[Senate Hearing 105-443]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 105-443
1998 FOREIGN POLICY OVERVIEW AND THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 1999
BUDGET REQUEST
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 10, 1998
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
__________
You may access this document on the Internet at: http://
www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate11.html
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
46-661 CC WASHINGTON : 1998
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
James W. Nance, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Albright, Hon. Madeleine K., Secretary of State.................. 3
Appendix
Prepared statement of Hon. Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of
State.......................................................... 43
Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by the Committee to
Secretary Albright............................................. 56
(iii)
1998 FOREIGN POLICY OVERVIEW AND THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 1999
BUDGET REQUEST
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1998
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m. In
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Helms, Lugar, Hagel, Smith, Thomas,
Grams, Brownback, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Robb, Feingold,
Feinstein, and Wellstone.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Madam
Secretary, you always draw a crowd.
The Chairman. Madam Secretary, once again all of us welcome
you to the Foreign Relations Committee. You have travelled
constantly in recent weeks and we admire your stamina. But we
want you to take care of your health.
Now I have told you that privately and I now say so
publicly.
With that, I am going to forego the best speech that I
never read and will yield to my friend and colleague, Senator
Biden.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent
that my opening statement be placed in the record as well, if I
may.
I would just say, very briefly, Madam Secretary, that it is
a pleasure to have you back. I thought you, as always,
represented us very, very, very well. It seems as though my
statement, not yours--you put a little spine in the Alliance
and you, as usual, are crystal clear in what our objectives
are.
We are off to a quick start here in this session. I want to
thank the chairman for getting underway as expeditiously as he
has. Iraq is on the table and NATO expansion is coming up very
close behind. We have to act on IMF funding. We have the
reorganization to revisit as well as the United Nations
arrearages. We have a full plate. But, based on the way the
chairman ran the committee the first year of this Congress, I
am confident that we can address all of those issues with you.
Let me just conclude by suggesting to you that I know there
is legal authority, that is, there are legal scholars who
believe there is residual authority from seven years ago if the
President wishes to use force in Iraq. I support his use of
force. I think he would be very wise, both constitutionally and
politically, if he decides to do that, to seek specific
authorization to do so. But I will get into that in the
question and answer period.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield the floor.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Biden
Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming the Secretary to the
Committee this morning. Madam Secretary, last year this Committee and
the Administration cooperated constructively on many issues to advance
the foreign policy interests of the United States.
I commend Chairman Helms for his leadership and look forward to
working with both of you this year to address many critical and far-
reaching decisions that will affect American security well into the
21st century.
The most critical challenge for American policy is forging, and
implementing, a new strategy of containment--a strategy directed not
against a particular nation or ideology, but against a more diffuse
danger--the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction.
It is commonplace to speak of ``defining moments.'' But it is clear
that Iraq's intransigence over U.N. inspections presents just such a
moment. If the world cannot summon the will to act decisively against
the ambitions of the world's most dangerous dictator to attain the
world's most dangerous weapons, then there is little prospect that the
international community can unify against less obvious threats.
Last week, you engaged in tireless diplomatic efforts to seek such
unity against Iraq. Oddly, other members of the Security Council
continue to indulge the fantasy that Saddam will suddenly begin
listening to reason.
Members of Congress do not share that delusion. We look forward to
receiving the President's recommendations with regard to the need to
use force to contain, if not destroy, Iraq's capability to produce
weapons of mass destruction.
I recognize that the Administration asserts that it has the legal
authority under the 1991 Gulf War resolutions to use military force
against Iraq. Nonetheless, if the President decides that the military
action is warranted, he would be wise to seek a specific legal
authorization from this Congress. I would support such an authorization
and believe it would receive overwhelming support.
I would hope that the Administration would also attain support in
this Committee for a new instrument aimed at containing nuclear weapons
proliferation: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The treaty, signed in
1996, is the culmination of nearly four decades of effort, beginning
with the Eisenhower Administration. Along with the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, the Test Ban Treaty is an essential tool in the
global strategy of containment.
A second critical challenge for the United States is assuring
security and stability on the European continent--where Americans
fought two bloody wars in this century. For nearly fifty years, the
North Atlantic Alliance has been the cornerstone of European security;
its enlargement to admit the new democracies in Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic will be a key building block in cementing the
democratic foundation in Central Europe. Because of the strong
leadership of Chairman Helms, I am confident that this Committee and
the Senate will give a strong endorsement to NATO enlargement in March.
A stable Europe is not possible, however, if the ethnic tinderbox
in the former Yugoslavia is allowed to reignite. Having been to Bosnia
twice in the past six months, most recently with the President in
December, I am convinced that President Clinton made the right decision
in extending the American troop presence there. Although the carnage of
the Bosnian conflict has been halted, and Bosnia is slowly rebuilding,
the peace is far from secure.
The hardest tasks remain. We must press the parties to fulfill the
promise of Dayton: freedom of movement, the return of refugees to their
homes, the seating of all elected municipal governments, and the
cooperative reconstruction of Bosnia. Further, we must demand the
arrest of indicted war criminals. The responsibility here is also ours:
NATO's policy of turning a blind eye to suspected war criminals must
end.
A third critical challenge for U.S. foreign policy is reorienting
and reforming our institutions, both domestic and international, for
the coming decades. Last year, the Senate overwhelmingly passed
landmark legislation, initiated by this Committee, to reorganize our
foreign affairs agencies and reform the United Nations. Unfortunately,
a handful of members in the House blocked the bill because of an
unrelated issue.
I hope I speak for the chairman in stating that we both remain
committed to the reorganization and U.N. reform bill. I'm not sure how
and when we'll cross the finish line, but we have come too far to fail.
The economic crisis in Asia presents an opportunity for the United
States to re-examine and reinvigorate the International Monetary Fund.
We must ensure that the IMF, created in the wake of World War Two, is
equipped for an era of economic globalization.
I commend the President for recognizing the importance of the Asian
crisis by requesting early consideration of $18 billion in funding for
the IMF. The financial meltdown in Asia affects our economic and
security interests; we must act, out of our own self-interest, to help
bring stability to the region.
Last year, this Committee authorized $3.5 billion for the New
Arrangements to Borrow. I look forward to working with the chairman and
other members of the Committee on legislation to authorize the IMF
quota increase and to strengthen the IMF's ability to address future
financial crises.
Madam Secretary, there is much more to say about the ambitious
agenda before the Committee this year, but I will stop there. In
closing, I want to commend you for the extraordinary start you made in
your first year as Secretary. You have a unique ability to communicate
to the public regarding the importance of international affairs to our
security. And that ability is critical, because no foreign policy can
succeed unless it has the informed support of the American people.
The Chairman. Madam Secretary, I would appreciate it and I
think most people listening on television and here in the
hearing room would enjoy an update on Iraq as you see it. You
can do it now or you can do it later; but I would suggest that
you do it now, because that is one of the things everyone is
waiting for.
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY OF STATE
Secretary Albright. Fine. Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, first of all, thank you very much. I have some part
of that in my remarks. But let me just do a quick update before
I go to those.
First of all, I think that we have made very clear over and
over again that it is essential for Saddam Hussein to live up
to his Security Council obligations and allow unfettered,
unconditional access for the United Nations inspectors. They
are the only ones who can really determine whether he still has
weapons of mass destruction and then continue monitoring
whether he is going to be able to reconstitute them.
We want very much to be able to solve this situation
diplomatically. But if we are not able to, we will, in fact,
use the force that we have now gathered in the Gulf. The
purpose of that use of force would be to substantially diminish
Saddam Hussein's ability to reconstitute his weapons of mass
destruction and the delivery systems for them, as well as not
to threaten his neighbors.
Obviously, we believe we have the authority in the United
Nations to be able to do that. In response to Senator Biden's
question, we believe that the President has the constitutional
authority to undertake this. But, obviously, we would welcome
Congressional support.
As you may have heard this morning, there is increasing
international and public support. The Canadians this morning
said that they would join us, and the Germans have stated that
United States bases on its territory could be used to support
military operations. Yesterday, I met with three of the new
invitees to NATO. They said, subject to consultations with
their governments, they were prepared to join us.
When I was in the Gulf, it was evident there to me that the
countries understood the fact that Saddam Hussein was to blame
for this crisis; that he had to bear the consequences of it;
that they would prefer to solve the issue diplomatically, as do
we; but that, if we had to use force, it was clear that Saddam
was responsible for the grave consequences.
When I met with them privately, not one of them said to me
go home and tell your president not to use force. As I say,
they prefer the diplomatic solution; but they did not, in fact,
say go tell your president not to use force.
So, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, what we are
doing is trying to follow out the diplomatic string, but it is
running out, frankly. We are prepared to use force. The
President has not made the decision. We are gathering
additional support. We feel confident that we will have the
support we need.
I would be happy to answer questions as we go on with this,
but should I go on with my statement?
The Chairman. Why don't you proceed with your statement.
Secretary Albright. OK.
I have been traveling a lot, lately, so it is very nice to
be back here where you always make me feel at home. Of course,
as a mother I know that home is where the hardest questions get
asked and where it is almost never enough to say I'll provide
the answer for the record.
Just one year ago, I came before this committee to ask your
help in creating a new foreign policy framework adapted to the
demands of a new century. And, although we have had a few
disagreements, on the whole we have worked together
successfully to advance American interests and sustain American
leadership. But major accomplishments lead to great
expectations. And so, this morning I am here again to ask for
your help.
It is true that, as we meet, America is prosperous and at
peace in a world more democratic than ever before. But
experience warns us that the course of history is neither
predictable nor smooth, and we know that in our era, new perils
may arise with 21st century speed.
So if Americans are to be secure, we must seize the
opportunity that history has presented to bring nations closer
together around basic principles of democracy, free markets,
respect for law, and a commitment to peace.
This is not an effort we undertake with a scorecard or a
stop watch in hand. But every time a conflict is settled or a
nuclear weapon dismantled, every time a country starts to
observe global rules of trade, every time a drug kingpin is
arrested or a war crime prosecuted, the ties that bind the
international system are strengthened.
America's place in this system is at the center and our
challenge is to keep strong and sure the connections between
regions and among the most prominent nations. We must also help
other nations become full partners by lending a hand to those
building democracy, emerging from poverty, or recovering from
conflict.
We must summon the spine to deter, the support to isolate,
and the strength to defeat those who run roughshod over the
rights of others, and we must aspire not simply to maintain the
status quo, for that has never been good enough for America.
Abroad, as at home, we must aim for higher standards so that
the benefits of growth and the protections of law are shared
not only by the lucky few but by the hard working many.
All this requires a lot of heavy lifting, and we will
insist that others do their fair share. But do not doubt: if we
want to protect our people, grow our economy, improve our lives
and safeguard the freedoms we cherish, we must stamp this
heretofore unnamed era with a clear identity, grounded in
democracy, dedicated to justice, and committed to peace.
Mr. Chairman, the best way to begin this year's work is to
finish last year's, and last year, working together, we
developed creative plans to restructure our foreign policy
institutions and to encourage United Nations reform while
paying our long overdue U.N. bills.
Unfortunately, a small group of House members blocked final
passage of those measures, along with the funding for IMF, not
because they opposed our ideas or had credible arguments
against them. They simply wanted to take a valuable piece of
legislation hostage. The victims were your constituents; for,
without reorganization, our effort to improve foreign policy
effectiveness is slowed, and the failure to pay our U.N. bills
has already cost us.
Last December, the General Assembly voted on a plan that
could have cut our share of U.N. assessments by roughly $100
million every year. Because of what happened, we lost that
opportunity and our taxpayers lost those savings.
But paying our U.N. bills is about more than money. It is
also about principle and our vital interests. We have important
business to conduct at the United Nations, from dealing, as I
just said, with Saddam Hussein to punishing genocide. And we
know that the U.N. is not, as some have seemed to suggest, an
alien presence on U.S. soil. It was ``made in America.'' Our
predecessors brought the U.N. together, led the drafting of the
U.N. Charter, and helped write the U.N. rules.
Mr. Chairman, this issue is not complicated, it is simple.
The best America is a leader, not a debtor. Let us act soon to
put our U.N. arrears behind us, restore America's full
influence within the U.N. system, move ahead with U.N. reform,
and use the U.N. as its founders intended, to make the world
safer, more prosperous, and more humane.
Even as we deal with old business we must think anew.
Normally, when I review U.S. policies around the world, I begin
with Europe and Asia. This morning, I want to break with
tradition and start with the crossroads linking those
continents, the vast territory that stretches from the Suez and
Bosporus in the West to the Caucasus and Caspian in the North
to the Bay of Bengal in the Southeast.
In case you are wondering about my prop (indicating), when
I was a professor I read a book by Zbigniew Brzezinski, and he
said that depending upon how you look at the map is the way you
look at the world.
Now most Americans look at the globe by having the United
States in the center--this way (indicating). However, if you
turn the globe around and look at it in terms of the Eurasian
continent that I am about to talk about, you see things quite
differently. You have your own versions, up there.
But as a professor, I always think that it is kind of fun
to be able to look at this from other people's perspectives,
and I have found that very illustrative, depending upon how you
look at it.
Senator Biden. Madam Secretary, with the permission of the
chairman, might I interrupt? For years and years in the Foreign
Relations Committee, we had a map along one wall, with the
United States sitting in the middle, flanked by the rest of the
world. I didn't know one single world leader who came in who
didn't comment on our perspective on that. [General laughter]
Secretary Albright. But the main thing is, when you do it
that way, you only see pieces of Eurasia on either side. And if
you look at it the other way, you can see the vastness of it.
The reason that I want to begin with this part of the world
this time is this. As much as any region, the choices made here
during the remaining months of this century will determine the
shape of the next. They will decide, for example, whether
weapons of mass destruction cease to imperil the Gulf and South
Asia; whether the oil and gas fields of the Caucasus in Central
Asia become reliable sources of energy; and whether the opium
harvests of death in Burma and Afghanistan are shut down;
whether the New Independent States become strong and successful
democracies; and whether international terrorists will have the
support they need to perpetrate their crimes.
Developing an integrated approach to this varied part of
the world is a major challenge. But we approach it with a set
of common principles.
First we must avoid a modern version of the so-called
``great game,'' in which past scrambles for power led to war
and misery. Each nation's sovereignty must be respected and the
goal of each should be stability and prosperity that is widely
shared.
Second, cooperation must extend to security. Nations must
have the wisdom and the will to oppose the agents of terrorism,
proliferation, and crime.
Third, neighbors must live as neighbors, by settling
differences fairly and peaceably.
Fourth, the international community must nurture inter-
ethnic tolerance and respect for humanitarian rights, including
women's rights.
U.S. policy is to promote and practice these principles, to
urge all to rise above the zero-sum thinking of the past, and
to embrace the reality that cooperation by all will yield for
all a future of greater prosperity, dignity, and peace.
That is certainly our message in the Middle East, where we
continue to seek progress toward a just, lasting, and
comprehensive settlement.
Last month, President Clinton presented ideas to Chairman
Arafat and Prime Minister Netanyahu in an effort to break the
current stalemate, recognizing that the parties, given the
level of their distrust, might respond to us, even if they
remain reluctant to respond to each other.
The issue now is whether the leaders are prepared to make
the kind of decisions that will make it possible to put the
process back on track. Indeed, we have to ask: are they
prepared to promote their common interests as partners or are
they determined to compete and return to an era of zero-sum
relations?
The stakes are high. That is why we have been involved in
such an intense effort to protect the process from collapsing.
U.S. credibility in the region and the interests of our
Arab and Israeli friends depend upon it.
The stakes are also high in the confrontation between the
international community and Iraq. Saddam Hussein is an
aggressor who has used weapons of destruction, mass
destruction, before and, if allowed, will surely use or
threaten to use them again.
Since 1991, he has been denied this opportunity for he has
been trapped in a strategic box, hemmed in by the four walls of
the U.N. sanctions, inspections, monitoring, and tough-minded
enforcement. Now he seeks to escape.
Instead of going through the front door by complying with
U.N. Security Council resolutions, Saddam is trying to sneak
out the back with weapons of mass destruction in hand and
aggressive intentions unchanged.
At the same time, Saddam is trying to pin blame for the
suffering of the Iraqi people on the United States and the
United Nations. The truth is that Saddam does not care a fig
about the Iraqi people whom he has terrorized and brutalized
for years.
Arab leaders tell me of the concerns their citizens have
for the plight of the Iraqi civilians, and that concern is
fully shared by the United States and the American people.
Saddam knows this, which is why he so ``bravely'' sends women
and children to guard his palaces in times of crisis.
The United States has strongly supported efforts through
the U.N. to see that foods and medicines are made available to
the Iraqi people. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has
proposed to expand these efforts, and we are looking hard at
how best to do that.
Meanwhile, the blame for Iraqi suffering does not rest with
the international community. It rests with Saddam Hussein.
As President Clinton has made clear, we will not allow
Baghdad to get away with flagrantly violating its obligations.
Saddam does not have a menu of choices. He has one: Iraq must
comply with the U.N. Security Council resolutions and provide
U.N. inspectors with the unfettered access they need to do
their job.
As I said, Mr. Chairman, there is still time for a
diplomatic solution. But the lower half of the hour-glass is
filling rapidly with sand. If Iraq's policies and behavior do
not change, we will have no choice but to take strong
measures--not pinpricks but substantial strikes that will
diminish Saddam's capacity to reconstitute his weapons of mass
destruction programs and reduce his ability to threaten Iraq's
neighbors and the world.
Let no one miscalculate. We have the authority to do this,
the responsibility to do this, and the means and the will.
The strategies we apply in places such as the Gulf, the
Caucasus, and Central Asia, show how much the political map has
changed. They show as well that the regional categories into
which we once divided the world no longer suffice.
But whether the problems we face are old or new, there is
still one relationship that more than any other will determine
whether we meet them successfully, and that is our relationship
with Europe.
Today, we are working with Europe to meet global
challenges, such as proliferation, crime, and the environment.
And we are working in Europe to realize this century's most
elusive dream, a Europe that is whole, free, prosperous, and at
peace. That effort is reflected in the Dayton Accords.
Around Christmas, I went to Bosnia with the President and
Senator Dole. We found a nation that remains deeply divided,
but where multi-ethnic institutions are, once again, beginning
to function. Economic growth is accelerating, indicted war
criminals are surrendering or being arrested, refugees are
slowly beginning to return, and a new Bosnian-Serb government
is acting on its pledge to implement Dayton.
More slowly than we foresaw, but as surely as we had hoped,
the infrastructure of Bosnian peace is taking shape and the
psychology of reconciliation is taking hold. But if we were to
withdraw our support and presence from Bosnia now, as some
urge, the confidence we are building would erode and the result
could well be a return to genocide and war.
Quitting is not the American way. We should continue to
play an appropriate role in Bosnia as long as our help is
needed, our allies and friends do their share, and, most
importantly, the Bosnian people strive to help themselves. That
is the right thing to do. It is the smart thing and it is the
only way to insure that when our troops do leave Bosnia, they
leave for good.
The effort to recover from war in Bosnia reminds us how
important it is to prevent war and how much we owe to those who
designed and built NATO, which has been for a half century the
world's most powerful defender of freedom and its most
effective deterrent to aggression.
In two weeks, I will be back again with you to seek your
support for making America among the earliest to ratify the
first round of NATO enlargement and thereby make America safer,
NATO stronger, and Europe more stable and united.
Mr. Chairman, moving around this globe, one of our most
important foreign policy objectives is to build an inclusive
Asia-Pacific community based on stability, shared interests,
and the rule of law. To this end, we have fortified our core
alliances, crafted new defense guidelines with Japan, and
embarked on four party talks to create a basis for lasting
peace on the Korean Peninsula.
We have also intensified our dialog with China, achieving
progress on proliferation, regional security cooperation, and
other matters, while maintaining our principles on respect for
humanitarian rights.
Let me stress here, Mr. Chairman, that engagement is not
the same as endorsement. We continue to have sharp differences
with China. But we also believe that the best way to narrow
those differences is to encourage China to become a fully
responsible participant in the international system.
Finally, we have been working with the IMF and the world
community to respond to the financial crisis in East Asia. Our
approach is clear: to recover from the current period of
instability, the nations affected must reform, and if they are
willing to do so, we will help.
We have adopted this approach because East Asia includes
some of our closest allies and friends, including South Korea,
which faces a large and well armed military force across the
DMZ. The region also includes some of the best customers for
U.S. products and services, and if they can't buy, we can't
sell.
Moreover, since the IMF functions as a sort of inter-
governmental credit union, its efforts to assist East Asian
economies won't cost U.S. taxpayers a nickel. Still, there are
some who say we should disavow the IMF, abandon our friends,
and stand aside, letting the chips or dominoes fall where they
may.
It is possible if we were to do so that East Asia's
financial troubles would not spread and badly hurt our own
economy, and that our decision to walk away would not be
misunderstood, and a wave of anti-American sentiment would not
be unleashed, and new security threats would not arise in this
region where 100,000 American troops are deployed.
All this is possible. But I would not want to bet American
security or jobs of your constituents on that proposition, or
it would be a very, very bad bet.
Even with full backing for the IMF and diligent reforms in
East Asia, recovery will take time and further tremors are
possible. But the best way to end the crisis is to back the
reforms now being implemented, approve our 15 percent share of
resources to the IMF, work to keep the virus from spreading,
and develop strategies for preventing this kind of instability
from arising again.
Mr. Chairman, closer to home, we meet at a time of
heightened emphasis in our policy toward the Americas. This
attention is warranted not only by proximity of geography but
by proximity of values; for today, with one lonely exception,
every government in the hemisphere is freely elected.
In the weeks ahead, we will be preparing for the second
Summit of the Americas, intensifying our effort to strengthen
democracy in Haiti and pressing for democratic change in Cuba.
Christmas had a specific meaning in Havana this year because of
the Pope's visit. But we will not rest until another day,
election day, has meaning there as well.
We are also heightening our diplomatic emphasis on Africa,
where the President will visit soon. During my own recent trip,
I was impressed by the opportunity that exists to help
integrate that continent into the world economy, build
democracy, and gain valuable allies in the fight against global
threats.
To frame a new American approach to the new Africa, we will
be seeking your support for the President's initiative to
promote justice and development in the Great Lakes and for the
proposed Africa Growth and Opportunity Act.
Mr. Chairman, many of our initiatives are directed, as I
have discussed, at particular countries or regions. But others
are best considered in global terms.
For example, it is a core purpose of U.S. foreign policy to
halt the spread and possible use of weapons of mass
destruction, which remains the most serious threat to the
security of our people.
To this end, we employ many means from traditional
negotiations to counter-terrorism, to cooperative threat
reduction programs, such as those pioneered by the Nunn-Lugar
legislation. We will also be seeking an early opportunity to
testify before the committee in support of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, a long sought agreement strongly backed by our
military and by the majority of the American people, which
would make us all safer by hindering the development and spread
of new and more dangerous nuclear weapons.
A second, over-arching goal of our foreign policy is to
promote a healthy world economy in which American genius and
productivity receive their due. Through bipartisan efforts we
have put our fiscal house in order, and our economy is stronger
than it has been in decades. I am pleased that American
diplomacy has contributed much to this record.
To stay on this upward road, we will be working with
Congress this year to gain for the President the fast track
trade negotiating authority he needs to reach new agreements
that will benefit our economy, workers, farmers, and business
people.
A third global objective of ours is to meet and defeat
international crime; and here we are using a full box of
diplomatic tools, from building viable judicial and law
enforcement institutions, to eradicating coca and opium
poppies, to forging bilateral law enforcement agreements, to
speaking frankly with foreign leaders about the need to close
ranks.
There is no silver bullet in this fight. But as our
increased budget requests reflect, we are pushing ahead hard.
Our purpose is to assemble a kind of global neighborhood watch
which denies criminals the space they need to operate and
without which they cannot survive.
The United States also has a major foreign policy interest
in ensuring a healthy global environment. So we will be working
to ensure that the promise of the Kyoto Protocol is realized,
including through the meaningful participation of developing
countries in the global response to climate change.
We took an essential step at Kyoto, but we have more to do.
Finally, we will continue to ensure that our foreign policy
reflects the ideals and values of our people. We will support
democratic aspirations and institutions however and wherever we
effectively can do so. We will advocate increased respect for
human rights, vigorously promote religious freedom, and firmly
back the International War Crimes Tribunal. And we will renew
our request that this committee approve, at long last, the
Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women.
Senators, American leadership is built on American ideals,
backed by our economic and military might and supported by our
diplomacy. Unfortunately, despite progress made last year with
bipartisan support from this committee, the resources we need
to support our diplomacy are stretched thin.
Over the past decade, funding in real terms has declined
sharply, personnel levels are down, training has been cut. We
face critical infrastructure needs. Our information systems
badly need modernizing, and we have seen the share of our
Nation's wealth that is used to support democracy and
prosperity around the globe shrink steadily so that now, among
industrialized nations, we are dead last.
