[Senate Hearing 105-223]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 105-223
SUDAN AND TERRORISM
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
May 15, 1997
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
James W. Nance, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
JOHN, ASHCROFT, Missouri, Chairman
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
BILL FRIST, Tennessee PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Emerson, Steven, Middle East Affairs Analyst, Author, and
Terrorism Expert, Washington, DC............................... 41
Prepared statement........................................... 43
Maikish, Charles, Vice President for Facilities Management,
Columbia University, New York, New York........................ 13
McCollum, Hon. Bill, U.S. Representative from Florida............ 6
Prepared statement........................................... 9
McKune, Kenneth R., Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism,
Department of State............................................ 22
Prepared statement........................................... 24
Moose, George E., Assistant Secretary of State for Africa........ 17
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Newcomb, R. Richard, Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control,
Department of the Treasury..................................... 25
Smith, Ed, Hamilton Hallmark, Woodland Hills, California......... 48
Winter, Roger, Director, U.S. Committee for Refugees, Washington,
DC............................................................. 49
Appendix
Responses to Questions Submitted by Members of the Committee..... 61
Responses of Assistant Secretary of State George Moose to
Questions Submitted by Senator Feingold.................... 61
Responses of Roger Winter, Director, U.S. Committee for
Refugees to Questions Submitted by Senator Feingold........ 64
Statement of the Embassy of the Republic of Sudan Regarding Sudan
and Terrorism.................................................. 66
Statement of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement............... 68
Appendix to Testimony of Steven Emerson.......................... 81
Amnesty International Report: Sudan--A New Clampdown on Political
Opponents...................................................... 87
(iii)
TERRORISM AND SUDAN
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 15, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:48 in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Ashcroft
(chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Ashcroft, Grams and
Feingold.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator Ashcroft. The committee will now come to order. I
want to thank all of you for your patience. We were winding up
a vote on the Senate floor and would otherwise have been more
prompt. I do not want to allege ever that the Senate is totally
prompt, but we would have been more prompt, and I thank you
very much.
We welcome all of the witnesses today, both from the
administration, the U.S. Congress, and from the private sector.
Just as a way of orienting us this morning, we would like
to begin this morning's hearing with a brief video
presentation. The video will feature speeches by Hassan Turabi,
the leader of the National Islamic Front Party in Sudan and one
of the most infamous supporters of international terrorism in
the world.
Osama bin Laden's call for a jihad against the U.S., and
particularly against U.S. soldiers in Saudi Arabia, will also
be featured. Bin Laden was harbored by Sudan for almost 5
years, and was involved in attacks on U.S. soldiers in Somalia,
Saudi Arabia, specifically in Riyadh and Dhahran.
The video will close with some footage from the World Trade
Center bombing, the most poignant reminder of the war
international terrorists are committed to waging against the
United States. If we could please--we will start the video and
hope everyone has a chance to see it clearly from their
position.
[A videotape was shown.]
Senator Ashcroft. In the post cold war world the United
States no longer faces the threat of bipolar cataclysm that
defined U.S.-Soviet relations. The collapse of the Soviet Union
ended the greatest menace to freedom in the 20th century, but
in this dawn of a new era in international relations, however,
the horizon is dotted with new national security threats that
will demand our constant vigilance.
One of the most serious of these new national security
threats is the rise of international terrorism. We are holding
this hearing today in the Subcommittee on African Affairs to
address the menace of terrorism as sponsored by the Government
of Sudan. Since first being designated a State sponsor of
terrorism in 1993, Sudan has risen quickly in the ranks of
infamy to join Iran as the worst of State sponsors of
terrorism.
Sudan harbors elements of the most violent terrorist
organizations in the world: Jihad, the armed Islamic group,
Hamas, Abu Nidal, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hizbollah, and the
Islamic Group are all present in terrorist training camps in
Sudan. These terrorist groups are responsible for hundreds of
terrorist attacks around the world that have taken thousands of
lives.
Abu Nidal alone has been responsible for 90 terrorist
attacks in 20 countries which have killed or injured almost 900
people. Jihad is responsible for the assassination of Egyptian
President Anwar Sadat, and Jihad's leader, Sheikh Omar Abdel
Rahman, was the ideological ringleader of the terrorists that
attacked the World Trade Center and plotted to bomb the United
Nations in New York.
Another terrorist organization, the Islamic Group, attacks
westerners in Egypt, and claimed responsibility for the failed
assassination attempt on President Hosni Mubarak during his
visit to Ethiopia in 1995.
In addition to harboring terrorist organizations, Sudan has
given refuge to several of the most notorious individual
terrorists, including Imad Moughniyeh and Osama Bin Laden.
Moughniyeh is believed to be responsible for the 1983 bombing
of the marine barracks in Beirut which killed 241 U.S. troops.
Bin Laden is the most infamous financier of terrorists in the
world, and has recently stated that U.S. soldiers in Saudi
Arabia, as you saw in the video, will be the principal target
of his terrorist attacks.
Sudan is not simply a favorite vacation spot for
terrorists. The Sudanese Government is an active supporter of
these terrorist activities. Sudan reportedly provided weapons
and travel documentation for the assassins who attacked
President Mubarak. Two Sudanese diplomats at the United Nations
in New York conspired to help Jihad terrorists gain access to
the U.N. complex to bomb the building.
The plot to bomb the U.N. was just one in a series of plots
to bomb numerous locations around New York, including the
Lincoln and Holland Tunnels, the George Washington Bridge, and
U.S. military installations. Five of the original 12 defendants
convicted in the series of terrorist plots were Sudanese
nationals.
Thankfully, this series of plots was thwarted by U.S.
authorities, but one of the earlier terrorist attacks, the
World Trade Center bombing, killed six individuals, injured
over 1,000 more, and caused $600 million in damages. The
terrorists responsible for the World Trade Center bombing
expressed regret that the twin towers were not toppled, a
catastrophe that would have taken the lives of tens of
thousands of people.
In addition to supporting international terrorism, Sudan
supports insurgencies against secular governments in northern
Africa, and wages a war of domestic terror against its own
people. Sudan supports extremist rebels and terrorist groups in
Algeria, Uganda, Tunisia, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.
The military regime of Omar al-Bashir has used genocide,
mass starvation, and slavery to pillage southern Sudan. Mere
children are drafted into Sudan's army to feed the flames of
the Government's hatred. Southern rebel leaders are guilty of
human rights atrocities as well, and the civil war has taken
the lives of 1.5 million people and displaced over 2 million
more in the last decade.
The malevolent character of Sudan's government makes it
patently clear why the U.S. has designated some nations as
State sponsors of terrorism and has imposed upon them the most
severe penalties and sanctions provided by U.S. law.
While it may seem obvious to all of us here today that
Sudan is deserving of our harshest censure, the Clinton
administration has had to be pushed and pulled into adopting an
aggressive stance against the terrorist State of Sudan. Only
under congressional pressure did President Clinton add Sudan to
the terrorist list in 1993, and now the Clinton administration
is failing to enforce U.S. antiterrorism law against this
terrorist State.
The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
passed by Congress and signed into law by the President last
April, contained a provision, section 321, prohibiting
financial transactions with State sponsors of terrorism. The
Clinton administration was given the opportunity to issue
regulations for section 321, and President Clinton blatantly
disregarded the clear language of the legislation and permitted
almost all financial transactions with some terrorist States to
proceed.
I do not understand this inconsistency in the President's
antiterrorism policy. In a speech at George Washington
University on August 5, 1996, just days before the regulations
for section 321 were issued, the President stated, and I quote:
The United States cannot and will not refuse to do what we
believe is right. That is why we have maintained or
strengthened sanctions against States that sponsor terrorism,
Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Sudan. You cannot do business with
countries that practice commerce with you by day while funding
or protecting the terrorists who kill you and your innocent
civilians by night. That is wrong.
The Congress of the United States has worked extensively in
a bipartisan manner to provide the American people with the
antiterrorism tools they need to defend themselves and isolate
these rogue regimes, and I am amazed that we are having to
revisit this antiterrorism legislation to force the President
to cutoff financial transactions with State sponsors of
terrorism.
Representative Bill McCollum, the original sponsor of
section 321, has introduced legislation in the House, H.R. 748,
to close the administration's regulatory loophole. I plan to
introduce companion legislation to H.R. 748 in the Senate. I am
thankful that America has been relatively isolated from most of
the world's terrorist violence, but just as terrorists have
targeted Americans abroad, they are now targeting Americans at
home.
International terrorism is one of our greatest national
security threats, and yet another example of a national
security threat that the administration is failing to address.
I want to thank the witnesses who will be testifying here
today for their assistance, and I hope that this hearing will
promote a frank and open discussion of the issues surrounding
the enforcement of our antiterrorism law.
I would call on the ranking minority member of the
committee, Senator Feingold.
STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR FROM
WISCONSIN
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This
is the first Africa Subcommittee hearing we are holding
together, and I am pleased to have the opportunity to work with
you and to continue into my fifth year of service on this
subcommittee, which I consider to be an important part of the
Foreign Relations Committee, and an important subcommittee in
the Senate.
As the chair notes, you and I share two subcommittee
jurisdictions. He is also chair of the Judiciary Subcommittee
on the Constitution, of which I am also the ranking member, so
I know we will be working together, having, in effect, quality
time together in the Senate throughout the 105th Congress, and
I look forward to it.
Mr. Chairman, I also want to thank you for holding a
hearing on the subject before us today, terrorism in the Sudan.
This is a vitally important topic for two reasons. One, as the
chairman has indicated, is terrorism itself, and the other is
the Sudan.
Terrorism is clearly one of the most vexing threats to our
national security today. Terrorist groups, by seeking to
destabilize or overthrow governments, serve to erode
international stability. By its very nature, terrorism goes
against everything we understand to be part of the
international system, challenging us with methods we do not
necessarily comprehend.
People, and all too often they are innocent bystanders, die
as a result of terrorism. Buildings are destroyed, and all of
us feel less safe after the fact.
According to the State Department's most recent Patterns of
Global Terrorism report, although the number of international
terrorist incidents in 1996 actually fell to 296, the lowest
annual total in 25 years, the death toll from these acts rose
from 163 in 1995 to 311 last year.
Approximately one-fourth of these acts were aimed
intentionally against the United States. In 1996, 24 U.S.
citizens were killed as a result of terrorism, a number that
unfortunately was twice as high as the previous year. So yes,
indeed, this is a vitally important subject for the Congress to
look at very carefully.
Mr. Chairman, I would also like to note the tremendous
importance, or at least the potential importance of the Sudan
in Africa. It is the largest country on the continent, and has
a population of 29 million people, with cultural and geographic
ties to both Arab North Africa and to black Sub-Saharan Africa.
The Sudan has the potential to play a significant role in
East Africa and the Gulf region, but unfortunately during its
41 years of independence, Sudan has only seen about 11 years of
peace. Instead, a brutal civil war between the largely
Christian and animist south and the Muslim-Arab north continues
to rage on.
This seemingly endless conflict has taken the lives of more
than 1.5 million and resulted in well over 2 million displaced
persons or refugees. Perhaps the saddest consequence of the war
is that there are thousands of teenagers who do not remember a
peaceful period, and who know better the barrel of a gun than
the inside of a classroom.
The international community has done the best that it can
with this situation. There are approximately 40 national and
international humanitarian organizations providing millions of
dollars annually in food and development assistance. For its
part, the U.S. Government has provided more than $600 million
in food assistance and nonfood disaster assistance since the
mid-1980's.
The United Nations' Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), which
maintains a unique agreement with the parties to the conflict,
has been instrumental in allowing humanitarian access to
displaced persons in the southern Sudan.
I want to just take a moment to commend the humanitarian
organizations operating in the region, who daily face not only
enormous technical and logistical challenges in serving the
Sudanese population, but obviously the all-too-frequent threat
of another offensive nearby.
Unfortunately, throughout this conflict both sides have
been engaged in all-too-frequent human rights violations.
According to the most recent State Department human rights
report, the Khartoum Government maintains not only regular
police and army units but also internal and external security
organs, a militia unit, and a parallel police called the
Popular Police, whose mission includes enforcing ``proper''
social behavior.
In 1996, according to the report, Government forces were
responsible for extrajudicial killings, disappearance, forced
labor, slavery, and forced conscription of children. Basic
freedoms--of assembly, of association, of privacy--are
routinely restricted by the Government. Worse, imposition of
Islamic law on non-Muslims is far too common.
Perhaps the Government's most egregious behavior, though,
is its involvement in terrorism, as the Chairman has well
pointed out. The State Department's 1996 Pattern of Global
Terrorism report noted that Sudan continued to serve as a
refuge, nexus, and training hub in 1995 for a number of
international terrorism organizations. As the Chairman has
already described, the Government continues to harbor members
of several international terrorist and radical Islamic groups.
Mr. Chairman, this is not a regime that should be included
in the community of nations. As Assistant Secretary Moose will
recall, I first became interested in this particular subject in
May 1993, during an Africa Subcommittee hearing chaired by then
chairman of the subcommittee Senator Paul Simon.
During that hearing, I questioned Secretary Moose regarding
Khartoum's relationship specifically with Hamas, an all-too-
well-known terrorist organization. Since much of that
information could not be disclosed in a public forum, I asked
him to brief me on these connections in private, and I later
encouraged the administration to take a hard line in its
efforts to curtail Sudan's involvement and support for
terrorist activity.
Shortly thereafter, in August, the President placed Sudan
on the official list of nations supporting terrorism, and I
just have to say for myself, Mr. Chairman, that when I asked
for the administration's response, it was not only adequate it
was swift, and considering I was the least senior member of the
entire committee, I was impressed that there was that kind of
response, and I fully supported this decision, and of course
continue to support Sudan's inclusion on the list.
The United States should not tolerate repugnant acts by
groups or governments, which is why, Mr. Chairman, the Congress
mandated the so-called terrorist list in the first place.
So again, I really do commend the Chairman for having a
significant hearing on this subject, and I look forward to
listening to the testimony.
Senator Ashcroft. I want to welcome Senator Grams of
Minnesota as a member of the committee as well, and thank him
for being here.
We are a bit under a time constraint as a result of the
vote, which delayed our beginning, so I would like to call our
first witness before the committee.
Our first witness is United States Congressman Bill
McCollum from the State of Florida. As I indicated in my
opening remarks, he has proposed legislation which would
provide a way to deal with State-sponsored terrorism and States
that sponsor terrorism.
He is the author of the measure which was contained in the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. He
serves in the House as chairman of both the Crime Subcommittee
and the Intelligence Committee's Subcommittee on Human
Intelligence Analysis and Counterintelligence, and it is a
pleasure to welcome him to the committee. Congressman McCollum.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL McCOLLUM, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM
FLORIDA
Mr. McCollum. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a
great pleasure being here with you, and I commend you and
Senator Feingold and Senator Grams for your effort in working
with respect to this issue. I think it is extraordinarily
important.
With your permission, I would like to ask unanimous consent
that my entire statement be put in the record. I would like to
simply summarize so as to save you some time.
Senator Ashcroft. It will be so ordered.
Mr. McCollum. I have the privilege, as you have indicated,
of serving as chairman of two key subcommittees that are
relevant to this matter in the House, and prior to that I was
the chairman of the Republican Task Force on Terrorism and
Unconventional Warfare. Everything you have described today--
through both the video and your statements--with regard to
Sudan and the terrorist activities is true in spades.
I became aware of these matters long ago, but frankly the
issue of what was in section 321 of the antiterrorism bill was
not something I really focused on until Louis Farakhan went
over to the Middle East and came back with money from Libya and
elsewhere, or it looked like he had a deal to do that.
Some of us began looking into the rules and regulations
regarding the financial transactions that could be done, and
discovered that while there were some executive orders
governing such transactions, they were not comprehensive. As a
result, this provision was drafted.
It was drafted with two purposes in mind, (1) prohibiting
some American citizen from going abroad to obtain
contributions, but more directly, prohibiting any foreign
nation that is identified as a terrorist country--one of the
seven that are out there, not just Sudan--from being able to,
as the government of that country, contribute money. It would
be wrong for us to take that money.
And then the other way around. That is, financial
transactions between both U.S. citizens and U.S. permanent
resident aliens and the governments of those foreign countries
were to be prohibited, and that is what section 321 was all
about.
Well, along the way the Treasury Department expressed its
concern to me that the diplomatic relationships we might have
could be strained. There were all kinds of possible exceptions,
all kinds of problems that would be there.
And since financial transactions are administered by the
Treasury Department, albeit with some consultation with the
Secretary of State, the decision was made, because of the
complexity, or the potential complexity of this, to give them a
broad basis for regulatory relief with the assumption that the
Treasury Department would write some regulations that would
specifically provide for diplomatic opportunities where the law
would not be that harsh.
Well, I want to tell you that what came out of the Treasury
Department's regulations was very, very disappointing, and I am
going to refer to my statement with regard to this.
In August of last year, I learned that the Treasury
Department had published these regulations. To my surprise, I
discovered that the regulations reversed the effects of the
prohibitions on the aforementioned financial transactions.
These regulations permit all financial transactions with Sudan
and Syria other than those which pose a risk of furthering
domestic terrorism.
I must say, so we understand it now, that we have economic
restrictions against the other five countries officially in
place but economic restrictions are not officially in place
against the Sudan or Syria, even though this provision in the
antiterrorism bill was designed to stop financial transactions
with all terrorist list countries. So this issue became far
more important, perhaps, because there were no other economic
sanctions in place against these two terrorist States.
At any rate, the regulations that the Treasury Department
issued prohibit U.S. persons from receiving unlicensed
donations and from engaging in financial transactions with
respect to which the United States person knows, or has
reasonable cause to believe that the financial transaction
poses a risk of furthering terrorist acts in the United States.
My cosponsor, Mr. Schumer, recently said that this is a
loophole big enough to drive a car bomb through. The reality,
Mr. Chairman, and I think I have got to make this very, very
clear, was not my intention, nor was it that of Mr. Schumer nor
anyone else connected with drafting these provisions in the
antiterrorism bill, that the regulatory authority provided
should be exercised in this manner.
If I had known the administration was going to choose to
render the prohibition meaningless, I would not have agreed to
the broad authority that was placed there. This business-as-
usual policy represents a step backward in the efforts to
isolate terrorist States, particularly the terrorist activities
in the Sudan and Syria.
So, in my judgment, the regulations could also permit
transactions with other nations if the current executive order
should ever be lifted. That is why H.R. 748 was introduced in
the House and why, I gather, that you are going to consider it
here in the Senate. It was to close this loophole.
The bill strips the executive branch of the authority to
issue regulations exempting transactions from the prohibition.
It establishes instead a legislative exception only for
transactions incident to routine diplomatic relations among
countries. By this, we mean those transactions which arise when
citizens of this country or representatives of a terrorist
supporting country travel or engage in activities for
diplomatic purposes.
For example, a cab ride from Kennedy Airport to the United
Nations building would not be included. Similarly, an American
diplomat traveling to Syria or Sudan on official business could
perform the financial transactions necessary for that trip.
Mr. Chairman, I think that is what we intended to begin
with, but that is not the way the Treasury Department has
allowed the enactment of section 321 of the antiterrorism bill
to work. If we are going to isolate these terrorist States,
section 321 must be enacted as intended.
Finally, I want to make one last comment. I know there are
those who believe that the targeted countries--Sudan, in
particular--are at the point now where they are ripe for
changing their ways, and there are those who think they have
already changed; that may be true. I would love to believe that
those nations will change in the future.
But I know it was only a few weeks ago that I had a visit
from the Ambassador from Sudan. We had a long conversation in
which we discussed a lot of the activities he said they had
done in Sudan to correct the problems and not allow terrorist
activities to be done. He encouraged me to be supportive and
open to the possibility of opening trade and removing the
restrictions, et cetera.
Although I cannot reveal all of the details, because I
serve on the Intelligence Committee, I can tell you that when I
went back to the Intelligence Committee and asked my
Intelligence Committee sources about the Ambassador's
statements, I found that the great majority of them were simply
unfounded and not true.
So I am very suspicious when I hear people say that the
Sudan is ready to cooperate, considering its past history of
human rights violations as well as terrorist encouragement.
It is one of those things that I will remain, and I trust
you will, too, very skeptical of as we listen to those who say
they have improved the situation.
That is not to say that we would not like to see the
targeted nations change in those ways, but the changes need to
be open, demonstrable, and clearly felt so that we can actually
see terrorist activities are no longer supported. That is
simply not the case today, and until that is the case, I would
certainly urge the enactment of H.R. 748 in the House and your
companion legislation in the Senate so that we may send it to
the President, because it needs to be law, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McCollum follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Bill McCollum, A Representative in Congress
From Florida
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss this critical issue
of international terrorism and Sudan. I commend you for taking the time
to focus on this important matter, and in particular, Mr. Chairman, for
your leadership in the Senate in shaping U.S. policy toward terrorist
sponsoring governments.
I have the privilege of serving in the House as chairman of both
the crime subcommittee and the Intelligence Committee's Subcommittee on
Human Intelligence, Analysis and Counterintelligence. These assignments
have presented me with the opportunity to receive extensive information
on the nature and extent of the threat posed by international
terrorism.
In my view, the forces of militant extremism in the Middle East and
Africa are among the greatest international dangers currently facing
America and its vital interests. The deadly threat posed by
international terrorists must not be underestimated.
We have all seen the pictures of bloody slaughter caused by these
violent criminals. Yet, if hatred and coldheartedness were all that
these killers needed, the world would be even more endangered than it
already is. But terrorists need more than desire. They need support;
they need infrastructure. And that's why the presence of terrorist
supporting countries is so harmful to the world community.
A handful of pariah States--Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Iran, Iraq,
Syria and Sudan--have been designated by the State Department, pursuant
to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, as terrorist
sponsoring countries or ``Terrorism List Governments.'' No one should
discount the significance of this designation. Without the support of
these countries, terrorists would literally not have a home, much less
the active assistance of government officials.
With regard to Sudan specifically, I would remind the Subcommittee
of how U.N. Ambassador Bill Richardson described this country only a
few months ago in connection with his confirmation. He said, ``The
Sudanese Government destabilizes its neighbors, supports terrorists,
commits human rights abuses against it own citizens, and pursues civil
war in the south.'' Clearly, the training and support of terrorists
occurring in Sudan are major contributors to the untold human suffering
cause by religious extremists in this region of the world.
Mr. Chairman, there should be no higher priority for the United
States in the battle against terrorism than the elimination of foreign
government support for terrorists. This is why section 321 of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 is a vital tool
in this battle.
The clear and unambiguous language of the statute addresses the
problem of financial support to terrorist sponsoring countries: Whoever
. . . knowingly or having reasonable cause to know that a country is
designated . . . as a country supporting international terrorism,
engages in a financial transaction with the government of that country,
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 10 years,
or both. The term ``financial transactions'' is defined very broadly to
include virtually all transfers of monetary instruments or a thing of
value.
Section 321 of the Anti-Terrorism Act
I became aware of the need for legislation in this area last year
when I learned through news reports that the Rev. Louis Farakhan had
traveled to Libya, and received a personal pledge of significant
financial support from Col. Moammar Gadhafi. Like most Americans, I was
outraged that a well known supporter of terrorism and enemy of the
United States such as Col. Gadhafi would be able to provide financial
support to a U.S. citizen.
After reviewing the relevant statutes and regulations, I learned
that the principle means for restricting most economic transactions
with terrorist supporting countries was through executive order, and
that not all governments known to support terrorists were covered by
such orders. I therefore concluded that a permanent ban on financial
transactions between U.S. persons (a term which includes both
individuals and corporate entities) and countries which support
terrorism was necessary.
This ban, which became section 321 of the Antiterrorism Act, was
offered as an amendment to the bill on the House floor by Congressman
Charles Schumer, the ranking minority member of the crime subcommittee
and myself, and it was adopted on a voice vote.
It was drafted with a dual purpose in mind. First, it prohibits
financial support from terrorist countries to U.S. persons, thus
attempting to prevent the long-arm of terrorism from reaching the
shores of the United States through domestic entities. Second, and more
broadly, it prohibits all financial transactions by U.S. persons with
these countries, regardless of where these transactions take place. The
obvious goal of this language is to cutoff terrorist sponsoring
governments from the economic benefit of doing business with U.S.
companies.
Since five of the seven terrorism list governments are already
subject to economic sanctions as a result of executive order, the
immediate impact of the ban related to Sudan and Syria.
While we were preparing the amendment, we were advised by the
administration that the broad wording of the prohibition could have
unintended consequences, particularly in the area of diplomacy. I
agreed to authorize the Department of the Treasury, in consultation
with the State Department, to issue regulations which provided some
exceptions to the ban. We intended these regulations to exclude various
innocuous transactions that occur in the course of diplomatic
activities and other related official matters
31 CFR Part 596
In August of last year, I learned that the Treasury Department had
published its regulations in relation to section 321. To my great
disappointment, I discovered that the regulations reversed the effect
of the new prohibition. These regulations permit all financial
transactions with Sudan and Syria, other than those which pose a risk
of furthering domestic terrorism. The regulations prohibit U.S. persons
from receiving unlicensed donations and from engaging in financial
transactions with respect to which the United States person knows or
has reasonable cause to believe that the financial transaction poses a
risk of furthering terrorist acts in the United States. As my
cosponsor, Mr. Schumer, recently said, this is a loophole big enough to
drive a carbomb through it.
Mr. Chairman, let me make this point as clearly as I can. It was
not my intention then, nor is it now, that the regulatory authority
provided in section 321 should be exercised in this manner. Had I known
that the administration would chose to render the prohibition
meaningless with its regulations I would not have agreed to give it
such broad authority. This ``business as usual'' policy represents a
step backward in the effort to isolate Syria and Sudan. The regulations
could also permit transactions with the other nations if the current
executive orders should ever be lifted.
H.R. 748
I have introduced H.R. 748 along with Mr. Schumer to close this
loophole and to prohibit transactions other than those that are
specifically connected to diplomatic activities. The bill strips the
executive branch of the authority to issue regulations exempting
transactions from the prohibition. It establishes instead a legislative
exception only for transactions ``incident to routine diplomatic
relations among countries.'' By this we mean only those transactions
which arise when citizens of this country or representatives of a
terrorist supporting country travel or engage in activities for
diplomatic purposes. For example, a cab ride from Kennedy airport to
the United Nations building would not be included. Similarly, an
American diplomat traveling to Syria on official business would not be
included. I realize that this legislation could affect many law-abiding
U.S. companies doing business in the affected countries. Under current
law, such business may be entirely lawful. But in my view, the only way
we are going to eliminate the governmental support terrorist
organizations desperately need, is to take a firm stance against
economic relationships with these countries.
Again, I thank the Subcommittee for inviting me to testify on this
issue, and I look forward to working with you on legislation that will
deter the spread of terrorism in the world.
Senator Ashcroft. Thank you, Congressman McCollum. I call
on Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. I have no questions. I just want to join
the chairman in welcoming the Representative. I appreciate his
interest, and I hope we can work together between the two
Houses to further our concern about Sudan itself and in
particular Sudan's activities with regard to supporting or
abetting terrorism.
Thank you.
Mr. McCollum. Thank you.
Senator Ashcroft. Senator Grams.
Senator Grams. Representative McCollum, what has been the
administration's reaction to this? Are they supportive of 748?
Mr. McCollum. No, they are not. I think you will find that
they believe there should be much more flexibility with this
legislation. If we can come up with specific exceptions within
certain bounds I would be open to them, as I think you should
be, but to say, ``a plague on your house, we do not want this
kind of restrictive prohibition,'' is not acceptable and that
is apparently their position.
You are going to hear from them today, but that is how I
understand their position.
Senator Grams. So despite evident concern by the Sudanese
about lifting some of the restrictions and some of the comments
they have made, and you have found them not to be completely
true, if at all, the administration would basically be ignoring
this?
Mr. McCollum. Well, at least the arms of the administration
dealing with this bill are ignoring it. I think that there are
people in the administration, in the intelligence community,
and others who could tell me that the Sudanese are not on the
up and up right now.
I am also concerned because a lot of businessmen in America
say, ``hey, we need these financial transactions. We are going
to be isolated. We are going to be cutoff. We are not going to
be able to do business. Somebody else is going to do the
business.''
I have heard that argument about every time the Congress
has proposed an economic sanction. There are times when
economic sanctions are a bad idea, and there are times when
they are absolutely necessary.
This is not an economic sanction in the true sense, but it
is a specific restriction on financial transactions. Some
American business interests certainly could complain that the
restriction hurts them, but we have got to do something about
terrorist States, and there is no other way to do it. If they
want to do business with us, as some of them profess they want
to do; then they must change their ways, modify their ways,
stop their terrorist support.
But I think the administration is only listening to the
business community that wants to continue its policies in
trading with Sudan, or expand its trade with Sudan.
Senator Grams. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ashcroft. Representative McCollum, your proposed
legislation, would it stop businesses from doing any business
in Sudan, or does it stop business from doing business with the
Sudanese Government?
Mr. McCollum. With the Sudanese Government, Mr. Chairman.
It would not prohibit private transactions among private
citizens. It is strictly with the Government, and it is limited
to financial transactions with the Government.
Senator Ashcroft. Is it your intention to continue to make
it possible for relief organizations in the event of disasters
or other compelling circumstances or exigencies to be able to
provide that relief?
Mr. McCollum. Absolutely. I certainly hope that the
Sudanese Government would permit humanitarian relief and not
hide behind this restriction in some manner. Humanitarian aid
from a relief organization does not require a financial
transaction with the Sudanese Government. Thus, such relief is
not automatically restricted by this prohibition.
Senator Ashcroft. Well, section 321 is originally designed
to make sure that our transactions there did not result in
sponsoring or funding or otherwise contributing to a capacity
to injure us or others in terrorist acts.
Mr. McCollum. That is exactly correct. The objective of 321
and the objective of 748 are both the same: To impair the
Government of the Sudan from furthering terrorism and to
restrict its financial transactions with United States
citizens, be it individuals or businesses, that could be in
furtherance of such terrorism. I do not believe, Mr. Chairman,
that you can simply narrow that down and say only those
transactions that pose that risk. Treasury's regulation is just
too narrow. As Mr. Schumer said, you can drive a car bomb
through it. You can drive a lot of things through it.
Senator Ashcroft. Are there any examples of transactions
which occurred or were discussed or could have occurred during
the interim which you might point out might have substantially
benefited or enhanced the capacity of Sudan?
Mr. McCollum. There was a lot of discussion about an oil
deal with one of our American companies. I understand that
there have been those who have back-tracked from the deal
saying, ``Oh, this really did not or was not going to happen,''
but it would have been directly with the Government of Sudan.
It would have been a new financial transaction with a
substantial amount of money involved.
Senator Ashcroft. Hundreds of millions of dollars?
Mr. McCollum. Hundreds of millions of dollars. However, it
did not take place.
Senator Ashcroft. So those are the kinds of things that our
State Department said would have been justified?
Mr. McCollum. That is correct, because they said that such
a deal does not pose a direct threat to terrorism. In other
words, we cannot say that this deal is directly financing the
terrorist activity itself.
Senator Ashcroft. So the charge has been made that the
Sudanese gave the machine guns to those to assassinate Hosni
Mubarak in Ethiopia?
Mr. McCollum. That is correct.
Senator Ashcroft. And our State Department would have said
well, that is OK, because buying machine guns for that is not a
threat to terrorism in the United States?
Mr. McCollum. I do not know if I would want to go that far,
but it could be interpreted that way, Mr. Chairman.
I think that you have got to recognize that there are
indirect means of supporting terrorism. That is why the
financial transactions are so important. Why should we, as the
Government and as citizens of the United States, allow money to
flow from our country to the Government of Sudan, knowing that
it could be used to sponsor terrorism? That is really what the
issue is all about.
It is not that we want to cutoff the private citizen's
business deals. However, all money is fungible. So if the
Sudanese Government gets money from our people, from our
citizenry, it can use that money for a variety of activities--
including terrorism, and we have no way of knowing which money
the Government is using for what.
Senator Ashcroft. If we have no way of knowing where any
money goes once it goes into their accounts, whether the same
money comes back out, would that not mean the interpretation
currently undertaken through the regulations by the
administration gives section 321 no effect whatever?
Mr. McCollum. That is right. It just renders it
meaningless. That is why the bill is so important that you are
about to sponsor here in the Senate.
Senator Ashcroft. I thank the Congressman for his good
work.
Mr. McCollum. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate it.
Senator Ashcroft. This morning, Assistant U.S. Attorney
General Andy Foyce called my office to make a special request
in regard to this hearing. The Justice Department requested
that Mr. Charles Maikish, one of our private witnesses, testify
first because he has to appear in an important trial concerning
the World Trade Center bombing in New York this afternoon. It
is not our custom to put private witnesses ahead of individuals
who represent the State Department, but we felt that in this
situation, at the request of the Attorney General's Office, it
would be important to do so.
I want to thank the members of the State Department for
their willingness to defer for this one private witness. The
other private witnesses will testify after the administration
panel as planned. I apologize for this change in the schedule.
It is, however, critical to the trial, and it is important to
accommodate the Attorney General's Office in this respect.
It is my pleasure now to call Charles Maikish, the former
building manager of the World Trade Center. He was the building
manager of the World Trade Center when the bombing occurred.
I welcome you to this hearing and thank you for your
willingness to testify.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES MAIKISH, VICE PRESIDENT FOR FACILITIES
MANAGEMENT, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK, NEW YORK
Mr. Maikish. Thank you, Senator. It indeed is a privilege
and an honor to be able to address this committee on the issue
of foreign terrorism, having experienced it personally.
I was the senior executive responsible for the World Trade
Center Complex in February 1993. Four years ago at 12:18 in the
afternoon, this country received a rather startling wake-up
call. For the first time, a major foreign terrorist act was
committed on U.S. soil, and not only on U.S. soil, but it was
targeted at the heart of our free economic system.
