary Beth Sheridan. I live in Tampa, Florida; and my little
angel is Samantha.
My pregnancy was the most wonderful experience in my life.
I loved being pregnant. Going through the delivery was
frightening, as I am sure it is for all new moms. When the
doctor pulled my baby from my womb, she had no skin on her left
hand. As the nurses and doctors touched and looked, huge
blisters formed all over my child before their eyes. I
recognized fear in their eyes and I was awake, as I was awake
for the delivery.
I will never forget the terror I felt when I realized that
these professionals did not know what was happening to my baby.
After a painful and emotional 6 weeks of waiting, worrying
and suffering, my husband and I discovered that our beautiful
baby was born with a dreadful genetic disorder called
Epidermolysis Bullosa, otherwise known as EB.
At a national EB registry in Chapel Hill, Samantha was
diagnosed with Recessive Dystrophc EB. We were somewhat
relieved, because the first diagnosis was the lethal form of
Junctional EB.
The pain and suffering that our baby endured we could not
believe possible. We could not conceive just how hard everyday
life would be for our beautiful daughter, Samantha. We learned
that the genetic disorder that Samantha was born with was
excruciatingly painful. The slightest touch to her skin causes
painful blisters to form which have to be burst and drained to
prevent infection. Often the skin heals slowly, and she has
open wounds to deal with. She lost her fingernails and toenails
at about 3 months of age.
Her body is wounded and blistered from head to toe. She
couldn't even wear the softest of clothes until she was 5
months old. Some days she can't eat because her mouth and her
throat are so full of blisters her throat is so narrow that she
can't even swallow milk. Managing her diet is very challenging,
because proper nutrition is important for her immune system in
order to fight off constant infection, which is so common for
these children.
As an infant, we can only lift our baby by the buttocks
with a sheepskin cushioning her underneath. Can you imagine
what it is like not to be able to cuddle or to hold to your
breast your own child or grandchild? We will always have to be
careful because our touch can cause severe blistering or even
denude our child's skin.
Now Samantha is three, and there are days she can't walk
because her little feet are so badly blistered that we have to
carefully carry her. She isn't able to run and play with the
other children, and it is hard for a 3-year-old to understand
her limitations. She wants so desperately to be like the other
children.
The painful burning and itching from healing and the
blistering is unbearable for our little girl. Her skin itches
so badly that she just tears it off sometimes. There seems to
be no relief from medication or creams. We have to bathe and
bandage her every day, which sometimes takes 2 to 4 hours. This
is also a painful procedure as the water burns her open wounds
and the bandages stick to her skin.
There are so many aspects of this horrific disease that it
can only be described as just sad; and, as a mother, I just
want somebody to find a cure. There are many terrible nights
that Samantha doesn't sleep but cries in pain. And, for me, my
greatest challenge is just getting through the day.
Samantha is beautiful, bright and adds joy to our life with
her sense of humor, her courage and her spirit. And I know God
has given her these gifts, and we appreciate them.
If only one child on this earth was affected by this
disease, EB, in my opinion, it would be too many. The reality
is that over 100,000 Americans suffer from EB, and there are
too many children who endure the suffering as my child does.
I ask you for your support of EB research, to help all the
children suffering today so they can reach their potential as
healthy, productive Americans.
Thank you so much for having us today.
Mr. Young. Mrs. Sheridan, thank you very much for being
here.
As you know, this disease causes wounds similar to the
wounds caused by certain types of chemicals, and so we have
funded a modest program through the Department of Defense to
study the causes and to see if we can help find a cure for this
disease or prevention for the disease.
We appreciate your being here. We understand the suffering
that all of you go through, and especially Samantha; and we
just pray for the day that we can find a way to stop this
terrible disease.
Mrs. Sheridan. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much for being here today.
Mrs. Sheridan. Thank you.
[The statement of Mrs. Sheridan follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. Now, Ms. Feder, were you going to make a
statement?
Statement of Ms. Feder
Ms. Feder. Yes, I will summarize.
I am the Executive Director of DebRA, and I want the
Committee and Mr. Chairman to know the appreciation for this
opportunity to appear before the House Appropriations
Subcommittee on National Security and ask for your continued
support for the DOD research initiative in EB.
As you know, over 100,000 Americans and their families are
very grateful that in fiscal year 1998 the DOD Appropriations
Act included $1 million for the study of wound treatment using
EB as a model.
As you know, EB is a group of skin diseases characterized
by fragility and easy blistering of the skin and other
epithelia including the eyes and the airways. The blisters
often lead to infection and cause premature death. In its most
severe form, the blisters lead to chronic, unremitting wound
healing which results in extensive scarring of the affected
area.
Extraordinary answers have recently been made in our
knowledge of the structure and function of the skin, and EB has
been the centerpiece of skin disease research and appears to be
the most appropriate for gene therapy. We are looking forward
to trial within the next 5 years.
How could EB research benefit the Army? Well, the wounds
caused by EB closely resemble the wounds caused by chemical
weapons, chemical vesicants. EB represents the natural model to
study the cause and consequences of blistering caused by
vesicants, trauma and other conditions relevant to military
medicine.
Dr. Robert Burgeson of Harvard was awarded a $625,000 grant
by the Army, and he is presently investigating enhanced models
for skin regeneration and wound healing. Dr. Burgeson's work
shows great promise for EB and for the treatment of blistering
caused by exposure to chemical weapons.
In normal skin, the basement membranes are composed of
independent but associated networks of type IV collagen and
laminins. Laminin 5 is essential to basement membrane stability
and the key bridging molecule that bonds the necessary
components of the skin. In EB, type IV collagens and laminins,
including subunits of laminin 5, are mutated; and the basement
membrane changes in the skin in sulfur mustard-induced
vesication mimics those of the Junctional form of EB.
Sulfur mustard gas causes denuding of the skin and slows
wound healing. In addition to being toxic to the most common
cell in the skin, sulfur mustard causes separation of the
epithelium from the underlying basement membrane zone, from the
underneath part of the skin to the most important part of the
functioning part of our skin. The phenotype observed is
strikingly similar to that observed in patients with specific
forms of EB.
The ability of sulfur mustard to crosslink these laminins
has already been documented. Many scientific aspects still have
to be investigated, but the studies clearly indicate that the
basement membrane molecules can be alkylated by sulfur mustard.
Alkylation means that the proteins in these cells are actually
changed to misfire, not to function with the sulfur mustard.
Dr. Burgeson and his colleagues are conducting studies on
mice with laminin 5 genetically enhanced grafts on wound
surfaces. The animal studies strongly suggest a potential of
benefit of laminin 5 when applied to extensively burned
patients. In collaboration with Japanese scientists, an amount
of laminin 5 was made available for human tests. In the cases
tried so far, the pretreated, the genetically treated grafts,
showed favorable results.
We believe that the DOD's research initiative in EB will
foster a better understanding of wound healing, the impact of
vesicants on the skin, eyes and airways and on the behavior of
healthy skin. EB serves as a natural model for skin
regeneration.
An additional $1 million in DOD-sponsored EB research could
be used to provide answers to the following problems: improving
our understanding of the molecular genetics of blistering;
increasing our knowledge of the role of collagen in blistering;
developing more successful treatments, such as gene therapy;
and perfecting the novel technologies for gene delivery, and
this is what we really have to be working on, which will affect
all gene delivery systems.
Once again, thank you for this opportunity to speak today;
and we hope that you share in our optimism about this important
initiative and urge your continuing funding in fiscal year
1999. Thank you.
Mr. Young. I want to thank both of you for being here
today. The Committee will do the very best it can with the
limited resources; and I would say, again, that our budget
numbers do not give us much room for adding any money over the
President's budget this year. But we will do the very best we
can. We understand the problems and thank you both for being
here.
Mrs. Sheridan. Thank you.
Ms. Feder. Thank you.
[The statement of Ms. Feder follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
WITNESSES
HON. LOUISE SLAUGHTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF
NEW YORK
NATHAN ROBFOGEL, VICE PRESIDENT FOR UNIVERSITY RELATIONS, ROCHESTER
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
NABIL NASR, PROFESSOR OF ENGINEERING, ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY; DIRECTOR, NATIONAL CENTER FOR REMANUFACTURING AND
RESOURCE RECOVERY
Introduction
Mr. Young. Next I would like to introduce a very
distinguished member of the Rules Committee, Congresswoman
Louise Slaughter of New York. She is here to introduce our next
witness.
Louise, we are very, very happy to have you here this
morning. Usually, I am sitting at the table talking to you at
the Rules Committee. Now we are happy to have you here at our
Committee.
Statement of Congresswoman Slaughter
Mrs. Slaughter. Well, I certainly appreciate your letting
me come this morning; and Mr. Skeen and Mr. Hobson, Mr.
Cunningham, it is a pleasure to be here with you this morning.
You may or may not remember, but last year we came here
with a proposal to try to do something about remanufacturing;
and you were very gracious and did give us $2 million for that
project. We promised you that, if you did, we would be good
stewards of it; and we are here to tell you this morning that
we have been. So I am very pleased, but I thank you most
profoundly for taking that chance on us last year and including
us in the budget.
I would like to introduce this morning Mr. Nathan Robfogel
and Dr. Nabil Nasr, who is the head of the National Center for
Remanufacturing and Resource Recovery.
Mr. Robfogel is the Vice President for University Relations
at the Rochester Institute of Technology; and Mr. Robfogel will
describe for you in a moment the commitment that RIT is making
in this particular field and the outlines of the cooperative
research program with the Office of Naval Research, which is
going really well.
Dr. Nasr and his fellow research scientists at RIT have
been in close contact with officials of the Office of Naval
Research since the enactment of last year's appropriations
bill. They are making great progress in developing research
that will benefit the Department of Defense.
Dr. Nasr is the leading scientist in the field of
remanufacturing in the Nation and can answer any detailed
questions the subcommittee might have about the research
program.
I was particularly encouraged to learn that the Office of
Naval Research has indicated that it is planning to introduce
RIT to the manufacturing technology officials in each of the
military services. There appears to be strong recognition
within the Department of Defense that learning how to better
apply the process of remanufacturing to defense systems is
critical under our present budgetary conditions; and we are
very much aware of that, Mr. Chairman.
We often hear the Members of the Congress and the Pentagon
talking about the affordability of new systems. RIT is prepared
to help the military services to better maintain and advance
the systems that they already have and can't afford to replace
with an expensive new system.
RIT wants to continue its cooperative research program
through the Office of Naval Research in fiscal year 1999 in the
amount of $2 million, and I am hopeful that the subcommittee
will look favorably on this request and include this amount in
the fiscal year 1999 National Security Appropriations bill.
Thank you most kindly, Mr. Chairman; and may I introduce
Mr. Robfogel?
Mr. Young. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Congresswoman Slaughter follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
1Mr. Young. We want to welcome all of you here and state
that the statements, your entire statements, will be placed in
the record; and we would ask that you condense and summarize
them to about 5 minutes or less if you can. We have a very long
list of witnesses today.
Statement of Mr. Robfogel
Mr. Robfogel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am Nathan Robfogel, Vice President for University
Relations at RIT. I am here today with Dr. Nasr, who is a
Professor of Engineering at the University and who is the
Director of our National Center for Remanufacturing and
Resource Recovery.
Mr. Chairman, before I begin, I would first like to thank
Congresswoman Slaughter for her introduction and her strong
support of RIT; in particular, our manufacturing technology and
our remanufacturing research program. She has been a great
champion for all of our efforts and the efforts to help U.S.
manufacturers.
I would also like to join Congresswoman Slaughter in
thanking you and the subcommittee for your inclusion of $2
million in last year's National Security Appropriations bill
for our cooperative remanufacturing research program with the
Office of Naval Research.
Mr. Chairman, understanding the extreme time constraints
that you are under, I would like to just summarize our
testimony and refer you and the subcommittee to our formal
written testimony for further details.
First, as Congresswoman Slaughter has said, RIT is fully
committed as a University in helping our Nation's manufacturing
industry compete in a global marketplace. We have built a
157,000 square foot state-of-the-art manufacturing research and
education facility, and that is the only one of its kind in our
Nation. Our engineering, imaging and other colleges work
collaboratively with industry to solve manufacturing problems
with this facility.
Several years ago, RIT researchers, led by my colleague,
Dr. Nasr, began looking into methods and practices of
remanufacturing--the process of taking a used product,
disassembling it, refurbishing its parts and remanufacturing it
into like-new condition.
Recently, RIT has become the national leader in
remanufacturing research and education. We have established,
under Dr. Nasr's leadership, the National Center for
Remanufacturing and Resource Recovery and are currently working
with the Argonne National Laboratory and the Department of
Energy, the Office of Naval Research, Environmental Protection
Agency, and a number of major U.S. manufacturing companies such
as Kodak, Xerox and Detroit Diesel.
Our work with Detroit Diesel, which remanufactures engines
for the Marine Corps Light Armored Vehicle, make it clear to
this old Marine and to the rest of us that the military and its
defense contractors would benefit greatly from a comprehensive
applied research program in manufacturing.
Mr. Chairman, the Department of Defense is, in fact, the
world's largest remanufacturer. Some examples of the weapons
systems currently remanufactured--and I will just list a few:
the B-52 Bomber, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Marine Corps
Light Armored Vehicle, the AV-8B Attack Aircraft, the SH-60F
ASW and the Phalanx Close-in Weapons System.
Why is the remanufacturing of these systems so important to
the Pentagon? For the following reasons, Mr. Chairman:
First, remanufacturing saves significant costs involved in
design and production of new systems.
Secondly, remanufacturing allows the insertion of new
technology faster and more efficiently than new systems.
Remanufacturing does not require the same amount of
resources needed for manufacturing of new systems, thereby
resulting in significant cost savings.
And, finally, remanufacturing of existing systems can be
done much closer or in some cases at point of use, thereby
resulting in significant cost savings.
Mr. Chairman, ONR is very interested in what we have to
offer to the Navy manufacturing technology program and, in
fact, has indicated that they want to introduce our program to
the other military services.
Mr. Chairman, our research project with ONR funded in last
year's bill will focus on enhancing the Navy's ability to
transfer remanufacturing know-how and technologies within and
outside of its facilities to fully exploit the benefits of
remanufacturing.
In year two of the project, which will utilize fiscal year
1999 dollars we are requesting today, the RIT project team will
collect detailed information on remanufacturing activities,
capabilities and technologies from DOD depots. The information
will be assembled into a searchable computerized clearinghouse.
The data will be analyzed in order to develop broad
recommendations for improvement of remanufacturing practices.
Mr. Chairman, Dr. Nasr and the National Center have
developed a multiyear plan of research cooperation and support
of ONR remanufacturing priorities. I am submitting with the
testimony a copy of the detailed proposal that we have
submitted to ONR relating to the use of fiscal year 1998
funding and a program for subsequent years.
In fiscal year 1999, RIT is requesting that the
subcommittee include another $2 million appropriation in ONR to
fund year two of this very vital program.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing us this opportunity
to testify. My colleague, Dr. Nasr, has all the answers, if you
have some questions; and I will back him up as sufficiently as
my credentials would permit me to.
Thank you for your time.
Mr. Young. Well, I would like to say that most--the biggest
question we would have for him is, how can we get the extra
money to take care of all of these programs that we are talking
about today?
And I would like to respond that the Committee is well
aware of the success of many of the remanufacturing programs,
and we understand we do get a lot for the dollar invested
there, and we appreciate your calling that to our attention
today.
And, Representative Slaughter, thank you very much for
bringing them.
Mrs. Slaughter. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your
graciousness. We appreciate your listening to us this morning.
You are very kind to have us in. Thank you.
Mr. Young. For your constituents, I would tell them that
you are a very important one to listen to.
As a member of the Rules Committee, she plays a major role
in the legislative process here in the House.
Mrs. Slaughter. You are always a pleasure to work with.
Mr. Young. Thank you.
Mrs. Slaughter. You were saying----
Mr. Cunningham. He is okay for a Marine.
Mr. Young. General Krulak told us there are no old Marines.
Mrs. Slaughter. Absolutely no old Marines at all.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. We appreciate you being
here this morning. Thank you.
Mrs. Slaughter. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Robfogel follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
NATIONAL COALITION FOR OSTEOPOROSIS AND RELATED BONE DISEASES
WITNESSES
SANDRA RAYMOND, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL OSTEO- POROSIS FOUNDATION
(NOF)
COMMANDER CHARLES SCOTT, U.S. NAVY
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to welcome next Sandra Raymond, the
Executive Director of the National Coalition for Osteoporosis
and Related Bone Diseases.
She is accompanied by Commander Charles Scott and his son
Nick. Commander Scott suffers from multiple myeloma, which is a
cancer of the bone marrow.
Ms. Raymond, your prepared statement will appear in the
permanent record; and we would ask that you summarize it at
this time.
Statement of Ms. Raymond
Ms. Raymond. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I will summarize my testimony. But I do want to say that
Commander Scott is here today, and his personal story, I think,
really lays out the real cost of bone disease to the military.
On behalf of myself and the Coalition, I want to sincerely
thank you, Mr. Chairman, and your colleagues on the committee
for the $10 million you appropriated for bone disease research
in the fiscal year 1997 DOD budget. This money has been put to
good use, and it is worth every appropriated dollar.
The DOD received 88 proposals, out of which they were only
able to fund 12 outstanding proposals; and those projects are
enumerated in our testimony that you have received today.
This is not an extension of the NIH research program,
because the DOD bone disease research program aims to enhance
military readiness by improving the bone health of young men
and women who are in the military.
The research addresses the important issue of stress
fractures, which are among the most frequent injuries that take
men and women off duty in the Army. According to the Army, the
minimum time away from significant duty for a male or female
soldier who develops a stress fracture is 6 to 8 weeks. Stress
fractures are very slow to heal, and full recovery takes as
long as 12 weeks.
You know, most of us think of stress fractures--that stress
failures heal and that the integrity of bone is maintained, but
that is not true. If a stress fracture goes untreated and if it
occurs in the same bone, you can have a full fracture; and that
full fracture may cause complete disability. It may cause
costly surgery and rehabilitation. And it is very, very costly
to the military.
An estimated 10 to 15 percent of women recruits experience
stress fractures during this 8 weeks of basic training. With an
increased number of women in the military, these stress
fractures can only increase.
One training intervention research project, which was
conducted among 22,000 recruits in the U.S. Marine Corps in San
Diego, showed that as much as $4.5 million could have been
saved by reducing stress fractures. So the DOD research program
is addressing these problems.
For example, one project will examine oral contraceptives
in bone health in female runners. Another will investigate
treatments which increase the rates of healing stress
fractures.
There are many other projects which are being conducted
under the DOD research program. It may be that what we learn
from DOD research will greatly contribute to bringing bone
diseases under control. Because osteoporosis and other related
bone diseases, such as Paget's disease, Osteogenesis Imperfecta
and multiple myeloma, are serious threats to the public health.
These diseases cause loss of independence, they cause
disability, they cause death, and they are extremely costly to
the medical system in the United States and to the military.
By discovering how we can build peak bone mass in military
recruits we will not only build a strong Nation in terms of
defense but also we are going to be able to extend our life and
extend and withstand the stresses of an extended life span. We
are today urging you to appropriate a modest $20 million in
appropriations for bone disease research in fiscal year 1999.
[The statement of Ms. Raymond follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Raymond. Commander Scott.
Statement of Commander Scott
Commander Scott. Gentlemen, as you heard, my name is
Commander Charles Scott. I am a Naval aviator, experimental
test pilot, aeronautical engineer and Persian Gulf veteran.
In December, 1996, after suffering a broken back, I was
diagnosed with multiple myeloma, which is a complex cancer of
the bone marrow that invades and destroys bone. As a result of
this disease, I have severe osteoporosis.
Each year, 14,000 new cases of myeloma are diagnosed. The
occurrence of myeloma has increased dramatically in the past
decade. The average life expectancy from the time of diagnosis
is three-and-a-half years, and there is no cure for this
disease.
I demonstrate the tangible cost of bone disease to the
military. The Navy has paid over $9 million to train me in the
highly technical fields in which I am qualified. This
investment by the taxpayers of this country is in jeopardy due
to my bone disease and cancer.
We are asking for $20 million for bone disease research. If
the research resulting from the Department of Defense Bone
Health and Military Medical Readiness Research Program could
help me recover my health and put me back into a flying status,
nearly one half of the amount we are requesting from you today
could be recovered.
By understanding the mechanisms of bone destruction in
myeloma, we can learn how the dynamic equilibrium of bone
damage and bone healing actually works.
In myeloma patients, bone damage is dramatically increased
but, more importantly, bone repair is almost completely
blocked. Myeloma bone disease cripples 50,000 Americans in the
prime of their lives. All Americans will benefit from increased
knowledge of what can make bones heal and become stronger.
Research focusing on the reduction of tumor burden, causative
factors and better treatments will benefit everyone suffering
the debilitating effects of bone disease and myeloma.
Reduction in military readiness, our ability to fight and
win wars, runs the gamut from the new recruit who fails to
complete basic training on time due to a bone fracture to the
seasoned veteran like me whose career is cut short by a
debilitating bone disease.
Thank you.
Mr. Young. We want to thank you very much for being here
and for your statements.
Mr. Cunningham is our in-house expert on Naval aviation,
having been, I believe, the first ace in the Vietnam War. He
has a little knowledge about this problem, and I have asked him
to comment on this.
Mr. Cunningham. Well, I was also a former coach at a high
school and college level.
You know, the Speaker of the House has insisted that we
increase funding for medical research at National Institute of
Health--NIH.
Another area that I would encourage you to look at,
although you have your particular problem, but especially in
fractures and stress fractures, sports medicine has got a vast
knowledge. I mean, they're professionals, it is in their best
interest to look at, A, how to prevent it, the diet, and also,
if you have a stress failure, how to fix that, and I would turn
you in that direction.
The third thing I would mention is, with the limited budget
which is as low as the 1950s, procurement has been cut 70
percent. We can't buy parts smart. We can't do the things that
actually save money. Because you need an airplane to go to
Bosnia--we have got in some cases only one airplane in the
squadron because we don't have parts to go forward. And we are
fighting this battle, and I support it and understand what your
problem is.
But I also would like you to know the Chairman's problem
that we are having, and we can't do the smart things because of
a limited budget. But we are sympathetic, and we will see what
you can do. And God bless you being a Navy fighter pilot.
Commander Scott. Coming from a procurement background, I
certainly understand and appreciate the constraints.
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you.
