[Senate Hearing 105-285]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 105-285
THE DEBATE ON NATO ENLARGEMENT
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HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 7, 9, 22, 28, 30 AND NOVEMBER 5, 1997
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
44-069 CC WASHINGTON : 1998
______________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
James W. Nance, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Hearing of October 7, 1997
Page
Strategic Rationale for NATO Enlargement......................... 1
Albright, Hon. Madeleine, Secretary of State..................... 6
Prepared statement.......................................... 12
Hearing of October 9, 1997
Pros and Cons of NATO Enlargement................................ 41
Brzezinski, Hon. Zbigniew, Counselor, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington, DC.......................... 46
Prepared statement........................................... 47
Dean, Hon. Jonathan, Senior Arms Control Advisor, Union of
Concerned Scientists, Washington, DC........................... 67
Prepared statement........................................... 70
Kirkpatrick, Hon. Jeane J., Senior Fellow and Director, Foreign
Policy and Defense Studies, American Enterprise Institute,
Washington, DC................................................. 47
Prepared statement........................................... 52
Mandelbaum, Dr. Michael, Professor and Director of American
Foreign Policy, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University,
Washington, DC................................................. 72
Roth, Hon. William V. Jr., United States Senator from Delaware,
Chairman, Senate NATO Observer Group, and President, North
Atlantic Treaty Assembly....................................... 42
Prepared statement........................................... 44
Hearing of October 22, 1997
Qualifications of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic for NATO
Membership..................................................... 91
Prepared statement of:
Cambone, Dr. Stephen A., Senior Fellow, Political-Military
Studies Program, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, DC.................................... 108
Grossman, Marc, Assistant Secretary of State, European and
Canadian Affairs........................................... 91
Kramer, Franklin D., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs............................. 94
Larrabee, Dr. Stephen F., RAND, Washington, DC............... 115
Micgiel, Dr. John S., Director, East Central European Center,
Columbia University........................................ 119
Hearing of October 28, 1997
Costs, Benefits, Burdensharing and Military Implications of NATO
Enlargement.................................................... 123
Eland, Dr. Ivan, Director of Defense Policy Studies, CATO
Institute, Washington, DC...................................... 165
Prepared statement........................................... 167
Hadley, Hon. Stephen, partner, Shea and Gardner, Washington, DC.. 170
Prepared statement........................................... 172
Kugler, Dr. Richard, Distinguished Research Professor, Institute
For National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.... 152
Prepared statement........................................... 154
Slocombe, The Hon. Walter, Undersecretary of Defense For Policy.. 124
Prepared statement........................................... 131
Hearing of October 30, 1997, Morning Session
NATO-Russia Relationship--Part I................................. 183
Kissinger, Hon. Henry A., President, Kissinger and Associates,
New York, New York............................................. 183
Prepared statement........................................... 186
Hearing of October 30, 1997, Afternoon Session
NATO-Russia Relationship--Part II................................ 207
Matlock, Ambassador Jack F. Jr., George F. Kennan Professor,
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey............ 230
Prepared statement........................................... 236
Odom, William E., Lt. Gen., USA, retired, Director of National
Security Studies, Hudson Institute, Washington, DC............. 238
Prepared statement........................................... 242
Pickering, Ambassador Thomas R., Undersecretary of State for
Political Affairs.............................................. 207
Prepared statement........................................... 214
Simes, Dimitri K., President, Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom,
Washington, DC................................................. 245
Prepared statement........................................... 248
Hearing of November 5, 1997
Public Views on NATO Enlargement................................. 261
Acheson, David C., President, The Atlantic Council of the United
States, Washington, DC......................................... 294
Prepared statement........................................... 296
Ciccolella, Charles S., Assistant Director, National Security and
Foreign Relations Division, American Legion, Washington, DC.... 305
Prepared statement........................................... 306
Doubek, Robert W., President, American Friends of the Czech
Republic, Washington, DC....................................... 277
Prepared statement........................................... 279
Harmon, Col. Herbert N., USMCR, National President, Reserve
Officers Association of the United States, Washington, DC...... 315
Prepared statement........................................... 317
Harris, David A., Executive Director, American Jewish Committee,
New York, New York............................................. 310
Prepared statement........................................... 312
Joyce, John T., President, International Union of Bricklayers and
Allied Craftworkers, Washington, DC............................ 313
Prepared statement........................................... 314
Karatnycky, Adrian, President, Freedom House, New York, New York. 297
Prepared statement........................................... 298
Koiva, Mati, member, Board of Directors, Joint Baltic American
National Committee, Incorporated, and President, Estonian
American National Council, Rockville, Maryland................. 283
Prepared statement........................................... 284
Koszorus, Frank, Jr., board member, Hungarian American Coalition,
Washington, DC................................................. 270
Prepared statement........................................... 272
Moskal, Edward J., President, Polish American Congress,
Washington, DC................................................. 266
Prepared statement........................................... 269
Nowak, Jan, Representative, Central and Eastern European
Coalition, Annandale, Virginia................................. 262
Prepared statement........................................... 264
Plesch, Daniel T., Director, British American Security
Information Council, Washington, DC............................ 290
Prepared statement........................................... 292
Rubinstein, Dr. Alvin Z., Political Science Department,
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania......... 318
Prepared statement........................................... 320
Shanahan, Adm. Jack, USN (Ret.), Director, Center for Defense
Information, Washington, DC.................................... 303
Prepared statement........................................... 304
Stern, Hon. Paula, President, The Stern Group, New York, New
York, on behalf of the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO........... 286
APPENDICES
Appendix 1
Additional material received for the October 7 hearing record:
``Hearing on the Strategic Rationale for NATO Enlargement,''
a staff memorandum to the members of the Foreign Relations
Committee.................................................. 331
``Meeting the Challenges of a Post-Cold War World: NATO
Enlargement and U.S.-Russia Relations,'' A Report to the
Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted by Senator Joseph
R. Biden, Jr............................................... 338
Prepared Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold............ 404
Letter from Barbara Larkin, Assistant Secretary, Legislative
Affairs, Department of State, to Chairman Helms............ 405
Responses of Secretary Albright to Questions Asked by Senator
Helms...................................................... 405
Responses of Secretary Albright to Questions Asked by Senator
Feingold................................................... 413
Appendix 2
Additional material received for the October 9 hearing record:
``NATO Expansion; A Bridge to the Nineteenth Century,''
submitted by Michael Mandelbaum............................ 418
Appendix 3
Additional material received for the October 22 hearing record:
``Hearing on the Qualifications of Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic for NATO Membership,'' a staff memorandum to
the members of the Foreign Relations Committee............. 439
Excerpts from ``Nations in Transit: 1997--Civil Society,
Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly
Independent States:''
Czech Republic: Freedom in the World Ratings, 1988-1997.. 446
Hungary: Freedom in the World Ratings, 1988-1997......... 463
Poland: Freedom in the World Ratings, 1988-1997.......... 475
Appendix 4
Additional material received for the October 28 hearing record:
``Hearing on the Costs, Benefits, Burdensharing, and Military
Implications of NATO Enlargement,'' a staff memorandum to
the members of the Foreign Relations Committee............. 488
Prepared Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold............ 499
``The High Cost of NATO Expansion,'' a policy analysis by
Ivan Eland................................................. 500
Responses of Mr. Slocombe to Questions Asked by Senator Helms 519
Responses of Mr. Eland to Question Asked by Senator Biden.... 522
Prepared statement of Dr. Stephen A. Cambone, Senior Fellow,
Political-Military Studies Program, Center for Strategic
and International Studies, Washington, DC.................. 523
Appendix 5
Additional material received for the October 30 hearing record:
``Hearings on NATO-Russian Relations,'' a staff memorandum to
the members of the Foreign Relations Committee............. 531
Appendix 6
Additional material received for the November 5 hearing record:
Letter from Alexandr Vondra, Ambassador of the Czech
Republic; Gyorgy Banlaki, Ambassador of the Republic of
Hungary; and Jerzy Kozminski, Ambassador of the Republic of
Poland; to Chairman Helms.................................. 537
Paula Stern, U.S. Committee to Expand NATO, supplemental
submissions................................................ 537
Lithuanian-American Community, Inc., prepared statement...... 546
Armand Scala, President of the Congress of Romanian
Americans, prepared statement.............................. 549
U.S.-Baltic Foundation, prepared statement................... 549
John E. Moon, Commander-in-Chief, Veterans of Foreign Wars of
the United States, letter and attachment................... 551
STRATEGIC RATIONALE FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT
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TUESDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 10:14 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms (chairman of the
committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Helms, Lugar, Hagel, Smith, Thomas,
Ashcroft, Grams, Frist, Biden, Sarbanes, Robb, Feingold,
Feinstein, and Wellstone.
Also Present: Senator Warner.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Madam Secretary, as you know, we welcome you. We appreciate
your being our lead-off witness as the Foreign Relations
Committee begins its consideration of NATO expansion.
For nearly 50 years, NATO has defended democracy against
communism and other forms of tyranny in Europe. Despite that
success, many Americans will never forget the betrayal at Yalta
which left millions of Europeans behind enemy lines.
Today, with the expansion of the NATO alliance, we have an
historic opportunity to right that wrong by accepting Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO. All Americans should
welcome these nations as they finally become equal partners in
a community of democratic nations, thereby ensuring that their
new democracies shall never again fall victim to tyranny.
Now, if Europe and the United States are to enjoy a century
of peace, upcoming, one that does not replicate the bloody wars
of the past century, we must embrace these democracies and
guide them and show them away from their tragic histories of
ethnic division and war.
That said, there's a right way and a wrong way to proceed
with NATO expansion. We in the Senate recognize that this vital
undertaking is not without cost to the United States, and I am
convinced that the three new democracies are willing and eager
to bear their fair share, but we must now make certain that our
present NATO allies are likewise willing to fulfill their end
of the bargain.
Just last week our allies made clear to us that they expect
the United States, meaning the American taxpayers, to pay the
lion's share of the cost of expansion. Now, Madam Secretary,
ratification of NATO expansion by the U.S. Senate may very well
succeed or fail on the question of whether you can dissuade our
allies of that notion.
Further, we must resist any temptation by the leadership of
our country to rush forward into an ill-considered NATO
partnership with Russia. Now, while the United States is
willing to take steps to demonstrate that NATO represents
absolutely no threat to a democratic Russia, NATO's relations
with Russia must be restrained by the reality that Russia's
future commitment to peace and democracy, as of this date, is
far from certain. In fact, I confess a fear that the United
States' overture toward Russia may have already gone a bit far.
I believe, Madam Secretary, that it's fair to expect the
administration to outline a clear, strategic rationale for NATO
expansion and to explain clearly to the U.S. Senate what
potential threats NATO may face in the 21st century and why an
expanded NATO alliance is necessary to counter such threats.
To illustrate, it is self-evident I think that one such
potential threat will manifest itself if and when Russia takes
a turn for the worse. In your testimony today, Madam Secretary,
I hope that you will address this and other possible threats to
Europe's security.
We live in a time when the United States finds few allies
within NATO or elsewhere in the struggle for freedom. Too many
expect the American taxpayers to pay the bills and to leave the
driving force up to these other nations.
For example, France boasts of investments to prop up the
terrorist regime in Iran, a regime that has spilled the blood
of American and French citizens alike. In fact, the European
Union waits with baited breath for Iran to allow their
Ambassadors to return to Tehran.
Denmark and the Netherlands, both having courageously
condemned China's human rights record in Geneva earlier this
year, now find themselves in the incomprehensible position of
being sanctioned by the Chinese while their opportunistic
European Union partners rush to enrich themselves with new
business opportunities.
Somehow an understanding must be made clear that the United
States did not create the NATO alliance and prepare for war and
send our troops to fight and die in Europe and spend our
country into debt for 50 years simply to defend European real
estate or European economic interests. Our commitment was first
and foremost to the defense of democracy and the preservation
of human liberty and it must remain so.
So many of our cold war allies have so quickly forgotten
how close they came to losing their freedoms, but you, Madam
Secretary, more than most, know that freedom cannot be taken
for granted because your family personally suffered the peril
of tyranny, ignored or tolerated by those entrusted with
leadership at that time.
NATO has yet to fight a war because NATO was thoroughly
convinced and convincing all along that NATO has been prepared
to fight a war, if necessary. But with the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the American people have turned their attention
to problems at home. There is no audible demand by the American
people to play the role of international referee or world
policeman.
Together we must explain to the American people that NATO
enlargement is vital precisely because it will secure peace and
security into the next century and ensure, at the same time,
that America will not be called upon once again to save Europe
from the advance of tyranny.
Now, Madam Secretary, as I conclude, I want to share with
you and others here today a passage written by the man I
consider the greatest statesman of the 20th century, Winston
Churchill. In his 1929 book, The Aftermath, Mr. Churchill tried
to warn the world about the slide down the slippery slope
toward the next world war.
At first his apprehensions fell on deaf ears, and in
connection with that, Mr. Churchill years later wrote the
following, with which I shall conclude.
He said: ``To the faithful, toiled, burdened masses, the
victory was so complete that no further efforts seemed
required. Germany had fallen and with her the combination that
had crushed her. Authority was disbursed. The world unshackled.
The weak became the strong. The sheltered became the
aggressive. The contrast between victors and vanquished tended
continually to diminish. A vast fatigue,'' he said, ``dominated
collective action and, through every subversive element,
endeavored to insert itself. Revolutionary rage, like every
other form of psychic energy, burnt low. Through all five acts,
the drama had run its course,'' he said. ``The light of history
is switched off. The world stage dims. The actors shrivel. The
chorus sings. The war of the giants has ended. The quarrels of
the pygmies has begun.''
I think that just about says it all. Senator Biden?
[Material submitted by Chairman Helms follows:]
The Madrid Summit--New Members, Not New Missions
[By Jesse Helms]
WASHINGTON, D.C.--As NATO leaders meet in Madrid today to discuss
the enlargement of the Alliance, some words of caution are in order.
The Clinton administration's egregious mishandling of NATO expansion is
raising serious concerns in the U.S. Senate, which must approve any
enlargement treaty.
There is growing distress among supporters of enlargement (like
myself) that the administration's plan for NATO expansion may be
evolving into a dangerous and ill-considered plan for NATO
transformation: that we are not inviting new nations into the NATO that
won the Cold War, but rather into a new, diluted NATO, converted from a
well-defined military alliance into a nebulous ``collective security''
arrangement.
No Rationale
To date, the Clinton administration has failed to present the
Senate with any credible strategic rationale for NATO expansion--that
is, no explanation of the threat posed to the Atlantic Alliance, nor
why an expanded NATO is needed to counter it. Instead, all sorts of
misguided proposals are floating around for transforming NATO's mission
and purpose, in an effort to justify Alliance expansion.
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, the Clinton
administration's pointman on NATO expansion, argues that while ``during
the Cold War, military and geopolitical considerations mainly
determined NATO's decisions . . . today, with the end of the Cold War,
other non-military goals can and should help shape the new NATO.''
NATO's primary mission, Mr. Talbott is saying, should no longer be the
defense of Europe, but rather ``promoting democracy within NATO states
and good relations among them''--in other words, nation-building.
Others see this ``new NATO'' serving as a stand-in peacekeeper for
a United Nations discredited by its failures in Somalia and Bosnia.
Indeed, the NATO-Russia ``Founding Act,'' largely negotiated by the
Clinton administration, enshrines this new role for NATO, hailing
NATO's ``historic transformation'' in making ``new missions of
peacekeeping and crisis management in support of the U.N.'' primary
Alliance functions.
Advocates of NATO transformation make a better case for the
Alliance to disband than expand. NATO's job is not to replace the U.N.
as the world's peacekeeper, nor is it to build democracy and pan-
European harmony or promote better relations with Russia. NATO has
proven the most successful military alliance in history precisely
because it has rejected utopian temptations to remake the world.
Rather, NATO's mission today must be the same clear-cut and limited
mission it undertook at its inception: to protect the territorial
integrity of its members, defend them from external aggression, and
prevent the hegemony of any one state in Europe.
The state that sought hegemony during the latter half of this
century was Russia. The state most likely to seek hegemony in the
beginning of the next century is also Russia. A central strategic
rationale for expanding NATO must be to hedge against the possible
return of a nationalist or imperialist Russia, with 20,000 nuclear
missiles and ambitions of restoring its lost empire. NATO enlargement,
as Henry Kissinger argues, must be undertaken to ``encourage Russian
leaders to interrupt the fateful rhythm of Russian history . . . and
discourage Russia's historical policy of creating a security belt of
important and, if possible, politically dependent states around its
borders.''
Unfortunately, the Clinton administration does not see this as a
legitimate strategic rationale for expansion. ``Fear of a new wave of
Russian imperialism . . . should not be seen as the driving force
behind NATO enlargement,'' says Mr. Talbott.
Not surprisingly, those states seeking NATO membership seem to
understand NATO's purpose better than the Alliance leader. Lithuania's
former president, Vytautas Landsbergis, put it bluntly: ``We are an
endangered country. We seek protection.'' Poland, which spent much of
its history under one form or another of Russian occupation, makes
clear it seeks NATO membership as a guarantee of its territorial
integrity. And when Czech President Vaclav Havel warned of ``another
Munich,'' he was calling on us not to leave Central Europe once again
at the mercy of any great power, as Neville Chamberlain did in 1938.
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other potential candidate
states don't need NATO to establish democracy. They need NATO to
protect the democracies they have already established from external
aggression.
Sadly, Mr. Havel's admonishments not to appease ``chauvinistic,
Great Russian, crypto-Communist and crypto-totalitarian forces'' have
been largely ignored by the Clinton administration. Quite the opposite,
the administration has turned NATO expansion into an exercise in the
appeasement of Russia.
After admitting East Germany in 1990 (and giving the Soviet Union
neither a ``voice'' nor a ``veto'' in the process), the U.S. delayed
NATO expansion for nearly seven years in a misguided effort to secure
Russian approval. Russia, knowing an opportunity when it sees one, has
used its opposition to NATO expansion to gain all sorts of concessions,
ranging from arms-control capitulations to the NATO-Russia ``Founding
Act.''
That agreement concedes ``primary responsibility . . . for
international peace and security'' to the U.N. Security Council, where
Russia has a veto. It gives Russia (the very country NATO is
constituted to deter) a voice at every level of the Alliance's
deliberations. And it gives Russia a seat at the table before any new
candidate members (those being brought in to protect them from
aggression) get a seat at the table.
It is my sincere hope that the U.S. Senate can approve NATO
expansion. But if we are to do so, some dramatic changes must be made.
As chairman of the Senate committee that must approve the resolution of
ratification, I urge the administration to take the following steps
before presenting NATO expansion to the Senate:
Outline a clear, complete strategic security rationale for
NATO expansion.
Agree that no limitations will be placed on the numbers of
NATO troops or types of weapons to be deployed on territory of
new member states (including tactical nuclear weapons)--there
must be no second-class citizens in NATO.
Explicitly reject Russian efforts to establish a ``nuclear
weapons-free zone'' in Central Europe.
Explicitly reject all efforts to tie NATO decisions to U.N.
Security Council approval.
Establish a clear delineation of NATO deliberations that are
off-limits to Russia (including, but not limited to, arms
control, further Alliance expansion, procurement and strategic
doctrine).
Provide an immediate seat at the NATO table for countries
invited to join the Alliance.
Reject Russian efforts to require NATO aid for Russian arms
sales to former Warsaw Pact militaries joining the Alliance, as
a quid pro quo for NATO expansion--NATO must not become a back
channel for new foreign aid to Russia.
Reject any further Russian efforts to link concessions in
arms control negotiations (including the antiquated ABM treaty
and the CFE Treaty) to NATO expansion.
Develop a plan for a NATO ballistic missile defense system
to defend Europe.
Get clear advance agreement on an equitable distribution of
the cost of expansion, to make certain American taxpayers don't
get stuck with the lion's share of the bill.
Strategic Threats
Is renewed Russian aggression the only strategic threat NATO must
consider? Of course not. There are many potential threats to Europe,
including the possibility of rogue states like Libya and Iran one day
threatening the continent with weapons of mass destruction. But the
Clinton administration has failed to define NATO expansion in terms of
any strategic threat.
If the Clinton administration views NATO not as a tool to defend
Europe, but as a laboratory for social work, then NATO should not only
eschew expansion, it should declare victory and close shop. The costs
of maintaining NATO, much less expanding it, cannot be justified if its
mission is democracy-building and peacekeeping. There are other, less
expensive and more appropriate forums for such ventures (such as the
European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe). NATO is a military alliance--it must remain so or go out of
business.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, welcome. It is always a pleasure to have
you here.
Mr. Chairman, I have stated my support for NATO enlargement
many times on the floor of the U.S. Senate and in private
forums. So, today I will only summarize my rationale for this
policy.
Europe remains a vital interest for the United States.
Other than North America, no other region can match Europe's
combination of political, economic, military, and cultural
power and significance to the United States. The European
Union, for example, has a population one-third larger than ours
and a combined GDP slightly greater than ours.
A large percentage of the world's democracies are in
Europe. By any geopolitical standard, it would be a catastrophe
for American interests if instability were to alter the current
situation in Europe.
After the cold war, there are new threats to Europe: Ethnic
and religious conflicts, one nation crossing the borders of
another as Yugoslavia did in Bosnia, international crime and
drugs; also I might note a possible future threat to Mideast
oil supplies.
For this reason, enlargement is being combined with a new
strategic doctrine and a force posture that provides a more
mobile and capable force projection capability in event of any
of those crises.
In the 20th century, Europeans have proven incapable, left
to themselves, of settling their differences peacefully. The
United States it seems to me must continue to lead the new
security architecture for that continent, for if we do not, I
do not know who will.
In this context, admitting Poland, the Czech Republic, and
Hungary into NATO will extend the zone of security to central
Europe in a way that, if left undone, will leave a gray zone
and insecurity in that region.
The question, I would emphasize, is not whether to enlarge
NATO or remain the same. The status quo, Madam Secretary, in my
view is not an option. If we were not to enlarge, the countries
between Germany and Russia would inevitably seek other means to
protect themselves, creating bilateral or multilateral
alliances as they did in the 1930's with, I predict, similar
results.
There is also a powerful moral argument for enlargement:
Redeeming our pledge to former captive nations to rejoin the
west. I mean both NATO and the EU when I say the west because
the Europeans will have to step up to that ball plate as well.
When they are fully qualified to join both, their security
will be fully secured. This fall's final accession talks
between NATO and each of the three candidate countries, Poland,
the Czech Republic, and Hungary, will reveal whether each of
them meets the alliance's demanding qualifications. Based on
what I saw in my travels, I believe they do.
Enlargement, Mr. Chairman, need not adversely affect our
relations with Russia. We must redouble our political and
economic engagement with that country in my view, and the NATO-
Russia Founding Act of May 1997 is a significant step in the
right direction and the Partnership for Peace arrangement is
equally as important.
The NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council created by the
founding act has begun functioning. I especially look forward
to the fourth in our series of hearings on October 30th when we
will examine the new NATO-Russian relationship.
Mr. Chairman, in my view two big issues must be solved
before the Senate considers ratification. One is directly
related, one not as directly, but they're both important:
Bosnia and cost sharing. If Bosnia is the prototypical European
crisis of the 21st century, then in the coming weeks--and I
mean weeks--the United States and its NATO allies had better
come up with a workable post-SFOR scenario.
Similarly, while the United States must continue to
exercise its leadership role in NATO, our European and Canadian
alliance partners must agree, as you indicated, to step up to
the plate and bear their fair share of enlargement costs.
The definitive NATO study on cost will come out in
December. In anticipation of the report, this committee will
hold its third hearing on NATO enlargement on October 22nd when
we will examine the cost and burden sharing items. So, today I
will not speak much to those items in my questioning.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that admitting Poland, the Czech
Republic, and Hungary to NATO, if they meet the qualifications,
which they appear to meet, will be in the security interest of
the United States of America. I believe to do otherwise would
be to extend a zone of instability rather than one of
stability.
I look forward to the Secretary's testimony.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for setting up an aggressive
series of hearings prior to the requirement for us to decide
whether or not to expand the Washington Treaty. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir. Now we will hear from you,
Madam Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY OF STATE
Secretary Albright. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, members of the committee, it
is with a sense of appreciation and anticipation that I come
before you to urge support for the admission of the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Poland to NATO.
Each of us is playing our part today in the long unfolding
story of America's modern partnership with Europe. That story
began not at the Madrid summit, nor when the Berlin Wall fell,
but half a century ago when your predecessors and mine
dedicated our Nation to the goal of a secure, united Europe.
It was then that we sealed a peacetime alliance open not
only to the nations which shared our victory in World War II,
but to our former adversaries. It was then that this committee
unanimously recommended that the Senate approve the North
Atlantic Treaty. On that day, the leaders of this body rose
above partisanship and they rose to the challenge of a pivotal
moment in history.
Mr. Chairman, I believe you are continuing that tradition.
I thank you for your decision to hold these hearings early, for
the bipartisan manner in which you and Senator Biden are
conducting them, and for the serious way in which you have
framed our discussion.
I am honored to be a part of what you have rightly called
the beginning of the process of advice and consent.
As I said, I am very conscious of history today. I hope we
can take a moment to remember what was said half a century ago
about the alliance we are striving to renew and expand today.
Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Chairman Helms' extraordinary
predecessor, predicted that NATO would become the greatest war
deterrent in history. He was right. American forces have never
had to fire a shot to defend a NATO ally.
This committee predicted that NATO would free the minds of
men in many nations from a haunting sense of insecurity and
enable them to work and plan with that confidence in the
future, which is essential to economic recovery and progress.
Your predecessors were also right.
President Truman said that the NATO pact will be a
positive, not a negative influence for peace, and its influence
will be felt not only in the area it specifically covers but
throughout the world. He was right too.
Thanks in no small part to NATO, we live in a different
world. Our Soviet adversary has vanished. Freedom's flag has
been unfurled from the Baltics to Bulgaria. As I speak to you
today, our immediate survival is not at risk.
Indeed, you may ask if the principle of collective defense
at NATO's heart is relevant to the challenges of a wider and
freer Europe. You may ask why, in this time of relative peace,
are we so focused on security.
The answer is we want the peace to last. We want freedom to
endure, and we believe there are still potential threats to our
security emanating from European soil.
You have asked me, Mr. Chairman, what these threats are. I
want to answer as plainly as I can.
First, there are the dangers of Europe's past. It is easy
to forget this, but for centuries virtually every European
nation treated virtually every other nation as a military
threat. That pattern was broken only when NATO was born and
only in the half of Europe NATO covered. With NATO, each
member's security came to depend on cooperation with others,
not competition.
That is one reason why NATO remains essential. It is also
one reason why we need a larger NATO which extends its positive
influence to Europe's other half.
A second set of dangers lies in Europe's present. Because
of the conflict in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union,
Europe has already buried more victims of war since the Berlin
Wall fell than in all the years of the cold war. It is sobering
to recall that this violence has its roots in the same problems
of shattered states and of ethnic hatreds that tyrants
exploited to start this century's great wars.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, and most important, we must consider
the dangers of Europe's future. By this I mean direct threats
against the soil of NATO members that a collective defense pact
is designed to meet. Some are visible on Europe's horizon, such
as the threat posed by rogue states with dangerous weapons.
Others may not seem apparent today, but they are not
unthinkable.
Within this category lie questions about the future of
Russia. We want Russian democracy to endure. We are optimistic
that it will, but one should not dismiss the possibility that
Russia could return to the patterns of its past. By engaging
Russia and enlarging NATO, we give Russia every incentive to
deepen its commitment to peaceful relations with neighbors,
while closing the avenue to more destructive alternatives.
We do not know what other dangers may arise 10, 20, or even
50 years from now. We do know that whatever the future may
hold, it will be in our interest to have a vigorous and larger
alliance with those European democracies that share our values
and our determination to defend them.
We recognize NATO expansion involves a solemn expansion of
American responsibilities in Europe. As Americans, we take our
commitments seriously and we do not extend them lightly. Mr.
Chairman, you and I certainly agree that any major extension of
American commitments must serve America's strategic interests.
Let me explain why welcoming the Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Poland into NATO meets that test.
First, a larger NATO will make us safer by expanding the
area in Europe where wars simply do not happen. By making clear
that we will fight if necessary to defend our allies, it makes
it less likely our troops will ever be called upon to do so.
Now you may say that no part of Europe faces any immediate
threat or armed attack today. That is true. The purpose of
enlargement is to keep it that way. Senator Vandenberg said it
in 1949: NATO is not built to stop a war after it starts,
although its potentialities in this regard are infinite. It is
built to stop wars before they start.
It is also fair to ask if it is in our vital interest to
prevent conflict in Central Europe. Some have implied it is
not. I am sure you have even heard a few people trot out what I
call the consonant cluster clause, the myth that in times of
crisis Americans will make no sacrifice to defend a distant
city with an unpronounceable name, that we will protect the
freedom of Strasbourg but not Szczecin, Barcelona but not Brno.
Let us not deceive ourselves. We are a European power. We
have an interest in the fate of the 200 million people who live
in the nations between the Baltic and Black Seas. We waged the
cold war in part because these nations were held captive. We
fought World War II in part because these nations had been
invaded. If there were a major threat to the security of their
region, we would want to act, enlargement or no enlargement.
Our aim must be to prevent that kind of threat from arising.
The second reason why enlargement passes the test of
national interest is that it will make NATO stronger and more
cohesive. The Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs are passionately
committed to NATO and its principles of shared responsibility.
Their forces have already risked their lives alongside ours
from the Gulf War to Bosnia.
I know you have expressed concern that enlargement could
dilute NATO by adding too many members and by involving the
alliance in too many missions. Let me assure you that we
invited only the strongest candidates to join and nothing about
enlargement will change NATO's core mission which remains the
collective defense of NATO soil.
At the same time, it is important to remember that NATO has
always served a political function too. It binds our allies to
us just as it binds us to our allies. So, when you consider the
candidacy of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, I ask you
to consider this. On the issues that matter, from
nonproliferation to human rights, to U.N. reform, here are
three nations we have been able to count on and will continue
to be able to count on.
Mr. Chairman, the third reason why a larger NATO serves our
interests is that the very promise of it gives the nations of
central and eastern Europe an incentive to solve their own
problems. To align themselves with NATO, aspiring countries
have strengthened their democratic institutions, made sure
soldiers serve civilians, signed 10 major accords that resolve
virtually every old ethnic and border dispute in the region.
I have been a student of central European history and I
have lived some of it myself. When I see Romanians and
Hungarians building a genuine friendship after centuries of
enmity, when I see Poles, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians forming
joint military units after years of suspicion, when I see
Czechs and Germans overcoming decades of mistrust, when I see
central Europeans confident enough to improve their political
and economic ties with Russia, I know something remarkable is
happening.
NATO is doing for Europe's east precisely what this NATO
predicted it would do for Europe's west after World War II.
This is another reminder that the contingencies we do not want
our troops to face, such as ethnic conflict, border skirmishes,
and social unrest, are far more easily avoided with NATO
enlargement than without it.
In short, a larger NATO will make America safer, NATO
stronger, and Europe more peaceful and united. That is the
strategic rationale. But I would be disingenuous if I did not
tell you I see a moral imperative too.
NATO defines a community of interest among the free nations
of North America and Europe that both preceded and outlasted
the cold war. Americans have long argued that the nations of
central Europe belong to the same democratic family as our
allies in western Europe. As Americans, we should be heartened
so many of them wish to join the institutions we did so much to
build.
We should also think about what would happen if we were to
turn them away. That would mean freezing NATO at its cold war
membership and preserving the old Iron Curtain as its eastern
frontier. It would mean locking out a whole group of otherwise
qualified democracies simply because they were once, against
their, will members of the Warsaw Pact.
Why would America choose to be allied with Europe's old
democracies forever but its new democracies never? Were we to
do that, confidence would crumble in central Europe leading to
a search for security by other means, including costly arms
buildups and competition among neighbors.
We have chosen a better way. We have chosen to look at the
landscape of the new Europe and to ask a simple question: Which
of these nations that are so clearly important to our security
are ready to contribute to our security? The answer to that
question is before you today awaiting your affirmation.
I said at the outset, Mr. Chairman, that there are weighty
voices on both sides of this debate. Let me address a few of
the concerns I expect you will consider fully.
First, we all want to make sure that the costs of a larger
NATO are distributed fairly. Last February the administration
made a preliminary estimate of America's share. Now we are
working with our allies to produce a common estimate by the
December meeting of the North Atlantic Council. At this point
the numbers we agree upon as 16 allies are needed prior to any
further calculations made in Washington.
I know that you are holding separate hearings on this
question, but I will say this. I am convinced that the cost of
expansion is real but affordable. I am certain our prospective
allies are willing and able to pay their share because in the
long run it will be cheaper for them to upgrade their forces
within the alliance than outside it. I will insist that our old
allies share this burden fairly. That is what NATO is all
about.
I know there are serious people who estimate that a larger
NATO will cost far more than we have anticipated. The key fact
about our estimate is that it is premised on the current
favorable security environment in Europe. Obviously, if a grave
threat were to arise, the cost of enlargement would grow, but
then so would the cost of our entire defense budget.
In any case, there are budgetary constraints in all 16 NATO
democracies that will prevent costs from ballooning. That is
why the main focus of our discussion, Mr. Chairman, and our
consultations with our allies needs to be on defining the level
of military capability we want our old and new allies to have
and then making sure that they commit to it. We should spend no
more than we must but no less than we need to keep NATO strong.
Another common concern about NATO enlargement is that it
might damage our cooperation with a democratic Russia. Russian
opposition to NATO enlargement is real. But we should see it
for what it is, a product of old misperceptions about NATO and
old ways of thinking about its former satellites in central
Europe. Instead of changing our policies to accommodate
Russia's outdated fears, we need to encourage Russia's more
modern aspirations.
This means we should remain Russia's most steadfast
champion whenever it seeks to define its greatness by joining
rule-based institutions, opening markets, and participating
constructively in world affairs.
But when some Russian leaders suggest that a larger NATO is
a threat, we owe it candor to say that is false and to base our
policies on what we know to be true. I believe our approach is
producing results from our cooperation in Bosnia to agreements
to pursue deeper arms cuts, to new signs that the new START II
Treaty may be moving ahead in the Duma, to NATO's new
relationship with Russia.
I know that some are concerned that this relationship with
Russia may actually go too far. You have asked me for an
affirmation, Mr. Chairman, that the North Atlantic Council
remains NATO's supreme decisionmaking body. Let me say it
clearly: It does and it will. The NATO-Russia Founding Act
gives Russia no opportunity to dilute, delay, or block NATO
decisions.
Another important concern is that enlargement may create a
new dividing line in Europe between a larger NATO and the
countries that will not join in the first round. We have taken
a range of steps to ensure this does not happen, from NATO's
commitment to an open-door policy, to a stronger Partnership
for Peace, to the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.
Among the countries that still aspire to membership, there
is enthusiastic support for the process NATO has begun. They
understand a simple fact: With enlargement, no new democracy is
permanently excluded; without enlargement, every new democracy
would be permanently excluded.
The most important thing the Senate can do to reassure them
now is to get the ball rolling by ratifying the admission of
the first three candidates.
A final concern I wish to address has to do with Bosnia.
Some have suggested our debate on NATO enlargement simply
cannot be separated from our actions and decisions in that
troubled country. I agree with them. Both are aimed at building
a stable, undivided Europe. It was our experience in Bosnia
that proved a fundamental premise of our enlargement strategy:
There are still threats to security in Europe that only NATO
can meet.
We cannot know today if our mission in Bosnia will achieve
all its goals, but we can say that whatever may happen, our
interest in a larger, stronger NATO will endure long after the
last foreign soldier has left that country.
We can also say that NATO will remain the most powerful
instrument we have for building effective military coalitions
such as SFOR. At the same time, Bosnia does not by itself
define the future of a larger NATO. NATO's most important aim,
if I can paraphrase Arthur Vandenberg, is to prevent wars
before they start so it does not have to keep the peace after
they stop.
These are some of the principal concerns I wanted to
address today. I know our discussion is just beginning. I am
glad that it will also involve other committees of the Senate,
the NATO Observers' Group, and the House of Representatives.
Most important, I am glad it will involve the American people.
When these three new democracies join NATO in 1999, as I
trust they will, it will be a victory for us all, Mr. Chairman.
On that day, we will be standing on the shoulders of many. We
will be thankful to all those who waged the cold war on the
side of freedom, to all those who champion the idea of a larger
NATO, to all those Members of Congress from both parties who
voted for resolutions urging the admission of these three
nations, to all those Republican Members who made NATO
enlargement part of their Contract with America.
Now, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, all of our
allies and future allies are watching you for one simple
reason: The American Constitution is unique in the power it
grants to the legislative branch over foreign policy,
especially over treaties. In this matter, you and the American
people you represent are truly in the driver's seat.
That is as it should be. In fact, I enjoy going to Europe
and telling our allies this is what we want to do but
ultimately it will be up to our Senate and our people to
decide. I say that with pride because it tells them something
about America's faith in a democratic process.
But I have to tell you that I say it with confidence as
well. I believe that when the time comes for the Senate to
decide, Mr. Chairman, you and I and the American people will
stand together, for I know that the policy we ask you to
embrace is a policy that the administration and Congress shaped
together, and I am certain that it advances the fundamental
interests of the United States.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Albright follows:]
Prepared Statement of Secretary Albright
Chairman Helms, Senator Biden, members of the committee: it is with
a sense of appreciation and anticipation that I come before you to urge
support for the admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to
NATO.
Each of us today is playing our part in the long unfolding story of
America's modern partnership with Europe. That story began not in
Madrid, when the President and his fellow NATO leaders invited these
three new democracies to join our Alliance, nor eight years ago when
the Berlin Wall fell, but half a century ago when your predecessors and
mine dedicated our nation to the goal of a secure, united Europe.
It was then that we broke with the American aversion to European
entanglements, an aversion which served us well in our early days, but
poorly when we became a global power. It was then that we sealed a
peacetime alliance open not only to the nations which had shared our
victory in World War II, but to our former adversaries. It was then
that this committee unanimously recommended that the Senate approve the
original NATO treaty.
The history books will long record that day as among the Senate's
finest. On that day, the leaders of this body rose above partisanship
and they rose to the challenge of a pivotal moment in the history of
the world.
Mr. Chairman, I believe you are continuing that tradition today. I
thank you for your decision to hold these hearings early, for the
bipartisan manner in which you and Senator Biden are conducting them,
and for the serious and substantive way in which you have framed our
discussion.
I am honored to be part of what you have rightly called the
beginning of the process of advice and consent. And I am hopeful that
with your support, and after the full national debate to which these
hearings will contribute, the Senate will embrace the addition of new
members to NATO. It would be fitting if this renewal of our commitment
to security in Europe could come early next year, as Congress
celebrates the 50th anniversary of its approval of the Marshall Plan.
As I said, and as you can see, I am very conscious of history
today. I hope that you and your colleagues will look back as I have on
the deliberations of 1949, for they address so many of the questions I
know you have now: How much will a new alliance cost and what are its
benefits? Will it bind us to go to war? Will it entangle us in far away
quarrels?
We should take a moment to remember what was said then about the
alliance we are striving to renew and expand today.
Senator Vandenberg, Chairman Helms' extraordinary predecessor,
predicted that NATO would become ``the greatest war deterrent in
history.'' He was right. American forces have never had to fire a shot
to defend a NATO ally.
This Committee, in its report to the Senate on the NATO treaty,
predicted that it would ``free the minds of men in many nations from a
haunting sense of insecurity, and enable them to work and plan with
that confidence in the future which is essential to economic recovery
and progress.'' Your predecessors were right. NATO gave our allies time
to rebuild their economies. It helped reconcile their ancient
animosities. And it made possible an unprecedented era of unity in
Western Europe.
President Truman said that the NATO pact ``will be a positive, not
a negative, influence for peace, and its influence will be felt not
only in the area it specifically covers but throughout the world.'' And
he was right, too. NATO gave hope to democratic forces in West Germany
that their country would be welcome and secure in our community if they
kept making the right choices. Ultimately, it helped bring the former
fascist countries into a prosperous and democratic Europe. And it
helped free the entire planet from the icy grip of the Cold War.
Thanks in no small part to NATO, we live in a different world. Our
Soviet adversary has vanished. Freedom's flag has been unfurled from
the Baltics to Bulgaria. The threat of nuclear war has sharply
diminished. As I speak to you today, our immediate survival is not at
risk.
Indeed, you may ask if the principle of collective defense at
NATO's heart is relevant to the challenges of a wider and freer Europe.
You may ask why, in this time of relative peace, are we so focused on
security?
The answer is, we want the peace to last. We want freedom to
endure. And we believe there are still potential threats to our
security emanating from European soil.
You have asked me, Mr. Chairman, what these threats are. I want to
answer as plainly as I can.
First, there are the dangers of Europe's past. It is easy to forget
this, but for centuries virtually every European nation treated
virtually every other as a military threat. That pattern was broken
only when NATO was born and only in the half of Europe NATO covered.
With NATO, Europe's armies prepared to fight beside their neighbors,
not against them; each member's security came to depend on cooperation
with others, not competition.
That is one reason why NATO remains essential, even though the Cold
War is over. It is also one reason why we need a larger NATO, so that
the other half of Europe is finally embedded in the same cooperative
structure of military planning and preparation.
A second set of dangers lies in Europe's present. Because of
conflict in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, Europe has already
buried more victims of war since the Berlin Wall fell than in all the
years of the Cold war. It is sobering to recall that this violence has
its roots in the same problems of shattered states and hatred among
ethnic groups that tyrants exploited to start this century's great
wars.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, and most important, we must consider the
dangers of Europe's future. By this I mean direct threats against the
soil of NATO members that a collective defense pact is designed to
meet. Some are visible on Europe's horizon, such as the threat posed by
rogue states with dangerous weapons that might have Europe within their
range and in their sights. Others may not seem apparent today, in part
because the existence of NATO has helped to deter them. But they are
not unthinkable.
Within this category lie questions about the future of Russia. We
have an interest in seeing Russian democracy endure. We are doing all
we can with our Russian partners to see that it does. And we have many
reasons to be optimistic. At the same time, one should not dismiss the
possibility that Russia could return to the patterns of its past. By
engaging Russia and enlarging NATO, we give Russia every incentive to
deepen its commitment to democracy and peaceful relations with
neighbors, while closing the avenue to more destructive alternatives.
We do not know what other dangers may arise 10, 20, or even 50
years from now. We do know enough from history and human experience to
believe that a grave threat, if allowed to arise, would arise. We know
that whatever the future may hold, it will be in our interest to have a
vigorous and larger alliance with those European democracies that share
our values and our determination to defend them.
We recognize NATO expansion involves a solemn expansion of American
responsibilities in Europe. It does not bind us to respond to every
violent incident by going to war. But it does oblige us to consider an
armed attack against one ally an attack against all and to respond with
such action as we deem necessary, including the use of force, to
restore the security of the North Atlantic area.
As Americans, we take our commitments seriously and we do not
extend them lightly. Mr. Chairman, you and I do not agree on
everything, but we certainly agree that any major extension of American
commitments must serve America's strategic interests.
Let me explain why welcoming the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
into NATO meets that test.
First, a larger NATO will make us safer by expanding the area in
Europe where wars simply do not happen. This is the productive paradox
at NATO's heart: By imposing a price on aggression, it deters
aggression. By making clear that we will fight, if necessary, to defend
our allies, it makes it less likely our troops will ever be called upon
to do so.
Now, you may say that no part of Europe faces any immediate threat
of armed attack today. That is true. And I would say that the purpose
of NATO enlargement is to keep it that way. Senator Vandenberg said it
in 1949: ``[NATO] is not built to stop a war after it starts, although
its potentialities in this regard are infinite. It is built to stop
wars before they start.''
It is also fair to ask if it is in our vital interest to prevent
conflict in central Europe. There are those who imply it is not. I'm
sure you have even heard a few people trot out what I call the
``consonant cluster clause,'' the myth that in times of crisis
Americans will make no sacrifice to defend a distant city with an
unpronounceable name, that we will protect the freedom of Strasbourg
but not Szczecin, Barcelona, but not Brno.
Let us not deceive ourselves. The United States is a European
power. We have an interest not only in the lands west of the Oder
river, but in the fate of the 200 million people who live in the
nations between the Baltic and Black Seas. We waged the Cold War in
part because these nations were held captive. We fought World War II in
part because these nations had been invaded.
Now that these nations are free, we want them to succeed And we
want them to be safe, whether they are large or small. For if there
were a major threat to the security of their region, if we were to wake
up one morning to the sight of cities being shelled .and borders being
overrun, I am certain that we would choose to act, enlargement or no
enlargement. Expanding NATO now is simply the surest way to prevent
that kind of threat from arising, and thus the need to make that kind
of choice.
Mr. Chairman, the second reason why enlargement passes the test of
national interest is that it will make NATO stronger and more cohesive.
The Poles, Hungarians and Czechs are passionately committed to NATO and
its principles of shared responsibility. Experience has taught them to
believe in a strong American leadership role in Europe. Their forces
have risked their lives alongside ours from the Gulf War to Bosnia.
Just last month, Czech soldiers joined our British allies in securing a
police station from heavily armed Bosnian Serb extremists.
Mr. Chairman, I know you have expressed concern that enlargement
could dilute NATO by adding too many members and by involving the
alliance in too many missions. Let me assure you that we invited only
the strongest candidates to join the Alliance. And nothing about
enlargement will change NATO's core mission, which is and will remain
the collective defense of NATO soil.
At the same time, it is important to remember that NATO has always
served a political function as well. It binds our allies to us just as
it binds us to our allies. So when you consider the candidacy of the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, Mr. Chairman, I ask you to consider
this:
When peace is threatened somewhere in the world and we decide it is
in our interest to act, here are three nations we have been able to
count on to be with us. In the fight against terror and nuclear
proliferation, here are three nations we have been able to count on. In
our effort to reform the UN, here are three nations we have been able
to count on. When we speak out for human rights around the world, here
are three nations we will always be able to count on.
Here are three nations that know what it means to lose their
freedom and who will do what it takes to defend it. Here are three
democracies that are ready to do their dependable part in the common
enterprise of our alliance of democracies.
Mr. Chairman, the third reason why a larger NATO serves our
interests is that the very promise of it gives the nations of central
and eastern Europe an incentive to solve their own problems. To align
themselves with NATO, aspiring countries have strengthened their
democratic institutions. They have made sure that soldiers serve
civilians, not the other way around. They have signed 10 major accords
that taken together resolve virtually every old ethnic and border
dispute in the region, exactly the kind of disputes that might have led
to future Bosnias. In fact, the three states we have invited to join
NATO have resolved every outstanding dispute of this type.
I have been a student of central European history and I have lived
some of it myself. When I see Romanians and Hungarians building a
genuine friendship after centuries of enmity, when I see Poles,
Ukrainians and Lithuanians forming joint military units after years of
suspicion, when I see Czechs and Germans overcoming decades of
mistrust, when I see central Europeans confident enough to improve
their political and economic ties with Russia, I know something
remarkable is happening.
NATO is doing for Europe's east precisely what it did--precisely
what this Committee predicted it would do--for Europe's west after
World War II. It is helping to vanquish old hatreds, to promote
integration and to create a secure environment for economic prosperity.
This is another reminder that the contingencies we do not want our
troops to face, such as ethnic conflict, border skirmishes, and social
unrest are far more easily avoided with NATO enlargement than without
it.
In short, a larger NATO will prevent conflict, strengthen NATO, and
protect the gains of stability and freedom in central and eastern
Europe. That is the strategic rationale. But I would be disingenuous if
I did not tell you that I see a moral imperative as well. For this is a
policy that should appeal to our hearts as well as to our heads, to our
sense of what is right as well as to our sense of what is smart.
NATO defines a community of interest among the free nations of
North America and Europe that both preceded and outlasted the Cold War.
America has long stood for the proposition that this Atlantic community
should not be artificially divided and that its nations should be free
to shape their destiny. We have long argued that the nations of central
and eastern Europe belong to the same democratic family as our allies
in western Europe.
We often call them ``former communist countries,'' and that is true
in the same sense that America is a ``former British colony.'' Yes, the
Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians were on the other side of the Iron
Curtain during the Cold War. But we were surely on the same side in the
ways that truly count.
As Americans, we should be heartened today that so many of Europe's
new democracies wish to join the institutions Americans did so much to
build. They are our friends and we should be proud to welcome them
home.
We should also think about what would happen if we were to turn
them away. That would mean freezing NATO at its Cold War membership and
preserving the old Iron Curtain as its eastern frontier. It would mean
locking out a whole group of otherwise qualified democracies simply
because they were once, against their will, members of the Warsaw Pact.
Why would America choose to be allied with Europe's old democracies
forever, but its new democracies never? There is no acceptable,
objective answer to that question. Instead, it would probably be said
that we blocked the aspirations of our would-be allies because Russia
objected. And that, in turn, could cause confidence to crumble in
central Europe, leading to a search for security by other means,
including costly arms buildups and competition among neighbors.
We have chosen a better way. We have chosen to look at the
landscape of the new Europe and to ask a simple question: Which of
these nations that are so clearly important to our security are ready
and able to contribute to our security? The answer to that question is
before you today, awaiting your affirmation.
I said at the outset, Mr. Chairman, that there are weighty voices
on both sides of this debate. There are legitimate concerns with which
we have grappled along the way, and that I expect you to consider fully
as well. Let me address a few.
First, we all want to make sure that the costs of expansion are
distributed fairly. Last February, at the behest of Congress and before
the Alliance had decided which nations to invite to membership, the
Administration made a preliminary estimate of America's share. Now that
we have settled on three candidates, we are working with our allies to
produce a common estimate by the December meeting of the North Atlantic
Council. At this point, the numbers we agree upon as 16 allies are
needed prior to any further calculations made in Washington.
I know you are holding separate hearings in which my Pentagon
colleagues will go into this question in detail. But I will say this: I
am convinced that the cost of expansion is real but affordable. I am
certain our prospective allies are willing and able to pay their share,
because in the long run it will be cheaper for them to upgrade their
forces within the alliance than outside it. As Secretary of State, I
will insist that our old allies share this burden fairly. That is what
NATO is all about.
I know there are serious people who estimate that a larger NATO
will cost far more than we have anticipated. The key fact about our
estimate is that it is premised on the current, favorable security
environment in Europe. Obviously, if a grave threat were to arise, the
cost of enlargement would rise. But then so would the cost of our
entire defense budget.
In any case, there are budgetary constraints in all 16 NATO
democracies that will prevent costs from ballooning. That is why the
main focus of our discussion, Mr. Chairman, and in our consultations
with our allies, needs to be on defining the level of military
capability we want our old and new allies to have in this favorable
environment, and then making sure that they commit to that level. We
must spend no more than we must, but no less than we need to keep NATO
strong.
Another common concern about NATO enlargement is that it might
damage our cooperation with a democratic Russia. Russian opposition to
NATO enlargement is real. But we should see it for what it is: a
product of old misperceptions about NATO and old ways of thinking about
its former satellites in central Europe. Instead of changing our
policies to accommodate Russia's outdated fears, we need to encourage
Russia's more modern aspirations.
This means that we should remain Russia's most steadfast champion
whenever it seeks to define its greatness by joining international
institutions, opening its markets and participating constructively in
world affairs. It means we should welcome Russia's decision to build a
close partnership with NATO, as we did in the NATO-Russia Founding Act.
But when some Russian leaders suggest that a larger NATO is a
threat, we owe it candor to say that is false--and to base our policies
on what we know to be true. When they imply that central Europe is
special, that its nations still are not free to choose their security
arrangements, we owe it to candor to say that times have changed, and
that no nation can assert its greatness at the expense of its
neighbors. We do no favor to Russian democrats and modernizers to
suggest otherwise.
I believe our approach is sound and producing results. over the
past year, against the backdrop of NATO enlargement, reformers have
made remarkable gains in the Russian government. We have agreed to
pursue deeper arms reductions. Our troops have built a solid working
relationship on the ground in Bosnia. Russia was our full partner at
the Summit of the Eight in Denver and it has joined the Paris Club of
major international lenders.
What is more, last week in New York we signed documents that should
pave the way for the Russian Duma to ratify the START II treaty. While
this prospect is still by no means certain, it would become far less so
if we gave the Duma any reason to think it could hold up NATO
enlargement by holding up START II.
As you know Mr. Chairman, last week, NATO and Russia held the first
ministerial meeting of their Permanent Joint Council. This council
gives us an invaluable mechanism for building trust between NATO and
Russia through dialogue and transparency.
I know that some are concerned NATO's new relationship with Russia
will actually go too far. You have asked me for an affirmation, Mr.
Chairman, that the North Atlantic Council remains NATO's supreme
decision making body. Let me say it clearly: It does and it will. The
NATO-Russia Founding Act gives Russia no opportunity to dilute, delay
or block NATO decisions. NATO's allies will always meet to agree on
every item on their agenda before meeting with Russia. And the
relationship between NATO and Russia will grow in importance only to
the extent Russia uses it constructively.
The Founding Act also does not limit NATO's ultimate authority to
deploy troops or nuclear weapons in order to meet its commitments to
new and old members. All it does is to restate unilaterally existing
NATO policy: that in the current and foreseeable security environment,
we have no plan, no need, and no intention to station nuclear weapons
in the new member countries, nor do we contemplate permanently
stationing substantial combat forces. The only binding limits on
conventional forces in Europe will be set as we adapt the CFE treaty,
with central European countries and all the other signatories at the
table, and we will proceed on the principle of reciprocity.
Another important concern is that enlargement may create a new
dividing line in Europe between a larger NATO and the countries that
will not join in the first round. We have taken a range of steps to
ensure this does not happen.
President Clinton has pledged that the first new members will not
be the last. NATO leaders will consider the next steps in the process
of enlargement before the end of the decade. We have strengthened
NATO's Partnership for Peace program. We have created a new Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council, through which NATO and its democratic
partners throughout Europe will shape the missions we undertake
together. We have made it clear that the distinction between the
nations NATO invited to join in Madrid and those it did not is based
purely on objective factors--unlike the arbitrary line that would
divide Europe if NATO stood still.
Among the countries that still aspire to membership, there is
enthusiastic support for the process NATO has begun. Had you seen the
crowds that cheered the President in Romania in July, had you been with
me when I spoke to the leaders of Lithuania and Slovenia, you would
have sensed how eager these nations are to redouble their efforts.
They understand a simple fact: With enlargement, no new democracy
is permanently excluded; without enlargement, every new democracy would
be permanently excluded. The most important thing the Senate can do to
reassure them now is to get the ball rolling by ratifying the admission
of the first three candidates.
Mr. Chairman, a final concern I wish to address has to do with
Bosnia.
Some have suggested that our debate on NATO enlargement simply
cannot be separated from our actions and decisions in that troubled
country. I agree with them. Both enlargement and our mission in Bosnia
are aimed at building a stable undivided Europe. Both involve NATO and
its new partners to the east.
It was our experience in Bosnia that proved the fundamental premise
of our enlargement strategy: there are still threats to peace and
security in Europe that only NATO can meet. It was in Bosnia that our
prospective allies proved they are ready to take responsibility for the
security of others. It was in Bosnia that we proved NATO and Russian
troops can work together.
We cannot know today if our mission in Bosnia will achieve all its
goals, for that ultimately depends on the choices the Bosnian people
will make. But we can say that whatever may happen, NATO's part in
achieving the military goals of our mission has been a resounding
success. Whatever may happen, our interest in a larger, stronger NATO
will endure long after the last foreign soldier has left Bosnia.
We can also say that NATO will remain the most powerful instrument
we have for building effective military coalitions such as SFOR. At the
same time, Bosnia does not by itself define the future of a larger
NATO. NATO's fundamental purpose is collective defense against
aggression. Its most important aim, if I can paraphrase Arthur
Vandenberg, is to prevent wars before they start so it does not have to
keep the peace after they stop.
These are some of the principal concerns I wanted to address today;
I know you have many more questions and I look forward to answering
them all.
This discussion is just beginning. I am glad that it will also
involve other committees of the Senate, the NATO Observers' Group and
the House of Representatives. Most important, I am glad it will involve
the people of the United States. For the commitment a larger NATO
entails will only be meaningful if the American people understand and
accept it.
When these three new democracies join NATO in 1999, as I trust they
will, it will be a victory for us all, Mr. Chairman. And on that day,
we will be standing on the shoulders of many.
We will be thankful to all those who prosecuted the Cold War, to
all those on both sides of the Iron Curtain who believed that the goal
of containment was to bring about the day when the enlargement of our
democratic community would be possible.
We will be grateful to all those who championed the idea of a
larger NATO--not just President Clinton, or President Havel, or
President Walesa, but members of Congress from both parties who voted
for resolutions urging the admission of these three nations. we will
owe a debt to the Republican members who made NATO enlargement part of
their Contract with America.
Today, all of our allies and future allies are watching you for one
simple reason. The American Constitution is unique in the power it
grants to the legislative branch over foreign policy, especially over
treaties. In this matter, Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, you
and the American people you represent are truly in the driver's seat.
That is as it should be. In fact, I enjoy going to Europe and
telling our allies: ``This is what we want to do, but ultimately, it
will be up to our Senate and our people to decide.'' I say that with
pride because it tells them something about America's faith in the
democratic process.
But I have to tell you that I say it with confidence as well. I
believe we will stand together, Mr. Chairman, when the time comes for
the Senate to decide, because I know that the policy we ask you to
embrace is a policy that the Administration and Congress shaped
together, and because I am certain that it advances the fundamental
interests of the United States.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Madam Secretary, for a very
eloquent statement. It will be written about and talked about
for some time because this is an important subject. It is an
important milestone in not only the history of this country,
but the world.
We are going to have a round of 6-minute questions by each
Senator, and I hope that they will not be taken up by
statements up until 10 seconds before the red light comes on
and therefore give you a chance to answer.
Reports that NATO intends to consult with Russia on such
fundamental matters as the military strategy and nuclear
doctrine of the alliance have caused a great concern among a
great many leaders of our country, past and present. They, you
better believe, are contacting me with suggestions.
Now, how can NATO consult with Russia on these and other
matters without compromising the security or decisionmaking
process of NATO?
I guess that leads to a second question. Will you establish
fire walls in NATO's relations with Russia and assure that
Russia has neither a voice nor a veto in NATO discussions of
issues such as arms control, strategic doctrine, and further
alliance expansion? A pretty hefty question but I know you can
handle it.
Secretary Albright. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, we are pleased with the development of the
NATO-Russia relationship to date. We believe that the NATO-
Russia Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council it created
offers real opportunities to develop a partnership between NATO
and Russia through regular consultations and activities to
build practical cooperation.
I have been very pleased with the early work of that
council, including its first ministerial meeting in New York on
September 26th, and I think that in many ways that was quite a
remarkable meeting in starting this process out. I believe that
these elements of the NATO-Russia relationship, together with
our bilateral efforts to integrate Russia more fully into the
rest of the West, are beginning to bear fruit.
At the same time, let me be very clear about your concern.
The Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council created as a
result do not provide Russia any role in decisions the alliance
takes on internal matters, the way NATO organizes itself,
conducts its business, or plans, prepares for and conducts
those missions which affect only its members, such as
collective defense, as stated under Article 5.
The Permanent Joint Council will not be a forum in which
NATO's basic strategy doctrine and readiness are negotiated
with Russia, nor will NATO use the Permanent Joint Council as a
substitute for formal arms control negotiations such as the
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.
Consistent with our past approach to relations with Russia,
NATO will continue to explain to Russia its general policy on a
full range of issues, including its basic military doctrine and
defense policies. Such explanation will not extend to a level
of detail that could in any way compromise the effectiveness of
NATO's military forces. Such explanations will only be
offered--and I state this very emphatically--after NATO has
first set its policies on issues affecting internal matters.
NATO has not and will not discuss these issues with Russia
prior to making decisions within the North Atlantic Council.
Now, further, the Permanent Joint Council operates by
mutual agreement, which means both NATO and Russia must agree
to discuss an issue in the first place. NATO's policy always
will first be established by consensus requiring all allies'
agreement. Moreover, NATO is not required to discuss any issue.
The Founding Act is a political commitment, not a legal
document. The U.S., thus, will always retain the ability to
prevent the Permanent Joint Council from discussing any issue
which it does not want addressed for whatever reason within
that forum.
So, let me just reemphasize. I can assure you that the
Permanent Joint Council will never be used to make decisions on
NATO doctrine, strategy, or readiness. The North Atlantic
Council is NATO's supreme decisionmaking body, and it is
sacrosanct. Russia will not play a part in the NAC or NATO
decisionmaking and it will never have a veto over NATO policy.
Any discussion with Russia of NATO doctrine will be for
explanatory, not decisionmaking, purposes.
But I also would like to state, Mr. Chairman, that I think
we will find the Permanent Joint Council a very useful
mechanism for having discussions with Russia on issues of
mutual interest. If the first meeting that we just held in New
York is an example of it, I look forward to seeing that as a
very useful mechanism as we develop our relationship with a
democratic Russia.
The Chairman. Very quickly because the yellow light is on.
That is a good answer to my questions and I appreciate it.
Have our allies met the current defense obligations to
which they have committed themselves as members of NATO?
Secretary Albright. Yes, they have. We are all part of how
we burden-share in terms of allotments for NATO. As you know,
there are really two parts to the NATO budget. There are common
budgets for which there are assessments, and then each country
provides within its defense budget to live up to its
obligations under NATO. I believe that they are doing so and I
also believe that they will do so as we go through developing
the processes for the payment of the enlargement.
The Chairman. Very well.
Our distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I have had the occasion now--it seems a
little premature--to debate this subject in different fora with
several of my colleagues who oppose the expansion of NATO, most
recently before a group of chief executive officers and opinion
leaders from one of our States who were here in town.
There have also been closed meetings that Senator Roth and
I have set up in the Senate's NATO Observer Group where our
colleagues come in and state their support, opposition, or
concern.
It seems to be coming down to a pretty basic thing. It is
kind of ironic. The only thing that seems to be carrying the
momentum right now in the minds of many of my colleagues and
the American people is the moral imperative, and that is that
Poland and particularly Hungary and the Czech Republic were
left behind the curtain. the curtain is up. Now is the time to
let them come to the west from the east.
But there's very little knowledge--I should not say
knowledge--there is very little consensus about why this is in
the vital interest of the United States. Very few people
believe that adding, as brave and as valiant as they may be,
the Polish army and the Czech army and the Hungarian army to
NATO is any more likely to make them sleep more safely in
Peoria than they sleep today.
I am going to recite the arguments I hear very briefly, and
then stop and ask you to comment because they are the essence
of what we are going to have to answer in order to prevail.
You indicate that the American people will eventually agree
with NATO expansion. I think there is only one lesson I take
away from the Vietnam War and that is that a foreign policy, no
matter how well or poorly constructed, cannot be maintained
without the informed consent of the American people. Right now
there is not informed consent.
Right now, if you ask the American people if they think
there is a need for NATO, if they like spending $120 billion a
year, or whatever allocation we would conclude is warranted by
our NATO membership, I suspect you would find them saying the
same thing I hear from my colleagues. Why cannot Europe do
this? Why not leave well enough alone?
If we expand, the alliance will lose its vitality. As one
of my senior colleagues on the Armed Services Committee said in
a debate I recently had with him ``if it ain't broke, don't fix
it.''
If you expand it, you are going to diminish consensus. We
have a hard enough time getting 16 nations to agree now. Expand
it by three or more nations and it is going to even be more
difficult to obtain consensus. You are going to do what was
done 300 years ago in Poland when the princes got together and
each had a veto. You are going to allow the basic structure to
crumble.
These are the arguments that I keep hearing, but the root
argument is as follows. Look at Europe. As one of our
colleagues says, of the six largest armies in the world, five
are in Asia. Our economic future lies in Asia. We have a
disproportionate allocation of our resources in Europe. Why are
we doing this?
It comes down, in my view, to the need to answer the
following question, and then I will cease when I ask it,--why
cannot the Europeans take care of themselves? Their GDP is
larger than ours. Their population is larger than ours. As my
father said in a different context to me, not since the Roman
army invaded Europe and quelled the pagans has there been an
occupying army that stayed in place as long as we have been
required to stay in place in Europe. Why?
I believe you and the President in particular are going to
have to carry that argument to the people, an answer to that
question. Why can Europe not do this themselves? Why do we have
to be involved?
I think I am like that old joke about the Texan who says he
does not know much about art, but he knows what he likes. I
feel firmly I know the answer to why we have to be involved,
but I think until it is explained to the American people, we
are going to have this shadow debate about a lot of things
other than why the Europeans cannot do this by themselves. Why
do we need to be in Europe?
Secretary Albright. Senator Biden, I think that that is a
key question that we have to answer. Let me just say here that
one has to really hark to history.
First of all, as both you and the chairman said, our
history is tied to the history of Europe, even before,
obviously, the 20th century. Our values and a great deal of our
history comes from Europe and strategically Europe is key to
the United States in terms of its population, its economy, its
geostrategic structure.
But let me also say that what is evident because of those
aspects, we have found that when we have not paid attention to
Europe ultimately because those elements are so strong, we are
drawn into dealing with Europe's problems, always at a much
greater cost than would have been the case in the first place.
I believe very strongly that this is a very smart
additional preventive measure because history has shown us that
we will go into Europe when we see massive wars that involve
people that we are very closely related to, and when it
involves our economic and strategic interests.
Now, we are not an occupying power in Europe. We are a
partner, and the point of this is that NATO does in fact bind
us to Europe in a way that keeps us there as an invited partner
and not as an occupying power. I believe that if we do not stay
there now, and say ``let the Europeans do it,'' history will
show us that we will be back and we will be back at much
greater cost than if we were to do it now at a lesser cost as a
partner rather than as someone that has to go dig them out of a
mess.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Albright, in my judgment the NATO enlargement
debate has thus far largely ignored the central question of
NATO's basic purpose. The Senate's ratification debate over new
alliance members should start with that question, and I commend
Chairman Helms for focusing on that theme in this committee's
initial hearing.
Many of us within the Congress and the administration have
been working hard to ensure ratification of the admission of
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, perhaps too busy to
define NATO's purpose. But issues associated with purpose and
burden sharing will come up in the ratification proceedings.
The answers will be key to the ratification, but also for the
future of NATO.
First, the absence of a clearly defined and understood
purpose can complicate the implementation of enlargement by
making it appear as if the alliance's exclusive mission is to
defend its members against some future, yet ill-defined threat
from the east.
While not insignificant, such a preoccupation could in turn
focus allied militaries on the wrong problem, particularly if
major strategic threats to the United States and its allies are
elsewhere.
Second, the act of enlargement is becoming confused with
the alliance's reason for existence, and the issue of future
additional members could either cause further delay in
addressing NATO's core purpose or be delayed by inadequate
definition of the alliance's core missions.
Third, the alliance force planning goals and programs must
be based on a military strategy which must, in turn, be shaped
by strategic purpose. Adequate defense spending in the
modernization and restructuring of outdated forces will not
occur in the absence of strategic purpose.
Fourth, the United States' strategy and technology are
driven by global priorities, while European forces are focused
on territorial defense and thus are largely irrelevant to U.S.
priorities. The recent Quadrennial Defense Review does not
substantially take account of NATO, Europe, or the allies in
U.S. global strategy and requirements. In short, adjudged by
the QDR, America's main alliance is not confronting the main
security problems of the United States.
Despite alliance emphasis on defense of its members'
territory under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and peace
operations and crisis management under Article 4, NATO is in
need of strategic direction. This should be accomplished before
or in parallel with further decisions about forces, command
structure, and membership.
To oversimplify, I believe there are at least two strategic
alternatives that could drive the alliance's core purpose.
The first is for NATO to be the guarantor of European
security, and thus NATO's mission is identified with a European
mission and should dovetail with Europe's danger.
The second is for NATO to serve as the vehicle by which
Americans and Europeans protect their common interests wherever
challenged. While it subsumes the first, it also suggests that
the Atlantic Alliance can and should confront the rising
threats to the interest of members beyond Europe. Geography is
the chief criteria of the first strategy. Interests are what
matter in the second.
These two strategic alternatives point toward quite
different futures and may suggest different approaches to
future enlargement to further encourage other engagement of PFP
partners to burden sharing, to structuring forces and commands.
Secretary Albright, where does the administration stand on
the definition of our strategic alternatives and what strategic
direction or rationale will it promote within the alliance?
Secretary Albright. Senator Lugar, let me say that there
are two parts to the answer to this question.
First of all, clearly the basic original objective of NATO,
which was a collective defense treaty to deal with Europe,
continues to be in place and in fact is adapted in order to
deal with the changing security environment and obviously the
change that has taken place with the end of the cold war. There
have been studies that have been undertaken internally in order
to adapt the strategic concept of NATO to the more current
threats that it faces.
If I might say, to dovetail on a point that Senator Biden
made, that those who say it ain't broke, don't fix it, the
truth is it ain't suitable for what we are doing now. So, it
needs to be fixed. Europe looks very different, and I would ask
you to review what I said in my opening statement: What would
happen if we did not adapt NATO and enlarge it? Because
otherwise, we would be dealing with the past instead of dealing
with the future.
At the same time, Senator, I do think that there has been
an incredible amount of creativity in terms of developing
institutional structures such as the EAPC or the Partnership
for Peace that allows us to look at how to use an enlarged NATO
or a NATO along with subsidiary organs to deal with
peacekeeping, and to deal with the potential threats from some
of the rogue states. I find what is going on is a very good
exercise in creativity with substantial backing from strategic
thinkers in terms of how to use what is the best military
alliance in the history of the world to deal with the new
threats, both geographically and the ones that you mentioned.
That process is going on. These are not two mutually exclusive
goals.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Madam Secretary, I want to join with my
colleagues in welcoming you before the committee. As everyone
has indicated, this is the beginning of an extended process to
examine carefully this issue.
I want to get some sense at the outset about the path that
we will be placed upon and where it will lead and what the
timing is, as we move forward. So, I would like first to just
get a sense of the parameters of the timing. How do you see
that unfolding?
Secretary Albright. Well, Senator, as of right now, we are
dealing both with our allies and the invitees to develop what
would be their defense plans and the budget that goes with it.
We would hope that by December there would be the NAC
ministerial at which the accession protocols would be signed.
Then our plan would be to submit the treaty to you formally and
have, in fact, the official debate going on. At the same time,
there would be a ratification debate going on in the
parliaments of the other NATO members. Then we would be able
to, in fact, have the new NATO, the enlarged NATO, at the 50th
anniversary in 1999.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, is the December meeting of the North
Atlantic Council the meeting at which you expect approval of
the entry of the three countries into NATO?
Secretary Albright. From the perspective that they have the
power to do that, the accession protocols would be signed.
Obviously, it is not final until this is ratified and goes
through the constitutional processes of each individual
country.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, at that point, will the burden of
the cost be outlined, or will that be something to be developed
later?
Secretary Albright. No. The plan is that the comprehensive
NATO and cost report would be approved by the NATO ministers in
December.
Now, I have to stress again, as I stressed in my statement,
those are to do with the costs in the current environment. They
would have been worked out as a result of very careful work
among the allies, as well as what is going on now, Senator
Sarbanes, in terms of our people going around talking with the
three invitees about developing their specific defense plans.
Senator Sarbanes. I am having some difficulty in
understanding why the 50th anniversary of either the Congress'
approval of the Marshall Plan or the entry into force of the
Marshall Plan is relevant as a date by which this process ought
to move. I wonder if you could enlighten me on that.
Secretary Albright. Well, we have been celebrating the 50th
anniversary of everything.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, I understand that.
Secretary Albright. Are you suggesting, Senator----
Senator Sarbanes. I take it that is about the only
rationale for it.
Secretary Albright. We believe, Senator, that the debates
will be going on in the various parliaments. We want to give
the publics a chance to really be a part of the debate. We
would like to be early on in the ratification process because
we are the United States and provide the leadership. We thought
it would be a nice time, but it could be earlier if everyone
were ready to go.
Senator Sarbanes. I take it once that process is completed,
then the immediate issue before us, as we are moving down this
path, would be the accession to NATO of other countries which
are seeking to become members. Would that be correct?
Secretary Albright. We have said that it is an ongoing
process. We have not specifically set a date for the next
tranche, and we will be considering new members. We had said
hypothetically that it could take place after these members
were full members, which is where we had put it in 1999.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, is it not reasonable to assume that
once these members are dealt with, that that issue will then be
immediately before us?
Secretary Albright. It is reasonable to assume that. I
think that there are countries that wish to be considered in
the next tranche. There are those that we would like to be
looking at that are, as part of the Partnership for Peace
process, already very much involved with what we are doing. We
are setting up relationships with those countries. So, this is
an ongoing process, Senator.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, that would encompass not only, say,
the two that were considered at Madrid, Romania and Slovenia,
but I take it other eastern European countries, would it not?
Secretary Albright. We have said that all those countries
that met the criteria and the guidelines, are eligible. NATO is
open to all democracies and market systems which can show a
real dedication to the development of democratic institutions
which include civilian control over the military, and which can
add to the security of NATO. We would not even consider other
countries that could not contribute generally to the
enhancement of NATO. That is the basis on which these three
were invited, and that would be the basis on which others would
be considered.
The Chairman. The able Senator from Nebraska.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Secretary Albright, thank you for taking time this morning
and for your testimony.
As you mentioned in your statement--and I think your
statement, Secretary Albright, is a good beginning to this
debate, but you mentioned clearly that NATO expansion is
interconnected. It is connected to many variables, many
interests, economic, trade, national security, Bosnia, Middle
East, Caspian Sea, and others.
Is the President of the United States going to set out a
clear visionary comprehensive foreign policy so that this
Congress, the American people, the world can understand what it
is that he thinks is important as we move into the next
century, including NATO expansion? How does that fit together?
Will that be forthcoming?
Secretary Albright. Well, Senator, I believe that all along
we are giving speeches, as is the President, about the
direction of our foreign policy. He has made a number of
statements already. He obviously will continue to do so as will
the rest of us.
We are in a period, I think, that is more exciting than any
that I have witnessed in terms of the possibility of putting
all those pieces together and explaining to the American public
what our national interests are and what the stake of each
American is in all those issues that you have raised. Yes, the
President will be speaking out, as will the rest of us.
Senator Hagel. On Bosnia, which you alluded to and did
mention that obviously Bosnia has in effect, will continue to
have in effect, as we debate NATO expansion, could you give us
an update at this point? Where are we in Bosnia? What is our
course of action? When do we look at pulling some troops out,
leaving some behind? Where might they be left? Where? Whatever
you can give us in regard to Bosnia.
Secretary Albright. Yes. Senator, I think it is very
interesting. Bosnia has obviously been very much on our minds
in the last couple of years, and often we focus too much on the
negative aspect of the fact that the situation has not been
totally resolved.
I would prefer to focus on the positive, which is that if
we go back 3 or 4 years, there were hundreds of thousands of
people dying. It was impossible for any of us to feel that we
were doing the right thing in terms of ethnic cleansing. There
were refugees not only throughout the Balkans, but throughout
Europe, and there was a question about the survival of the
whole region.
Thanks to the resolute action of the United States, led by
President Clinton, we have in fact been able to reverse the
tide and not only reverse the tide but take some very positive
actions.
First of all, there is a development of the centralized
institutions within the federation where they are moving more
and more to those central institutions. We have had municipal
elections. New elections have now been scheduled in Republika
Srpska for November. We have managed to see the return of
refugees. There has been a real change in terms of the economic
reconstruction. War criminals are going to the Hague. As we
know, we had 10 of them that the Croats have turned over, and
we see a genuine change.
The President has stated, as have I and Sandy Berger, that
we see the SFOR mission ending in June 1998. But clearly there
will be a need for continued international presence in Bosnia,
and that is evident in terms of an economic and political
presence. We will have to see what kind of a security presence
will be needed after that time, and that discussion has not
taken place either in NATO or for us specifically. That is what
we are turning our attention to now.
But after a large review of our Bosnia policy last year, I
do believe that we have new momentum and that we have done a
great deal to improve the situation for the Bosnian people and
ultimately, therefore, for the United States because it is in
our national interest that there not be instability in the
Balkans.
Senator Hagel. One additional comment and I would be very
interested in your thoughts on this, Madam Secretary.
It seems to me, although I was barely around 50 years ago,
that one of the reasons that NATO has been such a great success
is because the leaders at the time had very clear vision that
called upon the best of our people worldwide, certainly in
America, and they were able to articulate that and express that
in not just a grand vision but a realistic vision that called
upon the best that we as a people, as a Nation, had and as a
community of nations.
I would hope that the President will be very engaged in
this debate because it is very clear that his personal
commitment and leadership is going to be critical to whatever
happens here. He, as you suggest, has a tremendous opportunity,
one of the few opportunities in history, to really put a print
on the future for the world.
Secretary Albright. I was 10 years old, but I was on the
other side of this. I have to tell you, if I might, Mr.
Chairman, take a minute. I was living in Czechoslovakia at the
time and it was left out of NATO because there was a communist
coup and the Soviets had liberated Czechoslovakia and it was
not allowed to be in this great Western alliance that was there
to save the West. It did take the leadership of a lot of people
in the United States to finally realize that in order to stop
the slide toward communism, it was essential for the American
people, with our European allies, to draw the line. It took a
great deal of work by President Truman and by your predecessors
and by my predecessors.
I hope very much that that same kind of dedication takes
place now, and I can assure you that President Clinton and the
administration is fully with this. I know from listening to all
of you--and the fact that we have started this now--that we do
have that kind of commitment and partnership in examining the
questions in 1997 as they were examined in 1948.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I am obliged to acknowledged that I was not
barely around 50 years ago.
Senator Robb.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was here but I was not concentrating on these particular
matters at that precise moment in history.
I join you and other members of this committee in thanking
the Secretary for coming and being with us this morning and
thank her for her leadership.
I might observe, if I may, that a distinguished colleague
and my senior Senator from Virginia, who is the Ranking
Republican Member on the Armed Services Committee, has joined
us this morning. I do not recall recently having had the
privilege of his visit on this particular committee before,
although we both serve on the other committee. I do not know
whether he is going to join the questioning or not, but I am
delighted that he could join us.
Madam Secretary, let me just ask a couple of process
questions or timing questions that are follow up on questions
that have already been asked in part this morning.
One of the questions has to do with the basic criteria. You
indicated in your statement that no new democracy would be
permanently excluded from NATO membership, but we are not,
understandably, precise as to exactly how long that whole
process might be open and inclusive.
I wonder if you could indicate what your thinking is, at
least at the moment, with respect to additional accessions.
Will it be based strictly on the criteria that have been
established?
Will it be based on concerns about collective security?
Will it be based on concerns about threat assessments or
circumstances as they exist at that particular time?
Will it be based in part on the success both politically
and as a matter of creating a more stable relationship of the
first three accessions or the invitees that presumably will be
formally accepted sometime in the near future?
Secretary Albright. Senator, I think that what we have
based ourselves on as a guiding principle here is that in
enlarging NATO, we do not wish to diminish its effectiveness.
As we look at new members, we have to keep in mind that what is
prime for us is to maintain the cohesiveness of NATO and have
those that join it be contributors to its strength rather than
to draw on it and to detract from it. So, that is a guiding
principle.
At the same time, we have made very clear that enlargement
is not a one-time event, that this is a process and that we
have to have a robust open-door policy in principle, but
maintain a certain amount of flexibility and nonspecificity as
we move forward on this.
I think, as I stated to Senator Sarbanes, we agreed that
NATO will review the process in 1999. We have made no decisions
or formal commitments regarding future members. We are going to
be using the same guidelines as we did for the invitations to
these three current members.
Now, obviously the circumstances at the time will be part
of what we are looking at, but it is our belief that what needs
to be the guiding principle is to maintain the cohesiveness and
strength of NATO and have the new members be additions to that
central goal.
Senator Robb. Given the criteria that you have suggested
and the ultimate ability for any democratic state, if they meet
the criteria and whatever other matters will be considered by
the member nations in NATO at the time, what would you assess
is the prospect for the ultimate accession of, say, the Baltic
states?
Secretary Albright. Well, I think that again we will have
to look at it as we move forward and make an assessment as to
how the situation is evolving and what the first round has
brought us. But let me specifically address myself to the
Baltic states.
We are taking a number of steps in order to ensure that the
Baltic states are more and more enveloped in European
institutions and that they are a part of an evolution that
makes them a part of what we are doing in knitting them in. So,
for instance, we have done more in terms of knitting them into
Baltic organizations in northeastern Europe. We are founding
members of a new group called the BALTSEA which does better
coordinated donor military assistance. We are also promoting
closer ties with Nordic states, as well as coordinating efforts
to promote cooperation between northern Europe and northern
Russia. We are encouraging the Baltic states in terms of EU
membership. We are working very hard, I think, to make sure
that they are very much a part of what we are doing.
But the major statement, Senator, is that NATO is open to
all democracies that meet those guidelines that we have been
talking about. It is not closed to anyone and there is a
process in train, but I am not going to predict specifically
what the next group of countries will be.
Senator Robb. I can understand about not wanting to address
the question of timing, but clearly for those who have some
hopes and aspirations for those states, that is precisely not
ruled out.
Secretary Albright. Absolutely.
Senator Robb. Thank you.
I had another question. My time is expired, however. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
I think all of us welcome the distinguished chairman of the
Rules Committee.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I enjoy sitting, where else? To his right on
the Rules Committee.
Senator Ashcroft.
Senator Ashcroft. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I thank you for appearing before us.
You have stated today that there are no parts of Europe
that face immediate threat and you indicate that one of the
things we need to do is to enlarge NATO and to adapt NATO.
Obviously, the NATO enlargement is the subject of the
discussion.
Will the adaptation of NATO require us to restate the
purposes of the organizing documents in some way or is the
adaptation somehow within the limits of the purposes as stated
in the document?
Secretary Albright. We believe that it is within the
purposes of the document, a collective defense agreement.
Senator Ashcroft. In terms of collective defense, I'm
interested in what Senator Lugar mentioned. Defense seems to be
geographic, at least to defend the soil of those nations that
are members. Senator Lugar talked about pursuing the interests
of the member nations.
Do you see the adapted NATO and the enlarged NATO as
pursuing the interests of member states, as well as defending
the soil of those countries?
Secretary Albright. I do because I think that as I
mentioned to him, I think that there are increasing interests
out of area that the NATO countries themselves agree to pursue.
They are looking at ways to pursue the interests in a way that
is commensurate with the way that they define them. So, it is
not overreaching. On the other hand, there are threats that are
different from the original founding that in fact can be
subsumed in the way that the treaty is currently outlined.
Senator Ashcroft. Your use of the phrase ``out of area'' in
your response is instructive to me. I believe we see an out-of-
area deployment in Bosnia. How wide-ranging would you
anticipate out-of-area deployments might become under an
enlarged NATO? For instance, would you see them extending as
far as the Pacific Rim in the event our interests were
challenged there? Or would you define it as maybe extending to
the subcontinent of Asia? Or would you see us as having
potential out-of-area deployments in Africa, for example?
I guess then the thrust of my question is, if NATO becomes
an organization which addresses the interests of NATO nations
wherever they might take place, is it to be a sort of limited
U.N. that doesn't require quite as much consensus, or could you
comment about the potential limits? What would be beyond the
limit of a NATO which is to respond to the interests of members
sates rather than NATO's historical purpose of defending the
European democracies? Is there anyplace in the world to which
NATO troops might not be assigned?
Secretary Albright. Well, first of all, while I have said
it is the prime military alliance of our time, it is not the
only military arrangement that exists. The NATO Council
operates by consensus and we are obviously not just one but I
think people see us as a senior partner within the North
Atlantic Council. I think that the definition of how far it
would go is obviously based on that kind of a discussion.
But let me say what I have been particularly impressed by,
Senator, in the last couple of years is the creativity of the
international community in terms of dealing with nonspecific
threats that we had not heard about before. So, there are a
variety of ways that issues can be dealt with.
In the Pacific, we have just published new guidelines in
our dealings with Japan. We have a whole different way of
dealing with issues.
Without making any kind of a statement that rules anybody
in or out that might cause us problems later on, I would like
to underline the fact that what is interesting about this era
is the variety of ways that coalitions of the willing can be
formed where there is a core group and then there are ways to
deal with the problem where others join. The Partnership for
Peace is now viewed as a very creative way of dealing with
issues.
Senator Ashcroft. I think I am hearing you say that the
NATO Council's willingness to agree would be the only limit in
terms of our ability to enlist the aid of individuals pursuing
our interests somewhere else in the world.
Secretary Albright. Not only that, but obviously
constitutional processes of each of the countries is also
involved. While we always talk about NATO as triggering this
Article 5 where an attack on one is an attack on all, there are
different ways to grade whatever the threat has been and the
way that a country responds to it in which our constitutional
processes are the determinative factor.
Senator Ashcroft. I would like to raise one other issue. I
see the yellow light is on.
I am a little bit concerned about our relationships with
Russia. I think to allow enlargement, without understanding our
relationship to Russia in the context of it, would be in error,
and I am sure you are doing that.
But in one sense it seems like we are isolating a potential
ally in Russia. We are telling them that you are not a part of
the European or western oriented group of nations, and that
troubles me, particularly when it appears to me that the
administration is beginning to, while isolating a potential
ally, embrace a new threat--the People's Republic of China--
particularly the administration's consideration of allowing
nuclear cooperation with China.
I suppose the other hearings will afford opportunities to
address these issues, but I think we need to be careful, having
won the cold war against the Russians, not to turn them from
Europe and an orientation to the west.
Secretary Albright. If I might.
The Chairman. Sure.
Secretary Albright. On the contrary. I believe that what we
have managed here is to do a very important balance by, on the
one hand, asking Russia to join us in the NATO-Russia Founding
Act which allows them, as I mentioned in my remarks and also in
answer to Chairman Helms, a way to be part of a discussion
about issues of mutual interest. At the same time, this will
leave the door open to them and make it very clear that the new
NATO is not directed against them.
So, I feel very strongly that while we need to maintain
NATO as a guard against any potential resurgence, at the same
time we have walked this line very carefully in terms of not
isolating a new Russia from a new Europe and a new NATO.
The question about China, sir, is that we are very careful
in our dealings with China, in terms of having a multi-faceted
relationship with them, and making sure that they are part of
what we are trying to accomplish, which is a regime that does
not allow proliferation of any weapons of mass destruction. It
is important for us to engage with China also in a way that
does not isolate them as a huge power as we move into the 21st
century.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, it is good to see you again. You look
wonderful, none the worse for wear.
Secretary Albright. Love my job.
Senator Feinstein. Well, that helps.
Let me follow up on Senator Ashcroft's questions. My
concern about NATO is twofold. One is Russia and the second is
the cost item. Let me talk just for a moment about Russia.
I for one see a kind of growing instability there. I see an
increasing problem with proliferation, certainly a dramatic
impact in Iran and Iraq with that proliferation. Some have said
that there might be a response by Russia to NATO, by Russia's
trying to develop an alliance down south with those countries.
I do not know whether that is correct or not.
But when you see Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's comments too
on the subject that developments in Russia could take an
ominous turn. He says, I am not afraid that Poland or Hungary
or anyone else will be within NATO. It is not so dangerous for
Russia. The thing I am worried about is Russia and what might
happen in Russia and nothing else. End quote.
I think as we watch some of these events, I for one see his
point. I also recognize that START II is pending before the
Russian Duma. It would be hopeful for its ratification soon. I
would like your comment on that, and then whether promise
negotiations for a START III might be able to ease some of
this. But I think politically what happens in Russia as a
product of this is a potentially very dangerous thing. I would
like you to explore that a little further, if you would.
Secretary Albright. Senator, clearly one of the major
assignments that we have is managing the devolution of the
Soviet empire and creating a positive relationship with the new
Russia. I think we all see that as one of the major priorities
of this administration.
There have been all kinds of statements about how we were
moving with NATO enlargement how it was going to undercut our
relationship with Russia. It simply has not happened.
First of all, let me say Russia does not like NATO
enlargement. There is no question about that, and every time
that I meet with Foreign Minister Primakov or President Clinton
meets with President Yeltsin or Vice President Gore meets with
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, that point is made clear.
Nevertheless, it has not harmed us in terms of an ongoing
relationship with them. As I mentioned, the permanent Joint
Council meeting went very well. I have had extensive meetings
with Foreign Minister Primakov dealing with a whole host of
issues that we deal with on a mutual basis.
I also think that those who have predicted that NATO
enlargement would give solace to the hard-line members within
Russia have been wrong also. The process there in terms of
democratization is moving forward. I think we are seeing some
advances in their movement toward a market economy. It is not
without its problems, but it is not due to NATO enlargement. It
is due to very serious issues involved in the transformation of
that society, and our continued relationship with them and our
ability to support the reform process is something that we must
make sure continues.
On START, I was very pleased that while I was in New York
last week, I was able to sign a protocol to START II with
Foreign Minister Primakov which is going to make it possible
for them to move START II in the Duma. The Defense Minister and
the Foreign Minister now together have gone to the Duma pushing
for START II ratification. So, we are hopeful on that. They are
going to take up the CWC Treaty first, but they are going to
move on that in the next 4 or 5 weeks we have been told. I am
hopeful on that, too.
We have said that START III talks would begin after START
II goes into effect, but there are already expert talks that
are going on and there is a team in Russia right now that is
following up on a lot of these decisions.
So, I think that we are moving along well, not without
problems, but I think we have to understand that the dire
predictions about the end of the world if NATO enlarged are not
coming true. I ask you all to look at the kinds of statements
that Foreign Minister Primakov has been making when we sign
these protocols or the kind of discussion we had in the
Permanent Joint Council. So, the process is moving forward and
we have to support the reformers in Russia.
Senator Feinstein. Quickly on the subject of cost. With the
opening cost being between $27 billion and $35 billion, with
France's recalcitrance, and the limited means of the European
Union monetarily, how is this money going to get paid and will
it be paid?
Secretary Albright. Well, first of all, as I said, we are
now going through the process of determining what the cost
actually will be under the current environment. The NATO allies
have committed themselves--they did in Madrid--to paying the
cost, and we are going to make sure that they do. We will pay
our share and they will pay their share.
I think for them this is a domestic question--whether they
reallocate their defense resources in other ways; but they have
made a commitment to pay for the cost of enlargement.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Madam Secretary, the Senator who will question you has a
fan club in North Carolina. He is the only Senator, past or
present, maybe not future, who has done heart transplants. He
flies his own jet plane, and he has done transplants I
understand at every major hospital in North Carolina and
probably all the other 49 States as well. Dr. Frist.
Senator Frist. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I join my colleagues in thanking you for
your forthright comments today.
I want to turn and shift the focus a little bit on
expectations of the various parties that are involved and what
visions that they have. Undoubtedly, the singularity of mission
has been the glue which in the past has bonded NATO members
together so effectively since the creation of the alliance.
However, we all now recognize that that bond and singularity of
purpose created by the Soviet threat has largely dissolved.
As we face the challenges of maintaining that alliance and
at the same time redefining that common bond, something that
concerns me in this or any other multilateral obligation is the
difference in expectations of each of the parties, both
currently at the table and coming to the table.
The United States seems to believe that NATO can and should
continue to maintain its original mission of mutual defense and
include whatever necessary changes there might be to meet new
evolving European demands.
As indicated in remarks in Madrid in July, at least some of
our main European partners view such a mission and a level of
commitment as either too costly or unnecessary in the current
environment and that a more loosely defined security should be
the mission of the alliance.
The incoming European countries with Soviet domination and
presence clearly in their minds, really having had Soviet
troops on their soil just a few years in the past, have an
understandably even different expectation of NATO, especially
how it will relate to membership in the European Union.
I ask you to comment on these different visions and these
different expectations and ask whether you think such different
visions among the members and the potential members create an
internal tension which the alliance simply has never had to
address in the past, and then beyond that, how you see such
differences in expectations affecting the alliance.
Secretary Albright. Well, I think you have stated a very
interesting proposition, but I am not sure that I totally agree
with it. I think that the discussions that I have participated
in and witnessed regarding our current NATO allies is that they
are dedicated to the NATO they have seen and frankly are also
proponents of enlargement. Otherwise, we would not have it.
When we were in Madrid, I think our internal discussions
there showed a basic dedication to the original purpose of NATO
and the fact that it should be expanded to cover a certain
number of countries. The discussion we had was whether it
should not cover more. There is no one that is now arguing that
it should not have expanded.
I think what I have again found so interesting about the
NATO alliance is its creativity in adapting itself and looking
at how to restructure itself internally as well as look at what
a new strategic concept is, and we are going through that
process.
As far as the new allies are concerned, I think there is no
doubt that they see membership in NATO in terms of the
possibility of being in the world that was denied them in the
first place, as the chairman was saying, the promise of the end
of the Second World War that they were cut out of. They do see
that as a way of rejoining the West that they belong to.
President Havel, who was in Washington on Friday getting the
Fulbright Statesman Award, spoke, as is always his way, very
movingly about what this means to come back to the West.
At the same time, I think they do see it as an important
security structure, one, within the original context, and two,
as a way that is an impetus to them to deal with their current
instabilities, the instability that we are trying to guard
against: The problems that we see in Europe of ethnic conflict,
of instability created as a result of that, and the fact that
it has driven many of them to signing agreements with people
and groups that they would never have imagined doing, as I
mentioned in my statements, Hungarians and Romanians.
So, they see it as a return to where they ought to be, but
also a way of dealing with what they see as their security
problems, not unlike I think what the original NATO group also
sees.
Senator Frist. Thank you. The expectations issue is one
that I hope to continue to explore in our future hearings, but
thank you for setting that foundation for me.
We have mentioned Bosnia a couple of times and let me just
go back because of my own mind. The U.S. has set next July as a
date certain for withdrawal of at least our ground forces in
Bosnia. Consequently our European allies have said that should
the United States leave, withdraw, they too would withdraw. As
you pointed out in your statement earlier, the implications for
Bosnia are clear.
Bosnia stands what realistically could be called the first
test of an expanded or new mission of NATO, that is,
peacekeeping or peacemaking beyond the borders of its members.
Should this specific point of withdrawal become one of the
major contentions between us and our allies? And if so, what
are the implications for the so-called new NATO, and what
implications are there for defining this mission?
Secretary Albright. Well, first of all, I think there has
been a meeting now in Maastricht where some of the discussion
started in terms of how we all operate together as we look at
Bosnia in the future. Let me just say not so parenthetically
here that as we begin to think about this decision, obviously
we will be consulting very closely with all of you.
I think that what we have seen is that Bosnia in many ways
has been a very good example of how NATO countries can work
with non-NATO countries and how there can be the possibility of
dealing with the kinds of destabilizing conflicts within a new
context. I would imagine--I would hope in fact--that we would
look at the lessons of Bosnia as we think about future
missions, both positively and negatively, and try to see how
NATO and NATO in coordination with Partnership for Peace
countries and a wider alliance can in fact deal with different
kinds of new threats.
These two discussions are obviously going to intersect and
we welcome that. I think that it is important for us to see
that they are on parallel tracks. We cannot equate the
discussions, but they will be intersecting here and in Europe.
Senator Frist. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Wellstone.
Senator Wellstone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, thank you for being here.
I can very honestly and truthfully say that quite often I
have a real clear view about issues and know where I stand, and
on this question I am really quite undecided. I would like to
give you just a little bit of context and then put at least one
question to you.
My father was born in the Ukraine, but his family kept
staying one step ahead of the pogroms. He lived in Russia and
ultimately he came to this country in 1914 when he was 17.
He later had a chance to become friends with George Kennan
and he always used to praise George Kennan not only for his
wisdom but also for his command of the language.
George Kennan wrote a piece in the New York Times a while
ago now, in which he said something like he thought that this
expansion of NATO could be the most fateful decision. It could
have consequences that we could not even begin to prophetize.
So, there you have George Kennan, a real giant.
I have visited Russia, my father's home, and every time
there is a delegation that comes here, I try and meet with
people. I have not met anyone from Russia of any political
persuasion who is not very much opposed to this. On the other
hand, there is President Havel and there are you and others who
have, of course, taken a very different position.
This is what I do not quite understand. If we are talking
about the importance of improving the economies and
democratization of countries like Hungary and Czechoslovakia
and Poland, there is the European Union. I do not know how a
military alliance really meets those concerns.
I do want to mention Senator Feinstein's discussion of the
Prime Minister's remarks where he said I am not worried about
Czechoslovakia or Poland or Hungary, but I am worried about
what is going to happen in the country. You said, well, there
is no evidence yet. But that is kind of a snapshot of right
now. The question is where are we heading. We have to look to
the future.
If, for example, we are saying that this is not the end.
The Baltic countries are welcome. Ukraine is welcome. What then
would be the consequences within Russia?
I guess all of this leads me to one question, and maybe
this is my way, as somebody who is trying to sort through these
issues, of getting closer to what I think would be the right
position for me to take as a Senator.
You said that if countries meet this democratic criteria,
they are welcome. Would Russia be welcome? Maybe that is the
question I should ask. If Russia meets the criteria, after all,
all of us hope that they will build a democracy. I mean, it
will be a very dreary world if they are not able to. This
country is still critically important to the quality of our
lives and our children's lives and our grandchildren's lives.
If Russia meets this criteria, would they be welcome in NATO?
Secretary Albright. Senator, the simple answer to that is
yes. We have said that if they meet the criteria, they are
welcome. They have said that they do not wish to be a part of
it.
But let me just say several things to your very well-
articulated question and your legitimate concern. I think all
of us that have grown up in this era have the concerns that you
have stated.
I spent my entire life studying the Soviet Union and now
Russia and the republics. I think we have to understand that
Russia is not the Soviet Union and Russia is a different place
than any of us ever thought it would be.
All of us have genuflected in front of George Kennan. We
all have felt that he was kind of the father of the way that we
had studied the Soviet Union and Russia.
But with all due respect, I disagree with him on this
subject. I think that we are in a new era. I have spent a lot
of time talking with the Russians about this and persuading
them that if they want us to think about a new Russia, they
have to think about a new NATO and a new Europe.
Russia has a long way to go, but it is on a very important
path. While they are objecting or stating that they do not like
NATO expansion, we are involved in a whole web of relationships
with them now in a way that I think is supportive of their
democratic processes. We do not have time to go into all that.
But the fact that we are in a set of arms control negotiations
with them on a completely different approach than being
adversaries in the way that we were, that there are trade
agreements and market forces working, that there are democratic
forces working, that they are part of a discussion about our
mutual interests in Europe is for me a sign that we are heading
in a different direction.
Now, another aspect of this is I cannot understand why we
would self-limit our desires for central and eastern Europe by
what the Russians want. That is going back to the post World
War II era, and I do not think that is correct. It is not
correct in terms of security and it is not correct in terms of
the morality that we talked about. Why should we now in 1997
agree to a line that was created in 1945? I think it is wrong.
Senator Wellstone. If I could, Mr. Chairman, just in 30
seconds add, I do not have all of your intellectual capital in
this area, but a different formulation might be why would we be
trying to expand a military alliance, which we built, vis-a-vis
a Soviet Union that does not exist any longer?
It is not so much a question of our policy being governed
necessarily by ``paranoia'' in Russia, but it has more to do
with, as we look to the future, whether or not this could in
fact invite the very instability that would be I think so
dangerous to the world that we live in. It is a very
legitimate, important concern that I think we will have more
debate on. Again, for myself I still am trying to wade through
this.
Secretary Albright. May I, Mr. Chairman, respond?
The Chairman. Sure.
Secretary Albright. I would say the following. First of
all, we had options here. We could say the threat is different,
so let us just kind of junk NATO and start over. Why do that
when NATO as a structure has worked very well and is, I think,
capable of expanding and enlarging in terms of its strategy as
well as its membership, as I answered to members over here.
So, I think that the purpose here is NATO, while it
maintains its central core of being a defensive alliance, has
the capability of adjusting its strategic concept in a way that
is not directed against Russia. The threat at the moment in
Europe is instability and the undermining of the overall
structure of what we want which is a free, undivided and fully
united Europe. That is what is a priority for the United
States, and NATO provides a very good structure for that. It is
adjusting. It is a new NATO. It is not the NATO that you and I
grew up with.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Now, my chairman of the Rules Committee, the Senator from
Virginia, Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and
the other Members.
I will ask but one question, the same question that I have
debated very lively publicly with Senator Biden. I happen to be
a very firm skeptic of this program.
First, a quick answer. If Russia is admitted, I suggest
that that would be the end of NATO because one of the primary
missions of NATO would no longer exist. It would be the end
because when I joined the Senator 19 years ago for the first 5
years, this senior group up here led the defense against
withdrawing from NATO, pulling our troops back, predicated both
on an economic argument and other arguments. We remember very
well our distinguished Majority Leader Mike Mansfield who led
that fight. I think if Russia were admitted, that fight would
start again.
But my concern, Madam Secretary, goes to the other threat
that faces all of the new nations that are looking toward
admission, and that is they are fighting fairly today and
peaceably for economic survival. By conferring a NATO status on
the three, it puts the other three in my humble judgment at a
severe disadvantage in two ways.
First, they can put in their advertisements for foreign
capital, come invest here because you will be more secure
because NATO is here, not unlike the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation when you deposit in your bank.
Second, these nations will not have to mount their own
defenses because they will be a part of NATO. I have discussed
this with the Ambassadors and foreign ministers and defense
ministers of these countries. They readily admit our cost to
build that level of defense we think and security that is
necessary will be one-third or perhaps one-half of what the
nations that are not admitted will have to cough up.
All of this to me indicates that you will begin to breed
dissension. As we know today, part of the security of the
world, the growing part of it that is threatened, are the
ethnic strife, the border strife, religious strife, and you
superimpose on their struggle today for economic survival,
economic competition NATO status and a less cost for their
defense, and I think you are sewing the seeds of strife between
these countries.
I go back to Harry Truman's biography in which he said his
two proudest accomplishments were the Marshall Plan and NATO,
and I fear we may be undoing one of his proudest
accomplishments.
Secretary Albright. Senator, I was looking forward to
coming to see you in your committee.
Senator Warner. We will make that opportunity available
and this record will be a very important part of that
discussion.
Secretary Albright. Let me say we have had this discussion
and we will continue to have it.
But let me just say on the Russian question, first of all,
I think that, they have expressed no interest in being members.
I was answering a question of Senator Wellstone whether it was
hypothetically possible, and it is because, as we have said, it
is a process that is open to democracies that meet the agenda.
But it is a hypothetical question at this stage, and I
think we need to focus on the fact that we are looking at a
very different world. Who would have ever expected the things
that we have seen in the last 10 years? So, I would just leave
it in the realm of the hypothetical at this stage.
Now, on your other question, I think that there is no proof
of the fact that NATO status confers better investment. If you
just look, for instance, at what we have seen in western
Europe, NATO membership has not been used over the past half
century to draw investment, let us say, to Norway. I think that
there is no historical evidence of the fact that NATO provides
economic benefits.
At the same time, having spent a lot of time studying
central and eastern Europe, I can tell you that the other
countries, the non-invitees, are working very hard in terms of
their privatization, their various other institutions that
would provide good investment climate. They are creating a
whole web of other relationships with the hope that they will
be in NATO.
I also think that we cannot get ourselves into this
argument of none or all. We have to do what is right for NATO
which is expand in a way that is good for the central core of
keeping a cohesive alliance.
Senator, on your final point, I think that our greatest
leaders historically have been those who have understood that
history does not stand still and that there are opportunities
to be seized. What Harry Truman did with both the Marshall Plan
and NATO was go against the tide and assume leadership at a
time when creativity was needed. While one can never speak for
the dead, one would assume, in looking at his record, that he
would be the kind of person that would see the opportunities
that NATO enlargement offers for U.S. national interests.
Senator Warner. I thank the witness. I thank the chair and
the Ranking Member.
The Chairman. A bit of housekeeping. I ask unanimous
consent that a statement by Senator Smith of Oregon be
submitted at the appropriate place in the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Smith
Secretary Albright, thank you for appearing before the Committee
today to begin the process of advice and consent on the proposed
enlargement of NATO.
The United States is engaged in an ambitious effort to reshape the
political and security structures of post-Cold War Europe. The goal of
this effort is to build strong states, stable democracies, prosperous
economies, and friendly governments across the breadth of Europe. We
are joined in this effort by our NATO allies and by newly democratic
people yearning for the opportunity to pursue political freedom and
economic prosperity. Working against us are certain, backward looking
leaders, historical antagonism between certain states, and ethnic and
religious intolerance. These challenges that we confront, together with
our friends and allies, are significant but not insurmountable.
In recent years, Europe has seen historic changes. On the continent
of Europe, more people than at any other time in history live under
democratic government and enjoy the opportunity to pursue freely
economic prosperity for themselves and their families. This soaring
accomplishment is offset by the tragedy in the former Yugoslavia, in
which Europe experienced the most brutal and widespread violence since
Hitler's armies stalked the Continent.
These two extremes reflect the significant, competing pressures on
U.S. foreign policy at this moment in time. The United States is at
once pressing for the consolidation of the gains of democracy in Europe
by expanding NATO and with it our country's commitment to European
security. Simultaneously, we have reluctantly, and with some
controversy, assigned our soldiers to serve as peacekeepers in Bosnia
in a mission that is defined less by an exit strategy than an exit
date.
These conflicting impulses--to engage and withdraw simultaneously
from Europe--are manifested as much in our people as in our policies.
It is absolutely critical that these contradictory inclinations are
resolved through the leadership of the President, and through the
development of sensible foreign policies that will gain the support of
the American people. The Congress can be a partner in this effort, but
by its very nature it cannot lead the effort
The Chairman. Also, the record will be kept open for 3 days
for additional written questions to be submitted to the
distinguished Secretary.
Madam Secretary, you have acquitted yourself admirably and
effectively as always. It has been a pleasure to have you with
us.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, before you close, would you
yield me 30 seconds?
The Chairman. Certainly.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I think the last argument that
Senator Warner made is the most compelling, which is that these
nations are going to spend more money to go it alone or to put
it another way,less money to be part of the west. It seems to
me that he makes the argument for NATO when he makes the
argument that in fact they will be spending less money. They
are going to spend the money. They are going to seek their own
alliances. Bring them to the west.
Secretary Albright. I agree with that.
The Chairman. Do you agree?
Secretary Albright. Absolutely. That's why when people are
saying can they meet their obligations, they know that they can
do better by increasing their defense budgets to be a part of
NATO and that they will spend less by being a part of it. Yes,
I do.
The Chairman. Madam Secretary, is there anything else?
Sometimes when I make an appearance, driving home I make the
best speech of my career.
I think you have done well this morning, but do you have
any closing note that you would like to add?
Secretary Albright. Well, the only note that I would like
to make, Senators, is that I do think we are embarked on a
great historical partnership here of being able to take what we
have been watching very carefully, the evolution of Europe, and
being able to now put our stamp on it and do for the 21st
century what our predecessors have done for the second half of
this one.
I consider it a great honor to be here working with all of
you on this. I know we are going to have an interesting debate.
I think the questions are terrific. I do not know about all the
answers, but I really do appreciate this and I feel that we are
all making history here together.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Very well.
There being no further business, the committee stands in
recess.
[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to
reconvene at 2:06 p.m., October 9, 1997.]
PROS AND CONS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT
----------
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:06 p.m. in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms
(chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Helms, Lugar, Hagel, G. Smith, Grams,
Biden, Robb and Wellstone.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
We have Members on the way, including the distinguished
Ranking Member, Mr. Biden. Mr. Biden's representative suggested
that I proceed. I will do that by welcoming all of the
distinguished foreign policy people that we have scheduled for
today, including my friend, and the friend of a lot of people,
Senator Bill Roth, whom I admire greatly.
Today we are honored to have with us people on both sides
of the NATO expansion issue, and that is proper. I might say,
parenthetically, that what I envision as our role is to get all
of the facts laid out so that the American people, to the
extent possible, will understand what the issues are and where
who stands on what.
Our first witness is going to be, as I have said, the
distinguished President of the North Atlantic Assembly and
Chairman of the Senate NATO Observer Group.
Senator Roth will be followed by two prominent supporters
of NATO enlargement, Dr. Brzezinski, whom everybody knows--
nobody needs an introduction to him--and Ambassador Jeane
Kirkpatrick, who is on the way here. Both have, again,
generously consented to help Senators acquire a better
understanding of a complex foreign policy matter.
After completion of this first panel, the committee will
hear from two outspoken opponents of NATO expansion, Ambassador
Jonathan Dean and Professor Michael Mandelbaum.
Again, on behalf of the committee and on behalf of the
Senate, I thank each of you for being here and welcome all of
our guests.
We will first hear from Senator Roth. We are glad to have
you and I thank you for coming. You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., UNITED STATES SENATOR
FROM DELAWARE, CHAIRMAN, SENATE NATO OBSERVER GROUP, AND
PRESIDENT, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ASSEMBLY
Senator Roth. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a
great honor to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee to provide my perspective on NATO enlargement.
I come, as you pointed out, before your committee not only
as a colleague, committed to sustaining and strengthening the
Transatlantic Alliance, but as President of the North Atlantic
Assembly, as well as Chairman of the Senate NATO Observer
Group.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the North Atlantic
Assembly, representing over 40 political parties from the 16
NATO nations, has given more serious and consistent study to
the future of NATO than any other transatlantic organization.
The Senate NATO Observer Group, organized just last May by
Senators Lott and Daschle, has already held more than a dozen
meetings to examine the challenges and promise of enlargement.
My association with both the NAA and the Observer Group
leaves me firmly convinced that enlargement is not only
necessary and important to the alliance, but to the United
States as well.
Will enlargement be easy? Few things this important are
ever easy. Will it be worth it? Absolutely. Let me explain why.
As a leader in the North Atlantic Assembly, I was in Berlin
shortly after the Wall came down--meeting with many of the
young, democratic leaders who were emerging in Central Europe.
On that occasion, I was struck by two oddly opposing insights.
First, is that the cold war was over. Democracy had, indeed,
prevailed. My second insight, however, was that the move toward
democracy alone would not guarantee peace and stability on the
European continent. Having served in World War II, I was
painfully aware of just how important peace and stability in
Europe are to the United States of America.
As I see it, Mr. Chairman, NATO enlargement is an
opportunity unprecedented in world history. For the first time,
we have the chance to be proactive in shaping a strategic
landscape that will contribute to peace and stability in
Europe. We are not responding to aggression or disaster, but we
are building a foundation for a secure future in a region of
vital interest to the United States.
Four significant arguments make it clear why NATO
enlargement is in America's best interest.
First, a wider alliance is a stronger, more capable,
alliance. The proposal to grant NATO membership to Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic will add three democracies to
the alliance that have demonstrated their commitment to the
values and interests shared by NATO members: human rights,
equal justice under the law, and free markets. Each of these
nations has a growing economy and a military under civilian
control.
It is important to note that each also contributed forces
to Operation Desert Storm as well as our peacekeeping missions
in Haiti and Bosnia. In that NATO is first and foremost a
military alliance, the admission of these three democracies
will enable the alliance to better fulfill its core mission of
collective defense, as these nations will add another 300,000
troops to NATO.
Second, NATO enlargement will eliminate the zone of
instability that now exists in Europe. Throughout its history,
Europe has been a landscape of many insecure small powers, a
few imperialistic great powers, and too many nationalistic
defense policies, each creating friction with the other. Three
times in this century these dynamics have pulled America into
wars on the European continent. As President Havel has said,
``If the West does not stabilize the East, the East will
destabilize the West.'' Every time America has withdrawn its
influence from Europe, trouble has followed. This we cannot
afford.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, NATO enlargement
is the surest means of doing for Central and Eastern Europe
what American leadership, through the alliance has done so well
for Western Europe. This includes promoting and
institutionalizing trust, cooperation, coordination and
communication. In this way, NATO enlargement is not an act of
altruism, but one of self-interest.
Third, keeping the above argument in mind, it follows that
the costs of enlargement are insignificant compared to the
costs of remaining static. Should NATO fail to follow through
on the commitments made in Madrid, the alliance would be
denying what it has stood for and defended throughout the cold
war. Why? It is because NATO is much more than a military
alliance. It is also a community of values. Enlargement is not
only a strategic opportunity, it is a moral imperative. We
cannot ignore the valid aspirations of European democracies who
seek to become contributing members of our community.
Failure to expand must be considered in terms of what it
will cost as disillusionment replaces hope in Central Europe,
as nationalism--which enjoyed a renaissance following World War
II--fills the security vacuum in a region that has given birth
to two world wars. Costs must also be considered in terms of
the consequences to Russia and its struggle toward democracy.
Should Central Europe remain a gray zone of insecurity, such a
condition would risk reawakening Moscow's history of
imperialism. NATO enlargement is a critical, nonthreatening
complement to the hand of partnership that the West and NATO
has extended to Russia. It insures a regional context in which
a democratic Russia will have the best prospects for normal,
cooperative relations with its European neighbors.
Fourth, and finally, Mr. Chairman, NATO enlargement is
fundamental to Europe's evolution into a partner that will more
effectively meet global challenges to the transatlantic
community. An undivided Europe at peace is a Europe that will
be better able to look outward, a Europe better able to join
with the United States to address necessary global security
concerns. A partnership with an undivided Europe in the time-
and stress-tested architecture of NATO will enable the United
States to more effectively meet the global challenges to its
vital interests at a time when defense resources are
increasingly strained.
Mr. Chairman, these arguments make it clear that America's
best chance for enduring peace and stability in Europe--our
best chance for staying out of war in Europe, our best chance
for reinforcing what has been a strong, productive partnership
with Europe--is to promote a Europe that is whole, free, and
secure.What better organization to do this than the North
Atlantic Alliance, an organization that has kept the peace for
more than 50 years and remains unmatched in its potential to
meet the security challenges of the future.
Thank you for giving me this opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Senator Roth follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Roth
It's an honor to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee to provide my perspective on NATO enlargement. I come before
your Committee not only as a colleague, committed to sustaining and
strengthening the Transatlantic Alliance, but as President of the North
Atlantic Assembly, as well as Chairman of the Senate NATO Observer
Group.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the North Atlantic Assembly
representing over 40 political parties from the 16 NATO nations--has
given more serious and consistent study to the future of NATO than any
other transatlantic organization. And the Senate NATO Observer Group--
organized just last May by Senators Lott and Daschle--has already held
more than a dozen meetings to thoroughly examine the challenges and
promise of enlargement.
My association with both the NAA and the Observer Group leave me
firmly convinced that enlargement is not only necessary and important
to the Alliance, but to the United States, as well.
Will enlargement be easy? Few things this important are ever easy.
Will it be worth it? Absolutely.
Let me explain why. As a leader in the North Atlantic Assembly, I
was in Berlin shortly after the Wall came down--meeting with many of
the young democratic leaders who were emerging in Central Europe. On
that occasion, I was struck by two oddly opposing insights. First, that
the Cold War was over. Democracy had, indeed, prevailed. My second
insight, however, was that the move toward democracy alone would not
guarantee peace and stability on the European continent. And having
served in World War II, I was painfully aware of just how important
peace and stability in Europe are to the United States. of America.
As I see it, Mr. Chairman, NATO enlargement is an opportunity
unprecedented in world history. For the first time, we have the chance
to be proactive in shaping a strategic landscape that will contribute
to peace and stability in Europe. We are not responding to aggression
or disaster, but we are building a foundation for a secure future in a
region of vital interest to the United States.
Four significant arguments make it clear why NATO enlargement is in
America's best interest:
First, a wider Alliance is a stronger, more capable Alliance. The
proposal to grant NATO membership to Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic will add three democracies to the Alliance that have
demonstrated their commitment to the values and interests shared by
NATO members: human rights, equal justice under the law and free
markets. Each of these nations has a growing economy and a military
under civilian control.
It is important to note that each also contributed forces to
Operation Desert Storm, as well as to our peacekeeping missions in
Haiti and Bosnia. In that NATO is first and foremost a military
alliance, the admission of these three democracies will enable the
Alliance to better fulfill its core mission of collective defense, as
these nations will add another 300 thousand troops to NATO.
Second, NATO enlargement will eliminate the zone of instability
that now exists in Europe. Throughout its history, Europe has been a
landscape of many insecure small powers, a few imperialistic great
powers, and too many nationalistic defense policies, each creating
friction with the other. Three times in this century, these dynamics
have pulled America into wars on the European continent. As Vaclav
Havel has said, ``If the West does not stabilize the East, the East
will destabilize the West.'' Every time America has withdrawn its
influence from Europe, trouble has followed. This, we cannot afford.