At 12:18 that day, on a snowy afternoon, a massive
explosive device equivalent to 1,500 pounds of explosives was
detonated below the World Trade Center in the heart of this
Nation's and the world's financial capital.
It is clear that the intent of the foreign group was to
inflict massive loss of human life, and a lasting and permanent
disruption of our economic system and our way of life. To fully
appreciate the impact of this act and the threat it still
poses, I need to set it in a context by describing for you the
World Trade Center complex, its purpose, its location, and its
component parts.
The trade center is located in the heart of Lower Manhattan
in the world financial district. It is the single largest
international commercial complex in the world. It is owned and
operated by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey as a
facility for international trade and commerce, and the port
authority was created by the U.S. Congress 75 years ago.
It contains seven buildings surrounding a 5-acre plaza on a
16-acre site. You best know it for its twin towers, which are
emblematic of New York and this country worldwide. These towers
rise 1,350 feet in the air, being the second and third tallest
structures in the world.
The complex in fact is equivalent to a small or medium-
sized American city. It houses 50,000 workers on any one
particular day, and it can have as many as 80,000 visitors, for
a population of about 130,000.
It contains 12 million square feet of commercial office
space, the size of downtown Cleveland's commercial office
district. It has 3 million square feet of space below grade. It
has a 400,000 square foot shopping center, the equivalent of a
major shopping center.
It has three subway lines and the Path Interstate
Railroads, which stop in it as a major transit hub. It has a
major ticketing center. It has an 826-room international hotel.
It has the world-famous observation deck, which is visited by 2
million international visitors a year, and of course Windows on
the World, the famous restaurant on top of the other tower.
It is a major hub for media. It houses the broadcasting
facilities for the major TV, 22 stations, with the antenna,
which is the major broadcasting facility for the region in New
York.
Below the trade center is its operating guts and parking
for 2,000 vehicles.
It has 375 commercial leases and over 1,000 businesses,
international businesses that engage in trade and commerce on a
daily basis. To give you some examples, the New York
Commodities Exchange is located in the trade center. Those are
the five exchanges that set the market for world oil, the COMEX
Exchange, the NYNEX Exchange, the exchanges that set the world
market for precious metals, gold, et cetera, the exchanges that
set the market for cotton and textiles, and the exchanges that
set the market for other types of metals and futures.
It is a banking and international center. Eighty percent of
all U.S. treasuries are traded or brokered through facilities
at the World Trade Center.
It is an international phone exchange, with all of the
international phone lines and all the phone lines serving the
financial district going through its bowels. The loss of those
phone lines would mean a major disruption in world
communications of financial data. It would also mean, for
instance, the loss of the three airports because of the air
traffic control system telecommunications going through that
facility.
It represents the home for business and governments from 60
countries, and State and Government agencies, including U.S.
Customs, Secret Service, et cetera. The Government of Thailand,
the Republic of China, the Government of France, et cetera, are
all located there.
The bomb was placed at the Trade Center between the two
towers. I have two graphics here which display this for you.
The crater itself was absolutely enormous. It was half the size
of a football field, and what this particular photograph shows
you is the south wall of the north tower.
The bomb was placed immediately adjacent to the south wall
of the north tower, 1,500 pounds of explosives intended by
those that placed it there to cause the tower to topple.
Fortunately, they were not successful in their goal of doing
that.
As Judge Duffy commented in the sentencing in the first
trial, they were intending on killing everybody in the complex,
130,000 people.
Found within the locker where the explosives were contained
was also a barrel of cyanide, and there was cyanide missing.
The speculation was that they tried to lace the bomb with
cyanide as well to assure the death of the people in the Trade
Center.
It resulted in the loss of six lives and one unborn child.
If they had succeeded they would have killed tens of thousands
and injured many more.
More than that, though, it would have been a total
disruption to our system here in this country and the economic
loss would have been measured in the billions, not just the
$600 million that we talk about now, because the businesses and
the economic activities would have been disrupted for a long
period of time to come.
What was and should our response be? The Governor of the
State of New York when he saw this responded on what does he
tell the 16 million people in the State of New York as to how
they continue to go on in the face of this, and he answered his
own question. He said normalcy was the rule of the day, that we
needed to establish a normalcy and continue our way of the
life.
Mitigation of the act. We brought the Trade Center back in
3 weeks. We brought its businesses back, we had the Governor
move back, and businesses continue. We mitigated the economic
loss and the human tragedy.
I must commend ATF and the FBI for the work they did in the
quick investigation, determining who was responsible for this,
the apprehension, and the quick prosecution and punishment.
Last, constant vigilance, balancing our need to preserve
and protect our free society and its personal freedoms and our
market economy with the measures which are necessary to
preserve it at its core.
An example of this is, the Trade Center is no longer an
open access facility. There is controlled access to the towers.
We are ringed with very heavy planters to give us a hard core
exterior. There is no public parking. There is perimeter
security. There is the use of modern technology to ensure the
security within the complex, patrols and the use of human labor
to do that as well.
We are trying to preserve the sense of free movement and
avoid the perception of an armed camp. We are trying to stop
the threat at the perimeter of the Trade Center, rather than
allowing it in.
When you visit New York and the World Trade Center, it will
always be there standing tall for you to see. When you look
upon it, let it reawaken you to the ever present danger of
global terrorism.
Thank you for the opportunity.
Senator Ashcroft. Thank you, Mr. Maikish, for bringing to
us your unique perspective on this specific incident and on the
challenge which we all face.
I would call on Senator Feingold if he has any questions or
comments.
Senator Feingold. I have no questions. I just want to
express my appreciation for that very vivid account of this
horror that was perpetrated in our country, and my sympathies
to you and all the people that were affected by it, and
obviously we recognize the connection by this hearing between
what we do internationally and what happens within this
country. Thank you.
Senator Ashcroft. Mr. Maikish, I understand that you need
to leave promptly, so I will just ask one or two questions
myself.
I want to clarify what you are saying. What would have been
the cost in human life and injury if the first tower had
toppled into the second tower as the terrorists had hoped would
be the case?
Mr. Maikish. Literally, tens of thousands of people would
have been killed in such an event. The towers themselves handle
about 20,000 in each of the towers, so you had 40,000 I think
directly vulnerable to the loss of their life. The complex
itself had 130,000. You would have had severe and extended
injury to a good portion of that population that was in the
complex if, in fact, the towers had come down.
Senator Ashcroft. Do you know if the New York City or other
authorities have taken steps that you could discuss that would
help prevent this kind of situation from happening again?
Mr. Maikish. There are organized steps that have been
calculated to both receive early warning as well as to secure
against this type an event. I would rather not discuss the
particulars.
Senator Ashcroft. Do you have any idea about whether or not
the United States should continue to engage in the full range
of commercial dealings with terrorist governments?
Mr. Maikish. Senator, my only comment on that is to the
extent that these activities are well-funded, then our job
becomes a lot harder in terms of preventing it or stopping it
at our borders, and it causes us to expand a lot more in
financial resources and human resources in terms of prevention.
To the extent that they continue to be funded well, to that
extent the threat grows.
Senator Ashcroft. Thank you very much for taking your time
to be with us, and thank you for going out of order. You are
not out of order, but----
Mr. Maikish. Senator, I appreciate the courtesy.
Senator Ashcroft. Thank you very much, and I wish you a
safe trip.
It would be my pleasure now to introduce the panel of
witnesses from the administration. I call the Hon. George
Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, the Hon. Ken
McKune, Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism for the
Department of State, and R. Rick Newcomb, Director of the
Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of Treasury.
I am grateful for the fact that you all have been willing
to appear before us today. You have visited with us and
conferred with us in our offices, and I am eager to have your
contributions to this subject matter before the committee at
this time.
It is my pleasure to call upon Ambassador Moose for remarks
in the first instance.
STATEMENT OF GEORGE E. MOOSE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
AFRICA
Ambassador Moose. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
welcome this opportunity this morning to appear before the
subcommittee and to discuss the broad range of our policies and
concerns with respect to Sudan, and particularly on the issue
of Sudan's support for international terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, I have prepared a longer written testimony,
which I would request be included in the record of the hearing.
Senator Ashcroft. It will be included in the record, and
thank you for your willingness to hit the highlights and carry
us to the most important, salient features of your testimony.
Ambassador Moose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If I could briefly summarize the matters of great concern
to the United States with regard to Sudan. U.S. foreign policy
objectives with respect to Sudan are clear and unequivocal.
They are to isolate the Sudanese Government and to contain its
efforts to sponsor international terrorism and, second, to
oblige the Sudanese Government to change other unacceptable
aspects of both its domestic and its international behavior.
Our ongoing diplomatic contacts with the Sudanese
Government are aimed at making our serious objections known
directly to senior levels of the Khartoum Government. Our
concerns and our responses fall into four broad categories.
They are terrorism. They are regional destabilization. They are
human rights. And they are the continuing prosecution of the
Sudanese civil war.
With regard to terrorism, Mr. Chairman, the Sudan
Government continues to support international terrorism,
primarily in providing a safe haven for terrorist elements. It
was for that reason that the Clinton administration, in 1993,
placed Sudan on the list of State sponsors of terrorism. And in
accordance with that designation, we have applied a range of
unilateral sanctions to oblige the Sudanese Government to cease
and desist in its support for terrorism.
Since 1995, the Sudanese Government has failed to extradite
to Ethiopia three suspects in the assassination attempt against
President Mubarak of Egypt. The United States has led the
efforts in the United Nations Security Council to adopt
Security Council resolutions. As a result of Sudan's failure to
comply with those resolutions, particularly Resolution 1044,
the U.S. Government has reduced the number of Sudanese
diplomats in this country and restricted their travel within
the United States. We have imposed a restrictive visa regime
for the government and military officials. And we are actively
pursuing continuing efforts in the Security Council to impose
additional sanctions.
In the face of this mounting international pressure, Sudan
has taken some steps to respond to the concerns that we and
others have raised regarding their involvement in international
terrorism. Its most significant action was the expulsion of
exiled Saudi terrorist financier Osama bin Laden, and many of
his so-called Arab-Afghan followers. However, as others have
pointed out this morning, Mr. Bin Laden continues to maintain
links to a number of businesses in Sudan, and he retains ties
to some leaders of the National Islamic Front.
Khartoum has also taken steps to tighten its previously lax
controls on the movements of foreigners into and through its
territory by establishing visa requirements and other
restrictions.
Mr. Chairman, these actions, however, do not constitute an
adequate or a satisfactory response to the concerns that we and
others have raised. We consider them largely tactical, and
Sudan has far to go to meet the concerns that we and others
have raised with regard to its support for international
terrorism.
Our second set of concerns, Mr. Chairman, has to do with
Sudan's support for groups in the region who actively seek to
destabilize neighboring countries, particularly, but not
exclusively, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Despite numerous
regional efforts to promote mediation both within Sudan and
with its neighbors, Sudan's regional policies have, to date,
frustrated the efforts to achieve any reasonable accommodation.
To help these neighboring States contain Sudan-sponsored
insurgencies, President Clinton, in 1995, authorized the
transfer of some $15 million in nonlethal defensive military
assistance to Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea. That was in fiscal
year 1996. And a further transfer of $4.75 million of similar
equipment is authorized for this fiscal year.
The aid to date has consisted of such items as boots and
backpacks, field rations and tents. The first shipments of this
assistance for Eritrea and Ethiopia arrived in February of this
year.
Our third major set of concerns with regard to Sudan has to
do with Sudan's egregious human rights record. Indeed, Khartoum
has one of the worst human rights records in the world. It is
responsible for numerous abuses in both the north and the south
of the country, and it has allowed the continuing practice of
slavery in certain parts of the country. The United States has
taken the lead in the U.N. Human Rights Commission, in the
General Assembly, in denouncing these human rights violations.
And we have also mounted a significant effort, in 1996, to gain
access to Sudan on the part of U.N. human rights rapporteurs,
whose efforts have helped to uncover and publicize the extent
of Sudan's human rights abuses.
Last, Mr. Chairman, we remain deeply concerned by the
Khartoum Government's continued prosecution of a very costly
and devastating civil war in the South, rather than seek a just
solution that recognizes the rights of all of Sudan's citizens.
The 14-year conflict has taken an estimated 1.5 million lives,
and generated approximately 2 million internally displaced
persons. Active northern opposition now to the National Islamic
Front regime indicates clearly the extent to which Khartoum's
radical policies have alienated large segments of Sudanese
society.
The U.S. Government does not provide any support to any
party in the civil war. We have, however, supported efforts to
achieve a negotiated settlement in a manner that recognizes the
legitimate interests and the rights of all Sudanese, and we do
seek to mitigate the devastating impact of the civil war on the
Sudanese people. We are the largest single provider of
humanitarian assistance to Sudan. Since 1988, we have provided
more than $600 million in humanitarian assistance, primarily to
the war-affected people in southern Sudan.
Mr. Chairman, certain of the abhorrent policies and
practices are not new or unique to this current Sudanese
regime, and our approach to Sudan must take into account that
long history and the root causes of conflict. However, a
complex reality in no way absolves the current NIF-led regime
of responsibility for its own actions.
To date, the Sudanese response to our concerns and the deep
concerns expressed by others have been inadequate, intended
primarily to relieve domestic and international pressure,
rather than to reflect a real reconsideration of policy. Our
objective remains the same. It is to isolate this regime
diplomatically and otherwise, and to oblige it to pursue
policies and actions that will change its unacceptable
behavior. Failing that, we have made it clear to Sudanese
authorities that they will face growing international pressure
and that our own bilateral relationship will continue to
deteriorate.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would just say that when I
first assumed my responsibilities in 1993, one of the first
official acts or responsibilities that I was called upon to
perform was to advise Secretary of State Christopher on the
question of whether Sudan should be put on the list of State
sponsors of terrorism. And I recall very clearly my
conversation with Senator Feingold at that time.
I will say that there was unanimity within the State
Department that Sudan fully deserved and merited to be put on
that list. I cannot speak for others, but certainly in terms of
my own participation in that decision, there was no need for
any external pressure or exhortation in order to convince us
that that was the right and the appropriate decision.
Since that time, I would simply say, Mr. Chairman, that
there is no government in the world that has taken a stronger
stance or applied more specific measures with regard to Sudan's
behavior generally and specifically with regard to its support
for international terrorism. Our leadership on this issue has
been critical not only in terms of our bilateral actions, but
also in terms of our efforts to mobilize international opinion
to support broader measures to deal with Sudan's continuing
support for terrorism.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Moose follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador George E. Moose
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I welcome the opportunity to participate in this hearing on U.S.
counterterrorism policy towards Sudan. My colleague, Acting Coordinator
for Counterterrorism Ken McKune, will address the particulars of our
counterterrorism policy. I would like to complement his presentation by
describing the broader concerns we have with Sudan and the numerous
actions we have taken in response, including our fight against
terrorism.
Background
Sudan is the largest country in Africa, as large as the eastern
portion of the United States. Its 27 million people belong to numerous
ethnic and religious groups, many of which fit together uneasily. The
most distinct division in the country is between a predominantly Arab/
Muslim north and a predominantly non-Arab/non-Muslim south. The desire
of many southerners for greater autonomy, control of resources, and
liberation from the imposition of Islamic law lies at the heart of
Sudan's continuous civil strife. Since independence in 1956, only the
period between 1972 and 1983 saw a country at peace with itself. We
estimate that the conflict has taken about one and a half million
lives. Today there are approximately two million internally displaced
persons in Sudan, as well as several hundred thousand Sudanese refugees
living in neighboring States.
The tragedy of Sudan is compounded by the fact that a potentially
prosperous nation has failed its own people and contributed negatively
to the region's welfare. Decades of economic mismanagement have
resulted in an inflation rate of more than 100 percent and the largest
arrears to the International Monetary Fund of any country in the world.
Endowed with the potential to generate food surpluses, poor policies
and civil war make Sudan a net food importer. The threat Sudan poses to
its neighbors has forced those countries to divert scarce resources
from productive to military ends.
Sudan Under the NIF: Fundamental Problem
Since 1989, when military officers aligned with the National
Islamic Front (NIF) overthrew Sudan's last democratically-elected
government, Sudan has implemented a wide range of policies which have
further alienated it from its citizens and earned it the opprobrium of
the international community. Our concerns, and our responses, fall into
four broad categories:
First, the NIF regime supports international terrorism, primarily
by providing safe-haven to terrorist elements. We have taken unilateral
actions and worked through the UN Security Council to mobilize
international action on this issue.
Second, Khartoum actively seeks to destabilize its neighbors by
providing material support and haven for violent insurgent groups.
President Clinton's response is to provide the neighboring States of
Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea with non-lethal defensive military
assistance in 1996 and again this fiscal year.
Third, Khartoum has one of the worst human rights records in the
world, inflicting numerous abuses in both the north and the south of
the country and allowing slavery to continue in certain parts of the
country. The United States has urged Sudan to wipe out slavery and we
have taken the lead in the UN Human Rights Commission and General
Assembly denouncing its human rights violations.
Fourth, the NIF has prosecuted a costly civil war rather than seek
a just solution that recognizes the rights of all its citizens. In its
conduct of the war, Sudan also hinders the delivery of humanitarian
assistance to war-affected civilians. Since 1988 we have provided more
than $600 million in humanitarian assistance, primarily to the war-
affected people in southern Sudan.
Certain of these abhorrent policies and practices are not new or
unique to the current regime, and our approach to Sudan considers the
root causes of conflict. A complex reality, however, in no way absolves
the NIF-led government of responsibility for its actions. Our objective
is to isolate and contain the threat that the NIF regime poses as well
as to try to compel it to change its unacceptable behavior. Failing
that, we have made it clear to Sudan that they will face growing
international pressure, and that our bilateral relationship will
further deteriorate.
I now would like to go into greater detail on each of our concerns
and actions we have taken in response.
Terrorism
In 1993, the Clinton Administration placed Sudan on the list of
State sponsors of terrorism and we have applied unilateral sanctions
consistent with that designation. Sudan was known to provide refuge,
logistical support such as training facilities, travel documents, and
weapons to a variety of radical terrorist organizations.
Since 1995, Sudan has failed to cooperate with the international
community to help extradite to Ethiopia three suspects in the
assassination attempt in Addis Ababa against Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak. After demands from the organization of African Unity (OAU)
that Sudan facilitate their extradition to Ethiopia went unheeded, the
U.S. played a leading role last year in the adoption of three U.N.
Security Council resolutions. Resolution 1044 required that Sudan act
``to extradite to Ethiopia for prosecution'' the three suspects and
that it ``desist'' from ``activities of assisting, supporting and
facilitating terrorist activities and from giving shelter or sanctuary
to terrorist elements.'' The United States emphasized at the time that
we would consider Sudan responsible for extradition of the suspects
even if they allowed them to leave the country, as may now have
occurred.
As a result of Sudan's failure to comply with Resolution 1044, the
Council considered and adopted Resolution 1054, calling on member
States to adopt travel restrictions on Sudanese government officials,
and Resolution 1070, which conceived of a ban on flights by Sudanese
Government-controlled aircraft. The United States Government reduced
the number of Sudanese diplomats in this country, restricted their
travel here, and imposed a restrictive visa regime for government and
military officials.
In the face of mounting international pressure, Sudan has taken
some steps to respond to concerns about its involvement in
international terrorism. Its most significant action was the expulsion
of exiled Saudi terrorist financier Osama bin Laden and many of his so-
called ``Arab Afghan'' followers. However, bin Laden remains linked to
a number of businesses in Sudan and retains ties to some NIF leaders.
Khartoum also took steps to tighten what has been an extremely porous
border, establishing new visa requirements to control foreign travel
into and out of the country. However, we consider these largely
tactical steps. Sudan has far to go to meet our concern that it cease
its support for international terrorism.
Regional Stability
A central U.S. objective is that Sudan end its sponsorship of
insurgent groups which seek to destabilize the neighboring countries of
Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Despite regional efforts to promote
mediation, both within Sudan and with its neighbors, Sudan's regional
policies have to date frustrated efforts to achieve a reasonable
accommodation.
To help these neighboring countries contain Sudanese-sponsored
insurgencies, in late 1995, President Clinton authorized the transfer
of $15 million in non-lethal defensive military assistance to these
countries for FY96. A transfer of $4.75 million of such equipment is
taking place this fiscal year. The aid to date has consisted of boots,
backpacks, field radios, and tents. The first shipments of this
assistance for Eritrea and Ethiopia arrived in February 1997.
Human Rights
In April, the United States and other members of the UN Human
Rights Commission passed a consensus resolution expressing ``deep
concern at continued serious human rights violations by the Government
of Sudan.'' The Resolution identified a litany of ongoing abuses by the
government, including ``extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests,
detentions without due process, enforced or involuntary disappearances,
violations of the rights of women and children, slavery and slavery-
like practices, forced displacement of persons and systematic torture,
and denial of the freedoms of religion, expression, association and
peaceful assembly.'' The Commission expressed ``serious concern'' over
reports of ``religious persecution, including forced conversion of
Christians and animists, in government controlled areas.''
Last year, we succeeded, through the actions of the Human Rights
Commission, in getting Sudan to readmit the UN Special Rapporteur for
Human Rights in Sudan. As a consequence, the Special Rapporteur was
able to produce important information on ongoing abuses in Sudan that
contributed to the international consensus on Sudan's record.
Civil War and National Reconciliation
Key southern and northern opposition forces have recently formed
the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). Their avowed aim is to oust the
NIF from power. This is an important development in Sudan's civil war
which has historically been a struggle by southern Sudan's socially
distinct, non-Arab population against what they see as northern
government policies of ``Arabization,'' ``Islamicization,'' and
political exclusion. Active northern opposition to the NIF regime
indicates the extent to which its radical policies have alienated large
segments of Sudanese society. Rebel forces recently engaged and
defeated GOS forces in several areas of southern and eastern Sudan
separated by hundreds of miles.
The U.S. Government does not provide any support to any party to
the civil war. We have supported efforts to achieve a negotiated
settlement in a manner that recognizes the legitimate interests and
rights of all Sudanese. We do seek to mitigate the devastating impact
of civil war on the Sudanese people and are the largest provider of
humanitarian aid to Sudan. We continue to protest frequent Sudanese
bans on the type and destination of relief aircraft, based on
allegations, which we consider unfounded, that the assistance will go
directly to rebel groups.
I would like to note here that we remain very skeptical that
movement towards resolving the civil war will emerge from a Peace
Agreement signed on April 21 between the Government and a number of the
smaller rebel groups. Although the Agreement contained a positive step
in its recognition of Sudan's multi-racial, -ethnic, and -religious
nature, it did not spell out how and to what extent these rights would
be respected in the context of the current NIF policies and practices.
The GOS professions of a desire to negotiate, moreover, must be viewed
against the backdrop of repeated, failed mediation efforts. As in the
past, the most important elements of the opposition, in this case the
NDA, have not been persuaded that the process or the Agreement itself
will satisfy their legitimate interests.
I would also like to mention President Carter's trip to the region
last month. President Carter undertook this mission in his capacity as
a private citizen, and his efforts carried no official U.S. Government
sanction. At the same time, we welcome his interest in Sudan's
continuing conflict and his efforts to promote a just solution. The
insights he gained during his travel have been considered with interest
by the Secretary.
The Importance of a Comprehensive Domestic Peace
The U.S. Government believes that the NIF government is fully
culpable for the abuses it has inflicted on its people, the aggressive
acts it has committed toward neighbors, and the support it has given
international terrorism. We believe that it can and must cease these
activities.
It may be, however, that the radicalism of the current regime will
continue as long as the NIF-controlled government represents an
embattled and narrowly based segment of society. A just resolution of
Sudan's internal conflict--one that gives a voice in government to more
moderate elements in the north and to the major political and ethnic
forces in the south--would thus do much to eliminate the sources of
Sudan's unacceptable domestic and international behavior. For this
reason, our own contribution to regional and international efforts to
resolve Sudan's civil war can contribute to the achievement of our
other goals vis-a-vis Sudan as well.
U.S.
U.S. objectives are clear and unequivocal: to isolate Sudan and to
contain its support for insurgents and terrorists and to oblige the
Sudanese Government, by exacting a price for unacceptable behavior, to
change its domestic and international conduct.
Our ongoing diplomatic contacts with Sudanese officials are aimed
at making our serious objections known directly to senior levels in
Khartoum. As the Secretary said in another context, ``engagement does
not mean acceptance.''
Ambassador Carney and others have expressed our concerns in detail
to the Government of Sudan. To date, the Sudanese responses have been
inadequate and appear to have been largely tactical, intended primarily
to relieve domestic and international pressure rather than to reflect a
real reconsideration of policy.
The international community has made it clear that it will not
accept cosmetic changes from Khartoum and will insist on real
improvement in Sudan's domestic and international behavior. It remains
our hope that Sudan, in the face of this pressure, will recognize the
need to make such a fundamental change. Failing such a change, as I
said earlier, we have made it clear to the Government of Sudan that
they will face growing international pressure and that our bilateral
relationship will further deteriorate.
Senator Ashcroft. Thank you.
I would now call upon the Hon. Kenneth R. McKune, who is
the Associate Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the
Department of State. Thank you very much, Mr. McKune.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH R. MCKUNE, ACTING COORDINATOR FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. McKune. Mr. Chairman, Senator Feingold, thank you for
this opportunity to testify today on our counterterrorism
policy toward Sudan.
I have submitted a longer statement for the record. I will
summarize the policy and the Sudanese parts and leave off the
sanctions.
Senator Ashcroft. It is a pleasure to assure you that it
will be made a part of the record, and to welcome your remarks
highlighting the testimony.
Mr. McKune. Thank you.
Before commenting on Sudan specifically, I would like to
briefly provide the context by outlining several key elements
of our overall counterterrorism policy. They apply to Sudan and
to other countries on the terrorism list and to individual
terrorists.
First, a fundamental principle of U.S. policy is to make no
concessions to terrorists. We have a longstanding policy of not
giving in to terrorists' demands and not making concessions
that would reward terrorist actions, including payment of
ransom for hostages. Of course, we will use every appropriate
resource to gain the safe return of American citizens held
hostage, but without making concessions.
These principles have guided our counterterrorism policy
and actions for many years. We urge other governments to follow
these principles, and we apply them in practice.
Second, we treat terrorists as criminals, consider their
acts of violence as crimes, and make every effort to apprehend
international terrorists who attack U.S. citizens or interests,
so that they are prosecuted according to the rule of law.
Third, regarding countries that support terrorists, we seek
to bring pressure on them to end their assistance by imposing a
variety of economic, diplomatic and political sanctions. Sudan
was brought under this sanctions regime in August 1993, when
the Secretary of State formally designated it as a country that
has repeatedly provided support to groups engaged in acts of
international terrorism. Sudan thus joined six countries
already on the list: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea, and
Cuba.
Sudan was designated under section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act and related foreign assistance and arms
control legislation, because it provided--and continues to
provide--safe haven to terrorist groups, training facilities
and a transit point for these groups. Although we do not have
information that Sudan provides the level and type of
assistance and active support for specific operations as do
some countries on the State sponsors list, the type of
hospitality Sudan grants to terrorist groups makes it easier
for them to maintain their viability, train and to carry out
terrorist actions, such as the June 1995 attack by Al-Gama'at
al-Islamiyya against President Mubarak in Addis Ababa.
Sudan harbors a number of terrorist groups. They include an
old line secular group, the Abu Nidal organization, but most of
them are militant Islamic extremist organizations. Among them
are Hamas, Hezbollah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Al-
Gama'at al-Islamiyya. The Sudanese Government also supports
Islamic and non-Islamic opposition groups in Algeria, Uganda,
Tunisia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.
Sudan did take a positive step last year by expelling ex-
Saudi financier Osama bin Laden and expelling members of some
terrorist groups. However, Sudan has yet to comply with U.N.
Security Council Resolutions 1044, 1054 and 1070, which call on
Sudan to extradite to Ethiopia the three suspects in the June
1995 assassination attempt against President Mubarak, and to
end its support for terrorism. Sudan has not cutoff its support
for terrorist organizations that continue to have a presence
there.
The United States has the most stringent set of laws of any
country in imposing trade and other sanctions against State
sponsors of international terrorism. There are more than a
dozen such measures imposed against the seven countries
designated by the Secretary as State sponsors, including Sudan.
And here I will skip over the portion about the sanctions
and just conclude by saying that the United States believes
that the Government of Sudan, which is dominated by the
National Islamic Front, has not taken sufficient steps to stop
its support for terrorist extremist groups or expel them from
its territory. Until Sudan ends such support, it will remain on
our State sponsors of terrorism list.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKune follows]
Prepared Statement of Kenneth R. McKune
Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on our
counterterrorism policy toward Sudan.
Before commenting on Sudan specifically, I would like to briefly
provide a context by outlining several key elements of our overall
counterterrorism policy. They apply to Sudan and other countries on the
terrorism list, and to individual terrorists.
First, a fundamental principle of U.S. policy is to make no
concessions to terrorists. We have a long standing policy of not giving
in to terrorists' demands, and not making concessions that would reward
terrorist actions, including payment of ransom for hostages. Of course
we will use every appropriate resource to gain the safe return of
American citizens held hostage, but without making concessions.
These principles have guided our counterterrorism policy and
actions for many years. We urge other governments to follow these
principles, and we apply them in practice.
Second, we treat terrorists as criminals, consider their acts of
violence as crimes, and make every effort to apprehend international
terrorists who attack U.S. citizens or interests so that they are
prosecuted according to the rule of law.
Third, regarding countries that support terrorists, we seek to
bring pressure on them to end their assistance by imposing a variety of
economic, diplomatic and political sanctions.
Sudan was brought under this sanctions regime in August, 1993, when
the Secretary of State formally designated it as a country that has
repeatedly provided support to groups engaged in acts of international
terrorism. Sudan thus joined six countries already on the list: Iran,
Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea and Cuba.
Sudan was designated under section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act and related Foreign Assistance and Arms Control
legislation because it provided--and continues to provide--safe haven
to terrorist groups, training facilities, and a transit point for these
groups. Although we do not have information that Sudan provides the
level and type of assistance and active support for specific operations
as so some countries on the State sponsor list, the type of hospitality
Sudan grants to terrorist groups makes it easier for them to maintain
their viability, to train and to carry out terrorist actions--such as
the June 1995 attack by Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya against President
Mubarak in Addis Ababa.
Sudan harbors a number of terrorist groups. They include an ``old
line'' secular group, the Abu Nidal Organization, but most of them are
militant Islamic extremist organizations. Among them are: HAMAS, the
Lebanese Hizballah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Egypt's Al-
Gama'at al-Islamiyya. The Sudanese government also supports Islamic and
non-Islamic opposition groups in Algeria, Uganda, Tunisia, Ethiopia and
Eritrea.
Sudan did take a positive step last year by expelling ex-Saudi
financier Osama bin Laden and expelling members of some terrorist
groups. However, Sudan has yet to comply with the UN Security Council
Resolutions 1044, 1054 and 1070 which call on Sudan to extradite to
Ethiopia the three suspects in the June 1995 assassination attempt
against Egyptian President Mubarak and end its support for terrorism.
Sudan has not cut off its support for terrorist organizations that
continue to have a presence there.
The United States has the most stringent set of laws of any country
in imposing trade and other sanctions against State sponsors of
international terrorism. There are more than a dozen such measures
imposed against the seven countries designated by the Secretary as
State sponsors, including Sudan.
These measures include the Export Administration Act, which curbs
the sale of dual-use items that could enhance a designated country's
military capability or its ability to support acts of terrorism, as
well as provisions prohibiting economic assistance, export of military
equipment, and GSP trade treatment.
Furthermore, as noted on U.S. income tax forms, U.S. individuals
and companies are denied any foreign income tax credits for doing
business in terrorist list countries. Judging by the inquiries we
receive from companies and law firms in the course of a year, this
seems to be a considerable disincentive to establishing a business
relationship with a country, such as Sudan, that has only a minimal
trade with the United States, about $30 million, each way.
Other sanctions which apply to Sudan and the other terrorist list
governments include using our voice and vote against loans or grants by
international financial institutions. In addition, U.S. laws also
prohibit American economic assistance to governments that provide
economic aid or lethal military equipment to Sudan and other
governments on the terrorism list. We have been monitoring whether
there is any such assistance to Sudan and if we find such cases we will
take appropriate action.
These measures are aimed at the potential pressure points of State
supporters of terrorism: foreign assistance, international loans and
items which might have military use. The combined weight of these
measures imposes severe limits on the U.S. relationship with Sudan and
are designed to persuade Sudan to change its behavior in supporting
terrorists. Already our trade relationship with Sudan is relatively
minor; we mainly import gum arabic, which is used to provide the
backing for stamps and post-it notes.
With these economic sanctions as a background, we have continued
our efforts to put political and other pressures on Sudan. One arena,
as I mentioned, is in the United Nations. But we also work bilaterally,
both in our contacts with Sudan and with other governments that have
relations with Sudan, to persuade the Sudanese leadership to end their
support for terrorism.
The United States believes that the Government of Sudan, which is
dominated by the National Islamic Front (NIF), has not taken sufficient
steps to stop its support for terrorist extremist groups or expel them
from its territory. Until Sudan ends such support, it will remain on
our State sponsors of terrorism list.
Mr. Chairman, at this point, that concludes my overview and I would
be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Ashcroft. Thank you, Mr. McKune.
I now call on Mr. Newcomb.
Mr. Newcomb is the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets
Control in the Department of the Treasury.
Mr. Newcomb.
STATEMENT OF R. RICHARD NEWCOMB, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FOREIGN
ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Mr. Newcomb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Feingold.
Thank you for inviting me to testify in your hearing today.
The Office of Foreign Assets Control administers economic
sanctions and embargo programs against targeted foreign
countries or groups to further U.S. foreign policy and national
security objectives. In administering these programs, Foreign
Assets Control generally relies upon Presidential authority
contained in the Trading with the Enemy Act or the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act or upon specific
legislation to prohibit or regulate commercial financial
transactions with specific countries or groups.