Mr. Young. We thank you very much, and we certainly
understand the problem. Believe me, we could find a lot of ways
to spend a lot more money on medical research. This Committee
has taken the lead in a lot of medical research programs,
including the establishment of a bone marrow registry for
transplants. I understand that you had a transplant.
Commander Scott. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. But yours was anatologist, as I understand.
Commander Scott. Yes.
Mr. Young. So this Committee has taken a strong lead on
medical issues, and we appreciate your being here to back us
up.
As Mr. Cunningham said and as I have said, money is going
to be really tight this year. All I can say is, we will do the
best we can.
Commander Scott. Thank you.
Ms. Raymond. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Thank you again for being here.
----------
Thursday, March 19, 1998.
BRAIN INJURY ASSOCIATION
WITNESS
MARTIN B. FOIL, JR., CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, BRAIN INJURY ASSOCIATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to recognize now Mr. Martin Foil,
who is the voluntary Chairman of the Brain Injury Association.
The Members will remember, he is a constituent and good
friend of Congressman Hefner, who normally introduces him with
a very nice introduction. But Congressman Hefner is not able to
be here this morning, and I probably won't be able to do as
good a job.
But we appreciate all the time that you volunteer, Mr.
Foil, for this very important matter; and your statement will
be placed in the record, and I would ask that you summarize it
for us.
Statement of Mr. Foil
Mr. Foil. Thank you, Chairman Young, and good morning, and
all the members of the National Security Subcommittee. Thank
you.
We are sorry that Bill is not here this morning. We are
well aware that he is retiring, and all of his constituents are
going to miss him, and we who come before you will miss him as
well. He has been a good friend to the Brain Injury Association
and to our cause.
My name is Martin Foil, and I come before you as a father
of Philip Foil, a young man with a severe brain injury. I do
serve as a voluntary Chairman of the Brain Injury Association.
I am also the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Tuscarora
Yarns in Mt. Pleasant, North Carolina.
I receive no compensation from the Association or from the
programs I am testifying about here today. Rather, I contribute
considerable sums of my own money to the Brain Injury
Association to help improve the lives of persons with brain
injury. I am here, Mr. Chairman, simply because I do care about
the 9 million Americans living with brain injury and their
families.
The Defense and Veterans Head Injury Program, or DVHIP, and
the Violence and Brain Injury Project are collaborative efforts
among the DOD and the Veterans Affairs and the Brain Injury
Association.
Together, we not only serve Active duty military personnel
but we are an important resource to veterans and civilian
populations as well. Over 7,000 military people a year suffer
brain injury in peacetime.
Our programs, therefore, are exemplar cases of dual-use
funding; and I am pleased to report to you, Mr. Chairman, that
our collaborative efforts continue to pay off. We do this by
increasing the return to work rate of military personnel and
improving the efficiency of the medical services provided. By
doing this, DOD realizes significant cost savings.
We have also had many accomplishments this year, including
expanding of our Patient Registry Treatment and Referral
Network.
Our Brain Resource Center, developed by our Association, is
now available in over 60 locations across the country,
including select DOD and Veterans' Administration--VA hospitals
as well as civilian facilities.
Our toll-free help line continues to receive at least
15,000 calls a year helping military personnel and civilians
with brain injury and their caregivers.
We have increased our prevention and educational programs
to include something we call the brain building basics. This is
a violence, prevention and brain injury awareness program for
low literacy adults, including incarcerated populations.
Our HeadSmart Schools Program is now being used in 21
States, over 106 schools, 141,000 children, of whom 36,000 are
children of the military. We have schools in 12 military
installations.
Through the Brain Injury Association, we are embarking on
research of neurobehavioral problems following brain injury
that will help to return military personnel to work. Included
in this kind of research are FMRI studies to evaluate outcomes
and concussions in sports.
Brain injury is, however, a silent epidemic; and, as such,
it is the single largest killer and the cause of disability
among our young people. We need to learn more about the brain,
and we need to do more to prevent brain injury.
Our efforts continue to help our Nation's military
readiness by helping service members get appropriate care and
return to work. We need your support, Mr. Chairman, for $8.5
million in funding so that the DVHIP and VBIP and the Brain
Injury Association can carry on this unique partnership. This
has been a very successful program, and we are proud of our
association together.
I am happy, Mr. Chairman, to answer any questions. Thank
you and God bless you for allowing me here again this year.
Mr. Young. Mr. Foil, thank you very much. We appreciate
that.
I wanted to mention that the University of Florida has a
very aggressive brain injury program, and we do help with that.
I would also tell you that the Chairman of this
Subcommittee will miss Mr. Hefner as much as his constituents.
He has been a good friend and a very good Member of this
Committee.
Mr. Foil. He is a fine man, and we all will miss him.
Mr. Young. We appreciate you being here. Thank you very
much.
Mr. Foil. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Foil follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
THE FLEET RESERVE ASSOCIATION
WITNESS
MASTER CHIEF JOE BARNES, USN (RET.), DIRECTOR, LEGISLATIVE PROGRAMS,
THE FLEET RESERVE ASSOCIATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. Next I would like to welcome Master Chief Joe
Barnes, who is the Director of Legislative Programs for the
Fleet Reserve Association. Chief Barnes represents 160,000
enlisted sea service personnel who are serving or have served
in the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard.
Master Chief, your prepared statement will be made a part
of the Committee's permanent record, in that statement, which
we have read, it says, military readiness is now at code
yellow. You also warn of the pending damage to the Nation's
defense establishment if the fiscal year 1999 defense budget is
approved in its present form.
I will say amen to that. We recognize the serious
shortfalls in many areas in the President's budget.
Unfortunately, his top number is the same as the top number
that we are dealing with. So we are going to have to work
around that the best we can. But we appreciate your being here,
and we would like to recognize you to summarize your statement.
Statement of Master Chief Barnes
Master Chief Barnes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
present the Fleet Reserve Association's--FRA--priorities
regarding personnel issues for 1999.
I also wish to express appreciation to you and members of
the subcommittee for your strong support of the men and women
serving in our uniformed services. Thanks to your efforts, they
have seen significant quality of life improvements.
Our country and its uniformed services face many
challenges, not the least of which is turmoil in distant parts
of the world that threatens our national interests. Inadequate
defense funds, insufficient manpower, declining recruiting and
retention rates, widening pay comparability, crumbling
infrastructure and disenfranchised older retirees add to these
challenges.
These and other issues are addressed in our complete
statement, and in the interest of time I will focus only on
several key points.
Compared to 1989, DOD funding in fiscal year 1999 will have
dropped approximately $40 billion. This dramatic reduction
helped to balance the budget, generate a projected surplus and
free up money for other government programs. Notable is an
increase by next year of over $208 billion compared to 1989 in
Department of Health and Human Services funding.
Keeping in mind the challenges discussed above, it seems
those most deserving of consideration in the reallocation of
government spending are the men and women who are now sharing
the sacrifices and hardships of serving in the Armed Forces.
In addition to these major challenges, additional personnel
cuts are planned, not because the workload has decreased but
because money saved from the personnel account is sorely needed
for procurement and modernization.
OPTEMPO has significantly increased and reduced manpower
levels have led to longer deployments as well as family
problems, instability, stress and falling retention rates.
Next year's mission demands will be greater than in 1998,
and the Navy can ill afford to lose 18,000 more personnel as
recommended in the QDR, and the Marine Corps should not be
mandated to further reduce manpower below the pre-1998 levels.
Annual military pay raises always trail 15 months behind
the applicable employment cost index data, and each year the
pay gap grows wider and now stands at 13.5 percent.
FRA again draws your attention to the decline in pay
ratios. Prior to the all-volunteer force, the ratio between
senior enlisted personnel and new recruits was 4.6 to 1 and now
it is 2.6 to 1, indicating nearly a 44 percent decline.
Hopefully, Congress hasn't forgotten the need in 1981 to
raise the pay of its senior enlisted members. At that time,
many were voting with their feet. FRA urges larger pay
adjustments to narrow the pay gap in accordance with the latest
full ECI data immediately prior to the effective date of the
pay raise and a gradual pay increase for senior enlisted
personnel to bring it to a level commensurate with their
leadership roles.
Regarding health care, improvements are needed in the
TRICARE program; along with enactment of full Medicare
subvention; a broader mail order pharmaceutical drug program;
and, finally, a major priority is a test program to the Federal
Employees Health Benefit Program option for older
beneficiaries.
Confusion over the three military retirement plans is a
concern for uniformed service members pondering career
decisions. Second and third term enlistees are discovering that
the retirement program they may look forward to provides
significantly less financially than the previous two programs,
yet they must pay the same amount for health care for
themselves and their families.
FRA believes Congress should repeal the 1986 Military
Retirement Reform Act.
Mr. Chairman, FRA shipmates appreciate your untiring
commitment and support of personnel now serving and those who
have served in the past. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. Master Chief Barnes, thank you very much. We
always appreciate your excellent testimony; and, as you know,
we work with you to do the best we can to make good things
happen; and we thank you for being here this morning.
Master Chief Barnes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Master Chief Barnes follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
FORT ATKINSON CEMETERY
WITNESS
HON. DOUG BEREUTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF
NEBRASKA
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to recognize now one of our
distinguished colleagues from the great State of Nebraska,
Congressman Doug Bereuter. Doug serves on the Banking and
Financial Services Committee and the International Relations
Committee, where he chairs the Asia and Pacific Subcommittee
and, in his usual aggressive way, does an excellent job there.
Congressman, your prepared statement will be placed in the
record; and we would ask that you summarize it.
Statement of Congressman Bereuter
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Mr.
Cunningham and members of the Committee. I appreciate you
seeing me at this point. Because of an emergency, Chairman
Gilman will not be able to handle the next bill; and I will
have to do that.
I would want to bring to your attention a request for a
quarter million dollars. I know you don't often deal in a
request of that size.
In summarizing, let me tell you this. The first fort west
of the Missouri River in the United States is located in my
district. It was eventually called Fort Atkinson. The first
winter the troops were located there shortly after Lewis and
Clark had gone up the river and had met the Indians for the
first time at what is called Council Bluff.
The Missouri cantonment, over 200 troops died the first
winter. As far as I know, it is the largest area of unmarked
American military graves in the United States. Today, we don't
know exactly where these officers and men are buried.
There are other civilians that were buried as well, not on
the fort but an area north of it. I am sorry to tell you that
that area is cultivated today. It is farmed. We have had
difficulty getting access.
We need to use ground-sensing radar to find out exactly
where it is. We can take it down to within a 15- to 20-acre
site, and what I am asking for is site planning money; if
necessary, leasing; and preparation for memorializing these
graves of these 200-plus soldiers of what was the most--it was
actually the largest military establishment in the United
States at one time.
It is adjacent to a State historical park which is called
Fort Atkinson, named after an early Army officer that helped
explore the Missouri River territory and Nebraska territory and
Dakota territory. It is my expectation, once we locate these
graves with the assistance of the appropriate component of the
U.S. military, that we would arrange to have land purchased;
and I would think it would be the preference of the Federal
Government to transfer the land to the State historical park.
But I do think that proper recognition and memorialization
of these 200-plus American servicemen from the 1820 to 1827 era
is appropriate. And that is my request, a very unusual one; and
I think it is probably the first request I have ever made
before this Committee. It has nothing to do with my Asia and
Pacific Committee assignment.
I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.
Mr. Cunningham. I don't really have any questions for the
issue. I understand the issue, and I know the Chairman is
trying to wade through the priorities on it. A lot of our
foundation is on history.
When you say transfer of land you are actually asking for
money. I am not quite clear on the reasoning behind, the
expanse of money required if we transfer the land to bring up
these 200 or more.
Mr. Bereuter. I don't think it is appropriate to move the
graves. What we are asking for now is investigation money. Part
of that equipment is in the hands of the Smithsonian
Institution. Part of it is in the hands of the Army, the DOD.
We would like to find out precisely where these graves are, as
much as possible after this century and a half, and prepare a
site plan and memorialization of it.
We think it is--because of the noncooperation of the
landowner, it is going to be necessary to lease the ground for
a period of 3 to 6 months for that purpose. Then it would be my
expectation to either go to the State of Nebraska or the
Department of Interior Appropriations Subcommittee, Ralph
Regula's subcommittee, and request an additional 10, 15, 20
acres, whatever it might be, to add to Fort Atkinson.
I don't think the Federal Government would expect to
establish a Federal cemetery and would not want the property to
be under its control. So I would think it is logical at some
subsequent action, when we determine exactly where these graves
are and what kind of markers should be placed there and what
kind of visitation arrangements to the site should be there,
then I would think we would go for the additional purchase.
Or what the landowners would prefer is a land swap. I don't
know if that can be arranged.
I will tell you one thing more. This will be the site of
one of the three most important ceremony--festivity sites in
the Lewis and Clark expedition. In 2004, this is where the--one
of three sites will be for the Lewis and Clark expedition
bicentennial. It happens to be----
Mr. Cunningham. Has there been any attempt for a foundation
to be set up for--a funding foundation, private?
Mr. Bereuter. No. But I think probably the acquisition can
be handled by the Nebraska Game and Parks Foundation.
The problem is, we need at this point the expertise of the
military; and we think it is appropriate that they help find
those graves of American military men from that era.
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Congressman Bereuter follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
NON COMMISSIONED OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WITNESS
SERGEANT MAJOR MICHAEL F. OUELLETTE, USA (RET.), DIRECTOR OF
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, NON COMMISSIONED OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Introduction
Mr. Cunningham. Our next witness from the Non Commissioned
Officers Association is Sergeant Major Michael Ouellette. I
look forward to your testimony, Sergeant Major.
Statement of Sergeant Major Ouellette
Sergeant Major Ouellette. Good morning, Mr. Cunningham, and
thank you very much. On behalf of the Non Commissioned Officers
Association--NCOA, it is always nice to be given an opportunity
to appear before this subcommittee; and I, on behalf of NCOA, I
would like to thank all the members, especially the Chairman
who I thank constantly, for the efforts in past years to assist
military people and retirees.
I would tell you that we are--we still need help in those
areas, but we would be far off the pace if it had not been for
the efforts over the years to protect COLAs for retirees, to
provide pay raises, money for pay raises for the special
deployment pays and all of those items that come up to improve
the welfare of military men and retirees and, of course,
promote recruiting and retention.
Mr. Cunningham, I would just like to summarize. We have
submitted our statement.
I think there are a lot of issues. I don't think that this
Committee in 1 year is going to solve all of the problems. I do
think, though, that there should be a real attempt to try to
bring military pay up to par, as Mr. Barnes talked about.
I think the best way to start that, though, within reason,
is just to assure full employment cost index pay raises every
year. We came close to doing that last year; and, at the very
end, that provision fell out of the authorization bill.
So in the area of health care, Mr. Cunningham, you hear
that all the time. The problems--and there are many problems
with health care. Are we going to--do you have the money to fix
all of the areas during the course of any one year? The Non
Commissioned Officers association sure doesn't think so. But we
do think that probably selecting one thing and maybe
prescription--opening the mail order prescription drug program
to all retirees would be a major step forward.
That is the way this Committee has progressed over the
years. You haven't solved all the problems every year, but you
keep nipping at it.
On behalf of NCOA and our President, Chuck Jackson, Mr.
Cunningham, we--and the staff of the subcommittee, we certainly
appreciate all the things that you have done and look forward
to those things that you are able to do within the budgetary
restraints during--for the fiscal year 1999 program.
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you, Sergeant Major.
I think it is pretty much a bipartisan issue on taking care
of our veterans, and you know we look forward to--the
subvention bill was written by the veterans in my district and
submitted, and it took a long time.
I would tell you that J.C. Watts, Mr. Thornberry and myself
have a health care bill that I would like NCOA to take a look
at. I think it will save dollars in the long run and will
greatly benefit our military--the Chairman heard testimony of
all the service chiefs before, and one of the big things for
retention was loss of their benefits and they could do better
on the outside. So I know the Chairman is very concerned about
that, and we thank you for your testimony.
Sergeant Major Ouellette. All right, Mr. Cunningham. Thank
you very much.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for all you have done.
Mr. Young. Thank you. I am sorry that I missed your
testimony, but I just got the second vote that Mr. Cunningham
is going to have to go get now. Voting does interfere with our
Committee work.
Sergeant Major Ouellette. All right. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Young. We always appreciate you being here. We always
appreciate the support you give us when it is time to take this
bill to the floor and to the Committee.
Sergeant Major Ouellette. Likewise, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Thank you, sir.
[The statement of Sergeant Major Ouellette follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
WITNESS
ROCKY MORRILL, PRESIDENT, LOCAL #1156, MECHANICSBURG, PENNSYLVANIA,
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to recognize next Mr. Rocky
Morrill, President of the American Federation of Government
Employees, Local 1156, from Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania.
As a representative of 300,000 employees of the Department
of Defense, we are interested in what you have to say about
things of importance to them.
Statement of Mr. Morrill
Mr. Morrill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and subcommittee
members. I appreciate the opportunity to speak before you.
I am president of the American Federation of Government
Employees, Local 1156, at Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. The
American Federation of Government Employees represents more
than 600,000 Federal employees serving worldwide, including
300,000 employees at DOD.
I would like to begin my testimony by thanking the
subcommittee for this opportunity to testify on National
Security Appropriations.
While there are many important issues affecting DOD
employees which this subcommittee will consider, I will limit
my statement today to what I consider to be the most important
issue, the use of in-house personnel ceilings by DOD officials
to contract out work, often at higher cost because of the
absence of public/private competition.
DOD, the Department the American people rely on to
safeguard their future, is experiencing in-house staff
shortages. On March 16th, 1995, the personnel directors of the
four branches of the Armed Forces told the Senate Armed
Services Personnel Subcommittee that civilian personnel
ceilings, not workload, cost or readiness concerns are forcing
them to send work to contractors that could have been performed
more cheaply in-house.
Also in March, 1995, GAO reported that the personnel
ceilings set by OMB frequently have the effect of encouraging
agencies to contract out regardless of the results of cost,
policy or high-risk studies. And the DOD Inspector General
noted in a 1995 report the goal of downsizing the Federal
workforce is widely perceived as placing DOD in a position of
having to contract for services regardless of what is more
desirable and cost-effective.
Moreover, I have attached to my testimony three internal
documents which suggest that DOD managers are instructing
subordinates to manage by personnel ceilings and then contract
out the work.
The second document imposes a not-to-be-exceeded ceiling
and insists that work performed by employees under the GS-12
level be contracted out.
We shouldn't be surprised that much contracting out
occurring because of personnel ceilings is wasteful. After all,
there is no public/private competition. Federal employees
aren't given opportunities to compete in such situations,
simply because there aren't enough of them to do the work.
Clearly, DOD should be required to manage by budgets. If it
has work to do and money is authorized and appropriated to do
that work, then the DOD should be able to use Federal employees
if in-house performance is to the benefit of the warfighters
and the taxpayers.
We all know that the DOD civilian workforce is going to get
smaller. We all know that there is going to be contracting out.
But DOD should not be imposing arbitrary personnel ceilings and
foreclosing the option of the in-house performance of important
work, especially if contractors are less efficient, even if not
always successful.
At my own base, we have the base communications office,
already streamlined, has implemented cost-savings incentives
and has saved the government documented savings of $500,000
that continues through each fiscal year. Additionally, this
timely organization has backlogged projects that have the
potential for significantly larger savings. No contractor will
duplicate or exceed the efficiencies or economies demonstrated
by this organization.
I present the documentation of the director of this base
communications office that goes into further detail.
We appreciate the Committee's efforts to prevent DOD from
managing by personnel ceilings by the inclusion of prohibitions
in recent defense appropriations bills, and we urge that a
similar prohibition be included in this year's funding measure.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I would be happy
to answer any questions.
Mr. Young. Well, thank you very much for being here, and we
appreciate the opportunity to work with you on this issue. We
recognize the importance of the civilian workers in the
Department of Defense and the important role that they play.
Thank you for being here today.
Mr. Morrill. Thank you, sir.
[The statement of Mr. Morrill follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
NATIONAL MILITARY FAMILY ASSOCIATION
WITNESS
SYDNEY T. HICKEY, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, THE
NATIONAL MILITARY FAMILY ASSOCIATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like next to recognize Mrs. Sydney
Hickey, Associate Director of Government Relations of the
National Military Family Association. Mrs. Hickey is no
stranger to this Committee. She and her organization do a
really great job of standing up for the families of the men and
women who serve our great Nation. And I might also say they
publish a great newsletter which I find very informative.
Mrs. Hickey, we are very happy to have you back again. Your
entire statement will be placed in the record, and I would ask
that you summarize it for us.
Statement of Ms. Hickey
Ms. Hickey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and thank
you for letting NMFA again express its views. In grateful
recognition of your kind remarks, I will be less than 2
minutes.
We would like to reiterate again the gratitude of military
families for the concern shown by the members of this
Committee.
We have eight main items in our written testimony, which I
will simply list:
A continued stress placed upon the force and their families
by long workdays and weeks, as well as the frequent
deployments;
Two, the distress of families that their leaders continue
to voice little concern about compensation programs that
decrease their buying power and appear more concerned about
cutting costs than the family's quality of life;
Three, the privatization or outsourcing of vital family
service functions and the fear that such contracts will go the
way of the new parent support program contract;
The implementation of the family housing privatization
initiatives without full consideration of the effects on
military families and the surrounding civilian communities. Our
fear here is that this Subcommittee may be asked to fund the
full impact aid program rather than simply the supplemental.
The viability of the military community upon which we have
historically depended for our support under privatization and
outsourcing;
The continuing problems with our health care system years
after the initial implementation of TRICARE, and the fact that
we still do not have a solution for our over-65s;
A plea for the Committee's assistance in ascertaining if
military families everywhere are paying the lion's share of the
reduced provider payments under TRICARE Prime, as the exhibit
included in our testimony shows;
And, finally, our deep concern that policies and actions
that produce negative experiences for the family, military
family, of today will have a profound and equally negative
effect on the military force of the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Thank you for being here, and you know that we always look
forward to working with you and receiving your newsletter to
keep up to date on what you are doing.
Ms. Hickey. Thank you very much, sir.
[The statement of Ms. Hickey follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
NATIONAL MILITARY AND VETERANS ALLIANCE
WITNESS
COLONEL CHARLES C. PARTRIDGE, U.S. ARMY (RET.), NATIONAL MILITARY AND
VETERANS ALLIANCE
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like now to welcome Colonel Charles
Partridge in his capacity as spokesman for the National
Military and Veterans Alliance. Colonel Partridge is also the
legislative counsel for another important group, the National
Association for Uniformed Services. The Alliance represents 15
military and veterans organizations with 3.5 million members.