I urge the committee to support the President's budget
request in its entirety, remembering, as you do so, that
although international affairs amount to only about one percent
of the Federal budget, it may well account for 50 percent of
the history that is written about our era, and it affects the
lives of 100 percent of the American people.
A half century ago this month, a communist coup in my
native Czechoslovakia altered forever the course of my life and
prompted, as well, an urgent reappraisal by the West of what
would be required to defend freedom in Europe. In that testing
year, a Democratic President and a Republican Congress approved
the Marshall Plan, laid the groundwork for NATO, helped create
the Organization of American States, established the Voice of
America, recognized the infant State of Israel, airlifted life
sustaining aid to a blockaded Berlin, and helped an embattled
Turkey and Greece remain on freedom's side of the Iron Curtain.
Secretary of State Marshall called this a brilliant
demonstration of the American people's ability to meet the
great responsibility of their new world positions.
Some believe Americans have changed and that we are now too
inward looking to shoulder such responsibilities. In 1998, we
have the opportunity to prove the cynics wrong; and, Senators,
I believe we will.
From the streets of Sarajevo to the Arabian and Korean
Peninsulas, to classrooms in Africa, board rooms in Asia, and
courtrooms at the Hague, the influence of American leadership
is as deep and as beneficial in the world today as it has ever
been. This is not the result of some foreign policy theory. It
is a reflection of American character.
We Americans have a big advantage, because we know who we
are and what we believe in. We have a purpose; and, like the
farmer's faith that seeds and rain will cause crops to grow, it
is our faith that if we are true to our principles, we will
succeed.
Let us then do honor to that faith in this year of
decision. Let us reject the temptation of complacency and
assume not with complaint but with welcome the leader's role
established by our forbears. And by living up to the heritage
of our past, let us together and with God's help fulfill the
promise of our future so that we may enter the new century
free, respected, prosperous, and at peace.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee. I am happy to answer questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Albright appears in
the Appendix.]
The Chairman. Well said, Madam Secretary.
We have a great many Senators here today, and I have an
idea that others will join us as the time approaches for them
to ask questions. Therefore, because of the Secretary's time
limitation and because of the vote at 11 this morning, the roll
call vote, I am going to recommend that each round of questions
be limited to five minutes.
Now, Madam Secretary, Asia's democrats recognize the need
for political reform in order for Asia to find its way out of
the current economic crisis.
Now, South Korean President Elect Kim, who will take office
at the end of this month, blames his country's economic
problems on its authoritarian past. Mr. Kim said, and I quote
him, ``I believe the fundamental cause of the financial crisis,
including here in Korea, is the placing of economic development
ahead of democracy.''
Meanwhile, Martin Lee, the leader of Hong Kong's Democratic
Party, has also urged the United States and the West, and I
quote him, ``to seek not only economic restructuring from
Asia's teetering autocratic regimes, but substantial political
reform as well.''
I guess the obvious question, Madam Secretary, is this. Do
you associate yourself with the remarks of those two men?
Secretary Albright. Well, I do believe in democracy and I
do believe that a democratic form of government and market
reforms are the best way for countries to go. And it is our
hope that countries throughout the world do, in fact, choose
this way of operating because it is the best way to insure the
best life for their citizens.
The Chairman. I like that answer, but I want you to be a
little bit more specific, if you can and will.
What specific plans does the administration have to deal
with the political causes of the economic crisis?
Secretary Albright. Mr. Chairman, we are at this time
obviously very concerned about the financial crisis and have
spent a great deal of time--all of us, Treasury, State, and
other parts of the government--working together in order to try
to stem the problem. We have been backing the IMF because the
IMF we believe has the best process procedure, to having this
come about.
At the same time, we are also talking to the political
leadership and, specifically, in Korea, where obviously the
accession of Kim Dae Jung is a very important step. I think the
way that he has handled the situation, even while in a
transitional forum because he has not yet taken office, has
enabled him to show his support for the process and for
understanding that he needs to put his country back on its
feet. His election I think and the people that he has put there
has been very important.
In Indonesia, there is an election coming up. We have been
talking to President Suharto. I think it is important for the
legacy that he has put in economically to be maintained. But it
is very important for the system to be opened up and for
greater pluralism to take place.
So specifically, Mr. Chairman, as we are trying to deal
with the financial problems which are deep and need to be dealt
with, we are talking to the countries about generally the
importance of political reform where it is appropriate.
The Chairman. Well, as to IMF, I guess you saw Bill Simon's
piece in the Wall Street Journal the other day. You are going
to have some selling to do on the IMF, I think, even with me.
Along another line, I was delighted to hear you discuss the
ABM modifications. The administration, I think about nine
months ago, promised to submit amendments to the 1972 ABM
Treaty to the Senate for its constitutional advice and consent.
We are yet to see those documents and ``time is a wastin'.''
It has been 26 years since the Senate ratified the original
ABM Treaty, and I think the time has come for the Senate to
conduct a thorough review of the strategic rationale behind
that treaty which is, in my judgment, outdated.
When can the committee expect the President to fulfill the
promise to the Senate by submitting these documents so that we
can begin the review?
Secretary Albright. Mr. Chairman, we are committed to
seeking the Senate's advice and consent to the memorandum on
succession and the two agreed statements. As we have said, we
will send this forward with the START II extension protocol
after the Russians have ratified.
We believe that the ABM Treaty contributes in an important
way to stability and the agreed statements that accompany it
that allow theater missile defenses to go forward.
So you will be seeing all of that. We will send it up to
you. But, as I said, we are waiting for START II and the
Russians.
The Chairman. Have you got a sort of time certain, a no
later than?
Secretary Albright. We have been talking with the Russians
about the importance of their Duma ratifying, and I have spent
a great deal of time with Foreign Minister Primakov discussing
this. He is testifying before the Duma on the subject. I cannot
give you an exact date because that is what we are waiting for.
The Chairman. I am smiling because I know you cannot
guarantee the date if you are going to rely on the Russians.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, again, welcome.
Now five minutes is a proper time for us. It doesn't give
us much time to get into much detail, but this is more of a
survey, if you will, as to the state of the world.
To state the obvious, your becoming the Secretary of State
has had a lot to do, in my view, with this committee
functioning as cooperatively and as well as it has with the
administration. Although seeing Mrs. Helms in the audience, I
would say it is probably more of a consequence of her than it
is of the chairman.
All kidding aside, there are going to be some rough patches
that we are going to hit here because the chairman and others
have very deep philosophic concerns and disagreements relative
to arms control issues.
We have the Test Ban Treaty. Indeed, we have a very, very
full agenda. On some of the items that are going to first come
out of the box here, such as IMF, the chairman was kind
enough--not kind enough; the chairman exercised his leadership.
We acted on it. He did not agree to the $3.5 billion
contribution; but we prevailed, and he allowed the committee to
do its work.
But he is correct. I am afraid we are going to have a
harder time for the additional $14 billion. I think we should
be doing that. But I will withhold my questions on that because
Secretary Rubin and Alan Greenspan are going to be appearing
before the committee--not that you don't have full command of
the subject, but there is much more to discuss with you.
On Iraq, we have had some difficulty crafting a resolution.
To his great credit, the Republican Leader, in the response to
the State of the Union, made it clear to Saddam Hussein that
Americans, Democrats and Republicans alike in the Congress,
stood together in being willing to oppose his outrageous
actions.
But the devil is in the details, and as we are drafting
that resolution, there is some disagreement among Republicans,
among Democrats, between Democrats and Republicans in the House
and the Senate. It seems to come down to the degree of force
that we are willing, able, and wish to exercise if diplomacy
runs its course and ultimately fails.
I would like to ask you a very pointed question, if I may,
which is this. If we were, as some suggest and as we all would
like, to topple Saddam Hussein--I have been operating on the
assumption, by the way, parenthetically, that that means his
regime. My question is, in your judgment, in generic terms,
what would it take to topple him?
Number two, and an area of your expertise that is more
appropriate, rather than force structures and balance of forces
is, if he were to be toppled, what would we replace him with?
Would it require American troops to be stationed in Iraq in
your judgment for a serious amount of time? Is there an
indigenous alternative to Saddam Hussein? What, in your view,
would Iran feel compelled to do in light of the fact hundreds
of thousands of Iranians and Iraqis were killed in a long,
drawn-out, protracted war over oil fields?
Can you discuss with us for a moment--and I realize this
will take up all my time--but can you discuss with us what
alternatives we would be faced with? We always ask the
question: ``what next if bombing does not work?'' What next if
we topple Saddam?
Secretary Albright. Senator Biden, let me just say that,
as we have looked at the Saddam problem, which is really what
it has been, for the last almost decade, it is one of the most
serious ones that we face as a country.
He has, as we know, been able to develop these weapons of
mass destruction and did invade another country. For the years
that I was at the United Nations, we worked very assiduously to
keep the sanctions regime in place. It is the toughest
sanctions regime in the history of the world. Ambassador
Richardson is there also working to keep it in place.
But keeping the coalition together on that for a variety of
reasons became difficult, partially because Saddam Hussein was
using his people as a pawn and crying crocodile tears, making
it seem as if it had become an Iraq-U.S. battle when it is
basically Iraq versus the world.
Now there are three ways at this moment that the President
could deal with this and that we together could deal with this
issue. One is to do nothing. One would be to reconstitute a
force of a half million, as we had in 1990-1991, when a
decision was made at that time not to topple him, or to do what
we are trying to do now, which is to work at the problem that
we have, which is an issue that is a problem for our national
interest. This is his ability to create these weapons of mass
destruction or threaten his neighbors.
This is why what we have decided to do is, if, in fact, we
do have to use force--and let me repeat, again, that we prefer
the diplomatic route--we must make sure we diminish his
capability substantially to reconstitute these weapons of mass
destruction and the delivery systems as well as not threaten
his neighbors.
I know we all have been talking, as have all of you, about
the possibility of what it would be like after Saddam Hussein.
A year ago about this time I made a speech in which I said that
we are ready to deal with a post-Saddam regime.
We have, in the past, dealt with opposition groups. We are
interested in doing so again. But we have to realize that that
takes additional resources, something that you all may wish to
address yourselves to, that also we need to see what it would
look like afterwards.
I think you, Senator, have raised a lot of the issues. We
have said all along that we are committed to the territorial
integrity of Iraq.
I think that we all will have to consult and talk more
about this. There is not a simple solution to this problem. I
think what we have decided to do is the best course for now.
Senator Biden. Is it possible to topple him and leave?
Secretary Albright. I think it is not, Senator, because I
think that it is a country--and I don't want to go into too
much detail on this--chances are it would create a situation
which, for a time, would require the presence of troops.
Now let me just say this. I don't know how many here today
or in our discussions are prepared to send, again, a half
million troops into Iraq. At the time it took many months to
accomplish. There was an invasion, and I think these are the
kinds of subjects that we need to discuss. The President has
felt that there is not support nor a desire to constitute such
a force. And, as you say, it is not one that we can go in and
come out quickly.
I think that it would then require us to be there for some
time. But I don't want to speculate too much on that because
our goal is to deliver, if we do in fact use force--that it be
done not in a pin-prick fashion, as I said, but with a
substantial strike that would, in fact, allow us to accomplish
what the President has set out.
But let me just say that, no matter how one thinks about
what it would look like, I cannot imagine a worse regime than
the one they have now. So I do think we need to do what we have
to do now, follow the diplomatic route, talk to each other, and
explore those other things that we can look at.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Albright. Sorry to have taken so long.
The Chairman. Depending on the circumstances, you might
have more assistance from the Iraqi people than you would
imagine.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, you have touched upon many of these issues
in your prepared statement. But I would just observe, and I
want your counsel on what we do about it, that, essentially, at
a time in which we are heavily involved with the United
Nations, as you and others have pointed out, we have not paid
our dues, and there does not seem to be much prospect of that
for the moment unless somebody does something about it, either
in the administration or in Congress.
The IMF moneys are clearly in jeopardy, tied up at the end
of the session in the same package with the U.N. situation. But
the case for doing something in Asia is imperative. Life goes
on out there, even as we temporize here.
The State Department reorganization, likewise, is tied up
and is sort of in limbo, which is a problem for you and for us,
I believe. Fast Track authority disappeared. It may reappear,
but is critical, I think, as we head toward WTO negotiations as
well as toward the trade we are going to have to have, given
the lack of orders that are going to come as people in Asia
cancel what they want to do with this.
The enabling legislation for the Chemical Weapons
Convention is likewise tied up somewhere in the legislative
process, so much of that is not occurring. Finally, there is
the issue we discussed very pointedly today, the need for
Congressional action, which I think is very important, with
regard to our mission in Iraq. You have defined the mission
carefully and narrowly, as has the President in his press
conference. If it is still under discussion, so be it. But I
would hope that the President and the Congressional Leadership
would arrive at some language soon so that there could be a
vote up or down and there could be proper authorization for the
use of force.
I and others have observed that this is going to cost us
lives and money. There is a responsibility here that ought not
to be shifted in some way as we discuss past each other.
I just want some advice and counsel on what is to be done
with this long list. In essence, most of the tough issues of
American foreign policy are tied up somewhere that are not
observed. Nobody is having votes. Nobody is having debate.
The administration bears some responsibility here. Congress
clearly bears a lot. But who is going to get the logjam
unjammed? Who will do something that makes a difference with
regard to these issues?
Secretary Albright. Senator Lugar, thank you very much for
pointing out the large problems; because, while my colleagues
may not believe this, I actually enjoy coming up here and
having these discussions. I thank Senator Biden for his words
about how we all get along, and everybody knows that the
chairman and I do. So I think that the issue here is how we can
all do a better job without having our hands tied behind our
backs.
I have to tell you that I literally feel when I go out on
behalf of the U.S. that I cannot do it with both hands, and I
would like to have this ability. This is because we have not
been able to get final Congressional action on what you have
talked about--the U.N. arrears, the IMF, and the
reorganization.
I believe that the reorganization is very important to
streamline our foreign policy apparatus and to put the emphasis
in the right places, not to mention the other issues which I
will get to.
But I think what we need to be aware of, Senator, is as we
all know, those particular pieces of legislation were held up
by language that has to do with family planning and pro-choice
or pro-life issues.
I happen to have one view and many of you have another
view. The issue here is, I think, no matter which side of that
issue people are on, it is a very deep and important issue.
There are good folks on both sides of this issue and it needs
to be debated. It needs to be voted on. But it should not be on
national security issues.
Our national security is being harmed at this point, I
believe, by not being able to have all the assets that we need.
You would not want to go out there and try to represent
American interests with one hand tied behind your back and with
us not having the ability to really have full standing in terms
of our position at the U.N., because they do every time say
where is your money. And rightfully so, after all, because this
is not a bill; rather, these are dues.
The IMF I am sure we will have long discussions about. I
believe it is essential to an orderly process.
So I hope we are able to proceed. I hope that this
committee comes back to the legislation. We may have to change
some of the conditions a bit, because life is slightly
different at the moment. But I hope we do come back to it.
On the question of Iraq, as I said to Senator Biden, we do
think that we have the legal authority to go forward. But as we
have all said, we would very much like to have Congressional
support.
I can tell you that when I went out on my trip to Europe
and the Gulf the day after the State of the Union message,
where there was overall, bipartisan, loud applause for what the
President said about what he was going to do about Saddam
Hussein, it helped a lot. I can say that Congress was there,
speaking with the administration.
I would hope that we could show common cause here, debate
what is legitimate, obviously, and important. We have to make
sure that we send the right signal. So support would be
terrific.
The Chairman. Of course, if the President hadn't been so
insistent on vetoing the bill that you, I, and Joe Biden and
others worked so hard on, it would have been law last year.
Now the White House stonewalled that one. So maybe he could
swallow a little bit and take something that he doesn't like.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me at the outset of this question compliment you, Madam
Secretary, for the tremendous job that you are doing on behalf
of our country. We certainly all take great pride in the
tremendous efforts that you have made, particularly in the
situation in Iraq. I know my colleagues are focusing their
attention on that.
Senator Coverdell and I deal with Latin America. He is the
chairman of the subcommittee. I thought I might take that globe
and maybe bring it back to the picture that we usually see and
focus some attention here on our own hemisphere for a couple of
minutes, if I might, although I am sure you will want to get
back to Iraq very quickly and understandably so.
I would like to raise the issue of Cuba with you, Madam
Secretary. As you know, of course, the Pope made an historic
visit to Cuba just days ago that at least raises hopes that we
might see some changes inside Cuba.
Let me just at the outset say what I think all of us
embrace here, which is, obviously, that our fervent desire is
that democracy come to Cuba as quickly as possible. The people
of that country have the right to choose their own leadership
as quickly as possible. None of us retreats from that fervent
goal.
But some of us here have crafted a proposal that would at
least allow for the sale of medicine and food supplies to go to
the people of Cuba.
In fact, on his visit, the Pope called for such a move,
such a step to be made. So I would like to raise the issue with
you of whether or not the administration might be willing to
support the proposal that Senators Warner, Bennett, my
colleague from Minnesota, Senator Grams, Senator Leahy, Senator
Jeffords, and others and I have proposed to allow for the sale.
We allow, as I understand it, medicine and food to be sold
in Iraq, Iran, and Libya. This is about as unique a situation
as we have. We have some 20 cosponsors in a bipartisan proposal
here, and we would recommend this opening.
Why do we do it? I don't have any illusion that Fidel
Castro gets all of the medicine and food that he wants and
needs. The question is whether or not people down there who are
in desperate need--and we are told the situation is pretty
desperate--are going to get that help.
I have been told by some in the administration that we
allow these to go forward. There were some 28 licenses that
have been extended.
In our discussions with people who are involved in this,
they say that if we allow it, it is one of the best kept
secrets around. It is about $1.5 million or so that have gone
forward. In fact, a number of the licenses really do not amount
to much at all.
So I raise that question with you as to whether or not, in
light of the Pope's visit here, the Catholic Conference's call
for this modest change, one that is allowed for nations with
whom we have a far more hostile relationship, I might argue, as
hostile as the relationship is with Cuba, in light of that
whether we might begin to open up this door and see if we can't
try a different approach to bring about the desired change that
all of us wish for the people of Cuba.
Secretary Albright. Senator Dodd, I know we have all been
following very closely the events in Cuba and especially during
and after the Pope's visit. I think, since we are all aware of
the power of the Pope in many ways, but I think particularly of
what he has done to end communism in a variety of places--I
spent a lot of time studying this myself--I think the trip was
of great importance. What he did to make the Cuban people
understand that there were other things going on on the outside
and that they had a right to speak out on religious rights and
others was absolutely very important.
I do know about your bill, but I understand that Senator
Helms also has a proposal. I think that we are very interested
in reviewing this legislation to see what can be done. We will
look at it because I think that the points made are very
important and that, as often happens, the people, the Cuban
people, clearly are suffering under this regime.
But, as you pointed out yourself, Senator, some aid is
going in there, though not enough, obviously. We will take a
very careful look at your legislation.
Senator Dodd. I appreciate that. I have not had a chance to
talk with the chairman of the committee, and I appreciate
immensely his proposal here. I think it is a very positive step
and we ought to sit down and see if at some point soon here we
cannot move on that. I appreciate that.
I am watching the clock. I realize we have only five
minutes, so I will try to sneak one more question in to you. It
concerns Mexico and the annual drug certification process.
Last week, the administration made public a detailed
bilateral counter narcotics strategy drafted by Mexico and U.S.
authorities.
General McCaffrey I think has done an incredibly fine job
in a very, very difficult position. But he has been
tremendously cooperative and forthcoming with many of us up
here.
I know my colleague from California, Senator Feinstein, has
had numerous conversations with him.
I commend this effort. It is a tremendous effort that is
underway. The one thing lacking, and you may just want to give
a quick response to this, are benchmarks.
When I raised the issue last year about changing the
certification process--and I thought, Senator McCain and I
thought we ought to try something new here to multilateralize
this and approach it differently--one of the arguments raised
against it was that you did not really set out any benchmarks,
any guideposts here as to how you would achieve the same
results. It's not an illegitimate question.
I wonder if we might anticipate some benchmarks being laid
out in this approach that has just been crafted.
Secretary Albright. Well, we have all done a lot of
thinking and talking about this. We are looking at a variety of
ways to try to make the process work better. Benchmarks are one
way. But I don't have an answer for you yet on it.
Senator Dodd. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. I very much thank you, Madam Secretary, for
the work that you have done. As Senator Dodd said, I think all
of America is very proud of the way you have conducted
yourself. And, as the old saying goes, ``are you having fun
yet?''
Secretary Albright. Yes.
Senator Hagel. I can tell that you are.
Let me go back to Senator Biden's questions regarding Iraq.
I want to kind of develop that a little bit. Let me ask you
this.
Is the President, your colleague, Secretary Cohen, and
others--are you conferring with President Bush, Secretaries
Baker and Cheney, and General Powell on this issue?
Secretary Albright. We are having general discussions. I
have talked to some as have others. We have each talked to our
counterparts on the subject. I think that there are a variety
of views on it.
Senator Hagel. Well, you know your business. But I would
hope that that is being done. They developed a very successful
coalition, as you know, which was very successful in that
effort, at least in 1991. That leads me to the next question.
Why are we having such difficulty in developing Arab
support on this issue?
Secretary Albright. Well, first of all, let me say that it
was quite a different situation. Iraq had invaded, crossed a
border and invaded another country. It also took quite a long
time to put a coalition together. And I in no way wish to say
anything negative about that effort, because it was a brilliant
effort and we all saw America deal with what was a cross border
invasion in a very effective way.
But it was an effort that took a long time to put together.
Many people, as they talk about the coalition, know that it was
basically the U.S. and the U.K. that did the heavy lifting on
that. There were a number of countries that worked together.
So I in no way wish to take anything away from that or from
the great work that those gentlemen did. But I would like to
make that point.
Second, I have just come back from a lot of the Gulf States
and Secretary Cohen is out there now. I came back with the
following set of impressions from it.
First of all is that they are very concerned about what is
going on in Iraq. They understand about the problems of the
weapons of mass destruction and the fact that they do threaten
them. But it is less visible, I think, than a cross border
threat.
Second, they are fully convinced that this crisis has been
created by Saddam Hussein. They are concerned about the Iraqi
people, as are we, which is why we support this oil for food
plan that we wrote originally with Resolution 986 and that is
now being proposed to be expanded by Kofi Annan. They prefer a
diplomatic route, but they also understand that, should there
be consequences, they are the responsibility of Saddam Hussein,
who will be responsible for the grave consequences.
So I feel confident of their support. They state they have
domestic audiences, and they state their support for their own
purposes. But I do feel that, should we use force, they will be
helpful to us.
I think that they also understand the dangers, but it is
not quite the same situation as when Saddam Hussein invaded
Kuwait and there were six months to put together a coalition,
which was primarily a U.S.-U.K. operation.
Senator Hagel. Do you believe part of this problem is a
perception in the Arab world that we have tilted way too far
toward Israel in the Middle East peace process?
Secretary Albright. Some of them may think that. I do not
think that.
Senator Hagel. You don't think that's the case?
Secretary Albright. No, I do not. I think that these are
two separate issues, clearly very difficult ones. But my own
sense is we have to deal with both of them. We have to look at
our national interests. We have to deal with them both
separately. They are both very important to us.
We have ties with Israel that are indissoluble, and I think
that we have to work the Middle East peace process, which I do
and so does the President.
I think that some of them have stated those views, but I
don't agree.
Senator Hagel. But surely you believe that they are linked?
Secretary Albright. [Nods negatively]
Senator Hagel. You don't believe that there is any linkage
between the Middle East peace process and what is happening
with Iraq?
Secretary Albright. I prefer not to make that linkage.
Senator Hagel. You prefer not to make it?
Secretary Albright. Yes.
Senator Hagel. What are we doing collaterally in political
policy working with our allies over there, as Senator Biden was
referring to? What happens if we exercise the military option?
What happens after that? Are we doing anything in the political
world to drive him from Iraq, working with dissidents? Is there
anything you can share with us on what our policy is outside
maybe a military option and just focusing on sanctions and
resolutions?
Secretary Albright. Senator, as I have stated, we have
worked with opposition groups in the past and are interested in
working with them effectively. It is very hard to have this
discussion in this setting. We should probably discuss it
somewhere else.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Madam Secretary. I certainly join my colleagues in
expressing both pride in and gratitude for what you have
accomplished. It has been wonderful to watch.
As you know, I am a friend of much of what the
administration has sought to achieve in foreign policy, and I
am certainly a friend of yours on a personal level. But I must
say that, having attended now a number of briefings, both with
you, with Secretary Cohen, General Shelton and others, trying
to sort out where we are going, I have some concerns. I
probably find myself more hawkish than some in the
administration in the sense that I believe there is more that
we could, in fact, be doing. I am deeply concerned that this
situation may be sufficient to rise to the level of crisis that
it is for us--and I think it is. I think that the specter of
weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Saddam Hussein is
so deeply threatening to the region, weapons that have already
proven so provocative in his hands previously, that there is a
deep sense of concern over the lack of shared concern by
others, both in the Security Council and elsewhere.