Examples of our current Trading with the Enemy Act programs
include comprehensive asset freezes and trade embargoes against
North Korea and Cuba. Examples of our current IEEPA programs
include similarly broad sanctions against Libya, Iraq, the Cali
cartel in Colombia, and certain terrorist groups, as well as
comprehensive trade sanctions against Iran.
Alternatively, sanctions may be imposed by Congress
directly through legislation. Administration of sanctions
within the executive branch in these cases is usually delegated
to the relevant enforcement agency, depending on the nature of
the restrictions. Between 1986 and 1991, for example, OFAC
administered the trade and investment prohibitions against
South Africa, mandated by the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act.
Similarly, Foreign Assets Control has been delegated
administration of section 321 of the Anti-terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, which was signed into law by
President Clinton on April 24th of last year.
Section 321 of the Act prohibits financial transactions by
United States persons with the governments of terrorist-
supporting nations designated under 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act. Effective August 22nd of last year, except
as provided in regulations issued by the Treasury Department,
which were issued in consultation with the Secretary of State,
the Act prohibited financial transactions of U.S. persons with
North Korea, Cuba, Iran, Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Sudan. All but
Syria and Sudan were the subject of existing comprehensive
financial and trade embargoes at the time of enactment.
In accordance with foreign policy guidance provided to
Treasury by State, existing sanctions programs against North
Korea, Cuba, Iran, Libya, and Iraq were continued without
change. This permitted the specific policies developed over
time with respect to each of these countries to remain in
effect, including the exceptions to each embargo dictated by
unique humanitarian, diplomatic, news gathering, intellectual
property, and other concerns that we have had in the life of
these programs.
New regulations, known as the Terrorist List Government
Sanctions Regulations, were issued to impose the prohibitions
on financial transactions with regard to Syria and Sudan. The
new regulations, drafted in accordance with foreign policy
guidance provided by the State Department, authorized financial
transactions with the Governments of Syria and Sudan except for
transfers from these governments in the form of donations and
transfers with respect to which a U.S. person knows or has a
reasonable cause to believe that the financial transaction
poses a risk of furthering terrorist acts in the United States.
Regulations are consistent with the legislative history of
section 321 of the Act.
From a sanctions enforcement perspective, the Act and
implementing regulations are important, because they provide
the Office of Foreign Assets Control comprehensive jurisdiction
over all financial transactions between U.S. persons and the
Governments of Syria and Sudan. We now have authority, for the
first time, to act to stop or impede any particular suspicious
transfer to or from these governments by informing U.S. persons
handling the transfer that a reasonable cause exists to believe
that the transaction may pose a risk of furthering terrorist
activity in the United States or any other questionable
activity inconsistent with the Act's anti-terrorist purpose.
We believe the Act's authority provides a significant new
tool in the war against terrorist funding.
Thank you. I am pleased to take any questions you may have.
Senator Ashcroft. Thank you.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a number of questions, and let me begin with a few
for Mr. Moose. Do you think the regulations developed for
section 321 accurately reflected United States policy toward
Sudan at the time they were promulgated?
Ambassador Moose. I do, Senator. And, again, I think the
issue at the time was whether the legislation required the
administration to take additional measures with respect to
Sudan. The people who were involved in making that
determination, the lawyers, particularly at the State
Department and the Department of the Treasury, were very
closely involved and followed very closely the consideration of
the legislation at the time and, indeed, provided our views
about the legislation.
It was their considered judgment that the regulations
issued by the administration were consistent with the
legislative history and the legislative intent.
Senator Feingold. Let me just follow on that and just ask
more generally if the United States considers Sudan to be a
rogue State, why should commercial transactions be allowed to
take place at all?
Ambassador Moose. Senator Feingold, we are obliged, I
think, as we can do our work in all of these areas, to make
distinctions, and sometimes fine distinctions. As my colleague,
Mr. McKune, pointed out, Sudan is certainly an egregious
violator of a number of international norms, certainly with
respect to its support for international terrorism. And it was
for that reason that this administration took the initiative of
placing Sudan on the list of State sponsors.
We have significant evidence of Sudan's direct support for
groups that are involved in terrorism. In the case of others
that are on that list, we have evidence that goes beyond that--
evidence of their actual direction, organization and targeting
of terrorist activities.
Our objective must always be, it seems to me, to take those
actions, those measures which we believe have a chance of
changing the behavior, the conduct of States like Sudan. In the
case of Sudan, one would say that there is at least evidence
that they are not immune, not insensitive to the kinds of
pressures that we have been able to mobilize, both unilaterally
and multilaterally.
At the same time, we have made it quite clear that if
Sudan's actions persist, if its attitudes and its behavior
persist, we are quite prepared to consider tougher measures,
both unilaterally and multilaterally. We would much prefer,
frankly, to try to mobilize international support, because our
experience has been we really want to have an impact, and that
impact is likely to be greater if we can organize others to
join us in taking those kinds of actions.
But I think that we have tried to pursue a tough but
calibrated--if you will, graduated--policy with respect to
Sudan, with the objective of trying, to the best of our
ability, to persuade this government to cease and desist its
acts and actions in support of international terrorism.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. I will have a question near
the end of my questioning, again, on 321. But let me ask you a
few questions about the situation in Sudan itself for a minute
for background.
I understand on April 21, a so-called peace agreement was
signed between Khartoum and some of the smaller rebel groups.
The Sudan People's Liberation Army did not participate in the
agreement. What do you make of this agreement, first? Is there
anything new or significant here?
Ambassador Moose. Frankly, we are intensely skeptical about
the seriousness of the Government of Sudan's intentions here to
seek a genuine political solution to the conflict. We have
seen, unfortunately, other situations in which the Khartoum
Government has sought to engage in half measures, if you will,
efforts, not with a serious intent of reaching a settlement,
but, frankly, with the intent of deflecting both domestic and
international pressure.
Our concern about this most recent agreement is exactly
that. That concern is heightened by the fact that the
Government has not seriously engaged either the principal
southern opposition group, the SPLA, nor the broadly based
National Democratic Alliance, which is an alliance of both
northern and southern groups. The exclusion of those groups
from participation in this so-called peace agreement raises in
our minds very serious doubts about its viability and about the
intent of the Sudan Government.
Senator Feingold. Is there anything in that agreement,
whether it be lip service or not, that reflects an intention to
allow non-Muslims to be able to be free to practice their own
religion?
Ambassador Moose. There is in that agreement, I think, an
important statement of principle that says that the Government
would respect the rights of people throughout the country to a
certain degree of autonomy with regard to, for example,
religious freedom, et cetera. Again, I would say that we need
to look at that against the backdrop of the specific actions
the Government has taken in the past and the lack thus far of
any practical implementation of those principles.
Senator Feingold. But you cannot point to any particular
actions following up on that?
Ambassador Moose. As of this stage, no, we cannot, Senator.
Senator Feingold. Could you speculate for a minute, Mr.
Moose, about what would happen if the NIF-led Government were
to fall sometime soon? What would be your analysis about what
would happen in Sudan?
Ambassador Moose. Senator, I really do hesitate to
speculate on that. I would say that there is nothing in our
current assessment of the situation which leads us to conclude
that such an event is imminent. On the other hand, we have made
it quite clear, in both our public pronouncements and our later
actions with the Government, our belief that they need to take
actions, not only with respect to the south of Sudan but to the
north, that would accommodate the legitimate concerns,
grievances of the citizens of Sudan. Whether in fact this
current regime could do so and still survive is, I think, a
very good question.
Senator Feingold. One more question for you at this moment
just having to do with our diplomatic relationships there. The
United States pulled its embassy staff out of Khartoum early in
1996 and moved some of its embassy's operation to Nairobi
because of security concerns. What is the current status of the
embassy, and under what circumstances would we reopen the
embassy?
Ambassador Moose. We did indeed, Senator Feingold, suspend
our presence in Khartoum in early 1996 precisely because of
concerns about threats to the security of our people at the
embassy and our mission. Part of that concern, frankly, was the
continued presence in Sudan of representatives of the terrorist
groups that we have mentioned to you today. The question about
when and under what circumstances we might resume our presence
I think is a broad question that relates not only to security
but also to policy. And it is something, I think, that our new
Secretary of State will have to decide in the context of our
overall relationship and its evolution in Sudan.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Moose. I will come back to
you in a moment.
Now, just briefly, Mr. McKune, to review, there are
currently seven countries on the terrorist list: Cuba, Iran,
Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Can you review with
us again which sanctions are immediately applied upon
designation of these countries on that list, and in the context
of that designation, are all seven countries treated the same?
I think we know the answer pretty well, but I would like to
just make that clear on the record.
Mr. McKune. The Export Administration Act curbs the sale of
dual-use items that could enhance a designated country's
military capability or its abilities to support acts of
terrorism, as well as provisions prohibiting economic
assistance, export of military equipment and GSP trade
treatment. On our U.S. income tax forms, U.S. individuals and
companies are denied any foreign income tax credits for doing
business in terrorist list countries.
We have sanctions against Sudan and other terrorist list
governments, including using our voice and vote against loans
or grants by international financial institutions. We are
prohibited from providing American economic assistance to
governments that provide economic aid or lethal military
equipment to designated State sponsors. That is the character
of our sanctions against all State sponsors.
Senator Feingold. Prior to the passage of the Anti-
Terrorism Act, what other laws imposed sanctions on these
groups of countries? And, in particular, was there a
distinction made with regard to Sudan and Syria from the rest
of the group in any of those circumstances?
Mr. McKune. Senator, my understanding of the distinction is
that it evolved because different countries were put on the
list at different times, under differing circumstances, and
legislation in effect, such as the Trading With the Enemy Act,
at those times varied. It is a historical fact. That is
essentially what it is.
There is also, apart from the historical fact, if you look
at the question of Sudan, the character of the reasons why it
was designated as a State sponsor, that is, the support it gave
to terrorist organizations. If you compare that to why Iran is
on the list, the evidence we have against Libyan support for
terrorism against U.S. interests, what evidence we have against
Iraq for its support of terrorism against U.S. interests, you
make that kind of close look at the evidence we have, there is
a different kind of evidence, if you will. They are all State
sponsors. We condemn them all. That is why they are on the
list.
It is a grave judgment, and we take it very seriously and
we follow it up very seriously. But there is not the same kind
of evidence, as I said in my statement, we have regarding
direct Sudanese Government activity and sponsorship of
terrorism, that we have against the countries I mentioned.
Senator Feingold. All right. Just a question in terms of
the way in which the designation as a terrorist country is
used, Mr. McKune. Has the administration ever used the
possibility of getting taken off the list as a diplomatic
carrot?
Mr. McKune. We have discussed with the Sudanese and with
other governments on the list from time to time what is
necessary to get off the list, how you are removed, how these
sanctions are removed. The Sudanese, at various times, in our
discussions with them, in which we have pressed them very hard
about this, have expressed some interest in knowing what is
necessary to do. I believe this may be part of the reason that
they have taken some tactical steps. But we have not been
satisfied.
Senator Feingold. Let me just confirm with Mr. Moose; that
is the case that this is used sometimes as a potential carrot?
Ambassador Moose. Well, very definitely. I recall, Senator
Feingold, that even before the final designation was made, we
had numerous conversations with the Sudanese Government and
their authorities, which signaled the fact that we were
intending to put them on the list.
Senator Feingold. Prior to the designation?
Ambassador Moose. Prior to the designation. Because of
their failure to respond to our repeated expressions of concern
about their practices. In essence, giving them an opportunity,
should they have chosen that opportunity, to signal to us that
they were intent on changing practices and policies that would
have kept them off the list.
Since then, we have indeed--they have, as Mr. McKune has
said, actually asked us, sought our advice as to what it would
take to get them off the list. We have been quite clear about
what our expectations are. And as Mr. McKune has said, we have
also been quite clear that the steps that they have taken to
date do not satisfy us with regard to the fundamental concern
of their support for terrorism.
Senator Feingold. I am beginning to wind up, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your generous time on this.
Let me just ask Mr. Newcomb, in the process of developing
the regulations for section 321, what type of contact did your
office have with congressional offices?
Mr. Newcomb. As in this program and other programs, we
worked closely with the State Department for foreign policy
guidance. We are the implementing office. With regard to the
contact with the Hill, we relied on the contact that the State
Department had made with the relevant Hill offices as far as
what was in the legislation and the legislative history.
I will say, we met on numerous occasions and exchanged
correspondence on the various issues involved in the
implementation of the legislation.
Senator Feingold. So substantial contacts?
Mr. Newcomb. We met three, four, five times, yes.
Senator Feingold. Did any of the congressional offices
contact you after the regulations were printed in the Federal
Register?
Mr. Newcomb. I can speak for myself, and they have not
contacted me. I believe that contacts were made with my office,
but I can certainly go back and check that and get something
for you for the record.
Senator Feingold. I would appreciate that.
Mr. Newcomb. OK, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Newcomb. A check with my staff revealed that about a
dozen calls came into this office requesting general
information on the regulations and how they might affect
Americans doing business in the Sudan.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Moose, is there evidence of Sudanese
involvement in the current conflict in Zaire?
Ambassador Moose. Senator, no, I cannot think of any
evidence offhand that would tie Sudan directly to the current
conflict in Zaire. The one exception I would make is that it
was known for some time before October or November of last year
that Sudan was supporting Ugandan insurgent groups, which were
operating from Zairian territory--operating from that
territory, essentially because the Zairian Government either
could not or would not exercise control over those groups.
So, to that extent, I think some of the actions that we
have seen by States like Uganda and Rwanda has been partly
motivated by their concern about threats posed to them from
Sudanese supported operations emanating from Zaire.
Senator Feingold. Are you concerned at all about the role
Khartoum may play with respect to whatever post-Mobutu
government emerges from the current conflict in Zaire?
Ambassador Moose. We are concerned about a great many
things with respect to Zaire. But, at the moment, again, I
would say we have no evidence that the Sudanese are seeking to
exert a particular influence with respect to future
developments in Zaire. But that is something I think we would
be very vigilant about, were we to see any manifestation.
Senator Feingold. Finally, Mr. Chairman, for Mr. Moose.
One of the concerns about the exemption in the section 321
regulations is that one of the potential beneficiaries of the
exemption was an oil company. Mr. Moose, are you comfortable
with an American company conducting business in the oil
industry in the Sudan? Won't that type of activity provide the
regime with additional revenue with which to pursue its war in
the south?
Ambassador Moose. I think it is a legitimate concern, that
we need to be concerned about what commercial or other
activities might contribute to the capacity of the Sudanese
Government to carry out and continue its support for
international terrorism. I think the issue that we were
confronted with--and I can say I have met several times with
senior representatives of Occidental Oil--I will say to you
that at no time did this particular issue of section 321 ever--
was that issue ever raised in our conversations. No particular
treatment was sought by the representatives of Occidental Oil
and none was granted.
I think the issue, again, goes back to what was the
interpretation of the legislation, what did we think was
required by it with respect to Sudan. And it was the view, on
the advice of our lawyers and others who followed this
legislation, that it did not impose a restriction on such
commercial activities.
I will add, however, that in all of our conversations with
Occidental Oil, we pointed out to them that our relationship
with Sudan was a difficult one at best, that there was a
certain likelihood that that relationship would continue to be
difficult, and might even deteriorate. And that, in those
circumstances, there could be no assurances that the U.S.
Government would not, in the future, impose additional measures
or sanctions that might affect their ability to conduct
commercial operations in Sudan.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ashcroft. Thank you.
Mr. Newcomb, Senator Feingold was asking about the extent
to which you conferred with individuals on the Hill in the
promulgation of the regulation and after its promulgation. When
you said you had had many meetings, I was not clear whether you
were talking about meetings with the State Department, or
meetings with Members of Congress, or meetings with staff
members from the Members' offices. Could you clarify what you
meant when you said you had many meetings?
Mr. Newcomb. Yes, Senator. I had many meetings with the
State Department, who we had relied upon for foreign policy
guidance in this area, and were told that consultations did
take place with the State Department and the Hill. So I relied
on State.
Senator Ashcroft. Well, let me just ask you, and answer yes
or no, so I can get this clarified again. I thought he had
asked you whether you had meetings with people on the Hill. Did
you have meetings with Members of Congress?
Mr. Newcomb. No.
Senator Ashcroft. Did you have meetings with members of the
staff of Members of Congress?
Mr. Newcomb. I believe there may have been conversations
with people in my office with Members of Congress. I will go
back and check and clarify that as well.
Senator Ashcroft. But you relied mostly on what you
considered to be the contacts that the State Department was
having with Congress?
Mr. Newcomb. That is correct. And let me clarify that. In
the programs that we run, which I have mentioned--or some of
them--we routinely rely on foreign policy guidance with the
State Department in these areas.
Senator Ashcroft. All right. Mr. Moose, you said that the
terrorist bin Laden was expelled from Sudan. Is that your
belief, that he was expelled from Sudan?
Ambassador Moose. I will defer to my expert on the right,
Mr. McKune, but our understanding from the Sudanese Government
is that they claimed to have taken action to cause Mr. Osama
bin Laden to leave Sudan--so expulsion.
Senator Ashcroft. Are you aware of the statement of Hassan
Turabi that said:
I do not think that the matter was raised with him [Laden]
in such a direct manner. He is aware of the appreciation of
Sudan and those close to him for the things he has done and he
continues to do for Sudan. Many of them were frank with him.
They told him, if you prefer to remain in Sudan, nobody will
push you out. This is what they told him.
Are you aware of that statement?
Ambassador Moose. I have heard reference to that statement.
I cannot reconcile, Mr. Chairman, what the Sudanese Government
said to us and what Mr. Turabi is saying publicly in that
statement.
Senator Ashcroft. Would you agree that Mr. Turabi is the
most powerful person in regard to the policy of the Sudanese
Government?
Ambassador Moose. I certainly agree, Mr. Chairman, that his
influence has been preeminent in the course of this NIF-led
regime for the last 7 to 8 years.
Senator Ashcroft. So a preeminent influence meaning more
eminent than anybody's else influence?
Ambassador Moose. More eminent than anybody else's.
Senator Ashcroft. So that would be most powerful. Good,
that is just what I was wondering about.
I thought I heard you respond to Senator Feingold's
question about the so-called peace agreement--that you were
very skeptical of it.
Ambassador Moose. Indeed.
Senator Ashcroft. Do you believe that the peace agreement
includes the necessary parties to bring about a lasting peace?
Ambassador Moose. Certainly not, Mr. Chairman. Any
agreement, to be meaningful, is certainly going to have to
include the group that is well-recognized as having been the
principal southern opposition.
Senator Ashcroft. So you do not believe that the agreement
reflects the necessary parties, let alone the components of the
agreement?
Ambassador Moose. No, sir.
Senator Ashcroft. Do you feel that Sudan has become one of
the worst State sponsors of terrorism in the world?
Ambassador Moose. Mr. Chairman, I would say certainly it is
one of the worst. Let us put it this way: The reason we put it
on the list is precisely because we believe that it is an
egregious violator of international norms in support for
international terrorism. I would again say we are obliged to
make sometimes fine distinctions between the level, the extent,
the degree of such support, that there are distinctions among
the seven States that are currently on that list.
That said, the fact that they are on that list reflects our
view that their support for international terrorism is serious,
and that we take it seriously.
Senator Ashcroft. Is the State Department concerned about
international terrorism, or only about terrorist acts against
the United States?
Ambassador Moose. We are concerned about both, Mr.
Chairman. We have been very concerned not only about the
possibility of actions directed against citizens or properties
of the United States, we are also concerned about acts directed
against our friends and allies and acts that generally violate
international norms. That is why, again, we were in the lead in
supporting action in the U.N. Security Council following the
attempted assassination of President Mubarak in Addis Ababa in
1995. I will tell you that I was in Addis at the time of that
assassination attempt. That is why we are continuing to pursue
efforts in the international community, and particularly in the
Security Council, to apply further measures because of Sudan's
failure to comply with those earlier Security Council
resolutions.
Senator Ashcroft. To what extent was the policy of the
Department of State reflected in the regulation promulgated by
Treasury pursuant to section 321 of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996? Did you agree with what
Treasury eventually promulgated--and was it in accordance with
the wishes of the Department of State?
Ambassador Moose. The regulations prepared by Treasury, as
it was indicated earlier, were prepared on the advice and
recommendation of the Department of State.
Senator Ashcroft. So you recommended that policy?
Ambassador Moose. The Department of State, particularly the
lawyers and others who were required to interpret the intent of
section 321, made the recommendation to Treasury as to how to
interpret the law, and the regulations that were issued, I
think I would say, were a good faith effort on the part of
those involved to interpret the intent and the history of 321.
Senator Ashcroft. What I really wanted to find out is is
this the regulation you wanted.
Ambassador Moose. I will say first and foremost, Mr.
Chairman, we were not directly involved in--I was not directly
involved in interpreting that law. I would say also that yes,
indeed, that certainly what is reflected there is not
inconsistent with what we would wish.
Senator Ashcroft. Well, I have a question about it, and it
is this, that section 321 provides for sanctions against
individuals who do business with those countries supporting
international terrorism, and the regulation says that we limit
the prohibition for doing business with them to people who
would have a reasonable cause to believe that such business
would further terrorist acts in the United States. To the
untrained eye, perhaps mine, this looks like a vast disparity.
It looks like the intention of the Congress has been
narrowed from a concern about terrorism wherever it might exist
internationally to a concern only about terrorism in the United
States. You have just, I think quite appropriately, indicated
that we have concerns about terrorist acts against our friends.
I have concerns about terrorist acts against our enemies. I
think terrorism is an enemy of us all, wherever it exists. And
I do not understand why the State Department would recommend a
regulation which narrows--and maybe I am misreading this, so I
would be pleased to be corrected on this--narrows the intent of
Congress from concern about international terrorism to
something that just poses a risk of furthering terrorist acts
in the United States. Can you explain it? And I would invite
other members of the panel to help me understand that.
Ambassador Moose. Again, Mr. Chairman, I cannot profess
direct first-hand knowledge of the work that was done to
interpret the intent of the legislation.
Senator Ashcroft. I think I am clear on that, so we can all
agree that it is in the record that you do not have first-hand
knowledge. And if that means you cannot give me any
clarification, then we ought to move to see if someone can, but
I need to know if there is a reason why we are moving in that
direction.
Mr. McKune. Senator, let me offer a few comments.
Senator Ashcroft. Mr. McKune.
Mr. McKune. There is another provision of the law that
covers the aspect of fundraising in the United States for
terrorist groups or terrorist acts or terrorist organizations
outside the United States.
Senator Ashcroft. We are talking about business
transactions overseas, not fundraising in the U.S.
Mr. McKune. I am trying to point out that if you look at
the issue of section 321 from the perspective of dealing with
funds that may come from State sponsors, or organizations in
countries which are State sponsors, to organized terrorist acts
in the United States, that is an aspect of the problem, not the
entire problem.
Another part of the problem dealt with, if you look at the
other provisions of law, would cover opposite kinds of flows,
and there are, as I indicated earlier, a lot of other U.S.
statutes concerning State sponsors.
You have asked several times about what is the State
Department's view about fighting terrorism. We are part of the
U.S. Government interagency team that deals with the problem of
terrorism. We do not have a separate State Department agenda
regarding terrorism. We have the same view as the rest of the
U.S. Government.
Senator Ashcroft. It looks to me like you have a different
view than the Congress, and that is what I am trying to get at
here, because it looks to me like the Congress had an effort to
restrict business activity that might enhance international
terrorism, and when you eventually promulgate the regulation,
the provision applies only to terrorist acts in the United
States.
Mr. McKune. Well, Senator, we have tried to explain our
views about section 321. I do want to add that the State
Department conducts a vigorous worldwide counterterrorism
diplomacy campaign in which we focus attention on all of the
State sponsors with many governments, and the State Department
does this very actively.
Senator Ashcroft. Well, I would laud the State Department
for all the good things it does. I am trying to find out why it
narrowed in its regulation the intent of Congress to curtail
terrorism internationally to terrorist acts against the United
States. And I am sure we could spend a lot of time cataloguing
all the good things and good speeches that are made. If we do
not know why, I think we ought to say so. But is there a reason
why?
Ambassador Moose. Let me try that, Senator. Again, those
members of the Department of State who were responsible for
following this legislation were interacting with Members, the
drafters and others, of the legislation. There were numerous
communications between the State Department, the officials of
the State Department, and the drafters of the legislation at
the time. We communicated our views, our concerns, the
Department of State communicated its views with regard to that
legislation. And it was on the basis of all that communication
that our lawyers, along with the lawyers of Treasury, in good
faith, interpreted the law, section 321, as permitting this
kind of latitude.
The Department of State welcomed the addition of this
capacity, this tool, this instrument, as part of its policy to
deal with international terrorism. But as we understood, as our
lawyers and those of Treasury understood the legislative intent
and legislative history, they did not believe that that
provision required a full-scale imposition of blocking of all
financial transactions.
Senator Ashcroft. It just occurs to me what I am not asking
about is the scope of the imposition in terms of commercial
activities prohibited. What I am asking about is the scope of
the terrorism that would trigger the prohibition. And the scope
of the terrorism that triggers the prohibition in the
regulation is terrorism that would result--and I will just read
it--reasonable cause to believe that the transfer poses a risk
of furthering terrorist acts in the United States. That is the
scope of the trigger that you have put in the thing, and
basically you say you could do anything you want as long as it
does not pose a risk of increasing terrorism in the United
States. And for the life of me, I just have not been able to
find that in the language or the intent of Congress, which in
the provision says countries supporting international
terrorism.
Mr. Newcomb, it was your Agency that promulgated this
regulation. Do you have any light to shed on this?
Mr. Newcomb. Well, Senator, what I would say, first, our
lawyers did consult with the lawyers of the State Department.
We received a communication from the State Department as to how
foreign policy of this particular program on Syria and Sudan
both that this applies to. Following that communication we
developed regulations.
I think an important element here is that the regulations
and the statute do provide us jurisdiction for transactions
going from the United States to Syria and Sudan, and from Syria
and Sudan to the United States.
Now, with regard to the other five programs, we do have and
have had comprehensive economic embargo and sanctions programs
in place in some instances, like North Korea, back to as early
as 1950, Cuba in 1963, and so forth. So we have jurisdiction
where, for whatever reason, through a law enforcement reason,
intelligence reason, financial reason, banks call our office on
a daily basis to ask about a transaction which they think is
suspicious. ``Well, we have got something here from Syria or
Sudan, what do you think?''
We have active training programs that we work with
financial institutions. Since the promulgation of this act I
polled my staff, how often are we out there? We have had at
least 40 kinds of discussions with financial institutions. So
when we are aware that these activities are taking place they
are calling us, they are asking about us. We have routine
contact.
When there is reasonable cause to believe, notwithstanding
the fact that many of these transactions are generally
licensed, the key fact is we have jurisdiction to stop them if
we need to and if we have reason to do that. And of course, in
our routine work and activities with financial institutions,
they would do that based on a phone call. So if for whatever
reason we have a suspicion that is justified, we can stop a
financial transaction.
We have developed brochures. Financial institutions are on
alert. We have worked with the community to incorporate these
programs into the other programs that we administer.
Senator Ashcroft. I want to call on Senator Feingold. You
say that for whatever reason you can always stop a transaction.
It seems to me that the regulation you promulgated ties your
hands from using section 321 to stop transactions that relate
only to international terrorism. Because section 321 says
except as provided in regulation, you draft the regulation to
make a very narrow application of the law, which then curtails
your capacity to curtail terrorism, and I would like to know
why you did that.
Mr. McKune. Senator, I understand what you are saying.
Senator Ashcroft. Well, great. Good. Go right ahead.
Mr. McKune. Our understanding of the intent of the sponsor
of the legislation, according to a statement he made at the
time of introducing his amendment, was that it was to be used
to deal with a situation,
* * * where a terrorist organization, to be involved in the
United States in some terrorist activity, actually has some
American citizen, a recipient, bring into this country from a
terrorist State Government a certain amount of money that might
be used to further the cause of terrorist activities in the
United States.
This is our understanding of the purpose of the sponsor's
amendment.
Senator Ashcroft. Well, a statement of Representative
Schumer says,
I support the amendment, Mr. Chairman, for a simple reason.
I think it is wrong for anyone in the United States to
knowingly deal with a country that sponsors terrorism. Why
should we allow countries that sponsor such horrible acts as
blowing up our barracks or blasting our airliners out of the
sky to benefit from dealings with U.S. citizens? As I
understand the measure, it essentially ties together in one
place existing prohibitions that depend on a series of
executives acts. I want to salute the gentleman for doing it. I
think it is not controversial and I hope we can move the
amendment with alacrity.
And basically, I was interested in this: For blasting our
airliners out of the sky. The bomb on the Pan Am at Lockerbie,
is that a risk of furthering terrorist acts in the United
States?
I will answer the question. It is not. And I do not
understand why you would narrow the provision to not apply to
such terrorist acts.
I defer to my colleague.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it is
fair enough for the Chair to try to inquire into legislative
intent. Sometimes all of us are frustrated by a discrepancy
between what we intended and what was done by the
administration. Other times the intent is so unclear that it is
impossible for you to know. But in any event, apart from that
issue, I guess we need to think a little bit about the future
and whether or not this can be resolved at this point.
So, Mr. Chairman, I would just like to ask the
administration their view on Representative McCollum's proposed
legislation. Does the administration support legislation that
would sort of clarify this issue and resolve this issue?
Ambassador Moose. Senator Feingold, we are in the process
now of examining. We have not reached a position on Mr.
McCollum's new proposed legislation. I will say as a general
rule we would welcome additional authorities that would enable
the United States, the administration, to enhance its ability
to deal with terrorism.
I would say, if I might, as a general rule we would be a
little concerned about a particular piece of legislation that
tried to apply a one-size-fits-all response to all types and
forms and manifestations and sponsors of terrorism. I do think
if the objective here is to try to fashion policies that have
some reasonable prospect of dissuading or compelling
governments that do sponsor terrorism from ceasing and
desisting in that sponsorship, then there is a logical and
rational argument to be made for some degree of latitude
discretion flexibility in the way those instruments, those
implements, are used.
But as I said, we have not yet completed our review of the
particular piece of legislation in question, and we will be
prompt in our replies and our responses and our comments on
that legislation.
Senator Feingold. I have not yet completed my review,
either, and that is the kind of guidance I am looking for. I
would very much like to support his sort of effort, but I want
to be sure I am asking the right questions with regard to the
State Department's flexibility.
And also one other question: If the legislation had the
effect of treating Sudan and Syria in the same way as the other
five countries, could you speculate at all with regard to what
impact it might have in our relations with Syria and with
regard to the Middle East peace process? This is one of the
things I would like to know what aspects of it could have an
impact there.
Ambassador Moose. Senator, happily those are areas that
fall outside of my immediate area of responsibility and
jurisdiction, and I do not think it would be fair to my
colleagues back in the State Department to comment on that.
With regard to Sudan, though, I think one thing that we
would be concerned about are regulations, prohibitions on
financial or commercial transactions that, in addition to the
issues of diplomatic activity, might further complicate, make
more difficult, the efforts of humanitarian agencies to
continue to carry out their already very difficult missions in
the Sudan. I think that is one consideration that I would want
to look at very carefully as I was looking at any proposed
legislation.
Senator Feingold. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ashcroft. Ambassador Moose, in a related matter,
since we have talked about this regulation, can you tell us who
the officials were who developed this regulation, and did they
include White House involvement?
Ambassador Moose. Mr. Chairman, we can certainly provide
you with the names of the offices that were involved.
Essentially, it was the Office of Legal Affairs, our legal
advisors office, which routinely is asked to try to interpret
the history of legislation and the congressional intent.
Senator Ashcroft. Well, I would like to ask for that. I am
a little bit distressed about a number of things that, given
the way in which this was narrowed, I am concerned about a lack
of discretion in regard to these things. First, as the
regulations were being drafted the administration met with the
executives of Occidental Oil and Arakis Energy Corporation, the
Canadian oil company leading a joint venture of a Sudan oil
project; second, the oil venture in Sudan which would provide
that terrorist government with millions of dollars in
royalties, perhaps many more, was declared legal by
administration officials, under regulations for 321; third,
Mansour Ijaz, a Democratic fundraiser who boasts in the
Washington Post of his access to administration officials to
influence U.S. policy toward Sudan, was appointed by Arakis to
an advisory committee for the company. Arakis also appointed
Abdul Raman Hamdi to the advisory committee. Abdul Hamdi is a
former Finance Minister of Sudan and a Director of the Faisal
Islamic Bank of Saudi Arabia, an organization with alleged ties
to terrorists in Sudan and around the world.
Now, I would ask you to provide me with names of the
individuals who are involved in the drafting of the regulation,
including individuals outside the U.S. Government who had
involvement in the development of the regulations. And if there
are those who did, I would like to be informed at what point
they had their involvement and under what circumstances.
Ambassador Moose. Mr. Chairman, I can certainly repeat what
I said earlier. I have on numerous occasions met with
representatives of Occidental Petroleum, and I think that is a
normal part of my responsibility as the Secretary of State for
African Affairs and given their interests. I will repeat that
at no time in the course of those conversations did Occidental
Petroleum ever raise the issue of sections 321. At no time did
they seek any special treatment with regard to any provision of
law with respect to Sudan.
We did make it clear at that time that to the best of our
knowledge there was no legal prohibition on their continued
pursuit at that time of the commercial activity that they were
seeking pursuing in Sudan. But let me also reiterate----
Senator Ashcroft. But you wrote the law which would define
whether it was legal or illegal when you wrote the regulation
promulgated by Treasury.
Ambassador Moose. I also said to them quite categorically
that we could not offer any guarantee that our relationship
with Sudan would remain static or that there would not be a
further action by this administration or any other that would
not prohibit or somehow curtail these kinds of commercial
activities.