We appreciate the support that your organization has always
given us when we try to do the best we can for our Nation's
security. Your prepared statement is an excellent summary of
where you think we stand with regard to military health care,
and I might say this Subcommittee has spent considerable time
this year on the subject of military health and health care for
the families, some of the problems that have evolved, and we
look forward to hearing from you, sir.
Statement of Colonel Partridge
Colonel Partridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and we want to
thank you for all you have done over the years in military
health care. Just year after year after year, you and this
subcommittee have stood up. If it hadn't been for you, military
health care would have been underfunded in the past years by
almost three-quarters of a billion dollars; and we really
appreciate your help there.
As you know, we have supported the Department of Defense in
establishing the TRICARE program; and we worked hard to help
them with that. We worked hard with them on the Medicare
subvention issue, which Mr. Cunningham mentioned earlier was
drafted years ago from a man in his district; and we would like
to see, of course, Medicare subvention expanded just as rapidly
and quickly as possible.
We are also concerned, as I know you are, with the deep and
continuing cuts in the end strength, particularly medical end
strength, where it is down by about 30 to 35 percent. Military
hospitals are being closed as part of the BRAC--Base
Realignment and Closure--business, which we understand. That is
necessary.
What has concerned us is that, with all of these reductions
and cuts going on in the medical system, the Department of
Defense has not come up with a plan that would take care of all
of their beneficiaries. We know that the TRICARE program with
subvention will take care of a large number, and we know that
increasing coordination with the VA, between DOD and VA, is
going to help.
Even with all of that, though, there are people that are
falling through the cracks, particularly Medicare-eligible
retirees. And we--that is why we are proposing the Federal
Employees Health Benefits plan. And our--what we need is a plan
that works, that is a proven program, we know it works, and we
believe that it would cover some 30 percent of military
retirees over 65 who now have no other option. The other 70
percent would get their care somewhere else.
And we would--we understand there is an additional
legislative proposal in the works that would--that could begin
this program next year. We understand that the current bills
that are being considered would not begin for several years,
and we would like to see these older retirees getting this
benefit in the next year. Then, as the Department develops
their own alternatives, they can opt out of that into something
else. But, for now, we would like to see something started next
year, start them enrolling next year even if it is on a modest
scale.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Colonel, thank you very much. You know of our
commitment to making these things happen.
Colonel Partridge. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Also, I might tell you that a recent hearing we
had with the Surgeons General I had discovered several
recruiting posters that weren't all that old that promised, for
those who spend enough time to retire in uniform, that they
would have health care for life.
Colonel Partridge. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Many have said that that was not the case, but
we found these old recruiting posters, and we are doing the
best we can to keep faith with the people who believed that
when they signed up.
Thank you for being here today, sir.
Colonel Partridge. Thank you, sir.
[The statement of Colonel Partridge follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
DISABLED MILITARY RETIREES
WITNESS
EDITH G. SMITH, CITIZEN ADVOCATE FOR DISABLED MILITARY RETIREES
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to invite Mrs. Edith Smith to come
to the witness table now. Mrs. Smith is a long-time friend of
this Committee and has been a tireless advocate for our
Nation's disabled military retirees, and she has spent a lot of
time with the Members of the Committee in this great effort.
Mrs. Smith, we are always happy to hear from you. Your
entire statement will be in the record, and we would ask that
you summarize it.
Statement of Mrs. Smith
Mrs. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am Edith Smith, the wife of a disabled retired Marine,
who is very grateful to you, Mr. Young, and to Mr. Murtha and
to the members of this subcommittee for rising up and leading
the fight to protect the disabled military retiree by restoring
their earned CHAMPUS benefit as second payer to Medicare in
1991.
Members of this subcommittee may remember the courageous
testimony of your constituent Terry Cox that led to the
immediate implementation of your legislation by the Department
of Defense in 1992. The weak link, however, in your legislation
is with DOD in its implementation of this dual-coverage
benefit. For more than 6 years, DOD has not accomplished a data
match with--the Health Care Financing Activity--HCFA for your
legislation. The data match is required to identify and notify
Medicare-eligible beneficiaries under age 65 of their change in
eligibility for CHAMPUS.
I am here today to plead for understanding and relief for
any retirees under 65 who have not been informed of the unique
requirement to enroll in Medicare B in order to remain in their
CHAMPUS benefit, which is now known as TRICARE.
I would like to describe the crisis faced by these disabled
retirees with two real-life examples of young retirees who
believed they were covered by CHAMPUS until age 65, as are all
other military retirees.
One is a disabled retiree from Michigan, afflicted with
Huntington's disease. He learned of the Part B requirement
after the enrollment period had closed, 4 days too late. His
request for equitable relief was denied, and he was tragically
left without outpatient insurance for the next 15 months.
Two weeks ago, he was diagnosed with recurrence of cancer.
Had his CHAMPUS coverage not been taken away, would he have
gone to the doctor earlier? Would his cancer have been detected
sooner?
Another disabled military retiree signed up for TRICARE
Prime at Madigan Army Hospital, uninformed by the military of
his need to buy Part B. He died; and his widow suffered a
recoupment attempt by TRICARE of nearly $200,000 last year, not
once but twice in the same year, simply because this couple did
not know about the Medicare B requirement.
As DOD expands its managed care subvention demonstrations
and programs such as TRICARE senior, the disabled appear to
have been cherry-picked and left basically alone to fend for
themselves.
If DOD cannot coordinate one data match with HCFA in 25
years for the Active duty family members who are disabled, how
can they coordinate eight data systems for Medicare over-65s to
begin the TRICARE senior demonstration by 1 July?
For 10 years, Medicare eligibles have received a DEERS
letter of notification, detailing the switch from CHAMPUS to
Medicare at age 65. But this doesn't happen for the disabled
under 65s. Mr. Chairman, these disabled beneficiaries deserve
this important notification letter as well.
DEERS is now working on the data match, but it will not be
completed in time for the disabled retirees to enroll in Part B
by this year's closing date of March 31st.
Disabled beneficiaries not currently enrolled in Part B
will find themselves at risk of ruin emotionally, physically
and financially, because they will have no outpatient insurance
until July 1st, 1999, unless Congress presses DOD to take
protective measures regarding equitable relief waivers.
If eligibility requirements for TRICARE were equal to those
for the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program--FEHBP, these
gaps in medical coverage for the disabled would not exist.
Disabled Federal civilian retirees enrolled in FEHBP have a
voluntary choice to purchase Medicare B but the disabled
military retired beneficiaries do not.
My husband and I are concerned that military personnel are
viewed as second-class citizens by our employer, the Federal
Government. Military professionals have earned a legitimate
employer-provided health benefit such as FEHBP, which the
Congress provides to Federal civilian retirees.
Mr. Chairman, I have submitted my full statement for the
record; and I appreciate the opportunity to speak this morning.
If you have any questions, I would be happy to answer them.
Mr. Young. Ms. Smith, we are always happy to hear from you.
I still remember the help you gave us when the Andy Cox case
was before us.
Mrs. Smith. Yes. I mentioned Terry and talked to her last
night, and she asked that I relay her best wishes to you and
their appreciation as well for what you have done.
Mr. Young. And she, Mrs. Cox, appeared in one of our
hearings.
Mrs. Smith. That is right.
Mr. Young. I am sure you know that.
Mrs. Smith. Yes.
Mr. Young. And made a very good presentation.
Thank you very much for being here today. We appreciate all
the good work that you do.
Mrs. Smith. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cunningham. Let me say, Mrs. Smith, also, I am a
military retiree, and I don't consider you a second-class
citizen.
Mrs. Smith. Thank you.
Mr. Cunningham. I am one.
Mrs. Smith. Maybe we can work on this for the data match.
[The statement of Mrs. Smith follows:]
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THE RETIRED ENLISTED ASSOCIATION
WITNESS
CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT MARK H. OLANOFF, USAF (RET.), LEGISLATIVE
DIRECTOR, THE RETIRED ENLISTED ASSOCIATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. Our next witness is retired Chief Master
Sergeant Mark Olanoff, who is the Legislative Director for the
Retired Enlisted Association.
Chief, we are glad to have you here. You represent more
than 100,000 members and auxiliary of the Retired Enlisted
Association, and we are particularly interested in your views
on health care for military retirees since 61 percent of your
members are over the age of 65.
We will place your entire statement in the record and ask
that you summarize it at this point.
Statement of Sergeant Olanoff
Sergeant Olanoff. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First, I would like to let you know that, you know, I have
not testified here before, but I have read a lot about what you
have done personally and what this Committee has done for
military retirees, especially the ones that are the majority of
my membership; and we deeply appreciate what you do.
Although my statement discusses many issues, I will focus
my summary remarks on retired military health care.
We are not here to ask you for a new weapons system. We are
here to reclaim our employer-sponsored health care. Our
solutions include a combination of TRICARE, DOD and VA
subvention, and the option of the Federal Employee Health Plan
that you, your staffers and every other Federal employee has;
and we state that it should be unequivocal for any military
retiree, regardless of their age.
Mr. Chairman, I am going to refer to some attachments that
I have put into the record, so I will have to do a little bit
of reading. I just want to remind you, and you mentioned it
already, about the promise. Most of the information that I have
seen since I have been here, up until 1993 the United States
Army was still publishing that poster that guaranteed the
health care for life, and I can tell you----
Mr. Young. That was the date on the one that I found.
Sergeant Olanoff. Yes, sir. And just so you are aware of
it, you know that, prior to 1956, this country had the
equivalent of lifetime health care for military retirees
because the law that was passed in 1956 actually took it away
from us, because it created space-available health care.
Unfortunately, this message was distorted over a period of
time, and many of my members today still believe that that
promise was made and it was guaranteed.
I have a couple items that I am going to add that I have
not put into the record, and I will put them in the record. My
letter says that I have a week to do that. This information, I
just received.
Mr. Young. That is fine. We will be happy to include any
items that you want in the record.
Sergeant Olanoff. Thank you, sir.
The Acting Secretary of DOD Health Affairs, Mr.
Christoferson, testified before the Senate Committee on March
the 11th; and he reiterated the DOD's commitment to health care
for our over-65 people. However, there is one question and fact
that I want to bring up that was answered that you probably
have not seen this, but Senator Kempthorne's Committee asked
him about what their position is on FEHBP and how would they
implement it?
His answer was that the Department has consistently opposed
proposals to offer FEHBP because of the high cost and its
potential effect on medical readiness; and in parenthesis he
says, if substantial numbers of beneficiaries were no longer
seen within the military health system.
Well, sir, the first thing I can say to that is that I
receive many phone calls, and I am sure your staff does, that
these people are being turned away. So we don't see how this is
going to have any an impact on military readiness.
And I state in the attachments that I have given to you
from the General Accounting Office--GAO their--the numbers
don't match up. For example, the GAO stated there is 1.2
million of our people. They also state in another report that
Medicare subvention will only help 75,000 people, and they also
go on to say that DOD is currently taking care of approximately
300,000 of our people. So when you subtract 300,000 from 1.2
million, that leaves 900,000 left; and I am here to tell you
that if I could get you to put a law into this appropriations
bill that eliminated the words ``space available'' and all
those 900,000 people started coming back, I do not think the
Department of Defense could take care of all of those people.
There is also some testimony that has come out of the
authorizing committee which, unfortunately, we were unable to
participate in, concerning that enlisted personnel do not want
to pay for health care. Well, sir, I have some data which I
recently received since we are a member of the military
coalition, that is not--that I have not attached but I will
attach, of a survey that was done in 1996 of all the members of
the military coalition. That survey indicates that 66 percent
of all enlisted personnel have some type of Medicare
supplement. They are paying money for health care somehow.
And out of those 66 percent, based on the survey in which
the individuals were asked, how much are you paying for health
care specifically--and if these numbers are needed we can
provide them--but the chart that I have that was produced by
the military coalition indicates that of the Medicare-eligible
retirees over 65, 32 and a half percent of these people would
benefit with FEHBP because the costs that they are currently
paying equals what FEHBP would cost, or more.
So I hope we can dispel the myth that enlisted personnel do
not pay for their health care when it is not provided, because
I think they do.
The last thing I would like to discuss with you, sir, is
some congressional language and mandates that were given to the
Department of Defense.
In fiscal year 1997, the national--the fiscal year 1997
Defense Authorization Act instructed the Department of Defense
to conduct a study of FEHBP and cost available--and costs. In
last year's conference report from the authorizers, they
directed the Secretary to come up with a plan to expand TRICARE
by March the 1st, 1998.
There was also a sense of the Congress resolution that was
put in by Senator Cleland which says, we owe these people
health care even though it is not in the law, and we have an
obligation to take care of these people. And he says, we need
to do that within 2 years of the date that this was signed.
Finally, your Committee, based on your leadership, put in a
request, two requests. The first one was you directed them to
prepare a plan by March the 1st, 1998, to fully implement
subvention which, unfortunately, has not started because of
some administrative things, but we do believe that subvention
will work. And you directed them to come up with a plan so it
could be completed quicker. And, finally, you put a requirement
to them to submit a legislative proposal for FEHBP for a
demonstration project.
I am sure that you are aware, sir, that there are currently
48 Senators and 189 House Members who have signed on to the
legislation that has been pushed by us and other military
associations. I can only say that, in my opinion, it appears to
me that all of these mandates that have come out from these
reports, I have not seen any of these reports and I don't think
you have seen any of these reports, and I believe it is now
time to stop the rhetoric, the report language, the sense of
the Congress, and come up with a plan and oversee and make sure
that that agency does come up with a plan. Because our people
truly have believed in that promise, and I was also told that
promise in 1967 when I enlisted in the military.
So we would like to thank you for the time here, and
anything that you can do to help us we would really appreciate
it.
Mr. Young. Well, I appreciate your testimony; and for your
first time here I would like to say you made a very impressive
statement to the Committee.
As I mentioned, we have had numerous meetings with the
medical folks at the Secretary of Defense's office, as well as
the Surgeons General, trying to keep the pressure on to have
them comply with the directions we put in the appropriations
bill last year.
I know you understand that we are not the authorizers, so
we are not supposed to deal with the basic law, but sometimes
we get around that with language in the appropriations bill.
Sergeant Olanoff. Yes.
Mr. Young. And my last comment is, as a father of a young
man who is enlisted in the United States military, I understand
what you are saying about the fact that they do pay. In fact, I
get a bill every once in a while from him wanting a little bit
of supplement to his rather low salary.
Mr. Cunningham is wanting to make a comment on this issue
as well.
Mr. Cunningham. I thank you. And I also would like you to
take a look at this bill that does exactly what you want on
FEHBP. It deals with TRICARE and the eligibility for it. Even
this--it seems like we just spot each year little changes and
what we want is a seamless system for our veterans, and I would
appreciate if you would take a look at this.
We are going to submit this thing. We think it is far
better than the current legislation that is already in, and we
are asking for different retiree groups to take a look at it.
If you don't like it, don't support it.
But I would also say the very first subvention bill came in
2 years before I was a Member of Congress. I was asked to pick
it up by the veterans and pushed it through. A lot of that is
OSD, because they wouldn't implement it. But some of it is
politics, on just the ability to get selected as a ``pilot''
site it--which hospital got it.
I know I was involved in that. We slowed down the process.
We are going to speed it up and we want to thank you for your
testimony.
Sergeant Olanoff. Thank you very much, Mr. Cunningham.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Bonilla wanted to make a comment as well,
sir.
Mr. Bonilla. I thank the Chairman.
I just want to reiterate, I happen to represent an area
with a high retiree population. I have got a wonderful
community called Air Force Village II in my congressional
district. I hear about these problems all the time, and it is
frankly a very sad situation where we have military retirees
nowadays that have to wait 6 months sometimes to get an
appointment. When they get there, they have to wait 6 to 9
hours, and they wonder where--where is the commitment that was
made to them when they put 30 years in for our country? And it
is a sad situation.
So all the points you are making are taken to heart; and,
rest assured, there are a lot of us that, if you followed any
of the testimony we have had in this Subcommittee in recent
days and weeks, you know that a lot of us are on your side on
this issue.
I would ask one quick question, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Yes.
Mr. Bonilla. I have a question about those participating in
Medicare Part B, because there is a problem with them
participating in the subvention program. Can you comment on
that just briefly, please?
Sergeant Olanoff. The only comment, sir, is that there
are--I think Virginia Torres probably knows the number--I think
it is about 7 percent of the people did not enroll in Medicare
Part B because at the time they were advised that, because all
of these military facilities were available, that you would
waste your money by paying Medicare Part B.
So there are a few of our members that would be affected
that, if they are not in Medicare Part B right now, they would
not be eligible to apply for the test of Medicare subvention.
Mr. Bonilla. Well, keep tooting the horn for us out there;
and, rest assured, there are a lot of us that are listening to
this problem.
Sergeant Olanoff. Mr. Bonilla, I didn't see you walk in. We
know you are a cosponsor, and there are many in this
Subcommittee that are, and hopefully we will get some help, and
we will get these problems solved.
Mr. Bonilla. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Sergeant Olanoff follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Thursday, March 19, 1998.
UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE AND DENTISTRY OF NEW JERSEY
WITNESSES
HON. DONALD M. PAYNE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF
NEW JERSEY
RUSS MOLLOY, DIRECTOR OF GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE
AND DENTISTRY OF NEW JERSEY
BETTY GALLO, CANCER INSTITUTE OF NEW JERSEY
Introduction
Mr. Young. Our next witness is going to be introduced by a
very distinguished colleague of ours. I would like to invite
Congressman Donald Payne of the great State of New Jersey to
come to the witness table and introduce his guests.
Statement of Congressman Payne
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much, Chairman Young. It is not
often I have the opportunity to come before this august group,
but it is certainly a privilege and to Mr. Cunningham, Mr.
Bonilla.
I would like to take a few moments this morning to
introduce two very special people from my State of New Jersey,
Mr. Russ Molloy, who is the Director of Government Relations at
the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, which
is headquartered in my district; and Ms. Betty Gallo, with the
Cancer Institute of New Jersey.
UMDNJ, which is our State medical school, is unique because
New Jersey is probably one of the only States that has simply
one medical school and, therefore, it does a tremendous amount
of coordinating. Although we have two or three outlets, it is
one school; and, therefore, we believe that we are able to do
more with the allocations that we have because we don't have
competing medical schools; and so for that I am very proud.
Mr. Molloy is here to tell us about the International
Center for Public Health, a strategic initiative to create a
world-class infectious disease research and treatment complex
at the University Heights Science Park in Newark, which is also
being developed.
Accompanying him, Mr. Molloy, is a good friend of mine, Ms.
Betty Gallo, who is the wife of the late Congressman Dean
Gallo. Dean Gallo and I served in county government many years
ago, before he came to Washington, preceding me by several
terms, but we worked closely together when we were in county
government with youth organizations. YMCA, he was very fond of.
We became very good friends. On different sides of the aisle,
but we had many more things in common.
So it is my pleasure to introduce Ms. Betty Gallo.
Dean was diagnosed in February of 1992 with prostate cancer
in the advanced stage and sadly passed away in November of
1994.
Ms. Gallo is a national advocate for prostate cancer and is
currently on the staff of the Cancer Institute of New Jersey,
which received the NCI designation as a comprehensive clinic
cancer center just last year.
So, Mr. Chairman, once again, I appreciate the opportunity
to appear before you and to introduce the witnesses to speak
about this very crucial issue of importance to New Jersey.
Thank you.
Mr. Young. Don, thank you very much.
We welcome both of you; and, as Congressman Payne has said,
I think everybody in the past loved Dean Gallo. He was a very
special person.
Mrs. Gallo. Thank you.
Mr. Young. We sorely miss him. We are happy to hear from
both of you this morning. Whoever would like to go first, go
forth.
Statement of Mr. Molloy
Mr. Molloy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Yes, I would like to personally express the University's
thanks to Congressman Payne. He has been a wonderful friend to
the University and to the State of New Jersey, and we
appreciate his attendance today.
I would like to briefly give you a background about two
priority projects that the University of Medicine and Dentistry
is pursuing that really relate specifically to the national
security of the United States.
Just a bit of background on UMDNJ. The University, as
Congressman Payne just noted, is the largest public health
sciences university in the United States. We have three medical
schools, all within our umbrella. We are the only institution
that has that; and, therefore, we don't have that competitive
nature of having schools fight against each other.
We also have schools of dentistry, nursing, health-related
professions and biomedical sciences. We also happen to have, in
Congressman Payne's district, one of the largest acute care
hospitals in the State of New Jersey. We are affiliated with
three core teaching hospitals, the largest behavioral health
care delivery system in the State of New Jersey, and we are
affiliated with well over 100 academic and health care
institutions statewide. So we are clearly--we are a State
agency. We are a public entity, and we are statewide in nature
and operation.
Initially, let me just touch base on the International
Center for Public Health. I testified last year before this
Committee that we were moving forward; and there has been some
truly dramatic changes in this project, both positive and
negative.
On the negative side, I think--I don't have to tell this
committee about the problems of infectious disease. It is on
the front page of every paper almost weekly now. Clearly, this
issue about what happens to national--international security
forces with infectious disease is becoming a very prevalent
discussion topic. The deployment of U.S. troops to new
geographic areas within the increasingly global economy have
contributed to this resurgence in infectious microbes.
Rapid and repeated exposure to these types of diseases can
arise in any part of the world, and it is a reality for both
military personnel and to the common U.S. citizen. By the year
2000, well over 400 million people will engage in international
travel and the issue of connection with infectious disease and
its spread arises therefrom.
New Jersey is unique because we are surrounded by eight
international seaports and airports, so our access to the
international field is enormous. We, therefore, propose the
creation of an International Center for Public Health as a
direct response to this looming crisis.
Within the University Heights Science Park, which is this
50-acre development project that Congressman Payne mentioned
earlier, it is a linkage between four academic institutions
within the City of Newark and private partners, including the
major corporations, Prudential, Bell Atlantic, and public
service electric and gas. They have tied together this proposal
to link three core tenents into a single anchor facility.
It is the International Center for Public Health, which
combines the Public Health Research Institute of New York,
which will be relocating from Manhattan into New Jersey; the
New Jersey Medical School, our medical school; National
Tuberculosis Center at the University--it is one of three model
TB centers in the country that are funded by the CDC--and our
Medical School's Department of Microbiology and Molecular
Genetics.