Mr. Chairman, NATO enlargement is the surest means of doing for
Central and Eastern Europe what American leadership, through the
Alliance, has done so well for Western Europe. This includes promoting
and institutionalizing trust, cooperation, coordination and
communication. In this way, NATO enlargement is not an act of altruism,
but one of self-interest.
Third, keeping the above argument in mind, it follows that the
costs of enlargement are insignificant compared to the costs of
remaining static. Should NATO fail to follow through on the commitments
made in Madrid, the Alliance would be denying what it has stood for and
defended throughout the Cold War. Why? Because NATO is much more than a
military alliance. It is also a community of values. Enlargement is not
only a strategic opportunity, it is a moral imperative. We cannot
ignore the valid aspirations of European democracies who seek to become
contributing members of our community.
Failure to expand must be considered in terms of what it will cost
as disillusionment replaces hope in Central Europe, as nationalism--
which enjoyed a renaissance following World War II--fills the security
vacuum in a region that has given birth to two world wars. Costs must
also be considered in terms of the consequences to Russia and its
struggle towards democracy. Should Central Europe remain a gray zone of
insecurity, such a condition would risk reawakening Moscow's history of
imperialism. NATO enlargement is a critical, non-threatening complement
to the hand of partnership that the West and NATO has extended to
Russia. It ensures a regional context in which a democratic Russia will
have the best prospects for a normal, cooperative relationship with its
European neighbors.
Fourth, and finally, Mr. Chairman, NATO enlargement is fundamental
to Europe's evolution into a partner that will more effectively meet
global challenges to the transatlantic community. An undivided Europe
at peace is a Europe that will be better able to look outward, a Europe
better able to join with the United States to address necessary global
security concerns. A partnership with an undivided Europe in the time-
and stress-tested architecture of NATO will enable the United States to
more effectively meet the global challenges to its vital interests at a
time when defense resources are increasingly strained.
Mr. Chairman, these arguments make it clear that America's best
chance for enduring peace and stability in Europe--our best chance for
staying out of war in Europe, our best chance for reinforcing what has
been a strong, productive partnership with Europe--is to promote a
Europe that is whole, free and secure. What better organization to do
this than the North Atlantic Alliance--an organization that has kept
the peace for more than fifty years and remains unmatched in its
potential to meet the security challenges of the future.
The Chairman. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for being
here. That is an excellent statement and an excellent
introduction to what we are going to attempt to do here this
afternoon.
We would be delighted for you to say for as long as you
wish. But with all the things you have on your front burner,
you may want to depart. But please stay as long as you will and
as long as you can.
Senator Roth. I am on my way to Bucharest for a meeting of
the NAA. So I thank you for opportunity to be here before I
leave.
The Chairman. Well, do not miss the plane.
Senator Roth. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Now two names always thought of in this town and across the
country, for that matter, when foreign policy matters come up
are the names of Dr. Brzezinski and Dr. Kirkpatrick, who will
compose our first panel today.
I might mention that I first met Dr. Kirkpatrick through a
mutual friend, who later became President of the United States.
His name was Ronald Reagan. I had a hope then and I continue to
have the hope that one of these days Dr. Kirkpatrick may be
Secretary of State or higher.
Dr. Brzezinski, we will hear from you first. I certainly do
appreciate your being here.
STATEMENT OF HON. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, COUNSELOR, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
In my initial comment I will not retrace the ground that
was covered by your discussion with Secretary Albright on
Tuesday. It was an excellent discussion and many cogent
arguments were reviewed regarding the issue of NATO
enlargement.
In my brief comments, I would like to touch merely on the
historic and geopolitical significance of NATO's enlargement,
as I see it. In my view, that enlargement has truly global
significance. It is central to the step by step construction of
a secure international system in which the Euro-Atlantic
alliance plays the major role in insuring that a peaceful and
democratic Europe is America's principal partner.
Hence, NATO's enlargement is about America's role in
Europe, whether America will remain a European power, and
whether a larger, democratic Europe will remain organically
linked to America.
It is about Europe's historically important self-
definition, whether its scope and security are to be confined
to the lines drawn arbitrarily in 1945, thus to a rump Europe
with NATO increasingly anachronistic in the post cold war era,
or whether NATO's membership should correspond to the
aspirations of the democratic European nations.
It is about Russia's relationship to Europe, whether NATO's
enlargement helps a democratizing Russia by foreclosing to it
the revival of any self-destructive imperial temptations
regarding Central Europe.
Let me also note parenthetically that NATO and the European
Union have creatively resolved the old question of
disproportionate German power in Europe. The progressive
expansion of NATO can similarly resolve the question of
disproportionate Russian power in Europe. It is noteworthy also
in this connection that public opinion in key European
countries is favorable to expansion.
Moreover, so far, all of the apocalyptic predictions of the
critics of NATO expansion have failed to come to pass.
In brief, to me, NATO expansion is not principally about
the Russian threat for, currently, it does not exist, though
one cannot exclude its reappearance and, hence, some insurance
against it is desirable.
Second, to me, NATO expansion is not primarily a moral
crusade, meant to undo the injustice the Central European
people suffered during the half century's long Soviet
oppression, though one cannot ignore the moral right of the
newly emancipated and democratic Central Europeans to a life no
less secure than that enjoyed by the West Europeans, or, I may
add, ourselves, as well.
For me, the central stake in NATO expansion is the long-
term, historic, and strategic relationship between America and
Europe. NATO expansion is central to the vitality of the
American--European connection, to the scope of a secure and
democratic Europe and to the ability of America and Europe to
work together in promoting international security.
The expansion of the Euro-Atlantic alliance will bring into
NATO counsels new, solidly democratic, and very pro-American
nations. That will further deepen the American--European
kinship while expanding Europe's zone of peace and democracy.
Such a more secure Europe will be a better and a more vital
partner for America in the continuing effort to make democracy
more widespread and international cooperation more pervasive.
That is why NATO's enlargement, in itself a vivid testimonial
to the dynamism of the democratic ideal, is very much in
America's long-term national interest.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Brzezinski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Brzezinski
I would like to comment very briefly on the historic and
geopolitical significance of NATO's enlargement. In my view, that
enlargement has global significance--it is central to the step-by-step
construction of a secure international system in which the Euroatlantic
alliance plays the major role in ensuring that a peaceful and
democratic Europe is America's principal partner.
Hence
NATO's enlargement is about America's role in Europe--
whether America will remain a European power and whether a
larger democratic Europe will remain organically linked to
America;
it is about Russia's relationship to Europe--whether NATO's
enlargement helps a democratizing Russia by foreclosing the
revival of any self-destructive imperial temptations regarding
Central Europe.
(Let me note in passing that NATO and the EU have creatively
resolved the old question of disproportionate German power in Europe;
the progressive expansion of NATO can similarly resolve the question of
disproportionate Russian power in Europe. It is also noteworthy that
public opinion in key NATO countries is favorable to expansion.
Moreover, so far, all the apocalyptic predictions of the critics of
NATO expansion have failed to come to pass.)
In brief, to me NATO expansion is not principally about the Russian
threat, for currently it does not exist, though one cannot exclude its
reappearance and hence some insurance against it is desirable.
Secondly, to me NATO expansion is not primarily a moral crusade,
meant to undo the injustice the Central European peoples suffered
during the half-century long Soviet oppression, though one cannot
ignore the moral right of the newly emancipated and democratic Central
Europeans to a life no less secure than that enjoyed by the West
Europeans.
For me, the central stake in NATO expansion is the long-term
historic and strategic relationship between America and Europe. NATO
expansion is central to the vitality of the American-European
connection, to the scope of a democratic and secure Europe, and to the
ability of America and Europe to work together in promoting
international security.
The expansion of the Euroatlantic alliance will bring into NATO
counsels new, solidly democratic and very pro-American nations. That
will further deepen the American-European kinship while expanding
Europe's zone of peace and democracy. Such a more secure Europe will be
a better and a more vital partner for America in the continuing effort
to make democracy more widespread and international cooperation more
pervasive. That is why NATO's enlargement--in itself a vivid
testimonial to the dynamism of the democratic ideal--is very much in
America's long-term national interest.
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Brzezinski. Dr. Kirkpatrick.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, SENIOR FELLOW AND
DIRECTOR, FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE STUDIES, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank
you for inviting me today to testify before this distinguished
committee.
The Chairman. Thank you for coming.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the
subject of today's hearing is exceedingly important and that
the Senate's decision on NATO enlargement today is even more
important. I have followed this issue with substantial interest
since the end of the cold war made it a practical policy
option.
I begin with a question: why should we enlarge NATO? I
believe that the case for admitting Poland, the Czech Republic,
and Hungary to membership in NATO is not only strong, but that
it is essentially the same as the case for organizing NATO in
1947--to provide a security shield behind which the free
institutions of these more geographically vulnerable European
democracies can strike deep roots and thrive, to deter
aggression, and to discourage conflict.
Of course, there are differences between 1939, 1947, and
1997. There is no one major threat to peace and security
throughout the region today. But if the threats of aggression,
subversion, and conquest are less clear now than they were
after World Wars I and II, the new democracies' appetite for
democracy and peace is greater.
More people understand the benefits of freedom and long to
share in them, and long for a place in the prosperity and
security of the West. More associate that freedom, prosperity,
and security with joining NATO--and the European Union, which,
unfortunately, is not an issue that we are free to resolve by
action of this Senate or any other American forum.
I believe, these candidates that have been proposed for
membership in NATO, will strengthen that institution. Poland,
the Czech Republic and Hungary share a history and a
civilization with the countries of NATO and were engaged in
parallel patterns of democratic development when first Adolph
Hitler and then Josef Stalin's expansionist policies abruptly
strangled their evolution.
The people in each of these countries share our culture.
They have demonstrated their vocation for freedom with heroic
efforts to throw off foreign domination and regain control of
their own histories. This took place again and again during
their tragic evolution of this century.
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary can be incorporated
into NATO, I believe, without creating any serious disruption
and without requiring a reorientation of NATO's operations.
They will ``fit'' in NATO. Their inclusion will not require
qualitative changes in its purposes, culture, or mode of
operation. NATO has been and, after their inclusion, will be, a
military alliance of democratic nations united in the
determination to preserve their free societies from
aggression--by force, if necessary.
The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary applied for
membership in the European Union and in NATO years ago. Hungary
actually applied for membership in the European Union before
Soviet forces had departed their country. They have met all the
stated requirements, and have cooperated in all proposed
projects, including Partnership for Peace. They have
demonstrated their seriousness.
Moreover, 4 years have passed since President Clinton said
in Prague, ``Let me be absolutely clear: the security of your
States is important to the security of the United States. The
question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members,
but when and how.''
Yet to this day, no country that suffered under Soviet
dominance has been admitted into either NATO or the EU.
The post cold war period has seen the emergence of numerous
threats to the development of a democratic Europe. Resurgent
anti-democrats have won power in some States and threaten peace
in others. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Slovakian
Prime Minister Vladimir Mecias are examples.
Milosevic sponsored and encouraged Serbian aggression and
``ethnic cleansing'' against Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-
Herzegovena, in that order. He has attempted to destabilize
Macedonia and repeatedly violated democratic norms and the
human rights of the Serbian opposition. He has undermined
democracy in Serbia and outside it. The violent attacks he
sponsored have devastated two States--Croatia and Bosnia, and
have destabilized the region.
This aggression could happen because he is not a democratic
president, although he is, in fact, elected. This reminds us
that not all elected presidents are democratic presidents,
governing within a framework of law and constitutional rule.
It is no accident, Mr. Chairman, as the Marxists like to
say, that in democratic Czechoslovakia, the separation of
Slovakia from the Czech Republic was peaceful, and that the
separation of Yugoslavia was violent. The difference was not in
the preference of the presidents because the President of
Czechoslovakia also preferred that that country remain united.
The difference was the respect of those presidents for
democratic decisions.
There was in the Czech Republic no will to conquest in the
government. The Czech Republic is a democracy, prepared to
accept the democratic self-determination of Slovakia. Serbian
rulers were not committed to democratic methods and were not
prepared to accept the democratic self-determination of the
component States of former Yugoslavia. The result was, first,
instability, and then aggression and war, which continues to
this day.
There is, finally, in my judgment, Mr. Chairman, only one
reliable guarantee against aggression. It is not found in
international organizations. It is found in the spread of
democracy. It derives from the simple fact that true
democracies do not invade one another and do not engage in
aggressive wars.
Numerous studies establish beyond reasonable doubt that the
best system, the only reliable basis for collective security,
is that all the governments in an area should be democratic
governments. Therefore, what reinforces democracy reinforces
peace. That is the reason that the top priority for the United
States and NATO should, today, be to preserve and strengthen
the new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe, and in
Russia as well.
Preserving and strengthening democracies in Central and
Eastern Europe should be the United States' central goal and
top foreign policy priority in Europe, in my opinion.
Membership in NATO will help to achieve those goals and
strengthen the alliance.
Enlargement of NATO will assuredly expand the zone of
security, to quote the distinguished Senator who testified
before me. It will expand the zone of security in Europe and
will shrink the zone of insecurity and instability.
Unfortunately, I believe that it is necessary for the
United States to take a leadership role on this issue, perhaps
because we have had the opportunity to observe the inadequacy
of a purely European security framework policy to achieve these
desired goals. It is not graceful and perhaps not appropriate
for an American to emphasize the inability of the European
Union and the WEU or any of the purely exclusively European
military groups to protect peace and provide collective
security to Europe. Their failure is manifest, but more so
because, at the time the Serbs took up arms against Slovenia
and Croatia, then-President of the EU--and it was the EC,
then--Mr. Poos, of Luxembourg, said, and I quote, ``This is a
European problem that will be solved by Europeans. There is no
role here for Americans.''
I think President Bush was quite ready to have the
Europeans take that turn.
But everyone knows what happened. Presidents George Bush
and Bill Clinton were more than willing to stand aside while
first Europe, then the United Nations and Europe worked on the
problem. Unfortunately, what that experience provided was
additional and timely evidence of the inadequacy of purely,
European security arrangements to deal with the problems of
Europe.
And UNPROFOR, under Secretary General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali's command provided, I think, definitive evidence on the
inability of the United Nations to mount an effective military
operation in Europe or, indeed, virtually anywhere else.
The passive, inadequate response of the EU, the United
Nations, the OSCE, and the Western European Union testify to
the ineffectiveness of a collective defense based only on these
organizations. NATO has a different and a better record, though
it, too, was tarnished in Bosnia by its association with
UNPROFOR. I think it has reestablished its credibility.
I think we have seen clearly the inadequacy of a U.N.
response, which I emphasize only because we hear rather
frequently that peace can be defended by the United Nations and
peace can be restored by the United Nations. I believe that
certain lessons of great relevance to European security leap
out of the Yugoslav experience: that membership in the U.N.
cannot be regarded as a reliable guarantor of European
security--we have seen that very clearly, beyond any reasonable
doubt; that global institutions cannot necessarily provide
reliable solutions to regional problems; that diplomacy may not
be able to forestall aggression, whether or not that diplomacy
is directed from the U.N.; that ``peacekeeping'' is not an
adequate response to the determined use of military force; that
the ``peacekeeping'' rules of engagement that the U.N. has
invoked and imposed in former Yugoslavia may make peace keepers
hostages without deterring aggressors or assisting victims;
that effective force is often necessary to repel force.
NATO can be, and indeed, is, that effective force, Mr.
Chairman.
Why should we act now?
Czech President Vaclav Havel, a man of unusual foresight
and courage told the ``Economist'' magazine about a year ago
that he feared the spirit of Munich was returning to Europe. I
quote, ``I do not have in mind some concrete political act,''
he said. ``Rather, I refer to a mentality marked by caution,
hesitation, delayed decisionmaking, and a tendency to look for
the most convenient solutions.''
Havel charged the governments of NATO and the EU with
excessive caution and worried aloud that the opportunity to
build a Europe of independent democratic nations would not last
forever.
As usual, I think President Havel was right. Years which
might have been used to integrate the new democracies and to
reinforce them, to extend the institutions of freedom have
already been lost through indifference, procrastination and
timidity. These characteristics--indifference, procrastination,
and timidity--are not examples of effective foreign policy and
not examples of the kind of policy that Americans are proud of.
There has been a persistent question about whether we could
afford to support our share, our reasonable share, of the costs
of enlarging NATO. I would like to say Mr. Chairman, that the
United States spends each year in former Yugoslavia alone
several times the cost of even the CBO's estimates of enlarging
NATO. That is very interesting if you think about it.
No one made a decision to spend that much money in former
Yugoslavia. I would like to say that it would have been much
more economical in money and lives, to have taken timely action
to deter action that conflict.
Some people might argue that we could save the money by
simply ignoring the ethnic cleansing and the massacres in
former Yugoslavia. But the fact is, the United States cannot be
indifferent to a tragedy in the heart of the civilization of
which we are a part.
What about Russia? Mr. Chairman, I believe that NATO is a
defensive alliance dedicated to deterring and, if necessary,
defeating aggression. A democratic Russia will pose no threat
to anyone and a democratic Russia should not fear NATO. The
most urgent problem in my judgment in U.S. relations with
Russia is to help the Russian democrats defeat the internal
enemies of Russian democracy.
I think our government is working quite hard on that
problem and, indeed, has since the end of the cold war.
I think that it should be remembered that President Yeltsin
himself has on several occasions clearly indicated that he has
no problem with the inclusion in NATO of these independent
European neighbors who were formerly members of the Warsaw
Pact.
President Yeltsin is himself principally concerned with the
strengthening of democratic institutions in Russia. We cannot
help him achieve his goals or Russians achieve the goals of a
strong, consolidated, democratic government by appeasing the
extremists and anti-democrats in Russia. We do not help Russian
democrats by handing the opponents of democracy in Russia a
victory over NATO, a longstanding symbol of the West's
commitment to defend democracy
We can only help by strengthening and moving boldly toward
the construction of a democratic Europe, which is, indeed,
wholly consistent, indeed virtually identical, with his goal.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that Americans understand the
American stake in a stable democratic Europe. Public opinion
surveys and studies over the period from the end of World War
II, the Marshall Plan, and the establishment of NATO, down to
last week demonstrate that Americans support an active U.S.
role in Europe and support a strong America and a strong
democratic NATO. I think that the Senate should do no less.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Kirkpatrick follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Kirkpatrick
Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify before this
distinguished committee today.
The subject of today's hearing is important. The Senate's decision
will be more important. I have followed this issue with interest.
Why enlarge NATO?
The case for admitting Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to
membership in NATO is not only strong, it is essentially the same as
the case for organizing NATO in 1949--to provide a security shield
behind which the free institutions of these more geographically
vulnerable European democracies can strike deep roots and thrive, to
deter aggression and discourage conflict.
Of course there are differences between 1939, 1949 and 1997. There
is no one major threat to peace and security throughout the region
today. But if the threats of aggression, subversion and conquest are
less clear now, as they were after World Wars I and II, the appetite
for democracy and peace is greater. Still, more people understand the
benefits of freedom and long to share it--and the prosperity and
security of the ``West''. And more associate that freedom, prosperity
and security, with joining NATO and the European Union.
The new members ``fit'' in NATO
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary share a civilization with
the countries of NATO and were engaged in parallel patterns of
democratic development when first, Adolf Hitler's, then Joseph Stalin's
expansionist policies interrupted their evolution. The people in each
of these countries share our culture. They demonstrated their vocation
for freedom with heroic efforts to throw off foreign domination and
regain control of their own histories.
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary can be incorporated into
NATO without creating serious disruption or without requiring
reorientation of NATO's operations. They will ``fit'' in NATO. Their
inclusion will not require qualitative changes in its purposes,
culture, or mode of operation. NATO has been and, after their
inclusion, will be a military alliance of democratic nations united in
the determination to preserve their free societies from aggression--by
force if necessary.
The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary applied for membership in
the European Union and in NATO years ago (Hungary actually applied for
EU membership before Soviet forces had departed). They have met all
stated requirements and cooperated in all proposed projects including
Partnerships for Peace.
Moreover, four years have passed since President Clinton said in
Prague, ``Let me be absolutely clear: the security of your states is
important to the security of the United States ... the question is no
longer whether NATO will take on new members but when and how.'' But
neither they nor any other country that suffered under Soviet dominance
has been admitted to NATO or the EU.
``Threats'' to a democratic Eastern Europe
The post Cold War period has seen numerous threats to the
development of a democratic Europe. Resurgent anti-democrats have won
power in some states and threaten peace in others. Serbian President
Slobodan Milosevic and Slovakian Prime Minister Vladimir Mecias are
examples.
Milosevic sponsored and organized Serbian aggression, and ``ethnic
cleansing'' against Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovenia (in that
order) and acted repeatedly to destabilize Macedonia. He repeatedly
violated democratic norms and the human rights of the Serbian
opposition. He undermined democracy in Serbia and outside it. The
violent attacks he sponsored devastated two states--Croatia and Bosnia
and destabilized the region.
It is no accident, as Marxist liked to say, that in democratic
Czechoslovakia separation of Slovakia from Czeck Republic was peaceful.
And that the separation of Yugoslavia was violent. The difference was
respect for democratic decisions. There was no will to conquest in the
government of the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic is a democracy
prepared to accept democratic self-determination of Slovakia. Serbian
rulers are not committed to democratic methods.
There is, finally, only one reliable guarantee against aggression--
it is not found in international organizations. It is the spread of
democracy. It derives from the simple fact that democracies do not
invade one another, and do not engage in aggressive wars.
Numerous studies establish beyond reasonable doubt that the best
system, the only reliable system of collective security is that all the
governments in an area should be democratic governments. Therefore,
what reinforces democracy reinforces peace. That is the reason that the
top priority for the United States and NATO should today be to preserve
and strengthen the new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe and
Russia as well. Preserving and strengthening democracies in Central and
Eastern Europe should be the United States central goal and top foreign
policy priority in Europe. Membership in NATO helps achieve those
goals.
The Inadequacy of a purely European Response
It is not graceful and perhaps not even appropriate for an American
to labor the inability of the EC and the WEU to protect peace and
provide collective security to Europe. That failure is manifest, the
more so because at the time Serbs took up arms against Slovenia
Croatia, then President of the EC, Mr. Poos of Luxembourg, said, ``This
is a European problem that will be solved by Europeans. There is no
role for Americans.''
Everyone knows what happened. Presidents George Bush and Bill
Clinton were more than willing to stand aside while first Europe, then
the United Nations and Europe worked on the problem.
Unfortunately, this experience provided additional and timely
evidence of the inadequacy of purely European security arrangements.
And UNPROFOR, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghaii provided
definitive evidence on the inability of the United Nations to mount an
effective military operation.
The passive, inadequate response of the EU, the United Nations, the
Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Western
European Union have testified to the ineffectiveness of a collective
defense based only on these organizations. NATO has a different and a
better record though it was tarnished in Bosnia by its association with
UNPROFOR.
The Inadequacy of a U.N. Response
Certain lessons of great relevance to European security leap out of
the Yugoslav experience:
that membership in the United Nations cannot be regarded as
a reliable guarantor of European security;
that global institutions cannot necessarily provide
solutions to regional problems;
that diplomacy may not be able to forestall aggression--
whether or not that diplomacy is directed from the U.N.;
that ``peacekeeping'' is not an adequate response to the
determined use of military force;
that the ``peacekeeping'' rules of engagement may make
``peacekeepers'' hostage without deterring the aggressors or
assisting the victims; and,
that effective force is often necessary to repel force;
NATO can be that force.
Why Act Now?
Czech President Vaclav Havel, a man of unusual foresight and
courage, told the Economist magazine about a year ago that he fears the
spirit of Munich has returned to Europe.
``I do not have in mind some concrete political act,'' Havel said.
``Rather I refer to a mentality marked by caution, hesitation, delayed
decision-making and a tendency to look for the most convenient
solutions.'' Havel charged the governments of NATO and the European
Union with ``excessive caution'' and worried aloud that the opportunity
to build a Europe of independent democratic nations will not last
forever.
As usual, Havel was right. Years which might have been used to
integrate the new democracies and extend the institutions of freedom
have already been lost through indifference, procrastination and
timidity.
Can we Afford It?
The United States spends each year in former Yugoslavia several
times the cost of enlarging NATO.
How much more economical in money and lives it would have been to
deter that conflict.
What About Russia?
NATO is a defensive alliance dedicated to deterring and, if
necessary, defeating aggression.
A democratic Russia will pose no threat to anyone. The most urgent
problem in U.S. relations with Russia is to help Russian democrats
defeat internal enemies of democracy. Our government is working hard on
that problem.
It should be remembered that President Yeltsin has repeatedly
indicated that he has no problem with the inclusion in NATO of these
independent European neighbors. We do not help Russian democrats by
appeasing their opponents.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Those were two excellent
statements.
In doing a little housekeeping arithmetic, I note that we
have about 8 Senators here. I have to divide the time so that
we share it equally as nearly as possible. So I suggest that we
have a 5 minute time period each, at least on the first round.
Dr. Brzezinski, some critics of NATO enlargement are
alarmed by the negative reaction of Russia to this policy. If,
as we are led to believe by those critics, Russia has no
designs on the territory of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic, how does the membership of those countries in NATO
impact Russian interests?
Dr. Brzezinski. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that it
impacts on Russian interests adversely at all unless Russia is
of the view that NATO is an enemy and that the United States is
an enemy. If that is the Russian view, then we have a very
serious problem, in which case we ought to expand NATO for that
reason as well.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. That's right.
Dr. Brzezinski. But I don't think the Russians think of
NATO as an enemy. I don't think the Russians think of America
as an enemy, though some members of the Russian foreign policy
elite--in almost all cases, in fact, former members of the
Soviet foreign policy elite--would like to have the potential
option in the future of exercising dominant political influence
in Central Europe. This is why they don't like the expansion of
NATO.
In my view, we shouldn't cater to these anachronistic
prejudices. But we ought to work to create conditions whereby
Russia is not tempted in that fashion and is, therefore, more
likely to become really a democracy.
Let me just quote one sentence from Andrei Kozyrev, the
former Russian Foreign Minister. He says that to pay too much
heed to the Russian critics of NATO expansion would play into
the hands of the enemies of democracy in Russia.
I completely agree with Kozyrev.
The Chairman. An excellent answer.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick--and I like to call you that because
you did so well at the United Nations--how will the memberships
of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO enhance the
defense of democracy in Europe? What you said addressed this
very subject. What is the greatest strategic value, do you
think, of these three countries to the NATO alliance?
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I think that their principal value
to the NATO alliance is to expand in Europe and in an area of
Europe which has been, historically, one of turmoil and
victimization, to expand the zone of peace and the conditions
of peace and stability.
I believe that Western Europe as well as Central Europe and
Eastern Europe will, in fact, have enhanced stability and
confidence in the peace of their region if these countries are
accepted for membership in NATO.
Mr. Chairman, I read that you had said that it was an
historic opportunity. I think it is an historic opportunity and
I think it is the right thing to do, as well. I think the
people of these countries, having been denied by accidents and
tragedies of history that we all know about should be given the
opportunities for peace, prosperity, and stability that they
seek and would be very reliable allies. They would, as Dr.
Brzezinski said, and as I think Senator Roth said, strengthen
the armies of NATO. They will be enthusiastic, disciplined, and
effective members of NATO because they have already paid the
greatest price to join.
So I think both in war and in peace, militarily and
politically they would strengthen NATO and the context of NATO
operations.
The Chairman. Thank you, ma'am.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for
being here. You lend a great deal to this discussion.
I would like to parse this debate arbitrarily into two
pieces. The political argument up here is going to get down to
money, in my humble opinion, and whether or not there is any
use for NATO, period. It's the old Mansfield argument--bring
the boys home.
There is a strong strain of isolationism, stronger in one
party than in the other, but it exists in both, and there is
the question of why can't the Europeans do this. I mean, what
do they need us for?
I will leave that argument aside and focus on the arguments
that are made by the foreign policy establishment of which you
are two prominent members--and we are going to hear two
prominent members after you who are opposed to expansion--and
the intellectual community. They usually do not talk about
expansion in terms of money.
All of you will come up here--and I am a strong supporter
of expansion--and will say stability is the question. Mr. Dean
and Mr. Mandelbaum are going to argue that enlargement will
diminish stability rather than enhance it in Europe. I argue
that enlargement enhances stability and I think you will also
be making that argument.
I would like to lay out, as I have been doing for the past
6 months, what I think the arguments are devolving to. There
are only 3 or 4 arguments in opposition to expanding NATO and I
would like you to comment on them, if you will.
You mentioned the present President of Russia does not have
a problem--I might add that I met with Yavlinsky and he had no
problem. I met with Zyuganov and he had no problem. I met with
Lebed and he had no problem. I met with Baturin and he had no
problem. Not a single one of them had a problem in face to face
meetings each of which lasted a minimum of an hour. Not one of
them viewed the expansion of NATO as a threat, a physical
threat.
They viewed it in terms of being excluded from Europe. They
viewed it in terms of it having consequences for them
culturally and politically. They viewed it as a slap in the
face. They viewed it as an insult to their pride. But none of
them--and I asked the explicit question, ``Do you view it as a
threat?'' Not one of them has said that. Not one of the ones I
mentioned. I think I have covered the various political
factions.
Now here is what the arguments against expansion come down
to, as I see it, and then I would like you to comment. First is
that expanding NATO will diminish the organization's ability to
gain consensus on a lot of issues because 3 more countries are
being added to the 16, making a total of 19. It is hard enough
to get consensus now, and the added difficulty will unravel
NATO.
Second is that expansion will aid the Russian nationalists,
the Browns and the Reds, although I see no evidence of that.
This argument had much more saliency 10 months ago. It has
little now, in my view, in light of the NATO--Russian accord
that has been reached. But that is a second argument I have
heard.
The third argument is that expansion will require us to
station troops in the new member countries on the border of
Russia. Not one single head of state in each of these countries
that I visited, not one single defense minister, not one single
head of the military, not one single person of any authority in
any party in any of the 3 countries, has said they want
permanent troops stationed on their soil. We have all said we
are not going to permanently station troops. We are not going
to give Russia the right to veto stationing troops, but
regardless of that nobody has said we are going to permanently
station troops in any of those countries. That is the third
argument that I hear.
The fourth argument is that these countries cannot pay. My
counter to that is that if they do not pay to go this cheaper
route, does anybody think these regions are is going to sit
around and not try to increase their military capability on
their own; not try to establish bilateral or multilateral
relationships in that gray zone? And then aren't they going to
spend more money?
The other counter argument is that this power vacuum that
exists in Europe can be filled by the stability of extending
the hand of NATO to the east and stabilizing the situation in
Russia.
So I would like you to comment on: one, whether expansion
will diminish consensus; two, will Russian nationalism be
enhanced; three, are we likely to permanently station American
troops in those three countries; and, four, is joining NATO
going to cause them to drain their treasuries where otherwise
they would not, which is the implication?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Brzezinski. If I may start, Senator, first of all,
these are very good questions. Second, you have answered most
of them very well. So I am not sure I can improve. But I will
give it a try.
Senator Biden. Well, do you agree or disagree? Maybe I
should put it that way.
Dr. Brzezinski. As for diminished consensus, I think you
are going to get new NATO members who are going to be really
gung-ho and who are very, very pro-American. I think it is
going to strengthen the tendency of NATO to be vital. New
members tend usually to be activists, and these are countries
which are very pro-American.
Will it aid Russian nationalism? This is one of these hoary
arguments that has been made for several years, that Russian
nationalists will come to power if NATO expands. Well, we have
announced that it will expand. Have they gained power?
What about the recent changes in the Russian Government?
Have they moved them more toward the nationalists or more
toward the reformers? There is simply no evidence for it.
All of the evidence we have in terms of public opinion
polls is that the vast majority of the Russian people don't
give a damn. This is an issue which preoccupies the Russian
foreign policy elite, the old Soviet foreign policy elite, that
hobnobs with some members of our foreign policy elite and tells
them well, of course, we know NATO is not a threat, but our
stupid people think it is a threat and, therefore, if you
expand NATO, they will move toward the nationalists.
Then they go back home and say to the Russian people that
NATO expansion is a threat, don't you think? And the most that
they get is a yawn. So it is a hoary argument.
The argument that this will bring American troops into
these countries on the borders of Russia is a particularly
perplexing argument because Hungary does not have a border with
Russia, the Czech Republic does not have a border with Russia,
Poland has a tiny strip of a border with the Kaliningrad
region, but basically is separated from Russia. So, first of
all, it is an argument made by people who don't know geography.
Second, the countries concerned don't want American troops on
their soil.
Senator Biden. That's what I think.
Dr. Brzezinski. All public opinion polls indicate that they
do not want foreign troops. They want to be part of the
alliance. They want to contribute to it. But I think they would
like to have a status, say, like Norway.
What about that they can't pay? Well, first of all, they
are growing. They are now beginning to spend more or less on
the NATO level. Poland I think actually is slightly above the
NATO average. They know damn well that if they are not in NATO,
they will have to spend a hell of a lot more.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
The Chairman. Dr. Kirkpatrick.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I have now heard two sets of good
answers to those questions from Senator Biden.
I think that the concern about consensus, how difficult
will it be to build a consensus on NATO is not only a valid one
but a very important one. But I think it is also true that as
for these three countries, their membership in NATO will
certainly not complicate or render more difficult the process
of achieving consensus.
I believe, as Dr. Brzezinski has just suggested, that these
countries will make splendid, enthusiastic participants in NATO
and will, indeed, strengthen American leadership in NATO,
which, in my judgment, is important and necessary.
Senator Biden. If you forgive me, Mr. Chairman, I must say
that it is a pleasure to be agreeing with both of you.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. On Russian nationalism, I also
agree with the view expressed by Dr. Brzezinski, and I think it
is your view as well, that it would not enhance Russian
nationalism.
I think, as Dr. Brzezinski has said, that there is a lot of
exaggeration of the strength of Russian nationalism by the old
Soviet foreign policy elite, which looks for new grounds to
make outrageous demands and support outrageous policies. I do
not think that NATO's enlargement will have any discernible
effect. It may have an effect on the argument, but I don't
think it will have an effect on the strength of Russian
nationalism. I don't think it is something we should lie awake
worrying about.
I think the Russian people have an agenda of their own
which involves a better living than they have had in their
lifetime and their history, and more peace and more freedom.
I don't believe it will bring U.S. troops to the borders of
Russia. That is for geographical reasons, as Dr. Brzezinski
made clear. Also it is because it just won't happen. These
countries don't desire troops just as we would rather not put
them there. We control our own troops. We don't send U.S.
troops anyplace that the U.S. Government does not decide to
deploy U.S. troops.
It is simply not true that these countries could not pay
their way in NATO. They could, or if they can't right now, all
of them soon will be able to, and I think they will be eager,
in fact, to assume the burdens of full membership in NATO. The
added security of NATO can only enhance their economic
prospects.
I fully expect that they will be very reliable participants
and contributors and will enhance the strength of NATO.
The Chairman. Representatives of all three countries with
whom we met recently indicated precisely what you said.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. OK. Good.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Brzezinski, two sentences that you wrote in your
testimony I thought were really terrific. You talked about the
relationship to Russia and whether NATO's enlargement helps
democratize Russia by foreclosing the revival of any self-
destructive, imperial temptation. That is a different argument
or way of phrasing than I have heard and I think it is very,
very helpful.
But I wanted to ask about the preceding sentence as regards
America. You say that NATO's enlargement is about America's
role in Europe, whether America will remain a European power--
that is, America as a European power--and whether a larger,
democratic Europe will remain organically linked to America.
Now this makes sense, I think, to members of this
committee, to you, to Dr. Kirkpatrick and to others. But it is
a basic argument with regard to NATO altogether that we are
having or that many of us have never had before. In other
words, as I talk to constituents, they would say why are we a
European power, why do we want to be a European power and
organically linked. They say that really stretches the bridge
too far altogether.
What is your rationale, just as a help to all of us,
understanding why NATO is important, as to why America should
want to be a European power? What advantages are there to us in
this and if so, of course, this is the basic reason for being
in NATO. Try to express that, if you can.
Dr. Brzezinski. Senator, you have raised a very fundamental
issue. It has been addressed in part by Dr. Kirkpatrick and I
will follow her lead in that regard.
Europe is the place in which some of the worst human
suffering and some of the worst tragedies of this century were
precipitated. We were dragged into two world wars by the
dynamics of European politics.
Some of the worst suffering experienced by people in the
course of this century was a consequence of these wars.
We have created a system over the last 50 years which has
dramatically decreased the probability of war, which has
deterred aggression, which has created security in a very
important part of this very large Eurasian continent. I believe
that our future role in the world and the peace of the world
depends centrally on the maintenance of that relationship.
If we were somehow to begin to withdraw from Europe, if the
relationship with Europe started being loose, vague,
antagonistic, I think the world would be sliding, maybe if not
toward new wars since there are no immediate protagonists
threatening us, but certainly toward anarchy.
So I do think that the maintenance and enhancement of our
relationship with Europe and of our presence in Europe is
central to nothing less than global stability. The American
people, for all of their hesitations about use of force and
their uneasiness about casualties still instinctively
understand that.
I was struck by the fact that just today, as you have
launched this very important national debate on the enlargement
of NATO, a public opinion poll has been released regarding the
question of the enlargement of NATO. An overwhelming majority
of the American people favor the enlargement of NATO.
Well, that certainly does not signal to me a desire to
withdraw from Europe if at the same time the American people,
with only 18--18--percent opposing, say that we should enlarge
NATO. It seems to me that, instinctively, our people understand
that our fates have become inter linked, our values are the
same, and we share a common interest in making these values
more pervasive, in expanding the area that is safe and
democratic at the same time, that is strong and can, over time,
attract others, or, if necessary, contain and deter others if
they are threatening.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
I believe Senator Robb is next. Senator Robb.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and I thank our two
distinguished witnesses. I regret that I had another commitment
and could not hear Dr. Brzezinski's remarks today. I did have
the privilege last evening of hearing one of the most
extraordinary and provocative addresses I have heard in
Washington in years and I suspect that it is taken directly
from his most recent book which I would, on the basis of last
night's remarks alone, commend to others who want to be pushed
in terms of some of their thinking.
Dr. Brzezinski. I hope this is being televised nationwide,
Senator.
Senator Robb. I am afraid that it is not, so this will have
limited value in terms of a promotion for the book, but
certainly for the speech. I won't go on beyond that. I think
there are matters in there that I hope you will bring and
repeat before this committee when different subject matter is
the focus of our attention.
But I would like to ask just one question of both of our
distinguished witnesses, if I may. I am not very good at
leading a friendly witness, which would give you some
indication of where I am coming from in this particular debate.
The question of cost is one which is raised frequently and the
question of cost avoidance is not always factored in. I am not
sure that it is possible to give precise numbers, even with a
great deal of study.
I believe last night and I know previously others have
alluded to the cost avoidance of Nunn-Lugar funds, for
instance, in terms of what we don't have to spend on our own
defense if we reduce the capability and, presumably, the
potential of a possible enemy at home.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick made reference to the amount of
money that we are spending in Bosnia as compared to the amount
of money that we would spend out of the U.S. Treasury for this
particular NATO enlargement as things now stand.
I wonder, if you can, put some sense of a comparative cost
avoidance to the U.S. Government in terms of the kinds of costs
that we might otherwise have to spend if we decided not to
pursue this scenario, if we decided, for whatever reason, not
to approve of the enlargement of NATO.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Senator Robb, I have thought about
this quite a bit. We have CBO estimates, which I think, by the
way, are extremely exaggerated, about the costs of NATO
enlargement to us and to other NATO powers. I think the costs
can be kept substantially below those CBO estimates. But I
don't think we know what they would be compared to.
It occurred to me that one thing they could be compared to
is the cost of our military expenditures in non-NATO areas of
Europe today, and the most outstanding example is the former
Yugoslavia, and Bosnia quite specifically. I had a research
assistant who was formerly a member of the U.S. Government,
working in budget matters, do some very careful research for me
on the costs of some of the so-called U.N. peace operations. He
calculated the cost to us--our agreed-to share--as it were--of
those peace operations in former Yugoslavia.
I might say that these estimates do not include the very
large U.S. contributions that were made to what I call off
budget items, that is, funds or resources spent but never
submitted to the Congress for authorization or appropriation.
They were simply provided through the Pentagon.
The figures that I am about to propose were of expenses
that were authorized and appropriated in the formal process,
acknowledged by the administration and all parties. Those
figures put our expenditures in Bosnia at something around $4.5
billion between the end of 1992 and 1996. They put at about $2
billion our expenditures for Bosnian activities in 1996 and
1995. There is no year that we have participated that the
expenses have not been at or over $1 billion, which is several
times greater than anyone estimates the costs of enlarging
NATO.
Now why is that a relevant comparison? It is because if
NATO enlargement will have the effects that several of us have
suggested, it will enhance the stability and peace in the
region by both consolidating and strengthening democracies in
the region, but also consolidating stability in the region and
expanding the area that no aggressive government would feel
inclined to attack.
I cannot be certain that there would not be continued
efforts by Milosevic, let's say, to take such actions as he has
in the past. But I believe that an expanded, active, ready
NATO, who understands that neither the U.N. nor an exclusively
European security force provides an alternative, will be a big
deterrent to aggressive power and aggressive action.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I, too, would like to add my thanks to both of you for
contributing your distinguished voices to this debate.
Dr. Brzezinski, I was struck by the first paragraph in your
statement where you reference the global significance of
enlargement of NATO. I have thought for some time that this
might, in fact, be the most significant consequence of the NATO
expansion issue. All the other issues we have discussed today
that you both have thought through and written and talked about
are all critical, such as Russia. But when you really start to
think about the connection of security and stability as you
move South and East to Central Asia, to the Middle East, and,
as you say in your paragraph a step-by-step construction of
security internationally, I think that has a powerful amount of
insight into something that we need to really sort through as
we debate this issue.
I would very much like to hear in a little more detail from
you, Dr. Brzezinski and Ambassador Kirkpatrick, your thoughts
on this one issue.
Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you.
If I may, let me just add one footnote to the preceding
very able answer by reading from a document prepared by former
Secretary of Defense Perry and Ashton Carter, former Assistant
Secretary of Defense. They say the following: ``Despite the
debate over the estimated costs of enlargement, the fact
remains all estimates of the costs to existing members of
adding the three new candidate members identified at Madrid
show them to be a small fraction of existing NATO expenditures,
the current U.S. burden of supporting its NATO commitments, and
the U.S. defense budget.'' Then they go on to estimate that it
will be, in any case, less than 1 percent.
So I think this cost issue, while important, should not be
blown out of proportion.
Now on your very large issue, I think we are entering a
phase in world affairs in which the long-range choice for us is
either a slow slide toward some form of international anarchy
with no new single power emerging as a threat to us the way
Nazi Germany was or Soviet Russia was, but a slow slide into
international anarchy, or a gradual expansion of genuine
international security cooperation by a process of building
blocks and ink blotting effect, expanding particularly the zone
of security and democracy.
Here I think the American--European connection is
absolutely central. But over time I would hope--and I hope it
does not sound too illusory--over time, over the next 20 or 30
years, I would think we would point toward the creation of what
might be called eventually a Trans-Eurasian or a
Transcontinental security system in which NATO, in effect, the
Euro-Atlantic alliance, involving America and Europe, would
become linked to some sort of cooperative security arrangement
with Russia, eventually pointing toward China, and America and
Japan allied together also in a security relationship with
China. In effect, this would be a kind of transcontinental
OSCE.
But we can only get there if we create solid, vital blocks
of cooperative States committed to the same values and sharing
the same interests. This is why the argument for constricting
NATO to a rump Europe--one look at the map today shows that
NATO really is linked to a rump Europe--is historically
irrelevant. It is an anachronistic way of looking at the world.
We are building here a long-term structure, a long-term
process of creating the architecture of peace across all of
Eurasia. The way to start is where we can start, with the
democratic, solidly philosophically committed to the same
values we are countries, countries that want to be our allies
and who are committed to the notion of cooperative security.
So we are engaged here in a long-term process, the first
step of which is being taken now. But I think it is going to be
a long-term process well into the next century. That is why
your task is so historic.
Senator Hagel. Well, thank you. I think it is significant
and I think there is no reason why we cannot connect it all the
way around the world. I think we must.
Dr. Kirkpatrick, I would be interested if you had any
thoughts here.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. No. In my testimony, I emphasize
the fact that the countries which are being considered for
inclusion in NATO are countries that share our culture, our
values, and our aspirations and goals. I think that is very
important and I think it is possible, basically, to build
really strong alliances where there are such shared goals and
values, and broad agreement on institutional arrangements.
I believe that an enlarged NATO will insure an enlarged
zone of security as well as democracy in Europe and that it
will serve as an even more powerful magnet for Russia and other
countries in the region who are themselves tending in that
direction in any case.
I think this process of building strength, consolidating
freedom and prosperity, which then serves as a magnet is a
process by which we can hope for an indefinite expansion of
this zone of peace and security.
I think I want to read Dr. Brzezinski's new book before I
comment on the extension to Asia. I do believe that Asia, some
countries in Asia, are likely to pose some difficult problems
to the security of that region. I believe that an active
American role in Asia is also important to the peace and
freedom in that region. That is a point, by the way, that was
made by the Australian minister of defense at a luncheon here
in Washington just a few days earlier this week. I think that
is valid as well.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Wellstone.
Senator Wellstone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I know we are going to have testimony from Mr. Dean and Dr.
Mandelbaum, but the more I try to learn about this, I think the
more skeptical I become. I want you all to help me work through
these arguments.
I am not exactly sure why we are talking about expanding
NATO. I am not sure what the compelling need is. It certainly
does not seem to me to be a military threat from Russia, a
country that cannot even invade itself. It certainly does not
seem to me to promote economies in democracies because I don't
see how you do that in a military alliance and, in any case,
the more I hear the discussion, the more I am attracted to what
Senator Nunn used to talk about, which is we ought to be
talking about expanding the European Union. That seems to me to
be the way in which we focus on promoting market economies and
democracy and it is win/win from the point of view of what the
potential consequences are in Russia.
Moreover, I know that both you, Dr. Brzezinski, and you,
Dr. Kirkpatrick, are very committed and sincere in your
viewpoints and are professional and knowledgeable. You put a
tremendous emphasis on promoting peace and democracy in the
world and I agree with you. The question is whether this will
do that.
I mean, there are people like George Kennan, who is not an
isolationist, and Paul Nitze, who is not an isolationist, much
less our panelists to come, who are not isolationists, who
raise very real questions as to what exactly are we gaining
from this, what is even the reason to do this, vis-a-vis what
are the potential consequences or implications of this.
Now I just want to go a little bit further and get your
reaction.
I think that from everything I have read--and there is a
little bit of disagreement, I guess, with Ambassador
Kirkpatrick--the democrats in Russia are the most vociferous in
their opposition. The democrats--not with a large ``D'' but
with a small ``d''--are the most worried about this, though, I
must say, it seems to be the case that people of all political
stripes are very worried about it as well.
So the question becomes what is the reason to do this. The
final part of my question, which I raised the other day and I
want to go back to, is if the focus is on building economies
and building democracy, the countries we are talking about are
the most stable. We are talking about Czechoslovakia, Poland
and Hungary.
I would think we would be talking about Belarus, we'd be
talking about Ukraine, we'd be talking about the Baltic States.
Are we talking about them and if we are, are you going to tell
me that this does not have any consequences for what happens in
Russia?
Finally, shouldn't we be talking about Russia?
Secretary of State Albright spelled out the criteria for
choosing new NATO members: ``If we were creating a new alliance
today, we would not leave a democratic country out in the cold
because it was once, against the will of its people, part of
the Warsaw Pact. The only question we would consider is this:
which democratic nations in Europe are important to our
security and which are willing and able to contribute to our
security?'' That was before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, April 23, 1997.
Well, by these standards, it is Russia whose citizens
certainly were not consulted about joining the Warsaw Pact and,
by the way, whose officials have expressed the wish to belong
to the Atlantic Alliance. The Secretary said that this was not
the case, but that is not my understanding at all.
Senator Biden. She said not NATO.
Senator Wellstone. Pardon?
Senator Biden. Excuse me, Senator. I think she said not
NATO.
Senator Wellstone. Let me just finish. So wouldn't we be
talking about Russia? Wouldn't we be talking about Belarus?
Which countries should we be talking about?
This is a range of questions. Why are we doing this? What
is the military threat? How does a military alliance expand
economy and democracy? What are the consequences within Russia?
Isn't it true that the democratic forces in Russia are the most
opposed? Finally, would Russia be eligible, from your point of
view, to join an expanded NATO?
Dr. Brzezinski. Well, I can take part of your question and
then perhaps Ambassador Kirkpatrick can take part of it.
First of all, that the democrats are most vociferous in
opposition to expansion of NATO, that, of course, depends on
one's definition of ``democrat.'' I know that Zhirinovsky is
vociferous in opposition to NATO. But he is surely not a
democrat.
Senator Wellstone. I'm certainly not talking about him.
Dr. Brzezinski. Zyuganov is vociferous in his opposition to
expansion of NATO. He is not a democrat. Gaidar is not
vociferous in opposing the expansion of NATO. In fact, on
occasion he has indicated that they should not be so worried
about it and not make such an issue out of it.
Yavlinsky is not opposed to the expansion of NATO. Kozyrev
has written eloquently favoring the expansion of NATO. So I
think the picture is more mixed.
But there are some Russians who say they are democrats and
who are opposed to the expansion of NATO. Then I think they
have to explain what is it that they are really opposed to. Is
it because they think NATO is an enemy? Is it because they
think America is an enemy? Or is it just possible that they
really would like to have a sphere of influence in Central
Europe, which is exactly what the Central Europeans do not
want?
Insofar as the argument that we should be more worried
about Belarus or Russia than about the new democratic States of
Central Europe, I think there is something to the argument in
the sense that we should be worried about where they are
headed. But it certainly is not an argument for having them in
NATO.
I think NATO is an alliance of like-minded States that are
securely committed to the practice of democracy and share
common philosophical views regarding the nature of the
individual and his relationship to society and the State. That
is what is so discerning about the NATO alliance.
I do not think Belarus by that standard qualifies for
membership, though we should be worried about what is happening
in it. But worrying about what is happening in it I think gives
more salience to the idea of the adjoining States being
securely part of Europe.
What about that we should be expanding EU? Well, the United
States cannot expand EU. We are not a member of the EU. I would
like to see EU expand, but it is an infinitely more complicated
process than expanding NATO. You have to adopt something like
3,000 to 5,000 laws of the Common Market standard and implement
them domestically in order to qualify. It is a longer-range
process. But we encourage it. By the year 2002 or 2003,
probably the three candidate members that you are now
considering will be members of the EU as well.
Insofar as Russian membership in NATO is concerned, first
of all, it is a fact--and I think Senator Biden is correct--
that no Russian leader has stated clearly and explicitly that
they would like Russia to join NATO. Joining NATO does have
implications for them. It means that their armies should be
subordinated to an integrated command, currently headed by an
American and so forth. I see no evidence of Russia wanting to
be part of NATO.
Beyond that, there are certain objective criteria that
countries ought to meet to be members of NATO, and on this
there is consensus between us and the Europeans. They have to
be stably democratic. Russia is not yet so. They have to have
effective, working, market economies. Russia does not have
that, not fully, not yet. They have to have effective civilian
control over the military. Russia does not. They have to have
real respect for minority rights domestically. Ask the Chechens
about respect for domestic rights of minorities. They have to
have no border conflicts with their neighbors. That is hardly
true of most of Russia's southern and eastern frontier.
So simply on the basis of objective criteria, the issue is
not Russian membership in NATO. But there is a legitimate issue
about structuring a relationship of stability with Russia and
of reassuring Russia that NATO is not a threat, by: one,
promising them not to station American or German forces on the
soil of new members--we are doing that; no nuclear weapons on
the soil of the new members--we are doing that by creating
transparency in NATO, by having the Russians present there; we
are doing that by having systematic consultations with Russia
on NATO; we are doing that by having Russia participate in the
Partnership for Peace. We are doing that.
So I think we ought to strike a balance. I have advocated
for the last 3 years not only NATO expansion but a 2 track
approach: expand NATO and sign some accommodation, some
agreement, with Russia which reassures the Russians regarding
their legitimate concerns. But we should not cater either to
anachronistic prejudices or to hidden geopolitical designs.
Senator Wellstone. Just a clarification, by the way. My
argument was not necessarily that if there was going to be
expansion that Poland is not important, or Czechoslovakia. I am
just saying that if the concern is about stability and
democracy, it would seem to me there would be other countries
as well. I would still raise the question--though I have run
out of time and will come back to it--as to what exactly is the
reason for this. Is it a military threat? I don't see it. How
does a military alliance help these countries economically? I
don't see that, either.
Isn't it true--I quite agree with you that some people call
themselves ``democrats'' in Russia, but they are not. But my
impression from talking to a lot of people is there is a great
concern in that country among democrats as to where this is
going to take Russia.
The Chairman. I hate to do this, but the Senator's time has
expired a long time ago.
Would you like, Dr. Kirkpatrick, to comment?
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Just very briefly, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to say concerning the fact that Russians were
not consulted about their membership in the Warsaw Pact in the
previous regime and therefore should not be held responsible
for that membership, Russians were not consulted about anything
in the previous regime. This is one of the reasons that that
regime proved so brittle, I think, in the opinion of all of us.
Neither was any other member of the Warsaw Pact consulted about
its membership in the Warsaw Pact. They were not consulted
about anything.
I believe, too, that there are a lot of different reports
about how many of Russia's democrats oppose NATO enlargement
and how strongly. We know some who don't oppose it. I think it
is particularly significant, personally, that a very critical
Russian democrat, Boris Yeltsin, has repeatedly indicated that
he saw no problem, basically, about the expansion of NATO into
the area now in question.
He has from time to time backed off this clearly under
domestic political pressures as all prudent presidents do from
time to time. But we all know that there are Russian democrats
who oppose and Russian democrats who support. I think it is an
oversimplification to suggest that Russian democrats generally
oppose the enlargement of NATO. Even if they did, I would
simply say they have not thought that through because Russian
democrats have an especially large interest in the
consolidation of democratic governments and the strengthening
of stability and peace in Central Europe, which is closest to
them.
What are we trying to do and why are we trying to do this?
I ask myself this. Just as a personal note, I became an
advocate of the enlargement of NATO in 1992, and began at that
time to both write and speak about it. I concluded at a certain
point that maybe the time that we ought to enlarge NATO and
really work on it had passed and that maybe it was not as
desirable as it was in 1992, or 1993, or 1994, since the world
seems to be a good deal more peaceable and stable than we might
have dreamed--at least the European, the Western world is.
Why, then, should we do it? I think, Senator Wellstone,
that, first of all, NATO is a very great asset not for
Americans exclusively, or perhaps even principally, but it is a
great asset for democratic civilization and for Europeans who
have had a lot more trouble in keeping peace than, for example,
we in the Americas have had. NATO is a great asset, in my
judgment, to that end.
I have believed from the very beginning, and the more I
read and think about it, the more it seems to me that, from the
very beginning, NATO was a multi functional institution, which
we political scientists know most institutions are. From the
beginning it was engaged in the strengthening and consolidation
of democratic governments and again and again it incorporated
new democracies and provided and instilled in them the
reinforcement, training, and experience of the other democratic
countries. I think that has been particularly important with
the military establishments in a number of relatively new
democracies--Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Greece, and other such
countries, not to mention the initial reorienting of the German
military.
I believe it will be important to the new democracies in
Central Europe and I believe always in conserving one's assets.
Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank you very much.
Dr. Brzezinski, I promised to try to get you out of here by
3:15. I missed it by 12 minutes for which I apologize, but not
very strongly because we are glad to have you and appreciate
your coming.
The same goes for you, Ambassador Kirkpatrick.
Senator Biden. Thank you both.
Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. We will pause now momentarily while we set up
the second panel.
[Pause]
The Chairman. We are genuinely grateful to have two
additional experts here. They are Hon. Jonathan Dean, Senior
Arms Control Advisor for the Union of Concerned Scientists here
in Washington, headquartered here; and Dr. Michael Mandelbaum,
Professor and Director of American Foreign Policy of the Paul
H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns
Hopkins University. I recognize that I may have mispronounced
your name, sir.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Dean, you may proceed.
By the way, your entire statements will be printed in the
record. You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. JONATHAN DEAN, SENIOR ARMS CONTROL ADVISOR,
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Dean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want the thank
the committee for this opportunity to express my views on NATO
enlargement.
Mr. Chairman, I have been closely involved with NATO since
the early 1950's, when I helped with German entry into NATO. It
is painful for me personally to speak in opposition to
enlargement, but necessary. NATO in its present form and
present membership continues useful and important. But
enlargement of NATO will be costly, risky, and above all,
unnecessary.
The estimates of enlargement costs, and reference has been
made to that, are still very loose and imprecise. But, even if
we take the low, $30 billion, total for the first group of
candidates as estimated by the State Department in its February
report to the Congress, the United States is likely to have to
pay the largest part of that total if it is serious about these
force improvements.
Neither the European allies nor the candidate States can be
expected to pay the amounts allocated to them in these
estimates. Moreover, these estimates cover only the first three
candidates for membership--the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland. I believe that if the enlargement process continues,
the total cost at the end will be from 3 to 5 times this low
State Department figure of $30 billion for the first group,
with the United States paying at least half of this overall
total of $90 billion to $150 billion.
Nearly all of this expenditure would be, in my view,
wasteful because the need for the expenditure is created by the
enlargement program and not by objective factors.
My estimate here rests on the fact that including the
Madrid 3, there are now 12 candidates for NATO membership. This
total of 12 candidates can easily increase to 15 if Austria,
Sweden, and Finland decide to apply. In fact, I see a 16th
country, Ukraine, on the horizon.
Continuous enlargement of this scope and possibly doubling
NATO's current membership insistently recalls the scenes in
Disney's ``Fantasia'' about the Sorcerer's Apprentice who cast
a spell to create a spring of water but ended with a flood
because he did not know how to say ``stop.''
NATO has already decided at its Madrid summit to entertain
the candidacies of five more countries--Romania, Slovenia, and
the three Baltic States. We very much hope that better wisdom
will prevail, but if in fact the first group of three is
actually admitted as NATO members, then there should be no
doubt anywhere that negotiations on Baltic State membership
will be seriously pursued.
If nothing else, partisan political competition in the
United States will push these negotiations fatefully forward.
No one will wish to be accused of faint-heartedness in the face
of certain Russian opposition.
If the Baltic States do become members of NATO, then the
costs to present NATO members of making a realistic effort to
defend these countries, which border Russia at the Eastern end
of the Baltic Sea, will include very large increases in NATO's
force projection capabilities, including naval forces and
combat aircraft, and, quite probably, explicit reliance on
nuclear weapons, matching a parallel and ominous development in
Russian nuclear weapons policy.
There is no room, of course, in the small Baltic countries
to station outside NATO forces. But defending Romania and
Bulgaria, if they become members, would, in practical terms,
probably require stationing large NATO forces there. Possibly
part of them may have to be United States troops.
As regards risks, enlargement on this scale would
dangerously expand the scope of current United States security
commitments. It would extend United States security guarantees
to States with traditional mutual hostility, like Hungary and
Romania, Greece and Bulgaria, not to mention Macedonia and
Albania.
Then there is Russia, which still has 20,000 nuclear
warheads. The Russian public, as has been mentioned here, pays
relatively little attention to foreign affairs. It has other
worries. But the political class in its entirety, with very few
exceptions, from President Yeltsin to Zhuganov, opposes NATO
enlargement and strongly. This is the group which will form the
views of the Russian public about the outside world for the
next generation, with the message that Russia is hostilely
encircled and has been cheated by the same countries on the
cold war outcome.
The NATO-Russia Joint Council is a useful device, but it
cannot contain the negative Russian reaction to actual NATO
enlargement, especially if that enlargement includes the Baltic
States bordering directly on Russia.
We have, of course, already seen adverse reaction to NATO
enlargement in the Russian Duma's refusal thus far to ratify
START II and its general blockage of arms control agreements.
Mr. Chairman, the main thing that every one of these costs
and these risks have in common is that they are completely
unnecessary. They are unnecessary because what Eastern European
countries most want and most need is a form of membership in
the Western community that provides support for their growing
economic, social, and political structures.
The European Union, as has been mentioned, is preeminently
qualified to provide this support. Negotiations to enlarge the
Union will begin next year. Among the first group of candidates
very likely to be admitted are the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland, the same three countries who are today the leading
candidates for NATO enlargement.
Because of its nature and its mission, the European Union
can do this job better than NATO. It is significant that public
opinion in all three candidate countries sees this and shows
stronger support for European Union membership than for NATO
membership.
Moreover, Mr. Chairman, the European Union should do it. It
is their primary responsibility, not ours, to nurture
democratic and free market institutions among their European
neighbors. They can do this without incurring the risks of NATO
enlargement. European Union enlargement causes no problems with
Russia.
It is true that these negotiations for entry to the
European Union may take considerable time, perhaps, as Dr.
Brzezinski has mentioned, until 2003 or 2004, or even longer.
But Eastern Europe has plenty of time for this. It is making
continuous political and economic progress. There is no crisis
in Eastern Europe and no military threat to the area to require
rapid action.
However, a special, fast track European Union enlargement
program for the Baltic States is needed as a substitute for
their NATO candidacy.
NATO enlargement is also unnecessary because an improved
Partnership for Peace program provides close bilateral security
relationships between the candidate countries and NATO.
Finally, NATO enlargement is unnecessary because NATO, in
its present form and membership, effectively provides stability
in Europe, tying the United States to Europe, reassuring
European countries that a united Germany will not become
dominant, and providing very adequate residual insurance
against Russian misbehavior. NATO today performs all three of
these functions without increasing the possibility of Russian
misbehavior as the enlargement project does. It performs these
functions at no extra cost to the United States.
Mr. Chairman, I believe these circumstances justify a
request from the Senate to the administration to suspend action
on its present enlargement program until it has rethought this
issue and has presented to the Congress and to the American
public a detailed plan for organizing European security which
is genuinely comprehensive and which has a specific place in it
for all of the potential NATO candidates and also for Russia.
Such a plan would place European security on a far more stable
footing without the heavy costs and risks of the present NATO
enlargement program.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Dean follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Dean
I am Jonathan Dean, adviser on international security issues of the
Union of Concerned Scientists. I am also speaking on this occasion as a
board member of the Council for a Livable World.
I have been involved with NATO since the early 1950s, when I helped
with German entry into the alliance.
NATO in its present form and present membership continues useful
and important. But enlargement of NATO will be costly, risky and, above
all, unnecessary.
Costs
The costs to the United States of NATO enlargement have been
estimated at from two to twenty billion dollars for the first group of
candidates over a ten to fifteen year period. These estimates are still
very loose and imprecise. But even if we start with the very low $30
billion total for the first group of candidates estimated by the State
Department in its report of February 1997 to the Congress, the United
States is likely to have to pay the largest part of that amount if it
is serious about these force improvements.
A great deal of evidence, including well attested statements by
French President Chirac and German Chancellor Kohl as well as the views
of UK, French, German and Netherlands defense ministers reported in the
Washington Post of October 3, points to the conclusion that current
NATO members will not pay the shares allocated to them in these
estimates--and that the United States will consequently have to take on
a much larger proportion of the enlargement costs.
For their part, the Eastern European candidate countries are faced
by a costly and unneeded remilitarization precisely at a time when they
have to focus their resources on economic and social reconstruction.
They will not be able to afford these force increases, whose cost has
been estimated by the Congressional Budget Office at six times their
current defense budgets. Again, if the U.S. is serious about these
improvements, it will have to pay for most of them itself.
Moreover, these estimates cover only the first three candidates for
membership--the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The total cost of
NATO enlargement will probably be three to five times this low State
Department estimate of $30 billion, with the United States paying at
least half of that total.
This is because, including these three countries, there are now
twelve candidates for NATO membership. The others are Latvia,
Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and
Macedonia. This total of twelve candidates can easily increase to
fifteen if Austria, Sweden and Finland decide to apply for NATO
membership. In fact, I see a sixteenth country--Ukraine--on the
horizon. Internal discussion in Ukraine about applying for NATO
membership has gone back and forth. If the candidacy of the Baltic
States appears to be malting progress, then Ukraine will either apply
for full membership or fall into very serious internal dissension.
Enlargement of this scope, doubling NATO's current membership,
recalls the scenes in Disney's ``Fantasia'' about the sorcerer's
apprentice who cast a spell to create a spring of water but ended with
a flood because he did not know how to say stop.
The Risks
NATO has already decided at the Madrid Summit to entertain the
candidacies of five more countries--Romania, Slovenia, and the three
Baltic States. We very much hope that better sense prevails, but, if in
fact the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are formally admitted as
NATO members, there should be no doubt that these negotiations on
Baltic State membership will be seriously pursued. If nothing else,
partisan political competition in the United States will propel them.
No one will wish to be accused of faint heartedness.
If the Baltic States do become members of NATO, then the costs to
present NATO members of making a realistic effort to defend these
states bordering Russia at the eastern end of the Baltic Sea will
include very large increases in NATO's force projection capabilities,
including naval forces and combat aircraft, and quite probably explicit
reliance on nuclear weapons, matching a parallel ominous development in
Russia. There is no room in the small Baltic countries to station NATO
forces, but defending Romania and Bulgaria would in practical terms
probably require stationing large NATO forces there. If this happens,
part of them will have to be U.S. troops.
With these points, we also come to the risks of NATO enlargement.
Holding to the present twelve candidate states, enlargement would
dangerously expand the scope of current U.S. security commitments. It
would extend United States security guarantees to states with
traditional mutual hostility like Hungary and Romania, and Greece and
Bulgaria, not to mention Macedonia and Albania. More work has to be
done to resolve the quarrels of these countries, but it is very
doubtful that internalizing them in NATO is the most productive or the
safest way to go about it.
Then there is Russia. The Russian public is confronted by difficult
problems of daily life. Consequently, it pays relatively little
attention to foreign affairs. But the Russian political class in its
entirety opposes NATO enlargement. And this is the group that will form
the views of the Russian public on its outside environment for the
entire next generation. Russian policymakers are also worrying about
the activities of the Clinton administration and U.S. oil companies in
the Central Asian republics. Together with NATO enlargement, their
concerns reinforce the image of hostile encirclement that has already
played such a negative role in Russian history.
We have already seen negative reaction to NATO enlargement in the
Russian Duma's refusal thus far to ratify START II and its general
blockage of arms control agreements.
The NATO-Russia Joint Council is a useful device, but it will not
contain the negative Russian reaction to actual NATO enlargement,
especially if that enlargement includes the Baltic States bordering
directly on Russia.
Do we really want to deliberately add a decade of trying to cope
with this issue to the tasks of Russian governments already tottering
under the burden of economic and social reforms--in a country that
still has 20,000 nuclear weapons? It defies common sense to believe
that applying more and more pressures like this to a weak political
structure can have positive results.
Costs and Risks Not Necessary
The main point that every one of these costs and risks have in
common is that they are completely unnecessary.
They are unnecessary because what Eastern European countries most
want and most need is a form of membership in the Western community
that provides support for growing economic, social, and political
structures. The European Union is preeminently qualified to provide
this support. Negotiations to enlarge the European Union will begin
next year. The first candidates--very likely to be admitted--will be
none other than the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the same three
countries who are today the leading candidates for NATO enlargement.
Because of its nature and mission, the European Union can do this
job better than NATO. It is significant that public opinion in all
three candidate countries sees this and shows stronger support for
European Union membership than for NATO membership (see NATO Review,
#3, May-June 1997, p. 17). Moreover, it is appropriate that the
European Union and not the United States take on these economic and
political responsibilities for the Union's European neighbors. The
European Union can do so without the risks that arise from foisting off
this task on a less suitable NATO. It is true that these negotiations
for entry to the European Union may take considerable time, perhaps
until 2003 or 2004 or even longer. But Eastern Europe has the time for
this--it is making continuous political and economic progress, and
there is no crisis in Eastern Europe and no military threat to the area
to require rapid action. A special European Union enlargement program
for the Baltic States is urgently needed.
NATO enlargement is also unnecessary because an improved
Partnership for Peace backed by a coordinating Euro-Adantic Council
provides close bilateral security relationships between the candidate
countries and NATO.
And NATO enlargement is unnecessary because NATO in its present
form and membership provides stability in Europe--tying the United
States to Europe, reassuring European countries that a united Germany
will not become dominant, and providing very adequate residual
insurance against Russian misbehavior. NATO today performs all three of
these functions without increasing the possibility of Russian
misbehavior, as the enlargement project does, and it performs these
functions at no extra cost to the United States.
In sum, there is no perceptible logic or gain to the NATO
enlargement project, while the project entails many serious but also
superfluous costs and risks to this country. I believe these
circumstances justify a request from the Senate to the Administration
to suspend action on its present enlargement program until it has
rethought the issue and has presented to the Congress and the American
public a plan for organizing European security which is genuinely
comprehensive and which has a place in it for all of the potential NATO
candidates and ultimately also for Russia.
Such a plan would place European security on a far more stable
footing without the costs and the risks of the present NATO enlargement
program.
STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, THE PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Mandelbaum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you
and my friend, Senator Biden, for giving me the opportunity to
share my views with this committee.
I have submitted for the record and a copy has been made
available to all members of this committee a pamphlet I have
written, entitled ``NATO Expansion: A Bridge to the 19th
Century,'' which sets out in detail my reasons for opposition.
In that pamphlet, I make at some length two points that I wish
simply to state here without elaboration because time is short.
[See appendix for the material received for the record.]
Dr. Mandelbaum. First, I believe that we get no benefits
whatsoever from NATO expansion. All public policy must weigh
advantages and disadvantages. Whatever the costs of NATO
expansion--and I will be talking about that--I believe that the
advantages we incur are zero.
Second, I believe that the only coherent reason for
expanding NATO is to contain Russia. This is a military
alliance. Russia might some day become a threat to its
neighbors, but it is not a threat now and, therefore, NATO
expansion, as planned by the administration, is at best
premature and at worst counterproductive.
Rather, Mr. Chairman, than dwelling on those points, I wish
to address five others that I think are important for the
committee and the Senate to consider: first, the costs of
expansion; second, the status of the former communist countries
that are not being included; third, an argument we are likely
to hear with ever greater frequency, that we must proceed with
this plan because our credibility is at stake; fourth, some
alternatives to our current course; and, fifth, some comments
on how this policy is being managed.
Let me also state for the record, Mr. Chairman, that I do
not agree with much of what was said about Russia and Russia's
attitude toward this policy by the previous panel. I would
hope, Mr. Chairman, that you and your distinguished colleague,
Mr. Biden, would convene one or more sessions of this committee
to hear the testimony on this subject of our best experts on
Russia, those with a lifetime of study, reflection, and dealing
with that important country.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I should
point out to the witness that we have ordered just such a
hearing and the very people you are talking about will all have
a chance to testify.
Dr. Mandelbaum. Thank you very much, Senator Biden. As
often, you are ahead of me.
As for the costs, I believe that the administration has
dramatically underestimated both the total and the American
share of these costs. The administration's estimate of the
total is $35 billion, but the Congressional Budget Office
estimate is 4 to 5 times that. Moreover, as my colleague,
Ambassador Dean, has pointed out, the administration's
estimates presume 3 or 4 new entries, but I believe we are now
committed in some form to at least 8, with more to come.
Moreover, the administration assumes that no American troops
will be stationed in any of these countries.
But I do not believe, Mr. Chairman, that it will be
possible to guarantee the security of the Baltic States without
the deployment of Western troops. That, at least, is a question
that I hope the Senate will ask the Department of Defense.
As to the share, the administration forecasts the United
States paying 15 percent of the fixed costs and 6 percent of
the total costs. I do not believe that is remotely likely, Mr.
Chairman.
The administration foresees the Central Europeans, the new
members, paying 35 percent of the total costs. I believe they
will not be able to pay. They have steadily reduced their
defense spending since their liberation. They have been warned
by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund not to
increase defense spending. In no poll of public opinion in any
of the three prospective members have I ever seen more than 20
to 25 percent of respondents say that they are willing to spend
more on defense.
As for the Western Europeans paying 50 percent of the total
cost, as the administration predicts, this reminds me of a
story about the great Duke of Wellington, the victor at
Waterloo, who was once approached on the battlefield by a
junior soldier who did not recognize him and who approached him
by saying, ``Mr. Smith, I believe.'' The great duke turned to
him and said, ``If you believe that, you'll believe anything.''
How do we know that the Western Europeans won't pay 50
percent of the total cost--because they have said so. At the
Madrid Summit, Chancellor Kohl, President Chirac and Prime
Minister Blair all said on the record in one form or another
that their countries would pay nothing. Nor, Mr. Chairman, do I
believe that this is political posturing. It is politically
impossible for these countries to spend more money for NATO
expansion.
Germany and France are under enormous pressure to reduce
government spending in connection with the project of a single
European currency which, despite all of the claims that have
been made for NATO expansion, is far more important to them
than anything having to do with NATO.
Britain is under similar pressure.
All the Europeans regard NATO expansion as an American
initiative for which America will pay. So if we are going to do
this, Mr. Chairman--and I believe we should not, but if we
are--let us go in with our eyes open. No one else will share
the burden which occasions a number of reflections.
First, it may be that we won't have to spend very much
money. But if there is no need for more spending, that means
there is no threat to these countries, in which case there is
no need to expand NATO.
Second, whatever the near-term costs, we are undertaking
the mother of all unfunded mandates here.
Third, I believe that the refusal of the Europeans to bear
what we would regard as their fair share of the burden will
lead to a Transatlantic quarrel within NATO about burden
sharing which will weaken the Atlantic Alliance, which I favor
retaining, far more than expanding NATO could strengthen it.
Fourth, and finally, given that the Europeans will spend
nothing, this will raise one of two questions in the minds of
those of us American taxpayers who do have to pay. First, if
NATO is, indeed, a security organization, why is European
security more important to Americans than to Europeans? If, on
the other hand, as the administration sometimes claims, NATO is
being turned into a social welfare organization, the question
is why are American tax dollars being used for social spending
in Europe rather than for social spending, or, as some would
prefer, tax relief in the United States?
Perhaps, Mr. Chairman. There are good answers to these
questions, but I personally have never heard them.
The next point I would like to address is the status of the
former communist countries not being included in this
expansion, notably the Baltic States.
I believe that expansion as planned confronts the United
States with a problem with respect to these countries that we
can neither avoid nor solve. We have promised the Balts
membership. We have made statements to that effect. They expect
membership, and if Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are
entitled to join NATO, certainly Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia
are equally, if not more, entitled. Yet the Russians have said
unequivocally from Yeltsin on down that this is unacceptable
and that they would respond negatively.
If they should do so, Mr. Chairman, that would leave us
with three options, each of which is worse than our present
circumstance is not having expanded NATO.
First we could expand NATO membership to the Baltics,
meaning that we would bring the Western military alliance to
Russia's border. At the very least, I believe we would have to
expect a sharp diminution in cooperation with Russia and the
remilitarization of the line between Europe, between NATO and
Russia.
Second, we could try to bring in the Baltic States but fail
because our Western European allies vetoed this. This, I
believe, they would do. I believe that Baltic membership is
unacceptable to the Western Europeans, which means that we
would have a huge Transatlantic quarrel with our Western
European allies over this issue.
Or, the third alternative where the Balts and Ukrainians
are concerned is that we would fail to expand and thereby do
precisely what the administration claims NATO expansion is
designed to avoid. We would renege on a promise. We would give
Russia a veto over NATO's affairs. We would draw a new line of
division in Europe and we would strand new democracies on the
wrong side of it.
Now some argue privately that we can avoid this issue, that
we can just expand to these three countries and let it go at
that. I do not believe that this is feasible, even if it were
proper, which I don't believe it is.
First, we are on record as promising the Balts membership.
Second, they will press us on this issue, and rightly so.
Third, no American president will ever unequivocally rule
out Baltic or Ukrainian membership, which means that the
Russians will always have to assume that we may expand to
Russia's border, which means at the very least that this issue
will become a central one in relations between us and the
Russians as far as the eye can see with no benefit to us.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to address an argument that
we have heard already and will hear I think more insistently in
the future. That argument is that, whatever reservations one
may have about NATO expansion, it is now too late to turn back.
The failure to ratify NATO expansion, as indicated by the
administration, it will be said will shatter American
credibility and the U.S. position in the world.
I do not believe this is remotely the case. The argument
about maintaining credibility was a powerful one during the
cold war. It was the reason that we fought a major war in
Korea. It was the reason we stood firm in West Berlin. It was
the reason that we fought and continued to fight in Vietnam.
That argument was persuasive because of its context. We
were engaged in a global conflict with a militant, militarized
adversary. It was reasonable to fear that retreat in one place
would invite aggression elsewhere.
But that context has disappeared completely. The cold war
is over. The Soviet Union has collapsed. If the Senate decides
that the course recommended by the administration is not the
wisest one from the standpoint of American national interest,
will the Soviet army be in West Berlin the next day? The
question answers itself.
I would like also, Mr. Chairman, to address another version
of this issue, that is that this vote is a test of American
international commitment and that if we fail to expand NATO as
indicated, we will be guilty of isolationism.
Now as a professor of American foreign policy, let me
assure you that there is not now and never has been a policy of
isolationism in the United States. No significant American
figure ever imagined that the United States could or should
isolate itself from the rest of the world.
George Washington was not an isolationist. He was a shrewd
and effective geopolitician. We could use some of his
shrewdness now.
More to the point, even if the Senate should decide that
this particular course is not a wise one, this would not leave
the United States disengaged from Europe. We would still be
central to NATO. We would still be central to the Partnership
for Peace. We would still be central to the unprecedented and
under appreciated arms reduction treaties designed by President
Reagan and negotiated by President Bush. We would still be part
of a multiple series of bilateral and multilateral political,
economic, and cultural ties with Europe and with the rest of
the world.
This would hardly signal a retreat from engagement.
What is the alternative, then? Well, I echo my colleague's
injunction that there is certainly no need to do anything
rapidly, if at all. By the administration's own testimony,
there is no threat, there is no urgency. If you want to get a
sense of what is possible with respect to NATO expansion,
listen to those now urging expansion to Central Europe on the
subject of the Baltic countries.
They have said and will say well, there is no hurry. We
don't have to rush into bringing the Balts into NATO. We can
devise different arrangements for them.
Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that whatever security
arrangements are adequate for the Balts are more than adequate
for the Poles, the Hungarians, and the Czechs. Moreover, we
have an excellent security order now in place consisting of
NATO, the Partnership for Peace, arms treaties, and a Russia
that is not a threat. We cannot be sure that that will always
be true. But if circumstances change, we can change our policy,
and we will have plenty of advance notice to do so.
We should, I think, concentrate on the real security issues
in Europe: clearing up the status of the Russian finger on the
Baltic, Kaliningrad, getting some assurances on the status of
Belarus, getting START II ratified and proceeding to reduce
nuclear weapons even further, and proceeding further with the
reduction begun in the Reagan and Bush administrations of
reducing non-nuclear weapons in Europe.
Ironically, NATO expansion is at best a distraction from
and at worst a hindrance to dealing with the real security
threats.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would echo my colleague's
suggestion, first put forward by your distinguished former
colleague, Senator Nunn, that we harmonize the expansion of
security guarantees in Europe with European Union membership.
I have one final set of comments, Mr. Chairman, on the way
that this policy is being carried out.
As I have said, I see no benefits whatsoever to this
policy. But I recognize that there are those whom I deeply
respect, including the two gentlemen who flank you, one of whom
is present, also Senator Lugar, who have made important
contributions to American foreign policy in the past and who I
hope will in the future, who see things differently, who are
able to detect what I cannot find in this policy, namely some
merit.
But I believe that, even those who do find some merit,
ought to be concerned, indeed alarmed, about the way this
policy is being carried forward. I believe that that way is a
recipe for failure.
We know from bitter experience, since 1945, that the
foreign policies of the United States fail when they lack
public support. Public support, in turn, has three
requirements, none of which has been fulfilled here. The first
requirement is clear aims. But they are muddled. Is NATO an
organization to promote security or social welfare? Are we
including or containing Russia? Is this the old sturdy NATO or
an entirely new organization? The American public simply does
not know what it is being asked to support.
The second requirement for public support is a clear
strategy. I do not mean necessarily an exit strategy; I simply
mean a plan, some sense of how goals are to be achieved. There
is an old military axiom that says don't take the first step
without knowing the last.
In this case, not only do we not know the last step, we
don't know the next step. I find the way the issue of Baltic
and Ukrainian membership is being treated by the administration
particularly disturbing. In response to the question what comes
next, they simply say well, this process is open ended and we
won't name names.
Mr. Chairman, that is not an answer and it's not a policy.
It is an evasion. It amounts to saying to us, the American
people and you, our elected representatives, in response to
what may be the most momentous question hanging over this
issue, we won't tell you. Well, that means either they know but
won't disclose the answer or they won't disclose the answer
because they don't know it.
The first of these is constitutionally dubious, the second
strategically alarming.
The third requirement for attaining public support in any
major undertaking of the United States is candor about cost. As
I have said, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the discussion of
costs is characterized by an absence of candor.
The failure, finally, to fulfill these three requirements
has led, bitterly, to failure for the United States--in Vietnam
in the 1970's, in Lebanon in the 1980's, in Somalia in the
1990's, and I fear in Bosnia in the future.
Failure in Vietnam, Beirut, Somalia, and Bosnia was costly
and tragic. But failure where NATO expansion is concerned, at
the heart of Europe, involving the two greatest European
powers, Germany and Russia, and the most destructive weapons on
the planet, nuclear weapons, failure here, Mr. Chairman, could
be far worse.
Thank you.
The Chairman. I will say to you, sir, that I am very much
interested in your questions, and that is precisely the reason
these hearings have been scheduled.
Now there are at least three more hearings and I can
guarantee you, sir, that we are going to try to get to the
bottom of all the questions that you have asked plus the
hundreds that we have ourselves. So this is no done deal.
Mr. Ambassador, there is a large volume of public
information available for anybody who wants to find it that
Russia is cheating or has cheated on the ABM Treaty, the CFE
Treaty, the START I Treaty, the Missile Technology Control
Regime, the Biological Weapons Convention and, already in
advance, the as yet unratified Chemical Weapons Convention,
which, by the way, I oppose vigorously.
With the words of Sam Ervin ringing in my ears, I am going
to quote him because I thought he had a point. He said, up to
that time, when he was serving in the Senate, that the United
States had never lost a war or won a treaty. I think that is
what you are warning about here, both of you.
Now with the backdrop of the cheating that I have just
enunciated, could you be suggesting that the NATO enlargement
should be put off so that the hard line elements in the Russian
State Duma will approve the START II Treaty?
Ambassador Dean. Well, Mr. Chairman, I do expect that the
Yeltsin Government will make an effort shortly to gain Duma
approval of the START II Treaty.
I am not proposing, making the proposal you describe, but a
different one, which is that the administration should develop
a comprehensive program for, if you want to call it NATO
enlargement or for European security, which term I think I
would use, which has a place in it for all of these candidates,
including the Baltic States, Ukraine, Romania and all of the
other present candidates and possible future ones, and also
which lays out a timetable and requirements for possible
Russian membership in this system.
It is not accurate to say, as some have been saying here,
that Russia has expressed no interest in NATO membership.
Gorbachev several times suggested this as a possibility.
Yeltsin has several times suggested it as a possibility. Only
last year, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, speaking at Davos,
again suggested it as a possibility.
It is true that they have never pressed a specific claim
for it.
But what I have in mind is a program which would allow NATO
enlargement, which would defuse its negative aspects, and
which, at the end of the road, would have a real prospect of
Russian membership, but in a situation where they, because they
had such a prospect, would not object to the membership of
Baltic States, Ukraine and other potential candidates. That is
what I find missing from the administration's approach: We
should either not enlarge, or do it right.
The Chairman. I am not going to try to play ``gotcha'' with
you. But back in 1993--and I know you were going to be asked
about this if you have not been before, and I do it for no
reason whatsoever except to give you an opportunity to explain
now for the record what others may ask you--in 1993, you wrote
an op-ed for the ``Washington Post'' that made one of the best
arguments I have ever seen in support of NATO expansion. You
wrote that the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic would be ``good for them, good for the West''--and I'm
quoting you--``and good for Russia, too, provided that it is
accompanied by a clear definition of a new NATO policy toward
the former Soviet Union.
[The information referred to follows:]
[From the Washington Post, September 6, 1993]
Open the Ranks To Eastern Europe
(By Michael Mandelbaum)
An event of symbolic significance took place in Warsaw last month
when President Boris Yeltsin became the first Russian to visit Poland
as the leader of a free and equal country rather than as an imperial
master. The Polish government used the occasion to advocate a measure
with practical consequences for the future, especially for the United
States. Polish President Lech Walesa issued a joint statement with
Yeltsin noting Poland's desire to join the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, the Western security alliance that had opposed the Soviet
Union during the Cold War, and stating Russia's understanding of this
desire.
The idea is a good one. The inclusion of Poland--and of Hungary and
the Czech Republic, the two other formerly Communist countries most
firmly committed to democracy and free markets--would be good for them,
good for the West and good for Russia too, provided that it is
accompanied by a clear definition of a new NATO policy toward the
former Soviet Union.
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic seek full participation in
NATO along with membership in the European Community as a way of
anchoring themselves firmly and irreversibly in the West. Their pro-
Western governments wish to strengthen the forces within their
countries committed to consolidating democracy and building market
economies.
Poland, the largest and strategically most important of them, faces
no immediate threat: It is on cordial terms with its historical
adversary to the west, Germany, and the collapse of the Soviet Union
means that, with the exception of the detached Baltic fragment of
Kaliningrad, it no longer shares a border with Russia, its great
imperial tormentor to the east. Membership in NATO is, for the Poles, a
way to ensure that no threat will arise in the event that Russian
political forces opposed to Boris Yeltsin and democracy and interested
in recreating the Soviet empire should take power in Moscow.
Because Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic face no imminent
threat, the West would not risk war by admitting these countries to
NATO. Nor would their membership saddle the alliance with internal
territorial and political disputes of the kind that set Greece and
Turkey at odds with each other during the Cold War.
Including the three Eastern European countries in NATO would bring
benefits not only to them but to the West as well. It would ensure
stability on Germany's eastern border. It would extend the zone of
stability and democracy in Europe eastward, thereby consolidating some
of the gains of the Cold War. Perhaps most important, NATO membership
for these three countries would begin the long complicated and
necessary process of transforming NATO from a defensive alliance
against a threat that no longer exists into a broader security
community capable of contributing to the establishment of democracy and
the maintenance of peace from the English Channel to the Pacific coast
of Russia.
Part of that process may well involve undertaking ``out of area''
missions, such as policing a negotiated settlement in the former
Yugoslavia. Here Poland could be particularly useful. As a country with
a proud military tradition and a strong sense of international
responsibility, Poland would likely be more willing to furnish troops
for such operations than many Western European members of the alliance.
NATO's European members are not unanimously enthusiastic about
opening their ranks to Eastern Europe. Many in Western Europe want the
alliance to remain exactly as it is, as an insurance policy against the
revival of a threat from the east and as a mechanism for preventing the
``renationalization'' of defense policy, by which they mean independent
German foreign and defense policies.
The only way to perpetuate NATO, however, may be to change it.
Unless the alliance adapts to the new circumstances of the post-Cold
War world, public support for it, especially in North America, may
wither. As Sen. Richard Lugar of Indiana, the most influential
Republican voice on foreign policy and a supporter of expanding
alliance membership, recently put it, ``The choice is not between the
current NATO and a new NATO but rather between a new NATO and no
NATO.''
Were it to accept the three Eastern European countries, the
alliance would have to establish a timetable for their accession to
membership. The most important issue this prospect raises, however, is
NATO's relationship to the countries to its east. Specifically,
expansion to the borders of the former Soviet Union unavoidably raises
the question of NATO's approach to that vanished empire's two most
important successor states: Russia and Ukraine. The suspicions and
multiple sources of conflict between them make the relationship between
these two new and unstable countries, both with nuclear weapons on
their territory, the most dangerous and potentially the most explosive
on the planet today.
An expanded NATO must contribute what it can to promoting peaceful
relations between them, while avoiding the appearance either of
constructing an anti-Russian coalition or washing its hands of any
concern for Ukrainian security.
There is no more difficult task for the United States and its
European allies and none more urgent. To the extent that their
accession to NATO provides an occasion for addressing that task
seriously, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will have performed
yet another service for the West.
The Chairman. Now how should I put this.
Have Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic veered so far
from the course of democratic and economic reforms in the
intervening years that you now oppose their membership in NATO?
As I say, I am not trying to play ``gotcha'' with you. Take
your time.
Dr. Mandelbaum. Not at all, Mr. Chairman. It is a good
question, a fair question, and it bears on your hearings and on
the process that you and your colleagues are going through.
I wrote that article in the fall of 1993 when it appeared
that the expansion of NATO would be acceptable to the Russian
political class, and you quoted a crucial point in that
article--provided we could find appropriate arrangements for
the countries between Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
and Russia.
The administration has come up with no such proposals and
that is what my colleague, Ambassador Dean, was suggesting and
what I think is needed.
But let me go further, Mr. Chairman. I wrote that piece and
then I got detailed responses from people whom I deeply respect
who said, we think you're wrong. You should rethink this issue.
Because I respected them so much, I did sit down and
rethink them, leading, incidentally, to a book that I published
last year. I concluded that my critics were right and that I
had been wrong. I believe this is important for the following
reason, Mr. Chairman.
This is one of those issues that sounds good at first
glance. When you first hear about it, you think why not? Let's
be inclusive. Who could object to that?
But then, when you look further into it, you discover all
the snares and pitfalls and disadvantages. So I changed my
mind.
If I can change my mind, Senator, so can others. It is
never too late to be right. I would say to some of my friends
that if you change your mind on this issue, you will feel
better and you will be doing your country a service.
The Chairman. Now you know how I felt about the Chemical
Weapons Treaty.
Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Smith.
Senator Smith. I wonder if I could follow up your question
with the gentleman.
The Chairman. Sure.
Senator Smith. It seems to me that the NATO--Russia
agreement provides the very kind of security arrangement that
you propose that they needed to make this all work. Yet, that
is one of the things that gives some of us heartburn, that
maybe it gave them too much.
Is it defects in that agreement that caused you now to
change your view?
Dr. Mandelbaum. No. I changed my mind some time before. But
I'm glad you raised the NATO--Russian agreement, Senator,
because I think that does deserve some comment.
I would make two comments in particular. First, this
agreement has been put in place on the basis of publicly stated
and diametrically opposite interpretations by the American and
Russian Presidents. President Yeltsin said on television,
publicly, to the Russian people that this gives Russia a veto
over all the issues of concern to Russia in Europe. President
Clinton told us just the opposite.
So I fear that this could be a recipe for misunderstanding.
More to the point, Senator, President Yeltsin and every
other Russian has asserted that the NATO--Russia charter is
null and void if and when NATO expands beyond these three to
former Republics of the Soviet Union. That is why I say,
Senator, that the current expansion, as planned, puts that
second expansion irrevocably on the agenda, presents us with a
problem that we can neither avoid nor solve, and to no benefit
to ourselves.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Gentlemen, in the 24 years I have been here
I have called on both of you to ask for your advice. I respect
you both a great deal. I think on almost every issue, certainly
with you, Mr. Ambassador, we have been in agreement.
But I think you are dead wrong here. Let me tell you why. I
think you are unintentionally disingenuous when you assume a
dynamic situation in Eastern Europe and a static situation in
Russia. Thank God you are not doing planning from this
perspective regarding what the future of the United States and
Europe will be.
All of the criteria you lay out assume a static situation
in Russia. All the criteria you set out assume a dynamic
situation in Eastern Europe.
Second, you ended, Professor Mandelbaum, with the comment:
what purpose for NATO if not to contain Russia?
Well, Ambassador Dean can tell you the purpose. It was not
merely to contain Russia. It was to harness Germany; it was to
bring stability in Europe; and it has never, never, never only
been to contain Russia.
Now if you accept the proposition you stated, then we
should not only not expand NATO, we don't need NATO. We don't
need NATO.
Third, this idea that all of a sudden all of these arms
control agreements have been put on hold because of expansion
is a perversion of recent history. They were on hold before
they got anywhere, before there was any serious discussion of
expanding NATO. There wasn't anybody who believed it was going
to happen.
I visited Russia on several occasions; sat in the Duma;
went and spoke to those folks. Mr. Ambassador, they were going
nowhere fast. The reason is one of the arguments you have
presented. From the Russian standpoint, they need START III,
not START II. They cannot afford START II.
It didn't have a damn thing to do--with all due respect--
with NATO expansion. Also, this idea that we must have clear
aims, clear strategy, and candor about costs. If the costs are
as you stated, I am the only one who has stated from the outset
that there will be no expansion of NATO. We will not vote for
it--flat out.
I spent one entire week--and the Polish Ambassador is
sitting back there and probably remembers that week--
embarrassing people on occasion, sitting with them and saying,
``if you think you get a first class ticket without paying your
35 percent, forget it.'' Our State Department folks sat there
and thought oh, my God, what is he saying?
Well, it is real simple, real basic. If you are correct and
if the 15 European members of NATO have not gotten the message
that they have to pay 50 percent of the cost and the expanding
countries 35 percent, then there will be no vote here. You
don't have a thing to worry about. Nothing will expand. I
promise you that.
It will not happen.
The last point regards the projection of force, Mr.
Ambassador, that was part of a 1991 NATO agreement before there
was any discussion--any discussion--of NATO expansion. They are
not meeting their agreement--``they,'' meaning the 15 European
nations currently in NATO. They are not doing it. But it is not
because of NATO expansion.
Now, I could not agree with you all more if the costs are
as you state, misrepresented and likely to be unmet. I agree
with you. Expansion of NATO is a dead letter.
But I find it fascinating to go back to this notion of the
rationale for NATO in the first place. It is true that no one
feels a threat. I sat in every Eastern European capital. No,
that's not true. I didn't get to Romania. But I listened to
them, all the leadership, opposition as well as elected
leadership. None of them feels any threat from Russia right
now. None. Zero. None.
So if it is the Russian threat that propels the rationale
for NATO, let's save ourselves $120 billion now. I'll tell you
what I am more worried about. I am more worried about Germany
and France 20 years from now. They have not yet established a
degree of political maturation after over 100 years of being
nation-states, where they are at peace with one another without
the United States playing an integral role in Europe. That is
what I worry about.
I think that is a more real prediction and I'll bet you, if
you have a differing view, our grandchildren will read that the
more likely scenario than the amputated Russian bear lumbering
across Europe to attack, is that Germany and France are at it
again 30 years from now--maybe not in open war but in open
conflict.
So all these false premises create false choices. The
choice between knowing now exactly how all of Central Europe
and Eastern Europe are going to mature, or, without that
precise knowledge now, doing nothing. You sound like the former
general and revered figure in America today, General Powell. He
is the reason why we did not get to the point that you and I
think we should have gotten to in the Balkans. He said unless
he could be guaranteed that no American would be killed or
guaranteed that we could put 500,000 forces there, America
should do nothing.
That is a prescription for paralysis.
You point out that if the rationale for NATO relates to a
Russian threat only, we should not expand. Well, we should not
have NATO, I would respectfully suggest, if that is the only
rationale for its existence. We could save a lot of money.
Second, what I am curious about is how we got to the point
where anyone is thinking about permanently stationing troops in
the Baltics or permanently stationing troops in Romania. You
are correct, Ambassador, that if there is an open threat, we
will have to do that. But, guess what? If they are not part of
NATO, what do you think we are going to do?
What do you think we are going to do? Are you all taking
the position similar to what the Brits took in 1937, 1938, and
1939, which said by the way, if there is a threat, we are not
going to respond?
If there is a threat to Romania, if Russian troops are
massing on the border, or to the Balts, we are going to do one
of two things. We are either going to capitulate or Europe will
respond. All the President is saying is wherever we have new
members coming in, we will put infrastructure in place, no
permanent stationing of American forces, to accommodate the
very thing that we would have to accommodate if this threat
becomes a reality.
So I think it is somewhat disingenuous to suggest that the
Duma, because of its reaction--and by the way, I read every
word of what you write, Doctor, every word; I can probably
quote some of it from memory--that the Duma didn't go along
with these arms control agreements because of expansion.
Malarkey. I think it is disingenuous to suggest that if we are
going to bring in a country to NATO, it means that we would
have to permanently station troops there. That assumes that we
would not react if, in fact, there was a threat to them anyway.
So look, I think there are problems with expansion. But I
think the idea of the Russians eventually becoming part of
NATO, relies on their definition of NATO as an OSCE. It is not
a NATO like you and I define NATO.
No Russian leader that I am aware of has said--and it would
be wonderful if I could stand corrected on this; I will not say
it again and make the ``mistake'' again--no Russian leader has
said they are willing to subordinate Russian forces under the
command of an American general as required by the way NATO is
now constructed. They have said a redefined NATO, i.e., OSCE,
is something they could think about.
So I just think it is real important for such impressive
people for whom I have such great respect, not to raise the bar
here in a way that creates a problem. It's a little bit like
saying to me that if, in fact, in 1949, you couldn't tell me
exactly whether or not Germany could ever become a member of
NATO, we should have no NATO because we would be isolating
Germany like we did after World War I. We are going to put new
NATO members in that position.
I think I have talked too much and I apologize.
Senator Wellstone. Let's hear from the witnesses.
The Chairman. Have at it.
Dr. Mandelbaum. If I could respond, Mr. Chairman, certainly
no one could accuse Senator Biden of lacking candor.
Let me confine myself to three points by way of
clarification and rebuttal. First, I do not take the position
that the only justification for NATO is containing Russia.
Senator Biden. What is the justification?
Dr. Mandelbaum. The only justification for expanding NATO
is containing Russia. But there is a continuing a continuing
justification for NATO, which I have set out in my 1996 book,
``The Dawn of Peace in Europe,'' and I would be happy to supply
you and other interested members of the committee with a copy.
Senator Biden. Can you summarize in a paragraph what the
rationale for NATO is?
Dr. Mandelbaum. The rationale for NATO is three-fold: to
keep the United States engaged in Europe; to prevent the
Germans from having to pursue an independent policy; and to
serve as an insurance policy in case things go wrong in Russia.
Let me add, since you ask me, Senator, that does not
require any particular level of force or any particular level
of expenditure. I remind you that in 1949, when the NATO Treaty
was first signed, it was envisioned as a guarantee pact, not as
an integrated military force on the continent.
I certainly favor keeping that guarantee in place
indefinitely, and I think that the military force we need in
Europe, if any, to carry it out really depends on the nature of
the threat, which depends on Russia. So we should be flexible
on that as the founders of NATO intended.
Senator Biden. With all due respect, how is that different?
I'm sorry. We should debate this later, I guess. I'm sorry.
The Chairman. Yes.
Dr. Mandelbaum. I would be happy to return and I have
presumed on the chairman's patience. Could I have one more
minute, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Sure.
Dr. Mandelbaum. I would like to comment on the widespread
assertion that NATO is a school for democracy, that being a
part of the Western military alliance fosters democracy.
Senator Biden. No straw men. I didn't say that.
Dr. Mandelbaum. Well, this is widely said, Senator. I don't
impute it to you, but I believe it is false. I believe there is
no evidence for it.
To give you an example, Germany, West Germany became a
member of NATO in 1954, 9 years after the end of the war, when
democracy was fully established. So many things are now imputed
to NATO. In fact, such great claims are made for the
democratizing benefits of NATO for which, as far as I can tell,
there is no evidence that I sometimes think that one of the
great miracles of history is 150 years of democracy without
NATO membership in the United States.
But I would like to say for the record that I believe these
three countries are democracies. They are civilized, Western
countries. They do not need NATO membership to behave properly.
They have a wide range of problems, all of which stem from 40
years of communism, all of which they will deal with
successfully, none of which has anything to do with NATO.
Senator Biden. Why does Germany need NATO, then?
Dr. Mandelbaum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
indulgence.
The Chairman. Now, Mr. Ambassador, I think you ought to
have some time, too.
Ambassador Dean. It would be difficult to respond to all of
the issues that Senator Biden has raised.
Senator Biden. Oh, we'd be here at midnight.
Ambassador Dean. Yes, we would, or something close to it.
Senator Biden. I apologize, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Dean. However, I did not hear anything in what
he said which would do anything other than strengthen my point
of departure, which was that NATO, in its present form, is
adequate to these tasks without enlargement.
Senator Biden. I agree. We have not gotten to that. I was
just pointing out the criticisms you made of expansion. We have
not gotten to the next piece.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Wellstone.
Senator Wellstone. Mr. Chairman, I want to tell you, when
that light turns red, I am not going to pay any attention to
it, either.
Senator Biden. You have to be here 25 years to do that,
Paul, or be the Ranking Member, one of the two.
Senator Wellstone. Then, Joe, I will do it proportionally
and still won't pay any attention to that light.
The Chairman. Just try.
Senator Wellstone. Seriously, there are just a couple of
specific points I want to pick up on that went back to my
question earlier.
As I understand the position that you all have taken--and,
first of all, I am just trying to find out as somebody who is
trying to work his way through this and trying to decide what
is the right position to take, that is, the why of this, why
are we expanding NATO--I think what I understood your
testimony, what I think you have said is that it does not
really make sense if you are trying to think about it from the
point of view of expanding democracy or stability in these
countries; and that probably the reason for expanding would be
for containment; but then the question is who are we trying to
contain. Am I correct or not correct, just in terms of what you
said?
Ambassador Dean. Yes.
Dr. Mandelbaum. Yes.
Senator Wellstone. The second point is cost and we will
come back to that. I think that is a big issue in our country.
I think we all agree on that. Senator Biden has made it crystal
clear that, in fact, if some of the estimates of cost severely
underestimate what we are going to be faced with, or the
European countries are not going to be paying, then that is
going to become a big concern in our country.
But I still want to focus now on this. If there does not
seem to be a clear reason to do this, let's then go to the
downside of it beside cost. I want to go back to Russia because
I keep feeling that what happens in Russia is going to
crucially affect the quality of our lives and our children's
lives for better or worse. I want for it to be better. I want
the forces of democracy to triumph there.
There are two points. You said, Professor Mandelbaum, that
you did not agree--at least I thought I heard you say this, but
you did not get a chance to comment on it--with the analysis of
opinion, at least among the political class, the positions that
President Yeltsin has taken, and so on and so forth, in regard
to expansion. Could you spell that out a little bit more
because the testimony prior to your testimony was very
different.
Dr. Mandelbaum. Yes, Senator. I am delighted to hear that
you will have a panel in which people who are genuine experts
on Russia will come and tell you this.
What I would say is what I believe is a fact is that no one
in Russia favors NATO expansion, period.
Now there are many things you can say about this. You can
say that they can't stop it, which is true. You can say that
they will get used to it over time which may be true. We simply
don't know. You can say that NATO expansion is so important
that it is worth paying whatever price we have to pay with the
Russians in order to secure it. Of course, I don't agree with
that because I don't think it is worth anything at all. But
that is certainly a legitimate position and I assume that the
two panelists who preceded us would take that position.
But I do not believe there is any basis in fact for saying
that any Russian of any political stripe is at all well
disposed toward NATO expansion. I also believe that it is the
democrats who are most concerned because they care most about
cooperating with the West and NATO expansion makes it more
difficult--not impossible, but more difficult--for them to
promote the policy that they prefer.
Senator Wellstone. My final question is this. That, to me,
is a very important issue. I think that is a serious question
and one that we need to think deeply about.
Now my last question is more one for the record because
Senator Biden did not get a chance to follow up on this and I
want to do so for him. There is the whole question of the
definition of NATO and whether or not Russia has said that it
would like to join an expanded NATO or not. Senator Biden was
very vociferous in saying that he would like for somebody to
clarify the record.
Could one of you do that?
Dr. Mandelbaum. Well, Senator, in my pamphlet I cite a
number of published instances where senior Russian officials
inquired on this and were told in no uncertain terms that they
were not going to be allowed to join NATO.
I would add, Senator, that I do not favor bringing Russia
into NATO. I think we have the best of all possible worlds now,
and it is only what I regard as the ill-advised plan to expand
NATO that raises this issue at all. Were there no NATO
expansion, I don't think the Russians would be interested.
Given my view of NATO's continuing relevance, I see no purpose
in Russian membership.
Senator Wellstone. If there is no expansion, it is a moot
point. If there is expansion, then the question becomes how
this is perceived within Russia.
Dr. Mandelbaum. Let me add one other point, Senator. If we
expand to Central Europe, then the pressure will be enormous,
and rightly so, to expand to the Baltic countries and to
Ukraine. At that point, we may find ourselves in the position
in which the only way we can honor the promise to the Baltic
countries is to bring in the Russians at all.
Now that might or might be a good thing. It might or might
not be disastrous. But I would regard that as less good from
the point of view of American national interest to the status
quo, which I favor.
Senator Wellstone. Ambassador Dean, is there anything you
want to ask--and I am out of time?
Ambassador Dean. Yes.
Senator Wellstone. I'm sorry. I mean is there anything you
want to add.
Ambassador Dean. I think it is quite clear that the Baltic
State membership issue is the danger line in this entire
complex of questions. There is no doubt whatever about the
record there, that both Yeltsin--and Chernomyrdin said it only
2 weeks ago in Lithuania--feels that this would be a matter of
the gravest security interest to Russia.
That is the problem that I see. That is the reason why I
suggested that there be a fast track European Union method of
giving membership in the European Union to these three
countries as a substitute for their membership. I believe since
they are small and their economies are not large, this could be
done and should be done.
The Chairman. The distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Biden,
wants 5 minutes, and I tell him that I have the wire clippers
in my hand.
Senator Biden. All right and thank you.
Gentlemen, Mr. Ambassador, I agree with you absolutely
about the Balts. That is the fault line.
Really, much of what is being said here is that if, in
fact, we had said at Madrid only these three and never anybody
else, concern would be significantly diminished for both of
you--I think, diminished. You still would not be for NATO
expansion, but it does not rise to the level that you are most
concerned about.
I fully agree with you and made the very point you made
when I met with our European colleagues. I think when Senator
Roth and I were with the NATO Observer Group and met with
European defense ministers and foreign ministers, although they
could not make such a judgment, we felt that a rapid move
toward EU membership would really diffuse an awful lot of this.
Next, would your view change if tomorrow the Duma passed
the START Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention? If a week
from now or a month from now that happened, what would you say
then about whether or not this emboldens the Reds and the
Browns, emboldens the nationalists, and undermines U.S.-Russian
relations? Would it change your view at all if those arms
agreements are passed by the Duma? That is for either one of
you.
Ambassador Dean. It would change my view as to the present
impact. But the souring of Russian political opinion toward
relations with the United States did take place earlier and has
been a constant. My worry, of course, is about the long-range
implications of this development over a period of decades.
Senator Biden. I think that is a legitimate concern. I am
not dismissing that concern.
I remind you that 2 plus 4 was the same argument. I just
want to remind you of that. The same, exact argument was made.
It does not mean it should not have been made and it does
not mean the argument should not be made now. My point is about
dynamic change in Russia.
The question I have is what do you think happens in the
gray area? I read with great interest in your piece, Doctor,
about moving the fault line East. We are just drawing new lines
in Europe. That's a legitimate point that you made.
Regarding the Poles and the Romanians who have not been
invited to joint NATO thus far, what do you think these
countries in this gray zone now do about their military
relationships? I am not making the argument now that if we
don't do this such and such will happen.
The chairman and I agree. If, in fact, this thing goes down
for whatever reason, that the idea of American credibility is
not lost. We have credibility because we are the 10,000 pound
gorilla. It does not matter what anybody thinks. There is
credibility, period. I agree with that argument. So I am not
making that argument in a back door way here.
But what happens? What do you think will develop? Just as
you feel it is appropriate to ask the President to be able to
tell you now how that region is going to develop so that he has
a comprehensive plan, you tell me how you envision Central and
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet States evolving in terms
of their security architecture over the next 10 to 15 years
absent this move.
Ambassador Dean. Maybe I could start.
Absent this move, I think the main slack in the situation
should be taken by the European Union and its expansion of
membership.
Senator Biden. Do you think they will?
Ambassador Dean. Oh, yes. I do think so. As a matter of
fact, most experts do agree that the first tranche will be
accepted by the year 2003 or 2004.
Senator Biden. Six months ago, those same experts did not
think there was going to be one. I spent the last 2 years of my
life doing nothing but this. I read the same experts.
Ambassador Dean. Yes. But I think it will happen. Maybe the
timing will be off. I think we realize that Estonia is in this
first group.
Senator Biden. That's right.
Ambassador Dean. And I think there is good prospect that
the other two Baltic States will get in, too.
I think NATO in its present form should continue. I think
the European Union should expand and that, indeed, the OSCE,
which you have mentioned, should be built up somewhat. I have
no objection whatever to the NATO--Russian Founding Act. I
think it is a good thing which should be expanded. So it, too,
should play a role. Those are the components, I think, of a
stable European security order.
Senator Biden. I will leave you with only one thought. The
red light is about to go on, and I take the chairman seriously.
I leave you with only one thought. Just as I will entertain
the argument you have made--and sincerely, because I have an
inordinate amount of respect for both of you. That is not
hyperbole. You know that. You know what our relationship has
been all these years.
I would like you to think about the dynamism that exists
within Russia now and why you feel we have to view it in a
static sense rather than a dynamic sense.
I cannot predict to you exactly how it is going to turn
out. But I am prepared to predict, and my political future is
resting on this prediction, that the dynamism in Russia is a
dynamism that looks West. Russia sees, or ultimately will see,
security and stability among its former ``charges'' and will
moderate, not exacerbate, its attitudes toward dominion. I see
that dynamic movement.
I am not suggesting you agree with it. I just respectfully
suggest you at least entertain the prospect that if past is
prologue, the recent past, I think there is argument that my
view is at least as probable as the one you have.
The last point I will make is this. I have noticed in the
French legislature, the German legislature, and the British
legislature, that when it comes to a choice between farmers and
foreign policy, farmers always win. Did you hear what I just
said? Farmers always win.
One thing I do know more about than either of you is
politics. I mean that sincerely. Just look at the past. The
reason why there has been any movement, in my view, on the EU
is because of the movement on NATO.
The Chairman. As they say it in order, so might it be.
Senator Biden. Thank you, gentlemen.
The Chairman. Thank you, all. I hope that we have
ventilated this. We have tried to. This is the way we want to
do all hearings.
The record will be kept open for 3 days for Senators to
submit written questions.
Thank you for appearing.
We stand in recess.
[Whereupon, at 4:38 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene at 2 p.m., October 22, 1997.]
QUALIFICATIONS OF POLAND, HUNGARY AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC FOR NATO
MEMBERSHIP
----------
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee was scheduled to meet, pursuant to notice, at
2 p.m. in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon.
Gordon H. Smith, presiding.
The Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the
Qualifications of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic for
NATO membership was canceled at 2:00 p.m. on October 22 due to
an objection under Rule 26, Sec. 5a. Per the unanimous consent
request of Senator Smith of Oregon on November 5, 1997, the
testimony submitted for this hearing is included in the written
record of the hearing on NATO enlargement.
Prepared Statement of Marc Grossman,
Assistant Secretary of State,
European and Canadian Affairs
Senator Smith, Senator Biden, members of the committee It is an
honor and a privilege to have this opportunity to appear before you
today.
On October 7th, Secretary of State Albright appeared before this
Committee to make the case for NATO enlargement and to ask for your
consent to the addition of three new members to the Atlantic Alliance.
Today I hope to help contribute to your deliberations by talking
about the reasons the United States and our NATO allies extended
invitations to Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. As Secretary
Albright said here on October 7: ``Let me assure you that we invited
only the strongest candidates to join the Alliance.''
NATO membership entails the most solemn security commitment one
country can make to another--the commitment to come to their defense in
a crisis. NATO's decision in 1994 to enlarge the Alliance, and the
Alliance's decision in 1997 to invite Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic to begin accession negotiations were made only after a careful
review of America's strategic interests and the qualifications of the
countries involved. In making the decision to invite Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic to begin the process of accession, we put
America's interests first.
Secretary Albright reviewed for this committee the reasons NATO
enlargement is in America's interests: extending the zone of stability
which NATO provides to the countries to NATO's east would further our
goal of a united, peaceful Europe.
NATO must remain the strong Alliance that has served us so well for
the last half century. That is why we have said from the onset that we
will only admit countries that are willing and able to assume the
responsibilities of membership and whose inclusion will serve the
overall strategic interests of the Alliance. NATO is not a charity or a
political club; it is and will remain a military Alliance.
All aspiring nations must meet each of these two tests: first, they
must prove that they are willing and able; second, we in the Alliance
must agree that their membership serves our common interests.
Before turning to the qualifications of these three countries, let
me describe why their admission passes the test of being in the U.S.
national interest.
The United States is a European power. If we have an interest in
the lands west of the Oder river, then we also surely have an interest
in the fate of the 200 million people who live in the nations between
the Baltic and Black Seas. We fought World War II in part because these
nations had been invaded. We waged the Cold War in part because they
were help captive. Had Poland, Hungary, and the Czech republic been
allowed to choose in 1949, when NATO was first founded, there is little
doubt that they would have chosen to join the Atlantic Alliance.
As Secretary of State Albright said yesterday, now that the nations
of central Europe are free, we want them to succeed and we want them to
be safe. For if there were a major threat to the security of the
region, I am certain we would chose to act, enlargement or no
enlargement. Expanding NATO now is the surest and most cost effective
way to prevent that kind of threat from arising, and thus the need to
make that choice.
Poles, Czechs and Hungarians do not look at NATO as a one way
street. They are committed to the Alliance's principles of shared
responsibilities. They want to join NATO for the same reasons current
allies want to keep it. History has taught them to believe both in a
strong Alliance and a strong American role in Europe. They want to
start taking responsibility for their freedom and security. They want
to contribute to the security of the trans-Atlantic region.
But recognition of our strategic interest and their aspirations is
not enough to earn an invitation to the world's most successful
Alliance. These countries have to demonstrate to all current NATO
members that they are qualified. NATO is a first class Alliance and we
expect all new members to make a first-class contribution.
Decisions on who to include in the Alliance are made by the
Alliance. There are no set criteria for NATO membership. There is no
checklist that countries can meet in order automatically to gain entry.
But there are five basic principles which we have established as
benchmarks and we have insisted that each prospective member meet.
These five principles are based on the NATO Enlargement Study of 1995
and were subsequently laid out by former Secretary of Defense Perry in
a speech in Norfolk, Virginia in June 1996. They are:
commitment to democratic reform;
commitment to a free market economy; good neighborly
relations;
civilian control of the military; and
military capability to operate effectively with the
Alliance.
Twelve Central and Eastern European Partners have expressed their
desire to join NATO. Last spring at the NATO Ministerial in Sintra, we
discussed with our allies which of the aspiring Partners met this twin
test of being in our strategic interests and being qualified. In the
run-up to the July Madrid summit, we consulted closely in the Alliance
on our choice. The discussions were vigorous.
At the Madrid summit, President Clinton and the allies reached
consensus to extend invitations to the three countries we are
discussing today: Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary.
Why these three? Because Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
have not only met the requirements for NATO membership; they have
exceeded them. Because Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will be
security producers, not just security consumers. Because Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic will make the Alliance stronger and
will enhance European security and stability. And because Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic will make America safer for future
generations.
I will address the first four principles, my colleague, Assistant
Secretary Kramer will address the military capabilities and
contributions of each of the three invitees.
POLAND:
Poland has a solid track record of nearly eight years of reform. It
has just witnessed its second democratic change of government since the
collapse of communism. It has held seven fully free and fair elections
at various levels since 1989. The press is free and the government has
been a strong supporter of human rights. Poland has a new Constitution,
approved by national referendum in May, 1997, which codifies the
division of powers among the President, Council of Ministers,
legislative and judicial branches.
Poland's economic growth rates since 1993 have been among the
highest in Europe. Economic reforms in 1989 removed price controls,
eliminated most industry subsidies, opened markets to international
competition, and imposed strict budgetary and monetary discipline.
Poland was admitted to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) in 1996. The government is committed to
privatization, and the private sector accounts for nearly \2/3\ of GDP
and employs 60 percent of the workforce. In 1996, Poland spent
approximately 2.3% of GDP on defense.
Poland has resolved outstanding differences with its neighbors.
Last May, President Kwasniewski traveled to Kiev to sign a declaration
of reconciliation with Ukrainian President Kuchma, and Poland and
Ukraine are exploring the possibility of establishing a joint
peacekeeping battalion. Poland has strong economic ties with Russia and
expressed support for the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed last May.