Senator Ashcroft. Do you, or any of you, know of any
involvement of Occidental Company or the Arakis Energy
Corporation and their involvement in the drafting of these
regulations that is different from that recounted by the
Ambassador?
Ambassador Moose. I know of no such involvement, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Newcomb. Mr. Chairman, I know of no such involvement.
Senator Ashcroft. Do you know of the involvement of any
outside individuals other than the Arakis Energy Corporation or
the Occidental Oil Company in the development of those
regulations, any other interested parties?
Mr. Newcomb. From our perspective, we had consultations
with the State Department, which is what I have said, and that
was it.
Mr. McKune. No, sir.
Senator Ashcroft. Was there any special directive from the
White House, or input on the development of the regulation?
Ambassador Moose. I know of no such directive or
communication of any kind from the White House.
Senator Ashcroft. Do any of you know of any?
[No response.]
Senator Ashcroft. I think even though the administration
declared the Occidental venture legal and wrote a regulation
which obviously facilitates that, I think what Congress had in
mind was kind of situation like Occidental which might result
in substantial funding flows to a State that sponsors
terrorism. And frankly, I want to invite you to contact me
about how you think we might be able to craft legislation that
would help us do what is necessary, because apparently 321 did
not get done what we thought was appropriate.
And I will be very clear with you from my perspective. I do
not want to do anything to improperly curtail the capacity of
the State Department or the U.S. Government to have the
flexibility which is necessary. But I have to be equally candid
and say to you that the exercise of the flexibility granted in
321 seems to have been substantially without rational basis,
and appears to be without explanation.
Ambassador Moose. Mr. Chairman, I would certainly welcome
an opportunity to discuss with you ways in which we could
together strengthen our ability to deal with the threat of
international terrorism; specifically, with regard to Sudan.
Senator Feingold. I just want to thank the panel very much
for their time.
Senator Ashcroft. I appreciate very much your willingness
to appear and to make your responses. Thank you very much.
It is my pleasure now to call the third panel, and I thank
them for their patience, and I want to thank my colleague,
Senator Feingold, for his patience. The third panel will be
composed of Mr. Ed Smith, who is one of the individuals whose
family was tragically affected by the World Trade Center
bombing, he now lives in California--we are grateful that he
would come; Mr. Roger Winter, the Director of the U.S.
Committee for Refugees, who has just returned from Africa and
will have a unique insight into the humanitarian challenges
facing Sudan; and Steven Emerson, who is a journalist who has
done extensive work on international terrorist networks. He is
a Middle East affairs expert and author of works on terrorism.
Mr. Emerson, I want to thank you for coming to the
committee, and I call upon you for your remarks.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Chairman, if I could interrupt, I am
about 20 minutes late already for a caucus, and certainly want
to stay and hear the testimony. I will be unable to stay and
ask questions, and I am wondering if I would be able to submit
some questions in writing.
Senator Ashcroft. Obviously, we would be very pleased to
have them.
Senator Feingold. I just want to apologize to the panel.
This is a very helpful hearing, and it is very important to me
that we have this hearing.
So I again want to thank the Chairman, since I will have to
leave, for the tremendous amount of time he has put into this
and for his willingness to have the hearing. I do appreciate
it.
Senator Ashcroft. Thank you. Mr. Emerson.
STATEMENT OF STEVEN EMERSON, MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS ANALYST,
AUTHOR AND TERRORISM EXPERT, WASHINGTON, DC.
Mr. Emerson. Thank you very much.
In 1993, a group of radical Islamic fundamentalists
attempted to blow up the World Trade Center; although the
conspirators failed to topple the building as planned, the
result was six dead Americans and more than 1,000 wounded. The
carnage from a successful attack would have killed anywhere
between 30,000 and 50,000 people.
Undeterred by a series of arrests, the same clique of
radical fundamentalists then planned an even more brutal series
of attacks. Their goal was to blow up tunnels and bridges
leading to New York City, tourist landmarks, and a Federal
building. Fortunately, their plans were interdicted by
successful FBI work and the assistance of an Egyptian Muslim
informant. A successful series of attacks would have produced
more deaths on American soil, as Judge Michael Mukasey noted in
sentencing the defendants, than any other event since the Civil
War.
The fact that these terrorists would conspire to cause the
deaths of tens of thousands of innocent civilians for the
perceived obligation of waging a Jihad (or holy war) against
the United States, forces hesitance in considering a policy
that might lessen or reduce the pressure on those regimes that
support, directly and indirectly, such mass murder.
Although Iran and the Sudan are equally culpable in
sponsoring and orchestrating terrorist attacks. Sudan, under
the leadership of Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, the head of the ruling
National Islamic Front Party and de facto chief, has been
responsible for helping to create the global Muslim brotherhood
movement and subsidiary organizations. It would be wrong and
self-deceiving to underestimate the success and guile of Dr.
Turabi in both building up a fledgling Muslim brotherhood
movement into an actual State, and, more critically, forging
alliances between myriad branches and leaders of radical Islam.
Dr. Turabi's popular Arab Islamic Conferences--three have been
held so far--feature the full panorama of a global militant
Islamic movement, including Islamic delegations and leaders not
only from the Middle East, but from Spain, France, Italy,
Argentina, Mexico, Canada, Kenya, and even the United States.
I think it is important, as you hold this very, very
significant hearing, that in the attempt to tighten the screws
on Sudan policy, that the intent of Congress in the 1996
antiterrorist legislation be fully upheld. That intent was to
pressure countries which actively support or encourage
international terrorism by denying them access to the full
American market and technology. Policy exemption cannot rely
upon distinctions between the evil government sector and the
private good sector of a foreign terrorist regime, because
these distinctions are thoroughly false. There is no doubt that
with regard to the Sudan it has played a key role, and
continues to play a key role, as a leader of radical Islamic
militant movements and groups throughout the Middle East and
throughout the world.
Indeed, in the World Trade Center bombing itself, there has
been little discussion, primarily because of the absence of
hard information, about who was truly responsible. In fact,
what officials have discovered, supported by evidence released
at trial and other evidence still not released, (including wire
transfers, telephone records, bank accounts, and personal
papers), was that the Jihad conspiracy was the unique product
of operational collaboration, an ad hoc network of radical
Islamic groups operating in the U.S. for the first time, the
Egyptian Jamat Islamiya, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, the Al-
Fuqra group, Hamas, and the National Islamic Front.
Interestingly, the only group whose organization is
directly tied to a government is the National Islamic Front, or
the Islamic Fundamentalist Party, which controls the Sudan
under the de facto leadership of Dr. Hassan al-Turabi. Indeed,
the evidence produced at the trial and other information
obtained by prosecutors shows that top officials of the
Sudanese regime not only had advance knowledge of the second
series of plots, but actively facilitated in their preparation.
Evidence contained in intelligence intercepts and other
types of surveillance suggests that the entire Sudanese mission
to the United Nations, as well as Sudanese diplomats in
Washington, DC., are controlled by the National Islamic Front.
As recently as 2 months ago, a major Sudanese intelligence
officer previously employed in Washington sought to enter the
United States under false documentation in order to expand
Sudan's terrorist network in the United States. Fortunately, he
was intercepted.
It is important to acknowledge what was discovered in the
trials of the World Trade Center bombing. Conversations
released in transcript form, sourced from wire taps and other
types of recorded conversations, reveal explicitly and
unequivocally that Saddiq Ali, the Sudanese ringleader of the
second series of plots, was very close to the Islamic
leadership in the Sudan. This evidence also points to his close
ties to the Sudan mission in New York, quote: ``When we hit the
United Nations it will teach the world--the world, not only
America. It will teach America a lesson.'' This declaration was
made with reference to plans to blow up the East River wing of
the U.N.
He told his fellow conspirators that he could obtain
critical help from the Sudanese mission at the U.N. to obtain
credentials, license plates, and ID cards required to drive an
explosive-laden Lincoln car into the parking garage adjacent to
the U.N. And when Saddiq Ali began to plan the assassination of
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, it was the Sudanese mission
in New York that provided the conspirators with acutely
sensitive information about how to pierce President Mubarak's
security detail and transportation route to the Waldorf
Astoria, where the Egyptian President was scheduled to stay.
In a conversation taped by Ahmed Salem, and these tapes are
available, Mr. Ali informed his conspirators of the precise
route that Mr. Mubarak's U.S. Secret Service would be taking to
Manhattan. Asked by Mr. Salem where he got this information,
Mr. Ali responded, ``I get it from the highest level, from
people inside the Sudanese Embassy. My contact is the
Ambassador, brother.''
I should like to add that Mr. Ali was not the only Sudanese
connection to this terrorist plot. Another defendant is
Mohammed Saleh. This Yonkers gasoline operator was responsible
for providing the fuel for the incendiary brew, the explosive
agent. According to information obtained by Federal
investigators and other undisclosed material found on his
possession, Saleh is a Hamas leader in charge of training Hamas
terrorist recruits in the Sudan.
Mr. Saleh traveled in Sudan several times prior to his
involvement in the plan to oversee Hamas training exercises.
However, he has also revealed that he had obtained various
terrorist weapons in the Sudan, including guns and night vision
goggles, and ultimately smuggled them to Hamas terrorist squads
in the West Bank. Mr. Saleh's home in the Bronx was used as a
haven for known terrorists visiting the United States.
I'd like to request that the rest of my speech and
testimony be put into the record. Also, I would also like to
state my belief that your concentration on the intent of
Congress and the reasons for deviation in the interpretation of
section 321, focused on the core elements of this case.
Senator Ashcroft. Your speech, the entirety of your
remarks, written and oral statement, will be included in the
record. Thank you very much for your appearance here.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Emerson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Steven Emerson
Allah will spread terror in the infidel hearts, and cut their
necks up, and cut every finger of them [since] they stood up
against Allah and his Prophet and who stands against Allah and
his Prophet must realize that Allah is a strong punisher.
Recorded conversation of Siddiq Ali, Sudanese ringleader of
the plot to blow up New York tunnels, bridges and buildings in
mid-1993 following the World Trade Center bombing.
Imagine \1\ the horror of multiple car bombs--filled with a deadly
mix of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil--being detonated in the middle of
the day in the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels and the George Washington
Bridge, the three principal transportation arteries connecting the
island of Manhattan to New Jersey, where tens of thousands of commuters
travel each hour. Or, consider the bloody mayhem that would have
resulted in blowing up the United Nations Headquarters or Federal
Building at 26 Federal Plaza in downtown Manhattan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Steven Emerson is an author, analyst and investigator
specializing in the field of radical Islamic fundamentalist movements
and terrorist organizations. His is the Executive Producer of the
critically acclaimed documentary ``Jihad in America,'' which aired on
PBS in 1994. The recipient of numerous national prizes for his
investigations, Mr. Emerson is at work at present on a documentary
series on terrorism and is also completing a book. He frequently writes
for national periodicals and is the previous author of four books on
terrorism, the Middle East and U.S. counter-terrorist units.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1993, a group of radical Islamic fundamentalists tried to blow
up the World Trade Center, killing six Americans and wounding more than
one thousand. Although the conspirators failed to topple the building
as planned, the resulting carnage from a successful attack of the one
they intended would have killed and wounded anywhere between 30,000 to
50,000 people. Undeterred by a series of arrests, the clique of radical
fundamentalists then planned an even more brutal series of attacks,
this one designed to blow up tunnels and bridges leading to New York
City, tourist landmarks, and a federal building. Fortunately, the
attack was interdicted by successful FBI work and the courage of an
Egyptian Muslim informant.
Had the attack succeeded, the resulting slaughter would have caused
more deaths on American soil, as Judge Michael Mukasey noted in
sentencing the defendants, than any other event since the Civil War.
The fact that these terrorists would willingly plan the deaths of tens
of thousands of innocent civilians for no other reason than the
perceived obligation of waging a Jihad, or holy war, against the United
States must give anyone pause before considering any policy that might
lessen the pressure on those regimes that support, directly or
indirectly, such mass murder.
Today, as this congressional panel considers the role of Sudan in
the arena of world terrorism, it is important that we look at the
evidence unclouded by questions of political correctness, unobscured by
the deception of disingenuous moderate sounding language, and
untethered to vested commercial or political considerations that
somehow always insidiously creep into the formation of counterterrorist
policy.
There can be no denying that Sudan plays a pivotal role in the
worldwide operations of militant Islamic groups bent on imposing the
Sha'aria--the body of Islamic law--and confronting through murderous
violence any regime or institution that stands in its way. Sudan,
arguably the largest terrorist camp in the world, has become a central
player in supporting, sponsoring and enhancing radical terrorist groups
that have carried out--or at least tried to carry out--the most
horrific violence that the world has witnessed in decades. A veritable
``Murder Incorporated,'' Sudan has been directly tied to the entire
spectrum of radical Islamic violence that has plagued not only the
Middle East but the West as well. Unless some type of brakes are
forcibly applied to the spinning vortex of terrorism emanating from the
Sudan, the attacks on our friends and on ourselves will only continue.
And as low-tech and low-cost weapons and agents of mass destruction,
such as poison gas and bacteria, become more accessible to all
terrorists worldwide, it ought not come as a surprise the day these
weapons are finally used . . . against the United States.
Just look at Sudan's record thus far. To pick at random: Suicide
bombings in Israel. The attempted assassination of the Egyptian
President. A brutal military campaign of near genocidal proportions
against the black non-Muslim tribal minorities in southern Sudan.
Attacks on American Forces in Somalia. Sponsorship of the most ruthless
terrorist financier in the world today, Osama Bin Laden, who in turn is
linked to the World Trade Center conspiracy and two acts of carnage in
Saudi Arabia against American forces. Sponsorship and hosting of
unparalleled get-togethers of the most militant Islamic terrorist
leaders in the world today, including those that have planned the
murder of hundreds of Americans, not to mention Jews and Arabs deemed
to be ``infidels'' or ``enemies of Islam.'' Training camps for more
than a dozen terrorist organizations whose raison d'Etre is to kill
infidels, Christians, Jews and secular and moderate Muslims. Basing
privileges for the Iranian Navy. Training camps for Iranian
Revolutionary Guards, who in turn have trained street militias called
the Popular Defense Forces who carry out vigilante violence. Use of the
Sudanese diplomatic pouch to transport explosives. Support of terrorist
attacks in Ethiopia. And even direct support for, advance knowledge of
and critical involvement with the second series of planned terrorist
attacks in Manhattan following the World Trade Center bombing designed
to kill tens of thousands of American civilians.
Although Iran is as equally culpable as the Sudan in sponsoring and
orchestrating terrorist attacks internationally, what makes Sudan stand
out has been the marked success of Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, the head of
the ruling National Islamic Front party and de facto chief, in creating
a regime solely dedicated to supporting the global Muslim Brotherhood
movement and subsidiary organizations, all of which are Sunni. It would
be wrong and self-deceiving to underestimate the success and guile of
Dr. Turabi in not only building up a fledgling Muslim Brotherhood
movement into an actual State, but in critically forging alliances
between the myriad branches and leaders of radical Islam. Dr. Turabi's
Popular Arab Islamic Conferences--three have been held thus far--are
unprecedented conferences featuring representation of the full panorama
of the global Islamic movement, including Islamic delegations and
leaders from not only throughout the Middle East but from Spain,
France, Italy, Argentina, Mexico, Canada, Kenya and the United States--
and even Arab and Christian left-wing nationalists.
Apologists and supporters of Dr. Turabi and Sudan like to claim
that Sudan is being picked on only because of its Islamic identity. For
example, a militant Washington D.C. headquartered Islamic organization
called the Council on American Islamic Relations (known as CAIR)--which
falsely hides as an organization dedicated to preserving Muslim ``civil
rights''--wrote a letter to the Atlantic Monthly magazine in response
to an earlier article (``Turabi's Law'' by William Langewiesche,
Atlantic Monthly, August 1994) which exposed in chilling detail the
totalitarian religious code of law imposed by Sudanese leader Turabi
according to his extremist interpretation of Islam. In his response
(Atlantic Monthly, November 1994), Mr. Hooper attacked the author of
the article for making ``many negative assertions about Islam,
Sha'riah, Sudan and Hassan al-Turabi,'' denied the existence of
Sudanese secret police, and criticized the article as having ``merely
rehashed Western cliches about `fundamentalism' and `Islamic
radicalism' [while] ignor[ing] nonIslamic causes of Sudan's turmoil.''
``Non-Islamic causes of Sudan's turmoil?'' This is nothing but
unvarnished apologia for the terrorist regime of Sudan. Sudan's current
turmoil was brought on by only one regime--the Sudanese government
itself. Its support of terrorism, its authoritarian Islamic
dictatorship, its war against non-Muslims and its exhortations for
other militants to carry out a worldwide Jihad. To claim that these
factors are fabricated by the West is in reality a blatant effort to
render Sudan--and the Islamic radical movements it supports--immune
from any criticism. It is the same argument that Sheik Omar Abdul
Rahman, mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing conspiracy, used
in decrying his conviction as tantamount to a ``war on Islam.'' And it
is the same argument used by Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorists in
justifying their murderous suicidal rampages against defenseless
Israeli children and women. And it is the same argument used by the
World Trade Center conspirators in justifying their original attack on
the United States as a need to avenge the United States ``conspiracy
against Islam.''
To be sure, there are also non-Muslim apologists for Sudan. In
1993, when the Sudan was placed on the State Department list of
countries supporting terrorism, former President Jimmy Carter expressed
his disdain for the State Department decision, ``They declared that
Sudan was a terrorist training center, I think without proof . . . In
fact, when I later asked an assistant secretary of state he said they
did not have proof, but there were strong allegation . . . I think
there is too much of an inclination in this country to look at Muslims
as inherently terrorist or inherently against the West . . . I don't
see that when I meet with these people.'' (Reuters Financial Service,
September 13, 1993)
Well, despite what Mr. Carter is told by the urbane and British and
French educated Hassan Al-Turabi--he has a doctorate from the Sorbonne
and has also studied in London--Mr. Carter seems to believe that
militants have to carry automatic weapons, wear scruffy beards and
openly chant ``Death to America'' before they can qualify as
terrorists. In fact, the danger represented by Dr. Turabi is that he
speaks one, very soothing language to people like Mr. Carter and
another more revealing language when talking to his own. The focus on
the Sudan as a terrorist supporting nation has nothing to do with
picking on Islam; that would be the equivalent of saying that focusing
on the Klu Klux Klan as a racist and extremist movement is picking on
Christianity or focusing on radical Jewish fundamentalists is picking
on Judaism. Cuba and North Korea--two States that are decidedly not
Islamic--were placed on the list of nations supporting terrorism
precisely because of their support for international terrorism. Indeed,
to suggest that Sudan is being unfairly accused of terrorism merely
because of its Islamic identity is an affront to the vast majority of
the Muslim population that forswears and disavows any support for
terrorism or violence.
The hearing today is not about Islam but about the policies of a
rogue regime and how the United States should formulate and implement
its counter-terrorist policies to safeguard its vital national security
interests. If the intent of Congress in the 1996 anti-terrorist
legislation and in earlier Congressionally-directed initiatives was to
pressure countries which actively support or encourage international
terrorism by denying them full access to the American market as well as
to American technology, then any exemptions to this policy predicated
on the notion that such trade is determined ``not to have an impact on
any potential act of terrorism'' is a meaningless and unjustified
exemption. Regimes which support terror--whether they pull the trigger
or pay others to pull the trigger--cannot be compartmentalized into an
``evil'' government sector and a private ``good'' sector. While not
everyone living in a terrorist-regime necessarily supports terrorism,
the regime itself is the ultimate beneficiary of any increased trade
and technology. When dealing with totalitarian terrorist-supporting
regimes, any policy that can claim to substantively differentiate
between trade that has no impact on terrorism and that which has an
impact on terrorism is an illusion. While dollars may accrue to
exporters in the short term by exploiting the unintended exemption, the
long term injury to American interests by continuing to build up a
terrorist infrastructure to be used against the West is not only
incalculable, but unfathomable in the belief that policymakers at the
State Department would accept it.
With regard to the Sudan, there can no doubt about the role it
played in the series of planned terrorist strikes against the United
States right here in the U.S. backyard. Though the principal leader of
the bombing campaign, Egyptian Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman was convicted
for his role in authorizing the bombing campaign as part of the radical
Islamic Jihad against the West, a final accounting of the organizations
and powers behind the bombing has never been concluded because of the
absence of hard evidence. More than four years after the attack and
foiled conspiracy, many questions still linger, such as the extent of
other's involvement, both here and abroad, in the conspiracy and in the
master planning of the terrorist campaign. Speculation and unconfirmed
assertions have been made about possible Iraqi or Iranian sponsorship
but according to both FBI, Justice Department officials and CIA
officials, there has been no evidence whatsoever that either country
was involved in the conspiracy. In fact, the involvement of both
countries has been all but ruled out in internal FBI and CIA reports.
However, what officials have discovered, supported by evidence
released at trial and other evidence still not released, including wire
transfers, telephone records, bank accounts and personal papers, was
that the Jihad conspiracy was the unique product of operational
collaboration by an ad hoc network of radical Islamic organizations
operating in the United States who joined forces in a collective
terrorist campaign: The Egyptian Jamat Islamiya, the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad, the Al-Fugra organization, Hamas and the National
Islamic Salvation Front or NIF. The collaboration of these radical
Islamic groups represented an unprecedented network of loosely
affiliated groups that previously had never united before on such a
grandiose operational scale. Interestingly, the only group in the
conspiracy whose organization was directly tied to a government was the
National Islamic Front or NIF, the Islamic fundamentalist party which
runs the Sudan under the de facto leadership of Dr. Hassan al Turabi.
Indeed, the evidence produced at the trial and other information
obtained by federal law enforcement and intelligence agents
unambiguously showed that top officials of the Sudanese regime not only
knew in advance of the second series of bombing plots but actively
facilitated in the preparation of the plot. Two Sudanese diplomats in
New York, Ahmed Yousef Mohammed and Siraj Yousef, were later declared
persona non grata in 1996 and ordered out of the United States. But the
evidence, contained in intelligence intercepts and other types of
surveillance, suggests that the entire Sudanese Mission to the United
Nations, and the Sudanese diplomats in Washington, D.C. as well, are
thoroughly controlled by the National Islamic Salvation Front.
As recently as two months ago, a major Sudanese intelligence
officer, who once worked in Washington D.C. sought to enter the United
States under false documentation in order to expand the Sudanese
terrorist network in the United States on behalf of the National
Islamic Front. In Washington, a covert Sudanese diplomatic operative,
worked secretly out of the Washington offices of the America Muslim
Council--a Washington group that pretends to be moderate but actively
supports the Sudanese National Islamic Front, in addition to other
Islamic extremist groups--at night for almost a year, in order to
establish closer ties between Islamic groups in the United States and
members of their Muslim Brotherhood family in the Middle East.
Because of the need to protect sources and methods, the
intelligence community is frequently unable to produce the type of
physical evidence that is needed in a court of law. In the trials of
the World Trade Center defendants, however, actual conversations were
recorded in which the role of the Sudanese government was unequivocally
demonstrated. In those tapes, Siddiq Ali, a translator for the blind
Sheik and considered the Sudanese ringleader of the second series of
attempted bombings openly proclaimed that ``our relation is very, very,
very, very strong with the Sudanese government, and with the Islamic
leaderships of Sudan, thanks to God that I have a direct contact with
the Islamic leaders themselves. (#307-T, May 16, 1993). In the same
conversation, Mr. Ali stated that his ties are so close to Sudanese
officials in the U.S., that he could walk right into the office of the
Sudanese Ambassador to the United Nations, the Sudanese Consul and the
Vice Consul.
``When we hit the United Nations, it will teach the world, the
world, not only America a lesson,'' Mr. Ali declared in revealing a
plan to blow up the East River wing of the United Nations Headquarters
in Manhattan. Mr. Ali told his fellow conspirators that he could obtain
critical help from the Sudanese mission at the United Nations to get
credentials, license plates and id cards to enable them to drive an
explosives laden Lincoln into the parking garage adjacent to the United
Nations. The Sudanese officials were aware of the plan to destroy the
U.N., Ali stated.
And when Siddiq Ali began to conspire to assassinate Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak, who was scheduled to visit New York City that
spring, it was the Sudanese Mission in New York that provided Mr. Ali
with acutely sensitive information about how to pierce President
Mubarak's security detail and transportation route to the Waldorf
Astoria, where the Egyptian President was scheduled to stay. In
chilling detail, Mr. Ali--in a conversation taped by Emad Salem--told
his co-conspirators the exact route of Mr. Mubarak's U.S. Secret
Service detail to be used in transporting him to Manhattan, even
specifying the exact car in the police motorcade in which Mubarak would
be sitting. Asked by Emad Salem where he got this information, Mr. Ali
responded, `` I get it from the highest level . . . from people inside
the [Sudanese] Embassy . . . My contact is the Ambassador, brother.''
Mr. Ali was not the only Sudanese connection to the terrorist plot.
Another defendant, Mohammed Saleh, a Yonkers gasoline station operator
who was to provide the fuel for the incendiary brew that was to serve
as the explosive agent, according to information obtained by federal
investigators and by papers found on his possession, was a Hamas leader
who was in charge of training Hamas terrorist recruits in the Sudan.
Not only had Mr. Saleh traveled to the Sudan several times prior to his
involvement in the plot to oversee several Hamas training exercises,
but he also revealed that he had obtained various terrorist weapons in
the Sudan--including guns and night-vision goggles--and ultimately
smuggled them to Hamas squads in the West Bank. Mr. Saleh's home in the
Bronx was used as a haven for known terrorists visiting the United
States, including Jordanian militant Ahmed Noufal who has been directly
involved in sponsoring and organizing Hamas terrorist attacks against
Israeli civilians. (Significantly, Mr. Saleh had organizational ties to
Islamic militant front groups, including Mounazamat al-Da'waw al-
Islamiya, a Sudanese headquartered Islamic religious group which used
its protected religious status to promote and spread militant Islam
around the world, including the United States. Mr. Saleh also
participated in the radical Islamic conference in Oklahoma City in
December 1992 which was sponsored by a militant group called the Muslim
Arab Youth Association in concert with the Islamic Association for
Palestine, another U.S. Hamas front group.)
Mr. Turabi assumed control of the Sudan after a coup d'etat in
1989. As de facto ruler of the Sudan, Mr. Turabi has transformed this
nation into one of the largest militant Islamic terrorist camps in the
world today, hosting, sponsoring and training nearly every radical
organization and leader, including:
Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman, the militant blind Egyptian cleric
convicted in the World Trade Center bombing conspiracy trial.
In 1990, the Sheik succeeded in entering the United States from
the Sudan, which had offered him permanent residence following
the anti-Soviet Jihad victory in Afghanistan by the mujahideen.
Sheik Abdul Rahman declined the honor, preferring to manipulate
the strings of Jihad from the perceived safety of his residence
in the heart of the Great Satan itself.
Training and sanctuary for the assassins who attempted but
failed in their brazen assassination effort of Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak on June 26, 1995 in Addis Ababa. The
well-stocked killers--possessing rocket grenade launchers,
anti-tank missiles, explosives and automatic weapons--failed
only because of the tardiness of Mubarak's motorcade. Credit
for the attempt was claimed by the Jamat Islamiya, whose
members had been given training and whose extradition was
blocked by Dr. Turabi. In September 1995, the Organization of
African Unity condemned Sudan for its support of the attack and
called upon the regime to turn over the three terrorists wanted
in the attack. Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin openly
declared that Sudan had used diplomatic cover to smuggle the
weapons and explosives to Ethiopia.
Sponsorship of extraordinary conferences of the world's most
violently anti-American Islamic fundamentalist leaders, with a
smattering of residual Arab Christian leftists who share the
same anti-U.S. hatred.
Headquarters and training camp for the Palestine Islamic
Jihad, a militant Palestinian group that specializes in
dismembering and mutilating its victims. Mr. Turabi not only
gave diplomatic passports to the leaders of Islamic Jihad, such
as the Fathi Shekaki (killed in Malta in October 1995) and
Sheik Abdul Azziz Odeh, but funneled Iranian funds to the
terrorist group and helped Islamic Jihad terrorists make their
way back to Israel to carry out specific terrorist operations.
Training camps and safehaven facilities for Hamas, Algerian
Islamic Salvation Army fighters, Iranian Revolutionary Guards,
Gamat lslamiya and others. At present in the Sudan, half the
3000 Iranian Revolutionary Guards sent to Khartoum came from
Lebanon. Of these, more that 1000 were Lebanese Hizzbollah.
Among the sites of some of these camps are:
(1) the Al-Khalafiyya area, roughly 25 miles north of Khartoum
where Algerian Islamic Salvation Army and Armed Islamic Group members
have trained.
(2) the Akhil Al-Awliya, located on the banks of the Blue Nile,
south of Khartoum, where upwards--at any one time--of 500 Palestinians,
Syrians and Jordanians actively train.
(3) Al Mrihat, north of Um-Durman, where Egyptian members of the
Muslim Brotherhood, the Jamat Islamiya and the Vanguards train.
(4) Mukhayyamat Al-Mazari, northwest of Khartoum, serving as an
equal opportunity training center for all nationalities, including
Libyans, Tunisians, Palestinians, Syrians, Saudis, Lebanese,
Algerians--even several Americans are known to have passed through.
Although Dr. Turabi has demonstrated his generous hospitality to
all types of terrorists, the most significant guest that Dr. Turabi has
hosted was Osama Bin Laden, the wealthy Saudi expatriate militant who
single-handedly helped fund the Arab Muslim volunteers who migrated to
Afghanistan in the 1980's to carry out Jihad. Stripped of his Saudi
passport in 1991 and looking to expand the Jihad against the Western
infidel--following the victory against Soviet infidel--the Sudanese
government warmly welcomed Mr. Bin Laden into the Sudan where Mr. Bin
Laden succeeded in establishing a worldwide network of front companies,
Islamic charities and non-governmental organizations, and terrorist
recruitment centers to carry out attacks against American, Egyptian,
Israeli, Saudi and European targets. The companies set up by Mr. Bin
Laden with full Sudanese involvement and participation were critical in
helping the Sudan build up its transportation infrastructure, including
an airport in Port Sudan, roads and a port while at the same time
building up Bin Laden's wealth--he was given monopolistic control over
Sudanese agricultural exports and exclusive purchase rights over large
domains of farmland--together with Mr. Turabi's NIF cronies.
At the same time, Mr. Bin Laden sponsored the movement of nearly
2000 mujahideen from Afghanistan to the Sudan where they were
headquartered, under Bin Laden's largesse, in the expansion of the
Jihad battlefronts to other parts of the Middle East and to the West
itself. Mr. Bin Laden, who has openly called for a ``worldwide Jihad to
destroy the United States'' was afforded the opportunity to regroup,
establish a worldwide terrorist infrastructure--including cover
companies and radical Islamic groups in the United States itself--
during his very profitable and ``productive'' five year stay in the
Sudan. It is suspected by FBI and State Department officials that
during his stay under Sudan's protection, Mr. Bin Laden, beyond
directing or funding a host of terrorist attacks in the Middle East
against prowestern regimes, is connected financially to the World Trade
Center bombing, in particular the training and recruitment of a key
conspirator, Ramzi Yousef in the actual February 1993 bombing and the
aborted attacks on American airplanes in December 1994 in the
Philippines. There is mounting circumstantial evidence that Bin Laden
was directly connected, if not the ultimate sponsor, of the twin
attacks against U.S. Servicemen in Saudi Arabia in November 1995 and
June 1996, which killed more than 2 dozen Americans and wounded scores
of others. Bin Laden's departure from the Sudan in May 1996 back to
Afghanistan was a direct result of the mounting economic and diplomatic
pressure placed on the regime. His exit demonstrated that counter-
terrorist sanctions do work.
Senator Ashcroft. Mr. Smith, it is with a note of sympathy
that we welcome your testimony, and we thank you for your
willingness to come and share with us out of your very
troublesome experience.
STATEMENT OF ED SMITH, HAMILTON HALLMARK, WOODLAND HILLS,
CALIFORNIA
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, Senator
Feingold.
I came to Washington approximately 7 months ago to
participate in a ceremony held at Arlington National Cemetery
on the anniversary of the Beruit bombing. This ceremony was a
memorial for the victims of all terrorist acts that have been
committed against American citizens both home and abroad. That
day I spoke about how terrorism had progressed from an act
perpetrated overseas by foreign nationals to acts that have
struck America right here in its heartland. I said it that day,
and I will repeat today, we must do whatever it takes to stop
the killing and brutality perpetrated on innocent Americans.
As I looked over the crowd that day, there were victims
from the Beruit bombing, the Pan Am bombing over Lockerbie, the
World Trade Center, Dhahran, Riyadh, and other terrorist acts.
I experienced the pain first hand. As I looked out over the
crowd, there were spouses who had lost their partners, parents
that had lost children, and loved ones who had mourned the
dead.
I ask this committee to please help stop the senseless
killing and brutality of American people by passing legislation
to curb the threat of terrorism in the United States and abroad
against American citizens. Next year, when I come to Washington
for the memorial, I do not want to see any new faces filled
with the pain and suffering.
Thank you.
Senator Ashcroft. Roger Winter, the Director of the United
States Committee for Refugees, has just returned from Africa.
We welcome your testimony and your insight into the
humanitarian challenges that face the Sudan.
STATEMENT OF ROGER WINTER, DIRECTOR, U.S. COMMITTEE FOR
REFUGEES, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Winter. I would like to link the internal situation in
Sudan to its international terrorism, because what is going on
inside Sudan amounts to terrorism against the Sudanese people
by the NIF Government. But, first, I have to tell you, Mr.
Chairman, I have been coming up before this committee and the
comparable committee in the other body for the last 8 years,
and working in Sudan for the last 16 years. I started out as
one of these neutral humanitarian types that was seeking to
bind up the wounds of those people who were being victimized by
conflict in Sudan.