What we are doing is bringing together these three core
tenents to create a nexus, a connection that allows this
research to really expand.
Each of these groups have already gotten millions upon
millions of dollars in support for their research, both from
public and private sources; and we seek your support to pull
together and finalize this project.
Since I appeared last year, in October, a memorandum of
understanding was signed by the State of New Jersey and the
partners in this project; and the State has committed $60
million towards the overall cost of $78 million in both loan
and grant funds towards the development of this institution.
The State recognizes the enormous value and potential this
facility has; and we are appearing before you today, as I did
last year, to try to complete this project.
The secondary, if I may--Mrs. Gallo has already been
introduced to the Committee. Just to give you an overview of
what we are attempting to do.
The Cancer Institute of New Jersey, as Congressman Payne
mentioned, is the only NCI-designated clinical cancer facility
in the State of New Jersey. As we have discussed earlier, with
the International Center for Public Health, the key is to put
together the right experts to deal with the particular problem.
Prostate cancer, you will hear, I believe, later on from
the National Coalition on Prostate Cancer, is clearly an
enormous problem. Mrs. Gallo lost her husband to it. If anybody
is rediagnosed, if you get a recurrence of prostate cancer, it
is always fatal. What we are attempting to do is to bring
together a unique consortium of extraordinarily talented
individuals to go forward to create the Gallo Prostate Cancer
Institute, which is designed to do something quite dramatic. It
is designed to actually cure prostate cancer.
The Cancer Institute itself has been concentrating on
efforts to develop new ways to treat this devastating disease.
Currently, patients are enrolled in five different clinical
trials for advanced prostate cancer. And since we have the NCI
designation, anyone with a recurrent disease can immediately be
brought in to these advanced therapies and we can basically do
experimental therapies right now.
We are bringing in a series of focus groups so that we can
bring together the basic scientists looking at the core of the
problem, along with clinicians and physician-researchers so
they can work together and collaborate, which is now becoming
the catchword for all future research in this area. We have to
get enough people together to focus on this problem.
The Gallo Prostate Cancer Institute will be incorporated
into the Cancer Institute of New Jersey's statewide network so
that we have immediate statewide presence with all of our
affiliated hospitals with the Cancer Institute so that citizens
within the State and within the metropolitan region can
immediately access these goals--these new therapies and new
treatments.
We have already recruited investigators from sister
research institutes in the region in New Jersey to study this
issue. Clearly, we are--the issue about its impact not only on
the male population in general but on the African American
population is a critical component of this research. New Jersey
stands as a unique facility to try to address this issue
specifically.
With the establishment of the Gallo Prostate Cancer
Institute, collaborative research such as the projects that I
have just mentioned will be expanded. We can then also
effectively recruit all of the national and international
recognized scientists to focus on this research.
We expect to raise substantial private funds and public
funds through corporate and other resources, and we also ask
your support to secure whatever funds we can to facilitate the
establishment of this critically important resource.
This Committee is renowned for its efforts in biomedical
research; and we, on behalf of the University, want to thank
you for your efforts in the past. You have already taken major
steps in prostate cancer, and we encourage you to continue that
support.
I want to thank you for the time.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. We appreciate your
testimony. You know this Committee has invested substantial
sums in addition to the other funding provided by other
Committees, so we understand the seriousness of the problem.
Mrs. Gallo, did you want to make a statement?
Statement of Mrs. Gallo
Mrs. Gallo. The only statement I would like to say, Mr.
Chairman, is I appreciate the time to come here today; and I
just want to let you know that I am very committed to this,
because of Dean dying from prostate cancer.
You were not aware that when he was diagnosed in February
of 1992, he was in the advanced stages. His PSA, which is--
normally 1 to 4 is a normal PSA; his was 883. It was already
into his bones. His prognosis was 3 to 6 months at that time.
But being that we had the National Institutes of Health here in
Washington, he was able to go there and get a protocol called
Seromon which helped prolong his life for two and a half years
with a good quality of life.
That is why it is so important that with the--when an NCI
designate such as the Cancer Institute is able to get
information on clinical trials and, again, with our affiliates
kind of give them out to each of the communities so they--
people can stay in their communities but still have access to
these clinical trials through the Cancer Institute.
This Gallo Center would be in memory of Dean in the sense
that he did die of prostate cancer as a few colleagues here in
Congress already have, and I just feel that it is a real great
thing for what Dean had stood for and being able to help the
people in the State of New Jersey, who he so much cared about.
I am kind of trying to continue on his work.
Again, I just thank you.
Mr. Young. Well, thank you very much.
Congressman Payne, thank you for bringing the witnesses to
us today. We appreciate it.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Molloy. Thank you, sir.
[The statement of Mr. Molloy follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES
WITNESS
MAJOR GENERAL ROGER W. SANDLER, AUS (RET.), EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, RESERVE
OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to welcome back to the Committee
for another appearance General Roger Sandler, who is the
Executive Director of the Reserve Officers Association.
General, your statements are always very comprehensive; and
your entire statement will be placed in the record.
You point out that more than 106,000 Reservists were
deployed to Southwest Asia during Desert Shield and Desert
Storm. This last week, Mr. Bonilla and I had the privilege of
visiting with a number of Army Reservists at Camp McGovern,
just outside of Brcko in Bosnia; and I would have to tell you
that they are shoulder to shoulder with their Active duty
counterparts. You can't tell them apart. They are all doing a
really good job. Many of them would rather be back home, but
they understand the importance of what they are doing. So we
are happy to hear from you today.
One of the things they talked to us about, while we were
there, was the Ready Reserve Mobilization Income Insurance
Program and the problems that exist there. We think we fixed
that in the supplemental, which this Subcommittee reported out
of here last Thursday.
So we are happy to hear from you at this time, sir. It is
always good to have you back.
Statement of General Sandler
General Sandler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Cunningham,
Mr. Bonilla. Thank you very much.
We at the Reserve Officers Association certainly appreciate
what this committee has done, what you have done personally,
over the years in support of the Reserve components.
Let me just perhaps amend what I was going to say earlier
and just talk about the fact that I was also in Bosnia
recently, and that very subject was broached to me. The people
are only getting 5 percent of what they had originally
contracted for in the mobilization income insurance.
Now I realize we are putting forth a supplemental to
perhaps make up the difference so they will get 100 percent of
the benefit that is owed, but I would also tell you that they
are telling me that they would like to see that insurance
program reinstated in some fashion. Of course, we understand
that there was a problem in the manner in which it was designed
and the manner in which it was implemented, but perhaps we
could figure out some way in which we can do the same kind of a
program but with a more intellectual approach to how it is
implemented.
Let me just move on that, since the Gulf war, some
245,000--in which some 245,000 Reserve component personnel were
involuntarily mobilized, only 160,000, as you indicated, had
gone to the Gulf but considerably more were mobilized. There
has been a continuing levy on the demands of our Reservists in
northern Iraq, Haiti and in Bosnia.
It is our firm belief that the seamless integration of
which you just spoke of Reserve and Active components is at
least apparent in the operational contingencies; and, as a
result, the ROA feels that there needs to be a continued
recognition of the increased need to fund mission training in
modernization.
There have been approximately 17,000 Reservists of all
components mobilized for the Bosnia contingency. This shows no
sign of abating in the near future. There are inhibitors to
saving money, by not having enough contingency money available
to support extending Reservists on Active duty after they have
completed their 270-day statutory tour. We have many Reservists
who have indicated an interest in extending; but, because of a
lack of funding, they have not been able to do that. What that
really means is that we spend more money mobilizing a new
individual to take that person's place and paying the
transportation for the individual to come home and another bit
of transportation for a new person to go into theater and
thereby also interrupting the continuity of effort.
If we have got people who are willing to stay, then we
ought to consider figuring out ways to fund that.
I was on that trip to EUCOM, U.S./European Command, and
that short trip to both Hungary and Bosnia. I discovered that,
while I was there, that only the Air Force has made a sincere
attempt in providing this contingency type money so that they
could fly missions, in many cases--most cases, as a matter of
fact--with volunteers. And it really is important, in my
judgment, in the judgment of the leadership in EUCOM, that the
other services, particularly the Army but also the Navy, Mr.
Cunningham, that they also would come up with some way of--in
which they could fence money to pay for contingency operations.
We recommend that the Army and the Navy receive an increase
in their share of the DOD budget. I realize there is a lid on
the amount of the DOD budget, but they ought to get a larger
share. The Army itself has only had about 24 percent of the
budget for--almost historically, and they just need to figure
out a way, and perhaps this Committee could help direct their
efforts in that regard. If they want to use Reserve forces for
these contingencies, they need to have a pool of money to do
that.
Our feeling is that the Air Force has done a wonderful job,
and money ought not come from the Air Force to fund the Army or
the Navy. It ought to come perhaps from DOD overhead in various
and sundry headquarters around the world.
I will just touch again on the mobilization insurance
program. These folks are getting the 5 percent. They are
getting along just fine. You know, they realize that there is a
problem, but they do indicate very strongly to their
leadership, which was transmitted to me and also personally to
me by the individual soldiers with whom I spoke, that they
would like to see that reinstated.
So I would like this Committee to give strong consideration
to figuring out a way, and we would be delighted to work with
you on that, a way in which mobilization income insurance could
be reinstated.
My final comment, Mr. Chairman, is on the equipping and
training of the forces. As you know, long-term investment is
being sacrificed in order to maintain short-term readiness. We
need both. The Reserve components need to have sufficient money
to train the force. The Navy Reserve, in particular, has
reduced their annual training to 12 days in order to shift
funding to other requirements. They have also allowed a greater
number of exemptions from their annual training for the purpose
of saving and shifting money.
Fifteen percent of the officers in the Naval Reserve and as
many as 25 percent of the enlisted Naval personnel will not
perform any annual training. The statutory annual training days
are 14. Yet DOD has been given the authority to reduce that in
the event that they have been requested by the service. In this
case, the Navy did request it and were granted the authority to
reduce it to 12. They are the only service that is training
their people with 12 days annual training and allowing so many
exemptions from annual training.
We would also recommend that section 1301(a), Title 31,
U.S. Code--and I will provide that to you in a written form--be
broadened to allow reimbursement to the Reserve personnel
accounts without reprogramming. This was done on a very limited
basis previously. We would like to see it broadened so that the
contingency ops that are being supported by the Reserve
components could be reimbursed. This would assist in recouping
money back in those accounts.
Finally, this year, DOD--this is the year that DOD has been
waiting for, the year that their procurement lists were
expected to cover the needs of the Reserve components as well.
Well, they don't.
We request that you review the requirements in our
statement for the record and fund those high-priority items
listed. We believe that the $1.363 billion requested by DOD
falls short by at least a half a billion dollars.
Whatever amount is authorized, we recommend that the money
be allocated to miscellaneous accounts rather than line items
so that the services have the greatest amount of flexibility.
Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you very much for your
personal attention. Members of the Committee, thank you so
much. If you have any questions, I would be delighted to answer
them.
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much for being here.
The Members of this Committee recognize that we are being
forced to do more with less. We are wearing out troops. We are
wearing out equipment. We are not making that long-term
investment that you suggested. This Committee is trying to do
something about it that, but we are being hindered this year by
the lack of room in the budget.
General Sandler. Right.
Mr. Young. We are really going to have to get down to brass
tacks and work hard to do the things that have to be done.
General Sandler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. We appreciate your testimony today.
General Sandler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cunningham. General, I know that all the groups come in
here, but I have extreme hope. I look at the future and the
direction we are going--and this is not political, but a
balanced budget that gives us low interest rates, I mean, that
gives you more money in your pockets and the people that you
are talking about and the contingencies, when we--I think every
group in here, we could give them the dollars, but when you
have got to take out $16 billion for the extension in Somalia,
Haiti and Bosnia, and we are looking at staying in Bosnia,
which is going to be more, that is what really puts a clamp on
us. Because you only get about one of four dollars back, even
in a supplemental.
General Sandler. Right.
Mr. Cunningham. But I have extreme hope in the direction we
are going, and I think it is going to get better, and we will
do everything in a bipartisan way in this Committee to make
sure that that happens, sir.
General Sandler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. General, again, thank you very much for being
here with us. We always appreciate your testimony, sir.
General Sandler. Thank you.
[The statement of General Sandler follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
THE MILITARY COALITION
WITNESS
COMMANDER VIRGINIA TORSCH, MSC, USNR, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, GOVERNMENT
RELATIONS, THE RETIRED OFFICERS ASSOCIATION ON BEHALF OF THE
MILITARY COALITION
Introduction
Mr. Young. Now I would like to welcome Commander Virginia
Torsch of the Military Coalition. The Coalition consists of 25
military and veterans organizations, representing approximately
5 million members of the uniformed services, officers and
enlisted, Active, Reserve, veterans and retired, plus families
and survivors.
The Coalition does an excellent job of informing this
Committee of the collective thinking of the organizations; and
on those occasions that we need help with getting our
legislation supported throughout the Congress, the Coalition
has always been very helpful; and we appreciate that very much.
Commander, welcome to you. Your entire statement is
included in the record, and we would like to have you summarize
it.
Statement of Commander Torsch
Commander Torsch. Okay. Thank you very much, sir.
I would like to express my deepest appreciation to you and
your distinguished members of this Subcommittee for holding
these important hearings and for allowing us to present our
concerns. In fact, I think Mark Olanoff stole much of my
thunder, but I will reiterate--probably much of what he said
you will hear again in my statement.
We are particularly grateful for your leadership in
directing DOD to submit a test to allow the Medicare-eligible
uniformed services beneficiaries to enroll in the Federal
Employees Health Benefits Program.
I want to point out that we are very committed to making
TRICARE a better health care plan. I have detailed extensively
some of the problems with that program in my written testimony,
so I won't go over those; but I do want to say that I want to
thank this committee for being instrumental in ensuring that
many of these problems have been resolved or at least
ameliorated. We would like to express our deepest appreciation
for your Committee's role in working with and trying to fix
TRICARE, make it a better plan.
I also want to say that one of the most critical steps
towards restoring equity in the health care benefit for older
retirees was taken last year, with the enactment of legislation
for the Medicare subvention test and the Balanced Budget Act of
1997.
Again, the Coalition deeply appreciates the subcommittee's
leadership in getting this very important legislation enacted,
and we are optimistic that the test will prove that subvention
is a win/win provision for all concerned. However, we do have a
major concern that many subvention supporters believe
subvention is the solution. This is not the case at all. In
fact, when you look at TRICARE Senior, even if it is expanded
nationwide, when combined with DOD's level of effort, it will
only benefit about 30 to 40 percent of the Medicare-eligible
population.
Thus, to honor the lifetime health care commitment that
many have already previously testified to and which we in the
Coalition believe is a firm commitment to retirees, we believe
an additional option must be provided to the have-nots and the
lock-outs and that is to offer these beneficiaries the option
of enrolling in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program.
We realize that the principal argument being made currently
against FEHBP 65 is its price tag, both to DOD and to the
beneficiary. We took--the concern of the high cost to the
beneficiary was one that the Coalition took a good hard look at
and before we concluded that it would be a viable option for
beneficiaries, we conducted a health care cost survey in 1996.
That survey revealed that 32 percent of enlisted retirees who
are 65 and older and 41 percent of officers are already paying
substantially higher costs in supplemental care, and they would
be economically better off with FEHBP than under their current
health care coverage. That represents a significant population
who would benefit from FEHBP.
While the Coalition would prefer to have FEHBP 65 enacted
nationwide, we recognize that a limited test may be necessary
to take the guesswork out of the real cost of this option. For
this reason, we strongly urge this committee to pass at least a
test of FEHBP 65 along the lines spelled out in the current
House Bill 1766.
This bipartisan bill, which now has 190 cosponsors in the
House, and its Senate companion bill S. 1344 has 37 cosponsors,
would authorize a demonstration of FEHBP 65 in two geographic
areas, one including a TRICARE primary with military treatment
facilities and another area without such facilities; and it
would include no more than 25,000 Medicare-eligible service
beneficiaries in each area.
Based on the participation rate, we believe accurate data
could be derived to predict the cost of extending the program
nationwide; and I want to point out that this test initiative
has been scored by CBO as only costing $68 million each year.
The demonstration proposed by H.R. 1766 is consistent with your
committee's guidance in the fiscal year 1998 Defense
Appropriations Act, which directed DOD to submit FEHBP test
legislation to Congress this year.
We believe this should not be too problematic for DOD since
last year, in a report to Congress, Dr. Martin, who was then
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs,
indicated DOD would support a limited test of FEHBP 65 in non-
Prime areas. The Coalition is anxiously awaiting DOD's proposal
but is concerned that DOD is dragging its feet in developing
the plan.
Timing is critical because the Office of Personnel
Management has indicated to us that even with FEHPB 65
legislation enacted this summer, enrollment for the
demonstration could not begin until November, 1999, with
implementation in January, 2000. It would be a travesty if the
test slipped beyond that date.
It is truly ironic that, despite their many sacrifices,
retired service members lose their military health insurance at
age 65. Please keep in mind that those hit hardest by Congress'
and DOD's actions are the retirees who fought in World War II,
Korea and Vietnam and then won the Cold War. The latter victory
alone is saving the government many, many billion dollars in
reduced defense spending every year. These retirees have
already paid the premiums for equal coverage, not just in money
but in services sacrificed, including many who paid the
ultimate sacrifice.
Mr. Chairman, the Coalition respectfully requests and
strongly recommends that this Committee include funding to
conduct a demonstration of FEHBP 65 in its markup of the
Defense Appropriations bill.
I thank you, again, for the opportunity to address this
Subcommittee; and this concludes my testimony.
Mr. Young. Commander, thank you very much; and we, I say
again, do appreciate the position of the Coalition and the help
that you have always given us. We recognize the difficult
problem of getting DOD to move sometimes, but we are not the
authorizing committees, but we are trying to use the pressure
that we can to develop a test plan.
Commander Torsch. We much appreciate that, sir.
Mr. Young. Thank you again for being here.
Commander Torsch. Thank you.
[The statement of Commander Torsch follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
NATIONAL BREAST CANCER COALITION
WITNESS
FRANCES M. VISCO, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL BREAST CANCER COALITION
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to introduce next Ms. Fran Visco,
who is President of the National Breast Cancer Coalition.
The Coalition represents 400 member organizations and more
than 40,000 individual women, their families and friends. She
and the Coalition have been very instrumental in making sure
that this Committee and our colleagues in the Senate are well
aware of the needs here, and we appreciate that very much. We
have been able to add substantial money over the President's
budget for this effort for breast cancer research.
This year, the money is going to be very difficult to come
by. I have to warn everybody of that, because we don't have the
budget room that we had in previous years. But, anyway, Fran,
we are always glad to see you.
Ms. Visco. Thank you.
Mr. Young. We are always glad to hear you. It is always
nice to know that you are out there in the hallway during our
markup to give us the support that we need to get this job
done.
Statement of Ms. Visco
Ms. Visco. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Cunningham.
I want to come here today just to bring you up-to-date on
the program and to, again, offer my thanks to you, to the
Committee, for your ongoing support of this incredible program
and to pledge that we will work with you in any way necessary
to make certain that we have significant funding to continue.
I am here once again as a breast cancer survivor and on
behalf of the 2.6 million women living in this country with
breast cancer and in memory of the more than a quarter of a
million women who have died of breast cancer since this program
began. We truly believe, and we know that you agree with us,
that this program has brought about hope and has brought about
scientific discoveries that means that those numbers will
significantly change in the future.
Over the past year, this program once again has made
history. Last fall, the Era of Hope, Department of Defense
breast cancer research meeting occurred here in Washington,
D.C. For the first time ever, a major biomedical research
program, funded with taxpayer dollars, issued a report to the
Nation on what happened with those dollars.
It was an unbelievable meeting. It was unbelievable not
just because it was the first-ever report to the Nation but
also because it was unique in that it was really a
collaboration in partnership between women with breast cancer
and the scientific community. I want to tell you some of what I
heard at that meeting.
New researchers came up to me to tell me that, because of
this program, they think about their research differently. It
has changed the way they do their medical research.
Established scientists came up to me and said, why aren't
all of our programs run like this?
Very recently, an extremely well-known, internationally
well-known breast cancer scientist said to me, you--meaning
this program and the activists--have changed the way we think.
You have brought us out of our ivory towers; you have changed
our world.
This program has brought about not just more money for
breast cancer research, it hasn't just brought in new people to
the field, but it has changed the way scientists are doing
their research. And that has ramifications not just for me, for
a woman with breast cancer, but for all women, all women in the
military, all women everywhere, and all men also, because these
scientists focus on other areas. This program has set a model.
I also want to point out to you that, over the past year,
the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences
has issued a report. They evaluated this program, and they gave
it a four-star rating. They said the program is unbelievable
and must continue.
I want to thank you not just for continuing to fund the
program but also for respecting the integrity of the program. I
know that, working together, we have had a difficult time at
times protecting this program and recognizing this importance
of peer review and recognizing the unusual, incredible system
we have set up. You have really been a leader in making certain
that that system remains, and that is the system that has
captured the imagination of the scientific community and of
activists, and that is the system that has brought about
incredible results.
I don't think I need to take up much more of your time. You
know how important this program is and how successful it is,
and you know that you will hear from us and that we will
continue to work with you to make certain this program
continues.
But I do want to bring you one report, and it is just an
example of many. Very soon, there is a therapy that will be
submitted to the Food and Drug Administration for approval, and
that therapy will probably be made available to millions of
women in this country. It will be a very new, unusual, first
biologic for breast cancer treatment. That therapy is here
because the scientists who came up with the initial discovery
got funding from the Department of Defense Breast Cancer
Research Program when no one else would fund him.
That is a specific, concrete example of what we have done.
And I have told you that the change in the scientific community
is another example of what we have done.
I want to thank you for working with us to bring all of
this about. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. Well, Fran, we really appreciate you and the
good work that you do; and I hope that you know that and
believe that.
Ms. Visco. Yes.
Mr. Young. This is a very important crusade that we are all
on. It is very threatening to many, many, many women in our
country.
Ms. Visco. Yes, I know you know that.
Mr. Young. It is always good to see you. Thank you for
being here again.
Ms. Visco. Thank you.
Mr. Young. We look forward to seeing you in the hallway
during markup time.
Ms. Visco. Thanks.