This said, I am concerned about the parameters of potential
military action within which the administration appears to be
currently setting the terms.
On Friday, the President said that his decision was whether
any military action can substantially reduce or delay Saddam
Hussein's capabilities to develop weapons of mass destruction
and deliver them on his neighbors. Prior to that, the goal was
ostensibly to have unfettered and unconditional access to
inspections.
Today, you defined, in answer to Senator Biden, a response
that simply said to diminish his capability substantially and
reduce the ability to deliver or to threaten his neighbors.
It seems to me that that is a very temporary
accomplishment. You left out the word ``delay.'' Clearly, the
delay, according to most estimates, is only six months or so
before he could rebuild and threaten again. Everybody has
acknowledged that.
So I wonder if you could pull all of this together and
share with the American people in very precise and very defined
terms, if diplomacy breaks down, if we have to strike, or if
the decision is made to strike, what is the maximum that we can
anticipate we have accomplished by virtue of those strikes?
What have we done?
Then, of course, the question is where are we.
Secretary Albright. Senator, first of all, let me say that
I think that we need to keep our national interests in mind as
we look at this, and our national interests are to limit his
ability, reduce substantially, delay his ability to
reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction and the delivery
systems that are attached to that, as well as reduce his
ability to threaten his neighbors. Those are our national
interests at this time.
I think we are very concerned about his ability to have
weapons of mass destruction. So the words are the same as the
President's and those are our goals.
The second is that we do require unfettered, unconditional
access by the inspectors. We want Saddam to fulfill the
obligations that have been imposed upon him by the Security
Council.
The best way for this whole thing to end would be for
Saddam Hussein to go back and allow UNSCOM inspectors; because
UNSCOM has destroyed more weapons of mass destruction than were
destroyed in the Gulf War--38,000 chemical weapons, 100,000
gallons of chemical agent, 48 missiles, and warheads with 30
different kinds of weaponized warheads. So they do the best
job. That is why there is nothing contradictory between what
would be a military option versus what is our desire for the
best outcome, which is to have this unfettered and
unconditional access.
Senator Kerry. Well, the presumption is that if he has made
the decision not to have unfettered and unlimited access so as
to invite a strike, which has been promised, I presume, having
survived this strike, what then forces him to come around?
Secretary Albright. Well, I think, first of all, you will
have to have another briefing about the targeting of this at
some other time. But, as I have said, it will be a substantial
strike. We have made that very clear. This is in no comparison
to previous hits after the Gulf War. It will be a very
substantial strike and an important one in terms of its
targets.
We have also said that, if we get even any hint of the fact
that he is reconstituting, we will strike again. We have made
that clear. So this is not a one-time issue.
I think, Senator, what we have done, actually, is to be
very careful to define what it is we are doing for our national
interest. This is not to say, as I said, that we would not
welcome a post-Saddam regime or think about the other options
that you all have talked about. But we have tried to look at
what our national interests are here and to deal with them in
the most effective way we can.
Senator Kerry. I see my time is up.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Grams.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much.
Madam Secretary, it's nice to see you. I am pushing the
envelope on this vote, so I want to be very brief and quick and
will just ask a couple of quick questions. I will followup on
what Senator Kerry has said.
Retired General Norman Schwarzkopf has warned of a risk
that, just as in the bombing of North Vietnam during the
Vietnam War, pushing Iraq with air strikes without eliminating
Iraq's rulers only would toughen their resolve. Here you are
saying not a pin prick but a substantial air strike. It sounds
like we are kind of repeating some of the same things.
What exactly has the President set out to accomplish by
this? I don't know if I have heard that this morning. I know
that there are goals and objectives. But are you willing to
state exactly what those goals and objectives would be and how
they would be accomplished through a substantial air strike?
Secretary Albright. Well, as I have said, I think the
problem that we face is that Saddam Hussein is not coming clean
on what he has in terms of the weapons of mass destruction.
UNSCOM is the best way to deal with that problem.
If we are not able to have a diplomatic solution, that is,
one that would allow unfettered, unconditional access, then we
believe that we would have to take a military route. That route
would be to have a substantial strike--and I am not going to go
into the targets here--but that would substantially reduce his
ability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction and the
delivery systems and to threaten his neighbors.
That is what is in our national interest.
Now I think that there are those who would like us to
topple Saddam Hussein. I have said that that would take huge
ground forces, and they had those ground forces when General
Schwarzkopf was in charge. I think that the issue here is now
to decide what is in our national interest.
Senator Grams. So this would be more to delay his
capability than to eradicate it?
Secretary Albright. Well, it is to reduce it, delay it,
and to make sure substantially that he cannot regain his
ability with the weapons of mass destruction. ``Reconstitute''
is the word that we are using.
Senator Grams. I have two other quick areas. In Sudan, what
is the administration doing to put pressure on the Sudanese
Government right now, bilaterally or multilaterally through the
United Nations to lift what has now been imposed as a new
flight ban on the Bahr al Ghazal Province in Southern Sudan?
There is a lot of concern of urgently needed aid for up to
200,000 refugees. What is the government doing, the
administration, right now in the Sudan?
Secretary Albright. Well, we have a sanctions regime on
Sudan. But on that specific issue, we have some aid that goes
in. I will look into that specifically.
Senator Grams. We have had several inquiries and I am
trying to get some answers there.
Secretary Albright. I will get an answer for you, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
Department of State officials in Washington and Khartoum
have strongly protested to the Sudanese Government against the
flight ban in Bahr al Ghazal. The United Nations, with our
support, has also issued a protest.
On February 23, our Charge d'Affaires met with the U.N.'s
Special Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs in Sudan, Robert van
Shaik. The Charge expressed support for van Shaik's efforts to
get the flight ban lifted and urged him to tell Sudanese
authorities that the international community is prepared to
defy the flight ban if necessary to assist war-affected
civilians. Our Charge is organizing a multilateral demarche on
the Government of Sudan if it does not accede to van Shaik's
request.
The Sudanese have permitted U.N. personnel to go to Bahr al
Ghazal to conduct security and humanitarian needs assessments.
We are hopeful that the ban will be lifted soon. We will
continue our pressure on the Sudanese until it is lifted.
In the meantime, in an effort to get food to the more-than-
150,000 internally displaced persons in Bahr al Ghazal,
Operation Lifeline Sudan--a United Nations agency--is moving
food overland. USAID, working closely with Operation Lifeline
Sudan, will fund Norwegian Peoples Aid which will begin flying
food into Bahr al Ghazal on February 25 in defiance of the ban
if necessary. We expect other donor nations to provide funds to
the Norwegian group and/or other non-governmental
organizations.
In November, 1997 President Clinton imposed comprehensive
sanctions against Sudan. One of the reasons he cited for the
sanctions was ``the prevalence of human rights violations.''
Senator Grams. One final thing, quickly, Madam Secretary.
You, Ambassador Richardson, and Ambassador Sklar have given
this committee repeated assurances that the administration will
not certify that the U.N. has achieved a no-growth budget of
$2.533 billion if that amount was reached through any
accounting changes, like net budgeting. Madam Secretary,
quickly, would you state for the record that the administration
will only certify that the U.N. has achieved a no growth budget
if that is truly the case and no savings are recognized through
any kind of accounting gimmicks?
Secretary Albright. We have said that we would certify a
no-growth budget. I am not sure that we are going to agree as
to what you think is an accounting gimmick. But I think we want
there to be a real no-growth budget.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
Oh, Madam Secretary, I want to ask, just briefly, if there
are some questions that we cannot address here this morning in
the committee, would there be consideration maybe of another
closed door session to be able to ask more direct questions
with Iraq? I was just hoping that maybe you would consider that
within the next couple of days.
The Chairman. Madam Secretary, they have said for me that
cloture may be near.
Secretary Albright. For me?
The Chairman. I want to explain for those in the radio and
television audience that there have been all sorts of signals
with the security people. There was an unattended briefcase in
the back of the room.
Now don't anybody leave. It is gone. They handled it
gingerly, and I don't know whether they opened it or not. But
it will be safe, and you will be safe with Senator Lugar. I am
advised that two or three more Senators will be here to ask
questions.
If you will forgive me, I am going to go and vote. But I
will be right back.
Thank you.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar (presiding). Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Madam Secretary, in the statements that you made yesterday,
you commented on rumors that NATO expansion ratification could
have an amendment that limits new members or at least creates a
so-called pause effect of three to five years for additional
members to be considered.
Would you once again give your argument as to why the pause
idea is not a good idea?
Secretary Albright. Well, first of all, let me say that
the most important thing is that we have a strong and cohesive
NATO. I think that has been the basis of our policy. That is
why we decided that NATO expansion made sense, and also to try
to bring in countries that are ready to come into NATO based on
a set of guidelines that the NATO members have agreed upon and
an understanding that each new NATO member is ready to accept
the responsibilities as well as the privileges of NATO
membership.
We think that there needs to be an open door process
because what we do not want to do is create any new artificial
dividing lines because what we are trying to do, actually, is
eliminate them. If we were to say that there is a pause, it
would, in fact, create such a line and not allow the decisions
about expanded NATO membership to be made on the basis of
whether those countries are ready to come in.
It would be an artificial way of regulating it.
Now, if there are those that are concerned about who the
next members would be or when they would come, at the 1999 NATO
meeting there will be a review of how the process is working
and also, obviously, if new members were to be invited, then
you all would go back again through the process of advice and
consent on it.
It is just that we think that the pause is a very
artificial way to deal with it and does create the possibility
of a new dividing line.
Senator Lugar. How has the Foundation Act with Russia
worked this far? What are your impressions of how they are
working into this?
Secretary Albright. Let me say that I think it has
generally been working very well. There are those who predicted
the end of the world if we did expand NATO and that it would
hurt our relationships with the Russians. I think that the
truth is they have not changed their opinion about NATO. But we
have had two meetings of the Permanent Joint Council, one in
New York and one just now in Brussels. I think we are all
getting acclimated to how this works.
There was a great sense of history being made when Foreign
Minister Primakov was actually there at NATO in the meeting,
attending. I believe that a lot of work is being done. It is
establishing good working relationships on the issues of
concern there and made very clear that Russia does not have a
veto over any NATO decision, but that this is a way for there
to be discussions and consultations.
So I would say that it has been very useful and that it
will be a good vehicle.
Senator Lugar. The New York Times columnist, Tom Friedman,
this morning indicates that in the Czech Republic people are
very luke warm toward NATO membership. Is that an accurate
perception on the part of Tom Friedman?
You are an eye witness in many ways to the Czechs' ideas
about NATO. Could you testify as to what you think the
situation is there?
Secretary Albright. I think I have some reason to know
this issue, and I have checked on it. I do, in fact, think that
there is support in the public and there is support within the
government, which has been going through a lot of changes. But
I do think that the most eloquent spokesperson on behalf of
NATO expansion in President Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic.
I feel that there is support for it there. I think that
there are different polling results, but my own sense about
this is that there is an understanding and a desire for the
Czech Republic to be one of the three to come in.
Senator Lugar. In your testimony, you have offered support
and said it would be a priority that the administration would
try to bring about the African Growth and Opportunity Act. This
was initiated by distinguished House members. I have sponsored
or introduced it in the Senate. I was disappointed that it did
not move last year.
There were, apparently, mixed signals in the administration
with regard to some of the trade provisions, I gather with two
countries in textiles or some arrangement of this variety. Are
signals clear now and will there be strong administration
support in the relevant committees to move this legislation?
Secretary Albright. Yes.
We are very interested in this legislation and have it as
one of our priority issues. I was in Africa just before
Christmas. But my own sense is that we really need to look at
Africa in a different way. I tried very hard and was interested
in meeting with a variety of leaders in countries that I
thought offered great economic opportunities. It is essential
for us to see Africa as being able to be brought into the
global economy, not as a victim of it but as a partner in it.
This legislation will help us and you will see a lot of
emphasis put on it.
Senator Lugar. My understanding is that President Clinton
will go to Chile in April at another Summit of the Americas. Of
course, much is hoped for at that meeting. But some have
suggested that prior to that time, Fast Track authority ought
to be attempted again or at least some initiative that would
give the Chileans some hope that they might have access to
NAFTA, even if not Fast Track, or that somehow or other the
trading system in the hemisphere is likely to be liberalized,
to come unglued, prior to that very important meeting.
What is your thinking about that and what might be
attempted?
Secretary Albright. Senator, we have, obviously, thought
that Fast Track authority was very important, generally, and
obviously in our relations with Latin America. Getting ready
for the Santiago Summit is something that we are actively
involved in now.
I think that the President has spoken a great deal to his
counterparts about the importance of moving a trade agenda
forward.
In terms of it, specifically as we have said, and as the
President said in his State of the Union message, he would be
seeking Fast Track authority, but we have not decided on the
timing right now. But we have, in fact, had a lot of
discussions with Latin American leaders about the importance of
moving forward in a way that makes the agenda go forward.
Let me just say that the last time I was in Latin America
with the President, we met with a lot of the MERCOSUR leaders.
It was very much our sense that it is good for America to be
part of an overall free trade area system because they are
organizing themselves. It is not in competition with us, but it
is a very good building block.
I think when we are not involved in something like this, we
lose out. We are the losers. So we are looking at ways to open
up the system.
Senator Lugar. I am just curious as to what good news we
can bring in April. It is just a short period of time and
certainly the promise of the Miami Summit was free trade by
2005 in the hemisphere and immediate accession of Chile. Is the
2005 idea still on board?
Secretary Albright. Yes, it is, sir.
Senator Lugar. And will there be active discussion, for
example, of that?
Secretary Albright. Well, it is part of the agenda. We are
going to be looking at a variety of aspects to underpin a free
trade area.
Senator Lugar. Let me ask about the Middle East again.
Some have suggested, and this is a broad question that hits
several entangling predicaments, that dual containment with
regard to Iraq and Iran is a policy that is not working well
for us, even though people who say this are not certain
precisely what they would do about it. What consideration is
there in the administration to reviewing so-called ``dual
containment'' of those two countries?
Secretary Albright. Well, let me say, first of all, the
Iraq policy is front and center, and I think we are very clear
about the importance of making sure that Saddam Hussein does
not break out of the strategic box that we have put him in.
This is the purpose of what we are doing there, to make sure
that that does not happen.
On Iran, the President has said that he was very intrigued
by the election of President Khatemi, and he has indicated that
there are ways that we could see about some of the ideas that
President Khatemi suggested, which was looking at cultural
exchanges, and we are looking at that.
But let me say, as far as Iran is concerned, that we cannot
drop the idea that there are three issues that are of major
concern to us about Iran: their support for terrorism, their
lack of support for the Middle East peace process, and their
desire to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
And so, I think our problem here is to assess not the words
but the actions.
I can say, and I found interesting resonance about this on
my trip in the Gulf, that the President delivered a message at
the end of Ramadan in which there was a paragraph that was more
directed toward showing that we respected the civilization of
Iran. That was noted, at least among my Arab interlocutors.
So we need to make sure that Iran deals with these three
major issues of concern to us, and we are watching very
carefully. But what is also essential as we look at a variety
of ways for these exchanges is that, ultimately, the only way
there can be a change is we believe there has to be dialog
between the two governments. As you know, that is one of the
things that President Khatemi is saying, that he would prefer
other ways of doing this.
But, clearly, we are all intrigued, as clearly are you, by
what is going on.
Senator Lugar. What is the timeframe of decisions we must
make with regard to French and Russian exports to Iran? Many
have pointed out that at some point our Nation's laws and
policies would require us to sanction them and that they are
likely to retaliate by going to the World Trade Organization
and claiming that we are extraterritorial in our view and
beyond the bounds of what we can do.
How is this going to play out?
Secretary Albright. Well, we are, at this stage, going
through the investigation as to whether the activity is
sanctionable. We will have a report to you soon on that.
Senator Lugar. So there is a decision to be made----
Secretary Albright. There is a decision still to be made.
Senator Lugar [continuing]. A decision quite apart of the
timeframe from taking action?
Secretary Albright. Yes. Right.
Senator Lugar. In the case of the Israelis, the statement,
I gather, was made by the administration the other day that in
the event Israel was attacked by Iraq, it had the right to
defend itself. Is that a fair interpretation of the status of
that situation?
Secretary Albright. We have said that every country has a
right to defend itself and that, obviously, Israel will make
its own decisions, and we will be in close consultation with
them.
Senator Lugar. Now that is different from Desert Storm.
Isn't it the case that we actively intervened to ask Israel not
to retaliate or to take action at that point?
Secretary Albright. I was not there at that time. But this
is our position now.
Senator Lugar. Well, it is an important position. It sort
of bobbed up in the paper the other day. Clearly, the
interaction of all the factors in the Middle East is important.
Considering that you have been on the firing line on this
closer than anyone else, what is the future of the peace
process in the event that we conduct military strikes in Iraq?
Secretary Albright. Well, first of all, let me spend a
little bit more time talking about the peace process.
Nineteen ninety-seven was not a good year for the peace
process. As I have described, the peace process is based on
mutual trust, mutual recognition, mutual respect; and a lot of
the bonds of confidence had been rubbed away. So what we have
been trying to do is to rebuild those bonds of confidence.
As I said in my statement, they are not spending a lot of
time dealing with each other. So we were hoping that they would
have some reaction to our proposals.
When the leaders came here, the President presented his
proposals or ideas to them. Basically, there is not an American
plan. There are some ideas that we have. Then I went to the
Middle East to try to get some reaction from them as to how
they felt those proposals met their specifications or their
desires.
They are still thinking about that, I think. As I said, it
was very important for them to make some decisions.
If the decisions need to be made and we are proceeding with
that, we cannot let the two interfere with each other.
Now, granted, as I have said also, they are in the same
region. But they both have their own momentum. We will proceed
with the peace process, because we believe it is important to
do so.
Senator Lugar. As perhaps you know, I and a good number of
co-sponsors have offered legislation in the Senate, with
Congressmen Hamilton, Crane, and others in the House, that
would ask for a more careful review of sanctions, economic
sanctions, before the United States uses economic sanctions.
Our thought is that the rationale for why we are doing it,
what the objectives are, what are the benchmarks of success,
all of this ought to be known. In essence, our overall view is
that the United States has been using economic sanctions too
often, and this is debilitating not only to our trade but our
relations with others and is often nonproductive for reasons
the scholars have discussed for a long time.
Do you have any view with regard to this legislation? It
comes from ``USA engaged in an attempt by about 600 American
companies who have banded together, at least, to foster the
slowing down of sanctions as an idea,'' and this is a
legislative component of that?
Secretary Albright. Senator, let me kind of give a broader
answer on this.
When I was teaching, I used to talk about what tools
American foreign policy had, and there basically are three:
diplomatic activity, military force, and sanctions.
We know of the difficulty and appropriateness of using
military force, and diplomacy is there as a bread and butter
issue all the time. And there is a temptation to use sanctions.
When I was Ambassador in New York at the United Nations,
clearly that is one of the places, the most effective place,
for multilateral sanctions to be imposed. Then there are
bilateral sanctions that we take on our own when we believe
that we need to somehow influence the behavior of another
government.
People ask what is foreign policy about. It is about trying
to get another government to understand your national
interests.
However, as we have looked at sanctions and some of the
issues that you have been talking about, we have seen some of
the problems that you have described. I have asked at the State
Department that we really look at how effective sanctions are,
how we go about using them, generally doing a kind of review.
I have asked Under Secretary Eizenstat to really take a
look at that very carefully and he is doing so. He will
obviously also look at your legislation.
Senator Lugar. I would appreciate that. It is a serious
attempt to deal with a serious problem, not to eliminate
sanctions from your toolbox of responses, but to be more
thoughtful and understand the costs that are involved which may
be substantial to our country.
I am grateful that the chairman has returned.
Secretary Albright. So am I.
Senator Lugar. Thank you for your responses.
The Chairman (presiding). Isn't he a nice guy?
Secretary Albright. He's great, but it's like being in
orals exams, you know.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
The Chairman. This thing happens every once in a while. You
pray that it won't happen to you, but this is the second or
third time in a year that it has happened to me. There are many
Senators here. Chuck Robb, for example, is the ranking member
on his committee and the chairman is not there. But he wants to
get here.
Tell me what time you need to leave, Madam Secretary.
Secretary Albright. I think by about noon, Mr. Chairman.
Is that all right?
The Chairman. Very well. If we don't get two or three
Senators here by the time I ask you a question, we will just
let you go with our thanks.
Secretary Albright. I'm always happy to come back, as you
know.
The Chairman. On February 4, maybe you saw it, the
Washington Post had a story about Yassir Arafat who recently
ordered the release of two Palestinian militants jailed for
involvement in the January 1995 bombing that killed 21
Israelis. This is just the latest in a long series of
outrageous violations of the so-called commitment the
Palestinian Authority has made to combat terrorism.
The Palestinians still have not carried out the transfers
of any of the suspected terrorists requested by Israel and have
continued a policy of either not jailing the suspects or
setting them free soon after taking them into custody.
Now, Madam Secretary, do you feel that there is any hope of
the peace process advancing when the Palestinian Authority
refuses to punish the murderers of citizens of any country,
including Israel?
Secretary Albright. Mr. Chairman, the issue of terrorism
and how it is handled is obviously one of the most serious
aspects that we are dealing with in the Middle East peace
process, and security. Whenever I meet with Chairman Arafat, we
discuss the problem and the necessity for his making a 100
percent effort in this area.
There have been, I think, some positive steps in terms of
the Palestinian authorities dealing with the subject of
security, both unilaterally and bilaterally with the Israelis.
There are specific cases and we deal with those. I have
mentioned them, the President has mentioned them, and I think
there is obviously room for improvement. But I do feel that the
Palestinians are making an effort. They need to make more of an
effort, and we have stated clearly that a 100 percent effort is
required.
The Chairman. A while ago you mentioned the difficulties
about the things that you and I have worked together and made
concessions on. Let me say that in thinking about this while
going over to vote on the trolley just a while ago, I am afraid
there may not be swift approval of IMF and U.N. funding, even
if you have the votes for it, so long as the administration
continues to reject concessions made by the House last year on
the Mexico City policy.
Now I have to confess before some of the newspaper people
put it in the paper that yes, I wrote that Mexico City
provision. ``Mexico City'' around this place is shorthand for
prohibiting U.S. taxpayers' dollars from being used by foreign
organizations for abortions.
Jim Buckley and I collaborated on that little piece of
legislation.
Now as you may recall, I stood with you on a lot of things,
including pleading with the House not to insist on the Mexico
City provision. They did. They came forth with some
concessions.
Now the offer rejected by the White House would have freed
up funding for the IMF, the United Nations, and the State
Department Reorganization if the White House would simply agree
not to use taxpayer money to lobby--to lobby --foreign
governments to change their laws on abortion one way or
another.
Bear in mind that we are talking about a lot of Catholic
countries here.
One would think that this reasonable proposal would have
been acceptable to both pro-life and pro-choice supporters. But
I am sorry to say that I am not even sure the President was
asked to consider it. It was dismissed out of hand down the
line someplace.
But the White House, in any case, rejected the offer out of
hand, and the next day the President's Press Secretary
proceeded to call Republicans ``bone-headed.''
Now I have been called a lot of things, and that is one of
the nicer ones that I have been called.
Before we put the cart before the horse anymore, can you
give me any idea what the administration is going to do if we
have the push and the shove about Mexico City or a variation of
it in the reorganization and other things, because you are not
going to get any United Nations money? You are not going to get
the reorganization.
It seems to me that the President ought to reconsider what
I think some of his assistants have decided in his stead.
I would be glad to hear from you on that.
Secretary Albright. Mr. Chairman, please allow me to give
a fairly full answer on this; because this is an issue that has
created great problems, I think, for all of us. There was, in
fact, as you have said, an offer of ``a compromise'' on this
issue.
But, as you know, there are two parts to the Mexico City
matter. It is whether money can be used for performing
abortions or for lobbying--or family planning, I'm sorry.
In the proposal that was made, it would allow the President
to waive the restrictions on the funding to organizations that
use their own money to perform abortions, and it capped all the
funding for international family planning at $356 million if
the President did so. The President's request, by the way, was
$425 million.
The House Republican Leadership did not allow the President
to waive the prohibition against allowing the organizations
that use their own money to lobby and defined ``lobbying'' very
broadly, to include attendance at conferences and workshops
having among their themes the alleged defects in the abortion
laws as well as the drafting and distribution of materials
calling attention to such alleged defects.
So what this means is this. Let me just make something
clear.