But I must say at this point in time I have very strong
views about the fact that we should not be talking about
containing what is happening at the hand of the Government of
Sudan. We should be talking about eliminating the Government of
Sudan. As it stands now, it is in the interests of the United
States, it is in the interests of the Sudanese people, it is in
the interests of the regional States contiguous to Sudan, that
the administration which has shown this track record of both
international and internal terrorism no longer be in a position
to be recognized as a sovereign government.
And I am here to tell you today that amongst all the States
that are the participants in this international terrorism
network or matrix, this is the one State in which the
possibility of fundamental change exists, and that is why I
would like to link my comments to the internal dynamics of
Sudan.
First of all, let me say my views are strong, because I was
exceedingly involved in Sudan at the time this government came
to power. Keep in mind they overthrew a democratically elected
government. Since then, there has been no true participatory
politics in Sudan. There are no parties that really function as
parties.
When we talk, as a number of people have done earlier
today, about a million and a half people dead because of the
actions of this government and the war that it has carried
forth, you need to understand, that a million and a half is a
heck of a lot larger number than the number of dead from Zaire,
from Bosnia, from Somalia all put together.
This is a human tragedy of a massive dimension. It is hard
to imagine what 2 or 3 million internally displaced and war-
affected people look like in south Sudan, but if you understand
there are only 4 or 5 million of them there, so you are talking
about 50 percent of the total population of south Sudan having
been war-affected and displaced. It is a very dramatic impact
that we are talking about.
The massive human rights abuses of this government have
been documented by my colleagues in the human rights sector as
clearly as could possibly be the case. Once it came to power,
it purged the universities, it purged the intellectuals, it
purged the labor unions, it purged the military, it eliminated
a free press.
Government forces have engaged in religious persecution. I
should point out not only the burning of Christian churches,
but they are not averse to destroying mosques in certain parts
of the country, such as the Nuba Mountains, because they
believe that the people who worship in those mosques do not
represent the right brand of Islam.
But what we have in particular in south Sudan is the loss
of an entire way of life, the loss of an entire generation of
young people. There is no possibility of restoring the lost
education which has produced people who know nothing about how
to function, other than by taking up arms to defend themselves,
because that is what they have had to do.
This government has consistently manipulated the
humanitarian relief efforts of the United Nations through
Operation Lifeline Sudan. It has consistently bombed civilian
populations, because it has a very tough time locating military
targets of the SPLA.
What they do is, they fly over in Antonovs, little two-prop
jobs, with bombs, and they roll them out the back door. They
roll them out on the only identifiable targets they have, which
are almost never military. They are markets, or they are camps
of internally displaced people. Those are the bulk of the
casualties that you get at the hands of this particular
government.
You may not know that they even bombed, on April 20 of this
year, the town of Yei, while American Secret Service personnel
were on the ground advancing what was expected to be a meeting
between former President Carter and the head of the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement, Dr. John Garang. Carter was going
there on a mission of peace.
The Government of Khartoum knew that, and their response
was to bomb the town.
I think all of these things, both the international
terrorism that we discussed previously and this internal
terrorism that I am talking about, are linked to the NIF
agenda. They are linked to the NIF agenda, which is to Islamize
and Arabize not only Sudan but also the region.
The mission as I believe it is seen in Khartoum, when it
comes to the regional States, is to eliminate, to destabilize
those States in the region that are pro-American, secular
governments. They have problems with the pro-American presence.
They have problems with the secular presence, and their focus
on Eritrea, their focus on Ethiopia, and their focus on Uganda
are very conscious.
Let me just give you one example. The Government of
Khartoum documentedly supports what is called the Lord's
Resistance Army in Northern Uganda. Now, the Lord's Resistance
Army is sometimes referred to as an extremist Christian sect.
It is not any variety of Christianity I know, because their
program amounts basically to violence against civilians,
civilians that are following the Government of Uganda in terms
of trying to reconstruct and promote development in that
society.
The LRA does not have a political program. They engage in
gratuitous violence like cutting off people's noses, cutting
off people's lips. You should see those people. That is the
kind of regional terrorism that this government that we are
talking about has promoted.
In my view, the threat that it represents to our allies in
the region, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, is a direct threat to
U.S. interests, and we ought to be responding accordingly.
Now, I said before that I think there is a little bit of
good news here, despite the fact that the State Department did
not seem to recognize it earlier, and that is that Sudan is the
one State that is highly vulnerable within the international
terrorist complex.
Iran is tough. Iraq is tough. Libya is tough. A lot of
these guys are tough. Sudan is not so tough, and the reason it
is not so tough is there is a massive effective internal
opposition to this government. There is armed warfare against
this government that is occurring day by day by day, and it is
succeeding on the ground.
The opposition is not just the Christian and animist south.
It is a coalition of forces under the umbrella of the National
Democratic Alliance that involves traditional Muslim
leadership, a variety of Muslim elements from the north in
league with the Sudan People's Liberation Army in the south,
and over the last year-and-a-half or so the tide has definitely
turned in the favor of these forces.
There are now four military fronts in Sudan. There is a
national Democratic Alliance Front, the so-called ``Eastern
Front'' which is between Port Sudan and Khartoum, which is the
most strategic part of Sudan that you can imagine, because all
of Khartoum's supplies come through Port Sudan. The economy of
Sudan is based on transiting that territory, and their oil
supplies and petrol and all of that are based on that.
There is a front further south in Upper Nile and southern
Blue Nile Province in the area of the dam at Damizine, which
provides 80 percent of the power supply for Khartoum.
There is the front that the SPLA operates in the Nuba
mountains, where ethnic cleansing or cultural cleansing is
going on at the hands of this government, and there is the
major front in the south.
I visited Yei, which fell to the SPLA about 8 or so weeks
ago, just last week, and all of the garrison towns between Yei
and the Ugandan border have all recently been taken by the
opposition. The SPLA has eliminated the West Nile Bank Front,
which is one of the terrorist organizations functioning within
Uganda.
What I am trying to tell you, Mr. Chairman, is that these
four fronts and this combined capacity of the Sudan People's
Liberation Army and the National Democratic Alliance colleague
forces represent a significant threat to the survival of this
government; and that being the case, it seems to me the
possibility of talking about not containing but making a
fundamental change in Sudan is realistically on the table.
We do not need Americans to do this. We do not need
American hardware to do this. There is a strong capacity inside
Sudan to do this. My view is that what we ought to do are the
following three things.
First of all, it is my view that we need to support that
internal opposition, to support the victims, the humanitarian
victims of the war in Sudan, and we need to support our allies
in the region. First of all, we need a clear policy. We do not
have a clear policy, Mr. Chairman. The U.S. Government does not
have a clear policy on Sudan.
Sudan in my view is an enemy State. It backed Saddam
Hussein in the Desert Storm war. It is engaged in the terrorism
that we talked about on the international level. It has engaged
in the terrorism I talked about on the internal level, but we
continue to send ambiguous kinds of signals about how we are
dealing with Sudan.
We talk about changing their behavior. Not likely, sir. As
I said, I have been testifying before this committee for at
least 8 years, and I have seen how they change their behavior
and how they change it back when it suits them, after we stop
looking seriously at them, and that has happened on any number
of occasions.
What must they do more than has already been acknowledged
in this hearing for us to begin to view them as an enemy State
worthy of our specific support to their opposition?
Second, we need to respond to the urgent humanitarian needs
of civilians in the south of Sudan. I mentioned the areas I
visited last week. These are areas that, now that they are free
of the heavy-handed Government of Sudan, thousands, 75,000 to
100,000 refuges that were formerly outside the country are
returning.
There is no food up there. This whole area is war-affected.
For refugees who are returning there will be months before they
can produce a crop. There is no food there now. People are
living off mangoes out of the trees, and that mango diet really
does not suffice.
But what we see, I tell you frankly, from the Sudan field
office of USAID that handles this area, based in Nairobi, is a
lack of energy and a lack of creativity. For example, that
office has drawn physical lines in the sand above which it will
not supply humanitarian assistance, and these lines fall far
short of where these returning refugees would like to go home
to begin to start their life again, to begin to become
productive and independent.
There is a lack of energy and a lack of creativity in USAID
on this, and Operation Lifeline Sudan, which somebody earlier
referred to as a unique effort to try to meet the needs of
civilians regardless of what war sector they were found in is
something that the Government in Khartoum long ago cutoff at
the knees and manipulates regularly.
So, for example, this Operation Lifeline Sudan, which our
Government provides resources to, is barred by the Government
in Khartoum from assisting civilians every time there is a
fight in a location and the territory winds up in the hands of
the SPLA.
So in Yei there are hospitals filled with war-wounded and
other desperate kinds of civilians. There is no food assistance
up there or medical assistance provided by the OLS, because the
Government of Khartoum does not allow it. We need to meet those
needs. There are ways to do that.
Third, last year in the report on the foreign operations
appropriation, the Congress--you spoke of one kind of intent
earlier. There was another intent stated fairly clearly, I
think, in the report on the foreign ops appropriation.
Basically what it did was, in both the area of disaster
assistance and in the area more particularly of development
assistance it says, ``the committee authorizes AID to use
development and disaster assistance funds for capacity building
purposes in areas of south Sudan outside the control of the
Government of Sudan.''
The clear interest of the Congress was to begin to draw
lines in the sand that demonstrated that the American people
and the American Government recognized the threat that the
Government in Khartoum represents, and to begin to concretely
side with its opposition and with its victims and with our own
regional allies. That frankly, in my view, is what we should
do.
I believe there is a convergence of interest on the part of
the United States, on the part of our regional allies, and on
the part of the Sudanese people to have that government no
longer be the Government of Sudan.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Winter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Roger Winter
Introduction
I am Roger Winter, director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees.
Thank you for conducting this hearing on ``Terrorism and Sudan'' and
for inviting me to testify.
Senator Ashcroft, I know this is the first hearing on Africa under
your leadership as Chairman of the African Affairs Subcommittee. I and
the U.S. Committee for Refugees staff will always be available to
provide you and your colleagues continued information, analysis, and
policy recommendations on conflict and humanitarian concerns in Africa.
The U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) is a nonprofit,
nongovernmental organization that regularly monitors and assesses the
plight of refugees and displaced people around the world. We have
defended the rights of refugees, displaced, and war-affected people for
39 years. To do that seriously, we regularly go on site in the midst of
war and conflict situations, documenting conditions, analyzing the
political environment, and offering informed policy recommendations. I
am pleased to have an opportunity to offer my perspective on Sudan at
this hearing.
Linking Sudan's International and Domestic Terrorism
Mr. Chairman, I returned three days ago from my most recent site
visit to southern Sudan. I met in the field with the leaders of the
rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). I visited several
locations in the south, including Yei, Maridi, and Kaya. I also spent
time in Uganda, which has hosted large numbers of Sudanese refugees,
has been bombed by Sudanese military planes, and has suffered egregious
rebel attacks supported by the regime in Khartoum.
As this testimony makes clear, I have strong views regarding the
conflict in Sudan and the role of the extremist National Islamic Front
(NIF) government there. I did not start out with such strong views. I
work for a humanitarian agency, and that orientation is the story of my
professional life. However, I have become particularly engaged on Sudan
over the years by the needs of the victims of conflict, and I have seen
that the destructive agenda pursued by the Government of Sudan has
tragic consequences:
More civilians have died unnecessarily in Sudan than all the
casualties of Somalia, Zaire, and Bosnia combined--about 1.5
million during the last decade. African Sudanese have the
status of 4th class citizens in their own country. They have
endured constant bombing of civilian concentrations in the
south--mostly markets and displaced persons camps.
The education of a whole generation of southern Sudanese,
and many northerners too, has been lost.
Literally millions of people have been uprooted from their
homes. An independent, productive way of life has been stolen
from them.
All of the above, not just this last item, are a consequence of an
NIF government agenda to impose a virulent fundamentalist ideology on
an unwilling populace, while a largely disinterested West watched.
Mr. Chairman, the role played by the NIF government in Sudan has
been overwhelmingly negative. I come to you today with an important
message, however:
It is my view that Sudan is the one state sponsoring terrorism in
today's world that holds realistic potential for fundamental change in
the near-term. That change is, in my view, achievable within this
calendar year. It will be a change produced by Sudanese themselves,
without direct involvement of U.S. capacity. Since the Sudan government
is so clearly a player in the world of international terrorism, it is
distinctly in the interest of the United States to see such political
change occur, and to encourage it.
An extraordinary but true story that has not received attention in
the American press summarizes the audacious lack of scruples exhibited
of the Sudan regime both toward the United States as well as toward
peace efforts inside Sudan. On April 20, Sudan government war planes
bombed the strategic town of Yei in south Sudan while four U.S. Secret
Service personnel were on the ground there preparing for the arrival of
former U.S. President Jimmy Carter. President Carter was scheduled to
visit Yei in an attempt to encourage Dr. John Garang, Commander-in-
Chief of the SPLA, to force a ``peace accord'' with the Sudan
government. The Sudan government knew of Carter's mission.
Why did the Khartoum regime commit this depraved act? The
government of Sudan is aware that its survival is now in question. I
can only speculate that, in its desperation, the NIF government
intended its bombs to kill Dr. Garang, and thereby decapitate armed
opposition to the government, even at the risk of injuring or killing
former President Carter. This outrageous act reveals the Sudan
government's incorrigible mindset: the intention of President Carter
was to seek an end to the war; the government response was to bomb.
Let's put this in its full perspective. To the best of my
knowledge, the last time a high foreign official seriously threatened
violence against a former American President was in April 1993, when
Iraq's Saddam Hussein planned to kill former President George Bush in
Kuwait. Our government bombed Iraq in response.
Mr. Chairman, I understand that the primary focus of this hearing
is the export of terrorism by Sudan's National Islamic Front rulers.
The U.S. government has placed Sudan on the list of countries that
sponsor international terrorism.
In my testimony, I would like to establish an important link--too
easily overlooked here in Washington--between the international
terrorism practiced by the Sudan government, and the terrorism it
perpetrates against its own people, as well as against its immediate
neighbors in Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. It is my belief that the
NIF regime's levels of terrorism--international, regional, and
domestic--are closely intertwined. They emanate from the same font of
ideological extremism, the same sense of impunity, and the same disdain
for international law and humanitarian principles at home and abroad.
Sudan's international terrorism starts at home.
It is my conclusion that the most effective way to counteract and
ultimately end the NIF's terrorism abroad is to react aggressively to
its domestic terrorism. We should support in nonlethal ways the Sudan
government's opposition and victims. That will hit the NIF where it
hurts. The international community's persistent failure to respond
forcefully to the Sudanese government's internal terrorism during the
last eight years has, in my view, reinforced the NIF's notion of
invulnerability and has perpetuated the regime's willingness to
continue terrorist acts regionally and internationally.
Fortunately, the tide of events inside Sudan has turned decisively
against the government of Sudan in the last year. This presents the
United States and the world with a real opportunity to see progress on
the anti-terrorism front.
Years of Domestic Terrorism
As director of USCR, I have been a close observer and often an
eyewitness of events in Sudan for 16 years. I first traveled to Sudan
in 1981 and have conducted multiple visits to southern Sudan almost
annually on behalf of USCR since 1988.
On June 30, 1989, an extremist government came to power by military
coup in order to prevent peace in Sudan. In the process, it overthrew a
democratically elected government. It came into power with the mission
to Islamicize and ``Arabize'' Sudan and the entire continent of Africa.
In this endeavor, it has forged strong links with Libya, Iran, and
Iraq, with violent extremists in Algeria and elsewhere, and depended on
a constant supply of Chinese arms.
Sudan's terrorism against its own people is all too clear. In eight
previous congressional hearings on Sudan at which I have testified
since 1989, I have depicted the Sudan government's program of famine,
human rights abuses, massive population displacement, and other scenes
of destruction against its internal opposition.
Consider the parallels between the Sudan government's international
terrorism and its domestic pogroms:
Internationally, Sudanese officials were allegedly linked to
plans to bomb prominent buildings in New York City.
Domestically, Sudanese military planes have regularly bombed
international relief operations as well as clearly marked sites
where needy southern Sudanese civilians have congregated for
assistance.
Internationally, the 1995 assassination attempt against
Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak received support from the NIF
regime, according to investigators. It created an international
uproar. Domestically, more than 1.3 million southern Sudanese
have died since 1983 as a direct result of civil war and a
range of repressive policies perpetrated by the Sudanese
government. This massive death toll--twice as large as previous
estimates--has been carefully documented in a 1993 USCR study,
``Quantifying Genocide in the Southern Sudan.''
Internationally, the U.S. government cites alleged Sudanese
government support and training for terrorist groups such as
Abu Nidal, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Domestically, the same NIF
regime has provided arms and training to local ethnic militia
that have attacked camps of defenseless displaced persons in
southern Sudan. These government-backed militia have
perpetrated egregious human rights abuses over the years. I
have seen the corpses and destroyed villages with my own eyes.
Internationally, the Sudan government regularly denies that
it harbors terrorists. Sudanese officials use the same bald-
faced stonewalling in an effort to hide their transgressions at
home. The Khartoum regime has regularly denied international
relief organizations access to populations needing emergency
assistance in the south and west. Sudanese officials have
expelled the International Committee of the Red Cross on a
number of occasions, once for more than a year.
In other words, the lethal tactics that Sudan's leaders apparently
use to threaten the United States and the rest of the world through
terrorism echo the ruthless tactics Sudan's leaders use daily to wreak
havoc on their own people.
The government of Sudan has consistently impeded international
efforts to provide humanitarian relief to needy Sudanese civilians. In
my testimony to Congress in past years, I have joined with other
congressional witnesses to urge innovative relief strategies by the
international humanitarian community and have pressed U.S. officials in
public and private to make Sudan a high foreign policy priority. I have
tried to emphasize that Sudanese government policies deliberately
target southern Sudanese citizens for violence and displacement. Even
in the capital, Khartoum, in plain view of international diplomats, NIF
policies of forcible relocation have attempted to push three quarters
of a million persons out of the city into destitute locations.
The Sudan government consistently views many of its own citizens as
``the enemy.'' Sudanese have suffered immensely from the NIF's
terrorism against its own people. In our annual written reports, USCR
has documented the dramatic increase in refugees and internal
displacement. In 1985--four years before the NIF seized power--USCR
reported that some 70,000 Sudanese were refugees due to Sudan's civil
war. In 1990--one year after the NIF seized control--USCR reported that
the number of Sudanese refugees had risen to a half-million, plus some
4 million or more internally displaced and war-affected persons. By
1995, the number of uprooted Sudanese remained approximately 4.5
million, according to USCR estimates.
The Regional Threat
Mr. Chairman, in your review of Sudan's international terrorism, I
urge you to consider the destabilization it has inflicted on its own
neighbors. The government of Sudan has been actively engaged in
undermining secular, pro-American governments in the Horn of Africa.
Eritrea
Reports indicate that the NIF regime has been assisting at least
two Eritrean rebel groups: The Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and the
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), led by Abdalla Idris. The NIF
reportedly provides material support and facilities for training to the
EIJ. In late 1994, Eritrean government forces killed dozens of
Sudanese-backed Jihad militants inside Eritrea, and captured several
others. The Sudan-based Jihad is believed responsible for placing
dozens of landmines and for conducting terrorist attacks inside Eritrea
since late 1996.
Eritrea severed diplomatic relations with Sudan and invited
Sudanese opposition groups to establish offices in Asmara, the Eritrean
capital, in retaliation for the NIF's hostile actions. Sudanese
officials point to Eritrea's support for a new coalition of Sudanese
groups mounting an armed resistance to the Khartoum regime and
criticizes the Eritrean government for handing over the Sudanese
embassy building in Asmara to Sudanese opposition groups.
Ethiopia
Khartoum is also providing support to several Ethiopian opposition
groups, according to press reports and sources in the region. The NIF
regime provides financial and material support to the Islamic
fundamentalist group, el-Itahad and to the Islamic Front for the
Liberation of Oromia (IFLO). The Somalia/Ethiopia-based el-Itahad has
claimed responsibility for terrorist hotel bombings in the Ethiopian
capital last year. El-Itahad is also responsible for the attempted
assassination of the Ethiopian Transportation and Communications
Minister last year. El-Itahad bases along the Ethiopia-Somalia border
are being used by international terrorists as safe haven.
In response to these provocations, Ethiopian forces took pre-
emptive measures inside Somalia, attacking these training camps twice
last year. The attacks captured many el-Itahad members, as well as
members of extremist groups from the Middle East.
Uganda
A bizarre extremist ``Christian'' group, the Lord's Resistance Army
(LRA), operating out of southern Sudan with the support of the Sudanese
army, has terrorized innocent civilians in northern Uganda for several
years. The NIF government arms, trains, and protects the LRA and other
anti-Ugandan government groups in an effort to oust the government of
Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, viewed as pro-American by the NIF
regime. The situation in northern Uganda is increasingly unstable, and
there is concern for widespread instability in the country. The United
States has declared northern Uganda a ``disaster zone.''
The Sudan government also backs the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), an
armed group operating along the Zaire-Uganda border to destabilize
Uganda. A third Ugandan rebel group, a shadowy group known as the
Allied Democratic Forces, also operates from Zaire and has raided
southern Uganda in recent months. Some analysts have alleged that this
third rebel group has received backing from the Sudan government.
Sudan's NIF regime and some observers have maintained that the
Ugandan government supports the SPLA in southern Sudan and allows use
of Ugandan territory for military purposes.
Mr. Chairman, too often outsiders assume that instability and
violence in this region of Africa are endemic, as if they were part of
the natural disorder. In fact, many of these insurgencies appear to
have a guiding hand stretching back to the NIF regime in Khartoum.
Current Military/Political Situation
The virulent and expansionist extremism of the NIF government has
caused northern oppositionists and the SPLA to collaborate in seeking
the government's ouster under the umbrella of the National Democratic
Alliance (NDA). The emergence of the NDA is critical because it defuses
the NIF government's major rallying cry: that Islam in Sudan is under
attack by secularists and the West. The northern opposition forces are
all Muslim and include the traditional and very conservative Islamic
leadership, which claims the loyalties of much of Sudan's Muslim
population.
In January 1997, the NDA launched a military offensive in territory
far more strategic to Khartoum than the south. This initiative--the
``Eastern Front''--has the potential for shutting down Khartoum's vital
pipeline and corridor to the sea. Combined with NDA military fronts in
Sudan's Upper Nile and Blue Nile provinces (threatening a dam that
supplies 80 percent of Sudan's electrical power), SPLA rebel activity
in central Sudan's Nuba Mountains region, and a strong SPLA offensive
in the south generally, the NIF government finds itself confronted by a
major strategic dilemma. For the first time, the government faces
military challenges on four fronts. Never in its existence has it
confronted such a direct threat to its own survival.
In the past two weeks, I have conducted a site visit to southern
Sudan along the Uganda and Zaire borders, where the SPLA launched an
offensive in March. Based on what I saw and interviews I conducted on
the ground, it is clear that the government has suffered major losses
from north of Yei to the border. Prior to March, government forces were
stationed at garrisons spaced every five miles or so, coupled with so-
called ``peace villages'' that contained local civilians forced to live
there in part to serve as partial human shields for government troops.
Since March, a half-dozen of the government troop garrisons have been
overrun by the SPLA, along with all the major towns near the border. I
saw mountains of captured munitions, a destroyed column of tanks and
military vehicles stretching perhaps a mile-and-a-half, tanks burned
out, and towns such as Kaya with almost no building unscathed. The
headquarters of the Ugandan rebel West Nile Bank Front was one of the
locations captured by the SPLA.
I interviewed captured Sudan government soldiers, including a
senior officer who confirmed the great significance of the government's
losses. While I was meeting with Dr. Garang on May 1, an incoming radio
message stated that Rumbek had fallen. Days later, the town of Tonj
fell to the SPLA. In short, the SPLA is closing in on Juba, the vitally
important capital of southern Sudan, and is now only about forty miles
away.
During this site visit, I conducted long discussions with the SPLA
leadership about the future. Dr. Garang is more relaxed than I have
ever seen him. He expects that the combined capacity of the SPLA and
its NDA colleagues will cause the government to fall by autumn. I share
the view that this is likely.
Current Humanitarian Situation
Mr. Chairman, you have indicated that you want this hearing to
convey what terrorism looks like up close, to convey the human faces of
terrorism victims. During my many trips to southern Sudan during the
past 16 years, I have unfortunately witnessed the results of the
terrorism inflicted by the government of Sudan on its own people:
torched towns, empty fields, butchered corpses, terrified families. If
you or your colleagues ever care to see our archive of photos and
videos, we can make it available to you. It can be grisly viewing.
As I indicated earlier, more than 1.3 million southern Sudanese
perished during 1983-93 due to the civil war and policies of Sudan's
government. This means that at least one in five southern Sudanese have
died of these causes. This may well be a conservative estimate, because
it does not include the 25,000 or more rebel soldiers killed in combat,
nor does it include relocated southerners who died in two famines in
northern Sudan. USCR's research suggests that 80 percent of southern
Sudan's estimated 5 million population have been displaced at some time
during the past 16 years. Southern Sudan was impoverished and isolated
even before the civil war. Humanitarian conditions have only grown
worse under the NIF regime.
It is important to understand that innocent civilians are a primary
target in this war. This many people did not die accidently in
``crossfires.'' Rebels and government forces alike have committed
atrocities, to be sure, but there is no doubt that the government bears
the bulk of the responsibility. As a result of the war, many people
lack the land or dependable security to farm. During most years,
malnutrition and disease are pervasive, including measles, malaria,
tuberculosis, and other afflictions. The war and restrictive NIF
policies have impeded relief efforts to many locations. The regime uses
food as a weapon. A senior Sudan official told me face-to-face in late
1989--several months after the NIF came to power--that the government's
would unabashedly manipulate relief programs to advance military
strategy. They have done exactly that.
The situation remains grim in many places, Mr. Chairman. But there
is a change that was evident in my recent site visit. Military
successes by Sudanese rebels this year have enabled up to 75,000
Sudanese refugees to repatriate from Uganda during the past two months.
Two major refugee sites in northern Uganda are now virtually empty.
About 120,000 refugees remain in Uganda at other locations, however,
but will repatriate if, as expected, the SPLA advance continues.
Many of the new returnees have been uprooted for eight years. Some
have managed to return to their homes, but many others have congregated
at existing camps for displaced Sudanese, where they hope to receive
humanitarian assistance while they assess security conditions in their
home areas. Current food stocks operated by the World Food Program
(WFP) are dangerously low, however. In addition to the returning
refugees, some 2.1 million Sudanese require at least partial food
assistance this year, according to WFP assessments. Relief workers have
found malnutrition rates as high as 26 percent in some areas of the
south.
It is clear that food stocks in some locations such as Yei are
virtually nonexistent. People are surviving entirely on mangos, a
supply that will pass.
As the tide of war has turned against them, officials of the NIF
have reacted aggressively against the local population and
international relief efforts. Sudanese authorities are placing new
restrictions on aid deliveries by the UN-sponsored aid program,
Operation Lifeline Sudan. Aerial bombardments by government planes
against civilian targets in the south continue. A report in February by
the UN Human Rights Special Reporter for Sudan, Gaspar Biro, concluded
that ``all Sudanese citizens living in areas controlled by the
government of Sudan are potential victims of human rights violations
and abuses.'' I share that view.
In the conflict area of northeast Sudan, the NIF has been accused
of a ``scorched earth campaign'' by international investigators, and
100,000 persons are newly displaced. An estimated quarter-million
southern Sudanese, many of them displaced, remain crowded into the
major southern town of Juba, including 10,000 new arrivals since March.
More than a million Sudanese have fled or migrated to neighboring
Egypt, according to some estimates, where many of them live in a
pseudo-asylum.
Sudan's terrorist activities are disquieting to the world
community, but innocent Sudanese themselves are paying the highest
price for their regime. Humanitarian conditions in much of Sudan are
grotesque.
Recommendations
1. Establish a clear U.S. policy on Sudan that reflects U.S.
interests and sides with the people against a rogue government.
U.S. policy has not been clear. It has gradually evolved in a
desirable direction, in my view, largely because of the forceful
efforts of the National Security Council and the U.S. Congress. The
U.S. government's lack of political clarity confuses our allies in the
region. The United States seems disposed toward punishing Sudan for its
extremist behavior, yet the U.S. grants Khartoum an exception from our
country's anti-terrorist legislation. The United States government
officially welcomed the so-called peace accord signed in April (among
the Sudan government and several minor rebel groups, not including the
SPLA), yet U.S. officials generally recognize that it is a pact among
allies that the NIF government will exploit in its ongoing efforts to
divide and conquer the south.
It is in our interest, as well as the interests of the people of
the Sudan, to see a new, more moderate government in Sudan. This is an
achievable goal the United States should actively and unambiguously
pursue.
2. Respond to the urgent humanitarian needs in south Sudan.
Partly due to the lack of policy clarity, U.S. humanitarian efforts
to assist war-affected Sudanese lack energy and creativity. The USAID/
Sudan field office, based in neighboring Kenya, typifies the problem.
For example, thousands of Sudanese refugees currently are returning to
areas newly captured by the SPLA. Yet foodstuffs, seeds, and
agricultural tools are not available to them, undermining their ability
to survive until they can produce their first crops. The USAID/Sudan
field office will not allow food deliveries north of the town of Bazi.
Therefore, returning refugees congregate short of their homes, leaving
them in limbo. The food situation in the newly captured town of Yei is
desperate--people will not survive there long without quick food aid.
In addition, U.S. officials have allowed the NIF to undermine
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), a unique initiative that made
humanitarian history when first implemented in 1989. OLS has become
entirely subject to the whims and strategic interests of the NIF
government. The United States has recently taken only minimal steps to
contest the Sudan government's strategic efforts to thwart relief
deliveries to civilians in areas under SPLA control.
3. Implement the development assistance language contained in the
Committee report on last year's U.S. foreign operations appropriation
legislation. The special language attempted to give U.S. officials a
``green light'' to provide both relief and development assistance to
people in areas of Sudan outside the Sudan government's control.
Specifically, in the section labeled ``International Disaster
Assistance,'' the report stated: ``The committee encourages AID to
utilize funds made available for nongovernmental organizations
operating in areas of southern Sudan outside government control to
include capacity building activities in additional to traditional
relief programs.''
Under the heading, ``Development Assistance,'' the same report
stated: ``The committee authorizes AID to use development and disaster
assistance funds for capacity building purposes in areas of southern
Sudan outside the control of the government of Sudan. The committee
strongly encourages AID to make funds from these accounts available to
nongovernmental organizations for this purpose. The committee expects
that theses will not be used in areas controlled by southern factions
that have and continue to cooperate with the government of Sudan.
Simply put, the State Department has blocked implementation of this
clearly stated Congressional intent. In my view, the Congressional
intent is exactly the policy we should pursue.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the government of Sudan remains a
terrorist threat abroad, continues to destabilize its neighbors, and
continues to perpetrate the worst terrorism against its own citizens.
Yet the Sudan government is more vulnerable domestically than ever
before.
If this Subcommittee, this Congress, and this U.S. government are
truly dedicated to ending the NIF regime's terrorism abroad, the surest
and most effective way to accomplish that goal, in my view, is to
support the actions of NIF opponents inside Sudan. My just-concluded
site visit to Sudan convinces me that the opportunity is now.
Senator Ashcroft. Thank you very much.
I think you have been very clear in your remarks, and I
thank you for the directness with which each of you has spoken.
To Mr. Smith, I would like to for the record have it clear.
It is my understanding that your wife, carrying an unborn child
of yours, was killed in the World Trade Center bombing. Is that
correct?
Mr. Smith. That is correct.
Senator Ashcroft. That is not a fact which any of us really
want to recite, but I wanted that to be part of the record of
this proceeding. I just wanted to make that very clear.
I thank you for your willingness to come and help us
understand that terrorism is not something that just happens to
people on the other side of the globe, but it is something that
can strike very close to home.
Mr. Smith. Obviously dealing with one of these things was
one thing. I guess there was something said in one of the
speeches that I heard one day of, when we as Americans cannot
send our loved ones to work and expect them to come home the
same way they went to work, I think this world has changed from
where it was, and I think February 1993 was the big change.
Senator Ashcroft. I thank you for coming.
Mr. Emerson, the regulation promulgated by Treasury in
conjunction with the State Department authorized by section 321
of last year's enactment includes the language that relates to
terrorism in the United States, or in the United States of
America. Do you think it is productive to draw such a bright
line between terrorist acts here and abroad, or is it a more
difficult universe than that?
Mr. Emerson. It is impossible to draw that line. We used to
have a situation in this country where we had a distinction
between foreign terrorism and domestic terrorism. There is no
such distinction any longer.
The global village phenomenon that we saw CNN have with
regards to getting into every single television set around the
world has also replicated itself with regard to terrorism.
Terrorism is an international phenomenon. Terrorists come and
go as they please. They move and wire transfers, millions of
dollars, they get credentials to come in and out of countries,
they use faxes and modems and other telecommunications systems.
There is no such distinction as the domestic or foreign
terrorist.
There may be distinctions in their identity, but there is
no distinction in what they are carrying out or their ability
to carry out any place in the world, whether they live in
Chicago, Dallas, Brooklyn, or in Khartoum.
Senator Ashcroft. Thank you very much.
Mr. Winter, the civil war in Sudan is costly to the
Government of Sudan. I understand estimates range between $1
million and $4 million a day. Where is the government getting
the money to wage that kind of civil war against its own
people?
Mr. Winter. Without professing to know all the resources,
what is clear is that the radical Islamic movement is well-
financed. It draws from a variety of Saudi and other financial
resources; and, while Sudan is one of the poorest countries of
the world, it has been able to purchase arms. Very often, those
arms are financially enabled by Iran or similar kinds of rogue
States, usually, but not always, purchased from the People's
Republic of China.