[The statement of Ms. Visco follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NURSE ANESTHETISTS
WITNESS
RON VAN NEST, CRNA, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, NURSE ANESTHESIA PROGRAM,
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NURSE ANESTHETISTS
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to now welcome Ron Van Nest, the
Assistant Director of the Nurse Anesthesia Program at
Georgetown University. Mr. Van Nest represents 27,000 certified
anesthetists in the United States, including 600 in the
military services.
Mr. Van Nest, your prepared statement will appear in the
record; and we would like you to summarize it in your oral
testimony.
Statement of Mr. Van Nest
Mr. Van Nest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Incidentally, I understand you have some of your
students with you today; and I wanted to make the room aware of
that.
Mr. Van Nest. Yes, sir. Thank you very much for your
patience in them coming in.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before this Committee today. My name is Ronald Van Nest, and I
am a certified registered nurse anesthetist, a CRNA.
I served in the United States Navy for 30 years, and I was
a member of the American Association of Nurse Anesthetists
Federal Services Committee for the last 3 of those years. At
that time, I also held the position of Nurse Anesthesia
Consultant to the Navy Surgeon General. I am retired from the
Navy Nurse Corps and currently am an instructor in a Nurse
Anesthesia Program at a local university, as you mentioned,
Georgetown; and my students, as you mentioned, are here to
cheer me on, I hope.
I am testifying today on behalf of the American Association
of Nurse Anesthetists, the AANA, which represents more than
27,000 CRNAs, including 600 that serve in the Armed Forces.
My testimony here today will touch on the status of CNRAs
in the military and how effective utilization of those CRNAs
could result in considerable cost savings for the Department of
Defense, without any sacrifice in quality.
First, I would like to thank this Committee for its
continued support of the efforts of the Department of Defense
to recruit and retain qualified nurse anesthetists. The AANA
particularly thanks this Committee for your support of special
pay programs for CRNAs and strongly recommends their
continuation as an important recruitment and retention tool to
ensure that our Federal services can meet their medical
mission.
CRNAs save the Department of Defense a considerable amount
of money, without any sacrifice in quality of care. Nurse
anesthetists, while providing the same services as physician
anesthesiologists, are far less costly for the services to
educate and retain. Data indicates that as many as 10 highly
qualified CRNAs may be educated for the cost of training one
anesthesiologist.
It is true that cost effectiveness means nothing if the
quality is not there, but let me stress that numerous studies
have shown that there is no significant difference in outcomes
between the two providers. Both providers receive similar
training in anesthesia. One started that training as a
physician, the other as a nurse.
The services also spend far less in bonus money for CRNAs
as compared to anesthesiologists. Anesthesiologists receive far
more types and amounts of bonus money. If a nurse anesthetist
and a physician start in the anesthesia training at the same
time, in 8 years the nurse anesthetist will have received
$69,000 in special pays, while the anesthesiologist will have
received a quarter of a million dollars. The Department of
Defense could provide even more cost-effective care with more
appropriate utilization of its anesthesia providers.
The three services are currently operating at most medical
treatment facilities with approximately two CRNAs for every one
anesthesiologist. But isn't it ironic that during World War II,
when nurse anesthesia training was little more than 4 months,
and mostly on-the-job training at that, that their ratio was 17
CRNAs to one anesthesiologist? Compare that to today when
anesthesia is far safer, with sophisticated technology and
computerized monitors and alarms.
With nurse anesthetists educated at the Master's Degree
level, we find that CRNAs are being supervised and at ratios of
2 to 1 and in some cases even one to one.
On many military operational missions today, it is a CRNA
that is deployed with combat units or aboard aircraft carriers
as the sole anesthesia provider with anesthesiologist present.
I personally served as the sole anesthesia provider for a
population of 5,000 at our base in Keflavik, Iceland, for 2
years; and I also served as a sole anesthesia provider on an
aircraft carrier for 4 months. If such practice models are
acceptable in some settings, then there is no reason they
should not be acceptable in urban military treatment
facilities.
I would recommend that this Committee direct the Department
of Defense to utilize their anesthesia providers in the most
cost-effective manner, prohibiting strict ratio requirements
for urban facilities that only drive up the cost and do nothing
to enhance the quality of care.
In conclusion, AANA thanks this Committee again for its
support of military nurse anesthetists through the incentive
special pay and board certification pay. AANA believes that
more appropriate utilization of CRNAs in the military is of
critical concern and is an area that could be examined for
increased cost savings.
I thank the Committee members for their consideration on
these issues, and I will be happy to answer any of your
questions.
Mr. Young. Mr. Van Nest, thank you very much for being here
with us today.
We certainly understand--those of us who have gone through
some more serious surgeries understand the importance of what
it is that you do, and we appreciate your being here today.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Van Nest. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Cunningham. And let me just say about the last witness,
the only thing I disagree with, it shouldn't be just civilian.
The nurse's role should be expanded in a lot of other areas
besides just the one that he mentioned. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Van Nest follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Thursday, March 19, 1998.
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
WITNESS
DR. PHILIP FURMANSKI, DEAN, FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCE, CHAIRMAN AND
PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF BIOLOGY, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
Introduction
Mr. Cunningham. Next we will hear from Dr. Philip
Furmanski, Dean, Faculty of Arts and Science, New York
University. We welcome your testimony, Doctor.
Statement of Mr. Furmanski
Mr. Furmanski. Thank you, Mr. Cunningham.
My name is Philip Furmanski, and I am speaking on behalf of
New York University as Dean of its Faculty of Arts and Science.
I appreciate very much this opportunity to discuss with you
an initiative which addresses national goals for enlisting
university-based scientific research to catalyze technologic
innovation and strengthen national defense and military
preparedness. Our project will advance national security
interests through enhanced scientific understanding of brain
development and activity.
We believe that a national investment into research on the
mind and brain will repay itself many times over. To put my
remarks into a larger context, I would like to thank this
committee for its recognition that broad-based university
research over the years has been one of the cornerstones of our
national security efforts.
Research support provided by the Department of Defense has
been crucial to advancing new discoveries on campus with
important military and civilian applications.
For example, by its investment in research into computers,
communications and networking technology, the Department has
spurred the development of an entire civilian industry
generating millions of jobs and billions of tax dollars.
I would like today to present to you another possible
investment by the Department into research that will push the
frontiers of understanding of how the brain develops and
functions and how we can enhance our ability to learn, think,
remember and work as productive members of society.
At NYU, we are undertaking to do this by establishing a
Center for Cognition, Learning, Emotion and Memory Studies.
This Center will not only carry out research but will also act
to help train the next generation of interdisciplinary brain
scientists. Research in this Center will substantially expand
what we know about the neurodynamics of learning and memory;
the brain's perception, its acquisition and storage of
information; the neurobiology of fear and its impact on
learning and performance; and information processing in the
brain and, by extension, in computers and other machines.
These studies will have enormous applications in the
training and performance of military personnel and for the
development of new technologies.
As one example, our research has implications for
instruction, including those in the military, in the classroom,
as well as in hands-on use of sophisticated machinery and
weaponry. The more we know about how peopleprocess and retain
information, the better we can design such training programs and target
them to individuals with different levels of preparedness.
Our research can identify different learning styles and
suggest how instruction can accommodate those styles and how
learning technologies and simulated learning environments can
be harnessed to improve motivation and increase retention and
memory.
Second, our neurological research on emotion has
implications for improving performance under the high-stress
conditions that characterize military operations. Our research
in the neurobiology of fear is examining the brain systems that
malfunction, for example, in anxiety phobias, panic attacks and
post-traumatic stress disorders. These studies will help us
understand the source of fear and other emotions, how they are
triggered by circumstance, why they are hard to control, and of
the greatest practical importance, how emotions can
incapacitate, undermine attentiveness and weaken memory.
Ultimately, our research will generate clues for preventing and
treating emotional disorders on a very broad and wide scale.
Finally, our vision psychologists and computer vision
researchers are working together to investigate intelligence
and information processing in neural systems and in their
machine analogues in the computer data imaging, processing and
retrieval areas.
These kinds of studies have far-reaching implications,
first, for our understanding in improving the human capacity to
perceive and respond to visual cues; and, second, for
developing computer technologies to process and monitor large
displays of information which obviously have implications in
the military and in civilian areas as well.
To establish this interdisciplinary Center, NYU is seeking
support to expand research programs, attract investigators from
the disparate disciplines that are required and provide the
technical resources necessary to create a premier, world-class
scientific enterprise.
As you know, traditional funding sources cannot underwrite
the establishment of a cross-disciplinary area of scientific
study, particularly one that includes research and teaching and
reaches across the fields so disparate as computer science,
cognitive science, biomedicine, psychology and education.
New York University is well positioned to create and
operate this major national cross-disciplinary research and
training center. The largest private university in the United
States, with over 49,000 students and 13 schools, NYU has
outstanding researchers and well-established strengths in
neurobiology, cognitive science, neuromagnetism, behavioral
science, mathematics, computer science, educational psychology
and the like. With these strengths, NYU will create a
distinctive center that will produce a new understanding of the
brain and new ways of using that knowledge to meet our national
goals.
Our faculty are already widely recognized for their
research on memory, learning and motivation. NYU is
internationally known for its studies in vision, a key input to
learning; and NYU is the leader in new studies on the
neurobiology of emotion and its connections to learning, memory
and perception.
Parenthetically, I should say that much of this work has
been featured very prominently in media venues such as the New
York Times, Time Magazine and the networks.
As we complete what has been called the Decade of the
Brain, NYU, through this new center, is poised for leadership
in accomplishing the aims of this important initiative and the
goals central to this Committee's priorities.
NYU is in a special position among universities to bring
these strengths in so many very different disciplines together
to attack these crucial issues and then to disseminate the
results for the benefit of the American people.
I know, Mr. Cunningham, that many members of this Committee
have played a leading role in supporting brain research and
related issues concerning education, their application to
children, as well as those aspects that relate to the military;
and, for that, I would like to express my very deep
appreciation, both as a university administrator and as a
scientist myself.
Mr. Cunningham, this concludes my testimony. I thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today.
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you, Doctor. You need to have me
testify before your hospital and your university. This tape has
some 36 Surface-to-Air Missiles--SAMS fired at me while engaged
with 22 MiGs. Fear has an advantage by forcing the mind to
work, but uncontrolled fear makes you vulnerable.
Those studies are very worthwhile, and I thank you for your
testimony.
Mr. Furmanski. Thank you very much. Thank you.
Mr. Cunningham. I just got this tape the day before
yesterday, and it makes the hair on my neck stand up.
Mr. Furmanski. I imagine so.
[The statement of Mr. Furmanski follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Thursday, March 19, 1998.
NATIONAL PROSTATE CANCER COALITION
WITNESS
JAY H. HEDLUND, PRESIDENT AND CEO, THE NATIONAL PROSTATE CANCER
COALITION
Introduction
Mr. Cunningham. Our next witness, the National Prostate
Cancer Coalition, Jay Hedlund, President. Mr. Hedlund.
Statement of Mr. Hedlund
Mr. Hedlund. Mr. Cunningham, thank you for the opportunity
to be here today.
I am Jay Hedlund, President of the National Prostate Cancer
Coalition, a nationwide grass-roots advocacy organization
dedicated to the mission of ending prostate cancer as a serious
health concern for men and their families.
In addition to individual survivors, family members,
researchers, medical professionals, the National Prostate
Cancer Coalition members include the American Cancer Society,
the American Foundation of Urologic Disease, CaP CURE, national
survivor support groups like US TOO International, Man to Man
and PAACT, and numerous State and local survivor groups.
A fundamental objective of the Coalition is to increase
Federal funding for prostate cancer research commensurate with
the terrible impact of this deadly disease.
I am pleased to have the opportunity to provide testimony
in support of the prostate cancer research programs conducted
by the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command at Ft.
Detrick and the U.S. Army Center for Prostate Disease Research
at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. And on behalf of the more
than one million American men who are living with their
diagnosis of prostate cancer, and their families, I want to
thank this Committee for the terrific leadership that it has
given to the effort to fund basic and clinical research into
prostate cancer.
The commitment of this Committee to fund prostate cancer
research has given important new momentum to the drive to find
a cure for this epidemic, which we firmly believe research can
and will do.
I know that prostate cancer has touched this institution
and the Appropriations Committee. Former members Silvio Conte
and George O'Brien died of prostate cancer, Dean Gallo as well.
His wife Betty, who appeared before you earlier today, is a
member of the National Prostate Cancer Coalition Board and a
tireless advocate for prostate cancer research.
Fortunately, a number of other members of the institution
on the House and Senate side who have been touched by the
disease have had much better outcomes from their treatment, and
that is what we want to see for many more Americans as well.
We urge the Committee to substantially increase the
commitment they have made to prostate cancer in the last 2
years, in fiscal 1997 and 1998, with the establishment of the
new program at Ft. Detrick.
Prostate cancer has been left behind for too long to the
terrible impact on millions of Americans. Annually, more
Americans are diagnosed with prostate cancer than with any
other nonskin cancer. Last year, 209,000 Americans were
diagnosed with prostate cancer; and 41,800 American men died of
prostate cancer. Prostate cancer is the second leading cause of
cancer death among American men, just behind lung cancer.
African Americans have the highest prostate cancer incident
rates in the world, and their mortality rates are double that
of Caucasian men.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cunningham, prostate cancer comprises
more than 15 percent of all nonskin cancer cases that are
diagnosed but receives less than 4 percent of the Federal
research funds, cancer research funds.
I would like to make three brief points regarding the DOD's
involvement with prostate cancer research, particularly to
focus on the peer review program at Ft. Detrick, although we
strongly support the terrific program that is run by Colonel
David McLeod at Walter Reed as well.
First, the appropriation of $45 million each year in fiscal
years 1997 and 1998, through the work of this subcommittee,
although relatively modest, served to increase by more than 50
percent the total Federal commitment to prostate cancer
research. This has come at a critical time when momentum has
been building in the----
Mr. Cunningham. I am sorry to interrupt you, but if you
could hold, I have got 1 minute to make this vote.
Mr. Hedlund. Okay. I don't want you to miss that vote.
Mr. Cunningham. The Chairman is not back yet. He will let
you continue.
Mr. Hedlund. I would be glad to. Don't miss a vote,
absolutely.
Mr. Cunningham. All right.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hedlund, why don't you go ahead and proceed.
Mr. Hedlund. Okay, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
I won't go over the earlier part of my testimony, but I
wanted to express the regards of our Chairman, Bob Samuels,
from the Tampa Bay area, who you know and who is very
appreciative of the leadership that you and this Committee have
given to prostate cancer.
I wanted to make three points regarding the DOD's
involvement in prostate cancer, particularly focusing on the
new peer review program at Ft. Detrick, although in no way--I
very much want to stress how important we think the quality
work is that is being done by Colonel David McLeod over at
Walter Reed as well and don't want to neglect that program.
But, first, the appropriation of $45 million both in fiscal
years 1997 and 1998 through the work of this subcommittee,
although relatively modest, served to increase by more than 50
percent the total Federal research commitment to prostate
cancer.
This has come at a critical time when important research
funded by outside organizations, like CaP CURE, the American
Cancer Society, the American Foundation of Urologic Disease and
others, as well as research at the National Institutes of
Health, have built important momentum in the area of prostate
cancer research. That momentum, we believe, must be sustained
by the commitment of significant public resources if we are
going to achieve the needed breakthroughs in diagnosis,
treatment, cure and prevention of prostate cancer.
This Committee has also given important leadership in the
effort to accelerate the time period from appropriation to
distribution of research money to scientists. With the help of
this Committee, the Ft. Detrick program has expedited the
fiscal year 1997 schedule by several months and will award
initial grants, we understand, in the next 4 to 6 weeks. They
will use some of the fiscal year 1998 appropriations to fund
grant proposals received in the fiscal year 1997 cycle and will
cut in half the time taken from the fiscal year 1997 cycle for
the schedule--for the--between the receipt in appropriations
and distribution of scientists for the fiscal year 1999 money.
We think that both General Blanck and Colonel Rich and
their colleagues have been very responsive in this regard in
accelerating the program without sacrificing quality of
performance.
Second, we believe--the NPCC believes that the highly
focused, goal-directed program of basic and clinical research
into prostate cancer was very much needed, and that the peer
review program at Ft. Detrick in its first year has proven that
it will make a substantial contribution to fight to find a
cure.
I was just very struck by the terrific testimony that Fran
Visco gave earlier of the terrific progress that has been made
in the breast cancer program up at Ft. Detrick, and we see that
this program is being built in the model of that program and
can have the same kind of substantial impact that that program
has had.
The broad agency announcement that they issued really drew
in a large number of quality proposals. It gives evidence that
the program will attract new researchers into the field. Their
streamlined approach at getting research dollars into the field
will enable them to nimbly build on some of the breakthroughs
and some of the exciting research areas that are coming. We
believe that, with a continuing commitment of resources, that
they will make a substantial contribution in the comprehensive
research fight against prostate cancer.
Finally, we believe that they are positioned well to add
significantly to what is going on in prostate cancer research.
About a year, a year and a half ago, the National Prostate
Cancer Coalition gathered scientists and researchers to develop
an agenda of prostate cancer research; and they identified more
than $250 million of worthwhile prostate cancer research
projects that were going unfunded in 1997 simply due to lack of
public or private funds. We believe that the peer review
program at Ft. Detrick is really going to--has a promise of
filling a tremendous research need that exists in the prostate
cancer world to help us find a cure.
In sum, the Ft. Detrick program has attracted quality
proposals, has only been able to fund a fraction of those
through the fiscal year 1997 appropriation. It is structured in
a way that will be attractive to the most innovative
researchers who are making exciting progress in finding
breakthroughs for prostate cancer. We believe that Colonel Rich
has built a strong and promising program that deserves a
substantial increase in its appropriation for fiscal year 1999;
and, along with the program that Colonel McLeod has at Walter
Reed, we strongly urge this Committee to do whatever it can to
substantially increase its commitment to prostate cancer for
fiscal year 1999.
Saying that, I fundamentally want to thank the leadership
of this Committee for giving great hope and tangible benefits
to the millions of Americans whose lives are touched by
prostate cancer.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much for your statement, sir. We
appreciate your being here today. You know of our concern about
the issues that you have mentioned.
Mr. Hedlund. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Hedlund follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
WITNESS
CYRUS M. JOLLIVETTE, VICE PRESIDENT FOR GOVERNMENT RELATIONS,
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to introduce next Mr. Cyrus
Jollivette, who is the Vice President of Government Relations
at the University of Miami.
In his prepared statement, Cyrus requests funding for
several projects, including the Navy's Atlantic test range and
oceanographic research vessel and the University's high-
priority Cancer Prevention, Control and Treatment Initiatives.
Cyrus, that statement becomes a part of our record; and we
would like you to proceed with your oral testimony.
Statement of Mr. Jollivette
Mr. Jollivette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. It is always good to see you.
Mr. Jollivette. It is good to see you too, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cunningham, also.
Thank you very much for allowing me to appear before you
today on behalf of my colleagues at the University of Miami.
As you indicated, Mr. Chairman, we have included in our
earlier statement a request for support of four initiatives
that come within the purview of this Committee: first, the
South Florida Ocean Measurements Center in coordination with
the Navy, Florida Atlantic University and NOVA university;
next, support for a request that is coming from the University
of Southern Mississippi for a new fishery, oceanography
research ship for research programs in the Southeast,
Mississippi and Texas; continuation of funding for the North-
South Center; and, finally, support for the University of
Miami's Cancer Prevention, Control and Treatment Initiatives.
I would like to talk about the Ocean Measurements Center
first and the unique partnership that exists between academic
scientists from three Florida universities and the Navy, which
provides the opportunity to meet the significant need for
science and technology development efforts in the near shore
environment.
The Navy test range in Florida is a unique location in that
it is the nearest approach of the continental shelf to the
shore along the entire Atlantic seaboard. Our scientists and
ocean engineers are increasing their understanding of the near
shore acoustic environment and pursuing development of AUV
sonar and other related technologies.
We ask that you provide $2.75 million to continue this
private program in fiscal year 1999. My colleagues and I are
convinced that this consistently funded, long-term partnership
provides the best benefit to the Navy and the scientific
community.
Second, we respectfully urge you to fund the proposal put
forward by the Institute of Marine Scientists at the University
of Southern Mississippi for the construction of a Class III
research ship for the southeastern U.S., Mississippi and Texas.
A Class III ship, as you know, is approximately 190 feet in
length. We agree that a new fisher-oceanography research ship,
with the capability to conduct complex, interdisciplinary
research in the shallow water regions of the Gulf Coast and the
Intra-America Sea, is vital to support our academic research
programs.
The existing Southeast Consortium for Oceanographic
Research, known as SECOR, would operate the ship as a part of
the UNOLS fleet; and UNOLS does support this arrangement that
provides dock-side facilities in Texas and Florida and
coordinates instrumentation use and marine technician support
among the SECOR members. SECOR members now include three of the
ship-operations institutions in the Southeast and the Gulf, the
University of Miami, the University of Texas and Texas A&M. The
University of Southern Mississippi will be added very soon.
My colleagues and I believe strongly that only through
resource sharing can we effectively manage costly ship
operations. Support of this project will benefit all academic
institutions in the southeastern U.S. and the Gulf of Mexico.
Now, about the North-South Center at the University of
Miami. Its mission is to promote better relations and to serve
as a catalyst for change among the United States, Canada and
the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean. Our goal is to
find viable solutions to the problems confronting the nations
of the Western Hemisphere.
In the last decade, the North-South Center has been engaged
in promoting and sponsoring research and dialogue on inter-
American security issues. Among other issues, the Center has
conducted an extensive research program on drug trafficking in
the hemisphere, studied and promoted dialogue on the crisis in
Cuba, Panama and Haiti and has engaged in research in civil
military relations, conflict resolution and security
cooperation.
The relocation of the U.S. Southern Command to Miami has
afforded an enhanced role for the North-South Center in
security issues. My colleagues have figured prominently in
discussions of the future of civil-military relations in the
hemisphere. Our Center is committed to advancing the state of
security cooperation in the Americas. It serves as a bridge
between government officials, dedicated to enhancing regional
security, and academic and other civil society experts who have
devoted their professional lives to analyzing the hemisphere's
critical security issues.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me turn to health matters and
the University's focus on cancer. The disease does not spare
anyone based upon age, sex, ethnic background or socioeconomic
status. We know that basic research will eventually lead to the
causes and hopefully cures of this dreaded disease. However,
research already has given us the tools for prevention and
early detection that will reduce the suffering until cures can
be found.
My colleagues at the University School of Medicine seek to
apply these tools in a variety of settings for prevention,
control and treatment, especially in multiethnic, diverse
minority populations.