As a matter of long-standing law and policy of this and
previous administrations, no U.S. funds are spent to perform or
lobby for abortion, and current law prohibits this use of U.S.
funds. But under the so-called compromise, attendance at a
conference or workshop at which abortion laws were discussed
would disqualify any foreign organizations from receiving U.S.
funds. This is, basically, a gag rule that would punish
organizations for engaging in the democratic process in foreign
countries and for engaging in legal activities that would be
protected by the first amendment if carried out in the United
States.
So the language is so broad that foreign doctors and other
health professionals might be precluded from providing medical
advice on policy issues related to unsafe abortions. Even
research on the incidents, causes and consequences of unsafe
abortions would be endangered.
What it really does is dictate to organizations that would
not be using Federal funds for this how they should carry on
their activities.
I think that the administration has had very firm views on
this, and I think that we cannot have a compromise that is not
really a compromise.
I think that this is a very serious issue.
You and I disagree on the substance of this issue. I
believe that there are a lot of good people on both sides of
this issue. It is a very important issue. And I would hope that
we would all have a chance to debate the issue on its own
merits, on Mexico City language, as you say. And we should do
that.
But I don't think we should attach it to legislation that
is important for our national security. In fact, I think you
agree with me on that.
The Chairman. I stood with you last year, and I got fussed
at all across the country by people who thought I had sold out.
But I had not sold out. That's all right. I took my lumps and
went with it.
Let's have an agreement that we will sit down, perhaps with
the President and one or two other principals in this thing,
and see if we cannot work something out.
Secretary Albright. I would agree with that.
The Chairman. All right.
Now let me see.
Senator Sarbanes, you are next in line in seniority.
Senator Kerry has already asked his questions.
Go ahead.
Senator Sarbanes. Madam Secretary, just to continue along
this line, I don't know how many critical programs are going to
be taken hostage over this Mexico City/abortion issue. I mean,
the U.N. was being held hostage and we wrestled with that in
the last session. Now, apparently, there are some who want to
hold the IMF hostage as well.
I am just looking at the morning paper: ``Asian Monetary
Crisis Sends Ripples to the U.S. West Coast.'' Let me just read
a couple of paragraphs here.
California and its neighbors in the Pacific Northwest have
discovered their dependency on once booming Pacific Rim trade
may have some drawbacks as the Asian monetary crisis ripples
across the ocean.
California, in particular, has barely had time to savor an
export based comeback from the worst downturn since the Great
Depression, and faces an uncertain future once again for its
newly restructured economy because of volatile markets and
weakened currencies in Asia.
Then they go on to talk about the drop in the value of the
Asian currency against the dollar and that it means U.S.
products cost more and their imports to us cost less.
I think if we don't get these resources to the IMF in short
order, we may well contribute to a further intensified crisis
in Asia and then conceivably elsewhere. I don't know how the
administration can separate them out.
I know you've made the request to the Congress, and so the
problem is really up here. But it seems to me that we have a
situation out there.
First of all, we put, what, 18 percent of the quota up for
the IMF? Is that correct, that is, the U.S.?
Secretary Albright. Yes, I think that's right.
Senator Sarbanes. Yes.
Secretary Albright. Oh, 15. Fifteen percent.
Senator Sarbanes. No, I think it is 18 percent. We have to
put 15 percent or we lose our veto. If we fall below 15
percent, then we lost the ability to actually control the
decisionmaking. But I think we are at 18 percent. But, in any
event, whichever it is, it means that in terms of burden
sharing, we are getting 82 percent from other countries around
the world in order to enable the international community to
respond to this financial crisis, which seems to me to be a
pretty good deal. That actually is a better burden sharing than
we are getting at the U.N.
Second, as I understand it, we don't have to make a budget
expenditure in order to do this.
Secretary Albright. Right.
Senator Sarbanes. We have to have budget authority, but we
don't have any budget outlays connected with this. In fact, we
get a claim against the IMF which we can use ourselves if we
need to and which we have done on a couple of occasions in the
recent past at the time of the oil crisis. I think that is
correct.
Now, I take it this also has important foreign policy and
security implications, does it not? It's not just an economic
question. It's not just a question for the Treasury. I take it
that you are seriously concerned about its implications as
well, particularly with respect to Korea. Is that right?
Secretary Albright. Absolutely, Senator, and Indonesia.
Let me just say that you are stating the case in the best
possible way that this is a very serious problem. It is
affecting our national security. Basically, we are trying to
deal with problems without the resources with which to carry
on.
I think that the problem here is that this legislation is
being held hostage and that is the problem. I think that we
ought to free it up and vote on the issue itself, which is, as
I said, a very important one to a lot of people. But I think to
hold up our national security on issues that are--let me just
say--of principle to both sides--that's the problem. I don't
think principle is only on one side. I happen to have my views
on it, but I think there is principle on both sides.
When that happens, I think it is very hard to have a
compromise. Therefore, what needs to happen is to vote on it
separately, not to keep people from discussing it. But let us
not hold up what is clearly important to our national security
on the Asian financial situation as well as the U.N.
We are trying to tell people that Saddam ought to obey U.N.
Security Council resolutions. That is our vehicle for trying to
deal with some of these problems.
So yes, Senator, this is affecting us very deeply. I just
would ask that we vote on an issue like this separately. That
is all we are asking.
The Chairman. Madam Secretary, we have two Senators who are
here who would like to question you. Would you be able to stay
long enough for that?
Secretary Albright. I could.
The Chairman. Senator Robb, please forgive me, and thank
you. Senator Feingold has been here from the very beginning,
and I hate to pass over him.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you,
Senator Robb, very much. And thank you, Madam Secretary, for
being here.
I would like to commend you for your remarks about Africa
and also especially for your having visited Africa recently.
During your confirmation hearing, you pledged to this committee
that you would place great emphasis on doing what you could to
help Africa's democratic leaders broaden and deepen the
positive trends taking place in Africa. I was pleased by that
promise and that you followed through with it.
Perhaps the only greater way that the United States can
show support for these positive trends is for the President
himself to travel to the continent. So I am very pleased that
President Clinton plans to be the first sitting President since
Jimmy Carter, I am told, to make a similar trip in March.
We cannot underestimate the importance of this kind of
signal to Africa and to the world, and I appreciate the
administration's efforts in that area.
Having said that, I think it was unfortunate that many of
the press reports concerning your visit to Africa gave the
impression that in its drive to increase emphasis on economic
and security concerns, somehow the administration was beginning
to focus less on democracy and human rights issues even though
you have consistently stated that human rights and democracy
are cornerstones of your Africa policy. I think this would be a
good opportunity for you to tell this committee about your
expectations and goals for the trip. In light of some of the
press reports, would you consider the trip a success in that
regard?
Secretary Albright. Yes, Senator. Thank you.
Let me say, first of all, thank you for what you said
generally about our support for Africa and working more with
the African countries.
I hate to say this, but I don't think you should believe
everything you read in the newspapers. Let me just make the
following point.
I think that we have had a tendency to look at Africa just
as a continent when we ought to look at it as a patchwork quilt
of many different countries with many historical backgrounds,
different levels that they are involved in in terms of their
movement toward democracy. I think that it is a big mistake if
we just look at it as all being the same.
I think the big issue that came up was when I met with
President Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo. We talked
a great deal about what is going on in that country and how he
can move it forward in a way that would open up the system,
have transparency, a multi-party system, freedom of the press--
all the things that we consider essential to democracy.
I spoke to him about the centrality of human rights, which
is, obviously, always central to our foreign policy. But I have
to say that I think we need to look at each of these countries
individually without making any excuses, but see where they are
in their process and, at the same time, press them to develop
their economic base and to be aware of where they are within
their region, how they interact with their regional leaders.
So I in no way believe that I detracted from our overall
American policy to keep human rights central. But I think I did
recognize that in each country there is a slightly different
situation and that one has to look at where they are and at
what it is that one asks of them.
Senator Feingold. Let me follow your lead in regarding each
country differently. One that is not so slightly different is
Nigeria.
The administration has apparently been reviewing its
Nigeria policy for at least the year since you have been
confirmed, if not longer. I understand there is an options
paper floating around the State Department, but there has not
yet been a convening of the principals to make the hard
decisions that have to be made with regard to coming up with a
new policy.
So I just have to say for the record that I am very
disappointed that I have yet to see any results of this policy
review. The situation in Nigeria remains precarious, and I am
worried that the United States does not really have a Nigeria
policy.
Let me say to soften this a bit that my conversations with
your Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Susan
Rice, on this topic have been excellent. But I have been asking
for some time for some signal or closure on this, and I think
it is something urgent.
Secretary Albright. Senator, I do not disagree with you. I
have also been calling for such meetings. We will have them.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, with regard to China, I have a brief question
about the United States with respect to China at the upcoming
U.N. Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva.
Last year, as you obviously know, many observers blamed the
failure of the Commission to pass a resolution on China on the
failure of the United States to lobby vigorously enough, or
early enough, to garner sufficient support for such a
resolution. As I understand it, the President has made a strong
commitment to continue to raise human rights issues in China at
Geneva.
My question is this. Will the United States take the lead
in pushing for resolution this year? If so, do you intend to
begin those efforts now, prior to the development of a common
position by the European Union?
Secretary Albright. Senator, we are looking at the whole.
Obviously, in the State Department, we just released our human
rights report on this. We raise our human rights concerns with
the Chinese all the time and have also said that we will never
have a totally normal relationship with them until their human
rights policy changes and improves.
We are consulting on a resolution in the Human Rights
Commission.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Robb.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Madam
Secretary, for extending for just a moment.
I apologize. The Senate Armed Services Committee was also
having a full open hearing at precisely the same time and the
ranking member is traveling with your colleague, the Secretary
of Defense, and asked me to substitute for him in that meeting.
So I was not able to be here for your opening statement or the
questions.
I am told that Iraq has been explored quite thoroughly. I
would just add a comment, not a question. A number of us on
that committee were in Germany and Bosnia over the weekend at
the Verkunde Conference; and I can assure you that, on a
bipartisan basis, the members of the U.S. delegation made very
clear some of the points that you have been making publicly and
have been underscoring with the international community to the
point that, toward the end of the conference, some of the
defense ministers and other participants from international
communities asked if we had coordinated our comments. We had
not. But I thought you might be pleased to know that we were
speaking with one voice on those matters in that particular
conference.
There are a couple of matters that I do not believe have
been covered, and if they have, please tell me so that I will
not ask you to repeat them.
Kim Dae Jung is planning to visit Washington on March 9.
The question is whether or not that will be a state or a
working visit and whether or not you expect any different or
more assertive relationship from Kim Dae Jung than you had from
Kim Young Sam, at least in the latter stages of dealing with
North Korea and specifically relating to the framework
agreement and possible full participation which has now been in
question in terms of South Korea's part. Also, what do you
think Japan will do relative to the comments that have been
given and the difficult economic or financial position that
South Korea finds itself in today?
Secretary Albright. Let me answer on Korea and then I
would like to go back to Iraq for a minute.
First of all, we are looking at ways to try to have Kim Dae
Jung's visit be of the greatest use and at the appropriate
level, and I don't have an answer yet. We actually talked about
this yesterday.
I think all of us would like to see that visit be treated
with the greatest level of respect and to be able to show our
relationship with Korea in an appropriate way. But we will get
back to you as soon as we know.
I think Kim Dae Jung does seem to have a more aggressive
view toward trying to do something in terms of North/South
talks, and we will obviously be supportive of his approach. The
four party talks are a vehicle that is going on and I am very
glad that those are in train.
As far as the reactor is concerned, the South Koreans are
going to be able to fulfill their responsibilities, and the
Japanese also. And we are talking to others to make sure that
the KEDO process is able to continue. It is very important.
Also, whenever I meet with the appropriate people, we ask to
make sure that the funding on that continues.
Senator Robb. Madam Secretary, I may be in error, but I
thought I had read someplace where, in view of the crisis, with
respect to the financial crisis that was being experienced in
the South, there had been some reservations about the ability
by the South to complete their obligations, the $4 billion or
so, in terms of either timing or completion.
Is that incorrect?
Secretary Albright. Senator, yesterday I had the same
question as I was going through my notes. I asked about this,
and I was assured that it would be OK. But we can keep track of
that.
Senator Robb. Thank you.
Secretary Albright. If I may, on the Iraq thing, this is
also something that came up earlier. You said that you were at
this meeting. I think it is evident that there are quite a lot
of people with us on Iraq, and I am not sure that people are
aware at this moment what our support out there is.
Obviously, the United Kingdom is with us shoulder to
shoulder. But, as many of you may have heard this morning, the
Canadians have stated they are with us. Australia has also
expressed a willingness to participate in a military operation.
And then there are different versions of how people support us.
France has said that Saddam must comply and has emphasized
the need for diplomacy while noting that it is unclear how it
might succeed. And, while I was there, they said that all
options were open.
Germany has indicated that U.S. bases on its territory
could be used to support military operations. Russia and China
have rejected the use of force and have called for a diplomatic
solution.
I talked about the Arab countries. But I think here it is
very important for us to understand that there is agreement on
the following facts: that Saddam is responsible for this
crisis; that he must fulfill his Security Council obligations;
that a diplomatic route is preferable, but Saddam will be
responsible for whatever grave consequences may come. And if we
do have a military strike, it will be substantial; and we
reserve the right for a follow-on strike if we find that they
are reconstituting their weapons of mass destruction.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Madam Secretary. I had a couple of
other questions but, because of the time, I will defer. I will
simply comment, if I may, that your characterization of those
countries' positions was entirely consistent with their private
conversations to us and in many instances were considerably
stronger than what has been assumed to be the public response.
I think that is encouraging.
The Chairman. In that connection, Senator, I ask unanimous
consent that all members of the committee have until the close
of business Friday to submit additional questions in writing
for the record for the Secretary. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, with your permission and the
permission of the committee, I would just like to take 60
seconds on the matter of Mexico City and how it is holding up
very, very important business of the Nation.
Madam Secretary, I know you know this, but I want the
record to reflect that last year, the last calendar year, the
chairman intervened personally and consistently, and sometimes
in a very blunt fashion with his allies on this issue, on the
substantive issue of Mexico City, to plead, cajole, and firmly
state that he wanted the issues separated, that he thought they
should be separable.
I, quite frankly, at one point--because I did not think we
could get it done--counseled him not to stick his neck out
anymore. He was taking too much heat. It was one thing for him
to do it if there were any chance of this succeeding. But he
insisted that, as a matter of principle, this should be
separated and this was important to do.
So I just want the record to show that, although we
disagree on IMF and we disagree on Mexico City, he was
incredibly forceful, including picking up phones and calling
people that would surprise the living devil out of everyone
here if they knew what he did--and I am going to say this with
your permission, Mr. Chairman--to the point of asking me to
accompany him to the Majority Leader's office and engaging the
Speaker of the House at the same time on this issue.
Now I know you know that generally, but I am not sure you
know specifically. So when the chairman says he would like to
sit with the President and others to discuss a way out of this,
he has, as the old expression goes, he has given at the office
on this one. I am not sure how many liberals would go the other
way on this to get this done if it were being held up for
another reason, if you follow me.
So I just want the record to show this. I think he is wrong
on Mexico City. I disagree with him substantively. But on
separating this out, I don't know what else we could have done
the last time out. It was no skin off my back, because I was
pushing for a position that I happened to have that is
consistent both ways. In his case, it was putting the foreign
policy of the Nation on a separate track. He tried to do it.
I just want the public to know that.
I hope I have not caused you trouble, Mr. Chairman, but
that is a fact.
Secretary Albright. I also know it as a fact, and I am very
grateful to the chairman for this. He is a truly honorable
gentleman on what he has been doing on this, and I am very
grateful to him.
The Chairman. Local papers, please copy.
Thank you very much, both of you. I didn't know you were
going to do that. Thank you.
Senator Kerry, I think you have a private arrangement with
the Secretary.
Senator Kerry. I just wanted to ask something quickly.
First of all, I wanted to thank you for the clarification
that you gave, which I think is helpful. I just wanted to ask a
couple of quick followups.
One, have we arrived, in a sense, within the administration
at a decision that this particular goal can, in fact, be
accomplished, the goal that you set?
Secretary Albright. Yes.
Senator Kerry. We have arrived at that?
Secretary Albright. Yes, we have. But we have not made the
decision to do it.
Senator Kerry. I understand that. I understand.
Then quickly, on another subject, if I may, our staffs and
many of us have been informed by counterparts in the Duma and
by many of the staffs of people within the Duma that, in fact,
President Yeltsin is really the key to the passage of START II;
that, while the Foreign Minister and others are for it, it
really is going to be dependent on his ability to make the
phone calls he made on the Chemical Weapons Treaty to lobby
personally. Most of them say that if he does that, this could
happen within the next six months.
I wonder if the administration might take note of that and,
if there is any way that you felt extra leverage might be
exerted to try to solicit from President Yeltsin that kind of
effort because of the value, obviously, of achieving that.
Secretary Albright. I think in every meeting that I have
been in between President Yeltsin and President Clinton,
President Yeltsin has committed himself to the passage of it.
So we just have to see. I think you are absolutely right.
Senator Kerry. The final thing--and I thank the chair for
his indulgence and I thank you, Madam Secretary--is this. We
have become the world's largest arms dealer by far. We have
gone from about 11.1 percent in 1989 to now 44 percent of all
of the conventional weapons sales in the world belonging to us.
That is a remarkable economic accomplishment. But at the same
time there are many people who feel that some of the standards
that were part of the traditional assumptions and expectations
you mentioned earlier in your comments about the United States
and its role in the world do not take into account the kinds of
regimes with which we are dealing and trading and whether there
is a full level of human rights.
The House passed a code of conduct last year. I have
introduced it here in the Senate. I wonder if the
administration, if you, would be willing to agree to perhaps
review these to see if we can't find some language that is
multilaterally leverageable in the interests of the United
States, language which does not result in a unilateral shoot-
yourself-in-the-foot action but which simultaneously seeks to
reach a higher level of international dialog on the subject of
these arms sales, and particularly offer more leadership
ourselves with respect to it.
Secretary Albright. I would like to look at that Senator.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much.
Secretary Albright. Mr. Chairman, could I just say
something before I depart, if that is what I am to do.
The Chairman. All right. Somebody told me that with your
customary graciousness you have agreed to have Senator Thomas
ask you a question.
Secretary Albright. Yes, I would be happy for that. Yes.
The Chairman. If you do that, I would appreciate it.
Senator Thomas. Thank you. I will be very quick.
What about KEDO? What kind of commitment do we have from
South Korea that they are going to continue to finance their
portion of what they promised to do there?
Secretary Albright. Senator, they have said that, despite
their difficulties, they are going to continue. I checked on
this yesterday; and we will continue to keep track of it,
because I think that all of us believe that it is an essential
part to controlling nuclear proliferation.
Senator Thomas. And we are continuing to buy oil and send
it there?
Secretary Albright. Yes.
Senator Thomas. How much will we do this year? Will we have
the same level or are there increases in your budget for that?
Secretary Albright. I have to get back to you on that.
[The information referred to follows:]
The South Korean government has reaffirmed, both privately
and publicly, that it remains fully committed to KEDO and the
LWR project. In his February 25, 1998, inauguration speech,
South Korean President Kim Dae-jung stated that, despite the
country's current economic difficulties, his administration
would carry out the promises the ROK made in connection with
the construction of the LWRs in North Korea. It is also
important to note that full implementation of the LWR project
will take many years. The current financial crisis in South
Korea and the region is therefore not expected to have a
significant bearing on this long-term effort.
With regard to RFO deliveries, KEDO is committed to provide
North Korea with 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO)
annually to offset lost power generation from the freeze on the
DPRK's nuclear program. KEDO has fulfilled this commitment in
each of the last two years, and has also recently initiated
1998 HFO deliveries. To complete its delivery quota for the
year, however, KEDO will require significantly increased
funding from the international community, since its expected
funding needs for 1998 significantly exceed pledged
contributions. KEDO is currently carrying $47 million in debt
for past HFO deliveries, which must be funded along with 1998
HFO expenditures.
While South Korea and Japan bear primary responsibility for
funding the LWR project, the U.S. has taken the lead in
arranging financing for KEDO's HFO program. Most of our annual
contributions to KEDO in the past have been devoted to HFO, and
we anticipate that this will be the case again in 1998. At the
same time, we continue to urge other members of the
international community to contribute funding for KEDO's HFO
program to help ensure that the organization continues to meet
this commitment.
Our budget proposal for FY 1999 included a request for $35
million for KEDO. For FY 1998, Congress appropriated $30
million for KEDO, and also made available an additional $10
million to assist with KEDO debt relief, contingent upon a
certification by the Secretary of State that funds sufficient
to repay the remainder of KEDO's debt have been provided by
countries other than the United States. We believe our FY 1999
budget request for $35 million for KEDO is both necessary and
justified to maintain U.S. leadership within KEDO, ensure that
KEDO continues to fulfill its important mission, and secure
continued DPRK compliance with its nonproliferation obligations
under the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework.
Senator Thomas. You mentioned the International Monetary
Fund being kind of a credit union. Are you satisfied with the
reforms, for instance in Indonesia? You say there is going to
be an election. Well, there is not much doubt what the election
is going to be. Is Suharto going to make the changes that are
necessary?
Secretary Albright. Well, I think, first of all, he and
his government have committed himself to the IMF program and
they are pursuing that. I think that he clearly will be
elected. But I think the issue is that we need to talk and deal
with him on the long run here, that he has a legacy of economic
development for that country and that it is important that
Indonesia be able to prosper as a democracy and that we need to
be talking with him about how to make it more pluralistic.
Senator Thomas. But talking with him, I mean, that is what
we always say, that we are going to talk and so on. We are
talking about authorizing more money for this program and we
need to be sort of result oriented.
Are you confident that there are going to be changes in
Indonesia?
Secretary Albright. We are working to that end, sir.
Senator Thomas. You are not confident?
How do you expect, for instance, when people say gee, are
you making any changes--people in Wyoming say why should we put
more money there unless there is real, significant evidence
that there will be changes.
Secretary Albright. I believe that there will be. I think
that we have a stake in having Indonesia function properly and
having the economy work there well. Frankly, in all the
problems of the Asian financial crisis, these people are our
customers. They buy our goods. They are competitors. If they
are not doing well, they will cut the prices; and we have a
security interest throughout Asia.
So we believe that it is very important for us to resolve
this crisis. The best method is through the IMF process and
then to get them to pursue democracy. We believe, as I said to
the chairman on my first answer to his question, that
ultimately democratic governments with market systems are the
best way to achieve the kind of stability that is good for all
of us.
Senator Thomas. And no one would disagree with what you
said, that we need, sometimes, if we are going to commit
ourselves, some sort of assurance.
Someone asked me the other day about this. We have the
Middle East, which is unsettled. We have Asian economic
problems. Bosnia is uncertain as to when we are going to be out
of there. Iraq is obviously a problem. Russia is something of a
problem with trade and so on.
Senator Lugar listed a number of things. Do you think the
administration is giving enough emphasis to foreign affairs?
Secretary Albright. Well, I think I earn my pay.
Senator Thomas. I'm talking about results. Let's talk
about results.
Secretary Albright. I think that the administration is.
Yes, I do think so. I think that we need some more resources
for it. We need to be able to work through some of our serious
problems, the kind that we were talking about. Some of the
legislation being held up has to do with issues, the ones that
you are talking about.
I think we need to develop an even better partnership in
how we do foreign policy together.
There is no question as we move into the 21st century that
this is a job that needs to be done by all of us together, and
I seek your suport on it.
Senator Thomas. Thank you.
The Chairman. Madam Secretary, you certainly earned your
pay this morning. I am sorry about the votes and all the rest
of the delays, but you have been a real trooper.
I believe you had something you wanted to say.
Secretary Albright. I just wanted to say that we have
spent a lot of time on Iraq; and there is no doubt that we
started that way, because there are many questions; and it is
on everybody's mind. I think we have to keep in mind the
options that we have, how we best achieve what is good for
American national interests, what we can do, what we must do,
and to set out goals clearly, which I believe we have done, and
to follow through.
I think we need to spend a lot of time talking with each
other about it. But I also think that we need to show unity
because Saddam Hussein is watching us.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Well said.
There being no further business to come for the committee,
we stand in recess.
Thank you, ma'am.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee recessed.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Prepared Statement of Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, a year ago, I came here
to ask your help in creating a new foreign policy framework--adapted to
the demands of a new century--to protect our citizens and friends;
reinforce our values; and secure our future.
In the months since, we have worked together successfully as
partners, not partisans, to advance American interests and sustain
American leadership.
During that time, we have helped achieve progress towards a Europe
whole and free, a Bosnia where peace is beginning to take hold, an Asia
where security cooperation is on the rise, an Africa being transformed
by new leaders and fresh thinking, and a Western Hemisphere blessed by
an ever-deepening partnership of democracies.
We have also joined the Chemical Weapons Convention, intensified
the war against international crime, taken an essential first step
towards a global agreement to combat climate change and done much to
re-establish a bipartisan consensus for U.S. leadership in world
affairs.