Poland's relationship with the Baltic states, the Czech Republic,
Hungary and with its NATO neighbors, Germany and Denmark, is excellent.
Poland's new Constitution codifies civilian control of the military
and Poland is establishing legal and administrative structures to
ensure such control is effective and provides for parliamentary
oversight of the military. The 1996 National Defense Law subordinated
the Chief of the General Staff to the Minister of Defense.
HUNGARY:
Hungary has had two complete democratic changes of government since
1989, in fully free and fair elections. All six parliamentary parties
strongly support Hungary's entry into NATO. The government upholds
human rights, freedom of expression, the rule of law, and an
independent judiciary. The government has taken steps to improve the
conditions of its ethnic minorities and to deal more effectively with
the growing problem of organized crime.
Economically, in 1995, Hungary engaged in a successful strict
stabilization program to cut the current account and budget deficits
and to accelerate structural reform. Since 1990, Hungary has attracted
almost \1/3\ of all foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern
Europe (approximately 16 billion dollars). Hungary has privatized
almost all of the telecommunications and energy sectors, and has almost
completed the consolidation and privatization of its banking sector.
Hungary joined the OECD in May, 1996. In 1996, Hungary spent 1.6% of
GDP on defense and has committed to increase military spending by .1%
of GDP per year for the next five years.
Hungary has also resolved all outstanding differences with its
neighbors. In 1996, Hungary concluded Basic Treaties on Understanding,
Cooperation, and Good-Neighborliness with Slovakia and Romania, ending
long-standing disputes among those countries. Hungary and Austria have
a joint peacekeeping battalion which is part of the UN peacekeeping
force in Cyprus, and Hungary and Romania are working to establish a
joint peacekeeping battalion. Hungary's relations with Slovenia, Italy
and Croatia are strong. In the last year, Hungary and Ukraine have
signed bilateral cooperation agreements against organized crime,
terrorism and drug trafficking.
Hungary has effective civilian control of the military, guaranteed
by legislative and constitutional mechanisms which provide oversight of
the military by the Defense Ministry, and oversight of the Defense
Ministry by the Parliament. The constitution gives Parliament control
of the military budget, structure, deployment, fielding, stationing,
and senior leadership. The 1993 National Defense Law specifies that the
Minister of Defense, who is a member of Parliament, is the superior to
the Chief of Staff (Commander) of the Armed Forces.
THE CZECH REPUBLIC:
The Czech Republic has three fully free and fair elections since
1989. In 1996, two national elections were held: one for the lower
house and one for the newly-created Senate. The Constitution provides
for an independent judiciary and guarantees internationally recognized
human rights. Freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of the
press are fully protected.
Since 1989, the Czech Republic has engaged in tight fiscal and
monetary policies, liberalization of trade and prices, and
privatization of state enterprises.
Real GDP has been rising since 1994, inflation is controlled, and
unemployment is low. The Czech Republic has, nonetheless, recently
faced trade and current account deficits. The government has increased
capital markets regulation and instituted fiscal austerity measures to
address these problems.
The Czech Republic entered the OECD in December 1995 and has
concluded an association agreement with the EU, as well as free trade
agreements with the members of the European Free Trade Area and the
Central European Free Trade Area. The Czech government has committed to
increase military spending by 0.1% of GDP per year with a goal of
reaching 2.0% by the year 2000.
The Czech Republic maintains excellent relations with its
neighbors. In January 1997, the Czech Republic and Poland agreed to
harmonize their countries' approaches to NATO and EU membership.
Relations with Germany are especially strong and Germany is by far the
Czech Republic's leading foreign investor. Austria and the Czech
Republic have strong historical and economic bonds and Austria is the
Czech Republic's sixth largest foreign direct investor. Relations with
Slovakia are fundamentally sound, although some residual issues from
the split of Czechoslovakia still remain. But ties and travel between
the people of the two countries are very strong.
Under the Czech Republic's constitution, the President is the
Commander-in-Chief of the military. The Minister of Defense is a
civilian and the Parliament is increasingly active in defense and
military issues. Parliament is expected to enact a defense law this
year that will formally confirm in law the civilian command structure
mandated by the constitution.
CONCLUSION:
We chose these three countries because we were convinced they will
be good allies. They each have a track record that underscores their
commitment to the values the Alliance is pledged to defend and uphold.
In the past eight years, these countries have been among America's
staunchest friends. Their forces fought with ours in the Gulf War and
are with us today in Bosnia. They have joined with us on issues that
are of vital importance to us, such as human rights, nonproliferation
and the Chemical Weapons Convention. They are prepared to meet the
responsibilities of NATO membership, including paying their share of
NATO's costs. Our citizens and their citizens share many historical,
familial, and cultural ties.
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic may not be as advanced as
other current allies. They have work to do which require sacrifices to
meet the obligations of NATO membership. They have challenges ahead of
them.
But, they know that the benefits of NATO membership outweigh the
costs. And we know that their membership in NATO will make NATO
stronger, and America and Europe safer.
__________
Prepared Statement of Franklin D. Kramer,
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: I welcome the
opportunity to testify on the issue of NATO Enlargement, and, in
particular, on how the military capabilities of the three select
countries--Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic--will contribute to
the effectiveness of the NATO Alliance and the achievement of security
and stability in Europe.
Fundamental to answering this question is a recognition that Europe
is changing and will continue to change in the 21st century. The
preservation of security, including through military means, likewise is
changing. The objective of NATO enlargement is to enhance security in
the face of, and as part of, this change.
Now, and in the 21st century, the United States has and will
continue to have a vital interest in Europe, as critical to preserving
our own security and stability. We likewise seek to preserve and ensure
the expansion of freedom and democracy throughout Europe. For these
reasons, we fought two World Wars and we stayed the course during the
45 years of the Cold War. To serve these objectives in Europe in the
century to come, we seek to avoid a power vacuum, the boiling over of
ethnic divisions, the redress of old hatreds, or the establishment of
any conditions that would create instability and insecurity and lead to
future conflict. And we look to be able to perform the military
missions, with our allies, that the 21st century may bring.
Those 21st century goals will be achieved and those 21st century
military missions will be performed by NATO in a changing European
context where:
NATO itself is changing, from an Alliance committed to a
fixed defense to one that is mobile and can deploy to where new
threats may occur;
Allies are working with Partner countries outside the NATO
Alliance, in particular, through the Partnership for Peace;
But where NATO retains its core capabilities, including,
most importantly, its ability to perform collective defense.
NATO enlargement is part of the process of the adaptation of
security in Europe. The military capabilities of the three new
countries therefore must focus on NATO's missions. Let me discuss them
each, but let me begin with a context, the context of the existing
capabilities that each country brings:
It is important to recognize that each of these countries has
military forces that will add to the Alliance's existing capabilities:
Poland has a force of 230,000, roughly the size of the
forces of the United Kingdom (228,000) and Spain (200,000).
The Czech Republic and Hungary have forces of 57,000 and
60,000, respectively, roughly the size of the armed forces of
Portugal (56,000) and Canada (64,830). Combined, the three
invitees will add almost 300,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen
to the Alliance, including units with unique and specialized
capabilities such as chemical decontamination and combat
engineering. All three countries have begun training their
troops in NATO doctrine in earnest, and all three will be able
to make a substantial contribution to the force projection,
strategic depth, and capabilities of the Alliance. Put simply,
from this perspective, an Alliance with nineteen committed
Allies has more to offer than one with sixteen, and a larger
Alliance can spread the fiscal and operational burden more
evenly.
It goes without saying, of course, that these three countries need
to make improvements in a number of areas, including operational
capabilities, force structure and modernization. I would like to
address how Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic plan to improve
their capabilities and readiness and how they can make their
contribution to the Alliance most effective.
I. CONTRIBUTING TO AN ADAPTED ALLIANCE
In the 21st century, NATO must be able to deal with the problems of
instability and insecurity, and each of the new countries has
demonstrated already the ability to contribute to these new missions.
With the largest and most capable military in Central and Eastern
Europe, Poland has brought its 25 years of peacekeeping experience to
NATO's efforts in Bosnia. Since 1974, Poland has participated in more
peacekeeping operations than any former Warsaw Pact country, and it
currently has more personnel in UN peacekeeping, military observer and
civilian police missions than any other country. These deployments with
multinational operations have enabled Polish troops to gain experience
which has greatly enhanced their NATO-interoperability. It currently
has a 400-person airborne infantry battalion in SFOR's U.S. sector, a
355-person logistics battalion in the Golan Heights (UNDOF), an
infantry battalion and military hospital (632 troops) in Lebanon
(UNIFIL), 53 soldiers in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), and troops
supporting eight UN observer missions. In 1989, they established a
military training center for UN operations in southeastern Poland. In
1992, the Poles deployed an infantry battalion with UN forces in
Croatia. Since then, Poland has shown an increased willingness to
provide combat forces in support of peacekeeping, as reflected by their
commitment to IFOR and SFOR. Poland is currently working to establish
joint peacekeeping battalions with Ukraine and Lithuania, and the Poles
have contributed to UN efforts in Rwanda (UNIMIR), Georgia (UNOMIG),
Tajikistan (UNMOT), Iraq/Kuwait (UNIKOM), the Western Sahara (MINURSO)
and Cambodia (UNTAC).
The Czech Republic currently has a 620-person mechanized battalion
in SFOR, and prior to that it contributed an 870-person mechanized
battalion to IFOR and a 985 person infantry battalion in UNPROFOR. The
Czechs also deployed a 200-man decontamination unit to DESERT SHIELD/
DESERT STORM and have provided observers to UN observer missions in
Croatia (UNTAES), the Prevlaka Peninsula (UNMOP), the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (UNPREDEP), Mozambique (UNOMOZ), Georgia (UNOMIG)
and Liberia (UNOMIL).
Hungary contributed a 400-500 man engineer battalion to conduct
bridging and other engineering operations in support of IFOR. This
battalion, now reduced in number to 200-250, is currently deployed in
support of SFOR. Hungary's support to IFOR and SFOR also included
allowing U.S. and NATO forces to transit its airspace, station at its
airfields and use its facilities. Hungary demonstrated its ability to
operate as part of the NATO team with every bridge that was built and
every plane that landed and took off from its airfields. Over 80,000
U.S. military personnel rotated in and out of IFOR and SFOR assignments
through the Hungarian airbase at Taszar. U.S. armor units calibrate
their guns at Hungarian ranges prior to deploying to Bosnia, and again
upon re-deploying.
Past Hungarian peacekeeping contributions have included a 39-troop
contingent in Cyprus (recently increased to more than 100) as part of
an Austrian battalion assigned to UNFICYP; a 26 soldier and 15
policemen contingent in the Sinai (MFO); and 20 observers in Iraq/
Kuwait (UNIKOM), Angola (UNAVEM), Cambodia (UNTAC), Mozambique
(UNOMOZ), Tajikistan (UNMOT), and Georgia (UNOMIG). Hungary may also
provide forces to the UN Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade
(SHIRBRIG).
In short, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are already
working with NATO and NATO Allies in the field.
II. AVOIDING NEW DIVISIONS IN EUROPE
NATO must also work with the other countries of Europe to keep new
dividing lines from being created. The Partnership for Peace and its
recent enhancements are integral efforts in this regard. Each of the
three new countries has many substantial outreach efforts, including
significant involvement in the Partnership for Peace, which will
strengthen the bonds between NATO and those countries not yet selected
for membership.
The Czech Republic has served as a political role model for Central
and Eastern Europe. It has made great progress in establishing broad
democratic control over its armed forces; it is fully dedicated to a
free, open market economy and since 1989 it has been a fully
functioning democracy. The Czech Republic has also cultivated close
ties with all of its neighbors. No border is in dispute with Germany,
Austria, Poland or Slovakia, and the Czechs have no conflicts with
neighboring countries relating to minority ethnic groups. Since the
Madrid Summit, Prague has also increased its trilateral regional
defense cooperation with Warsaw and Budapest. The Polish, Hungarian and
Czech militaries agreed to jointly address the NATO Defense Planning
Questionnaire (DPQ), air defense, logistics, human resources
management, and the preparation of delegations to the accession
negotiations. Bilaterally, the Czechs have also contributed to the
security of Central Europe by resolving historical disputes and
developing close ties with Germany. In 1993, they signed a military
cooperation agreement with Germany, and they have worked closely with
the German military since then.
Poland is forming joint NATO-interoperable peacekeeping battalions
with both Ukraine and Lithuania, efforts which not only improve its
ability to deploy to peacekeeping operations, but which also reassure
both Kiev and Vilnius that their future lies with Europe. It is also
working with Germany and Denmark to form a trilateral mechanized
infantry corps that would be fully integrated into the NATO force
structure.
Outreach initiatives like these, combined with Poland's geographic
location, will enable Poland to serve as an important ambassador for
NATO to the East. Poland has also undertaken active defense cooperation
with the Baltic states, particularly Lithuania, to reassure them of
Europe's commitment to their security. Poland has also made efforts to
normalize relations with Moscow, which reinforces the increasingly
close cooperation between NATO and Russia. Finally, Poland's internal
reforms, including enhancing civilian control of the military and
taking steps to strengthen its democratic polity and market economy,
serve as a role model for other Central and Eastern European states
which aspire to increased integration into Western political, economic
and defense institutions.
Hungary participates in several Central-European regional
cooperation organizations that indirectly reduce the effects of risks
and instability. Hungary has concluded more than 170 cooperation
agreements with its neighbors, encompassing a broad variety of fields.
Especially noteworthy are agreements with Slovenia and Italy to form a
trilateral peacekeeping brigade; an agreement with Romania to form a
combined peacekeeping battalion; and a treaty with neighboring Slovakia
on good-neighborly relations and friendly cooperation that covers
everything from protecting the environment, to protecting minorities,
to pledging never to use force against each other. Hungary is also a
participant in the U.S.-established secure ``hot line'' network, which
provides secure communications among most central European Ministers of
Defense in the event of a crisis.
Each of these countries' outreach efforts helps to strengthen ties
with current NATO members, as well as to build bridges from the
Alliance to important non-NATO allies and Partners. Their efforts are
thus already contributing to the enhancement of the Alliance.
III. ENHANCING THE ALLIANCE
The three new countries have, as I have already discussed, shown
the ability and willingness to contribute to the Alliance's new
missions and to work in Europe to erase old divisions and to bring all
European countries into an effective security structure. Ultimately,
however, NATO depends on its ability to perform collective defense.
Each of the three new countries is taking steps in the right direction
to perform that collective defense mission. To understand these steps,
let me again give some context.
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic all maintained their
militaries for four decades under the Warsaw Pact. Not surprisingly,
then, the current status of these militaries reflect Warsaw Pact
doctrines and approaches. In our working with these countries, we have
sought to make their militaries more like NATO militaries, for such a
transformation is important to make their inclusion into NATO as
effective as possible. We recognize that they will not have fully
transformed militaries by 1999. Instead, we have sought to ensure that
each country has a plan to effect such a transformation over time. We
have done so in NATO and also through bilateral efforts, as have other
members of the Alliance. In NATO, we have focused on interoperability
through the Partnership for Peace and, since the Madrid Summit, on the
NATO Defense Planning Process. We have also focused on the key national
priorities for each country to make it most able to work effectively
with NATO. As we considered such priorities, we found that there were
three broad, critical categories: personnel reform; training and
doctrine; and interoperability, this last with a focus on command,
control and communications, air defense architecture, logistics, and
infrastructure to facilitate reinforcement.
Let me discuss the plans of each of these countries to deal with
these critical NATO and national issues. Each of the three countries
has recognized that NATO compatibility depends on the implementation of
a well thought-through plan. As noted above, these plans include
involvement with PfP, the NATO Defense Planning Process, and the
establishment of national efforts.
A. Interoperability Through the Partnership for Peace
I have discussed previously the benefit of PfP toward avoiding
further divisions of Europe. But the PfP program, particularly the
conduct of military exercises, has also been a training ground for NATO
enlargement. For example, in 1997 alone, Poland will have participated
in 22 PfP exercises in which the United States also took part; the
highlight of these events was exercise BRAVE EAGLE, one of the largest
and most complex Pfp exercises to date, which Poland hosted. Poland
also participates in a hundreds of bilateral and multilateral
exercises, seminars, and other activities with other Partners and NATO
Allies, all of which contribute to increasing their interoperability.
The Poles have emphasized military training and tactical exercises in
their PfP participation.
Hungary has been an enthusiastic participant in the PfP program and
the enhanced PfP effort, as the Hungarians believe that PfP activities
contribute directly to the establishment of NATO interoperability and
its declared objective of NATO integration. Hungary was, in fact, the
first Partner to include a PfP line item in its defense budget. Like
Poland, Hungary has participated extensively in bilateral and
multilateral military exercises and activities which have produced
valuable lessons learned. The Hungarians have participated in seventeen
multilateral PfP exercises in 1997 in which the United States also took
part, and it will host a major exercise next Spring. The invitation in
Madrid will gradually alter the nature of Hungary's participation in
PfP, making Hungary not only a consumer but more and more a contributor
to the enhanced PfP program. Since the Madrid Summit, for example,
Hungary has offered to mentor Romania on the DPQ process, and they have
volunteered to participate in the twelve NATO teams assessing Albania's
post-conflict military.
The Czechs participated in eighteen multinational PfP exercises
with U.S. involvement in 1997. They have also conducted numerous joint
training activities and joint exercises with a majority of other
Allies, including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. They have conducted joint
company, battalion and brigade training with the French 7h Infantry
Division and the British Royal Marines, just to name a couple of the
major training partners. In overall numbers of activities, they have
been particularly closely involved with Germany, where they signed up
for 100 joint activities for 1997 alone.
In addition, during the last three years all three countries have
participated in PfP's Planning and Review Process (PARP), in which NATO
established 41 specific Interoperability Objectives (IOs). Examples of
these objectives include: C3/SAR, ground refueling of aircraft,
commonality of airfield procedures, use of NATO communications
procedures and terminology, aircraft IFF system, logistics support, and
interoperability of communications equipment and of air navigation
aids. Poland committed to attain all 41 IOs by 1999, Hungary pledged to
reach 38, and the Czech Republic promised to meet 31.
As NATO assessment teams have visited each country over the past
two months they have increasingly discovered evidence that PfP and PARP
have produced results directly relevant to NATO enlargement. For
example, when the American general heading the NATO team visiting
Kecskemet Air Base asked how Hungary would accommodate a squadron of
NATO F-16s, he was surprised by the precision and level of detail of
the Hungarian response--and the level of installation readiness
achieved. He was told that the Hungarians has not just ``planned'' for
the accommodation of NATO's F-16s--they had done it. Through a PfP
exercise, Hungary had hosted a squadron of Dutch F-16s for several
weeks in 1996.
In many cases, the selectees have used the interoperability
objectives as guideposts for procurement decisions--decisions they have
made and implemented--in advance of NATO membership. For example: a
SHAPE analyst monitoring the NATO Common Fund Cost Study's progress
noted that even though communications and information systems
requirements were increasing, the prospective costs to the Czech
Republic kept dropping. Upon closer inspection, it turned out the
Czechs had already anticipated the requirements for secure and non-
secure digital communications programs and had applied NATO standards
to the national programs they are pursuing on their own. In short,
because of PfP the Czechs have already spent their own money to fund
some projects that we had assumed would be paid for by NATO as a whole
through the common budgets.
All three countries' active participation in PfP activities and
exercises have helped them understand how to operate with NATO forces
and are preparing them for the burdens and responsibilities of NATO
membership. Experience gained through PfP was integral, for example, in
each country's preparation of its DPQ reply.
B. Successful Completion of Initial DPQ
Since Madrid, the three invitees have gone beyond PfP activities
and worked with the NATO international staff to fill out a special
Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) as their initial step into the
NATO Defense Planning Process. These questionnaires, which all NATO
allies submit annually, are a disclosure of each country's force and
financial plans. Each of the invitees was visited in July and September
by the international staff, which delivered and explained the DPQS.
Teams with the international staff met frequently with the invitees to
assist their defense ministries in preparing their replies. I am
pleased to be able to tell you that all three of the invited countries
submitted their DPQ replies by the deadline of 1 October--a deadline
that was not announced to them until the Madrid Summit in July. To put
this in perspective, only four of the current NATO allies met their
deadline this year--and the United States was not one of them.
Poland has declared its willingness to commit all of its
operational military forces to NATO. One-third will be designated as
``NATO-Assigned,'' meaning they will be fully integrated into the NATO
force structure and placed under the operational command or control of
a NATO commander when called upon. These NATO-Assigned forces, which
include both immediate and rapid reaction forces, are already partly
capable of joint operations with NATO and should be fully interoperable
by 2002. The types of units to be assigned to NATO include airborne,
armor and air defense units, as well as fighter squadrons and transport
aircraft. Poland will designate the remaining two-thirds of its armed
forces as ``NATO Earmarked,'' meaning they could be put under NATO
operational command or control in time of need.
Since its DPQ submission, Czech officials have noted that they are
willing to earmark up to 90 percent of their operational forces to NATO
in times of crisis. The Czech Republic is also expected to assign to
NATO's force structure elements of both their immediate and rapid
reaction brigades, as well as fighter and combat helicopter squadrons,
search and rescue units, chemical defense units, and mechanized and
artillery brigades. The military and MOD staffs will also continue to
refine the DPQ Reply with NATO and help develop its Target Force Goals,
which are due early next year.
Presently, Hungary has assigned to NATO both immediate reaction and
rapid reaction forces, consisting of combat brigades and battalions,
support brigades and battalions, fighter squadrons, artillery units,
and anti-air, anti-armor and combat helicopter assets. These forces are
only partially able to conduct joint operations with NATO at present,
but the Hungarians are working hard to increase capabilities. Hungary
has also earmarked to NATO a number of air force units.
C. National Efforts
PfP and NATO defense planning efforts are only part of the work of
these countries to be able to perform the task of collective defense. I
have regularly worked with the governments of these countries on NATO
issues. In mid-September, I traveled to Budapest, Prague and Warsaw to
discuss with senior civilian and military officials the steps which
these countries are taking to prepare themselves for NATO membership.
In extremely candid sessions, they provided their assessments of their
own strengths and weaknesses, and they discussed in great detail their
plans for improving their interoperability with NATO forces. Remedying
many of the shortcomings they identified will be costly, and some will
take time. I was, however, pleased with what I heard. Let me review
some of their efforts.
1. Military reforms and modernization
In Poland, I was briefed last month on the wide range of military
reforms and modernization programs that will reshape Poland's military
doctrine, restructure the armed forces, and modernize military
technology and capabilities. The Ministry of Defense has developed a
comprehensive 15-year plan to modernize the military and make it
interoperable with NATO, assisted by the defense planning skills
learned from the processes of compiling Poland's Defense Planning
Questionnaire Reply and cooperating with NATO Staff on the development
of Target Force Goals. The initial focus of the long-term plan will be
on several key areas: command, control and communications (C3); air
defense and air traffic control; logistics and infrastructure; and
personnel reform, including a 21 percent reduction in forces and an
increase in the quality of training provided to those that remain.
These areas of focus are identical to those we see as critical.
Hungary has developed its own plan, ``Force 2000'', to better
prepare it for NATO admission. Its goals are to downsize the armed
forces, standardize structures along NATO lines, further
professionalize and increase the volunteer personnel in its force, and
improve the quality of military life. This plan is scheduled for
completion in 2001. After 1998, the Hungarians will focus on additional
NATO adaptation requirements and the modernization of land and air
force equipment. Hungary has an integrated system of defense planning
compatible with the NATO system. The new command and organizational
structure, to be in place by the end of 1997, places the main emphasis
on establishing NATO compatibility. The medium-term plan priorities
include the modernization of air defense, reconnaissance, information
and control systems, the acquisition of modem armored and transport
vehicles, modernization of aircraft and helicopters, implementation of
NATO standards, and training and equipment interoperability for NATO
designated units. Hungary has devoted a large amount of staff time to
learning the NATO defense planning process. The staff is now turning
its attention to completing the process and focusing on the development
of NATO-directed Target Force Goals by early next year.
The Czech defense leadership is well aware that their process of
creating a new defense establishment is far from complete. They know
that they need to take steps to increase public support for membership
(and recent polls do show much increased support); that serious,
effective military personnel reform must take place; that a series of
defense acts must be passed by parliament to legalize the reforms being
implemented in the Czech Armed Forces; and that interagency
coordination on defense issues must be improved. They realize that they
have much work to do in these areas; while they are working with us and
other Allies to overcome them, the Czechs know that they will have to
do the majority of work themselves. The Ministry of Defense will be
working hard to implement the recommendations of its recently-approved
long-term defense plan, ``National Defense Concept 2005,'' which
addresses most of the Czech Republic's crucial defense reform
challenges.
2. Allocating Sufficient Resources
The reforms called for in each country's long-term modernization
plan will not come cheap, and each country has pledged to commit the
resources required to achieve their objectives. Poland has carefully
thought through the financial implications of the broad reforms in its
15-year plan, which calls for annual increases in defense spending
which are pegged to the levels of GDP growth to cover the necessary
costs. Based on a conservative estimate of 4.2 percent annual growth,
defense spending will increase approximately 3.2 percent annually. In
1996, Poland spent 2.3 percent of its GDP on defense, a higher
percentage than half of current NATO Allies.
Hungary has also focused on the need to provide adequate resources
for defense. The total national defense budget for 1997 is about $800M,
which represents about 1.8% of projected GDP. Hungary has stated that
it plans to link defense spending growth to the rate of GDP growth and
to increase the percentage of GDP dedicated to defense by 0.1 percent
annually for the next five years. If so, Hungarian defense spending may
increase in real terms by three to eight percent annually during the
next four years. Between 80-85% of future planned defense budgets will
be dedicated to the maintenance of the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF),
and 15-20% will be allocated to its development. Hungary assesses that
this budget may not provide the necessary funds for a significant
degree of modernization in the armed forces. Until the end of 1998,
Hungary will allocate 12% of its military budget to procurement and
modernization; in 2001, Hungary plans to increase the amount allocated
to 25%. Lacking sufficient overall fiscal resources for modernization
of the entire force, we can anticipate that Hungary will concentrate
its efforts in specific areas such as modernizing air and air defense
forces, modernizing C41 capabilities and preparing selected ground
units capable of operating alongside NATO forces in peacekeeping and
out-of-area operations.
Czech military, defense, foreign affairs and parliamentary
officials assured me in September that the Czech Republic plans to
increase its defense budget by 0.1 percent of GDP for each of the next
three years, bringing defense spending up to 2.0 percent of GDP by the
year 2000. For 1998, using Czech Defense Ministry figures, this would
raise total defense spending from approximately $900 million to $1.1
billion dollars. Such a decision is a positive sign, particularly in
light of the devastation caused by the recent floods, which hit about
one-third of the country. I am confident that their determination to
implement crucial reforms and their decision to devote substantial
resources to the restructuring and modernization of the armed forces
will help make the Czech military a net provider of security by 1999.
D. CORE CAPABILITIES AND INTEROPERABILITY
The Czechs, Poles and Hungarians are all focusing on the
deficiencies that we believe present the greatest challenges:
personnel; training and the adoption of NATO doctrine; and
interoperability.
1. Personnel
We have made it clear to all three that serious, effective military
personnel reform must be accomplished as soon as possible within the
Armed Forces, and all three have begun to take the necessary steps. The
Czechs agree that they need to create a Western structured military,
reliant on an effective Non-Commissioned Officer corps, with quality,
well-trained forces that are properly recruited, paid, housed, and
retained. To accomplish these goals, they understand that they need to
dedicate the required resources and, in some cases, pass appropriate
legislation.
Personnel reforms will encompass perhaps the most drastic and the
most difficult changes to the Polish military. The military has
announced plans to cut total forces from 230,000 to 198,000 by 1999,
and to 180,000 by 2004. It will increase the number of career soldiers
from 36 percent to 50 percent of total troops, and it plans to improve
the junior-to-senior officer ratio from its current 50:50 to a more
appropriate 70:30 by the year 2012. To reflect better the reliance by
NATO militaries on a skilled, professional NCO corps, Poland plans to
increase the number of NCOs to one-third of its total forces and to
invest heavily in their training.
Difficult personnel reforms are also needed in Hungary. Hungary's
priority areas for personnel also include improving the ratio of junior
to senior officers and of officers to NCOS, but they also plan to
address quality of life issues for the military, win a 23% pay raise
for the military in 1998 (Parliament votes on this issue in early
December), and enact legislation on pay standards (scheduled to take
effect on January 1, 1999). The military has stated that it will cut
ground forces personnel from the present 59,715 to 34,000 by 2005, and
Air Force personnel from the current 17,500 to 14,000. Hungary hopes to
have a 60:40 professional to conscript ratio by the end of the century.
Another important objective is to increase the present one-to-one
proportion of NCOs to officers to two-to-one, and ultimately three-to-
one. The length of service for conscripts will be reduced from 12 to 9
months.
Like Poland and Hungary, personnel reforms will be perhaps the most
drastic and most difficult change for the Czech military to implement.
The Czechs assured us during a recent visit to Prague by Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy Fred Pang that
personnel reform is their number one military priority. They pledged to
develop, with our support, a concrete action plan that will address and
correct their personnel deficiencies.
The Czechs began the process of implementing personnel reform back
in March when it approved the National Defense Concept. The primary
objective of the concept is to reorient the military away from the
heavy, manpower-intensive Soviet-style corps of the Warsaw Pact and
toward smaller, more mobile, NATO-compatible units in both the Czech
Ground Forces (Army) and Air Forces. The plan aims to downsize the
armed forces to 55,000; develop a professional cadre of career
soldiers; standardize structures along NATO lines; improve the quality
of military life; and, most importantly, develop a professional NCO
corps. The implementation of this plan, which started on July 1, is
scheduled for completion by the end of 1998.
2. Training and NATO Doctrine
Each country has begun to aggressively adopt NATO doctrine and
incorporate it into their training programs. Within the PfP framework,
all have obtained NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGS) and
regulations and are translating them as fast as they receive the
documents from Brussels. All three have also set up NATO Integration
departments in the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, as well
as in the General Staff, to help achieve their prioritized
interoperability goals and facilitate their swift operational
integration into the Alliance.
Training will become a crucial element of each country's
integration plans. The operational experience gained through active
participation in PfP exercises has greatly improved the ability of all
three invitees to operate jointly with NATO forces. Each country is
conducting staff exchanges with the United States in such areas as
acquisition, budget and finance, logistics, public affairs and
legislative affairs.
The one million dollars Poland received from the United States
under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program
has provided training in such key areas as English language skills, NCO
development, and logistics. Poland has also received training from
other Allies in logistics, English language, C3, and defense planning.
English language proficiency is a critical element of NATO
interoperability. and Poland plans to have 25 percent of officers in
NATO-designated units proficient by 1999. Over 1,100 officers per year
are currently studying NATO languages (primarily English).
The Hungarians have placed a great deal of emphasis on training.
Two of Hungary's highest priorities are to increase English proficiency
and to improve the quality of professional training, and the one
million dollars in IMET funds which the United States provided in 1997
has been spent wisely in both areas. NATO Allies also provide training
to Hungary in NATO doctrine, recruitment, defense planning, and force
modernization.
Training provided by the United States and Allies has directly
impacted both Hungarian operational capabilities and senior-level
defense planning and reform. The Chief of the Defense Staff and
Commander of the HDF is the first officer of his grade and
responsibility from all of Central and Eastern Europe to attend the
U.S. Army War College. His First Deputy Chief of Staff is also a U.S.
War College graduate. Together, based on their U.S.-training, they have
successfully restructured the Hungarian General Staff and Service
Staffs along NATO lines to be more compatible and interoperable with
NATO.
The Czech Republic rightfully views the Partnership for Peace (PfP)
program as the most direct path to achieving NATO compatibility, and
its participation with the United States and other Allies have enabled
it to begin developing the capabilities needed for it to operate with
NATO forces. Active PfP participation, coupled with its peacekeeping
activities, already allows Prague to contribute well-trained and
seasoned personnel that are familiar with NATO procedures and
operations. The Czechs have used the $800,000 in IMET funds provided by
the United States in 1997 for training in such areas as English
language skills, NCO development, and defense planning. The Czech
Republic has also received training from other Allies--the United
Kingdom, France and Germany, among others--in C3, logistics, air
defense, and air traffic control.
3. Interoperability
The third broad area of national effort for each of these countries
is interoperability with a focus on C3, air defense architecture,
logistics, and infrastructure. All three invitees will be making
significant investments to infrastructure improvements--some of which
they would have made whether they were invited to join the Alliance or
not--and they know that those improvements will be costly. We are
finding, however, that some of the infrastructure inherited from the
Warsaw Pact is adequate and does not require significant modifications
for NATO use. When a SHAPE assessment team visited Poland in September,
for example, they asked a Polish major familiar with the details of a
particular rail complex whether we could reasonably expect to transport
a NATO armored division through it in one week's time. The amused major
replied by asking the SHAPE general how many Soviet heavy divisions he
thought they planned on moving through the same location when the
trains were heading west.
All three countries are also moving quickly ahead on initiatives to
improve interoperability in key areas. For example, sweeping reforms to
existing air defense and air traffic control systems have greatly
improved the three invitees' ability to defend and manage their
airspace. When their Air Sovereignty Operations Centers (ASOC) come
online in 1998, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will have
consolidated control of their civilian and military air traffic control
networks into one streamlined system and be ready to establish a future
link with NATO's air defense system when the political decision to do
so is made. Hungary has already completed the installation of
``identification-friend-or-foe'' (IFF) transponders to their modem
combat aircraft, and Poland and the Czech Republic plan to do so by
1999.
POLAND
Poland has ensured that most senior unit commanders are familiar
with NATO command, control and communications procedures by
incorporating NATO C3 procedures into its training, by participating in
C3-related Partnership for Peace exercises, and by adopting NATO
command structures, military maps, and hundreds of standardization
agreements (STANAGs). U.S. Warsaw Initiative funds are being used to
acquire NATO-interoperable communications equipment, and a U.S. Air
Force team conducting a C3 interoperability study reported that Poland
already has ``an excellent foundation for achieving NATO
interoperability objectives'' in this area.
Poland has selected two air defense squadrons for full NATO
interoperability, and it is working to implement NATO air defense
doctrine across the board. Improvements made under the Warsaw
Initiative-funded Regional Airspace Initiative (RAI) have enabled
Poland to cut air defense personnel from 110,000 in 1991 to 56,000 in
1997, and it is striving ultimately to bring this number down to
38,000.
Poland's ports, airfields, rail and road networks and other
infrastructure are already largely capable of receiving NATO troops and
materiel, and its logistics forces are working to improve their ability
to support NATO troop deployments to Poland and Polish troop
deployments abroad. Poland has identified specific areas where
improvements continue to be required, and it has included them in its
15-year modernization plan. Poland's defense infrastructure includes
nine training facilities that are available to NATO, several of which
have already been used by NATO Allies.
HUNGARY
Along with the Poles and the Czechs, the Hungarians are moving
ahead with their new NATO-interoperable Air Sovereignty Operations
Center. Force modernization is required in all services but will take
many years due to lack of available funds. Approximately 70-80% of
major equipment is becoming antiquated, for example, and the current
air defense capability is limited.
In the area of command, control, and communications (C3), the
Hungarians have incorporated NATO C3 procedures into training, ensured
that all major unit commanders are familiar with NATO C3, stressed
English language training, and made very effective use of the funding
Congress has made available through the International Military
Education and Training program. All Service schools and academies
include NATO C3 in their curricula. Active participation in C3-related
PfP exercises has helped them adopt NATO-compatible procedures. They
are using over $3 million in Warsaw Initiative funding to acquire NATO-
interoperable communications equipment, and plan on spending more this
fiscal year.
In the area of Air Defense and Air Traffic Control, the Hungarians
are in the process of merging civilian and military air traffic control
networks. They hope to see the ASOC operational in 1998 and already
have aircraft equipped with IFF systems, as previously mentioned. In
addition to the U.S., Belgium and the Netherlands are providing Air
Traffic Control assistance.
In the area of infrastructure, the Hungarians are well on their way
toward the creation of a NATO-compatible air base at Taszar that can be
used as a staging base. Their assistance has allowed us to throughput
more than 80,000 U.S. military personnel for rotation into and out of
IFOR/SFOR assignments, and Hungary will continue to provide such host
nation and transit support for Allied forces.
As far as logistics are concerned, the Hungarians have set a
medium-term objective to improve interoperability and the capability to
receive NATO troops and materiel. They hope to have NATO fuel
classification and increased distribution capabilities by 1999. They
have established a NATO logistics liaison unit in the General Staff,
and the U.S.-contracted Logistics Management Institute conducted a very
successful logistics exercise last month.
CZECH REPUBLIC
The Czech modernization program also focuses on C3; air defense and
air traffic control, and infrastructure. In the area of C3, the Czechs
have incorporated NATO C3 procedures into training; all major unit
commanders are familiar with NATO C3 and they have stressed English
language training. All Service schools also include NATO C3
instruction. In the area of Air Defense and Air Traffic Control, the
Czechs are in the process of merging their civilian and military air
traffic control networks (considered state-of-the-art), a process which
will be completed with the introduction of their Air Sovereignty
Operations Center (ASOC) in 1998.
In the area of infrastructure, the Czech Republic's airfields, rail
and road networks, as previously mentioned, are already capable of
receiving some NATO troops and materiel. It is also working closely
with NATO to make sure its infrastructure will be NATO-compatible.
As far as logistics are concerned, the Czechs, like the other two
invitees, have set a medium-term objective to improve interoperability
and the capability to receive NATO troops and materiels They are
working with NATO on a number of key issues, including plans to
increase their distribution and storage capabilities by 1999. They have
also established a NATO logistics cell in the General Staff. They have
flexible and redundant distribution networks for petroleum, oil and
lubricants; are increasing their links to western oil and gas
pipelines; and possess sufficient munitions for their current weapons
systems.
CONCLUSION
Reforming military doctrine, overhauling personnel systems, and
modernizing weaponry and equipment are not small tasks, and all three
countries' armed forces certainly have hard work ahead of them. It goes
without saying that much still needs to be done to turn their plans
into reality. However, their Political and military leaders are firmly
committed to their integration with the West and to their membership in
NATO. They have promised to dedicate the necessary resources to improve
their military capabilities, and the defense establishments of the
United States and other NATO Allies will continue to help them achieve
their objectives by providing training, advice and material assistance.
I am fully confident that, with the reforms and strategies currently
being implemented in all three countries, Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic will be both reliable allies and net Producers of security to
the North Atlantic Alliance.
Thank you.
Prepared Statement of Dr. Stephen A. Cambone,
Senior Fellow, Political-Military Studies Program,
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear before this Committee to
discuss with you my judgment of the military capabilities of Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic, each of which have been invited to
accede to the Washington Treaty and become members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.
My judgment of the candidates' military capability is based on two
factors. First, the strategic objective of the United States in seeking
the enlargement of NATO. Second, on an estimate of the contribution to
be made by the military capabilities of the enlarged alliance to the
achievement of that objective. I will define both factors, briefly,
because I derive the criteria for judging the military capabilities of
the candidates from them.
Strategic Objective of Enlargement
By enlarging NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic, the US can reasonably assure itself that economic, political
or military developments in the heart of Europe will not provide the
occasion, as it has repeatedly in the past, for tension, crisis and
war. Those occasions in the past have been rooted in what seem to be
two, immutable, facts of European history, over the last three
centuries. The first is the inherent weakness of the states within the
Central European region. The second is their location between the
powerful states of Europe to their west and east. Over those three
centuries it is possible to trace the origins of Europe's major wars,
in whole or in part, to these two immutable facts.
We enter the fourth century of Europe's modern history with the
facts of European political, economic and military life fundamentally
unchanged. Western Europe possesses political and economic power
unimaginable only fifty years ago and far in excess of what any state
in Central Europe can hope to approach for a generation or more.
Russia, while weak as it recovers from the ravages of communism, it is
not without substantial political, economic and military potential.
That potential is fully within its reach and if realized its power
would dwarf the states in the Central European region within a
generation. We are hopeful that these facts will not lead to tension,
crisis and war in the coming generation. We also are hopeful that the
states of Europe have renounced war as an instrument of state policy.
But prudence dictates that we not rely on our hopes and that we
ought not to allow chance the opportunity to play its fickle role in
our affairs. This is especially so when we have at hand the means to
assure, so far as it is possible, that the immutable facts of
political, economic and military power in Europe do not follow their
historical course. The enlargement of NATO to the states of Central
Europe can provide this assurance. Through enlargement the members of
the alliance, and none more than the US, can assist the candidate
states to complete their transition to modem liberal states and
establish friendly relations with their neighbors. But more than this,
the enlargement of NATO creates the conditions under which these states
are shielded from pressures from their east while permitting the US and
its allies to extend through them a liberal and liberating influence
into the Baltics, the Balkans and eastward toward Minsk, Kiev and
Moscow.
For those schooled in the old concept of geopolitics, enlargement
consolidates in Europe the political victory of the democracies over
tyranny in the Cold War, deters those who might seek to exploit the
real and potential disparities of power on the continent and defends
the still nascent civil society of Europe against aggression of any
form. For those schooled in the new concept of preventive diplomacy,
enlargement further reduces the likelihood of conflict today, protects
the newly founded liberal regimes in the heart of Europe and increases
the possibility that nations further to the east will find in the
success of their immediate neighbors examples worthy of emulation.
The Military Contribution to our Strategic Objectives
The achievement of our strategic objective requires a combination
of political, economic and military initiatives. Our attention here is
on the contribution to be made by our military capabilities to
achieving our objective. With respect to those capabilities, the US
chose to ally itself through the Washington Treaty and to combine its
forces in NATO with those of its allies in order to assure that in
Europe sufficient military capability would exist to accomplish the
following missions.
a defense by each ally of its borders and its air and sea
approaches,
collective defense among the allies to maximize their
individual deterrent and defense capabilities,
and, in the aftermath of the Cold War, ``out of area'' or
peace support operations by any combination of allies operating
as a combined force.
This mission list remains the priority listing for allies within
NATO. The priority is dictated by the requirement of a sovereign state
to see first to its own security, to that of its allies and then to
that of the regional or international system. But if the list reflects
the obligations of states to their citizens, circumstances dictate how
best to accomplish these missions. During the Cold War each ally had to
provide substantial forces to defend its borders and air and sea
approaches. But each ally understood that no member of the alliance was
capable of providing for its security alone. The collective
capabilities of all were needed to lend to each the confidence that
together they could defend themselves should deterrence fail.
The decisive victory of the Cold War has made it possible for the
allies individually and the alliance as a whole to pursue these
missions in ways different than they did during the Cold War. Today,
the maintenance of the collective defense capabilities of the alliance
remains essential to the defense of each ally. But today, and into the
future, the absence of a massive, imminent and direct hegemonic threat
means that the requirements imposed on each ally to defend itself are
substantially lower than they were during the Cold War. Yet the risks
to allied nations have not disappeared by any means. A few examples
illustrate the point. Kaliningrad is still a depot for a large number
of competent troops that could be used to influence affairs in the
Baltic region or in Belarus, with direct consequences for Poland.
Ukraine and Russia are closer today than at any time in the post-Soviet
era. But Ukraine has embarked on a security policy that is not entirely
coincident with that of Moscow. Tension between Russia and Ukraine will
affect Poland, Hungary and the rest of NATO. We have seen how crisis
and conflict in the Balkans can threaten allied security. Iraqi and
Iranian arms build-ups pose a threat as well. So, too, do developments
along the African littoral. Again, these are not threats of the same
kind as posed by the Red Army and the USSR. But they are threats to the
territory of NATO's member states that must be addressed by a
combination of national defense establishments and collective defense
efforts.
In this reduced threat environment all allies have agreed that
their security depends more today than in the past on their ability to
conduct military operations on or beyond the periphery of the alliance.
A reactive defense doctrine does not meet the strategic conditions of
the day. Based on this assessment, and given the logic and the habits
of allied cooperation the allies have reached agreement on two points.
First, they will continue to maintain collective defense capabilities
to deter the lower but not insignificant probability of a direct and
massive attack on one or more of them. Second, some or all of them may
draw on those capabilities to conduct operations on or beyond the
periphery of the alliance to deter or defeat threats that each of them
believe undermine their security.
It is into this newly revised framework for collective defense that
the national capabilities of new members of the alliance must be
fitted, And it is in the context of that framework, and the
requirements for collective defense and power projection that it
imposes on the allies that the contributions of the new members should
be judged.
NATO's New Standards
Mr. Chairman, it is not so long ago that we measured the military
capability of NATO in terms of armored division equivalents. But such
measurements have been rendered anachronistic by two developments. The
most obvious is the absence of an immediate and massive armored threat
to NATO. The second, and more important, is that modem military power
is no longer measured in the terms associated with armored division
equivalents--general defense positions (GDPs), forward edge of the
battle area (FEBA), echeloned forces, etc. In today's combat
environment the silicon chip has all but conquered rolled homogenous
steel. Precision strikes, launched by platforms in the air, on land and
at sea, are replacing massed forces. High speed, secure communications
to relay information to combatant forces are now rivaling traditional
lines of communication as the essential arteries of combat operations.
While seizing and holding territory may remain the key to securing the
aims of a war, it is now possible to think of winning battles and
campaigns by destroying an enemy's forces and supporting infrastructure
from long range and without having to mass friendly forces on the
adversary's soil.
Whether one views these changes in warfare as a revolution or as
the natural progression in technology and tactics over the last twenty
years, the fact is that the military forces required to conduct
operations today and into the future are very different from those
fielded in the past. Among the allies, the US has moved swiftly to
exploit these new technologies and tactics. The reasons for this are
complex but may boil down to this: Americans have a penchant for
adapting to new technology and a pressing need to increase the
effectiveness of our forces to meet our unique global commitments in an
age of fixed military budgets.
Our allies have not moved to exploit the new technologies and
tactics as quickly as we have, but they have made substantial progress
nonetheless. Like us, each of them has taken the difficult steps of
reducing their manpower overall, reducing the proportion of their
forces made up of conscripts and making the transition from military
capabilities designed in the late 1970s to those designed for the next
century. The pace of this transition, begun later than ours, is
hampered by the fact that allied defense spending is not directed by a
central authority, but by the governments of each ally. The result is
that the efficiency of spending on new technology and the adaptation of
their forces for new tactics is degraded.
That said, the allies are confident enough in their own progress to
have adopted a new approach to NATO defense planning. Instead of the
fixed GDPS, FEBAS, etc., of the past, the alliance has decided to plan
its defense around ``projection forces.'' That is, rather than suffer
the expense of maintaining large numbers of troops for deployment to
pre-planned defense positions when the threat does not demand such
deployments, the alliance has agreed that it would rely on the rapid
assembly and deployment of forces to conduct both traditional
collective defense missions as well as newer, out of area and peace
support operations. As a result smaller, more professional forces
supported by advanced C41SR (command, control, communications,
computational, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance)
capabilities and armed with more lethal weapons for ground-, air- and
sea-based combat are being introduced into national forces and assigned
to NATO to meet allied mission priorities.
Converting Cold War Forces
The United States has led the way in converting its forces from its
Cold War emphasis on national defense and contributions to allied
collective defense forces. A few example suffice to make the point.
In 1985, the US spent 6.5% of its GDP on defense. By 1995 spending
had fallen to 3.8% of GDP. In 1995 constant dollars, this means we are
spending $90 billion less a year than we spent in 1986.
This absolute decline in spending is reflected in the forces. Over the
same period the armed forces were reduced by some 600,000 personnel.
The number of active army divisions shrank from 18 to 10; the number of
navy combatants from nearly 600 to less than 350 and the number of
active air force fighter wings from 25 to 12. Equally important,
weapons acquisition spending has been cut in half, from about $150 B in
the mid-1980s to about $80 B today with only half of that in
procurement. Procurement is slated to increase after the turn of the
century, but for much of the 1990s the US bought only a handful of
tanks, aircraft and ships.
Allied military capabilities have been adjusted as well. In 1985,
allied spending amounted to 3.1% of GDP; by 1995 it was 2.3%. In 1995
constant dollars the decline in allied spending is not so great as that
of the US: today the allies are spending $10 billion less
in a year than they did in 1985. The armed forces shrank by about
600,000 troops as well. Weapons acquisition spending in 1996 was about
$40 B, down from about $50 B in 1990. Substantial efforts are being
made in national and multinational programs to bring on line modern
fighter aircraft (France: Rafale; IT/GER/UK: EFA), transport aircraft
(UK: C-130J, others: FLA), communications and surveillance satellites
(UK; FR/GER/SP); new transport and attack helicopters and self-
propelled artillery, new frigates, minehunters, amphibious ships (UK
and FR) and an aircraft carrier (FR). These efforts are being slowed by
domestic budgetary restrictions and the difficulties experienced by the
Europeans in multinational program management.
It is the case that the US and its allies are presently out of
phase with respect to modern military capability. The reason is the
high level of procurement spending by the US in the 1980s which was
nearly three times that of its allies. These so-called legacy systems--
displayed to such effect in Iraq--were designed in the late 1970s and
early 1980s and began coming on line in the mid-1980s and early 1990s.
They will carry us through the 1990s and will form the backbone of US
forces until 2005-2010. New technology forces--advanced C41SR systems
and processes, the F-22, the digitized army, new navy ship designs,
more accurate and lethal stand-off weapons, etc.--will begin to come on
line in large numbers post-2010.
The advent of new technology systems in the US will occur about the
time allies are completing the process of fielding the systems they are
currently procuring. These systems, designed in the mid- to late-1980s
for the most part, will not possess the most advanced ``stealth''
characteristics of American aircraft, be able to provide the
situational awareness available to US Army forces or be able to provide
the volume and variety of firepower US navy ships will be able to
project from the sea. But for all that, allied forces will be not be
interior to anticipated threats and will be interoperable with US
forces. The silicon revolution and constant training makes it possible
to do with software and tactics what hardware would otherwise prevent.
The more troubling aspect of the modernization efforts of the
current allies is the lack of funding for those assets that operate
above the corps level--C4ISR, long-range air transport, air refueling,
hospital units, engineering units, logistics and supply capabilities.
That is, the allies are not investing as heavily as they might in those
elements of military power essential to the sustained projection of
military power. The allies are conscious of their shortfall and, within
what they believe are real constraints related to enlarging the EU and
bringing about European monetary union, are doing their best to
overcome it.
France is determined to develop in the next ten years the ability
to project 40,000 troops at a distance of 2,000 km and sustain them
indefinitely. This effort is hampered by its need to shed itself of
thousands of conscripts and its determination to equip the force out of
European industry. The UK is procuring amphibious ships and shorter-
range C130Js to give them greater lift and mobility. Its desire to
balance procurement between the US and Europe, however, leads it to
hesitate to commit to a buy or lease of a US C-17 capability so long as
there is a reasonable prospect of the future large aircraft being
launched by its European industrial partners. Germany is putting
together a KRK or crisis reaction corps of 50,000 men for projection
missions. But it is reluctant to provide it with above corps echelon
capability because it does not want to give the impression that it is
able to conduct modern military operations independently of its allies.
The projection shortfall of our major allies can be overcome. But
it will require a political agreement between the US and them on a
major issue--defense industrial base reform and long-term procurement
practices. This is beyond the scope of NATO enlargement, but it is
critical to its success.
Candidate Member's Capabilities
Mr. Chairman, in providing insight into the capabilities of the
candidate members it is always helpful to have a few static figures in
mind. These figures do not by themselves tell us enough about the
potential of candidates. But they are useful for comparative purposes.
Poland: In 1985 Poland had some 320 thousand personnel in the
armed forces. It spent about $7.8 billion (in 1995 dollars) or 8.1% of
its GDP on defense. Today, Poland deploys about 215 thousand personnel;
it spends about $3.6 billion or 2.4% of GDP. Its plans call for it to
further reduce its armed forces to around 180 thousand and to maintain
spending at the current level of 2.4% of GDP. The EIU estimates GDP in
1997 at about $136 billion and real growth at an average of 5.7%
between 1996 and 2004. Thus, a roughly $163 billion GDP should yield
about $4.0 for defense in 2001, an increase of $600 million in
comparison to today.
Hungary: In 1985 Hungary had some 106 thousand personnel in the
armed forces. It spent about $5.2 billion (in 1995 dollars) or 7.2% of
its GDP on defense. Today, Hungary is reducing its armed forces to
about 44 thousand personnel; it spends about $630 million or 1.4% of
GDP on defense. Its plans call for it to increase spending at a rate of
0.1 percent of GDP per year until it reaches 1.8% of GDP. The EIU
estimates GDP in 1997 at about $43 billion and real growth at an
average of 4.5% through 2001. Thus, a roughly $60 billion GDP should
yield about $1.0 for defense in 2001, an increase of $400
million in comparison to today.
Czech Republic: Figures for the Czech Republic are not comparable
due to the ``velvet divorce'' between it and Slovakia. Under the
settlement the Czech Republic took a roughly 2:1 share of defense
assets. Today the Czech Republic deploys about 60 thousand troops, it
spends about $850 million or 1.7% of its GDP. Its plans call for an
increase in spending to 2.0% of GDP by 2000. The EIU estimates GDP at
about $50 billion today and real economic growth through 2001 at about
3.3% Thus, a roughly $60 billion GDP should yield about $1.2 billion
for defense in 2001, an increase of $350 million in comparison to
today.
These figures should not be viewed as predictions and some
variations in the numbers are possible, depending on deflators, which
elements of the budget are counted against defense, etc. Nevertheless,
what then, tell us is that, all else being equal, the three candidate
countries in 2001 could have, in comparison to 1997, some $1.3-1.4
billion a year among them in additional funds to spend on defense. This
suggests that the cost of enlargement, reasonably defined, are
certainly affordable.
But the availability of funds is not an indicator of a willingness
to spend those funds or to spend them in ways that make sense from the
perspective of the military capabilities of the alliance. With respect
to a willingness to spend, we can only take the word of the ministers
and parilaimentarians of the three countries. With respect to spending
in ways that make sense, that depends on a close collaboration between
national authorities and those of NATO. And in this regard developments
tend to support the view that these nations have begun to make concrete
decisions that will yield substantial military capability for
themselves and the alliance in about a decade's time.
Manpower: I have already indicated that each of the candidates has
dramatically reduced their overall manpower. Now they are taking, or
about to take, two very difficult decisions. The first is to reduce the
overall ratio of senior officers to junior officers and to raise the
percentage of quality of non-commissioned officers. The surplus of
officers and lack of trained NCOs is a product of their Warsaw Pact
heritage when command structures were oriented to top-down orders to
execute set-piece battle plans. NATO armies have always favored
initiative by junior officers and NCOS. The new technology and tactics
require that these junior officers and NCOs have a great deal of
responsibility. To improve the ratios of officers and the competence of
NCOS, Hungary introduced mandatory retirement at age 55, leading to a
reduction of 25% of existing general officers in 1995. An additional 10
generals were expected to retire in 1996. The Czech Republic has
promised to reverse the 2:1 ratio of officers to NCOs and began that
process in 1996. The issue is more sensitive for the Poles, but they
have committed to make the changes. In order to bring up new talent,
they are offering retirement at 15 years and 40% pay to currently
serving officers.
The second significant manpower-related decision is to increase the
ratio of professionals to conscripts in the armed forces. Poland and
Hungary plan their forces to be 60% professional; the Czech Republic is
moving to a 50% ratio. In all three cases the increased ratio does not
represent a dramatic increase in the total number of professionals
because in all three cases the dramatic cut in armed forces personnel
since 1985 has occurred in the conscript ranks. But what it does mean
is that the per soldier cost will rise. In return, each will have a
professional-based units available for NATO operations.
Modernization: Existing stocks of weapons in each nation, except
perhaps for aircraft, are not so inferior in age or technical
capability as compared to those of other NATO powers. All three are
committed to upgrading their C41 capability, air defense forces, and
ground force components, the last primarily through upgrades of
existing equipment. To be sure, each of the three is faced with the
need to replace the bulk of their fighter aircraft. However,
appreciating the cost of aircraft and in light of NATO assurances that
Brussels is not expecting the candidates to invest heavily in new
platforms (specifically aircraft), all three nations have delayed
making firm plans or commitments to new purchases. Nevertheless, Soviet
MiGs and Sukhols will eventually need to be replaced (more on this
below). But in keeping with the overall commitment to make the less
glamorous and often unseen changes to infrastructure first so that the
effects of subsequent modernization can be maximized, all three nations
have committed to bringing a modem regional air control system on line.
The military and civilian systems inherited from the Warsaw Pact were
unacceptable to NATO. The new regional air control system will both
improve civil and military air traffic control and improve safety while
making the next step in the process--settling on IFF (identification
friend or foe) codes and procedures--easier and quicker to implement.
Thus, when replacement aircraft are deployed, they will operate in a
NATO-compatible environment.
Military Contributions: The internal reform of the armed forces and
their modernization are intended to make the military forces of the
candidates capable of operating alongside their NATO allies. But none
of the three has waited for NATO membership to contribute.
The Czech Republic offered chemical warfare detection vehicles to
the coalition forces in the Gulf War. It has deployed a mechanized
infantry unit of some 850 men to Bosnia as part of IFOR/SFOR. This unit
is made up of volunteers from the Czech rapid deployment brigade, which
is already considered to be NATO compatible. It is also the view of
many that the Czech infrastructure--roads, rail nets and stations,
pipelines, airports, etc.--is already adequate to support NATO's rapid
reaction corps.
Hungary has made its airspace and its base as Taszar available to
NATO forces to support operations in Bosnia. And given the modest
amount of upgrading needed at Taszar, its infrastructure may prove,
like that of the Czech republic, to be in better condition to support
allied forces than has previously been thought. The allied use of
Hungarian airspace has resulted in its completion of efforts to equip
all of its aircraft with NATO-compatible IFF. In addition to its
airspace and bases, Hungary has also made available a 450 man
engineering battalion for service with IFOR/SFOR. Individuals from this
unit are now reconstructing the bridge in Mostar. By 2005 It is
expected that Hungarian reforms and modernization will allow it to
deploy as many as three rapid reaction brigades fully NATO compatible.
Poland, like the Czech Republic supported the coalition in the
Gulf, allowing transit rights and sending medical teams to Saudi
Arabia. It has contributed an airborne battalion of troops in Bosnia
under IFOR/SFOR, deployed as part of the multinational Nordic Brigade.
(It also has a battalion in Syria as part of the UNDOF.) The Poles have
made at least two brigades and a field hospital unit available to NATO
in 1997 and plans to have two more brigades sufficiently NATO
compatible to conduct peace support operations by 2000. Observers
believe its infrastructure generally adequate to support all elements
of NATO's rapid reaction corps.
All three are full and eager participants in PFP. Since 1995, all
three have participated in a dozen or more PFP exercises. Hungary funds
its PFP activities outside the military budget, a sure sign of its
commitment. Poland has become a favored location for armored training
by the UK.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, it is evident that the candidates will
have the financial resources to meet their anticipated obligations,
they have made significant efforts to reform their military forces,
began modernization efforts and are contributing to allied military
operations.
Looking to the Future
Does this mean that all is in hand and we can rest assured of a
successful outcome? No. Economic forecasts are notoriously unreliable
and growth projections could fall short. But even if their economies
grow less than suggested earlier, the combination of force draw downs
and reform and real economic growth should provide the three together
with additional defense funds to meet their new obligations to NATO.
There are four additional factors which, if managed with a clear
eye on our ultimate goal, could smooth the integration of the candidate
nations into the alliance and substantially enhance the capability of
its member states to provide for modern national defense forces, to
contribute to collective defense and cooperate in ``out of area''
missions. They are listed in increasing order of importance:
the evolution of the transatlantic defense industrial base
and national procurement policies. US industry has a
substantial lead on its European counterparts in the process of
down sizing and consolidation. European efforts are hampered by
the complicating issues of policy within the EU. But the
introduction of the Euro (European Monetary Union) will speed
the process in Europe as fiscal and budgetary policies are
harmonized in the Euro's wake. This will affect the candidate
members as well, all of whom are also EU candidates. The US and
the EU need to put in place soon the laws and regulations that
will allow for two consolidated defense industrial bases to
maximize their comparative advantages while minimizing
politically disruptive economically unproductive competition.
the candidate states have been given assurances by NATO that
they are not expected to undertake large, near-term purchases
of expensive defense equipment and platforms. This assurance
makes good sense in light of the earlier discussion.
Nevertheless, the obsolescent state of their air forces will
require that each of them put in place soon a long range plan
to reduce their force structures, upgrade units where feasible
and plan for the financing of replacement aircraft. It will be
important that the effort be financed in a business-like way.
``Give away programs'' will not, in the end, provide the
necessary incentives to the West to moderate their offers or
for the candidates to ration their acquisitions. Loan
guarantees, ``lease-to-buy'' and other arrangement using US FMS
funds or other programs need to be explored.
the progress of the next round of the Conventional Forces in
Europe (CFE II) needs to be monitored for its potential effect
on the force goals and structures of new alliance members. The
assurances given by NATO that it would not deploy a large
number of NATO forces on new members' territory was based on
current and foreseeable circumstances. Those circumstances
could change. We must be careful not to convert current
requirements into legally binding restrictions. Otherwise, we
could find ourselves in the future in the embarrassing position
of wanting to take a decision in Brussels to deploy forces to
allied territory but deterred by the prospect that the
deployment would require the receiving ally to reduce its own
force structure to remain compliant with CFE II.
NATO's current Strategic Concept, drafted in 1991, is under
review and likely to be revised in the next year or two to take
account of the changing strategic circumstances in Europe and
the addition of new allies. It is important that the final
document preserve as the core mission of the alliance the
collective defense of its members and the European region for
two reasons.
Each ally bases a significant fraction of its
national military requirements on that mission statement and
NATO's military components derive their own requirements from
it. As noted earlier, modern technology and tactics have made
it possible to satisfy the collective defense mission in the
coming decades with forces smaller in size, higher in mobility
and more lethal in their effects than was imagined just a
decade ago. It is from the collective defense capabilities of
the alliance that the means for conducting ``out of area''
missions are drawn. No ally, including the US, has yet to
identify ``out of area'' requirements in such a way that they
yield forces adequate to meet either the collective defense or
national military requirements.
Apart from the impact of the collective defense
mission on technical military capabilities, focusing on it
rather than the ``new'' missions of the alliance is important
for political reasons. We are only in the earliest stages of
defining the ``new'' missions of the alliance. We have not yet,
at the current sixteen or the projected nineteen, taken time to
assess the strategic situation outside the NATO area, compared
our interests in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and beyond,
and agreed on a common political and military agenda. The
successful conclusion of such an effort is surely a long way
off and its outcome should not be prejudged by a near-term
revision of the alliance's strategic concept.
Conclusions
An assessment of the military component of the qualifications of
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic must be conducted in two
dimensions, The first is the contribution, today and anticipated in the
future, of the current allies to the security of Europe. Each of them,
including the US, has experienced a sharp draw down in military
spending and reductions in force sizes. At the same time each has made
a longer-term commitment to modernize its forces and take a new
approach to meet their enduring Article 5 obligations. Past approaches
have been made obsolete by the collapse of the USSR and the advent of
new technology. The new approach will depend less on the prior
deployment of massive forces by each ally than the rapid projection of
highly lethal ground- air- and sea-based multinational task forces to
perform all alliance missions. The modernization of US forces is well
advanced and noticeably ahead of its allies. But the allies are making
a sustained effort to close that gap. This effort may, in the end it
may require that they increase their defense spending modestly.
The second dimension is the capability of the candidate members,
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Like the current 16, each of
them has experienced a sharp reduction in manpower and funding for the
military. But their forces are not so old or incapable that they cannot
make a contribution to NATO's capabilities, even today. All three have
troop contingents in Bosnia. All three are reforming and retraining
their troop structures and units. All three are taking a measured
approach to the upgrading and modernization of their forces.
Most importantly, all three have economies that are expected to
grow in the coming years by an average 4.5-5.0% per year. As a result,
on present plans their base defense budgets could be as much as $1.3-
1.4 billion higher in 2001 than in 1997. This growth, even if it should
slow some in succeeding years, in combination with military reform,
ought to allow them to meet the costs of enlargement.
Mr. Chairman, the success of the candidate member's efforts, and
therefore to the enlargement of the alliance, rests in an important way
with the US Senate.
The advice given to the president by the Senate ought to insist
that the new allies be provided by NATO with realistic defense planning
guidelines and time lines informed by the collective defense mission of
the alliance. The Senate should make clear its preference that the plan
stress infrastructure improvements, the installation of modern C41
capabilities, near-term upgrades of critical platforms and systems and
on internal reform and that these take precedence over major platform
purchases and drastic restructuring. Such an insistence will help set
the expectations of the US in this matter and help to bound within
reasonable parameters the military requirements of the new members. The
combination ought to set the stage for a successful enlargement of the
alliance.
Prepared Statement of Dr. F. Stephen Larrabee,
RAND
Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I welcome this opportunity
to testify today on the issue of NATO enlargement. This is an issue of
vital importance--both for the United States and for European security
more broadly.
In my view, NATO enlargement is clearly in the U.S. national
interest. It will lead to a more secure, more stable and more
integrated Europe, one that can act as a more reliable partner in
helping to manage the challenges the U.S. and the Alliance are likely
to face in the coming decades.
NATO ENLARGEMENT IN BROADER PERSPECTIVE
Before discussing the qualifications of the three candidates for
membership in NATO--Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic--I would
like to make a few preliminary remarks designed to put the issue of
NATO enlargement in perspective.
First, NATO enlargement cannot be seen in isolation. It must be
seen as part of a much wider comprehensive strategy to enhance security
in Europe. The goal of this strategy is to project stability to the
East. For this a multiplicity of institutions is needed. No one
institution alone can provide this type of comprehensive security. NATO
has an important role to play. But it is not the only institution.
Other institutions such as the EU, WEU, and OSCE, also have a role to
play. Together they are part of the larger process designed to enhance
stability in an expanded Euro-Atlantic space.
Second, membership in the European Union (EU) will contribute to
enhancing stability in Eastern Europe. But EU integration alone is not
enough. EU integration must be complemented by a security framework.
The main institution providing that security framework is NATO. Only
NATO can provide ``hard security''--as developments in Bosnia have made
clear.
Third, NATO enlargement is not being carried out because there is a
specific military threat but as part of a broader process of promoting
stability and integration. The goal is to anchor the countries of
Eastern Europe in a broader European and transatlantic framework and
prevent a ``return to history.''
Historically, Eastern Europe has been a region marked by
instability and a geopolitical bone of contention, especially between
Russia and Germany. The Western goal is to prevent a return to the old
19th Century geopolitical rivalry and nationalism that led to
instability--and eventually to two world wars. This can best be done,
if Eastern Europe is integrated into a broader transatlantic and
European framework rather than being left as a political gray zone.
Leaving Eastern Europe as part of such a gray zone would only encourage
the type of geopolitical rivalry and maneuvering that has created so
many problems in the past.
It is well to remember that the three candidates for NATO
membership--Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic--were historically
part of Europe. Prague, after all, is further West than Vienna. The
Cold War artificially separated these countries from their historical
and cultural roots. These countries now want to return to their roots
and join Euro-Atlantic institutions.
NATO is the keystone of this Euro-Atlantic structure. If they meet
the qualifications for membership, they should become members. This is
the best guarantee that these countries will develop healthy economies
and democratic institutions and avoid becoming the objects of
geopolitical rivalries of the past. The Western goal should be to
project stability into the area and help those countries develop stable
democratic institutions--that is, the type of political institutions
and culture that developed in Western Europe after World War II.
Some may ask, if the aim is to promote stability, then why not
admit Ukraine or the Balkan countries first, since they need stability
even more than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The answer is
that prospective new members need to have achieved a certain degree of
political, economic and military maturity before they can become
members. They need to be ``contributors to security'' not just
``consumers'' of it. Otherwise, NATO and the EU would simply become a
collection of economic and political basket cases and both
organizations would be unable to function effectively.
Indeed, NATO membership provides an incentive for reform. Aspirants
know that they will be considered for membership only when they have
achieved a certain level of economic and political reform and have
resolved their internal problems, including minority problems. This has
given aspirants--especially the three prospective new members--a strong
incentive to carry out the political and economic reforms necessary to
qualify for membership.
The prospect of membership has also provided an incentive for these
countries to regulate their relations with their neighbors. The desire
for EU and NATO membership, for instance, was a major factor behind
Hungary's efforts to sign the bilateral treaties regulating its
minority problems with both Slovakia and Romania. The same is true for
Poland, which has signed important bilateral treaties with Ukraine and
Lithuania regulating long-standing territorial disputes and differences
over minority issues.
The importance of these treaties should not be minimized. They
represent an important contribution to stability in the region. And
they would not have taken place--certainly not with the same speed and
impact--if the West had not made clear that a regulation of territorial
and minority problems was prerequisite for entry into NATO.
This is not to say that integrating the new members into NATO and
transforming their militaries so that they can function effectively
with NATO forces will be easy--either for NATO or the new members
themselves. But the United States--and the Senate--should not lose
sight of what is at stake. We have a historic opportunity today to
stabilize Eastern Europe and prevent a return to old 19th Century
nationalism and a rivalry that was so destructive and led to two world
wars. History--and our grandchildren--will not forgive us if we fail to
seize this opportunity.
NATO membership alone will not do this. But together with EU
enlargement it provides a prudent insurance policy against a return to
history.
However, as NATO enlarges, we need to ensure that NATO's core
functions--particularly collective defense--are not weakened. New
members must be able to contribute to carrying out NATO's core
functions as well as be able to participate in NATO's new missions
elsewhere on NATO territory and, if required, beyond it. In order to
perform these missions, the forces of new members need to be capable of
working effectively with NATO forces.
THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE NEW MEMBERS
Now let me turn to the issue of the qualifications of the
prospective new members. How qualified are the three countries for NATO
membership? Will they contribute to Alliance security?
I believe the answer to both questions is clearly ``yes''. This
does not mean that there are no problems or that the three countries do
not have a lot of work to do to modernize their military forces and
make them compatible with NATO forces. They do. But all three countries
have demonstrated that they are committed to the values of the Alliance
and are willing to undertake the reforms--economic, political and
military--necessary to qualify for membership.
Since 1989 the three prospective new members have made significant
progress in four important areas:
DEMOCRATIC REFORM
All three countries have established stable democratic political
systems based on the rule of law. Democracy, to use Juan Linz's phrase,
has become ``the only game in town.'' All the major political forces in
the three countries accept the democratic rules of the game and are
prepared to abide by them. In addition, there is a broad consensus in
all three countries about the basic strategic directions of policy,
whether it be market reform, membership in the EU, or membership in
NATO. These goals are espoused not only by the former democratic
opposition but also by the post-communist parties. Indeed, in Poland
and Hungary these post-communist parties have pursued EU and NATO
membership just as aggressively as their noncommunist predecessors.
The recent elections in Poland illustrate this growing political
maturity. The elections in September 1993 led to the formation of a
left-wing government led by former communists. On most major issues,
the post-communist government continued the basic policy of its non-
communist predecessors. In, September of this year, the non-communist
forces were returned to power. This alteration of power illustrates the
health and viability of the new democratic political system. In short,
politics in Poland--as well as Hungary and the Czech Republic--is
increasingly beginning to resemble politics in Western Europe.
ECONOMIC REFORM
The three countries have also made significant progress in
implementing market reforms. Today nearly 80 percent of the Polish and
Czech economy is in private hands; the figure is only slightly lower in
Hungary. Last year Poland's growth rate was 6 percent--one of the
highest in the Western industrialized world--far higher than in most
countries in Western Europe. After several years of slow growth,
Hungary has begun to emerge from the recession that characterized its
economy in the last years. The Czech economy has begun to witness some
problems lately but it still maintained a very respectable growth rate
of about 4 percent last year.
MINORITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
All three countries have also made substantial progress in
regulating their relations with their neighbors and in assuring the
rights of minorities. Hungary has signed bilateral treaties with
Slovakia and Romania, which provide important provisions for minority
rights. Poland has signed similar treaties with Lithuania and Ukraine.
These treaties have served to enhance stability and significantly
defuse potential tensions in the region. All three countries have also
become members of the Council of Europe.
This does not mean that there are no minority problems in these
countries. But these differences have diminished significantly since
the signing of the bilateral treaties and are not of such a magnitude
as to pose a threat to regional security.
The prospect of NATO membership played an important role in this
process. Indeed, without the prospect of NATO membership the bilateral
treaties might not have been signed. All three countries knew that they
had to regulate their minority problems if they were to have any hope
of entering NATO. Thus NATO has already contributed in important ways
to enhancing stability in Central Europe.
MILITARY REFORM
At the same time, the three candidate members have also begun to
undertake important military reforms designed to restructure their
militaries and make them more compatible with those of NATO.
They have also taken important steps to establish civilian control
over their militaries. For instance, in Poland the 1996 National
Defense Law clearly subordinates the Chief of the General Staff to the
Minister of Defense. Similarly, in Hungary the 1993 National Defense
Law specifies that the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces is
subordinate to the Minister of Defense.
Some critics have expressed concern that the East European
countries will be consumers rather than producers of security and that
they will require a massive assistance program in order to bring their
militaries up to NATO standards. This is not the case. The three
prospective new members do face important challenges in the military
field but these challenges are by no means insurmountable if the
countries implement prudent defense policies.
These countries do not face a major military threat in the
foreseeable future. In order to modernize their armed forces they do
not need--and should be discouraged from embarking on--crash military
programs that might weaken their economies. What is needed in each case
is a well thought out and well designed long-term defense program over
the next 10 to 15 years to modernize their military forces and bring
them up to NATO standards.
The basic problem these countries face is to increase the quality
of their forces while reducing the quantity. The manpower levels of the
prospective new members are significantly above those of NATO members
of comparable size, while their quality does not match that of NATO.
The new members can significantly reduce the size of their forces and
still fulfill their defense requirements to join NATO. The money saved
from the reductions can then be reinvested to improve the quality of
their forces.
Again, the answer to this dilemma is not a crash military program
designed to bust the budgets of these countries. But rather a prudent
long-term defense program designed to increase the quality of their
forces in key areas--modernization, readiness, logistics support,
technical compatibility, and interoperability--while reducing the
quantity of their forces, in some cases by 30 to 40 percent.
Doing this will not bankrupt the economies of their countries.
Their economies are growing at an average rate of about 4 percent a
year. This is higher than the growth rate of most of our West European
allies. They do not have to allocate a far larger share of GIDP to
defense in order to restructure their militaries. They can retain the
current share, while steadily elevating defense spending as their
economies grow.
Indeed, one of the great attractions of NATO membership to these
countries is that it will allow them to keep their defense expenditures
modest and to focus their resources on economic reconstruction.
Alliances save money. If they were not members of NATO, they would have
to spend even more money for national defense.
This does not mean that NATO membership will be a free ride. On the
contrary, NATO membership will require these countries to spend their
resources differently than they otherwise might if they had to provide
for their own defense using national means, and to increase spending in
some areas while decreasing it in others. But it will allow them to
purchase a greater degree of security at a much lower cost than would
otherwise be the case if they were not members of NATO.
Moreover, the types of changes needed to make the forces of the
three prospective new members compatible with those of NATO do not have
to be built overnight. As noted, what is needed is a prudent long-term
defense modernization program. During the Cold War, NATO had to begin
to build a posture in Central Europe almost from scratch in 1950. It
took three decades for the Alliance to meet many of its military
objectives, but it managed to do so gradually in a step-by-step fashion
by laying out prudent defense modernization programs. A similar result
is achievable in Eastern Europe over the long run.
The three prospective members have already begun to take steps to
modernize their militaries and make them better able to work
effectively with the forces of NATO.
Poland has advanced the farthest in this regard. Poland recently
presented a detailed 15-year plan for the modernization and reduction
of the Polish armed forces. The plan calls for a reduction of the armed
forces to 180,000 men, with a complete overhaul of the officer corps
structure, and the introduction of professional NCOs and warrant
officers. Under the new plan the Polish forces will be systematically
upgraded in order to meet NATO standards of readiness and
interoperability.
In addition:
Poland is currently preparing two airfields, two ports, and
two large depots for operations with NATO.
It has established national military centers for language
education.
more than 100 officers a year are enrolled in courses at
Western higher military schools and universities (including
West Point and the National Defense University).
Poland has also set up a joint peacekeeping battalion with
Ukraine (operational by Summer 1998) and Lithuania (expected to
be operational in 1999).
The Czech Republic has also begun to modernize its military forces.
The Czech government recently pledged to increase defense spending by
.1 percent of GDP a year for the next three years. This commitment is
reflected in the new budget and was maintained despite the severe
floods this Summer that caused millions of dollars of damage. As a
result, defense spending will rise 17 percent this year. While the
Czech government still has a way to go, this increase reflects the
government's commitment to take the steps necessary to modernize the
Czech military and make it more compatible with NATO forces.
Hungary has also committed to increase defense spending by .1
percent of GDP a year over the next five years. It has introduced a
comprehensive military reform designed to restructure the Hungarian
armed forces and make them compatible with NATO. In the process its
forces have been reduced from a little over 100,000 in 1985 to 48,000
today.
In addition, Hungary plans to set up a peacekeeping battalion with
Romania and a Hungarian Italian-Slovenian peacekeeping brigade. Indeed,
military-to-military relations between Romania and Hungary are
excellent. This underscores the way in which NATO can contribute to
promoting peace and stability among once antagonistic neighbors.
Perhaps most important, Hungary has made facilities available for
U.S. troops in Bosnia. This is a very strong indication of Hungary's
commitment to NATO. Hungary may not yet be in NATO, but NATO is already
in Hungary.
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR MEMBERSHIP
There is also strong public support in all three countries for
joining NATO In all three countries, support has remained steady or
increased. Support is highest in Poland (83 percent), followed by
Hungary (65 percent), and the Czech Republic (59 percent). \1\ In
addition, publics in all three countries have expressed a willingness
to continue with political and economic reform that would allow these
countries to qualify for NATO membership.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Figures are based on USIA opinion data taken in the Spring and
Fall of 1997. See 'NATO Enlargement: The Public opinion Dimension,'
office of Research and Media Reaction, United States Information
Agency, October 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This support, moreover, is likely to grow as the publics in these
countries come to better understand the benefits and obligations of
NATO membership. One of the reasons for doubts on the part of some
parts of the population in the Czech Republic and Hungary is ignorance.
Many Czech and Hungarian citizens do not really know what NATO is; for
others, the idea of an alliance has a negative connotation. They
associate it with domination and loss of sovereignty--their experience
as members of the Warsaw Pact. However, the governments in Hungary and
the Czech Republic have undertaken efforts lately to better educate
their publics and this has led to a rise in support for NATO in both
countries.
CONCLUSION
In sum, Mr. Chairman, I believe the three prospective members are
fully qualified to become members of NATO. Their inclusion in NATO will
contribute to a stronger, more stable and more secure Europe, one that
is a more reliable partner for the United States. Such a Europe is
clearly in the U.S. national interest.
Thank you.
__________
Prepared Statement of Dr. John S. Micgiel,
Director,
East Central European Center,
Columbia University
Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to address this
distinguished body today on the matter of extending membership in NATO
to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.
Two world wars began in the region between Germany and Russia in
this century. After World War II, NATO provided a shield against
aggression behind which Western European states could build a community
of democracies, prosperous market economies, and civil societies.
Postwar arrangements effectively barred the Czechoslovak, Hungarian,
and Polish nations from being able freely to elect governments, from
participating in the Marshall Plan, the 50th anniversary of which we
are celebrating this year and, in short, from acting as sovereign
states.
The implosion of the Soviet system and the emergence of
democratically elected governments in most of the states in the region
beginning in 1989 resulted in those governments pursuing European and
Euro-Atlantic policies, joining Western multilateral organizations like
the Council of Europe and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, and being invited to enter into accession talks with the
European Union and NATO.
The mere prospect of membership in the latter has acted as a
catalyst for political reform and served a point of reference for
decision makers. In Poland, for example, prospective membership in NATO
resulted in the clear establishment of civilian control over the
military. The precondition of friendly relations with neighboring
countries has had a dramatic impact throughout the region. Poland has
Good Neighbor Treaties with all seven of the states that now adjoin it:
Belarus, the Czech Republic, Germany, Lithuania, Russia, the Slovak
Republic, and Ukraine. Hungary concluded Basic Treaties with Ukraine,
Romania, and Slovakia. Following its peaceful separation from Slovakia
in 1992, the Czech Republic concluded a much awaited Treaty with
Germany, The prospect of being included in the first group of countries
invited into NATO also caused the Romanians to conclude controversial
Basic Treaties with Hungary and Ukraine. And the very tone of political
discourse and culture has changed, with much less anti-Russian rhetoric
in evidence today than just a few years ago, a sure sign of increasing
political maturity and self-confidence,
The three prospective member countries have each taken a proactive
role in cooperating with their neighbors and sometime former
adversaries. Poland, the only country among the three bordering on
Russia, has led the field here by engaging the Germans and Danes in
plans for a European Corps, and it has engaged the Lithuanians and
Ukrainians separately in the establishment of joint battalions. Poland
has also begun a wider political strategic partnership with both
Lithuania and Ukraine. Hungary and Romiania are cooperating militarily,
and the Czech Republic is now cooperating with Poland and Hungary on a
regional air defense network.
The desire to demonstrate the ability to cooperate regionally
resulted in the establishment of the Central European Free Trade
Agreement, and what is now known as the Central European Initiative,
both of which have brought politicians on various levels together at
regular intervals to discuss trade issues, the reduction of tariffs,
and the development of infrastructure throughout the region. And trade
within CEFTA doubled between the organization's inception in 1993 and
1996, as economies grew and tariff barriers dropped. The declaration by
the Czech, Hungarian, and Polish ministers of defense regarding plans
for joint military procurement are another logical step in the
direction of increased regional cooperation.
Inclusion in multilateral organizations, and the concomitant
legislative, political, and economic reforms have played and continue
to play a great role in attracting direct foreign investment (FDI).
Hungary, in particular, has been successful in obtaining investments of
over $16 billion, while in Poland, FDI jumped from $6 billion in 1995
to $14 billion in 1996. Each has obtained an investment grade rating
and is making progress in meeting the economic criteria for European
Union membership. Much progress has been made in constructing viable
market economies, all of which have demonstrated growth despite
occasional setbacks. Current account deficits in Hungary and the Czech
Republic resulted in the implementation of difficult and generally
unpopular stabilization measures. Yet each country has declared its
ability and willingness to adequately support its membership in NATO.
The Czech Republic has announced that military spending will rise in
each of the next three years to a level of two percent of GDP in 2000,
while Hungary's defense budget will rise from 1.4 percent of GDP in
1996 to about 2 percent by 2001. Poland is already devoting and will
continue to devote about 2.5 percent of GDP. As the economies grow, the
funds devoted to the military will grow substantially in absolute
terms. In the Polish case, for example, the economy has grown an
average of seven percent over the last 3 years, and if that tempo were
kept up, the amount in absolute terms would double in a decade.
Each of three candidate countries has adopted different
modernization strategies for their armed forces. They share, however,
several commitments: to implement and drop below CFE limits; to
reorganize and restructure units to bring them into alignment with NATO
standards; and to cooperate with NATO in PfP exercises, in Bosnia,
Eastern Slavonia, and other Unapproved operations. Each candidate
country has a modernization plan that aims toward enhancing the
interoperability of its armed forces with NATO, All three are reducing
their armed forces, by 40 percent in the Czech case, 35 percent in the
Polish case, and nearly 60 percent in the Hungarian case.
And following the third round of discussions between Poland and
NATO in Brussels earlier this month the Poles declared their
willingness to contribute 1-9 percent of the current NATO budget. It is
worth noting that seven of the current sixteen members of NATO make
lower contributions.
Are Czech, Hungarian, and Polish citizens in favor of joining NATO?
A Hungarian public opinion survey taken in September 1997 indicated
that 75 percent of those people who indicated that they would
participate in a referendum on NATO would vote in favor of joining
NATO; they will have an opportunity to do so on November 16 when a
referendum on NATO accession will be held. A USIA survey of Czech
citizens in May 1997 indicated that 60 per- cent favored entering NATO.
Polish surveys have consistently reported approval ratings of above 83
percent.
The fact is that these countries share Western values and
principles and want to contribute to, not merely benefit from, the
stability and security that accompanies NATO membership. Suffice it
here to mention Czech and Polish participation in Desert Shield/Desert
Storm, Polish action on behalf of American interests in Iraq following
the war, active participation in SFOR by Poland and the Czech Republic,
and Hungary's support of SFOR by permitting NATO bases to be
established in Hungary, and allowing NATO troops to pass through and
over Hungarian territory to and from Bosnia.
At present, no real major threat to the peace and security of any
of the three candidate countries exists, including Russia. However, the
perception of a Russian threat, still exists in Poland and Hungary,
based on a shared historical experience and, in the Polish case, the
proximity of a quarter million Russian troops in Kaliningrad blast and
the establishment of the recent Russian-Belarusian Union. NATO is seen
as being the only ready and tested structure that can effectively
discourage potential trouble before it occurs.
Despite the posturing we see in some Russian circles, NATO
expansion does not pose a threat to a democratizing Russia that, after
all, has a special relationship with NATO. According to a recent Brown
University poll Russian elites express greater fear of Chinese
demographic pressure and Islamic fundamentalism. Nonetheless, the
failure to ratify the accession treaties would be perceived as a clear
signal of U.S. disinterest in a region over which the United States had
waged a forty-year struggle against the Soviet Union. That would result
in a grey zone, a security vacuum, and temptation for the radicals that
today are on the fringes of Russian politics.
With dynamic economies, solid democratic values, excellent
relations with neighbors, strong moral and political support for and a
record of cooperation with NATO, and strongly pro-American attitudes,
the three candidates have much to offer the Euro-Atlantic community. At
a meeting of the New Atlantic Initiative on September 9, 1997, former
National Security Adviser Anthony Lake spoke of the relatively low
priority that NATO expansion holds for the average Russian, and
concluded that enlargement ``is the opportunity of a generation and it
would be the shame of our generation if we do not now seize it.'' The
overwhelming majority of the 60 million inhabitants of the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Poland, the 11 million co-nationals residing
here in the U.S., and the many more Americans who see a safer America
in an enlarged NATO, would only echo that assertion.
COSTS, BENEFITS, BURDENSHARING AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF NATO
ENLARGEMENT
----------
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms
(chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Helms, Hagel, Biden, Robb, Feinstein and
Wellstone.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. I would
say, for the record, that we are in the midst of the end of
session frustration. At the moment, the Senate is trying to get
a quorum, which may take a while. They may have to go to a live
quorum to get a vote on it.
And then, we have at least one vote to follow immediately
after that. So rather than have the witnesses sit here all
morning, not to mention the guests, I am going to start it and
I think we can get pretty far down the road before anything
happens on the floor.
In any case, let's see what we can do.
Now, we'll begin for the record.
The Foreign Relations Committee today continues its
examination of the critical issues surrounding the proposed
expansion of NATO. This morning, the subject for our discussion
will be the cost, the benefits, the burden sharing, and the
military implications of NATO enlargement.
Maybe you recall that during Secretary Albright's recent
appearance before this committee, I mentioned that the issues
that we would consider this morning may very well be the issues
that would determine whether NATO enlargement will succeed or
fail in the Senate.
Now our first panel will consist of the Honorable Walter
Slocombe from the Department of Defense who is here and I have
already greeted him. Mr. Slocombe will discuss the military
implications of NATO and will present the administration's
analysis of how much NATO enlargement will cost.
Now, Mr. Slocombe will be followed by a private panel
consisting of Dr. Richard Kugler of the National Defense
University; Dr. Ivan Eland of the Cato Institute; Mr. Stephen
Hadley, a former Defense Department official during the Bush
administration. By the way, Mr. Hadley is now with the law firm
of Shea and Gardner.
Now, all of these gentlemen have checked the
administration's mathematics, and are here to tell us whether
anything has been missed in putting together the
administration's estimate of how much NATO enlargement will in
fact cost the American taxpayers, as well as how this policy
will benefit the national interests of the United States.
So I say to you, Mr. Slocombe and the other gentlemen who
will follow you, we welcome you, we deeply appreciate your
coming, and we look forward to your comments. You may proceed,
Mr. Slocombe.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. WALTER SLOCOMBE, UNDERSECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Mr. Slocombe. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm
honored to have the opportunity to appear before this committee
on behalf of the administration and the Department of Defense
to address the military implications and costs of NATO
enlargement.
I want particularly to express our appreciation for the
fact that the committee has chosen to have these series of
hearings early on as we begin to define the issues and open the
debate on this fundamental question.
Nowhere are American concerns more vital or are efforts
more focused than in the case of Europe. The United States
maintains a commitment to Europe in terms of troops on the
ground, in terms of capacity to reinforce as needed, and in
terms of political engagement in seeking to resolve problems.
America makes this commitment not as an act of charity, but
because the security of Europe is vital to our own security as
events in this century have shown.
As a result of the success of freedom and the collapse of
communism and the end of the cold war, we know have a chance to
build a security system for all of Europe. We need to do so,
for, unfortunately, while the massive Soviet threat has
evaporated, we continue to face problems as well as
opportunities--threats to stability and security can still
arise from old national and ethnic hatreds, from home-grown and
state-sponsored terrorism, from threats from unstable regions
outside Europe, and from the prospect of the threat of weapons
of mass destruction.
In the new European security system we seek to build, the
key instrument is NATO. NATO enlargement is the most
publicized, but not the only part, of a much broader strategy
to create a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe. In my
full statement, I outline the other elements of that effort.
Enlargement, which is the focus of this committee's and,
indeed, the country's attention, will serve the common security
interests of all the member NATO--all the member nations of
NATO, including the United States. Adding nations to the
alliance in a gradual and careful way as they meet the
standards for membership will, first of all, foster stability
throughout Europe and the world by providing for stability,
which has historically been a principal source of conflict in
Europe.
Second, it will make NATO stronger by creating a larger
circle of like-minded nations prepared to work together in the
common defense.
Third, it provides an institutional setup for improving
relations among the region's states, both members and non-
members. Indeed it is--the prospect of NATO enlargement has
already had an important positive effect in that direction.
Fourth, it will broaden the number of countries that can
participate in burden sharing within NATO, both in financial,
in manpower, and in strategic terms. It will create a better
environment for trade, investment, and economic growth in
Eastern and Central Europe because it is as true in Europe as
it is in other parts of the world that without basic security
and stability, free economies cannot prosper.
It will help secure the historic gains of democracy in
Central and Eastern Europe by providing the security in which
those newly free societies can flourish. It will help all of
Europe become a stronger partner for the United States in
political, economic, and security affairs.
Thus, the enlargement will serve American interests and
American principles just as it will serve those of all of
Europe, both old and new members, states inside and outside the
alliance.
As you are, of course, aware, at the Madrid Summit this
summer, the NATO alliance, the NATO countries decided to invite
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to begin negotiations
toward an accession agreement, which we expect to have signed
in December.
The main focus of my testimony this morning is with regard
to the military implications of the accession of those
countries and the associated costs.
With respect to military implications, NATO's first task
now and as an enlarged alliance will be the so-called ``Article
5'' defense of the territory of its members. This core function
will not be diminished with enlargement, or indeed with other
changes in the alliance.
Back in 1991, NATO adopted a new strategic concept that
recognized the end of the cold war and shifted from the cold
war program of position forward defense to place new emphasis
on flexibility and mobility and an assured capacity for
augmentation.
Applying this concept to enlargement, NATO does not need,
in the existing strategic environment, to permanently station
combat forces of any substantial numbers on new members'
territory. Instead, the military forces of the new members will
be made capable of operating with NATO forces, supplemented by
the capability of current members, to provide appropriate NATO
reinforcements in a crisis if necessary.
Thus, the defense posture associated with enlargement will
apply to those new members the same concept of regional
reinforcement that it applies to current members. Similarly,
NATO has agreed that while new members will be expected to
support the concept of deterrence and the essential role that
nuclear weapons continue to play in the alliance strategy,
enlargements won't--enlargement will not require a change in
NATO's current nuclear posture.
For this reason, the alliance has stated that it has no
intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on
the territory of new members nor does it foresee a future need
to do so. But with respect to this statement as well as the
statement about stationing forces, these positions depend on
current conditions and could, of course, be reviewed where
conditions have changed.
NATO will also, of course, expect new members to be able to
contribute to non-Article 5 missions, including being able to
participate in out-of-area deployments and, indeed, it is
relevant that all three of the countries which have been
invited to join are active participants with forces in Bosnia,
and, indeed, in other operations.
With respect to costs, of course NATO enlargement areas
cost. Security is not free. It is a price well worth paying but
it is not free. Analysis of the financial costs of enlargement
can, I think, usefully be broken into three components.
First, there are the costs to new members; that is, to
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to develop military
forces that are better able to contribute to their own defense,
to the defense of other NATO members, and to other NATO
operations.
Second, there are the costs to current members so that they
can improve their forces' mobility, deployability, and
flexibility--in short, to proceed with the efforts they are
already committed to and needed to meet the defense
requirements of NATO's current membership.
These first two categories of costs are for actions that
the countries concerned would need to take to provide for their
own defense whether or not NATO added members. Indeed, to get
comparable levels of security without NATO enlargement, new
members and, arguably, even current members, would have to
spend more than they will have to spend with an enlarged
alliance.
And finally, there are the costs to both new and old
members of integrating the new members into NATO or building
the links that make the alliance a real working military
alliance.
From one point of view, these direct costs could be
considered the only real costs of NATO enlargement, since they
are the only costs that are uniquely associated with
enlargement--the only costs that would not be incurred if NATO
did not add new members. But we have thought it appropriate to
count all three categories of costs to present a complete
picture of what the requirement will be.
But these direct costs are associated with enhancing
interoperability. They include improvements in communications,
air command and control, logistics, infrastructure, and
conducting the program of exercises necessary to be sure that
this linking system works. As you know, earlier this year the
Department of Defense had prepared and submitted to the
Congress are--an initial analysis of what the costs would be.
It's important to understand the assumptions that lie
behind this or any projections of cost. Our estimated assumed
that while there will be a need for serious defense
capabilities for an enlarged NATO just as there is now, there
is currently no threat of large-scale conventional aggression
in Europe, and that any such threat would take years to
develop.
That is, of course, the same assumption that we make in the
United States for our own national planning and that NATO makes
in planning for the defense of its current members. That
assumption includes a recognition that there is no guarantee in
an absolute sense that that threat could not arise, and that we
have to hedge against the possibility and NATO provides an
important basis for the hedge.
Total costs, as we estimated them for all three categories
aggregate, was $27-$35 billion over the period from now through
2009; that is, 10 years after the planned accession of the new
members.
Let me give you a brief breakdown of how those costs were
allocated. First, new members costs for restructuring their own
national forces. Those costs were estimated at between $10 and
$13 billion over that timeframe or around $1 billion a year.
Those costs amount to some 10-30 percent of the projected
defense budgets for the prospective new members over that
period of time. Now, that is a significant part of the total
budgets for those countries. On the other hand, it represents
the investment that they will need to make in making a
fundamental new direction in their own national defense.
To meet those costs, they will have to increase their
defense budgets to some degree and they will outline plans to
do that. But we and they expect that a substantial part of the
costs will be met by savings from reducing the size of the
three nations' current forces.
I also want to emphasize that all of these costs would be
borne by new members, except to the likely very limited extent
that the American Congress, or indeed, other NATO parliaments,
decided to continue the limited support that we now have for
some of the Central European militaries.
For example, as you know, the United States now provides
about $100 million a year through the so-called Warsaw
Initiative to fund PF--Partnership For Peace countries and to
support their participation in PFP.
These costs for the three new members will be the cost of
moving from their own Soviet-style forces, which were little
more than auxiliaries of the Red Army, to militaries
appropriate for independent democracies in a free alliance.
But it's important to recall that these countries do not by
any means start from zero. Indeed, they have per capita rather
larger militaries than most NATO allies; probably in terms of
just number of people, larger than they need.
What they need to do, and we have made clear the priorities
for this, is first to invest in quality personnel. Make sure
those personnel are trained. Achieve a real degree of
interoperability with NATO, which means upgrading
communications, logistics capability, infrastructure, and
integrated their air defense with that of the alliance as a
whole.
It is certainly the case that each of the invited nations
will have to modernize its equipment in the years ahead. But it
is our view and theirs that acquiring large amounts of high-
tech weapon systems should not be the highest priority.
These countries are already working hard to demonstrate
that they are ready for membership in NATO. Assistant Secretary
of Defense Cramer and Assistant Secretary of State Grossman
are, as I understand it, prepared to testify before this
committee next week. They were scheduled last week and it was
canceled--postponed regarding these preparations, so I will not
go into them in detail beyond noting that each nation
acknowledges the need both to restructure and increase their
defense effort.
The second broad category is the current allies' cost; that
is, the cost to improve deployability. I want to begin by
noting that our cost estimates to date do not anticipate any
added costs to the United States in this category--that is,
ability to deploy--because the United States forces are already
highly deployable and sustainable at long distances.
Their requirement to deploy to meet contingencies in places
like Korea or Southwest Asia is actually more demanding than a
hypothetical crisis in Central Europe. U.S. costs of
enlargement are relatively low because we've already provided
for the force's projection missions that the new NATO requires.
But it is certainly the case that the other members of the
alliance need to improve their capabilities to deploy. Now we
have estimated that the costs of meeting the requirements will
be in the range of $8 to $10 billion, or around $600-$800
million per year.
Now, these are a very modest share of the total defense
budgets of the non-U.S. NATO allies, on the order of 1 percent.
For the most part, they represent efforts already under way to
adapt their forces to new postcold war needs and missions.
These costs would all be borne by current allies and not by
the United States. As this committee is well aware, for decades
now, the United States has made no financial contribution to
NATO allies' defense budgets except for the limited amounts for
loan support to Greece and Turkey.
We believe that our current allies can and should do more
to increase their capability for the sort of mobile, flexible
operations that NATO will need to be ready for in the future.
But it is important to recognize that most of these countries
have already made improvements and are committed to make more,
and detailed examples are set forth in my statement.
Finally, turning to third category, the direct enlargement
costs for linking new and old allies, those were estimated at
about 9 to $12 billion over this period, or about $700-$900
million per year. This, again, is the cost of things like
communications reinforcement, reception infrastructure, and
other interoperability measures.
We estimated that about 60 percent of these costs, or about
$5.5 to $7 billion in total, would be paid for out of the NATO
common budgets over the 10 years following accession. The
remainder would be paid almost entirely by the new members.
Now, this number is particularly important because this is
the only number to which the United States would have to
contribute. As you know, the United States pays approximately
25 percent of each of the three NATO common budgets. We expect
that this relative cost share will stay the same--the ratio of
three European to one U.S. in the period when NATO is meeting
these requirements.
With these assumptions, the U.S. share would be about $150-
$200 million per year. Now, that is simply our share of the
common budgets.
These are, certainly, manageable costs. Obviously, $200
million is a lot of money, but it is only a fraction of a
percentage point of the entire U.S. defense budget, which is
$266 billion this year.
We are still discussing whether or what portion of those
direct costs of enlargement, which would be paid for from
common budgets, will represent a net increase overall in the
common budgets, but whether some can be offset by reductions in
lower priority programs. Now, there will be certainly be some
reprioritizing of projects, and, therefore, less than dollar
for dollar increase. The United States continues to expect that
additional resources will be required.
Having explained the numbers that we provided earlier this
year, I now want to talk about them, the next step, to get more
refined estimates. Our estimates earlier this year were
necessarily preliminary, if only because we didn't know what
nations would be invited to join, and we certainly didn't know
the detail of the steps needed to link them into the alliance.
Immediately after the Madrid decisions, NATO started a
detailed review of the military implications, the miliary
requirements, and the costs of meeting those requirements that
are associated with enlargement.
The present NATO costing effort is highly specific and
focused on individual installations. In an effort to better
understand requirements as well as the current capabilities of
the three invited nations, members of NATO's international
military staff have been conducting cite visits at various
military facilities in the invited countries. They actually go
out and look at the air field, at the rail head, at the
communications' facility, and the air defense radar stations to
identify what changes will be necessary in order to bring those
facilities up to the required standard.
They will then cost these requirements and prepare a
proposed schedule on which they will be met. That work is to be
completed in time for approval at the December NATO
ministerials. This--and those cost estimates based on these
detailed analyses will, therefore, be available to Congress
simultaneous with the signing of the accession agreements and
well before any vote on enlargement.
Based on what we know now, we expect that the NATO cost
estimates will be somewhat lower than those you received from
us in February. First of all, the initial U.S. cost estimate
assessed that four, not three, new members would be admitted,
so there is some reduction simply from that.
Second, and this is important in terms of the debate,
remember that the number which NATO will come up to is
comparable to the $5.5 to $7 billion that we estimated for the
costs to the common budgets. NATO will only be estimating the
costs to the common budgets, not the other categories.
But we also expect that the NATO cost estimates will be
lower because some of the things in these countries are better
than we expected. It is clear that there is a lot for them to
do, but we believe that the additional investment required to
prepare for membership will be less than initially anticipated.
My detailed statement gives some examples of our experiences
showing why this is the case.
In general, we found that the old Soviet-style
infrastructure, while having lots of defects, provides a sound
base on which to build and perhaps, more important, that the
prospective new members have been making good use of the time
and opportunities that the Partnership For Peace and nearly a
decade of freedom has afforded in their ability to improve
their--the capacity of their militaries to work as a part of
the NATO team.
There is on--this is a question of making the estimates.
Then there is the matter of finding the money. Once the
military requirements and cost estimates are agreed, we will
move forward to make good on the commitments taken by--
undertaken by the leaders of the alliance in Madrid that,
quote, ``The resources necessary to meet the costs of
enlargement will be provided.''
At Maastricht earlier this month at the informal Defense
Ministerial, Secretary of Defense Cohen reminded his colleagues
that all of the allies have acknowledged that the admission of
new members will involve the alliance providing the resources
which enlargement will necessarily require.
There was no disagreement on this point. Of course, until
we know the detailed costs and the proposed schedules, we will
not able to determine the net increase in NATO common budgets
as British Defense Minister George Robertson noted last week in
an article published in the American press.
Because enlargement is a high priority for NATO, we may
have to delay some lower priority subjects. As I said, there is
a question whether the enlargements costs to common budget can
be fully offset.
But Minister Robinson added, ``If additional spending is
requiring, Britain will pay its share. We are confident that
that will, in the end, be the position of all the allies. We
will keep you informed over the coming months as this
discussion continues.''
Finally, I want to emphasize that these estimates of the
cost of enlargement relate to capabilities required in the
security environment that we in fact or see. Nation's need
serious defense capabilities, which we have to hedge against
the possibility things turning bad, in which there is no
immediately threat of large-scale conventional aggression and
whether any threat would take years to develop.
Of course, a fundamentally different and far more demanding
set of requirements for defense, in NATO and worldwide, would
arise if trends in Russia or anywhere else developed in such a
way such as to renew a direct territorial threat to NATO
members.
Because such a threat is hypothetical, it's impossible to
estimate with any precision the costs of meeting it. But there
can be no question that those costs would be substantial--they
would be affordable, but they would be substantial. Remember
that just 10 years ago, the United States and most of its
allies were spending nearly twice as much as a share of GNP on
defense as we do today.
There can, however, be no question that if we ever had to
meet such a threat, we could do it more effectively and less
expensively in an expanded alliance than in a Europe still
divided along cold war lines. In such a circumstance which we
do not expect and hope never to see, the added manpower,
military capability, political support, and strategic depth
afforded by NATO enlargement would amply justify whatever
additional costs there were at having additional members within
the alliance's security umbrella.
But perhaps the most important point to be made about cost
is that there would be greater cost and greater risks in not
enlarging. If we fail to seize this historic opportunity to
help integrate, consolidate, and stabilize Central and Eastern
Europe, we would risk a much higher price later.
The most efficient and cost-effective way to guarantee
stability is to do so collectively through NATO. That was true
in the cold war; it is true now; it will be true in the future.
The costs of doing so are manageable for all concerned.
Alliances save money. Collective defense is both cheaper and
stronger than solely national defense.
A decision to defer enlargement, much less to withhold it
altogether, would send the message to Central and Eastern
Europe that their future does not lie with NATO and the West.
It would falsely validate the old divisions of the cold war.
The resulting sense of isolation and vulnerability would be
destabilizing in the region, and would encourage nationalists
and disruptive forces throughout Europe.
NATO would remain stuck in the past, in danger of
irrelevance, while the United States would be seen as
inconstant and unreliable in its leadership, withdrawing from
its responsibilities and its interests in Europe and in the
world.
The years ahead will be challenging ones in Europe in
trans-Atlantic security. NATO enlargement is an essential
feature of adapting the Western military and security
organization to efficiently and effectively meet the challenges
ahead. While there will be costs, they are manageable.
Most important, for the United States, for our allies, for
our partners, the costs--not just the financial costs of a
strong, effective, and engaged North American alliance pale in
comparison to the costs that would be implicated by stagnation,
instability, and failure of leadership in Europe. I appreciate
the committee's attention and I look forward to the chance to
answer your question.
[The prepared statement of the Mr. Slocombe follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Slocombe
Thank you. I am honored to be invited to appear before this
Committee to address the security and military aspects of NATO
enlargement. I would like to address first the rationale for NATO
enlargement in the context of the European security framework and then
talk about the military implications of enlargement, including the
aspect of costs, which I know has been of interest to this committee,
the Senate, and the public at large.
I. American Interests in Europe
As Secretary Albright made clear in her appearance before this
Committee, nowhere are American concerns more vital, and our efforts
more concentrated, than in Europe. We will maintain our commitment to
Europe in troops on the ground, in capability to reinforce as needed,
and in political engagement in seeking to resolve problems. America
makes this commitment not as an act of altruism, but because the
security of Europe is vital to our own, as events in this century have
repeatedly shown.
And we have an historic opportunity before us. President Clinton
said recently, ``Taking wise steps now to strengthen our common
security when we have the opportunity to do so will help build a future
without the mistakes and the divisions of the past, and will enable us
to organize ourselves to meet the new security challenges of the new
century.''
Twice before in this century, America had the opportunity to help
build a system of European security. The first time, after WWI, we
foolishly held back from the responsibilities our interests required we
assume. The second time, after WWII, 50 years ago, Western Europe and
the United States together chose a path of reconciliation and
reconstruction through the Marshall Plan, and together moved from
terrible destruction to unprecedented prosperity and security. However,
Eastern Europe and Russia did not participate because of Stalin's
paranoia and relentless expansionism.
We now have a third chance . . . this time to build a security
system for all Europe that will:
Solidify the place of the newly free nations in a secure
Europe linked to the U.S.;
Maintain U.S. leadership and engagement;
Foster growing European integration;
Ensure that Russia will play a constructive role,
commensurate with its importance and weight in European
affairs; and
Preserve and strengthen NATO as the core instrument of
military security in Europe.
And, unfortunately, we face problems as well as good opportunities.
The end of the Soviet threat, while very welcome, has not meant the end
of threats. Threats to stability and security can still arise from old
national and ethnic hatreds, home-grown and state-sponsored terrorism,
threats from unstable regions outside Europe, and the prospect of the
spread of weapons of mass destruction.
II. NATO in the New Europe
In the new European security system we seek to build, the key
instrument is NATO. NATO is the only effective, continuing multilateral
military alliance in the world. It has risen to the challenge of
providing a critical instrument to promote peace in Bosnia. The best
evidence of NATO's continuing relevance is the eagerness of many
countries to join it--and the determination of its current members to
keep it strong and to shape it to respond to the new challenges and
opportunities we face. Countries want to join NATO because of what it
is--a strong military alliance, with strong U.S. leadership. It will
remain so.
To that end, we have embarked on an historic program to build a new
NATO. NATO enlargement is the most publicized, but not the only, part
of a much broader strategy, to help create a peaceful, undivided and
democratic Europe. That strategy has included many other elements:
support for German unification; fostering reforms in Russia, Ukraine
and other new independent states; assistance to the withdrawal of
Russian forces and nuclear weapons from newly independent states;
negotiation and adaptation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty;
and the evolution and strengthening of European security and economic
institutions, including the European Union, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe and the
Western European Union, and working toward the creation of a European
security and defense identity within NATO.
With regard to NATO itself, NATO enlargement is also part of a much
broader series of steps to adapt the Alliance to the post-Cold War
security environment, including adaptation of NATO's strategy,
strategic concept, command arrangements and force posture;
strengthening its ability to carry out new missions beyond NATO's
territory, as it has in Bosnia, while maintaining its core function of
collective defense; and the creation and enhancement of the Partnership
for Peace (PFP). As part of this broad series of steps, NATO
enlargement aims to help the United States and Europe erase outdated
Cold War lines and strengthen shared security into the next century.
III. NATO Enlargement
The impulse for so many of the nations of Central and Eastern
Europe to wish to join NATO stems from their desire for thorough,
permanent inclusion in the broad Atlantic community and for the sense
of living in the secure neighborhood that NATO has brought to its
current members. They want to be irreversibly part of the West, and we
want to help them in this endeavor.
A. Benefits of Enlargement
Enlargement will serve the common security interests of all current
NATO members. Adding nations to the Alliance in a gradual and careful
way as they meet the standards for membership will:
foster stability throughout Europe by providing an
institutional stability for Central Europe, which has
historically been a principal source of conflict in Europe;
make NATO stronger by creating a larger circle of like-
minded nations devoted to collective defense, both for
protection of their own territory and for mutual action when
their security is threatened by events outside their territory;
improve relations among the region's states--both members
and non-members--as in the historic reconciliation of Germany
and the Czech Republic, and of Hungary and Romania;
broaden burden-sharing within NATO;
create a better environment for trade, investment and
economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe;
help secure the historic gains of democracy in Central and
Eastern Europe by providing the security in which their free
societies can flourish and the hatred of the past be
permanently buried, just as it did for Western European nations
such as Germany, Italy, and Spain; and
help all of Europe become a stronger partner for the United
States in political, economic and security affairs. This will
serve American interest and American principles, just as it
will serve those of all of Europe, both old and new members and
states inside and outside the Alliance.
B. The Choice of Prospective New Members
Of course, the process of enlargement must be carefully prepared.
Formal membership in NATO carries with it both political and military
obligations of a special character--what President Clinton has called
``the most solemn security guarantees.'' Enlargement must not, and will
not, dilute the Alliance's military effectiveness, nor its political
cohesion. The broader context of European security, including impact on
Russia, on Ukraine, and on nations that remain outside NATO, must be
taken into account.
Sincere aspiration to join cannot alone be enough for membership.
New members must be ready to accept the obligations of membership. They
must demonstrate a commitment to democracy and the rule of law, to an
open market economic system, to civilian constitutional control of
their militaries, to peaceful resolution of disputes with neighbors, to
respect for human rights and the rule of law, and to a gradual
development of military capabilities that are congruent and
interoperable with NATO systems.
After extensive discussion with allies, with candidate countries,
with members of Congress, and within the Administration, the President
decided this year that the US would support Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic for first round invitations. In Madrid, NATO invited
these three new democracies to begin accession talks to join the
Alliance. This decision was based on our conclusion, shared by the
military and our allies, that the three invitees--Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic--have made sufficient progress on military,
political, economic, and social reforms. They are clearly ready to take
the next steps to becoming full members, accepting all the rights and
responsibilities of membership.
Nine other European states had also declared their desire to join
NATO, and many of them are making excellent progress in preparing
themselves for membership. The United States and the Alliance
recognized the arguments in favor of several other candidate countries,
including Slovenia and Romania. We concluded, however, that the
alliance should extend an invitation now only in the clearest cases,
where there is a broad consensus that the candidate countries have
already demonstrated readiness for membership on all relevant
standards. Inviting accession is a profoundly significant action, which
carries heavy obligations both for new and old members. Where there is
reasonable doubt about whether a nation has yet made sufficient
progress, the prudent course is to defer invitations. This approach is
all the more appropriate, given that the door to membership will remain
open, so that there will be ample opportunities to invite additional
members.
The key non-selects--Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Baltic
states--have naturally all expressed disappointment at their non-
selection. But all have also indicated that, far from abandoning the
course of integration, NATO membership will remain a top foreign policy
goal for them. They are committed to continuing and accelerating
reforms. They are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices. In
addition, all aspirants have expressed their intentions to participate
in enhanced PFP and the EAPC.
C. Military Implications
NATO's first task is ``Article 5'' defense of the territory of its
members. NATO's adoption of a new Strategic Concept in 1991 shifted
from the Cold War program of positioned forward defense to place a new
emphasis on enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability
for augmentation when necessary. Consistent with this concept, NATO
does not see a need in the existing strategic environment to
permanently station substantial combat forces on new, members'
territory. Instead, it envisions an effort to make the military forces
of new members capable of operating with NATO forces, supplemented by
the capability of current members to provide appropriate NATO
reinforcements in a crisis.
Thus, the defense posture associated with enlargement will apply to
new members the same concept of regional reinforcement that it applies
to current members, relying on the capability of new members' forces to
operate with and be reinforced by NATO units. The same forces and
capabilities needed to meet today's needs will apply to meeting those
associated with the new members.
Similarly, NATO has agreed that while new members will be expected
to support the concept of deterrence and the essential role nuclear
weapons play in Alliance strategy, enlargement will not require a
change in NATO's current nuclear posture. For this reason, the Alliance
has stated that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy
nuclear weapons on the territory of new members; nor does it foresee
any future need to do so.
NATO will also expect new members to be able to contribute to
NATO's non-Article 5 missions, including being able to contribute to
out-of-area deployments.
IV. Costs of Enlargement
Of course, NATO enlargement carries costs. Security is not free.
There are new financial costs to enlarging, but these costs are
affordable. They are modest compared both to our total defense
spending--and to the costs and risks of not enlarging. The most
important costs--like the most important benefits are non-financial.
The United States and its allies will, by enlargement, extend solemn
security guarantees to additional nations. NATO members must provide
the capability, with that of the new members, to back those guarantees.
The Madrid Statement acknowledges that the Alliance will need to find
the needed resources.
A. Categories of Enlargement Costs
Analysis of the financial costs of enlargement can be broken into
three components:
First, there are the costs to new members to develop military
forces to contribute to their own defense, to the defense of other NATO
members, and to other NATO operations. While they currently make some
contribution, in order to be greater producers of security, the new
members must over time re-build, re-equip, and re-train their forces.
They must have smaller, better equipped, better supported, and better
led forces, and those forces must be better able to operate with other
NATO forces.
Second, there are the costs to current members to improve their
forces' mobility, deployability, interoperability, and flexibility--in
short, to proceed with the efforts already committed to and needed for
NATO's current membership.
These two categories of costs are all for actions that the
countries concerned would need to take to provide for their own
defense, with or without NATO enlargement. Indeed, to get comparable
levels of security without NATO enlargement the new members would have
to spend more. Similarly, existing members would need to meet their
commitments to improve their forces' flexibility and deployability
whether or not NATO added members. But with enlargement, the
capabilities that these other costs will fund will be needed all the
more. So it is important that the commitments actually be met, and we
have thought it right to identify the first two categories of costs
that will need to be paid to ensure that an enlarged NATO is able to
meet its obligations.
Finally, there are the costs to both new and old members of
integrating new members into NATO. These direct costs to enlarging
could be considered the only true costs of NATO enlargement, since they
are the costs that would not be incurred if NATO did not add new
members.
These costs are associated with enhancing interoperability in
communications, reinforcement, exercises and air operations. They
include:
Communications:
Refurbishment/renovation of new members' existing
headquarters facilities to accommodate a NATO C2 element
(including necessary intel & comms equipment).
Extension of communications interfaces to all new member
forces.
Education in NATO languages & procedures for new members'
officers.
Air Command and Control:
Acquisition of interoperable air traffic control
capabilities and weapons engagement capability.
Interoperable aircraft avionics (IFF).
Logistics:
Acquisition of interoperable fuel facilities and other
support equipment at reception sites.
Host-nation support planning and procedures for arranging
routine logistics support.
Infrastructure:
Improvements to new members' airfields, road and rail links,
ports, and staging areas to accommodate NATO reinforcements.
Enhanced fuel storage and distribution capabilities.
Exercises:
Upgrades to existing exercise facilities to ensure
compatibility with NATO safety standards.
Transportation and operating costs for incremental combined
exercises tied specifically to enlargement.
B. Initial U.S. Cost Estimate
As you know, the Department of Defense has prepared a notional
estimate of the costs of enlarging. This estimate was part of the
report, requested by the Congress, that the President submitted to you
in late February of this year.