This translational approach to biomedical research, that
is, applying the basic scientific knowledge we have already
gained to populations in clinical settings, is a key component
of our research at the University of Miami. By applying this
knowledge, we can reduce the morbidity, mortality and improve
the quality of life for all. We are convinced our special
expertise in this area, in pediatric cancer, in breast cancer,
in prostate cancer and other areas referred to will greatly
assist the Department of Defense.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to
appear today. My colleagues and I hope it won't be difficult
for you to fund these initiatives in what is a difficult budget
year.
Thank you.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. We always appreciate the
dialogue that we have with you and the good work that is done
at the university.
Mr. Jollivette. Thank you very much. We appreciate your
confidence and support.
[The statement of Mr. Jollivette follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
LOVELACE RESPIRATORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
WITNESS
JOE L. MAUDERLY, SENIOR SCIENTIST AND DIRECTOR OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, THE
LOVELACE RESPIRATORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to now welcome Dr. Joe Mauderly of
the Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute from Albuquerque,
New Mexico. The Institute currently performs some work for the
Air Force and the Army, as well as a number of other Federal
agencies.
Doctor, your entire statement will be placed in the record;
and I would ask that you summarize it at this point.
Statement of Mr. Mauderly
Mr. Mauderly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to discuss how our Institute can meet some
important existing needs of the Department of Defense, as well
as our support in the past.
Lovelace is an independent, nonprofit institute in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, conducting research on respiratory
disease and risk from inhaled toxic materials in the workplace
and the environment. Lovelace also leases the privatized
government-owned inhalation toxicology research facility on
Kirkland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, which is the Nation's
best-equipped facility for studies of inhaled materials.
Lovelace has a track record of supporting the Department of
Defense. It produced much of the information that placed the
health risk of nuclear weapons production and deployment in
their proper context and by virtue of that helped to win the
Cold War.
Lovelace is working to place our understanding of illnesses
potentially related to Gulf War activities on a stronger
scientific basis than it often has been in the past.
Together with Sandia National Laboratories, we are
developing methods for the remote detection of airborne
biological agents. We are working with another company on a new
plasma technology for destroying chemical and biological agents
without air contamination, which has been an important problem.
We are also determining the toxicity of depleted uranium
fragments from armor-piercing munitions.
Now Lovelace proposes to work with the Department to meet
its research needs in four specific areas that I would like to
discuss briefly.
The first is establishing a cooperative agreement for
conducting toxicological research. It is becoming increasingly
apparent to both Lovelace and the Army in particular, also
other services, that the Institute is well-matched to a number
of current research needs, a spectrum of needs, particularly in
the toxicology area. Lovelace seeks a cooperative agreement
with the Department to facilitate the conduct of this work in a
cost-effective manner.
The second area is using the National Environmental
Respiratory Center to address the Department's concern for the
inhalation of multiple air contaminants. Now the health risks
of breathing multiple air contaminants and pollutant mixtures
is a difficult issue that until now has received very little
attention. The Department needs to understand these risks from
inhaling mixtures of air contaminants, from sequential
exposures to various air contaminants and from combinations of
occupational exposures and nonoccupational exposures such as
cigarette smoke.
The National Environmental Respiratory Center is being
established this year at Lovelace by EPA to address the health
risk of mixtures and combined exposures to inhaled materials.
Lovelace proposes that the Department participate in this
activity to meet information needs specific to its issues, as
well as the environmental issues of concern to EPA.
The third area is in the reduction of chemical and
biological threats. The development of new technologies to
reduce these important threats requires multidisciplinary
research. Better detection and countermeasures will require
integrated research involving electronics, chemistry, aerosols,
lung injury and infectious disease.
Now, no single institution is expert in all of these
fields. However, together, Lovelace, Sandia National
Laboratories and the University of New Mexico are expert in all
of these areas; and they propose to work together to develop
new ways to deal with these threats. The focus of this work
would be on remote detection of airborne agents, personnel
protection, threat neutralization and treatment of affected
individuals.
The final area is improved treatment of disabling
respiratory diseases. As you have heard this morning, the
Department has military employees and civilian workers with
many kinds of disabling diseases, including lung diseases.
Those destructive respiratory diseases, such as severe
emphysema, have been thought to be incurable; and treatment
consists just largely of trying to maintain quality of life for
the patients.
Other diseases, such as lung cancer, are possible to cure
in some instances but are usually fatal; and more than twice as
many women will die of lung cancer this year as breast cancer;
more than twice as many men will die of lung cancer this year
than prostate cancer.
Together with its Senior Fellows that it supports in other
institutions, Lovelace is now making breakthroughs in the
treatment and cure of these intractable diseases. A remarkable
example is the work of Lovelace Fellows Drs. Don and Gloria
Massaro at Georgetown University Medical School, who have now
produced results suggesting that emphysema might actually be
reversed by treatment with analogues of Vitamin A; and this has
been done in animals at this time.
Another example of our work is to deliver anti-cancer drugs
directly to the lung and airway surfaces by inhalation, a route
that has not yet been used. Supporting research aimed at
treating and potentially curing disabling respiratory disease
is well within the scope of the Department's health concerns.
I thank you again for the opportunity to present this
information.
Mr. Young. Doctor, thank you very much.
I know that Mr. Skeen will be pleased to read your
testimony. He is very interested in the work in Albuquerque and
all of New Mexico. Thank you for being here.
Mr. Mauderly. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Mauderly follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
JOSLIN DIABETES CENTER
WITNESS
KENNETH E. QUICKEL, JR., M.D., PRESIDENT, JOSLIN DIABETES CENTER
Introduction
Mr. Young. Mr. Nethercutt, Dr. Quickel is our next witness.
Mr. Nethercutt. The Committee welcomes Dr. Kenneth Quickel,
President of the Joslin Diabetes Center of Boston,
Massachusetts. His center participates in a joint VA/DOD
diabetes research project.
I am certainly well aware of what you do, Doctor, and
certainly welcome you here today. I have a special interest in
diabetes and have been delighted to have a chance to work with
you. Your prepared statement will be made a part of the record,
and we are happy to have you summarize your testimony at this
time.
Statement of Dr. Quickel
Dr. Quickel. Thank you, Mr. Nethercutt. I want to record
our sincere thanks to the chairman and the entire Committee and
especially to you for your support of a fairly unique
partnership that we are endeavoring to establish with the
Department of Defense and the VA system, with your help.
The Joslin demonstration project will Institute some pilot
programs for the detection of diabetes, the prevention of it
and the care of people with diabetes in two regions, first in
Hawaii through the Tripler Army Medical Center and the second
in Boston's VA hospitals.
The project has a very strong emphasis on telemedicine and
computer-based care of individuals with diabetes, and these
strategies fit very well with the military's and VA's
distributed systems, which depend on those technologies. So
there is a unique and excellent marriage between what we can
bring to the table and what they need, and their patient base.
We at Joslin want to thank you and the Committee for your
support.
I have two objectives today. The first is to give you a
little brief status report on the status of the project and the
second is to focus on next year's funding of the project.
There are two objectives in the project. The first is a
screening for diabetes among Department of Defense and VA
personnel and patients, and the second is to implement
strategies to improve diabetes care in the Department of
Defense and the VA system in New England and Hawaii.
We have now reached an understanding, with the excellent
support of personnel that we have come to know in the
Department of Defense and the VA system, concerning how to
establish a work plan, how to put the systems in place as we
had intended over this coming year.
By September, we will have completed a phase 1 setup and
validation stage and a phase 2 implementation of the broad
program in the VA hospitals in New England. We are well along
the way to accomplishing that now.
By September, we also will have completed the phase 1 setup
and validation at Tripler and be prepared to implement
subsequently there. And also by September, we will have
accessed--deployed equipment and staffing in three remote sites
selected throughout New England, which will then feed into the
VA system. And later we will do the same thing in Hawaii and in
the Pacific.
In year 2, what we intend to do is to accomplish several
objectives. The first is to begin actually providing care to
people with diabetes that feed into those two regions, the VA
and the military, in Boston and in Honolulu. The second is to
begin to screen for diabetes broadly throughout those regions,
using some unique strategies that we have developed. And the
third is that over that period of time we will endeavor to
improve the metabolic control of individuals throughout the
regions that we serve. Subsequently, of course, we hope to
spread beyond that.
Mr. Nethercutt. Doctor, let me interrupt you, if you would,
and ask you, what are the techniques----
Dr. Quickel. Sure.
Mr. Nethercutt [continuing]. Very briefly, of screening
that you have developed?
Dr. Quickel. Well, the first technique is the use of a
light source to actually shine into the pupil of the eye, and
by measuring refraction of light that uniquely occurs in people
with diabetes, you can actually screen for the presence of
diabetes without drawing blood. It is a totally unique
strategy. And the advantage of that is that you can do it in
large numbers of people. You can do it in a drugstore. You can
do it extremely simply without having to handle bloods and draw
bloods.
The second strategy is to image--to obtain a digital image
of the back of the eye so we can screen for the leading cause
of blindness in diabetes. And the third strategy is a computer-
based method of instructing individuals with diabetes how to
care for themselves and provide support for their care. So you
can create a broad program to do all of those things.
Mr. Nethercutt. Is the eye screening, example number one,
available today? Or is that something you will be developing
over the next few years?
Dr. Quickel. It is live and working today. And we are
presently, as I speak, transmitting images from Chinatown in
Boston to our center across on the other side of town. What we
want to do is to take it out to broader areas, because we think
it is a strategy that is ideally adapted to telemedicine across
the Pacific or throughout New England or in any other widely
dispersed area.
Mr. Nethercutt. That's great. Forgive me for interrupting.
I appreciate having that for the record.
Dr. Quickel. That is all right.
To date, we have spent about $1.5 million on this phase of
the project and have not yet been able to free up the
appropriated funds from the Department of Defense. And this has
been a particular challenge for a tax exempt organization and
for me, who has to face a board periodically and justify those
expenditures.
We were not, frankly, aware that at each stage as the money
came out it would get a little bit peeled off to support the
development activities of other agencies. And as a result we
will, over the next 2 years, probably have made unexpected
assessments within the Department of Defense and the VA system
of about $2 million, that will not actually pay for the system
to go into place.
The $4 million budget we submitted last year is probably
going to result in about $3 million of funding for the project
and it was fairly bare bones. With the support of the
Department of Defense and especially the Army, we are
submitting a request for next year of $6.4 million in order to
be able to cover those unanticipated losses and be able to
accomplish the goals that I have outlined here today.
Once again, I think we have a wonderful opportunity for a
unique partnership between what essentially is a private
research institution and a large Federal agency that marries
what we can do and what they need uniquely, and if we can do it
well perhaps we can benefit people even beyond the Department
of Defense.
Thank you very much for allowing us to testify.
Mr. Nethercutt. Well, thank you very much for your
testimony. And Joslin does wonderful work and I certainly thank
you for your dedication to this project and also your work to
help improve human health. Thank you very much.
Dr. Quickel. Thank you.
[The statement of Dr. Quickel follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
FEDERATION OF BEHAVIORAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE SCIENCES
WITNESS
DAVID JOHNSON, PH.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FEDERATION OF BEHAVIORAL,
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE SCIENCES
Introduction
Mr. Nethercutt. Our next witness is Dr. David Johnson,
Executive Director of the Federation of Behavioral,
Psychological and Cognitive Sciences. Dr. Johnson's group
represents 17 scientific societies and some 150 university
graduate departments.
Your prepared statement will appear in the record, sir, and
you may summarize it at this time. Thanks for being here.
Statement of Dr. Johnson
Dr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Nethercutt.
Normally when I speak to the Subcommittee about--when I
speak before this Subcommittee, I am coming to talk about the
basic or 6.1 behavioral research budget. But I am going to
spend most of my time today on a proposed cut to applied and
advanced development or 6.2 and 6.3 research, and I am going to
talk about that because those cuts would destroy the behavioral
research program at the Air Force.
Most applied and advanced development work on manpower,
personnel and training is managed by the Armstrong Lab at
Brooks Air Force Base in San Antonio. Behavioral research and
development--R&D there is funded this year at $11 million. The
1999 budget request would reduce funding to $3 million. That
will kill the program.
If 6.2 and 6.3, that is, the development of research into
products, goes by the wayside, the 6.1 program will quickly
follow suit since it will be left as the front end of a
pipeline that doesn't lead anywhere.
If the Air Force abandons human performance research, what
will it lose? It will lose its ability to adapt personnel to
new skill requirements; to maintain readiness in the face of an
increasingly diverse personnel pool; to maintain strength and
quality while continuing to downsize; to incorporate usability
planning into new system designs; and to meet the increasing
demand for distributed training. It will even lose its ability
to adapt its personnel to the changing nature of warfare. That
is really pretty fundamental and it is a lot to lose.
The handicap this R&D faces under the current pressure to
cut research is that the service it provides is to the whole
Air Force, indeed in many cases to the whole of the Armed
Services. That means in practicality that no one owns it in the
way that each major command knows in detail what hardware
development it must have.
In contrast, the commands understand the importance of
behavioral research only when something goes wrong. For
example, the military, NASA and the FAA are partners in a
massive modernization of air traffic control terminals. Human
factors were not taken adequately into account in the early
planning of the terminals with the result that air traffic
controllers found they couldn't use the new terminals. That has
prompted costly retrofits that could have been avoided if human
factors research knowledge had been incorporated in the initial
design.
We are strongly urging this Committee to stop the
devastation of the Air Force manpower, personnel and training
R&D program. We ask this Committee to recommend explicitly a
funding level of $11 million for the behavioral research
programs of the Armstrong Lab. We ask you, in addition, to
support the administration's request for $12.567 million for
6.1 behavioral research at the Air Force.
Let me turn briefly to the behavioral research budgets of
the Army and the Navy. Both of these budgets are also under
stress. And I want to thank this Committee for its role last
year in saving the Army Research Institute--ARI. Congress
appropriated $21 million for those programs for fiscal 1998.
Unfortunately, to date I understand ARI has received only $13
million of this appropriation, and that is severely impacting
the flow of research. The request for next year, $16.7 million,
is a large cut from the appropriated fiscal year 1998 amount.
We ask the Committee to maintain ARI at $21 million, its
appropriated fiscal year 1998 level.
We also ask that the Committee support the administration
request of $49.69 million for the 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 behavioral
and bioengineering programs at the Office of Naval Research.
In closing, however, it is important to mention that ONR,
ARI and AFOSR budgets have been severely impacted by
withholding of significant amounts of funds to help pay for
unbudgeted nonresearch costs such as the cost of supporting our
current efforts in the Persian Gulf. Those unanticipated cuts,
amounting to 15 percent in the current fiscal year for
behavioral research at ONR, wreak havoc with research programs.
We hope that the Committee will continue working to improve our
means of responding to unplanned costly events like the Persian
Gulf and Bosnia.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you very much Doctor. We will do the
best we can and we appreciate you being here to testify.
Dr. Johnson. Thank you.
[The statement of Dr. Johnson follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
WITNESS
WILLIAM STRICKLAND, PH.D., AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
Introduction
Mr. Nethercutt. The Committee now welcomes Dr. William
Strickland of the American Psychological Association. Dr.
Strickland is also a graduate of the Air Force Academy. I was
particularly interested in the portion of your prepared
statement, Doctor, which points out that the Air Force loses a
fighter squadron a year through accidents, 80 percent of which
involve human error.
You also say this happens not because we don't have the
world's best pilots but because we have allowed hardware and
software to get too far ahead of human ware.
We all know the next generation systems are going to be
even more challenging than those we fly now, so we are
interested in your views on where we go in the future. So I am
happy to tell you your prepared statement will be made a part
of the record and you may summarize it as best you can.
Statement of Dr. Strickland
Dr. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Nethercutt.
Mr. Nethercutt. Yes, sir.
Dr. Strickland. As you say, I am representing today the
American Psychological Association, a professional and
scientific organization of 155,000 people, many of whom conduct
behavioral research relevant to the military.
This statement addresses two main issues, the continuing
need to invest in psychological research in the Department of
Defense and the particular need to sustain support for the
human systems programs in the Air Force.
Our military is facing a host of new challenges. Our forces
are downsizing, women are playing an increasingly prominent
role and constant deployments have become a way of life. Modern
weapons systems and the availability of information technology
have dramatically changed the way our forces fight. What hasn't
changed is that success still depends on people, at every level
in every unit.
Behavioral research answers questions at the heart of
military operations. Who should be recruited? How should they
be selected and assigned? What job should they be trained for?
How should they be trained? How can they maintain their skills?
What should the human system interface look like? How should
systems be operated for maximum efficiency, effectiveness and
safety?
Answering these questions requires serious investment in
behavioral research, and currently that investment is
appalling. Personnel and training costs account for one-third
of DOD's total budget, yet DOD invests less than 1 percent of
its science and technology budget in personnel and training
research. For every $4 we spend on equipment, we spend a dollar
in R&D to make it better. For every $4 we spend on people, we
invest less than 3 cents to do the same task.
APA supports the DOD request for $12.6 million for Air
Force basic behavioral research. We are very concerned,
however, about the significant cuts you just heard about that
are proposed for behavioral 6.2 and 6.3 R&D at Brooks Air Force
Base. The FY 99 request would reduce the development side of
behavioral R&D from $11 million to $3 million. Product
development in the behavioral research pipeline will be
eliminated.
What does the Air Force get for its modest current
investment? The answer is, essential tools that will allow the
Air Force to operate effectively with fewer people, with
changing and complex technical jobs in a rapidly changing
environment.
Answers to tomorrow's critical questions, who should be
trained? Where? When? How? Who has the skills? Who could
develop the skills to do totally new kinds of jobs? Which
recruits have the aptitude for cooperative work?
The customer for this R&D is the Air Force of tomorrow. The
people in that future Air Force are not the voices you hear in
the clamor over short-term budget decisions, but Congress must
ensure that their voice is heard.
APA urges the Committee to include specific language in the
FY 1999 appropriation that would restore $9.84 million to the
6.2 and 6.3 funding at Brooks Air Force Base. This would only
maintain programs at their 1997 level.
APA is also grateful for this subcommittee's leadership in
restoring funds to the Armored Research Institute in FY 98.
Last year's proposed cut would have crippled ARI's research.
Once again, we ask for your help. Despite ARI's strong record
in funding research essential to the training and performance
of Army personnel, the Institute's funding continues to erode.
The 1999 request is $16 million, a substantial cut from the
currently appropriated $21.4 million. We urge the subcommittee
to continue support for ARI.
ARI conducts behavioral research on such topics as
recruiting, including minority recruiting, personnel testing
and evaluation, training and retraining, and leadership. While
the Army seeks to cope with downsizing, to solve problems of
sexual harassment and to establish workplaces that bring out
the best from a diverse workplace, studies done for the Army by
scientists who understand how the Army works will be critical
in helping the Army to plan and execute change.
I refer the Committee to the APA statement for our
association's complete recommendations.
In closing, please remember that behavioral research can
continue to provide the foundation for tremendous savings
through increased personnel efficiency and productivity.
Increasingly sophisticated weapons systems place more, not
fewer, demands on human operators. We must ensure that military
personnel are at least as well prepared as their machines to
meet the future. This requires a sustained investment in human
oriented research.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you very much, sir, for being here
today and we appreciate your testimony.
Dr. Strickland. Thank you.
[The statement of Dr. Strickland follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF OTOLARYNGOLOGY--HEAD AND NECK SURGERY, INC.
WITNESS
JOHN R. WILLIAMS, DIRECTOR, CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS, AMERICAN ACADEMY
OF OTOLARYNGOLOGY--HEAD AND NECK SURGERY, INC.
Introduction
Mr. Nethercutt. The Committee now welcomes John Williams of
the American Academy of Otolaryngology--Head and Neck Surgery.
The academy and the physicians who belong to it are
dedicated to the care and treatment of patients with disorders
of the ears, noses and throat and related structures of the
head and neck. Your prepared statement will be made a part of
the official record of the Committee, sir.
Your statement represents an interesting perspective on
tobacco availability in the military, as well as skin cancer,
ultraviolet--UV radiation and noise reduction. Mr. Williams, we
are glad to have you here.
Statement of Mr. Williams
Mr. Williams. Once again, my name is John Williams. I am
Director of Congressional Relations here for the American
Academy of Otolaryngology--Head and Neck Surgery. I am here
today in place of Dr. Michael Maves, Executive Vice President
of the academy, who was unable to be here due to a family
illness.
As you mentioned, the American academy of Otolaryngology--
Head and Neck Surgery is the largest medical society of
physicians with over 10,000 members dedicated to the care and
treatment of patients with disorders of the ears, nose, throat
and related structures of the head and neck. We are more
commonly referred to as ENT physicians.
We have testified before the Committee over the last
several years about some matters that I am going to discuss in
this testimony, and deeply appreciate the courtesy with which
the Committee has reviewed our views.
Today I would like to briefly reiterate three of these
issues of importance to our membership. The first is tobacco
use in the military. The American Academy has been opposed to
tobacco for many decades. We are the physicians who, again,
care for most of the patients with cancer of the head and neck
and we see the harmful effects of tobacco use among our
patients every day.
All over the news, you see reports of tobacco companies
finally admitting to the adverse effect of tobacco users. We
also know that there can be a significant impact on
individuals, especially children, who happen to be in the
vicinity of toxic smoke from tobacco products used by others.
We are pleased to see that the Department of Defense
announced a policy ban of smoking in all DOD work facilities
worldwide. This far-reaching initiative makes DOD workplaces
free from harmful secondhand smoke as well, thus, will improve
the overall health of military personnel. We do know, however,
that many military--many in the military have substituted
tobacco smoking with smokeless tobacco to avoid disciplinary
actions where smoking itself is prohibited.
Smokeless tobacco is also a very serious medical--has very
serious medical effects upon the oral cavity. Even with all the
scientific information we now have about negative impacts of
smoking and secondhand smoke on individuals, we find that the
tobacco use is still indirectly encouraged by the military
through the subsidized sale of tobacco products at military
commissaries and PXs where cigarettes and other tobacco
products can be bought at a much lower price than otherwise
would be charged outside.
The academy has expressed its concern that the DOD would
likely not ban the sale of tobacco products in the commissary
system. However, we strongly support the concept of bringing
tobacco prices at least to the parity where civilian prices
would help cut down on its use.
The next of that is--the next issue of importance to our
membership is the--is that of skin cancer and UV radiation.