These efforts are paying dividends both here at home and overseas.
And this Committee has been a major contributor, forging a strong
record on legislation, treaties, oversight and moving promptly and
fairly on nominations.
Of course, important accomplishments lead to great expectations.
And so, this morning, I am here again to ask for your help.
As we meet, America is prosperous and at peace in a world more
democratic than ever before. But we cannot afford to rest. For
experience warns us that the course of history is neither predictable
nor smooth. And we know that, in our era, new perils may arise with
21st century speed.
Today, our citizens travel the world and we have major interests on
every continent. We work in a global marketplace in which economies
rise and recede together. We face dangers no nation can defeat alone--
dangers as mobile as a renegade virus, as deadly as a terrorist's bomb,
as widespread as international crime and as pernicious as violence
spawned by ethnic hate.
As always, the obligation we have is to our citizens, but that
obligation comes now with the knowledge that, increasingly, what
happens anywhere will matter everywhere.
If Americans are to be secure in such a world, we must seize the
opportunity that history has presented to bring nations closer together
around basic principles of democracy, free markets, respect for the law
and a commitment to peace.
This is not an effort we undertake with a scorecard in hand. But
every time a conflict is settled or a nuclear weapon dismantled; every
time a country starts to observe global rules of trade; every time a
drug kingpin is arrested or a war criminal prosecuted; the process of
constructive integration moves forward and the ties that bind the
international system are strengthened.
America's place is at the center of this system. And our challenge
is to see that the connections around the center--between regions and
among the most prominent nations--are strong and dynamic, resilient and
sure.
We must also help other nations find their way into the system as
partners--by lending a hand to those struggling to build democracy,
emerge from poverty or recover from conflict.
We must build new institutions and adapt old ones to master the
demands of the world not as it has been, but as it is and will be.
We must summon the will to deter, the support to isolate, and the
strength to defeat those who run roughshod over the rights of others.
And we must aspire not simply to maintain the status quo. Abroad,
as here, we must strive for higher standards in the marketplace and
workplace, the classroom and courtroom, so that the benefits of growth
and the protections of law are shared not only by the lucky few, but by
the hardworking many.
All this requires a lot of heavy lifting. We must--and we will--
insist that others do their fair share. But do not doubt, if we want to
protect our people, expand our economy, improve our lives and safeguard
the freedoms we cherish, we must stamp this heretofore unnamed era with
a clear identity--grounded in democracy, dedicated to justice and
committed to peace.
I. Unfinished Business
Mr. Chairman, the best way to begin this year's work is to finish
last year's. And last year, at your initiative, we developed creative
plans to restructure our foreign policy institutions and to encourage
United Nations reform while paying our long overdue UN bills.
Unfortunately, a small group of House Members blocked final passage
of those measures, along with needed financing for the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). Those Members did not oppose our ideas, nor make
credible arguments against them. They simply wanted to take valuable
legislation hostage. And as the price for releasing the hostages, they
insisted that the Administration agree to their unrelated position on
international population programs.
The victims of this act of legislative blackmail are your
constituents--the American people. For without reorganization, our
effort to improve foreign policy effectiveness is slowed. And the
failure to pay our UN bills has already cost us. Last December, the
General Assembly voted on a plan that could have cut our share of UN
assessments by roughly $100 million every year. But because of that
small group of Congressmen, we lost that opportunity--and our taxpayers
lost those savings--and will continue to do so every year we fail to
address this obligation.
But paying our UN bills is about more than money. It is also about
principle--and honor--and our vital interests.
The United Nations is not--as some have seemed to suggest--an alien
presence on U.S. soil. It was Made in America. Our predecessors brought
the UN together, led the drafting of the UN Charter and helped write
the UN's rules. And we have used the UN to tell America's side of the
story during international showdowns from the Korean War, to the Cuban
Missile Crisis, to the destruction of flight KAL-007, to Operation
Desert Storm, to Castro's shootdown of the Brothers to the Rescue two
years ago this month.
Today, we still have important business to conduct at the UN, such
as dealing with Saddam Hussein, punishing genocide, ensuring the safety
of Americans traveling abroad and helping poor and hungry children to
survive.
Mr. Chairman, this issue is not complicated; it is simple. The best
America is a leader, not a debtor.
Let us act quickly to put our UN arrears behind us; restore
America's full influence within the UN system; move ahead with UN
reform; and use the UN, as its founders intended, as an important tool
to make the world safer, more prosperous and humane.
II. American Leadership and Interests Around the World
A. The Crossroads
As we move to deal with old business, we must also think anew.
Normally, when I review U.S. policies around the world, I begin with
Europe and Asia. This morning, I want to break with tradition and begin
with the crossroads linking those continents--the vast territory that
stretches from the Suez and Bosporus in the west to the Caucasus and
Caspian in the north to the Bay of Bengal in the southeast.
I do so because--as much as any region--the choices made here
during the remaining months of this century will determine the shape of
the next.
They will decide, for example: whether weapons of mass destruction
cease to imperil the Gulf and South Asia; whether the oil and gas
fields of the Caucasus and Central Asia become reliable sources of
energy; whether the opium harvests of death in Burma and Afghanistan
are shut down; whether the New Independent States become strong and
successful democracies; whether Israel can find peace with security and
Arabs prosperity through regional trade and integration; whether
terrorists are denied the support they need to perpetrate their crimes;
and whether the great religions of the world can work together to
foster tolerance and understanding.
As Secretary of State, developing an integrated approach to this
part of the world is a major challenge, not least because it includes
countries covered by every regional bureau in the Department except
Africa and Latin America. But despite the region's diversity, we are
able to approach it with a set of common principles.
First, we believe that the nations in and outside the region must
work together to avoid a modern version of the so-called ``Great
Game,'' in which past struggles for resources and power led to war,
repression and misery. Here, as elsewhere, each nation's sovereignty
must be respected; and the goal of each should be stability and
prosperity that is widely shared.
Second, cooperation must extend to security. Nations must have the
wisdom and the will to oppose the agents of terrorism, proliferation
and crime.
Third, neighbors must live as neighbors. From the Middle East to
Central and South Asia, long festering disputes remain unsettled. Those
within the region must seek to protect vital interests, while settling
differences fairly and peaceably. Those outside the region must refrain
from exploiting divisions and support efforts to settle conflicts.
Fourth, the international community must nurture inter-ethnic
tolerance and respect for human rights, including women's rights. This
responsibility is shared by all, for no culture or religion has a
monopoly on virtue--nor is any fully free from extremist violence.
U.S. policy is to promote and practice these principles; to
persuade all those with a stake in the region to rise above the zero-
sum thinking of the past; and to embrace the reality that cooperation
by all will yield for all a future of greater prosperity, dignity and
peace.
That is certainly our message in the Middle East, where we continue
to seek progress towards a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement,
based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, including the
principle of land for peace.
The President sent me to the region to follow up on the ideas he
presented to Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Netanyahu. He presented
our ideas as a way to break the stalemate, recognizing that the
parties, given the level of their distrust, might respond to us even if
they remain reluctant to respond to each other.
Frankly, the issue now is whether the leaders are prepared to make
the kind of decisions that will make it possible to put the process
back on track. Indeed, we have to ask: are they prepared to promote
their common interests as partners? Or are they determined to compete
and return to an era of zero sum relations?
The stakes are high. That's why we have been involved in such an
intense effort to protect the process from collapsing. U.S. credibility
in the region and the interests of our Arab and Israeli friends depend
upon it.
America's interest in a stable and prosperous Middle East also
depends on whether the nations there work together to reform their
economies, attract investment and create opportunities for their
people. Hopelessness is a great enemy of the region, for those with
faith in the future are far more likely to build peace than those
immobilized by despair.
Accordingly, I hope we will have the Committee's support for our
proposals to contribute to a Middle East and North Africa Development
Bank, provide desperately-needed assistance to the Palestinian people
and to development in Jordan, where King Hussein has been a consistent
and courageous supporter of peace.
Mr. Chairman, if we are to have an international system based on
law, we must have the spine to enforce the law. And that is where our
policy towards Iraq begins. Saddam Hussein is an aggressor who has used
weapons of mass destruction before and--if allowed--would surely use or
threaten to use them again.
At the end of the Gulf War, the UN Security Council established a
system to ensure that Saddam would not have this opportunity. Iraq was
required to declare its weapons of mass destruction and delivery
systems, destroy them and never build them again. The UN Special
Commission, or UNSCOM, was to verify the declarations and the
destruction, inspect to be sure of the truth and monitor to prevent the
rebuilding of weapons.
But from the outset, Iraq did all it could to evade UNSCOM's
requirements. Iraqi officials lied, concealed information and harassed
and bullied inspectors. UNSCOM nevertheless accomplished a great deal,
destroying more weapons of mass destruction than were demolished in the
entire Gulf War.
Then, in 1995, Saddam Hussein's brother-in-law defected and
provided new and chilling information especially about Iraq's
biological weapons program. This set in motion a high stakes game of
poker between UNSCOM and Iraq.
As UNSCOM has learned more about Iraqi methods, it has become more
creative in its inspection strategy--and increasingly threatening to
Saddam. As UNSCOM has moved closer to discovering information that Iraq
wants desperately to hide, Baghdad has grown more belligerent,
repeatedly blocking inspection teams, challenging UNSCOM's authority,
and refusing access to dozens of suspect sites. Iraq now says it will
eject UNSCOM altogether if UN sanctions are not soon lifted.
Clearly, if UNSCOM is to uncover the full truth about Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction programs, it must have unrestricted access
to locations, people and documents that may be related to those
programs. But as UNSCOM's Chairman Richard Butler attests, Iraq is
making it impossible for the Commission to do its job. We, in the
international community, are left with a choice between allowing Saddam
Hussein to dictate the terms of UN inspections--essentially folding our
hand--or calling Saddam's bluff.
In recent months, we have worked hard to find a diplomatic
solution. The UN Security Council has insisted repeatedly and
unanimously that Iraq cooperate fully with UNSCOM. Meanwhile, the UN
inspectors have been kicked out, then allowed back in, then prevented
from doing their work, then threatened again with expulsion. Saddam
Hussein's dream is the world's nightmare--to gain the lifting of UN
sanctions, without losing his capacity to build and use weapons of mass
destruction. In pursuing this fantasy, Saddam has thwarted efforts to
resolve the crisis diplomatically and made the use of military force
more likely.
As President Clinton has made clear, the United States will not
allow Iraq to get away with flagrantly violating its obligations. And I
have been heartened, both during my travels and in other
communications, by the support our position has received.
In virtually every part of the world, there is a determination that
Iraq comply with the UN Security Council resolutions, and that it
provide unfettered access to UN weapons inspectors. There is agreement
that responsibility for the current impasse and its potential
consequences rests with Iraq alone. And there is an understanding that,
unless Iraq's policies change, we will have no choice but to take
strong measures--not pinpricks, but substantial strikes--that reduce
Saddam's capacity to re-constitute his weapons of mass destruction and
diminish his ability to threaten Iraq's neighbors and the world. Let no
one miscalculate: we have the authority to do this, the responsibility
to do this, the means and the will.
Before leaving this subject, I want briefly to dispose of Saddam's
argument that the UN and the United States are to blame for the
suffering of the Iraqi people. The truth is that Saddam doesn't care a
fig about the Iraqi people, whom he has terrorized, tortured and
brutalized for years.
I am told by Arab leaders I trust that there is great concern in
the Arab world about the plight of Iraqi civilians. I am convinced that
is true for this concern is fully shared by the United States and the
American people. Saddam knows this, which is why he so bravely sends
women and children to guard his palaces in time of crisis.
The United States has strongly supported efforts through the UN to
see that foods and medicines are made available to the Iraqi people. UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan has proposed to expand these efforts, and
we are looking hard at how best to do that. Meanwhile, the blame for
Iraqi suffering does not rest with the international community; it
rests with Saddam Hussein.
Mr. Chairman, America is never stronger than when it is together. I
have been deeply impressed and encouraged by the strong bipartisan
backing we have received on this issue. We will look to Congress for
continued support and counsel in the days ahead.
Across the border from Iraq in Iran, there are signs that popular
support is building for a more open approach to the world. We welcome
that. An Iran that accepts and adheres to global norms on terrorism,
proliferation and human rights could contribute much to regional
stability. Iran's President Khatami called recently for a dialogue
between our two peoples. There is merit in this, for we have much to
learn from each other. But the issues that divide us are not those of
respect between our two peoples, but matters of policy that must
ultimately be addressed directly through government to government
talks.
Further north, in the Caucasus, we are working hard with our Minsk
process co-chairs to settle the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan
over Nagorno-Karabakh. Although the cease-fire continues, progress
towards a definitive solution has stalled. We have substantial
interests here, but our leverage would increase if Congress lifted
legal restrictions on nonmilitary assistance to Azerbaijan, while
maintaining support for aid to Armenia--where we will be encouraging
free and fair Presidential elections this spring.
Finally, President Clinton plans to visit South Asia later this
year to explore possibilities for closer economic ties, press concerns
about proliferation, and seek better mutual cooperation across the
board. With India, we have begun a strategic dialogue between the
world's oldest democracy and the world's largest. And with Pakistan, we
are developing a broader partnership with our long time friend. These
nations, and Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, with their large, diverse
populations, are laboratories of democracy. We are committed to working
with them in appropriate ways to strengthen institutions, facilitate
growth, protect human rights and enhance the rule of law.
B. Europe
Mr. Chairman, the strategies we are developing in places such as
the Gulf, the Caucasus and Central Asia illustrate the breadth of
change that has transformed the political map. They show, as well, that
the regional categories into which we once divided the world no longer
suffice.
But however old or new the challenges we face, there is still one
relationship that more than any other will determine whether we meet
them successfully, and that is our relationship with Europe.
This is not because we and our European friends always see eye to
eye. We do not. The transatlantic partnership remains our strategic
base--the drivewheel of progress on every world-scale issue when we
agree, the brake when we do not.
Today, we have two strategic goals in Europe. The first is to work
with our European Union partners to continue carrying out our New
Transatlantic Agenda, and with all our friends on the continent to meet
global challenges.
This means supporting peace initiatives from the Middle East to
Central Africa. It means recognizing that halting the spread of weapons
of mass destruction is a shared responsibility that cannot be balanced
against competing political or commercial concerns. It means joining
forces to fight international criminals and protect the global
environment. And it means joint efforts to build a more open world
economy with reduced barriers to cross-Atlantic investment and trade.
A second goal is to build a Europe that is itself for the first
time whole, free, prosperous and at peace.
To this end, two years ago, the United States led the effort to
stop the war in Bosnia. We knew that it did not serve our interests to
see aggression undeterred and genocide unpunished in the heart of
Europe, or NATO divided on how to respond. Now, we must finish what we
started and maintain our support for implementing the Dayton Accords.
Shortly before Christmas, I went to Bosnia with the President,
Senator Dole, and members of Congress to visit our troops and talk
frankly with local leaders. We found a nation that remains deeply
divided, but where multi-ethnic institutions are once again beginning
to function. Economic growth is accelerating. Indicted war criminals
are surrendering or being arrested. Refugees are slowly beginning to
return. And a new Bosnian Serb government is acting on its pledge to
implement Dayton.
More slowly than we foresaw, but as surely as we hoped, the
infrastructure of Bosnian peace is taking shape and the psychology of
reconciliation is taking hold. Day by day, town by town, the evidence
is growing that, if we persevere, peace will be sustained.
But if we were to leave now, as some urge, the confidence we are
building would erode, the democratic institutions would be embattled,
and the purveyors of hate would be emboldened. The result could well be
a return to genocide and war.
That would surrender the progress we and our partners have helped
Bosnians achieve, and devalue the sacrifices our armed forces,
diplomats and private citizens have made. It would abandon Bosnia's
democrats, who put their faith in the United States. It would hurt
American leadership within NATO, which is vital to our national
security. And it would undermine NATO itself, by raising doubts, even
as we propose to enlarge it, about the willingness of the alliance to
tackle hard problems.
Quitting is not the American way. In Bosnia, the mission should
determine the timetable, not the other way around. And as the President
made clear in December, ``that mission must be achievable and tied to
concrete benchmarks, not a deadline.''
So Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I ask your support. Let
us continue to play an appropriate role in Bosnia as long as our help
is needed, our allies and friends do their share, and the Bosnian
people are striving to help themselves. That is the right thing to do.
And it is the smart thing, for it is the only way to ensure that when
our troops do leave Bosnia, they leave for good.
The effort to recover from war in Bosnia reminds us how important
it is to prevent war. And how much we owe to those who designed and
built NATO, which has been for a half century the world's most powerful
defender of freedom and deterrent to aggression.
Mr. Chairman, in two weeks, I am scheduled to be here with you
again, together with Secretary Cohen and General Shelton, to seek the
Committee's support for making America among the first to ratify the
admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to our alliance. I
hope you will agree when the time comes for a vote--and I hope it will
come early--that by welcoming these three nations, and holding the door
open to others, we will make America safer, NATO stronger, and Europe
more stable and united.
Building peace in Bosnia and beginning the enlargement of NATO are
two key elements in our effort to build a peaceful, free and undivided
Europe. But there are many others.
Last month, President Clinton joined the leaders of Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania in signing the U.S.-Baltic Charter, to show our support
for the freedom and security of these nations and for their efforts to
join western institutions. We are pursuing our Northeast Europe
Initiative to encourage integration among nations of the Nordic and
Baltic region, and to strengthen their ties with us, the EU and their
neighbors.
We strongly support the expansion of the EU into central and
eastern Europe, and Turkey's desire to be part of that process.
We are putting in place a new Southeast Europe strategy to help
integrate countries in that region into western institutions.
We are leading the transformation of the OSCE into an organization
that produces not just reports, but results.
President Clinton and I are backing efforts to achieve lasting
reconciliation in Northern Ireland.
We are working hard to ease tensions in the Aegean and have put
unprecedented effort into trying to achieve a Cyprus settlement.
We have cemented our strategic partnership with Ukraine, knowing
that an independent, democratic, prosperous and stable Ukraine is a key
to building a secure and undivided Europe. In 1998, we will continue to
support Ukraine's economic and political reforms, deepen our
cooperation under the NATO-Ukraine Charter and insist on its adherence
to nonproliferation norms.
We are also striving to build a relationship with Russia--and
between Russia and NATO--that is steady and consistent--encouraging
Russia toward greater openness at home and constructive behavior
abroad. In coming weeks, we will be working with Russia to keep its
economic reforms on track, urge START II ratification by the Duma, and
take needed steps to prevent proliferation.
C. Asia
The United States is a Pacific nation, just as we are an Atlantic
and a Caribbean nation. We have allies and friends in every part of the
continent. We are major buyers and sellers in Asia-Pacific markets. We
are backers of Asian democracy which--as the recent election in the
Republic of Korea indicates--is alive and well. And we have a vital
stake in the security of Asia, where we have fought three wars during
the past six decades.
Since becoming Secretary of State, I have traveled to East Asia
three times and to the APEC Ministerial and Summit in Vancouver. This
reflects the priority we have placed on improving ties throughout the
region.
Our overarching objective is to continue building a new and
inclusive Pacific community based on stability, shared interests and
the rule of law.
To this end, we have fortified our core alliances, crafted new
defense guidelines with Japan, maintained our forward deployment of
troops, embarked on Four Party talks to create a basis for lasting
peace on the Korean Peninsula, and continued to implement, with our
partners, the Agreed Framework which is dismantling North Korea's
dangerous nuclear program.
In addition, we are working with ASEAN and other regional leaders
to encourage a return to representative government in Cambodia, and a
meaningful dialogue in Burma between the authorities there and the
democratic opposition, led by Aung San Suu Kyi.
We have also intensified our dialogue with China, achieving
progress on economic and security matters, while maintaining our
principles on respect for Tibetan heritage and human rights. Let me
stress here, Mr. Chairman, that engagement is not the same as
endorsement. We continue to have sharp differences with China--but we
also believe that the best way to narrow those differences is to
encourage China to become a fully responsible participant in the
international system.
Steps in the right direction include China's commitment to strictly
control nuclear exports, assurances on nuclear cooperation with Iran,
security cooperation on the Korean peninsula, signing the CTBT,
continued economic liberalization, the release of Wei Jingsheng and the
invitation to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to visit.
But most urgently, Mr. Chairman, we have been working with the IMF
and the world community to respond to the financial crisis in East
Asia.
Many of your constituents may have asked why the United States
should help Asian governments and businesses recover from their
mistakes. It is a good question to which the facts provide a persuasive
answer.
The crisis resulted from bad economic habits in the countries
involved and on the part of those who did business with them. Rapid
growth bred excess short-term borrowing, which was used to finance
imprudent investments, which led to unsustainable levels of debt, which
local authorities were slow to recognize and confront. Last summer,
markets began responding to these weaknesses and a crisis of confidence
grew.
Our approach is clear. To recover, a nation must reform its
economy. And if it is willing seriously to do so, it will be in our
interest to help.
The governments of Thailand, Indonesia and Korea have developed
programs with the IMF that address the economic problems they face.
These arrangements require market-opening measures, the restructuring
of financial sectors, greater investment transparency and other
reforms.
We are working with these governments, and with others such as
Japan, Singapore and China, to prevent the crisis from spreading.
And we will be asking Congress to approve our 15% share of the
additional IMF resources that are required.
We have adopted this approach for several reasons.
East Asia includes some of the best customers for U.S. products and
services; more than one-third of our exports go there. Thousands of
good jobs in Atlanta and St. Paul, Wilmington and Raleigh depend on
economic vigor in places such as Bangkok and Seoul.
Second, the reforms the IMF is supporting are designed in part to
promote better governance, by encouraging more openness and
transparency in decisionmaking. This offers the greatest hope of
progress towards more democratic and accountable political systems
which should lead, in turn, to sounder and wiser economic management.
Third, East Asia includes some of our closest allies and friends.
South Korea faces a large, hostile and well-armed military force across
the DMZ. Democratic Thailand has taken courageous steps to put its
fiscal house in order. Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous
country and one of its most diverse; its stability, and the efforts of
its people to build a more open society, are central to the region's
future.
Finally, since the IMF functions as a sort of intergovernmental
credit union, these so-called bailouts won't cost our taxpayers a
nickel--just as the President's bold plan to rescue the Mexican economy
three years ago proved cost-free.
Still, there are some who say we should disavow the IMF, abandon
our friends and stand aside, letting the chips--or dominoes--fall where
they may.
It is possible that, if we were to take this course, the economies
of East Asia might miraculously right themselves and we would not
experience a sharp drop in exports or see our own markets even more
inundated with cut-rate foreign goods.
It is possible that we would not see instability and civil violence
create new security threats in this region where 100,000 American
troops are deployed.
It is possible that the effects of a financial freefall in East
Asia would not spread around the world, and that our decision to walk
away would not be misunderstood, and a wave of anti-American sentiment
not be unleashed, and potential progress towards the higher labor and
environmental standards we advocate not be washed away.
All this is possible, but I would not want to bet American security
or prosperity on that proposition. Nor would I want to risk the jobs of
your constituents. For it would be a very, very bad bet.
The truth is that, even with full backing for the IMF, and diligent
reforms in East Asia, the risks are substantial. Recovery will take
time. And further tremors are possible.
The best way to minimize the depth and duration of the crisis is to
back the reforms now being implemented and do all we can to keep the
virus from spreading.
But we must also take strong steps to prevent this kind of crisis
from recurring.
To this end, we are continuing efforts to improve the international
financial community's ability to anticipate and respond to problems.
Reforms achieved since the G-7 Halifax Summit in 1995, such as the
IMF's Emergency Funding Mechanism, have helped us respond to the Asian
crisis. In all of the Asian programs, we have pressed hard to increase
transparency, and have succeeded in getting the specifics of the IMF
programs published. More needs to be done. At the President's
initiative, Secretary Rubin will convene a meeting later this spring
with finance ministers and central bank governors from around the world
to build a consensus on ways to strengthen the global financial system.
They will focus on four objectives: improving transparency and
disclosure; strengthening the role of the international financial
institutions; improving regulation of financial institutions; and
developing the role of the private sector in bearing an appropriate
share of the burden in time of crisis.
D. The Americas
Mr. Chairman, closer to home, we meet today at a time of heightened
emphasis in our policy towards the Americas. In recent months,
President Clinton has visited Canada and Mexico, with whom we enjoy
relationships of extraordinary warmth despite occasional disagreements.
He also traveled to Central and South America and the Caribbean. In
April, he will go to Chile for the second hemispheric Summit.
This attention is warranted not only by proximity of geography, but
by proximity of values. For today, with one lonely exception, every
government in the hemisphere is freely-elected. Every major economy has
liberalized its system for investment and trade. With war in Guatemala
ended, Central America is without conflict for the first time in
decades. And, as recent progress toward settling the Ecuador-Peru
border dispute reflects, nations are determined to live in security and
peace from pole to pole.