Our initial estimate assumed that, while there would be a need for
serious defense capabilities for an enlarged NATO, there is currently
no threat of large-scale conventional aggression in Europe, and that
any such threat would take years to develop. This is, of course, the
same assumption that we make for our own national planning, and that
NATO makes in planning for defense of its current members.
Total costs for achieving all three categories were estimated as
$27-35 billion. These costs would be spread over the 13-year time frame
of 1997 through 2009--ten years after the planned accession of new
members.
Now, using the breakdown for these costs which I just outlined for
you, let me give you what we estimated each group would have to bear
for each of the three categories of costs:
1. New Members' costs for restructuring their national forces.
Prospective new member costs for restructuring their militaries
were estimated at about $10-13 billion over that time frame or about
$800 million to $1 billion per year. These costs amount to some 10-30%
of the total current defense budgets of the prospective new members.
New members will be expected to increase their defense budgets to
some degree, and they have outlined plans to do so. But we expect a
substantial part of these costs will be met by savings from reducing
the size of the three nations' current forces. These costs would all be
borne by the new members, except to the limited extent Congress decides
to continue limited support to Central European militaries. (As you
know, the U.S. now provides about $100 million in Warsaw Initiative
funding to all PfP countries combined to support their participation in
PfP.)
These will be costs of moving from their old Soviet-style forces,
which were little more than auxiliaries of the Red Army, to militaries
appropriate for independent democracies. These countries do not start
from zero. Indeed, they have, per capita, rather larger militaries than
most NATO allies. They each are contributing to NATO's force in Bosnia.
They have begun restructuring their forces, which are poorly equipped,
trained, and manned.
We have, since our first analysis, discovered some unanticipated
capabilities in the three invitees; however, as our study continues, we
will, of course, likely also find some deficiencies--especially
regarding personnel, specialized training, communications, and force
modernization. While the three cannot be expected to ``fix'' everything
by 1999, each must have a serious program that lays out a defined path
toward the enhancement of their defense capabilities.
We have told each invitee that its highest priority should be
investing in quality personnel. They must develop effective systems for
recruiting and retaining good troops. Key to this is the development of
an effective NCO corps. The next priority is training, including
English language training, for personnel and equipment are meaningless
without adequate training. The next priority is achievement of a real
degree of interoperability with NATO, including communications,
logistics, infrastructure for reinforcement, and air defense. In all 3
cases, the outcome will be smaller, but more capable forces.
While it is clear that each of the invited nations must undergo
modernization of major weapons systems in the years ahead if it is to
remain a contributor to overall alliance security, acquiring high tech
weapons systems should not be the highest priority.
These three countries are working hard to demonstrate that they are
ready for membership in NATO. Right after the Madrid Summit, Secretary
of Defense Cohen met with the three Ministers of Defense to explain
what they would need to do and to hear their plans. After the Madrid
Summit, Secretary Cohen traveled to Budapest while the President and
Secretary Albright traveled to Warsaw and Prague. We made these trips
not only to congratulate them but to remind them that the journey to
Alliance membership had just begun, not ended.
In the past month, Assistant Secretary Kramer has traveled to each
of the invitees' capitals to discuss their preparations for membership.
He and Assistant Secretary Grossman will testify before you next week
regarding these preparations, so I will not go into them in detail, but
it bears saying that each of these nations wants to be a contributor
to, not just a consumer of, security. They are already contributing to
the security of Europe by restructuring and modernizing their
militaries to operate with NATO, by serving with our soldiers in
Bosnia, and by helping to make a success of the Partnership for Peace.
Each country has some work to do. The Czechs, for example, in their
original DPQ responses to NATO, did not, commit enough of their forces
to NATO missions, but their most recent response commits virtually all
of their forces to NATO. Their future budgets need to allocate greater
resources for defense; they have promised to increase their defense
budget, currently 1.7% of GDP, to 2% by the year 2000. While both
Poland and Hungary have had similar deficiencies they are overcoming
them. Hungary has increased its budget and Poland has an extensive
fifteen year plan. I am encouraged by the rapid Czech response to our
and NATO's constructive criticism during the past few weeks.
2. Current Allies' Costs to Improve Deployability.
Current allies' costs for NATO regional reinforcement upgrades were
estimated at about $8-10 billion, or about $600-800 million per year.
These are a modest share of their total defense budget--less than 1%--
and for the most part, represent efforts already underway to adapt
their forces to new post-Cold War needs and missions.
These costs would all be borne by the current allies. For decades
now, the U.S. has made no financial contribution to Allies' defense
budgets (except for some loans to Greece & Turkey).
It is important to note that our cost estimates to date do not
anticipate any added costs to the U.S. in this category because U.S.
forces are already readily deployable and sustainable. The requirement
to deploy to meet a contingency in places like Korea or Southwest Asia
is more demanding than a hypothetical crisis in Central Europe. US
costs of enlargement are relatively low because we have already
provided for the forces' projection missions that the new NATO
requires.
Both the U.S. and our NATO allies have made big cuts in our defense
budgets since the end of the Cold War. But, using the key indicators of
burdensharing, as set by Congress, most of our NATO allies still make
very substantial contributions to the common defense. For example, more
than two-thirds of the troops participating in SFOR are non-U.S.
forces.
We believe the allies can and should do more to improve their
capability for the sort of mobile, flexible operation NATO will need to
be ready for in the future. But is it important to recognize that most
have already made improvements, and are committed to more. For example,
Britain provides NATO's only rapidly-deployable corps headquarters
committed to NATO and British forces are the backbone of the Allied
Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). The U.K. also has the
capability to deploy and sustain a division-sized force of 20-25,000
personnel in a Gulf War-style scenario.
France, in general, is restructuring its armed forces to be more
mobile and easily deployable. The French are establishing a Rapid
Action Force (FAR) designed for rapid response in both European and
overseas contingencies. France also participated heavily in IFOR
efforts to implement the Dayton peace accords in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. With nearly 10,000 troops, France was the third largest
troop contributor, after the U.S. and Britain, and was responsible for
one of the three geographic sectors--and continues to be in SFOR.
Likewise, Germany is standing up a Rapid Reaction Force of some
53,000 fully-equipped troops from the Army, Navy and Air Force. The
first units stood up in 1996 and the force will be fully capable in
1998. In general, German armed forces are in the process of re-creating
themselves into a mobile, deployable--rather than static home defense--
force.
The smaller European nations are also improving their forces. For
example, the Royal Netherlands Navy and Air Force have improved both
their transport and air defense capabilities with new procurements such
as: two KDC-10 transport/tankers (the Dutch can now deploy their own F-
16s without reliance on the U.S.); an amphibious-lift ship to make the
marine brigade self-deployable; and upgrades to their F-16 fleet and
their Patriot systems.
3. Costs to Link NATO and New Members.
Turning to the third category of direct enlargement costs for
linking new and old allies, those were estimated at about $9-12
billion, or about $700-900 million per year. This again, is the cost of
items such as communications, reinforcement reception infrastructure,
and other interoperability measures. We estimated that about 60% of
these costs, or about $5.5-7 billion, would be paid for out of NATO
common budgets over the ten years following accession, with the
remainder paid by new members. We further assumed that the U.S. would
pay its current approximately 25% share of the NATO common budget.
In 1997, total NATO common budget spending totaled about $1.8
billion. The total U.S. contribution to the three budgets was about
$485 million, while the allies contributed the other $1.3 billion. We
expect these relative percentage cost shares will stay the same three
European to one U.S.--in the period when NATO is meeting the
requirements of enlargement.
With these assumptions, the U.S. share of the direct costs of
enlargement would be about $150-200 million per year, representing our
share of the NATO common budget that would be applied to the linking of
new and old members.
These costs are manageable. Projected U.S. requirements to meet
direct enlargement common budget costs amount to only a fraction of a
percentage point when compared with total U.S. defense spending ($266
billion in 1997).
Still under discussion is whether that portion of the direct costs
of enlargement which are a shared responsibility and funded from the
common budget will result in an overall increase in the NATO common
budget--or whether some can be offset by reductions in lower priority
programs currently in the common budget. While there will certainly be
some reprioritizing of projects, and therefore a less than dollar-for-
dollar increase, we continue to believe that additional resources will
be required.
C. Ongoing NATO Work to Help Refine the Cost Estimate
As noted, our February estimates were necessarily preliminary, if
only because we did not know what nations would be invited to join, nor
the detail of steps needed to link them to the Alliance. Immediately
after the Madrid decisions, NATO started a detailed review of the
military implications and costs of enlargement, what new members will
bring to the Alliance, and any additional requirements for current
allies. The U.S. has long argued that any NATO cost estimate must be
driven by the military requirements of enlargement. We were successful
in pressing. that argument in the Alliance, and a review of the
military requirements is currently underway by the NATO staff.
These reviews are ongoing at NATO this fall, with recommendations
to be completed in November for consideration by ministers in December.
The invitees worked with the NATO international staff to fill out a
special Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) response as their initial
step into the NATO Defense Planning Process. All NATO allies respond to
the DPQ annually.
The present NATO costing effort is highly specific and focused. In
an effort to better understand requirements as well as the current
capabilities of the invited nations, members of NATO's international
military staff have been conducting site visits at various military
facilities in the invited countries this summer. They visited airfields
and railheads in each country. They checked out communications
facilities and visited air defense radar stations. This month they are
visiting other facilities in each country to try to ensure that the
first facilities they inspected are representative of the condition of
the majority of facilities in that country.
The international staff of NATO will then cost those new
requirements. They will also help determine a schedule by which to meet
requirements. That is part of the work that is to be completed in time
for the December ministerials. This level of detailed information was
obviously not available to us when we did our first cost study, and it
is still being formulated. But cost estimates based on these detailed
analyses will be available to Congress well before any vote on
enlargement.
NATO cost estimates may be lower
Based on what we know now, we expect that the NATO cost estimates
will be lower than those that you received from us in February. First,
the initial U.S. cost estimate assessed four, not three, new members.
Further, the NATO estimate will address only the direct, common-funded
costs, which, as explained above, OSD estimated at $5.5-7 billion over
10 years. National costs borne by each ally or prospective ally are
separate from, and will not be estimated by, the NATO work.
But we also expect the NATO cost estimates will be lower because
some things are better in the invited nations than people thought. As a
result of assessments NATO planners and logisticians have been
conducting, we believe the additional investment required to prepare
each of these nations, their military forces, and their infrastructures
for full NATO membership will be less than initially anticipated.
Let me share some examples of our experiences during these
assessments to show why this is the case.
Interoperability Progress by the Invitees
When the American General heading a small NATO team visiting
Kecskemet Air Base asked his Hungarian host how he might accommodate a
squadron of NATO F-16s, he was surprised by the precision and detail of
the Hungarian response--and the level of installation readiness already
achieved. He commented that the Hungarians had done some excellent
research. He was told it wasn't just research. Hungary had hosted a
squadron of Dutch F-16s for several weeks in 1996, and a United States
Air National Guard squadron was scheduled to arrive the week after the
general's visit. The Dutch and American planes were in Hungary as part
of a series of PfP exercises designed to improve interoperability. Thus
Hungarians are already capable of handling NATO aircraft at some of
their airfields. There is less work that needs to be done--and in
turn--less money to be spent to improve these airfields than we had
estimated earlier this year. This example also shows how PfP has
contributed in direct and practical ways to preparing for NATO
membership.
In another example, an analyst monitoring the NATO Common Fund Cost
Study's progress noted that even though communications and, information
systems requirements were increasing, the prospective costs to the
Czech Republic kept dropping. Upon closer inspection, it turned out the
Czechs had already anticipated requirements for secure and non-secure
digital communications programs and had applied NATO standards to the
national programs they are pursuing on their own. In short, the Czechs
had already spent their own money to fund some projects that we had
assumed would be paid for by NATO as a whole through the common
budgets.
Finally, an American general asked a Polish major familiar with the
details of a particular rail complex whether we could reasonably expect
to transport a NATO armored division through it in one week's time. The
amused major replied by asking the general how many Soviet heavy
divisions he thought they planned on moving through the same location
when trains were going the other way?
These examples demonstrate an important point. When we conducted
our initial cost study, we assumed a very substantial need for
improving military bases and equipment to support interoperability and
reinforcement. As we spend more time on the ground in the countries of
each of the invitees, learning the details of their military forces and
infrastructure, we are gaining a better appreciation for just how well
prepared they were to fight against NATO, and for how much effort they
have subsequently dedicated to preparing to integrate into NATO. Of
course, we will also find deficiencies, but the new members will be
modernizing from a relatively robust foundation. We will not be
building airfields from scratch. In fact, NATO will be inheriting a
great deal of usable infrastructure. Accordingly, the direct costs of
enlargement will likely be less than we originally estimated.
During the Cold War these levels of capabilities would have been
bad news stories, but today they are all good news stories. What I am
attempting to demonstrate is that we are increasingly impressed by the
levels of readiness, understanding, and initial success of the invitees
in working toward NATO interoperability. These capabilities will
contribute to driving down the need for NATO common-funded improvements
once they become members of NATO. These capabilities are generally
higher than we assumed in our February study on the requirements and
costs of enlargement. I'm convinced, as we delve deeper into the
circumstances in these countries, we will discover more examples of
infrastructure capabilities either inherited from the Cold War or built
up over the past three years through the Partnership for Peace.
The NATO staff work I have been outlining for you, when forwarded
to Ministers in December, will provide the basis for a more refined
assessment of the costs associated with NATO enlargement. In order to
support the Congress' review of issues associated with enlargement, we
will, as Secretary Cohen stated in his 16 October letter to Senator
Stevens, provide you with an update based on these NATO efforts in
early 1998.
D. Finding the Resources
Once the military requirements and cost estimates are agreed to in
December, we will move forward to make good on the commitment
undertaken by national leaders at Madrid that, ``the resources
necessary to meet [the costs of enlargement] will be provided.''
In Maastricht, at the informal NATO defense ministerial, Secretary
Cohen led the discussions on this issue. Secretary Cohen reminded his
colleagues that at our defense ministerial in June, we all pledged to
play our full part: (1) in preparing the nations invited to join NATO
for their future roles and obligations as Alliance members; (2) in
providing sufficient resources to maintain the Alliance's ability to
perform its full range of missions; (3) in implementing the Alliance's
decisions to further enhance its relations with partners; and (4) in
acknowledging that, ``the admission of new members . . . will involve
the Alliance providing the resources which enlargement will necessarily
require.'' These commitments were reaffirmed at the Summit in Madrid,
where our Heads of State agreed: (1) that there will be costs
associated with the integration of new members; (2) that these costs
will be manageable; and (3) that the resources necessary to meet these
costs will be provided.
There was no disagreement on this point in Maastricht. Of course,
until we know the detailed cost and proposed schedule of action, we
will not be able to determine how much net increase in the NATO common
budgets will be needed. And, as British Defense Minister George
Robertson stated last week, ``[b]ecause enlargement is a high priority
for NATO, we may have to delay some lower priority projects.'' But,
Minister Robertson added, ``if additional spending is required, Britain
will pay its share.'' We are confident that will, in the end, be the
position of all the allies.
We will keep you informed over the coming months as this discussion
continues.
E. The Effect of a Greater Threat on Costs
Finally, it is important to understand that these estimates of the
cost of enlargement--and of keeping NATO capable in new conditions--
relate to the capabilities required in the European security
environment that we in fact foresee--one in which nations need serious
defense capabilities, but in which there is no threat of large scale
military conventional aggression and where any such threat would take
years to develop. Of course, a fundamentally different--and far more
demanding--set of defense requirements would arise if trends in Russia
or elsewhere developed in such a way as to renew a direct territorial
threat to NATO members. Such a threat does not exist, nor is there an
expectation that it will reemerge. Moreover, the United States and its
allies would have years of warning and preparation time in the very
unlikely event such a dramatic change in the European security
environment were to occur.
Because such a threat is hypothetical, it is not possible to
estimate with any precision the costs of meeting it. But there can be
no question that the cost of responding to such a threat would be
substantial. Just ten years ago, for example, the United States and
most of its Allies were spending nearly twice as much of GDP on defense
as today.
There can, however, be no question that, if we had to meet such a
threat, we could do so more effectively and less expensively in an
expanded alliance than in a Europe still divided along Cold War lines.
In such circumstance, the added manpower, military capability,
political support and strategic depth afforded by NATO enlargement
would amply justify whatever additional cost there were in having
additional members in the Alliance.
Perhaps the most important point to be made about the costs of
enlargement is that there would be greater costs and risks to not
enlarging. If we fail to seize this historic opportunity to help
integrate, consolidate and stabilize Central and Eastern Europe, we
would risk a much higher price later. The most efficient and cost-
effective way to guarantee stability in Europe is to do so collectively
through NATO. The costs of doing so are manageable for all concerned.
Alliances save money. Collective defense is both cheaper and stronger
than national defense. A decision to defer enlargement, much less to
withhold it altogether, would send the message to Central and Eastern
Europe that their future does not lie with NATO and the West. It would
falsely validate the old divisions of the Cold War. The resulting sense
of isolation and vulnerability would be destabilizing in the region and
would encourage nationalist and disruptive forces throughout Europe.
NATO would remain stuck in the past, in danger of irrelevance, while
the U.S. would be seen as inconstant and unreliable in its leadership
and withdrawing from its responsibilities in Europe and the world.
V. Conclusion
The years ahead will be challenging ones in European and
Transatlantic security. NATO enlargement is an essential feature of
adapting the Western military and security organization to efficiently
and effectively meet the challenges ahead. While there will be costs,
they are manageable. More important, for the United States and its
allies and partners, the costs--and not just financial costs--of a
strong, effective and engaged North Atlantic Alliance pale in
comparison to the costs that would be implicated by stagnation,
instability and failure of leadership in Europe.
Senator Hagel (presiding): Mr. Slocombe, thank you. We
appreciate your appearing here this morning. Chairman Helms
went to vote, if you wondered what was going on up here.
Mr. Slocombe. He explained.
Senator Hagel. I know you are no stranger to this. He will
be back, and in the interest of time, I will proceed with
questions and then ask Senator Feinstein for her questions.
Mr. Slocombe, in light of the news this morning about the
present--or at least it appears to be a present shakeup in the
Czech government, have we anticipated problems that might occur
with the three new invited nations into NATO--government
problems, financial problems? And if we have anticipated those
problems, for example, on the financial assistance side, if one
of these new nations is unable to finance its share of its
membership, what is plan B?
Mr. Slocombe. I think that whatever shape of the
governments in any of these three coun--the short answer to
your question is yes, we have looked at the political stability
of these three governments. One of the requirements was that
any country that was going to be seriously considered for an
invitation would have to have clearly established a democratic,
stable system.
And that is certainly true for these three. It's true for
other countries in Central Europe, but that was a necessary but
not a sufficient condition. I think it is clear that any
conceivable government in any of these three countries will be
dedicated to NATO membership and to paying the costs that are
necessary to do that.
Now, they may have economic ups and downs. The possibility
of occasional blips in the economic structure is not confined
to Central and Eastern Europe. But I think the base--their
basic commitment to NATO membership and to paying the costs
will be met.
The problems in the Czech Republic--and I have to confess,
Senator, that in the time that I had been getting up here,
whatever's happened in the Czech Republic has happened. I can't
comment in any detail. There have been some special issues in
the Czech Republic and I think they have had a wakeup call and
they understand they need to make a stronger effort. We expect
they will make that.
Senator Hagel. Let me delve into this a little more
specifically. Would members, current NATO members, do you
believe, step up their assistance in order to cover the nation
or two or three invited nations if there was a shortfall or a
problem in their commitment to financially support their
involvement in NATO?
Mr. Slocombe. We have made clear from the beginning that on
the whole, NATO is a club in which you pay your own dues. The
United States has had a modest program for all of the
Partnership For Peace countries, although a large part of it
goes to these three countries, to support participation in the
Partnership For Peace.
A number of the other European countries have small
programs of their own that work on particular focused areas.
But except for that very limited and very focused effort, there
is no contemplation by anybody that there will be financial
assistance to meet the basic defense budgets of any of these
countries.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
The Congressional Budget Office and the RAND Corporation,
as you know, both estimated NATO expansion costs, but came up
with dramatically different numbers. How would you explain the
differences? If the major difference is in the threat
assumption, what threat assumptions underlie the
administration's projections?
Mr. Slocombe. The answer to that question differs for the
two studies. The CBO study, at least its big number--the $120
billion, which gets all the attention--assumed a dramatically
larger threat and assumed that we would need to recreate in
Central Europe the sort of forward positional defense which we
had in the middle of Germany during the cold war.
Obviously, if you make that assumption, the costs are going
to be very substantially higher--whether they're $120 billion,
for all I know, could be low. But it is a--that is an
assumption about a threat which does not exist now, which there
is no prospect of existing in the future in the sense of any
indications, and which even if you make the most pessimistic
possible assumptions about Russia, could not exist without
years of warning.
The--I'm sure you're aware, the committee is aware, that
the Russian army--leaving aside the geographic problem--the
Russian army is in a state of considerable trouble, and to put
it mildly, is not sitting on the border of Poland or--Poland is
the only country that would be relevant here--threatening
anybody. That's the main difference for the assumptions in the
CBO study.
I also want to be clear, and I understand that the
principal researcher on the CBO study is also the man who did
the recent study for Cato. He also has very different views
about what you would need to do to meet the current threat. It
has essentially to do with the level of current threat and the
response.
Now, with respect to the RAND study, that--those numbers
are obviously a lot closer to the ones which we reached in the
Department of Defense. Indeed, the range in the RAND study
overlaps with the range in the Department of Defense study. The
principal difference there is a relatively technical one about
the number of divisions that you would need to provide for
reinforcement.
I believe that Mr. Kugler, Dr. Kugler, who did the RAND
study, is going to testify on the second panel and you'll have
an opportunity to ask him in more detail. But my understanding
is that the RAND study and the Defense Department study made
essentially similar assumptions and came to essentially similar
conclusions.
Obviously, these estimates have a--are notional estimates,
and until we have the NATO analysis--as I say, going down and
looking at the particular facilities, the particular ports, the
particular communication centers--that's when we'll be able to
say, ``Yes, this is the work which is going to need to be
done.''
Senator Hagel. Thank you. Those NATO allies who were also
members of the European Union are currently, as you know,
working with us and attempting to meet strict budgetary
requirements for the proposed European Monetary Union.
Could you give us your sense of how likely it is that this
effort, as well as domestic political factors, will constrain
their willingness or lack of willingness, or their ability to
increase defense spending sufficient to accommodate an expanded
NATO?
Mr. Slocombe. There's no question that in all of the
countries in the EEL that are trying to meet the financial--the
fiscal criteria for the European Monetary Union, there are
pressures on public spending and that includes pressures on
defense spending. That is, perhaps, particularly dramatic in
the case of France and Germany.
So their defense budgets are constrained--I mean,
everybody's defense budget is constrained in some sense. But
these countries are clearly going to continue to have serious
defense budgets, serious defense efforts.
And most important, they are all of them--all of the
principal European allies, not just France and Germany--are
embarked on an effort to restructure their forces so that they
shift from forces that were essentially oriented toward
territorial defense toward forces that are more mobile, more
deployable, more able to do what we need to do in the future.
I think there's no question that the European defense
programs will be--well, they'll be constrained to use your
term. They will be constrained by the requirements to meet the
EMU criteria, but they will not be gutted, they will not become
ineffective. They will continue to work toward this goal of a
more flexible, more deployable force.
Senator Hagel. Have we had--I assume we have in-depth
conversations with our allies on this point?
Mr. Slocombe. We have indeed. The most important
conversation, in a sense, that we have with the allies is the
conversation that takes place through the NATO defense planning
process.
Every year, every member of the alliance, including the
United States, responds to the so-called Defense Planning
Questionnaire and lays out its defense program. That program is
then reviewed and discussed.
Now, it's always up to national governments to decide what
they will do, but the--this provides a formal process for
exchanging views on our respective national defense programs.
In addition, of course, we have--particularly through the
Department of Defense--we have continuing discussions about our
respective defense programs, about where the emphasis ought to
be, about meeting common needs.
I think it's in the nature of these things that no defense
establishment is ever convinced it has completely and
thoroughly met all of the things it would like to do. But all
of these countries have serious defense programs and will
continue--particularly will continue this really historic shift
in emphasis from territorial defense to deployability, and you
see that in Bosnia.
I mean, the--almost all the NATO countries, certainly all
the principal ones, have larger relative contributions to their
population, total size of armed forces, in Bosnia than we do.
That's been an important--in addition to other reasons it's
been important--that has been an important experience for them
in sustaining forces outside their national territories, and
that's essentially what we're talking about in terms of
reforming.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, thank you.
Mr. Slocombe. Thank you, sir.
Senator Hagel. We have been joined now by the--both the
chairman and the distinguished ranking minority member. So it
is a high honor for me indeed to--is that all right to pass the
baton over here, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. (presiding) Thank you.
The fact is, Mr. Secretary, I voted against these new
trolley cars and every time I get on one it seems it breaks
down, and you cannot do a thing in the world about it. You sit
there.
Mr. Slocombe. Well, at least it's not a Defense Department
system.
The Chairman. They cost $23 million bucks, and the excuse
for them was they would save 10 seconds or something for the
Senators to get over there. I said, ``They ought to start
earlier, keep the old ones.''
I have only one question--well, maybe I have more than one.
Have you had yours?
Senator Biden. No, but you go ahead.
The Chairman. No, no!
Senator Biden. No, no, no! I just arrived. Go ahead,
please.
The Chairman. So did I.
Senator Biden. It would give me a chance to figure out what
he had to say.
The Chairman. I was interested in one statement you made.
Of course, what you said was true. You said ``Certainly''--in
effect--``Certainly, there are going to be additional costs.
It's not free. But it's well worth paying.'' And that is what
we are trying to determine.
But my point is that Uncle Sugar--Uncle Sam--should not be
forced to pick up the tab on this to protect Europe. Anyway,
representatives of the three new members were here, and they
assured me and other Senators that they were perfectly willing
and prepared to pay their fair share.
And as far as Germany and France and all the rest of them,
they ought to ante up a little bit more because we have sent
men over to die and spent billions of dollars saving their
bacon twice in this century. So I do not have very much
sympathy for their unwillingness to pay the cost.
Now, the United States and its NATO allies are in the
middle of an effort to identify the specific costs. Did you
make clear exactly the answer to the question ``Will NATO have
an agreed estimate by December of this year?''
Mr. Slocombe. Yes. That, as the statement explains in sort
of bureaucratic detail, we're in the middle of a process----
The Chairman. And I assume you did.
Mr. Slocombe. [continuing]. to produce that by December.
The Chairman. Was it different from the Clinton
administration's estimate?
Mr. Slocombe. We expect that it will be somewhat lower.
The Chairman. Somewhat lower?
Mr. Slocombe. Yes.
The Chairman. And, now, the other 15 members--since we are
talking about fair share. Are they going to help pay the cost
of bringing new members into the alliance?
Mr. Slocombe. Yes, they will, Senator. Mr. Chairman, the--
one thing which is not in dispute is that the common budgets
will continue to be distributed essentially as they are now.
Obviously, the percentages will change slightly because the
three new members will pay a contribution. Given their relative
size and relative economic position, it'll be quite small, so
that everybody's absolute percentage will go down a little bit.
But the most important point is that the relative shares
will not change and that's three European dollars for every
American dollar. The United States pays about a quarter of the
European--of the NATO common budgets and the other members of
the alliance pay the other three quarters.
And there is no proposal that I have heard about--and I
think I would have heard about it--there is no proposal to
change that ratio.
The Chairman. Well, I am going to have one or two more
questions which will be of an arithmetical nature and I will
file those in writing and you can respond in writing in order
to save time.
Mr. Slocombe. If I could, Mr. Chairman, there is one point
that I think it is important to have in mind as we think about
what the NATO estimate will be.
NATO is estimating what the cost to the NATO common budgets
will be. The number that we estimate for that is not the $25--
$27-$35 billion. It is about $5.5 to $7 billion, which is
embedded within the larger estimate, but it is important that
we be clear what NATO will be estimating is the cost of common
budgets, not the estimates for the whole range of costs.
The Chairman. Good point. Senator Biden?
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman--a good point that
no one understands.
I'm not being facetious.
Mr. Slocombe. This is a----
Senator Biden. No, no, no--see--Walt, you know this place,
Mr. Secretary. You know this place extremely well. I am not
being solicitous when I suggest that you have the respect of
both sides of the aisle here.
You have been here awhile. You have been here in more than
one administration. One of the things that I think is very,
very important for those of us who support expansion is to make
sure that we are able as clearly as possible to delineate for
our colleagues and for our constituencies the difference in the
additional cost that would be required as a consequence of
expansion, and the difference as a consequence of plans and
agreements already made within NATO to modernize and upgrade
NATO capacity and capability even if we did not expand NATO.
Mr. Slocombe. Exactly, sir.
Senator Biden. And so I hate to ask you to do this, but in
light of what you have just stated, the common budget that you
just referred to, what does that common budget speak to? What
elements does it take into account? Does it take both those
elements into account--the element of the cost of expansion of
the additional three nations and the element of the cost of
modernization that we had already agreed to, I guess, what,
more than 2 years ago?
Mr. Slocombe. It does not include any of the costs of
modernization in that--in the sense to which you refer.
Senator Biden. Right.
Mr. Slocombe. Those are paid, they have been paid for--
again, with the special exception of Greece and Turkey, they
have been paid for by the NATO members for the last--right at
the beginning of NATO, there was some direct grant assistance.
But for decades, those costs have been--national costs paid
for by--the Belgian taxpayer pays for the Belgian army, the
German taxpayer pays for the German army and so on.
Senator Biden. Right.
Mr. Slocombe. And the American taxpayer pays for the
American armed force.
There are--and that will continue to be true.
In a sense, the answer to the question is if those costs
are not met, we may have a problem, but we will not have a
bill.
Senator Biden. Right.
Mr. Slocombe. We may have a problem in the sense that our
allies will not have done what we think is necessary for the
common defense.
Senator Biden. Or what they agreed to do.
Mr. Slocombe. Or what they agreed to do or what they
proposed to do.
Senator Biden. Right.
Mr. Slocombe. In general, they have proposed to do all
this. We may have a problem, but the one thing which we will
not do is write a check to the German government.
Senator Biden. Right.
Mr. Slocombe. And that is not going to happen.
Senator Biden. Good. I am sorry, go ahead.
Mr. Slocombe. Now, you asked if--you asked what the NATO
common budgets cover. There are--and this gets complicated.
There are three of them.
One is the civil budget, which essentially--one is the
civil budget, which essentially pays for the NATO headquarters,
science program, a few things like that.
Senator Biden. Now, if I can stop you on that one. The
incremental cost to that common budget as a consequence of
adding three nations is relatively small, is it not?
Mr. Slocombe. I do not have a breakdown as to----
Senator Biden. No, I am not asking you for a specific
breakdown.--I mean--in relative terms----
Mr. Slocombe. It would be very small.
Senator Biden. It would be small.
Mr. Slocombe. It should be very small.
Senator Biden. Here is the point I am driving at in each of
these, at some point, we have to, on the floor of the Senate,
be able to parse out for our colleagues that when they hear
``common budget,'' they are going to hear a big number, a
bigger number.
Mr. Slocombe. It is going to be a few billion dollars.
Senator Biden. Right. And a lot of people, even well-
informed people or informed people, are going to assume that
amount is what we are talking about the United States having to
pay.
And so, it would be a useful thing for DOD or whomever to
break out for us on the common budget number we are going to
hear the three categories, you are about to tell me. One
relates----
Mr. Slocombe. Civil, military, and what we used to call
``NATO infrastructure,'' now called ``NATO Security Investment
Program.''
Senator Biden. If you could, when that common budget is
agreed upon, break out for the committee the incremental
increase in each of those categories as a consequence of adding
three additional nations, that would be helpful.
And, further, whether or not that expansion--I think it is
self-evident, but--if that expansion cost is being shared on
the same basis among the 16 nations as the underlying cost is--
or as the base cost is.
My terminology may not be correct.
Mr. Slocombe. You mean the present NATO common----
Senator Biden. The present NATO common budget.
Mr. Slocombe. Right.
Senator Biden. You follow me?
Mr. Slocombe. Yes, exactly.
Senator Biden. Because you are going to have people
focusing on two things--one, what is the total cost to the
American taxpayer in writing additional checks to anything
related to NATO as a consequence of expansion? And, two, of
that additional cost, does that reflect a fair share of what
other people are paying?
And, so, we are going to have to be able to answer those
questions. I am not being--again, to use the phrase twice--
facetious on this point.
Mr. Slocombe. I understand.
Senator Biden. We are going to have to be able to put up a
big old chart on the floor, a colored chart, and say, ``Now,
look, this is the total cost of adding these three nations.
These are the categories into which it falls. We are paying
this amount, and the other 15 nations are paying this amount of
that expansion cost.''
Because you are going to get people very upset--not you,
us. Those of us pushing expansion are going to get people very
upset here if a) the cost is real high, which I believe it will
not be, or b) even if it is not high, we are paying a larger
proportion of that bill than seems fair relative to what the
breakdown to date has been in terms of sharing costs for NATO.
Are you with me?
Mr. Slocombe. Absolutely.
Senator Biden. If you have any other better ways of doing
it, I am open. I do not pretend to have the best way of
presenting that. But we are going to have to be able to present
that in fairly concrete terms.
So I will not bore you anymore with it now. But if you
could have your staff work on that notion for me, for us, and
maybe you could assign one of your staff members to actually
just give me a call. I am sure everybody is interested.
But in addition to the committee, I would like to sit down
with----
Mr. Slocombe. To make it----
Senator Biden. [continuing]. somebody to actually go
through that process.
Mr. Slocombe. To add to its baroque complexity, the three
NATO military budgets are funded in three separate
appropriations bills for the United States.
Senator Biden. Exactly, exactly. But we can handle that
piece, in my view--in terms of the debate.
One last question--my time is up. I realize I may make your
negotiation a little harder by this question, but it will make
my negotiations easier, so--better you because you are a better
negotiator.
What is not reflected, I do not believe--correct me if I am
wrong--is the benefit that may flow to American taxpayers in
jobs and equipment--sales of military equipment and
infrastructure possibly from--as a consequence of this
expansion.
Is there any estimate as to what benefit may flow to the
economy as a consequence of selling products, communication
systems, whatever?
Mr. Slocombe. The--there will certainly be some such
benefit because a fairly substantial part of what the new
members will be paying is to improve their own equipment.
Now, I do not want to oversell this because we are--this
is--we are sometimes accused from the other side----
Senator Biden. Of it being everywhere.
Mr. Slocombe. This is just a trick by the Americans to go
peddle a whole lot of fancy stuff these countries do not need
and it will bankrupt them and so on.
But, they will have to re-equip their forces. A lot of that
equipment will be--some will be produced domestically because
almost all of these countries have some kind of defense
industry of their own.
A lot of that will be produced in partnership with U.S.
companies--they are increasingly doing teaming arrangements,
and that benefits the U.S. economy.
To some degree, they will buy end items in the United
States, and that obviously benefits the U.S. economy.
I want to make the point, though, that the real economic
benefit is stability in Eastern and Central Europe.
Senator Biden. Oh, I agree with that.
Mr. Slocombe. This is a--an area that is doing quite well
economically. It has every prospect in a decade of becoming--
probably take longer than that before they get to be like
Switzerland--but of becoming major regular, developed,
European-style economies. Those are big export markets for the
United States.
And the only way you get big export markets on a
sustainable basis, especially where you are talking about an
industrialized society, is with security and stability. That is
the--I want to be clear. I will try to answer your question
about the----
Senator Biden. I could not agree with you more.
Mr. Slocombe. That is the real economic benefit.
Senator Biden. And I think we who support this all agree
that stability is the rationale for expansion--economic,
political, and otherwise. But that little bit would help.
Thank you, Mr. Slocombe.
Mr. Slocombe. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. I know Senator Robb will forgive me, but
Senator Feinstein has been here quite awhile. If it would be
all right, I shall call on her first, and then the Senator from
Virginia.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Mr. Slocombe.
I--you mentioned that the allies--allied costs would be
about $9-$12 billion. But I think you also mentioned that
modernization costs are separate and not included in that. Is
that correct?
Mr. Slocombe. No. If I gave that impression, I--in all the
confusion and numbers.
Senator Feinstein. Could you correct just what this is?
Mr. Slocombe. Our estimate is that the costs for the
current members, to improve their deployability, their ability
to move--their ability to move forces and deploy them like we
already are able to.
Senator Feinstein. You call that modernization. That is----
Mr. Slocombe. It is modernization. Our estimate for that is
$8-$10 billion.
Senator Feinstein. All right.
Mr. Slocombe. The $9-$12 billion is actually our estimate
of the costs, all of the costs, of linking the new members into
the alliance. We anticipate that of that $9-$12 billion, about
60 percent will be funded through the NATO common budgets, and
the remainder--virtually all of it will be paid for by the new
members.
Senator Feinstein. And, so, the new members cost is what?
Mr. Slocombe. The new members cost is that--what? $3--$4
billion,--which is for linking to the alliance, plus the cost
of modernizing their own forces, which is also on the order of
$10 billion.
One way just to remember--the way I remember it all----
Senator Feinstein. So you add those two together? So it
is----
Mr. Slocombe. Yeah. The way I remember all this is that it
is three categories and it is about $10 billion a category.
But the NATO common budgets are only 60 percent of the
link--what I call the linking cost.
The three--three categories. One of the new members have to
pay for their own military modernization.
Senator Feinstein. Which is considerable.
Mr. Slocombe. Which is around $10 billion over the whole
period. Or do current members have to pay--current European,
and Canada--members have to pay to be able to deploy, to meet?
There are already existing commitments to the alliance, to the
alliance's new strategic concept.
And third, what do--what does everybody have to pay to link
the new members to the existing members?
And that latter category is further broken down. About 60
percent of it would be paid for by common budgets. There are
complicated rules which determine what you can get paid for out
of the NATO common budget and what has to be paid for
nationally.
And about 40 percent of that would be paid for nationally
by the new members.
Senator Feinstein. And so you are saying each category is
about $10 billion?
Mr. Slocombe. Each category is $10 billion, and the last
category is divided 60/40--60 percent coming out of the NATO
common budget, 40 percent--almost all of it, a little bit would
be paid for by current members.
But almost all of it would be paid for by the new members
because it is for facilities and activities in their countries.
It is for exercises, that sort of thing.
Of the--60 percent share, a quarter, or 15 percent, would
be paid for by the United States because that is our share of
the NATO common budgets. We pay about a quarter and the other
allies pay the other three quarters.
It varies very slightly among the three different
categories.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you, that is helpful. Now
everything I have been reading about our allies, particularly
France and Germany, is negative with respect to the increased
costs.
Is this just their spin for the present time? Are there
specific commitments that they will pay their fair share--I
think particularly, President Chirac has been rather verbal
about it. What specific commitments do you have that the allies
will pay this increased share?
Mr. Slocombe. The argument on this point has to do with the
NATO common budget. The European allies--the Germans, the
French, everybody else--is committed to a serious defense
program for the future which will restructure their forces to
make them more mobile.
That is, as we were saying in response to Senator Hagel's
question--like everybody else, their defense budgets are under
pressure. But that part is not in dispute--I do not argue with
that.
What they are saying is with respect to the NATO common
budgets that we all pay together. The shares are agreed--
whatever it is, three to one, European to American.
They are saying in effect ``We understand there will be
costs of building the facilities for enlargement. But let us
meet those costs by cutting back on existing programs''--by
what they call ``reprioritizing.'' And clearly, there is going
to be some of that.
The number we have estimated it, gross cost, to be--and to
the degree you do not do projects in Western Europe, you can do
projects in Central Europe.
This argument is over whether or not there is a net
increase in the common budgets. Until we know in detail the
size of the requirement for the common budget, we will not
know--and what somebody's proposal is for what you are going to
reprioritize out of, you are kind of arguing in the air.
The Europeans are certainly saying, ``We think we can do
these improvements at''--it is partly scale. It is partly pace.
It is partly how much can you reprioritize out of other
projects?
Senator Feinstein. Just one quick question, Mr. Chairman
if--it requires a ``yes'' or ``no'' answer.
In your best professional judgment, do you believe there is
a full commitment that however this works out, that your--our
present European allies, the present NATO members, will pay
their full share?
Mr. Slocombe. Yes.
Senator Feinstein. And that the three new members will be
able to pay their share?
Mr. Slocombe. Yes.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Senator Robb?
Mr. Slocombe. Those ``yeses''--one of the problems with a
``yes'' or ``no'' answers is that yes covers a lot of
assumptions, but I am confident that those are the answers when
the smoke clears.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
The Chairman. What he means is ``Yes, but.''
Mr. Slocombe. No, sir. I mean ``Yes because.''
The Chairman. OK. Senator Robb?
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, the
asterisk was appropriately noted in your last answer, and Mr.
Chairman, I do thank you.
And let me just observe--I appreciate your yielding to
Senator Feinstein. As one who sat on the end of the dais for
many, many years and would constantly see somebody come in just
ahead and realize that I had been there for 2 or 3 hours
acknowledging the differences in terms of when we arrived, it
still makes sense and it is appreciated.
I would have been here at the start but I had two judges
who were finally up for confirmation and that was important
that I be there to introduce them so I am a little bit late. I
apologize to Secretary Slocombe for missing his opening
statement.
I do not know that these questions have been asked, but I
have just a couple that relate in part to questions that you
have addressed, at least.
The IMF has recommended that the three NATO invitees avoid
large defense spending increases and I was just wondering what
your view of the IMF recommendations was.
Mr. Slocombe. First of all, we understand--and when I say
we, I mean the U.S. Government and the Defense Department--
understands that for all of these countries, the first priority
is to solidify their democracy and establish market economies.
Nobody is talking about increasing their defense budgets at a
rate which will jeopardize that.
These countries spend actually not too far off the NATO
norm. They could all do with a little increase and they are all
pledged to an increase in terms of the percentage of GDP spent
on defense.
More important, as their economies grow, the amounts that
they spend on defense, obviously, will grow if the percentages
increase.
I do not see any--in any sense an irreconcilable conflict
between doing what they need to do to attend to what is rightly
their first priority, their internal economic stability and, in
a sense, really, to become mature market democracies, and doing
what they need to do for defense.
In general, for these countries, what they need to do is to
restructure what they have in terms of defense. As the
statement says, basically, these countries had armies which
are, in some sense, too big--too many people which were
auxiliaries of the Red Army which were there to support a
Soviet assault on Western Europe.
They have already begun this process, but it is a--you can
appreciate. It is a long and complicated process to take a
military establishment which was aimed at this and convert it
into the kind of military establishment for medium-sized
European countries that is appropriate for what they need and
for how they can contribute to the alliance.
For example, each of these countries will make substantial
cuts in the total number of people in the military. They will
begin for the first time to have serious professional non-
commissioned officers corps. They will probably, all three of
them, keep conscription, but they will substantially increase
the percentage of professionals in the forces. They will go
away from large mobilization-based forces to more deployable,
more capable forces. They will begin to build the links--
indeed, they have already begun the links--through the
Partnership For Peace and so on back to NATO.
So it is not fundamentally an issue of massive increases in
amount. There are going to be some increases, but it is not
massive increases in amount.
In a sense, a sum which may almost be harder to re--it is
massive changes in the way they do business in their
militaries. Hey, you are either talking about militaries with
an officer structure, which even after, what, 8 years, is still
largely a holdover from the old days at the senior level? You
are talking about military cultures that are still, to some
degree, holdovers, and those have to be changed.
Senator Robb. Mr. Secretary, the Ambassadors, and in some
cases, the ministers from the countries have been in or will be
in to continue to both brief individual members, reassure on
some of those questions.
But, as my time is about to expire, let me just ask you the
``what if'' question. What if, for whatever reason, one of the
new members is simply unable to meet their expansion related
program? What happens then?
I realize none of them contemplate facing a difficulty nor
do you contemplate facing a difficulty, but----
Mr. Slocombe. And I do not--I think it is an extremely
unlikely possibility that they would. The arguments about
whether or not they made their one-tenth of a percent increase
in a particular year, something like that--that is an issue of
pace and direction, not of absolute capacity.
The one thing which I think is clear is that it is--no one
is talking about substantial scale, direct assistance to these
countries. It is not--it is a little bit like I said in the
more general problem. We may have a problem but we will not
have a bill--a bill in the sense of anybody expecting the
United States to meet that payment.
And these countries obviously will have problems. But there
is every reason to expect that over the next decade, which is
the period we are talking about, their economies will continue
to grow, maybe not in a straight line, but they will continue
to grow.
And they are all, as I think you will know from talking to
their spokesmen, they are all deeply committed. They see this
as a huge opportunity to do something of absolutely fundamental
historic dimension for these countries--that is, to become
firmly a part of the trans-Atlantic system and for the first
time in their history, solve their security problem. They are
going to give that a very high priority, even if they fall into
economic difficulty.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Slocombe.
We appreciate your coming.
Mr. Slocombe. Thank you.
The Chairman. Let me just add this thought. I had the
impression that there was no dancing in the streets in Paris or
in London about this, but am I wrong about that?
Mr. Slocombe. Dancing--it takes a lot to get either the
British or the French to dance in the streets these days. But I
think it is----
In all seriousness, I think all of the European countries,
all of the European members of the alliance, understand that
this is something which is very much in NATO and Europe's long-
term interest.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much.
The second panel of distinguished witnesses this morning--
and I apologize to them because of the high jinks of the trying
to fit this in the Senate schedule.
As I said earlier, Dr. Richard Kugler, the distinguished
research professor, Institute for National Strategic Studies of
the National Defense University; Dr. Ivan F. Eland, Director of
Defense Policy Studies at Cato; and the Honorable Steve Hadley,
a partner in Shea and Gardner in Washington, D.C.
Mr. Kugler?
I would emphasize again how grateful we are to each of you
gentlemen for being here and for your patience.
We have a little bit of a time problem. We want all of your
statements, and they will be included in the printed record and
they will be distributed. I am not going to run any clock on
you, but as close as you may come to 5 minutes would be
beneficial. Then we could all get out of here in a reasonable
length of time.
But do not feel like that is an absolute necessity. Do what
you need to do to make your point and state your case.
And I thank you very much. Sir, if you will proceed.
STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD KUGLER, DISTINGUISHED RESEARCH
PROFESSOR, INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL
DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
Dr. Kugler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators. It is a
pleasure to be here. I hope to make a contribution. I
particularly will address RAND's cost estimate as it compares
to DOD's cost estimate. I was a RAND employee at the time and
helped prepare the RAND estimate. I am currently a DOD
employee, but I am speaking for myself and not for DOD or RAND.
Obviously, I support enlargement. I agree with the
testimony given by Secretary of Defense Cohen and Mr. Slocombe
recently. In fact his points were almost identical to mine in
so many ways.
Let me be very brief. Mr. Chairman, you asked earlier
whether the administration has its mathematics about the costs
correct and the answer is ``yes, roughly.'' That is my opinion.
And so that is my testimony.
I will now go through the cost issue in more detail. I have
a written testimony that I shall submit.
Why do not I just go directly to this RAND/DOD cost
estimate and discuss that for a couple of minutes?
The RAND study--this is important--preceded the DOD study.
It came before and so it was, by definition, an independent
estimate. As a matter of fact, it came before any other study.
It was an original.
And so we did not have an opportunity to be biased or
prejudiced. There was no other study: There was nobody else to
be biased or prejudiced against at the time.
Both the RAND study and the DOD study are merely initial
forays into a new and complex issue. As a result, both are
notional estimates. They are aimed at identifying the costs and
defense measures of enlargement in approximate terms. They are
both well-done, but they are not meant to be definitive.
When RAND did its study, we were responding to Defense
Department guidance. We initially looked at a very wide
spectrum, including options that fell outside NATO's strategy,
both less and more ambitious. So this generated a very wide
range of costs.
Then we looked at options that were consistent with NATO's
strategy, and our cost estimate for that, for about the same
period of time, was $30-50 billion. So, as Mr. Slocombe says,
this RAND estimate overlaps the DOD estimate of $27-$35
billion.
RAND then looked at an illustrative option that we deemed
to be sensible, a sound one. The cost of that option was
estimated at $36-$42 billion. So we have here a RAND estimate
of a single option of $36-$42, and a DOD estimate of $27-$35,
and you see how close they were.
There are 30 different measures in both estimates, and the
studies are not absolutely consistent in how they deal with
each measure. They vary somewhat from one measure to the next.
RAND has higher air defense costs than DOD; DOD has higher
infrastructure costs than RAND: There are many similar
technical differences, but they do not have a big impact on
total cost differences.
The key difference is in the NATO reinforcement postures,
as Mr. Slocombe said. RAND assumed a NATO reinforcement
posture, of 5 divisions and 10 wings because this is a standard
U.S. practice for reinforcement of the various regions--5
divisions and 10 wings.
DOD assumed a smaller commitment of four divisions and six
wings because this is NATO's practice. So RAND was using DOD's
practice, and DOD was using NATO's practice. The two postures
have exactly the same strategic intent. So that is where the
primary cost difference came.
Now, if you went into the RAND estimate and inserted DOD's
reinforcement posture, RAND's estimate would have been $28-$34
billion and the Pentagon's is $27-$35--the two estimates would
have been identical.
So that is the end of the issue of RAND versus DOD over
costs--they are singing from the same sheet of music here, and
they are in the same strategic ballpark. So that is my opinion
on that matter, and I hope I have laid that issue to rest.
A couple of final points. The DOD plan, in my view, is not
sacrosanct. Some say it is too high, others too low. Others
would change its internal details. We will be fighting about
these issues for years.
But seen in perspective, the DOD plan makes political and
military sense. It is a good launching pad for considering how
to enlarge. The Pentagon got the costs about right in my
opinion, and I have been studying this issue for 3 years.
Another point is that the DOD plan, in my view, is not
susceptible to far higher or lower costs unless its theory of
requirements is greatly altered in one direction or another.
Let me explain why this is the case.
Again, there are 30 separate measures in the DOD plan and
the RAND plan. So the total expanse is determined by adding
together a large number of measures, each of which is very
moderate in cost.
In the RAND study--and I suspect the DOD study is similar--
for each measure, there is a range of uncertainty from high to
low. When I performed this analysis, it was a very thorough and
detailed analysis; it took a long time--I basically took the
midpoint for each measure.
So, for each measure, there is a somewhat higher range and
a somewhat lower range. For example, the mid-point for one
measure might be $1 billion; the high range $1.25 billion; and
the low range, $75 million.
But in order to get a much higher aggregate total cost, all
30 measures, or the vast majority of them, would all have to
cost a lot more than the mid-point.
What we are likely going to get here is some measures being
higher than DOD estimated, other measures being about what DOD
estimated, and others being lower. If so, there will be an up
and down and offsetting dynamic that I think, in the end, is
going to keep the final estimate to within the range of what
DOD is estimating.
Mr. Slocombe also said correctly that there is a
forthcoming NATO cost estimate which will be lower than DOD's
estimate because NATO is looking at common funding and common
infrastructure. Even so, there is a common theme among all
three studies here, and the common theme is that the costs of
NATO enlargement are going to be affordable and moderate.
This should be the case as long as we maintain political
control over these measures and as long as we plan and carry
them out carefully.
So my expectation is that this effort is going to end
happily, that we will, in fact, carry out an effective
enlargement, and that we will, in fact, do it ways that are
affordable. Clearly one goal is to minimize costs, and another
goal is to do enlargement right so that we carry out credible
security guarantees.
We have 50 years of working with NATO in this context. By
and large, NATO has gotten it right most of the time, and I
think that is what is going to happen here. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kugler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Kugler
Mr. Chairman and Senators, it is a pleasure to be here.
I Hope to make a contribution to your hearings.
I have been asked to provide testimony on the costs of NATO
enlargement.
My testimony will include how RAND's cost estimate compares to
DOD's estimate. I was a RAND employee at the time, and I helped prepare
its estimate.
I speak only for myself, not for DOD or RAND.
Obviously I support NATO enlargement, and I agree with the
testimony given by Secretary of Defense Cohen.
For the record, I am submitting two short ``Strategic Forum''
papers recently prepared at the National Defense University.
The first, written by myself, explains why the costs of a sound
defense program are likely to be moderate and affordable.
The second, prepared by David Gompert, explains why such a defense
program will produce major strategic benefits.
I will be brief, but I will gladly answer questions about the
technical issues. My testimony consists of seven key points.
Key Points
First: The strategic purpose of a defense program for enlargement
is not to deter a threat, but to meet NATO's preparedness standard for
peacetime.
It is vitally important that a gradual, long-term program be
carried out so that enlargement will be safe and successful.
What we want to achieve is new members that are defended as
effectively as old members.
What we want to avoid is a purely political enlargement and a
hollow commitment.
Second, the exact costs and requirements of a sound defense program
are uncertain and will remain so for some time.
But we do know enough to judge that if this program is well-
managed, it can be both affordable and effective.
Third: the RAND estimate is a little higher that the DOD estimate,
but seen in perspective, the two estimates are similar.
They are in the same strategic ballpark.
Fourth: the DOD plan is not sacrosanct. Some say it is too high,
and others, too low. Others would change its internal details. But seen
in perspective, it makes political and military sense.
It is a good launching pad for considering how to enlarge.
Fifth: The DOD plan is not susceptible to far higher or lower costs
unless its theory of requirements is greatly altered in one direction
or another.
A less-ambitious plan is unwise, and a bigger plan is unneeded
unless a major threat emerges. Such a threat is not anticipated.
NATO's forthcoming cost estimate likely will be lower than DOD's
estimate, but in limited ways because it focuses only on common
infrastructure and related items.
The effect is not to invalidate DOD's plan, or to greatly lower its
overall sense of goals and capabilities.
Seventh, hopefully enlargement can be carried out at even less
expense than DOD has estimated. But although cost reduction is an
important aim, it is not the only aim.
We also need to work with NATO and our allies to ensure that DOD's
plan--or a reasonable facsimile of it--is launched and carried out.
With these points in mind, I will now briefly discuss the RAND and
DOD cost estimates.
The RAND study preceded the DOD study. Both are merely initial
forays into a new and complex issue. As a result, both are notional
estimates.
They were aimed at identifying the costs and defense measures of
enlargement in approximate terms.
They are both well-done, but they were not meant to be definitive.
Rand considered a wide spectrum of options, including some that lie
outside NATO's strategy. To carry out NATO's strategy, RAND portrayed a
set of options costing $30-50 billion. The option that RAND deemed most
appropriate costs $36-42 billion, for all of NATO, through 2010.
This option includes 30 separate measures. Roughly one-half of the
expense is needed to prepare the forces of new members and their
military infrastructure. The other half is needed to improve NATO's
forces for projection missions in the CEE region and elsewhere.
An important point is that the RAND study includes only measures
that are required by enlargement. As a result, it counts only about 20%
of the total defense efforts of new members.
It treats the remainder as national programs. These programs are
important for the overall health of new-member military postures, but
they are not counted as part of enlargement, per se.
When this study was first briefed to the executive branch and NATO
officials, the common reaction was relief that the costs are low.
The primary reason for low costs is that no new forces must be
created. Instead, the task is merely one of improving forces that
already exist.
The DOD study focused on a similar, but not identical, set of
measures. Its estimate is $27-35 billion, or a little lower than RAND's
option of $36-42 Billion.
The two estimates differ in their internal particulars, but the
primary difference is their treatment of NATO's reinforcement posture.
Rand assumed a posture of 5 divisions and 10 fighter wings because
this is consistent with U.S. practice. DOD assumed a smaller posture of
4 divisions and 6 wings because this reflects NATO's practice.
If RAND had used DOD's posture, its estimate would have been $28-34
billion--identical to DOD's estimate.
The DOD cost estimate can cause sticker shock, but when it is seen
in perspective, it comes across as genuinely moderate.
It is less than the cost of buying and operating a single ground
division or a carrier battle group.
It is similar to the cost of a single normal modernization program.
The annual cost is only $2-3 billion. Of this, NATO's new members
will pay about $1 billion or a little more, the West Europeans together
will pay about $1 billion, and the United States, only $150-200
million. These are not onerous amounts.
The new members will need to increase their defense spending in
order to fund their measures and otherwise prepare their forces. But
their growing economies will permit them to gradually elevate their
spending in the necessary amounts, without greatly increasing the share
of GDP allocated to defense.
NATO's current members will need to allocate only 1% of their
current budgets to enlargement. They can fund most of their measures by
reallocating their budgets in small ways, rather than increasing their
spending.
The burden on the United States will be small. It will be only
about \1/10\ of 1% of DOD's budget, and the costs of stationing U.S.
forces in Europe will not rise appreciably.
To put things in perspective, the average U.S. citizen will have to
pay only 67 cents annually, and the average west European, only $2.60.
This is hardly an onerous expense for building a new and better NATO,
and a stable and democratic Europe.
I doubt that anybody regards the DOD plan as fixed in concrete. It
is merely a starting point, and it clearly will evolve as more analysis
becomes available.
But it makes strategic sense because it embraces sound goals,
identifies the correct types of measures, and points NATO in the right
direction, with fair burden-sharing.
It will enable NATO to carry out its new security commitments in
the CEE region, and to become better at projecting power elsewhere.
Let us also remember that if NATO does not enlarge, the cost of
defending the CEE region will be far higher: perhaps double the DOD
estimate.
To me, the DOD plan is an immense strategic bargain. It is
equivalent to finding a new Rolls-Royce on sale at Filene's Basement
for $1000. Let's buy the car first, and quibble about the price second.
Obviously some parts of the DOD plan may prove more costly than
estimated. But UMR parts likely will be less expensive.
For example, costs for air defense may rise. But costs for
infrastructure and reinforcement measures may fall.
The effect of this ``up-and-down'' dynamic likely will be to keep
the cost in the general vicinity of DOD's estimate, and perhaps less.
Regardless, the costs will be ours to determine. We will not be
captured by an inflating dynamic beyond our control.
NATO's estimate will be lower than DOD's estimate primarily because
its focus on common infrastructure and related items accounts for only
10-20% of the overall plan.
Even if some infrastructure items cost less, the overall plan will
decline by only a few billion.
Costs for the entire program will not be known for some time, and
these issues probably will be studied and debated for years.
What can be said is that although enlargement is not going to be a
free lunch, its cost will be moderate and affordable.
In summary, we clearly should minimize costs and resist unnecessary
expenses.
But we also should guard against any unwise dilution of an already
inexpensive defense program that is vital for enlargement's success.
A principal challenge is to mobilize the multinational political
consensus and willpower needed to fulfill a sound plan
Strong U.S. leadership and hard work by all countries will be
needed.
The future is uncertain, but NATO's history provides confidence
that while the result may not be perfect, it will get the job done.
Thank you. I will be happy to answer questions.
__________
STRATEGIC FORUM
National Defense University
Institute for National Strategic Studies
Number 128--October 1997
COSTS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT
Moderate and Affordable
by richard l. kugler
Conclusions
NATO must pursue a sound defense program as it enlarges--not
to prepare for a threat, but to meet its peacetime preparedness
standard.
DOD's cost estimate of $27-35 billion for all NATO
enlargement measures through 2009 causes sticker shock to some,
but it is moderate: only about 1% of NATO's total defense
spending.
This estimate is now low-sided or prone to major inflation.
it is similar to the RAND estimate, and lower than the CBO
estimate because CBO embraced a higher threat and theory of
requirements.
The United States will not be carrying unfair burdens. Its
expense may be no more than $2 billion through 2009. The cost
of stationing U.S. forces in Europe will not rise appreciably.
The Cost Issue in the Enlargement Debate
Cost has become an important factor in the NATO enlargement debate.
It will influence the Senate's vote on ratifying the admission of three
new members in 1999-Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. NATO's
willingness to fund key defense measures will influence whether
enlargement unfolds safely and effectively.
This Strategic Forum explains the costs of NATO enlargement in
clear terms. Strategic Forum #129 by David C. Gompert addresses the
benefits of a sound defense program. This paper focuses on seven key
issues:
1. Why pay costs if no threat exists?
2. What is DOD's cost estimate and its rationale?
3. Is the cost affordable or excessive?
4. Is DOD's estimate accurate or vulnerable to inflation?
5. Is DOD's estimate lower than other estimates, and if so, why?
6. Will enlargement require bigger defense budgets?
7. Will the United States have to carry an unfair share of the
burden?
Why Pay Costs If No Threat Exists?
The answer is that NATO needs strong defenses even though its new
borders today face no major threat. NATO's ``peacetime preparedness
standard'' needs smaller forces and budgets than during the Cold War,
but it is still demanding. As NATO enlarges, it must avoid a two-tier
alliance in which new members receive less security than old members.
Strong forces are required for peace support missions, minor
crises, as well as other interventions. These forces will help build
partnership relations with non-NATO powers, deter threats from
emerging, and prevent destabilizing trends. Members must be assured of
their security in the event relations with outside powers sour. NATO
also needs to promote sound planning and integration. Members can
decide upon defense efforts and multinational involvements only if they
are given a clear definition of NATO's commitments to their security.
NATO must ensure that the forces of new and old members are sufficient
both now and for the future.
What is DOD's Cost Estimate and Its Rationale?
In February 1997, the Clinton Administration issued a study judging
that the costs of NATO enlargement will be $27-35 billion for the years
1997-2009. This is the cost facing the entire alliance. The United
States will pay only a small portion of it--perhaps no more than $1.5-
2.0 billion. The average annual cost will be $2.1-2.7 billion for NATO
as a whole, and $150-200 million for the United States over the decade
following accession. The primary reason for the low U.S. expense is
that the United States already has paid the cost of developing forces
for projection missions.
This DOD estimate is notional, but it was a product of a serious
review that employed sound methods. It was prepared before NATO began
assessing defense requirements for enlargement. It also was prepared in
advance of validated cost data for some specifics. Its purpose is not
to be definitive, but instead to gauge costs in approximate terms. It
is a starting point for designing NATO's defense relationships with new
members. Doubtless it will be refined as NATO develops better
information.
It should be viewed as a basis for judging broad policy and
strategy, not as precise tool for programming and budgeting.
DOD's estimate grows out of NATO's strategic concept and defense
strategy. It presumes that new members will take primary responsibility
for their self-defense, and that NATO's current members will provide
necessary reinforcements. Because it judges that adequate levels of
combat forces already exist, it focuses on steps needed to make
existing forces capable of carrying out enlargement.
Some of these measures are already underway, and many arguably
would be needed irrespective of enlargement. The DOD estimate divides
costs into three categories:
1. New Members' Military Restructuring. This category costs $10-13
billion during 1997-2009. It includes force structure
adjustments and enhancements by new members so that they
improve their self-defense capability. It includes measures to
upgrade modernization, readiness, and sustainment.
2. NATO Regional Reinforcement Capabilities. This category costs $8-10
billion. It deals with steps for upgrading NATO's capacity to
deploy forces eastward in peace, crisis, and war. It includes
measures to enhance deployability, logistics, and sustainment.
It assumes a NATO reinforcement posture of four divisions and
six fighter wings.
3. Direct Enlargement Costs. This category costs $9-12 billion. It
includes measures directly tied to enlargement so that the
forces of new members and old members can operate together. It
includes such measures as improved C3I, infrastructure (e.g.,
roads and rail), reception facilities, training sites, and
storage areas.
This estimate is based on assumptions that first establish an
``initial capability'' and culminate in a ``mature capability'' by
2009. It calculates that new members will pay $13.0-17.5 billion, the
non-U.S. NATO members will pay $12.5-15.5 billion, and the United
States, the remainder. Because this estimate includes only enlargement-
related measures, it does not include the larger defense preparations
that all NATO countries will be pursuing. The costs for new members
will consume 15%-25% of their future defense spending of $65-100
billion; the remainder will be used for national programs.
This estimate is based on a ``middle-ground'' theory of
requirements. It is not minimalist. It is not a bare-bones estimate
aimed at minimizing costs at the expense of necessary capabilities. It
does not reflect a high theory of requirements that acquires all
plausible capabilities. It is not threat-based, and it does not expect
trouble with Russia. It reflects a normal NATO peacetime preparedness
standard in which the goal is to acquire essential capabilities at an
affordable price.
Is the Cost Affordable or Excessive?
To some, DOD's cost estimate of $27-35 billion causes sticker
shock. Seen in a broader perspective, it is moderate and affordable:
It is similar to the cost of normal defense departures of
this type: e.g., a U.S. air modernization program or defense of
another region.
It imposes a high financial burden only on new members, who
will gain big strategic benefits.
For the West European members of NATO, it will cost only
about 1% of the $2 trillion that they will be spending on
defense.
For the United States, it will cost only about one-tenth of
1% of DOD's future spending of $3 trillion. The cost of
stationing U.S. forces in Europe will not rise appreciably (by
my estimate 2-5 percent or less).
Other comparisons reinforce the conclusion of moderate costs:
The cost of $27-35 billion for all of NATO is equal to the
full expense of a single U.S. active division or carrier battle
group for a similar period.
The annual cost is about 30% of what the United States and
NATO spend on military construction, and 40% of their expense
on family housing.
The cost is equal to what they spend on revolving accounts
and management funds--small accounts that fluctuate upward and
downward.
For the average citizen, the costs are affordable (see Table 1: A
Comparison of Enlargement Costs). For the average American, the annual
cost is equal to the price of a candy bar. For a West European, it is
equal to that of a McDonald's hamburger. For the CEE citizen, the cost
would pay for one dinner at a restaurant.
Given the immense strategic benefits of NATO enlargement, all are
getting their money's worth. Moreover, alliances save money. For all
participants, NATO enlargement lowers the cost of integrating and
defending the CEE region. If NATO does not enlarge, the costs could be
double that of enlargement.
Is DOD's Estimate Accurate or Vulnerable to Inflation?
Can DOD's estimate be trusted as accurate? Is there a risk that DOD
is underestimating? These questions are being asked because many
previous defense programs became far more expensive as they unfolded.
When the details are considered, the DOD estimate merits confidence--
provided its underlying plan is not changed in a wholesale way.
Table 1: A Comparison of Enlargement Costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost To: Annual Cost Total Cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average U.S. Citizen.......................... $0.67 $8.75
Average West European Citizen................. $2.60 $34.15
Average New-member Citizen.................... $21.00 $272.50
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The DOD estimate is based on judgments about more than 30 measures.
No single measure dominates. If the true cost is radically different
from the DOD estimate, it will occur because several measures are
pulling in that direction, not just one measure. As a result, the
primary determinant of costs is not the expense of individual items,
but strategic decisions about requirements.
The actual costs for each measure might prove to be different than
DOD has estimated. This owes to potential variations in both costs and
the measures themselves. For example, the cost of a single prepared
airbase might be higher or lower than DOD estimated. Alternatively,
NATO might decide to acquire fewer or more airbases. But unless the
totality of measures is greatly expanded or contracted, the final cost
for the entire plan likely will be similar to the DOD estimate. Higher
costs for some measures probably will be balanced by lower costs for
others. For example, acquisition of Patriot rather than I-Hawk could
elevate costs for air defense improvements, but pursuit of less costly
measures for airbases and other facilities could offset this increase.
This up-and-down dynamic likely will keep the cost in the $27-35
billion range.
The actual costs will not be known until NATO's force planning
process for enlargement is finalized. NATO may decide to trim or delay
some of DOD's measures. Moreover, NATO develops cost estimates only for
common-funded programs (e.g. infrastructure). These factors may lower
NATO's estimate, below the DOD estimate. The real issue is not these
narrow costs, but instead costs for the entire defense program when it
is complete.
When the dust settles, the costs could be somewhat lower than DOD
has estimated. The specific needs of the three invitees might change,
thus lowering the cost a little. Another reason is that some measures
(e.g., reception facilities) may cost less than estimated by DOD. Even
so, the total cost could be far lower only if the major features of
DOD's estimate are scaled back sharply. This step is inadvisable
because it could result in a weakened effort that fails to meet future
requirements.
The cost could rise above $35 billion, but the DOD estimate is
vulnerable to major cost inflation only if its theory of requirements
is elevated far upwards. The DOD estimate does not develop new
technologies, which can be a principal source of cost inflation. Costs
could surge if NATO commits to a much larger reinforcement posture or
if new members buy more expensive equipment than envisioned by DOD.
Such measures could be needed if a threat emerges, but not in today's
setting. NATO will be able to control costs, for they are largely a
product of strategic decisions.
Is DOD's Estimate Lower Than Other Estimates?
DOD's estimate is in the same ballpark as RAND's estimate. For the
same defense strategy, RAND estimated a cost of $30-52 billion. RAND's
mid-point estimate of $42 billion is higher than DOD's estimate
primarily for a single reason. Whereas RAND costed a NATO reinforcement
posture of five divisions and 10 wings (a typical U.S. force practice),
DOD costed four divisions and six wings because this commitment
reflects NATO's practice. Had RAND costed the DOD program, its estimate
would have been $28-34 billion: virtually identical to DOD's estimate.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) has assessed the DOD estimate
and, despite questioning specifics, pronounced its assumptions as
reasonable. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) tabled a higher
estimate of about $125 billion, but the differences are readily
explained. About $30 billion of the difference owes to CBO's inclusion
of new-member measures that DOD deemed as falling outside the NATO
enlargement account. The remaining difference owes to CBO's decision to
embrace a higher theory of threats and requirements. CBO costed a NATO
reinforcement posture of 12 divisions and 12 wings, a difference of
nearly $30 billion. CBO also included more robust measures for C3I
systems, munitions, and facilities. To CBO, these measures make
military sense. DOD's estimate judges that they are not needed.
Will Enlargement Require Bigger Defense Budgets?
If the DOD estimate is carried out, new members will need to
increase their defense spending in order to fund enlargement measures
while also improving their forces. NATO membership will allow them to
downsize their currently large postures because they will be receiving
security guarantees. This downsizing will generate savings to help pay
for many enlargement measures. These countries need to increase their
defense spending not only because they are joining NATO, but because
the quality of their forces has eroded in recent years. If they do not
gain membership in NATO, their defense budgets will need to rise far
faster. As they join NATO, economic recovery may allow higher spending
without allocating greatly increased shares of GDP to defense.
NATO's current members can fund enlargement by increasing their
defense budgets, or reprioritizing, or both. Increased spending avoids
the need to pare defense assets elsewhere. Reprioritization is always
painful, but the amount required to fund NATO enlargement is feasible--
only about $1 billion annually split among all current members.
If the West Europeans choose to reprioritize, they could trim
spending on operations and maintenance. Alternatively, retiring a few
units would not compromise their security.
Will the United States Have to Carry an Unfair Share of the Burden?
The DOD commitment to defense of new members is one division and
one fighter wing, or about 25% of NATO's reinforcement posture. The DOD
funding commitment of $1.5-2.0 billion is only about 10% of the expense
for enlargement facing NATO's current members. The West Europeans and
NATO's new members will be carrying the bulk of the burdens in forces
and money.
The U.S. expense could rise if other NATO members fail to carry
their fair share of the burden, or if the United States decides to aid
new members by giving them security assistance.
The U.S. costs could rise moderately and still be affordable. The
United States will have control over the expense. If it chooses to
spend more, it will act because the strategic benefits are worth the
added cost--not because of circumstances beyond its control.
Summary
The costs are moderate and, as Gompert argues, the benefits are
compelling. To gain these benefits, an appropriate set of defense
measures must be implemented. NATO has carried out many similar
innovations before, but such efforts are never easy. Careful management
and sustained political commitment will be needed. The outcome will
influence the enlargement's success.
Dr. Richard L. Kugler is a Distinguished Research Professor in INSS. He
focuses on NATO and U.S. defense strategy. He can be reached at (202)
685-2328. Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or
implied in this paper are solely those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the Institute for National Strategic
Studies, National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any
other government agency.
The ``Strategic Forum'' provides summaries of work members and guests
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__________
STRATEGIC FORUM
National Defense University
Institute for National Strategic Studies
Number 129--October 1997
NATO ENLARGEMENT
Putting the Cost in Perspective
by david c. gompert
Conclusion
Fundamentally, Europe is now more secure than it has been in a
century--one of the most secure regions on Earth. Our strategy should
be to: (1) keep it that way; and, (2) get more contribution from
Europeans to strengthen security in Europe and elsewhere. The
investments needed to implement NATO enlargement directly support this
strategy:
The U.S. share of $150-200 million per year will update the
security infrastructure of Europe, thus helping to ensure that
recent progress is made permanent.
The new members' share of about $1 billion per year--which
they willingly, democratically, are choosing to accept--will
transform their ex-communist militaries into lean and competent
organizations fully answerable to civilian leadership.
The old members' share of about $1 billion per year will
give the United States added security and reduced strain by
augmenting U.S. power projection capabilities for use not only
in Europe but beyond, where more acute dangers lie.
The security of Europe, after a century of unprecedented violence,
is so vital that we need not expect a specific future threat to justify
this investment. Moreover, if some new threat arose, we would surely
feel compelled to defend European democracy, as we did in the past
whether or not NATO has been enlarged. Rather than ``costs of
enlargement,'' these payments should be considered an investment in the
future of democracy in Europe and in the ability of our allies to bear
more of the burden of common defense in Europe and elsewhere.
Introduction
Congress faces two questions about the cost of admitting Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO: (1) How much will it cost? (2)
Is the cost worth it? In Strategic Forum #128, Richard Kugler explains
that, based on reasonable and consistent assumptions, the Clinton
Administration's figures--$2.1-2.7 billion per year for NATO as a
whole, with $150-200 million per year the U.S. share--are sound. The
debate should now shift to whether this would be a good investment.
Although the U.S. cost is small, it is important for Congress to
understand the justification. The Pentagon's budget is already tight:
planned reductions in U.S. military infrastructure will barely pay for
needed modernization of forces in the years to come. With so little
slack, every new obligation must make sense. Moreover, the young
democracies about to join NATO are still going through a difficult
economic transition and cannot afford any unnecessary military outlays.
Finally, most of NATO's current European members are struggling to live
within more austere national budgets in order to qualify for the
European Monetary Union; they, too, are pinching their francs, lire and
deutchmarks.
As Richard Kugler explains, the ``costs of enlargement'' are minor
compared to total current U.S. and European defense budgets. There is
no need to beef up forces to defend Europe from some new threat. But
there is a need for NATO members, new and old, to invest in peacetime
preparedness. This paper identifies three strategic dividends from that
investment:
1. Insurance that Europe will be fundamentally secure in the twenty-
first century--quite a change for the continent that produced
two world wars and one cold war in the twentieth century.
2. The creation within the new members of military establishments that
are streamlined, competent, accountable, and integrated into
NATO--a crucial step on the road to permanent democracy.
3. Improvement in the capability of our current West European allies to
bear more responsibility and burden for security in Europe and,
just as significant, the defense of common interests beyond
Europe, e.g., the Persian Gulf.
Insuring the Security of Europe
Because there is no specific threat to Europe on the horizon, this
is the least concrete strategic gain from the proposed investment. Yet
in a sense, it is the most basic. In this new era of uncertainty and
flux, those charged with responsibility for their citizens' security,
be they American, German or Polish, cannot neglect defense capabilities
in hopes that new threats will not arise. Indeed, a consensus exists in
the United States--among Democrats and Republicans, the President and
Congress, the government and voters--that prudence demands a capable
military even when the country is unthreatened. The same reasoning
should apply to the security of Europe, scene of the worst violence in
world history. To be sure, European security has improved dramatically
over the last decade. Our strategic goal is to lock in that progress.
Historically, central Europe has been the fuse of European
conflict. Two world wars were ignited there; a third might have been,
but for NATO. Reasonable American voices now ask: Would we risk the
lives of our sons and daughters to defend Poland, Hungary or the Czech
Republic? But surely a threat of aggression against the new democracies
of central Europe would have to be regarded as a threat to Europe
itself. To presuppose a future attack on Poland that we would not
consider a threat to Europe flies in the face of both experience and
geography So the fairer question is: Would we defend Europe? Three
times in 80 years, Americans answered yes.
If our answer remains yes, we would defend Europe (and thus
Poland), it follows that we would be wise to make that intent clear by
admitting these countries into NATO, thus reducing the likelihood of
actually having to do so. It follows, as well, that we should invest in
the peacetime preparedness of Europe, including the new democracies.
Failing to do so would suggest that the security of half but not all of
Europe is important to us. In the remote event that the threat of
aggression reappeared, we would rue our failure to make our position
clear and to make at least minimal preparations. Conversely, the return
on this investment, in that admittedly unlikely event, would be
incalculable.
The expectation of a future Russian threat is not necessary for
this commitment and this investment to make sense. We should take a
longer view of the safety of Europe, the security of this part of
Europe and the value of NATO. The Cold War and the former Soviet threat
were but one episode in a continuing history of a continent at once
blessed with promise and cursed with conflict, whose future, like its
past, will affect the United States and the rest of the world. Being
purely defensive, this investment in peacetime preparedness will help
insure a far safer century for Europe, and thus for us, than the one
now ending.
In a practical sense, $150-200 million per year should also be seen
as the cost of upholding the principle that NATO must have military
integrity--a principle championed by the United States. If we decline
to make this contribution to NATO's infrastructure, and our current
allies followed our ``lead,'' as they surely would, we would be
signaling an indifference to NATO's military underpinnings,
contradicting and weakening our insistence that this is not a hollow
alliance, with commitments it cannot fulfill. At best, this would
suggest that we stand behind the security of the alliance's old members
but not its new ones. At worst, it would lead to the erosion of NATO's
entire military foundation. This investment will reinforce the
discipline that enabled NATO to prevail in the Cold War, to become the
world's most credible alliance, and to respond to the security
challenges of the new era.
Transforming the Militaries of the New Democracies
A military establishment that is integrated into NATO will never be
the same. NATO ``denationalized'' the militaries of the original West
European members, which had previously warred with each other on a
regular basis. It helped reform the armed forces of several current
members that were once undemocratic: Spain, Portugal, Turkey and
Greece. And now it can help Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
develop militaries that lend strength and add confidence to democracy's
future.
Their inclusion in NATO's military organs, their streamlining and
modernization, and their use of NATO's physical infrastructure will
rivet the armed forces of the new members to a model that has worked
extraordinarily well for the rest of the alliance. This, too, should be
considered a strategic return on the proposed investment, since the
success of democracy depends on military reform, and the United States
has a huge equity in democracy's success. For the country that stood,
for many decades, for the right of Poles, Hungarians and Czechs to
become democratic, the cost of transforming their militaries to
strengthen democracy should not seem too large.
No one is more mindful of the need to reform and integrate the
military establishments of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic than
the countries themselves. When communism ended, the old militaries--
overfed, unresponsive to democratic direction, environmental polluters,
mismanagers of public resources--were unacceptable. In the years that
followed, military reform was disappointingly slow compared to the rest
of their political and economic metamorphosis. Creating new
militaries--trim, professional, accountable, efficient, respected--is a
high priority.
There are already signs of progress in anticipation of NATO
membership. Civil-military relations have begun to improve; plans to
streamline forces and ready them for NATO are being drawn up; the
vestiges of the old Warsaw Pact militaries are vanishing. With
ratification and subsequent integration, the transformation will be
accelerated and finished.
One hears from American skeptics of NATO enlargement, or of bearing
the costs, that the new democracies have better things to do with their
money than to remold their armed forces. This point of view
underestimates the importance of having a professional, apolitical
military establishment in making democracy succeed. Perhaps because
U.S. democracy is so secure and the U.S. military is so able, we take a
responsive military for granted. In any case, who is in a better
position to understand whether the cost of joining NATO is worth it
than the countries that are joining? Suggesting that these countries
cannot make the right decisions on matters as weighty as their own
security and the path of their own transformation is not helpful. We
must show confidence in them and their democracy.
Moreover, it is by no means clear that the cost of restructuring
their armed forces within NATO will be greater than the amounts they
would spend over time--inefficiently, no doubt--on national defense if
they were excluded from NATO. Becoming members of the world's strongest
alliance, led by the world's strongest country, is bound to improve
their security, perceived and real. So Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic, if excluded, would either end up spending more on security or
else feeling less secure. In any event, without the military and
management discipline provided by NATO, they could waste their
resources and squander their chance for permanent security. If we are
genuinely concerned about the wise and economical allocation of
resources on defense by the new democracies, NATO membership is not the
problem but the solution.
Improving West European Contributions to the Defense of Common
Interests
The third strategic dividend from the proposed NATO investment is
potentially the biggest for the security of U.S. interests. Unlike the
United States, which is highly capable of projecting military power,
the bulk of West European forces are suitable mainly for border
defense--a holdover from the Cold War. If another Gulf War occurred
today, the NATO allies would be no more able to contribute major forces
to a U.S.--led coalition than they were in 1990, when they provided
less than 10 percent of the force (by the most charitable measure). If
we could increase this to, say, 20 percent, the benefit for the United
States would be great. The allies could share more in the cost and
risk--and, in the worst case, the casualties--while giving the
coalition more overall muscle. In peacetime, the allies could take some
of the strain off the U.S. force structure, which is now laboring hard
to meet the need for peacekeeping while also remaining ready for major
conflict.
What has NATO enlargement to do with the defense of the Persian
Gulf and other common interests? A great deal. The military strategy to
provide for the security of the new members does not call for permanent
forward defense, Cold-War-style. There is no need to base U.S. and West
European forces on the soil of the new members. Provided the necessary
NATO infrastructure improvements are made--which depends on the United
States and the other allies making the investment--we can refrain from
deploying forces eastward unless and until a need arises. This strategy
will not require any improvement in U.S. forces, which are already
highly mobile. (This explains why the U.S. share of the cost of
enlargement is less than Western Europe's.) But major improvement is
needed in the ability of German, French, British and other West
European forces to deploy and operate at a distance. Enlargement gives
our current allies not only a motivation but an obligation to enhance
their forces in this direction.
As they do, they will be able to help more in defense of shared
interests not only in Europe but in more dangerous adjacent regions,
including the unstable but critical swath of lands from North Africa
through the Middle East to the Persian Gulf. This would lessen the
burden and risk of the United States and make the current $250 billion
defense budget go much further. In this sense, the nearly $1 billion
per year the West Europeans should spend on improving their forces--
roughly 40 percent of the total investment--can be seen from the U.S.
perspective not as a cost at all but as a direct benefit.
But can the current NATO allies afford this? Absolutely.
Collectively, the European members of NATO spend about $160 billion per
year on defense, second only to the United States. By reprogramming $1
billion, they can improve significantly their ability to project
forces. We should be concerned less about whether the allies increase
their total defense spending than about how they intend to spend it.
The key is for them to invest more of their money on forces that can
conduct distant operations. Some allies understand the need for this:
the British and French, and to a lesser degree the Germans, have begun
to point their defense programs away from stationary defense and toward
the ability to protect far-away interests. But their progress has been
slow, and enlargement should provide the needed impetus.
Congress should focus not on whether the current European allies
are going to increase defense spending but on whether they are going to
modernize their forces in this strategically beneficial way. And the
Clinton Administration should direct its energies to ensuring that
allied plans are adequate. If they are, congressional concerns about
fair burden-sharing should be satisfied. It would be reasonable for
Congress to ask NATO's Supreme Allied Commander to confirm that the
defense programs of our current allies are sufficient to increase their
share of the burden of defending NATO's new members and other common
interests.
Let's not underestimate the potential of the new members to
contribute in the future to the security of common interests other than
their own territory--especially as they develop more modern armed
forces that work with ours through NATO. They helped as best they could
during DESERT STORM, and they are helping in Bosnia. As their
confidence in their own security and future gains strength, we should
count on them to join the rest of the European allies in shouldering
more of the responsibility and burden of protecting common interests.
David C. Gompert is a Distinguished Research Professor at INSS, on
leave from RAND, where he is vice president. He was Senior Director for
Europe and Eurasia on the NSC staff of the Bush Administration. He can
be reached at (202) 685-2355. Opinions, conclusions, and
recommendations expressed or implied in this paper are solely those of
the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute
for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, the
Department of Defense, or any other government agency.
The ``Strategic Forum'' provides summaries of work members and guests
of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National
Defense University faculty. These include reports of original research,
synopses of seminars and conferences, the results of unclassified war
games, and digests of remarks by distinguished speakers.
editor in chief--hans binnendijk
editor--jonathan w. pierce
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Server is http://www.ndu.edu/cgi-bin/wais.pi.
The Chairman. Dr. Eland?
STATEMENT OF DR. IVAN ELAND, DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE POLICY
STUDIES, CATO INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Eland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, I would like to
deal with some of the things that have come up during the first
couple of speakers here.
There seems to be a repositioning of estimates--DOD and
RAND versus the CBO estimate, which I originally did as you
know. It seemed that DOD first criticized the CBO estimate,
which had five options--a range of $61-$125 billion--as being a
cold war estimate that was based totally on a resurgent Russian
threat.
Well, in my Cato policy analysis, I have made it directly
comparable to the administration's plan of four divisions and
six wings in projection, so they can no longer say that.
[See appendix for Dr. Eland's Policy Analysis, ``The High
Cost of NATO Expansion: Clearing the Administration's Smoke
Screen.'']
Today, Mr. Slocombe said, that my estimate had a very
different opinion of what needed to be done under the current
threat. This is a different argument, now that I have
normalized my estimate to make it comparable with DOD.
So I guess I would have to plead guilty of that to some
extent because I think DOD did so little in its estimate. For
instance, just to give you an example, both infrastructure and
weapons. They took it very light on the infrastructure. The DoD
analysts said that they felt constrained in how much
infrastructure they could put in these countries or assume that
they would put into these countries.
They did not say whether the constraints were based on
Russian sensitivities or Congressional sensitivities about
cost. Anyway, they felt constrained.
Here is an example. They put in one reception facility for
one division and when they are moving four divisions. Well they
actually put in two divisions region-wide, but they spread them
out so that the most reception facilities put in any one
country was Poland--three brigades or one division.
When you have four divisions descending on a facility meant
for one division, in time of crisis that could be a bottleneck
that the enemy could have fun with, so to speak.
Mr. Biden was saying earlier, ``Well, we have got to stack
the costs of NATO expansion into different categories. What
will the U.S. really pay?''
Well, DoD did include the category of the cost for new
member weapons. But they had a very low amount--they had $1.6
to $1.8 billion. In my original CBO study, I had $11.5 billion.
Now, what they got for that amount was one squadron of
boneyard aircraft for each of the three countries. That is 18
aircraft per country. In contrast, these countries are planning
to buy over 300 new aircraft. So, some of their assumptions are
not very realistic.
The other thing that went into that $1.6-$1.8 billion was
what they called ``a level of effort'' which was basically
picking a number for the amount of anti-tank, air-to-air, and
air-to-ground weapons that they purchased with the amount.
They did some ground modernization that was outside of that
amount, but again, they did a level of effort. Basically what I
am saying is that they did not do very much in the way of
upgrading or modernizing to new members' forces, even though
they count it as a category. They also did not include very
much infrastructure.
The other problem that I have is that the DOD has been
offering the possibility of discounts, leases, and other types
of financing arrangement for foreign military sales, but they
do not include that in their cost estimate, either. That could
mean additional costs.
So I think I do more in my estimate in a certain sense, but
only because they do less.
In my original study, I assumed very modest buys for these
countries. We bought rudimentary precision guided munitions. We
have upgraded existing weapons and then bought new ones in the
long term. In the long term, a 13 to 15-year estimates is what
we are talking about here. These countries are going to have to
buy new weapons by 2005. They are not going to have air forces
if they do not.
So I think, to some extent, DOD has understated the costs
of what they need to do to meet the current threat. So I do not
believe their numbers at all.
Also, I have an observation about the RAND number. If you
refer to the Potomac Foundation Report, they compare the RAND
and the DoD numbers using comparable categories and they do not
come out the same.
To the extent that they appear to coincide, they do so
almost by coincidence because they had different methodologies.
RAND had a requirements-based, detailed estimate, whereas DOD
picked these numbers and did not give a rationale or detailed
costing information for them.
I think you have to add in weapons costs. RAND did it as an
add-on, whereas DoD had included the new member weapons costs
in their estimates. So the numbers come out to be the similar,
but it is a different analysis and a different methodology. So
I think there has been a repositioning of some of the estimates
here.
I would just respond to a couple of other things and then I
will give it back to the chairman.
The statement was made, ``alliances save money.'' But the
question is for whom does it save money? It is going to save
money for the countries that are getting in. Whether it will
save money for us is another story.
As Mr. Biden was saying, ``Well, we need to detail who is
paying for what,'' but if the new members cannot pay this, the
you have one or two choices. You can either provide security
assistance or other types of assistance. There is a precedent
for this under PFP in small amounts that grow bigger with NATO
enlargement. Or you will have the problem if these
improvements, both to the existing member allied forces and the
new member allied forces, do not get made. This problem will
occur some years down the road when a threat arises. I am not
talking about a resurgent Russian threat. I am talking about
maybe a Serbia attacking Hungary.
You are not going to have many mobile forces from the
allies or you are not going to have any new member
capabilities. Who are people going to call? Well, the United
States, of course, because we have the only very potent forces
that have strategic and tactical mobility. My bottom line is
that the U.S. could end up paying a large share of these
expenses either now through helping these countries or later
because we have to come and intervene when the--threat changes.
I project that the new countries are going to have to pay
$34 billion, which is almost a 60 percent increase in their
defense budgets. Undersecretary Slocombe said 10-30 percent
increase; I project a 60 percent increase. That is going to be
a problem for them to pay.
And so I think it is difficult to segment these things
because you have to say, ``Well, what would these countries
have done anyway?'' That is very hard analytically, and any
analyst who tells you that they can actually figure that out
with certainty is trying to mislead. These countries have an
incentive to say, ``Well, we would have done that anyway.'' And
so, I think that the U.S. could be in for bigger costs than we
are planning at this time.
I think you want to include these countries' militaries'
costs for a very important reason: If they cannot pay it, you
may have to pay it. Also, if you sell these countries weapons,
there is going to be pressure to provide security assistance.
Such security assistance and that was not figured into the DOD
estimate. You are going to have to add that in.
Plus, these nation's budgets have been declining since the
end of the cold war up until recently when they wanted to get
into NATO. They have not done much. Also, the existing allies
have not done much to improve their projection of power. So you
say, ``Well, what is the base line? What would they have
done?'' I say ``Not much.''
DOD itself has said that the expanded NATO will not be
effective if these improvements, both to the new member forces
and to the existing allied forces, are not made.
So those are just some thoughts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Eland follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Eland
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to be here
today to talk about the real costs of NATO expansion. When I was at the
Congressional Budget Office, I wrote its cost study on NATO expansion.
I have recently moved to the CATO institute. I am submitting the CATO
Policy Analysis entitled, ``The High Cost of NATO Expansion: Clearing
The Administration's Smoke Screen,'' for the hearing record. It
provides a detailed critique of the administration's cost estimate and
makes the original CBO cost analysis directly comparable to it.
I believe the United States will pay a large share of the expenses
for expansion, either now or later. And U.S. costs will be at least
three to five times as great as the administration claims.
Under the administration's defense concept of projecting four
divisions and six wings eastward to reinforce these nations in time of
crisis, I project U.S. costs to be at least $7 billion, compared with
the administration's $1.5 to $2 billion estimate. The words ``at
least'' are very important because I believe, based on my work at CBO,
that the $7 billion is a conservative estimate. If the potential new
members cannot afford all of the $34 billion that will be their
responsibility, U.S. expenses could increase dramatically,
Potential new members will probably be unwilling and unable to pay
the $34 billion. That sum amounts to roughly a 60% increase in their
collective defense budgets at a time when their economies are in
transition. Also, because these nations realize that President Clinton
has staked his prestige on NATO expansion and is unlikely to retract
the offer, we have lost much of our leverage in getting them to pay a
significant amount. Polls indicate that their populations don't want to
increase defense spending.
The United States is likely to get stuck picking up the tab for new
members because key NATO allies--such as France and Germany--have
already indicated that they will not pay more than they are now.
I am always struck when people say, ``I support expansion, but we
must make our allies pay their fair share.'' Well, they are not going
to!!! Even during the cold war, when the Soviet threat was severe, we
complained that our European allies were not paying their fair share. I
had one Air Force general say to me once, ``as long as we care more
about European security than the Europeans do, they won't pay up.'' In
the post-cold war world, they will be even less likely to pay up. The
threat is drastically reduced, the Europeans are under pressure to
lower government spending for the EMU, and NATO expansion was our idea.
They will say and are saying, ``you pay for it.''
Of course, some people have suggested privately that we shouldn't
worry that nobody will pay for expansion, because we can skimp on
military improvements. After all, the threat environment is currently
relatively benign. We must consider what will happen if some years down
the road a significant threat appears. And I'm not talking about a
resurgent Russia. Let's say Seribia attacks Hungary or Belarus becomes
a problem for Poland. If European forces have not been augmented to
project power and new members' forces and infrastructure are still
inadequate, there is only one place to turn.
The United States, of course. It is the only nation with potent
forces that have the tactical and strategic mobility to get to the
conflict relatively quickly. This unilateral intervention will be
costly in American lives and dollars because military preparations and
improvements will not have been made. That's why I say the United
States will pay for a large share of the expenses for expansion sooner
or later. So if the Senate is concerned about the U.S. paying too much,
it has no other choice but to vote expansion down.
The costs will also be much higher than the administration claims.
The administration projects $27 to $35 billion in total costs, with
$1.5 to $2 billion accruing to the United States. Some have said that
other estimates are no more reliable than the administration's. That's
ridiculous!!! The administration, unlike CBO and RAND, failed to do a
bottom-up costing of the detailed military improvements needed for
expansion. In many cases, they simply chose an amount of money that
they wanted to spend on a broad category of items--for example,
logistics improvements. They often picked a number without providing a
military analysis of what was needed or many details on the
improvements made or costs incurred. In essence, DOD's estimate is not
a requirements based cost analysis but an estimate of what is
affordable--that is, the costs the administration believes the Congress
will accept.
In other cases, DOD used very questionable assumptions. Here are
some egregious examples:
Even though their analysis stretched 13 years into the
future, to lower their estimate, they assumed that each nation
would purchase the outdated I-Hawk air defense system. The I-
Hawk, originally deployed in the late-1960s, is being phased
out by the Army and will likely be phased out by the Marine
Corps.
Another example is tactical aircraft. They assumed that each
nation would buy one squadron of worn-out F-16s from the
boneyard. Yet, over the long-term, potential new member
countries plan to purchase almost 300 new aircraft.
DOD analysts also admitted to me that they felt ``constrained'' in
the amount of military infrastructure that they assumed would be built
or upgraded in new member nations. It's possible that they felt
constrained by Russian sensitivities, or even more likely,
congressional sensitivities to cost. In either case, their estimate was
not based on what military improvements would be required for NATO
expansion.
Finally, despite the fact that DOD is holding out the possibility
of grants, discount loans, and free leases to encourage new members to
buy U.S weapons, the Department did not include the costs of any U.S.
security assistance in its own estimate.
In short, the administration's estimate is flawed and substantially
understates the cost of NATO expansion. In my policy analysis, I made
CBO's original study, which had five options for expansion costing from
$61 to $125 billion, comparable to the administration's very specific
plan. The administration's plan, which projected four divisions and six
air wings east to reinforce new members, did not compare exactly with
any of the five CBO options, but tended toward the lower end of the
range. For the total costs of the administration's plan, instead of
DOD's $27 to $35 billion estimate, I project the cost to be almost $70
billion, or at least double that amount.
For U.S. costs, instead of DOD's $1.5 to $2 billion, I project at
least $7 billion (with emphasis on the ``at least''). Therefore, my
estimate is at least 3 to 5 times greater than that of the
administration.
I spent 15 years at GAO and CBO evaluating government programs in
the defense and foreign affairs area. The vast majority of government
initiatives cost significantly more than their initial optimistic cost
targets. Given the flawed cost estimate of the administration, cost
escalation is especially likely to happen with NATO expansion. After
all, the Clinton administration's original cost estimate for the Bosnia
operation was only $2 billion. Even if the United States pulls out in
June 1998--which is unlikely--costs will have escalated to over $6.5
billion.
Also, the total costs of expansion could increase to as much as
$125 billion, or in the extreme case--$167 billion, if Russia again
became a threat.
Furthermore, I am pessimistic that the Congress will get any better
cost numbers from the administration or NATO before the ratification
vote. Conveniently, NATO will not decide how much to increase its
common budgets and who will pay for any increases until June 1998,
months after the ratification debate set for early next year. Perhaps
Congress should delay the ratification vote until then so that it can
demand a more rigorous estimate of costs from NATO and get a better
idea of who will pledge to pay them. Otherwise, Congress is being asked
to write a blank check for expansion.
The cost estimate that NATO is currently conducting will be a
political deal. Even more so than the negotiated settlement reached
between the White House and DOD over what administration cost figures
the Congress would accept.
The United States rejected the original NATO estimate for its
faulty assumptions and costs that were too low. then administration
officials realized that the Europeans would refuse to pay a lot of
added costs. Secretaries Albright and Cohen have already begun to say
that the administration's already low estimate of $27 to $35 billion is
probably too high. They are beginning to sound like contestants on the
``price is right.''
Last week, the Secretaries suddenly found the military
infrastructure in new member nations to be better developed than they
thought. When I did the CBO study, however, I received an unclassified
intelligence briefing that said that the military infrastructure, the
armed forces, and the road and rail systems of the new member states
were in terrible shape. Finally, theNATO estimate will leave out the
substantial costs to correct shortfalls in new member and allied
forces. In short, don't look for the cost estimates to get any better.
In fact, it looks like they're going to get worse.
But high costs are not the only reason that the Congress should
reject expansion of the alliance. Expansion impairs the flexibility of
U.S. foreign policy in an uncertain post-cold war world. We could be
tied down in Europe when the major challenges may come in Asia. Also,
we might benefit from Russia's help if China becomes a rising,
aggressive power. Why needlessly antagonize Russia for ill-defined
security gains in a non-strategic region of Europe, when we might want
its cooperation on other issues that are more critical to U.S.
security, Russia is still the only nation that can completely devastate
our homeland with nuclear weapons and NATO expansion is impeding
strategic arms reduction.
If the NATO military alliance is so good at ensuring stability, and
the real goal of expansion is to stabilize this part of Europe, why
have so few proponents considered admitting Russia. It is the nation
which is the most crucial to stabilize. Instead there is euphemistic
talk of ``consolidating the gains of the cold war,'' which implies that
expansion is really aimed at a future Russia that is resurgent and
aggressive. This pessimistic scenario is not a given. Besides, what's
the rush to expand? We have plenty of warning time to spot the rise of
a future peer competitor.
Finally, an Article 5 defense guarantee to new members could
involve the United States in regional quagmires in an unstable and non-
strategic area--future Bosnias. Yet, we are expanding both the
territory and the missions of the alliance at a time when western
defense budgets have been declining.
That concludes my prepared remarks. I will be happy to answer any
questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Mr. Hadley?
STATEMENT OF THE HON. STEPHEN HADLEY, PARTNER, SHEA AND
GARDNER, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Hadley. Thank you Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee.
In my statement, I suggest that we get too quickly in this
debate into dueling dollar figures and details of costs, and
not enough talking about what are the requirements associated
with the admission of these three countries in NATO and what
are the military capabilities needed to meet those
requirements?
In that connection, let me just make a few points here.
One, I think we can all agree that the security guarantee
that comes with NATO membership for these countries must be
credible. We do not want to make commitments that we cannot
deliver on. I think that is a starting point.
So then the second question becomes are we doing that if we
bring them into the alliance? I think the answer is no. You are
going to want to hear testimony from current military leaders
on this subject, but my understanding is there is a fairly wide
consensus that it is a benign security environment in Europe
today and that the current forces deployed in NATO are adequate
to defend this territory today.
That raises a question, of course----
Senator Biden. Excuse me, point of clarification, Mr.
Hadley.
Mr. Hadley. Sir?
Senator Biden. The credible guarantee--were you talking
about the guarantees required by the Atlantic alliance, or by
the Atlantic treaty? In other words, the Washington treaty--
that we would go to the common defense?
Mr. Hadley. Right, article 5.
Senator Biden. And you are saying that is not credible?
Mr. Hadley. No. I am saying that it is very important that
that be credible and to make it credible, we have to have real
military capability to stand behind it.
No one wants to give that guarantee----
Senator Biden. I see. I am sorry.
Mr. Hadley. [continuing]. and not have the wherewithal to--
and I think that is a point of departure for all of us here.
So there--the question then becomes if in the current
security environment, we are not extended an incredible
guarantee, but in fact, the guarantee is credible, what about--
what is the likelihood in the requirement if there is a major
threat down the road to NATO and to these three countries?
And, of course, for such a change--threat to emerge, it
would probably come from Russia. It would require a change of
policy in Russia. It would require a major reconstitution of
their conventional military capability. That will take time.
The United States would have to--and NATO, its NATO
allies--would have to do a lot of things to respond to that
kind of threat. Again, while I think it is a question for
senior military leaders to talk about, my own view is that
having these three countries in NATO would not add
significantly to the burden of what the United States and NATO
would have to do in light of that eventuality.
Indeed, I would think that because of the forces these
countries would have and the strategic significance of the
territory they occupy, we would be glad to have them in NATO
should that eventuality arise.
So it raises the question about the military requirements
that result from the entry of these three countries into NATO
for both the countries themselves, for, as Secretary Slocombe
talked about, the common funding programs, and for our existing
allies. Let me just make, if I could, three points about that.
First, I think it is important to emphasize that there is a
normal NATO planning process that is going to identify the
answers to all of these things--what is required for the NATO
common funding, what these countries need to be doing in terms
of their own forces. There is a process under way to do that.
One of the elements is the cost of integrating these
countries and their militaries into NATO. The estimate placed
by the OSD people was that is a $9-$12 billion item over a 10-
year period.
I would agree with the GAO report of August 1997 that this
really is the true cost of NATO enlargement, the cost that but
for enlargement, you would not be incurring. My own judgment is
those kinds of numbers over a 13-year period is a small price
to pay for the benefits of NATO enlargement.
Now, there is the issue of the requirements for these
countries, these three countries who would join NATO. It has
been made clear that is a national responsibility out of
national budgets.
Concern was raised earlier in the questioning as to whether
this is an unreasonable burden to impose on these countries. I
would simply say we have to recognize these are not bombed-out
economies in the post World War II period. These are robust
economies, they are expected to expand.
What we are really talking about is getting them to the
point where they would spend 2 to 3 percent of their gross
domestic product on defense. That is not an unreasonable
number. It is what we have tried to get our other allies to do.
And I think these countries have indicated that they are
willing to do it, and that because of their histories, they
understand the price the--that freedom requires and I think
they are liable to pay it. I do not think it is an unreasonable
burden.
Finally, there has been a lot of talk about the requirement
of the existing NATO allies to improve the ability of their
forces to go out of area, to deploy and be sustained. I would
just point out that is a requirement that predates NATO
enlargement. It came in 1990 and 1991 timeframe when we
revising NATO's strategy at the end of the cold war.
It is not, in my view, fairly a cost of NATO enlargement.
That is not to say it is not important for our European allies
to do this--it is. We should push them.
But rejecting the applications for membership from Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic will not somehow make it more
likely that the Europeans will undertake these expenditures.
Rejecting membership of these three will not make NATO any
safer if the Europeans fail to undertake these expenditures.
On balance, I am optimistic that they will. I think the
Germans are critical on this point. I think you are going to
want to talk with German government officials, but my
conversation with them suggests that they understand that the
security of these three countries is essential to the security
of Germany, that NATO's ability to defend Poland is essential
to the defense of Germany, and I think that gives them the
incentives to do what needs to be done.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared Statement of Mr. Hadley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Hadley
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. I appreciate very much the
opportunity to appear before you today on the question of the costs,
benefits, and military implications of bringing Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(``NATO'').
Recent public debate on the issue of NATO enlargement has focused
increasingly on the issue of the cost. You have my sympathies as you
try to come to grips with this difficult issue. I believe the public
debate has perhaps disserved you a bit by moving too quickly into a
battle of competing estimates and different dollar figures. Before we
get into the details of the cost issue, it may be useful to step back a
minute and ask ourselves the question: what are the military
requirements associated with NATO membership for Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic, and what military capabilities are needed to meet
these requirements? I will try to walk briefly through the kinds of
questions that present themselves when one begins the cost debate from
this starting point.
Requirements, Capabilities, and Costs
But before doing so, there is one point of principle on which I
would hope everyone involved in this debate can agree. That is, that
the security guarantee that comes to these countries with NATO
membership must be a credible one. It must be backed up by real
military capabilities which would allow NATO, if necessary, to make
good on its defense commitment to these new members. We do not want an
alliance with two tiers of members--the secure, and the less secure.
With that as a starting point, the first question is simple:
What are the military requirements for making credible the security
guarantees extended to the three new members as part of NATO?
The answer to this question requires an assessment of the current
security situation. In brief, with the important exception of Bosnia,
the security situation in Europe is probably the most benign that it
has been at any time in this century. There is no immediate threat of a
major attack on our NATO allies and no prospect of one in the
foreseeable future. The Committee will want to hear testimony from
current U.S. military leaders on this subject. But my understanding is
that there is a fairly widespread consensus that NATO's current
military forces deployed in Europe are adequate to insure the security
of NATO's current members and these three countries in the current
security environment.
The question that logically follows from this conclusion is this:
What additional military requirements would result from bringing these
three countries into NATO if a major conventional military
threat were to arise at some point in the future?
Perhaps the most readily identifiable source of such a potential
threat would be Russia. I would argue that one of the benefits of NATO
enlargement is precisely that it makes such a future Russian threat
less likely by stabilizing Central Europe, an area that has played a
central role in two World Wars and one Cold one. The effort to develop
a positive relationship with Russia and to bring Russia into a variety
of political and economic relationships with Western nations are all
designed to reduce the prospect of such a threat. For such a threat to
emerge, it would require not only a major change in policy on the part
of the Russian government but also a major reconstitution of Russian
conventional military capabilities. This would require a major effort
that Russia cannot now afford, and could only arise over a period of a
decade or more. I believe this conclusion reflects the consensus of
most analysts who have looked at the question.
The emergence of such a threat would require a major response from
the United States and NATO in upgrading and expanding their military
forces. The United States and NATO would have to act decisively based
on evidence of such an emerging threat and build up their own forces
within the timelines of the force buildup of their potential adversary
in order to try to deter a conventional conflict. While it is a
question for the nation's senior military leaders, I would be surprised
if they would conclude that the presence of Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic in NATO would add significantly to the burden that the
United States and NATO would otherwise have to bear in order to meet
such a reconstituted Russian threat. Indeed, because of the forces that
these countries will themselves have, and the strategic significance of
the territory they occupy, I believe that should such a threat arise,
we will be very glad that we had included them as members of NATO.
This leads to a third question:
If we do not need to be prepared today to deal with a major
conventional military threat, what standard should we apply in
judging NATO's military requirements?
One might think of a standard that would call for sufficient
military capability:
To provide security and reassurance within Europe in the
current relatively benign security environment;
To provide highly capable military forces able to move
rapidly to areas of crisis in the event that some unexpected
military threat arises; and
To provide a solid military base on which NATO can build in
the event a major conventional military threat should
materialize.
How would one identify the military requirements that result from this
standard as applied to the entry of Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic into NATO?
The process of identifying these requirements is already underway
within NATO as part of the traditional NATO force planning process, now
expanded to include these three potential member countries.
The first part of this force requirement process will be to
identify those military facilities and capabilities required for these
three countries to operate as part of the NATO alliance. This involves
such things as airfields that can receive, refuel and service NATO
aircraft, communications equipment that will allow the military forces
of these three countries to talk to other NATO forces, and
participation in the NATO air defense network. NATO is engaged right
now in defining these requirements and will have its results in
December. The great majority of the costs associated with these
requirements will be funded out of three so-called ``common funded''
programs to which all NATO members contribute. These costs are spread
among NATO members using a well-established formula, with the current
U.S. share being 24 percent.
The point here is that there is an existing procedure for obtaining
NATO consensus on what these requirements are, what it will cost to
meet them, and how that cost will be shared among the NATO allies. How
much if anything NATO members will be asked to contribute over and
above what they have already committed to these three common funds will
depend on the requirements actually identified by NATO, the cost of
meeting those requirements, and whether those costs can be met by
taking funds from existing lower priority projects. The study prepared
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (``OSD'') last February
estimated these costs at between $9 and $12 billion over a ten year
period. Secretary Albright and Secretary Cohen have indicated that the
actual number might turn out to be significantly lower. The U.S. share
of the OSD estimate would be about $150 to $200 million per year.
I would agree with the General Accounting Office in its report of
August, 1997, that these are the true costs of NATO enlargement--costs
that NATO would not incur but for the admission of these three
countries into the Alliance. It seems a small price to pay when
compared to the benefits of NATO enlargement in terms of enhancing
stability in Europe, strengthening the NATO alliance, contributing to a
more stable relationship between NATO and Russia, and maintaining U.S.
leadership and influence in Europe.
That said, however, the three new states will be joining a military
alliance and will assume an obligation, like the other members of that
alliance, to contribute their fair share to the common defense. But
this is hardly a cost of NATO enlargement. This is the cost that every
nation incurs in providing for the common defense of its citizens.
Which leads to the fourth question:
What are the requirements for the militaries of the three new members
of NATO?
Generally, these nations need smaller forces, of higher quality,
that are interoperable with those of NATO. NATO will help these
countries turn this principle into specific military requirements and
the kinds of military capabilities best suited for meeting those
requirements. This will be done as part of the normal force planning
process in which all NATO members participate. But as is the case for
all NATO members, the cost of fielding the forces needed to meet these
requirements will be a national responsibility, funded out of the
national budgets of these three countries. It will not represent an
additional cost for NATO or its current members.
Some have suggested that these costs pose an unacceptable burden
upon these three countries. The studies I have consulted and the
experts I have talked to do not agree with this assessment, however.
Because of the relatively benign security environment in Central
Europe, these countries should have a considerable period of time over
which to improve their forces. They will have the flexibility to trade
off meeting military requirements against other budgetary priorities.
All three countries have robust, expanding economies projected to grow
at a rate of about four to five percent per year into the next decade.
They have indicated that they believe they can ultimately afford
defense spending at the level of two to three percent of their gross
domestic product--the level that is expected from NATO members
generally. This level of spending should provide sufficient financial
resources to meet NATO requirements. While such expenditures do reflect
an economic burden, I believe these countries would be the first to say
that this is a relatively small price to pay for preserving their
newly-won freedom. And it is certainly a lower price than they would
have to pay if they were outside the NATO alliance.
That is not to say that our NATO allies, and the United States,
have not in the past or will not in the future decide voluntarily to
provide some assistance on this score. But I do not believe, as some
have suggested, that these countries need a military ``Marshall Plan.''
These are not ruined economies recovering from the devastation of war
and facing an imminent, overwhelming military threat. They have the
time to upgrade their militaries, and the economies from which to fund
it.
Which leads to the fifth question:
What are the military requirements of NATO enlargement for our existing
NATO allies?
In addition to paying their prescribed share of the NATO ``common
funded'' programs (such as the NATO Infrastructure Program), our NATO
allies should continue, as they have already been doing, to work
bilaterally with these three countries to help prepare them for the
responsibilities of NATO membership. There are a number of examples of
what our allies have undertaken in this regard, the most recent being
an effort to create a joint multinational military unit among the
Danes, Germany, and Poland. This is the kind of ``burdensharing'' that
we can rightly ask our allies to undertake in connection with NATO
enlargement.
It has been suggested in the public debate, however, that part of
the cost of NATO enlargement are expenditures by our NATO allies to
enhance the re-enforcement and the sustainment capability of their own
forces--the ability to maintain those forces outside of their home
territory on military operations for a sustained period of time. I
believe strongly that our NATO allies need to make the expenditures
required to give their forces this capability. But I do not believe
these expenditures are properly viewed as a cost of or a prerequisite
to the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO.
These force requirements had their origin in the NATO force planning
process during the 1990-1991 timeframe as a result of a change in NATO
strategy to reflect the end of the Cold War. NATO changed its defense
concept from one of fixed forces defending the NATO homeland against a
known threat to increasingly multinational forces able to deploy
flexibly to meet contingencies within NATO territory or outside its
borders. While these forces would be used to reinforce Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic in the event of a major conventional threat (of
the kind that presently seems quite unlikely in Central Europe), the
requirement predates NATO enlargement and would exist even if NATO were
not to expand. Therefore, it seems unfair to assess this as a cost of
NATO enlargement.
Let me be clear. These are expenditures that our European allies
should make as part of their contribution to the common defense
regardless of NATO enlargement. But rejecting the applications for
membership from Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will not make
it more likely that the Europeans will undertake this expenditure.
Quite the contrary.
On balance, I am optimistic that our NATO allies will carry out the
commitments they have made to upgrade the reinforcement and sustainment
capability of their forces. The Germans are key in this regard. I hope
the Senate will have an opportunity to hear senior German governmental
officials on this point. But my conversations with German officials
suggest that they clearly view the security of Poland as essential to
the security of Germany--that NATO's ability to defend Poland is
essential to the defense of Germany. This increases the incentive that
force enhancements useful in defending this territory will in fact be
made. In addition, the U.K., Germany, and France all have programs
underway to create rapid reaction forces of various kinds. These plans
result not just from their NATO commitments but also from their desire
to enhance European defense capabilities as part of an emerging
European defense and security identity. This gives these countries an
added incentive for carrying out these plans.
The Benefits of Enlargement
It seems unfair to address the costs of NATO enlargement without
also addressing the benefits--or, to put it another way, without
addressing the cost of not expanding NATO. If the OSD cost study is
even close to right as to the direct cost of NATO enlargement--$9 to
$12 billion over 13 years--and even considering the additional cost
associated with modernizing the forces of the three new entrants and
upgrading the forces of our remaining NATO allies, the benefits of
expanding NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic more
than outweigh these costs.
It will make Europe more stable, not less stable, and will
reduce the risk of military competition or conflict.
It will strengthen NATO, not weaken it, and will make NATO a
better instrument for protecting the security of Europe.
It will contribute in the long run to a more stable
relationship between NATO and Russia by eliminating a potential
area of competition.
It will help to maintain U.S. leadership and influence in
Europe.
Let me elaborate on these points:
Stabilizing Europe
The experience of Western Europe after the Second World War has
shown that encouraging greater integration among the countries of
Europe is the best way to overcome a long history of military
competition and conflict among European states. That is why since the
end of the Cold War it has been the policy of both Republican and
Democratic administrations to bring the nations of Central and Eastern
Europe into a closer political and economic relationship with the West.
We know from history that leaving these nations in a geopolitical
no-man's land in Central Europe has contributed to two World Wars and
one Cold one. Membership of these three countries in NATO will
eliminate the future possibility that they will be caught in a
geopolitical competition between a unified Germany and a potentially
resurgent Russia. In this way, we can eliminate an historic area of
instability and one of the few that in my judgment could present the
risk of a serious and renewed military confrontation in Europe.
Strengthening NATO
The addition of these members will strengthen, not weaken, the NATO
alliance. These three nations, and Poland in particular, already
possess significant military capability that exceeds that of a number
of existing NATO nations. They have already shown a willingness to
shoulder the responsibilities of collective defense by contributing
military forces during the Gulf War and the Yugoslav crisis. Because of
their histories, these are countries that take security seriously.
In NATO, these countries will be a force for stability in Europe.
Just the prospect of NATO membership has been a real incentive to these
states to resolve border disputes with their neighbors and to establish
frameworks for managing their relations with ethnic communities located
within the territory of their neighbors. These nations have made real
progress in building democratic societies and have reached a level of
maturity that I believe should provide confidence that they will
continue to make a positive contribution to security in Europe and will
not, as some would suggest, use their position within the Alliance to
provoke or bully their neighbors. The best way to encourage their
continued democratic evolution and maturation is to bring them into the
NATO family of democratic states, not to put them through the domestic
political trauma of turning down their bid to join NATO.
Improvinig Relations with Russia
Expanding NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
does not exclude Russia from Europe and is not intended to do so. Both
Republican and Democratic administrations since the end of the Cold War
have sought to support democratic and free market reform in Russia and
to include Russia in Western political and economic institutions. In
addition, Russia has been included in the NATO force in the Balkans,
has been included in NATO's Partnership for Peace program, and now has
its own special relationship with NATO as reflected in the Founding Act
signed in Paris last spring.
Despite the concern expressed by some that enlargement of NATO
would lead to a crisis in relations between Russia and the West, it has
not done so. While even Russian democrats cannot be seen to sanction
NATO enlargement publicly, opinion polls in Russia suggest that
bringing Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO is just not
an issue of concern to the bulk of the Russian population. Even General
Lebed has recently said publicly that inclusion of these three
countries in NATO does not present a threat to Russia but is only ``the
legal formalization of the historically developed community of western
civilization.'' NATO enlargement in the long run will support democracy
in Russia by making clear to more reactionary elements that a ``return
to greatness'' by reestablishing a Russian sphere of influence in
Central and Eastern Europe is simply not in the cards.