I can tell you from what I saw last week in the areas that
were captured by the SPLA the government certainly did not lack
arms. I am not a military person, but howitzers and canons of
all varieties were all over the place. T-55 tanks are all over
the place, many of them burned out as a result of the fight
that occurred there that I was able to witness, a whole column
that was taken out by the SPLA.
So I mean, they have these resources. They have the
alliance with fundamentalist elements in Saudi Arabia and
elsewhere, and they have governments like Iran that are willing
to supply them. These are petrodollars, recycled for killing
Sudanese.
Senator Ashcroft. I want to thank all of you for coming. I
want to thank you for your patience. I want to thank all of the
witnesses for appearing here today. I think the hearing
provides us with an opportunity to have a frank discussion
about issues relating to Sudan and to terrorism, about human
rights issues. It is appalling to hear about the deprivation of
religious freedom that affects all faiths and pits one religion
against another. It gets to be intrafratricidal, relating even
to different iterations of Islam.
Obviously, there are still issues to be resolved, questions
to answer. I hope this hearing is the first step toward
correcting at least the regulatory loophole for section 321.
I want to work together with the administration. We do need
to do that to more effectively isolate Sudan and other State
sponsors of terrorism.
I want to thank all of you for being here, and I would
invite individuals who want to participate in the record of
this hearing to understand that the record will remain open
until Monday so that if you have additional documentation that
you would like to provide we will be pleased to receive it.
Thank you very much. [Whereupon, at 1:23 p.m., the
subcommittee adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Responses to Questions Submitted by Members of the Committee
United States Department of State,
Washington, D.C.,
July 23, 1997.
Hon. John Ashcroft,
Chairman, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign
Relations,
U.S. Senate.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Following the May 15, 1997 hearing at which
Assistant Secretary of State George Moose testified, additional
questions were submitted for the record. Please find enclosed the
responses to those questions.
If we can be of further assistance to you, please do not hesitate
to contact us.
Sincerely,
Barbara Larkin,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
__________
Responses of Mr. Moose to Questions Submitted by Senator Feingold
Question. I understand that for the past several weeks, the
Government of Sudan has denied flight clearance for all Operation
Lifeline Sudan consortium flights from Kenya into south Sudan and
that--as a result--the humanitarian organizations are facing serious
fuel shortages and risk food shortages as well. What explanation has
the United States received for the denial of flight clearance? In what
way does the current situation endanger the humanitarian community?
What steps is the United States taking to reinstate immediately the
authorization for OLS flights?
Answer. The Government of Sudan (GOS) denied flight clearance to
all Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) aircraft on May 4. The GOS also
suspended relief flights from Khartoum to government-held areas. The
GOS disallowed C-130 flights during the previous two weeks, but allowed
other OLS aircraft operations. USG relief officials shared the concern
of OLS partners that the denial of flight clearance would negatively
impact relief operations, with security for relief workers and the need
for timely delivery of seeds and tools our primary concerns.
The relief community met immediately in Nairobi and Khartoum to
discuss the flight ban, dispatched letters to various ministries, and
the UN and GOS held high-level meetings. The GOS listed the military's
desire for ``clean skies'' to improve aircraft identification in areas
of military operations as the rationale for the ban but pledged to lift
it shortly. On May 16, the GOS authorized flight clearance to most of
the usual areas, with the exception of three towns recently seized by
the SPLA. However, the C-130 was prohibited from flying to any
locations in Bahr el Ghazal and Eastern Equatoria where major military
operations were underway.
While any suspension of flights is problematic given the dependence
of many areas of Sudan on air support for relief operations, the short
duration of this flight ban mitigated its impact. However, continued
denial of clearance for the C-130 to fly into Bahr el Ghazal renders
our attempts to deliver food more difficult, in terms of expense and
logistics.
During the flight ban the United States consulted with UN
officials, participated in various meetings and offered to coordinate a
donor demarche or press statement. However, the UN asked that they be
allowed some time to resolve the situation quietly. U.S. Ambassador
Carney was in Washington during the flight ban and raised USG concerns
with the Sudanese Ambassador who promised to pass them on to Khartoum.
Question. In January 1997, the National Democratic Alliance
launched its first major military offensive, capturing towns along the
Ethiopia-Sudan border. In early February, NDA forces were 20 miles from
a key dam. Please give us an overview of the military situation. What
are the prospects of total military victory for the opposition?
Answer. Despite recent rebel gains in Sudan, we do not believe that
the National Democratic Alliance's offensive has tipped the military
balance decisively in its favor. The situation along the Ethiopia-Sudan
border has not changed appreciably since January. NDA leaders assert
that their goal is not to destroy the key dam in that region. At the
same time, there has been greater rebel pressure along the Eritrea-
Sudan border, where NDA forces are presently threatening to close the
main road between Khartoum and Port Sudan. Nevertheless, while rebel
forces have made progress in that region, the onset of the rainy season
will likely hamper military operations on both sides. On balance, we do
not believe the opposition has the capability to prevail at this time.
Question. Both the NIF and the Southern People's Liberation Army
(SPLA) appear committed to continue their respective military
campaigns. In this context, can there be hope for a negotiated
settlement? What further tools could the United States employ to
increase pressure on Khartoum? Are we doing all we can?
Answer: We continue to believe that a negotiated settlement is
possible, although this will require fundamental changes within the NIF
government. In order to be lasting, however, such a settlement will
have to address the legitimate concerns of all Sudanese, especially
with respect to fundamental political and human rights. In light of the
increased military and political pressure on Khartoum, combined with
the NIF's increasing isolation within the international community, we
believe that the prospects for a negotiated settlement have improved
somewhat over the past year.
In late May, Kenyan President Daniel arop Moi invited the Heads of
State of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Sudan, as well as SPLA leader
John Garang, to come to Nairobi to restart the dormant peace process.
All leaders accepted Moi's invitation. We expect this IGAD summit to
take place in June. Any breakthrough at this time is problematic.
The United States remains actively involved in efforts to provide a
political solution to Sudan's civil war. we play a prominent role in
the IGAD Partner's Forum (IPF), Sudan Sub-group (formerly Friends of
IGAD). We have joined with key IPF colleagues to offer our support to
IGAD's latest effort.
At the same time, we remain skeptical that the April 21 ``Peace
Agreement'' between the Sudanese Government and splinter rebel groups
is sufficient to resolve the civil war and achieve national
reconciliation. We also seek concrete evidence that the NIF is
addressing our concerns about its support for terrorism and the related
problem of regional stability. To achieve our policy goals, we will
continue to consult and work with Sudanese opposition leaders and
international players who are involved in the peace process, including
President Carter, to explore various ways to achieve a comprehensive
and durable peace in Sudan.
The Administration is in the midst of a review of its Sudan policy.
Numerous means of applying pressure on Khartoum to oblige to change its
behavior are under serious discussion.
Question. The United Nations Human Rights Commission recently
passed a resolution condemning Sudan's human rights record. What can
you tell us about the work of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Sudan?
Answer. Pursuant to the 1996 UNHRC resolution on Sudan's human
rights abuses, UN Special Rapporteur, Mr. Gaspar Biro, submitted a
report on the human rights situation in Sudan to the UN Human Rights
Commission (UNHRC) in accordance with the Commission's resolution 1996/
73. His report, dated February, 1997, documents grave human rights
abuses such as slavery, arrests without due process, torture, arbitrary
detention and interrogation, summary executions, indiscriminate
killings and abductions of refugees, the round-up of street children,
indiscriminate killings of civilians and devastation of villages; and
restrictions on freedom of the press, the rights of women, and freedom
of religion.
During 1993-97, the United States introduced and supported
resolutions in the UN General Assembly and at the UNHRC that criticized
and called for the end of human rights abuses in Sudan. Additionally,
U.S. efforts in the UNHRC meetings in March 1996 were successful in
getting Sudan to readmit UN Special Rapporteur Biro to continue his
investigations. The recent 1997 resolution extended Mr. Biro's mandate
for another year. We are well aware of widespread human rights abuses
in Sudan and have denounced these abuses for several years. U.S.
Ambassador Timothy Carney and other officials have urged Sudan to halt
the inhumane treatment of Sudanese citizens. We fully support the
conclusions of UN Special Rapporteur Biro's report. The U.S. Government
is actively pursuing a negotiated settlement to the 14-year-old civil
war which has claimed more than a million and half lives. We believe a
speedy resolution of the conflict would bring about a long overdue
improvement in the lives of all Sudanese.
Question. The Government of Sudan and Iran reportedly have warm
relations. There have been numerous high level meetings and visits
between the two countries over the past several years. Please describe
Iran-Sudan relations. Is there any truth to reports that Iran has
provided Sudan chemical weapons? What about Sudan's relations with
Iraq?
Answer. Despite cordial relations between Sudan and Iran, this
relationship may suffer from unrealized expectations on both sides. To
a large extent, this relationship is based on some common interests and
a shared sense of international isolation, although ideological and
leadership differences militate against closer relations. Iran views
Sudan as an entree to Africa. For its part, Sudan views Iran as a
source of much-needed military and other kinds of assistance.
Although we are aware of worrisome allegations that Iran has
provided chemical weapons to Sudan, these have emanated almost
exclusively from the Sudanese opposition and have not been
corroborated. Nevertheless, this is a serious issue which we continue
to monitor closely, not only with respect to Iran but also with regard
to Iraqi support in this connection.
In general, relations between Iraq and Sudan are cordial and
mutually supportive. Iraq has provided limited military aid in the
past, including some training and other modest assistance. Overall,
however, this mutual support now is mostly rhetorical.
Question. I understand an agreement was recently signed between
General Bashir and President Museveni of Uganda. Can you tell us more
about this agreement?
Answer. Sudanese President Bashir and Ugandan President Museveni
held a summit meeting on May 10 in Nairobi, Kenya, which was hosted by
Kenyan President Moi. Following that meeting, the Foreign ministers of
Sudan and Uganda signed a Joint Communique, which outlined the main
issues that were discussed during the meeting. According to the Joint
Communique, President Bashir briefed President Museveni on the April 21
``Peace Agreement'' that was signed between the Government of Sudan and
allied rebel splinter groups. The two presidents welcomed that
``Agreement'' as a major step towards a just and lasting peace in
Sudan. They also agreed to work together to bring John Garang into the
peace process and to complete the peace efforts through IGAD.
The Sudan-Uganda Joint Communique referred to previously signed
agreements between the two countries and called for their reactivation.
Moreover, the two presidents agreed to resolve outstanding bilateral
issues and problems, including the release of all captured and abducted
soldiers and civilians. Presidents Bashir and Museveni also agreed to
request the chairman of IGAD to convene an urgent meeting of that
organization to discuss measures to reinforce the peace process in
Sudan. This aspect appears to have been realized. All IGAD leaders and
John Garang have agreed to meet to revive the IGAD's Sudan peace
process. Despite this Joint Communique, there remain serious bilateral
problems that will likely preclude an agreement to resume diplomatic
relations--at least in the near term--between Uganda and Sudan.
Question. Sudanese-Egyptian relations became strained in recent
years partly due to Sudan's Islamic fundamentalist agenda. Relations
were further strained in 1995 after the assassination attempt on
President Mubarak by an Egyptian group with ties to the Government in
Khartoum. What are Egypt's strategic interests in the Horn of Africa?
How would you describe Egypt's relations with Sudan and Sudanese
opposition groups?
Answer. Egypt adamantly opposes the National Islamic Front (NIF)
regime in Sudan but pursues a cautious approach because of its shared
borders, water resources, and lengthy history. Egyptian opposition to
the NIF is due in large part to Sudanese involvement in the 1995 Addis
Ababa assassination attempt on Egyptian President Mubarak and to
Sudanese support of terrorism within Egypt.
While Sudan does not pose a credible military threat to Egypt, the
NIF poses a terrorist threat against Egypt and the possibility of
border skirmishes is always present. Cairo has had a Nile water-sharing
agreement with Sudan since 1959. Should Sudan attempt to stem the flow
of the Nile, the Egyptians would almost certainly take swift military
action.
Question. The United Nations Security Council has passed three
resolutions demanding that Sudan extradite the three suspects in the
Mubarak assassination attempt. In 1996, the UN imposed a series of
sanctions against Sudan for its lack of cooperation on the
extraditions, but Resolution 1070, which would ban Sudan Airways
flights, has not yet been implemented. Why has the Security Council
been unable to act on this resolution? In what way is the United States
pursuing this implementation?
Answer. The Government of Egypt is taking the lead in the UN
Security Council on follow-up to Resolution 1070. There continue to be
discussions among Security Council members concerning this issue,
although there are differing views on how best to proceed. For our
part, we continue to advocate the imposition of air sanctions against
Sudan and we will continue to support fully Egypt's efforts in the UN
Security Council. At the same time, we believe that it is important to
forge a unified position on Sudan, which requires ongoing consultations
with key allies in the Security Council. We expect these efforts to be
renewed since the recent election of new governments in some allied
capitals.
Egypt has hosted high-profile visits by Sudanese opposition figures
as a way of sending a strong message that it sees alternative avenues
of governance in Sudan beyond the NIF. However, the government of Egypt
has as one of its priorities maintaining the territorial integrity of
Sudan and it has made this preference very clear.
______
June 4, 1997
Betty Alonso,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
DSOB 450,
Washington, DC 20510.
Ms. Alonso: Per your request, enclosed are my written answers to
Senator Feingold's written questions about Sudan. I appreciate the
Senator's interest in Sudan's domestic and regional terrorism,
especially given the Subcommittees's decision to focus on other matters
during the balance of the hearing.
As you know, I have mailed an edited version of the hearing
transcript back to the Committee's publication staff.
If there is anything else that Sen. Feingold, you, Linda, or your
colleagues need, please don't hesitate to contact either me or my
administrative assistant, Alison Seiler.
Sincerely,
Roger P. Winter,
Director, U.S. Committee for Refugees.
Response of Roger Winter to Questions Submitted by Senator Feingold
Question. I understand that for the past several weeks, the
Government of Sudan has denied flight clearance for all Operation
Lifeline Sudan consortium flights from Kenya into south Sudan and that,
as a result, humanitarian organizations are facing serious fuel
shortages and risk food shortages as well. How concerned are you about
humanitarian access issues?
Answer. The Government of Sudan (GOS) has a long track record of
denying OLS access to populations in need. The regime in Khartoum has
made abundantly clear over the years, by word and deed, that it is
prepared to manipulate OLS and block entire relief programs for
political and military reasons. The government of Sudan tends to regard
southern Sudanese civilians as ``the enemy'' and therefore tends to
treat OLS and its relief efforts as a subversive activity.
There is cause for serious concern about current OLS operations and
humanitarian access problems. Access problems may worsen in coming
months as the GOS retaliates for its weakened position on the military
and political fronts. Even though the GOS has allowed a resumption of
OLS flights from Kenya in recent days, strong potential exists for
additional cut-offs. Nor should it be forgotten that OLS flights are
apparently permanently banned to entire regions of Sudan, such as the
Nuba Mountains. In addition to interference from the Sudan government,
OLS also faces funding problems. UNICEF's OLS operations, for example,
have received only 11 percent of the $14 million required from
international donors to implement its emergency programs for 2 million
displaced and war-affected Sudanese targeted by UNICEF.
Restrictions placed on OLS have serious consequences. Malnutrition
at four key sites in the south--Malakal, Wau, southern Kordofan, and
Juba--range as high as 24 percent, according to recent surveys. Due to
the limited OLS air capacity, short interruptions in relief flights can
cause lengthy food or medical shortages at specific locations. UNICEF
has tentatively canceled its vaccination campaign later this year.
Governmental and financial impediments to OLS may prove to be
particularly dangerous this year, as tens of thousands of Sudanese
refugees attempt to return to their vulnerable home areas in newly-
captured SPLA territory.
Congress should continue to push the U.S. government to support
cross-border relief programs that operate outside the OLS mandate. That
is the most reliable way to circumvent restrictions that the GOS
routinely places on OLS. Yes, humanitarian access to southern Sudan is
a major concern--but, ultimately, access can only be denied if
decision-makers in the West choose to place a higher priority on
diplomatic niceties such as ``sovereignty'' and ``gaining governmental
permission'' instead of doing whatever is necessary to save lives.
Question. In January 1997, the National Democratic Alliance
launched its first major military offensive, capturing towns along the
Ethiopia-Sudan border. In early February, NDA forces were 20 miles from
a key dam. Please give us an overview of the military situation. What
are the prospects of total military victory for the opposition?
Answer. I believe the military forces of the opposition are in a
position today strategically different entirely to their position at
any time since this phase of the war began in 1983.
In my view, the fronts in the south and in the Nuba mountains have
never threatened militarily the survival of the National Islamic Front
government, though they were not without major political effect. Even
had the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) actually succeeded in its
Juba offensive in 1991, it might not have caused the collapse of the
government.
Today, however, the National Democratic Alliance forces, including
the SPLA, are operating on two additional fronts that can cause the
government's collapse: the ``Eastern front'' which threatens the
corridor between Port Sudan and Khartoum, and the front at Damazin
which threatens the Rosaires Dam. The former front targets Khartoum's
lifeline to the outside world, the latter the source of perhaps 80% of
Sudan's electric power.
The opening of these two newer fronts has caused the government to
shift its military attention, spreading them thin and enabling the SPLA
to score major gains in Western Equitoria and Bahr-el Gazal. I believe
Juba will be severely threatened at a minimum by fall. I believe it
could well fall by year's end.
The major effort on Juba, I expect, will be coordinated with
furious attacks on the two newer fronts. The opposition has the
capacity to do this. If this analysis is correct, the NIF government
will not survive, in my view.
Question. Both the NIF and the Sudan People's Liberation Army
(SPLA) appear committed to continue their respective military
campaigns. In this context, can there be hope for a negotiated
settlement?
Answer. I believe there is no good prospect of a negotiated
settlement in Sudan because the opposition collectively believes the
NIF government is so extreme in its views that it is not negotiating
``in good faith,'' but only to produce strategic advantage. Personally,
I believe that assessment.
The NIF government which has engaged in the terrorism against the
people of Sudan outlined in my testimony is fully practiced in breaking
the conventional rules of diplomacy.
However, should the strategic situation produce a ``moment of
truth'' in which the NIF government agrees to step down, I would
encourage every effort to include some NIF engagement in a government
of national unity. Like it or not, they exist in Sudan.
__________
Statement of the Embassy of the Republic of Sudan Regarding Sudan and
Terrorism
Submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African
Affairs, May 19, 1997
----------
The Government of Sudan submitted for the record the following
response to the hearing on ``Sudan and Terrorism'' held by the
Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. The Chairman of the Subcommittee does not verify the
accuracy of the statement. The pledges made by Sudan in this statement
to fight international terrorism are welcomed. Concrete actions to
achieve this goal must accompany verbal promises, however.
----------
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
This statement is submitted in response to the serious and grave
charges presented at the May 15, 1997 hearing accusing the Government
of the Republic of Sudan of complicity in terrorism on a horrifying
scale. Witness Steven Emerson maintained that the GOS is responsible
for: ``Suicide bombings in Israel. The attempted assassination of the
Egyptian President . . . Attacks on American Forces in Somalia.
Sponsorship of the most ruthless terrorist financier in the world
today, Osama Bin Laden . . . Sponsorship and hosting of unparalleled
get-togethers of the most militant Islamic terrorist leaders in the
world today, including those that have planned the murder of hundreds
of Americans, not to mention Jews and Arabs deemed to be `infidels' or
`enemies of Islam.' Training camps for more than a dozen terrorist
organizations whose raison d'etre is to kill infidels, Christians, Jews
and secular and moderate Arabs. . . . Training camps for Iranian
Revolutionary Guards . . .''
Mr. Emerson's terrorist bill of indictment against the GOS and
sister accusations presented at the hearing all share important
earmarks of unreliability: all are founded on secret anonymous
information and none has been established before a tribunal where the
GOS would enjoy the right of confrontation or cross-examination.
The following generally uncontested facts should shake confidence
in the facile charge that the GOS champions or sponsors terrorism:
The GOS has extradited Carlos the Jackal to France and
hijackers of Ethiopian aircraft to Addis Abbaba, has expelled
Osama Bin Laden, and has declared its soil off limits to any
person or group plotting terrorism against a foreign country.
Contrary to some rumors, Mr. Bin Laden is headquarted in
Afghanistan and has not returned to Sudan;
The GOS has never practiced terrorism against its domestic
opponents, including the belligerent John Garang of the SPLA
and his current ally and former Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi.
That renunciation cannot be said of any other country on the
terrorist list of the United States;
The Government of Ethiopia tried and executed in absolute
secrecy (like a Star Chamber proceeding) three Egyptians
accused of the Mubarak assassination attempt. The three,
according to Ethiopia, implicated the GOS in the dastardly
plot. If that were true, however, Ethiopia would have publicly
paraded the damaging testimony in an open trial broadcast to
the world;
The Spanish Inquisition, the British ``Papal Plots,'' and
Senator Joe McCarthy's discredited accusation that the
Eisenhower Administration's State Department was brimming with
Communist Party Members show the unreliability of secret,
anonymous, and un-cross-examined charges like the terrorist
indictment hurled against the GOS. As a former esteemed
Attorney General of the State of Missouri, the Chairman of this
Subcommittee is acutely aware of the imperative of cross-
examination in seeking to separate facts from falsehoods, a
procedural safeguard that has been characterized as the best
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth;
The GOS has publicly and repeatedly denounced terrorism in
all circumstances, and former President Jimmy Carter, after a
briefing by the National Security Council on the listing of
Sudan as a terrorist country in 1993, publicly maintained:
``They declared that Sudan was a terrorist training center, I
think without proof . . . In fact, when I later asked an
assistant secretary of state he said they did not have proof,
but there were strong allegations. . . . I think there is too
much of an inclination in this country to look at Muslims as
inherently terrorist or inherently against the West . . . I
don't see that when I meet with these people.'' (Reuters
Financial Service, September 13, 1993). Former President
Carter's evaluation should command heightened credibility
because he holds no incentive to act as an apologist for the
GOS.
Two chief accusers of the GOS for complicity in terrorism--
the presidents of Eritrea and Uganda--have been proven
notorious for unreliability. The former recently and publicly
confessed to the use of Eritrean soldiers to fight with Mr.
Garang's forces against the GOS after long months of heated
denials of the same;
The GOS has itself been a victim of terrorism. Hijackers of
a Sudanese civilian aircraft are receiving red carpet treatment
in Eritrea over the protest of the GOS, and it has been forced
to evacuate its Embassy in Asmara in favor of a Sudanese
opposition alliance implacably dedicated to overthrowing the
popularly elected GOS by force and violence;
The comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the GOS and all
rebel factions in the South but one on April 21, 1997,
discredits the theory that the GOS promotes terrorism to spread
its version of Sharia or the Holy Koran abroad. The Agreement
enshrines in the Sudanese Constitution the right to full
freedom of religious practice and belief without government
interference and enforceable by an independent judiciary
entrusted with authoritative constitutional interpretation.
Constitutional rights are made supreme over any other code of
law. In other words, the GOS has renounced the use of coercion
or force to promote Sharia even within Sudan itself; and,
The witnesses called to testify before the Subcommittee did
not reflect the full spectrum of views on Sudan and terrorism.
The GOS is confidant that a fair-minded and complete investigation
of the facts would acquit it of the terrorist accusations. Toward that
end, it has unequivocally urged the highest levels of the United States
Government to establish a counterterrorism unit in its Embassy in
Khartoum with unrestricted choice of travel sites to search unannounced
for terrorists or terrorist training camps jointly with Sudanese
security forces and to train the latter to fight terrorism. The GOS has
also invited a score of Honorable Members of Congress to visit Sudan to
make an unfiltered assessment of the facts. It has been a source of
disappointment that these serious and sincere overtures to do something
about terrorism and to seek facts before a terrorism verdict in lieu of
exchanging sterile accusations for counteraccusations have seemingly
been neglected.
To paraphrase former Senator Hiram Johnson of California, truth is
the first casualty of either hot or cold war, and the terrorism
accusations lodged against the GOS by the United States would seem to
deserve a more thorough and critical examination than they have
received at present before important policy decisions and actions are
taken.
__________
Statement of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)
Honorable Members, I am privileged to make the following
submissions to this august subcommittee.
A. The Government of Sudan [GOS] and State Terrorism
1. The GOS continues to host, train, and arm most of the infamous
terrorist groups of the Middle East. The training camps are located in
the interior of the country's western and central regions. The camps
are camouflaged as Islamic orientation schools for Sudanese. They are
out of bounds to visitors and foreign journalists. Such persons are
often shown alternative bona fide institutions.
The regime cannot close these camps and abandon their functions
because they are the justification for financial and military aid from
the richer sponsors of international terrorism.
2. The GOS continues to host, train, and arm extremist religious
groups against the governments of Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and
Uganda.
3. The GOS continues to raid, bomb and destroy civilian settlements
including relief centers in southern Sudan. Captives from these raids
are taken into chattel slavery. `Surplus' slaves are exported to the
richer sponsors of international terrorism.
Solution
1. International terrorism, regional destabilization, and domestic
human rights violations in Sudan cannot be ended voluntarily by the
regime itself. The regime cannot be pressured to reform. It would lose
its raison d'etre without terrorism. The GOS sees itself as having a
`divine mission' to save humanity from `satanic paganism'. It seeks to
revolutionize global social and political order along the lines of
fundamentalist Islam. The United States or what they call `The Great
Satan' is a principal target of the scheme.
In the last one year or so, the regime has responded to
international condemnation and isolation by tactically retreating from
some of its terror fronts. In some cases, it has changed the form of
the attacks. In the West in particular, more and more local people are
being employed as proxy crusaders and potential terrorists. The change
in methods increases, not reduces the danger.
2. The role of the Sudan as an active member of the coalition of
terrorist States can only be ended through the resolution of the
country's civil war and the establishment of a secular democratic
government in Khartoum.
B. Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement Position on Peace [Annex X]
1. The SPLM reaffirms its willingness and readiness to resume peace
negotiations on the basis of the Nairobi Declaration of Principles
within the framework of the IGAD Peace Committee under the chairmanship
of Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi.
2. The so-called peace agreement between the GOS and some southern
Sudanese individuals in Khartoum on April 21st cannot constitute a
mechanism for resolving the Sudanese conflict. It is not an accord
between the warring parties. It is an internal arrangement by the
regime and its political and military allies on how to defeat the
opposition.
3. The letter of the `agreement' is dishonest and deceptive. In
particular:
(a) It maintains Islamic Sharia Law as the principle source of
legislation. The provision that the southern States would be exempted
from Islamic Law is impracticable. How can a citizen be exempted from
the Islamic versions of the laws of contract, banking, and taxation?
What criminal law, penal code, procedure and law of evidence would
govern non-Muslims living and working in the northern parts of the
country?
(b) The agreement entrenches the one party theocratic State by
prohibiting pluralistic democracy.
(c) The right of the people of southern Sudan to self-determination
is subject to their April Charter provision that commits the allies to
the unity of the Sudan by force and coercion.
(d) The interim period prior to a referendum on self determination
is elastic. It can be increased indefinitely by president Omar al
Bashir who has made no secret of his opposition to the principle of
self-determination.
(e) The 10 mini `Bantustans' in the south are placed under Islamic
Wallis (governors) who are directly responsible to Khartoum.
(f) The `Coordination Council;' and its `President' have no real
executive political and fiscal authority in the south.
(g) The `president' of the coordination council is appointed by and
responsible to General Omer al Beshir not the people or representatives
of the people of the south.
(h) The entire judicial system is Islamic and wholly controlled by
General Omer al Beshir.
(i) The `agreement' does not provide for a legislative organ in the
south. That authority lies in Khartoum.
(j) The `agreement' institutionalizes Arab racial hegemony by
providing that only the Arabic language shall be the official language
of the Sudan. This negates the recognition in the same `agreement' of
the cultural and racial diversity of the Sudan.
(k) The `agreement' does not address the grievances of the people
of the Nuba Mountains, southern Blue Nile, Eastern and Western Sudan.
C. The NDA Position on Peace [Annex Y]
1. The NDA affirms its commitment to a comprehensive peace
settlement that:
(a) Redresses all the injustices that had been committed on the
people of the south and other marginalized areas in the past.
(b) Allows full pluralistic democracy.
(c) Guarantees stability in the region.
2. The `Peace Agreement' of April 21st 1997 is totally rejected for
the following reasons:
(a) It is an agreement between allies.
(b) It is an agreement between northern and southern minority
groups. The mainstream southern and northern political forces are not
parties to the `agreement'.
(c) There are no constitutional or regional and international
guarantors to the `agreement'.
(d) The real aim of the GOS is not to bring peace. The `agreement'
is a plot to knock southerners against each other while the regime
concentrates on fighting the northern opposition. It is an `agreement'
for more war.
(e) Peace can only be realized on the basis of the 1995 Asmara
Agreement. [Annex Z]
Signed:
Steve Wondu,
Representative.
__________
ANNEX X
Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Sudan People's Liberation Army,
Secretariat for Organization
SPLM/SPLA Position on the So-Called `Peace Agreement'
On April 21, 1997, the NIF regime signed with its southern allies
led by Riek Machar a deal which in practice amounts to a war agreement
against the SPLA. The political and military significance of this fake
peace agreement lies in the fact that it is an NIF regime's new
stratagem for southernisation of the war. This is to enable it to buy
more life time, because of the intense military pressure of the SPLA
and its partners in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) which makes
the demise of the regime a real and an imminent possibility. The
agreement is another desperate retreat to the ``divide and rule''
policy when the Jihad is not bearing fruits to the regime.
The National Islamic Front staged the military coup that brought it
to power in June 1989 just 4 days before the Constitutional Conference
that would have brought an end to the war on the basis of the Sudanese
Peace Initiative negotiated between the SPLM and the Democratic
Unionist Party. The coup was in essence a negation of the peace
process. Since then the NIF government embarked on a war path and
launched military offensive to defeat and destroy the SPLA, while at
the same time, it undertook political and diplomatic initiatives to
isolate the SPLM/A on the national and international level.
In Abuja 1992, the head of the NIF delegation to the Peace Talks
hosted by President Babingida, declared that ``self-determination'' for
southern Sudan will come out through the barrel of the gun''. This was
echoed by Dr. Ghazi Sallahudin, the leader of the NIF regime delegation
to the fourth and last negotiation session of IGAD Peace Talks when he
bluntly told the Foreign Ministers of the IGAD countries that ``we came
to fulfil a mission of Islamising and Arabising Africa, so the issue of
self-determination is a non-starter''. Since then, this has stalled the
IGAD Peace Talks and there has not been a negotiation session. In view
of the above, the NIF government is not interested in a just and
lasting peace. What it is doing is the devising a series of tricks to
suck into its political thinking the weak South Sudan leaders. The
regime was convinced beyond doubt that it was going to crush the SPLA
and therefore embarked on its ``peace from within'' process.
The question, therefore, is why has the NIF regime made an about
turn and offer self-determination to groups it politically
manufactured, and who don't constitute a threat to its power? If the
NIF regime is serious and wants to end the war by accepting what it
arrogantly rejected in 1994, does it not return to the IGAD Peace
Process. The NIF political moves are not sincere, but are designed to
bail it out of the serious military defeats inflicted on it by the SPLA
and its partners in the NDA.
This agreement, therefore, must be rejected for the following
reasons among others:
1. The agreement is essentially a deal between allies but not a
conflict resolution mechanism. This is because since 1991, these SPLM/A
breakaway groupings have been overtly collaborating with Khartoum
against the people of the South and other marginalized areas of Sudan.
Since then they have been coordinating military campaigns against the
SPLA with an avowed mission of destroying it under disguise objective
of achieving independence for southern Sudan. To concretize this
military collaboration and co-ordination, several agreements were
concluded between the NIF regime and these splinter groups in Frankfurt
and at the Hague in 1992 and in Nairobi 1993.
2. In the preamble the statement which says ``Fully cognizant of
the fact that unity of the Sudan cannot be based on force or coercion,
but on the free will of the people'' does not hold water because it is
in direct contradiction with article 2 of their April 10th 1996,
``Political Charter which obligates the parties to the Charter to
affirm the unity and territorial integrity of Sudan within its known
boundaries and to protect it against internal and external enemies. It
is clearly stated in the agreement that ``the general principles
contained in the Political Charter signed in Khartoum on 10th April
1996 shall be part of this agreement and shall guide and explain its
provisions''. The implication is that the Charter is the basis for
interpretation of the agreement in case of controversy, and therefore
overrides the provisions of this agreement.
3. The agreement does not clearly define southern Sudan, but the
newly created 10 southern states excluding areas such as Hufra Nahas,
Kafia Kingi and Shallefil which were parts of the south as on 1st
January 1956. In this connection, the agreement described as ``Sudan
Peace Agreement'' can obviously not deliver peace to the whole country
since it does not address grievances of other parts of the fighting
Sudan such as the Nuba Mountains, southern Blue Nile, East and West of
Sudan.
4. As to the co-ordinating council, it is not a government of
southern Sudan as the HEC of the Addis Ababa Agreement was. It is not
accountable to the people of southern Sudan. It has neither executive
nor legislative powers, but only acts as a link between the 10 states
in southern Sudan (that actually operate independently) and the federal
government. Worst of all, the President of the co-ordinating council is
appointed by the President of the Republic. He is not accountable to
the people of southern Sudan nor to the council either, and could be
any person from any part of Sudan. It is actually an implementing
agency for the policies of NIF in southern Sudan.
5. The agreement also states that ``during a four-year interim
period South Sudan shall enjoy a special status''. On close examination
of the provisions of this agreement, this ``special status'' is not to
be traced anywhere. What is this ``special status'' of the south?
6. Regarding the problem of Abyei, it has been glossed over by
deferring it to ``a conference that will be convened in the area with
the interim period''. The Addis Ababa Agreement was much clearer on the
issue of Abyei because it provided for the referendum for the people of
Abyei to decide whether to remain within southern Kordofan or join
southern Sudan.