Despite this, the region still faces serious challenges. Growing
populations make it harder to translate macroeconomic growth into
higher standards of living. For many, the dividends of economic reform
are not yet visible, while the costs of the accompanying austerity
measures are. The building of democracy remains in all countries a work
in progress, with stronger, more independent legal systems an urgent
need in most.
In Haiti, the challenge of creating a democratic culture and market
economy--where neither has ever existed--is especially daunting. For
the past nine months, Haiti has been mired in what is both a political
standoff and a separation of powers dispute. Other young democracies
have taken years and endured much violence to sort out such issues.
Haitians are trying to resolve their differences through dialogue and
debate, not guns. But it will take time to find the way forward.
Meanwhile, the pace of restructuring an economy still badly damaged
by decades of dictatorial rule has lagged. For millions of impoverished
Haitians, democracy has not yet delivered on the hope of prosperity.
We cannot turn our backs at this critical stage. To do so would
risk Haiti's mirroring its past: an undemocratic Haiti that serves as a
safe haven for criminals and drug traffickers and from which thousands
of would-be migrants are driven to seek refuge on our shores. Our
economic and food aid to Haiti is directed at basic human needs and at
laying the foundation for sustained economic growth. I ask your support
for continuing and increasing this assistance to strengthen civil
society and help expand microenterprise, health, education and family
planning efforts. It will also be used to assist secondary cities to
attract private investment and create jobs.
In Cuba, Christmas had special meaning this year because of the
Pope's visit. But we will not rest until another day--Election Day--has
meaning there, as well. The people of Cuba deserve the same right as
their counterparts from Argentina to Alaska to select their own leaders
and shape their own lives. The Cuban regime was right to allow the
Pope's visit. It should act now in the spirit of free expression that
His Holiness espoused. Meanwhile, the United States will continue
working with friends in Europe and throughout the hemisphere to
heighten the pressure--which is building--for democratic change.
This spring, the hemisphere's democratic leaders will gather in
Santiago for the second Summit of the Americas. Their purpose will be
to set an agenda to take us into the 21st century, an agenda that will
include education, trade, economic integration, fighting poverty,
strengthening the rule of law, judicial reform, the environment and
human rights.
The United States is looking forward to participating in the
summit, and to achieving an outcome notable not only for its goals, but
also for concrete plans to achieve them.
E. Africa
In the past, U.S. relations with Africa have been distorted by the
prisms of east-west and north-south divisions. We have a rare chance
now to establish more mature relationships, characterized by
cooperation and dedicated to solving problems.
During my recent visit, I was impressed by how rapidly Africa is
departing from the shopworn stereotypes, even as it continues to
grapple with chronic problems of poverty and strife. Today, many old
conflicts are being settled. Countries are modernizing. Centralized
economies are giving way to open markets. And civil society is
beginning to blossom.
As a result, the opportunity is there to help integrate Africa into
the world economy; build democracy; and gain valuable allies in the
fight against terror, narcotics trafficking and other global threats.
As we prepare for the President's upcoming visit, we want to
express our support for countries such as South Africa, Botswana and
Benin where the commitment to democracy is strongest, while paying
heed, as well, to the trouble spots that remain.
In the strategic, strife-torn Great Lakes region, for example,
countries face long odds. Rwanda is still recovering from genocide;
Burundi remains without a stable political order; and the vast,
resource-rich Democratic Republic of Congo must rebuild and democratize
after decades of misrule.
I urge the Committee's support for the President's initiative to
promote justice and development in the Great Lakes, so that we may help
the people there to prevent further outbreaks of violence and to plant
the seeds of democratic progress and social renewal. I urge your
support for our request for funds for education, debt relief and
development. And I hope Congress will act quickly to approve the
proposed Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. This is a Capitol Hill
initiative, supported by the Administration, designed to frame a new
American approach to the new Africa.
We believe that the African countries that most deserve our help
are those that are doing the most to help themselves. And that the most
useful help we can provide is the kind that will enable economies to
stand on their own feet--through open markets, greater investment,
increased trade and the development among their peoples of 21st century
skills.
III. Global Opportunities and Threats
Mr. Chairman, to protect the security and prosperity of our
citizens, we are engaged in every region on every continent. Many of
our initiatives and concerns are directed, as I have discussed, at
particular countries or parts of the world. Others are more
encompassing and can best be considered in global terms.
A. Reducing the Threat Posed by Deadly Arms
For example, it is a core purpose of American foreign policy to
halt the spread and possible use of weapons of mass destruction, which
remain--years after the Cold War's end--the most serious threat to the
security of our people.
The new world map has created for our diplomats a twin imperative:
achieving further progress in our difficult nuclear build-down with
Russia; and maintaining a global full-court press to keep biological,
chemical and nuclear weapons, and the missiles that deliver them, from
falling into the wrong hands.
These demands require a wide of range of approaches old and new,
from traditional negotiations, to international law-enforcement and
counter-terrorism efforts, to cooperative threat reduction programs,
such as those pioneered by the Nunn-Lugar legislation.
And with President Clinton's leadership, we have made real
progress. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is now permanent; its
safeguards are stronger; and only five countries remain outside its
framework. Some 150 nations, including the nuclear powers, have signed
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Russia has followed us in
joining the Chemical Weapons Convention, and China is undertaking
important new nonproliferation commitments.
This year, Mr. Chairman, I hope we can work together to build on
the record we have forged, for we have a unique opportunity to ensure
that the American people never again face the costs and dangers of a
nuclear arms race.
Much depends on whether the Russian Duma ratifies START II. This
treaty will slice apart Russia's heavy MIRVed SS-18 missiles--the
deadliest weapons ever pointed our way. And it would set the stage for
START III, and cuts in strategic arsenals to 80 percent below Cold War
peaks.
This past September, we completed the ABM Treaty Demarcation and
Succession agreements. Mr. Chairman, we agree that the Senate deserves
every opportunity to examine them closely, and I look forward to
testifying before you at the appropriate time.
But to encourage the Russians to act on START II, we have told them
firmly that we will neither begin negotiating START III, nor submit the
ABM agreements and the START II Extension Protocol to this Committee
until the Duma acts. We should not retreat from that stand.
Meanwhile, the Demarcation agreements allow us to continue
developing robust theater defenses. And we know that for Russian
reductions to continue, the ABM Treaty must remain viable.
An essential part of our strategy to reduce the nuclear danger is
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty now pending before the Senate. By
ending testing, we can hinder both the development and spread of new
and more dangerous weapons.
The CTBT has been a goal of U.S. Presidents since Dwight Eisenhower
and John Kennedy. It has the support of 70 percent of the American
people. It has been endorsed by four former chairmen of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff: Generals John Shalikashvili, Colin Powell and David
Jones, and Admiral William Crowe. And it holds the promise of a world
forever free of nuclear explosions.
But if we are to fulfill this promise, America must lead the way
this year in ratifying the Treaty, just as we did in negotiating and
signing it. Mr. Chairman, I respectfully seek an early opportunity to
testify before this Committee on a treaty that our citizens want and
our interests demand.
Last year, thanks to the Senate's bipartisan support, the United
States joined the Chemical Weapons Convention as an original party.
This year, we will continue working with Congress to enact domestic
implementing legislation, to make it harder for terrorists to concoct,
conceal, or conspire to use poison gas in our own country. Our
experience with Saddam Hussein in Iraq underscores how tempting
biological weapons remain to the very worst regimes. This year, with
the President's leadership, we are determined to strengthen the
Biological Weapons Convention through an international inspection
system to help detect and deter cheating.
Finally, the United States is determined to contribute mightily to
the worldwide effort to protect civilians from anti-personnel
landmines.
We lead the world in humanitarian demining. And we are
substantially increasing our own commitment, while asking other
countries to increase theirs. Our goal is to free civilians everywhere
from the threat of landmines by the year 2010.
Meanwhile, we have embarked on an aggressive search for
alternatives to anti-personnel landmines, with the hope that we can
fulfill the President's goal of ridding the world of these terrible
weapons.
B. Promoting Prosperity
A second overarching goal of our foreign policy is to promote a
healthy world economy in which American genius and productivity receive
their due.
Through bipartisan efforts, we have put our fiscal house in order
and our economy is stronger than it has been in decades. I am pleased
that American diplomacy has contributed much to this record.
Since President Clinton took office, we have negotiated more than
240 trade agreements, including the Uruguay Round and agreements on
information technology, basic telecommunications services and--most
recently--financial services. These agreements remove barriers to U.S.
products and services, thereby creating good American jobs. To help
level the playing field for American business, we concluded an OECD
Convention last year that commits more than 30 other nations to join us
in criminalizing foreign commercial bribery.
We have also been striving to ensure that agreements made are
agreements kept. Our diplomats know that one of their principal jobs is
to see that American companies and workers get a fair shake. To that
end, our trade negotiators are making full use of every available
enforcement tool, including a strengthened WTO.
All this matters to Americans because trade is responsible for one-
third of the sustained economic growth we have enjoyed these past five
years. Today, some twelve million U.S. jobs are supported by exports
and these are good jobs, paying--on average--15% more than non-trade
related positions.
To stay on this upward road, we are using our diplomatic tools to
forge an increasingly open system of global investment and trade that
is fair to investors, business people, farmers and workers alike.
At last November's APEC summit, Pacific governments agreed to begin
negotiation on a sectoral liberalization package covering more than
$700 million in trade. We are continuing to explore new opportunities
for expanded commerce with the EU. We have an opportunity in the OECD
to conclude a major treaty on the rules of international investment. In
April, at the hemispheric summit in Santiago, we will seek to launch
negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas. And this
summer, at the International Labor Conference in Geneva, we will be
striving for a strong declaration on core labor standards.
We will be working with Congress this year to ensure that the
President has the fast-track trade negotiating authority he needs to
reach agreements that benefit our economy and advance our overall trade
liberalization, environmental and worker rights objectives.
We will also be asking you to support our economic and humanitarian
assistance programs and the Peace Corps. Many of our fastest-growing
markets are in developing countries where the transition to an open
economic system is incomplete. By helping these countries overcome
problems, we contribute to our own prosperity while strengthening the
international system, in which we have the largest stake.
For example, our programs assist developing nations in stabilizing
population growth rates, thereby allowing them to devote more of their
scarce resources to meet the basic needs of their citizens. Moreover,
the family planning programs we support are voluntary. They do not fund
abortions; on the contrary, they contribute to our goal of reducing the
incidence of abortions.
An open, growing world economy is vital to our prosperity--and a
foreign policy imperative. For when we make progress on the
international economic front, we make progress on all fronts. A world
that is busy growing will be less prone to conflict. Nations that have
embraced economic reform are more likely to embrace political reform.
And as history informs us, prosperity is a parent to peace.
C. Fighting International Crime and Narcotics
Mr. Chairman, a third global objective of our foreign policy is to
fight and win the struggle against international crime. In our era, the
drug trade, arms smuggling, money laundering, corruption and
trafficking in human beings have become overlapping and reinforcing
threats. They undermine our effort to build a more stable, prosperous
and democratic international system. And they threaten us whether we
are traveling abroad or walking down the very streets on which we live.
Here at home, we have found that community policing and a strong
judicial system can cut crime. Our parallel strategy overseas is
reducing crime before it reaches our shores. The Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is leading an
aggressive effort to strengthen foreign judicial systems, break up
international criminal cartels, eliminate offshore havens for hot
money, increase extraditions, and block the illicit smuggling of
narcotics, guns, stolen cars and illegal aliens.
All this requires more than increasing police on our borders or
Coast Guard ships at sea. It involves virtually every aspect of our
diplomacy, from building viable judicial and law enforcement
institutions; to eradicating coca and opium poppies; to forging
bilateral law enforcement agreements; to speaking frankly with foreign
leaders about the need to close ranks.
There is no silver bullet in the fight against international crime,
but--as our increased budget request for this year reflects--we are
pushing ahead hard. Our purpose, ultimately, is to create a kind of
global ``Neighborhood Watch'', with governments and law abiding
citizens everywhere coming together to plug the legal and law
enforcement gaps that give criminals the space they need to operate and
without which they could not survive.
D. Environment
The United States also has a major foreign policy interest in
ensuring for future generations a healthy and abundant global
environment and in working to prevent environmental problems that could
lead to conflict or contribute to humanitarian disasters.
The wise stewardship of natural resources is about far more than
esthetics--about whether one responds more warmly to butterflies than
bulldozers. Misuse of resources can produce shortages that breed
famine, fear, flight and fighting. And as societies grow and
industrialize, the absorptive capacities of the Earth will be severely
tested.
We can respond to this reality with complacency, assuring ourselves
that the full costs of our neglect will not come due until after we
have passed from the scene. Or we can meet our responsibility to future
generations by striving to identify meaningful, cost-effective ways to
anticipate and mitigate environmental and resource-related dangers.
We are choosing the latter course.
That is why we have incorporated environmental goals into the
mainstream of our foreign policy, and why we have established and are
pursuing specific environmental objectives in every part of the world.
It is why we are seeking an international agreement to regulate the
production and use of persistent chemical toxins that have global
impacts.
It is why we will be focusing new attention on what may be one of
the most explosive international issues of the 21st century--access to
secure supplies of fresh water.
And it is why we will be asking Congress to work with us as we seek
to ensure that the promise of the Kyoto Protocol is realized. In Kyoto,
the world's leading industrialized nations committed themselves for the
first time to significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and
adopted, in key respects, the U.S. market-based approach to achieving
those reductions. Kyoto also made a significant downpayment on securing
the meaningful participation of developing countries in the needed
global response, but clearly more must be done to meet our
requirements.
E. Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law
Finally, U.S. policy is to promote democracy, the rule of law,
religious tolerance and human rights. These goals reflect a single
premise: the health of the community depends on the freedom of the
individual.
A half century ago, the nations of the world affirmed in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights that ``the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace'' resides in the ``inherent dignity and . . . equal .
. . rights of all members of the human family.''
Today, there are those who argue that the Declaration reflects
western values alone. But that is nonsense.
Consider, for example, the first Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference
held in Indonesia more than four decades ago. There, the
representatives of 29 nations from China to Libya and from Sudan to
Iraq cited the Universal Declaration as ``a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations.''
And less than five years ago, countries on every continent
reaffirmed their commitment to the Declaration at the Vienna Conference
on Human Rights.
Unfortunately, as our recent human rights report indicated, the
face of the world remains scarred by widespread abuses, many the
byproduct of ethnic and religious intolerance, others perpetrated
willfully by authoritarian regimes. These violations are an offense to
humanity and an anchor retarding human progress. For only when people
are free to express their identities, publish their thoughts and pursue
their dreams can a society fulfill its potential.
In recent months, some have criticized America for, in their words,
trying to ``impose'' democracy overseas. They suggest it is hopeless
and sometimes damaging to encourage elections in countries that are not
yet developed. They appear to assume that our efforts are limited to
the promotion of elections, and that we are indifferent to the history,
culture, politics and personalities of the countries involved.
In truth, we understand well that democracy, by definition, cannot
be imposed. It must emerge from the desire of individuals to
participate in the decisions that shape their lives. But this desire is
present in all countries. America's aim is to assist democratic forces,
where and when we can, to assemble the nuts and bolts of a free
society. That requires far more than elections. Depending on the
country and the situation, we employ a wide variety of means from
vigorous diplomacy to training judges to providing technical advice on
everything from drafting a commercial code to the rules of
Parliamentary procedure.
To term our support for democracy an imposition is to get the logic
upside down. For democracy is the only form of government that allows
people to choose their own path. There could be no better way for us to
show respect for the uniqueness and autonomy of others than to support
their right to shape their own destinies and select their own leaders.
So let us be clear. American policy proceeds from this truth: in
any language, on any continent, for any culture, dictatorship is an
imposition; democracy is a choice.
Accordingly, the United States will continue to support democratic
ideals and institutions however and wherever we can effectively do so.
We will continue to advocate increased respect for human rights,
vigorously promote religious freedom and firmly back the international
war crimes tribunals.
As the President pledged in his State of the Union Address, we will
send legislation forward to address the intolerable practice of abusive
child labor.
We will renew our request that the Committee approve--at long
last--the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women.
And because of our commitment to the rule of law, and to the
economic, security and scientific interests of the United States, we
are pleased to join the Department of Defense in urging your support
for the revised International Convention on the Law of the Sea.
IV. World-Class Diplomacy
The efforts we make to advance our security, prosperity and values
are both right and smart for America and for our future. But we cannot
lead without tools.
It costs money to track the development of weapons of mass
destruction around the world; to dismantle and dispose of nuclear
materials safely from the former Soviet Union; to protect American jobs
by representing American interests in Tokyo and Brussels, Ottawa and
Buenos Aires; and to help our partners build societies based on peace,
democracy and law. But these costs do not begin to compare to the costs
we would incur if we did not act; if we stood aside while conflicts
raged, terrorists struck, newfound freedoms were lost and chemical,
nuclear and biological weapons spread willy-nilly around the globe.
American leadership is built on American ideals, supported by our
economic and military might, and tested every day in the arena of
international diplomacy. To thrive in the new century, America will
need first-class factories and farms; first-class students and
scientists; and first-class soldiers and sailors. We will also need
world-class diplomacy.
World-class diplomacy depends on having the right number of people,
in the right places, with the right level of skills, modern
communications systems and buildings that are secure.
Unfortunately, despite strong support from many in both parties in
Congress, we have lost ground during this decade. In real terms,
funding has declined sharply. Since 1993, we have closed 32 embassies
and consulates. We've been forced to cut back on the life's blood of
any organization, which is training. We face critical infrastructure
needs in key capitals such as Berlin and Beijing. We must modernize our
information systems or we will enter the 21st century with computers
that do not work. And we have seen the percentage of our nation's
wealth that is used to support democracy and prosperity around the
globe shrink steadily, so that among industrialized nations we are now
dead last.
So I urge the Committee to support the President's budget request,
remembering as you do so, that although international affairs amounts
to only about one percent of the Federal budget, it may well account
for fifty percent of the history that is written about our era, and it
affects the lives of one hundred percent of the American people.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, as Secretary of State, I can tell you that
you can be proud of the people--foreign service officers, civil service
and foreign service nationals--who work every day, often under very
difficult conditions, to protect our interests around the world. I have
never been associated with a more talented, professional or dedicated
group of people. And I hope I can work with the Committee this year to
see that our personnel receive the support and respect they deserve;
and to maintain the highest standards of diplomatic representation for
America.
V. Conclusion
As always, Mr. Chairman, I come before you with my mind focused on
the present and future, but conscious, also, of past events that have
shaped our lives and that of our nation.
A half century ago, this month, a Communist coup in my native
Czechoslovakia altered forever the course of my life and prompted, as
well, an urgent reappraisal by the west of what would be required to
defend freedom in Europe.
In that testing year, a Democratic President and a Republican
Congress approved the Marshall Plan, laid the groundwork for NATO,
helped create the Organization of American States, established the
Voice of America, recognized the infant state of Israel, airlifted
life-sustaining aid to a blockaded Berlin and helped an embattled
Turkey and Greece remain on freedom's side of the Iron Curtain.
Secretary of State George Marshall called this record ``a brilliant
demonstration of the ability of the American people to meet the great
responsibilities of their new world position.''
There are those who say that Americans have changed and that we are
now too inward-looking and complacent to shoulder comparable
responsibilities. In 1998, we have the opportunity to prove the cynics
wrong. And Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I believe we
will.
From the streets of Sarajevo to the Arabian and Korean peninsulas
to classrooms in Africa, boardrooms in Asia and courtrooms at The
Hague, the influence of American leadership is as beneficial and as
deeply felt in the world today as it has ever been.
That is not the result of some foreign policy theory. It is a
reflection of American character.
We Americans have an enormous advantage over many other countries
because we know who we are and what we believe. We have a purpose. And
like the farmer's faith that seeds and rain will cause crops to grow;
it is our faith that if we are true to our principles, we will succeed.
Let us, then, do honor to that faith. In this year of decision, let
us reject the temptation of complacency and assume, not with complaint,
but welcome, the leader's role established by our forebears.
And by living up to the heritage of our past, let us together
fulfill the promise of our future--and enter the new century free and
respected, prosperous and at peace.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you very much. And
now, I would be pleased to respond to your questions.
__________
Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by the Committee to
Secretary Albright
Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Biden
Authority to Use Force Against Iraq
Question. What is the basis for the Executive's assertion that it
has the necessary authority, under both domestic and international law,
to launch a military strike against Iraq?
Answer. With respect to domestic law, the President has two
mutually reinforcing sources of authority--his constitutional authority
as Commander-in-Chief and the statutory authority provided at the
outset of the Gulf War and reaffirmed since then. Here Congress
expressly authorized the President to use force against Iraq under
Public Law 102-1, enacted in January 1991. Public Law 102-1
specifically stated that it satisfied the 1973 War Powers Resolution.
Congress affirmed in section 1095 of Public Law 102-190, enacted in
December 1991, that this authorization to use force continued to apply
after the Gulf War ceasefire to any action needed to achieve the goals
of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687. That resolution
required Iraq, among a number of other requirements, to destroy its
weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and to accept
United Nations inspections to verify this.
These provisions should be understood in light of the President's
constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief to use armed forces to
protect our national interests.
From the end of the Gulf War to the present, the Bush and Clinton
Administrations have submitted the reports to Congress called for under
Public Law 102-1. As reported to Congress, both Presidents authorized
the use of force during this period under these authorities.
With respect to international law, Resolution 678 authorized United
Nations member states cooperating with Kuwait to use ``all necessary
means'' to implement the Council's resolutions and ``to restore
international peace and security in the area.'' This resolution and
other relevant resolutions of the Council remain in force.
Resolution 687 mandated a ceasefire, but also imposed a number of
requirements on Iraq, including--as indicated above--destruction of
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and its
acceptance of United Nations inspections to verify this.
Iraq's actions have constituted flagrant, repeated and material
breaches of these requirements. Such breaches would entitle Coalition
members to exercise the authority given by Resolution 678 and to take
necessary and proportionate measures, including the use of force, to
compel Iraq to comply with all relevant Security Council resolutions.
This is in addition to our right to act in self-defense against any use
or threat of force by Iraq.
On March 2, the Security Council adopted a resolution that
recognized that failure by Iraq to fulfill its obligations ``to accord
immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access'' to UNSCOM would be
sufficiently serious to warrant the ``severest consequences.''
Rwanda: Hate Radio
Question. What is the U.S. doing to counter the reemergence of
destabilizing hate radio messages?
Answer. On December 11, 1997, there was a broadcast from Bukavu
inEastern Congo which encouraged the expulsion and/or extermination of
ethnic Tutsis. This broadcast coincided with the movement of extremist
Hutu militiamen from eastern Congo to Rwanda. We have detected no
transmissions since December 11. Although this may have been an
isolated event, we are well aware of the previous devastating impact of
hate radio in the region and are therefore preparing offensive and
defensive strategies to counter this threat.
Our offensive strategy is to augment messages of ethnic
cooperation, healing, and reconciliation. Voice of America (VOA)
broadcasts in local languages in the region and enjoys a wide audience.
We are examining how we might better utilize VOA programming to promote
peace and inclusivity. We have also sent a team to the region to assess
how we might further advance reconciliation through grass-roots
activities such as village plays and radio dramas.
Jamming hate broadcasts requires detailed information on the
location of the transmitter(s) and the frequencies being used. We are
exploring this issue and can provide you with further details in a
classified briefing, if you desire.
Rwanda: Support to Rebels
Question. Do we know who is responsible for supporting the rebels
responsible for the continued violence--and can we do anything to shut
off that support?
Answer. We do not know definitively who is responsible for
supporting the rebels. Our intelligence services continue to examine
the issue and have prepared a report of their findings. You may contact
the CIA directly for a copy of this classified paper.
In an effort to gain more information and to eventually help thwart
rebel supply-lines, we are asking the United Nations to reinstate the
U.N. Arms Flow Investigative Commission. We have canvassed our Security
Council partners and there is broad support for this initiative. The
task now is to identify adequate financial support.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Ratification
Question. The President called for the Senate to give its advice
and consent to ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) this year. He said that the treaty ``can help prevent the
development of new and more dangerous weapons, and make it more
difficult for non-nuclear states to build them.'' We are also told that
the Department of Energy's 45-billion-dollar ``stockpile stewardship''
program will maintain the safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear
weapons without the need for nuclear testing.
(a) Why is it important for the Senate to address the issue of
ratifying the treaty this year, rather than waiting 5 or 10 years to
judge the success of the Department of Energy's ``stockpile
stewardship'' program?
(b) Will early U.S. ratification of the treaty have a real impact
upon how soon it enters into force, or on whether countries like India
and Pakistan comply with it?
Answer. (a) It is essential that the U.S. demonstrate leadership
with regard to the crucial treaties and regimes that strengthen our
global nonproliferation effort. Were the U.S. to delay its ratification
of CTBT for 5 to 10 years, it could do serious harm to U.S. global
nonproliferation efforts, and to the prospects for the CTBT entering
into force (EIF) in the near future.