There is great uncertainty about the future direction of Russia,
but what Russia becomes in the future will be determined by what
happens inside Russia, particularly to its economy. What is important
is for us to impress upon the Russians that we welcome a democratic
Russia as part of the West and that we take Russia's legitimate
security concerns seriously. Our goal should be to cooperate closely
with Russia on issues of common interest, while at the same time
providing reassurance and stability to Russia's Central and Eastern
European neighbors and discouraging any inclination in Russia toward
trying to reassert a military sphere of influence there. This is a
sophisticated policy, hard to sustain. But despite some evidence to the
contrary, I believe that a U.S. foreign and security policy can
successfully pursue both of these policies at the same time.
Insuring American Leadership
Since the end of World War II, the United States has expended
enormous effort and trillions of dollars in seeking to build a unified
Europe composed of free and democratic states at peace with one
another. For the first time since the end of World War II, we have a
realistic possibility of achieving this objective. It is important that
the United States not turn its back on this great European project but
continue to provide the commitment and leadership required to see it
through. For the reasons I have already suggested, inclusion of Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO substantially advances this
goal.
The United States needs a vital, robust NATO as not only an
instrument for assuring long-term stability but also for deterring or
dealing with those security crises that are likely to emerge in Europe
(such as Bosnia), on the periphery of Europe (such as in North Africa),
or from outside of Europe (such as the Persian Gulf). If NATO does not
adapt to the changes that are occurring in Europe--including most
particularly the emergence of these three Central European nations as
free, independent, and democratic states--then NATO will become
irrelevant to Europe.
It is true that America has important interest elsewhere in the
world and that the threats to those interests are in some sense more
acute--whether it is the possibility of a nuclear Iran or uncertainties
about the intentions of an emerging China. But precisely because of
these other interests and potential threats, it is critical that Europe
remain a zone of relative peace and stability so as to give the United
States the freedom of action it needs to exercise its power and
leadership to deal with crises and problems outside of Europe. The
absence of an immediate threat in Europe is precisely the time to take
those actions that will help to ensure that a threat to stability in
Europe does not arise in the future.
The Chairman. Senators, suppose we take 5 minutes apiece.
Let us see how we do on that.
Senator Biden. OK.
The Chairman. And then have two or three rounds in case
somebody else comes in.
The one I hear most from my constituents who discuss this
expansion--not many of them are discussing it. They have got
things closer to home.
But they said that, ``Well, everything is peaceful in
Europe now. No Hitlers in sight,'' and so forth.
``But our problem,'' they have said, ``lies in the other
direction over in the Pacific.'' And I guess what they are
asking me is does the NATO alliance offer the United States any
benefits beyond Europe, especially in the event of war in the
other side? You want to address that?
I had a young group of people ask me that, and I did the
best I could with it, not knowing the answer to it, and I am
sure you do not, either. But what is your speculative answer to
it?
Mr. Hadley. I think they can help us in those situations.
We had a number of our NATO allies, almost all of our NATO
allies, with us in the Gulf War. We also had a number of these
three countries in the Gulf War. So I think there is an
advantage, and they can help us in those contingencies.
But I think it is also important to emphasize that Europe
is secure and stable right now and we have an interest to
keeping it stable and secure.
And that is why I think NATO enlargement is important
because with a NATO--with a Europe that is safe and secure, we
have the freedom and flexibility to use our forces to deal with
some contingencies in other areas where it is--where we have
real interests and where those interests may seem to be more
imminently threatened such as places like the Gulf, with a
potentially nuclear Iran, or uncertainties about China.
But it is precisely stability and security in Europe that
is going to both free us to deal with those problems, and I
think also, give us some allies to help us.
The Chairman. OK. Now, Dr. Eland, another thing that comes
up in the conversation with not only the folks back home, but
people I meet from other states. Considering the estimate--your
estimates of the costs involved in this expansion, do you think
the United States continues to derive sufficient benefits from
the NATO alliance with or without expansion? And if you were
asked that question by a group to which you just addressed,
what would you say?
Dr. Eland. Well, I would say that the NATO alliance and,
especially, an expanded NATO alliance, somewhat impedes our
flexibility in foreign policy. I think it may tie us down and
take a lot of resources when we may want more flexibility in an
uncertain world.
For instance, we might want Russia's help in containing an
aggressive China if one comes up--I am not predicting that.
The other thing is it may take a lot of resources that we
should be saving for other theaters. Maybe we will be too
concerned with Europe and not enough with Asia. I think those
are issues of flexibility.
This was originally a cold war alliance, and the cold war
is over now. So I think you really have to assess whether it
impedes your foreign policy flexibility to some extent.
The Chairman. Are you asking that question--I know you make
a lot of public appearances. Are you asking the--essentially
the same question that I just asked you? Is that the answer you
give--to the question?
Dr. Eland. Well, I do not make a lot of public appearances,
really. So I really have never given that answer before.
But I think it is a good answer.
The Chairman. All right. Dr. Kugler, very quickly. If we do
not proceed with the expansion, do you have any estimate of
what the potential cost to the United States would be if
tensions should rise in Europe?
Dr. Kugler. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I earlier did an analysis
for the Pentagon. It was not focused so much on the cost of
rising tensions. Instead, it was focused on this issue: If we
do not admit these countries into NATO, how much will it cost
to defend this region without having them in NATO? And my
estimate was that the cost would double--in peacetime.
Now, if we got into a crisis confrontation, and these
nations are in NATO, the RAND estimate put forth an estimate of
about $110 billion. But if they were not in NATO, the estimate
would be far higher.
The Chairman. I see.
Dr. Kugler. Yes.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Biden?
Senator Biden. Thank you. Mr. Hadley, I think the way you
approach this really kind of sets out the issues, how we should
be looking at expansion--and people can reach a different
conclusion than you and I reach on this.
But this notion of credible guaranteeing, what Dr. Kugler
is talking about, and that is--what would it cost to defend
these countries were they in or not in NATO in a different
circumstance?
Interestingly I think that--and Mr. Eland, I suspect you
would agree with this as well; maybe the only thing we would
all agree on--is that right now, if you asked the 100 United
States Senators ``Would you respond with aid if Poland were
invaded by Russia?,'' I think you would get 99 ``yeses.''
I may be wrong, who knows? But I think there would be an
overwhelming sense, whether it is official or not, that we
would not tolerate another invasion of Czechoslovakia--I mean,
excuse me, of Hungary. We would not tolerate Russian troops
moving back into the Czech Republic, and so on.
Part of this debate is kind of surreal because we talk
about it in terms of whether we are going to defend, be part of
defending those countries, or we are not going to defend them
when, in fact, our stated public policy--and I cannot imagine
it changing from this president to a Republican president--
would be to say, ``No, no to either option. That is we will
make our decision when an invasion occurs.''
Now, granted, treaties are serious business, so when you
sign the treaty, you are pledging the sacred honor of this
country that you will do it. So I am not diminishing the
significant difference in actually being in the treaty and not
being in the treaty.
But it kind of confuses me, in terms of the way the debate
is conducted. If we could all kind of start from a basic
premise, the same basic premise, we could construct a syllogism
here that might serve us well.
Do you start, Dr. Eland, from the premise that the United
States either commits to defending those countries if it is in
NATO, if they are in NATO, or if they are not in NATO, we make
no such commitment?
Do you address that in your threat assessment? You went
through a threat assessment based upon what the world will look
like in your view, and it is a reasonable view. I mean, I am
not criticizing the assessment of what the world looks like
today and what Europe looks like today, what Europe will look
in 10 years from now or 15 years from now.
You conclude that our European--that the three countries in
question will have to do something we did not with any other
admittees--with Spain, for example. You suggest they have got
to be up to snuff with modern precision aircraft within that
10-year period.
Dr. Eland. No, they say that.
Senator Biden. Pardon me?
Dr. Eland. They are planning on doing that, in the long
term.
Senator Biden. Yeah. They are saying that, but you and I
both know that they do not have the money to do that.
And the question is whether or not it is reasonable--well,
whether or not that will be demanded of them by NATO.
In other words, there are two issues here. You sit down and
you talk to the Poles, as I did in Warsaw, and they say what
they would like their military to look like in 10 years is--it
may or may not be what is a minimum requirement for them to be
a contributor to NATO.
If we look at Spain and Spain's accession to NATO and the
manner in which it modernized its military, the speed with
which it did it, the proficiency with which it acquired that
capability--that expansion is significantly different.
And they are a great ally--I am not in any way belittling
their contribution. But we did not look at them and say, ``Now,
look, here is the deal. You have to do what, quote, some in
Poland are saying they would like to do.''
So is there a distinction between what the Poles, for
example, say they plan on doing, and what is required to meet
the Perry principles for Poland to have to be able to do to be
a contributor to NATO? Is there a difference there?
Dr. Eland. Well, I think if you want them to do peace-
keeping exercises, you give them a few radios and that is
pretty much it.
But if you want them----
Senator Biden. They are already doing peacekeeping
exercises.
Dr. Eland. Right--under PFP. So just admit them and have no
costs at all then.
But I think that these countries are going to buy these
aircraft over time.
Senator Biden. Yeah.
Dr. Eland. This is a 13 to 15-year window.
Senator Biden. Right.
Dr. Eland. And in my estimate, I did not gold plate this at
all. I mean, we rewired existing MiGs, we rewired T72 tanks,
and then over time we only replaced one-third of the T55 tanks
which do not work today.
So as far as my estimate goes, there is no disconnect
between those two. I think it was pretty modest because we
assumed that basic precision weapons would be purchased. We did
not gold plate the estimate.
And they are going to have to buy some aircraft because in
2005, they are not going to have an air force if they do not do
that. All of these estimates are over a 13 to 15-year period.
So I think it depends on how effective you want them to be,
but DOD says that they must have a basic defense capability.
Their militaries are not in very good shape.
DOD includes these costs to improve new member's weapons.
As I mentioned before, you probably should include these costs.
``What would they have done anyway'' is basically what your
question is.
Senator Biden. No, no, no. That is not my question. My
question is what is needed for them to do to be a contributing
member to NATO, what is needed for them to do over the next
decade, versus not what they would do, what they want to do, or
what they will do. What is needed for them to do to be a
contributing member?
Mr. Kugler would like to--is it all right with you, Mr.
Chairman? May he respond to----
The Chairman. Well, let me say this. We need to wind this
up.
I was going to say, beginning with Mr. Kugler, each to have
a--3 or 4 minutes, if you need it, for a postscript to answer a
question or extend a comment or whatever. We will begin with
you.
Dr. Kugler. This is the question that I want to answer: The
difference between what the new members should do and what they
will do. The difference will be only 7 percent. Let me explain.
Subsequent to this RAND work that I have talked about here,
I have been working on an additional study on this issue. I
performed this study for the Pentagon--it contained about 40
different dimensions--that identified where we will want these
new members to go in terms of NATO military capabilities.
The basic goal was to make them average and normal for NATO
as a whole--not at the top of NATO and not at the bottom, but
in the middle--thus, solid and capable of carrying out NATO's
defense plans.
Now, subsequent to that, I have gotten access to the Polish
defense budget and where they are going.
We did a study at RAND for Poland and they are doing
excellently. They literally--given what they plan to spend and
what is in their budgets--will draw within 7 percent of, on
average, of the goal of making them solid and normal. This is
well within the range of adequacy.
So, the Poles in my view get a grade of A. If we can have
all of our allies like the Poles, we will have an excellent
alliance. I cannot speak so much for the other two countries; I
have not looked at them in as much detail. But, anyway, that is
my answer. You, Senator, have asked the proper question: where
should we drive the new members, where are they going, and is
there a difference between the two?
And in the case of Poland, there is not much difference.
The Chairman. OK. Mr. Hadley, let us jump down to you for a
postscript.
Mr. Hadley. I would like to pick up on Senator Biden's
point because I think he has asked the right question.
If you think, and if 99 Senators think that we would come
to the defense of these three countries, I would argue that
that is a very strong argument for bringing them into the
alliance and making that clear. I think it is the right answer
because I see defense of these three countries as an extension
of our commitment to defend the current allies.
But you want to make that clear so that the Russians
understand it are not--do not--we do not have any
miscalculations here, and so that these three countries
understand it and know where their place is. So I think that is
a good place to start this debate.
The Chairman. Thank you. Dr. Eland?
Dr. Eland. Well, I would just like to say that if we are
going to defend these countries then that is a national
decision whether we do that or not if we have not admitted them
into the alliance.
To admit them there are also going to be additional
expenses for interoperability and things that we are going to
have to pay as well. So I think the costs are going to be
greater to admit them in the alliance.
The other thing is what is a basic defense? I mean, we may
differ on that, I think. I received an unclassified
intelligence briefing when I was doing the study, that
concluded their armed forces and their military
infrastructure--for example, their road and rail system--are in
very poor shape.
I would also like to respond to one other thing. I made the
statement that the NATO alliance and especially expanding the
NATO alliance, might impede your flexibility. I mentioned Asia.
But you can also get pulled into things in which you do not
want to be involved. As you were saying, Senator Biden, there
is a difference between saying, ``Well, we are going to give
you aid'' and actually being committed to defend and put troops
on the ground.
I think the costs will increase dramatically. What I think
is going to happen here is that we are going to let these
countries in. The new countries are not going to pay very much
to improve their militaries and infrastructures and the
existing allies are not going to pay very much either. And the
United States is constrained by budgetary constraints. We think
we do a lot in NATO already.
So what happens then if, say, Serbia attacks Hungary down
the road or Belarus becomes a problem for Poland? We are going
to have to come to the rescue. That is going to be a lot of
lives and dollars, and that is going to increase the cost.
Even if you vote in favor of expansion, you should get the
Department of Defense to provide a better cost estimate. I have
gone into the details and I just do not think it is a very good
cost estimate.
Senator Biden. You are opposed to expansion unrelated--in
addition to your concern about costs?
Dr. Eland. Well, when I did the study, I worked at the CBO,
and I made an honest attempt to not gold plate the thing just
to----
Senator Biden. I am not suggesting you did. I am just
asking your view of expansion. Do you support expansion,
assuming the costs were able to be met?
Dr. Eland. I am opposed to expansion and not just on the
basis of costs. I think there are a lot of other reasons.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. This has been a very
enlightening morning for me, and all of this will be printed
and made available to the media and to others.
Now, we will submit some written questions--Senators who
were not present, and I am sure you will not mind responding to
them.
There being no further business to come before the
committee, we stand in recess.
[Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, to
reconvene at 9:32 a.m., October 30, 1997.]
NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP--PART I
----------
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms
(chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Helms, Hagel, Smith, Grams, Frist, Biden,
Robb, and Wellstone.
The Chairman. Good morning, Dr. Kissinger. It is great of
you to come after having had such a late evening last night. It
is a pleasure to welcome you on behalf of the committee. The
subject this morning, of course as everybody knows, is the
NATO-Russia Relationship.
Now, Henry Kissinger needs no introduction by me, or for
that matter by anybody else in the world. He is that well
known. The Secretary and I have sometimes had slightly
different views during the decades that we have known each
other, but I have always respected Dr. Kissinger and
particularly his appraisals of important foreign policy
matters. So I say to you, sir, in addition to good morning,
your views on NATO enlargement and specifically the NATO-Russia
relationship will be enormously helpful to this committee.
I see the Ranking Member will be here shortly, but I
suggest that you proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, PRESIDENT, KISSINGER AND
ASSOCIATES, NEW YORK, NEW YORK
Dr. Kissinger. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I
have submitted a formal statement and I stand by all of it, but
in order to permit more time for questions I will just read
some extracts from it and then respond to your questions.
It is an honor to appear before this committee on a matter
of such importance to America's future. If this century has
taught any lesson, it is that our security is inextricably
linked with Europe's. NATO, the institution expressing this
conviction, has successfully deterred war in Europe for 50
years. Now that Soviet power has receded from the center of the
continent, NATO needs to adapt itself to the consequences of
its success.
Let me add here a comment which is not explicitly in the
text. Whatever we believe about the evolution of other parts of
the world, I believe that the rock bottom organization and
grouping which we must foster is that of the nations which
share our democratic tradition and much of our history. So I
believe that the relationship of the democracies in the North
Atlantic and in the Western Hemisphere should be the key
building block of the future American foreign policy. Therefore
of course a key question is, what is this Europe? What is this
North Atlantic area to which we want to relate ourselves, to
which we must relate ourselves? I think it is essential that
the nations of Eastern and Central Europe, which were excluded
from their historical traditions by the arrangements that were
made at the end of World War II, find their place in the
relationship of the democracies.
Now, critics of NATO enlargement argue that the admission
of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary threatens prospects
for the democratic evolution of Russia, and therefore magnifies
perils rather than allays them. I hold the opposite view. The
Russian Defense Minister, Rodionov, explained Russian
opposition to NATO enlargement on the ground that it deprives
Russia of a buffer zone in Central Europe. Were NATO to fall in
with this argument, it would perpetuate the injustice of the
Soviet satellite orbit by condemning the recently liberated
nations of Central Europe to institutionalized impotence, and
it would store up endless future troubles.
Basing European and Atlantic security on a no man's land
between Germany and Russia runs counter to all historical
experience, especially that of the interwar period. It would
bring about two categories of frontiers in Europe, those that
are potentially threatened but not guaranteed, and those that
are guaranteed but not threatened. If America were to act to
defend the Oder but not the Vistula, 200 miles to the east, the
credibility of all the existing NATO guarantees would be
gravely weakened, nor would this exclusion of traditional
Central European nations from the common defense achieve its
purpose. Once Russia succeeded in establishing a military
buffer zone, it would logically follow with demands for a
political corollary that would imply a veto over foreign
policy.
If the eastern border of Germany is defined as the limit of
Western Europe, and the western defense, Germany will be driven
to doubt America's leadership and to try to influence the
security position of the buffer zone on a nationalist basis.
Failure to enlarge NATO would thus risk either collision or
collusion between Germany and Russia. Either way, American
abdication would produce a political earthquake threatening
vital American interests.
Considerations such as these have transformed the great
Czech president, Havel, into a strong advocate of early NATO
enlargement. An ardent human rights activist, he surely
appreciates the argument for encouraging a democratic evolution
in Russia, but he obviously believes that even the most
optimistic outcome will take longer than is safely compatible
with the establishment of a vacuum in Central Europe. I know no
leader of Central Europe who does not share this view.
NATO expansion therefore represents a balancing of two
conflicting considerations: The fear of alienating Russia
against the danger of creating a vacuum between Germany and
Russia in Central Europe. Failure to expand NATO is likely to
prove irrevocable. Russian opposition would only grow as its
economy gains strength. The nations of Central Europe would
drift out of their association with Europe. So I would strongly
urge the Senate to ratify NATO enlargement.
Now, let me turn to another matter. While I strongly favor
NATO expansion and recommend its approval, I am deeply worried
about the Founding Act which seeks to reconcile Russia to NATO
expansion by offering Russia a role in NATO councils. Part of
my objection is philosophical. Alliances define a common
threat; collective security deals with a legal contingency.
Alliances delineate an area to be defended; collective security
is open-ended and is redefined from case-to-case.
The language of the Founding Act is that of collective
security, not of alliance. I have gone through a lot of
analysis of the language, which we do not have to do here.
The words ``common defense'' apparently proved so offensive
to their commitment to collective security that the drafters of
the Founding Act could not bring themselves to invoke them, and
used instead the euphemism, quote, ``commitments undertaken in
the Washington Treaty,'' unquote, which created NATO in 1949.
This view is assuredly not shared by the new members who
are seeking to participate in NATO for reasons quite the
opposite of what the Founding Act describes, not to erase
dividing lines but to position themselves inside a guaranteed
territory by shifting the existing NATO boundaries some 200
miles to the east.
My major concern is not philosophical. The most worrisome
aspect of the Founding Act is the consultative machinery for
which it provides. The act calls into being, side-by-side with
existing NATO institutions, a new Permanent Joint Council
composed of the same Ambassadors who form the existing NATO
Council, plus a Russian full member. The Russian ambassador is
located inside the same building as the other Council members,
as are the military representatives. The Permanent Joint
Council is supposed to meet at least once a month. Twice a year
the Council is to meet at the foreign ministers' level. The
first such ministerial meeting was held in the shadow of the
United Nations last month. Regular meetings of the defense
ministers are also envisaged, as well as regular summits.
The act designates the Permanent Joint Council as the
principal venue for crisis consultation between Russia and
NATO. Each side agrees that, quote, ``it will promptly
consult,'' unquote, within the Permanent Joint Council, quote,
``in case one of the Council members perceives a threat to its
territorial integrity, political independence and security,''
unquote. Thus, if Poland feels threatened by Russia, it may
first have to appeal to the Permanent Joint Council on which
Russia is represented.
It will be argued that if the Permanent Council deadlocks,
the regular NATO Council remains free to perform its historic
functions. That is true in theory, but it will never work in
practice. Since, except for the Russian representatives, the
membership is identical, each country will assess the grave
step of meeting without a Russian presence in terms of its
overall relationship with Moscow. Thus, in practice, NATO
Council sessions and Permanent Council sessions will tend to
merge. The free and easy ``family atmosphere'' of existing
institutions will vanish.
As for the new members of NATO, they are joining in these
restrictions with respect to the deployment of other NATO
forces and nuclear weapons. The ultimate irony is that Russia
will be participating in the Permanent Joint Council and
achieving a voice in NATO 2 years before the new members, who
have to wait for ratification of the enlargement by all the
parliaments of NATO.
The dilemma the supporters of NATO enlargement now face is
that the Founding Act has already gone into effect upon
signature. As an executive agreement, it does not have to be
ratified by the Senate, while NATO enlargement, involving a
treaty, does. Thus if the admission of new members were not
ratified, we will have inherited the worst possible outcome:
The demoralization of Central Europe and a NATO rendered
dysfunctional by the Founding Act.
Mr. Chairman, I know that you and other members of this
committee share my concerns about the possibility that the
Founding Act has given Russia too much of a role in NATO
matters; and I am aware that you pressed the Secretary of State
for clarification on a number of these issues when she appeared
before the committee 2 weeks ago.
I was pleased to note that, in her response to your
questions, the Secretary reassured you and the American people
that nothing which has been agreed to with the Russians will
detract from the primacy of NATO. If I may make a suggestion, I
believe this offers the Senate an opportunity in the course of
the ratification procedure to address the philosophical
ambiguities of the Founding Act.
Specifically, Mr. Chairman, I recommend that, in its
instrument of advice and consent, the Senate explicitly
reassert the central role of the Atlantic Alliance for American
foreign policy, and insist that nothing in any other document
shall detract from the North Atlantic Council as the supreme
body of the alliance. Such a resolution could draw directly on
the forthright response which Secretary Albright gave to your
questions. Additionally, the Senate resolution should declare
that the United States expects Russia to desist from all
pressures and threats in Europe on this issue. In the meantime,
while ratification proceeds, a joint resolution of Congress
should urge that the new NATO members be permitted to join the
Permanent Joint Council while waiting for ratification. This
would remove the anomaly that the institution created to
reconcile Russia to NATO's expansion should come into being
years before the expansion actually occurs.
In this way I believe a truly bipartisan approach to the
European security relationship can be achieved.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kissinger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Kissinger
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: It is an honor to appear
before this committee on a matter of such importance to America's
future. If this century has taught any lesson, it is that our security
is inextricably linked with Europe's. NATO, the institution expressing
this conviction, has successfully deterred war in Europe for 50 years.
Now that Soviet power has receded from the center of the continent,
NATO needs to adapt itself to the consequences of its success.
The stakes involved are large, for the nations of the Atlantic area
need each other, and NATO is the fundamental link between the two.
Without America, Europe would turn into a peninsula at the tip of
Eurasia, unable to find equilibrium, much less unity, and at risk of
gradually subsiding into a role similar to that of ancient Greece in
relation to Rome--the only outstanding question being whether America
or Russia will play the role of Rome. Without Europe, America would
become an island off the shores of Eurasia, condemned to a kind of pure
balance-of-power politics that does not reflect its national genius.
Without Europe, America's path would be lonely; without America,
Europe's role would approach irrelevance. This is why America concluded
twice in this century that the domination of Eurasia by a hegemonic
power threatens its vital interests and has gone to war to prevent it.
A major American role in Europe is a prerequisite for European
coherence. Without it, the European Union would founder on the fear of
German domination; France would see reinsurance in a Russian option;
historic European coalitions would form, compounding their traditional
tenuousness with irrelevance; Germany would be tempted into a
nationalist role, Russia into revanchism. That role requires a
definition of Europe that is historically valid--that is, which
includes the nations of Central Europe.
An American presence in Europe provides a measure of equilibrium.
It gives France a safety net against German hegemony and Germany an
emotional harbor as European unification slows down, as well as
protection against outside dangers and excessive European nationalism.
Even Russia has much to gain from an American presence, which is the
best guarantee against the reemergence of historical European
rivalries. Europe by itself cannot handle the two most dangerous
Russian contingencies: resurgence of nationalism or implosion. A Russia
facing a divided Europe would find the temptation to fill the vacuum
irresistible. An America cut off from Europe would lose an anchor of
its foreign policy.
Critics of NATO enlargement argue that the admission of Poland, the
Czech Republic and Hungary threatens prospects for the democratic
evolution of Russia and therefore magnifies perils rather than allays
them.
I hold the opposite view. The former Russian Defense Minister Igor
N. Rodionov explained Russian opposition to NATO enlargement on the
ground that it deprives Russia of a buffer zone in Central Europe. Were
NATO to fall in with this argument, it would perpetuate the injustice
of the Soviet satellite orbit by condemning the only newly liberated
nations of Central Europe to institutionalized impotence. And it would
store up endless future troubles.
Basing European and Atlantic security on a no man's land between
Germany and Russia runs counter to historical experience, especially
that of the interwar period. It would bring about two categories of
frontiers in Europe: those that are potentially threatened but not
guaranteed, and those that are guaranteed but not threatened. If
America decides to defend the Oder but not the Vistula, 200 miles to
the east, the credibility of the existing NATO guarantee would be
gravely weakened. Nor would this exclusion of traditional Central
European nations from the common defense achieve its purpose. 'Once
Russia had succeeded in establishing a military buffer zone, it would
logically follow with demands for a political corollary that would
imply a veto over foreign policy.
If the eastern border of Germany is defined as the limit of the
common defense, Germany will be driven to doubt America's leadership
role and to try to influence the security position of the buffer zone.
Failure to enlarge NATO thus would risk either collision or collusion
between Germany and Russia. Either way, American abdication would
produce a political earthquake threatening vital American interests.
Considerations such as these have transformed the great Czech
president, Vaclav Havel, into a strong advocate of early NATO
enlargement. An ardent human rights activist, he surely appreciates the
argument for encouraging a democratic evolution in Russia. But he
obviously believes that even the most optimistic outcome will take
longer than is safely compatible with the establishment of a vacuum of
power in Central Europe. I know no leader of Central Europe who does
not share this view.
NATO expansion therefore represents a balancing of two conflicting
considerations: the fear of alienating Russia against the danger of
creating a vacuum in Central Europe between Germany and Russia. Failure
to expand NATO is likely to prove irrevocable. Russian opposition is
bound to grow as its economy gains strength; the nations of Central
Europe may drift out of their association with Europe. The end result
would be the vacuum between Germany and Russia that has tempted so many
previous conflicts. When NATO recoils from defining the only limits
that make strategic sense, it is opting for progressive irrelevance.
While I strongly favor NATO expansion, I am deeply worried about
the Founding Act which seeks to reconcile Russia to NATO expansion by
offering Russia a role in NATO councils. Alliances define a common
threat; collective security deals with a legal contingency. Alliances
delineate an area to be defended; collective security is open-ended and
is redefined from case-to-case.
The language of the Founding Act is that of collective security,
not of alliance. The Act speaks of the parties' ``shared commitment to
build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free'' and
refers to the parties' ``allegiance to shared values, commitments and
norms of behavior.'' But Russia sells nuclear power plants, submarines
and other arms to Iran, ignoring specific American requests to desist.
Russia supports, in opposition to American policy, the lifting of the
embargo on Iraq. It refuses to delineate its border with Ukraine. Of
what, then, do the shared commitments cited in the Founding Act
consist?
The words ``common defense'' apparently proved so offensive to
their commitment to collective security that the drafters of the
Founding Act could not bring themselves to invoke them and used instead
(and only once) the euphemism commitments undertaken in the Washington
Treaty'' (which created NATO in 1949). But they did not specify the
nature of these commitments.
The view assuredly is not shared by the new members, who are
seeking to participate in NATO for reasons quite the opposite of what
the Founding Act describes--not to erase dividing lines but to position
themselves inside a guaranteed territory by shifting the existing NATO
boundaries some 200 miles to the east.
The most worrisome aspect of the Founding Act is the consultative
machinery for which it provides. The Act calls into being, side-by-side
with existing NATO institutions, a new Permanent Joint Council composed
of the same ambassadors who form the existing NATO Council, plus a
Russian full member. The Permanent Joint Council will meet at least
once a month. Twice a year, the Council is to meet at the foreign
ministers' level. The first such ministerial meeting was held in the
shadow of the United Nations last month. Regular meetings of the
defense ministers are also envisaged, as well as summits.
The Act designates the Permanent Joint Council as the principle
venue for crisis consultation between Russia and NATO. Each side agrees
that ``it will promptly consult'' within the Permanent Joint Council
``in case one of the Council members perceives a threat to its
territorial integrity, political independence and security.'' Thus if
Poland feels threatened by Russia, it may have to appeal first to the
Permanent Joint Council. Similarly, according to the letter of the Act,
Russia could have insisted that the Gulf War be brought to the
Permanent Joint Council where--as the Founding Act repeatedly states--
decisions are made by consensus.
It will be argued that if the Permanent Council deadlocks, the
regular NATO Council remains free to perform its historic functions.
That is true in theory but will not work in practice in all but the
most extreme cases. Since, except for the Russian representatives, the
membership is identical, each country will assess the grave step of
meeting without a Russian presence in terms of its overall relationship
with Moscow. Thus, in practice, NATO Council sessions and Permanent
Council sessions will tend to merge. The free and easy ``family
atmosphere'' of existing institutions will vanish.
As for the new members of NATO, they are clearly joining in a
second-class status subject to unprecedented restrictions with respect
to the deployment of other NATO forces and nuclear weapons. The
ultimate irony is that Russia will be participating in the Permanent
Joint Council and achieving a voice in NATO two years before the new
members who have to wait for ratification of the enlargement by all the
parliaments of NATO.
The dilemma the supporters of NATO enlargement now face is that the
Founding Act has gone into effect upon signature. As an executive
agreement, it will not have to be ratified by the US Senate, while NATO
enlargement, involving a treaty, does. Thus if the admission of new
members is not ratified, we will have inherited the worst possible
outcome: the demoralization of Central Europe and a NATO rendered
dysfunctional by the Founding Act.
Mr. Chairman, I know that you and other members of this committee
share my concerns about the possibility that the Founding Act has given
Russia too much of a role in NATO matters. And I am aware that you
pressed the Secretary of State for clarification on a number of these
issues when she appeared before the committee two weeks ago.
I was pleased to note that, in her response to your questions, the
Secretary reassured you and the American people that nothing which has
been agreed to with the Russians will detract from NATO's primacy. And
if I may make a suggestion, I believe this offers the Senate an
opportunity, in the course of the ratification procedure, to address
the philosophical ambiguities of the Founding Act.
Specifically, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that, in its instrument of
advice and consent, the Senate should explicitly reassert the central
role of the Atlantic Alliance for American foreign policy and insist
that nothing in any other document shall detract from the North
Atlantic Council as the supreme body of alliance. Such a resolution
could draw directly on the forthright response which Secretary Albright
gave to your questions. Additionally, the Senate resolution should
declare that the United States expects Russia--after the qualitative
changes that we have made--to desist from all pressures and threats in
Europe on this issue. In the meantime, while ratification proceeds, a
joint resolution of Congress should urge that the new NATO members be
permitted to join the Permanent Joint Council while waiting for
ratification. This would remove the anomaly that the institution
created to reconcile Russia to NATO's expansion comes into being years
before expansion occurs.
If the administration does not want to be remembered as having in
effect atrophied the most effective alliance of this century, it should
welcome efforts to clarify the many ambiguities in the Founding Act. In
this way, a truly bipartisan approach to American-European security
relations can be restored.
The Chairman. Dr. Kissinger, I thank you very much. I am so
glad that you got into the matter that I exchanged
correspondence with the Secretary about recently.
I think we will go on 5 minutes for each Senator for the
time being, because as soon as this breakfast is over we are
going to be joined by many other Senators. Let us see how we
can do on that.
I am hesitant to do this, Dr. Kissinger, but you know about
as much about China as anybody I know. I guess all of us have
been thinking about the advice to give visitors, that includes
me.
Dr. Kissinger. That I give the advice--
The Chairman. To the Chinese leaders who are visiting us.
That has nothing to do with NATO, but I want you to spend a
minute or so saying, telling, revealing what you think would be
the best course for the United States to follow in trying to
work out an amicable relationship with China.
For my part, I have made several contacts over a period of
time now trying to point out to the Chinese that the American
people like the Chinese people and they want to do business
with them and want to recognize them as the power they are, but
the human rights thing is standing in the way. It certainly
stands in the way as far as I am concerned. As I put it to one
leader yesterday, you have no idea, Sir, how much cooperation
and goodwill you would build if there could be not an
expression of retreat but an expression that we are going to
work on it sincerely and honorably. I do not know whether that
did any good or not, but I thought the President of the United
States did quite well yesterday in standing up for that.
If you would give your opinion, what would you say to the
President, or maybe you have said it since he has been here,
the President of China, what would you say to him?
Dr. Kissinger. Mr. Chairman, I am doing this really off the
top of my head.
The Chairman. I know that.
Dr. Kissinger. I have not made any formal preparation for
this, however it is obviously a topic about which I have
thought. I did not have an opportunity on this trip, because I
just came back from Europe yesterday late afternoon, to talk to
the President of China, but I have had other occasions and I am
sure I will have the opportunity.
Of course we are all influenced by our experiences. I was
the first American official to visit China. I was sent there by
President Nixon. In those days there was a huge philosophical
gap between China and the United States. President Nixon, with
my enthusiastic concurrence, agreed or felt that peace,
flexibility for American foreign policy, the ability to play a
significant role in Asia, required that we have diplomatic
exchanges with China, even though philosophically we could not
have disagreed more than we did with the China of the Cultural
Revolution.
So we have on the face of it two somewhat contradictory
problems. We have a national security problem, a national
interest problem, which is that China has a population of
1,250,000,000. There are 60 million overseas Chinese with a
major influence on the economies of Southeast Asia. China plays
a significant role in Korea, Cambodia, and elsewhere. So it is
in our interest, if we can, to find a basis for cooperation to
serve our own purposes and to see whether there are joint
interests that can be developed.
Confrontation with China is not the same as it was with the
Soviet Union. China's is a different history, a different
society. Its method of conducting confrontations is to make
them extremely prolonged and exhausting. On the other hand, it
is also true that, being a democracy, our government will not
find support among the people if fundamental American values
are consistently being violated. These are the dilemmas that we
face.
For somebody who has been in China in the Seventies, the
present China looks more respectful of individuals than the
China we saw then. Now, I recognize this is a relative
statement, and I believe that in terms of day-to-day life the
lot of the Chinese has greatly improved. In terms of their
right to political opposition, it has not.
Then, assuming as we must that there will be strong
disagreements between us and China on human rights, there is
the question of how we can influence it better. I believe we
can influence it better as a Nation by quiet diplomacy than by
visible pressures.
Let me add, incidentally, that I have no problem with, in
fact I respect, the demonstrators who express their views as
private citizens. This is how our system operates. I, however,
believe that, as a government, we should, if at all possible,
avoid sanctions and attempt to find areas where we have
genuinely common interests. Therefore, if China's leaders asked
me, I would tell them that they should take very seriously
expressions of concern such as the one you mentioned. If the
President asked me to what extent he should do that publicly
and with pressure, I would urge him to try to find another way
to do it if at all possible.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Wellstone.
Senator Wellstone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
being here, Dr. Kissinger. I have just one comment about the
last day or two, and I much appreciate your comments about
people in the parks.
Dr. Kissinger. I was not here, though.
Senator Wellstone. On the question of the situation in
China, you of course have a perspective that I do not have, but
I know that one of the things that I find personally--and Mr.
Chairman, this refers to some meetings we had yesterday--really
quite devastating is the State Department's report on human
rights in China. It is really dismal. In fact Assistant
Secretary Shattuck, I believe met with Wei Jingsheng and
because of that meeting Wei now finds himself back in prison.
He just wrote a book called, ``The Courage to Stand Alone.''
It is troubling that we don't see a lot of evidence of this
quiet diplomacy working, at least by our own State Department
reports on the state of human rights. I quite agree with you,
there is of course a very legitimate question as to what we
should do, what is most effective. But, boy, the most recent
empirical evidence we have on what is going on in China is not,
it certainly does not give one much reason for optimism, and I
think that is why many of us are speaking up and are proud to
identify ourselves with the human rights community.
You can respond to that if you want to, but I want to ask
you a question about NATO expansion. Do you want to respond
first?
Dr. Kissinger. Could I make a response to the Senator?
Senator Wellstone. Of course.
Dr. Kissinger. If I may make a response, Senator, I have
never criticized the people who express their views on human
rights, and I have, on several occasions which I have chosen
not to publicize, intervened on behalf of some of the cases,
and in at least two cases have succeeded. But my approach
requires that I do not talk about it afterwards.
What bothers me as I see this debate evolving is that we
are dealing here with a huge country still in the process of
evolving, and I believe it is really not in the American
national interest to conduct its relations with it from a
posture of confrontation. First, because I do not believe that
any other Asian nation will support us. Second, because all the
other Asian nations will then adopt a posture of semi-
neutrality between us, which means a more nationalist policy.
So our capacity to shape events will diminish.
When I became, first Security Advisor and then Secretary of
State, we had 500,000 Americans in Vietnam, where we thought we
would bring democracy and then found ourselves in a struggle we
did not know how to end. So I am very influenced by the
experience and do not believe in getting ourselves into a
confrontation if it is avoidable, and second, that we make
absolutely sure that when we do, the American public
understands why we have done it.
If China threatens the equilibrium in Asia, and if it
becomes a military threat, I will be before this committee
supporting opposition to it. But I am trying to avoid the
situation, and I think the future of China is now still
somewhat open. I cannot believe that it is possible to change
the economy as they have without political consequences. What
these consequences are exactly, I do not pretend to know.
So this is my profound worry. Incidentally, I must add, it
has nothing to do with economics. I would like to see trade,
but that is minuscule in my consideration.
Senator Wellstone. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary.
Dr. Kissinger. So this is what is on my mind as we go
through these dramatic few days.
Senator Wellstone. Let me ask one question. I very much
appreciated--
The Chairman. He will have to answer it on the next round.
Senator Wellstone. OK. I will put the question out there.
You have written that the new nations that are hoping to join
NATO, and I quote: ``are seeking to participate in NATO . . .
not to erase dividing lines but to position themselves inside a
guaranteed territory by shifting existing NATO boundaries 300
miles to the east. . . .'' I really appreciate your candor.
This position, though, at least seems to me to be in
contradiction with the administration's pronouncements that
NATO expansion will erase dividing lines in Europe. In the
words of the President, it is intended to, ``build and secure a
new Europe undivided at last.''
Maybe you can get to it later. I do not think it is, Mr.
Chairman, an inconsequential question, because if there is
anything we want to know about NATO expansion, it is whether it
is going to unify or whether it will redivide Europe. I wonder
whether you could comment at some point in time on what I
identify at least as a contradiction here.
Dr. Kissinger. Should I do that later?
The Chairman. Yes, Sir. Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Dr. Kissinger, thank you for coming this
morning. I have just a quick comment on China, and then I would
like to get your thoughts on a couple of the elements that you
talked about in your opening statement. I have always thought
on the China debate that we have somehow misplaced some of the
focus of the debate. It should not be about do we support human
rights or do we not support human rights. Of course we all
support human rights in China. The debate should be focused on
how we best influence the behavior of the Chinese leaders to
bring more human rights, and I only say that because as I have
listened and witnessed much of this debate, it is like
environmental issues and other issues, you are either for a
clean environment or you are against it, and we need to get
back to the real issue.
Your points about the Founding Act, what do you believe the
Russians think about the Founding Act, but more importantly,
what do you believe their view is of the Founding Act?
Dr. Kissinger. Let me just make a very quick comment about
your China point. I am somewhat disturbed by the impression
that is being created in the debate that the only issue we have
vis-a-vis China is human rights, and that the only debate we
have in this country is how we can improve human rights in
China. I would urge that there be examination of whether we
have any common interests in terms of our national security
that would drive us to some degree of cooperation with China.
This aspect of the relationship must be included, otherwise we
will always seem as if we are somehow inadequate.
Now about Russia. I do not agree with the administration's
analysis of the Russian problem, and therefore I do not agree
with the statement about erasing dividing lines in that sense.
My analysis of Russia is as follows.
A dominant view of some of the administration spokesmen
seems to be that the obstacle to relations with Russia is the
absence of pluralistic democracy, and that once democracy is
established in Russia, all other problems will disappear. Then
Russia will merge into some kind of big Eurasian structure.
I think the problem of Russia is more complicated. First of
all, the country is partly in Europe but also partly in the
Middle East and partly in Asia, so that the pulls on Russia are
much more complex than those faced by any other nation in
Europe. Second, the history of Russia is quite different. It
has not had a separate religion, as was the Catholic religion
during the Medieval period, which established its own principle
of justice. It did not have the Reformation, it did not have
the Enlightenment, it did not have the Age of Discovery, it did
not have capitalism. So the evolution toward democracy in
Russia is more complex. Hopefully it will develop.
Second, Russia has also been an imperialist country that,
for 400 years of its history, acquired territories, expanding
from the region around Moscow to the shores of the Pacific,
into the Middle East, to the gates of India, and into the
center of Europe. It did not get there by plebiscite. It got
there by armies. To the Russian leaderships over the centuries,
these old borders have become identified with the nature of the
state.
So I believe that one of the major challenges we face with
Russia is whether it can accept the borders in which it now
finds itself. On the one hand, St. Petersburg is closer to New
York than it is to Vladivostok, and Vladivostok is closer to
Seattle than it is to Moscow, so they should not feel
claustrophobic. But they do. This idea of organizing again the
old commonwealth of independent states is one of the driving
forces of their diplomacy. If Russia stays within its borders
and recognizes that Austria, Singapore, Japan and Israel all
developed huge economies with no resources and in small
territories, they, with a vast territory and vast resources,
could do enormous things for their people. Then there is no
security problem.
So for all of these reasons I do not believe that in any
foreseeable future it is possible for Russia to join NATO, and
I think it would be a lot better if we said explicitly that
this cannot happen. If I am very much in favor of negotiating
with Russia, and the Chairman will remember, as I surely do,
that in earlier incarnations he expressed some doubts about
what he considered my excessive propensity for negotiating with
the Soviet Union.
But I believe that this is a question for political and
diplomatic efforts. If we created a body within the European
Security Conference to conduct dialog with Russia, I would
favor that. What I do not favor is giving this impression that
everything sort of mergers and everything is sort of evolving
toward some kind of mini-U.N. From the Chinese border to the
Canadian border up in Alaska. I have been very opposed to this
approach and have said so repeatedly publicly.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. It is good to see you, Dr. Kissinger, Mr.
Secretary. I apologize for being late. I was where the Chairman
was wise enough not to be. I was at the breakfast, and I
apologize.
My understanding, and please correct me if I am wrong, is
that on the central issue before this committee, which is
whether or not we should expand NATO, whether we should vote to
amend the Washington Treaty, you think that we should.
Dr. Kissinger. I strongly support it, and I urge you to do
that.
Senator Biden. The primary criticism is the way in which
the relationship with Russia, as it relates to what was the
Partnership for Peace and is now becoming the expansion of
NATO, on those two fronts has changed.
Dr. Kissinger. Correct.
Senator Biden. I, quite frankly, got myself in a little bit
of a bind because I quoted you in a debate. I referenced you in
a debate I was having as a source of authority for a position I
was taking, and was later informed that it was not your
position. This was about 8 months ago. I recalled, and I had my
staff go back and get it, a piece you had done in December 1994
where you called for, and it confused me, you called for a
treaty with Russia, a U.S. treaty with Russia. You said such a
treaty would provide that no foreign troops be stationed on the
territory of new NATO members on the model of the arrangements
for East Germany (or better, no closer than fixed distances
from the eastern border of Poland). In the next paragraph you
say, at the same time such a treaty would provide for
consultation between NATO and Russia on matters of common
interest.
I kind of thought that was what the President did, and that
is what confused me. Now, I am not being a smart guy here or a
wise guy. What is different between what you are recommending
and what actually took place?
Dr. Kissinger. First of all, that was the first article I
wrote on this subject, and I do not believe that the President
goes to bed at night worrying necessarily what I think of the
subject.
Senator Biden. I do. He does not, but I do.
Dr. Kissinger. But he can be in no doubt that I modified my
thinking on this. What I had in mind then was to accept some
restrictions on the deployment of troops, and I still favor
that on the model of East Germany. I did not think that it
could be interpreted into this elaborate machinery which makes
Russia, to my mind, a de facto member of NATO, no matter what
we say about a voice and not a veto.
Senator Biden. Again, as you know, as you were kidding me
earlier today when I saw you in the hallway, you were saying
you were hoping I would not be here because you and I have gone
round and round. I want the rest of you to know the first
meeting I ever attended as a young Senator was over in the
Foreign Relations Committee room in the Senate, Mr. Chairman.
I came to this meeting room at age 30 thinking I was
supposed to be here because Dr. Kissinger was at that time
presenting in closed session, quote, ``his world view.'' That
is how we billed it. I was here ready and waiting, and a young
staffer walked out and asked me, Senator, I had been here 2
months, what are you doing. I said I am here for the hearing.
He said no, it is over in the other building.
So I went running over to the other building looking for S-
116 on the little door handles, and to make a long story short,
I burst into the room, perspiring, I was nervous as heck. The
door opened, and remember you used to have those filing
cabinets right by the door, it came out and it smashed against
the filing cabinets. I think I gave everybody coronary arrest,
almost everybody. Then I walked in, sat down, making myself the
second ranking member of the committee, looked over at Dr.
Kissinger whom I had only known from watching on television,
and Senator Mansfield said, ``do you have any questions?'' He
was the acting chairman. I said yes, and Dr. Kissinger said,
``I thought this was for Senators only.'' At which time I said,
``well, Secretary Dulles, I am here to ask you whatever I
can.''
That is how our relationship started.
Dr. Kissinger. Now you understand why my relations with the
Senators were not always what they should have been.
Senator Biden. Anyway, my time is up. I truly appreciate
your clarification. I am not being facetious when I say my view
of the arrangement that has been worked out is what I thought
you were envisioning by a treaty providing consultation between
NATO and Russia on matters of common interest. My reading of
the agreement we made is not, and I could be dead wrong, but as
I read the text, and talking to the principals, there is no
including the non-NATO members of other countries. It was
literally consultation, not intertwining the, as you put it,
larger matrix of relationships. But you have answered my
question.
Dr. Kissinger. I have high regard for the people who
negotiated this. I can live very happily with what Secretary
Albright said here. I simply think that it is difficult to make
it work that way as time goes on. You have these Ambassadors
sitting in the building, they meet every day. Then the NATO
members go off and say we are going to have our own meeting.
Legally, of course, they can do it, but the human nature of
these multi-lateral parties is against it.
You asked me what the Russian strategy is. Russian strategy
cannot be to build NATO. It is against their whole tradition.
So they have every interest to water down NATO into some vague
multi-lateral U.N. type talk shop. Therefore they will bring
issues before the NATO Council that will achieve this purpose.
This is my concern. I have no doubt at all that Secretary
Albright means exactly what she is saying.
Senator Biden. I thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The Chairman. Senator Smith.
Senator Smith. Mr. Secretary, first, thank you for coming
to this hearing. For those of us who are new and trying to
catch up with what you know and to learn the history that you
both have and have made, I for one am grateful to you.
When I listen to the President of the United States and
others, well-intentioned, use words like we are not redrawing
lines in Europe, Europe is undivided and free, and I see us
expanding NATO, I frankly must confess I think we are playing
word games. I think in fact what we are doing, and rightfully
doing, is redrawing lines that say American values, western
interests, principles that we value such as private property,
the rule of law, human rights, that we do draw lines, and that
as a community of western nations we reflect this not just
economically and politically but even militarily in order to
provide security arrangements. So frankly I find somewhat
puzzling some of the language that we use to talk around this
issue.
I think what we are doing is moving lines, but I do think
we have got to allow others, other people on the other side of
those lines, we have to give them an eraser. They have to be
able to join the western community by taking on our values, our
culture, if they will, if they want to, and we need to be
prepared to receive them. In my mind that certainly includes
Hungary and Poland and the Czech Republic. I would have even
allowed Slovenia and Romania into this first round.
I guess the real push is going to come when it comes to the
Baltics. Even we must be honest and say should it not also
ultimately include Russia, if they would take on the kinds of
institutions and abide by the rule of law that we share
commonly with Western Europe. I wonder how you feel about
further expansion, and ultimately Russia's inclusion if they
would join Western Europe more than just rhetorically.
Dr. Kissinger. Let me tell you what historic models I have
in mind. I know there are a lot of people who think I burn
votive candles to Metternich every night in my devotion to the
19th century----
Senator Biden. We thought you were.
Dr. Kissinger. I knew it. May I give, however, an historic
example. At the end of the Napoleonic wars France was in the
position Russia is in today, that is, it was considered to be
the aggressor in Europe. Everybody was deeply concerned about
the fact that they might start on expansion again. So they
created two separate institutions. One was the Quadruple
Alliance. This was aimed at preventing a military attack from
France. Second they created something called the Concert of
Europe in which France could participate. The Concert of Europe
discussed all the political issues, and in fact that became in
time the dominant element. The Quadruple Alliance was never
abolished, but it never needed to be activated.
This is sort of the model that I have in mind for Russia. I
think Russia should be consulted and participate in political
discussions that affect its vital interests and the peace, and
that as Russia evolves those institutions become more and more
dominant. But I would keep NATO as a safety net, and keep it as
unspoiled as possible as a community of democratic nations. If
values were to be shared, then the political organs would
become more dominant.
But what worries me is that we have now created something
that in the terms of the day-by-day, competes with the NATO
Council and that historical analogy, kind of merges the
Quadruple Alliance and the Concert of Europe. And that worries
me deeply. I do not think that Russia should be permanently
excluded. The Chairman knows very well that I was in favor of
exploring with Russia even then whether there might be any
common areas, and I certainly believe it even more today.
Senator Smith. There is no more reason then to keep the
Baltics out than to keep Poland out.
Dr. Kissinger. The problem with the Baltics or, say,
Ukraine, is that when you move former republics of the Soviet
Union into NATO and an integrated military structure, then you
have, especially with Ukraine, a major challenge to Russian
self-consciousness. On the other hand, we have to find a way of
conveying that a threat to the independence of the Baltics and
Ukraine would be inimical to any friendly relationship with the
United States, and that this is something we would look at with
the greatest gravity.
The Chairman. Senator Robb.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kissinger, thank
you for being with us this morning. You have indicated
skepticism about the consultative process and the degree of
influence that Russia might have on the NATO operations. Are
there any steps that the United States ought to pursue, in your
judgment, during this formative period that could be included
in whatever charter arrangements are ultimately agreed to or
changes that might be made that would restrict that role in
ways that you believe are appropriate?
Dr. Kissinger. Senator, I made clear before you came in the
room that I strongly favor ratification in any event.
Senator Robb. Unless there be any doubt, I do too.
Dr. Kissinger. Nothing I have said should be interpreted as
negative.
Senator Robb. Nor was my question intended to imply that.
Dr. Kissinger. I did not interpret it that way. What I have
recommended to the Chairman and to the committee is that, in
the instrument of ratification, the Senate find a way of
expressing its view that the NATO Council is the dominant
instrument for the operation of the alliance that the Permanent
Council is a more political instrument, and that the
fundamental decisions are taken in the first instance in the
NATO Council. In order to keep the bipartisan character, I have
also recommended that some of the language, or for all I know,
all of the language that Secretary Albright used before this
committee in explaining how she interprets the Founding Act, be
incorporated in this so that we have a basis for a bipartisan
consensus.
I am convinced that future Secretaries of State would be
grateful to be able to point to a Senate instruction to them,
so that it does not look as if they are the spoil sports if
they want to move more issues into the regular NATO Council. I
would do my utmost to establish a procedure whereby no
significant issue moves into the Permanent Council until there
is a NATO Council decision with respect to it, and that this
not be used as an alternative method. First there is a NATO
Council decision, and then one meets with the Russians.
Senator Robb. Well, with respect to current or future
progress in terms of coming to decisions, I think it is fair to
say that the rather lengthy and protracted process where we
move from UNPROFOR into IFOR was not a model of efficiency. Are
there suggestions you might have to address that particular
question?
Dr. Kissinger. One of the problems with respect to Bosnia
was that the United States did not really have a policy; and
history shows that a strong American lead is usually needed to
crystallize a position. But I do not have any great structural
suggestion.
Senator Robb. There were a number of us, including members
of this committee, who made certain recommendations earlier in
that process that might have facilitated that.
Dr. Kissinger. As to policy or as to procedure?
Senator Robb. Really as to procedure. I take it back, as to
policy in terms of what we ought to do, when we ought to do it.
Dr. Kissinger. I agree. If that had been done, Senator, the
likelihood is that there would have been a more unified NATO
position.
Senator Robb. It certainly proved to be beneficial once
that was achieved. Mr. Chairman, I see my time is about up, and
I am expected to be the acting Ranking Member over in the Armed
Services Committee at this point. I thank you for the time, and
I thank Dr. Kissinger for his appearance before this committee.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Robb. Dr. Frist.
Senator Frist. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Dr.
Kissinger, for being with us. I am interested in the differing
expectations that current members and prospective European
members of the expanded NATO might have and what that might
mean in terms of obligation and role in a postcold war Europe.
These potential differences in expectations I would think would
have real implications as we project ahead what the
participants and potential participants would see as the future
mission of NATO and how effective that future NATO can be.
First of all, there is our own expectation, and it seems to
me that the United States is struggling with what we should
really think and expect of a future NATO. It is something that
these discussions help all of us with, I think, to a great
degree. If we look at the European current participants, their
visions and expectations with our European partners seem to be
different in many ways, but judging from their view of NATO's
role in Bosnia and of numerous comments, there seems to be an
indication that their expectations are different than our own.
Then if we look at the prospective members, and you might
help us with this in terms of what their expectations might be,
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, clearly their
expectations are very high, and understandably so, viewing NATO
membership as a long overdue reentry back into the West.
With the common bond or the glue that has held NATO
together in terms of an external threat clearly changing, and
with members and future members having these different visions,
I guess I have two questions, do we have today an internal
culture in NATO that is consistent with the expectations of the
three potential new members to support an alliance strong
enough to hold the expanded NATO together, again, the
expectations today being very different than they might have
been 10 years ago?
Dr. Kissinger. Well, I think that is a very important
question. I had the privilege of being in Poland at just about
the time that its membership in NATO was approved. I thought it
was one of those exhilarating moments somewhat comparable to
being in Europe at the end of World War II, the liberation from
German occupation, in that the Polish people that I met felt
they were at last, after several hundred years, rejoining
Europe as an integral member and as a charter member.
A personal friend was Havel, the President of the Czech
Republic. I did not see him at that time, but I saw him shortly
afterwards, and he has a similar view. I might add, that when I
first met Havel, he had some of the classic left wing notions
of European socialism. He thought that NATO was sort of what
the bellicose people do, and that the elevated people did
something better. He has changed that view completely because
he thinks it is now essential for the morale and cohesion of
Europe.
In this respect the Central Europeans have a different view
from the West Europeans. They are more like the West Europeans
were in the Fifties, and they also do not have the view that
dividing lines are being erased. They still feel threatened.
Now, in Western Europe and in America the problem is that NATO
has not been given a new morale impetus, or psychological
impetus-- or political impetus, whatever you want to call it--
for a long time, and that we are running on just operating the
institutions.
The Europeans are now absorbed in creating a common
currency and in elaborating some kind of European identity. But
what is that identity? What is it they are trying to do? There
are too many voices in Europe that want to create this identity
in some sort of opposition to the United States. If that
becomes the dominant theme, then NATO will wither, no matter
what institution we create. So I think it is very important
that some new political initiative be taken to tie the Western
democracies together.
I find myself in the position that, on the issue of
democracy I do not go along with all the exuberant notions of
the protesters on China, but I would go much further on pushing
the cohesion of the democracies in the West. This is a question
of emphasis, and I am very worried that our relations in the
North Atlantic are sort of withering. Nothing bad is happening,
but a whole new generation is growing up that does not have the
experience that my generation had of working together for noble
objectives. We have become sort of mechanics in operating a
system, and Bosnia is a symptom of this. So in this respect I
much prefer the attitude of the East and Central Europeans, for
whom NATO enlargement represents a moral act, and why not
ratifying it would be a terrible blow to their whole image of
what recent history has meant.
Senator Frist. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Secretary, I think
you can imagine the correspondence we receive, maybe you get
some of it too, that at best is an over simplification of what
the problems are. Even some of the witnesses, and I respect
them all, who have appeared here, some of them have appeared to
suggest that this is an either/or proposition, that either we
expand NATO and get drawn into future conflicts in Europe, as
they put it, or we do not expand NATO and perhaps stay free of
any involvement in Europe's recurring calamities.
Now, my question to you almost answers itself, but I want
to get it as a matter of record. Can you foresee a major
European war occurring in which the United States would not be
involved?
Dr. Kissinger. No. There has not been one in which we have
not been involved in this century.
The Chairman. Our involvement in a European conflict is all
but inevitable, if it happens, and, as you just indicated, it
happened twice in this century. May I say what advantages does
NATO expansion provide us in the best case to prevent wars and
in the worst case to win them? I know that is sort of a
convoluted question, but I would like to have your answer to
that so that, to be honest about it, we can quote you.
Dr. Kissinger. First, Mr. Chairman, with respect to some of
the testimony you have received, I am frankly astonished that
professionals of diplomacy could argue that a treaty we have
signed and that is then not ratified--well, let me put it this
way: If 3 years ago when this debate started, somebody had said
let us not do this, I would understand that position. I would
disagree with it but understand it. But I do not understand how
it can be recommended to the Senate not to ratify an agreement
which, if it is not ratified, would have such devastating
impact on Eastern Europe, and which, in my view, would also
have in the longer term a devastating impact even on the
existing NATO countries.
How can one say to the Germans that we are absolutely
determined to defend the Oder, but that the Vistula, which is a
few hours' drive away, we will not defend; that Poland, which
has been as much part of the West, is excluded when Germany,
which in a way was the cause of the war that created this mess,
is included? Therefore failure to ratify would absolutely
undermine the existing NATO.
I have been astonished at some of the statements that I
have seen made by people who used to be great Cold Warriors but
who are suddenly acting as if history had been totally
abolished.
Second, the main argument for NATO expansion is, in my
view, that these countries are historically members of the
community of the West, that they feel themselves to be so, and
that to say we will not defend you but we will defend those a
few hundred miles further east does not make any sense. Third,
it then will set up a competition between Germany and Russia in
this area, because that vacuum is going to be filled anyway.
Fourth, I believe that the best way to draw Russia into a
cooperative relationship, which I strongly favor, is to remove
its historic temptations and beliefs, because once you have
declared Poland and this whole region a neutral zone, the
inevitable next step for any Russian leader will be to try to
influence the foreign policy of that region. Then we are right
back to what caused the European wars in this century.
So I believe that NATO expansion will stabilize Europe and
improve our long-term relations with Russia, provided we give
Russia an honorable opportunity to participate in dialog, and
these would be my major reasons.
The Chairman. Very good. Thank you. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Mr. Secretary, I really appreciate the way
only you can express very, very fundamental basic ideas. It
amazed me, some of the people who have testified here, people I
have great respect for, who seem not to understand the history,
the very recent history. When in history, in the last 300
years, has there been a vacuum in Central or Eastern Europe
that has not been filled? And when has there been a
circumstance where countries that were part of this grey zone
or supposedly neutral have not sought their own separate
arrangements for their own security because they are wise
enough to understand that someone is going to attempt to fill
the vacuum? That seems to me to beg the issue whether we should
expand.
The question in light of the way the Soviet Union has
collapsed, is not whether we expand NATO or keep it the same,
it is whether we have NATO or we expand it. The way you
describe the attempt, the necessary foreign policy judgment
would have to be made in Berlin and in Bonn and in Moscow, that
they would have to compete to try to fill that Central and
Eastern Europe vacuum. That seems to me the absolute last thing
in the world we want--either the Germans filling the vacuum or
the Russians. I am not eager for either of those outcomes.
I am not by this question suggesting that you do not feel
and believe we have a commitment to the Baltics, but I think
there is a factual historical difference between Ukraine and
the Baltics. For example, I think the immediate effect on the
Russian psyche of admitting either the Baltics or Ukraine would
be very similar. But in fact we never recognized that the
Baltics, which were annexed by the Soviet Union, were
legitimately part of the Soviet Union. We have never recognized
that, and it seems to me that any further actions will take
some time and may need some massaging. I am not smart enough to
know exactly how to do it, but it seems to me as a matter of
principle that it is very important to make a distinction
between the Baltics, for example, and Ukraine.
Dr. Kissinger. I agree with this. On the current schedule
of NATO expansion, there is no way the issue of the Baltics can
arise until well into the next term, if not later. If we simply
look at the priorities that have been established, I doubt that
there will be another similar hearing in this administration
about new members. But that is my judgment. It is simply the
way these things work. So we are talking about well into the
next administration, or maybe even the one after that.
I think however that some steps should be taken immediately
to make clear that the Baltics are members of the Western
community, and that the European community has almost an
obligation to speed up the membership of these countries in the
European Union. It is absurd to say that 10 million Baltics,
because their economic evolution is not quite at the right
level, is going to create an insuperable problem for a union
that has some 300 million population.
Senator Biden. I absolutely agree with this.
Dr. Kissinger. But this is only the first thing that should
be done. The second thing we should do is to study how military
arrangements can be made that do not necessarily involve the
advance of the integrated command, because the method of
defending the Baltics does not have to be the same as the
method of defending the Vistula, being geographically
different. This I would recommend as a study-though I have not
come to any view, I would not just sit until 2005 or whenever
that issue becomes ripe on the present schedule. These are the
interim steps we should be able to take almost immediately.
Senator Biden. Again, my time is up, Mr. Secretary. Let me
just make two very brief comments. One, nothing has
disappointed me more or reinforced my view of the lack of
political maturation that still exists in Europe, in Western
Europe, than the failure of the EU to understand how it could
play, without any damage to its economic integration, a
historic role here to ameliorate a circumstance that could
fester in a way that causes political problems. It is one of
the great disappointments, the disconnect between their view of
their naked economic interests and their long-term political
interests. I think it is a very little chance they would be
taking, although they have made some steps now with regard to
Latvia, or maybe it is Estonia, I am not sure.
The second point--
Dr. Kissinger. But they do it as a purely economic issue.
It is not an economic issue.
Senator Biden. No, it is not. It is well beyond an economic
issue. But the second point that I would make, if I may
conclude, Mr. Chairman, is that by 5 years from now one of two
things is going to happen. This progression within Russia
toward democracy and a market economy will be considerably more
evident or it will be in difficulty, in my view. It will not be
settled, but we will have a clearer picture. That, I think, is
going to impact significantly on what the next president of the
United States feels he or she is able to do relative to the
Baltics without upsetting the apple cart in meeting what I
think is a recent historic obligation.
Again, I thank you for the way in which you phrased the
dilemma relative to expansion of NATO and this neutral zone and
the vacuum.
Dr. Kissinger. One slightly heretical point on the Russian
situation. We have a tendency to present the issue entirely in
terms of Russian domestic politics. I could see Russia making
progress toward democracy and becoming extremely nationalistic,
because that could become a way of rallying the people. We also
have to keep an eye on their propensity toward a kind of
imperialist nationalism, which, if you look at the debates in
the Russian parliament, is certainly present.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, following up a little bit on
what Senator Biden was talking about, your response to Senator
Frist, you mentioned in your opening comments about reasserting
the central role of NATO. You mentioned a theme, you talked
about new political initiatives, the interconnects that Senator
Biden was talking about that have been discussed here the last
hour and a half. Should we take some initiative to redefine
NATO after 50 years? It is being somewhat redefined. Should we
take the initiative to really start focussing on its mission?
The thing that you mentioned earlier in response to a
comment I made on China it seems to me is very clear here, and
that is the interconnects here. You mentioned Bosnia. All these
are going to have major consequences and impacts on what we do
with NATO expansion. I was wondering if you could develop that
a little further.
Dr. Kissinger. I believe that the next major, constructive
phase of American foreign policy should be an emphasis on
uniting the existing democracies as the base from which we
operate, and I would apply that to the Western Hemisphere and
to the North Atlantic. These are separate building blocks, but
I would try over time to merge them.
Right now there is no significant initiative in the North
Atlantic area. We are operating on momentum. The Europeans are
creating their own currency and are trying to evolve a new
identity without any significant input from the United States
on what might emerge in the long run. A few years ago I
recommended a North Atlantic free trade area, but there may be
other, better, ideas. And unless there is something by which we
define that relationship, I think the evolution of the rest of
the world is going to make what I consider the central
relationship less and less relevant. If that continues, then we
will be in the strange position of being confined sort of to an
island off the coast of Europe and Asia.
This will drive us into the kind of policy that, for
example, my critics always say is unsustainable, namely a
balance of power policy all over the world. If we do not have a
community within which we operate, then we have to try to
balance interests, rewards, and punishments.
Now, in Asia, we have no choice in this matter, but in
Europe and the Western Hemisphere we do have a choice. One
reason, to get back to the question of German tradition, is
that in Asia we have to balance the various nations, but in
Europe and in the Western Hemisphere we can create a community.
In Europe and in the Western Hemisphere war is highly unlikely.
There, we can build structures based on common values, and we
should give this more emphasis. In fact we have not given it
any significant emphasis. We have put much more emphasis on
relations and trade with Russia and other similar things.
That would be my basic theme, even if I do not have a
precise notion. If you put the best minds we have to work on
it, as we did in the early Fifties, we will come up with
something. I have no doubt.
Senator Hagel. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Grams.
Senator Grams. Dr. Kissinger, welcome. I am sorry I am
late. I do not know if I will retrace some steps that have been
taken or questions that have been asked, but if I do you may be
brief in answering those for me. I have a couple of questions.
In June 1997, in an op-ed article in the Washington Post you
said that you were gravely concerned that the Founding Act will
dilute NATO into being a U.N.-styled system of collective
security by grafting an elaborate and convoluted machinery for
consultations with Russia at every level of the alliance. Now,
what steps do you suggest that the Senate take in the
resolution of ratification to ensure that this would not occur?
Dr. Kissinger. I have made this recommendation. As I said,
I strongly favor ratification, and nothing I have said should
detract from that. I would, however, find it helpful, and I
believe succeeding Secretaries of State and Presidents will
find it helpful if the Senate expressed its view that the NATO
Council remain the priority, that the central relationship we
have in the North Atlantic area is within the Atlantic
Alliance, and that relations with Russia should be friendly and
cooperative but not part of the essence of NATO. I complimented
Secretary Albright with respect to her forthright statement in
response to a question by the Chairman, and some of the
language she used might be incorporated so that it does not
look like a partisan attack.
Senator Grams. Is that an adequate response to the argument
that while the Founding Act may give Russia no formal veto over
NATO decisions, Russia will acquire basically a de facto veto
through the Permanent Joint Council since some NATO countries
could hesitate to decide a sensitive issue in NATO's policy
making North Atlantic Council. Are we giving Russia too much
voice, whether de facto or actual?
Dr. Kissinger. I look at NATO, Senator, as our core group,
and therefore I would not begin a new initiative by diluting
it. There are many fora that can be created to deal with
Russia, and I would favor those. But to use a military alliance
as the principal forum confuses things. You know, I may be too
old fashioned. I was not wild about the idea of a NATO Council
meeting--of a Permanent Council meeting within the context of
the U.N. in which the NATO Council meets with Russia in New
York. If we had tried to have a NATO Council meeting in New
York in the context of the United Nations, everyone would have
screamed that this was extremely provocative and merging with a
military organization. But here now you have a Permanent
Council meeting in New York. That is not what NATO was
originally designed to do.
Second, you have this machinery in Brussels. You have the
Secretary General who sits in on all these meetings. His staff
serves both the NATO Council and the Permanent Council. Russia
and the Secretary General are there all the time in the
Permanent Council, and the United States rotates through it
every 16th or 18th time. So these are two different
institutions that are being merged by the same bureaucracy and
in the same building.
I do not doubt the good intentions of the people who are
testifying here about a voice and not a veto. I am saying
however that, operationally, I am very uneasy about this, and
therefore the committee and the Senate could make a
contribution by defining the role in a way so that future
Presidents and Secretaries of State can point to it as
instruction from the Congress, from the Senate. Even then I do
not like it, for I would not have gone this way, but it would
improve it.
Senator Grams. There are some critics of enlargement that
have stated concerns that enlargement will push Russia away
from being cooperative with the West and toward more
cooperation with China and with rogue states such as Iran,
Iraq, and Libya. Do you think that this is a valid concern?
Dr. Kissinger. Russia's relations with China will be
determined by its own perception of its national interest and
not by irritation, as may be the case with the West. I would
think that there are certain geopolitical realities. They have
a 4,000 mile frontier on one side of which is a billion people
and on the other side of which are 30 million people. Normally,
this is not an ideal situation for close political cooperation.
After all, what brought the Chinese into a relationship with
the United States when Nixon and Mao started it was not that
both of them had suddenly become sentimental, but that there
was a common national interest between the United States and
China. So I think that whether Russia and China cooperate will
be determined by their own fundamental interests. It is not a
natural partnership, and I do not think it can possibly be
affected by whether Poland joins NATO.
One ought to remember another thing. Here is Russia with
20,000 nuclear weapons. Who in Western Europe can even conceive
of an attack on Russia? It is a myth. If one looks at history
one has to say that Russian armies entered Europe more
frequently than even European armies entered Russia. So if war
becomes excluded in that region, a whole new consideration will
arise. But I do not accept the proposition.
I might point out one other thing from my own experience.
When we made our first tentative overtures to China, all the
former Ambassadors to the Soviet Union--and they were a very
distinguished group including George Kennan and Chip Bolen--
requested an appointment with President Nixon and called on him
to say that Russia would never forgive us, that our relations
with Russia would never recover from these little moves we were
making. It was a long time before President Nixon sent me there
and the exact opposite happened. Our relations with the Soviet
Union improved after our opening to China.
If we conduct ourselves sensibly, which is to continue a
serious dialog with Russia, but not within the context of them
being tempted every day to see what they can do to weaken NATO,
but on those issues that are of principal concern between us, I
think our relations are more likely to improve than not. In any
case, I do not believe that their relations with China will be
driven by whether Prague is in NATO.
Senator Grams. So we are not going to push Russia into a
closer alliance with China just because of this? Such an
alliance would have to be in their best interest?
Dr. Kissinger. If you look at what Russia is actually doing
rather than at the rhetoric, you realize that Russia is trying
to needle us in many places, such as Iran and in many
institutions in order to establish some claim to great power
status. That is understandable. Some of this we can deal with
by consulting with them, but we cannot change the structure of
what we consider to be the essence of future relationships. I
really feel that when you look at the world--at the upheavals
that are likely to arise in the Islamic world, at the evolution
in Asia and elsewhere--that the Western democracies have a
basis for cooperation that should be preserved. I do not know
what will happen 20 years from now with Russia. We could see
this thing evolve, but that is more of a political than a
military issue.
Senator Grams. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.
The Chairman. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have no further
questions. I want to thank you again, Mr. Secretary, for being
here. You, unlike anyone in the 25 years I have been here, have
a way of putting the issues we are discussing in perspective in
the broad sweep of historical change, and I for one appreciate
it.
It is presumptuous of me to predict anything, but I predict
that you are going to be dead right. That is, I am absolutely
convinced an expansion of NATO in the near-term and long-term
will enhance our relationships with Russia, not diminish them.
I am absolutely convinced of that. I am also convinced that as
you look back over the last 50 years the very people who knew
the most about Russia and the Soviet Union are a little bit
clientized as they look at these things. I think their focus is
so narrow in terms of what negative impact may come as a
consequence of moves we make that I think sometimes, it is
presumptuous of me to say this, they are somewhat blinded by
the extent of their knowledge, if that makes any sense.
The last point I will make is, and this is the only thing I
disagree with what you said, and time will tell, I predict that
we will have another hearing in this committee before this
President's term is up on admission of Romania and Slovenia.
Dr. Kissinger. I will be here testifying for it.
Senator Biden. I know you will. But I was just referencing
the point about how long this process is going to take. I agree
with you that it probably will not be the Baltics within the
time of this President, but I suspect, I hope at least we will
be considering those other two countries sooner rather than
later.
At any rate, I want to thank you very much, and thank you,
Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to make a concluding comment.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, we are all indebted
to you for being available. We may not always agree, but the
young folks on the Foreign Relations Committee staff, both
Democrat and Republican, they know that they can ask you for
your opinion and you always take the time to answer. We have
two or three people like that, but we have a whole lot of
people who say they do not have the time. I thank you for
coming here this morning, and we are getting you out at
approximately the time we had agreed to do. I bid you farewell,
and good luck.
Dr. Kissinger. Thank you for this opportunity.
The Chairman. There being no further business to come
before the committee, we stand in recess.
[Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the hearing was adjourned, to
reconvene at 2:08 p.m., October 30, 1997.]
NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP--PART II
----------
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1997
U. S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m. in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Chuck Hagel,
presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Thomas, Biden and
Wellstone.
Senator Hagel. Welcome. Mr. Secretary, nice to have you.
Ambassador Pickering. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
Nice to be with you.
Senator Hagel. I note you were looking at the nameplate
there. I can assure you it is not Kissinger. It is Pickering,
spelled right.
The Foreign Relations Committee this afternoon continues
its examination of the critical issues surrounding the proposed
expansion of NATO. The subject of our discussion will be the
evolving NATO-Russia relationship. Appearing before the
committee is a distinguished panel of our nation's leading
experts on Russia.
We will first hear from the Undersecretary of State for
Political Affairs, the Honorable Thomas Pickering, who also
served most recently as United States Ambassador to the Russian
Federation.
He will be followed by a second panel of non-governmental
experts including Ambassador Jack Matlock, the George F. Kennan
professor at the Institute for Advanced Study and America's
last Ambassador to the Soviet Union; Lt. Gen. William Odom,
director of National Security Studies at the Hudson Institute;
and Mr. Dimitri Simes, president of the Nixon Center for Peace
and Freedom.
Gentlemen, on behalf of the committee, I welcome you and
thank you for being with us and we look forward to your
testimony this afternoon.
Mr. Secretary, you may proceed. Good to have you.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR THOMAS R. PICKERING, UNDERSECRETARY OF
STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
Ambassador Pickering. Thank you, Senator Hagel and members
of the committee. I am very pleased to have this opportunity to
appear before you today. With respect to the nameplate, I would
be delighted to appear here as Dr. Kissinger but I am sure
there would be no confusion, at least in the physiognomy.
These are truly historic hearings. They have begun the
process of advice and consent on the enlargement of NATO. They
have accelerated the national debate on this important
initiative. Now the fate of NATO enlargement is in your hands
and in those of the American public.
We welcome this because as Secretary Albright said, we know
that the security commitment that NATO enlargement entails will
only be meaningful if it reflects the informed consent of the
American people and their representatives.
It is a special pleasure for me to come before you today to
discuss NATO's emerging relationship with Russia. Having spent
the past 38 years in the foreign service, I witnessed and
participated in the remaking of the U.S./Soviet, and later, the
U.S./Russian relationship from the confrontation of the cold
war to the new opportunities of cooperation which we have
today.
As Ambassador to the Russian Federation from 1993 to 1996,
I had the opportunity to meet the new leaders of this
remarkable country and witness firsthand the salient changes
that made such cooperation possible, and to participate in some
of the planning which led to the founding act; the CFE second
stage negotiations; to the ABM, TMD, and Start III issues.
In her testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee earlier this month, Secretary Albright explained the
rationale for NATO enlargement and the reasons why we believe
it is in our national interest. Today, I would like to tell you
why we think a cooperative NATO-Russian relationship is also in
that national interest.
The challenge for the United States in relations between
NATO and Russia can be framed in four simple declarative
sentences.
First, it is in the security interest of the United States,
NATO, and the States of Central Europe to have constructive
relations with Moscow, and to integrate a democratic, peaceful
Russia into the world community.
Second, while Russia's reforms have been impressive,
Russia's future is not yet certain. In any case, our interests
and those of Russia sometimes diverge. Third, the enlargement
of NATO significantly advances U.S. security interests. Fourth,
Russia's leadership voices its opposition to NATO enlargement.
Today, I want to describe how we have framed our policy in
a way that takes into account each of these realities.
One of the greatest challenges of diplomacy is how a
country structures its relations with former adversaries. After
World War I, the United States and its allies failed that test,
and the tragic results are well known. After World War II, the
United States and its allies got it right, and the
reintegration of Germany and the other Axis Powers into the
community of democracies and the West stands as one of the
great diplomatic accomplishments of this century.
Today, there are few challenges more important than
ensuring that we structure our relationship with the new Russia
in a manner that serves our national interests and helps to
promote United States/Russian cooperation. Russia today is
still in the throes of a titanic political struggle over its
future. We cannot be neutral bystanders in that struggle, for
its outcome is not predetermined and American national
interests are at stake.
Our goal, like that of many Russians, must be to see Russia
become a normal, modern state, democratic in its governance,
abiding by the rule of law, market-oriented and prosperous, at
peace with itself, with its neighbors, and with the rest of the
world, and playing its full constructive role in the world
community. Quite simply, we want to see the ascendancy of
Russian reformers--those who look outward and forward rather
than inward and backward.
Ultimately, however, Russia's future rests squarely and
completely in the hands of its people. A Russia that defines
its national greatness in terms of the peace, well-being, and
accomplishments of its people is likely to be part of the
solution to Europe's and the world's problems.
Conversely, a Russia that defines its greatness at the
expense of its own people, or its neighbors, could be in the
21st century just as it was in the 20th century--a serious and
significant problem for us and others.
Our objective must be to craft the political arrangements
that help to encourage Russia to pursue the first path and not
the second. This objective is fully consistent with our policy
of adding new states to NATO. Indeed, the two complement each
other.
For example, I know that many Senators are concerned about
the costs of NATO enlargement. One way to ensure that the costs
remain low is to ensure that Russia remains on track, and
continues on a cooperative course with the rest of Europe.
Conversely, as Secretary Albright said to this committee
earlier this month, and I quote, ``By engaging Russia and
enlarging NATO, we give Russia every incentive to deepen its
commitment to democracy and peaceful relations with neighbors
while closing the avenue to more destructive alternatives.''
Thus, a cooperative and functioning NATO-Russia
relationship can become a pillar of stability in the new
Europe. The importance of this objective is what led Presidents
Ronald Reagan and George Bush to reach out to the then-Soviet
Union, and later Russia, and to take the first steps in laying
the foundation for a new NATO-Russia relationship.
Already, at the Rome Summit in 1991, NATO declared that it
no longer considered Russia a threat. It invited Russia to be a
part of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In 1994, NATO
created the Partnership for Peace and asked Russia to be a part
of that program as well--an invitation that Russia ultimately
accepted.
We also began the so-called 16+1 conversations with Russia
and other partner states, which refers to the discussions
between the 16 members of NATO and other parties on a one-by-
one basis.
The United States and NATO also consulted closely with
Russia in formulating our strategy to stop the war in Bosnia
and found a way for our troops to work together to implement
the Dayton peace accords.
Today, American and Russian soldiers are working side-by-
side in Bosnia, an arrangement that few of us would have
believed possible a decade ago. It is a unique arrangement in
which Russian soldiers serve side-by-side with NATO under
American command.
The most important step in relations between NATO and
Russia, however, came on May 27 of this year when President
Clinton and the other NATO leaders joined President Yeltsin in
signing the NATO-Russia Founding Act.
The Founding Act is a landmark document. It opens the door
to a new and constructive relationship between these two cold
war adversaries. It sets out the principles of the
relationship; describes possible areas for consultation and
cooperation; establishes a new forum, the Permanent Joint
Council, for discussions between the alliance and Moscow; and
it sets out a number of points regarding the political/military
aspects of the relationship.
In crafting the Founding Act, NATO structured its
discussions with Russia with extreme care. We declared at the
outset that there were some things we were willing to do, and
that there were some that we were not.
We said we were willing to create a document that would
describe our new relationship. We said we were willing to
create a new consultative forum. We said we would be willing to
pursue adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe.
But we also had five red lines. We said Russia would have
no veto over NATO decisions including its own enlargement. We
said there would be no delay in the enlargement process. We
said we would not subordinate NATO and the North Atlantic
Council, its decisionmaking body, to any other body or
organization. We said we would not do anything that would
consign new NATO members to second class status. We said that
the act does not automatically exclude any qualified European
state from future consideration for NATO membership.
As we have explained to this committee on previous
occasions, the ultimate text of the Founding Act stayed
completely within these red lines.
Barely 5 months have passed since the Founding Act was
signed, but we have already seen some important steps to
implement its provisions--most significantly, Russia is taking
the Permanent Joint Council seriously, as is NATO.
On July 18, the PJC met for the first time in Brussels at
the level of permanent representatives. On September 26,
Ambassador Albright and her counterparts held the first
ministerial level meeting of the PJC in New York. The most
recent PJC meeting was held among the permanent representatives
on October 24.
In addition, the PJC has adopted rules of procedure and a
work plan for the remainder of 1997--documents that have been
shared with this committee and the Senate NATO Observer Group.
We have also made progress in implementing other parts of
the Founding Act. On October 20, the Russian Minister of
Defense named General Viktor Zavarzin as Russia's military
representative to NATO. The general is expected to assume his
duties before the end of the year, and he recently visited NATO
with General Kvashnin, chief of the Russian General Staff.
In addition, at the most recent Ambassadorial level meeting
of the NATO-Russia PJC, NATO and Russia agreed on steps to
implement the work program, including experts' talks on
peacekeeping.
As NATO and Russia deepened their record of consultation
and cooperation in the PJC, in Bosnia, and in other ways, our
own government continues to support Russia's reforms and to
pursue important issues with Russia in other ways as well.
We are continuing our efforts to achieve mutual and
balanced reductions in both our countries' nuclear arsenals.
Both countries have ratified the START I Treaty and are
implementing its reductions in arms levels. We are looking
forward to Russian ratification of START II, a treaty which we
have already ratified. President Yeltsin and his advisors have
begun making serious efforts to obtain the approval of the
Russian Duma.
And at the Helsinki Summit in March, President Yeltsin and
President Clinton agreed that we will begin to work on a START
III treaty as soon as START II has entered into force, so that
we can make even deeper reductions in both countries' strategic
stockpiles on an even and balanced basis. At Helsinki, we
agreed that START III would be focused on reducing warheads to
levels between 2,000-2,500 on each side.
We also have continued efforts with Russia on conventional
arms reductions in Europe. Along with 28 other states, we are
pursuing a major adaptation of the Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe treaty, and in July, all 30 states parties signed a
decision on basic elements for treaty adaptation that can help
us to achieve that goal.
We also have deepened our cooperation with Russia and have
worked to integrate Russia more fully into world economic
institutions, into the Paris Club as a creditor country, and
the World Trade Organization on terms normally applicable to
newly acceding members.
The regular discussions between Vice President Gore and
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin have produced important agreements
concerning cooperation on energy and the environment, as well
as in seven other areas of significant cooperation, from
agricultural and health to defense conversion.
And through the Gore/Chernomyrdin process, and other
bilateral discussions, we have raised our concerns with Russia
about its relations with Iran, arms control, and other security
issues.
Those are the steps we have taken to build the new
relationship between NATO and Russia. This relationship is
based on shared principles and shared interests. It is a
relationship that holds great promise for us and for all of
Europe, as Russia continues in joining us in making the
Permanent Joint Commission a constructive forum focused on
problem solving.
This new relationship is also, I want to remind members of
the committee, a serious two-way street. Do not forget that
while the Russians can propose raising issues in the PJC that
they are concerned about, so can we, and we will.
It is also not a process that can spin out of our control
or out of NATO's control. Every item on the PJC agenda must be
agreed to by consensus. That means we do not have to agree to
discuss any issue that we think would be inappropriate or
harmful to our interests or those of NATO.
I know that there are two major concerns about the
direction of our policy on NATO-Russia relations. One concern
is that despite the Founding Act in the PJC, NATO enlargement
will leave Russia isolated; strengthen Russian hard-liners who
stress that isolation; undermine Russian reform; and doom
prospects for security cooperation, especially in arms control.
This would be a serious problem if it proved correct, for one
of our goals is to integrate a democratic Russia into the new
Europe.
But a fair reading of recent events suggests that NATO
enlargement is not having this impact on Russia and its
policies. Over the past 18 months, precisely when NATO
enlargement has been a salient part of our agenda, Russian
reform and security cooperation have moved forward, not
backward.
To cite but a few examples, during this period, President
Yeltsin was re-elected. He elevated reformers within his
government. He appointed a new defense minister who supports
START II and is actively working for its ratification.
As I noted earlier, President Yeltsin agreed to negotiate a
START III Treaty as soon as START II enters into force. He
signed the Founding Act. We have made progress in the CFE
negotiations. Russia has made positive steps in its relations
with Ukraine.
This track record does not support the hypothesis that
Russian reform or reformers and security cooperation will
inevitably suffer as a result of NATO enlargement. Russia has
pursued these steps because they are in Russia's interest.
We should also understand that the broad Russian public is
not well-informed on NATO and does not consider NATO to be the
key threat to their future. They are far more concerned about
other issues, from wages and pensions to corruption and crime.
That is why I am persuaded that we must continue to pursue
both NATO enlargement and a steadily more constructive
relationship with Russia, that they are not incompatible, and
that they are in the long-term interests of both NATO and
Russia in producing stability, prosperity, and cooperation in
Europe.
We are realists. We know that Russian opposition to NATO
enlargement is real. But we must see it for what it is--a
product of misperceptions about NATO's true purpose, a token or
an artifact of outdated Soviet thinking about former satellites
in Central Europe.
Instead of changing our policy to accommodate outdated
fears, we need to encourage the new Russia's more modern
aspirations. This means we should be Russia's steadfast
champion whenever it seeks to define its greatness by joining
rule-based organizations, opening its markets, or by
participating constructively in regional or world affairs. But
when some Russian leaders suggest that a larger NATO is a
threat, we must say that this is false and base our policies on
what we know to be true.
If the first group of critics worries that we have not done
enough to promote cooperation with Russia, a second group of
critics worries that we have done too much. I know that former
Secretary of State Kissinger testified here before you this
morning. Dr. Kissinger, along with others, has charged that the
Founding Act and the PJC give Russia too much influence over
NATO decisionmaking.
I am a great admirer of Dr. Kissinger, and once had the
privilege of serving as his special assistant. But on this one,
as I have told him, I respectfully disagree with his judgment.
I believe Secretary Albright has described cogently and
carefully the limitations on any potential jeopardy regarding
our consultations with Russia, and that this is the correct
model for the future. She did this here before the committee,
and I am happy to say that Dr. Kissinger apparently agrees that
this is the correct model.
We designed the Founding Act and the PJC to protect NATO's
independent decisionmaking authority, and I believe we have
succeeded. The PJC has no role in NATO's internal
decisionmaking--none. It gives Russia a voice but not a veto.
The North Atlantic Council remains NATO's sole and supreme
decisionmaking body. The Founding Act imposed no restriction on
NATO's military doctrine, strategy, or deployments. The
unilateral statements of NATO's military policy are just that--
unilateral statements of policy that NATO had previously
adopted outside the context of NATO-Russian discussions.
The Founding Act in no way works to the detriment of NATO's
new members. They will come into the alliance the way all the
other allies did--as full and first-class members.
It is also just not true that the U.S. and NATO created the
Founding Act and the PJC as compensation to Russia or as
concessions in exchange for Russian acquiescence to NATO
enlargement. Rather, our goal has been for Russia to find ways
to work together with Russia in spite of our disagreement on
NATO enlargement.
We insisted that every provision of the Founding Act had to
meet this test--does it make sense on its own terms in regard
to American interests? Our answer in each case has been yes.
These are the two schools of criticism we hear most often
regarding NATO-Russian relations. They come at this question
from quite different perspectives, but there is one point on
which they sometimes converge.
Both camps often charge that we are ducking the issue of
Russia, or being disingenuous about our motives. People in both
camps often ask me a simple question--is not NATO enlargement
ultimately about Russia? Is not it premised on a real or
potential Russian threat? The question is important because it
goes to the core of our fundamental intentions in pursuing the
alliance's enlargement and this new relationship with Russia.
Let me be clear. For the reasons I have listed, our policy
is to engage Russia and to maximize the likelihood that that
country will stay on the path of democratic development.
But as the Secretary said before the Senate Appropriations
Committee last week, none of us in the State Department has a
perfect crystal ball. One contingency that the alliance must be
able to respond to, even though we see it as unlikely and are
working hard to make it even less likely, is the possibility
that Russia could abandon democracy and return to old
threatening patterns of behavior.
That, however, is not the only reason or even the primary
reason to enlarge the alliance. It is a mistake in our view to
assume that this is the unspoken single premise guiding our
policy.
NATO does not need an enemy. It has enduring purposes--
deterring future threats, keeping the United States engaged in
Europe, ensuring that Europe's security policies remain
cooperative rather than competitive, and providing a collective
defense capability for a range of future contingencies.
That is precisely why we are pursuing both NATO's
enlargement and a cooperative NATO-Russia relationship, and why
both of them serve our interests. What we are asking you and
your Senatorial colleagues to ratify is not a policy of NATO
enlargement instead of a positive relationship with Russia, but
NATO enlargement together with a positive relationship with
Russia. We are committed to pursuing both, and we believe our
policy is already showing positive and reassuring results.
Thank you again, Senator Hagel, very much, and I stand
ready to address your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pickering follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Pickering
Senator Hagel, members of the Committee: I am pleased to have this
opportunity to appear before you today. These are truly historic
hearings. They have begun the process of advice and consent on the
enlargement of NATO. They have accelerated the national debate on this
important initiative. Now, the fate of NATO enlargement is in your
hands, and those of the American public. We welcome this because, as
Secretary Albright said, we know that the security commitment that NATO
enlargement entails will only be meaningful if it reflects the informed
consent of the American people and their representatives.
It is a special pleasure for me to come before you today to discuss
NATO's emerging relationship with Russia. Having spent the past 38
years in the Foreign Service, I witnessed and participated in the
remaking of U.S.-Soviet and later U.S.-Russian relations from the
confrontation of the Cold War to the new opportunities of cooperation
we have today. As Ambassador to the Russian Federation from 1993-1996,
1 had the opportunity to meet the new leaders of this remarkable
country, and witness first hand the salient changes that made such
cooperation possible, and participate in some of the planning which led
to the Founding Act, the CFE negotiations and ABM and START III talks.
In her testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
earlier this month, Secretary Albright explained the rationale for NATO
enlargement and the reasons why we believe it is in our national
interest. Today I would like to tell you why we think a cooperative
NATO-Russian relationship is also in that national interest.
The challenge for the United States in relations between NATO and
Russia can be framed in four declarative sentences. First, it is in the
security interest of the U.S., NATO, and the states of Central Europe
to have constructive relations with Moscow, and to integrate a
democratic, peaceful Russia into the world community. Second, while
Russia's reforms have been impressive, Russia's future is not yet
certain, and in any case our interests and those of Russia sometimes
diverge. Third, the enlargement of NATO significantly advances U.S.
security interests. Fourth, Russia's leadership voices its opposition
to NATO enlargement. Today, I want to describe how we have framed our
policy in a way that takes account of each of these realities.
One of the greatest challenges of diplomacy is how a country
structures its relations with former adversaries. After World War I,
the United States and its allies failed that test--and the tragic
results are well known. After World War II, the United States and its
allies got it right--and the re-integration of Germany and the other
Axis powers into the community of democracies and the West stands as
one of the great diplomatic accomplishments of this century. Today
there are few challenges more important than ensuring we structure our
relationship with the new Russia in a manner that serves U.S. national
interests and helps to promote U.S.-Russian cooperation.
Russia today is still in the throes of a titanic political struggle
over its future. We cannot be neutral bystanders in that struggle, for
its outcome is not pre-determined, and American national interests are
at stake. Our goal, like that of many Russians, must be to see Russia
become a normal, modern state--democratic in its governance, abiding by
the rule of law; market oriented and prosperous; at peace with itself,
with its neighbors, and with the rest of the world and playing its full
constructive role in the world. Quite simply, we want to see the
ascendancy of Russian reformers, those who look outward and forward
rather than inward and backward. Ultimately, however, Russia's future
rests squarely and completely in the hands of the Russian people.
A Russia that defines its national greatness in terms of the peace,
well being, and accomplishments of its people is likely to be part of
the solution to Europe's and the world's problems. Conversely, a Russia
that defines its greatness at the expense of its own people or its
neighbors could be in the 21st century just as it was in the 20th
century--a great problem for us and others. Our objective must be to
craft the political arrangements that help encourage Russia to pursue
the first path rather than the second.
This objective is fully consistent with our policy of adding new
states to NATO. Indeed, the two complement each other. For example, I
know that many Senators are concerned about the costs of NATO
enlargement. One way to ensure that the costs remain low is to ensure
that Russia remains on track and continues on a cooperative course with
the rest of Europe. Conversely, as Sec. Albright said to this committee
earlier this month, ``By engaging Russia and enlarging NATO, we give
Russia every incentive to deepen its commitment to democracy and
peaceful relations with neighbors, while closing the avenue to more
destructive alternatives.'' Thus, a cooperative and functioning NATO
Russian relationship can become a pillar of stability in the new
Europe.
The importance of this objective is what led Presidents Ronald
Reagan and George Bush to reach out to the then Soviet Union and later
Russia and to take the first steps in laying the foundation for a new
NATO-Russian relationship. Already at the Rome summit in 1991, NATO
declared that it no longer considered Russia a threat. It invited
Russia to be a part of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In 1994,
NATO created the Partnership for Peace, and asked Russia to be a part
of that program as well--an invitation that Russia ultimately accepted.
We also began so-called ``16+1 conversations'' with Russia and other
partner states which refers to the discussions between the 16 members
of NATO, and other parties on a one-by-one basis.
The United States and NATO also consulted closely with Russia in
formulating our strategy to stop the war in Bosnia, and found a way for
our troops to work together to implement the Dayton Peace accords.
Today, American and Russian troops are working side by side in Bosnia--
an arrangement that few of us would have believed possible a decade
ago. It is a unique arrangement in which Russian soldiers serve side by
side with NATO under American command.
The most important step in relations between NATO and Russia,
however, came on May 27 of this year, when President Clinton and the
other NATO leaders joined President Yeltsin in signing the NATO Russia
Founding Act. The Founding Act is a landmark document. It opens the
door to a new and constructive relationship between these two Cold War
adversaries. It sets out the principles of the relationship, describes
possible areas for consultation and cooperation, establishes a new
forum, the Permanent Joint Council, for discussions between the
Alliance and Moscow, and sets out a number of points regarding the
political-military aspects of the relationship.
In crafting the Founding Act, NATO structured its discussion with
Russia with extreme care. We declared at the outset that there were
some things we were willing to do, and some that we were not. We said
we were willing to create a document that would describe our new
relationship. We said we were willing to create a new consultative
forum. We said we would be willing to pursue adaptation of the Treaty
on Conventional Forces in Europe.
But we also had five red lines. We said Russia would have no veto
over NATO decisions, including its own enlargement. We said there would
be no delay in the enlargement process. We said we would not
subordinate NATO and the North Atlantic Council, its decisionmaking
body, to any other body or organization. We said we would not do
anything that would consign new NATO members to second-class status. We
said that the Act does not automatically exclude any qualified European
state from future consideration for NATO membership. As we have
explained to this Committee on previous occasions, the ultimate text of
the Founding Act stayed completely within these red lines.
Barely five months have passed since the Founding Act was signed.
But we have already seen some important steps to implement its
provisions. Most significantly, Russia is taking the PJC seriously, as
is NATO. On July 18, the PJC met for the first time in Brussels at the
level of permanent representatives. On September 26, Ambassador
Albright and her counterparts held the first Ministerial level meeting
of the PJC in New York. The most recent PJC meeting was held among
PermReps on October 24. In addition the PJC has adopted rules of
procedure and a work plan for the remainder of 1997--documents that
have been shared with the Committee and the Senate NATO Observer Group.
We have also made progress in implementing other parts of the
Founding Act. On October 20, the Russian Minister of Defense named
General Viktor Zavarzin as Russia's Military Representative to NATO.
The General is expected assume his duties before the end of the year
and recently visited NATO with General Kvashnin, chief of the Russian
General Staff. In addition, at the most recent ambassadorial level
meeting of the NATO Russia PJC, NATO and Russia agreed on steps to
implement the work program including holding experts talks on
peacekeeping.
As NATO and Russia deepen their record of consultation and
cooperation in the PJC, in Bosnia, and in other ways, our own
government continues to support Russia's reforms and to pursue
important issues with Russia in other ways as well. We are continuing
our efforts to achieve mutual and balanced reductions in both our
countries' nuclear arsenals. Both countries have ratified the START I
Treaty and are implementing its reductions in arms levels. We are
looking forward to Russian ratification of START II--a Treaty we have
already ratified--and President Yeltsin and his advisers have begun
making serious efforts to obtain the approval of the Russian Duma. And
at the Helsinki Summit in March, President Yeltsin and President
Clinton agreed that we will begin work on a START III Treaty as soon as
START II has entered into force, so that we can make even deeper
reductions in both countries' strategic stockpiles. At Helsinki we
agreed that START III would be focused on reducing warheads to levels
between 2000 and 2500 on each side.
We also have continued efforts with Russia on conventional arms
reductions in Europe. Along with 28 other states, we are pursuing a
major adaptation of the Conventional Force in Europe Treaty, and in
July, all 30 states parties signed a Decision on Basic Elements for
Treaty Adaptation that can help us achieve that goal.
We also have deepened our cooperation with Russia and have worked
to integrate Russia more fully into world economic institutions--into
the Paris Club as a creditor country and the World Trade Organization
on terms normally applicable to newly acceding members. The regular
discussions between Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chemomyrdin
have produced important agreements concerning cooperation on energy and
the environment as well as in seven other areas of significant
cooperation from agriculture and health to defense conversion. And
through the Gore-Chemomyrdin process and other bilateral discussions,
we have raised our concerns with Russia about its relations with Iran,
arms control and other security issues.
Those are the steps we have taken to build the new relationship
between NATO and Russia. This relationship is based on shared
principles and shared interests. It is a relationship that holds great
promise for us and all of Europe, as Russia continues in joining us in
making the PJC a constructive forum focused on problem-solving. This
new relationship is also a two-way street. Don't forget: while the
Russians can propose raising issues in the PJC that they are concerned
about, so can we. And we will. It is also not a process that can spin
out of our control, or out of NATO's control. Every item on the PJC
agenda must be agreed to by consensus. That means we do not have to
agree to discuss of any issue that we think would be inappropriate or
harmful to our interests or NATO's.
I know that there are two major concerns about the direction of our
policy on NATO-Russian relations. One concern is that, despite the
Founding Act and the PJC, NATO enlargement will leave Russia isolated,
strengthen Russian hardliners who stress that isolation, undermine
Russian reform, and doom prospects for security cooperation, especially
arms control. This would be a serious problem, if it proved correct,
for one of our goals is to integrate a democratic Russia into the new
Europe.
But a fair reading of recent events suggests that NATO enlargement
is not having this impact on Russia and its policies. Over the past 18
months, precisely when NATO enlargement has been a salient part of our
agenda, Russian reform and security cooperation have moved forward, not
backward. To cite a few examples, during this period, President Yeltsin
was re-elected. He elevated reformers within his government. He
appointed a new Defense Minister who supports START II and is actively
working for its ratification. As I noted earlier, President Yeltsin
agreed to negotiate a START III treaty as soon as START II enters into
force. He signed the Founding Act. We have made progress on CFE. And
Russia has made positive steps in its relations with Ukraine. This
track record does not support the hypothesis that Russian reform or
reformers and security cooperation will inevitably suffer as a result
of NATO enlargement.
Russia has pursued these steps because they are in its own
interest. We should also understand that the broad Russian public is
not well informed on NATO and does not consider NATO to be the key
threat to their future. They are far more concerned about other issues,
from wages and pensions to corruption and crime. That is why I am
persuaded that we must continue to pursue both NATO enlargement and a
steadily more constructive relationship with Russia, that they are not
incompatible and that they are in the long-term interests of both NATO
and Russia in producing stability, prosperity and, cooperation in
Europe.
We are realists. We know that Russian opposition to NATO
enlargement is real. But we must see it for what it is--a product of
misperceptions about NATO's true purpose and a token of outdated Soviet
thinking about former satellites in Central Europe. Instead of changing
our policy to accommodate these outdated fears, we need to encourage
the new Russia's more modem aspirations. This means we should be
Russia's steadfast champion whenever it seeks to define its greatness
by joining rule-based organizations, opening its markets or by
participating constructively in regional or world affairs. But when
some Russian leaders suggest that a larger NATO is a threat, we must
say that this is false and base our policies on what we know to be
true.
If the first group of critics worry that we have not done enough to
promote cooperation with Russia, a second group of critics worries that
we have done too much. I know that former Secretary of State Kissinger
testified before you this morning. Dr. Kissinger, along with others,
has charged that the Founding Act and the PJC give Russia too much
influence over NATO decisionmaking.
I am a great admirer of Dr. Kissinger, and once had the privilege
of serving as his Special Assistant. But on this one, as I have told
him, I respectfully disagree with his judgment. I believe Secretary
Albright has described cogently and carefully the limitations on any
potential jeopardy regarding our consultations with Russia and that
this is the correct model for the future.
We designed the Founding Act and the PJC to protect NATO's
independent decisionmaking authority, and we succeeded. The PJC has no
role in NATO's internal decision making--none. It gives Russia a voice,
but not a veto. The North Atlantic Council remains NATO's sole and
supreme decision making body. The Founding Act imposed no restrictions
on NATO's military doctrine, strategy, or deployments. The unilateral
statements of NATO's military policy are just that--unilateral
statements of policy that NATO had previously adopted outside the
context of NATO-Russian discussions. The Founding Act in no way works
to the detriment of NATO's new members. They will come into the
Alliance the way all the other allies did--as full and first class
members.
It also is just not true that the US and NATO created the Founding
Act and PJC as compensation to Russia, or as concessions in exchange
for their acquiescence to NATO enlargement. Rather, our goal has been
to find ways to work together with Russia in spite of our disagreement
on NATO enlargement. We insisted that every provision of the Founding
Act had to meet this test: does it make sense on its own in terms of
American interests? Our answer is yes.
These are the two schools of criticism we hear most often regarding
NATO Russian relations. They come at this question from quite different
perspectives. But there is one point on which they sometimes converge.
Both camps often charge that we are ducking the issue of Russia or
being disingenuous about our motives. People in both camps often ask me
a simple question: ``Isn't NATO enlargement ultimately about Russia?
Isn't it premised on a real or potential Russian threat?'' The question
is important, because it goes to the core of our fundamental intentions
in pursuing the Alliance's enlargement and this new relationship with
Russia.
Let me be clear. For the reasons I have listed, our policy is to
engage Russia and to maximize the likelihood that this country will
stay on the path of democratic development. But, as the Secretary said
before the Senate Appropriations Committee last week, none of us in the
State Department has a crystal ball. And one contingency that the
Alliance must be able to respond to--even though we see it as unlikely
and are working hard to make it even less likely--is the possibility
that Russia could abandon democracy and return to old, threatening
patterns of behavior.
That, however, is not the only reason, or even the primary reason,
to enlarge the Alliance, and it is a mistake to assume that this is the
unspoken single premise guiding our policy. NATO does not need an
enemy. It has enduring purposes: deterring future threats; keeping the
U.S. engaged in Europe; ensuring that Europe's security policies remain
cooperative rather than competitive; and providing a collective defense
capability for a range of future contingencies.
That's precisely why we are pursuing both NATO's enlargement and a
cooperative NATO-Russia relationship, and why both of them serve our
interests. What we are asking you and your Senate colleagues to ratify
is not a policy of NATO enlargement instead of a positive relationship
with Russia, but NATO enlargement together with a positive relationship
with Russia. We are committed to pursuing both, and we believe our
policy is already showing positive and reassuring results.
Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. I am
joined here by my colleagues Senator Wellstone from Minnesota,
Senator Lugar from Indiana, Senator Thomas from Wyoming. What
we will do is--and the distinguished ranking minority member,
Senator Biden.
Senator, we have just taken the eloquent testimony of
Secretary Pickering, and if you would like to make a comment,
we will get to questions.
Senator Biden. No, no. I am sure I could not improve on
anything the former Secretary said.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, what do you
believe the expectations, goals, are of the Russians, their
leaders, in signing the Founding Act? What do they wish to get
out of this? What do have in their minds as short-term, long-
term goals?
Ambassador Pickering. Senator, ever since my arrival in
Russia in the middle of 1993, I have been impressed by the fact
that a key pillar of President Yeltsin's policy, alongside
democratic and economic reform, has been to play a serious role
in the world community as a democratic State with an open and
developing and prosperous set of market arrangements.
And while President Yeltsin has objected to NATO
enlargement, the Founding Act provided him and his colleagues
in the reform group in Russia a serious opportunity to play a
role alongside NATO in the future of European security to deal
with problems through consultation that might arise in the
context of European security, hopefully before they became
serious problems, and to cooperate as he had with us in the
Contact Group, where there is no question in dealing with
Bosnia we had differences.
But there is no further question that we were able to work
out and resolve those differences as we went through the
process of Dayton, and in the implementation of the Dayton
accords.
This, in my view, is a record we need continually to look
at, and it is a picture of Russia that I think is important to
understand despite the fact that there are many who believe
that Russia is bent on recreating a Soviet-style imperialist
State.
I think the facts of President Yeltsin's leadership belie
that. I think a number of the points that I have made in my
opening statement about their pursuit with us jointly of arms
control arrangements and their interest in playing a
constructive role in European security is culminated, if you
would like, in getting into the Founding Act with NATO and
seeking to provide a way to assure further cooperation in
European security, which is what the NATO Founding Act is
designed to provide.
Senator Hagel. I want to read back to you just for a minute
a sentence or two from your testimony and ask for a little
further explanation. Page seven you say, The PJC has no role in
NATO's internal decisionmaking--none. It gives Russia a voice,
but not a veto.
Could you explain, Mr. Secretary, for the committee, what
that means, it gives them a voice but no veto? What kind of
voice?
Ambassador Pickering. I would like first, Senator Hagel, to
make sure that you understand that the PJC is a consultative
mechanism, and that consultation in diplomatic parlance means
just that, talking together.
It does not mean a situation in which you are obliged to
negotiate. It does not mean you are in a situation where you
are obliged to make a decision. It is an exploration of finding
ways to harmonize policy on the basis of your interest and
intent. So, it provides that kind of opportunity.
It is extremely important, I believe, that we all
understand that even the subject matter to be raised in the PJC
is subject to consensus. In cases where the Russians might
suggest subject matter on which there is no NATO position, it
is clearly provided that NATO is not required to undertake any
such discussion and certainly can, if it wishes and chooses to
make such a discussion, first agree among itself, its members,
as to what its position is.
It is important, however, because it is a two-way street.
There are benefits, I believe, from talking to the Russians
about a whole range of questions, from peacemaking through the
issue of broad security questions inside the European
continent. In this day and age, I think a level of transparency
consistent with our security interests is very important.
Second, a two-way street is a two-way street. We have equal
rights to ask the Russians to discuss issues with us, and we
have equal rights to expect a comparable level of attention to
the issues as we are prepared to give them. I believe this is
important in carrying on a dialog and I believe it is
significant that the Russians have agreed to this.
The Founding Act contains a number of important principles.
One of those is, of course, that internal affairs are internal
affairs. Others are that no particular discussion item is
required to be brought forth if either party does not wish to
discuss it.
So it is an opportunity to conduct, if you like, diplomacy
and relations between the alliance and Russia on a constructive
basis but on a willing buyer/willing seller/willing partner
basis, and that is precisely what it is designed to achieve.
From the Russian perspective, to go back to your first
question, it gives them an opportunity to have a voice in the
process of developing European security. That voice is
important because just as the Contact Group led to cooperative
Russian participation in the forces implementing Dayton, so a
voice with NATO in future questions could open the door to an
equally productive and cooperative relationship with respect to
other problems in Europe.
Russia is a considerable power. It has significant
interests. It can speak with an important voice. To have Russia
inside the tent, to borrow a phrase from Lyndon Johnson, rather
than outside, I think, is extremely important.
The price we pay for that is only our willingness to
discuss, but I believe there is important benefits to both
Russia and the United States for being willing to pay that
price, which is to lend an ear and a voice to the process.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. Senator Biden?
Senator Biden. It is good to see you, Tom. It has been a
long time that you have been coming up before this committee. I
am getting a little worried my staff reminded me, as if I could
forget, that you are now the senior guy at the State
Department. My God, we are getting old. We have been here a
long time.
Ambassador Pickering. Senator, I do not know whether I came
up here before you did or not.
Senator Biden. I think you probably did. I did not come
until 1973, so it was January 1973, but----
Ambassador Pickering. I can remember some bad days before
that.
Senator Biden. Yep. I--it is interesting that--I think, by
the way, what we put together today is one of the most--
beginning with Dr. Kissinger this morning and with the panel
that will follow you including your predecessor, Ambassador
Matlock and others--distinguished panels we have had to comment
on this. What strikes me is the divergence of opinion.
And it reflects what goes on up here in that the Founding
Act is viewed by some as having given too much and by others as
not having given nearly enough. Some think it not only
mollifies Russia but emboldens Russia to have a greater say in
what happens in NATO, and others think that it really isolates
Russia.
And we are going to hear that divergence today, I expect,
as we will in the future of this debate about the security
concerns Russia has relative to the expansion of NATO.
I have only made one trip to Moscow in the last 12 months,
and met with every leader of every major faction. And nobody
talked about the direct security concerns. They talked about
their anger, their sense of rejection, this meaning that we
really never want them to be part of the West, the isolation of
Russia, and so on.
But it was actually a Russian that reminded me that Norway
has long been a member of NATO, the only country with a common
border of the ones that are involved, including the three new
ones that are about to come in. There has never been any great
concern because Norway and NATO made fundamental decisions
about nuclear weapons and the stationing of troops there. The
same decisions that have unilaterally been made by NATO with
regard to the three new countries who are a hell of a lot
further from the Russian border.
But I would like to pursue a point made by Secretary
Kissinger this morning. I, quite frankly, have misunderstood
his position twice. I think I understand it now, and I am not
being facetious when I say that. He had early on in 1993 or
1994 written about the need to have, I thought, just such a
consultative group or arrangement. Then, I realized he was
opposed, I thought, unalterably opposed to the notion.
Really, what he said today as I understand it and maybe
everybody understood it all along, but I did not--was, look at
the way these institutions function--it was kind of the
argument that the old anti-arms controllers used. If you start
to negotiate, you are going to be compelled to bring back an
agreement. Kind of like the way Senators talk about special
prosecutors these days, no matter how honest he or she is, you
appoint them, their reputation rests on an indictment, and if
they do not get one, they will find one.
And as I listened to him, he talked about, as I understood
it, the concern that notwithstanding the fact that you and the
President and Secretary Albright and others are of the view
this is a voice, not a veto, the practical effect of being in
the same building, the same proximity, the same circumstances,
is that women and men are not going to get up from this
consultative group in room B after having talked about
something that the Russians raised--that we do not have to
listen to if we do not want to, we do not have to respond to if
we do not want to--and then walk down to room A where the NAC
is meeting and say, Now, I am not going to consider what was
just said in there.
His concern is there is going to be this--this is kind of
my phrase--porous wall between those two rooms or those two
floors or those two separate wings of the building.
How do you respond to that concern because in one sense, he
reflects how human nature basically functions in that even
though officially they will not have this direct an impact, the
kind of impact many worry about, practically, they will have an
impact?
Again, I may have butchered his view, but I think that is
the essence of what his concern was--that the effect will be a
Russian veto, although the institution does not require it,
does not call for it, and actually explicitly says they will
not have a veto, that will be the net effect because of the
proximity--physical proximity.
Ambassador Pickering. Thank you. Senator, thank you also
for your kind words.
It is an interesting point because I, too, had
misunderstood his position although I knew that this was part
of his position. I thought his position had more weight in
other directions, and it may now be reduced to its simplest
proportions.
I, in no way, would ever second guess Dr. Kissinger on the
frailties of human nature. But I would say that having seen him
operate in the position of Secretary of State and having seen
Secretary Albright, I in no way can share his doctrine which is
a kind of fundamental presumption on the frailty of human
nature or the inability of Secretaries of State and their
servants to understand American national interests and pursue
them.
I think we have lots of checks and balances, a group of
them are in this room. There are others out there in the press,
and there is the necessary transparency in the foreign policy
process. But I do not think we necessarily need you biting our
ankles to be sure that we understand what American national
interests are and continue to pursue them.
And besides, if it was such a problem, why has not our
bilateral relationship with Russia totally contaminated our
NATO policy and I do not believe it has? I think, in a sense,
that we have the ability as a country to be big enough to
listen to all points of view; indeed, we ought to welcome it.
We ought to consider that a helpful check on the innate
correctness of our position.
But at the same time, I think, we should have an unerring
compass and that is the President's responsibility and the
Secretary's responsibility and our responsibility as advisors
to make certain that we do have paramount before us American
national interests. I can tell you in our building 100 times a
day in all corners these are problems and issues that are
constantly re-examined against the bedrock of what are our
national interests.
So I do not believe they go out the window or are forgotten
or are elided by discussion. I do not believe Secretary
Kissinger's secretaryship was characterized by that particular
problem.
And so, while his discernment in characterizing human
failures in other individuals may be large, it is not
necessarily in my view a contamination of the total Government
by that particular issue; rather, the contrary. I do not think
we would be able to stay on our jobs, or in office, if we
pursued that kind of weakness on this set of issues.
It is, however, important that we hear other views, as I
said. It is important we take those into account. It is
important that we continue to review our national interests
against the backdrop of this.
Senator Biden. But he argues that--in fairness to him, he
strongly argues that it is necessary as well. It is ironic. He
has become the darling of many conservatives now, and for
years, was pilloried, because he wanted dialog.
But, and I mean this sincerely when I say he made a very
important point, that there should not be a military
institutional framework within which to discuss these issues.
It should be a separate entity like the Concord of Europe early
on.
I mean, he makes a distinction that both should occur. But
they should not be within the context of a military
organization, even though one is separate and apart but can
comment on it. It should be a different institutional
arrangement, that is all.
Ambassador Pickering. But there are--if I could just make
one other comment on that--obviously differing views of NATO.
It is essentially a collective defense organization, but it has
many other facets. We have known for years that NATO members
have found, indeed, that security is broader than, even if
fundamentally founded upon, the central military interests, and
that we talk widely about everything from the environment to
political relationships in foreign States in the organization.
So it is not so narrowly constructed.
But second, I still think that the sense of pressure,
contamination, influence by osmosis, is not there. I think that
we have enough clearheadedness to avoid that.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. Senator Lugar?
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
Pickering, in his testimony this morning, former Secretary of
State Kissinger commented upon what he felt was the threat of
second-class status for the new and potential entrants to NATO.
Specifically, he said the dilemma supporters of NATO
enlargement now face is that the Founding Act has gone into
effect upon signature. As an executive agreement, it will not
have to be ratified by the Senate, while NATO enlargement,
involving a treaty, does have to be ratified.
Thus, if admission of the new members is not ratified, we
would have the worst of the two worlds; namely, the Founding
Act--demoralization, as Secretary Kissinger saw it, of Central
Europe--``and a NATO rendered dysfunctional by the Founding
Act.''