7. The amalgamation of the splinter groups, individuals, and their
respective armed units into the so-called United Democratic Salvation
Front (UDSF) and Southern Sudan Defense Force (SSDF), is in fact a
transformation and integration of these groups into NIF Salvation
Revolution and Popular Defense Forces and therefore consistent with the
characteristics and particularities of the NIF regime (Inghaz el-
Watani).
8. The agreement confirms sharia as the supreme law of the land and
its main source of legislation; while African custom is just a
supplementary component. In case of conflict between Sharia and Custom,
the supreme law prevails. In fact constitutional Decree No. 13 directs
judicial courts to be guided exclusively by Sharia, neither by Custom
nor by both Sharia and Custom together.
9. Articles enumerated under the fundamental rights and freedoms
are in fact general principles contained in the universal Bill of
Rights and enshrined in the international conventions. No disagreement
can be expected over them. The irony of the situation is the
fundamentalist, dictatorial and theocratic nature of the regime, cannot
provide a conducive atmosphere for their observance, but essentially
negates them. These rights have been long proclaimed in 1991 by its
regime before this agreement was concluded; and yet arbitrary arrests,
ghost houses (torture chambers), restrictions of movements and
assembly, extra-judicial executions, etc. are still the order of the
day.
10. On democracy, the agreement stipulates that ``participatory
democracy shall be realized through congresses and national convention
or conference''. This indicates that there is no genuine democracy
based on pluralism. Therefore, the creation of the United Democratic
Salvation Front is a farce. Consequently, the UDSF has become one of
the congresses of the NIF National Convention. The USDF has been
effectively absorbed into the participatory democracy just like
Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), was absorbed into the
Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) in 1972.
11. Examination of the Federal Powers, the Powers of the States and
the Powers of the Coordinating Council, reveals that power sharing does
not really exist. It is a duplication of sets of functions that at the
end of the day benefit the Federal Government. Articles 2, 19 and 28 of
the Chapter on power sharing deal with armed forces and Defense
Affairs, National Security and Emergency Jurisdiction can effectively
be used to usurp the purported powers of the Coordinating Council. In
case of dispute over the residual powers, the agreement maintains that
the supreme court shall pass ruling on the dispute. Taking into account
the Islamic nature and composition of the supreme court, the outcome of
its ruling will be a foregone conclusion in favour of the Federal
Government.
12. In regards to wealth sharing, the agreement states that
``revenue allocation commission shall be established to recommend
wealth sharing formula for the whole country; and the coordinating
council shall be represented''. The basis for the composition of the
commission has not been defined in clear terms, except for the
representation of the coordinating council. The possibility of tilting
the balance in favour of the Federal Government in the commission's
composition is real.
13. The elasticity of the interim period is intentionally made
elusive so as to keep in line with vague articles of the Political
Charter on the achievement of ``reasonable level of development''
contigent to the exercise of referendum. the minimum and maximum limits
of the interim period are also tied to the regime's military agenda of
``destroying the SPLA''. It is an arrangement at the pleasure of one
person--the President of the Republic. The content of the interim
period remains the Sharia, Islamization and Arabization of the south.
It is therefore expected that the outcome of the interim period must
naturally be consistent with the objectives of the interim period.
14. The constitutional arrangements for amending the agreement are
totally weak if not non-existent. The power to amend the agreement is
vested in the 25-man coordinating council and the President of the
Republic, who appoints it. There is no reference to the people of the
Southern Sudan directly or indirectly through an elected Southern
Assembly. In fact the agreement does not provide for an elected
Southern Assembly during the interim period. By this arrangement the
NIF regime has secured for itself an easy and sure mechanism to wreck
the agreement at its convenience. In contrast, the Addis Ababa
agreement 1972, though later unilaterally abrogated by General Nimeri,
has stronger guarantees and mechanism for amendments.
In view of the above reasons the SPLM/A regards the so-called
``Sudan Peace Agreement'' as a totally inadequate framework for
bringing about a comprehensive, just and durable peace in the country.
The agreement is a part and parcel of the NIF's programme of peace from
within. It was worked out in Khartoum and the renegade commanders were
merely invited to sign. No reputable Regional or International
mediators, observers or witnesses were involved. Therefore this sham
agreement must be thrown out and rejected in its totality. However, the
SPLM/A is committed to its search for a peaceful settlement of the
conflict to bring to a close the sad chapter of human tragedy in our
country. This can only be achieved through the IGAD Peace Process on
the basis of the Declaration of Principles (DOPs), formulated in May
1994 under the chairmanship of H.E. President Daniel Arap Moi.
Mr. Pagan Amum,
Chairman of Peace Committee, National Liberation Council (NLC),
Yei, NEW SUDAN.
__________
ANNEX Y
Date: June 5, 1997.
National Democratic Alliance
Secretary General
Press Release
The Executive Bureau of the NDA convened an extra-ordinary meeting
in Cairo lately to discuss and deliberate on the latest developments in
the Sudan, in particular the signing in Khartoum on the 21st of April
of the so-called peace agreement between the NIF government and some
southern splinter groups led by Southern Sudan Independence Movement
(SSIM). The meeting was attended by Sayed Sadig El Mahdi and a number
of members of the NDA leadership council who were present in Cairo at
the time of the meeting. The meeting resolved the following:
Firstly: The total rejection of the NIF government so-called peace
agreement signed with its allies led by Southern Sudan Independence
Movement (SSIM), as all measure for confidence building over a
transitional period specified in that agreement becomes irrelevant when
the two sides are agreed that the solution to the Sudanese crisis lies
on the partition of the country.
Secondly: The agreement doesn't bring the desired peace or
stability to the Sudan as it is between a minority in the North and a
minority in the South in the total absence of any popular internal
constitutional guarantees or external regional and international
guarantors.
Thirdly: The aim of the NIF government from this agreement is not
to achieve real peace, on the contrary, it is seeking to change the
nature of the war in the south to turn it into a fratricidal tribal war
between the peoples of the south which would release the regime's armed
forces from their duties there, and enable it to transfer them
Northwards to wage war in the defence of its battered regime.
Therefore the majority of the peoples of the Sudan represented in
the NDA reject and condemn this agreement and promise to resist it by
all means.
The NDA confirms that a just and lasting peace in the Sudan has to
be a comprehensive one and address the major issues that has
destabilized the country since its independence, to achieve the
following three inter-connected purposes:
1. A peace agreement that would re-address the past injustices and
grievances in the Sudan and open the way for a new united Sudan on the
basis of Asmara resolutions of 1995.
2. A pluralistic democratic system which establishes constitutional
legitimacy as the basis of guarantying the people's rights and the
peace agreement.
3. To realize regional stability on the basis of good
neighborliness and the concept of developmental and security
integration.
Mubarak El Mahdi.
__________
ANNEX Z
The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Conference on the Issues of
Destiny
The Final Communique
Friday, June 6, 1995.
The NDA held a historic meeting in Asmara, the capital of the State
of Eritrea, from June 15 to June 23, 1993. The conference, held under
the banner of ``Issues of Destiny'', was attended by all the leaders of
the political, trade unions, and military formations in the NDA as well
as the national personalities, viz:
(1) The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP);
(2) The Umma Party;
(3) The SPLM/SPLA;
(4) The Union of the Sudan African Parties (USAP);
(5) The Sudan Communist Party;
(6) Trade Unions;
(7) The Legitimate Command;
(8) The Beja Congress;
(9) The Sudanese Allied Forces;
(10) and non-partisan national personalities.
The Conference discussed the following issues:
(1) stopping the War and restoration of peace;
(2) the right of Self-determination;
(3) religion and politics;
(4) system of rule during the interim period;
(5) programme and mechanisms for escalating the struggle to
overthrow the NIF regime;
(6) interim arrangements and responsibilities;
(7) The Sudan of the future;
(8) the structure of the NDA; and
(9) humanitarian issues.
The NDA convened its conference under difficult and severe
conditions imposed by the NIF fascist regime on our people. The regime
has devalued the dignity of the Sudanese citizen, destroyed the
national economy, abused Sudanese foreign relations by threatening
regional and international stability and by exporting terrorism and
discord to the neighbouring countries and other countries in the world
as well. The regime has amply demonstrated its bellicose nature by
aborting all the peace initiatives and by intensifying the war in the
South. The NDA would therefore like to re-affirm the continuity of the
political, military and popular struggle against the regime.
On the basis of the principles of the NDA, and by way of continuing
the struggle of our people against successive dictatorships, and
inspired by its experience in the consolidation of national unity, and
fully believing in a new democratic system based on political pluralism
and respect for human rights, the conference hereby resolves as
follows:
A--Ending the War and Restoration of Peace
1. The right of self-determination:
(a) affirmation of the right to self-determination as a basic,
original and democratic right of all peoples;
(b) recognition that the exercise of the right to self-
determination shall bring the war to an end and shall facilitate the
retrieval and consolidation of democracy, peace and development;
(c) the right to self-determination should be, however, exercised
under conditions of legitimacy, democracy and under regional and
international supervision;
(d) the areas affected by war are South Sudan, Abyei District, the
Nuba Mountains and Ingessina Hills;
(e) the citizens of Southern Sudan (within its boundaries as they
stood on 1/1/1956) shall exercise the right to self-determination
before the end of the interim period;
(f) the people of Abyei shall be consulted, in a referendum to be
held before the end of the interim period, to ascertain whether they
wish to continue with the administrative arrangements within Southern
Kordofan or to join Bahr El Ghazal. If the majority choose to join Bahr
El Ghazal, then they will exercise their right to self-determination
together with the citizens of South Sudan.
(g) With regard to the Nuba Mountains and the Ingessina Hills, a
political solution, aimed at removing the existing grievances in these
two areas, shall be sought and implemented by the government of the
day, after which a referendum shall be held, during the interim period,
to ascertain the wishes of the peoples of these areas over their
political and administrative future.
(h) Affirmation of the NDA's commitment to the realisation of a
just and democratic peace and unity based on the free choice of the
Sudanese people, and a just and effective peaceful resolution of the
ongoing armed conflict. In this regard, the NDA hereby announces its
acceptance of the IGADD's Declaration of Principles (DOP) as
constituting a reasonable and practical basis for achieving a just and
lasting peace.
(i) Affirmation that real peace in Sudan cannot be achieved by
viewing the problem as the Southern Problem, but by comprehending the
national origins of the problem.
(j) Convinced that the national problems of Sudan cannot be solved
except through a serious, open dialogue among all the national groups,
and that the nature and history of the Sudanese conflict has proved
that just peace and stability in the county cannot be achieved by
military means.
2. The Conference hereby affirms that all NDA members shall
seriously work to adopt a common stand on the issues of the referendum,
which are:
(a) unity (confederal or Federal) and;
(b) independence.
(3) The NDA government recognises that the exercise of the right of
self-determination, aside from being a human, democratic and peoples'
right, is also an instrument for putting an immediate end to the civil
war and for opening up a unique and historic challenge to build a new
restructured Sudan of justice, democracy and free choice. The NDA is
committed to leading the Sudanese to a successful exercise of this
historic right.
B--Religion and Politics in Sudan
(1) All human rights norms and standards enshrined in the regional
and international human rights instruments, charters and covenants
shall be deemed to be an integral part of any constitution of Sudan,
and any law, decree, executive order or action or policy measure
contrary thereto shall be null and void for being unconstitutional.
(2) Laws shall guarantee full equality of citizens on the basis of
citizenship, respect for the religious beliefs and traditions and
without discrimination on grounds of religion, race, gender or culture.
Any law contrary to the foregoing stipulations shall be null and void
and unconstitutional.
(3) No political party shall be based on religion.
(4) The State recognises the plurality of religions and noble
spiritual beliefs and is committed to ensuring a peaceful co-existence
and interaction, equality and tolerance among religions and the noble
spiritual beliefs. The State permits freedom of ``proselytisation'' by
peaceful means and forbids compulsion or any act or measure which may
lead to religious sedition, racial hatred in any place, forum or
location.
(5) The NDA is committed to upholding the dignity of the Sudanese
woman and affirms her role in the Sudanese national movement and
recognises her rights and duties stipulated in the international human
rights covenants and instruments to the extent that they don't
contradict religious tenets.
(6) National enlightenment, education and cultural programmes shall
be based on the commitment to the international human rights covenants
and instruments.
C--System of Rule
(1) The Sudan shall be run on a system of decentralisation during
the interim period. The Transitional Constitution shall determine the
distribution of powers and functions between the Central Authority and
the regional entities.
D--The Decentralisation Act
(1) Decentralisation shall be based on the distribution of the
powers and functions agreed upon between the Central Authority and the
Northern Entities on the one hand and between the Central Authority and
the Southern Entity on the other and deferring the naming of the system
to a later stage.
(2) Local government systems and native administration should also
be catered for in the Decentralisation Act.
(3) The following factors should be considered in the
decentralisation arrangements during the interim period:
(a) redressing of grievances and removal of the causes of the war
and the creation of an atmosphere conducive to national reconstruction;
(b) ascertainment of people's wishes in various areas in the
process of developing democratic structures; and
(c) taking into account the economic circumstances of the country
and the need for retrenchment.
Emphasis shall therefore be on mobilisation of the masses, and the
provision of adequate opportunities for popular participation in the
democratic structures of the decentralisation arrangements.
E--On the Programmes and Mechanisms for the Intensification of the
Struggle to Overthrow the System:
(1) Legitimacy of the armed struggle being currently waged by some
formations in the NDA to overthrow the system. Armed struggle is by
agreement one of the mechanisms for overthrowing the system.
(2) Provision of the necessary support.
(3) Establishment of a High Military and Political Committee to co-
ordinate and supervise the implementation of the programmes for
intensification of the struggle to overthrow the system.
F--Interim Military and Security Arrangements
The conference adopted all the recommendations made by the relevant
specialised committee.
G--The Sudan of the Future
To lay the foundations of the New Sudan, the conference adopted the
following:
(a) the economic programme for the interim period;
(b) programme for foreign policy, regional and international co-
operation;
(c) programme for the removal of the vestiges of the NIF regime;
(d) Political Parties Bills;
(e) Trade Unions Charter; and
(f) Press and Publications Bill.
H--Humanitarian Issues
The wrong-headed economic policies of the regime and its escalation
of the war have aggravated internal displacement, heavily damaged the
environment, and have created tragic conditions of life for the
ordinary Sudanese citizen, especially the women. In addition to the
war, instability, political repression and violation of human rights
have driven thousands of Sudanese into exile. In pursuit of its
commitment to the security and safety of the Sudanese people and their
freedom of movement within and outside the Sudan, the Conference has
adopted a practical programme for relief during the interim period, all
in co-operation and co-ordination with the international community and
the relevant establishments in Sudan.
I--Structures of the NDA and Amendment of the Charter
The conference adopted the new structure of the NDA which consists
of:
(1) The Conference;
(2) The Leadership Councilium;
(3) The Executive Office; and
(4) The General Secretariat;
(5) Specialised Secretariats; and
(6) Centres for the subsidiaries.
The Conference also adopted amendments to the Charter in keeping
with the changing political scene.
Signatures:
1. Mohamed Osman El Mirghani, DUP;
2. Dr. Omer Nur El Dayem, Umma Party;
3. Dr. Colonel John Garang de Mabior, SPLM/SPLA;
4. Eliaba James Surur, Leader, the Union of Sudan African Parties
(USAP);
5. Tighani El Tayeb, Sudan Communist Party;
6. Engineer Hashim Mohamed Ahmend, Trade Unions;
7. Lieutenant General Fatih Ahmend Ali, Legitimate Command of the
Armed Forces;
8. Mohamed al Tahir Abu Bakr, the Beja Congress;
9. Brigadier Abdel Aziz Khalid, the Sudanese Allied Forces;
10. Bona Malwal, independent Sudanese personality;
11. Farouk Abu Eissa, independent Sudanese personality;
12. Al-Wathiq al-Kameir, independent Sudanese personality; and
13. Mansour al-Agab, independent Sudanese personality.
______
National Democratic Alliance Conference on Fundamental Issues
Resolution on the Issue of Religion and Politics in the Sudan
The National Democratic Alliance (NDA);
Recognising that the relationship between religion and
politics has a direct bearing on nation-building;
Aware of the reality of religious, cultural and national
diversity in the Sudan;
Cognisant of the role of scriptural religious and noble
spiritual beliefs as sources of moral values and spiritual
tenets that can help promote tolerance, brotherhood, justice
and peaceful coexistence;
Conscious of the terrible human rights abuses committed by
the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime through its diabolical
manipulation of religion to perpetrate genocide and ethnic
cleansing falsely in the name of jihad;
Determined to achieve a just and lasting peace and national
unity based on justice and the free will of the Sudanese
people; and
In adherence to the principle of non-exploitation of
religion for political purposes, hereby make the following
constitutional dispositions:
1. All human rights norms and principle enshrined in regional and
international human rights instruments and covenants shall be an
integral part of the constitution of the Sudan, and any law, decree,
executive order or policy measure contrary thereto shall be considered
null and void and unconstitutional.
2. All laws shall guarantee full equality of citizens on the basis
of citizenship, respect for religious beliefs and traditions and
without discrimination on grounds of religion, race, gender or culture.
Any law contrary to the foregoing stipulation shall be considered null
and void and unconstitutional.
3. No political party shall be established on religious basis.
4. The State shall acknowledge and respect religious pluralism in
the Sudan and shall undertake to promote and bring about peaceful
interaction and coexistence, equality and tolerance among religious and
noble spiritual beliefs, and shall permit peaceful religious
proselytisation and prohibit coercion in religion, or the perpetration
in any place, forum or location in the Sudan of any act or measure
intended to arouse religious sedition or racial hatred.
5. The NDA undertakes to preserve and promote the dignity of the
Sudanese woman, and affirms her role in the Sudanese national movement
and her rights and duties as enshrined in international instruments and
covenants without prejudice to the tenets of prevailing religious and
noble spiritual beliefs.
6. National programmes in the fields of information, education and
culture shall be formulated and disseminated in accordance with the
regional and international instruments and covenants on human rights.
Signed:
1. Democratic Unionist Party
2. Umma Party
3. Sudan Communist Party
4. Union of Sudan African Parties
5. Sudan People's Liberation Movement & Sudan People's Liberation
Army
6. Trades Unions
7. Legitimate Command
8. Sudanese Alliance Forces
9. Independent National Personalities
Resolution on the Issue of Self-Determination
Preamble:
The National Democratic Alliance
Deeply committed to an immediate ending of the current armed
conflict through a just and lasting settlement;
Fully aware that the attainment of such a just and lasting
settlement requires political courage, statesmanship and
farsightedness on the part of the leadership of its constituent
members;
Convinced that our preferred option is unity, based on
diversity, and the recognition that the Sudan is a multi-
ethnic, multi-religious, multi-cultural and multi-linguistic
country, and that this unity shall also be based on the right
of citizenship and equality in rights and responsibilities in
acoordance with the norms and standards enshrined in
international conventions on human rights;
Fully cognizant of the fact that the unity of the Sudan
cannot be durably based on force or coercion, but on justice
and the free consent of all the various groups in the Sudan;
Conscious of the existence of other issues and problems
caused by the interaction among tribes living in contiguous
areas, which problems and issues shall be addressed and
resolved during the national constitutional conference; and
Mindful of the fact that the resolution of the present
Sudanese conflict requires a comprehensive approach in order to
bring peace and justice to all the marginalised people of the
Sudan and build the New Sudan; hereby:
I. 1. Affirms that the right of self-determination is a basic
human, democratic and people's right which may be exercised at any time
by any people.
2. Recognizes that the exercise of the right of self-determination
constitutes a solution to the on-going civil war, and facilitates the
restoration and enhancement of democracy in the Sudan.
3. Affirms that this right shall be exercised in an atmosphere of
democracy and legitimacy and under regional and international
supervision.
4. Affirms that the areas afflicted by war are Southern Sudan,
Abyei District, the Nuba Mountains and Ingessena Hills.
5. Declares that the people of Southern Sudan (within its borders
as they stood on 1.1.1956) shall exercise the right of self-
determination before the expiration of the interim period.
6. Resolves that the views of the people of Abyei District as
regards their wish to either remain within the administrative set up of
Southern Kordofan region or join Bahr El Ghazal region shall be
ascertained in a referendum to be held within the interim period but
before the exercise of the right of self-determination for the South.
If the outome of the referendum establishes that the majority of the
people of this district wish to join Bahr El Ghazal, the people of
Abyei shall accordingly exercise the right of self-determination as
part of the people of Southern Sudan.
7. Resolves that with respect to the Nuba Mountains and Ingessena
Hills, a political solution to redress the injustices suffered by the
people of these areas shall be sought by the interim government and
that a referendum to ascertain their views on their political and
administrative future shall be organized and carried out within the
interim period.
8. Reaffirms its commitment to a just peace, democracy and unity,
based on the free will of the people of the Sudan, and to resolving the
present conflict by peaceful means through a just and lasting
settlement. To this end the NDA endorses the IGADD Declaration of
Principles (DOP) as a viable basis for such a just and lasting
settlement.
9. Reiterates that true peace in the Sudan cannot be viewed within
the framework of the problem of the South but rather from the
standpoint that our problem is of a national origin.
10. Affirms that our national problems cannot be solved except
through clear, serious and continuous dialog among all Sudanese
national groups.
11. Asserts that the nature and history of the Sudanese conflict
has proved that permanent peace and stability in the country can not be
achieved through a military solution.
II. The constituent members of the NDA shall adopt a common stand
on the options to be presented in the referendum in the South, which
options shall be (a) unity (confederation/federation) and (b)
independent statehood.
III. The NDA affirms that the Central Authority shall within the
interim period devise and implement the necessary confidence-building
measures and the appropriate restructuring of the State and socio-
economic institutions and processes, so that the exercise of the right
of self-determination could have the best chances of upholding the
unity option.
Signed:
1. Umma Party
2. Sudan Communist Party
3. Union of Sudan African Parties
4. Sudan People's Liberation Movement & Sudan People's Liberation
Army
5. Trades Unions
6. Legitimate Command
7. Sudanese Alliance Forces
8. Independent National Personalities
______
Resolution on the System of Rule
Whereas the Sudan has been in a State of war against itself for
four decades,
Whereas this unremitting war is a result of historical injustices
with political, economic, social, cultural, religious and
administrative dimensions; and
Whereas the continuation of war throughout this period has created
a great mistrust among compatriots; and
Whereas the hegemony of the Centre (Khartoum) on most regions in
the Sudan has led to the perpetuation of underdevelopment in, and
marginalization of, those regions; and
Whereas the National Democratic Alliance, representing the Sudanese
people in the South, North, East and West is determined to remove all
historical injustices and eliminate all causes of war in order to
create conditions conducive to the birth of a new Sudan united through
the free will of its people and in which every citizen shall enjoy
peace, security and happiness; and
Whereas the creation of those conditions requires the adoption of
all political and administrative measures necessary to restore
confidence,
Decided:
1. The Sudan shall be ruled in the interim period as a
decentralized state. The powers and competence of the central authority
and decentralized entities shall be provided for in the constitution.
2. Immediate attention should be given, in view of the nature of
the interim period, to the definition of those powers, leaving the
appellation of the entities to a later date.
3. The NDA shall give due consideration, in promulgating
decentralization laws, to the role of local government and native
administration within the new set-up.
4. Due regard should be given in the regional administrative
divisions to:
(a) the wishes of the people in accordance with democratic
processes,
(b) keeping in mind that the division of power between the Centre
and the Entities at this critical point of our history is meant to end
historical injustices that have led to war and marginalization, restore
confidence and consolidate peace, stability and a unity based on
people's free will.
5. In view of the difficult economic conditions of the country
administrative costs of decentralization should be reduced to the
minimum necessary.
Powers of Entities in Northern Sudan
The legislative and executive organs of Northern Regional Entities
shall have competence over:
1. Economic planning in alignment with national development plans
2. Finance including the levying and collection of taxes (according
to an agreed upon schedule)
3. Telecommunication (within the Entity)
4. Town planning and construction of feeder roads
5. Police, prisons, fire brigade and game wardens
6. Promotion of local culture and arts
7. Health services
8. Education up to higher secondary level
9. Industry, intra-Entity commerce and supply
10. Agriculture, forests, pastures and plant protection
11. Animal wealth and fisheries
12. Sustainable land use and development
13. Water use with due regard to national water policies and
international obligations
14. Intra-Entity river, land and air transport
15. Radio, television and print media within the Entity
Powers of Central Authority (CA) Vis-a-vis Northern Entities (NE)
1. National defence and national security
2. Foreign affairs and regional and international cooperation
3. Nationality, passports, immigration and aliens
4. Auditor General
5. Judiciary, attorney generalship and regulation of private legal
practice
6. Currency and coinage
7. Regulation of interstate waterways and national electricity grid
8. Mineral resources without prejudice to the right of the host
Entity to fix a reasonable percentage of the returns of the revenue
accruing from the exploitation of that resource
9. Customs and foreign trade excepting of borders trade
10. Commission for National Elections
11. National Education Planning
12. National Health Planning
13. National Economic Planning
14. National census (Concurrent)
15. Railways
16. Regulation of river and air transport
17. Levying and collection of taxes (according to the established
schedule)
18. Posts and telecommunication
19. Weights and measures
20. National statistics
21. National Radio and Television and regulation of technical
matters pertaining to radio and television stations in the Entities
22. Higher education
23. Any other power that is not specifically allocated to the
Entity
Concurrent Powers (CA & NA)
1. Environment protection
2. Water use
3. Economic development planning
Institute of NE
Legislative:
Executive: made up of Governor, Executive Council and Secretariat
Competence of the Southern Entity (SE)
The legislate and executive organs of the SE shall have competence
on following matters:
1. Maintenance of peace security and good governance
2. Police, prison wardens, game wardens, fire brigade
3. SPLA armed forces in accordance with the interim military and
security arrangement
4. Agriculture, forestry, pastures and fisheries
5. Animal husbandry
6. Industry
7. Wildlife and tourism
8. Commission for Elections within the SE
9. Water use without prejudice to international obligations and
national policies
10. Administration of justice including the establishment,
maintenance and organization of courts and attorney generalship
11. Exploration, developments and management of non-renewable
natural resources subject to arrangements with the CA over taxation,
revenue sharing and development needs of disadvantaged regions
12. Radio and TV and print media
13. Art and culture
14. Education up to senior secondary school level
15. Levying and collection of taxes according to agreed upon
schedule
16. Intra-entity commerce and supply
17. Intra-entity water, land and air transport
18. Intra-entity telecommunication
19. Trade with neighbouring countries and levying of customs on
goods entering SE from those countries
20. Personal law, property law and the incorporation, registration
licensing of companies
21. Public health services
22. Any other issue that does not come under the competence of CA
and under concurrent powers
Section B
Special Dispositions:
1. For the purpose of reconstruction and rehabilitation the SE
shall solicit financial and material assistance from, and conclude
cultural and economic agreements with, the international community and
foreign entities.
2. SPLA Forces shall remain in the SE under their present command
and subject to the authority and overall command of the SE government
and in accordance with the interim security and military arrangements.
The government of the SE shall discuss with the CA the formation,
functions and composition of the National Security Council after a
common understanding over national security and threats to it has been
achieved.
Concurrent Powers (between CA and SE)
1. Environmental protection
2. Reconstruction in the war-affected areas and rehabilitation of
the war disabled
3. Higher education
4. Licensing and regulation of private professional practice
5. Cost of translation of official proceedings, documents, notices,
minutes
6. Location and establishment of CA courts
Institutions of SE
1. Legislature
2. Executive: made up of President, Cabinet and Secretariat
3. Judiciary up to the supreme court of the Entity
Competence of CA vis-a-vis Southern Entity
1. National defence subject to interim security arrangements
2. Foreign affairs as qualified by the special powers given to the
SE in relation to mobilization of resources for reconstruction and
rehabilitation
3. (CA) judiciary
4. Currency and coinage
5. Foreign trade subject to qualifications regarding trade with
neighbouring countries
6. Coordination of national economic policy
7. Coordination of national health policy
8. Railways
9. National electricity grid
10. Levying and collection of taxes (according to schedule)
11. Posts and telecommunication
12. Weights and measures
13. Supervision of national Radio and regulation of national TV and
Print media
14. Regulation of radio and television stations within the Entities
15. Civil Aviation and ports
Subject to 3 Requirements
1. Institutions which exercise competence over these powers should
be restructured in terms of personnel, orientation and functions so as
to effectively reflect the decentralized and pluralistic character of
the Sudan.
2. Decentralization of those institutions dealing with
naturalization, immigration, passports and visas so that they are
reasonably accessible to citizens all over the Sudan.
3. Decentralization and deconcentration of development and
financial institutions and services.
Interim Period
The interim period shall be 4 years starting from the day of the
official inauguration of the interim government.
Signed:
1. Democratic Unionist Party
2. Umma Party
3. Sudan Communist Party
4. Union of Sudan African Parties
5. Sudan People's Liberation Movement & Sudan People's Liberation
Army
6. Trades Unions
7. Legitimate Command
8. Sudanese Alliance Forces
9. Independent National Personalities
__________
Appendix to Testimony of Steven Emerson
Selected Citations
Terrorism, Sudan and US Counter-Terrorist Policy
Terrorist Training Camps Operating in Sudan
``Between 20 and 30 camps shelter and train terrorists in
Sudan. They include terrorists of various Arab and Islamic
nationalities. . . . Most of these camps are farms in isolated
areas that have either been usurped or are owned by individuals
who belong to the National Islamic Front.''
Source: Rose al-Yusuf, Sept. 4, 1995 (Cairo)
During the interrogation of Zakariya Bashir (one of the
Sudanese terrorists held in the attempted assassination of
Hosni Mubarak) revealed that Mustafa Hamzah, one of the four
members of the Islamic Group's consultative council that
participated in a meeting for its leaders in Afghanistan at the
end of 1994, confirmed the following information: that al-
Turabi and the Sudanese authorities welcomed extremist Islamic
groups that were being pushed out of Pakistan to come to Sudan.
There they [Sudan] would give them the necessary facilities,
camps, weapons, and instructions they needed for their
operations.
Source: Al-Musawwa, July 7, 1995 (Cairo)
``As an eyewitness and as a minister in the top executive
authority, I can emphatically confirm the presence of foreign
terrorists groups which come and go and which work at camps for
training terrorists in the various Sudanese provinces. There
are secret official instructions to facilitate the movement of
these groups and enable them to contact NIF members, each
other, and the outside world.''
Not only does the government allow these groups to operate
with impunity, but it has also devised ``a plan to back NIF
supporters in the neighboring countries with the aim of
changing the governments there, including opening recruitment
camps in border areas and amassing large numbers of popular
defense units to reinforce the activities of these groups in
their respective countries.''
Source: Muhammad Ahmad `Abd-al-Qadir al-Arbab, Minister
Health and Social Affairs of Sudan in the province of Sannar
quoted in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, March 28, 1995 (London)
``Sudan also has been a strong supporter of terrorists for
export. In 1995, terrorists trained in a camp outside Khartoum
with the express purpose of carrying out terrorist activities
in Egypt. . . . The Egyptian government claims at least 20
international training camps exist in Sudan, 17 of which are
believed to be directly administered by the Islamic Sudanese
government with the intention of training Muslim militants. . .
. Known to train in their own camps are terrorists from Libya
and Egypt, as well as camps for Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Abu
Nidal organization. . . . One camp in particular is reported to
specialize in the training of individuals selected to
assassinate heads of state and other highranking political and
governmental personalities.''
Source: Jane's Intelligence Review, March 1, 1997
As a Provider for Terrorists and Terrorist Organizations in Sudan and
Abroad
Foreign Affairs Minister of Kenya [Stephen] Kalonzo Musyoka
revealed the presence of multi-national terrorist groups,
including Kenyan terrorists, in Sudan after attending a OAU
ministerial session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Source: KTN Television Network, December 20, 1995 (Nairobi)
Lakhdar Ibrahimi, Envoy of UN Secretary General Dr. Boutros-
Boutros Gali, went to Sudan in order to persuade them to hand
over the three suspects in the attempt on Hosni Mubarak. He
brought proposals that included either the disclosure of, or
extradition of the three suspects to Egypt. It is known that
Egypt furnished the UN with a list of 317 terrorists known to
the Egyptians to be hiding in Sudan.
Source: AL-ITTIHAD, October 30, 1996 (Abu Dhabi)
``Sudan has emerged as a clear threat to the stability of
nearby African and Middle Eastern states because of its support
for subversive activities of regional opposition groups. This
threat is likely to remain as long as the National Islamic
Front (NIF) is the dominant political force in the country. In
its efforts to spread its version of Islamic fundamentalism
beyond Sudan and destabilize regional moderate governments
friendly to the United States, the NIF supports insurgent and
terrorist groups opposed to the government of Egypt, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, and Uganda. Sudan also provides safehaven and limited
material support to other radical groups such as Hizballah,
HAMAS, the Abu Nidal Organization, and the armed Algerian
extremist groups.''
Source: Prepared statement of John Deutch, Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency before the Senate Intelligence
Committee Worldwide Threat Assessment, Federal News Service,
February 22, 1996
``The Palestinian Islamist delegation which went to Sudan
last week to meet with the Khartoum based Hamas [Islamic
Resistance Movement] military leaders in an apparent bid to
seek consensus for rapprochment with the Palestine authority
returned to Gaza Wednesday with reportedly positive results . .
. The delegation to Sudan included prominent Islamist figures
such as Khalid al-Hindi, Sa'id al-Nimruti and `Abdallah
Muhannah along with the Amman-based Hamas spokesman `Abdallah
Ghawshah . . . The delegates described their meetings in
Khartoum, held under the auspices of Sudan's Islamic leader
Hasan al-Turabi, as `very encouraging'.''
Source: IRNA, October 13, 1995 (Tehran)
Sudan support for armed factions of the FIS--responded to
requests for arms, and formally arranged for weapons transfers.