U.S. commitment to completing the CTBT was instrumental in
achieving the unconditional extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) in 1995. A lengthy delay in U.S. ratification would negate the
commitment the U.S. so clearly demonstrated during and after the CTBT
negotiations; it would thereby harm implementation of the NPT and U.S.
nonproliferation initiatives generally.
Until the United States has itself ratified the CTBT, it will also
be very difficult for us to cooperate closely with others in the
international community in promoting ratification by all 44 countries
(including the U.S.) whose ratifications are required for EIF. Were EIF
to be delayed, one or more of the nuclear weapon states--which are
currently observing self-imposed moratoria on test explosions--could
decide, in the absence of firm legal constraints, that they must resume
testing.
Moreover, we do not need to wait to see if the Stockpile
Stewardship Program works. The directors of the U.S. nuclear weapons
laboratories have confirmed to the President their confidence in the
Stockpile Stewardship Program and its ability to maintain America's
nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing. Successful implementation of
the Program has already begun. The second of the recently mandated
annual stockpile certifications has been completed, and it confirmed
that no nuclear testing is required at this time. Problems in
stockpiled warheads have been resolved, and an existing weapon has been
modified without explosive testing.
Senate advice and consent would also be conditioned on six
safeguards. One of these is the President's commitment that, if he is
informed that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability
of a nuclear weapon type considered to be critical to our nuclear
deterrent could no longer be certified, he would be prepared, in
consultation with Congress, to withdraw from the treaty under the
standard ``supreme national interests clause'' in order to conduct
whatever testing might be required.
(b) Rather than waiting to see if others will ratify the CTBT,
America must lead in bringing the CTBT into force. U.S. ratification of
the Chemical Weapons Convention last year, for example, led to Russian
and Pakistani ratification shortly thereafter. The sooner we have
signed and ratified it, the better our position will be to urge others
to adhere to it.
In addition, if the CTBT has not entered into force three years
after it is opened for signature, the treaty provides for an annual
conference of countries that have ratified to consider what measures
may be taken to accelerate the ratification process in order to
facilitate early EIF. To participate in such a conference, the U.S.
must ratify. Ratification by the U.S. and others will also strengthen
the international norm against nuclear testing, thus helping to deter
tests by non-signatories and support the international community's
efforts to gain universal adherence to the CTBT.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Question. In December, you used your waiver authority under section
573 of the Fiscal 1998 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act in order
to be able to provide economic assistance to areas in the Republic
Srpska that are not in compliance with the war criminals provisions of
Dayton. Last month Milorad Dodik, non-nationalist Bosnian Serb, was
elected Prime Minister of the Republika Srpska. Dodik has pledged to
implement Dayton to the fullest.
(a) Does it still make sense to waive compliance with Dayton and
give U.S. assistance to localities that are harboring war criminals?
(b) In other words, why should we undercut Prime Minister Dodik's
courageous policy of implementing Dayton?
Answer. (a) The waiver for U.S. bilateral assistance signed by the
Acting Secretary on December 23, 1997, was necessary under the
provisions of our appropriations act to permit U.S. bilateral
assistance to any part of the Republika Srpska. It is essential for the
success of our policy in Bosnia to keep providing carefully targeted
assistance in support of Prime Minister Milorad Dodik.
In fact, the political and economic assistance we provided last
year to President Plavsic prior to the RS assembly elections was
responsible for the Pale hard-liners losing.their majority in the RS
assembly and is the reason Mr. Dodik is now Prime Minister at the head
of a moderate coalition.
Even though war criminals continue to live in the RS, we believe
that U.S. assistance should be provided in support of Dodik. He and
President Plavsic were active in encouraging the recent peaceful
surrender of two indictees in Samac, and we believe this sort of
cooperation on war criminals will continue.
(b) As I have mentioned, providing assistance in the Republika
Srpska will bolster Prime Minister Dodik, not undercut him. Prime
Minister Dodik needs resources if he is to gain control of the RS
Government and be able to cooperate on war criminals, refugee returns,
and other Dayton implementation issues.
Question. Wouldn't it be better to underline our support for Dodik
by conditioning all aid to cooperation on war criminals, refugee
returns, and seating of elected governments?
Answer. We have, in fact, discussed with Mr. Dodik a number of
conditions for continued U.S. assistance and support, including those
you have mentioned. Mr. Dodik has voiced his clear support for the
implementation of Dayton but has indicated that he will need help to
establish a fully functioning government capable of carrying out Dayton
commitments.
We will carefully tranche our assistance to the Dodik government
and have made it clear that we expect progress in all areas of Dayton
implementation in order for it to continue to receive U.S. political
and economic support. But denying him any kind of assistance until
there is complete implementation of commitments on war criminals,
refugee returns, and seating of elected governments would effectively
rob the new government of necessary tools to accomplish these and other
difficult tasks, many of which are going to take time to achieve.
Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Smith
Funding for the Global Environment Facility (GEF)
Question. The budget request proposes $300 million for the
GlobalEnvironment Facility (GEF). This is a 525% increase from the 1998
enacted level of $48 million. What is this money for?
Answer. The Administration strongly supports the GEF as an
essential tool for mobilizing international resources to protect the
global environment, especially as regards climate change and protection
of biodiversity.
With over 120 members, the GEF provides grant funding for projects
that protect the global environment. Its programs focus exclusively on
global resources vital to the health and long-term economic prosperity
of all countries, specifically in the areas of climate change,
biodiversity, international waters and ozone depletion. The GEF acts as
a catalyst for other funding, using relatively small grants to leverage
much larger projects, thus far committing about $1.3 billion for over
200 full-scale projects, plus 300 smaller local projects funded through
its highly successful Small Grants Program.
The U.S. pledged $430 million in 1993 to support the GEF's current
four-year (FY95-98) work program; yet over the past three years, the
U.S. has given barely half its pledged amount due to Congressional
underfunding. We now carry GEF arrears from FY96-98 of $193 million.
The Administration's $300 million request will clear our arrears and
meet our FY99 pledge of $107 million.
The GEF is an instrument that can help us meet our twin objectives
of promoting U.S. technology and shaping international environmental
responsibility, but only if it receives adequate funding. We already
have the best technology to address these challenging environmental
problems, and the U.S. must take the lead in shaping global
environmental responsibility as well. Unless we maximize the potential
of the GEF, it will not be able to help us meet our international
environmental goals.
Funding for Security and Maintenance of U.S. Missions
Question. The budget request proposes $641 million in budget
authority for the State Department Security and Maintenance of U.S.
Missions account--a 61% increase from the $398 million in 1998. What is
this money for?
Answer. The Department's $640.8 million request in Fiscal Year 1999
for the Security and Maintenance of U.S. Missions account is to provide
safe, secure, and functional overseas facilities from which we conduct
our diplomatic activities. The request reflects the Administration's
continuing commitment to protect and maintain our overseas facilities
infrastructure investment.
The increase of nearly $250 million over the Fiscal Year 1998
enacted appropriation for foreign buildings is primarily to construct
new chanceries in Beijing ($200 million) and Berlin ($50 million of the
$120 million needed). The total request for all other Foreign Buildings
programs, $390.8 million, is about $7 million less than the Fiscal Year
1998 enacted appropriation. These funds are used to maintain,
rehabilitate, and modernize the 3,000 USG-owned and long-term leased
facilities overseas; lease property required for operations; and assess
the adequacy and safety of our facilities.
The chancery in Beijing is needed because the current structure has
security and life-safety deficiencies, is greatly overcrowded, and
cannot support the kind of U.S. presence needed now and in the future.
The $200 million that the Department is requesting will allow us to
acquire a site, design and construct the new building.
The American Embassy in Germany is moving from Bonn to Berlin in
phases, with the final elements moving in late 1999. The Department
plans to construct a new chancery in Berlin on Pariser Platz, the site
of our pre-Worid War II embassy next to the Brandenburg gate. The
Department plans to finance the construction of the new Berlin
Chancery, to the extent possible, with the proceeds from the sale of
excess property in Germany. Because one of these properties cannot be
sold at the price we originally estimated, we will require an
appropriation of $50 million to enable the Department to proceed with
the capital project, which is estimated to cost $120 million.
The Department's request also includes increases in the amounts
allocated for safety programs and security-related projects. We plan to
hire additional staff to oversee the management of pesticides and other
hazardous materials and to increase the number of facility maintenance
specialists who manage USG properties abroad.
Israeli Foreign Aid
Question. What has been the Administration's reaction to the
Israeli government's plan to wean itself off American Foreign Aid?
Answer. In late January, Israeli Finance Minister Yaacov Ne'eman
began discussions with Members of Congress and Administration officials
on a proposal that would gradually reduce Israel's economic assistance
to zero, while phasing in military assistance increases.
We welcome the Israeli government's initiative and are working
closely with Israel and the Congress to further develop the concept.
As Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu told a joint session of
Congress, there is no greater tribute to America's longstanding
economic aid than Israel's achievement of economic independence.
OMB Revision of Budget Subsidy Risk Premiums
Question. In 1999 the Office of Management and Budget will change
the way it calculates risk used to determine subsidy levels for Ex-Im
and OPIC loans and the Treasury's debt reduction program. What prompted
0MB to recalculate the sovereign risk?
Answer. There are two main reasons the Administration has proposed
changing the risk premiums used to determine the subsidy cost of U.S.
government international credit.
First, the existing premiums have been in use since the FY 1993
budget. The proposed premiums update them to reflect financial market
experience of the last six years.
Second, the existing premiums were determined by reference to U.S.
domestic corporate bond premiums. Because more data is now available,
the proposed premiums use international bond premiums as a reference to
the extent possible.
Bipartisan Budget Agreement
Question. Last year the Bipartisan Budget Agreement designated
Function 150 as a priority function and specified $128.6 billion in
budget authority and $18.8 billion in outlays as the agreed to
discretionary flinction levels for FY 1999. I therefore expected to be
supporting that budget request in FY 1999. However, the Administration
moved the goal posts on me. When the budget was released last week, I
found that to support full funding of the 150 account I couldn't stick
with agreed-upon $18.6 billion figure, but instead was being asked to
support a figure about $1 billion more. Madam Secretary why is this?
Answer. First, it is important to note that our FY 1999 budget
request is fully compliant with last year's Bipartisan Budget
Agreement. As you recall, that Agreement set annual caps on non-defense
discretionary spending, which includes Function 150 spending. For FY
1999 the overall Federal budget is within those caps while eliminating
the deficit earlier than envisioned in the Agreement. The Agreement
also gave priority to certain budget functions and programs of which--
as you point out--the International Affairs function was one. However,
amounts for these priority functions, including Function 150, were
indicative but not mandatory. For example, for FY 1998 the Congress did
not provide all the funds envisioned in the agreement for International
Affairs.
As you indicate, our FY 1999 request--excluding arrears payments
for the Multilateral Development Banks--is about $1 billion over the
notional FY 1999 target for Function 150. However, much has changed
since the Budget Committee approved its outyear funding levels last
spring. I would like to explain why we require this higher figure and
to solicit your support for the $19.6 billion level. I hope you share
my strong belief that our nation cannot afford a lower funding level
for International Affairs. Some of the more important programs and
accounts where increases above of the FY 1999 budget ceiling include:
The New Independent States (NIS) (+$80 million): We have no higher
priority than to ensure that NIS countries build peaceful ties with the
West through free-market engagement and reliable democratic
institutions. Our NIS programs promote democracy and market economies
by building a grassroots constituency for continuation of needed
reforms. To succeed, we need to augment the resources for reform
efforts, particularly, but not only, in Russia. This approach is solid
insurance against the risk of a return to confrontational relations
with a major power.
Bosnia (+$170 million): Last year, when levels were set for the
SEED account, it was anticipated that Bosnia expenses would be scaled
back considerably, reflecting an improved situation. This, however, has
proved unrealistic. Our FY 1999 budget request for Bosnia is $225
million in recognition of the continuing need to accompany our allies
in providing the reconstruction and economic assistance that will make
sustained peace in Bosnia possible after military forces leave.
Africa (+$120 million): During my recent visit to the region, I was
firmly persuaded that we need to renew our efforts in Africa. We must
assist in finding solutions to basic problems, especially in the Great
Lakes region. It makes good sense to be proactive in attacking the
underlying causes of instability, rather than engaging in continual
crisis response. The President's Fiscal Year 1999 budget increases
funding for Africa by $120 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF),
Treasury Debt Reduction Programs, and Development Assistance. This
increase will provide $35 million in special debt reduction for African
nations as part of the ``Partnership for Growth and Opportunity in
Africa''; $30 million for the Africa Trade and Investment Initiative;
$25 million to support the Africa Great Lakes Initiative designed to
prevent further conflict in the region; and $10 million to support
Education for Democracy and Development in Africa.
Non-proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related (NADR)
Programs (+$120 million): New requirements proposed in the budget
include: $50 million to support the President's Demining 2010
Initiative; $28.9 million to support for the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, including development and installation of an international
nuclear explosion monitoring program; and funds that will support
technology transfer and export control programs to contain
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and strengthen technical
assistance for International Atomic Energy Agency nuclear safety
programs.
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (+$40 million): To
maintain our success in reducing narcotics production in the Andean
countries, we have increased our request for interdiction and anti-
narcotics programs.
Peace Corps (+$45 million): The FY 1999 budget will put the Peace
Corps on the path to 10,000 volunteers (from 6,500) in the early years
of the next century. More Americans are expressing an interest in Peace
Corps service than ever before, and the request for volunteers by other
countries far exceeds the level that current resource levels can
support.
Export Import Bank of the United States (+$130 million): These
funds help Americans maximize their export sales, thus stimulating
economic growth and creating jobs in the United States. The increase
reflects business growth in Russia, the New Independent States, and
other ``big emerging markets''.
State Operations (+$400 million): Budget assumptions made in 1997
did not allow for significant new operational requirements necessary to
maintain our overseas investments in FY 1999. The construction of new
facilities in Beijing ($200 million) and Berlin ($50 million) require a
strong capital investment. In addition, there is a compelling need to
continue modernizing our worldwide information technology
infrastructure, including Year 2000 compliance requirements.
Assessments to International Organizations (+$40 million): The FY
1999 request is consistent with statutory restrictions of U.S. assessed
contributions to the United Nations (UN) and 48 international
organizations. Early progress in meeting our UN arrears in 1998 will
enable us to seek a reduction of our assessments from 25 percent to 22
percent that will result in significant future year savings.
To accommodate these new requirements, we have reduced funding in a
number of accounts below the levels anticipated in last year's budget
agreement. However, there is a limit to how much we can do within the
base provided. New demands for one region or program do not mean that
we can afford to shirk our responsibilities in another. We must be able
to respond to new requirements while maintaining our longer-term
investments.
Our FY 1999 submission is more than a routine budget request. This
is an appeal for bipartisan consensus to provide the funding necessary
for International Affairs programs and personnel indispensable to
maintaining U.S. global leadership; a leadership that serves
increasingly vital interests of direct consequence to the American
people. I hope I can count on your support.
Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Feingold
The President's New Initiatives for Africa
Question. The President has proposed several new Africa programs as
part of an overall ``Africa initiative'' (including the Partnership for
Trade and Development, the Great Lakes Initiative and Education for
Development). Please detail the various components of this initiative,
and the accounts from which funds are to be made available. What is the
total budget request represented by these components?
Answer. The new Africa initiatives for which funding is being
requested are: the Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in
Africa, the Great Lakes Justice Initiative, and the Education for
Development and Democracy Initiative. They are distinct yet mutually
supportive. Each targets a key area of need and promise and strives to
coordinate and unify diverse U.S. government agency expertise and
resources under a clear strategy. Private U.S. expertise is being
factored into the development of each initiative as well. Together, the
initiatives are designed to boost Africa's integration into the world
community of free market democracies as the 21st Century approaches.
The initiatives are described below.
The Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in
Africa ($65 million):
Prior to the June 1997 G-8 Denver Summit, the President announced a
new Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportuniry in Africa with five
major components: (1) market access, (2) debt relief, (3) investment
support, (4) assistance to improve economic policies and business
climates and (5) multilateral support. A total of $65 million is
requested in FY 99: $35 million in Debt Relief and $30 million in
Development Assistance. Additional support will be provided through
ongoing U.S. programs and private sector resources as described below.
Market Access: The Partnership advocates renewal of current market
access incentives provided under the U.S. Generalized System of
Preferences Program (GSP) which allows eligible countries to export
products to the U.S. duty free. Under the new GSP law, those considered
least developed countries (LDCs--29, or the majority, are African) may
export an additional 1800 product categories to the U.S. duty free from
all African countries. If passed, the proposed African Growth and
Opportunity Act would provide additional market access incentives to
African countries that are implementing aggressive economic reforms by
eliminating a $75 million per product competitive need limitation on
GSP imports. If doing so would not harm U.S. industries, the Act allows
those countries to export products currently excluded from the GSP
program, including textile and apparel products, on a duty free basis.
The Act also calls for quota free entry of textile and apparel products
from selected African countries. Finally, under the President's
Partnership, the United States will be open to pursuing free trade
agreements with African countries that meet rigorous requirements for
starting negotiations.
Debt Relief: The Partnership for Economic Growth seeks to take our
previous U.S. efforts in debt relief a step further. Benefits will
focus on those countries that are making serious efforts to implement
sound economic policies, create a hospitable climate for investment,
and liberalize their trade regimes. Relief of bilateral concessional
debt will be offered under the partnership. This would be in addition
to reduction of concessional or market-rate debt provided through the
Paris Club or under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
initiative.
Investment Support: Under the Partnership, the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) issues loan guarantees for a privately-
managed investment fund capitalized at $150 million. The fund is open
to 29 African countries. Under the Partnership, OPIC is also seeking
investors to establish and manage additional OPIC guaranteed funds that
could be capitalized for up to $500 million. These investment funds
would finance infrastructure projects in African countries, and could
be established within OPIC's existing budget.
Improvements in Economic Policy and the Business Climate: USAID is
seeking $30 million in FY 99 to help African private and public sector
partners design and implement policy reforms that will make their
countries attractive to international trade and investment. This will
include a combination of: Technical assistance to implement reforms in
trade and investment regimes, with particular attention to a limited
number of countries with outstanding economic reform records; non-
project assistance to help such countries with the introduction of
aggressive, market-friendly reforms; and assistance to forge business
linkages and networks to help catalyze relations between U.S. and
African firms. USAID's existing Initiative for Southern Africa will
also contribute to objectives of the Partnership. It will provide up to
$25 million annually for regional programs that facilitate economic
integration and development in southern Africa. The Partnership also
calls for more Trade and Development Agency missions and urges greater
allocations of PL-480 commodities to African countries with outstanding
economic reform records.
Multilateral Support: In addition to bilateral measures by the
United States Government, under the Partnership, the Administration
will actively support greater financial assistance from international
financial institutions and other bilateral donors for African countries
with good economic reform records.
The Great Lakes Initiative ($25 million)
The objective of the Great Lakes Justice Initiative, which is
subject to congressional consultation and the approval of required
waivers to legislative restrictions, is intended to contribute to
efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC), Rwanda and
Burundi to help bring an end to the cycle of violence and culture of
impunity. Recognizing that justice is one critical element, the
initiative is designed to support an expanded effort to help those
nations to develop justice systems that are impartial, credible and
effective, and to help promote respect for human rights, inclusivity,
coexistence, human rights and security. The initiative offers a true
partnership involving African support and expertise, in which Africans
will define their own needs and solutions. Secretary Albright announced
plans for this initiative when she traveled to Africa in 1997. Total FY
99 funding requested: $25 million in Economic Support Funds.
Because the hallmark of the initiative is partnership, specific
objectives and project activities will be developed in concert with
African governments, civil societies, international and indigenous non-
governmental organizations and the donor community. An illustrative use
of funds at the national level might include, for example, (1) reform
projects such as coordinating commissions that work with Ministries of
Justice and Interior and the courts, prosecutors and prisons under
their direction to implement reforms, build institutional capacity or
train personnel, or (2) assistance to professional associations and
universities in civil society to formulate improved laws and practices
and support reform in governmental institutions.
At provincial and local levels, the FY 99 ESF could, for example,
be used to support legal education programs, human rights monitoring
activities, and local and regional reconciliation initiatives such as
alternative dispute resolution programs and inter-ethnic economic and
reconstruction projects.
The Education for Development and Democracy Initiative ($66
million)
The Education for Development and Democracy Initiative improve the
quality of, and technology for, education in Africa as the 21st Century
approaches. The African education system has declined over twenty years
of rapid population growth amid diminishing resources. Over twenty
African countries are pursuing educational reforms, and a number of
donors, including the United States, are already active in this area.
But the difficult challenges have yet to be met. They include:
providing basic education for the fifty percent of Africa's population
which is below the age of 15; providing skills to post-secondary
students which will enable Africa to participate effectively in the
global economy; and developing policies, institutions, values and
knowledge needed to empower African citizens politically as well as
economically. $66 million is requested in FY99: $5 million in Peace
Corps funds, $10 million in Economic Support Funds, $25 million in PL
480 II assistance, and $26 million in Development Funds.
Like the Great Lakes Initiative, the Education Initiative will be a
collaborative venture in which specific project objectives and
activities will be designed according to local African needs and
preferences. The Education Initiative will leverage U.S. experience,
resources and skills with African and other efforts already underway.
U.S. programs will focus in areas where the United States has a
comparative advantage or can provide value-added, catalytic investments
based upon field-proven methods. The Initiative will strengthen U.S.-
African partnerships and partnerships among Africans that link
governments, educational institutions, private corporations and civil
society to improve the quality of education.
Depending upon need and African vision and programs for education
reform, Education Initiative project activities will be made available
at all levels of public education with a focus on girls and women, and
will include skills training and civic education to promote sustainable
democracy by targeting professionals such as judges, parliamentarians,
journalists and civil socIety leaders.
Projects sponsored by the initiative could, for example, provide or
expand access to computer ecuipment and provide training, allow access
to the internet, or provide other technology, such as radio learning,
through local community resource centers, university systems, and USIS
Information Resource Centers in order to accelerate African integration
into modern global systems of education, government, business and
communications. In some contexts, simpler tools and supplies such as
typewriters or duplication equipment might be more useful. Pilot
programs will be used in finding the right mix of support under the
initiative, and for testing the operability of innovative methods to,
for example, improve the quality of teacher preparation and develop
curriculum reforms, explore renewable energy sources for computers,
sustain resource centers which provide internet access, provide
practical job skills training, or forge reciprocal school, university
and community linkages.
New Programs in the Africa Initiative
Question. Which pieces of this initiatIve represent entirely new
programs? How do these components compare to activities undertaken in
previous fiscal years, in both budget and programmatic terms?
Answer. While each initiative coordinates and builds upon elements
of ongoing U.S. programs and resources under a clear focus, each also
includes entirely new components.
Under the Partnership for Economic Growth, the $35 million
requested for bilateral concessional debt relief for reformers would
augment other U.S. debt relief programs and concessional debt
rescheduling and reduction through the Paris Club and the Highly
Indebted Poor Countries (HPIC) initiative. Investment in infrastructure
through the $500 million fund that OPIC is seeking to establish would
be new. The $25 million in Development Funds requested to improve
economic policy and the business climate will be used for new
activities described in the previous question. The Trade and
Development Agency will increase the number of reverse trade missions
to African countries. USDA will allocate a much larger portion of PL-
480 Title I commodities to African countries with outstanding economic
reform records for FY 98 and beyond Finally, diplomatic efforts to
press for multilateral support for reformers would seek to take such
efforts further than before.
Funds requested for the Great Lakes Justice Initiative, which is
subject to congressional consultation and the approval of required
waivers to legislative restrictions, are in addition to Africa's annual
request for Economic Support Funds for regional democracy programs. The
Great Lakes Initiative's program components, while new, will
incorporate best lessons from rule of law programs in Africa and other
regions. USAID has provided some bilateral assistance to Rwanda in
recent years to improve the administration of justice, working with the
Ministry of Justice and bar and judicial associations, and training
lawyers. The bilateral Rwanda program also seeks to increase civil
society participation in governance. As of yet, however, only
humanitarian and small grant NGO projects are being undertaken in
Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Rwanda
program lacks the coordinated, regional approach of the Great Lakes
Initiative.
The Education Initiative will coordinate elements of ongoing U.S.
agency programs with new projects and resources. Of the $66 million in
FY 99 funds requested for the Education Initiative, $10 million in FY
99 Economic Support Funds, $5 million in Peace Corps support, $25
million in FL 480 II resources and $26 million in FY 99 DevelopmenL
Assistance are in addition to ongoing programs. New project activities
that U.S. and African partners choose to implement will build upon, be
coordinated with, or be supplemented by, ongoing U.S. agency projects
in ways which provide clearly focused, value-added support for
education and technology. Project activities will expand or complement
ongoing African, U.S. and other donor education programs in Africa.