Two paragraphs later, he offers a solution.
Secretary Kissinger has offered what I suppose is the first
amendment or reservation, to the resolution of ratification. I
would like your comments on the effect of reservations and
amendments, that Secretary Kissinger and others might propose
to the resolution of ratification.
Specifically, the Secretary suggested the Senate should
explicitly reassert the central role of the Atlantic Alliance
for American Foreign Policy insist that nothing in any other
document shall detract from the North Atlantic Council as the
supreme body of the alliance. Such a resolution could draw
directly on the forthright response of Secretary Albright:
``Additionally, the Senate resolution should declare the
United States expects Russia, after the qualitative changes we
have made, to desist from all pressures and threats in Europe
on this issue.
``In the meantime, while ratification proceeds, a joint
resolution of Congress should urge that the new NATO members be
permitted to join the Permanent Joint Council while waiting for
ratification. This would remove the anomaly that the
institution created to reconcile Russia to NATO's expansion
comes into being years before the expansion occurs.''
What is your opinion of Secretary Kissinger's
recommendation?
Ambassador Pickering. Thank you, Senator Lugar. It is a
challenging and interesting question, and I would like to first
to address the premises, although I am at a disadvantage
because I was not here and did not hear the testimony or read
the statement of Secretary Kissinger. As a result, if I get it
wrong, I can say only that I heard what you had to say.
But my sense is that it is important to understand that
advice and consent to changes in the NATO treaty is
fundamental. It is fundamental in my view for many reasons, but
most fundamentally because of article 5. The fact is that we
all collectively agree to treat an attack against one as an
attack against all. Therefore, it must be through the agreement
of all of the NATO member parliaments or through the process of
ratification in each NATO member state that we can add new
members to the alliance. I think that is extremely significant
because it involves a very serious security commitment.
On the other hand, the Founding Act is an executive
agreement that does not involve such security commitments and
indeed, if we had taken it up the other way around, we would
have implied quite to the contrary that we were doing something
more portentous with respect to security obligations of the
United States that merited advice and consent to ratification.
So I think the initial distinctions here are very important
to keep in mind, and I think they go further to answering the
question that we are over committed to NATO in the Founding Act
and I think it is important to keep that in mind.
Second, with respect to reservations, while you have been
kind enough to welcome executive branch advice if not consent,
it is clearly something within your province.
But let me, on the basis of your invitation, offer you a
couple of thoughts--one, that Secretary Albright's statement in
response to Chairman Helms' question was carefully thought out
to try very, very clearly to define for you precisely how we
saw and interpreted the Founding Act with relevance to that
particular question of Is Russia playing too large a role in
this process and is Russia now able to intrude into NATO
decisionmaking? And our answer remains a resounding no.
And I am sure the Secretary would be happy to have you take
into account, in whatever way you thought best, her very clear,
very thoughtful, and I think very open reassurance on that
particular subject.
The issue of Russian behavior is always of concern to us,
and I do not believe under any circumstances the executive
branch would reject the notion that should Russia seek to use
unconscionable pressure or outrageous threats or anything else
that we would not object to it immediately, certainly,
directly, and forthrightly.
It is a principle of our diplomacy. It is a principle,
perhaps, of our national existence. I do not believe it
requires a treaty reservation to take something as fundamental
as that and make sure that we understand where our interests
lie on that particular problem.
Again, that is something you would have to answer for
yourself. But I do not believe that any administration would
feel that it should be presumed to be deficient, if I could put
it that way, in that particular area.
With respect to new members, potential new members
participating in the PJC, the PJC is a NATO-Russia agreement.
It is limited to NATO members. NATO members are members when
all 16 parliaments and the parliament of the exceeding country
have ratified the protocol admitting that country. You cannot
be half a member; it is like pregnancy. You either are or you
are not.
In this particular set of issues, I do not believe that
countries which are not yet members could sit on PJC and
exercise the same rights, the same role, as the other member
states without creating what I would say is elements of
discord, discontinuity, and difficulty.
That having been said, we would hope that the PJC remains a
transparent body, one that we can in its overall lines of
activity, inform others about. It is not meant to be a secret
conclave. Its meetings are closed as a lot of diplomatic
meetings are, but we would hope that in fact there is enough
openness so that new members and potential new members down the
road--because we do not a closed door policy on membership--
would know and understand exactly what is happening in the PJC
and in a sense be clearly informed about that process as it
goes ahead.
And of course, they are always free to say what they think
about things. It is a free and open world, and countries do
accept those responsibilities.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. Senator Wellstone?
Senator Wellstone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have to be
brief because I have another panel to attend to, and there are
witnesses there that I know we want to hear from.
I guess my--I guess I want to put this in a somewhat
different framework and ask you a question that I have asked
earlier. I mean, I do not any evidence of any military threat
to the countries of Eastern Europe, Central Europe. In some
ways, I think this is sort of a bit of a relic of a cold war as
to why we are really expanding NATO. I know my colleagues
agree; it makes me skeptical.
You talked about putting Russia inside the tent. If Russia
meets the same criteria that we are going to apply to new
members--because after all, it is Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Hungary, but then we could be talking about the Baltic states,
talking about the Ukraine. Then my question is sort of what
this--what effect this has on Russia.
If Russia meets up the criteria, would they, Russia, be
eligible for membership?
Ambassador Pickering. Thank you, Senator Wellstone, for
that question. It is not the first time that that question has
been raised, I know. I would tell you this, that the United
States believes that it is essential to maintain an open door
to membership.
In respect to that, Russia has continually asserted its
view that it does not wish to be a member. Nevertheless, our
view has been that all states which meet the criteria are
eligible for membership. There are two sets of criteria,
obviously--one is the capability and willingness of States to
meet the responsibilities of NATO membership, and indeed the
trust and faith of the members of the alliance the applying
states have the capabilities and the intentions to meet the
objectives of the alliance.
And so, in fact, it is a two-way street, and so Russian or
Lithuanian or, indeed, anybody else's membership would have to
meet those criteria. But I see nothing at this stage that would
ipso facto rule out what your question implies except at the
moment what we understand to be the Russian opinion on this
question.
Senator Wellstone. We have this kind of internal debate
here. I am actually going to try to go to the larger question,
and I do not--I know that Senator Biden and I talked to it.
Again, my understanding for the record is that the Ambassador
to--that Russia's Ambassador to the United States, Yuli
Vorontsov? Vorontsov? Have I got the pronunciation right?
Ambassador Pickering. Vorontsov.
Senator Wellstone. Vorontsov. My father was from Russia--
look how poorly I am doing. That according to him, that when
the idea of expanding NATO was originally floated, he asked
whether or not this invitation was also to Russia, and was told
no and that he has received the same answer from others in the
United States Government--maybe so, maybe not.
The point is--and you are shaking your head no so we do not
need to debate it. I guess my question is we have got--and this
is what I keep coming back to, because I do not want to keep
going over the same ground--Ambassador Matlock is going to
testify, and I just want to quote.
He starts out his testimony and he says--I will just read
one part of it. If it should be approved, talking about the
expansion of NATO, by the U.S. Senate, it may well go down in
history as the most profound strategic blunder made since the
end of the cold war.
Far from improving the security of the United States, he
goes on, says he thinks it would lead to a chain of events
which could pose a serious security threat, including something
that Senator Lugar has been very concerned about, which is what
happens with all of this nuclear weaponry and it gets into the
hands of rogue states and is taken out of the country.
I mean, given that concern, why--what, again, is the case
for this? I mean, we do not have a military threat. This is
primarily a military alliance. Why are we doing this? Given
this potential--what Ambassador Matlock is talking about, what
George Kennan has talked about, why--if could you just in a
very succinct way tell me why are we doing this?
Ambassador Pickering. Yes, I could, and let me try to do
this in very clear and simple terms. NATO enlargement, as I
indicated in my speech, has a series of concerns.
One is the one that I think stems from your first question.
While we recognize that Russia is on the democratic track and
on the reform track, and we want to do everything to keep it on
that track.
Senator Wellstone. Right.
Ambassador Pickering. There is no certainty that in the
long-term, that is an inevitable outcome. So, states in the
region who felt concern about the uncertainties of the long-
term future have for their own reasons sought to join and
enlarge NATO.
Second, we see a whole series of seriously disruptive--and
that is a massive piece of understatement if you have been
through Bosnia--problems in Europe or emerging in Europe which
not only NATO enlargement but I would submit the NATO-Russia
cooperative arrangements in the Founding Act are well-designed
to attempt to deal with.
A third point is that we in this country have been drawn
into two horrendous wars in this century, in large measure, as
a result of opting out, if you like, of serious problems all
across Europe. Unfortunately, the new area of focus of NATO
was, in many cases, a kind of cockpit for difficulty in the
historical past.
And as a result, we believe, NATO can provide an
arrangement for security in that area which can help us to
avoid it.
Fourth point--our involvement in Europe, we believe, has
had a very useful effect in dealing with old, long-standing
animosities and antagonisms in the center of Europe. So our
role in being helpful in those kinds of problems is, in my
view, not irrelevant.
Fifth point is a negative one. What would happen if we
accepted the Russian view that there is no need to expand NATO?
Would we be accepting the Stalin dividing line, or somebody
else's--Churchill's dividing line--on Europe, that on the one
side you could be members of a collective defense arrangement;
on the other side, you were forbidden that kind of membership
by a pure accident of geography and not by the application of
rational thought?
The next question. Is this a fundamental security threat to
Russia with all of the problems and difficulties that that
might portend for internal and external Russian concerns? And
the answer, in my view, is yes. If you accept Stalin's
characterization of NATO, you have got to believe that.
I do not know anybody in this room, frankly--I have not
talked to them all--who is persuaded that that view is right. I
know a lot of people who tell me they are persuaded that view
is right, but they have not persuaded me. I have seen a lot of
people among the Russian reformers who are not persuaded that
view is right.
But they do not know how to persuade the rest of the
Russians that that view is not right, except by a process of
moving ahead and building a relationship with NATO, West and
the rest of the world, which is the way I believe the new
Russian leadership sees the role for the future of its country.
Senator Wellstone. Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, I have got only one
additional question, and then my colleagues may have additional
questions.
In light of the activity of the past year, more
specifically, the NATO enlargement issue and what we have been
talking about here the last hour, do you detect--see in any way
any efforts to reach or implement arms control agreements with
the Russians going any easier or better as a result of these
negotiations the last few months?
Ambassador Pickering. I would say that the safest thing I
can say is that it is not getting harder, and there are some
signs that it is getting easier.
The reason I say this is that I have focused my attention
principally on START II. I can recall that when former
Secretary of Defense Bill Perry spoke about this in the Russian
Duma, there were a long series--the deep litany of problems
having to do with Start II, and that a large number of them
have been resolved, even if you like--if you accept the view
that NATO enlargement is so terribly negative.
Even under the shadow of the enlargement discussion in
Europe and in Russia, steps have been made forward--steps have
been taken forward in dealing, for example, with the Russian
problem in the ratification of START II having to do with the
fact that the configuration of START II and the nature of
Russian security forces requires that they dismantle a lot of
multiple warhead missiles, and then, in order to come to parity
to the United States, construct a lot of new single warhead
missiles.
And so, we came forward with the concept, Secretary Perry
and others, that we go to a START III and that START III would
parallel the implementation of START II. START III would aim to
have both countries reduce warheads overall so that there would
not be a build-down to buildup on the Russian side which they
said they could not afford.
We have resolved, in my view, a very thorny and difficult
problem in distinguishing between anti-ballistic missile
defense and theater missile defense, talking with the Russians
under a set of circumstances which permits all of the theater
missile defense programs that we had in view and in plan to go
ahead while at the same time, I believe, carefully assuring the
Russians that the lines of control under the ABM Treaty have
not been breached--a very important part because we had huge
disagreements about this. This was another premise for people
in Russia to reject START II.
A third premise from the point of view of Russia, although
it has nothing to do, in my view, in any direct sense with
START II, was NATO enlargement. Now we have the Founding Act.
Not all Russians are reconciled, but we have a Russian
government which, after all, has to go and defend START II and
says that they are prepared to cooperate with NATO even as they
object to its enlargement.
The difficulty, I think, is that in the Russian Duma on
Start II, you have a parliamentary body dominated by communists
who clearly do not believe that START II, for political
reasons, is something that they want to ratify and gratify
President Yeltsin's reform government. As a result, they search
for any set of arguments.
Having, even in the period of NATO enlargement, winnowed
out and cut down the whole series of those arguments, we have
given President Yeltsin additional ammunition and backing in
the process of trying to move his Duma forward, and we have
recently seen in his efforts with the Duma the beginning, at
least I think, of the assertion of a number of the very
considerable advantages he has in dealing with his Parliament
which the American president does not have, including an
opportunity to dismiss over a period of time, and an
opportunity independently to legislate, on areas where the
legislative has not gone or does not choose to go.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. Senator Biden?
Senator Biden. We call that executive fiat here.
It kind of happens sometimes. I have one very brief comment
and one question off of it.
You know, one of the arguments used against expansion of
NATO is that it was obviously a military organization designed
to meet a specific military threat. It was the Soviet Union,
although we never mention the Soviet Union--in any place I can
recall. There is no place it is mentioned in the Washington
treaty.
And therefore, since we do not have the Soviet threat--it
is an argument made by my distinguished colleague from
Wisconsin--since we do not have that threat, why are we
enlarging?
Well, it seems to me if that argument makes sense, a
logical argument is why NATO? I mean, why do we have NATO? So I
think those who suggest that we should not enlarge and make
that argument have to examine whether or not the argument they
are making justifies the continuation of NATO in the first
instance because NATO no longer has the same precise purpose.
It may have that purpose in the future, it may be anticipatory.
But there seems to have been a transition and a
recognition, although never stated for the last 40 years, that
it was also about stability. It was also about England and
France,--I mean, France and Germany. It was also about
something other than, in addition to--not other than, in
addition to--whether or not the Fulda Gap was going to be
breached by 45 divisions of Russian soldiers.
But in keeping with this notion of what NATO is, has
become, what its purpose was, what it has evolved to, and what
it will evolve into, in my discussions with people who are
above my pay grade in Russia, NATO expansion is usually
discussed in the context of wounded pride and isolation.
Now, this may be a strange question, and I realize the
answer is totally subjective. But you are there, day-to-day.
You are trying to figure out everything from whether or not you
have enough electricity coming into the compound--with no
interruption because of a faulty electrical system, whatever,
straight through to whether START II is going to be ratified,
or START III.
You have been there. In all the things that end up on your
desk, get to your level, that affect bilateral relationships
with the United States, where does enlargement of NATO rank?
How often is that a central concern expressed to you, whether
that is the purpose of your interfacing with your counterparts
or whether it is brought up as an adjunct to other issues? What
role does it play in your day-to-day running of the business of
our country's relations with Russia?
Ambassador Pickering. Let me first tell you that I have not
been in Russia since I left the post almost a year ago. So, I
cannot give you--except from my close relationship in my new
job in the State Department with the charge and now with
Ambassador Collins--my successor, a sense of this issue.
Senator Biden. But you were there leading up to all of
the----
Ambassador Pickering. But I was there leading up to it and
I wanted to try to point out to you that a significant amount
of my time was spent dealing with the questions, as I indicated
in my statement, of how we could build together a NATO-Russia,
a US/Russia relationship in light of the enlargement to deal
with either significant or putative problems in the
relationship so that in a sense we could build a framework that
we have brought to you, what I think is the win-win--the
Founding Act, the CFE negotiations, and the NATO enlargement--
if not in a package for ratification, at least in a package for
presentation.
But I would tell you that my feeling was in my time there,
it went from about a 3-percent of the public interest inside
the Moscow Beltway to slightly over a 20 percent interest
nationally, but that it is extremely clear that in the
hierarchy of Russian issues of angst, if I could call it that
way, it was well down the list--that there were a whole lot of
other things, again as I said in my statement, having to do
with existential, economic, and social issues that bothered
Russians a great deal more than this.
And that at the same time, that the major groupings who
were concerned about this happened to be the Russian
equivalents of our think tanks, the Russian equivalents of our
editorial writers, the Russian equivalents of our legislators,
and some of the Russian equivalents of our executive branch
people.
Senator Biden. In my much more limited encounters than
yours or Jack's--and I know he was not there at the time in the
capacity, and others will testify--NATO expansion would be
raised, but then it was like, well, let us get onto something
that we can really deal with here.
Ambassador Pickering. I think quite so, and there were, in
fact, several times when I was there that there really had to
be a small group of Russian so-called thinkers and
intellectuals--opinion influencers--who would sort of gather up
themselves and produce a new paper and then spread it around in
the paper and say: Let us reinvigorate our lagging concern.
At the same time, a number of Russians, some of whose names
have been mentioned in this hearing, had come to me time after
time and said, Cannot we work out a set of arrangements that
helps deal with this particular problem?
And many of the ideas in the Founding Act came out of those
kinds of conversations. They were constructive, they were
useful. They were people concerned about isolation and how do
you deal with it. You get into consultations.
Senator Biden. I am over my time. Can I go for another 2
seconds?
Senator Hagel. Well, I am going to do better than that. How
about a minute?
Senator Biden. OK.
Ambassador Pickering. I apologize. I made you go over the
time in my answer.
Senator Biden. My impression is that even when enlargement
was the focus of the discussion, it was almost always used, and
has continued to be, to make a larger point that does not
relate to physical security concerns, but relates to ``Do you
love me? What is this relationship going to be? Where am I on
this--where are we in this deal?''
I mean, I am not being very articulate here, but, you had
Yeltsin, for example, when telling Walesa, Look, you are an
independent country. You are a sovereign. You want to be part
of NATO? It is OK.
He gets back--he got the living hell kicked out of him
rhetorically back home, and then, things change.
But I just never have gotten the sense that it was viewed
by most Russian intellectuals or think tankers, legislators, or
other--in the security context as much as in a context of are
we equals? What is this relationship going to be? What does
this say about where it is going?
Ambassador Pickering. Mr. Senator----
Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, you have 1 minute.
Ambassador Pickering. [continuing]. there are two answers,
two pieces to the answer. One is that it was even deeper than,
`` Do you love me?'' It was a fundamental of who is most
important--Western Europe or us?
Second set of questions was--in Russia, politics is
domestic, preeminently, and it is economic. Therefore, Yeltsin
was prepared not to take on his nationalists and right-wing
opposition, if I could phrase it that way, over a foreign
policy issue of this size, when he had a lot of other important
fish to fry in bringing reforms about.
Senator Biden. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to you, Mr.
Secretary.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, as always, we are grateful.
Thank you.
Ambassador Pickering. Thank you, Senator Hagel so much.
Senator Hagel. Good seeing you, Tom. If our distinguished
second panel would come forward.
[Pause]
Senator Hagel. Gentlemen, welcome. Ambassador Matlock,
would you like to begin? Thank you.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JACK F. MATLOCK, JR., GEORGE F. KENNAN
PROFESSOR, INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY.
Ambassador Matlock. Thank you very much. At the outset, let
me say that I agree totally with what Secretary Pickering has
said about the Founding Act, and about the advantages of the
relationship that the administration has negotiated with Russia
and with NATO.
I think that everything he said about that not only agrees
with my judgment, but I think that negotiating that agreement
is a real achievement of this administration.
Having said that, I must also point out those elements in
his testimony and in the administration's position with which I
disagree.
I am probably the only person on the panel you have called
today who disagrees that the enlargement of NATO significantly
advances U.S. security interests, one of statements that
Secretary Pickering made earlier in his testimony.
I think that to bring in new members at this time under
these conditions is a misguided policy and if it should be
approved by the Senate, that it could go down in history as a
profound strategic blunder.
Now, far from improving the security of the United States,
its allies, and the nations that wish to enter the alliance, it
could well encourage a chain of events that could produce the
most serious security threat to this nation since the Soviet
Union collapsed.
I know these are strong words, but I am convinced they are
justified, and I appreciate the opportunity to explain why I
use them.
In Russia today, there are somewhere between 40 and 50,000
nuclear warheads, maybe even more--22,000 of them tactical
weapons relatively easy to transport. Furthermore, there are
enormous stocks of highly enriched uranium of weapons grade,
and plutonium, at research institutes, naval facilities, and
warehouses scattered throughout that vast country.
In addition, Russia has something like 50,000 tons of
chemical warfare agents, and an amount which one can only guess
of biological warfare agents, agents the possession of which
they only admitted officially after Russia became independent
and Yeltsin was President.
Equally important, Russia has a veritable army of
scientists and engineers who are adept at turning these
materials into weapons and devising ingenious delivery systems.
There is no serious danger now, or in the foreseeable
future, that the Russian Government intends to use any of these
weapons against us, our allies, or for that matter, against any
other country. It would be totally irrational for them to do
so, and though Russian Governments may sometimes see things
differently from the way we do, they are not irrational.
The danger these weapons pose is not that they may be
intentionally used by a Russian Government, but that they may
fall into irresponsible hands or rogue states.
It is very much in Russia's interest that such weapons and
the materials and know how to make them not leak out of secure
control to other quarters. But the sad fact is that the Russian
authorities may no longer have an ability to ensure their
safety. When the people guarding them have not been paid for 6
months and weapons scientists literally have trouble feeding
their families and heating their apartments in sub-zero
weather, it is unreasonable to expect that all are going to
resist the temptation of selling dangerous materials to local
criminals or of going to work for some unsavory regime.
Let us count it a miracle that there has yet been no
documented diversion of a nuclear weapon, though we may never
know for sure that one has occurred until one turns up in some
unexpected place.
Now, in general, I do not use the term ``vital interests''
lightly. Countries can have many interests. It is rare,
particularly in a country as strong as the United States, to
say that a given threat or a given interest is absolutely
vital.
But it seems to me by any definition secure, responsible
control of weapons of mass destruction has to be one of them,
and maybe the top one. If any of these weapons get into the
hands of a rogue regime, the United States will be right at the
top of the list of the terrorists they sponsor. They could do
it in a way to render our deterrent force useless.
If we did not where the weapon came from, how could we
retaliate? And very likely we would not know until we had lost
a city or two anyway. Nor will a missile defense protect us
from weapons delivered by means terrorists are most likely to
choose: a ship, a small plane, a minivan, even perhaps a large
knapsack two men could lift.
Chemical and biological weapons are potentially equally
dangerous, as the attacks on the Tokyo subway a few months ago
showed. They are even easier to deliver than nuclear devices,
and would not require a suicide bomber do it.
Now, what has this to do with the question before us?
Simply this. Adding members to NATO will do nothing to protect
us from the real threat I have described. But it does convey to
the Russian nation, and particularly their military, that we
still consider Russia at least a potential enemy, unsuited for
the same security guarantees and the same degree of cooperation
that countries in Central and Eastern Europe are being offered.
Even if the Russian Government is forced to acquiesce to
the enlargement of NATO, which, in effect, it has, there is no
question that our decision to take on new members now, when no
country in Eastern Europe faces a security threat from the
outside, will greatly complicate our efforts to see to it that
the vast stocks of nuclear weapons now in Russia are never used
against us or our allies.
We are constantly being assured that nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction in Russia are under full and
responsible control. This may be correct when it is a question
of intercontinental ballistic missiles, ICBM's, and other large
missiles in the Rocket Forces. But smaller weapons, and much
weapon-grade nuclear material, is much less secure.
General Lebed has recently said that 84 portable weapons
are missing from Russian arsenals. His allegation has been
denied by Russian authorities, but still it is impossible to be
complacent about this question. Even if it is a matter of
sloppy recordkeeping rather than actual theft of a nuclear
weapon--and, frankly, that is the hypothesis I would put
forward first--it, nevertheless, seems most likely that neither
we nor the Russians know how many weapons they have and where
they are at all times.
Given the prevalence of organized crime and the high prices
some regimes or terrorist groups would pay for nuclear weapons
and materials, the possibility of diversion is clearly the most
immediate and tangible threat to American security today. The
progress we have made in assisting Russia to improve the
security of its weapon stocks is substantial, but still
inadequate.
I would recommend, if you have not seen it yet, Mr.
Chairman, a book just recently out, called ``One Point Safe.''
I have no financial or other authorial interest in this book.
You really ought to read it or at least have your staff
summarize it for you. It may contain a few exaggerations. The
prose is sometimes a bit hyped. But I think it describes a real
situation, and a situation which we must take into account when
we think about U.S. security.
Now, the fact is it is going to become increasingly
difficult to obtain Russian cooperation in securing this
material if our actions are interpreted as attempts to exploit
Russia's current weakness, as they are by most officials in
those Russian institutions responsible for weapons security.
Let me say here that I agree with Secretary Pickering in his
judgment on one thing: This is largely an elite issue, and most
Russians do not spend a lot of time talking about it. That is
true. But such issues as NATO enlargement counts very heavily
in military minds and others in the security complex--the very
complex with the very people we now have to depend upon to keep
these weapons under control.
I would point that out. I would also say in that regard--
and I was there when we negotiated German unification and so
on--the basic steps that brought an end to the cold war did not
elicit that much interest from the broader public. The degree
of interest in the public is not necessarily a measure of the
importance of an issue or what its future impact is going to
be.
Now, adding new members to NATO--and what is announced will
be nearly the first stage in a continued process of
enlargement--will inevitably undermine our ability to influence
Russian attitudes on the nuclear question. This has nothing to
do with whether Russia has designs on Eastern Europe or not. I
think they do not have designs on Eastern Europe. Their
problems are precisely the psychological problems that we heard
discussed between Secretary Pickering and Senator Biden just
now.
The fact that these problems are abstract issues does not
mean that they do not play a great role, particularly in the
psychology of people whom we are going to have to depend on, to
some degree, for our own security.
Now, I am convinced that this policy has in fact caused a
delay in the ratification of START II. I know that the
Communists do not want to give Yeltsin a victory. But I believe
his case would have been much stronger if we had not started
the announced policy of bringing new members into NATO without
regard to Russia's position and without regard to whether there
is a threat to the candidate countries or not.
And also, this move has produced pressures for the Russian
Army to rely more, rather than less, on nuclear weapons in the
future. After all, they are feeling very weak after their
defeat in Chechnya, and the Army is running into increasingly
difficulties. They are going to have to restructure, to
restructure radically. Of course, as they do so, a lot of
people are going to lose their jobs--people, including those
who work in these nuclear and other weapons establishments.
It is hard to overestimate the security Russian weapons
hold for the safety and well-being of the American people.
Although the administration has paid some lip service to its
importance, its efforts to deal with the problem have been
hobbled by bureaucratic infighting, some of which you can read
about in this book and elsewhere, lack of senior-level
attention, and, most of all, the failure of the President and
his senior associates to give the matter the priority and the
day-to-day attention it deserves.
I can tell you, as one who worked for 3 years on the staff
at the NSC during the Reagan administration, that nothing gets
done in the American Government, except things the bureaucracy
does every day, unless it gets a push from the top. That push
has to be continual, day in and day out. This issue, is not
getting that push.
What little we are doing--and it is more than a little, but
it is still not enough--came from an initiative from this end
of Capitol Hill. Notably in the Nunn-Lugar appropriations. This
has been, I think, highly successful. It is probably the best
value of all of our defense appropriations.
The Nunn-Lugar program has been implemented reasonably well
by the administration. But instead of a strategy that would
enhance our ability to work on this issue in an effective
partnership with those Russian agencies responsible for weapons
security, we see instead enormous efforts to promote an ill-
conceived plan that does not meet the real security dangers we
face, and, in fact, makes it substantially more difficult to
deal with it.
The plan to increase the membership of NATO, in my opinion,
fails to account for the real international situation following
the end of the cold war and proceeds in accord with the logic
that made sense only during the cold war. The thing that many
people seem to forget is that Russia is not the Soviet Union.
It was my privilege to be present in those last few years
of the Soviet Empire. The Russian political leaders who are
still in power in Russia today were the final force that broke
up the Soviet Empire. That is something that people who say,
Russia is always imperialistic and is likely to be in the
future, forget, or maybe they never noticed.
But the fact is, if Yeltsin and his associates had not
pulled Russia out of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, there
would be a Soviet Union of some sort, with at least seven or so
republics. The Central Asians and Belarus did not want to leave
the Soviet Union. Russia, in the final analysis, broke up that
Empire, and they did it in their own interest.
When we were winding up the cold war, the influence of the
Russian leaders was pushing Gorbachev to go even further than
he went. When there was the war in the Gulf, Yeltsin told me at
that time--he was head of the Parliament in Russia--he said,
``We not only should cut off all arms supplies to Iraq during
this crisis, we should cut them off to all the radical states
in the Near East, and we should send our troops to fight with
you.
Well, this was not politically possible. But I would
emphasize that we did end the cold war with the cooperation
with the Russian leadership. Those who say, ``We won the cold
war,'' of course are right. But we won the cold war over the
Soviet Union. We won it in part because we convinced the
Russians it was in their interest as well to end it.
So to treat Russia now, as if it is a defeated enemy and a
potential threat in the future would be making the same mistake
we made after World War I, when we blamed Germany exclusively
for the First World War and did not heal the rift between
Germany and the Western powers, which left Europe vulnerable to
a new war.
The division of Europe ended before there was any thought
of taking new members in NATO and, the fact that this was the
case was recognized by this administration, at least a few
years ago. Here is a statement made from the White House podium
in January 1994:
``The United States believes that the objective of
promoting security and stability in Europe could be undermined
if NATO were to be expanded too rapidly. Such a course as that
would risk dividing Europe by creating new blocs and
unintentionally replicating a bit further to the east a line of
demarcation that NATO has fought for such a long time to
erase.''
Who made that statement? Former Secretary of State Warren
Christopher.
Now, obviously, he must have changed his mind, or was
ordered to change his mind, somewhere along the line. He made
that statement before we announced the Partnership for Peace.
The Partnership for Peace has now been in operation only about
3 years, which is a very short time to organize a multinational
effort, and not really enough to show what it can achieve. Yet,
for 2 years now, we have been on a course that, in effect,
ignores that and ignores the wisdom in Christopher's statement
in 1994.
The fact is that no one is threatening to redivide Europe.
It is therefore absurd to claim, as some have, that it is
necessary to take new members into NATO to avoid a future
division of Europe. This not only misrepresents history, since
the division of Europe ended under previous administrations; it
ended because the Warsaw Pact collapsed, because the Soviet
Union collapsed. NATO never divided Europe. Europe is not
divided today.
It is also, I think, devoid of logic to make the statement
that to rectify the division of Europe in the past we have to
move NATO eastward. If NATO is to be the principal instrument
for unifying the continent, then logically the only way it can
do so is by expanding to include all European countries. But
that does not appear to be the aim of the administration. Even
if it is, the way to reach it is not by admitting new members
piecemeal.
Now, Mr. Chairman, all of the purported goals, in my
opinion, of NATO enlargement are laudable. Of course the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe are culturally part of
Europe and should be guaranteed a place in European
institutions. Of course we have a stake in the development of
democracy and stable economies there. But membership in NATO is
not the only way to achieve these ends. It is not even the best
way, in the absence of a clear and identifiable security
threat.
I am one who has always been a champion of NATO, and I
continue to be. I agree with Secretary Pickering and others who
point out that the aim of NATO was much more than simply
deterring the Soviet Union. All of those reasons which he cited
for us to stay in NATO are there. That is one of the reasons I
do not like to see a premature move to expand the alliance,
which I believe will weaken the organization ultimately.
Even if NATO is able to absorb the three candidate members
successfully, there are going to be other applicants who we
have already been told that they are also in line for
membership. I think there are about 12 applicants in the line
now. If Russia has not applied, it is only because it fears
being turned down, not that it has no interest in membership.
It seems to me that this starts a process which will
require NATO for the next decade or so, to focus not on the
real security threats that we face, but on the questions of who
should be the next member, and under what conditions. In other
words, NATO will be condemned to contemplate its navel, its
expanding waistline, and will have little time to attend to the
real security threats, particularly those that I have
described.
It seems to me, therefore, that although the goals that
have been described are laudable, this is not the right time or
the right method to pursue them, and to proceed as the
administration has proposed would be a strategic error.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Matlock follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Matlock
In contrast to the other persons invited to testify today, I
consider the Administration's recommendation to take new members into
NATO at this time misguided. If it should be approved by the United
States Senate, it may well go down in history as the most profound
strategic blunder made since the end of the Cold War. Far from
improving the security of the United States, its Allies, and the
nations that wish to enter the Alliance, it could well encourage a
chain of events that could produce the most serious security threat to
this nation since the Soviet Union collapsed. Those are strong words,
but I am convinced that they are justified, and I appreciate the
opportunity to explain why I use them.
In Russia today there are somewhere between 40,000 and 50,000
nuclear warheads, 22,000 of them tactical weapons, relatively easy to
transport. Furthermore, there are enormous stocks of HEU and plutonium
at research institutes, naval facilities, and warehouses throughout
that vast country. In addition, Russia has something like 50,000 tons
of chemical warfare agents and an amount which one can only guess of
biological warfare agents. Equally important, it has a veritable army
of scientists and engineers who are adept at turning these materials
into weapons and devising ingenious delivery systems.
There is no serious danger now, or in the foreseeable future, that
the Russian government intends to use any of these weapons against us,
our Allies, or for that matter against any other country. It would be
totally irrational to do so, and though Russian governments may
sometimes see things differently from the way we do, they are not
irrational. The danger these weapons pose is not that they may be
intentionally used by a Russian government, but that they may fall into
irresponsible hands or rogue states. It is very much in Russia's
interest that such weapons and the materials and know-how to make them
not leak out to other quarters, but the sad fact is that the Russian
authorities may no longer have an ability to insure their safety. When
the people guarding them have not been paid in six months and weapons
scientists literally have trouble feeding their families and heating
their apartments in sub-zero weather, it is totally unreasonable to
expect that all are going to resist the temptation of selling dangerous
materials to local criminals, or of going to work for some unsavory
regime. Let us count it a miracle that there has as yet been no
documented diversion of a nuclear weapon (though we may never know for
sure until one turns up in some unexpected place).
I do not use the term ``vital interest'' lightly. But by any
definition, secure, responsible control of weapons of mass destruction
has to be one of them. If any get in the hands of a rogue regime, the
United States will be right at the top of the list of the terrorists
they sponsor. And they could do it in a way that our deterrent force
would be useless. If we didn't know where it came from, how could we
retaliate? And, very likely, we would not know, until we had lost a
city or two. Nor will a missile defense protect us from weapons
delivered by means terrorists are most likely to choose: a ship, a
small plane, a minivan, even perhaps a large knapsack two men could
lift. Chemical and biological weapons are potentially equally
dangerous, as the attacks on the Tokyo subway a few months ago showed.
They are even easier to deliver than nuclear devices, and would not
require a suicide bomber.
What does this have to do with the question before us? Simply this:
adding members to NATO will do nothing to protect us from the real
threat I have described. But it does convey to the Russian nation, and
particularly their military, that we still consider Russia a potential
enemy, unsuited for the same security guarantees and the same degree of
cooperation that countries in central and eastern Europe are being
offered. Even if the Russian government is forced to acquiesce to the
enlargement of NATO, there is no question that our decision to take in
new members now, when no country in Eastern Europe faces a security
threat from the outside, will greatly complicate our efforts to see to
it that the vast stocks of nuclear weapons now in Russia are never used
against us or our Allies.
We are constantly being assured that nuclear and other weapons of
mass destruction in Russia are under full and responsible control. This
may be correct when it is a question of ICBMs and other large missiles
in the rocket forces. But smaller Weapons and much weapon-grade nuclear
material is much less secure. General Lebed has recently said that 84
tactical weapons were missing from Russian arsenals. His allegation has
been denied by Russian authorities, but still it is impossible to be
complacent about the question. Even if it is a matter of sloppy record
keeping rather than actual theft of nuclear weapons, it seems most
likely that neither the Russians nor we know how many weapons they have
and where they are at all times. Given the prevalence of organized
crime and the high prices some regimes or terrorist groups would pay
for nuclear weapons or materials, the possibility of diversion is
clearly the most immediate and tangible threat to American security
today. The progress we have made in assisting Russia to improve
security of its weapon stocks is substantial, but still inadequate.
It is going to become increasingly difficult to obtain Russian
cooperation in securing this material if our actions are interpreted as
attempts to exploit Russia's current weakness, as they are by most
officials in those Russian institutions responsible for weapons
security. Adding new members to NATO, in what is announced will be
merely the first stage in a continued process of enlargement, will
inevitably undermine our ability to influence Russian attitudes on
nuclear questions. This policy has already caused a delay of at least
two years in the Duma!s ratification of the START II treaty, and has
produced pressures for the Russian Army to rely more rather than less
on nuclear weapons in the future.
It is hard to overestimate the importance of this issue to the
safety and well being of the American people. Although the
Administration has paid some lip service to its importance, its efforts
have been hobbled by bureaucratic infighting, lack of senior level
attention, and most of all a failure of the President and his senior
associates to give the matter the priority and the day-to-day attention
it deserves. In fact, I see no evidence of an overall strategy to deal
with the problem, What little we are doing came from an initiative from
this end of Capitol hill. Instead of a strategy which would enhance our
ability to work in an effective partnership with those Russian agencies
responsible for weapons security, we see enormous efforts to promote an
ill conceived plan that does not meet the real security dangers we
face, and in fact makes it substantially more difficult to deal with
them.
The plan to increase the membership of NATO fails to take account
of the real international situation following the end of the Cold War,
and proceeds in accord with a logic that made sense only during the
Cold War. The division of Europe ended before there was any thought of
taking new members into NATO. No one is threatening to re-divide
Europe. It is therefore absurd to claim, as some have, that it is
necessary to take new members into NATO to avoid a future division of
Europe; if NATO is to be the principal instrument for unifying the
continent, then logically the only way it can do so is by expanding to
include all European countries. But that does not appear to be the aim
of the Administration, and even if it is, the way to reach it is not by
admitting new members piecemeal.
All of the purported goals of NATO enlargement are laudable. Of
course the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are culturally part
of Europe and should be guaranteed a place in European institutions. Of
course we have a stake in the development of democracy and stable
economies there. But membership in NATO is not the only way to achieve
these ends. It is not even the best way in the absence of a clear and
identifiable security threat.
The effect on Russia, however, is perhaps not the most important
reason for saying that the Administration's proposal is misguided. I am
a strong supporter of NATO, which I believe is essential for the future
stability of the European continent. And I am convinced that the
process which the Administration proposes to start is going to weaken
the alliance ultimately. For a decade or more we will be debating who
should or should not be a member, and these debates are bound to be
divisive within the Alliance. Meanwhile, these debates will distract us
from dealing with the real threats that exist.
If ever there was a case of misplaced priorities, this is it.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much. General
Odom.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM E. ODOM, LT. GEN., USA, RETIRED, DIRECTOR
OF NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, HUDSON INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
General Odom. Mr. Chairman, it is not only an honor, but
an exceptional responsibility to testify before the committee
on enlargement. The gravity of the issue inspires a sense of
humility. I think too much is at stake to make the decision
based on clever arguments and representation.
And I must say, after Ambassador Matlock's presentation, I
have a huge sense of cognitive dissonance. I do not know how
NATO, if he asserts it never divided Europe, how will it divide
it by expanding? But let me get on to a more important issue.
You have already heard, I think, virtually all of the
arguments that can be made for and against. You are hearing a
lot of arguments added that do not have anything to do with it
one way or the other.
Now, I do not suffer the illusion that I can bring much new
remarkable evidence to this debate. Instead, I would rather
offer a way to stand above the plethora of arguments and
details and evidence in order to get our bearing, and to
simplify things and see what the evidence and arguments which
are truly important and which can be set aside in making the
decision.
Now, how does one do that? I believe it comes down to
focusing on three questions--basic questions, questions that
draw out what is at stake, the most significant forces
affecting what is at stake, and the priorities we must maintain
to defend what is at stake.
The first basic question is whether or not the United
States should remain committed militarily and politically to
Europe. This may not strike you as a relevant question, but I
think it will soon become so in my further remarks.
The major lesson in the first half of this century is that
when we have had bad relations or no military ties to Germany
and Japan--we have tried--and when we have tried to avoid
dealing with emerging German and Japanese power, we have had
war in Europe and Northeast Asia. The lesson of the second half
of the century is that when we have had strong military ties to
Germany and Japan, we not only have had peace, we have enjoyed
unprecedented prosperity, and our liberal democratic values
have spread in the world. We too often lose sight of this
simple yet critically important understanding.
Now, for example, I think people tend to forget it when
they complain that our wealthy allies in Europe do not carry
their share of the military burden. One can debate how fairly
the burden has been distributed, but one cannot deny that we
have grown wealthier than our freeloading friends, even while
carrying the larger share. Our defense allocations in Europe
should be seen not primarily as a burden. Actually they have
been a very profitable investment, because they have made
possible freer trade, more trade and lower transaction costs in
trading activities. Without them, both we and our European
allies would be poorer.
Now, this is not to suggest that costs are irrelevant.
There has been greater burdensharing precisely because U.S.
Senators have pressed it with our allies. Rather it is to
explain why the cost issue is not fundamental for deciding the
NATO enlargement issue. It should not figure in one's final
decision, because remaining committed to European security has
proven a money-making, not a money-losing, proposition.
Now, the case for keeping U.S. forces in NATO in Europe is
overwhelming when one considers the political and military
consequences that would ensue if U.S. forces were withdrawn.
Now, this is an important conclusion. Again, you may react by
asserting that we are not debating whether or not to remain in
Europe, but whether or not to enlarge NATO. My colleague here
to the right obviously does not see the connection.
That strikes me as a seriously mistaken impression. It
takes me to my second basic question: Can NATO survive if it
remains static, refusing to enlarge in a dynamic and changing
Europe?
I have heard no opponents of enlarging NATO address this
question. I have heard--they merely assume that NATO can more
or less remain as it is, making only internal adjustments. Now,
this is highly unrealistic. The reasons why take us to a
question of our strategic priorities in Europe. Which country
is more important and consequential for the United States in
Europe, Russia or Germany?
Economically, politically and militarily, Germany clearly
deserves first priority.
Too many American policymakers take Germany for granted.
They assume that the European political/military integration
process is irreversible, even close to full success, something
that removes the century-old German question from the European
agenda. Now, if you share that mistaken impression, then I
would ask you to consider several facts.
First, Britain and France opposed German reunification, and
are still not happy about it, a point the Germans will not
forget soon.
Second, Britain and France fell into a serious quarrel with
Germany over Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia during 1992-1995,
making a mockery of a common European defense policy. The
British Foreign Secretary, in 1994, was reported to have said
that it is better to have Russia on the Adriatic coast than
Germany. This quarrel is now repressed only because the United
States belatedly took a leadership role and put NATO forces in
Bosnia. If U.S. troops are withdrawn any time soon, it will
resurface with a vengeance.
Would that be in our strategic interest? Hardly.
Third, in Germany, virtually all political leaders of all
parties but the Greens, and even some of the Greens, support
NATO enlargement. Why? Several SPD leaders who were never very
pro-NATO, have offered the most articulate and compelling
answer. They cite the inter-war period, when Moscow, Berlin,
London, Paris, and Rome, which George Kennan ought to remember,
but seems to have forgotten, competed irresponsibly for
influence in Eastern Europe, a competition that set up the
conditions allowing World War II to break out. They remember
that even a weak Soviet Union was able to use diplomacy to play
off major powers in Europe, one against another, inducing
strategic instability.
These German spokesmen argue that if NATO is not enlarged,
Germany will be forced to follow a unilateral Ostpolitik, a
foreign policy that will make Germany vulnerable to deals by
Moscow at the expense of the small states in Central and
Eastern Europe. That, in turn, will exacerbate Germany's
relations with its Western allies. A common European foreign
and defense policy will fade even as an aspiration. The
consequences for European security and economic prosperity will
be adverse.
Can it be in the United States strategic interest for
Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Russia, and perhaps others to
fall into a major struggle for influence in the countries of
Central Europe? The Germans argue that the most effective way
to prevent this is to enlarge NATO.
Now, fourth, I recently spoke with a group of journalists
from the three new candidate members. In our discussion, they
forthrightly admitted that although their publics want them to
join NATO because of the Russian threat, the more thoughtful
people want to join because of U.S. forces in Germany, which
will protect them from Germany.
Does the United States really want Poland to believe and
act as thought it is threatened both by Moscow and Berlin?
Fifth, a well-placed Russian national security official
told me about a year ago that he and his colleagues foresee
their main challenge as strategic competition with Germany over
hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe. They oppose NATO
enlargement precisely because this would neutralize this
competition.
Can it be in the U.S. interest to allow this competition to
distract Russia from dealing with its problems of economic and
political reform, and controlling nuclear weapons?
These five points indicate something of the postcold war
dynamic in a changing Europe. They reveal emerging forces that
a static NATO cannot control. If it cannot control them, what
will be the consequences?
Just imagine the impact on Germany if the United States
decides against enlargement. Not only will its western
neighbors, but the United States as well will be at odds with
Germany over its policy toward Russia and Central Europe. No
matter how good our relations with Russia are, the United
States will find itself embroiled in all kinds of intra-
European bickering and competition, but without NATO embracing
a sufficient number of the troublesome countries to prevent a
downward spiral. Reluctant to enlarge NATO, the United States
will find itself on the path of withdrawal. It can only stay in
Europe as long as its ties to Germany are strong and
cooperative, a condition that now requires NATO enlargement.
The third question is this: What will be the consequences
for Russian political development if NATO enlarges?
I put this question number three, because in the context of
U.S. strategic interest, it is the lowest priority. Russia is
indeed an important country. But in deciding on NATO
enlargement, one is dealing with the U.S. stake in two mutually
related goals: first, a secure and economically prosperous
Europe; and, second, ensuring that a reunified Germany does not
catalyze a new balance of power game among our European allies.
I see now way that Russia can be more important for the U.S.
strategic interest than these two goals.
This has been the U.S. strategic priority since the
formation of NATO: Europe and Germany first; Russia second. Let
us suppose that all the direst warnings about Russia's
reactions to NATO enlargement were to come true. Would that
provide sufficient cause for the United States to reverse these
priorities? Obviously not. I simply see no way that Russia,
even if it becomes a thriving liberal democracy, can be more
important or more critical to the U.S. than Europe and Germany.
Those who oppose the NATO enlargement because of Russia's
possible reaction are really asking us to reorder our most
fundamental strategic priorities without even debating the
question, not even bringing it up, without even consciously
considering what it would mean.
If I were in your position and had to vote on NATO
enlargement, I would want the opponents to explain to me why
they believe that this well-established and stabilizing order
of strategic priorities should be reversed. I would want to
know how they believe the dynamics of Europe, from the Atlantic
to the Urals, in the decades ahead will not drive us out of
Europe, leaving Europe politically and militarily not
integrated--far from completion of its integration, but perhaps
giving way to disintegration.
Clearly the NATO enlargement issue should be decided not on
the basis of Russia's reaction. Even if we knew that the worst
will happen in Russia, that is simply not sufficient reason to
fail to enlarge.
Happily, the most dire warnings about Russia's reaction are
not persuasive. In fact, NATO enlargement is far more likely to
contribute objectively to the prospects of liberal democracy in
Russia. I know that several experts on Russian and Soviet
affairs believe otherwise, but I believe they are fundamentally
mistaken. I will be glad to elaborate this dissenting view in
the question period, but let me offer one point now.
The key issue that will determine whether or not Russia has
a fair chance at democratic development is empire. Both in the
Imperial Russian period and during the Soviet period, the
imperatives of empire made a liberal development path
impossible. If Russia returns to empire, it has not prospects
for becoming democratic. NATO enlargement will diminish the
likelihood of Russia taking that path. Failure to enlarge NATO
will encourage it.
Other Western policies will also be required to lower the
chances that it will return to empire. But NATO enlargement
will make it more difficult. It will encourage those liberals
in Russia who favor NATO enlargement precisely for this
objective reason, but who have been intimidated into silence by
neo-imperialist voices, trumpeting so loudly against NATO
enlargement in Moscow today--voices which do not reflect public
opinion polls or genuine Russian strategic interests.
Now, to sum up, I believe that when all these arguments,
pro or con, are sorted out, and when we look at the basic
questions on which our foreign policy ought the turn, we will
reach the following inexorable conclusions:
First, the U.S. commitment to Europe has long enjoyed a
consensus in the United States. A negative vote on enlargement
would be to reject this consensus and go against it without
even considering the consequences.
Second, it is most doubtful that NATO can remain in a
static in a rapidly changing Europe. Many of the arcane and
complicated developments in Central Europe contributing to
change receive too little attention or understanding in our own
public debates on NATO enlargement.
Third, even if all the dire warnings about Russia, if they
come true--and I think not very probable--this should not be a
decisive factor.
Now, in light of these conclusions, the prudent decision, I
think, is obvious and not even a close call. This is not to
say, however, that enlarging NATO will not bring problems, and
some of them quite trying. The arguments about the impact of
dilution on the NATO military structure are serious. The
reactions of the countries not admitted are serious. The
Russian reaction could be troublesome. There will be some
financial costs. To avoid these problems by not enlarging the
Alliance, however, is to risk creating far larger problems.
Finally, it seems to me that you members of the Senate face
a choice in this question of no less historical importance than
when the Senate refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty and
when it did ratify the North Atlantic Treaty. The outcomes of
both of those decisions are a sound guide for facing the choice
today. Going forward with new commitments was not risk free in
1949, but it transformed the world in a positive way. Standing
pat, refusing to go forward in 1920, was intended to avoid
risk, but it also transformed the world, making this the
bloodiest century in history.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Odom follows:]
Prepared Statement of General Odom
Mr. Chairman, it is not only an honor but an exceptional
responsibility to testify before this committee on NATO enlargement.
The gravity of the issue inspires a sense of humility. Too much is at
stake to make the decision based on clever arguments and
representation.
You have already heard virtually all of the arguments that can be
made, for and against, on this question. I do not suffer the illusion
that I can provide much new or remarkably enlightening evidence.
Instead I want to offer a way stand above the plethora of arguments,
details, and evidence in order get our bearings, to simplify things,
and to see what evidence and arguments are truly important and what can
be safely set aside in deciding the question.
How does one do this? I believe it comes down to focusing on only
three basic questions, questions that draw out what is at stake, the
most significant forces affecting what is at stake, and the priorities
we must maintain to defend what is at stake.
The first basic question is whether or not the United States should
remain committed militarily and politically to Europe. This may not
strike you as a relevant question, but I believe that will soon become
clear that it is.
The major lesson of the first half of this century is that when we
have had no military ties to Germany and Japan, when we have tried to
avoid dealing with emerging German and Japanese power, we have had war
in Europe and Northeast Asia. The lesson of the second half of the
century is that when we have had strong military ties to Germany and
Japan, we not only have had peace; we have enjoyed unprecedented
economic prosperity, and our liberal democratic values have spread in
the world. We too often lose sight of this simple yet critically
important understanding.
For example, people seem to forget it when they complain that our
wealthy allies in Europe do not carry their share of the military
burden. One can debate how fairly the burden has been distributed, but
one cannot deny that we have grown wealthier than our free-loading
friends even while carrying the larger share. Our defense allocations
in Europe should not be seen primarily as a burden. Actually they have
been extremely profitable investments because they have made possible
freer trade, more trade, and lower transactions costs in trading
activities. Without them, both we and our European allies would be a
lot poorer today.
This is not to suggest that costs are irrelevant. There has been
greater burden sharing precisely because US Senators have pressed it
with our allies. Rather it is to explain why the cost issue is not
fundamental for deciding the NATO enlargement issue. It should not
figure in one's final decision because remaining committed to European
security has proven a money-making, not a money-losing proposition.
The case for keeping US forces in Europe is overwhelming when one
considers the political and military consequences that would soon ensue
were US forces withdrawn. This is an important conclusion, although
again you may react by asserting that we are not debating whether or
not to remain in Europe but whether or not to enlarge NATO.
That strikes me as a seriously mistaken impression, and it takes me
to the second basic question: Can NATO survive if it remains static,
refusing to enlarge, in a dynamic and changing Europe? I have heard no
opponents of enlarging NATO address this question. They merely assume
that NATO can remain more or less as it is, making only internal
adjustments. This is highly unrealistic. And the reasons why take us to
the question of our strategic priorities in Europe. Which country is
more important and consequential for both the United States and Europe?
Russia or Germany? Economically, politically, and militarily, Germany
clearly deserves first priority.
Too many American policy-makers take Germany for granted. They
assume that European political and military integration is
irreversible, even close to full success, something that removes the
century old German question from Europe's agenda. If you share that
mistaken impression, then I ask you to consider several facts.
First, Britain and France opposed German reunification and are
still not happy about it, a point the Germans will not soon forget.
Second, Britain and France fell into a serious quarrel with Germany
over Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia during 1992-95, making a mockery of a
common European defense and foreign policy. The British foreign
secretary in 1994 was reported to have said that it is better to have
Russia on the Adriatic coast than Germany. This quarrel is now
repressed only because the United States belatedly took the leadership
role and put NATO forces in Bosnia, and if US troops are withdrawn
anytime soon, it will resurface with a vengeance. Would that be in our
strategic interest? Hardly!
Third, in Germany, virtually all political leaders of all parties
but the Greens, and even some of the Greens, support NATO enlargement.
Why? Several SPD leaders, some who were never very pro-NATO, have
offered the most articulate answer. They cite the interwar period when
Moscow, Berlin, London, Paris, and Rome competed irresponsibly for
influence in Eastern Europe, a competition that set up the conditions
allowing World War II to break out. They remember that even a weak
Soviet Union was able to use diplomacy to play off the major powers in
Europe against one another, inducing strategic instability. These
German spokesmen argue that if NATO is not enlarged, then Germany will
be forced to follow a unilateral Ostpolitik, a foreign policy that will
make Germany vulnerable to deals offered by Moscow at the expense of
the small states in Eastern and Central Europe. That in turn will
exacerbate Germany's relations with its Western European allies. A
common European foreign and defense policy will fade, even as an
aspiration. And the consequences for European security and economic
prosperity will be adverse. Can it be in the US strategic interest for
Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Russia to fall into a major
struggle for influence in countries of Central Europe? The Germans
argue that the most effective way to-prevent it is to enlarge NATO.
Fourth, I recently spoke with a group of journalists from the three
new candidate NATO members. In our discussion, they forthrightly
admitted that although their publics want them to join NATO because of
the Russian threat, the more thoughtful people want to join because US
forces in Germany will protect them from Germany. Does the United
States really want Poland to believe and act as though it is threatened
both by Moscow and Berlin?
Fifth, a well placed Russian national security official told me
that he and his colleagues foresee their main challenge as strategic
competition with Germany for hegemony over Central and Eastern Europe.
They oppose NATO enlargement precisely because that would neutralize
this competition. Can it be in the US interest to allow this
competition to distract Russia from dealing with its problems of
economic and political reform?
These five points indicate something of the post-Cold War dynamic
in a changing Europe. They reveal emerging forces that a static NATO
cannot control, and if it cannot control them, what will be the
consequences? Just imagine the impact on Germany if the United States
decides against NATO enlargement. Not only its western neighbors, but
the United States as well will be at odds with Germany over its policy
toward Russia and Central Europe. No matter how good our relations with
Russia are, the United States will find itself embroiled in all kinds
of intra-European bickering and competition but without NATO embracing
a sufficient number of the troublesome countries to prevent a downward
spiral. Reluctant to enlarge NATO, the United States will find itself
on the path of withdrawal. It can only stay in Europe as long as its
ties to Germany are strong and cooperative, a condition that now
requires NATO enlargement.
The third basic question is this: what will be the consequences for
Russian political development if NATO enlarges? I put this question as
number three because in the context of US strategic interests, it is
lowest in priority. Russia is indeed an important country, but in
deciding on NATO enlargement, one is dealing with the US stake in two
mutually related goals: first, a secure and economically prosperous
Europe, and second, insuring that a reunified Germany does not catalyze
a new balance of power game among our European allies. I see no way
that Russia can be more important for US strategic interests than these
two goals.
This has been the US priority since the formation of NATO--Europe
and Germany first, Russia second. Let us suppose that all of the direst
warnings about Russia's reactions to NATO enlargement were to come
true. Would that provide sufficient cause for the United States to
revise these priorities? Obviously not. I simply see no way that
Russia, even if it becomes a thriving liberal democracy, can be more
critical to the United States than Europe and Germany.
Those who oppose NATO enlargement because of Russia's possible
reaction are really asking us to reorder our most fundamental strategic
priorities without even debating this question, without even
consciously considering what it would mean. If I were in your position
and had to vote on NATO enlargement, I would want the opponents to
explain to me why they believe this well established and stabilizing
order of strategic priorities should be reversed. I would want to know
how they believe the dynamics of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals
in the decades ahead will not drive us out of Europe, leaving European
political and military integration not only incomplete but giving way
to disintegration.
Clearly the NATO enlargement issue should not be decided based on
Russia's reaction. Even if we knew that the worst will happen in
Russia, that is not a sufficient reason to fail to enlarge NATO.
Happily, most of the dire warnings about Russia's reaction are not
persuasive. In fact, NATO enlargement is for more likely to contribute
objectively to the prospects for liberal democracy in Russia. I know
that several experts on Soviet and Russian affairs believe otherwise,
but I believe they are fundamentally mistaken. I will be glad to
elaborate this dissenting view in the question period, but let me offer
one reason for it at this point.
The key issue that will determine whether or not Russia has a fair
chance at democratic development is empire. Both in the Imperial
Russian period and during the Soviet period, the imperatives of empire
made a liberal development path impossible. If Russia returns to
empire, it has no prospects for becoming democratic. NATO enlargement
will diminish the likelihood of Russia taking the imperial path once
again, and failure to enlarge NATO will encourage it to do so. Other
western policies will also be required to lower the chances that it
will return to empire, but NATO enlargement will make it more
difficult. And it will encourage those liberals in Russia who favor
NATO enlargement precisely for this objective reason but who have been
intimidated into silence by the neo-imperialist voices trumpeting so
loudly against NATO enlargement in Moscow today, voices which do not
reflect public opinion polls or genuine Russian strategic interests.
To sum up, I believe that when all the arguments, pro and con, are
sorted out, and when we look at the basic questions on which our
decision ought to turn, we will reach the following inexorable
conclusions:
First, the US commitment to Europe has long enjoyed a consensus in
the United States, a consensus among both policy elites and the public
for very good military, economic, and political reasons. A negative
vote on enlargement would be to reject this consensus and go against it
without even considering the consequences.
Second, it is most doubtful that NATO can remain static in a
rapidly changing Europe. Many of the arcane and complicated
developments in Central Europe contributing to change receive little
attention or understanding in our public debates on NATO enlargement.
Third, even if all the warnings about Russia's reaction come true--
not very probable--this should not be a decisive factor in deciding
whether or not to expand NATO.
In light of these conclusions, the prudent decision on enlargement
is obvious, not even a close call. This is not to say, however, that
enlarging NATO will not bring problems, some of them quite trying. The
arguments about the impact of dilution on the NATO military structure
are serious. The reaction of those countries not admitted is serious.
The Russia reaction could be troublesome. There will be some modest
financial costs. To try to avoid those problems by not enlarging the
alliance, however, is to risk creating far larger problems.
Finally, it seems to me that you face a choice in this question of
no less historical importance than when the Senate refused to ratify
the Versailles Treaty and when it did ratify the North Atlantic Treaty.
And the outcomes of both of those decisions are a sound guide for
facing the choice today. Going forward with new commitments was not
risk free in 1949, but it transformed the world in the most positive
way. Standing pat, refusing to go forward in 1920-21, was intended to
avoid risks, but it also transformed the world, making this century the
bloodiest in history.
Senator Hagel. General Odom, thank you. Mr. Simes.
STATEMENT OF DIMITRI K. SIMES, PRESIDENT, NIXON CENTER FOR
PEACE AND FREEDOM, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Simes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am also
very privileged to testify before the committee. I know that it
is a great responsibility. I know that at this late hour, my
particular responsibility is to try to be very brief, which I
will, especially as so much of ground has already been covered
and you already have my statement, in which I tried to be, to
the best of my ability, sophisticated and nuanced.
Senator Hagel. Your statement, Mr. Simes, will be included
in the record.
Mr. Simes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me say first that if we were debating today the
question of whether Russia supports NATO enlargement, we would
probably find a consensus among all students of Russia that the
answer is negative. I have yet to find a single Russian who
believes that NATO enlargement, which they assume would exclude
Russia, is a good idea.
But I presume that this is not what we are debating. I
believe we are debating whether NATO enlargement may adversely
affect important American interests vis-a-vis Russia. If that
is the question, it is very difficult for me to find evidence
which would suggest that we are going to lose anything of
importance in the U.S. relationship with Russia if we proceed
with NATO enlargement, particularly with the very cautious and
moderate first stage of NATO enlargement, which, mind you,
would not bring the Alliance to the Russian border, with the
one exception of the Kaliningrad enclave.
Even in Russia, to the best of my knowledge, no one
seriously claims that Poland will become a staging ground for
the invasion of Kaliningrad. If one looks at public opinion
polls, they suggest that in today's Russia this is, for all
practical purposes, a non-issue, particularly after Helsinki
and Madrid.
One can find Russian officials who duly register their
opposition to NATO enlargement, which in Russia has become the
functional equivalent of belief in God and apple pie. But this
is not an emotional issue.
Like Senator Wellstone's father, my father was also born in
Russia. Unlike in the case of Senator Wellstone, however, my
father-in-law still lives in Russia, as do as many of my other
relatives and friends, some of whom actually negotiated with
Ambassador Matlock and Ambassador Pickering these very issues
of NATO enlargement.
I have yet to remember a single conversation I have had
with anyone in the Russian foreign policy establishment or in
the Yeltsin government after office hours in which NATO
enlargement has been a serious emotional issue. They do not
like it. They do not approve of it. They worry about the second
stage, especially Ukraine and the Baltic nations. But as far as
the three Visegrad nations are concerned, it is simply not a
serious political matter for anyone in Russia.
When I hear that NATO enlargement could move Russian public
opinion in a nationalist/extremist direction, I really want to
know what kind of naivete it requires to believe this about a
country in which, as Ambassador Matlock observed, the Russian
leadership was the principal architect of the destruction of
its own empire. Unlike General de Gaulle's withdrawal from
Algeria or the British pullout from India, Russia's leaders
made no arrangements whatsoever to protect its own citizens,
the 26 million ethnic Russians living in other Soviet
republics.
They also engaged in terrible atrocities in Chechnya
against, among others, many Russian civilians. They are not
paying wages and pensions to their own people at the time when
the people can easily observe the huge mansions of the new,
elite and the private jets of Russia's new tycoons. None of
this moves the Russian politics in a nationalist or reactionary
direction. But somehow an obstruction like NATO enlargement is
supposed to have a mystical destructive impact on Russian
politics. It is very difficult for me to believe.
As far as arms control agreements are concerned, let me
simply say that President Yeltsin has not lifted a finger to
have START II ratified by the Russian Duma. We have been told
this by many Russian political commentators. We have been told
this by many members of the Russian Duma. It has simply never
been a priority for the Russian Government.
I am not going to engage in speculation about what Yeltsin
would do if he had a friendly Duma and if ratification could be
delivered to him on a silver platter. But the fact remains that
even before NATO enlargement became a major issue, Yeltsin was
not interested in ratification of the START II treaty--at least
he was not interested in fighting with Communists and
nationalists in the Duma over this arms control agreement.
The Nixon Center hosted Mr. Zyuganov. We had a very
interesting presentation by him and another very interesting
presentation by General Lebed. Both of them made very clear
that while they have serious concerns about the START II
agreement, these concerns connected much more to the ABM
treaty, with all the differences between theater and
intermediate-range nuclear defenses, than with anything that
may happen in the first stage of NATO enlargement.
General Lebed is a nationalist politician and a very
ambitious man. I do not think that he would be so outspoken in
arguing that NATO enlargement is not a problem, that the first
stage of NATO enlargement is not a problem, if he were
concerned that such statements would alienate his nationalist
constituency.
What really should be discussed is whether we need NATO
enlargement as a protection against a new Imperial Russia. I
agree with Ambassador Matlock that Russia is not a threat
today. I am not going to dwell on that. It is almost self-
evident.
However, I disagree with Ambassador Matlock that simply
because the Yeltsin leadership was instrumental in destroying
the old Soviet Union, we should say that it is anti-Imperial.
It was very much to Yeltsin's advantage to destroy the Soviet
Union and to take the country from under President Gorbachev.
Looking at the composition of the Russian leadership today, it
is clear that they are certainly not Jeffersonian democrats.
They are not people who came from the ranks of dissidents or
any kind of opposition. As Russia becomes minimally stronger
today as the economy begins to stabilize, we see a growing
Russian assertiveness.
I think that Bismarck was quite right when he observed that
Russia is never as strong or as weak as it appears to be. I
think chances are quite good that at the beginning of the 21st
century Russia is going to be a serious power once again--not a
superpower--but a serious power. I can well understand that
nations in Central Europe may be somewhat nervous about it.
Now, I would not suggest for a second that Russia is a
prisoners of its history. Germany and Japan prove otherwise--at
least hopefully prove otherwise in the long run. I would not
suggest that the current Russian leadership is interested in
aggression. In fact, they are interested primarily in the
enrichment of themselves and the Russian elite as a whole. But
taking into account Russia's past and its potential power, it
is simple prudence to proceed with a new security architecture
in Central Europe, if it can be done without seriously damaging
your relationship with Russia and without alienating Russian
public opinion.
I believe it can be done without alienating Russian public
opinion. And the time is precisely now, when Russia is
preoccupied with domestic issues when we have a fairly benign
relationship with Yeltsin, and when Russia is still modestly
dependent upon foreign aid, particularly from the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund. The present time is a
window of opportunity to expand NATO without entering into a
confrontation with Moscow.
Where I see a problem with Russia and NATO enlargement is
exactly where Secretary Kissinger sees it. I am not going to
talk about that a great deal. I am sure that he presented his
perspective; mine is very close to his. I am not going to talk
about NATO bodies and what kind of voice Russia will have
within them. This is not a purely technical question. I think
that the administration is entitled to argue that there is
enough ambiguity in the Final Act for us to believe that Russia
is getting a voice but not a veto.
But everything depends on who interprets the Final Act. Mr.
Yasrtrzhembsky, Yeltsin's press secretary, said, 2 days after
the Final Act was signed that it was not the end of the battle
over NATO enlargement,end, but rather the beginning of the
battle of the interpretation of the Final Act, and that Russia
would try to interpret it in the broadest possible way.
Looking at the Clinton administration record vis-a-vis
Russia, I have to admit that I am concerned that the Clinton
administration is not always prepared to be sufficiently
realistic about Russian behavior and intentions. I think that
the administration has not leveled with the American people
about President Yeltsin's undemocratic practices, including the
gross violations of human rights in Chechnya, which were real
atrocities perfectly comparable to what happened in Bosnia.
I think the Clinton administration has not leveled with the
American people and the Congress about the extent of
corruption, which reaches into the highest echelons of the
Russian Government. Some of the people labelled reformers by
the administration are called thieves in Moscow.
I think that the administration has been somewhat too
lenient about Russian arms control violations, about violations
of a variety of other agreements and, even more important,
about defending American interests, particularly in the case of
Russian nuclear missile and energy deals with Iran. Under these
circumstances, I am not confident that the administration's
interpretation of the Final Act will be based on sufficiently
realistic assumptions about Russia rather than our best hopes
and sometimes naive expectations.
That is why it seems to me we have to appreciate one very
simple fact. NATO, of course, has to be adjusted in a number of
ways. The call to reform it is proper. NATO adaptation should
be debated in this building and across the Atlantic, and a
great deal of innovative thinking and serious discussion is in
order. But I am concerned that sometimes people in the
administration, and especially those who opposed the expansion
and have now joined the administration, are trying to use NATO
expansion to change the very nature of the Alliance, and to
turn it into a collective security body. That, in my view,
would be a major mistake.
Let me conclude with a very simple proposition. A strong
and effective NATO will be not an obstacle, but an asset in
dealing with Moscow in the 21st century. It will not create new
dividing lines in Europe as long as we cooperate with Russia on
many other levels, from trade to security. It is precisely
because we want to have a united Europe that we need to create
certainty in Russia's about what is permissible and what is off
limits. That security climate would be much better for a united
Europe than the misguided accommodation of Russia today, which
can lead only to trouble, misunderstanding and confrontation
tomorrow.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Simes follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Simes
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, for the
opportunity to explain my views on the impact of NATO enlargement on
Russia, its foreign policy, and its relations with the United States.
Let me state first, however, that the Nixon Center for Peace and
Freedom does not take institutional positions on policy issues and,
accordingly, that my remarks today represent strictly my own opinions.
To put the impact of NATO's enlargement on Russia in its proper
context, it is important to remember the original reasons behind the
expansion of the Alliance. Those reasons did not include strengthening
U.S. ties with Russia; rather, they were built around promoting
stability and security in Central Europe, consolidating the gains of
democracy in the region, and responding to the historical aspirations
of its peoples to be included in the Western community of nations. It
is these goals that have been presented as the principal rationale for
NATO's expansion by the U.S., its NATO partners, and prospective
members in the Alliance. Accordingly, in evaluating the impact of NATO
enlargement on Russia, the key question is not ``Will NATO enlargement
have a positive effect on Russia?'' but ``Will NATO enlargement
adversely affect key U.S. interests with respect to Russia?'' By such a
standard, NATO expansion--especially in its first stage--is not a
problem.
Even before the agreements reached between Presidents Clinton and
Yeltsin in Helsinki in March of this year--and despite the efforts of
some Russian opinion-makers--the Russian public was not at all
exercised about the prospect of NATO expansion. A variety of polls
indicated that under 10% of Russia's citizens see NATO enlargement as a
serious threat. After the Helsinki Summit, and particularly after the
July 8-9 Madrid Summit, the NATO issue has for all practical purposes
dropped off the radar screens of the vast majority of Russia's
citizens.
Nevertheless, opponents of NATO enlargement continue to predict
darkly that expanding the Alliance will undermine the Yeltsin
government and turn Russian domestic politics in a reactionary,
nationalist direction. It requires an inordinate degree of naivet6 to
take this argument--which is also the principal argument against NATO
expansion made by some elements of the Russian government and foreign
policy establishment--at face value. If the Yeltsin regime could
survive nationalist ire after playing a leading role in the destruction
of the USSR and essentially abandoning 26 million ethnic Russians
living in the other Newly Independent States; if it could survive
public outrage over its conduct of a genocidal war in Chechnya in which
at least 40,000 civilians (including many ethnic Russians) were killed;
if it could withstand the humiliation of defeat in that same war by the
Chechen rebels; if it could be forgiven for using tanks against its own
democratically-elected (albeit very imperfect) parliament in October
1993 (after Yeltsin issued a decree to dissolve it that he himself
admitted at the time was ``extra-constitutional''); if it could survive
the massive redistribution of Soviet/Russian state property to corrupt
officials and well-connected tycoons who make America's 19th century
robber barons look like innocents; if it could sustain itself while
withholding wage and pension payments to millions of citizens for
months while the same officials and tycoons built huge mansions and
bought private jets, it is difficult to imagine how an abstraction like
the incorporation of three Central European states with no shared
border with Russia (with the exception of Poland's border with the
Kaliningrad enclave) into NATO could have a serious impact on Russian
politics. If such an impact were to any serious degree imaginable, it
is highly unlikely that an unabashedly nationalist presidential
candidate such as General Aleksandr Lebed would say point-blank that
NATO enlargement ``poses no threat at this stage.''
Those in Russia who oppose NATO enlargement can be divided into two
broad categories. The first category includes xenophobic Communists and
hardline nationalists who have made opposition to the West, and the
U.S. in particular, their battle cry. This group does not need NATO
enlargement--or any other Western policy--to become motivated and
mobilized. What little basis is necessary to trigger complaints and
accusations from them is demonstrated by an open letter to President
Clinton from the heads of several Duma committees (with the notable
absence of the Yabloko faction) on October 16 charging that NATO's
``Sea Breeze-97'' maneuvers with Ukrainian forces in Crimea violated
the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 1949 Geneva
Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons because they took
place in the vicinity of a children's hospital.
The second category of Russian critics of NATO enlargement consists
principally of government officials and pro-government establishment
figures who want to establish their patriotic credentials on the cheap
to protect themselves in Russia's increasingly nationalist political
climate. Significantly, after Helsinki and particularly Madrid, these
voices have been considerably muted--at least as far as the first stage
of expansion is concerned. Some even argue that if Russia manages to
develop meaningful cooperation with NATO through the NATO Russia
Permanent Joint Council, it is not inconceivable, as an influential
Izvestia columnist recently wrote, that in two years the Russian press
agency ITAR-TASS will report on President Yeltsin's congratulations to
the Presidents of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic on their
entry into the Alliance.
For the United States to fail to proceed with NATO enlargement
would be a stunning event, even in Russia, and a tremendous victory for
the hardliners.
Some American critics of NATO expansion also argue that enlarging
the Alliance may complicate the Russian State Duma's ratification of
the START II treaty and other arms control agreements. However, this
argument ignores the fact that to this day--before and after Western
discussions of NATO enlargement--the Yeltsin government has done next
to nothing to get START II ratified. NATO enlargement cannot be an
alibi for President Yeltsin's failure to make START II ratification a
priority, especially as the Duma opposition connects ratification much
more closely to the maintenance of the ABM treaty than to NATO
expansion. Paradoxically, the process of NATO enlargement could even
improve Russian cooperation on arms control if the Clinton
Administration indicates that the scope and timing of the next round of
expansion may be influenced by Russia's arms control performance. At
present, there is simply not a single negative development in Russian
foreign policy which can be attributed to NATO expansion.
The relationships with China and Iran--which are often cited as
``responses'' to NATO enlargement--also have other, prior, and more
substantial causes.
Thus, I believe that the impact of NATO enlargement on Russia
should not be a major concern in evaluating the future of the Alliance.
Conversely, however, the potential Russian challenge should be a
legitimate consideration in deciding when and how to expand the
Alliance. Russia today is not in a position to threaten its European
neighbors. Its armed forces are too weak and its dependence on foreign
aid and investment is too great to encourage provocative conduct. Also,
Russia is led by a relatively benign government which seems generally
committed to developing a reputation as a good international citizen.
It is not a government which seems prepared to take chances in the name
of anything other than the immediate economic interests of the new
post-Communist elite.
But the Russian economy is beginning to show signs of
stabilization. Russia's leaders seem to believe, perhaps prematurely,
that their country is now less dependent on credits from the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund. Also, for the first time, there is
serious talk of military reform. And there are indications of a new,
more assertive foreign policy in Moscow aimed at undermining U.S.
global leadership and shaping a new, ``multipolar'' international
system. Finally, Boris Yeltsin will not be the President of Russia
forever and, since the Russian constitution was uniquely tailored to
his personal political needs, there is a good chance of significant
changes in Russia when Yeltsin leaves office. Simple prudence suggests
that an appropriate security architecture should be created to define
the limits to any revanchist aspirations should they ever again impel
Russian policy. It is precisely now, when Russia is relatively weak and
preoccupied with its own evolution--and when, due to its benign
relationship with the West, NATO enlargement is less likely to be
perceived through the prism of hostility--that is the right time to
proceed .
As Germany and Japan have demonstrated in the second half of the
20th century, no nation is a prisoner of its history. It would be both
unfair and counterproductive to accuse the presently peaceful Russia of
aggressive designs preemptively. But history should not be ignored
either. It is outright recklessness not to take Russia's past--and
power--into account when considering the future of Europe. This is all
the more true as we have already seen how extremely brutal today's
relatively benign Moscow can be, even with its own citizens, when
Russia's leaders believe they can get away with such behavior.
The inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO
will not create new lines of division in Europe as long as Russia
remains on the path of democratic development and does not threaten its
neighbors. The new ties between Russia and the West--in the economic,
political, security, and even social spheres--are broad and deep enough
to preclude such an eventuality. What NATO enlargement does is create
certainty in Moscow that policies of aggression and intimidation in
Central Europe will have profoundly negative consequences.
That understanding will be advantageous even to the nations not
invited, at least in the near future, to join the Alliance just as the
presence of NATO members on the borders of Austria, Sweden, and Finland
provided an essential security umbrella during the Cold War. Ukraine
and the Baltic States will benefit in a similar manner from the
inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the Alliance.
Although Ukraine is not at this point seeking membership in the
Alliance as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are, all four states are
united in the belief that NATO enlargement--even if limited to its
current parameters--is advantageous to their security. As a matter of
fact, as expansion of the Alliance has become increasingly likely,
Russian treatment of Ukraine and the Baltic States has become more
moderate and more flexible. Russian policymakers clearly appreciate
that rocking the boat too much could accelerate NATO's expansion to
Russia's frontier--something they are eager to avoid.
It is not the implications of NATO expansion within Russia but
rather Russia's new role in NATO which could create profound problems.
From the outset, when Central European nations first announced their
intentions to join NATO, Moscow has taken the position that enlargement
would be acceptable to Russia only if the Alliance changed its name and
transformed itself into a universal collective security system. The
Clinton Administration rejected the first symbolic demand but has made
major concessions to accommodate the second, substantive one.
There is enough ambiguity in the so-called Founding Act between
NATO and Russia to allow the administration to claim that Russia has
been given a voice but not a veto. But the Permanent Joint Council
established by the Founding Act has at least the technical possibility
to deal with a broad range of political and security matters central to
the ability of the Alliance to maintain its character as a cohesive
military organization. The Russian government is certain to interpret
its prerogatives under the Founding Act as broadly as possible. As
Yeltsin spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky put it, ``the signing of the
agreement is not the end but the beginning of its life: it begins the
struggle over its interpretation.''
Thus, a great deal depends on who interprets the agreement and how
it is interpreted on the NATO side--particularly in Washington. In this
respect, the Clinton Administration's record does not inspire
particular confidence. The President and his advisors have consistently
demonstrated a predisposition to go the extra mile to accommodate the
Yeltsin government. This excessively generous attitude has ranged from
a reluctance to criticize Russian atrocities in Chechnya to a refusal
to acknowledge the undemocratic practices and pervasive corruption
evident at the highest levels in Moscow, and from the promotion of
Russian membership in the G-7 and the Paris and London Clubs--none of
which are justified on economic merits--to lobbying on Russia's behalf
with the IMF and World Bank. The administration is also hesitant to
introduce any penalties for undesirable Russian behavior when important
U.S. interests--and even U.S. laws--are disregarded, as in the case of
Russian nuclear, energy, and weapons deals with Iran. Further, senior
administration officials make clear that they visualize not just an
expanded NATO but a fundamentally altered NATO, redesigned in a manner
which appears to be largely along the collective security lines
advocated by Russia.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO is in need of
adaptation if it is to cope with a radically different international
environment. This reform will require innovative thinking and serious
debate on both sides of the Atlantic. But it would be a great mistake
to use the expansion of the Alliance as cover to change its nature
fundamentally simply in order to avoid alienating Russia. A strong and
effective NATO is not an obstacle, but an asset in dealing with Moscow
in the 21st century.
Dimitri K Simes is President of the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom,
a non-partisan public policy institution with offices in Washington, DC
and Southern California.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Simes, thank you very much.
To all three of you, thank you.
Ambassador Matlock, have you missed your train, or will you
be taking another train?
Ambassador Matlock. I have another 10 minutes, yes.
Senator Hagel. May I start with you. I know you have to get
a train, and I am grateful that you would spend some time with
us.
I noted you being a little itchy, listening to your friends
and colleagues. Would you care to respond? This is not open
ended, by the way. But if you would take a couple of minutes to
respond, I would be interested in a couple of your responses to
what you heard.
Ambassador Matlock. Just two points. Although, obviously,
to discuss them thoroughly would take a long time.
First of all, I really cannot understand General Odom's
feeling that NATO is static if it does not take in new members.
It seems to me NATO has been substantially changing its focus
and its orientation. We made some rather significant changes in
connection with German unification. We since have had the
Partnership for Peace, which is just beginning to be
implemented. All the states in the area are members of that.
Some are going to be more active than others. We still have not
really tested the limits of that. Now we have the Founding Act
with Russia.
I think these are all very, very important changes in NATO.
I do not understand how is can be considered ``static.''.
I would say I simply do not accept that we have to take new
members in now, under these conditions, in order to preserve
NATO. I do have the strong feeling that it is not just a matter
of these three countries. We have said that others are coming.
I do not see how we can avoid a divisive debate for many years
to come about who they are going to be. I do not think that is
the primary security issue we face.
Regarding Mr. Simes' comments, I would simply clarify my
own position. My position is not that we should accommodate
Russia. Far from it. It does seem to me that whatever residual
imperialistic tendencies, which, indeed, can be a problem, can
best be contained by methods other than adding members to NATO.
I can think of no lever more effective, no political lever,
than the threat that if Russian behavior does not meet certain
standards, NATO will be enlarged, and enlarged very rapidly,
and even further, and considerably further, than the current
proposal envisages.
As a diplomat, I would love to have such leverage to try to
keep them in line. Therefore, I think that my position is not
properly described as one calling for concessions to Russia.
My final point would be that if indeed NATO is to be the
primary instrument for preventing conflict among its members,
then why not enlarge it to cover those areas where there is
actual violence? The current proposal is to bring countries
into NATO that do not need it to keep them from becoming
threats to the press. If that is the objective, then, for
goodness sake, let us look at the Balkans. Let us look at
Transcaucasia.
My point is that we need to use other means to deal with
violence-prone areas in Europe. They will be much more
effective. I do not see that Germany is a potential problem. I
am just not seeing evidence that supports General Odom's
assertion. One can draw all sorts of scenarios, and yet, he
says that his scenario has not been refuted. Well, if I had a
week or so to write it out, I could refute it, and probably
write a book almost as long as the one I wrote before. But,
obviously, we do not have time for that now.
Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Ambassador, do you foresee at any time
in the future a need or a reason for NATO enlargement?
Ambassador Matlock. Possibly, yes. I testified here 2 years
ago that I could see two conditions under which NATO
enlargement would not only be desirable but necessary. One
would be an arrangement which would include Russia, and either
have some Russia/NATO arrangement where this would be part, but
would make Russia a partner in responsibility for helping
maintain the security of Europe.
The other would be a situation whereby Russia potentially
or actually begins to threaten other countries in Europe. In
either instance, I would be in favor of enlargement. But it
does seem to me that we have many instruments today to meet the
legitimate concerns of the East Europeans.
I am one who feels that their membership in the European
Union is much more important to their future and to the
development of democracy and to the development of their
economies than is membership in a military organization, when
their security is not under threat from military sources.
Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. I am going to direct my questions to you at
the moment, since you have to leave. I am a little confused--
and I mean that seriously--about the correlation between the
expansion of NATO and Nunn-Lugar. Rather than my characterizing
it, can you explain that to me again?
Ambassador Matlock. I did not connect the two. What I said
was that I consider the most serious potential security threat
to the American people the possibility that weapons of mass
destruction from Russian arsenals will seep out to
irresponsible rogue regimes or terrorist groups.
Senator Biden. I agree with that concern.
Ambassador Matlock. And that I do not see a strategy
emerging from the administration to deal with this. I said that
one of the most effective things we are doing did not originate
there. It originated here on the Hill, which shows that the
influence. So I was praising this program and praising the
initiative from the Senate to do so.
Senator Biden. I understood that. I just thought you were
suggesting a connection and you have clarified it. I thought
you were making a connection that the one thing that made a lot
of sense was Nunn-Lugar. Nunn-Lugar worked as far as it was
allowed to go. This administration has not had a larger or
broader or more encompassing initiative to either keep
scientists and/or materiel from----
Ambassador Matlock. I think you are absolutely--yes, that
was the point I was making. I think if I look and try to assess
what are the real near-term security threats to the American
people, threats that could result in substantial casualties,
this is the one that I would put at the top of the list.
Senator Biden. All right.
Ambassador Matlock. And I think it is the responsibility
to--and I am convinced that bringing new members into NATO is
irrelevant to it, and potentially can undermine the effort. I
would like to know how the administration--I would think the
Senate would like to know--what plans it has to deal with this
and how it relates to its plans for NATO enlargement.
Senator Biden. I would also like to know their plan to deal
with a number of issues that relate to Russia and other places.
But I do not know why we cannot sort of walk and chew gum at
the same time. That is, press them on that, and if this other
matter is unrelated--and I think it is, although you say
potentially it could undermine efforts to deal with weapons of
mass destruction--I am lost on how it potentially undermines
those efforts--press the administration and still do our job.
Constitutionally Senators are constituted to do one thing and
only do one thing in foreign policy--and that is, we have to
react.
We cannot make foreign policy. We can initiate things like
Nunn-Lugar, which I played a small part in. But, ultimately, we
basically react in the area of foreign policy. If we had our
way, I could make the argument that continuing the Partnership
for Peace, which turned out to be much more robust and much
more successful than I think anyone thought it would be at the
outset, may arguably have been a better way to go, and that to
continue that process and beef it up before you move to
expansion, if you move to expansion, would have been better.
But we are where we are. From my perspective--I speak only
for myself, but I do not think I am totally alone in this--I
did not see a threat when I was in Warsaw or Budapest or in
Slovenia or anyone else seeing an immediate threat from Russia.
But I see the threat lying in a gray zone existing where there
is instability, where individual nations seek their own
individual alliances, like they have in past historical moments
like this, and where competing interests on the continent
conclude that they will, not by the use of force but by the use
of economic, political and diplomatic leverage, attempt to
affect the foreign policy of those nations that are in play.
And Poland is in play. Ukraine is in play. These countries
are in play. So my view is that by making them part of NATO we
enhance stability, although arguably there could be a better
and more successful way of doing what I seek, and that is to we
enhance stability. It seems to me if I am a Russian democrat,
the last thing I want happening is the various countries that
were either part of the Union and/or were satellites out there
deciding what their relationships with their neighbors are
going to be.
I would argue, for example, that the only reason Romania
has worked out, for the first time in my lifetime, some
reasonable arrangement with their Hungarian brothers is because
of the prospect of NATO admission. I would argue the reason why
Germany and Poland moved on border disputes as rapidly as they
did, in part, was related to this issue.
So I find it to be something that is calming troubled
waters. I do not think the Russian bear is going to, all of a
sudden, resurrect itself and come roaring across Europe again.
Quite frankly, I do not think so. Where I disagree with Mr.
Simes is that I think it is not only crippled, I think it is an
amputee right now.
Now, maybe bears can grow back limbs; I do not know. That
may happen. I am not suggesting anything is permanent in this
business. But for the next 10 to 20 years, it seems to me
incredibly difficult to figure out a circumstance where anyone
in Russia would contemplate the use of land forces or engaging
in an all-out war in Europe. I mean, I just think that is not
likely.
But whether that is true or not, it seems to me there is a
fairly compelling argument, Jack, that something is going to
happen. Something is going to happen, over the next 5 years,
with Poland and with the Czech Republic and in countries not
invited, Romania and others, as to how they are going to
determine what their security arrangements are going to be.
We, in a sense, talk about them like they are orphans. You
know, either we or the Russians are going to decide their
future. When, in fact, I quite frankly think they are sitting
there thinking, OK, if we do not get this deal, what do we do?
Ambassador Matlock. Well, Senator, I do know the area well.
I speak Czech. I read Polish. I know the literature, the
history. I was Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, not only the
Soviet Union.
Senator Biden. I know that. That is why I am asking.
Ambassador Matlock. I would simply say that I do not buy
the argument that we hear from some--and I know this is not
yours--that this is a geopolitical vacuum. It is not a vacuum.
These are countries that are now basically very healthy
politically. They know where their orientation is. It is to the
West. They are not going to start making alliances elsewhere.
That would be idiotic, and it would be against their whole
culture.
Senator Biden. Well, I am not suggesting they will make
them elsewhere. They may make them amongst themselves.
Ambassador Matlock. But the thing is, I think this is
actually a very stable part of Europe now. If there is
instability and if the argument is that NATO has to bring
members in and order to give them incentives to make it stable,
then look at the Balkans.
Now, I am not making that argument.
Senator Biden. That is why I think Slovenia should be part
of NATO.
Ambassador Matlock. Well, and we need to go even further.
Slovenia is stable. Do you want Bosnia in? This would give them
a real incentive to get together.
Senator Biden. No, Jack.
Ambassador Matlock. No, I mean, really. If you follow that
logic, if you follow that logic----
General Odom. The answer is NATO out-of-area action.
Senator Hagel. What we will do here is we will let
everybody in this.
Ambassador Matlock. Thank you very much. I do have a train
I have to catch.
Senator Hagel. General Odom, do you want to jump in? Mr.
Simes?
Senator Biden. You better catch your train. I am accustomed
to having to catch the train.
Senator Hagel. Ambassador Matlock, thank you very, very
much.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
Ambassador Matlock. Thank you both.
Senator Hagel. Why don't we just pursue what we have been
throwing around here. I know you both have some thoughts
regarding some of the statements Ambassador Matlock made. So
you just jump in where you want, General Odom. Please, Mr.
Simes, feel free to engage here.
General Odom. Let me followup on this point, because I
think Senator Biden, in responding to Ambassador Matlock, is
putting his finger right on the point I tried to highlight and
say is being lost entirely in the situation. The Ambassador
said he did not understand why NATO is static. He understands
it is changing. I say that it makes internal adjustments,
surely, but my statement was that NATO does not have its arms
around all of the dynamic forces and change in Europe in a way
that will allow it to control, either with out-of-area
operations in Bosnia or otherwise.
And Senator Biden has just gone down and reiterated the
kinds of dynamics in Central Europe that are outside of NATO
and that will, as the Germans warn us, become the basis for
deals between Moscow and Berlin at the expense of the East
Europeans, which, in turn, will invite the British and the
French to cut deals inside, or it can work the other way. We do
not know. But we do know that we had several variants of that
in the inter-war period.
We also know that 7 years out, 5 years out from the
Versailles Treaty, if we had been in this room, having the
debate again, we would have had an ambassador telling us about
how stable the democracies in Poland and Czechoslovakia and
Romania and Hungary were. They were then.
By the mid-1930's, they were all gone but the Czechs. We
are much too early to reach those kind of conclusions. That is
the point I want to make.
The other point I want to relate to you and reemphasize is,
having said that, we do not draw the further connection that if
you really buy in the arguments against expansion, you are
raising a very real prospect that you are voting to leave
Europe. Now, I do not hear people saying that, and I do not see
people thinking about that. I think you make that probability.
Nothing is certain. But I think you make that probability very
significantly higher.
And if you want to convince yourself, go talk to the
Germans. I think they are pretty critical.
Senator Biden. We have similar isolationist friends up here
today that we have talked to. We may have to go to Germany.
General Odom. But those are the essential components. That
is the point I want to leave you.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Simes?
Mr. Simes. I would like to respond to Senator Biden, if I
may.
Senator, I completely agree with you that if we lived in an
ideal world, we would not need NATO enlargement in Central
Europe. But I would like to remind you of the dynamics of the
process. The idea did not originate in Washington. It did not
originate in the White House. It originated in Central Europe.
I would even go one step further. If Boris Yeltsin did not
go to Warsaw and, as we are now told, have a little bit too
much to drink with President Walesa, and then say things that
encouraged the Poles, which Walesa exploited very carefully to
claim that Russia now did not mind NATO expansion, we perhaps
would not be having the discussion. But we are dealing with a
real situation, not a hypothetical one.
I did not mean, Senator, for a second to imply that 10 or
15 years from now I expect Russian armies moving----
Senator Biden. No, I was not suggesting you said that.
Mr. Simes. I understand. But let me continue. What worries
me is that Central European nations, whose history with Russia
is very different than America's history with Russia, look at
the situation with a much greater degree of concern. They will
want to go even one step further. So we should also discuss
Ukraine and the Baltic nations.
Opponents of enlargement very often say, well, if you
really want to protect those who are truly vulnerable, why
don't you expand instantly into Ukraine and the Baltic nations?
Of course, Ukraine has not asked us. They have not applied for
membership. As far as the Baltic nations are concerned,
however, something very interesting has happened recently.
Once NATO's expansion into Central Europe became almost
inevitable from the Russian standpoint, and once Russia became
concerned what could happen with the Baltic applications,
Moscow's treatment of the Baltic states improved immeasurably.
As has Russian flexibility vis-a-vis Ukraine. During the Cold
War the Austrians, Finns, and Swedes were neutral, but they
benefited from the power equilibrium in Europe and the
certainty, in the Russian mind, that certain things Moscow
tried to say would be off limits.
It is these kind of subtle concerns, rather than the
apocalyptic scenarios, that, in my view, favor NATO
enlargement.
Senator Biden. Let me ask you a question. I would argue
that the same dynamic is going to take place within Russia. And
there is an expression that I always use with my younger staff
when they come on, and they say, why don't you tell Senator so
and so why he should vote for this? And I say, I never tell
another man or woman her politics. They know their politics
better than I do. They know what works in their State better
than I can presume to tell them what their best political
judgment is.
And it is kind of presumptuous, in carrying that a little
further, to tell another country what its interests are. But it
seems to me--and I mean this sincerely--it seems to me that the
dynamics put in play here not only are the ones that, in my
view, have required the Romanian Government to accommodate the
Hungarian minority, but have required the Russian Government to
accommodate more readily the Baltic concerns. I think you are
going to see that same dynamic occur within Russia.
It is a very basic decision. You two have forgotten more
about this than I am going to learn. But let me just state it
for you and ask you to comment.
Part of the struggle within Russia, historically, in the
last 70, 80, 90 years--70 years--has not been merely communism
or capitalism. It has been West versus rejection in the West.
It seems to me that the dynamic that gets put in play here, is
for Russia and successive Russian Governments, if I had to bet,
to look West for anchors rather than looking to Central Europe
or to the East. Because Central Europe is no longer an option
as we make this judgment--Central Europe alone.
And so I would think--and I would like you to comment on
this, the human mind has an incredible ability to rationalize--
I made the judgment this expansion is a good idea, and I want
to make sure I am not kidding myself about this. But it seems
to me that one of the potentials is that it is as likely that
this will ameliorate the conduct, the negative conduct, of
Russian Governments in the future as it is that it will
exacerbate the negative aspects of their conduct.
Is that because you have, I would say, a more--some would
say--more realistic, others would say more pessimistic view of
what may happen in Russia? Would you comment on that?
Mr. Simes. Senator, first of all, my view is not
pessimistic. Let me put it differently. It is more open minded.
What I see in Russia today is a mixed bag. There are a variety
of trends. Some, on the top, very disturbing. Others are quite
encouraging, such as the emergence of a middle class and
something that begins to look like civil society. I am not
pessimistic about the Russian future. I am agnostic.
The most fundamental choices, of course, will have to be
made by Russia. But to the extent that empire has traditionally
been a straight jacket on Russian democracy, a better Russian
relationship with the Balts and a more normal Russian
relationship with Ukraine would be a contribution to Russian
democracy, to the establishment of checks and balances, and, in
the long run, to a more benign Russian foreign policy.
Senator Biden. Well, that is a more succinct and rational
way of saying what I was attempting to say.
General Odom. I would add that most of the arguments you
are making I have made in writing for some time. I think most
of my colleagues in the Soviet area really got it wrong. The
impact on Russia internally of NATO expansion has been
positive. You had a very distinguished scholar, like Sergei
Blogavolin, make this argument openly and strongly in Russia
back in 1993. In fact, an article that I wrote was translated
for NATO expansion.
It was translated and published in a Russian newspaper, and
Blogavolin was asked to respond to it. He said, I do not
disagree. He made the argument for the Russian side.
So I also remember having a discussion in March 1996 with a
former very high-level official in the Foreign Ministry, who
said the minute the elections are over this summer, the next
day you should enlarge NATO. If you were to, again, to
understand his rationale for that, it would follow exactly the
line that you are making, Senator.
Senator Biden. I agree. By the way, to get Western Europe
to react to a threat that is a perceived threat or an agreed-
upon threat from Moscow, that calls for enlargement, as the
Ambassador suggested, seems to me to run counter to every
instinct that would likely come to the fore. As the Ambassador
says there are two circumstances in which he would suggest
expansion, one of which is the emergence of a genuine threat.
It would seem to me that every apologist argument in the
world would begin to be made once that occurred. I mean, the
likelihood of it expanding in that circumstance seems to me to
be highly unlikely, if past is prologue. Second, in terms of
being viewed as whether or not it is a pejorative act, whether
it is a threatening act, it would be put in that context of
emergency or threat. Because it would be. It would be a
counter.
Senator Hagel. We are going to do one more minute. I do not
want to in any way inhibit the good Senator Biden's voting
record. I want to keep a perfect record for him. We had a vote
called about 5 minutes ago. So if we can get 1 minute more.
Thank you.
Mr. Simes. Let me make a second comment. Senator, as you
explained very well, we have to be practical about our choices.
You cannot rewrite history. You can advise, consent and perhaps
amend agreements signed by the President. You have to ask how
the Russians, particularly Russian hardliners, would interpret
it if this NATO enlargement were rejected by the U.S. Senate.
I do not know whether NATO enlargement will help Russian
politics. But I know that the rejection of enlargement would
have a devastating impact on the credibility of Russian
reformers.
Senator Hagel. General Odom?
General Odom. I will take 30 seconds.
Senator Biden raised one of my concerns when he said he has
convinced himself of this and he wants to be sure. I have had
the same reaction. It seems to me the case, even though great
imponderables face us here, the case is enormously compelling
to expand. Therefore, I have been going through what I call an
honesty in advertisement exercise, in trying to foresee the
problems that are going to emerge. There are some. I list a few
here. I think one that this body may face is that merely the P-
for-P force requirements are overextending the troop levels we
have in Europe today, plus Bosnia.
Another one is whether or not we understand the connection
of succeeding in Bosnia with NATO enlargement. We cannot fail,
and separate that issue.
Senator Biden. Absolutely.
General Odom. There are tough issues here.
Senator Biden. The chairman and I have been talking about
that one for a few months.
Senator Hagel. Yes.
General Odom. Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Gentlemen, you have been very, very helpful.
Thank you.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
Mr. Simes. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, to
reconvene at 10:04 a.m., November 5, 1997.]
PUBLIC VIEWS ON NATO ENLARGEMENT
----------
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gordon Smith
presiding.
Present: Senators Smith, Kerry and Robb.
Senator Smith. Ladies and gentlemen, we welcome you to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing.
Today's hearing will provide an opportunity for the Foreign
Relations Committee to hear from a broad spectrum of ethnic,
civic interest, and religious groups with views on NATO
enlargement. We will hear from a total of 15 witnesses, both
for and against NATO enlargement.
In the letter of invitation to each of these witnesses, the
committee asked that oral statements be limited to 5 minutes. I
plead with our witnesses in advance to please adhere to that
limit in order to insure that all views can be heard today.
Longer written statements, of course, will be submitted in
their entirety as part of the permanent record of the NATO
expansion debate. So we would welcome any additional comments
you would like to enter for the record.
I expect the witnesses to express their views with
precision and ask Senators, if they find it necessary to ask
for additional explanations, to limit their questions to one
per witness.
Before we start, I ask unanimous consent to include in the
record the testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Marc
Grossman, Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Cramer, that of
Dr. Stephen Cambone, Dr. Steve Larrabee, and Dr. John Micgiel.
This testimony was prepared for an October 22 hearing on the
qualifications of candidates for NATO membership. That hearing
was canceled at the last minute due to an unrelated objection
in the Senate.
Finally, I ask unanimous consent that a letter from the
Ambassadors of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as well
as testimony of several organizations not able to appear today
be included in the printed record of this hearing.
It is so ordered.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Senator Smith. Senator Biden will be joining us shortly. He
is at the White House at another meeting. But I know he wants
to be here, especially to greet and I think ask questions of
Mr. Jan Nowak.
I now recognize Mr. Nowak, the representative of the
Central and Eastern European Coalition as the first witness, to
be followed by the remaining witnesses, which I will announce
after Mr. Nowak.
Mr. Nowak, we welcome you and thank you so much for being
here to share your experience and your views with us.
STATEMENT OF JAN NOWAK, REPRESENTATIVE, CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPEAN COALITION, ANNANDALE, VIRGINIA
Mr. Nowak. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am here as
a spokesman of the Central and Eastern European Coalition,
which unites 22 million U.S. citizens from 14 ethnic
communities.
At the first stage of NATO enlargement, the Senate will be
asked to ratify the admission of only three new NATO members.
Why, then, do all our ethnic communities unanimously support
this decision?
We do not believe that the isolation or humiliation of
Russia would serve the interests of the United States or the
countries of our heritage. We would like to see a new European
security architecture based on close cooperation between the
enlarged NATO and Russia. This is why our organizations do not
oppose the Founding Act as long as it offers partnership with,
and not the participation of, Moscow in the NATO
decisionmaking.
There is no animosity between the Russian people and their
neighbors. 2 million Russians cross the Polish border every
year to trade with Poles. According to a public opinion poll
conducted by the Moscow Center of Sociological Research last
April, 68 percent of Russians expressed friendly feelings
toward Poles. Intense Russian propaganda against NATO does not
seem to have any impact. Attempts to organize protest meetings
against NATO enlargement in front of the Polish and American
embassies in Moscow last July were a spectacular failure.
The Russian people do not see NATO as an enemy or a threat.
They are mainly interested in the improvement of their
desperately bad living conditions.
Unfortunately, the Russian political ruling class has not
reconciled itself to the loss of its empire. The economic and
political system has been changed, but the mentality of the
people who are pursuing global designs for the Soviet super
power all their lives cannot be changed overnight. Eduard
Shevardnadze warned the American people that the Russian empire
disintegrated but the imperialistic way of thinking still
remains. Andrei Kozyrev also warned against the old guard which
has a vested interest in presenting NATO as a threat and an
enemy. ``Yielding to them,'' wrote Kozyrev in Newsweek, ``would
play into the hands of the enemies of democracy.''
Both statesmen have inside knowledge of the Russian ruling
elite. They certainly speak with authority. Moscow is opposed
not to the enlargement of NATO but to the very existence of
NATO because it rightly sees a defensive military alliance as a
threat to its long-term ambitions to regain in the future a
controlling influence over the former nation of the Soviet
orbit.
As in the time of the Soviet Union, we have to expect that
the continued enlargement of NATO will meet with threats and
fierce opposition from Moscow. Once, however, the process is
complete, any imperialistic dreams will become unrealistic and
Russia may accept the present boundaries of its influence as
final. Such a reconciliation with reality would prompt Moscow
to concentrate its full attention and resources on internal
recovery. A change of the present mind set would open a new
chapter of friendly relations between Russia and her neighbors,
who would no longer see Moscow as a threat. This new sense of
security would be an historic turning point.
This is exactly what happened between Germany and Poland.
Final recognition by Germany of its postwar borders brought an
end to the centuries-old German drive to the East. German
nationalists finally lost hope of regaining the territories
they had lost in two world wars. With the loss of hope came the
loss of nationalists' influence. Traditional enemies, Germany
and Poland, are today friends and are ready to become allies.
In a similar way, the enlargement of NATO may bring to an
end Russia's relentless drive to expand its huge territories.
For over 5 centuries, this urge to expand has been a scourge
for the Russian people. Russia remains the largest country in
the world, but Russians remain the poorest people of the world.
Let me emphasize that we want to see the continued
enlargement of NATO, which would leave no gray zone and no
unprotected nations between Germany and Russia, because we want
peace and friendship with Russia--a Russia finally reconciled
to the loss of its empire. Only then will the United States be
able to reap its full and lasting dividend of peace. Only then
will the United States be free to turn her attention to other
potential sources of conflict.
Allow me to end with a few personal observations as an
eyewitness of much of the dramatic history of this century. I
was born on the eve of World War I in Warsaw under the rule of
Czarist Russia. Five years later, Poland reemerged on the map
of Europe thanks to its own indomitable will and thanks to
President Woodrow Wilson. As a child, I was saved from
starvation, in a country totally devastated by war, by the
Herbert Hoover Relief Committee for Poland. There was a
monument of gratitude to America in the heart of Warsaw which
was erased by the Nazis. There was the George Washington Rondo
and monuments to President Wilson in Polish cities. Every
American who was in Poland will tell you that Poland, as well
as other countries in that region, are the most pro-American
nations in the world.
The admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
into NATO and later the admission of other nations in this
region with their traditional ties to America will considerably
strengthen American leadership and presence in Europe. The
rejection of these nations by NATO would do much to destroy
this strong pro-Western and pro-American orientation.
The United States' withdrawal from Europe after World War I
and the appeasement of Hitler by France and Britain led to
World War II. Hitler would never have attacked Poland and have
set the world on fire had he known that he would face the
awesome power of the United States.
When I look at the thousands of white crosses on the hills
of Arlington Cemetery, I am painfully aware that these young
Americans could have lived full, happy lives. World War II
could have been prevented; 60 million people killed, executed,
and tortured to death in concentration camps and 6 million
Jews, extinguished like insects in gas chambers, could have
been saved.
In World War II, I crossed enemy lines five times, both
ways, as an emissary between the Warsaw underground and the
allies in London. I was there between Tehran and Yalta. I met
Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, and other British leaders. I
watched with despair how the appeasement of Stalin led to the
enslavement of Poland and others. The allies made it so easy
for Stalin to subjugate eight nations with a total population
of 100 million people that he was led to believe he could go on
expanding his empire without risk beyond the dividing lines
established at Yalta and Potsdam. This is how the cold war
began.
Today, I have a horrible feeling of deja vu when I hear
opponents of NATO asking why the United States should risk
American lives in defense of distant countries such as Poland,
Hungary or the Czech Republic. Neville Chamberlain asked the
same question on the eve of the Munich Agreement. Hitler
perceived these words as a signal that dismemberment of
Czechoslovakia and the onslaught on Poland would not be
resisted by the Western democracies. Should we today encourage
the hopes of Russian nationalists that the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe may one day, once again, become a Russian
sphere of influence?
Throughout the period of the cold war, the United States
stood ready to defend its allies. Because of our determination,
not one single American soldier lost his life in defense of
such distant countries as Greece or Turkey. Should we not learn
from this historical experience?
The United States will not be safe either economically or
militarily without a safe Europe. Europe will not be safe
unless the smallest European nation feels safe.
The United States won World War I and then lost the peace.
The United States won World War II and lost the peace for the
second time. The United States won the cold war, and I beg of
you, let's not lose the peace for the third time.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nowak follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Nowak
I'm here as a spokesman of the Central and Eastern European
Coalition, which unites 22 million U.S. citizens from 14 ethnic
communities.
At the first stage of NATO enlargement, the Senate will be asked to
ratify the admission of only three new NATO members. Why then, do all
our ethnic communities unanimously support this decision?
We do not believe that the isolation or humiliation of Russia would
serve the interests of the United States or the countries of our
heritage. We would like to see a new European security architecture
based on close cooperation between the enlarged NATO and Russia. This
is why our organizations do not oppose the Founding Act as long as it
offers partnership with, and not the participation of Moscow, in NATO
decision-making.
There is no animosity between the Russian people and their
neighbors. Two million Russians cross the Polish border every year to
trade with Poles. According to a public opinion poll conducted by the
Moscow Center of Sociological Research last April, 56 percent of
Russians believe that Polish-Russian relations are friendly; 30 percent
consider them normal; and 68 percent \2/3\ expressed friendly feelings
toward Poles. Intense Russian propaganda against NATO does not seem to
have any impact. Attempts to organize protest meetings against NATO
enlargement in front of the Polish and American embassies in Moscow
last July were a spectacular failure. The Russian people do not see
NATO as an enemy or a threat. They are mainly interested in the
improvement of their desperately bad living conditions.
Unfortunately, the Russian political ruling class has not
reconciled itself to the loss of its empire. The economic and political
system has been changed, but the mentality of the people who were
pursuing global designs for the Soviet super power all their lives
cannot be changed overnight. Eduard Shevardnadze warned the American
public that the Russian empire disintegrated but the imperialistic way
of thinking still remains (ABC's Nightline with Ted Koppel; 9/28/93).
Andrei Kozyrev also warned against the old guard, which has a vested
interest in presenting NATO as a threat and an enemy. Yielding to them,
wrote Kosyrev in Newsweek, ``would play into the hands of the enemies
of democracy.'' (Newsweek, 10/2/97)
Both statesmen have inside knowledge of the Russian ruling elite
(one was a foreign minister of the Soviet Union, the other of the
Russian Federation). They certainly speak with authority. Moscow is
opposed not to the enlargement of NATO but to the very existence of
NATO, because it rightly sees a defensive military alliance as a threat
to its long-term ambitions to regain in the future, a controlling
influence over the former nations of the Soviet orbit.
As in the time of the Soviet Union, we have to expect that the
continued enlargement of NATO will meet with threats and fierce
opposition from Moscow. Once, however, the process is complete, any
imperialistic dreams will become unrealistic and Russia may accept the
present boundaries of its influence as final. Such a reconciliation
with reality would prompt Moscow to concentrate its full attention and
resources on internal recovery. A change of the present mind set would
open a new chapter of friendly relations between Russia and her
neighbors, who would no longer see Moscow as a threat. This new sense
of security would be an historic turning point.
This is exactly what happened between Germany and Poland. Final
recognition by Germany of its post-war borders brought an end to the
centuries-old German ``drive to the East''. German nationalists finally
lost hope of regaining the territories they had lost in two world wars.
With the loss of hope came the loss of the nationalists' influence.
Traditional enemies, Germany and Poland, are today friends and are
ready to become allies.
In a similar way, the enlargement of NATO may bring to an end
Russia's relentless drive to expand its huge territories. For over five
centuries, this urge to expand has been a scourge for the Russian
people. Russia remains the largest country in the world, but Russians
remain the poorest people in the world.
Let me emphasize, we want to see the continued enlargement of
NATO--which would eventually leave no gray zone and no unprotected
nations between Germany and Russia--because we want peace and
friendship with Russia, a Russia finally reconciled to the loss of its
empire. Only then will the United States be able to reap its full and
lasting dividend of peace. And only then will the United States be free
to turn her attention to other potential sources of conflict.
Allow me to end with a few personal observations as an eyewitness
of much of the dramatic history of this century. I was born on the eve
of World War I in Warsaw under the rule of Czarist Russia. Five years
later, Poland reemerged on the map of Europe thanks to its own
indomitable will, and thanks to President Woodrow Wilson. As a child I
was saved from starvation--in a country totally devastated by war--by
the Herbert Hoover Relief Committee for Poland. There was a monument of
gratitude to America in the heart of Warsaw which was erased by the
Nazis. There was the George Washington Rondo and monuments to President
Wilson: Wilson Squares, Wilson Parks, and Wilson Streets in Polish
cities. Any American who was in Poland will tell you that Poland, as
well as other countries in that region, are the most pro-American
nations in the world. The admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic into NATO, and later, the admission of other nations in this
region, with their traditional ties to America, will considerably
strengthen American leadership and presence in Europe. The rejection of
these nations by NATO would do much to destroy this strong pro-western
and pro-American orientation.
The United States withdrawal from Europe after World War I and the
appeasement of Hitler by France and Britain led to World War II. Hitler
would never have attacked Poland and have set the world on fire, had he
known that he would face the awesome power of the United States. When I
look at the thousands of white crosses on the hills of Arlington
Cemetery, I am painfully aware that these young Americans could have
lived full, happy lives--World War II could have been prevented; 60
million people killed, executed and tortured to death in concentration
camps and 6 million Jews, extinguished like insects in gas chambers,
could have been saved.
In World War II, I crossed enemy lines 5 times both ways as an
emissary between the Warsaw underground and the allies in London. I was
there between Tehran and Yalta. I met Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden
and other British leaders. I watched with despair how the appeasement
of Stalin led to the enslavement of Poland and others. The allies made
it so easy for Stalin to subjugate eight nations--with a total
population of 100 million people--that he was led to believe he could
go on expanding his empire without risk beyond the dividing lines
established in Yalta and Potsdam. This is how the Cold War began.
Today, I have a horrible feeling of deja vu when I hear opponents
of NATO asking why the United States should risk American lives in
defense of distant countries such as Poland, Hungary, or the Czech
Republic. Neville Chamberlain asked the same question on the eve of the
Munich Agreement. Hitler perceived these words as a signal that the
dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and the onslaught on Poland would not
be resisted by the Western democracies. Should we today encourage the
hopes of Russian nationalists that the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe may once again become a Russian sphere of influence? Throughout
the period of the Cold War, the United States stood ready to defend its
allies. Because of our determination, not one single American soldier
lost his life in defense of such distant countries as Greece or Turkey.
Should we not learn from this historical experience?
The United States will not be safe either economically or
militarily without a safe Europe. And Europe will not be safe unless
the smallest European nation feels safe.
The United States won World War I and then lost the peace. The
United States won World War II and lost the peace for the second time.
The United States won the Cold War and I beg of you: let us not lose
the peace for the third time.
Thank you.
Senator Smith. Mr. Nowak, thank you for coming and sharing
with us your views and the history that you helped to make.
Your counsel is wise and we will heed it.
I wonder if you have any misgivings about the NATO--Russia
agreement and if there are things that the Senate should do to
make sure that the administration's words, which are that
Russia has a voice but not a veto, are, in fact, so, that, in
fact, Russia does not have an operative or a de facto veto. Are
there some changes that you think we need to shore up or
assure?
Mr. Nowak. Well, I take the assurances and the
interpretation of the administration on their face value. I
mean, we are told that it is not a treaty, not a commitment,
but it is a unilateral declaration of intentions. There is no
commitment that, for instance, NATO troops should never enter
Poland. It simply says there is no need for it right now. We
agree with that.
So I believe that there is no reason to be concerned as
long as Russia does not have a right to a veto and a right to
participate in the decisionmaking. But the partnership with
Russia is necessary, is important. NATO enlargement would not
make much sense if it would not be linked with the partnership
and cooperation with Russia.
Senator Smith. We hope the same thing. We hope that
people's intentions are met and we hope that this vacuum that
exists will soon be filled by the presence of NATO. We will win
the peace this time.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Nowak. Thank you very much.
Senator Smith. We will now call up Edward Moskal. He is the
President of the Polish American Congress. Mr. Moskal, welcome.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD J. MOSKAL, PRESIDENT, POLISH AMERICAN
CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Moskal. Thank you, Senator Smith and members of the
committee. Because we are of Polish heritage, we are, of
course, concerned that the freedom and independence of Poland
is maintained. We are, however, Americans first, some by birth
and others by choice. Therefore, our primary interest is in the
well-being of these United States.
Almost 6 decades ago, the Polish American Congress warned
that the peace of this country, indeed that of the entire
world, was inextricably tied to the security and welfare of
Central Europe, in general, and of Poland, in particular. The
result of inattention to that prediction is well known and
there is no need to repeat that historical account today.
If the past is but prologue, however, we chance renewed
disaster when we do not heed its lessons.
More than ever, as events have placed the United States as
the world's major economic and military power, discord among
other nations is bound to draw this country into the eye of the
hurricane, perhaps as peacemaker, but just as likely as a
participant.
The newly emancipated nations arising from a half-century
of virtual occupation are strategically fragile today and,
without international assurance for their security, will remain
basically weak tomorrow. A world still rejoicing in the
collapse of communism and the end of the cold war is not
anxious to consider the possibility of future conflict, even
though the sober contemplation of experts will demonstrate just
how precarious peace really is.
Such self-inflicted blindness is a potential danger to our
own continued freedom from conflict.
It has long been a policy of our nation that military
preparedness is our best defense against the possibility of
war. Great sums have been expended in the pursuit of that
concept, a concept in which a vast majority of the American
people continue to believe. Oddly, although there appears to be
a general agreement on the expansion of NATO, there are also
voices of concern about the price of such expansion.
Admittedly, there are differences of opinion regarding the
actual cost to the U.S. and its allies that may be attendant to
the addition of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. We
suspect, however, that even the highest estimates would be far
less than the costs resulting from intervention in a conflict
involving these nations, an intervention that no one reasonably
denies as a possibility. More realistically, considering the
proven effectiveness of the alliance, the investment will be an
excellent bargain.
If we examine the highest estimates of $60 billion as a
total cost of admitting the three proposed countries to NATO, a
sum I hasten to add with which we do not agree, expended over 6
years it equals the amount spent annually to assist friendly
nations in the Middle East, an expenditure which is only rarely
questioned in these halls.
It is remarkably, however, a similar overall cost involving
clear allies in Europe, a continent into whose problems and
conflicts we have been drawn with too great a frequency.
There is a tendency in some quarters to develop an urgent
sense of economy. Moreover, the cost to the United States will
be only a fraction of the total, our allies being expected to
accept their share and the new members having indicated a
willingness to assume their fair portion of costs associated
with their assimilation into the alliance.