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation
Administration, Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation Report,
1992, p. 42
``Mauritania has accused Sudan and the banned Algerian
Islamic Salvation Front [FIS] of masterminding rising Islamic
fundamentalism in the country by ``secretly funding secret
Islamic organizations'' whose aim is ``to topple'' President
Maaouya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya's government. . . . For the last
year there has been a guerrilla training program in progress,
and the maintenance of relations with Islamic fundamentalist
groups--including the FIS based in Europe, Tunisia, and
Sudan,'' Mauritania's Rachid Ould Saleh, Minister of the
Interior, Post, and Telecommunications told AFP. ``The 60
Mauritanian Islamic leaders arrested at the end of September, .
. . who were later pardoned, were infiltrated by the aides of
Sudanese Islamic leader Hassan al-Turabi,'' Mr. Saleh
explained.''
Source: Paris AFP, November 7. 1994
On Middle-East Peace Process
``At the end of March the leader of the National Islamic
Front (NIF), Hassan al-Turabi, presided over the third Popular
Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC) in Khartoum. . . . A common
theme among many of the delegates was a rejection of normalised
relations with Israel and support for the armed struggle
against it.''
Source: The Economic Intelligence Unit Ltd.; EIU Country
Reports, May 14, 1995
Sudan Viewed Through the Eyes of Radical Islamic Jihad
The following is from an interview between Nafiz `Azzam (Jihad
spokesman) and Amir Bayati for Vienna News:
``Bayati: How do you envisage Palestine's future?
Azzam: There can only be a future when Israel is destroyed.
Then we will establish a Islamic state according to the example
of Sudan where God's law is valid.''
Source: Vienna News (German), March 7, 1996
Al-Turabi's Connection to Muslim Brotherhood
The following is an excerpt of an interview by Mahir Muqlid for AL-
AMJALLAH, September, 1995 (London) in Cairo with the `former commander
of the [Muslim] Brotherhood militias,' Ali Ashmawi:
``Muqlid: Is there any connection between al-Turabi in Sudan
and the Brotherhood in Egypt?
Ashmawi: Certainly, because al-Turabi was all his life a
member of the Brotherhood and was its guide in Sudan. What has
changed was actually only his outlook. He wants to be leader of
the entire Islamic world, and has recently begun temporarily to
refuse to heed the guidelines of the Brotherhood in Egypt out
of his desire to become the Brotherhood's general guide. But
when he called for the convocation of a large Islamic
conference in Khartoum, Mashur [referring to Mustafa Mashur,
deputy general guide of the Muslim Brotherhood] traveled there
to attend it.''
Sudan-Iran Connection
Brigadier General `Abd-al-`Aziz Khalid `Uthman, Sudanese
opposition leader, is quoted as saying that his men have found
training camps where Iranian `experts' train Sudanese in the
areas of state security, intelligence and civil defense.
Source: Al-Akhbar, February 19, 1997 (Cairo)
``A news report in al-Haram Monday says it has been
established beyond a shadow of doubt that Hassan Turabi, leader
of Sudan's National Islamic Front and the man Cairo regards as
the real power behind Khartoum's military government, paid a
recent visit to Munich, where a large number of extremists are
based and which also serves as a center for funding terrorist
operations in the region . . . After Munich, Turabi flew to
Tehran, the paper says, and it was only after his return to
Khartoum that the Sudanese government announced it(s) charge
that Cairo was involved in the alleged coup attempt . . .''
Source: Mideast Mirror, May 17, 1993, quoting Egypt's
newspaper, Al-Ahram
``Iran, which has remained a strategic ally to Sudan,
continues to cultivate good relations with Khartoum. In March
an Iranian Foreign Ministry Under-Secretary visited the
Sudanese capital to discuss ways of promoting bilateral
relations. Several accords were signed in early April when the
President of the Iranian parliament, Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri,
visited Sudan . . . This later agreement has been reported to
contain the following provisions.
Iran will be allowed to use naval facilities
in Port Sudan for military purposes. In return it will
help to train the Sudanese navy.
Iran will expand its revolutionary guard
involvement in training the Sudanese Popular Defence
Force.
The two countries will set up a joint
security apparatus to exchange intelligence and analyse
information.
Iran will resume military aid and training.
Tourism and other visits between the two
countries will be expanded.
Cultural and information exchanges will be
pursued.
Eight cultural centres for the dissemination
of the ideas of the Iranian revolution will be
established.''
Source: The Economic Intelligence Unit Ltd.; EIU Country
Reports, May 14, 1995
``Sudanese strongman Hassan Turabi, addressing what he
described as the largest Islamic conference of its kinds in
modern history, has denounced the U.S. as a warmonger and
defended Iran as a country trying to do right and right wrongs.
. . . The paper [Al-Hayat] quotes Turabi as telling the
conference that America does better in conducting wars than in
conducting peace initiatives, and that Iran is trying to do
right and right wrongs but the U.S. is trying to bring it to
its knees.''
Source: Mideast Mirror, December 3, 1995, quoting Al-Hayat
______
Turabi in His Own Words
Turabi on extremism:
``We are proud to go back to our roots and we are extremist
in our principles. We are preparing to terrorize the oppressor
and remind him of what is right.''
Mideast Mirror, March 31, 1995
The Following are excerpts from Turabi's Speech at Al-Taqwa Mosque
in Brooklyn, NY, May 7-9 1992:
``Now the state of Islam, perhaps one of the first countries
in the world to go Islamic again is the Sudan, Alhamdulillah,
after Iran, but among the Sunni Muslims, among Arab countries,
the Sudan is the first state to go Islamic, and it experiences
the same the same degree of isolation, and the degree of
oppression, and the same attempt to suffocate Islam and to kill
it in the cradle before and to stamp it out completely. There
are propaganda campaigns against us, we are aware of them, and
there was complete boycott, and there was military siege also
and the unfortunate aspect of all this is that even so-called
historical Muslim states were used against us, neighboring
states who look to us as brothers, as neighbors, as fellow
Muslims, as fellow Arabs.''
``And ultimately we have to wage Jihad, true Jihad, not just
struggle, but actively we have to fight to protect the state of
Islam in the Sudan, because everybody was used against us, to
subvert our security, in a military way, and we have to wage
Jihad. And we discovered the baraka (blessing) of Jihad. When
people fight for a certain value that value becomes so dear to
them because they become prepared to spill their blood to
protect it''
``I don't think the New World Order will persist for very
long. The western world is a world of conflict. If there is no
belief in Allah, there is nothing but conflict. Humanism
ultimately breed conflict, because every human being ultimately
wants to become the superhuman being, on top of all the world,
and that immediately breeds friction and conflict . . . If
anyone of you was asked five years back how long will the
Soviet Union survive, you would have said fifty years, more so,
a hundred years. But it just collapsed. The body can grow and
can be inflated and can have attractive colors, but just one
single pin, and everything will collapse, like a balloon. So
people think that America is great now, it is omnipotent, it is
omniscient. They know everything, they are everywhere, they can
change international law with respect to Iraq and Algeria. They
can just go away with international law and maintain their
spirit universally. But this is power based on barbarism, it is
a balloon, it looks very impressive but Allah has a time a for
everybody. Once it has served its term, just one pin and phhhh,
yes.''
Dr. Hasan al-Turabi Visits the U.S. (video tape), 1992
Turabi on America and the West:
During press conference, following a meeting of an Islamic
delegation seeking to mediate the Gulf crisis, Dr. al-Turabi
informed his audience that the United States had enlisted the
help of other nations merely ``for its own interests, to
express its own arrogance and its interest in furthering the
Zionist expansion in the area.''
The Independent (Amman), October 2, 1990
``The enemy is America . . . If we are challenged
economically we will develop our own country, we are very rich;
if we are challenged culturally we will develop our own
culture; if we are challenged militarily, we will have to fight
back.''
The Daily Telegraph (London), Aug 15, 1995
``We have a heritage and a wealth of culture but their (the
West's) life has been culturally empty. Even their music is now
more like loud noise than serious music. They no longer know or
read books. They are content with just watching television and
switching from one channel to another.''
Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), Feb 7, 1997
``The United States is nothing more than a Jewish grouping
plus a number of European groupings and some African groupings
who were taken there as slaves or serfs.''
Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), Feb 7, 1997
Turabi on Harboring ``Rebels'':
``But Sudan is still more merciful towards our Eritrean
brothers. About 750,000 Eritreans are still in Sudan. They came
to us as fighters against Ethiopia. We could now turn them
against the regime . . .
Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), Feb 7, 1997
Turabi on the establishment of Islamic law in Sudan:
``We have come to uphold G-d's Shari'ah. Some of the
upholders of Islam are young. They are the people most
dedicated to the jihad and they are the promise of the future .
. .
Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), Feb 7, 1997
Turabi on Osama Bin Laden:
``He [Bin Laden] worked for Sudan. Now, on the occasion of
the independence anniversary, the president has inaugurated the
road to northern Sudan, which will stretch to the port. It is
the road being built by Bin-Laden's company which is still
building the shortest roads to the sea . . .''
Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), Feb 7, 1997
``He is aware of the appreciation of Sudan and those close to
him for the things he has done and continues to do for Sudan.
Many of them were frank with him. They told him: If you prefer
to remain in Sudan nobody will push you out. This is what they
told him.''
Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), Feb 7, 1997
Interviewer: ``What is [Usamah] bin-Laden doing in Sudan?''
Truabi: ``He is a big businessman and helps Sudan.''
Al-Nahar (Beruit), Mar 11, 1996
Turabi on resisting modernizing influences:
``There was no defeat. I believe they [the modernizing
elements] have succeeded and have crushed the door of terrorism
and fundamentalism. For this reason, they might have begun to
propagate this impression and ease up against Sudan, and they
have enjoyed this victory for some time. But when I come back,
I will come many times more active than I was before. Now they
have launched a siege against us in the United States.''
Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), Feb 7, 1997
Turabi on Jihad:
``In an article published by `Guiding Star' newspaper of
Khartoum, Thursday, 8th June 1989, the NIF [leader], Dr. Hasan
al-Turabi, called upon his Muslim supporters to be ready for
jihad to face those who oppose Shari'ah.''
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 16, 1989
``The intellectual, dialetic, and Jihad (military) potentials
should be combined in order to make cultural transformations .
. . The Qu'ran is clear. Allah orders us to invite people to
Islam with wisdom and beautiful preaching; and to argue with
them in ways that are the best and most gracious. But we should
be ready and cautious in order not to be deceived. We should be
ready for Jihad.''
Palestine Times, May 1997
``The fact is that the current issue [democracy in Sudan] is
not one of human rights or democracy but of Islam, and the
Islam I mean is the Islam that refuses to suspend the duty of
jihad.''
Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), Feb 7, 1997
Interviewer: ``What is your opinion on the `jihad' current? I
am asking you now as an intellectual and leader in the modern
Islamic movement.
Turabi: ``It complements the call's current which began
through preachers and writers. If this call has been
preoccupied with materialism of culture and money, this should
be complemented with jihad. This current emerged in countries
where its presence has become necessary because the other party
does not want to hold a dialogue. It only wants to fight.''
Al-Wasat (London) Nov 7-13, 1994
Turabi expressed the need for the Muslim peoples to mobilize
``in a struggle--or a jihad, if you want to use the Arabic
word--to protect their territories and their holy land and
their wealth.'' Should war break out, he predicted that ``there
is going to be all forms of jihad all over the world because it
is an issue of foreign troops on sacred soil.'' He went on to
explain that this meant, ``demonstrations, fighting, targeting
the enemy everywhere.''
The Independent (Amman) October 2, 1990
Turabi on the Palestinian/Israeli peace process:
``They [the Arabs] let it [Palestine] down, despite their
Arab prestige. Even the Arab League almost accepted the
establishment of a Palestinian state and an Israeli state,
because Palestine is the root and the Israelis have seized it
by force, terrorism, and looting . . . Now they are preparing
to drop yet another degree. We in Sudan do not want to turn
against them and thus we and not they become the focus of
cameras' attention. We do not want the Palestinians to turn
against each other so that both sides get killed, terrorism
gets forgotten . . .
Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), Feb 7, 1997
Turabi on Hamas activities:
``If what they are trying is to completely alter the
situation in Arab Palestine, this cannot be achieved by killing
one or ten people. I believe that the people in Hamas want to
stop of some of their leaders by the Israeli security agencies.
They are taking an eye for an eye. If this really is the
situation, I can understand it.''
Al-Nahar (Beruit), Mar 11, 1996
Turabi on Sharm al-Shaykh anti-terrorist summit in 1996:
. . . it [the summit] seeks a confrontation with Islam as a
whole, the Islam which produces both extremists and moderates.
They want neither extremists nor moderates. They want to uproot
both.''
Al-Nahar (Beruit), Mar 11, 1996
Turabi on Iran:
``Praising the Islamic revolution in Iran and its
accomplishments, al-Turabi said Iran and Sudan are at present
regarded as the united base of Islam. `This is threatening to
the enemies of Islam, and they work to crush these two
countries.' ''
Al-Nahar (Beruit), Mar 11, 1996
``The secretary general of the Popular Arab and Islamic
Conference, PAIC, Dr. Hasan Abdullah al-Turabi, affirmed that
the special relations between Sudan and Iran do not represent
any malice against any country or body, explaining that these
relations emanate from religious values and future Islamic
conceptions.''
Omdurman National Radio Unity Radio, Dec 13, 1995
Turabi's aide, assistant secretary-general of PAIC, Ibrahim al-Sanusi,
on Hamas and Hezbollah:
. . . Hamas and Hezbollah groups have done nothing other than
carry out acts of resistance inside the Palestinian territory
because their aim is to regain the right and the land, which is
lawful matter guaranteed by international laws and indeed by G-
d's laws throughout history. Jihad and resistance by those who
seek to retreive their lands and who resort to their legitimate
rights in this respect cannot be described as terrorism.
British Broadcasting Company, Dec 4, 1996
Turabi on Zionist Conspiracy:
Interviewer: ``Do you believe the Zionists and the Americans
are planning to drag the people of the Nile Valley into a major
estrangement?''
Turabi: ``Whatever happens between the Egyptian and Sudanese
Governments, they are exploiting it to create a crisis between
the two peoples . . .
Interviewer: ``They [Egyptians] are fuming with anger over
the act committed by the Ethiopean aggressive elements, who
raped women, burned mosques, slaughtered old people, and
enslaved young girls.''
Turabi: ``Yes, they raped our girls, burned the Koran, and
looted property during Ramadan. They are the Ethiopeans and the
Zionists.''
Interviewer: ``What about Zionists tampering with the Nile
sources?''
Turabi : ``They are currently inciting Ethiopia to set up
dams and to turn land into agricultural land, and the same is
true of Uganda. Sudan gives part of its annual water share to
Egypt.''
Al-Sha'b (Cairo), Feb 21, 1997
Turabi on the International Islamist Movement:
Interviewer: ``Is there an Islamic international?''
Turabi: ``Yes there is. Here at the seat of this Arabic and
Islamic People's Conference [PAIC] in Khartoum, we have Muslims
from all over the world, from Africa, the Middle East, Europe,
America, and Japan. We have very good links with the Islamists
in Tunis. We have advised Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front
[FIS] to devise a political, economic, and international
relations program.''
La Vanguardia (Barcelona) July 16, 1995
__________
Amnesty International
Sudan: A New Clampdown on Political Opponents
April 1997
Arrests in Port Sudan and Khartoum in late March and early April
1997 underline that the large scale round-up of suspected political
opponents begun by the Sudanese authorites on 13 January 1997
continues. Amnesty International has identified over 260 men and women
arrested in towns and cities in northern Sudan (see attached list).
Most still remain in detention without charge or trial. Some have been
denied access to their families and necessary medical treatment. There
are reports of torture.
The arrests follow intensified military action in eastern Sudan by
armed forces belonging to the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), an
umbrella organization of banned political parties, trade unions and
armed opposition groups in exile. On 12 January 1997 troops from the
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF)
captured army garrisons north and south of the Blue Nile and the towns
of Kurmuk and Geissan close to the Ethiopian border. They then pushed
towards the site of an electricity generating station which supplies
Khartoum, Sudan's capital, with much of its power. The Sudanese
authorities have accused Ethiopia of invading Sudan, which Ethiopia
denies. In March the NDA mounted further attacks on targets close to
the border with Eritrea.
The NDA has said that it is aiming to weaken the government to pave
the way for a popular uprising in Khartoum. On 21 January Sadiq al-
Mahdi, Sudan's Prime Minister ousted in the 1989 coup that brought the
current government to power, called on the armed forces to rise against
the government. Sadiq al-Mahdi left Sudan clandestinely in late 1996.
Although many of those detained are suspected of being supporters
of the NDA, the government has not charged them or produced evidence to
suggest that they were involved in violent or treasonable activity. On
29 January Hassan al-Turabi, Speaker of the National Assembly and the
ideological mentor of the government, told journalists that the
authorities had arrested ``10 to 15'' men from the Umma Party and
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in order to prevent disorder. He went
on to say that ``once we restore our territory, probably they will be
released''. On the same day President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir
described the arrests as a precautionary measure ``that will end when
the foreign threat is removed''. He indicated that the detainees would
not be charged and brought to trial. Amnesty International is concerned
that the detainees are facing indefinite detention without charge or
trial.
Senior opposition politicians were among the first arrested, many
are men who have been detained on several previous occasions. Several
members of the banned Umma Party, which is led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, were
arrested at their homes before dawn on 13 January. Senior adherents of
the Ansar, one of Sudan's main Islamic orders (closely connected to the
Umma Party), were taken to jail over the next few days; eight others
were arrested on 17 February. Detained members of the banned DUP,
Sudan's other major political party, include Sid Ahmad al-Hussein, the
party's Secretary General and former Deputy Prime Minister. Communists,
Ba'athists and members of banned southern Sudanese political parties
were also among those arrested.
Scores of trade unionists, students, lawyers, businessmen and
others are also detained. They include the leaders of the banned Sudan
Workers' Trade Union Federation and many other senior trade unionists.
At least 11 doctors have been arrested; the Medical Association was one
of many trade unions which played a key role in ousting the government
of Ga'afar Nimeiri in a popular uprising in April 1985. Student leaders
from Khartoum, al-Ahlia, al-Nilein and Northern Region Universities are
also in detention.
Most detainees are reported to be held in a security service-run
section of Kober Prison, the country's main jail located in Khartoum
North. Conditions are reported to be harsh and crowded. Some had been
held incommunicado in security offices and secret detention centres
before transfer to Kober. For example, Mohamed Ibrahim Abdu (also known
as ``Kabaj''), was denied access to his family while being held at an
unknown location after his arrest on 10 February. He is a diabetic and
only received necessary insulin after his family were finally able to
see him in Kober in early March. Other detainees who are reported to be
receiving inadequate medical care include the prominent lawyer Ali
Mahmud Hassanein and the veteran trade unionist Ali al-Mahi al-Sakhi.
Reports of torture include the beating by security officers of a
recently graduated student who was held for several hours on 16 March
and forced to strip naked. This treatment was described as ``a
graduation present''. He was told that every time the opposition
attacked in the east he would be re-arrested and beaten again.
On 13 January, the day the round-up started, Dr Gaspar Biro, the
United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Sudan, arrived in Khartoum at the start of a scheduled visit. On 14
January the authorites told him that they ``were not able to guarantee
his safety'' because of the ``anger of the Sudanese masses'' at the
military threat in the east. The Special Rapporteur left Sudan after
one day. Amnesty International believes that the government's action
amounted to expelling the Special Rapporteur at a time when it was
engaged in arresting political opponents.
Amnesty International is calling on the Sudan Government to release
prisoners detained unless they are to be charged with a recognisably
criminal offence and brought promptly to a fair trial. The organization
is also calling for detainees to be allowed access to lawyers, their
families and all necessary medical treatment. Reports of torture should
be investigated and those responsible brought to justice.
Appendix One: Arrests Reported in Sudan Between January and March 1997
1 Abdel Nabi Ali Ahmad, University lecturer & former Regional
Governor
2 Adam Yousif, Ansar
3 Fadl al-Nur Mohamed Jabir, Umma party
4 Fadlalla Burma Nasir, former Minister
5 Hashim Awad Abdel Magid, Lawyer
6 Omer Mohamed Omer, Ansar
7 Mohamed Mahil, Ansar
8 Ali al-Omda Abdel Magid, Ansar
9 Mohamed Satti Ali Mohamed, Ansar
10 Mahdi Abderahman Ali, Businessman
11 Mohamed al-Mahdi Hassan, Imam al-Ansar mosque
12 al-Fadl Adam Ismail, Umma party
13 Ibrahim Ali, Office Director of the former Prime Minister Released
14 Abdel Mahmud Haj Saleh, former Minister Released
15 al-Haj Abdelrahman Abdallah Nugdullah, former Minister
16 Abdel Rasoul al-Nur, former Governor
17 Mohamed Ismail al-Azhari, Democratic Unionist party Released
18 Mustafa Abdel Gadir, Lawyer
19 Bakri Ahmad Adil, former Minister
20 Ali Mahmud Hassanein, Lawyer
21 Nagib Nejm al-Din Hassan al-Tom, Doctor
22 Fadlalla Mohamed Hashim, Bank employee
23 Yahya Ali Abdalla, Trade unionist Reporting to security daily
24 Abdel Latif Gimiabi, Umma Party
25 Bushra Mahdi Bushra, Umma Party, student Released
26 Ismail Adam Ali
27 al-Fadl Ahmad Diab, Civil servant
28 Mohamed al-Sil, Worker
29 Babu Shaafi
30 Mohamed Mahjub Mohamed Ali, Trade unionist, accountant
31 Ali Ahmad al-Said, Lawyer
32 Jamal Abdel Rahman, Musician
33 Mohamed al-Hassan Nourain, Engineer
34 Yahya Mudalal, Trade unionist
35 Saudi Darraj, Trade unionist
36 Taha Sid Ahmad, Trade unionist
37 Abdalla Mohamed Malik, Trade unionist Released
38 Nasr Ali Nasr, Trade unionist
39 Kamil Abdel Rahman al-Sheik, Trade unionist Reporting to security
daily
40 Siddiq Youssif al-Nur, Engineer, communist
41 al-Haj Karoum, communist
42 Mohamed Adam, Trade unionist
43 Awad al-Karim Mohamed Ahmad, Trade unionist
44 Abdel Karim Karoma, Businessman
45 Abdel Aziz al-Rufa'i, Trade unionist
46 Gaafar Bakri, Trade unionist, communist
47 Kouko, communist
48 Mohamed Abdin Osman, Democratic Unionist Party
49 Ali al-Simat, President of Rail Workers Union Reporting to
security daily
50 Sid Ahmad al-Hussein, Democratic Unionist Party, former Deputy
Prime Minister
51 Hashim Babiker Tulub, Trade unionist
52 Osman Hassan Sorkati, Doctor Reporting to security daily
53 Fadl al-Nur
54 Abdel Rahman Nugdalla, Businessman
55 al-Tijani Mustapha, Lawyer
56 Farouq Kadoda, Lecturer, communist
57 Mahjoub al-Zubeir, Trade unionist
58 al-Hadi Abdel Aziz
59 Taha Sid Ahmad, Trade unionist
60 Salah Abdel Karim, Economist
61 Adam Madibu, Former Minister
62 al-Fadl Mahir
63 Mohamed Suleiman, Trade unionist Released
64 Abdel Jalil Karoma, Worker
65 Mohamed Di'a al-Din, Trade unionist
66 Ali Khalifa, Trade unionist
67 Mansour Hassan, Imam Majid
68 Mohamed Babiker Mokhtar, Trade unionist Released
69 Sayed Haroun
70 Jad Karim, Businessman
71 Mubarak
72 Sabir
73 Nur al-Din Medani, Office manager al-Khaleej newspaper
74 Samira Hassan Ali Karrar, (F) Human rights activist Released
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(F) Female prisoner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
75 Osman Idris Abu Ras, Ba'ath party
76 Mohamed Dia al-Din, Ba'ath party
77 Abdel Moneim Ahmad al-Haj, Communist Released
78 al-Tijani Hussein Dafallah al-Sid, Ba'ath party
79 Ishaq Ibrahim, Ba'ath party
80 Abdel Mahmud Abbo
81 al-Tahir al-Rigayek, Trade unionist
82 Mohamed al-Mahil, Doctor
83 Abdel Karim Abdel Galil, Trade unionist
84 Mirghani Yousif
85 `Abd al-Fateh al-Rufa'i, Trade unionist
86 Taj al-Din al-Bashir, Vet
87 Yahya Mukwar, Doctor
88 Abdel Wahab Khojali
89 Moatisim Abdel Rahim Medani, Lawyer
90 Sifay Hadish, Ethiopian
91 Areha Tesfay, Ethiopian
92 Mouez Haile Selassie, Ethiopian
93 Woldegabriel Berhata, Ethiopian
94 Hagos Haile Mariam, Ethiopian
95 Yohanes Tsegay, Ethiopian
96 Desta Negga, Ethiopian
97 Woldu, Ethiopian
98 Abaye, Ethiopian
99 Goitom, Ethiopian
100 Halfome, Ethiopian
101 Habtu, Ethiopian
102 Habtamu, Ethiopian
103 Mekonnen Godefi, Ethiopian Released
104 Abdel Gadir al-Gilani
105 Mohamed Abdel Rahman Abu Shanab
106 Amin al-Rabi'e, Businessman
107 Ali Mahjub
108 Mohamed Abdullah al-Meshawi, Lawyer
109 al-Tahir Khalil, Bank employee
110 Tabera Habani, Businessman
111 al-Hadi Tanjur
112 Abdel Rahman Kajur
113 Mauwia al-Din Osman Mohamed
114 Deng Awak Achan
115 al-Fateh Gharballah
116 Mohamed Osman Abu Ras
117 al-Haj Osman al-Hassan, Trade unionist
118 Shehab al-Din Ahmad Gaafar, Lab technician
119 Adil Abdu, Journalist
120 al-Haj Osman Mohamed, Businessman
121 Minallah Abdelwahab, Trade unionist
122 Mokhtar Abdullah
123 Ali al-Mahi al-Sakhi, Trade unionist
124 Mustapha Zaki al-Hakim
125 Adil Saleh Mukwar, Businessman
126 Abdel Gadir Fahmi
127 Amin al-Shawafa, Businessman Released
128 Deng Wuol, Doctor
129 Ishaq al-Gassim Shadat, Lawyer
130 Abdel Rahim Mabiou
131 Salah Haroun, Doctor Reporting to security daily
132 Hassan `Abd al'ati, Lecturer Reporting to security daily
133 Ahmad Mirghani
134 Abbas al-Subiya, Businessman
135 al-Tayeb Kanouna, Civil servant
136 Hassan Abu Zeid, Agriculturalist
137 Mohamed Hamad Nadim
138 Mamoun Mohamed Hussain, Doctor
139 Sabri Fakri
140 'Abd al-Aziz Mohamed al-Amin, Brigadier in army
141 'Abd al-Rahim Hamid Fadl, Brigadier in army (retired)
142 al-Ha Langi, Brigadier in army
143 Mohamed Hamed Ahmad, Brigadier in army
144 Sayid `Abd al-Karim, Lieutenant colonel in army (retired)
145 Omar `Abd al-Majid, lieutenant colonel in army
146 Ezekiel Kodi, former minister
147 Joshua Dau Diu, School owner
148 Kwai Malak, Teacher
149 Mustafa Ahmad Ibrahim, Student al-Ahlia University Released
150 John Michael, Driver Released
151 Widaat Hassan Ali Karrar, (F) Human rights activist Released
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(F) Female prisoner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
152 Mohamed Ahmad al-Rayah, Brigadier in army (retired)
153 Yousif al-Habum, Ba'ath party
154 Abu Khalid al-Mahi, Ba'ath party
155 Usama Mohia Abdel Majid, Ba'ath party
156 Moataz Hassan, Ba'ath party
157 Mohamed al-Simat
158 Mohamed Abdallah al-Duma
159 Yahya Malik
160 Mustapha Abdel Gadir, Lawyer
161 Sadiq Yahya, Trade unionist,
162 Dr Hashim
163 al-Tijani Da'oud, Trade unionist
164 Mohamed Abdel Nabi, Doctor
165 Ali Yousif, Academic
166 Abakar al-Tayib
167 Sirr al-Khatim
168 Adil al-Mardi, Civil servant Reporting to security daily
169 Atif Hassan, Student al-Ahlia University
170 Ahmad Hassan
171 Rashad Hamid al-Said
172 al-Zoheir Khalil
173 Abdel Rahman Sharif Mamoun, Graduate Released
174 Sidiq Sharif Mamoun, Graduate al-Ahlia University
175 Mohamed Ibrahim Abdu ``Kabaj''
176 Mohamed al-Howar, Ansar Affairs Secretariat
177 Abdel Karim al-Amin al-Malih, Ansar Affairs Secretariat
178 al-Faki Abdallah Ishaq, Ansar Affairs Secretariat
179 Abbas Awad al-Karim, Ansar Affairs Secretariat
180 Mohamed Musa, Ansar Affairs Secretariat
181 Abdallah Adam Ali, Ansar Affairs Secretariat
182 Sabur Abdel Rahman, Ansar Affairs Secretariat
183 Abdel Rahman Mohamed Issa, Ansar Affairs Secretariat
184 Babiker Deqna, Businessman
185 Adam Farajallah, Civil servant (retired)
186 Ismail Bilol, Civil servant (retired)
187 Mohamed Mohamed Tom, Trade unionist
188 Jalal al-Din al-Sayed, Lawyer
189 Ali Qurun, Businessman
190 Yasir Issa, Bank employee
191 Bashir Hamid Suleiman, Trade unionist (retired)
192 Ahmad Adam, Student of Majid al-Imam `Abd al-Rahman
193 Sadiq Shams al-Din, Driver
194 Abdelrahman al-Siddiq Mustapha, Businessman
195 al-Sadiq Babiker, Businessman
196 Adam Ibrahim, Graduate
197 Adam Abu Taqiya, Security officer
198 Mohamed Ahmad Jakumi, Businessman
199 Sadiq Mohamed Tom, Graduate
200 Ibrahim Musa, Worker
201 Ahmad Babiker Nihar, Doctor
202 Ahmad Bishara, Businessman
203 Omar Faiq, Lab technician
204 Mahmud Ahmad al-Zubeir, Labourer
205 Ismail Wali, Student Khartoum University
206 Abdelgadir Nasr, Businessman
207 Mohamed al-Hassan, Doctor
208 Mahmud Kharif, Trade unionist
209 Ahmad Mohamed Ahmad, Trade unionist
210 Mohamed al-Mahdi, Doctor
211 Isam al-Shubagi, Student al-Nilein University
212 Imad al-Amin, Graduate Khartoum University
213 Omar Mohamed Ali, Student Khartoum University
214 Yasir Abdel Hamid, Student Khartoum University
215 Mohamed Farouq, Student Khartoum University
216 Usama Siddiq Youssif, Student al-Ahlia University
217 Tariq Abdel Majid, Student al-Ahlia University
218 Usama Said, Student al-Ahlia University
219 Mohamed Taj al-Sirr, Student al-Nilein University
220 Mamoun Ibrahim Karrar, Student al-Nilein University
221 Osman al-Sair, Student al-Ahlia University
222 Ali Mohamed Osman al-Simat, Student al-Ahlia University
223 Issa Ahmad Issa, Colonel in army (retired)
224 Adam Musa, Umma party
225 Khatim Hassan al-Tahir, Umma party
226 Sidiq Mohamed Tom, Umma party
227 Mubarek Mohamed Saleh, Umma party
228 Mohamed Adam, Umma party
229 Mohamed Zaki, Umma party
230 Nasr Mohamed Nasr, Umma party
231 Yousif al-Nur Hamed, Umma party
232 Yousif Mohamed al-Agab, Umma party
233 Abdelkarim al-Jabalabi, Umma party
234 Abdalla Ahmad Adam, Umma party
235 Salih Abdel Mahmud al-Haj Saleh, Student Khartoum University
236 Isam Mohamed Farah, Student al-Nilein University
237 Abdelrahman Adam, Student al-Nilein University
238 Yousif Mohamed Salih, Student al-Nilein University
239 Ibtesam al-Said Abdalla, (F) Student Northern Region University
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(F) Female prisoner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
240 Tahani Bashir Mohamed Ali, (F) Student Northern Region University
241 Afaf Haidar Mohamed al-Haj, (F) Student Northern Region University
242 Qesma Mohamed Ahmad Kafour, (F) Student Northern Region University
243 Muna Mustapha Khalid, (F) Student Northern Region University
244 Mohamed Idris Ali, Student Northern Region University
245 Hamid Abdelhakim Hederbi, Student Northern Region University
246 Hassan al-Samani, Student Northern Region University
247 Hamza Abdelkarim Abdelazim, Student Northern Region University
248 Ramadhan Jadallah, Student Northern Region University
249 Abbas Abdelkarim Abdelazim, Student Northern Region University
250 Abdelmottalib Abdelazim, Student Northern Region University
251 Abdelmottalib Abdalla al-Sheikh, Student Northern Region
University
252 Mohamed Said Mohamed al-Kheir
253 Sid Ahmad al-Khatib, Doctor
254 Kheirallah Rahamtalla Koko
255 al-Sir Khedir
256 al-Sadiq al-Fadl Sail
257 Atif Yousuf Ahmad Dau al-Beit, Student Khartoum University
258 Jalal Ismail Awadallah, Businessman
259 Abdallah Musa, Port worker
260 `Abd al-Rahman al-Amin, Trade unionist
261 Bedawi Abdallah, Democratic Unionist Party
262 Moatism Siyam, Trade unionist
263 Adam Mohamed Sharif, Lawyer
264 Hussein Saleh, Lawyer
265 Ahmad Abdel Hafiz, Lawyer
266 Sara Abdallah Abdelrahman Nugdallah, (F) Umma party
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(F) Female prisoner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------