Three years ago, the American Academy indicated its strong
support for environmental--indicated its strong support to the
Environmental Protection Agency and the National Weather
Service in developing a nationwide UV index to alert members to
the public dangers of excessive radiation to the sun and
potentially resulting in skin cancers, especially to the head
and neck and other immune systems.
Our academy members deal with medical problems of the head
and neck where many of these skin cancers occur. We urge that
this Committee consider how it might participate with the
Department of Defense in ensuring that all personnel and their
families are educated in this regard.
One excellent instrument of this education is the UV index,
widely made available by the National Weather Service and
private weather reporting companies.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me talk about the issue of noise
reduction. Our academy has long been concerned about the effect
of excessive noise in the structures of the ear, particularly
those noises which are extremely excessive. We know that noise
is a necessary part frequently of--part frequently of daily
military life, particularly so in wartime. Nevertheless, we
believe that many of the noise effects in military personnel
can be reduced by appropriate noise reducing and prevention
activities.
Finally, I would just like to thank you for your time and
be happy to answer any questions that you may have.
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you very much for being here, Mr.
Williams. We appreciate having your testimony today.
[The statement of Mr. Williams follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
RESEARCH SOCIETY ON ALCOHOLISM
WITNESS
DR. MICHAEL CHARNESS, CHIEF OF NEUROLOGY, BROCKTON/WEST ROXBURY VA
MEDICAL CENTER AND ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF NEUROLOGY AT HARVARD
MEDICAL SCHOOL
Introduction
Mr. Nethercutt. Our next witness is Dr. Michael Charness
representing the Research Society on Alcoholism. Dr. Charness
makes the point in his written statement that heavy drinking in
the military is 40 percent more prevalent than in the civilian
sector and that as a result there is a 24.5 percent
productivity loss in the E-1 to E-3 pay grades.
We are interested in your views on this subject, sir, and
we are happy to say your prepared statement will be made a part
of the record. We welcome you today and please summarize your
testimony.
Statement of Dr. Charness
Dr. Charness. Thank you very much. I am Chief of Neurology
at the Brockton/West Roxbury VA Medical Center and am also
associated with Harvard Medical School. I conduct basic
research on how alcohol changes the function of brain cells,
and I also care for alcoholics whose drinking has damaged their
brains and their muscles and nerves. I appreciate very much the
opportunity to appear here before you today on behalf of the
Research Society on Alcoholism.
We are a professional research society whose 1,200 members
conduct most of the basic clinical and psychosocial research on
alcoholism and alcohol abuse that is conducted in this country.
I am here to discuss drinking in the military, which I believe
is a serious problem that compromises the defense of the
Nation.
One in 10 Americans will suffer from alcoholism or alcohol
abuse. The cost to this country is $100 billion annually.
Alcohol is a factor in 50 percent of all homicides, 40 percent
of all motor vehicle fatalities, 30 percent of all suicides and
30 percent of all accidental deaths.
In the military, the costs of alcohol abuse and alcoholism
are likely to be enormous. Nearly 1 in 5 military personnel
engages in heavy drinking, a rate which is almost double that
of the civilian population.
In 1990, 23 percent of deaths in the United States Air
Force were related to alcohol. There is a human face attached
to each of these statistics. As physicians, we see men, women
and children who are paralyzed in car accidents caused by drunk
drivers. We see accomplished men and women who will never
remember another new experience because drinking has damaged
their brains. We see frightened and abused children who grow up
in homes with abusive alcoholic parents.
Many talented and dedicated people in the Department of
Defense are working hard to reduce drinking in the military,
but current prevention and treatment programs are simply not
good enough.
Only research halts the promise of change. Alcohol research
is presently conducted primarily at the National Institute of
Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism and within the Department of
Veterans Affairs. This effort is severely underfunded in
proportion to the magnitude of the problem and, moreover,
neither NIAAA nor the VA focus their research efforts on
prevention and treatment issues that are specific to the needs
of the military.
While the high rates of use and abuse of alcohol in the
military are alarming, the good news is that we are poised at a
time of unprecedented opportunities in research. For the first
time, scientists have identified discrete regions of the human
genome that contribute to the inheritance of alcoholism. Two
new medications, Naltrexone and Acamprosate have proven
effective in reducing drinking and are undergoing large-scale
clinical trials. The development of more effective drug
therapies for alcoholism awaits an improved understanding of
how alcohol affects brain function.
Alcohol research has now reached a critical juncture and
the scientific opportunities are numerous. With the support of
this subcommittee and the Congress, we believe that we can
achieve significant advances in alcohol research that will
reduce heavy drinking in the military.
Research society on alcoholism urges the Department of
Defense to take the lead on initiating what the Department of
Veterans Affairs calls a new broad cooperative research program
on alcoholism. We also urge that the Department of Defense
establish with NIAAA research programs on the epidemiology,
causes, prevention and treatment of alcoholism.
This request balances the morbidity, mortality and huge
economic costs of heavy drinking in the military with the
abundance of research opportunities for improving the
prevention and treatment of alcohol abuse and alcoholism. I
thank you.
Mr. Nethercutt. Let me ask you, Doctor, to what extent do
you get information from the National Institutes of Health on
the issue of alcoholism?
Dr. Charness. NIAAA is very helpful. They have a program of
public education that involves sending out information to
virtually all the physicians in the country.
Mr. Nethercutt. Do you rely on that aspect of NIH or that
Institute?
Dr. Charness. I think that the treatment committee in
particular does. As a researcher, I get it from the horse's
mouth.
Mr. Nethercutt. I understand. Thank you, sir, very much.
Dr. Charness. Thank you.
[The statement of Dr. Charness follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF TROPICAL MEDICINE AND HYGIENE
WITNESS
PHILIP K. RUSSELL, M.D., PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL HEALTH, SCHOOL OF
HYGIENE AND PUBLIC HEALTH, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
Introduction
Mr. Nethercutt. The Committee will now hear from Dr. Phil
Russell of Johns Hopkins University, representing the American
Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene.
As Dr. Russell points out in his written statement, U.S.
soldiers will continue to be deployed in regions of the world
where the threats of infectious disease exist. That written
statement that you have prepared will be made a part of the
record, Dr. Russell, and you may summarize it at this time.
Welcome.
Statement of Dr. Russell
Dr. Russell. Thank you, Mr. Nethercutt. It is my privilege
to present the testimony on behalf of the American Society of
Tropical Medicine and Hygiene. In order to emphasize the
written testimony, I would like to focus on three points. The
first you mentioned is the emerging infectious disease issue.
The Nation as a whole is beginning to recognize the growing
problems and increasing threat of emerging infectious diseases.
Social and behavioral changes, environmental changes and
microbial evolution are all contributing to an increasing risk
to our entire population and most especially to the military.
Deployed military forces, because of the nature of military
operations, have throughout history been at especially high
risk to infectious diseases.
In response, military medical research programs have been
specifically directed at protecting the armed forces through
development of vaccines, drugs and other preventive measures.
Although there have been notable successes and great advances
in military preventive medicine in recent years, the threat
remains and the threat continues to change and increase as
disease producing organisms evolve and as the environment in
which these organisms produce disease continues to change.
The current epidemics of dengue, cholera, Rift Valley fever
and malaria now ongoing in several tropical countries would all
be extremely serious hazards if military deployment in those
areas were necessary. The threat is increasing, yet the Army
and Navy medical research organizations have had to deal with
severe restrictions in both personnel and budget in recent
years. I urge the Committee to look at this and to reverse this
downward trend.
The second issue I would like to address is the value of
military medical research structure in drug and vaccine
development. Military scientists have been world leaders in
several areas of tropical medicine for many years, and they
continue to do very high quality and important research. The
exciting development with a new malaria vaccine which has
protected volunteers and is moving into field trials is an
outstanding example. However, there are several potential new
products that are not advancing or are moving ahead very slowly
because of lack of funds and shortage of scientific personnel.
The third area I would like to call to your attention is
the network of overseas medical research laboratories operated
by the Army and the Navy.
These are extremely valuable medical research, public
health and military assets. They provide unparalleled
opportunities for training of military and civilian scientists
in tropical medical research and for that reason are highly
valued by the civilian academic community, as well as the
military scientists. They provide excellent opportunities for
collaboration between military and academic scientists in
research as well as in training of junior scientists.
These laboratories can potentially provide an outstanding
surveillance network to monitor emerging infectious disease
problems in critical parts of the world. They have done so at
many times in the past and have provided medical experts with
up-to-date knowledge and research capability needed to address
epidemics in civilian populations in their region. The recent
examples include dengue epidemics in Peru and RVF epidemics in
east Africa. Additional funding is urgently needed to enable
these laboratories to achieve their potential for dealing with
the emerging infectious disease threat.
Perhaps the greatest and most obvious value of these
laboratories is their capacity to conduct field trials of drugs
and vaccines. Anti-malarial drugs, hepatitis A and Japanese
encephalitis vaccines are examples of products which have been
licensed in the country on the basis of trials done by these
laboratories at the overseas sites.
As we move forward with new vaccines for dengue, malaria,
diarrheal diseases and hopefully HIV, the value of these
laboratories as a basis for field trials will become even
greater. They need and they deserve additional support.
In conclusion, I want to thank the Committee for their past
support for these programs and on behalf of the society request
your continued support of DOD infectious disease research
programs. This is critically important given the resurgent and
emerging infectious disease threats which exist today. We are
pleased that the administration's request does not cut current
funding levels but we see that there are still many unmet needs
and opportunities, and failure to act will result in health
care cost increases downstream and threaten the effectiveness
of future troop deployments.
Thank you for your consideration of our request, sir.
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you for making the request. I would
just ask, are these emerging infectious diseases--generally
fatal or are they only debilitating?
Dr. Russell. Both. Dengue, for example, is just a very
serious disease with little threat of death to military
populations. Rift Valley fever and malaria, on the other hand,
are potentially fatal.
Mr. Nethercutt. Sure. I understand. Well, thank you very
much for your testimony.
[The statement of Dr. Russell follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES
WITNESS
GENE D. BLOCK, VICE PROVOST FOR RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
Introduction
Mr. Nethercutt. Our next witness is Gene Block, Vice
Provost for Research at the University of Virginia. He is
appearing today on behalf of the Association of American
Universities, in support of DOD University research.
Your prepared statement notes, sir, that DOD basic research
funding has been used several times in the last few years to
provide offsets for unrelated new expenditures in supplemental
appropriations bills.
As you may know, we marked up a supplemental bill to pay
for Bosnia and our support forces in the Persian Gulf last week
right here in this Committee without offsets.
So I encourage your association to let others in the
Congress know of your views because there are many members who
believe we should offset that supplemental. And you are right,
we may have to use R&D funding as an offset.
Your prepared statement will appear in the record of the
Committee, and we are delighted to have you summarize it at
this time.
Statement of Mr. Block
Mr. Block. Thank you very much. As you mentioned, my name
is Gene Block. I am the Vice Provost for the University of
Virginia for Research, and I am also the Director of the
National Science Foundation Center for Biological Timing. In
addition, my academic background is in neurobiology. I am
specifically interested in biological clocks and I am partially
funded by a grant from the Air Force Office of Scientific
Research.
I am testifying today on behalf of the Association of
American Universities, representing 62 premier research
universities in the United States and Canada, and the National
Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges,
representing 195 public institutions of higher education across
the United States.
I have provided you with a copy of my written testimony,
and I will not read that. I will just highlight some of the
important issues.
Let me emphasize verbally how important I believe it is for
your Subcommittee to provide adequate funding this year for
basic and applied research at the Department of Defense. As you
know, basic and applied research are funded under program
elements 6.1 and 6.2 in the research, development, testing and
evaluation section of the Department of Defense appropriation.
The Army, the Navy, the Air Force and defense-wide account
under the Office of the Secretary all receive separate
appropriations for these programs. Universities play the
largest role in basic defense research, receiving more than 60
percent of this funding. That is program element 6.1. They also
receive substantial funding for applied defense research and
advanced technology development, program 6.2 and 6.3
respectively.
The department's budget request would provide a total of
$1.11 billion for defense 6.1 programs in FY 99, including
programs funded under the Office of the Secretary of the
Defense as well as the Navy, Army and Air Force research
programs.
This represents an increase of 6.6 percent over the final
funding levels of FY 98. According to the defense--the
department's RTD&E programs report, applied research would
receive a total of $3.02 billion, an increase of .8 percent
over FY 98. I believe these budget projections represent a
realistic and appropriate estimate of what will be needed to
carry out a vigorous research program in the coming year, and I
hope you will approve them for the FY 99 appropriation.
As you are aware, many crucial defense technologies have
emerged from fundamental research conducted on American
University campuses. Among these are radar, nuclear power,
digital computers, semiconductor electronics, lasers,
fiberoptics, night vision, inertial guidance, a global
positioning system, stealth and other advanced materials,
computer networking. As you remember, Advanced Research
Projects Agency Net--ARPANet was actually the forerunner of our
current Internet and computer-based visualization systems for
training and planning and for conducting operations.
With future threats to the national security so uncertain,
maintaining technological superiority will require a strong and
continuing research effort. The Armed Forces today must not
only be ready to fight in conventional regional wars such as
the Gulf War but must be ready to undertake peacekeeping
missions in hostile situations and defend against
unconventional threats such as terrorism, biological and
chemical agents and computer sabotage.
Supporting university research benefits DOD in many ways.
It produces important advances in knowledge. It helps keep top
scientists and engineers involved in defense research. Not
least, the students who get hands-on research training and
become highly qualified scientists and engineers of the future
will go on to work in academia, industry and Federal
laboratories.
DOD is the third largest Federal funder of university
research after the National Institutes of Health, and the
National Science Foundation. The funds are awarded under
competitive merit review procedures to assure high quality.
Nearly 350 universities and colleges sponsor DOD research and
development.
Unfortunately, last year, the science and technology budget
of DOD hit a 35-year low after adjusting for inflation. Basic
research is down by $350 million in just the lasts 5 years.
While the University of Virginia has actually seen an increase
in DOD funding in the past year, I am concerned that other
colleagues in the scientific community will find resources
drying up for promising areas of inquiry.
In particular, I'm concerned about the effect that
shrinking funding will have on those disciplines that are most
heavily funded by the department since other sources of support
may not easily be found to keep these disciplines healthy.
At this point I would just like to speak very briefly about
some projects funded through DOD support at the University of
Virginia. We received $10 million in defense, Department of
Defense grants and contracts between July 1, 1996 and June 30
1997. These funds supported 69 projects. DOD funds provide
critical support for broad areas of fundamental research at our
university. The results of this research are paying important
dividends for the government and the public as well, and I'd
like to just very briefly mention 3 areas to show you the
diversity and the interesting research going on.
One is in the area of biological timing research. A grant
from the Air Force office of scientific research supports
studies on the ability of the biological clock to adjust to
changes in time cycles associated with transmeridian flights
such as experienced by military flights across time zones or
even in rotating shift work scheduling. The research performed
in my laboratory and the laboratory of Dr. Michael Menaker
employs state of the art continuous monitoring of electrical
neural signals from the biological clock. This allows us to
give insights into the functioning of the biological clock, and
this should help us eventually be able to reduce fatigue during
extended military operations, improve safety and productivity
in the civilian work force. So this is work going on,
biological work being supported by the Air Force.
The Office of Naval Research supports engineering research
on directed vapor deposition of thermal barrier coatings. The
hot section combustor components of today's high performance
aircraft engines operate close to the melting point of the
materials of which they are made. Professor Haydn Wadley at the
University of Virginia Department of Material Science has
invented and patented a revolutionary new technology for
coating these components with thin, thermally plated ceramics.
These coatings can be applied with a new technology at one-
tenth the cost of competing technologies. By engineering their
composition and structure the coatings can be twice as
effective as the existing coatings that are being used. This
will dramatically increase the thrust and fuel efficiency of
engines that exploit them. As a result, military aircraft from
the F-22 to the Global Hawk would be able to extend their
mission duration and range.
And finally I even have a little sample here, the third
example of research going on at UVA, this is supported by
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency--DARPA. These are
smart air jell sensors for biological agent detection. Arguably
the greatest threat posed to the security of our nation's
citizens is from the biological attack by a terrorist group.
The ease of biological agents synthesis and the relatively
simple technologies needed for the dispersal in urban
environments and their near absence of effective methods of
rapid detection create a real risk for biological agents.
Professors Norris and Brinizer of the University of Virginia
Mechanical, Air, Space and Nuclear Engineering Departments, in
conjunction with the Pacific Sierra Research Corporation, are
developing a smart biological censor that exploits the unique
internal structure of aerojels. Aerojels are novel ultraporous
polymer materials that contain enormous concentrations of
interlinked pores. The minute pores can be engineered to match
the size and shape of molecules of biological warfare agents.
When attached to micro unmanned air vehicles the aerogel
sensors have the capacity to continuously monitor the
atmosphere, thereby providing an alert to potential biohazards.
This technology will have tremendous nonmilitary applications
as well.
What I wanted to point out is the tremendous diversity of
the types of research supported by DOD and the importance that
this plays actually in the university research program.
I want to thank you again for the opportunity to testify,
and I'd be happy to answer questions.
Mr. Nethercutt. I want to say thank you very much, sir, for
being here. We appreciate your testimony. We'll do the best we
can on your request.
[The statement of Mr. Block follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
OVARIAN CANCER NATIONAL ALLIANCE
WITNESS
ANN KOLKER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, OVARIAN CANCER NATIONAL ALLIANCE
Introduction
Mr. Nethercutt. The Committee is happy to welcome our next
witness, Ann Kolker. Ms. Kolker is the Executive Director of
the Ovarian Cancer National Alliance. The Ovarian Cancer
National Alliance is a young organization and was founded just
last summer by Ms. Kolker.
Ms. Kolker. Among others.
Mr. Nethercutt. Among others. Because this Committee is
interested in the health of women in our military, we provided
$10 million in last year's appropriation for research for this
deadly disease that effects 1 in 55 women. Your prepared
statement is an excellent summary of the issues regarding the
ovarian cancer research. It will be made part of the record of
the Committee, and we're delighted to have you summarize it as
you wish.
Statement of Ms. Kolker
Ms. Kolker. Thank you very much and thank you for providing
the opportunity to testify, and a special thank you to Chairman
Young and also to Representative Murtha for including and last
year increasing critically needed funds for the ovarian cancer
research in the congressional special interest research
program.
I'm Ann Kolker, a founder, one of many and now the
Executive Director of the Ovarian Cancer National Alliance. As
Congressman Nethercutt noted, the alliance is a new
organization formed last summer. It's the creation of leaders
from the growing number of ovarian cancer groups across the
country. These groups united to establish an umbrella group,
the alliance, in order to have a coordinated effort that will
put ovarian cancer policy, education, research issues squarely
on our national agenda. Our statement today marks our first
public appearance on Capitol Hill.
I also serve as a consumer representative on the
Integration Panel of the DOD ovarian cancer research program
and, as members of this Committee are aware, this program is
still in its first funding cycle. So there is no track record
yet for it as there is for the breast cancer research program.
We look to the success of that effort, described earlier today
by Fran Visco, to inform the expansion of the ovarian cancer
program.
On behalf of the alliance, I have a straightforward
message. Ovarian cancer research has been drastically
underfunded to date and it's urgent that policy makers expand
resources devoted to this disease. The goal must be to increase
in a significant way the ovarian cancer survival rate, which is
so poor that this disease has the unwelcome distinction of
being the deadliest of the female cancers.
Ovarian cancer is truly life threatening. More than 50
percent of the women who have it die within 5 years of
diagnosis, and that's because in at least 70 percent of the
cases women aren't diagnosed until the cancer has reached an
advanced stage when it is often too late to cure. But when
women are diagnosed in the first stage, which unfortunately
occurs in less than 1 quarter of cases, the survival rate is
over 90 percent. I was fortunate to be diagnosed in this stage.
As is the case with many other cancers, a key to improved
survival is early detection, and for ovarian cancer a critical
component of early detection is a better understanding of key
scientific aspects of the disease. This will happen only if
research is increased substantially.
The creation of the ovarian cancer research program several
years ago and last year's expanded appropriations of $10
million were important steps in that direction. Today we ask
you to consider a significant funding increase and broadening
the requirements for potential applicants who are now, as
you're aware, restricted to comprehensive cancer centers.
Increasing funding for research will go a long way toward
helping improve the poor survival rate.
Knowledge about key aspects of ovarian cancer is so limited
that diagnostic tools are too often imprecise and there is no
simple reliable screening mechanism. We need a screening tool
that is as simple and as successful as the pap smear is for
cervical cancer, the mammogram is for breast cancer and the PSA
is for prostate cancer. Even with their limitations, these
tests have dramatically improved early detection and spared
many people with cervical, breast and prostate cancer the early
death sentence that so many women with ovarian cancer face.
Thus, for the alliance the development of a screening tool
that is affordable, reliable and easy to administer is a top
priority. This lifesaving tool will only be found when more
research dedicated explicitly to ovarian cancer is available,
and we hope that this committee will--the funds that this
Committee makes available will play an important role in
ultimately producing that tool.
However, until that tool is available early detection of
ovarian cancer will continue to elude too many women and their
families. Thousands and thousands of women will needlessly
continue to die, and it's our strong hope that the research
funded through this important program will ultimately yield a
screening instrument. 183,000-plus women who currently live
with ovarian cancer, our sisters, our daughters, our
granddaughters and millions of at-risk women around the country
and all of our families and loved ones look to your support for
increasing the resources dedicated to this lethal disease.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. Ms. Kolker, thank you very much.
Several of us on this Committee have had personal
experiences with this terrible disease and understand the
importance. Thank you very much for----
Ms. Kolker. I'm sorry to hear that, and I hope that the
money that comes from this Committee will help those, as well
as the many women who are associated with the alliance.
Mr. Young. Thank you for a very impressive statement.
[The statement of Ms. Kolker follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
JOINT POLICY BOARD FOR MATHEMATICS
WITNESS
JAMES CROWLEY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SOCIETY FOR INDUSTRIAL AND APPLIED
MATHEMATICS
Introduction
Mr. Young. We would like to welcome now Mr. James Crowley,
who was the Executive Director of the Society for Industrial
and Applied Mathematics, located in Philadelphia. Mr. Crowley
is here today representing the Joint Policy Board for
Mathematics, a collaborative effort of three professional
societies, SIAM, the American Mathematical Society and the
Mathematical Association of America. Mr. Crowley is a former
Air Force officer and chief scientist at the Air Force Systems
Command at Andrews Air Force Base.