U.S. Programs Changes Due to Africa Initiatives
Question. Are the programs of any specific government agency (e.g.,
OPIC, TDA, Ex-IM) expected to change substantially as a result of these
Africa initiatives? Please explain.
Answer. Overall, ongoing U.S. agency programs are not expected to
change substantially as a result of the Africa Initiatives. As has been
noted in the previous questions, the Africa Initiatives strive to
improve coordination among and target certain U.S. agency resources
under a coherent interagency strategy in ways which have not been
attempted previously or which expand efforts beyond current programs.
Such coordination is proving beneficial in achieving a new synergy of
best U.S. practices and expertise. Although some U.S. agency program
resources may serve the goals of that agency and the goals of a new
initiative simultaneously, individual U.S. agency guidelines will
continue to constrain and direct how that agency's resource
contribution will be factored into each initiative.
Distinction Between Development Assistance Proposed for The Economic
Partnership and Development Assistance Proposed for the
Education Initiative
Question. Please explain the distinction between the $30 million
request for development assistance funds being proposed as part of the
Partnership for Economic Development and the request for $26 million in
Development Funds being proposed as part of Education for Development
and Democracy. I would appreciate a comparison between these proposals
and similar ones in previous fiscal years.
Answer. The FY 99 Development Assistance being requested by USAID
for each of these initiatives will be applied towards the distinctive
programs of each. The Development Assistance requested for the
Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity will contribute to
increasing Africa's integration into the global economy. The trade and
investment policy reform activities (described in your first question),
for which the Development Assistance is requested, draw upon USAID's
expertise in implementing similar programs in African countries.
The Development Assistance requested for the Education for
Democracy and Development Initiative will focus on building Africa's
human resource capacity in order to sustain economic progress and
political reform into the 21st Century. Activities (described in an
illustrative fashion in the first question) that are funded with
Development Assistance will draw upon the expertise of a variety of
U.S. agencies and private sector experts, as well as African experts,
and might expand or might innovate upon ongoing program activities, as
described in the first question, depending upon what African recipients
feel is appropriate.
Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa
Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa, Function 150
Resources
($ in thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999
Appropriation Actual Estimate Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Debt Relief...................... ........... ........... $35,000
DA............................... ........... ........... 30,000
Total...................... ........... ........... 65,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives
The Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa
(Partnership) provides the policy framework and programs that the USG
will implement to pursue the Administration's highest foreign policy
objective for Africa--the integration of African countries into the
global economy. The Partnership seeks to help African countries move
away from dependence on foreign assistance by providing incentives for
them to adopt sound economic policies that will spur economic growth
and make them better trade and investment partners for U.S. companies.
Most African countries are eligible for the U.S. Generalized System
of Preferences program and OPIC investment support as part of the basic
Partnership program. A number of other programs will be open to a
select group of African countries that meet rigorous economic policy
reform criteria: (1) debt reduction of $35 million for FY 1999; (2)
participation in the U.S.-African Economic Forum; and (3) three USAID
programs amounting to $30 million annually.
Under the Partnership, renewal of the current GSP law will provide
enhanced market access for the poorest African countries that are in
the Least Developed Country category (LLDCs). New legislation must be
passed to provide enhanced market access to the growth-oriented African
countries that meet the reform requirements for Level 2 participation
in the Partnership. The Administration is working with the sponsors of
the African Growth and Opportunity Act to develop a market access
program for Level 2 countries that can be passed by Congress and that
will not harm U.S. industries.
To encourage private investment in Africa, OPIC has launched two
new funds which are available to support up to $270 million in U.S.
investments in Africa. OPIC's activities will not require any
additional budget authority.
Strategy for FY 1999
The Administration is moving forward with Partnership Programs that
do not require legislation. Most programs are in the implementation
stage and will be continued during FY 1999. An interagency review
process to determine which reform-oriented countries will be invited to
participate in the U.S.-Africa Economic Forum and Level 2 of the
Partnership should be completed by the third quarter of FY 1998. During
FY 1998 USAID will continue to develop the three programs that be will
launched during FY 1999 which will provide economic-policy related
assistance to Level 2 Partnership countries.
Legislation must be passed to implement the market access
provisions of the Partnership. Renewal of the GSP law and passage of
the African Growth and Opportunity Act are high legislative priorities
and the Administration vigorously will seek their passage by Congress.
Indicators
Complete development work on 3 USAID programs for Level 2 of
the Partnership and launch them during FY 1999.
Complete work necessary to grant debt relief to Level 2
countries during FY 1999.
Obtain passage of African Growth and Opportunity Act which
has politically feasible market access provisions that will not
harm U.S. industries.
Continue implementation of ongoing Partnership programs
which were launched during FY 1998.
Organize and hold first ministerial-level meeting of the
U.S.-Africa Economic Forum.
Great Lakes Initiative
Great Lakes Initiative, Function 150 Resources
($ in thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999
Appropriation Actual Estimate Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ESF.............................. ........... ........... $25,000
Total...................... ........... ........... 25,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives
Emerging from major conflicts, the Great Lakes region is a
potential engine for development of a large part of Africa. U.S. policy
seeks to prevent destabilizing conflicts, secure the rule of law,
strengthen democratic practices, and promote long-term economic growth.
To tap the region's potential and address the roots of conflict, we
will act as a catalyst to mobilize international donor resources to
support regional development.
Strategy for FY 1999
We will work to strengthen mechanisms for justice and
reconciliation in order to break the cycles of impunity, extreme
violence, and instability that have plagued the region's recent
history. Additional goals are to assess the role of the international
community in becoming a partner in finding solutions: to reinforce
internal constituencies for judicial reform; and to galvanize support
for social reform and social security systems which enhance
accountability and the rule of law.
To address the culture of impunity, renewed dedication is required
at three levels: civilian justice, military justice, and international
mechanisms. At each level, we will focus on three goals: training of
personnel, building institutional capacity, and creating long-term
financing of justice institutions.
In addition, creating and/or reinforcing the institutions that
support democracy is a critical ingredient for preventing future
conflict. We propose to provide training, technical assistance and
direct support to local, regional and national institutions in key
sectors so as to enhance the responsiveness of governments on key
issues. We will also provide support to parliaments, electoral
commissions, local civil society institutions, and constitutional
commissions to promote wider participation in governance.
We will initiate efforts to demobilize and demilitarize the region
via targeted support for programs that are linked to the productive
private sector to offer an alternative livelihood.
We will channel assistance to programs aimed at eliminating
transportation and communications bottlenecks in order to unleash the
economic potential of key sectors throughout the region. We will also
support regional integration efforts through joint planning and
projects for roads, railways, ports, and communications infrastructure
and harmonized tax and tariff policies. $10 million of the BSF
allocated for this initiative in the President's budget has been
reallocated to support the Education for Development and Democracy
Initiative.
Indicators
Reduction in the size of regional armed forces.
Creation of demobilization programs linked to micro-economic
enterprises or agricultural development programs.
Technical assistance missions to national ministries of
finance and planning focused on creation of rational investment
regimes.
Establishment of human rights commissions or ombudsmen and
human rights NGOs.
Increased naval justice military and civilian training.
Drafting of military codes of justice.
Creation of a witness protection program for the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
Implementation of the Rwanda genocide law.
Increased effectiveness of the DROC Office of Ill-Gotten
Gains, created to identifv assets misappropriated by the Mobutu
regime.
Education for Development and Democracy
Education for Development and Democracy, Foreign Operations Resources
($ in thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999
Appropriation Actual Estimate Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peace Corps...................... ........... ........... $5,000 \1\
ESF.............................. ........... ........... 10,000
USIA............................. ........... ........... [4,500] \2\
PL 480 II........................ ........... ........... 25,000
DA............................... ........... ........... 26,000
Total...................... ........... ........... 66,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In addition, $29,000,000 of Peace Corps funding in Africa is already
designated for education programs.
\2\ Included in other USIA figures.
U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives
The U.S. seeks to promote a democratic, economically developed
Africa. An educated citizenry is fundamental to meeting these
objectives. Democracy and development in Africa need to be addressed in
a larger social and political context. One of the major obstacles
Africa faces is the limited human capacity that hinders efficiency,
popular participation in decision-making, and good governance. There is
also a lack of understanding regarding civil and political rights and
the respective roles of governments and citizens in a democracy. In an
effort to overcome historical patterns of centralized power and
corruption, many African governments are moving toward a wider
dispersal of economic and political power throughout their societies.
The United States will work with Africans to enhance human capacity
through education to strengthen democracy and free-market systems. The
United States will also seek to improve Africans access to the
technology and knowledge they need to participate fully in the global
economy and the world community of democracies.
Strategy for FY 1999
U.S. objectives will be pursued through combining U.S. experience,
resources and skills with African and other donor efforts already
underway to improve education in Africa. With assistance from USAID,
USIA, the Peace Corps, and private U.S. institutions and NGOs, the
United States will help equip Africans to build educational
institutions and practices that will foster efficient economic systems
and a democratic political culture. U.S. programs will focus on areas
that promise practical short- or medium-term results at primary through
university levels, as well as on civic education and skills training
for professionals such as judges, journalists and civil society
leaders.
Targeted infusions of technology, which can accelerate African
integration into modern global systems of education, government,
business and communications, will be pursued. The Leland and GLOBE
initiatives are examples of U.S. efforts in this area. U.S.-African
partnerships linking governments, educational institutions, private
corporations and civil society to promote education will also be
strengthened and expanded. Pilot programs will be used to test the
operability of innovative concepts, such as the use of hand-crank
radios for rural education, renewable energy sources, new methods to
train teachers, the design and implementation of curricula reforms, and
the creation of regional hubs which serve as technical resources and
manage partnership linkages.
Indicators
Increased linkages between U.S. and African partners in
universities, civil society groups, private corporations,
schools and other groups and institutions involved in African
education.
More effective overall linkages between U.S. education
programs in Africa, both governmental and private.
Innovations in increasing the accessibility of education
technology to Africans.
Creation of pilot programs which lead to improvements in
African education.
African Crisis Response Initiative
Question. Please comment on the progress of the African Crisis
Initiative and the Administration's plans for ACRI in FY 1999.
Answer. At the conclusion of FY 1998, the Administration's African
Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) will have provided six ACRI partner
countries with interoperable communications and other peacekeeping
equipment, completed Initial Training and initiated Sustainment
Training with five battalions, and begun Initial Training with two
additional battalions and a brigade staff. Under the ACRI, Initial
Training consists of a team of 70 U.S. Special Forces training the host
military unit for 70 days; Sustainment Training (30 trainers for 30
days) both promotes training retention in the host military unit and
provides additional training depth in certain specific subjects. Our
ACRI partner countries are, in order of Initial Training: Senegal,
Uganda, Malawi, Mali, Ghana, and Ethiopia. The total number of African
soldiers trained by the end of FY 1998 under the ACRI's international-
standard Program of Instruction represents approximately one-half of
the Initiative's objective of 10,000-12,000 trained and equipped
soldiers prepared for peacekeeping or humanitarian relief operations
identified in the Administration's ACRI Strategic Plan. This level of
recruitment and training puts the Administration on target for the
proposed five-year ACRI program.
An additional successful aspect of the ACRI can be seen in the
cooperation between the U.S. and our European partners (most notably
France and Great Britain, but Belgium and Portugal have also indicated
an interest in assisting with the ACRI in some capacity) to enhance
African peacekeeping capacity. Further international cooperation has
been stimulated by the initial meeting of the African Peacekeeping
Support Group held in New York last December.
The Administration's Strategic Plan calls for training and
equipping additional ACRI partner countries in FY 1999. We anticipate a
requirement for the same funding level ($20 million) to engage three
additional battalions and one company of African soldiers into the
ACRI. We are particularly interested in adding more of the politically
and militarily stable states in southern Africa to our ACRI
partnership. Sustainment Training, a critical part of the total ACRI
concept, will also be provided through requested funding during ten 30-
day training events in six countries.
International Military Education and Training Program for Indonesia
Question. Despite the fact that last year the Government of
Indonesia opted to decline participating in the International Military
Education and Training program--in part because of the controversy its
participation inspires in Congress--it is my understanding that the
Administration continues to pressure the Indonesians to renew its
participation. Given everything else that is taking place in Indonesia
right now--the financial crisis, growing food shortages, important
political changes--and the fact that congressional opposition to
Indonesia's participation remains as strong as ever, is it your view
that IMET should still be a priority for our Embassy in Jakarta? Please
explain.
Answer. Congress has limited Indonesian participation in IMET to
the Expanded IMET program, and we have allocated $400,000 in FY 98 in
the expectation that the Government of Indonesia will reconsider
participating in the IMET program.
The Administration continues to support resumption of IMET to this
important country but is certainly not ``pressuring'' Indonesia to
resume its participation in this program. Indonesia is one of the key
countries in ASEAN; has played a leading and constructive role in the
region on issues of common concern such as Cambodia; and straddles sea
lanes of strategic importance to regional and world security. We thus
see resumption of IMET and the enhanced military-to-military ties that
would result as in U.S. security interests.
As Indonesia faces its current crisis, proper military conduct is
essential. The IMET program represents an opportunity to expose the
Indonesian military to U.S. culture and values, and resumption of IMET
would complement Indonesia's efforts to instill professionalism, proper
conduct and respect for human rights in its military. IMET graduates
have played prominent roles in investigating human rights abuses and
are likely to be major players in future military reforms.
Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Grams
Restoration of pre-1975 Coalition Government in Laos
Question. What is the prospect for restoration of the coalition
government and constitutional order that existed in Laos prior to the
Communist seizure of power in 1975?
Answer. We see no prospect for the restoration of the coalition
government that existed prior to 1975. A series of unstable coalition
governments were militarily defeated by the Lao communist party, the
Pathet Lao, and its armed forces. The U.S. has maintained unbroken
diplomatic relations with the state of Laos since the fifties.
While Laos remains a one party state, recent political and economic
reforms are fundamentally changing the nature of government.
The party leadership adopted a constitution in 1990 which marked
the beginning of a shift from an authoritarian government ruled by
party decree to a society ruled by law with greater separation of state
and party.
We are continuing to work with the current government to make
changes which will improve the political and economic lives of all Lao.
We believe this is the most effective course we can undertake to
improve conditions in Laos.
Human Rights Violations in Laos
Question. What is the Administration doing to address the genocide
and human rights violations against Hmong and Lao people? I am told
that the ``killing fields'' are still going on today.
Answer. The State Department takes allegations of human rights
abuses in Laos very seriously and the U.S Embassy in Laos vigorously
pursues all such reports. This administration has worked hard to
improve human rights in Laos generally and the situation of the Hmong
in particular.
All available evidence indicates that state organized mistreatment
of the Hmong, which had been a serious problem from the end of the war
until the late eighties, ended a decade ago when the last of those held
in reeducation camps were released.
During meetings with the Lao President and Foreign Minister in
Vientiane last November, Deputy Secretary Talbott highlighted the
importance of respect for human rights to our bilateral relationship.
The American Embassy in Vientiane and the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) closely monitor the Lao government's
actions toward the Hmong refugees who have chosen to return to Laos.
Two UNHCR monitors who are fluent in the Hmong language move widely and
without hindrance throughout the country and follow up on specific
allegations of government persecution and/or discrimination of
returnees. The embassy also consults a variety of nongovernmental
sources, including some in the local Hmong community, in its attempts
to verify reports of human rights abuses.
Neither UNHCR nor our Embassy in Vientiane have found current
evidence of government directed or sanctioned persecution of Hmong
returnees or villagers.
Hmong language programming on Radio Free Asia
Question. There are over 12 million Hmong people in East Asia.
Currently there is no Hmong language programming through Radio Free
Asia. I would appreciate your consideration of Hmong programming to
reach these people throughout East Asia.
Answer. Hmong language programming is an issue of resources and
priorities for Radio Free Asia, an independent broadcaster operating
under the general direction of the Broadcasting Board of Governors.
Hmong represent a minority (by our estimates no more than 5-10
percent) of the approximately 5 million Lao. Small Hmong populations
also reside in Vietnam and Thailand, however, the bulk of the Hmong in
East Asia reside in China.
Meanwhile, almost all Hmong living in East Asia speak a second
language, either Mandarin, Lao, Vietnamese or Thai. Radio Free Asia,
and Voice of America, have Mandarin, Lao and Vietnamese language
services which report on potential issues of interest to Hmong speakers
in those countries.
Chemical Weapons in Laos
Question. There have been reports that Laos has been producing
chemical weapons in Laos and using them against political opponents. Is
there evidence of this, and what is being done to counter that?
Answer. In early Eebruary, the State Department received three
written reports from a U.S.-based human rights group which accused the
Lao government of using chemical/biological weapons on Hmong villages
in Northern Laos in late January.
These charges are reminiscent of the claims made fifteen to twenty
years ago that ``yellow rain'' was being used to subdue ethnic minority
groups in Laos, particularly the Hmong. At the time, it was claimed
that a biological substance, trichothecene mycotoxin, was being sprayed
on rural areas believed to harbor anti-government elements. Those
claims were controversial at the time and proved impossible to verify
conclusively.
Nonetheless, we take all such charges seriously. The U.S. Embassy
has asked the Lao government for an investigation into these charges
but has not yet received a response. The Embassy is also attempting to
seek information on the reports of chemical weapons attacks through
non-governmental sources. However, to date we have received no
independent confirmation of these charges.
We will keep you informed of the results of our efforts.
Cambodian Elections
Question. Will Hun Sen allow the safe return of Prince Ranariddh,
and can a fair election be held in July?
Answer. We do not know yet, but the Administration is working with
the ASEAN Troika Foreign Ministers and the international community to
support the creation of conditions that can enable Prince Ranariddh's
safe return and full participation in the July elections.
In cooperation with our ASEAN Troika colleagues, we have urged all
the key Cambodian parties--Hun Sen, Prince Ranariddh, and King
Sihanouk--to intensify efforts to reach a political settlement
permitting Prince Ranariddh to return safely to Cambodia with a royal
amnesty and full political rights intact. Diplomatic efforts toward
this goal continue. The ASEAN Troika met with the Friends of Cambodia
on February 15, endorsing the principles of a cease-fire and amnesty
for Prince Ranariddh proposed by Japan; another meeting of the Troika
is scheduled for March 6 to assess progress on this initiative after
another round of diplomatic contacts with the key Cambodia players.
We have said that free and fair elections in Cambodia are the best
way to restore the principles of the Paris Peace Accords. We have also
made clear our view that an essential part of free and fair elections
must be the full participation of opposition candidates and parties, in
a climate free of fear and intimidation. We continue to urge the
Cambodian government to do more to create those conditions for free and
fair elections, including taking concrete steps to improve the human
rights climate.
Japan's Cambodia Peace Proposal
Question. Is Japan's peace proposal for Cambodia achievable?
Answer. The meeting chaired by the ASEAN Troika for the Friends of
Cambodia in Manila on February 15 issued statements endorsing the
principles underlying the proposal offered by Japan for a Cambodian
cease-fire and an amnesty enabling Prince Ranariddh's return to
Cambodia. Both Mr. Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh voiced support for
Japan's proposal, but the recent reports that the Cambodian government
plans to draw out the process by holding more than one trial for Prince
Ranariddh indicates that Hun Sen is already backing away from the key
principles of Japan's initiative.
The Administration views Japan's proposal as a serious and
constructive effort, which forms the basis for further negotiations
among the Cambodian parties. In cooperation with the ASEAN Troika
Foreign Ministers and other concerned nations, we are urging the key
Cambodian parties to intensify efforts and take the necessary steps to
make their support for Japan's proposal a reality.
Relations with the Hun Sen Government
Question. What kind of contact does the U.S. have with the Hun Sen
government? Are there plans to recognize the coup?
Answer. The U.S. immediately condemned the violent ouster last July
of Prince Ranariddh, the democratically elected First Prime Minister.
We were among the first to condemn this as a violent overturning of the
Paris Peace Accords framework, and steadfastly rejected as undemocratic
the Hun Sen government's appointment of Foreign Minister Ung Huot as
Prince Ranariddh's replacement.
As a matter of policy, the U.S. recognizes states not governments.
We opposed the seating of Hun Sen's delegation at the U.N. last year
and supported the delegation of Prince Ranariddh as the legitimate
claimant to Cambodia's seat. Our position led to the U.N.'s decision to
leave the seat vacant.
We continue to have the necessary and appropriate contacts with the
government of Cambodia to advance key U.S. interests across the board,
including promotion of democracy, human rights, law enforcement and
counternarcotics efforts.
China WTO Accession and Permanent MFN
Question. What are China's chances for entry into the WTO this
year? If that happens, will the Administration seek permanent MFN for
China? The two seem to be tied together.
Answer. We do not have a timetable for China's entry into the WTO.
The key to moving forward will be the substance of China's positions,
although we are willing to move as fast as China on this issue.
We support China's accession to the WTO on the basis of its
providing significant new market access for our companies and
committing to fundamental WTO principles. We believe we have made some
progress over the past year and one-half.
A decision on permanent MFN would require legislation and is
ultimately up to the Congress. One important consideration will be
whether or not China has made adequate offers in its WTO accession.
U.S./China Nuclear Agreement Implementation
Question. Will you actively oppose efforts to block the President's
certification that China is complying with the U.S.-China Nuclear
Agreement?
Answer. The Administration is committed to working with Congress to
uphold the President's certification of China's nuclear
nonproliferation credentials necessary for implementation of the 1985
U.S./China Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.
Throughout the negotiating process leading to certification,
Administration officials consulted closely with Congress. We continue
to meet with Members and staff to discuss the nuclear certification and
the President's reasons for recommending certification now. On February
4, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Einhorn testified before
the House International Relations Committee on the certification. We
will continue to talk to Members and their Staffs about the
certification process and the importance of implementation to U.S.
nonproliferation goals and U.S.-China bilateral relations.
Implementation of the 1985 Agreement will bring important benefits
for the United States. It will also provide an effective means of
encouraging China to live up to the nuclear nonproliferation
commitments it has recently made. We will be monitoring Chinese
behavior closely. If and when we encounter problems or uncertainties,
we will raise them with Beijing. With prospects for continued
cooperation potentially at risk, China will have a strong stake in
being responsive to our inquiries and in taking prompt, corrective
steps to prevent or stop any activities inconsistent with China's
policies and commitments. Activating the Agreement will also give us
the most promising basis for making further progress in other
nonnuclear nonproliferation areas--chemical, missile, and advanced
conventional arms--where serious problems remain in China's policies
and practices.
Normalization of the U.S.-Vietnam trade relationship
Question. When will the President waive Jackson-Vanik for Vietnam?
Where are we on the trade agreement with Vietnam that precedes
consideration of MFN?
Answer. On November 18, 1997, the Administration decided to move
forward on a waiver of the Jackson-Vanik amendment as the next step in
economic normalization with Vietnam. On February 4, 1998, the
Department of State recommended to the President that he grant the
waiver to Vietnam. The President is expected to act on that
recommendation shortly.
We are able to consider a waiver in light of the progress Vietnam
has made towards liberalizing its emigration policy as evidenced by the
more than 450,000 Vietnamese who have emigrated under the Orderly
Departure Program (ODP) and recent implementation of the Resettlement
Opportunity for Vietnamese Returnees (ROVR) program. With respect to
ROVR, the Vietnamese authorities have dropped the requirement that ROVR
applicants obtain exit permits prior to their visa interviews with the
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, substantially increased
the number of ROVR applicants presented for interview and begun to give
an accounting of those who have not been presented for interview.
A Jackson-Vanik waiver, which must be reviewed annually, is a
prerequisite along with a bilateral trade agreement for most-favored-
nation (MFN) status. MFN can only be extended to Vietnam after Congress
approves this agreement. We began negotiation of a bilateral trade
agreement with Vietnam in Spring 1996. Several rounds have been held,
but much hard work lies ahead.
Democracy and Human Rights
Question. Madam Secretary, are you concerned that the bombing of
Iraq will inflame anti-American sentiment in the Middle East region and
could jeopardize the incremental gains that have been made towards
greater democracy and respect for human rights among Iraq's neighbors?
Answer. Democratization, human rights, and political reform are
important elements of our dialogue with governments of the region. In
the case of Iraq, the international community has spoken clearly and
unanimously that Saddam Hussein must respect the UN Security Council
resolutions and allow the UNSCOM inspectors to do their work unimpeded.
If Saddam complies with the UN resolutions, there will be no need for
military force.
The U.S. understands that the Iraqi people are suffering under the
Saddam Hussein regime, and has introduced and recently expanded
humanitarian aid options through the oil-for-food programs. Saddam is
using his people as political pawns and devoting his nation's resources
not to caring for Iraqis but to build WMD and lavish palaces. We do not
wish to see the Iraqi people sick and hungry because Saddam Hussein
sees food and medicine as his lowest priorities.