Estimates of NATO enlargement have varied widely. We
suggest that the confusion is largely due to the failure to
make a distinction between what Poland in particular would be
required to spend for modernization and military reorganization
as opposed to those costs which may arise directly from its
membership.
The Polish Ministry of National Defense, for which it was
vitally necessary to assess NATO membership costs, determined
that modernization, integration and the adoption of new
methodology will require an expenditure of $1.26 billion.
Adding payments for the NATO civil and military budgets, as
well as costs of joint missions, total costs are estimated at
$1.5 billion, which, if spread over 15 years, until the year
2010, amounts to 4 percent of Poland's 1995 military budget.
These figures may, indeed, seem minuscule when compared to
other estimates. The Poles, however, recognize that the cost of
modernizing their armed forces or of reorganization are not
validly calculated as NATO--related expenses. On the contrary,
those are expenses that must be made under any circumstances.
In fact, an even larger investment in modernization would
surely be insufficient to defend the nation without the
security inherently provided through NATO.
It is not surprising, then, that the Defense Ministry of
Poland has stated with clarity that it is ready to pay the
largest part of costs arising from its NATO admission.
In the brief time that Poland has enjoyed independence, it
has already taken the necessary steps for the improvement of
its internal defense industry. That development, however, is
hampered by the inability to fully adopt international
standards until its membership status is solidified.
Similarly, the Polish communication infrastructure,
purposefully inadequate under the recent occupation, is being
modernized and expanded with surprising alacrity. A program
known as the National Communications System, funded by private
domestic and foreign corporations, will assure total
communications interoperability with NATO nations within only a
few years.
Regarding transportation, Poland already has a highly
developed rail system and is expending over $15 billion in
highway construction and has a long-term plan for development
of 12 interconnected airports. This plan provides for air
traffic control and safety, including state-of-the-art radar
systems, all of which are demonstrable assets which Poland
brings to NATO, the benefits of which are not properly added to
the actual cost of admission to the alliance.
Two conclusions must be made. First, Poland is well aware
of the direct costs arising from admission to NATO. It has
considered them, implemented plans to deal with them, and
accepts its responsibility in regard to these costs.
Second, modernization of the Polish military forces is
required in any event. Poland is already moving seriously in
that direction.
I have not mentioned the political implications of NATO
expansion only because we recognize the need to address sincere
questions relative to monetary consideration. Nevertheless, I
would be remiss if I did not conclude by acknowledging their
importance.
The contribution of NATO to the peace and stability of
Europe, and, thereby, the world, is unquestioned. What a
wonderful boon to mankind it will be when the actuality of the
spirit found in the NATO alliance is expanded to Central
Europe.
The antithesis is readily witnessed in the sad situation of
Bosnia, where it has already cost us over $5 billion in an
ongoing attempt to restore the peace. It proves, once again,
that expenditures to maintain the peace are a bargain, whether
counted in dollars or in lives.
It would be another of history's great errors and omissions
if unfounded fears were to deter us from insuring a wider zone
of cooperation, peace, and stability.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Moskal follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Moskal
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, because we are of Polish
heritage, we are, of course, concerned that the freedom and
independence of Poland is maintained. We are, however, Americans first,
some by birth and others by choice. Therefore, our primary interest is
in the well-being of the United States.
Almost six decades ago the Polish American Congress warned that the
peace of this country, indeed that of the entire world, was
inextricably tied to the security and welfare of Central Europe in
general and Poland in particular. The result of inattention to that
prediction is well known and there is no need to repeat that historical
account today. If the past is but prologue, however, we chance renewed
disaster when we do not heed its lessons.
More than ever, as events have placed the United States as the
world's major economic and military power, discord among other nations
is bound to draw this country into the eye of the hurricane, perhaps as
peacemaker, but just as likely as a participant. The newly emancipated
nations, arising from a half century of virtual occupation, are
strategically fragile today and, without international assurance for
their security, will remain basically weak tomorrow. A world still
rejoicing in the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War, is
not anxious to consider the possibility of future conflict, even though
the sober contemplation of experts will demonstrate just how precarious
peace really is. Such self inflicted blindness is a potential danger to
our own continued freedom from conflict.
It has long been a policy of our nation that military preparedness
is our best defense against the possibility of war. Great sums have
been expended in the pursuit of that concept, a concept in which a vast
majority of the American people continue to believe. Oddly, although
there appears to be general agreement upon the expansion of NATO, there
are also voices of concern about the price of such expansion.
Admittedly, there are differences of opinion regarding the actual cost
to the U.S. and its allies that may be attendant to the addition of
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. We suspect, however, that even
the highest estimates would be far less than the costs resulting from
intervention in a conflict involving these nations, an intervention
that no one can reasonably deny as a possibility. More realistically,
considering the proven effectiveness of the Alliance, the investment
will be an excellent bargain.
If we examine the highest estimates of $60 billion as a total cost
of admitting the three proposed countries to NATO, a sum I hasten to
add with which we do not agree, expended over six years, it equals the
amount spent annually to assist friendly nations in the Middle East, an
expenditure which is only rarely questioned in these halls. Remarkably,
however, a similar overall cost involving clear allies in Europe, a
continent into whose problems and conflicts we have been drawn with too
great a frequency, there is a tendency in some quarters to develop an
urgent sense of economy. Moreover, the cost to the United States will
be only a fraction of the total, our allies being expected to accept
their share and the new members having indicated a willingness to
assume their fair portion of costs associated with their assimilation
into the alliance.
Estimates of NATO enlargement have varied widely. We suggest that
the confusion is largely due to the failure to make a distinction
between what Poland, in particular, will be required to spend for
modernization and military reorganization, as opposed to those costs
which may arise directly from its membership.
The Polish Ministry of National Defense, for which it was vitally
necessary to assess NATO membership costs, determined that
modernization, integration and the adoption of new methodology will
require an expenditure of $1.26 billion. Adding payments for the NATO
civil and military budgets, as well as costs of joint missions, total
costs are estimated at $1.5 billion, which, if spread over 15 years
until the year 2010, amounts to 4% of Poland's 1995 military budget.
These figures may, indeed, seem minuscule when compared to other
estimates. The Poles, however, recognize that the costs of modernizing
its armed forces or of reorganization are not validly calculated as
NATO-related expenses. On the contrary, those are expenses that must be
made under any circumstances. In fact, an even larger investment in
modernization would surely be insufficient to defend the nation without
the security inherently provided through NATO. It is not surprising,
then, that the Defense Ministry of Poland has stated with clarity that
it is ready to pay the largest part of costs arising from its NATO
admission.
In the brief time that Poland has enjoyed independence, it has
already taken necessary steps for the improvement of its internal
defense industry. That development, however, is hampered by the
inability to fully adopt international standards until its membership
status is solidified.
Similarly, the Polish communication infrastructure, purposefully
inadequate under the recent occupation, is being modernized and
expanded with surprising alacrity. A program known as the National
Communications System, funded by private domestic and foreign
corporations, will assure total communications interoperability with
NATO nations within only a few years.
Regarding transportation, Poland already has a highly developed
rail system, is expending over $15 billion in highway construction, and
has a long-term plan for development of twelve interconnected airports.
This plan provides for air traffic control and safety, including state-
of-the-art radar systems, all of which are demonstrable assets which
Poland brings to NATO, benefits which are not properly added to the
actual costs of admission to the alliance.
Two conclusions must be made. First, Poland is well aware of the
direct costs arising from admission to NATO. It has considered them,
implemented plans to deal with them and accepts its responsibility in
regard to these costs. Second, modernization of the Polish military
forces is required in any event, Poland is already moving seriously in
that direction.
I have not mentioned the political implications of NATO expansion
only because we recognize the need to address sincere questions
relative to monetary consideration. Nevertheless, I would be remiss if
I did not conclude by acknowledging their importance. The contribution
of NATO to the peace and stability of Europe, and thereby the world, is
unquestioned. What a wonderful boon to mankind it will be when the
actuality of the spirit found in the NATO alliance is expanded to
Central Europe. The antithesis is readily witnessed in the sad
situation of Bosnia, where it has already cost us over $5 billion in an
ongoing attempt to restore the peace. It proves, once again, that
expenditures to maintain the peace are a bargain, whether counted in
dollars or in lives. It would be another of history's great errors and
omissions, if unfounded fears were to deter us from ensuring a wider
zone of cooperation, peace and stability.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Moskal. We
appreciate your testimony.
We are pleased to be joined by Senator Robb and Senator
Kerry.
I wonder if either of you has a question.
Senator Robb. No, not at this time, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, but no.
Senator Smith. Then we thank you.
Mr. Moskal. Thank you.
Senator Smith. We will now call up Mr. Frank Koszorus. Mr.
Koszorus is a board member of the Hungarian American Coalition.
We welcome you, sir. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF FRANK KOSZORUS, JR., BOARD MEMBER, HUNGARIAN
AMERICAN COALITION, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Koszorus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a great
honor to appear before you to address the vital issue of United
States security.
The Hungarian American Coalition enthusiastically supports
the enlargement of NATO to include Hungary, Poland, and the
Czech Republic. We believe this historic step will serve the
geopolitical interests of the United States.
As a military alliance for the Euro--Atlantic Community,
NATO has succeeded in keeping the peace in Europe by deterring
outside aggression. The United States has provided NATO with
strong leadership because it has recognized that threats to
European security constitute threats to U.S. security as well.
In fact, the two hot wars and the cold war in Europe
resulted from aggression emanating from Europe and it cost
America dearly, both in terms of lives lost and treasure
expended.
Today, there is a security vacuum in Central and Eastern
Europe. That vacuum will be filled. The only question is who
will fill it.
NATO enlargement will shore up the new democracies, insure
stability of the region, and help facilitate market economies
and prosperity--ingredients of a peaceful and secure Europe.
NATO enlargement does not threaten Russia. NATO has always
been a non-threatening defensive alliance. Moreover, the West,
including the United States, has continued to demonstrate its
good faith toward Russia through generous assistance programs
and by entering into the Founding Act, which we must insure
will give Russia a voice, but certainly not a veto, over NATO
matters.
In fact, stability on Russia's Western border translates
into greater security for Russia, as well.
The costs of expanding NATO are modest, considering the
defense budget, and, further, as an insurance policy against
future instability, tensions, and conflict, the price tag is
indeed inexpensive and a wonderful bargain.
Mr. Chairman, I had the great pleasure of recently visiting
Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic as part of a joint
Department of Defense/Department of State fact finding mission.
It was striking to observe the desire of the military
leadership of the three countries to be part of and to
contribute to NATO and to the security of the region.
This desire was evident, for example, in Hungary, where the
young, reform minded officers who recently had been promoted to
senior ranks enthusiastically spoke about steps they had taken
to restructure the military better to conform to NATO
standards.
We were particularly impressed as they and their junior
officers briefed us in English.
The majority of Hungarians welcome NATO membership because
they want to be part of a successful and defensive alliance.
Mr. Chairman, they recall how their quest for freedom and
independence was brutally crushed by Soviet tanks in 1956
because Hungary was on the wrong side of Stalin's dividing
line.
Now having testified about NATO's preeminent role in
promoting peace, I would be remiss if I failed to mention an
often ignored and misunderstood, but significant, element of
security in the region.
NATO enlargement is a building block, indeed the
cornerstone of stability in Europe and, there by extension, in
the United States. An enlarged NATO alone, however, is not a
panacea for ethnic peace. While an enlarged NATO that sticks to
its core function will promote interstate stability in Central
Europe, the alliance cannot alone resolve tensions caused by
discriminatory policies and practices of majorities toward
ethnic minorities, the historical source of conflict and
stability in the region.
The United States, therefore, can cement long-term
stability by not only enlarging NATO but also by promoting the
ability of minorities to enjoy the fruits of democracy.
A sure way of defusing ethnic tensions in Central and
Eastern Europe, protecting the territorial integrity of the
States, and promoting democracy and good neighborly relations
is to grant ethnic minorities group rights, such as the ones
exercised by Western Europeans. Such policies, as opposed to
basic treaties between the countries of the region, would serve
U.S. strategic interests in Central Europe and dispel our fears
of perpetual conflict. They would also insure the continued
strength and vitality of an expanded NATO.
Mr. Chairman, as we approach the 21st Century, we simply
cannot afford to squander an historic opportunity to safeguard
long-lasting stability and democracy. We can win the peace this
time. If only to avoid being drawn back into exacerbated
controversies, the United States should not ignore the
challenges posed by Central and Eastern Europe.
This means that NATO enlargement should be ratified quickly
and overwhelmingly and the democratically expressed aspirations
of ethnic minorities to enjoy the fruits of Western style
minority rights should be actively and vigorously promoted.
These steps would constitute inexpensive, yet vital,
insurance policies for the United States. Our failure to
exercise leadership, on the other hand, will insure a post
communist evolution far less congenial to our interests.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Koszorus follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Koszorus
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, it is a great honor and
pleasure to appear before you to address the vital issue of the
security of the United States which is closely linked to European
security. Mr. Chairman, the Hungarian American Coalition
(``Coalition'') enthusiastically supports the enlargement of NATO to
include Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. We believe that this
historic step will serve the geopolitical interests of the United
States. In order to be successful, the enlargement process must take
into consideration the unique history of the region and espouse West
European norms relating to the ethnic communities of Central and
Eastern Europe.
The Coalition is a consortium of organizations and individuals
which disseminates educational and cultural materials about Hungarians,
U.S. relations with Hungary and the Hungarian minorities living in the
Carpathian Basin.
The Coalition strongly believes that the long-term national
security and budgetary interests of the United States require an
unequivocal commitment to the transition of Central and Eastern
European countries to fully democratic and free market status. That
commitment requires the United States to be actively engaged in the
region.
The Coalition further believes that peace and stability throughout
Europe serve the national security interests of the United States. In
this century, the United States was called upon to fight two hot wars
and a 45-year Cold War--conflicts which emanated from the heart of
Europe--in the furtherance of those vital geopolitical interests. These
wars, which resulted from uncertainty and instability in the region,
cost America dearly in lives lost and treasure expended.
In addition to the institutionalization of democracy and market
economies in Central and Eastern Europe, the prevention of any large
power dominating any part of Europe are the best means of guaranteeing
that there will be no further European conflicts which will entangle
the United States. We believe that with the collapse of communism and
the Soviet Union, the objectives of peace, stability, and democracy in
Europe are achievable if we exercise leadership.
Among the most visible and effective forms of our engagement is our
continuing involvement in the security issues of the region. We believe
that the general stability and security of the region can be
accomplished through the enlargement of NATO to include Hungary and
other countries which desire to join the Affiance and meet the criteria
for membership.
Mr. Chairman, I had the great pleasure of visiting Hungary, Poland
and the Czech Republic two weeks ago as part of a joint Department of
Defense/Department of State fact finding mission. It was striking to
observe the desire of the people, including the military leadership, of
the three countries to be part of and contribute to NATO and the
security of the region. This desire was evident, for example, in
Hungary where young, reform-minded officers recently had been promoted
to senior ranks and enthusiastically spoke about steps they had taken
to restructure the military better to conform to NATO standards. We
were particularly impressed as they and their junior officers briefed
us in English.
The majority of Hungarians welcome NATO membership because they
want to be part of a successful and defensive alliance. They recall how
their quest for freedom and independence was brutally crushed by Soviet
tanks in 1956 because Hungary was on the wrong side of Stalin's
dividing line.
Today, we must not permit Central and Eastern Europe to languish in
a security vacuum. Russian interests are not threatened by the
expansion of a defensive alliance. Moreover, stability and economic
growth on the borders of Russia can only benefit Moscow. Russia should
not be isolated and mechanisms, such as the Founding Act between NATO
and Russia, should dispel any lingering concerns Moscow may entertain
about an enlarged NATO. Russia, however, should under no circumstances
be permitted to exercise a ``veto'' in NATO matters.
Russia is in a fluid state with voices of nascent expansionism
being heard in some quarters. Failure by NATO to accept the invited
countries will redraw the lines imposed by Stalin and signal Russian
imperialists that they, in fact, enjoy a ``sphere of influence'' in
Central and Eastern Europe. The consequences of rejecting Hungary,
Poland and the Czech Republic would be contrary to U.S. geopolitical
interests in a secure, integrated, and democratic Europe.
NATO enlargement is a building block--indeed the cornerstone--of
stability in Europe. An enlarged NATO alone, however, is not a panacea
for ethnic peace. As a military alliance, NATO's role has been to
defend its members from outside aggression. An enlarged NATO that
sticks to its core function will promote a large degree of interstate
stability in Central Europe. The Alliance alone will not resolve
tensions caused by discriminatory policies and practices of majorities
toward ethnic minorities--a historical source of conflict and
instability in the region. The United States, therefore, can cement
long-term stability by not only enlarging NATO, but also by promoting
the ability of minorities to enjoy the fruits of democracy.
NATO enlargement should not be seen as a means of sweeping minority
rights under the rug; the enlargement process must not apply a
different standard to new members as has been applied to current
members. It should be recalled that the scope of collective--i.e.,
ethnic or group--rights of the Catalans and Basques of Spain, the Welsh
and Scots of Great Britain, the South Tyroleans of Italy, the Walloons
of Belgium or the Swedes of Finland are significantly greater than
those sought but denied to ethnic communities, especially Hungarians,
in Central and Eastern Europe.
The Soviet Union cynically suppressed minorities while loudly
proclaiming that socialism had solved the nationalities question. A
NATO expansion process which ignores the legitimate and democratically
asserted aspirations of minorities will leave them frustrated and
dissatisfied. They once again will feel abandoned as they did in 1920
when borders were drastically redrawn and millions of minorities
created without their having a say in the determination of which states
they would live in. If NATO enlargement is to serve U.S. interests, it
must not become a vehicle of instability by ignoring the rights of
minorities in Central and Eastern Europe.
In order to promote lasting stability in Central Europe, the United
States must do two things in addition to enlarging NATO. First, it must
recognize that improved interstate and interethnic relations are a
function of democracy and enlightened minority policies.
Second, the United States must use its influence to convince the
states in the region that if they want to join Western institutions,
including NATO, they must conform to Western minority rights practices.
Central European minorities must be granted the same rights as the
rights exercised by Western European minorities. Dismissing the
aspirations of Central Europeans to enjoy such rights virtually
guarantees that our worst fears may become self-fulfilling prophecies.
The surest way to defuse ethnic tensions in Central and Eastern
Europe, protect the territorial integrity of states and promote
democracy and good neighborly relations is to grant ethnic minorities
group rights such as the ones exercised by Western Europeans. Such
policies--as opposed to basic treaties between the countries of the
region--would serve United States strategic interests in Central Europe
and dispel our fears of perpetual conflict. They would also ensure the
continued strength and vitality of an expanded NATO.
As we approach the 21st century, we simply cannot afford to
squander a historic opportunity to safeguard long-lasting stability and
democracy. We can win the peace this time. The adverse consequences of
our withdrawal from Europe at critical times in the past are well
known. Had the United States reacted firmly to the turmoil threatening
peace in Europe prior to the First and Second World Wars, many American
lives and resources would have been spared. Similarly, the Cold War
would have been far less expensive and dangerous had the United States
not pulled back from the heart of Europe and had we resisted domestic
pressure to ``bring the boys home'' before the European political order
had been settled.
If only to avoid being drawn back into exacerbated controversies,
the United States should not ignore the challenges posed by Central and
Eastern Europe. This means that NATO enlargement should be ratified
quickly and overwhelmingly, and the democratically expressed
aspirations of ethnic minorities to enjoy the fruits of Western style
minority rights should be actively and vigorously promoted. These steps
would constitute inexpensive, yet vital insurance policies for the
United States. Our failure to exercise leadership, on the other hand,
will ensure a new world order far less congenial to our interests.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Koszorus. We really
appreciate your testimony.
Are there questions?
Senator Kerry. I would just ask one quick question, if I
may, or a couple.
The first tranche is fairly accepted now and I think will
most likely move rapidly through the Senate. But clearly the
first tranche changes what NATO was and its fundamental
rationale at one time was, though you say it was defensive, it
clearly shifts in this post soviet era. So the question is with
respect to the other nations, you have differing degrees of
problems that arise with their possible entry. I think the
great issue is not necessarily the initial tranche and the
difficulties faced by that--I feel as though those have almost
sort of taken care of themselves--but what follows.
Do you have any opinion about whether or not the sanguinity
expressed by many people about Russia's acceptance of this
first tranche would change significantly as it grows larger and
particularly as you get to the point of thinking about Baltic
States?
Mr. Koszorus. Senator Kerry, NATO enlargement has been a
self-selecting process. It has enlarged over the years without
threatening Russia itself.
I think NATO enlargement must be, should be, has to be open
to all countries of this region which meet the membership
criteria and want to contribute to the alliance itself.
I do not believe that an enlargement of this defensive
alliance itself will pose a threat. Quite to the contrary, I
think once stability of the region, once prosperity of the
region is insured, I think that will only benefit Moscow and I
think Moscow will see the advantages of a strong, stable
region.
So I do not see that as any long-term problem.
Senator Kerry. But if they don't, if they said we don't, if
they were to continue to express a particularly strong
attitude, and if the perception were that it was having an
impact on your implementation of arms control agreements, if
your perception was it was playing a serious hand in terms of
internal Russian politics, is it conceivable that your attitude
might then be different about the Baltics?
Mr. Koszorus. Well, I think we have to work with Russia,
certainly through mechanisms such as the Founding Act. I think
that those types of confidence building measures will diffuse
those types of problems.
What is the alternative? Do we assign these States to the
Russian sphere of influence once again? Do we open that door
again? I don't think that would be a wise policy from our
perspective. I think that with mechanisms--the Founding Act,
continued cooperation, continued interaction, continued
assistance--I think we can bring Russia along to acceptance.
Senator Kerry. But that does not presume that that is the
only alternative. I mean, you might extend Partnership for
Peace. You might have any number of other things. It may be
that the Western European entity becomes more viable. I mean,
there are other possibilities, are there not?
Mr. Koszorus. Certainly there are other possibilities and,
of course, we are going into an area of speculation at this
point. I think, considering the history of Europe, considering
the history of U.S. relations with Europe, NATO has been the
engine of stability, has been the engine of security in the
region. I think if a sovereign State, an independent State,
which has won its independence from the Soviet Union wishes to
be part of NATO, it should certainly be given every opportunity
to do so.
Senator Kerry. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Koszorus. You know,
Senator Kerry asked a very important question that this
committee, I am sure, will grapple with over the next 4 years.
I wonder if Mr. Nowak, who has lived through this, who has seen
us win a war and lose a peace, would care to answer Senator
Kerry's question. If you would, answer it for me based on what
you have experienced in your life.
Then I would like to say we will stand in a brief recess.
The three of us need to go and cast a vote in just a few
minutes.
Mr. Nowak, would you care to speak to that?
Mr. Nowak. I strongly believe that to limit the NATO
enlargement to only 3 States would mean the division of Europe
into two spheres of influence. The Russian perception will be
that these States are in something like the situation of
Finland at the time of the cold war.
The Russians--rather, the Soviets--did oppose every stage
of NATO enlargement, including the foundation of NATO itself.
There were threats, bordering on ultimata. Even when Spain was
going to join, there was an opposition.
Once they faced an accomplished fact, however, they
accepted it. I believe they accepted it, practically speaking,
by signing the Founding Act, the enlargement of NATO as far as
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are concerned. I am
convinced that they will accept also continued enlargement.
There will be protests. There will be an opposition. But
they will finally accept it--on one condition, that they will
not be isolated. Enlargement has sense only if it is linked
with growing cooperation with Russia itself.
I just said that we believe in the new security
architecture that would be based on close cooperation between
an enlarged NATO and Russia. I am confident that, once it is
over, Russia will accept it and it will have a considerable
impact on the Russian mentality, particularly of its ruling
class. It will get reconciled, finally, with the loss of its
empire because they will see no realistic possibility
otherwise.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, if I could just make one
comment.
Senator Smith. Of course.
Senator Kerry. I spent a very interesting weekend with
former Secretary Perry, Secretary Christopher, Ashton Carter,
General Joulwan, General Scowcroft, and a host of people--maybe
15 or 20 people--out at Stanford. We spent an entire Friday and
Saturday talking about this.
I was struck by the breadth of experience that was there
talking about it and the breadth of disparity of opinion with
respect to where we go as we go down the road. You know, NATO
is one thing today. It is something that we can define. It is
something that is tangible. It's something where we can clearly
understand its mission.
But every expansion poses as yet undefined and unanswered
questions with respect to that future mission. It is an
organization that, as we know, works on consensus. That
consensus may be harder and harder to draw as the mission
definition changes.
So I think it is a little more complicated than perhaps
some people have yet come to grips with. I am not suggesting
that only those people have a sense of its complexity. But I do
think, as we go down the road here, there are some very
significant questions. I mean, Russia is a major cooperator
with us in Bosnia. I think you have to be thoughtful about what
really will matter to the whole series of relationships that we
have with Russia and that we need to have with respect to a lot
of other issues as we go down this road.
So I, for one, am unwilling to suggest that a decision as
to what NATO will be or who will be members will be up to only
those countries that decide they want to join. I think we have
to be very careful about that, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Nowak. Senator, I believe that NATO will be much
stronger after these three countries and others are included
because they are traditionally pro-American and pro-Western.
Therefore, the balance of power within NATO will shift to the
advantage of the United States, its presence in Europe and its
leadership.
I believe that as I know these countries.
Senator Kerry. Let me say that I absolutely agree with you.
I have no question but that NATO will be stronger for the
admission of the countries that we are currently considering
admitting and that I am convinced, obviously, will be admitted.
We will ratify it. I have no doubt about that.
But I think there are, as yet, a series of unanswered
questions about what comes next. That is all I am suggesting,
that we should not be in automatic gear here. We need to be
very thoughtful about it.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Senator.
Thank you very much, Mr. Nowak.
We will stand in brief recess. We will be right back and
will carry on, hearing from Mr. Bob Doubek.
[Recess]
Senator Smith. The committee will come to order. We
apologize for the recess, but we were sent here to vote and we
did it as quickly as we can.
We are going to have to ask, in order to accommodate
everyone who wishes to be heard, when you give your testimony,
please do so as quickly as we can. Obviously we would
appreciate that.
Now we will call forward Mr. Bob Doubek, President of
American Friends of the Czech Republic. Mr. Doubek, welcome.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT W. DOUBEK, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN FRIENDS OF
THE CZECH REPUBLIC, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Doubek. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
President of American Friends of the Czech Republic and I thank
you for the opportunity to testify. By way of identifying
myself, I served in Vietnam as an Air Force officer and I was a
leader of the effort to build the Vietnam Veterans Memorial on
the Mall. In 1986, the Senate voted to award me a Congressional
Gold Medal.
I speak today in behalf of Americans who support the Czech
people. This includes 140 major corporations, who have invested
over $1 billion, thousands of Americans who work and live in
the Czech Republic, thousands of Americans of Czech birth,
millions of Americans of Czech descent, and millions of
Americans who are otherwise friends of the Czech people. We
support NATO enlargement and the membership of Poland, the
Czech Republic, and Hungary.
The Czechs will be great allies. This is because they have
a deep and abiding friendship for the United States, because
our countries share many historical ties, and because we share
many key values, especially civil and religious liberty.
The strategic location of the Czech Republic, it political
stability, and its human and industrial resources will
strengthen NATO. The Czech State has been part of the West for
over 1,000 years. It was part of the Holy Roman Empire. The
Protestant Reformation had its roots there with the teachings
of John Hus. After 3 centuries of national subjugation, the
Czech people fought with the allies in World War I and achieved
their independence. The Czechs, then, with the Slovaks formed
what became the only democracy that functioned in Central
Europe through the Munich Agreement. Czechoslovak soldiers and
airmen fought on the allied side in World War II, suffering
10,000 combat deaths.
In 1948, after less than 3 years of revived freedom, the
Soviet backed communists took over the country and turned it
into a police State. The Czechs in 1968 tried to reassert their
independence but were crushed by the Warsaw Pact. In the last 8
years, however, they have reclaimed their heritage as a free
and democratic nation. They wish now to rejoin the Western
family of nations.
Ties between our countries are centuries old. The first
Czech immigrant came in 1633 and surveyed the Chesapeake Bay
region. The Moravian Brethren who settled in North Carolina and
Pennsylvania beginning in the 1740's were of Czech descent. So
was a signer of our Declaration of Independence.
A code of Czech laws written in 1579 contributed to our
Bill of Rights. Many Czechs served in the Union Army in the
Civil War, and the wife of Thomas Masaryk, the first President
of Czechoslovakia, was an American from Brooklyn, a Mayflower
descendant.
Their Declaration of Independence was patterned after our
own.
Czechs and their descendants have made major contributions
to America in many fields. We can talk about John Havlicek in
sports, Kim Novak and Sissy Spacek in film, but especially
astronauts Eugene Cerna, James Lovell and John Blaha in space.
McDonald's, which is the worldwide symbol of American
business enterprise, was founded by an American of Czech
descent, Ray Kroc.
Czechs supported America in the Gulf War. Their
contribution to the peacekeeping forces in Bosnia exceeds our
own in proportion to their population. They made a firm
commitment to increase their defense spending to meet NATO
norms and the Czech people now support NATO membership by two
to one.
America left much blood and treasure in Europe in World
Wars I and II. NATO prevented World War III and won the cold
war. The extension of NATO to Central Europe will enhance its
ability to defend freedom and democracy against new threats.
Democracies do not invade one another, and NATO membership
will give these countries the security to flourish as
democracies. With the addition of these capable and committed
allies, NATO will be politically, militarily, and morally
strengthened.
The costs of not expanding NATO would be far greater than
enlargement, as shown by Bosnia. The ultimate cost of not
enlarging NATO is incalculable because the alliance would
probably not support such inertia.
Prague is closer to Dublin than to Moscow. It is closer to
Copenhagen than it is to Sarajevo. The Czechs have contributed
to Western culture, science, art, and industry. They want to
contribute now to Western security.
The status quo is not an option. The choice is between an
enlarged NATO, preserving it, or delivering a death sentence.
Czech President Vaclav Havel said it well: ``If the West
does not stabilize the East, the East will destabilize the
West.''
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Doubek follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Doubek
I. Introduction
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. My name is Robert W.
Doubek. I am the president of American Friends of the Czech Republic
(AFoCR), a national educational and advocacy organization based in
Washington, DC. I thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
By way of identification, I served as an Air Force officer in
Vietnam in 1969. I was a principal leader in the effort to build the
Vietnam Veterans Memorial, for which the Senate in 1986 voted to award
me a Congressional Gold Medal.
The mission of AFoCR is to assist the Czech people in rejoining the
Western family of free and democratic nations. We speak for the many
and varied American constituencies supporting the Czech Republic. These
include almost 140 major U.S. corporations with business and investment
interests, the thousands of Americans presently residing and pursuing
careers in the Czech Republic, thousands of Americans of Czech birth,
millions of Americans of Czech descent, and the millions of Americans
who have visited the Czech Republic or otherwise are its friends.
We wholeheartedly support the enlargement of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic and
Hungary. Because others today will speak to Poland and Hungary, I limit
my remarks to the Czech Republic.
We support the admission of the Czech Republic because the Czechs
will be among the best allies that the United States has ever had. This
is because of their deep and abiding friendship and admiration for
America, the many and substantial historical links between the Czech
and American peoples, and the broad range of values shared by Czechs
and Americans. Throughout their history, the Czech people have valued
learning and civil and religious liberty. Since the American
Revolution, they have looked to America as a beacon of hope embodying
these values.
Furtherrnore, the strategic location of the Czech Republic in the
heart of Europe, its stability, its industrial and human resources, and
its military capabilities will strengthen the NATO alliance.
II. The Czech Republic and Its History
The present day Czech Republic occupies the historical regions of
Bohemia, Moravia, and part of Silesia. Bohemia emerged as a European
state more than a thousand years ago. One of its earliest princes was
Wenceslas, who died in 929, but whose memory lives on in our Christmas
carol. The Czechs were Christianized by the Roman church and were an
integral part of the Holy Roman Empire. In the 14th century the Czech
state flowered as a center of commerce, learning and government under
King Charles IV, who became Holy Roman Emperor and founded Charles
University in Prague in 1348.
The Protestant Reformation had roots in Bohemia with the teachings
of John Hus, who reformed the liturgy, introduced the vernacular in
worship and preached the primacy of the Gospel. These innovations were
embraced a century later by Martin Luther, who acknowledged the role of
Hus. By the year 1600, the majority of the Czech population of Bohemia
and Moravia was Protestant.
In the year 1620, however, the Czechs suffered a calamitous
military defeat at the Battle of the White Mountain and lost their
national independence for almost three centuries. During this time,
religious, civil and educational liberties were suppressed, and the
Czech language lived on only among the peasants and working people.
A national reawakening occurred in the 19th century and brought
with it the idea of national independence. During World War I Czech
prisoners of war and deserters formed the Czech Legions to fight with
the Allies for the independence of their country. With freedom in 1918
the Czechs, together with the Slovaks, formed what was the only
functioning democracy in Central Europe as of the Munich Agreement in
October 1938. During World War II many Czech soldiers and airmen
escaped and fought bravely in the Allied side. Czech pilots were
instrumental in winning the Battle of Britain, Czech bomber squadrons
bombed Germany, and Czech infantry units distinguished themselves at
Tobruk, in North Africa. Czechoslovak combat deaths exceeded 10,000.
In early 1948, after less than three years of revived freedom, the
Soviet-backed communists took over the country and turned it into a
police state. When the Czechs in 1968 again tried to assert their
independence, the Soviet Union and its satellites invaded and crushed
the freedom movement.
For many years it seemed that all hope was lost, but in 1989 the
Czech and Slovak peoples overthrew communist domination and set out to
create a new future. Czechoslovakia peacefully divided itself as of
January 1, 1993, and the Czechs have reclaimed their heritage as a free
and democratic country, and they want to rejoin the Western family of
free and democratic nations. Only by being part of NATO can they be
assured of peace and freedom, as well as the opportunity to help defend
and further them.
It is important to note that the Czechs never have attacked any
other country, and Bismarck, the first Chancellor of a united Germany
stated that whoever controls Bohemia controls Europe.
III. The American Constituencies for the Czech Republic
The American constituencies for the Czech Republic are many and
varied. Currently almost 140 major U.S. corporations have business
interests and investments in the Czech Republic. These include Boeing,
Bristol-Myers Squibb, Continental Airlines, Ford Motor, ICF Kaiser,
Kodak, Philip Morris, Proctor & Gamble, and United Technologies, all of
whom have supported AFoCR. Total U.S. direct investment in the Czech
Republic through 1996 exceeded $1.0 Billion.
Currently almost 20,000 Americans, especially younger people, are
residing and working in the Czech Republic. Some have worked on public
service, such as teaching English and democracy, while others have
started entrepreneurial ventures to take advantage of the many business
opportunities. A prime example is the weekly English language Prague
Post newspaper, which is owned by a young American woman.
Since 1989 hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Americans
have visited the Czech Republic and have been enchanted by its natural
beauty, its artistic and architectural treasures, its cultural life,
and the friendliness and industry of its people. Czech President Vaclav
Havel, the playwright dissident who led the Velvet Revolution, is one
of the world's most admired statesmen. Last month in Washington he
received the J. William Fulbright Award for Statesmanship from the
association of former Fulbright scholars.
One example of the range of American support for the Czech Republic
is the initiatives of the University of New Orleans, which has an
exchange program with Charles University allowing both Czech and
Louisiana students to study abroad. A further example is the
Jacksonville, Florida, Chamber of Commerce which has conducted trade
missions for Florida business leaders to the Czech Republic and hosted
Czech business people for training in American management practices.
A fourth major constituency for the Czech Republic is the body of
almost two million Americans of Czech descent, who reside throughout
the United States, but primarily in the states of Illinois, Texas,
Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, Nebraska, and now
Florida, Arizona and California. Although the first Czech immigrant
came in 1633, significant Czech immigration began after 1848 and
swelled between the years 1880 and 1914. Czech immigrants in this
period were primarily farmers and skilled tradesmen, and the Czechs had
the highest rate of literacy of all ethnic groups coming through Ellis
Island.
A fifth major constituency is comprised of Americans of Czech
birth, who fled the Nazi occupation of 1939, the communist coup of
1948, and the Soviet invasion of 1968. Refugees to the U.S. from Hitler
numbered about 20,000, and Czech immigrants between the years 1946 and
1975 numbered over 27,000. This is an extremely highly educated group
of people, among which are many professors and scientists who occupy
positions in major U.S. universities and government research
facilities. They are concentrated in Massachusetts, New York, Maryland,
Virginia, and California.
IV. American/Czech Influences and Connections
The first known Czech immigrant was Augustin Herman, a surveyor who
came to New Amsterdam in 1633. He created the first map of the
Chesapeake Bay region and received 13,000 acres in Maryland. Today the
Bohenua River flows through his former lands into the northern tip of
the Bay. A signer of the Declaration of Independence, William Paca of
Maryland, was of Czech descent.
Another significant infusion of Czech values came with the arrival
of the Moravian Brethren into Pennsylvania and North Carolina beginning
around 1740. The Moravian Brethren were disciples of John Hus who had
fled to Germany to practice their Protestant beliefs. Although they
spoke German when they immigrated to America, their liturgy and music
reflected their Czech origins. Czech values influenced America's
founding fathers. At Colonial Williamsburg, Virginia, in the exhibit of
documents that contributed to our Bill or Rights is the Czech Code of
1579.
Many Czechs served in the Union Army in the Civil War, and by 1870
there were over 40,000 living in the United States. One of the earliest
organized efforts of Czechs in America was the founding of fraternal
benefit societies to care for one another, their spouses and children.
The story of the struggle of these immigrants was poignantly told in
the novel ``My Antonia'' by Nebraska author Willa Cather.
In 1892, Czech composer Antonin Dvorak was invited to head the
National Conservatory in New York. His New World Symphony,
incorporating the influences of Black spiritual music as well as
nature, has been a major contribution to American culture. His legacy
directly influenced the development of the American classical work of
George Gershwin and Aaron Copland.
With the outbreak of World War I Czechs in the United States played
a major role in the Czech independence movement, which was led by
Professor Thomas Masaryk, whose wife Charlotte Garrigue, was an
American from Brooklyn, New York. Some 3,000 Americans joined the
Czechoslovak Legions to fight in France, and 40,000 Americans of Czech
and Slovak origin served in the American forces.
During the war a network of 80 Czech immigrants spied on the German
and Austrian businesses and embassies where they worked. They exposed
the infamous Zimmermann telegram, which played a major role in the U.S.
decision to enter the war.
The newly designed Czechoslovak flag was flown for the first time
at the Plaza Hotel in New York, and on October 18, 1918, the
Czechoslovak Declaration of Independence, which was patterned after our
own, was proclaimed in Washington, DC.
Another indication of the ethics and values of the Czech people is
that their descendants have made very good Americans, who have made
major contributions in business, the trades, professions, arts and
sports. Some well known names in various fields of endeavor are:
Politics: Mayor Anton J. Cerniak, Senator Roman Hruska, and
Congressman Charles Vanik
Space: Astronauts Eugene Ceman, James Lovell and John Blaha
Science: Dr. Ales Hrdlicka--Curator of the Smithsonian
Institution
Military: Lt. Col. David Hrdlicka and hundreds of other names
on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial
Business: Bulova Watch Co. and Ray Kroc, founder of McDonald's
Corporation
Arts: Rafael Kubelik, Rudolf Firkusny and Jarmila Novotna
Movies: Sissy Spacek, Kim Novak, and Milos Fonnan
Sports: George Halas, George Blanda, John Havlicek, Jay
Novacek, as well as Czech born hockey and tennis players
V. The Czechs as Allies
The Czechs have participated in numerous military exercises under
the Partnership for Peace, and have earned the praise of U.S. officers.
The Czech Republic sent a unit to the Gulf War that was instrumental in
identifying chemical agents. The Czech Republic currently has a
Mechanized Battalion serving with the NATO peace keeping forces in
Bosnia and Czech troops levels exceed that of the U.S. in proportion to
their population.
The Czech Government has made a firm commitment to increase its
spending on defense so as to reach NATO levels by the year 2000. The
Government has confirmed this commitment in its 1998 budget, even in
the face of pro rata reduction in most other areas due to the damage
from the catastrophic floods last July.
While the percentage levels of support for joining NATO among the
Czech population have not been as high as in Poland and Hungary, the
lower percentages can be explained by the fact that the Czechs, unlike
the Poles and Hungarians, do not have a tradition of military glory as
a nation state. Yet, an October survey by the U.S. Information Agency
showed that the Czech people were 2 to 1 in favor of NATO membership.
VI. The Importance of NATO Enlargement
Recognizing the importance of NATO enlargement to the United States
is as easy as I, II, III: World War I, World War II and World War III.
Americans in large numbers answered the call in World War I and left
much of their blood and treasure on the fields of Europe. Following
that war, however, the spirit of isolationism prevailed and Americans
left Europe and, like most Europeans, disarmed.
Only twenty years later, Americans in large numbers had to answer
the call in World War II and return to Europe, shedding much more blood
and treasure on the same fields. Following that war, however, the
tragic lesson of World War I prevailed and Americans maintained their
presence in Europe. With our European allies and even their former
adversaries, Americans helped create and sustain the most powerful and
effective Alliance the world has ever known. That Alliance, and the
solidarity of its membership, not only prevented World War III, but
secured victory in the Cold War without major bloodshed in Europe.
NATO is adapting, as it must, to new threats by attempting to
project its stability eastward, working with its new partners and
allies to consolidate, strengthen, extend and secure the peace. The
extension of NATO membership to democracies in Central and Eastern
Europe will enhance NATO's ability to adapt and continue to defend the
freedom and democratic political systems of its members against these
new threats.
First, one of the most reliable guarantees against aggression is
the spread of democracy; democracies do not invade one another and do
not engage in aggressive wars. The extension of membership will also
help provide the security in which these young democracies can set
deep, sturdy roots and flourish so as to contribute fully to Alliance
goals well beyond their own borders.
With the addition of capable and committed allies in Central and
Eastern Europe, NATO will be politically, militarily and morally
strengthened and all the better prepared to address its security
concerns and prevent conflict in that region and elsewhere, as well as
respond to it if necessary.
If NATO were not to extend its membership, if it were to ignore the
need for integrating these new democracies with the West and for
creating a Europe free, undivided and secure, or if it were to leave
this task to some other organization, the costs would be far greater
than those for enlargement. For example, the United States currently
spends far more on its involvement in the former Yugoslavia than it
will need to pay toward NATO enlargement, and it would be spending far
less there if a concerted NATO effort had been marshaled early to deter
the conflict. Moreover, if the new democracies were forced to provide
for their own defense independent of any collective security
arrangement, their expenses would be far greater than those required
for NATO membership and would be far less cost-effective. To quote
German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel: ``We do not want a re-
nationalization of defense policy; we want multilateral integration
instead.''
The ultimate cost of not extending membership to the new
democracies is probably incalculable, because NATO would not survive
such inertia--the status quo would be untenable--and the current
configuration of NATO would atrophy and disintegrate. European nations
would lose their primary bond to collective security, and slide
backward toward the dangers of pre-Alliance diplomatic and military
perspectives. Central and Eastern Europe would remain a security vacuum
in which freedom and democracy would have far less chance to prosper,
and the United States might well find itself returning to Europe once
again to shed more blood on the same fields.
VII. Conclusion
The Czechs will be among the best allies that the United States has
ever had because of their deep and abiding friendship and the broad
range of values which we share. The strategic location of the Czech
Republic, its stability, its industrial and human resources, and its
military capabilities will strengthen the NATO alliance.
Prague is closer to Dublin than it is to Moscow. Prague is closer
to Copenhagen than it is to Sarajevo. The Czech people throughout their
history have contributed to Western culture, science, industry, art and
prosperity. They now want to contribute to Western security.
The status quo is not a real option. The United States Senate will
not be choosing between enlarging NATO and preserving it in its current
state. The choice is between preserving NATO in an enlarged form or
delivering its death sentence.
For almost fifty years, NATO has maintained peace and freedom for
America and Western Europe. It can do the same for the Czechs and other
former communist-dominated countries if they are admitted. If they are
not, we can expect real problems and costs. Czech President Vaclav
Havel said it well: ``[I]f the West does not stabilize the East, the
East will destabilize the West.''
I thank you again for the opportunity to testify.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Doubek.
We will now call Mr. Mati Koiva, who is a member of the
Board of the Joint Baltic American National Committee,
Incorporated. We welcome you, sir.
STATEMENT OF MATI KOIVA, MEMBER, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, JOINT
BALTIC AMERICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, INCORPORATED, AND
PRESIDENT, ESTONIAN AMERICAN NATIONAL COUNCIL, ROCKVILLE,
MARYLAND
Mr. Koiva. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. We have submitted written testimony and also I will
now present a summary of that.
I welcome this opportunity to appear before you to discuss
the importance of a successful ratification vote for NATO
enlargement and the necessity, commitment, and timetable for
further enlargement.
The Joint Baltic American National Committee represents
over 1 million Americans of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian
descent. JBANC strongly believes that the long-term national
security and economic interests of the United States demand an
unwavering commitment to an enlarged NATO to the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, including Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania.
With U.S. leadership, a stable and democratic Europe has
been restored after two costly world wars and a 45 year cold
war. We can sustain this stability by overwhelmingly ratifying
an amendment to the Washington Treaty allowing Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic to become full NATO members, which will
begin the enlargement process.
JBANC holds the position that the European Security Act of
1997 is a part of the NATO enlargement process. This act, which
received overwhelming support from the House and subsequent
adoption by the Senate, states that Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania should be invited to become full NATO members at the
earliest possible date and makes them eligible for transition
assistance.
The Security Act, now part of the State Department
Authorization Act, is held up in conference. JBANC urges the
House and Senate to resolve the situation to assure the
enactment of the European Security Act in the year of its
designation, that is, 1997.
Similarly, JBANC also fully endorses the Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act of 1997 and urges its final passage.
Our specific recommendations for the ratification process
and continued enlargement are as follows. First, the U.S. must
unequivocally express its commitment to NATO enlargement to
assure ratification in the parliaments of other members.
JBANC urges the Senate to ratify the NATO treaty in a way
that clearly supports continued enlargement without any
restrictions on a time line for a second wave. Any delay in the
process provides an opportunity for unsettling European
stability and encourages anti-NATO nationalists in a volatile
Russia.
Second, JBANC urges the administration to issue a timetable
and strong commitment for further enlargement. In 1999, when
Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic become full NATO
members, countries designated by Congress as being eligible for
NATO transition assistance, including Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania, should be invited for accession talks.
Third, JBANC fully endorses the position that overall
stability and security in Europe can be best accomplished
through an expedited enlargement of NATO to all nations that
desire to join and who qualify.
It is critical that the Baltic countries of Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania, who are now structuring their defense
forces to NATO standards and participating in NATO's Bosnia
operations become full NATO members by 2001.
The U.S. never recognized the Soviet occupation of the
Baltics. They should not be treated any differently from other
NATO candidates, as Russia wants us to believe. JBANC remains
concerned about reports that contradict the President's
assurances that Russia does not have an implicit veto over NATO
enlargement.
Russian officials have repeatedly voiced opposition to
Baltic membership in NATO. Less than 2 weeks ago, Russian
President Boris Yeltsin issued a statement saying that the
Russian side has already stated that we do guarantee the
security of the Baltic countries. He suggested that these
guarantees be a unilateral obligation of Russia through mutual
security and friendship agreements between Russia and the
Baltic countries.
These offers of security guarantees and friendship treaties
are reminiscent of a 1939-1940 occupation of the Baltic
countries and similar events in the region that started World
War II.
We ask the Baltic and U.S. Governments not to be lulled
into a false sense of security but to move ahead vigorously
with NATO expansion. The final passage of the European Security
Act by Congress would demonstrate U.S. resolve of this action.
We conclude with a plea to the committee, that since the
U.S. is committed to shaping a peaceful and undivided Europe,
the Baltic countries must be included in its security
architecture.
We strongly support Secretary Albright's statement that all
States large and small must have the right to choose their own
alliance in a new Europe. It is in the U.S. national security
and economic interest to enlarge NATO to Central and Eastern
Europe, including Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Koiva follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Koiva
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I welcome this
opportunity to appear before you to discuss the importance of a
successful ratification vote for NATO enlargement and the necessity of
a commitment and timetable for further enlargement.
The Joint Baltic American National Committee, Inc. (JBANC)
represents over one million Americans of Estonian, Latvian and
Lithuanian descent. JBANC strongly believes that the longterm national
security and economic interests of the U.S. demand an unwavering
commitment to enlarging NATO to the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe, including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
In this century, the United States was called upon to fight two
costly World Wars and a 45-year Cold War in Europe. NATO allies with U.
S. leadership were essential in restoring peace, freedom and democracy
to the current stable Europe,.
In order to further foster a peaceful, undivided and democratic
Europe, the Alliance extended invitations in Madrid to Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic for accession talks. In keeping with the pledge
of an open door policy for further enlargement, the NATO Madrid
Declaration supports the Baltic countries as aspiring members.
JBANC urges the Senate to overwhelmingly ratify an amendment to the
Washington NATO Treaty allowing Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
to become full NATO members, which will begin the enlargement process.
Since NATO enlargement is viewed as an on-going process, JBANC
holds the position that the European Security Act of 1997 is a part of
the process. JBANC is pleased to be a leading supporter of this Act
which received overwhelming support from the House. The Act designates
the Baltic countries as being eligible to receive funding to help them
qualify for NATO in the future. The Act also states that Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania should be invited to become full NATO members at
the earliest possible date. This language was also strongly adopted by
the Senate.
The European Security Act, now a part of the State Department
Authorization Act (H.R. 1757) is held up in conference committee due to
unrelated family planning amendments. JBANC urges the House and Senate
leadership to resolve these issues and to enact the European Security
Act in the year of its designation, i.e. 1997.
JBANC also fully endorses the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act
of 1997 which received overwhelming support in Congress. This includes
funding to assist the Baltic defense forces to prepare for NATO. JBANC
urges its final enactment.
That brings us to our specific recommendations for the ratification
process and continued enlargement:
First, the U.S. must unequivocally express its commitment to NATO
enlargement if the ratification process in the parliaments of the other
fifteen NATO allies is to be achieved. JBANC strongly supports an
overwhelming ratification vote in the Senate for Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic which will reflect the confidence among American
voters that NATO enlargement is in the U.S. best interests. This in
turn enhances the open door policy enabling a second wave of
enlargement, including the Baltic countries.
JBANC urges the Senate to ratify the NATO treaty in a way that
clearly supports continued enlargement without any restrictions on a
timeline for the second wave.
Second, JBANC believes that not only must there be a successful
vote for NATO ratification in the Senate but the Administration must
issue a timetable and strong commitment for further enlargement. In
1999 when Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic become full NATO
members, all the countries that have been designated by Congress as
being eligible for NATO transition assistance, including Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania should be invited for accession talks.
Any delay in the process of continued enlargement provides an
opportunity for those whose aim is to destabilize Europe, thus
decreasing the Allies' security. Hesitation in completing the
enlargement process encourages anti-Western forces in Russia. In the
long term, a delay in the process would adversely affect the security
and economic interests of the United States.
As has been noted by many commentators, the Baltic countries are
the most exposed and at risk of all the NATO aspirants in Central and
Eastern Europe, by virtue of their geography and history of being
forcibly annexed by the USSR. The U.S. never recognized the Soviet
occupation of the Baltic countries. Therefore they should not be
treated any differently from other countries in Central and Eastern
Europe for NATO membership. If democratic reform in Russia falters and
if NATO enlargement is incomplete, the Baltics could be relegated to a
gray zone of instability. A gray zone in the Baltic region encourages a
volatile Russia to renew expansionism.
Third, JBANC fully endorses the position that overall stability and
security on the European continent can be best accomplished through the
enlargement of the NATO alliance to all nations of the region that
desire to join and meet the membership criteria. At this critical
juncture, it is necessary that the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania become full NATO members by 2001.
JBANC remains deeply concerned about reports that contradict the
President's assurances that Russia does not have an implicit veto over
NATO enlargement. Russian officials have repeatedly voiced opposition
to Baltic membership in NATO and have extended Russian security
guarantees in return--as demonstrated by Russian Prime Minister
Chemomyrdin in Vilnius, Lithuania.
More recently in Moscow, President Boris Yeltsin issued a formal
statement regarding Russian relations with the Baltics, ``The Russian
side has already stated that we do guarantee the security of the Baltic
countries. As a follow-up to this initiative we suggest that such
guarantees should be given in the form of a unilateral commitment of
the Russian Federation backed, perhaps, in terms of the international
law, by an agreement on good-neighborliness and mutual security
provision between Russia and individual Baltic countries or between
Russia and all three Baltic countries.'' (Article attached).
These offers of security guarantees and good-neighborly treaties
are reminiscent of the 1939-1940 occupation of the Baltic countries and
similar events in the region which started World War II. We urge the
Baltic governments and the U.S. not to be lulled into a false sense of
security but to move ahead vigorously with the inclusion of the Baltics
and others into NATO.
The Administration's lack of a public denouncement of Yeltsin's
statement emphasizes the urgency for the European Security Act to be
passed in this session of Congress. This Act designates the Baltic
countries as being eligible to receive funding to help them qualify for
NATO in the future and states that they should be invited to become
full NATO members at the earliest possible date. The final passage of
the European Security Act will demonstrate U.S. support for the Baltics
security, sovereignty and territorial integrity.
JBANC holds the position that enlarging NATO to emerging
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, including Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania promotes not only the institutionalization of democracy
and market economies but also good-neighborly relations and settlements
of minority issues.
Legislation and Congressional statements of support for Baltic
membership in NATO clearly indicate that the Baltics would make
outstanding contributions to furthering the goals of NATO and that they
should be invited to become full NATO members at the earliest possible
date.
In this session of Congress, Senators Richard Durbin (D-IL) and
Slade Gorton (R-WA) co-chair the Baltic Freedom Caucus, consisting of
Senators Carol Moseley-Braun (D-IL), Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), and
Charles Grassley (R-IA). All have demonstrated strong support for the
Baltic peoples' security concerns. Senators Durbin, Gorton and Mitch
McConnell (R-KY) have been instrumental in sponsoring legislation which
fully endorses Baltic security issues.
In the House, International Relations Committee Chairman Ben Gilman
(R-NY), Gerald Solomon (R-NY) and Henry Hyde (R-IL) have taken the lead
on legislation which strongly supports the security concerns of the
Baltic countries. JBANC would like to thank all Members of Congress who
have demonstrated outstanding support for the security interests of the
Baltics.
JBANC believes the Baltic countries are meeting the criteria for
NATO membership. The Baltics are succeeding in implementing democratic
and economic reforms. They have made tremendous progress toward
establishing civilian control of their militaries, good-neighborly
relations, making commitments to protect the rights of all their
citizens and adhering to the rule of law.
The Baltic countries are building their defense forces by NATO
standards. They are working to achieve interoperability between their
defense forces and NATO. They are cooperating in a regional airspace
initiative, improving their communication and information systems and
command and control. The Baltics have shown their willingness to be
producers, not just consumers, of security by joining NATO's
Partnership for Peace program with increased support for activities and
by providing troops for NATO-led operations in Bosnia.
We want to conclude with a plea to the Committee that since the
U.S. is committed to shaping a peaceful and undivided Europe, the
Baltic countries must be included in the security architecture.
Stability in the entire Baltic Sea region promotes stability in all of
Europe.
We strongly support Secretary Madeleine Albright's statement that
all states, large and small, must have the right to choose their own
alliances and associations in the new Europe. It is in the U.S.
national security and economic interests to enlarge NATO to the
emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, including Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania.
Thank you.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Koiva. Obviously, you don't
think that the Baltics' former status as part of the Soviet
Union really changes their status any more than Poland,
Hungary, or the Czech Republic?
Mr. Koiva. No. We believe it should not.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Mr. Koiva. Thank you.
Senator Smith. We will now call up Hon. Paula Stern,
representing the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO. We welcome you.
STATEMENT OF HON. PAULA STERN, PRESIDENT, THE STERN GROUP, NEW
YORK, NEW YORK, ON BEHALF OF THE U.S. COMMITTEE TO EXPAND NATO
Ms. Stern. Thank you very much. We brought several items to
show and tell with us. Gloria Jones is assisting in putting
them up.
Thank you very much for inviting me to testify here. I am
delighted to be here to speak about guaranteeing European and
American security for the 21st Century for that is what I
believe will be achieved by expanding NATO to include the
Central European democracies of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic.
In sharing with you my convictions that NATO enlargement is
absolutely justified, I draw your attention to these two
posters that I have brought with me. They were produced by the
U.S. Committee to expand NATO, which is a bipartisan group of
which I am a member. Both distill some fundamental truths that
should be kept in mind as you and your colleagues in the Senate
decide how to vote on this issue.
The one which is the Price of Peace is a good example.
There is a cost. There is a price. But I think you have to
consider that the cost of not ratifying NATO expansion would be
staggering. This demonstrates that you could calculate that the
price would be, the cost to the taxpayer would be about as much
as it would to buy a kid a candy bar. Following Halloween, I
certainly think we could afford to get rid of a lot of that
candy.
Wes Clark, the current SACEUR, said that an ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure. I would add to that that
since the cost of expansion is less than a candy bar, it
certainly would also be less fattening.
I would not go on and talk about other, broader economic
consequences.
When the North Atlantic Treaty was ratified in 1949, the
alliance was dedicated to containing the threat posed by the
Soviet Union and to providing America's allies in Europe with a
crucial security umbrella that they would need to rebuild their
economies and strengthen their democratic institutions in the
aftermath of World War II.
Today, with the geopolitical landscape of both Europe and
the world dramatically changed, NATO's mission must also be
adjusted, even as it remains the security alliance it has
always been. In effect, by opening itself to Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic, NATO is extending assurances of
stability that will allow those nascent democracies and free
markets in these newly sovereign States to flourish.
As one who is particularly concerned about the economic
ramifications of NATO expansion, I am convinced an enlargement
under consideration is all to the good. Consider, for instance,
the economic impact of NATO--inspired stability among its
existing member States. Statistics show that in 1996, two-way
trade across the Atlantic reached $544 billion and two-way
investment was a staggering $776 billion, making that trade
relationship between the U.S. and European allies the most
significant in the world today.
Clearly, what must be said about this trade relationship
and its vitality is that it simply would not have materialized
without NATO. So, at the same time, in considering enlargement
of the alliance we need to recognize these other aspects of
NATO's mission, that it was set up to safeguard the freedom,
common heritage, and civilization of its member nations'
peoples; that it was founded on the principles of democracy,
individual freedom and the rule of law; and that its success is
a testament to the fact that it has become more than just a
security arrangement.
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the
former Soviet Union, it is now time for NATO to become
something new again--an organization that reflects the changes
in the landscape that surrounds it. What better way to reflect
such changes than to extend the peace, stability, and
prosperity NATO member nations have enjoyed to the three young
democracies most deserving and desirous of joining?
In fact, it must be said that even the prospect of joining
NATO is having a tremendous impact on the development of these
new market economies. GDP growth in Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic ranges between 4 and 5 percent, far faster than
the rest of Europe. Moreover, infrastructures are improving and
the determination to create viable and successful open, free
market economies is changing the way business is conducted.
Such vitality, of course, is providing many opportunities
for U.S. businesses in these untapped and very promising
markets. Trade and direct investment between these countries
and the U.S. is growing and it will continue to do so. But the
formula is clear: Transatlantic trade is vital to the success
of NATO economies and NATO expansion will increase the
opportunities for such trade.
Still, success is dependent on building confidence in
tomorrow's future. We can talk about improving bilateral ties,
or economic relations, or encouraging the European Union to
take the lead, and so forth. But the bottom line for these
countries, and really for any country, is that without
security, without stability, economic progress is next to
impossible.
Beyond Bosnia there remain real potential flash points of
ethnic friction in Central and Eastern Europe, and the mere
presence of NATO in the region can help keep these frictions
from igniting. Ultimately, through the expansion of economic
wellbeing, NATO's presence can, in fact, dissipate these
frictions.
We should not get in the way of such possibilities and we
should bear in mind in our own deliberations that if we do not
advance the twin ideas of enlargement of NATO and adjustment in
its mission, we would put that institution at risk of not
surviving.
Ultimately, of course, in the absence of NATO, the cost of
keeping the peace will fall on the shoulders of the United
States alone, an eventually that I don't think any of us
relishes.
Also I am convinced that NATO's expansion in Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic will do for these countries in
the East what it did for the West after World War II. Rather
than just a cost, there NATO enlargement must be seen as an
investment in the future, in new markets, and in new
opportunities for the U.S. economy.
I am not alone in that line of thinking. You must
appreciate, for instance, the results of a recent study by the
Pugh Research of American Political Opinion. It showed that,
while a solid 63 percent of the American people support an
expanded NATO, an overwhelming 91 percent of America's business
leaders support future NATO enlargement.
Dana Meade, chairman and CEO of Tenneco, an early investor
in Central Europe, recently said that these figures should not
come as any surprise because--and I am quoting--``security and
prosperity of America is inextricably tied to the security and
prosperity of Europe.''
Increased trade, however good for America, is not the only
reason why I am a staunch supporter of NATO expansion nor why
the Senate should be as well. The lessons from history are
clear: Peace in Europe should not be taken for granted. Rather,
they must be nurtured, and NATO enlargement is part of that
process of insuring that continued peace in Europe and the
prosperity it brings to the United States.
It is clear that the prospect of NATO membership has
encouraged positive developments in the economies of these
countries, in their human rights records, and in their
relationships with their neighbors. NATO enlargement will lock
in that stability in Central Europe that we now enjoy.
I know that there are some issues surrounding the costs, as
I said, but I believe that that price is marginal, especially
if you look back at the vast costs of war.
Turning our back on these democracies by not expanding NATO
would be a severe blow to the viability of all of their
political, social, and economic reforms.
Now, briefly, I would just like to share with you the
Transatlantic Business dialog's potential to facilitate NATO's
expansion. I currently serve as an adviser to this TABD, the
Transatlantic Business dialog, which is a group of business and
government people. As a matter of fact, I will be leaving in a
few hours for Rome to attend the government--business TABD
conference. That is a unique example of entrepreneurial
diplomacy by American and European businesses.
They sought to ferret out concrete barriers to trade and
were instrumental in this year's Information Technology
Agreement and in the U.S.--E.U. Mutual Recognition Agreement.
In closing, 50 years ago, the Marshall Plan resurrected
Europe from the Second World War. That era is long gone.
Invigorating the economies of Europe, especially those nations
about to enter NATO, requires a business and commercial, not
just a government sponsored economic outreach. The more quickly
these new NATO members are integrated into the NATO economies,
including that of the United States, the sooner they will be
meeting fully their contribution to European security and to
U.S. security.
Just as NATO expansion brings security, the TABD's
equivalent expansion in the dialog that will be going on this
week means that NATO economies will be brought in as well to
enhance trade and prosperity while serving as a natural agent
for helping the new NATO countries modernize their own
economies.
NATO's expansion and even the prospect of membership is
clearly moving Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic in the
right direction. But, more importantly, NATO expansion is good
for the United States.
Thank you.
[See appendix for supplemental material submitted by Ms.
Stern.]
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Ms. Stern. We
appreciate it.
I now call forward Mr. Daniel Plesch, Director, British
American Security Information Council. We welcome you, sir.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL T. PLESCH, DIRECTOR, BRITISH AMERICAN
SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Plesch. Good morning and thank you, Mr. Chairman,
members of the committee. It is an honor to testify before you
today on the Council's behalf.
Consideration of the desirability of expanding NATO should
begin with the security needs of Europe. There is no
conventional military threat to NATO or to Eastern Europe.
Nevertheless, thousands of nuclear weapons could, despite
President Clinton's assurances, destroy this country in an
hour. The risk today is of accident and human error.
We must reduce and eliminate Weapons of Mass Destruction
and further reduce the likelihood of any conflict to the East
and South of NATO through the aggressive pursuit of arms
control and nonproliferation measures.
Unfortunately, NATO enlargement is at best irrelevant to
these policy priorities and appears to be slowing them down.
Even before the invention of nuclear arms, the leaders and
peoples who fought two world wars realized that a system of
military alliances alone always produces war and that these
have become increasingly destructive. We had, first, the League
of nations and now the United Nations. The first failed and the
second is faltering.
This is happening for the same reason as in the 1920's. The
great powers are returning to the belief that they can rely on
their own military power alone.
We would do well to recall the words of the Atlantic
Charter, of Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, who, in
the dark days of August 1941, declared that they believed that
all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as
spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of
force.
They further outlined the need for reductions in armaments
leading to the creation of a system of general security.
It is becoming commonplace today to deride disarmament and
arms control as ineffective and unverifiable. This is the worst
form of defeatism for, if it is impossible to create effective
disarmament measures, then in the long run nuclear war will be
inevitable.
Fortunately, there is a great tradition of disarmament to
be pursued. Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev's INF and START
treaties name but two.
Today, for the first time in history, there are no
significant cross border conflicts in Europe. According to
NATO's own assessments, the Russian Army barely exists and will
take a generation to rebuild We need to build upon that
opportunity with nonmilitary measures.
I would like now to come to a central issue in the nature
of the alliance itself, Mr. Chairman. There is, unfortunately,
a dangerous illusion at the heart of the pro-enlargement
argument. NATO is said to offer a security guarantee. But if
one looks at what President Clinton said in a letter to members
of the Senate, he explained the Article 5 commitment in this
way. Article 5 states that members will consider an attack
against one to be an attack against all. It does not define
what actions would constitute an ``attack'' or prejudge what
alliance decisions might be made in such circumstances.
Member States, acting in accordance with established
constitutional processes, are required to exercise individual
and collective judgment over this question. That is a case by
case interpretation of Article 5.
Contrast that with the remarks of Secretary Albright in
Prague, where she said above all, NATO membership means you
will always be able to rely on us.
This weakness and contradiction has long been understood by
officials in Europe. During the cold war, no one raised the
matter in public except the French. In any case, it was assumed
that any war would rapidly become nuclear, in which case the
small print of documents would not become relevant.
Extending these commitments today is a very different
matter. It is reckless of the administration to talk of
guarantees in Eastern Europe but of loopholes when talking to
the Congress.
The Hungarian people are soon to be asked to vote on
whether they want a security guarantee from NATO. No one has
shown them the small print. Bosnia is a critical case. The U.S.
was and is reluctant to commit troops. We are led to believe
that this reluctance would not exist were Bosnia or any other
country to be in NATO. Yet, the answer given by President
Clinton to Senator Hutchison and other members indicates in the
clearest possible way that the NATO treaty does, indeed,
contain an escape clause, permitting another Munich or
Sarajevo.
We should recognize that there is not much difficulty
between the commitments already given in the Partnership for
Peace and the NATO treaty itself.
Mr. Chairman, all the arguments that one nation can put
forward for inclusion in NATO can be put forward by its
neighbor. We are faced with a chain of commitments leading
through Russia to the borders of China. If NATO enlargement
continues, we are just embarking on expanding NATO across
Eurasia. If the process of enlargement is halted, we will again
draw a new dividing line in Europe; that is to say, do we leave
out Russia, do we leave out Poland?
The better, more modern approach will be going back to the
wise words of Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill to
develop our political interest in all encompassing nonmilitary
institutions.
For example, the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe has to do with just $55 million for its entire
operating budget.
Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to take the time of this
committee, but if I may, I would close with one final point
with respect to nuclear weapons, which I think illustrates many
of the key problems at the heart of this enterprise.
The United States rightly spent much time and energy
insuring that Belarus and Ukraine became non-nuclear countries.
Now, with the prospect of security guarantees to Poland, we are
going to bring the Poles and other East Europeans into the NATO
nuclear planning process. South Africa and many other
countries, other than Belarus and Ukraine, see this as a
problem within the Nonproliferation Treaty. This contradiction
is, I believe, just one of many, more detailed points that I
trust, I am sure, the committee is looking at.
Thank you for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Plesch follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Plesch
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, it is an honor to testify
before you today on the Council's behalf and to submit written
testimony for the record.
Consideration of the desirability of expanding NATO should begin
with the security needs of Europe today. There is no conventional
military threat to NATO or to Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, thousands
of nuclear weapons could, despite President Clinton's assurances,
destroy this country in an hour. The risk today is of accident and
human error.
We must reduce and eliminate Weapons of Mass Destruction and
further reduce the likelihood of any conflict to the East and South,
through the aggressive pursuit of arms control and non-proliferation
measures. NATO enlargement is at best irrelevant to these policy
requirements it appears to be slowing them down.
There has indeed been a revolution in military, indeed human,
affairs brought about by the invention of nuclear weapons. For the
first time humanity has the power of self-destruction. This
necessitates a change in strategy which has yet to take hold amongst
the great powers. This is not unusual, revolutions in thought do not
happen quickly. In this case though the challenge to the human mind may
be too great. The mass use of violence in war may remain attractive
until it is too late. The future can only lie in global cooperation
accompanying the global market.
Even before the invention of nuclear arms the leaders and peoples
who fought two world wars realized that a system of military alliances
always produces war and that these are increasingly destructive. As a
result we had first the League of Nations and now the United Nations.
The first failed and the second is faltering. This is happening now for
the same reason as in the 1920s; the great powers are returning to the
belief that they can rely upon their own military power alone.
We would do well to recall the words of the Atlantic Charter of
Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, who, in the desperate days of
August 1941 declared that, ``they believe that all of the nations of
the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the
abandonment of the use of force.'' They further outlined the need for
reductions in armaments leading to the creation of a system of general
security. It is becoming commonplace to deride disarmament and arms
control as ineffective and unverifiable. This is the worst form of
defeatism. For if it is impossible to create effective disarmament
measures then nuclear war will be inevitable.
Fortunately, there is a great tradition of disarmament to be
pursued: Ronald Reagan's and Mikhail Gorbachev's INF and START
Treaties.
Not long ago the confrontation with the totalitarian communist
regimes of Eastern Europe made progress extremely difficult. Today for
the first time in history there are no significant cross border
conflicts in Europe.
According to NATO's own assessments, the Russian Army barely exists
and would take a generation to rebuild. NATO has conventional military
supremacy against any combination of adversaries to the East and South.
There is no significant modern defense industrial base we and our
allies do not control. In this uniquely favorable setting, we can do no
less than those who worked in far more difficult times.
Mr Chairman, there is a dangerous illusion at the heart of the pro-
enlargement argument. NATO is said to offer a security guarantee. It
does not. President Clinton made this clear in a letter to members of
the Senate. President Clinton explained the commitment in Article 5 of
the NATO Treaty this way: ``Article 5 states that members will consider
an attack against one to be an attack against all.'' It does not define
what actions would constitute ``an attack'' or prejudge what alliance
decisions might be made in such circumstances. ``Member states acting
in accordance with established constitutional processes, are required
to exercise individual and collective judgment over this question.''
Contrast this case by case interpretation with Secretary Albright
in Prague last July 17th. ``Above all, it [NATO membership] means you
will always be able to rely on us and we will always be able to rely on
you ... If there is a threat to the peace and security of this country,
we will be bound by a solemn commitment to defeat it together. For this
reason, we can be confident such a threat is far less likely to
arise.''
The weakness of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty has been
long understood by officials in Europe. It is often contrasted with the
clearer language of the West European Union which states; ``If any of
the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in
Europe .... the other High Contracting Parties will afford the Party so
attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their
power.'' Article 5 WEU Treaty.
The confrontation with the Soviet Union ensured that no one, except
the French, raised this matter in public. In any case, it was assumed
that any war would rapidly become nuclear in which case documents would
not be relevant.
Extending these commitments today is a very different matter. It is
reckless of the Administration to talk of guarantees in Eastern Europe
but of loopholes when talking to the Congress. The Hungarian people are
soon to be asked to vote on whether they want a security guarantee from
NATO. No one has shown them the small print.
Bosnia is a critical case. The US was and is reluctant to commit
troops. We are lead to believe that this reluctance would not exist
were Bosnia or any other country to be in NATO. Yet the answer given by
President Clinton to Senator Hutchison indicates in the clearest
possible way that the NATO Treaty does indeed contain an escape clause
permitting another Munich or Sarajevo. We should recognize that there
is not much difference between the commitments already given in PfP and
the NATO Treaty itsell
Mr Chairman, all the arguments that one nation can put
forward for inclusion in NATO can also be put forward by its
neighbor, which produces a chain of commitments leading through
Russia to the borders of China. The Administration is explicit
that the door is open to all states in the Partnership for
Peace.
If NATO enlargement continues, we are just embarking on
expanding NATO across Eurasia. The Administration is creating a
massive new unfunded mandate. Former Secretaries Warren
Christopher and William Perry believe that all nations within
the Partnerships for Peace should be built up to the same
military level as NATO members.
If the process of enlargement is halted, we will again draw
a new dividing line in Europe. That is to say do we leave out
Russia or do we leave out Poland?
The better and more modern approach would be to develop our
political interest in a non-military institution. The
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has to
operate on a budget of just $55 million for its work in
mediation, arms control and elections. The creation of a
greater pool of skilled personnel for these tasks is an
international priority. The OSCE has some advantages for the US
because it has the potential to involve it in European economic
policy--a long standing and unfulfilled US goal. Certainly the
OSCE is out of fashion, but this is because the US has shown
little interest in it.
Mr. Chairman; There are additional negative consequences of the
enlargement policy.
We have betrayed our promise to Russia and are needlessly
recreating conflict. The diplomatic record has been made clear
by those who negotiated the end of the Cold War. The Russians
were given commitments by the United States during the
negotiations on Germany that NATO would not expand. NATO with
Mrs. Thatcher's leadership, issued the ``Declaration of
Turnberry'', in which we offered Russia a ``Europe whole and
free.'' There is no intention now of treating Russia as an
equal partner, even though its has embraced both democracy and
the free market economy. For hundreds of years Russia has been
one of the powers of Europe. Despite suffering under absolute
monarchy and communism its people played a positive role in
European history and helped save Europe from the tyrannies of
Napoleon and Hitler. To exclude them now from decision making
is a clear return on our part to sphere of influence politics.
Russia certainly pursues policies we do not like but so too do
other states with whom the United States has good relations
such as Japan and France. This is no reason to refuse to treat
either these countries or Russia as genuine partners.
NATO enlargement is likely to increase tensions and
misunderstanding between those who join and those who are left
out. The increased credit worthiness that membership of the
Alliance brings will be more than offset by the drain on
capital resources of increased military expenditures and the
negative impact on excluded neighbors. The US is already
diverting funds for economic assistance into military programs
the hundreds of millions of dollars which United States
taxpayers are already devoting to improving the armaments of
Eastern Europe would be far better spent in building the civil
sector or in reducing the tax burden in the United States.
Military relations are now so dominant that threat and risk
reduction strategies have been neglected. The Alliance has no
proposals for further reducing armaments in Europe although
vast quantities remain. The Conventional Forces in Europe
Treaty was an enormous achievement of the Reagan and Bush
Administrations. We need to see a follow-on and more emphasis
on preventing weapons proliferation. Much of the flow of
illegal small arms onto world markets comes from Eastern
Europe. NATO agreed at the Lisbon OSCE meeting to consider
reductions in new types of weapons, which should include small
arms and new technologies. It has failed to follow through. The
alliance and the Partnerships for Peace should have an active
program to destroy surplus weapons and shut down the factories
supplying rogue nations and groups.
NATO enlargement is likely to increase tensions and
misunderstanding between those who join and those who are left
out. The increased credit worthiness that membership of the
Alliance brings will be more than offset by the drain on
capital resources of increased military expenditures and the
negative impact on excluded neighbors. The US is already
diverting funds for economic assistance into military programs
the hundreds of millions of dollars which United States
taxpayers are already devoting to improving the armaments of
Eastern Europe would be far better spent in building the civil
sector or in reducing the tax burden in the United States.
Military relations are now so dominant that threat and risk
reduction strategies have been neglected. The Alliance has no
proposals for further reducing armaments in Europe although
vast quantities remain. The Conventional Forces in Europe
Treaty was an enormous achievement of the Reagan and Bush
Administrations. We need to see a follow-on and more emphasis
on preventing weapons proliferation. Much of the flow of
illegal small arms onto world markets comes from Eastern
Europe. NATO agreed at the Lisbon OSCE meeting to consider
reductions in new types of weapons, which should include small
arms and new technologies. It has failed to follow through. The
alliance and the Partnerships for Peace should have an active
program to destroy surplus weapons and shut down the factories
supplying rogue nations and groups.
The enlargement of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group is nuclear
proliferation. South Africa and other states have pointed out
that the expansion of NATO will bring more countries to rely
upon nuclear weapons, is in contradiction of the objective of
the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States rightly
went to enormous effort to de-nuclearize Belarus and Ukraine.
But now Belarus and Ukraine are to border a state whose
officials will take part in NATO nuclear planning. This
contradiction illustrates how misguided the enlargement policy
is.
It common to say the train has left the station, we must go on. But
this is exactly what was said at the outset of the First World War.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Plesch. We
appreciate your testimony. We are happy to have it considered.
We will now call up Mr. David Acheson. Mr. Acheson looks
like a former Secretary of State whose book I recently read,
``Present at the Creation.'' It is an excellent book if you
want to understand why American foreign policy is where it is
and why we are here.
STATEMENT OF DAVID C. ACHESON, PRESIDENT, THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL
OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Acheson. I recommend it, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Smith. I figured you would.
Please proceed.
Mr. Acheson. I am here to state my views on NATO
enlargement, specifically the accession of the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland, which I strongly support.
I think we can all see that newly evolved missions of NATO
have already assumed great importance in addition to the
mission of collective defense. I refer to peacekeeping and
peace enforcement and promoting stability in Central Europe, a
region which has, for centuries, been fought over and dominated
by various great powers.
Central Europe has now chosen to break free of that history
through NATO membership, seeking stability by inclusion in the
company of Western democracies. NATO has several times in the
past sought to provide stability by adding member countries
that had once been threats to the peace but sought to lock in
their democratic reforms by association with NATO. I refer to
the enlargements of NATO by the additions of Germany, of Greece
and Turkey, and of Spain.
When one reflects on how NATO membership has kept the lid
on the animosity between Greece and Turkey and how the desire
to qualify for NATO membership has done a lot to resolve the
quarrels between Hungary and Romania and between Slovakia and
Hungary, I think we can find proof of the proposition that NATO
can promote stability by inclusion and extension.
So far as peacekeeping and peace enforcement are concerned,
it makes all kinds of sense to broaden the base upon which NATO
can draw for protecting the peace, not only as a matter of
enlarging resources for that purpose but also in order to
enhance the interoperability of multinational peacekeeping
forces.
Mr. Chairman, it has been a fundamental American policy for
50 years to encourage European integration, chiefly in the
economic sphere, as a means of enhancing stability and
prosperity in that continent. Mutual dependence has been
thought to tighten the bonds of peace, and I believe we can see
that this has happened to a very great extent both in the
European Union and in NATO.
It stands to reason, therefore, that the inclusion of
properly qualified new countries in NATO will extend the
network of mutual dependence and tighten the bonds of peace
even further. If this is a reasonable hope, then the benefits
of admitting the nations invited at the Madrid Summit would
appear to greatly outweigh the risks, which seem very modest,
always subject to a searching negotiation of the terms of
accession so that the new members will be contributors and not
merely users of security.
Mr. Chairman, I do not see NATO enlargement as a
provocation to Russia. The NATO--Russia Permanent Joint Council
has been set up. The Russian representatives are participating
in it. Mr. Primakov has agreed to it, and I think they are
going to learn a lot about the peacekeeping characteristics and
the peaceful characteristics of NATO through participation in
that organ.
More important, the Russian brigade in Bosnia under the
NATO Supreme Commander is going to learn even more than the
diplomats about the real NATO through daily experience from
private soldier to general.
I believe it to be an exaggeration when people say that
NATO enlargement will energize the demagogues in the Duma. I
think one can already see the issue fading in Russia as the
public opinion polls indicate. I do not, however, go so far as
to say that open ended enlargement of NATO might at some future
time energize the demagogues in the Duma. Much is to be learned
as the years go by as to whether that problem is disappearing
or whether it might return.
In short, Mr. Chairman, I think NATO enlargement well
serves the purposes of peace and stability of Europe and is
entirely consistent with the historic American policy of
encouraging greater cohesion in Europe.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Acheson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Acheson
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee: My name is David C.
Acheson. I am president of the Atlantic Council of the United States, a
non-profit, bipartisan policy center in Washington. Since the Council
does not take formal institutional positions on legislation, I am here
to state my personal views on NATO enlargement, specifically the
accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, which I strongly
support.
I think we all can see that newly evolved missions of NATO have
assumed great importance. In addition to collective defense those
missions are peacekeeping, peace enforcement and promoting stability in
Central Europe, a region which has for centuries been fought over and
dominated by various great powers. Central Europe has chosen to break
free of that history through NATO membership, seeking stability by
inclusion in the company of western democracies. NATO has several times
in the past sought to enhance stability by the inclusion of countries
that had once been threats to the peace, but which sought to lock in
their democratic reforms by association with NATO. I refer to the
previous enlargements of NATO by the addition of Germany, Greece,
Turkey, and Spain. When one reflects on how NATO membership has kept a
lid on the animosity between Greece and Turkey, and how the desire to
qualify for NATO membership has done much to resolve the quarrels
between Hungary and Romania and between Slovakia and Hungary, I think
we can find proof of the proposition that NATO can promote stability by
inclusion.
So far as peace keeping and peace enforcement are concerned it
makes all kinds of sense to broaden the base upon which NATO can draw
for protecting the peace, not just as a matter of enlarging resources
for that purpose, but also in order to enhance the interoperability of
multinational peacekeeping forces.
Mr. Chairman, It has been American policy for fifty years to
encourage European integration, chiefly in the economic sphere, as a
means of enhancing stability and prosperity in that continent. Mutual
dependence has been thought to tighten the bonds of peace and I believe
we can see that this has paid dividends both in the European Union and
in NATO. It stands to reason that the inclusion of property qualified
new countries in NATO will further extend the network of mutual
dependence and tighten the bonds of peace. If this is a reasonable
hope, then the benefits of admitting the nations invited at the Madrid
summit, would appear to outweigh the risks which seem very modest,
always subject to a searching negotiation to make sure that the new
members will be contributors, an not merely users, of security.
Mr. Chairman, I do not see NATO enlargement as a provocation to
Russia. The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council has been set up an the
Russian representatives are participating in it. They are certain to
learn a lot about the peaceful character of NATO. More important, the
Russian brigade in Bosnia under the NATO Supreme Commander is learning
at least as much as the diplomats about the real-life NATO through
daily experience, from private soldier to general. I believe it to be
an exaggeration when people say that NATO enlargement will energize the
demagogues in the Duma. I believe one can already see the issue fading
in Russia, as the public opinion polls indicate, though we should watch
this carefully as further enlargement is approached.
In short, Mr. Chairman, I think the Madrid tranche of NATO
enlargement well serves the purposes of peace and stability in Europe
and is entirely consistent with the historic American policy of
encouraging greater cohesion in Europe.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to express my views.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Acheson, for your
testimony and we thank your family, too, for its contribution
to a better world.
Mr. Acheson. I appreciate that very much. We do our best.
Senator Smith. Thank you.
We will now call up Mr. Adrian Karatnycky. I would simply
remind everyone that we have to recess at noon and we have
seven more witnesses. So we encourage you to make your comments
but to make them as briefly as you can.
STATEMENT OF ADRIAN KARATNYCKY, PRESIDENT, FREEDOM HOUSE, NEW
YORK, NEW YORK
Mr. Karatnycky. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted for this
opportunity. I have three basic points to make. Although I feel
that I am part of the second tranche of speakers before this
committee, I think that our enthusiasm for NATO enlargement is
no less than that of the second tranche of aspirants.
Senator Smith. As with the second tranche of nations, you
are also welcome.
Mr. Karatnycky. Thank you. I appreciate that.
I would like to make three basic points--the point of
democracy, the point of the internal culture of the NATO
alliance with enlargement, and also the effects on the security
climate, including on Russia, of the prospects of NATO
enlargement.
The first is to say that Freedom House, which as an
institution is a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution which
surveys the state of political rights and civil liberties
around the world, recently produced a report entitled ``Nations
in Transit: 1997'' in which we look at all the countries of
East and Central Europe and Central Eurasia and examine the
vibrancy of their civil institutions, political liberties,
freedom of the press, and the like.
It is the unrelated conclusion, but one that fully
corroborates the decision of NATO, that the three countries--
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland--rate the highest among
the 25 countries that we surveyed in terms of these basic
freedoms. These are stable democracies, they are stabilizing,
they will make able and reliable partners for the alliance.
The second reason is the cultural reason. As Jan Nowak had
indicated, the accession of the three--Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic--makes sense because these countries have
recently struggled. Millions of people in these countries
recently struggled for their freedom. These are the countries
that have given us the Polish Solidarity Movement, the Czech
Republic Civic Forum, the Democratic Opposition Movements of
Hungary--people who put their lives on the line to win their
freedom from communist tyranny.
Moreover, NATO's leadership will be dramatically enhanced
by the voices and values of such leaders as Hungary's President
Arpad Goncz, who was a freedom fighter in 1956 and was
imprisoned for this activity, Solidarity Prime Minister Jerzy
Buzek, who risked his personal freedom by leading an
underground in that country to struggle for the rights that the
NATO alliance upholds, and, of course, Vaclav Havel.
The third reason that NATO enlargement makes sense is in
the security dimension. As Mr. Acheson has indicated, the very
prospect of NATO enlargement has created a new reordering of
cooperation among the countries of East and Central Europe.
There are the agreements between Poland and Ukraine, Ukraine
and Romania, Romania and Hungary, Slovakia and Hungary. All of
these trends, as the Romanian Foreign Ministry's Dumitru Ceausu
noted, were intended to demonstrate that Romania has no
problems with its neighbors and similarly other representatives
of the foreign ministries indicate. So NATO enlargement is
leading to greater stability in terms of interstate cooperation
as, importantly, NATO enlargement is having a dramatic effect
on Russian conduct and, contrary to that, the opponents of NATO
enlargement had argued.
Tough love, I would argue, with Russia is working. Russia
is realistically responding to the reality of the strategic
balance of power in the region.
It was 6 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but
it was only on May 30, just a month before NATO's Madrid
Summit, that Ukraine and Russia agreed to a treaty of
friendship that confirmed borders and resolved the potentially
incendiary issue of the division of the Black Sea fleet. Russia
has indicated that it is entering into stronger relationships
and is eager to sign cooperation agreements with the Baltic
States.
Moreover, despite the claims of U.S. opponents of NATO
enlargement that the enlargement would undermine pro-Western
reformers in Russia, the fact is that the advocates of free
market ideas and democratic change within Russia are gaining
strength in the upper reaches of the Russian Government as the
process of NATO enlargement moves along.
In conclusion, I would say that all of the evidence of the
last year and all of the trends in Central and Eastern Europe
show that democracy and security are being strengthened by
NATO's plan to expand.
The arguments that the critics of NATO enlargement have
advanced are being daily shattered by the on the ground reality
of the new security and political order of Central and Eastern
Europe. All that enlargement's critics have going for them is
disproved hypotheses and discredited theory.
A NATO enlargement is encouraging democratic practices in
the region, peaceful interstate relations and market reforms.
It is insuring that the Atlantic Community's ideals of
liberty are on the ascendancy in the region. If this pattern
persists and is given further momentum, then it will be
possible to agree with the statement of German General Klaus
Naumann, who chairs NATO's Military Committee and who recently
told a Polish news weekly that, ``We have the chance of
attaining in Europe the same stability that we had in the
period of the Congress of Vienna.''
I thank you for the opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Karatnycky follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Karatnycky
Mr. Chairman, it is a great honor to testify before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on an issue of vital importance to the
security of the American people and of the Euro-Atlantic community--a
community united by the values of democracy, freedom, and economic
liberty. Freedom House, as you and your colleagues well know is a non-
profit non-partisan organization that tracks the state of political
rights, civil liberties and economic freedom around the world.
In May, 1997 we produced a major report that analyzes the states of
political rights, development of civil society, emergence of free
markets, independent media, rule of law. Our findings--published in a
book--constitute an inventory of democracy, entitled Nations in Transit
1997 freedom, and economic liberty in Central and Eastern Europe and
the New Independent states of the ex-USSR.
Mr. Chairman, as one of the coordinators of that study, I can say
without reservation that Freedom House's findings fully corroborate the
decisions made by NATO's leaders in their decision to begin accession
talks with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. These three Central
and East. European states stand at the top of the heap as the freest
and most open countries in the former Soviet space. I have appended
Freedom House's ratings of the countries in the region to my written
testimony (Appendix 1). These ratings were evaluated by a group of
eminent political scientists and area experts from Princeton
University, Columbia University, and Johns Hopkins. Additionally, I
would like to turn over to you and your Committee a copy of our 400-
page study.
These three NATO aspirant countries have the East Central European
region's most vibrant civic institutions, governments and citizens
subject to the rule of law, and democratic political processes. In
addition, there is a vibrantly free media in Poland and the Czech
Republic. Hungary, where privatization of national television and radio
still lags behind, has made less progress in terms of its free and
independent media.
It also is clear that eight years after the fall of Communism,
public attitudes in the three NATO aspirant countries are solidly in
favor of democracy, pro-Western in orientation, and pro-American. NATO
enlargement will strengthen and deepen these propitious developments.
Moreover, by joining NATO, the armed forces of these countries will
deepen their respect for democratic civilian control of the military.
Joining NATO, of course, cannot insulate any country completely
from internal instability. But it can act as an important factor in
stabilizing the already considerable achievements of the new and
emerging democracies.
There is a second reason, why the accession of Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic into NATO makes sense. The participation of these
countries will enrich and strengthen the Atlantic alliance. Millions of
citizens in these countries have taken part in the struggle for
freedom. These countries have been profoundly changed by the legacy of
Poland's Solidarity, the Czech Republic's Civic Forum, and Hungary's
democratic opposition movements.
NATO enlargement eastward will ensure that this spirit of deep
commitment to democracy will become a part of the shared legacy of the
Atlantic Alliance. I would aver that this spiritual and moral dimension
is as important as the technical capabilities of these countries
militaries to participate in the Alliance's force structures. As
significantly, no one should dispute that NATO's leadership will be
enhanced by the voices and values of such leaders as Hungary's
President Arpad Goncz, who fought for freedom from tyranny in 1956 and
participated in the democratic opposition after his release from prison
in the 1960s; Poland's new Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek, who risked his
personal freedom when he headed the Solidarity trade union underground
in the coal-mining region of Silesia in the 1980s; and the Czech
Republic's leading fighter for freedom, President Vaclav Havel.
The third reason why NATO enlargement makes sense is the security
dimension in Central and Eastern Europe. Even before Congress acts,
NATO enlargement already is having a salutary effect on security in the
region and on relations between states in the region--including Russia.
Well before the July 8, 1997 NATO meeting in Madrid, the very
prospect of NATO's move eastward already has led to some dramatic
improvements in the security of Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed,
since the NATO allies and especially the U.S. signaled their intent to
expand the Atlantic alliance, there has been a flurry of diplomatic
activity in Eastern Europe.
Much of this diplomacy has been driven by the desire of Central
European countries to join NATO and other Western institutions.
Additionally, a number of treaties and agreements between Russia and
her neighbors also suggest that the shifting power balance in the
region is affecting Russia's behavior in ways that suggest that Moscow
is beginning to grudgingly accept its more limited role in the region.
As part of the process of improving the chances for entry into the
Atlantic alliance and the European Union, the emerging democracies of
Central and Eastern Europe have been moving at a rapid, indeed,
dramatic pace to resolve outstanding security and border issues and to
resolve questions related to the potentially incendiary problems of
minorities residing within their borders.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, NATO's formal decision
to enlarge its membership is already proving to be a landmark
development in European history. The very expectation that NATO would
move eastward has contributed to dramatic improvements in the security
of Central and Eastern Europe.
For the past year, there has been a flurry of diplomatic activity
among the countries of East-Central Europe, driven by their desire to
join the Alliance and other Western institutions. This diplomacy has
resulted in treaties that have resolved longstanding border issues and
ethnic disputes that were the source of instability and tension, and
that could have led to armed conflict.
In the hope of strengthening their case for entry into the Atlantic
Alliance, Hungary and Slovakia have signed and ratified a comprehensive
treaty. The treaty establishes mechanisms for dealing with the half-
million strong Hungarian minority in Slovakia, and it allows for
limited local self-government in southern Slovakia, the area where most
of the ethnic Hungarian minority lives. Hungary also has settled its
border issues with Romania through a far-reaching Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation signed in 1996 and ratified by both parliaments by May
of 1997.
Meanwhile, under President Emil Constantinescu, Romania has worked
with Ukraine to resolve some potentially destabilizing border and
minority issues. Despite opposition from the ex-Communists who ruled
Romania until this year, the two countries initialed a basic treaty May
3 confirming the inviolability of existing borders and renouncing the
threat or use of force. The document also provides for measures to
protect the culture and preserve the rights of Ukrainian minorities in
Romania and Romanian minorities in Ukraine. As the Romanian Foreign
Ministry's Dumitru Ceausu noted, the settlement with Ukraine was
achieved quickly ``to demonstrate that Romania has no problems with its
neighbors''-a precondition for NATO membership.
Poland, meanwhile, has signed a document on Ukrainian-Polish
reconciliation that addresses the mutual recriminations stemming from
the 1930s and 1940s. In May, the legislatures of Poland and Lithuania
deepened cooperation by creating an Inter Parliamentary Assembly
designed to strengthen cultural relations and protect minority rights.
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are playing a also critical
role in promoting security in the countries to their East that are not
in the first wave of NATO enlargement. The three new prospective
members of NATO understand that although the Alliance is the
cornerstone of regional security, it cannot solve all the region's
problems. Poland, in particular, has taken the lead in promoting
regional cooperation through a process known as the meetings of ``the
Five Presidents.'' The Five Presidents are those of Poland, Ukraine,
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia; they will meet regularly to discuss
economic cooperation, cultural exchange, and regional security.
New cooperation represents a dramatic change for the better in the
political climate. And while the deepening democratic and free-market
transformations is a major factor, there is no doubt that it was helped
greatly by the understanding that NATO, anchored by the U.S., is the
predominant economic and military presence in the region, a force that
can intercede when ethnic tension or border disputes threaten peace.
Nor has this positive trend been limited to Central Europe. While
Russia remains cool toward NATO expansion, its conduct toward its
neighbors is improving. This suggests that as NATO enlargement move
forward, Moscow is awakening to the reality that Russia's diminished
economic and military power means it will perforce play a more limited
role in the region.
In recent months, Russia has sought to improve relations with
states it has threatened and bullied in the past. Nearly six years have
passed since the collapse of the USSR, but it was only on May 30, a
month before NATO's Madrid summit, that Ukraine and Russia agreed to a
treaty of friendship that confirmed their borders and resolved the
potentially incendiary issue of the division of the Black Sea. Similar
progress has occurred in Russia's relations with other neighbors. In
late May, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov sent a letter to
his Latvian counterpart, Valdis Berkavs, expressing hope that a border
agreement between the two countries could be signed in the fall. And on
July 3, Russia signed a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Security
with Azerbaijan that provides protections for the territorial integrity
of both countries.
NATO's enlargement has not led to the radicalization of moderate
forces within the Russian establishment-vide the recent 2 to 1, vote in
the Federation Council (Russia's upper legislative house) which
rejected the lifting of embargoes against Iraq and Libya. Nor has NATO
enlargement caused Russian leaders to abandon their plans to radically
scale back the size of their armed forces.
Despite claims by U.S. opponents of NATO enlargement that it would
undermine proWestern reformers, in fact, advocates of free-market ideas
and democratic change are gaining in strength within the upper reaches
of the Russian government, as demonstrated by the growing power of the
reformist First Deputy Prime Ministers Boris Nemtsov and Anatoly
Chubias. Many key hardliners, meanwhile, are being eased out of office.
Clearly, setbacks cannot be ruled out. No one can guarantee that
Russia's democracy will not falter or that some reckless demagogue may
not seize power in some East European country now on the path toward
democracy and the free market. But most signs point to a continuation
of the progress already witnessed in the region. Particularly, if
NATO's new members continue pursuing widely supported policies of
taking the economic, political, and security steps needed to link
Eastern Europe to the West.
In conclusion, all the evidence of the last year and all the trends
in Central and Eastern Europe show that democracy and security are
being strengthened by NATO's plan to expand. With the arguments of NATO
enlargement's critics being daily shattered by the on-the-ground
reality of the new security and political order of Central and Eastern
Europe, all that enlargement's critics have going for them is disproved
hypotheses and discredited theory.
NATO enlargement is encouraging democratic practice, peaceful
inter-state relations, and market reforms. It is ensuring that the
Atlantic community's ideals of liberty are on the ascendant. If this
pattern persists and is given further momentum, then it will be
possible to agree with the statement of German General Klaus Naumann,
chairman of NATO's Military Council, who recently told Poland's Wprost
news weekly that ``We have the chance of attaining in Europe the same
stability that we had in the period of the Congress of Vienna.''
Mr. Chairman, as a non-profit, non partisan organization that
unites liberals, moderates, and conservatives, Democrats and
Republicans, and representatives of business, labor and the academic
community, Freedom House does not take positions on specific
legislation. Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, I hope that this testimony
will contribute in a small way to a better understanding by the
American people and their elected representatives that the
preponderance of the facts demonstrates the wisdom of an enlarged NATO
in safeguarding Europe's security and deepening its democratic culture.
I thank you and the Committee for the opportunity to share these
views.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Karatnycky. I
appreciate your testimony.
I now call Admiral Jack Shanahan, Director of the Center
for Defense Information. We welcome you, Admiral.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JACK SHANAHAN, USN (RET.), DIRECTOR,
CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, WASHINGTON, DC
Admiral Shanahan. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Chairman, I am grateful to you and the other
distinguished members of this committee for granting me the
opportunity to speak on NATO expansion.
In 1969, Mr. Chairman, I was in country in Vietnam, engaged
in a real war where Americans were fighting for their very
lives. In 1970, I was assigned to the U.S. Mission to NATO in
Brussels.
Mr. Chairman, it is difficult to imagine the culture shock,
some of which remains with me to this very day, of moving from
Vietnam to the never-never land of NATO, and mingling with some
3,000 mindless bureaucrats and diplomats whose main mission in
life was to avoid taking any position disruptive of a serene
lifestyle. 500 people could have done the job better.
The prevailing attitude of most members of the alliance was
that they were safely tucked under the U.S. nuclear umbrella
and that the Warsaw Pact was not a major concern. As a result,
our allies did not consistently meet their NATO commitments in
terms of defense spending. Their prepositioned war reserves of
food, ammunition, fuel, et cetera, were well below NATO's
standards. Interoperability was a joke. They were not ready
then and they are not ready now. As we integrate East European
militaries into the alliance, this condition will worsen,
placing greater demands on the U.S. military to shoulder the
burden.
Even as we speak, our allies are making significant
reductions in their military spending and in their force
structures.
With that background, Mr. Chairman--and I am sure you sense
some bias on my part--I am here to express my very real concern
on the issue of NATO expansion. That concern has to do with the
need to maintain our bilateral relations with Russia, which are
more important to the long-term security and economic interests
of the United States and the American people and which far
outweigh the fuzzy goals of NATO expansion.
We could well be driving Russian foreign policy in a
direction decidedly not to our liking. There are many issues
out there on which Russian cooperation is essential. I have in
mind nuclear weapons stockpile reductions, nuclear
nonproliferation, environmental pollution, conventional arms
control and sales, access to new oil resources, strategic
relationships in the Middle East and the Far East and the
success or failure of a series of treaties either signed or on
the table.
Thus, I oppose NATO expansion on the grounds that we are
sacrificing our long-term relations with Russia on the altar of
an ill-conceived plan to haphazardly expand an outmoded
military alliance, ill conceived for domestic political
purposes, ill conceived as a legacy for one man, and ill
conceived since we are not clear on why, how, when, and where
to expand.
It is haphazard because we don't know how many countries
will eventually join. There is no clear definition of NATO's
new mission and there is no clear idea of the real costs.
I hope, therefore, that the Senate, in its infinite wisdom,
will delay the process of allowing time for an informed debate
on both sides of the Atlantic. As George Kennan observed,
expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American
policy in the entire post cold war era.
If this be true--and I believe it is--sir, we need to be
cautious and proceed with deliberate speed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield the balance of my
time.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Shanahan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral Shanahan
Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, I am grateful to you and the other
distinguished members of this Committee for granting me the opportunity
to speak on NATO expansion.
In 1969, Mr. Chairman, I was in country in Vietnam, engaged in a
real war where Americans were fighting for their very lives. In 1970, I
was assigned to the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels. Mr. Chairman, it
is difficult to imagine the shock, some of which remains with me to
this very day, of moving from Vietnam to the never-never land of NATO,
and mingling with some 3,000 mindless bureaucrats and diplomats whose
main mission in life was to avoid taking any position disruptive of a
serene lifestyle. Five hundred people could have done their jobs
better.
The prevailing attitude of most members of the alliance was that
they were safely tucked under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and that the
Warsaw Pact was not a major concern. As a result, our allies did not
consistently meet their NATO commitments in terms of defense spending.
Their pre-positioned war reserves of food, ammunition, fuel, etc. were
well below NATO standards. Interoperability was a joke. They were not
ready then, they are not ready now, and as we integrate East European
militaries into the alliance this condition will worsen, placing
greater demands on the U.S. military to shoulder the burden. Even as we
speak, our allies are making significant reductions in military
spending and in their force structures.
With that background, Mr. Chairman, and I am sure you sense bias on
my part; I am here to express my very real concern on the issue of NATO
expansion. That concern has to do with the need to maintain our
bilateral relations with Russia, which are more important to the long
term security and economic interests of the U.S. and the American
people and which far outweigh the fuzzy goals of NATO expansion.
We could well be driving Russian foreign policy in a direction
decidedly not to our liking. There are many issues out there on which
Russian cooperation is essential. I have in mind nuclear weapons
stockpile reductions, nuclear non-proliferation, environmental
pollution, conventional arms control and sales, access to new oil
resources, strategic relationships in the Middle East and the Far East,
and the success or failure of a series of treaties, either signed or on
the table.
Thus, I oppose NATO expansion on the grounds that we are
sacrificing our long term relations with Russia on the altar of an ill-
conceived plan to haphazardly expand an outmoded military alliance--
ill-conceived for domestic political purposes, ill-conceived as a
legacy for one man, and ill-conceived since we are not clear on why,
how, when, and where to expand.
It is haphazard because we don't know how many countries will
eventually join, there is no clear definition of NATO's new mission,
and no clear idea of the costs.
I hope the Senate in its infinite wisdom will delay the process to
allow time for an informed debate on both sides of the Atlantic. As
George Kennan observed, ``Expanding NATO would be the most fateful
error of American policy in the entire post-cold war era.'' If that be
true, and I believe it is, then, Sir, we need to be cautious and
proceed with deliberate speed.
Mr. Chairman, let me thank you once again for this opportunity. I
will be pleased to answer any questions you or any other members of the
committee might have.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Admiral. We appreciate your
views, your perspective, and for contributing to this very
important debate.
Thank you, sir.
We will now call Charles Ciccolella to the witness table.
Mr. Ciccolella is the Assistant Director of the American
Legion. We welcome you.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES S. CICCOLELLA, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS DIVISION, AMERICAN
LEGION, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Ciccolella. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
opportunity to present the American Legion's testimony in
support of NATO expansion.
The American Legion has long recognized that the security
of the United States is tied to and depends on a stable Europe.
Ours, after all, is an organization founded by veterans of
World War I and dedicated to insuring that America should
always be militarily prepared. No one knows better than
veterans that America's security is tied to the security of
Europe.
Thousands of Americans fought and died in World War I and
World War II. Hundreds of thousands of others served during the
cold war and also endured many risks. If this century has
provided Americans and American veterans one lesson, it is that
continued engagement in Europe is a vital national security
interest of the United States.
Mr. Chairman, in the years since the demise of the Soviet
Union and the end of the cold war, the American Legion has come
to believe that we now have an unprecedented opportunity to
help shape a more stable Europe through the integration of the
Central and Eastern European nations with West European nations
and by the reduction of old ethnic disputes and military
rivalries.
That is why the American Legion wholeheartedly endorsed the
U.S. sponsored initiative, Partnership for Peace. That
initiative has provided Central and Eastern European nations an
opportunity for political and military cooperation. It has
encouraged them to transition to democratic, free market
societies.
Now it is time for America to take the next step. The
American Legion has taken that lead.
As early as 1995, delegates to our National Conventions
have repeatedly adopted and approved resolutions which
encourage these nations to continue participating in the
Partnership for Peace initiative and to consider applying for
NATO membership on a case by case basis.
Enlarging NATO is consistent with the American Legion's
principles of U.S. foreign policy, in particular the concept
that we advocate called ``democratic activism.'' In this case,
democratic activism means that the American Legion supports the
democratic right of these nations to join in the NATO alliance
if they meet the qualifications. This goes to the heart of
Senator Kerry's question. It is too soon to tell or to discuss
and prejudice the outcome of the debate on the Baltic nations.
The American Legion supports the right of those nations to
apply for membership in NATO if they meet the qualifications.
NATO today must respond to new challenges and threats. The
American Legion is convinced that the best way to address these
new threats is to expand on the gains which were made at the
expense of so many American service men and service women who
served during two World Wars and the cold war.
NATO enlargement is, in our view, the best way to help
prevent the possibly of another war in Europe.
This year at the Madrid Summit in July, three States were
formally invited to join NATO. It is probably no accident that
these three--Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic--
physically lie in an area which has often been called the
``geopolitical no-man's land'' of Europe.
The American Legion believes that when these three
countries join NATO, the so-called ``no man's land'' will
become a more stable region.
We are also well aware of the criticisms which have been
lodged against this initiative, that the costs involved in
enlarging NATO will be significantly higher, or that the United
States may become involved in entangling alliances which are
not in our interests, or that the relationship between Russia
and the United States could be jeopardized, possibly propelling
Russia to a resurgent nationalism.
The American Legion knows that expanding the alliance
represents a major commitment by the United States and the
other members of NATO. It will not be easy and it will not be
cheap. It will take many years for the new NATO members to
become fully integrated into the alliance or for their
militaries to be able to operate effectively as an integral
part of NATO forces.
Expanding the alliance does, in fact, entail new security
commitments and we believe that these must be the same
commitments, backed up by military force, if necessary, which
apply to all other members. We recognize, too, that Russia's
interests must be considered, but we believe Russia should have
no veto and certainly no decisionmaking authority with regard
to NATO's actions.
Mr. Chairman, the 3 million members of the American Legion
believe that the accession of these 3 States to the NATO
alliance represents a major step forward for the security of
Europe as well as the security of America. Enlarging NATO will
enhance the alliance by making it stronger.
Contrary to what some witnesses have proposed, we are
already seeing a more constructive relationship developing
between the alliance and its former adversary. It is also
reaffirming America's pivotal leadership role in the collective
security apparatus of Europe.
Most important of all, the American Legion believes that
enlarging NATO will help prevent American soldiers having to
fight another war in Europe.
Mr. Chairman, this is a foreign policy initiative that
makes sense.
That concludes my testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ciccolella follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Ciccolella
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, The American Legion
appreciates the opportunity to present testimony in support of NATO
enlargement. The American Legion has long recognized the security of
the United States depends upon a stable and secure Europe. In 1919,
battle tired World War I veterans founded The American Legion to ensure
the proper care of returning veterans and to ensure that America would
never again be militarily unprepared.
Unfortunately, the Legion's call for military preparedness
following World War I, through the concepts of Selective Service and
Universal Military Training, were largely unheeded. Sadly, America's
unwillingness to ensure a stable Europe after World War I resulted in
American service members, once again, fighting and dying in foreign
lands. The impulses which guide this organization's values regarding
the security of Europe, are the first hand experiences of Legionnaires
who helped liberate Europe and served to protect NATO members during
and after World War II.
If this century has provided American veterans one lesson, it is
that engagement in Europe, whether through the Marshall Plan or by
forward-deployed military forces is a vital national security issue for
the United States. Since the end of the Cold War, The American Legion
believes the United States is faced with an unprecedented opportunity
to help shape a more stable Europe through the integration of former
Soviet Bloc nations with western Europe and the reduction of ethnic
disputes and military rivalries.
In 1994, The American Legion wholeheartedly endorsed the U.S.-
sponsored PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (PFP) Initiative. The American Legion
believes the PFP initiative has provided a sound framework for both
political and military cooperation, as well as crisis management in
humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping efforts. In April 1996, the
Ambassador from the Republic of Slovakia, Dr. Branislav Lichardus, and
Colonel George Buskirk, from the Indiana Army National Guard, spoke to
The American Legion on their relationship as a result of the
Partnership for Peace initiative. It was clear to Legionnaires that
such Partnership For Peace relationships have forged strong links among
U.S. and NATO forces and their new democratic partners from Eastern and
Central Europe. The Partnership for Peace Initiative has also helped
provide many former Soviet Bloc countries political, economic and
military encouragement in their efforts to become more democratic, free
market nations.
As early as 1995, The American Legion commissioned an Ad Hoc Group
to study the issue of NATO enlargement. The study group first reported
favorably on the continuing effectiveness of the NATO Alliance and
reaffirmed that U.S. membership in NATO continues to serve the vital
interest of the United States. In addition, the study concluded that
expanding the NATO Alliance was consistent with The American Legion's
principles of U.S. Foreign Policy, particularly the concept of
``Democratic Activism.'' This concept supports the democratic right of
Central and Eastern European nations to apply for membership into the
NATO Alliance.
As a result of the study group's efforts, delegates to The American
Legion's National Convention repeatedly approved and adopted
resolutions encouraging the Central and Eastern European nations
continuing participation in the Partnership For Peace Initiative and
their applications for NATO membership. However, The American Legion
believes applications should only be favorably considered on an
individual basis. Each candidate should also accept and conform with
the principles, policies and procedures adopted by all standing members
of the NATO Alliance.
Last year, three Central European nations were identified as
leading candidates for membership into NATO. At the Madrid NATO Summit
in July of 1997, these candidates were formally invited to join the
Alliance. It is probably no accident that these three--Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic, physically lie in an area identified as the
``geopolitical no-man's land of Europe.'' The American Legion believes
that when these three countries--Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic--are accepted for membership by the United States and the
other 15 Members of NATO, this so-called ``no man's land'' will be
replaced by a more stable region and result in closer political,
economic and military ties with the West.
The American Legion fully supports expanding the NATO Alliance with
the addition of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The American
Legion believes history has demonstrated the need to pursue the
inclusion of these countries. Securing the stability of Central Europe
by expanding NATO to these three candidates is in the best interest of
the United States. The American Legion believes the best way to address
the new threats of the Post Cold War environment is to expand on the
gains achieved during the Cold War. NATO enlargement appears to be the
best alternative to ensure stability in Europe.
Critics of NATO enlargement assert the costs involved in enlarging
the Alliance will be significantly higher than current administration
estimates. While various budget estimates differ, these estimates share
underlying assumptions that the United States should be required to
fund its share (some 40%) of the interoperablility or direct
enlargement costs. These interoperability costs, which total about 10
billion dollars over a 10-year period (approximately 200 million
dollars a year for the United States), are roughly one-third of the
total NATO enlargement estimates. It is The American Legion's
understanding that the two other major categories of costs,
modernization and power projection, will be funded by the current and
new NATO members. For example, the military modernization expense for
the new members will be born by those nations themselves, while the
costs for enhancing each NATO nation's power projection capabilities
are to be born collectively by the current members of the Alliance.
In summary, it is our understanding that three NATO dollars will be
spent for each U.S. dollar committed to fund NATO Enlargement. The
American Legion believes this is an equitable distribution. Both the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State have estimated the
direct enlargement costs may actually be less than originally
estimated. According to both the Departments of State and Defense,
further investigation reveals that Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic have better developed infrastructures to support their
military integration into NATO than original estimates.
Thus, the relatively small U.S. contribution to fund NATO expansion
appears to be a fair price for the expected return of stability and
security in Europe. The American Legion National Commander, Anthony
Jordan, recently returned from a mission to NATO Headquarters in
Brussels, as well as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. During an
interview, Commander Jordan was questioned about the costs of expanding
NATO. Commander Jordan noted that ``this is not a cost issue, this is a
peace issue.'' Simply put, protecting American lives from future
hostilities in Europe is well worth the monetary costs.
Expanding the alliance will also entail new security commitments
and possible risks. The American Legion is fully aware of the dangers
of America becoming involved in new entangling alliances. This is an
important concern because the same security guarantees which protect
current NATO members must be extended to new members. This means that
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic must be defended in the same way
as all others nations in the Alliance. What critics ignore is the force
structure contributions of these new members. After all, each new
member will be contributing its own military forces and will be
shouldering responsibility for its share of the collective defense of
Europe.
The American Legion is convinced that Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic will take their security commitments seriously. During
National Commander Jordan's recent NATO tour, he also witnessed several
military live-fire exercises and visited with Polish, Hungarian and
Czech forces. Commander Jordan concluded these three nations are fully
prepared now to contribute immediately to NATO. Commander Jordan also
noted that each of these nation's military personnel truly want to join
NATO to actively contribute to the collective security of Europe.
Some critics have argued that enlarging NATO could seriously
jeopardize U.S.-Russian relations and perhaps lead Russia towards a
resurgent in nationalism. In addition, some believe NATO enlargement
would encourage Russia to abrogate its responsibilities with regards to
various treaties and arms control agreements. While no one can rule out
such possibilities, The American Legion believes NATO's relationship
with Russia must evolve from one oriented at confronting and containing
the former Soviet Union to one focused on a stabilized Central and
Eastern Europe. Mr. Chairman, the Cold War is over and working with the
former Soviet Union to resolve our differences is essential to the
success of the NATO enlargement initiative.
The question our Legionnaires have raised, however, is whether the
United States is better off in any of these scenarios with an expanded
NATO or with the current NATO. The membership of The American Legion
has concluded that the United States is better off as a member of an
expanded alliance. Like the United States and current NATO members, the
people of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic want security and
stability in Europe. As National Commander Jordan stated, ``it will be
good for the United States to have more allies in NATO (because) it
gives us another shield, so to speak, from possible threats to our
national security interests.''
The American Legion believes the accession of these new candidates
to the NATO Alliance will promote the national security interests of
the United States. Enhancing the NATO collective security alliance will
mean a more stable, secure and democratic Europe. United States'
support for NATO enlargement also reaffirms our pivotal leadership role
in Europe. Most important of all, The American Legion believes that
when NATO is enlarged, there will be much less chance that American
soldiers will be called upon to fight another war in Europe.
Mr. Chairman, The American Legion applauds your leadership and the
leadership of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for conducting
full and thorough hearings on the implications of expanding NATO with
the entry of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and possibly later on,
other invited nations. The American Legion is pleased that Congress and
the administration have addressed this issue in a bipartisan approach
and believes it is the right course in addressing and resolving the
concerns of the American people with regard to this major foreign
policy initiative. The American Legion urges this committee to report
NATO enlargement favorably to the full Senate so it may provide its
advice and consent to the addition of these states to the NATO Alliance
in a prompt and timely manner.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. Thank you.
__________
SEVENTY-NINTH NATIONAL CONVENTION
OF
THE AMERICAN LEGION
ORLANDO, FLORIDA
SEPTEMBER 2, 3, 4, 1997
RESOLUTION NO.:
102
SUBJECT:
POLICY ON NATO
EXPANSION
Origin:
Maryland
Submitted By:
Foreign Relations
3WHEREAS, The American Legion has long recognized that European
security and preservation of the NATO Alliance are critical to
America's vital national security interests; and
WHEREAS, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization of 1949 anticipated the
addition of member states which has included Greece and Turkey in 1952,
the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982; and
WHEREAS, The American Legion wholeheartedly supported the 1994 U.S.-
sponsored initiative known as the Partnership for Peace (PFP) Program,
including the concept of extending membership in NATO to Central and
Eastern European nations on a case by case basis consistent with their
commitments and participation in the PFP; and
WHEREAS, The American Legion believes that expanding NATO will: 1) make
a stronger alliance, 2) protect against another European war, 3) defend
against old European ethnic and border disputes, and 4) help to build
an undivided Europe; and
WHEREAS, On April 22, 1997, the Senate created a bipartisan NATO
Observer Group to work cooperatively with the Administration throughout
the NATO Enlargement process; and
WHEREAS, Russia will be consulted on NATO Alliance issues but will have
no veto authority or ability to delay entry into the Alliance for any
country; and
WHEREAS, On May 27, 1997 NATO and Russia signed a ``Founding Act'' to
create a more constructive relationship between the alliance and its
former adversary; and
WHEREAS, At the Madrid NATO Summit meeting in July 1997, the members of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization extended invitations to Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic to join the Alliance and formal
accession talks are now underway with those states; and
WHEREAS, The first nations which received invitations to join NATO will
not be the last and the Partnership For Peace Program will be enhanced
for those nations not initially invited into the Alliance and; now,
therefore, be it
RESOLVED, By The American Legion in National Convention assembled in
Orlando, Florida, September 2, 3, 4, 1997, That The American Legion
urges the President to continue to consult fully with the Congress
throughout the process of NATO Expansion; and, be it further
RESOLVED, That The American Legion urges the Senate to conduct full and
thorough hearings on the proposals to expand NATO with the entry of
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic and at a later time other
invited nations, and to resolve the issues and concerns which will
address the implications of expanding the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization in a bipartisan manner; and, be it finally
RESOLVED, That following this public debate, The American Legion urges
the United States Senate to provide its advice and consent to the
addition of these states to the NATO Alliance in a prompt and timely
manner.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Ciccolella. We appreciate it.