Mr. Crowley your statement will be placed in the record in
its entirety, and we would ask that you summarize it at this
time.
Statement of Mr. Crowley
Mr. Crowley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity
to comment on the fiscal year 1999 appropriations for DOD.
Today I'd like to address DOD's investment in basic research,
or 6.1 as it's known to DOD.
As I noted in my written statement and as you noted just
before, I served 22 years as an Air Force officer and so I'm
familiar with the importance of basic research to the defense
mission. I've seen firsthand how the results of basic research
were incorporated into defense technologies and systems for the
ultimate benefit of our defense forces, the American taxpayers
and our national security. I'm very concerned though, Mr.
Chairman, that the buying power of DOD support for basic
research has dropped dramatically in recent years, by 18
percent since 1994, and I included a chart in my written
statement that shows this. Moreover, these funding levels are
well below historical levels of investment and defense basic
research. Those past investments played a critical role in
enabling today's DOD to meet the Nation's defense needs through
superior and cost effective military technologies which are
even more important with the constrained operational budgets
today.
The reduced budgets have had a staggering effect on DOD
research agencies' ability to maintain the strength of their
programs. In the mathematical and computational sciences, for
example, the scope of promising research that DOD has
identified as relevant to its mission have been curtailed and
whole thrusts of research have had to have been eliminated in
some programs. The opportunities lost are not insignificant.
Mr. Chairman, the funding erosion of DOD's basic research
programs must be stemmed if we are going to achieve our
national security objectives into the future. We urge the
subcommittee to begin restoring the buying power of defense
basic research by fully funding DOD's request for basic
research. We must start reversing the downward funding trend,
and enacting the relatively modest proposed increase for fiscal
year 1999 would be a crucial first step.
Let me say a few words about what basic research means to
DOD. You are no doubt aware of the importance of long term
fundamental research. I would also point out that some of the
research supported through the 6.1 account is not as long term
as you might think. In many cases university researchers have
been brought in for special expertise to help solve real-time
scientific and technical challenges, and this raises a critical
point. By engaging the Nation's research universities and
defense-related problems, DOD ensures itself access not only to
today's researchers and the latest discoveries, but also to
graduate students whose involvement in defense-related research
areas helps guarantee the production of mathematicians,
scientists and engineers who can contribute to meeting defense
needs in the future, to tackling the long term research
problems and being available to DOD to call on for more
immediate ones.
Let me illustrate my remarks about DOD's investment in
basic research and its contributions to the national defense
with a few examples. You are no doubt familiar with the rapid
advances in computer hardware. Computer speed doubles every
1\1/2\ years. Equally important is the fact that new and
improved mathematical algorithms, which are the basis of all
computer software, also contribute to this remarkable trend. In
fact, the computer hardware would be useless without equally
sophisticated advances in mathematical modeling and algorithm
development.
Let me cite a couple of cases in which DOD support has
facilitated breakthroughs in this area. Research in the past 25
years, much of it funded by DOD, led to the development of
mathematical techniques underlying computer programs that can
easily manipulate geometric objects. The techniques form the
basis for modern CAD/CAM packages to make rapid prototyping and
computer aided design possible. These tools are used by defense
contractors to cut the development time and cost for new
aircraft and other major DOD purchases.
And in addition, simulation based upon mathematical models
is becoming an important component of design. For example,
mathematics can be used to model or predict how radar waves
behave when scattered off of surfaces such as aircraft bodies.
Advances in the developments of computational algorithms that
design the testing of stealth technology in simulation; that
is, on computers, before any actual development begins.
More recently, a DOD initiative and modeling simulation and
control of fabrication processes for thin films promises to
deliver new, more reliable and economical processing techniques
for these thin films, which are critically important for new
and advanced electronic components for such examples as high
performance microwave filters for wireless and aerospace
communications. These thin films are not easy to manufacture
and the computational model and simulation will be critical to
obtain the uniformity that is necessary to obtain the device
properties.
I have chosen just a few examples, but clearly research in
mathematics, algorithms, computing and all other areas of
science for that matter have played and will continue to play a
critical role in new technologies ranging from smart weapons to
advanced aircraft design.
This concludes my testimony. I appreciate the opportunity
to talk to you about the impact of defense basic research, but
let me also thank you for taking the time to speak last year at
the DOD Demonstration Day, which was entitled ``Basic Research
in the National Defense,'' sponsored by the Association of
American Universities. I hope you're able to join us again at
this year's event that's going to be held on April 29.
Again thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would be pleased to
answer any questions you might have.
Mr. Young. Mr. Crowley, thank you very much, and your
statement is very thorough and we appreciate that, and we thank
you for being here today and we believe in basic research. We
would like to get a little basic research into how to get more
money to pay for some of these programs that we've heard about
today that are not included in the President's budget. So what
I can tell you is we'll do the best we can.
Thank you very much sir.
[The statement of Mr. Crowley follows:]
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Thursday, March 19, 1998.
CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CENTER
WITNESS
JANE WEISENBERG, DIRECTOR OF AMBULATORY SERVICES, CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL
AND HEALTH CENTER, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
Introduction
Mr. Young. I'd like to welcome Jane Weisenberg, Director of
Ambulatory Services in San Diego, California. Ms. Weisenberg
has appeared before the Committee in support of the new parents
support program which is operating at 29 army installations
worldwide as well as several Navy installations and is intended
to help prevent child abuse, something that we're all certainly
supportive about and concerned about. We're happy to hear from
you today, and your statement has been placed in the record and
you may summarize it as you wish.
Statement of Ms. Weisenberg
Ms. Weisenberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairperson, and other
Members of the Committee.
I have to say I really do appreciate the stamina that you
all have to listen to all of our testimonies, and I got a
flavor of that since I did get to appear last. The written
testimony was submitted by Blair Sadler, the CEO and President
of Children's Hospital. He really wanted to be here today, but
he was detained with emergency business in San Diego. So he
asked me to represent him and I have to say I'm truly honored
to be here.
I thank you for being supportive of the new parent support
program over the last years. My testimony today is applicable
to the Marine Corps New Parent Support Program in terms of you
have helped over 11,000 military families since your support in
1993.
I would also like to welcome you all if you're interested
in seeing firsthand the new parent support program we are
operating on all Marine Corps installations worldwide,
including the newest site at Miramar.
There continues to be a critical need for family support
programs for military personnel. Last year I attended an event
celebrating the 222nd birthday of the Marine Corps. A videotape
was shown where General Krulak described the essence of the
Marine Corps. He used the Battle of Bella Wood as the pivotal,
essential and defining moment of the reputation of the Marine
Corps. He portrayed the spirit of honor, courage and commitment
as fierce, independent and unconditionally committed to
victory. I was moved by his presentation where bayonets were
drawn and men died in battle. Then I sat back in my chair and I
thought how challenging it is to reconcile the fighting spirit
of the Marine Corps with the nurturing, caring and loving that
is needed to sustain a family relationship and raise a child.
There are risk factors related to military life where
parenting starts at a young age. There is physical isolation
and some remote locations, there is separation from family and
friends, there is unknown resources and support systems in
unfamiliar communities, there is frequent moves, there is
difficulty in stretching a paycheck to meet the housing and
other expenses, there is the uncertainty of peace and war. The
new parent support program addresses these issues with the
overall goal of strengthening military families and preventing
family violence through the use of home visitation by nurses
and social workers and prevention activities such as Daddy's
Baby Boot Camp.
The program makes a difference in peoples' lives. Consider
a staff sergeant with his young wife who is five months
pregnant, anemic, thin, unhealthy, 2 children, a son 4 years
old who is moderately autistic, a son 19 months old. The wife
feels overwhelmed by the care of an autistic child. They have
recently transferred to their new location. The husband states
the wife's housekeeping skills are poor and beginning to become
a problem for him. He goes to the family services for
counseling and is referred to the new parent support program.
The problems identified are that a 19-month-old child is
nonverbal, the household was not using speech with the
children, they were all communicating by sign language, there's
financial difficulties that do not allow the mother to get her
eyes cared for so she may not get glasses, therefore she's
unable to get a driver's license in a new State and is unable
to drive. The mother was not on the women-infant children
supplemental food program and neither were the 2 children.
A home visitor, a trained social worker, went to the home,
did an assessment of this family situation. Some of the
interventions included having the Lions Club pay for glasses
for mom which resulted in her being able to take a driver's
test and have access to transportation, both mom and children
were put on WIC, and mom is no longer anemic, she's getting
appropriate prenatal care, and her pregnancy is progressing
smoothly. A speech therapist goes into the home twice a week.
The household has become more verbal and speech has improved
for both of the children. The Child Abuse Prevention
Association provided the family with gift certificates to buy
clothing in their thrift shop, the home visitor worked with mom
and dad around their own organizational skills so they could
develop a family routine. They also have the family apply and
receive Social Security for the autistic child. The family is
using the money to provide opportunities to enhance the child's
skills and development. They also are now enrolled in a food
share program. The day-to-day stressors are under control, and
thanks to the early intervention this family can now be
prevented from having more serious consequences of their
situation. It's really your support that made a difference in
the life of this family and many, many others.
The need continues for programs aimed at assisting military
families. Programs such as the new parent support program on
all Marine Corps installations plays an important role in
military readiness by insuring the stability of military
families. Congress has generously provided support for the
Marine Corps' new parent support program and in light of this
subcommittee's previous support for new parent support and
other family advocacy initiatives, we request funding of $5.6
million to continue this program into the FY '99--through the
FY '99 appropriations bill.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and other members of the Committee
for your support.
Mr. Young. Ms. Weisenberg, I have a quick question for you.
If a reservist or a guardsman is called for active duty,
are they eligible for this program?
Ms. Weisenberg. All active duty military are eligible. They
usually receive services by first going to the family service
center on that installation. They can also be referred by
community agencies or self-referrals.
Mr. Young. I visited just last week in Bosnia with a
reservist from my district who had been called up and his wife
is expecting momentarily their third child, and he's going to
be in Bosnia while she's in St. Petersburg having the baby.
Ms. Weisenberg. So she's not near a Marine Corps
installation.
Mr. Young. No, and he's not in the Marine Corps, he's in
the Army.
Ms. Weisenberg. He is and she's not. That is an interesting
situation.
Mr. Young. And the closest we have is MacDill Air Force
Base but that's a joint command there.
Ms. Weisenberg. I think that's a very interesting
situation. I'd be happy to follow up and see what happens in
that type of situation, but that's a perfect example where the
husband in this case is off in Bosnia and the wife is the one
that needs assistance.
Mr. Young. Well, thank you very much for being here today,
we appreciate your support of the program and your willingness
to travel all the way from San Diego to be here to visit with
us today, and again I apologize for you being at the end of the
line.
Ms. Weisenberg. I have to say it was a very interesting
morning and a good use of my time. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much.
That I think is the end of our witness list. The Committee
is adjourned until the call of the chair.
[The statement of Ms. Weisenberg follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
W I T N E S S E S
----------
Page
Bailey, Maj. Chris............................................... 133
Barnes, Master Chief Joe......................................... 514
Bereuter, Hon. Doug.............................................. 536
Block, G.D....................................................... 1017
Bosiljevac, Com. Tim............................................. 133
Bye, Dr. R.E., Jr................................................ 1132
Charness, Dr. Michael............................................ 976
Clark, Gen. W.K.................................................. 1
Clark, Les....................................................... 1128
Collins, Father T.B.............................................. 1134
Crow, Dr. Michael................................................ 1138
Crowley, James................................................... 1035
Cunha, Manuel, Jr................................................ 1128
Emery, J.L., Sr.................................................. 1116
Farr, Hon. Sam................................................... 1072
Feder, Miriam.................................................... 344
Foil, M.B., Jr................................................... 440
Furmanski, Dr. Philip............................................ 838
Gallo, Betty..................................................... 705
George, Father W.L............................................... 1134
Hayes, A.B....................................................... 1146
Hedlund, J.H..................................................... 852
Hickey, S.T...................................................... 586
Hubbard, Capt. Curtis............................................ 133
Johnson, David................................................... 918
Jollivette, C.M.................................................. 863
Kenny, M.P....................................................... 1128
Kolker, Ann...................................................... 1027
Mauderly, J.L.................................................... 882
Mica, Hon. J.L................................................... 1061
Molloy, Russ..................................................... 705
Morrill, Rocky................................................... 562
Nasr, Nabil...................................................... 387
Olanoff, Chief Master Sgt. M.H................................... 643
Oullette, Sgt. Maj. M.F.......................................... 540
Owens, W.D....................................................... 1090
Partridge, Col. C.C.............................................. 617
Patrick, Barbara................................................. 1128
Payne, Hon. D.M.................................................. 705
Prueher, Adm. J.W................................................ 211
Quickel, K.E., Jr................................................ 897
Raymond, Sandra.................................................. 429
Reheis, C.H...................................................... 1128
Reis, Sgt. First Class Larry..................................... 133
Robfogel, Nathan................................................. 387
Roemer, Hon. Tim................................................. 338
Russell, P.K..................................................... 996
Sadler, Blair.................................................... 1046
Sandler, Maj. Gen. R.W........................................... 728
Schoomaker, Gen. P.J............................................. 133
Scott, Comm. Charles............................................. 429
Sheridan, M.B.................................................... 344
Slaughter, Hon. Louise........................................... 387
Smith, E.G....................................................... 627
Staton, J.D...................................................... 1083
Strickland, William.............................................. 954
Tilelli, Gen. J.H., Jr........................................... 211
Torsch, Comm. Virginia........................................... 778
Van Nest, Ron.................................................... 822
Visco, F.M....................................................... 810
Waters, Hon. Maxine.............................................. 1074
Weisenberg, Jane................................................. 1043
Weller, Maj. Eric................................................ 133
Williams, J.R.................................................... 968
Young, Dr. Robert................................................ 1136
Zinni, Gen. A.C.................................................. 1
I N D E X
----------
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND AND COMMANDER IN
CHIEF, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
Page
Assassination, Strategy of....................................... 128
Basing Issues, United States:
Access....................................................... 128
Access to Bases in Southwest Asia............................ 126
United States Basing in Europe............................... 111
United States Basing Rights, in the Middle East.............. 105
Bosnia Contingency Operation...................................107, 119
Economics.................................................... 108
Infrastructure, Bosnia....................................... 102
Landmines in Bosnia........................................109, 111
War Criminals, Balkan........................................ 101
Budget Priorities and Deficiencies............................... 120
Chinese Involvement with Iran/Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) Programs................................................. 112
Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund.................... 125
Command Operations............................................... 115
Deployment of Forces............................................. 100
Length of Current Deployments................................ 106
European Economic Status......................................... 113
Force Structure, Composition of.................................. 106
Fundamentalism, the Dangers of................................... 103
Intelligence Capabilities........................................ 104
Introduction..................................................... 1
Iranian Policy/Update.....................................103, 108, 129
Missile Production........................................... 130
Iraq............................................................. 120
Outlook...................................................... 128
Potential Airstrikes......................................... 120
Saddam Hussein's Strength.................................... 129
Sanctions Update............................................. 102
Effectiveness of......................................... 103
Threat Assessment, Iraqi..................................... 100
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Exercises............................ 124
Kosovo........................................................... 101
Violence in.................................................. 119
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Expansion............110, 117
Persian Gulf Region:
Burdensharing................................................ 113
Situation in the Gulf Region................................. 99
United States Forces Readiness in the Gulf................... 100
Remarks of Mr. Murtha............................................ 2
Statement of General Anthony C. Zinni............................ 67
Statement of General Wesley K. Clark............................. 5
Summary Statement of General Clark............................... 2
Bosnia Operation............................................. 3
European Command Threats..................................... 3
NATO Expansion............................................... 3
Personnel Issues............................................. 3
Summary...................................................... 4
Summary Statement of General Zinni............................... 66
Supplemental Budget Request...................................... 99
Swing Strategy................................................... 131
Theater Missile Defense (TMD).................................... 130
Turkey........................................................... 105
Weapons Inspections.............................................. 127
Year 2000 Computer Problem....................................... 122
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND AND COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES FORCES, KOREA
Antipersonnel Landmine Moratorium................................ 302
Asian Financial Crisis....................................302, 315, 321
Impact of Financial Crisis on Contingencies.................. 316
B-2 Bomber....................................................... 305
Chemical and Biological Attacks, Defense Against................. 308
Chemical Weapons................................................. 306
China:
Chinese--Indian Relations.................................... 314
Chinese Military Power....................................... 323
Chinese Misperceptions....................................... 325
Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund (CBTRIF).......... 332
Emergency Supplemental........................................... 318
F-18E/F Aircraft................................................. 319
Force Protection................................................. 332
Forces and Supplies, Adequacy of................................. 317
Frequency Spectrum Problems...................................... 313
India:
India's Elections/Military Power............................. 326
India's Military............................................. 307
Relations with............................................... 301
Indonesia........................................................ 327
International Military Education and Training (IMET)............. 300
Introduction..................................................... 211
Japan:
Environmental Clean-Up of United States Bases in Japan....... 309
Nuclear Carriers in Japan.................................... 316
Okinawa, U.S. Marines in..................................... 329
Security Alliance, United States--Japan...................... 329
Joint Exercises.................................................. 333
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar Systems (JSTARS) Aircraft. 306
Korean Peninsula:
Agreed Framework on North Korea's Nuclear Program, 1994...... 322
Energy Development Organization.............................. 311
Foreign Currency Fluctuation and Burdensharing.............310, 330
Four Party Talks............................................. 323
North Korea, Food Shortages in............................... 311
North Korean Threat.......................................... 322
South Korea.................................................. 323
Philippines:
Status of Forces Agreement, Philippines...................... 328
United States--Philippines Military Accord................... 328
POW/MIAs......................................................... 334
Priorities and Deficiencies....................................319, 320
Changes in Priorities........................................ 320
Top Priorities............................................... 320
Remarks of Mr. Murtha............................................ 212
Reserve Components............................................... 318
Spare Parts...................................................... 297
Statement of Admiral Joseph W. Prueher........................... 217
Statement of General John H. Tilelli, Jr......................... 273
Strain from Operational Commitments.............................. 296
Summary Statement of Admiral Prueher............................. 212
Area of Responsibility....................................... 213
Forces in Pacific Command.................................... 212
Readiness.................................................... 214
Strategy in the Pacific...................................... 212
Summary...................................................... 216
Thailand..................................................... 214
Summary Statement of General Tilelli............................. 269
Alliance with the Republic of Korea.......................... 270
Antipersonnel Landmines Moratorium........................... 270
North Korean Threat.......................................... 269
Quality of Life Issues....................................... 271
Resources.................................................... 271
Summary...................................................... 272
Two Simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs)...........297, 303
Year 2000 Computer Problem....................................... 331
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
Bosnia Mission................................................... 210
Implementation Force (IFOR) Cost Estimates................... 199
Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Units...............195, 199
Counterproliferation............................................. 208
Counter-Terrorism................................................ 203
CV-22 Aircraft................................................... 201
Demining Missions................................................ 181
Deployment Impacts on Family..................................... 189
Deployment Vignettes............................................. 170
Bosnia EC-130 Operation...................................... 171
Colombia Counter Drug Operation.............................. 170
Namibia Demining............................................. 172
Namibia Psychological Operations............................. 174
Senegal--Acri Operation...................................... 176
Sierra Leone Operation....................................... 177
Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Request.................................. 183
Information Warfare.............................................. 202
Introduction..................................................... 133
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)....................... 204
Modernization Programs, United States Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM)...................................................... 200
Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO) and Deployments........................ 196
Personnel Issues................................................. 193
Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO)...................................... 191
Remarks of Mr. Cunningham........................................ 190
Reserve Forces................................................... 180
Employer's Support........................................... 181
Rules of Engagement.............................................. 184
Special Operation Forces (SOF):
Assessment and Selection Process...........................185, 194
Retention.................................................... 186
SEAL Retention............................................... 187
Somalia Revisited................................................ 187
Statement of General Peter J. Schoomaker......................... 136
Submarine Platforms, Special Operations Forces (SOF)............. 189
Advanced SEAL Delivery System..............................190, 201
Summary Statement of General Schoomaker.......................... 134
USSOCOM--Budget Request...................................... 134
USSOCOM--State of the Command................................ 134
Summary...................................................... 135
Survival, Escape, Resist and Evade (SERE) Training............... 182
Unfunded Requirements............................................ 184
Year 2000 Computer Problem.....................................188, 207
TESTIMONY OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND OTHER INTERESTED INDIVIDUALS AND
ORGANIZATIONS
Air Force Sergeants Association.................................. 1083
American Academy of Otolaryngology--Head and Neck Surgery, Inc... 968
American Association of Nurse Anesthetists....................... 822
American Federation of Government Employees...................... 562
American Psychological Association............................... 954
American Society of Anesthesiologists............................ 1090
American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene................ 996
Association of American Universities............................. 1017
Brain Injury Association......................................... 441
California Industry and Government Coalition on PM-10/PM-2.5..... 1128
Central Intelligence Agency Investigation........................ 1074
Children's Hospital and Health Center............................ 1043
Columbia University.............................................. 1138
Disabled Military Retirees....................................... 627
Dystrophic Epidermolysis Bullosa Research Association of America. 344
Federation of Behavioral, Psychological and Cognitive Sciences... 918
Florida State University......................................... 1132
Fort Atkinson Cemetery........................................... 536
Fox Chase Cancer Center.......................................... 1136
Georgetown Institute for Cognitive and Computational Sciences.... 1134
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)............... 338
Joint Policy Board for Mathematics............................... 1035
Joslin Diabetes Center........................................... 897
Live Fire Testing and Training Initiative........................ 1061
Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute.......................... 882
National Association of Energy Service Companies................. 1176
National Breast Cancer Coalition................................. 810
National Coalition for Osteoporosis and Related Bone Diseases.... 429
National Military and Veterans Alliance.......................... 617
National Military Family Association (NMFA)...................... 586
National Prostate Cancer Coalition............................... 852
Navy Professional Development Education.......................... 1072
New Parent Support Program....................................... 1116
New York University.............................................. 838
Non Commissioned Officers Association of the United States of
America........................................................ 540
Ovarian Cancer National Alliance................................. 1027
Research Society on Alcoholism................................... 976
Reserve Officers Association of the United States................ 728
Rochester Institute of Technology................................ 387
The Fleet Reserve Association.................................... 514
The Military Coalition........................................... 778
The Retired Enlisted Association................................. 643
University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey............... 705
University of Miami.............................................. 863
University of San Diego.......................................... 1146