We now call forward Mr. David Harris, Executive Director of
the American Jewish Committee. Mr. Harris, welcome, and please
go forward.
STATEMENT OF DAVID A. HARRIS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AMERICAN
JEWISH COMMITTEE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK
Mr. Harris. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.
It is an honor to appear before the committee this morning
to discuss with you why the American Jewish Committee supports
the expansion of NATO.
The American Jewish Committee, Mr. Chairman, was founded in
1906 in response to a series of pogroms carried out by Czarist
officials against Jews in Russia and elsewhere in Eastern
Europe. In the 91 years since our founding, we have seen the
horrible consequences produced by instability in Central and
Eastern Europe. It is precisely because we carry with us the
memory of those horrors and because we believe that America is
best served by an active and vigorous foreign policy that the
American Jewish Committee became the first Jewish organization
in this country to publicly come out in support of NATO
enlargement.
We are convinced, Mr. Chairman, that opportunity in life is
temporary, not permanent. It is either seized or it is lost.
The opportunity presented by an expanded NATO is one that
should not, must not, be lost, for an expanded NATO means
greater stability and security for Central Europe, a region
that has already been the cockpit for two World Wars that
brought such horror to the world.
Mr. Chairman, I have spent my professional and academic
life involved with affairs in Russia and the surrounding
region. I have lived and worked in the Soviet Union. I am
convinced that to leave Europe divided at its old cold war
boundaries, to ignore the lands to the East, to have NATO
members turn their collective backs on Central Europe would be
to ignore the lessons of history, the dangers to European and
Western security that lurk there.
From the Balkans to the Caucasus, more Europeans have died
violently in this region in the past 5 years than in the
previous 45. As Vaclav Havel, the distinguished President of
the Czech Republic, said, ``Just as it is impossible for one-
half of a room to be forever warm and the other half cold, it
is equally unthinkable that two different Europes should
forever exist next to each other without detriment to both.''
In addition, Mr. Chairman, retaining the North Atlantic
Alliance in its cold war configuration would have meant
continuing an historic injustice--the abandonment by the
democratic West of the small nations of Central Europe. Let me
remind us all that it happened in 1938 at Munich; it happened
in 1945 at Yalta; and the West watched from the sidelines as
Soviet power squashed fledgling and promising democratic
movements in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in
Poland in 1981.
An expanded NATO not only strengthens democracy in those
nations embraced by the alliance at Madrid, but it encourages
the other nations in the region to accelerate their own
democratic and market reforms as well as resolving long-
simmering disputes.
The 1994 Poland-Lithuania agreement on good neighborly
relations and the 1996 Hungary-Romania bilateral friendship
treaty are but two examples of this conflict resolution.
Moreover, Mr. Chairman, integration in the Western Alliance
offers a real safeguard for the rights of Jews and other
minority communities, historically the target of national,
religious, or ethnic hatreds in too many places.
Throughout its history, NATO has been a collective defense
pact only. Russian reaction to NATO's decision to extend
membership to three former Soviet Bloc States has been far more
restrained than many have suggested. Indeed, just as was the
case prior to the introduction of NATO forces in the former
Yugoslavia, opponents of NATO expansion have invoked supposed
Russian opposition to any display of Western power largely in
order to boost their own case against using it.
The Founding Act signed by Russia and NATO in May does give
Russia a voice in alliance affairs immediately, while those
countries currently being invited will not have a seat at the
table for at least 2 years.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to add a word, if I may, as well
about Senator Kerry's probing questions. It would be premature
to become too specific today about the scope of a second or
even a third tranche of NATO expansion. But it is, I believe,
very important to keep alive NATO's openness, as demonstrated
in Madrid, to further ways of expansion. To do otherwise would
be to dash the hopes of tens of millions of Europeans, from the
Balkans to the Baltics, that their future would not under any
circumstance include membership in NATO and, therefore, to
permit the risk of a recreation of European spheres of
influence, a profoundly destabilizing step that could have
unintended, indeed unforeseeable, consequences.
At the very same time, though, the United States and NATO
must make the Founding Act with Russia work both in letter and
in spirit to ease Russia's historical fear of encirclement.
This requires ongoing, careful, nurturing attention both to
Russian--NATO and Russian--U.S. ties and to attend to those
many areas of cooperation both current and potential while
periodically reminding Moscow that the new NATO of today is not
an alliance directed against it.
Last, we should not look at NATO expansion as a zero--sum
game where expansion means forfeiting our ties with Russia.
That is simply wrong-headed. It is not the American intention,
it is not NATO's intention, and it certainly ought not to be
the Russian intention as it moves toward institutionalizing its
democratic and market reforms.
With the implosion of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union,
Europe is poised at one of those infrequent moments of
historical definition where choices are clear and alternatives
stark. We respectfully urge the U.S. Senate to grasp the
significance of this moment, the chance to solidify the
democratic ideal, and to enhance European and Western security.
The history of our century teaches, or ought to teach, that
American leadership is indispensable in building an undivided,
democratic, and peaceful Europe, that leadership embodied today
in the drive to NATO expansion continues a proud tradition and,
therefore, that we are pleased to support it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Harris follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Harris
Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear before the Committee to
discuss with you why the American Jewish Committee supports the
expansion of NATO. The American Jewish Committee was founded in 1906 in
response to a series of brutal pogroms carried out by Czarist officials
against Russian Jews. In the ninety-one years since our founding we
have seen the horrible consequences produced by instability in Central
and Eastern Europe. It is because we carry with us the memory of those
horrors, and because we believe that America is best served by an
active and vigorous foreign policy, that the American Jewish Committee
was the first Jewish organization in the United States to publicly come
out in favor of NATO enlargement following the historic Madrid Summit.
On June 26, we observed that ``An enlarged NATO will mean greater
security and stability and also hasten the political and economic
integration of Europe.'' This view was confirmed to us just last month
when the AJC participated in a fact-finding visit to the three proposed
new member countries--the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland -organized
by the Departments of State and Defense. This mission toured military
facilities in the three countries and met with senior defense and
military officials. It only confirmed our judgment that an enlarged
NATO is good for the stability and security of the newly freed peoples
of the region, is good for European security and integration, and is
good for the United States.
We are convinced that opportunity is temporary, not permanent.
Either it is seized or it is lost. The opportunity presented by an
expanded NATO is one that should not be lost. An expanded NATO means
greater stability and security for Central Europe, a region that was
the cockpit for the two world wars that brought such horror to the
world--and to the Jewish people.
Mr. Chairman, I have spent my professional and academic life
involved with affairs in Russia and the surrounding region. I lived in
the Soviet Union. I was National Coordinator of the historic Freedom
Sunday for Soviet Jewry. I am convinced that to leave Europe divided at
its old Cold War boundaries, to ignore the lands to the east, to have
NATO members turn their collective backs on Central Europe, would be to
ignore the dangers to European--and Western--security that lurk there.
From the Balkans the Caucasus, more Europeans have died violently in
this region in the last five years than in the previous 45. As Vaclav
Havel, the distinguished president of the Czech Republic, noted: ``Just
as it is impossible for one-half a room to be forever warm and the
other half cold, it is equally unthinkable that two different Europes
should forever exist next to each other without detriment to both--and
it is the stabler and more prosperous one that would pay the higher
price.''
In addition, retaining the North Atlantic alliance in its Cold War
configuration would have meant continuing an historic injustice--the
abandonment by the democratic West of the small nations of Central
Europe. It happened in 1938 at Munich and 1945 at Yalta, and the West
watched from the sidelines as Soviet power squashed fledgling
democratic movements in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and
Poland in 1981.
An expanded NATO not only strengthens democracy in those nations
embraced by the alliance at Madrid but encourages the other nations in
the region to accelerate democratic and economic reforms, as well as
resolve long-simmering disputes. The 1994 Poland-Lithuania agreement on
good neighborly relations and military cooperation, that established a
basis for friendly bilateral relations, and the 1996 Hungary-Romania
bilateral friendship treaty, that extends mutual recognition of the
rights of national minorities, are just two examples. Moreover,
integration in the Western alliance offers a real safeguard for the
rights of Jews and other minority communities, historically the target
of national, religious or ethnic hatreds in too many places.
Further, an expanded and strengthened NATO insures that sufficient
military force and supporting infrastructure are in place in Southern
Europe and along the Mediterranean littoral if need should arise for
power projection by the Western democracies into neighboring regions in
Eurasia.
NATO throughout its 50-year history has been a collective defense
pact only. Russian reaction to NATO's decision to extend membership to
three former Soviet bloc states has been far more restrained than many
had suggested. Indeed, just as was the case prior to the introduction
of NATO forces in the former Yugoslavia, opponents of NATO expansion
have invoked supposed Russian opposition to any display of Western
power largely in order to bolster their own case against using it. The
founding act signed by Russia and NATO in May gives Russia a voice in
alliance affairs immediately, while the countries being invited now
will not have a seat at the table for at least two years.
With the implosion of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, Europe
is poised at one of those infrequent moments of historical definition,
when choices are clear and alternatives stark. We respectfully urge the
United State Senate to grasp the significance of this moment, the
chance to solidify the democratic ideal and enhance European--and
Western--security, and support the proposed enlargement of NATO.
The history of our century teaches that American leadership is
indispensable in building an undivided, democratic, and peaceful
Europe. That leadership, embodied today in the drive to NATO expansion,
continues a proud tradition. The American Jewish Committee believes
that, while the cost of NATO expansion will not be negligible, the cost
of failure to assure European stability and security would be far
higher. We therefore urge the Committee to support the Administration
in its steady, incremental broadening of the Western Alliance.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Harris. We appreciate your
testimony very much.
We are now pleased to call Mr. John T. Joyce, President of
the International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers
to the witness table. We welcome you, sir.
STATEMENT OF JOHN T. JOYCE, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
BRICKLAYERS AND ALLIED CRAFTWORKERS, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to summarize the written remarks that I have
presented to the committee supporting the expansion of NATO at
this point.
I think it is obvious to most people the fact that the
labor movement in the United States, both directly and through
our society more generally, made an enormous investment in
waging and winning the cold war because we recognized the
profound threat that Soviet communism posed to democracy and to
free trade unions.
Our experience working with trade unions in Central and
Eastern Europe and not so incidentally with trade unions
elsewhere tells us that the advances that have taken place in
democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, such as they are, are
fragile and that the dynamics that began with the collapse of
the Soviet Union are very uncertain as to their outcome.
I think too many people are dangerously sanguine on that
particular point.
It would, indeed, be a tragic waste of the investment that
we have made as a society. It would be a tragic waste in terms
of wasting that money itself and in the consequences that could
relatively easily flow from it.
Expansion of NATO is certainly a necessary part of the
effort that is required at this point. It is, of course,
necessary to also address the broader social, political, and
economic issues that exist here, just as the Marshall Plan
addressed those areas in the period immediately after the
Second World War and assured the initial success of NATO.
We, therefore, urge the committee's support for expansion
of NATO. We express the hope that ratification will be not only
bipartisan but overwhelming. We think it would be indeed
unfortunate if at this time elements within Russia should
erroneously begin to perceive signals that it would be possible
to forestall the further expansion of NATO to those countries
that meet the membership requirements of NATO that have been
established.
It would be extremely unfortunate if we saw a reemergence
of the Sonnenfeldt doctrine that held that the primacy of
Russia in terms of its sphere of influence in that area had to
be the dominating factor in our foreign policy.
Because we were able to resist that doctrine, we were
successful in the cold war. It would be a shame if, at this
juncture, we allowed that doctrine to reemerge and, therefore,
make it possible to lose the peace.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Joyce follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Joyce
When Lech Walesa, then the leader of the new independent trade
union movement of Poland, met for the first time with a representative
of the American trade union movement his first question was ``What
about the Sonnenfeldt doctrine?''
The Sonnenfeldt doctrine was the notion that the interests of the
United States would best be served by maintaining or helping to
maintain a stable relationship between the Soviet Union and its East
European satellites. Furthermore, it said we should do nothing to
disturb the stability of that relationship. The widespread view, the
dominant view in the liberal and conservative communities, was that the
Soviet system was here to stay.
The American trade union movement rejected that notion and despite
the protestations of two successive secretaries of state, one Democrat
and one Republican, we continued to support the Solidarity trade union
of Poland when it was forced to go underground in 1981. We were
explicitly urged not to set up a fund to aid the Polish workers of
Solidarity because we were ``meddling in very, very delicate waters'',
and we might upset relations there. Whole theories and policies were
based on the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine. And people were miseducated for a
generation.
But all the people of Central and Eastern Europe, not having been
persuaded by the Sonnenfeldt doctrine, simply made a shambles of what
was a staple of American foreign policy for years and years and years.
Although more sophisticated analysts mistook workers underground for
the dead and buried, the workers of Poland proved to be the vanguard of
the revolution against communism.
The trade union approach to foreign policy always understood that
when the workers of Eastern Europe finally spoke for themselves they
would have it as their aim to establish democracy. Now that so many of
our assumptions have been proven true, three of those nations are
candidates to join NATO, the alliance of democracies.
The American trade union movement, along with our society, made an
enormous investment in waging and winning the cold war. It would be a
tragedy if we dissipated that investment by failing to take the next
logical step necessary to advance the cause of democracy. Given the
fragile nature of progress to date, modest expenditures on democracy
building, are the least we can do to honor the sacrifices of blood and
treasure already made.
Vaclav Havei, the President of the Czech Republic has said ``the
alliance should urgently remind itself that it is first and foremost an
instrument of democracy intended to defend mutually held and created
political and spiritual values. It must see itself as not as a pact of
nations against a more or less obvious enemy, but as a guarantor of
Euro-American civilization and thus as a pillar of global security.''
His view reminds us of NATO's roots. In the preamble to its
original charter the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty stated that
``they are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and
civilization of their peoples, founded on principles of democracy,
individual liberty and the rule of law''. And Article 2 further states
that ``the parties will contribute toward the further development of
peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their
free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the
principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting
the conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate
conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage
economic collaboration between any or all of them.''
Some of those who oppose NATO enlargement, act as if democracy is a
modular technology which needs no more than the appropriate plug to
ensure peace and stability. More accurately, democracy is like a
flowering plant which requires the proper nurturing and nutrients to
assure growth and survival. It would be foolish to believe that the
collapse of communism means that there are no longer threats to the
values of freedom and democracy we share.
The dangers of our day come not from the current government in
Moscow, but from local conflicts and ancient hatreds stoked by
opportunistic nationalists and as the role of NATO in Bosnia has
demonstrated, NATO is the only international institution capable of
confronting and conquering such threats.
We delude ourselves and risk the failure of this endeavor if we
treat the enlargement of the alliance as no more than the sharing of
military hardware. Instead as President Havel has suggested ``NATO
expansion should be perceived as a continuous process, in which the
nations of Central and Eastern Europe mature toward the meaning, values
and goals of the enlarged and revived alliance.''
Just as De Tocqueville noted the unique set of American
institutions that assured the success of our American democracy, it is
essential that we assist the emerging democracies of, Central and
Eastern Europe to build enduring institutions of democracy and civil
society in their own countries. The hatred that has poisoned what was
once Yugoslavia is not unique to that country among all in Europe.
And as the founders of NATO indicated in their original charter,
the avoidance of economic conflict is also essential to stability.
Security, I am saying, is no longer just a military term. We need to
recognize that the salient issues of military consequence are a
necessary, but not a sufficient aspect of an updated approach to
security questions.
The new democracies need both a strong elected government, with a
military responsive to civilian authority and a strong private sector
comprised of business, farmers, professionals and unions which all add
to the defusion of power to the citizens in society. An economy or a
government run by the same old bureaucrats in market or democratic
dress will assure future inequity, demagoguery and the sort of
instability that could spill over borders. Preemptive measures against
these risks could in the end save the lives of American troops.
The lessons of the Marshall Plan should not be lost on us. Those
efforts were essential to a successful NATO in an earlier era. We
ignore these issues only at our peril.
To recognize that such problems are part of our responsibility is
not the easiest path to take. But if we ignore the full nature of the
challenges before us we will insure a far, far more difficult set of
tasks will come when the failure to build the necessary civil society,
the democratic and economic basis for long term stability, catches up
with us.
So I support the enlargement of NATO, but I urge Congress to
concurrently support that expansion with the requisite assistance for
the development of pluralist democracy that has been the essential to
the success NATO has known to date.
In the late 1990's, as in 1949, the parties will best ``contribute
toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international
relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a
better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions
are founded, and by promoting the conditions of stability and well
being'' through the promotion of the principles of democracy.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Joyce. We
appreciate your testimony.
Colonel Herb Harmon is next. We welcome you, sir and invite
your testimony.
STATEMENT OF COLONEL HERBERT N. HARMON, USMCR, NATIONAL
PRESIDENT, RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
WASHINGTON, DC
Colonel Harmon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is a privilege to be here today representing the nearly
100,000 members of the Reserve Officers Association to let you
know our position on the issue of NATO enlargement.
Our association was established 75 years ago at the behest
of General of the Armies John J. Pershing by commissioned
officer veterans of World War I, known at that time as ``the
Great War.'' ROA's founders were concerned about what they
perceived as our Nation's drift into unilateral disarmament and
isolationism. They believed that a strong military was the best
defense against the threat of future wars.
In 1950, President Harry S. Truman, a founding member of
ROA Chapter 1 in Independence Missouri, signed our
Congressional charter. That charter set forth our association's
object and purpose--to support and promote the development and
execution of ``a military policy for the United States that
will provide adequate national security.''
Mr. Chairman, our object and purpose remain unchanged and
our association continues to speak out on those issues that
affect our military policy and national defense. NATO
enlargement is very much within our purview.
This past July, at our annual National Convention in Kansas
City, our general membership approved a resolution in support
of NATO enlargement. This resolution recognizes the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization as the most successful defensive
alliance in history, one that has survived 50 years of
unparalleled international tensions which, absent its
existence, could have led to a Third World war.
One great measure of NATO's success is the strategic
relationship that we have been able to achieve in the post cold
war world with Russia and the other, now independent, nations
of the former Soviet Union. This strategic relationship is
based upon mutual cooperation, dialog, confidence building,
crisis prevention, and the Partnership for Peace with the
nations of Central and Eastern Europe.
This relationship recognizes the need for stability and
mutual security among all of the nations of the North Atlantic
region and fosters emerging trends toward closer integration
within Europe.
We believe that, over time, the essential defensive nature
of the alliance will become clear to all parties and, with it,
the realization that NATO threatens no one. NATO is and will
remain a purely defensive alliance whose fundamental purpose is
to preserve peace in the Euro-Atlantic area and to provide
security to its members.
I have just returned from Europe where I had the
opportunity to visit with numerous military and civilian
officials from Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland, as well
as NATO officials and the military officers from the European
Command. I was able to meet with embassy officials, visit with
Hungarian Air Force pilots, witness military training in the
Czech Republic, and receive briefings from officers of the
Polish General Staff.
In all of these encounters, I came away with a strong sense
of the growing confidence of these now independent nations in
the processes and institutions of democratic government as well
as their sense of themselves as partners in the greater
European community.
To me, NATO enlargement means growing democracy.
Studies on NATO enlargement indicate that it will
contribute to enhanced stability and security for all countries
in the Euro--Atlantic area by encouraging and supporting
democratic reforms, including civilian and democratic control
over the military.
It will foster patterns and habits of cooperation,
consultation, and consensus building that characterize
relations among present members of the alliance. Enlargement
will promote good neighborly relations in the whole Euro--
Atlantic area and increase transparency in defense planning and
military budgets, and, thus, confidence among States. It will
reinforce the tendency toward integration and cooperation in
Europe and strengthen NATO's abilities to contribute to
European and international security and to support peacekeeping
activities in cooperation with the U.N.
Finally, it will strengthen and broaden the Transatlantic
partnership.
The Reserve Officers Association of the United States
strongly urges you to support NATO enlargement consistent with
the United States policy. NATO enlargement is the logical
consequence and fruit of the success that NATO has enjoyed
since it was established in April, 1949. Enlargement is both
the reward and the process that will further enable and secure
the blessings of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness to
NATO members and to provide increased stability to all peoples
of the world.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Harmon follows:]
Prepared Statement Colonel Harmon
Mister Chairman and Members of the Committee, it is a privilege to
be here this morning representing the nearly 100,000 members of the
Reserve Officer's Association, to discuss ROA's position on the issue
of NATO enlargement.
Our association was established 75 years ago at the behest of
General of the Armies John J. Pershing by commissioned officer veterans
of the World War I, what was called then ``the Great War.'' RONs
founders were concerned about what they perceived as our nation's drift
into unilateral disarmament and isolationism. They believed that a
strong military was the best defense against the threat of future wars.
In 1950, President Harry S Truman, a founding member of ROA Chapter
1 in Independence Missouri, signed our congressional charter. That
charter set forth our association's object and purpose--to support and
promote the development and execution of ``a military policy for the
United States that will provide adequate national security. . . .''
Mister Chairman, our object and purpose remain unchanged, and our
association continues to speak out on those issues that affect our
military policy and national defense. NATO enlargement is very much
within our purview, and for many of the same reasons that led General
Pershing and his fellow veterans of the Great War to found ROA in 1922.
This past July, at our annual National Convention in Kansas City,
our general membership approved a resolution in support of NATO
enlargement. This resolution (ROA Resolution No. 97-10) recognizes the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization as the most successful defensive
alliance in history, one that has survived 50 years of unparalleled
international tensions, which absent its existence, could have led to a
third world war.
One great measure of NATO's success is the strategic relationship
that we have been able to achieve in the post-Cold War world with
Russia and the other, now independent nations of the former Soviet
Union. This strategic relationship is based upon mutual cooperation,
dialogue, confidence building, crisis prevention, and the Partnership
for Peace with the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. This
relationship recognizes the need for stability and mutual security
among all of the nations of the North Atlantic region, and fosters
emerging trends toward closer integration within Europe. We believe
that over time the essential, defensive nature of the alliance will
become clear to all parties, and with it the realization that NATO
threatens no one. NATO is, and will remain, a purely defensive alliance
whose fundamental purpose is to preserve peace in the Euro-Atlantic
area and to provide security to its members.
I have just returned from Europe, where I had the opportunity to
visit with numerous military and civilian officials from Hungary, the
Czech Republic, and Poland, as well NATO officials and US military
officials from the European Command. I was able to meet with US embassy
officials, visit with Hungarian air force pilots, witness military
training in the Czech Republic, and receive briefings from officers of
the Polish General Staff. In all of these encounters, I came away with
a strong sense of the growing confidence of these now-independent
nations in the processes and institutions of democratic government, as
well as their sense of themselves as partners in the greater European
community. To me, NATO enlargement means growing democracy.
Studies on NATO enlargement indicate that it will contribute to
enhanced stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic
area by encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including
civilian and democratic control over the military. It will foster
patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation, and consensus
building that characterize relations among present members of the
alliance. Enlargement will promote good-neighborly relations in the
whole Euro-Atlantic area, and increase transparency in defense planning
and military budgets and, thus, confidence among states. It will
reinforce the tendency toward integration and cooperation in Europe,
and strengthen NATO's ability to contribute to, European and
international security and to support peacekeeping activities in
cooperation with the UN. Finally, it will strengthen and broaden the
transatlantic partnership.
The Reserve Officers Association of the United States strongly
urges you to support NATO enlargement consistent with United States
policy. NATO enlargement is the logical consequence and fruit of the
success that NATO has enjoyed since its establishment in April 1949.
Enlargement is both the reward and the process that will further enable
and secure the blessings of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness
to NATO members, and provide increased stability to all peoples.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Colonel and the Reserve Officers
Association also for participating in this hearing.
Colonel Harmon. Thank you very much.
Senator Smith. We will call our final witness, Dr. Alvin
Rubinstein of the Political Science Department of the
University of Pennsylvania. We welcome you, Doctor.
STATEMENT OF DR. ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN, POLITICAL SCIENCE
DEPARTMENT, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, PHILADELPHIA,
PENNSYLVANIA
Dr. Rubinstein. It is a pleasure to be here and I very much
appreciate the honor of appearing before the committee. I will
try not to be more than my 5 minutes.
I will limit my comments on the shortcomings of NATO
enlargement to several interrelated issues that have been
largely overlooked in the hearing so far: First, the U.S.
national interest in Europe; second, the German question; and,
finally, the effect of enlargement on U.S. policy and options
in East Asia.
America's vital interests on the European continent have
been to prevent any hostile power from dominating the European
land mass. Three times in this century the United States
expended enormous efforts to defeat an aggressive power's quest
for control of Europe. Twice the enemy was Germany, once the
Soviet Union.
Today, the U.S. led NATO alliance is the dominant military
force on the continent. Strategically, conditions in Europe are
conducive to a Pax Americana that is affordable, supportable,
and credible. There is in place a structure of power different
from any that existed in previous epochs. The United States is
the preeminent power and seeks only to promote a durable peace.
No European country has any prospect of supplanting its
position.
NATO anchors Germany in a U.S.-dominated security system,
helps deepen the historic Franco-German reconciliation, and
buys valuable time to advance West European integration.
A secure strategic environment is predicated on stable
relationships, and in NATO this means maintaining the present
equilibrium of forces among the inter-dependent actors.
Any introduction of new elements must affect the structure
of power and the cohesion that have heretofore shaped the
behavior of the alliance. Certainly no alliance has
strengthened itself by embracing weak, dependent, resource poor
new members, none of whom is in danger of attack.
But utopian engineering is apt to trigger troublesome
consequences with respect to Germany. Germany is already the
most powerful country in Western Europe, a dominant member of
the European Union, and commercially and financially the most
influential actor in Central and Eastern Europe.
NATO enlargement is a geostrategic gift that places Germany
once again at the center of Europe. Far from resolving the old
question of disproportionate German power in Europe, as was
suggested here a few days ago, NATO enlargement stirs up
unpleasant historical memories.
One result may be rekindled uneasiness between Germany and
France and between Germany and Russia. Another may be delayed
European integration as France and Britain reassess the
implications of Germany's newly enhanced status.
Any geopolitical development, however well intentioned,
that transforms Germany from an ordinary nation-state into a
strategic hub radiating political and military, as well as
economic, influence across much of Europe will pose problems
for America's presently unchallenged dominance.
Finally, there is an essential connection between the
increased commitments the United States would make toward
Europe through NATO enlargement and its ability to act
effectively in a variety of volatile situations in East Asia.
Whereas in Europe, political systems are stable, defense
expenditures are declining, and territorial and ethnic
irredentism marginalized, in East Asia very different trends
prevail. Uncertainty in Asia means increased defense costs. How
much of America's resources will need to be committed there?
How extensive a power projection capability is required, and
what will public sentiment support over the longer term?
In light of these indeterminate variables in East Asia,
prudence would suggest the United States not assume unnecessary
responsibilities in Europe. Also, it is not true that U.S.
credibility would suffer if NATO enlargement were rejected or
were postponed for 5 to 10 years to allow prospective members
to demonstrate that they do, in fact, meet the criteria for
membership laid out in the original Partnership for Peace
proposal. It is not the U.S. long-standing commitment to NATO
that is being debated. The only issue is the enlargement of
NATO.
America's credibility is not being called into doubt, only
President Clinton's judgment. No country will end its alliance
with the United States as a consequence of the Senate's vote on
enlargement. NATO will not wither away.
Nor does the honor of the United States require that the
Senate support a policy which the President cannot demonstrate
is in the national interest. On the contrary, the honor and
integrity of the democratic process require that Senators vote
not for or against the President but for whatever policy they
judge to be in the national interest.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Rubinstein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Rubinstein
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union
presented Europe with a unique opportunity to create an improved system
of security that would preserve and deepen the peace that it has
enjoyed since 1945. In the post-Cold War era, Europe seeks stability
and security within a broad framework of growing integration and
cooperation--a studied contrast to the 1945 to 1990 period when the
continent was divided into two hostile, ideologically, militarily, and
politically antithetical blocs. The question is how to proceed. The
nascent European Union (EU) having proved too weak to provide effective
leadership, the responsibility for uniting and protecting Europe in the
next century, for want of a seemingly better alternative, has devolved
upon NATO.
The Central and East European countries believe that NATO and the
EU are integrally connected, that membership in the former one will
assure admission to the other. In June 1993, the EU spoke favorably
albeit vaguely, of membership for the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary,
and Slovakia (the so-called Visegrad Four, an appellation that was soon
discarded, since none of the group wanted to be tied to any of the
others). But the impetus that energized NATO and its prospective
hopefuls came not from the EU but the U.S.; the catalyst was not Europe
is concern about its security, but U.S. domestic politics.
Clinton and Partnership for Peace
The fall of 1993 was a difficult time for Bill Clinton. The new
President was rebuffed by Congress in his exhaustive attempt to have a
national health plan passed; criticized for mishandling U.S.
involvement in a flawed U.N. exercise in nation-building in Somalia and
for equivocating on Bosnia; beset by groups and governments concerned
over the constitutional challenge to Yeltsin and the ominous rise of a
truculent ultra-nationalistic Russian Right; and urged by supporters to
avail himself of a ``peace dividend'' by reducing America's defense
costs in Europe.
Using a time-tested ploy, his advisers crafted a foreign policy
initiative to enhance the President's sagging domestic prestige. At a
NATO summit meeting in Brussels on 10-11 January 1994 President Clinton
praised NATO and signaled his determination to strengthen it and extend
its protective umbrella. He recalled a comment made by Walter Lippmann
three days after the treaty had been signed in Washington: ``The pact
will be remembered long after the conditions that have provoked it are
no longer the main business of mankind. For the treaty recognizes and
proclaims a community of interest which is much older than the conflict
with the Soviet Union, and come what may, will survive it.'' \1\ More
important, it was at this meeting that Clinton proclaimed the
Partnership for Peace (PfP) proposal, which held out the prospect of
NATO membership for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and
the republics of the FSU, including Russia. Nevertheless, the timing
and criteria for admission were deliberately left uncertain.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ William J. Clinton,``Partnership for Peace: Building a New
Security for the 21st Century,'' U.S. Department of State Dispatch
Supplement 5 (January 1994), 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As initially envisaged, PfP was an invitation to prospective
applicants to work with NATO for ``transparency in national defense
planning and budgeting processes;'' ``ensuring democratic control of
defense forces;'' developing closer military ties with NATO ``in order
to undertake [joint] missions in the field of peacekeeping, search and
rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be
agreed;'' and fostering the training of ``armed forces that are better
able to operate with those of NATO's.''\2\ However, before the end of
the year, enlargement completely overshadowed this menu of low level
cooperation in essentially military activities. PfP's purely military
goals of participation, cooperation, confidence-building, and
interoperability of forces were superseded by NATO enlargement's
political considerations and inherently contradictory strategic
purposes, that is, fostering security, promoting democracy, and dealing
with Russia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``Partnership for Peace: Framework Document,'' NATO Press
Release Vl-l (1994) 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clinton Expands U.S. Role In Europe
With its abrupt embrace of NATO enlargement, the Clinton
administration upped the ante of NATO's role in post-Cold War Europe,
and it did so without benefit of any serious consultation with Congress
or attempt to explain the implications of its policy to the American
people. Following the Republican Party's control of both Houses of
Congress as a result of the November 1994 mid-term Congressional
elections, the administration adopted an even more activist stance in
Europe to demonstrate its ``toughness'' in the face of Russia's
opposition to the new U.S. policy. The ideological stimulus was
supplied by strong advocates such as Richard Holbrook (at the time,
ambassador to Germany and the President's trouble shooter in Bosnia)
and Madeleine Albright (then ambassador to the U.N.), think-tanks such
as RAND and the Brookings Institution, and a few prominent members of
Congress such as Senator Richard Lugar and Senator Sam Nunn. On 21
November 1994, then Secretary of State Warren Christopher made clear
the irrevocable course on which the administration had embarked: ``NATO
is and will remain the centerpiece of America's commitment to European
security. But now our challenge is to extend the zone of security and
stability that the Alliance has provided--to extend it across the
continent to the east.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Warren Christopher, ``NATO: Extending Stability in Europe,''
U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 5, 48 (28 November 1994), 790.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This expression of intent largely dispelled the fog of ambivalence
that had enveloped U.S. policy. Whereas President Clinton himself had
stated that NATO expansion ``will not depend upon the appearance of a
new threat in Europe,'' his principal adviser on Russian affairs and
close friend, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, cautioned that
the expansion of NATO would be determined by ``the overall security
environment in Europe.'' \4\ However, once the President determined to
press ahead with NATO enlargement, all equivocating interpretations
disappeared. European allies were reassured, as were countries seeking
NATO membership, and domestic groups anxious over Washington's
conflicting views.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Zbigniew Brzezinski, ``A Plan for Europe,'' Foreign Affairs,
74,1 (January/February 1995), 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In August 1995, Strobe Talbott, who had initially reacted coolly to
enlargement because of its adverse consequences for U.S. relations with
Russia, gave (or was assigned the task of giving) an official response
to the public criticisms made by a blue ribbon group of retired
diplomats and military leaders. He argued that NATO enlargement should
be undertaken for three basic reasons. First, collective defense.
Though acknowledging that ``the end of Soviet communism, the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the breakup of the USSR have
eliminated the threat that NATO was created to counter during the cold
war,'' he nonetheless maintained that ``new threats may arise that
would require NATO to protect the members and to deter attack.'' The
possible threat he saw, though nowhere on the horizon, was Russia.
Second, promotion of democracy. Admission to NATO would provide the
countries of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union ``with
additional incentives to strengthen their democratic and legal
institutions, ensure civilian command of their armed forces, liberalize
their economies, and respect human rights, including the rights of
minorities.'' Third, regional peace and stability. In return for
admission to NATO, new members would be expected ``to resolve disputes
peacefully and contribute to peacekeeping operations.'' \5\ ( Note:
Talbott never explained why these incentives were to be applicable to
countries in Central and Eastern Europe but not to Russia as well.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Strobe Talbott, ``Why NATO Should Grow,'' The New York Review
of Books (10 August 1995), 27. According to Michael McGwire, who offers
a trenchant critique of the official rationale for NATO's expansion,
Talbott's article reminded him ``of those in the Communist Party house
organ Kommunist, where the losers in an internal Soviet debate were
required to publicly recant by expounding the official party line.''
Michael McGwire, ``Russia and Security in Europe,'' in Five Years After
the Fall: The Role of the Outside World in the Transformation of the
Former USSR, edited by Karen Dawisha (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe,
forthcoming).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
From the beginning, Clinton's policy on NATO enlargement was driven
by domestic considerations. His announcement that he wanted the first
group of countries admitted in 1999 on ``NATO's 50th anniversary and
ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall'' was made in Detroit in
the final two weeks of a bitterly waged campaign for reelection. It was
made to attract maximum support from the Central and East European
ethnic groups who were crucial to the electoral outcome in the Mid-
Western part of the United States. Again, as in late 1993, there was no
discussion, no consultation with Congress, and no explanation to the
country of its implications. Soon after his reelection, Clinton
obtained NATO's approval on 10 December 1996 for the timing of the
first tranche: the NATO communique called for the convening of a Summit
meeting in Madrid on 8-9 July 1997, one aim of which was ``inviting one
or more of the countries which have expressed interest in joining the
Alliance to begin accession negotiations.'' Accordingly, most observers
concluded NATO enlargement a done deal.
Perhaps so. But serious questions remain, and these may undergo
close scrutiny by the U.S. Senate, which has the constitutional
responsibility for reviewing the utility, feasibility, and costs of new
treaty obligations. In the meanwhile, criticism is growing from a
variety of leading figures as to whether NATO enlargement is in the
national interest of the United States or any other member of the
Alliance, or even the new invitees. Among the prominent Americans who
have doubts are former Senator Sam Nunn, General John Galvin, who
served as supreme allied commander in Europe, Jack Matlock, ambassador
to the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev era, and policy advisers and
arms control negotiators Paul Nitze and Jonathan Dean. Criticism
focuses mainly on questions of security in Europe; the Russian Factor;
Costs; the German Question; and the future of democratization in
Central and Eastern Europe.
The Security Environment in Europe
A January 1997 editorial in the prominent U.S. defense journal
Aviation Week & Space Technology, which has close ties to the
Department of Defense and the military-industrial community, derided as
``breathtakingly complacent'' the view that NATO's ``imperial drive to
bring former Soviet client states into the fold'' is consistent with
its remaining ``a defensive alliance of likeminded states,'' and held
that ``plunging ahead with enlargement is likely to result in a riskier
world, not a safer one.'' \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ ``Back Off Expansion,'' Aviation Week & Space Technology,
January 6, 1997, 70.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A careful look at the security environment in Europe that NATO
enlargers seek to remake reveals a Europe at peace and no power
threatening a major war. For the first time in this century--indeed, in
Europe's history--a European peace can be assured by the long-term
security commitment of a non-European power, the United States. Such a
commitment is far more likely to be sustained for a minimalist NATO
that does not require unnecessary increases in expenditures by an
American electorate that has already been shouldering heavy defense
burdens for Western Europe's defense for almost six decades. From a
geostrategic perspective, the dominant force on the European continent
is the U.S.-led NATO alliance. It securely anchors a democratic Germany
to the rest of Western Europe and no other power or coalition of powers
poses any threat to its present hegemonic security community or
security outreach.
Eastward, stretching from Estonia to Bulgaria, a vast borderland
has emerged from the collapse of the Soviet imperial system. It
contains nine newly independent former Soviet satellites and three
former Soviet imperial possessions. Together, they constitute an
extensive buffer zone between Germany and Russia, the prime disrupters
of Europe's peace since 1870. Far to the east lies Russia itself, a
severely weakened empire shorn of its protective perimeters from the
Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, and from Transcaucasia across Central Asia
to China; bordered by eight of the fourteen weak and vulnerable Soviet
republics that acquired instant independence when the Soviet Union was
dissolved on 25 December 1991; marginalized as a great power; and
uneasy over the potential of Political Islam. What is more, the Russian
government presides over a society in disarray, a demoralized people,
and a deteriorating, quasi-anarchical economy and political system. \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Elaboration of the line of argument herein developed is set
forth in Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ``The U.S. Stake in Russia,'' Orbis, Vol.
41, No.1 (Winter 1997), 31-32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As in any alliance, so in NATO, threat is determined principally by
the dominant power(s) who bear responsibility for the security of all
the alliance members. Time and again, U.S. leaders have stated that
there is not now any threat to the security of NATO or the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe or the Baltic states; Russia is not
considered a threat. Thus, the case for NATO enlargement is not being
made on grounds of any ``clear and present danger'' to prospective
members. Assuredly, enhanced security and peace are extremely
important, yet on this count alone, NATO enlargement would not seem
necessary. After all, there is in place a structure of power that
distinguishes the present strategic environment from that which has
existed over centuries.
First, there is a functional hegemon, the United States, which is
not located in Europe, which does not covet territory, and which seeks
only to institutionalize the conditions for a long peace. Second, among
the major European powers, no country has any prospect of overturning
the present benign strategic situation and supplanting the U.S.
position and role. Third, all the countries of Europe--large and small,
powerful and weak, secure and vulnerable--can have a say in their
future and in the creation of a viable and lasting security
architecture in which to shelter in the decades ahead.
Why, then, the avidity of the states of Central and Eastern Europe
and the Baltic area to join NATO? Scholars of learning theory in
international relations argue ``that balance of threat theory does not
explain alliance choices,'' that states often opt for neutrality rather
than alliances, depending on the experiences of their leaders. In this
body of literature, there is support for the proposition ``that small
powers do have real freedom of action in world politics and are not
puppets following the whims of great powers,'' hence the very different
behavior before and after World War II of Sweden, The Netherlands,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Yugoslavia, and so on. \8\ However,
the data on why nations chose as they did are so diverse and open to
various interpretations that we are reduced to assuming only that
multiple explanations are possible. And in this process, historical
memory and historical experience are crucial determinants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning. Alliances, and World
Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 214-215.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the late 1990s, most of the leaders, key elites, and electorates
of prospective NATO members have had their political images and
formative political years shaped by the experience of living under
repressive Communist and Soviet rule from 1944-1945 on. The rush to
join NATO is, in one sense, a continued flight from the shadow of
Muscovite power and repression. This is understandable, but irrelevant
to the strategic conditions in which they live today.
The Cold War, though dangerous, did not lead to actual war, but it
did leave the peoples of the former Soviet empire in Central and
Eastern Europe and the Baltic region with a scarred psyche and a deep-
rooted suspicion of Russia that motivate their search for security
guarantees and economic concessions from Western Europe and the United
States. NATO enlargers, frozen in a Cold War mind set, place great
emphasis on that period of U.S.-Soviet rivalry and extrapolate from it
into the future. By so doing, they convey the impression that Russia,
not Germany, was the principal catalyst of the great wars of the
twentieth century that deranged Europe's peace and societal cohesion
and that drew the United States into the continent's turbulent affairs.
The Russian Factor
Especially noteworthy in questioning the wisdom of an enlarged NATO
has been George F. Kennan, the Dean of Russian specialists in the
United States. It was Kennan's article, ``The Sources of Soviet
Conduct, published in early 1947 and arguably the most influential
essay in the history of U.S. diplomacy, that served as the intellectual
basis for the Containment Doctrine that shaped U.S. foreign policy
during the 45-years of Cold War rivalry with the former Soviet union
(FSU). His opposition today to NATO enlargement has galvanized ex-
diplomats, journalists, academics, and policy analysts to express their
deep concerns.
In an article in The New York Times in early February 1997, Kennan
deplored not just President Clinton's peremptory decision but its
timing and avoidance of substantive explanation. ``Bluntly stated,''
wrote Kennan, ``expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of
American policy in the entire post-Cold War era:
Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-
Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an
adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the
atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian
foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking. \9\
\9\ George F. Kennan, ``A Fateful Error,'' The New York Times,
February 5, 1997, A23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In light of Kennan's experience and wisdom regarding Russian
affairs, and considering the hopeful possibilities engendered by the
changed political and security environment of the post-Cold War era, it
is incumbent on us to provide a persuasive answer to his query,
``should East-West relations become centered on the question of who
would be allied with whom and, by implication, against whom in some
fanciful, totally unforeseen and most improbable future military
conflict?''
Kennan's concern that NATO enlargement will complicate further
efforts to proceed with nuclear downsizing is shared by Fred C. Ikle,
Undersecretary of defense for Policy in the Reagan Administration. In
testimony before the House Committee on National Security on 17 July
1997 Ikle acknowledged the dangers inherent in ``loose nukes'' and
weapons grade fissionable material scattered throughout Russia, and the
possibility of theft of plutonium and enriched uranium. But he
preferred to emphasize a different aspect of the problem, namely, his
fear that in managing NATO enlargement Washington will be diverted from
pressing ahead on the much higher priority nuclear issues: ``There is
only so much time in high level meetings to cover multiple agendas. The
nuclear issues that require Russian action are so important, so
overarching, that we must focus on them all our leverage and influence
with Moscow, all the `carrots and sticks' that we can command for this
continuing negotiation with the Russian authorities.'' \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Statement by the Honorable Fred C. Ikle before the Committee
on National Security, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.,
July 17, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As it is, NATO enlargement has already had chilling effects on
Russian-American relations. It has reopened a psychological and
political divide, which will not easily or soon be bridged, the
establishment of the Russia-NATO Permanent Council, to the contrary
notwithstanding. This ceremonial Paris trumpery, which followed
Moscow's accession on 27 May 1997 to the Russian-NATO Founding Act,
will do little to allay Russian concern that the West is essentially
anti-Russian. Any expansion to the east by a powerful military
alliance, regardless of its peaceful pronouncements, can hardly be
viewed as other than a potential threat. In January 1997, Mikhail
Gorbachev, whose desire to see Russia a part of the ``European home''
and integrated into the Western-dominated international economic order
cannot be doubted, made this point, lamenting the risk that enlargement
places on all the breakthroughs to date in Russia's relations with the
West. \11\ The spillover from the enlargement issue has affected
crucial arms control issues. START II may eventually be ratified by the
Duma, but the character and degree of cooperation needed to assure full
and expedious compliance is in doubt. START III is problematic.
Moreover, all signed arms control treaties, nuclear and nonnuclear,
will probably become more difficult to negotiate, implement, and
sustain. Professor Michael Mandelbaum of Johns Hopkins University has
been in the forefront of those who are deeply skeptical. Dismissive of
NATO enlargement, his position is that the arms control agreements
concluded during the 1987 to 1993 period have, taken as a whole,
created a common security that reduces ``the possibility of great power
conflict'' and provides all European countries with solid confidence in
the future stability and security in the region. Thus, beginning in
1987, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement, followed
by a combination of confidence building measures (CBMs), lower levels
of conventional armaments through the Conventional Forces in Europe
(CFE) accord, and strategic arms reduction treaties (START I and START
II), drastically altered the threshold of threat: ``a country bent on
overturning the European status quo could not hope to mount a
successful attack without extensive preparations, which would be
readily detected and would plainly violate signed treaties.'' \12\ Even
if Russia turned hostile, the probability is strong that this would
result in the reimposition of ``a sharp line of division in Europe''
much farther to the east and to the unmistakable detriment of Russia's
situation. \13\ According to Raymond Garthoff, a retired diplomat and
member of The Brookings Institution, whatever eventuates, the very
process of enlargement cannot help but leave a residue of suspicion and
divisiveness; it ``has already made a mockery of the policy of the Bush
and early Clinton administrations to create a post-Cold war partnership
with Russia stretching from Vladivostok to Vancouver, and it is even
undermining the conception of a Europe stretching from the Atlantic to
the Urals celebrated at the Paris Summit of 1990 marking the end of the
Cold War.'' \14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Mikhail Gorbachev, ``Expanding NATO Won't Bring More Peace on
Earth,'' The New York Times, January 17, 1997.
\12\ Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York: The
Twentieth Century Fund, 1996), 102-103; 105.
\13\ ibid., 144.
\14\ Raymond L. Garthoff, ``Western Efforts to Shape Post-Soviet
Behavior,'' in Karen Dawisha(ed.), The International Dimension of Post-
Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk,
N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Without doubt, the nuclear issue with its attendant security
implications, broadly conceived, is the central concern of most
opponents to enlargement. Thomas Friedman, the diplomatic correspondent
to The New York Times, for one, says that the United States would be
much better off if President Clinton, Secretary of Defense William
Cohen, and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright spent ``as much time
on the threat that does exist--Russia's massive nuclear arsenal--as
they have on the threat that doesn't exist--a Russian invasion of
Poland.'' \15\ His commentaries repeatedly return to the theme that in
the interests of peace and stability NATO should remain unchanged, both
as to membership and focus--its primary aim being to deter nuclear war
in Europe.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Thomas L. Friedman, ``It's Unclear,'' The New York Times, June
2, 1997, A 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In sum, critics of NATO enlargement do not believe that any threat
to the prevailing structure of power that serves the NATO community
exists, and it is difficult to imagine any strategic principle or
concern so mighty as to justify jeopardizing the future of this irenic
environment. As Senator John Warner of Virginia observed to Secretary
of State Albright, ``I come from the school if it's not broken, why try
and fix it?'' \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Quoted in R.W. Apple, Jr., ``Road to Approval is Rocky, And
Gamble is Perilous,'' The New York Times, May 15, 1997, A 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cost Calculus
President Clinton said NATO enlargement was not without cost or
risk. In a report to Congress on 24 February 1997 he held that the
costs would be modest, averaging no more than $150 million to $200
million a year for the first ten years, basing his estimate on an in-
house State Department study. But even staunch NATO-boosters are uneasy
with this minimalist figure. Several years ago, the highly respected
Rand Corporation, known for its close ties to the Pentagon, calculated
the cost at $3-5 billion per year over a ten year period, with the U.S.
share being $1-$1.2 billion annually. The congressional Budget Office
posits costs greater than Rand's by a factor of two or three, depending
upon the assumptions used. \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ A useful starting point for moving into the thicket of direct
and indirect (hidden) costs of NATO enlargement is: U.S. General
Accounting Office: Report to Congressional Requesters, NATO
Enlargement: Cost Estimates Developed To Date Are Notional (August
1997, Washington, D.C.). GAO/NSIAD-97-209.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clearly, no one knows what enlargement will really cost, but the
Clinton Administration's estimates contravene experience. one need look
no further than the Bosnian operation for evidence. In late November
1995, when the administration undertook to commit ground forces to
Bosnia, it estimated the cost to the United States of helping to
enforce the cease-fire at $1-1.2 billion for the year 1996. In fact,
the cost to the United States was almost $4 billion; and by late 1997,
about $7 billion. Notwithstanding Secretary of State Albright's
assurance to a Senate committee that ``NATO enlargement is not a
scholarship program,'' \18\ that is precisely what it is likely to
resemble: long-term government guaranteed loans to enable recipients to
pay for costly goods and services with a promise of eventual repayment.
Prospective members would thus be forced to purchase weapons they
cannot afford and do not need, but which they must acquire as the entry
fee for membership in the NATO club. As two journalists noted, the only
winners would be U.S. arms merchants for which enlargement would be the
boon of the decade. \19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ As quoted in Allison Mitchell, ``Clinton Girding for Stiff
debate on NATO Issue,'' The New York Times, June 29, 1997, A 6.
\19\ See Jeff Gerth and Tim Weiner, ``Arms Makers See A Bonanza In
Selling NATO Expansion,'' The New York Times, June 29, 1997, 1; 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senators John Warner (Va) and Kay Bailey Hutchison (Texas) found
the administration's cost estimates ``troubling because of its
assumptions about burden sharing, or how much of the total cost of NATO
enlargement will be borne by our European allies. According to the
administration, the United States will pay just 15 percent or so of the
direct enlargement costs. Other members will pay 50 percent, and the
new members 35 percent.'' But they note that French President Jacques
Chirac has said that France will not increase its spending. \20\
Indeed, Chirac, angered by Washington's rejection of Romania and
Slovenia for membership in the first round that included Poland, the
Czech Republic, and Hungary, is not alone in viewing the unilaterally
accelerated process of enlargement as Clinton's payback to supportive
domestic constituencies. And he has declared that new members ``must
pay their own way. France does not intend to raise its contributions to
NATO because of the cost of enlargement.'' \21\ Representative Barney
Frank, a Democrat from Boston, seized on Chirac's statement to offer
amendments (rejected, for the time being) to reduce defense spending at
home, unless our European allies show a willingness to assume their
fair share of the burden. \22\ Ronald Steel, a distinguished historian
and frequent contributor to leading print media, observes that the
Clinton Administration keeps assuring us ``that the rich West Europeans
will cough up the money for their continental brethren, even though
those same burghers have been vigorously cutting their own defense
budgets.'' \23\ Even the consistently pro-enlargement Wall Street
Journal has, on occasion, acknowledged that ``questions about how much
defense NATO will offer its new members, the cost, and who will provide
troops and pay the tab'' must be dealt with. \24\ Somewhere along the
road to the ``Great Debate'' in the U.S. Senate over NATO enlargement
deals are going to be made--and the compromises will have to be
transparently mutual in character. In the Senate, the devil may well
lie in the accounting process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ John Warner and Kay Bailey Hutchison, ``The Missing NATO
Debate,'' Washington Post, July 24, 1997.
\21\ Elizabeth Neuffer and Brian McGrory, ``Leaders Sign 2 Security
Agreements,'' Boston Globe, July 10, 1997, A 16.
\22\ Chris Black, ``Frank Pushes For Sharing of NATO Costs,''
Boston Globe, July 22, 1997, A 6.
\23\ Ronald Steel, ``Eastern Exposure,'' The New Republic, July 14
& 21, 1997, 27.
\24\ Carla Anne Robbins, ``Devil Is In Details of NATO Expansion,''
Wall Street Journal, August 9, 1996, A 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The German Ouestion
Already the most powerful country in Western Europe and the
dominant member in the EU, Germany is still far from attaining maximum
economic strength and influence, in part because of the unexpectedly
large and continuing drain on resources by the former East Germany.
However, within a decade or so, it should hold the position of
unmistakable economic-industrial strength that it held on the eve of
the First and Second World Wars. Inevitably, NATO enlargement will not
only reinforce Germany's claim to European leadership but also place
Central and Eastern Europe securely under its economic and political
influence; it will mean Germany's de facto colonization of the area.
The positions of France and Great Britain will correspondingly
diminish, with unforeseen and damaging consequences for European
integration.
Recall that twice in a generation Germany unleashed catastrophic
``civil wars'' in the heartland of Western civilization. Today,
however, Germany is a key EU partner and in the forefront of Western
Europe's integration. As long as it remains a nonnuclear weapons power
and a member of NATO, Europe's prospects for a long peace are bright.
But much depends on U.S. leadership in NATO, which helps deepen the
Franco-German reconciliation; gives time for strengthening the
institutional bonds that are being forged to bind the West European
states together; provides the nations of Central and Eastern Europe and
the Baltic region with a chance for independent democratic development;
and reassures Russia against another German threat materializing. Under
present circumstances, a minimal U.S. military presence in NATO is
itself sufficient to allay West European--and Russian--anxieties about
the German phoenix, and to deter threats to the independence of most
non-NATO nations situated between Germany and Russia.
In the future, an increasingly powerful Germany will naturally seek
a political role commensurate with its economic influence. Already
indicative of the sea change in Germany's outlook is its growing
assertiveness in foreign policy that may be dated from mid December
1991 and the Yugoslav succession crisis. The key move, which came less
than two weeks before the USSR's implosion, was the German government's
announced intention to extend diplomatic recognition to Croatia and
Slovenia, notwithstanding the requests for patience from Washington,
Paris, and London, and the U.N. secretary-general. Confronted with
German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher's determination to go
his own way, Britain and France sheepishly followed suit: so much for
the EU's collective decision making. Genscher revealed a nationalistic
outlook that some observers find worrisome. \25\ It was manifested not
just in the Yugoslav crisis where traditional German interests in the
Balkans were highlighted, but also in the EU where Genscher pressed for
the German language to be accorded the same status as English and
French; in the Far East, where he offered to mediate the knotty
territorial dispute between Russia and Japan; and in Eastern Europe
where German investment and trade have increased noticeably.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ For example, Jacob Heilbrunn,``Germany's New Right,'' Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 75, No.6 (November-December 1996), 80-98.
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In all probability, Germany would be the biggest beneficiary of
NATO enlargement. Its political and military elites see enlargement as
the answer to Germany's complex Eastern Problem, which has three
facets: the vulnerability of its borders to unwanted migrations from
Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union; the
psychological feeling that Germans have of continuing ``to live at a
front-line, albeit one which is characterized by open borders and major
imbalances in wealth, stability and political culture''; and the
aversion to again being squeezed between two adversarial blocs and the
sense that Germany should take ``its natural geographic place, which is
in the center of Europe, not at an artificial borderline of European
subregions.'' \26\ The Bundeswehr likes the prospect of a cushioning
security zone that would redefine the political boundaries of Europe in
such a way that the Russians are kept out, the French pacified by
symbolic involvement in East European matters, and the Americans
enthusiastic over the idea of spreading democracy to new areas. It has
entered into defense cooperation agreements with all the former Warsaw
Pact members, and hopes that enlargement will result in the
establishment of a new NATO command for Central and Eastern Europe,
headed by a German. In addition, powerful economic interests in
investment, banking, and trade reinforce Bonn's welcoming attitude.
Indeed, no debate on the issue was deemed necessary by the Bundestag.
Instead, a consensus has gradually emerged among the ruling Christian
Democratic Union (CDU) (in coalition with the Free Democratic Party),
the opposition social Democratic Party, and even part of the ``Green''
Party, to the effect that Germany should pursue its necessary and
legitimate national interests in the East, preferably within the
framework of NATO enlargement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Reinhardt Rummel, ``The German Debate on International
Security Institutions,'' in Marco Carnovale (ed.), European Security
and International Institutions After the Cold War (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1995), 187.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the same time, Bonn is unsparing in its courtship of Moscow,
seeking by political gestures, diplomatic visits, and economic carrots
to allay Russian concerns over NATO enlargement; and it continually
reassures the Central and East Europeans and the Balts of its support
for their eventual accession to NATO and the EU, thereby enhancing its
position as their champion in West European council.
But NATO enlargement will make Germany a more difficult alliance
partner. It will intensify tensions arising out of competing national
interests and residual national fears. With growing prominence on the
continent, Germany's aspect has become more ``German'' and less
``European,'' especially in the East. Klaus Kinkel, who succeeded
Genscher in early 1992 as foreign minister, stirred up a hornet's nest
when he demanded that the Czech Republic apologize and make restitution
for the expulsion of the two to three million Sudeten Germans in 1945.
\27\ Federal Minister of Finance Theo Waigel went even further, calling
on the Czechs to recognize ``the Heimstrecht --the right of return--of
the Sudeten Germans... [and] to confess the crime.'' \28\ More than two
generations later, the furor over what happened in the Sudetenland has
exposed raw historical memories. \29\ Alarmed at the consequences of
escalating claims and counterclaims, on 21 January 1997 in Prague, the
German and Czech governments signed a declaration of reconciliation
containing reciprocal expressions of regret Germany apologizing for
``the suffering and injustice'' and the policies of violence inflicted
by Nazi Germany on the Czech people, and the Czech Republic deploring
the ``great injustice and suffering'' caused innocent people by the
1945 expulsion of more than two million ethnic Germans. \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Alan Cowell, ``Memories of Wartime Brutalities Revive Czech
German Animosity,'' The New York Times, 9 February 1996 1, A12; and
Hans Koning, ``German Irredenta,'' The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 278, No.
1 (July 1996), 30-33.
\28\ ``Waigel, Stroiber Take a Hard Line on the German-Czech
Reconciliation at Meeting of Sudeten German Expellees,'' quoted in The
Week in Germany, 31 May 1996, 1. Also, see ``World War Wound Reopens
in Bonn: Expulsions by Czechs a Hot Issue,'' International Herald
Tribune, 28 May 1996, 5.
\29\ For an informative account, see Timothy W. Ryback, ''Dateline
Sudetenland: Hostages to History,'' Foreign Policy, No. 105 (Winter
1996-97), 162-178.
\30\ Alan Cowell, ``A German-Czech Pact on Wartime Abuses,'' The
New York Times, 11 December 1996; and Craig R. Whitney, ``Germans and
Czechs Try to Heal Hatreds of the Nazi Era,'' The New York Times, 22
January 1997, A3.
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Even so empathetic and astute an observer of German policy as
Timothy Garton Ash evinces a touch of anxiety over signs that
nationalism rather than Europeanism is beginning to characterize
Germany's approach to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. At
the heart of his uneasiness is Germany's dichotomous approach to
Western and Eastern Europe. He cites approvingly Elizabeth Wiskemann's
writing in 1956 that if German-Slav relationships are to flourish in
the future, it ``would call for exquisite tact . . . : the very same
German who worked very well with the French or Italian or Benelux
representatives in the West might find it traditionally too difficult
to keep his manners as good in the East.'' \31\ In the twentieth
century, the German record in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Russia,
in particular, has been a sad one. Germany is now a democracy and
certainly very different from what it was. Still, Ash wonders if it
will be able to resist the temptations that come with supremacy, not
excluding territorial revisionism. After all, in the past, he notes,
``if strong states were next to weak states which had territory they
coveted, and to which they could construct some historical claim, they
sooner or later took it.'' \32\ While not believing that history
repeats itself, he foresees inevitable tensions, which will require
Germany to act with considerable delicacy and ``exceptional self-
restraint.'' After forty-five years of steadily working to widen the
bounds of German power the Germans must now cultivate ``the new habit
of not fully exerting the power they had. More dramatically still: they
had the particular task of helping the consolidation of other
democratic state-nations in territories where Germans had until quite
recently lived and ruled.'' \33\ Although his magisterial work, In
Europe's Name, predated the issue of NATO enlargement, in it Ash
suggested that before Central and Eastern Europe could be integrated
with Western Europe and admitted to the European Union the individual
countries of the area ought first go through a nation building process,
``consolidating the state-nation,'' essential for becoming ``secure,
liberal, democratic states.'' \34\ His mood of cautious skepticism
about the future of Germany and its relations with Central and Eastern
Europe is one that the countries of the region would be well to
consider carefully, as they rush to be embraced by NATO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided
Continent (New York: Random House, 1993), 403.
\32\ ibid., 406.
\33\ ibid., 407-408.
\34\ ibid.
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Central and Eastern Europe At a Crossroads
Throughout this century, the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe and the Baltic region have been door mats for aggressive great
powers, repeatedly trampled on and viewed as marginal, expendable
assets. Historically, this vast area of multiple ethnolinguistic,
cultural groups, of indefensible borders, and of meager natural
resources, served as a magnet for invaders and occupiers, in
particular, Germanic and Slavic states. Two significant political
processes shaped the struggles of the victimized peoples of ``the
borderlands:'' first, their resistance, yet inevitable ``incorporation
into one or another of the bureaucratic empires closing in on them, and
second, the rivalry of the Great Powers for domination over the
contested zones between them.'' \35\ During their protracted period of
weakness, subjugation, and vulnerability, these diverse peoples failed
in their efforts to play off the competing imperial powers on their
flanks, and ultimately they became vassals of one or another great
power.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Alfred J. Rieber, ``Struggle Over the Borderlands,'' in S.
Frederick Starr (ed.), The Legacy of History in Russia and the New
States of Eurasia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 66.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Viewed from a broad perspective, which includes the largely
disappointing experiences of the new nations of Africa and the Middle
East since decolonization, the history of the peoples and nations of
borderlands teaches unequivocal lessons: develop strong internal
politics and economies or risk conquest and dominion by expansionist
powers or powerful neighbors; cooperate with similarly vulnerable
neighbors or fall prey to foreign penetration and influence; neglect
internal transformation to pursue marginal gains of dubious durability
at the expense of equally vulnerable neighbors and the consequences
will be satellitization in some form.
The invitees--(Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary)--believe that
their security, stability, and long term prosperity lie in joining
NATO, and that this will eventually result also in admission to the
European Union. Are these assumptions the best ones, politically and
geoeconomically, to drive policy?
One relevant observation from the Cold War experience is that great
powers are more willing to supply swords than plowshares: contrast the
apparent eagerness of NATO countries to sell weapons to enable
prospective members to contribute militarily to collective defense and
new out-of-area missions with the reluctance of the EU to open its
markets to non-member states, and its very tough bargaining in trade
negotiations, as the Poles and others have discovered. George Soros
sums it up well: ``The problems of Central and Eastern Europe require
political integration and economic prosperity, not the extension of
military alliances. The countries of the region need political, moral,
and economic assurance that they are indeed part of the West and the
world of open societies. To give them armies and military alliances
instead misconstrues the threat. In fact, the expansion of NATO can
easily turn into a self-fulfilling prophesy, generating the very
dangers against which it is meant to defend.'' \36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ George Soros, ``Can Europe Work?'', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75,
No. 5 (September-October 1996), 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, whereas the timetable for admission of new NATO members
is politically driven, compliance with the military criteria that
applicants were to have met under the Partnership for Peace program
having been waived or modified, the conditions for full membership in
the EU are as tough as ever, and there are no signs in the EU's
Parliament of plans to add new members. Indeed, it is on this very
issue that Thomas Friedman, diplomatic correspondent for The New York
Times, castigates EU members:
What threatens them right now are all those new East European
free-market democracies, whose factories and farmers want to
export to Western Europe at prices that will undercut the West
Europeans and whose workers all flock to Western Europe for
jobs which would drive down wages. Russian missiles and Russian
tanks are a nebulous and distant danger to Western Europe. But
Polish hams and Polish workers are a clear and present danger.
So NATO expansion is the bone EU members throw the East
Europeans instead of letting them into the European common
market, which is what the East Europeans really want and need.
\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ Thomas L. Friedman, ``NATO or Tomato?'', The New York Times,
22 January 1997, A21.
Given the benign strategic environment of post-Cold War Europe , in
Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic region security should, first
and foremost, be a matter of nation building. This is the period to
foster internal cohesion, develop democratic institutions and
processes, promote modernization, and strengthen regional cooperation.
Though governing marginal lands that are militarily insignificant and
burdened with a deplorable Soviet legacy of environmental degradation
and an aging infrastructure, today's leaderships have yet another
chance. Their predecessors, when confronted with choices, opted for
parochial politics and strategic myopia. To paraphrase what the
Englishman Harold Beglie (1871-1929) once said about Christianity, it
is not that democratization and development were tried and found
difficult, but that they were found difficult and not tried.
The conflict between the Germanic and Slavic peoples is part of the
``ancient'' history of Europe. It has been overtaken by new strategic-
military realities: nuclear weapons that preclude another invasion by a
massive land army bent on conquest; a Germany firmly anchored in
alliance with the United States and integration with Western Europe;
and a Russia in sharp decline. Although the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe cannot change their geography, they can adapt in a more
positive fashion than heretofore and concentrate on transforming
themselves into liberal, democratic societies where the rule of law,
protection for minorities, the supremacy of civilian authority, and
eco-political pluralism are nurtured. Each of the countries has a
Russian problem which should be put in perspective and normalized as
quickly as possible: dwelling on the past, with its injustices and
victimization, is no way to build for the future. In this respect, the
experience of France and Germany shows the redemptive and generative
power of political reconciliation and economic integration, and should
be emulated. Why should Poland not extend itself to do as much with
Lithuania, the Czech Republic, or Ukraine; or the Czech Republic not
follow suit with Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland; or Hungary not
reconcile with Romania, Slovenia, Ukraine, and Slovakia? None of them
can hope to accomplish anything meaningful alone; and none are economic
``tigers'' who need only the reassuring protection of NATO membership.
They lag in economic and political reforms, run high budget deficits
that demand greater fiscal and monetary discipline, and they must do
far more to encourage innovative entrepreneurial elites and attract
foreign investment.
True, some self-help steps have been taken, but hardly enough.
Thus, in December 1992, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Slovakia established the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA).
Slovenia became a member on 1 January 1996. CEFTA's ambitious
objectives included the elimination of restrictions on the automotive,
electrical, and textiles industries. To date, progress has been
erratic. Slovenian-Italian relations, long conflictual, show signs of
functional cooperation in trade and transportation. \38\ The free trade
agricultural agreement signed by the prime ministers of Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania in June 1996 and put into effect on 1 January
1997 is another promising, though timid, measure; timid, because it is
hedged with clauses that allow for protectionist barriers. Time will
show if the Baltic states have the political will to make their free
trade area work. Poland could be a trading and transportation hub for
all of north-central Europe, but this requires that its government
commit at least as much energy and diplomatic assets to developing
joint ventures with Lithuania, Ukraine, and the Czech Republic as it
uses to court France and Germany in order to gain entry to NATO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ ``Slovenia: Bridge in Europe,'' The Economist, 11 January
1997, 49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Observations
The thesis advanced in this paper leans toward the position that
NATO enlargement is not necessary to advance the goal of all European
security, and that a minimalist NATO, for geostrategic and political
reasons previously developed, may be the right policy, at the right
time, for the right reasons.
Hardly had the elation everywhere in Europe over the collapse of
the USSR and the end of the Cold War subsided than a group of American
analysts began hawking the need for a Greater NATO. Prominent among
those who made the intellectual case for NATO's expansion were Richard
Kugler, Ronald D. Asmus, and F. Stephen Larrabee, members of RAND, a
think tank with close ties to the Pentagon. So effective have the NATO
enlargers been that there was little discussion in the U.S. Senate
issues until the ratification debate began in earnest in late 1997.
Starting in 1993, when the case for keeping NATO in the post-Cold War
era was popularized by the catchy phrase ``use it or lose it,'' the
enlargers have pressed for an all-inclusive NATO, but one that excludes
Russia. They know that nothing could undermine NATO enlargement in the
Congress more than its inclusion. Shades of the pre-Marshall Plan days!
But a close, comprehensive relationship with Moscow is a necessary
U.S. and, I believe, Western priority because, however straitened its
circumstances and diminished its power, Russia remains a nuclear
superpower. Only the United States is equipped to deal effectively with
Russia on a range of critical nuclear issues.
NATO enlargers maintain that despite Russia's opposition to
enlargement, there is nothing it can do to stop the process. But this
misses an important point: the question is not what the Russians can
do, but rather what they might not do. Russia's cooperation against
nuclear smuggling, indiscriminate arms sales, violations of the nuclear
nonproliferation treaty, illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and
terrorism is crucial, if European security is to be meaningful and
enhanced.
Today the Central and East European countries face momentous
choices--and dilemmas. They all want security, democratization, and
development. But which goal should take priority? In face of the
concrete realities of contemporary Europe, which is the most important
to the transformation and future well-being of these long repressed and
exploited societies? Some urge incorporation into NATO, arguing that
only in this way can these countries prevent historic ethnic tensions
from turning violent, as they did in Yugoslavia. Some see and abhor a
power vacuum in the region. Thus, Henry Kissinger urges NATO's
expansion to forestall the creation of ``a gray area in Eastern Europe
between Germany and Russia, potentially tempting historic Russian
drives to create political and strategic vacuums around its
periphery.'' \39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ Henry A. Kissinger, ``Beware: A Threat Abroad,'' Newsweek, 17
June 1996, 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At a minimum, such strategizing from a NATO-centric perspective
will result in subordinating democratization and development in Central
and Eastern Europe. As Michael Mandelbaum has observed, ``NATO is not
an effective instrument for promoting either free markets or
democracy.'' No alliance, it needs be stressed, has ever succeeded in
advancing such goals. NATO is ``a military alliance, an association of
some sovereign states directed against others. The 'other' in this case
is Russia.'' \40\ There is still time, if the will exists, to reexamine
all possibilities. small countries who aspire to be bishops but more
often find themselves mere pawns might want to consider Cassius's
warning:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ Michael Mandelbaum, ``Preserving the New Peace: The Case
Against NATO Expansion,'' Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3 (May/June
1995), 9-10.
Men at some time are masters of their fates: The fault, dear
Brutus, is not in our stars, But in ourselves, that we are
underlings.
Julius Caesar
Act 1, Scene 2
Senator Smith. Thank you, Doctor, for your contribution and
all of you who contributed, we thank you.
This committee hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Appendix 1
Hearing of October 7, 1997
October 3, 1997
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Members, Committee on Foreign Relations
THROUGH:
James W. Nance and Edwin K. Hall
FROM:
Steve Biegun, Beth Wilson, and Mike Haltzel
SUBJECT:
Hearing on the Strategic Rationale for NATO
Enlargement
On Tuesday, October 7, 1997 at 10:00 a.m., the Committee on Foreign
Relations will hold a hearing on the Strategic Rationale for NATO
Enlargement.
Senator Helms will preside.
Overview
The Foreign Relations Committee has scheduled a series of six
hearings this fall to examine all elements of NATO enlargement. (One or
two additional hearings will be scheduled early next year after the
treaty is formally transmitted to the Senate). The first two hearings
will provide an overview of the arguments for and against NATO
enlargement with Administration and private witnesses. Subsequent
hearings will address costs, benefits and burden sharing; the
qualifications of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic for NATO
membership; the NATO-Russia relationship; and public views. This memo,
prepared with the assistance of Paul Gallis from the Congressional
Research Service, includes an overview of the aforementioned topics.
Memos with more detailed analysis will be provided for the later
hearings.
NATO: From Cold War to Enlargement
Cold War
NATO was established on August 24, 1949, with the entry into force
of the Washington Treaty, as an alliance of mutual defense among
democratic and market oriented governments in North America and Western
Europe. Original members included the United States, Canada, and ten
European countries emerging from the destruction of World War II (Great
Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Denmark, Norway,
Luxembourg, Iceland and Italy). NATO has been central to peace and
stability in Europe for almost fifty years, and serves as the principal
vehicle through which the United States maintains its relationship and
manifests its influence with its European allies.
During the Cold War NATO served as a bulwark against the threat of
the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites. The U.S. strategic
nuclear guarantee served as a deterrent to Soviet aggression, and U.S.
conventional forces stationed in Europe, reaching over 300,000 at their
peak, were evidence that the United States would meet its commitment to
collective defense under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (the part
of the Washington Treaty which obligates NATO members to come to each
other's defense). The collapse of communism demonstrated NATO's success
in fending off the massive, external threat posed by the Soviet Union.
But NATO continues to fulfill a second role equally important as the
defense against communism. After two World Wars in the first half of
the century into which the United States was inevitably drawn, the
close relationship among NATO members allowed countries to lay aside
historical grievances and develop democratic traditions and market
economies to the enormous benefit of themselves, their neighbors and
the United States.
To date, the alliance has been enlarged on three separate
occasions--to include Greece and Turkey in 1952, the Federal Republic
of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. A process has been set in motion
to expand the membership of NATO yet again to include several Central
and Eastern European nations that emerged from Soviet domination with
the collapse of communism. Changes under consideration in NATO extend
beyond the question of adding new members. The current enlargement
debate, to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as full
members of NATO, is occurring at the same time as an important debate
over NATO's mission in post-Cold War Europe.
New Missions
The Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 and the current disarray of the
Russian military have, in the view of NATO, largely eliminated any
immediate, conventional threat to Western Europe and the United States.
In 1991, as the Soviet Union teetered on the verge of collapse, NATO
members agreed to a new alliance purpose in a document known as the
Strategic Concept. The Strategic Concept reiterates the importance of
collective defense, but it notes that, with the emergence of
independent democratic states in Central Europe, ``the political
division of Europe that was the source of the military confrontation of
the Cold War period has... been overcome.'' The allies agreed, even
before the now evident decline of Russia, that risks to security were
from ``instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social
and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial
disputes'' in Europe. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
disrupted access to vital resources, and terrorism are also noted.
While NATO's core mission remains collective defense, the Strategic
Concept outlines a leaner approach to security for the post-Cold War
environment. Militarily, the allies agreed to move away from a
positional forward defense and develop forces to counter ``diverse and
multi-directional risks.'' Such forces would ``require enhanced
flexibility and mobility and an assured capability for augmentation
when necessary.... This ability to build up by reinforcement, by
mobilizing reserves, or by reconstituting forces, must be in proportion
to potential threats....'' The themes of risks rather than threats, and
lighter forces capable of rapid reinforcement and reconstitution have
been central elements in Administration efforts to develop a strategic
rationale for enlargement.
As an inevitable follow-on to the Strategic Concept, the risks to
peace in post-Cold War Europe that have replaced the Soviet threat have
given rise to consideration of new missions for NATO, such as
peacekeeping and crisis management. However, differences are evident
over such issues as whether to expand NATO's purpose beyond collective
defense, how to bring stability to Bosnia, and whether the European
allies possess the will and capacity to accomplish such new missions
themselves, with limited U.S. involvement. The debate over new missions
will also affect burden sharing in the alliance, perhaps more so than
that of expansion itself.
Critics point out that consideration of new missions for NATO will
be problematic for the alliance. While NATO has been relatively
successful in maintaining consensus for the narrow mission of the
territorial defense of its members, consensus on peacekeeping or crisis
prevention will be quite complicated. Proposals under consideration
that would tie such deployments to the approval of the United Nations
or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) could
subject NATO decisions to the consensus of self-interested motives of
undemocratic nations that have membership in those organizations.
Finally, because the United States is the leading military power in
NATO and has force projection capabilities far superior to most of the
allies, the costs associated with a peacekeeping oriented mandate will
inevitably fall disproportionately upon the United States military.
Enlargement
Administration officials have cited a range of U.S. interests that
enlargement could serve: strengthening states that share a belief in
democracy; development of free-market economies open to U.S. investment
and trade; securing allies willing to share cooperative efforts in an
array of global issues; and preserving a Europe free of domination by
any one power. Critics have been concerned that enlargement might
isolate and antagonize Russia, that it may financially overburden the
allies in a time of shrinking defense budgets, and that it may create
new political divisions in Europe. Some also believed that admitting
new members with weak militaries and recently developed democratic
practices might dilute the military capability and political like-
mindedness of the alliance, and deflect the alliance from its core
mission of collective defense. Concern has also arisen over whether
arrangements agreed to allay Moscow's concerns have given Russian
leaders a role in NATO decision making.
While some allies initially expressed hesitation over enlargement,
NATO members preliminarily endorsed the expansion of the alliance at a
January 1994, NATO summit. On balance, the allies believe that
enlargement, coupled with later expansion of the European Union (EU)
and the continued engagement of the United States, will enhance
stability on the continent. In Madrid, on July 8, 1997, the allies
unanimously agreed to invite Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to
begin accession talks. The allies pledged to leave the door open to
future candidates, but did not commit themselves to a date for
additional enlargement or to particular countries for consideration.
Key Issues
Strategic Rationale
The Administration continues to describe collective defense as the
core of the alliance, but believes that NATO has other, closely
related, purposes as well. At a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing
in April 1997, Secretary Albright was asked to explain who the alliance
is defending against. She responded:
The threat is basically...the instability within the region
which has in fact created two world wars. But there is also the
possibility of an outside threat. There is a possibility of
threats from various parts outside the region, to the south, we
have to guard against. And, on the off chance that in fact
Russia does not turn out the way we are hoping it will and its
current leadership wants, NATO is there.
Central Europe for centuries has been a region of instability.
Supporters of enlargement believe that admitting qualified new members
is a means not only to secure gains from the end of the Cold War, but
an historic opportunity to develop a community of states that embraces
democracy and free markets and sets aside enduring ethnic and border
tensions that have caused conflict. In addition, in this view,
enlargement sends a clear signal to Russia that while the era of
intimidation of its neighbors is at an end, the opportunity is at hand
for Moscow to seek cooperation with its European neighbors and the
United States to bring stability to the entire continent.
Critics of enlargement tend to believe that a reformed Russia,
still controlling a nuclear arsenal, is the key foreign policy interest
for the United States and its allies. Enlargement, in this view, will
humiliate Russia by taking from its orbit a region that it believes is
within its historic sphere of influence, and serve as an inducement to
nationalists to overturn Russian reformers' efforts to work
constructively with the West in such areas as arms control and conflict
prevention. In addition, they believe that Central Europe's experiment
with democracy may be but a brief moment in centuries of turbulence,
and that western publics are not prepared to guarantee the security of
such a region when scarce resources might be utilized for domestic
needs rather than for defense.
The Candidate States
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have suffered repeated
divisions and subjugation by empires to their east and west during the
last several centuries. With the collapse of the Soviet empire in
Central and Eastern Europe, these countries restored sovereign,
democratic governments for the first time since the aftermath of World
War II. The impetus for NATO enlargement, which first gained momentum
in 1993, was largely driven by the concern of anti-communist Eastern
European leaders such as President Lech Walesa of Poland and President
Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic, who feared that Russia would seek
to reassert influence over former Soviet satellite states. It is the
hopes of the leaders of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic that
NATO membership will provide a stable security environment as their
countries and others in the region deepen their drive toward democracy
and market economies on the Western periphery of a Russia whose future
is far from certain.
Public opinion in Poland and Hungary favors entry into NATO, in
Poland overwhelmingly and in Hungary strongly. In the Czech Republic,
polls show a narrower margin of support on the issue of enlargement.
The governments and parliaments of all three candidate states support
NATO membership as a means to enhance stability. Due to their concern
over the return of an aggressive Russia, they view the Article 5
commitment as the principal, but mostly unstated, reason for joining
the alliance.
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have each held several
elections judged free and fair since regaining its independence. Each
has made progress in privatizing its economy and is experiencing
economic growth. The three candidate states have accepted NATO's
requirement of assuming the necessary military responsibilities should
they enter the alliance. Each now enjoys civilian control of the
military, although each remains encumbered, to differing degrees, with
armed forces top heavy with officers and only partially trained in NATO
doctrine and practices. They are at different stages of modernizing and
restructuring their armed forces, and each has outlined plans to ensure
that defense expenditures are sufficient to meet the obligations of
NATO membership.
Each candidate state is a member of a range of European
institutions, including the OSCE and the Council of Europe. The
European Union is considering the three countries (and others) as
possible candidates for membership, to be formally named at an EU
summit in December 1997. NATO and the EU have both required candidate
states to settle border and ethnic disputes to qualify for membership.
To this end, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have signed
agreements with neighboring states, and the leading political parties
in each of the three countries have given strong evidence of dedication
to the settlement of ethnic and border disputes.
Costs, Benefits, and Burden Sharing
In a February 1997, ``Report to Congress on the Enlargement of
NATO: Rationale, Benefits, Costs, and Implications'', the Department of
Defense outlined its analysis of the costs of enlargement. (NATO is
drafting its own cost study of enlargement, which is due to be
completed in December 1997). The Pentagon study is premised upon the
collapse of the Russian threat, the need for fulfilling the defense
requirements of the Strategic Concept, and the potential contribution
of the candidate states to NATO's new missions.
The Administration estimates that 12 years (1997-2009) would elapse
before the three states might fully contribute to collective defense.
The estimated total cost (combined U.S., fifteen NATO allies and three
candidate states) of enlargement will be $27-35 billion. The study
assumes that current members would deploy no substantial forces on the
territory of new members, but it does note that NATO defense costs
would be appreciably higher in the event of a renewed Russian threat--
with or without enlargement.
Focus on this issue should include three distinct points. The first
point is the cost of accepting three new members into the alliance.
According to the Pentagon estimates, the cost of NATO enlargement will
be divided among the United States (15%), the new members (35%), and
the other existing members of NATO (50%). The dollar amount from the
United States for this purpose is estimated at $150-$200 million per
year from 1999-2009.
The second category of expense, the cost to the new members to meet
the military requirements of NATO membership, is estimated at $10-13
billion over twelve years--an amount that Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic have publicly committed to meet. All three countries have
stable democratic governments, and economic reforms have progressed to
a degree that NATO defense expenditures can reasonably be met. Poland's
economic growth rate this year is running at 5.5 percent, with Hungary
and the Czech Republic not far behind.
The third category of expense, the cost for existing alliance
members to meet obligations to pay a fair share of the cost of NATO
obligations as agreed in the Strategic Concept, is estimated at $4.5-
$5.5 billion. This represents commitments already made but not yet
achieved by the allies. In fact, European defense budgets are shrinking
and it is this latter category of cost sharing that must be met by the
Europeans if NATO membership is to remain beneficial to U.S. interests.
Assumptions of the threat to NATO and what constitutes an
``adequate'' defense have driven estimates in the two other enlargement
cost studies of note, offered by the RAND Corporation (a national
security think tank) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Both of
these studies examine escalating threat scenarios, coupled to the cost
of correspondingly increased defense postures. RAND's total cost
estimates for NATO enlargement range from $10 billion to $110 billion
over 10-15 years. The low end of the RAND study's estimate assumes a
minimal threat, with new members bearing the costs of military
modernization; the high-end estimate assumes a substantial forward
deployment of current members' forces on new members' territory coupled
with a resurgent Russian threat.
CBO assessed enlargement costs under five possible scenarios,
ranging from assisting a new member engaged in a border skirmish or a
conflict with a regional power, to the permanent stationing of the
forces of current member states on the territory of new members to
prepare for a broader conflict with Russia as the adversary. According
to CBO, over 15 years the estimated range of total costs would be $60
to $125 billion, with the total U.S. share ranging from $4.8 to $18.9
billion.
Allied governments do not agree with the cost of enlargement as
defined by the Administration (or the two private studies). Due to
their differing assumptions about threats and required responses, and
in view of their publics' desire for declining defense budgets, most
NATO allies think the cost of NATO enlargement should be far less.
French President Chirac has said: ``We have adopted a very simple
position: Enlargement must not cost anything in net terms'' because
there is no threat. ``In reality, NATO is a peacekeeping body, a crisis
management system, and accordingly can afford much lighter resources to
cover enlargement.'' The former British Ambassador to the United States
has said that the Administration report assumes a greater threat than
warranted, and that U.S. officials are ``using arguments about
enlargement to leverage a better performance [from allies] on [NATO]
force goals.'' Both of these remarks, which are representative of
thinking in several allied capitals, raise questions about the future
capabilities of NATO and the willingness of current allies to devote
resources sufficient to meet their military obligations.
While defense burden sharing inside NATO remains unequal, the
American-led NATO alliance provides the best forum for the United
States to press the European democracies to continue to meet their
obligations, not only for European defense but, even more importantly,
for the global defense of mutual interests. It is no coincidence that
the integrated, well-trained forces of the U.S. and its European allies
formed the spearhead of the successful attack against Iraq during the
Persian Gulf War. This was a direct result of cooperation among members
of NATO.
Maintaining the abilities of NATO to respond to future crises will
be a vital U.S. interest if the Europeans can be pressed to share the
burden. Without NATO, the global defense burden of the U.S. would
likely increase. The ability of the allies to coordinate with U.S.
forces in a military crisis would be reduced and the net result would
probably be more instances where the United States is forced to either
``go it alone'' or stay out of conflicts that could have the potential,
as was the case in the first half of the century, ultimately to bring
the U.S. in anyway.
NATO-Russia Relations
Many allies, particularly Germany, France, and Italy, were
initially concerned that enlargement would jeopardize improved
relations with Russia and inspire a nationalist backlash injurious to
western interests. In this view, an angry Russia would cause
instability and tension in Central Europe. To avoid such a development,
NATO endorsed an effort to reach agreement with Moscow over a forum for
consultation.
NATO and Russia formalized consultative procedures in a document
called the Founding Act, which was signed on May 27, 1997. The Founding
Act established a Permanent Joint Council (PJC) for NATO-Russia
consultations. Secretary Albright has said that the Council is a
``forum for consultation, cooperation, and--where possible--joint
action. It will not have the power to dilute, delay, or block NATO
decisions, nor will it supplant NATO's North Atlantic Council'' (SASC
hearings, April 1997). Russia has ``a voice but not a veto,'' and
appropriate issues for discussion include proliferation, the
safekeeping of nuclear arsenals, and coordination of responses to
``humanitarian crises and threats to peace.''
The NATO-Russia relationship has been strained by three years of
strident Russian opposition to NATO enlargement. In the assessment of
many observers, Russian objections are primarily aimed at achieving
maximum assurance that NATO will pose no future threat to Russia.
Others conclude that Russia is simply irreconcilably opposed to NATO
enlargement, or that Russian leaders are using the issue, without
concern for the consequences, to outmaneuver nationalistic political
opponents at home.
Specifically, the Russian government is seeking assurance that NATO
enlargement will not lead to the deployment of NATO conventional
infrastructure or nuclear weapons directed at Russia. On the question
of conventional capabilities, NATO has resisted any permanent
constraints that would lead new members in Central and Eastern Europe
to be less secure than other members of the alliance. Nonetheless, NATO
formally declared on March 14, 1997, that ``in the current and
foreseeable security environment the alliance will carry out its
collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary
interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather
than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.''
In the case of the latter point, related to the deployment of nuclear
weapons, NATO stated on December 10, 1996 that its members have ``no
intention, no plan, and no reason'' to deploy nuclear weapons in new
member states.
Aside from the official statements of intent by NATO on
conventional and nuclear deployments in new member states, two treaties
offer assurances to both Russia and NATO on these issues: the
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) and the START II
Treaty. The premise of the CFE Treaty, which was ratified by the Senate
in 1991, is that conventional armaments reductions would create a more
balanced and stable military situation in Europe. It establishes
regional and national limits on certain categories of military
equipment, including tanks, artillery, armored fighting vehicles,
fixed-wing aircraft, and attack helicopters among the members of NATO
and former members of the Warsaw Pact (as well as their successor
states). The adaptation of the CFE Treaty is currently under
negotiation in order to make it relevant to the post-Cold War security
environment in Europe.
An emotional element of the Russian complaint about an increased
conventional threat as NATO enlarges is that NATO will then be on
Russian borders. An enlarged NATO may indeed approach the borders of
Ukraine and Belarus, but these are not Russian territory. The small
piece of Russian territory that an enlarged NATO would border,
Kaliningrad, has questionable strategic value to Russia and is not
contiguous with the rest of Russia. A better example of the
relationship envisioned by NATO between new members and Russia can be
found between Russia and Norway. Norway, an original NATO member, has
shared a border with Russia (and before that the Soviet Union) without
threatening Russia. In fact, Norway has no foreign forces on its
territory, it has no nuclear weapons on its territory, it has no
substantial, forward-deployed conventional forces, and it maintains
good relations with Russia. (It even provides foreign aid to Russia).
The avenue for Russia to receive legally binding assurance against
a nuclear threat is the START II Treaty, which was ratified by the
Senate in 1995 and is pending approval in the Russian Duma. This arms
control agreement requires the United States and Russia to reduce
nuclear weapons holdings to 3,000-3,500 warheads each. The Clinton
administration has committed to begin negotiations on a START III
Treaty, with further reductions to a range of 2,000-2,500 each, if
Russia approves the START II Treaty. While a START III Treaty is far
from a forgone conclusion--with many complicated issues dividing the
two sides and an internal U.S. debate over how low the United States
can take its level of strategic nuclear weapons and retain effective
deterrence--it is through these negotiations that the Russian
government can gain increased assurances and security from the nuclear
holdings of NATO members.
Proponents of the NATO-Russian Founding Act see this measure as a
definitive symbol of NATO's desire to work with, not against Russia. It
addresses a widely held view--including among potential members of NATO
in Central Europe--that isolating Russia would undermine European
security. The Founding Act establishes a forum for Russia to have a
voice in European security, and it has allowed Russia to save face as
NATO almost inevitably enlarges.
Critics, however, contend that the NATO-Russia Founding Act
provides Russia with a status inside NATO in advance of Central
European states seeking membership. Furthermore, Russia's status has
been achieved through a political agreement among NATO members while
Central European states are required to gain the approval of member
states through ratification. On a separate matter, critics point out
that because difficult decisions at NATO are not made by casting votes
or using vetoes, but rather through a careful process of building
consensus, the ``voice but not a veto'' construct actually gives the
Russian government equal footing with members of the alliance on
virtually any subject considered in the Permanent Joint Council.
Finally, critics assert that while a NATO-Russia dialogue has some
appeal in the abstract, when held up against the concrete, contemporary
challenges of European security, the ability to reach a common approach
between NATO and Russia on issues such as Bosnia will be problematic if
not impossible.
Bosnia
The long war in Bosnia ended when the United States brokered the
1995 Dayton Accord to establish a multi-ethnic, non-partitioned state.
The NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) oversees and enforces military
aspects of the accord, which the parties themselves have in large part
successfully implemented. Implementation of non-military provisions
that would consolidate peace and political stability has been less
successful. National Security Advisor Berger said September 23, 1997,
that Bosnia will ``remain a source of dangerous instability in Europe''
unless the international community remains engaged after the end of the
SFOR mandate on June 30, 1998. Secretary of defense William Cohen, in
an October 1-2, 1997, meeting with his NATO counterparts, stated that
no final decision had been made about a post-SFOR force in Bosnia.
States contributing to SFOR also differ on whether the NATO force
should become more engaged in missions such as capturing war criminals
in Bosnia. Many European governments maintain an ``in together, out
together'' policy: if U.S. forces leave, theirs will depart as well.
The United States supplies 31% of the forces for SFOR, Britain 19.3%,
France 9.1%, and Germany 7.3%. Germany has absorbed 300,000 refugees
from the former Yugoslavia, at a cost of $2.5 billion a year.
Bosnia may affect the debate over NATO enlargement because western
engagement there is seen as a test of the Europeans' willingness to
share the burden of bringing stability to their own continent. In this
view, France, for example, demands an enhanced leadership role for
Europeans in the alliance, but at the same time the Europeans refuse to
commit to ensuring stability in Bosnia without a U.S. ground presence
and leadership. Some European officials counter that the United States
cannot be resolute in guaranteeing the security of Poland, the Czech
Republic, and Hungary if it lacks the resolve to bring peace to Bosnia,
which is clearly causing instability in neighboring regions. In these
officials' view, if a key new mission of an enlarged NATO is crisis
management, then Bosnia is a crucial test that the alliance can not
fail and still hope to retain its vitality.
Timetable for Enlargement
Accession negotiations with the three candidate states began in
September 1997, and NATO intends to sign a protocol for amendment of
the Washington Treaty to admit Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
at a December 15-16, 1997, meeting of NATO foreign ministers. The
Administration expects to transmit the protocol to the Senate in
January 1998. If the member states approve the protocols, the alliance
wishes to admit the three states in April 1999 on NATO's 50th
anniversary.
MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF A
POST-COLD WAR WORLD:
NATO ENLARGEMENT AND
U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS
C O N T E N T S
__________
Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ 341
I. Policy Recommendations..........................................345
II. Observations....................................................346
III.Status Reports on Leading Candidate Countries...................351
A. Poland.................................................... 351
B. The Czech Republic........................................ 355
C. Hungary................................................... 358
D. Slovenia.................................................. 362
IV. Roster of Meetings in Russia and Central Europe.................366
ADDENDA
A. Speech by Senator Biden at Warsaw University, March 25, 1997.. 371
B. The North Atlantic Treaty (Washington, DC, April 4, 1949)..... 376
C. Chronology of NATO Enlargement................................ 379
D. Helsinki Summit Declaration (March 21, 1997).................. 381
E. North Atlantic Council Ministerial Communique (December 10,
1996).......................................................... 383
F. Statement by the North Atlantic Council (March 14, 1997)...... 394
G. NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996..................... 395
H. Selected Bibliography on NATO Enlargement..................... 400
I. Map of Europe with Members of NATO and the Partnership for
Peace.......................................................... 403
(339)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
May 13, 1997.
The Hon. Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman. During the week of March 23, I traveled
to Europe to learn more about the process of the enlargement of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its likely effect
upon our relations with the Russian Federation. This report is
based upon an extensive series of meetings held during that
trip and background reports by several agencies of the U.S.
Government, including the Department of State, the United
States Information Agency, the Department of Defense, and the
Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress.
The trip immediately followed the U.S.-Russia summit
meeting in Helsinki, Finland and took me first to Moscow, and
then to the capitals of the four countries named in the 1996
``NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act''--Poland, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia.
In traveling to these five countries, I was accompanied by
Dr. Michael Haltzel, Professional Staff Member of the Foreign
Relations Committee, and Commander Sean Fogarty of the U.S.
Navy. Our group was given invaluable assistance by the
Embassies of the United States in Moscow, Warsaw, Prague,
Budapest, and Ljubljana.
Mr. Chairman, for political, economic, strategic, and
cultural reasons, Europe remains an area of vital interest to
the United States and, therefore, stability on the continent is
fundamental to the well-being of our country. The often painful
history of the twentieth century has demonstrated that the
United States must play a leading role in organizing the
security of Europe. From World War I at the beginning of this
century to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the mid-1990's, without
American leadership the countries of Europe have proven unable
to resolve their differences peacefully.
Over the last decade, the end of the cold war and the
collapse of Communism have completely altered the face of
Europe. Newly independent states in Central and Eastern Europe
are striving to create and solidify political democracy and
free markets. For most of these countries it is a difficult
process, which, if not put into a larger framework, could spin
out of control.
It is in this context that the enlargement of NATO must be
seen. During the cold war, NATO provided the security umbrella
under which former enemies in Western Europe were able to
cooperate and build highly successful societies. The
enlargement of the alliance can now serve to move the zone of
stability eastward to Central Europe, thereby preventing a
1930's--type renationalization of that historically volatile
region. For the United States this translates into investing
today in a modernized, enlarged NATO in order to avoid, once
again, having to spill incalculably more blood and expend more
resources to settle conflict tomorrow.
NATO enlargement will reach a crucial stage on July 8-9,
1997 in Madrid, Spain when the alliance is expected to extend
an invitation to membership to one or more candidate countries.
In order for enlargement to proceed, however, both our current
NATO allies and the candidate countries invited to join in
Madrid, must agree to shoulder their fair share of financial
costs and all mutual obligations. My discussions with Central
European leaders convinced me that this basic message needs to
be driven home.
The failure of our current and future allies to pull their
weight would surely cause support for NATO in the United States
to wane. America's 50-year-long commitment to the alliance has
been predicated upon equitable division of burdens. The clear
and understandable tendency among the American people and some
of its leaders to look inward is growing. I believe, however,
that this isolationist impulse is dangerous, and it is up to
the President and the Congress to persuade Americans that we
must continue to engage Europe.
Russia, also undergoing a comprehensive and difficult
transition from totalitarianism to free-market democracy, will
continue to be one of the major players in determining whether
Europe remains secure. It is essential, therefore, that
enlarging NATO be accompanied by a broader and deeper
relationship with Russia. Some observers doubt that
simultaneously achieving both goals is possible. I disagree.
This report reflects my strong belief that NATO enlargement
need not adversely affect U.S. relations with Russia. From
Communist leader Zyuganov, to liberal leader Yavlinsky, to
nationalist leader General Lebed', no Russian politician with
whom I met believed that NATO enlargement posed a security
threat to Russia. Rather, their opposition to enlargement
reflected a deeper psychological problem of coming to grips
with the loss of empire and a fear of Moscow's being
marginalized in the changed world of the 21st century.
There is much that we can do to allay their misgivings. By
stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe, NATO enlargement can
induce Moscow to reorient its political and economic policies
westward toward Europe and the United States. Moreover, before
Madrid, NATO and Russia may reach agreement on a charter that
will outline mechanisms for enhanced consultation and
cooperation, without adversely affecting the ability of NATO to
function as the world's most powerful, defensive military
alliance. Finally, through intensified trade, investment, and
technical assistance the United States and Western Europe can
help Russia overcome the real threats to her security--crime,
corruption, environmental degradation, and loosely guarded
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and material.
Security does not come cheaply, and maintaining NATO is not
inexpensive. American taxpayers deserve to understand the
benefits of their continuing to support the alliance now that
its mission has broadened to projecting security rather than
the old cold war task of confronting a single aggressive enemy.
I know that you agree on the importance of these issues,
and I look forward to working with you to ensure that the U.S.
Senate and the American people are fully informed as the
process of NATO enlargement continues.
Sincerely,
Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Ranking Member.
I. Policy Recommendations
1. Initiate a national debate on NATO enlargement.--No
foreign policy, no matter how well formulated, can be sustained
without the informed consent of the American people. Therefore,
a national debate should be launched to explore the costs,
obligations, and benefits to the United States of NATO
enlargement. To begin that debate, the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations should hold a series of comprehensive
hearings on NATO enlargement and relations with Russia in both
the Subcommittee on European Affairs and the Full Committee.
2. Immediately engage European alliance partners on funding
NATO enlargement.--Before the U.S. Senate votes on enlargement
in 1998, there must be a clear understanding with our NATO
Allies of how the costs will be shared. Therefore, the U.S.
Government should without delay engage our European NATO
partners to urge them to agree to shouldering, with Canada, the
50 percent of the direct costs of NATO enlargement and the
costs of power projection enhancements called for by the
administration in the February 1997 Pentagon study.
3. Support the invitation to admission to NATO of four
countries at Madrid.--The U.S. Government should without delay
announce its support for the invitation to admission to NATO at
the July 8-9, 1997 summit in Madrid of Poland, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia, a move which will extend the
zone of stability into Central and Eastern Europe. The
declaration of support should remind the four countries of
their responsibility to shoulder part of the costs of
enlargement.
4. Undertake a program to strengthen cooperation with those
countries not invited at Madrid.--The U.S. Government should
without delay reiterate that NATO enlargement is not a single
event, but a process. There will be additional rounds of
enlargement, and no country should be automatically excluded if
it meets the membership criteria. In that connection, the
United States should present a program to NATO to strengthen
political and military cooperation with candidate countries not
invited to join the alliance at Madrid. This program could
include an enhanced Partnership for Peace, intensive
participation through the new Atlantic Partnership Council, or
regional initiatives.
5. Immediately engage NATO partners on Bosnia.--The U.S.
Government should redouble its efforts to convince our European
NATO partners, particularly the United Kingdom and France, to
continue to maintain ground forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina
after July 1, 1998, to be augmented by U.S. air, naval,
communications, and intelligence support, with a U.S. rapid
reaction force in ``over-the-horizon'' proximity.
6. Refocus and strengthen U.S. engagement with Russia.--
After 5 years of providing technical assistance to Russia it is
time to shift our focus: to projects to encourage trade and
investment and to grassroots partnerships designed to help
create a civil society. In this regard, the administration's
proposal labeled the ``Partnership for Freedom,'' provides a
good conceptual framework, so long as viable Russian
institutions for partnerships and investment can be identified.
7. Ensure continued support for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program.--The Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program, commonly known as the ``Nunn-Lugar Program,'' is a
joint effort with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan to
dismantle the Soviet war machine. By providing the authority
and financing to destroy production capabilities, delivery
vehicles, and weapons and materials of mass destruction, the
program has reduced the threats to the United States and its
allies and friends from nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons. Because nuclear, chemical, and biological stockpiles
still remain in the states of the former Soviet Union, however,
sabotage, theft, and unlawful exports remain serious problems.
The ``Nunn-Lugar Program'' should continue to be supported by
the Congress.
8. Maintain support for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.--
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, now headquartered in Prague,
remains an important instrument in advancing the fundamental
U.S. foreign policy objective in Central and Eastern Europe and
Russia: the consolidation of democracy. Although a free press
is beginning to take root in the region, RFE/RL still has a
dual function: to keep honest those who would seek to silence
the press, and to provide a model of how independent media
should operate in a free society. This function is not one
conceived in the abstract. The people of Central and Eastern
Europe and Russia continue to turn to RFE/RL because it is
often perceived as the most unbiased available source of news.
U.S. Government support for the radios must be maintained.
II. Observations
For political, economic, and security reasons the
maintenance of stability in Europe remains a fundamental
component of United States foreign policy. In order to
guarantee that stability, a continued American military
presence in Europe is essential. Yet with the collapse of
Communism in most of Europe, many Americans have begun to
question the continued need for the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). For that reason alone, the United States
must be profoundly concerned that the security structures of
the last 50 years be adapted to meet the challenges of the 21st
century. Important elements in that process involve redefining
the alliance's mission and increasing NATO's membership to
reflect the dramatic changes that have occurred in Central
Europe since 1989.
Contrary to fears expressed in some quarters, NATO
enlargement need not adversely affect U.S. relations with
Russia over the long term. Rather, it and the proposed NATO-
Russia Charter can be important steps in definitively shaping a
new European security structure, thereby helping to persuade
Moscow to orient its foreign political and economic policies
westward toward Europe and the United States. Over time, Moscow
can come to realize that the enlargement of NATO will move the
zone of stability eastward to Central Europe, thereby
preventing a 1930's-type renationalization of that historically
volatile region.
In order for enlargement to proceed, however, both our
current NATO allies and the candidate countries invited to join
at the Madrid summit on July 8-9, 1997 must agree to shoulder
their fair share of financial costs and all mutual obligations.
This agreement is the sine qua non of the continued viability
of NATO.
Although few Russians like NATO enlargement, policymakers
in Moscow have accepted it as a fait accompli. Moreover, no
Russian leader whom I met on my trip--from Communist leader
Zyuganov, to liberal leader Yavlinsky, to nationalist leader
General Lebed'--believed that NATO enlargement constitutes a
security threat to Russia. Nearly all politicians and experts
whom I met understood the non-aggressiveness implicit in NATO's
``three no's``--the alliance's declarations of having no
reason, intention, or plan in the current and foreseeable
security environment permanently to station nuclear weapons or
substantial combat forces of current members on the territory
of new members.
Rather, the Kremlin's opposition to enlargement is largely
a psychological question connected with the loss of empire,
wounded pride, and--most importantly--an uncertainty about
Russia's place in the world of the 21st century. As part of
this uncertainty, most Russian leaders are worried about being
marginalized, and as a result they are eager to move forward
with its bilateral relationship with the United States.
Although China or even Iran are occasionally mentioned in
the press and in Moscow as potential alternatives to a Western
orientation, except for tactical cooperation like arms sales to
China, or broad declarations of increased Sino-Russian
cooperation, these options are recognized by nearly everyone in
the Russian policy community as not being substitutes for
improved relations with the West.
In a sense the Helsinki Summit may have marked a watershed
in Russian foreign policy in that it forced the Russians to
confront the fact that they are no longer the Soviet Union, a
superpower. For the last 5 years they have focused almost
entirely on pressing domestic matters, without adequately
paying attention to the fundamental changes in Central Europe
and the need for long-term stability there. Closer to home,
Russia is still struggling to come to terms with an independent
Ukraine that has its own independent foreign policy. Russian
Foreign Minister Evgenii Primakov has a vision of a tighter
Confederation of Independent States (CIS), but in practice
Moscow has carried out a clumsy policy, even toward Belarus. In
that regard, one might say that the debates of the 1840's and
1850's between the Slavophiles and Westernizers are still going
on. Unfortunately until now the current Westernizers have
seemed unsure how to achieve their goal, since they have no
firm grasp as to how Russia is going to interact with the
international economy. The recent addition of the young and
sophisticated Anatolii Chubais and Boris Nemtsov as First
Deputy Chairmen of Yeltsin's government augurs well for better
comprehension of the West in general and of NATO enlargement in
particular.
Symptomatic of Russia's uneven progress toward Western-
style democracy is the increasing corruption of the news media,
especially the electronic media. Grigorii Yavlinsky, leader of
the Yabloko Party in the State Duma, told me that every
television channel is now propagandizing for someone.
Therefore, he said, the U.S.-run Radio Liberty is essential for
Russians who want to get unbiased news.
Despite the heated rhetoric, several political figures in
Moscow acknowledged to me that Russia's biggest problems are
home-grown domestic ones. These include widespread corruption,
violent crime, insufficient legal infrastructure for foreign
investment, environmental degradation, and loosely guarded
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and material.
The United States should continue to engage Russia
politically and militarily by means of the NATO-Russia Charter,
which is currently being negotiated. Whatever institutional
arrangements emerge, they must, of course, not adversely affect
the ability of NATO to function as the world's most powerful,
defensive military alliance. President Clinton's dictum, ``a
voice but not a veto,'' must be strictly observed.
Moreover, arms control agreements with Russia must be
ratified and expanded. Of especial importance is getting the
State Duma to ratify the START II Treaty and then, together
with the United States, to move on to further reductions in
START III. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
(CFE) must also be adapted to reflect the changed environment.
In addition, it is vitally important that the United States
continue its economic engagement with Russia, not through
massive infusions of money, which Moscow, especially if it
cleans up its corruption, does not need, but more through
broadened investment and trade, expanded grassroots
partnerships, and some targeted technical assistance.
Significantly, not a single senior official in Warsaw, Prague,
Budapest, or Ljubljana whom I met wanted to isolate Russia from
the West.
The central, and compelling rationale for enlarging NATO is
that adding selected new members would extend the zone of
stability to Central Europe. NATO was the umbrella that
permitted the post-war rapprochement between France and
Germany, that reintegrated Italy and Spain back into Europe,
and that has kept the feud between Greece and Turkey from
escalating to warfare. The question for today is not ``enlarge
NATO or remain the same.'' The status quo is simply not an
option. If there were to be no NATO enlargement, the countries
between Germany and Russia would inevitably seek other means to
protect themselves, and a potentially destabilizing
renationalization of Central Europe would likely result.
Enlargement must be accompanied by a redefinition of NATO's
mission. The alliance's primary mission as outlined in Article
5 of the Washington Treaty of April 4, 1949 remains the same:
treating an attack on one member as an attack on all and
responding through the use of armed force if necessary. In
addition, in the current post-cold war situation, non-Article 5
missions like peacekeeping operations, sometimes in cooperation
with non-NATO powers have become possible. The cooperative SFOR
effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Russia and several other
non-NATO countries is one example.
The candidates for membership in NATO must understand and
accept the obligations of membership. One of these is assuming
the financial burden of modernizing their armed forces and
making them interoperable with those of NATO members. Other
obligations are military, such as agreeing to come to the aid
of Allies, as described in Article 5; allowing basing of NATO
troops on their territory, if necessary; and allowing
overflights of NATO aircraft, if necessary.
The February 1997 Pentagon study on NATO proposed a
distribution of direct costs of enlargement whereby 50 percent
would be assumed by current non-U.S. members (i.e. Western
Europe and Canada), 35 percent by the new members, and 15
percent by the United States. Calculating these ratios begins
with the estimate that about 40 percent of direct enlargement
enhancements could be nationally funded, and 60 percent common
funded.
The expected U.S. contribution of $150-200 million per year
for 10 years, although a small fraction of the total defense
budget, is nonetheless not trivial, given current domestic
demands to balance the U.S. Federal budget. These costs are
also likely understated. Prospective new NATO members must keep
that basic political fact of life in mind, lest they get the
erroneous impression that their accession to the alliance would
be a painless, free ride. In spite of the undeniable strains
that meeting NATO enlargement costs will put on Central
European countries who are still in transition from command to
free-market economies, the candidate countries must make the
financial means available if they expect current members to
ratify their accession to membership. As I told one Polish
military official, ``if you want to fly first class, you have
to buy a first class ticket.''
The 50 percent share of direct enlargement costs allocated
to the Western European NATO partners and Canada may, in fact,
be politically more difficult than the 35 percent allocated to
the new members. Moreover, current non-U.S. NATO members are
called upon to pay for power projection enhancements, which the
United States made in the 1980's. The Pentagon study calculates
the cost for these enhancements to be in the $8-10 billion
range.
Further complicating matters is the fact that the 11
European NATO members who are also members of the European
Union are currently engaged in painful budget cutting in order
to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria for Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) on January 1, 1999. Nonetheless, for NATO
to remain a vibrant organization with the United States
continuing to play a lead role, the non-U.S. members must
assume their fair share of direct enlargement costs.
I fear that a coincidence of events in the late spring of
1998 may make Senate ratification of NATO enlargement
problematical. Just when the Senate is likely to be voting on
amending the Washington Treaty to accept new members, American
ground forces will be completing their withdrawal from Bosnia
and Herzegovina. As it now stands, European NATO allies will
follow suit, insisting on ``in together, out together,''
despite a U.S. offer to make air, naval, communications, and
intelligence assets available to a European-led follow-on
force, with an American Rapid Reaction Force on standby alert
``over the horizon'' in Hungary or Italy.
U.S. Senators, mindful of the repeated calls by some
European NATO members, led by France, for more European
leadership in the alliance and a sturdier ``European pillar''
within NATO, may see in the European refusal to maintain troops
in Bosnia evidence of inequitable burden-sharing or, worse
still, may question the worth of NATO altogether. Hence, I
believe that our European NATO partners, especially France and
the United Kingdom, should reconsider their unwillingness to
lead a post-SFOR ground force in Bosnia after mid-1998.
International organizations other than NATO also have
meaningful security components and should be encouraged to
intensify their efforts. The Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which during the past few years
has undertaken conflict-prevention, crisis management, and
electoral missions in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, Chechnya,
Bosnia, and Albania, will likely continue to grow in
importance. The United States is playing an increasingly
important role in the OSCE.
The European Union (EU) plays a profound role in
stabilizing the continent. With a combined gross domestic
product that is larger than that of the United States, the 15
members of the EU are forming ``an ever closer union'' with
greater political and economic integration. The EU's immense
economic clout has made it vital to the development of Central
and Eastern Europe, and it is therefore virtually inconceivable
that even a non-NATO EU member state would be the object of
aggression.
The EU hopes some day to create a common foreign and
security policy, and in the recent past France concentrated on
giving the EU an independent military dimension through the
Western European Union (WEU). After the Gulf War, which
revealed how far the U.S. was ahead of Europe in military
technology, and with NATO's endorsement of a European security
and defense identity within the alliance, which would allow
European members to carry out contingency operations under the
political control and strategic direction of the WEU, Paris
reconsidered and now intends to re-enter NATO's integrated
command. Its demand, however, for European control of the
Southern Command in Naples--a step rejected by the United
States--is complicating the issue.
There is, though, a sub-surface tension between NATO and
the EU. From the early 1990's the EU firmly proclaimed that
NATO enlargement had to precede EU expansion (the accession of
Austria, Finland, and Sweden excepted). Some observers have
feared that the EU has used NATO enlargement as a pretext for
postponing the admission of qualified Central and Eastern
European countries. Now that NATO has set a 1999 date for
completion of its first round of enlargement, the EU should
move ahead with its own expansion. The year 2002 has been cited
as a target date. When I raised this issue in the four Central
European capitals that I visited, it elicited emotional
responses.
Public opinion polls in Poland, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Slovenia reveal that, to a greater or lesser
degree, the citizenries are unclear about the mutual military
obligations that NATO membership entails. With these data in
mind, I urged the four national governments to quickly embark
upon public education campaigns so that invitations to join
NATO in Madrid in July will not catch their populations off
guard and unaware of the action their governments are
proposing.
The process of NATO enlargement must not lead to the
drawing of new lines through Europe. In order to prevent such a
development, NATO must make unmistakably clear that the first
round of enlargement is not the last, but rather the beginning
of an ongoing process. Moreover, NATO should conclude
agreements to strengthen and deepen ties with candidate
countries that do not receive invitations at Madrid, in
preparation for their joining the alliance at a future date.
All four Central European countries that I visited--Poland,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia--appear to have
fulfilled the basic criteria for NATO membership: political
democracy, free-market economy, civilian control of the
military, peaceful relations with neighbors, and a commitment
to NATO principles and trans-Atlantic security. Their progress
in committing resources for enhancing their military
preparedness and in achieving Interoperability with NATO,
however, varies considerably. Status reports for the four
countries, which follow, illustrate these differences.
III. Status Reports on Leading Candidate Countries
A. Poland
Poland might be described as a divided society united only
in its overwhelming desire to become a NATO member. Polling
done by the United States Information Agency (USIA) shows
public support in Poland for NATO membership at about 90
percent, the highest of any country in Central or Eastern
Europe. In addition, only in Poland and Albania do majorities
support sending their troops to defend another NATO country.
Poland was the only country polled in 1996 in which a majority
favored allowing regular, routine overflights by NATO aircraft,
and with Albania was the only one to favor (by 52 percent to 38
percent) the stationing of NATO troops on its soil, and was the
only one with a majority (67 percent--up from 45 percent in
1995) favoring regular, routine exercises by NATO forces on its
territory.
Currently Poland is spending 2.3 percent of its GDP on
defense, a percentage which will almost certainly have to rise
to meet the demands of modernization and Interoperability. Yet
this funding may be difficult to produce. When asked by USIA
whether they would favor increasing the percentage of the
national budget spent on the military rather than, for example,
on education and health care, only 16 percent of Poles agreed,
while 74 percent opposed. This result is not surprising, given
the hardships most Poles endured in the transition from a
command to a market economy. Despite the existence of a well
worked out Polish plan to fund military modernization and NATO
Interoperability, my discussions in Warsaw revealed
misconceptions about how much aid was likely to be forthcoming
from the United States.
Foreign observers give credit to the current administration
of President Aleksander Kwasniewski for having greatly improved
Polish-Jewish relations after a period of insensitivity under
former President Lech Walesa. A Law on the Status of the Jewish
Faith was waiting Presidential signature at the time of my
visit. It was to give surviving Jewish communities the right to
ask for communal property back.
Four issues will likely be central to the fall 1997 Polish
Parliamentary elections: first, abortion and the role of the
Catholic Church in society--the Church seems unsure of its
role, and the parish priests are the key players; second,
protection for the agricultural sector, which still employs 35
percent of the work force, more than in any other
industrialized country; third, privatization of the big state
industries like energy, steel, copper, coal, energy, and the
banks; and fourth, coming to terms with the past--whether or
how to deal with individuals who were members of, or cooperated
with, the Communist secret police before 1989.
If the conservative-nationalist Solidarity Electoral Action
(AWS) coalition wins a majority in the Parliament this fall,
there will almost certainly be friction between Parliament and
the President on domestic affairs. It is important to note,
however, that the foreign policy views of the leftist and
rightist blocs are nearly identical.
Poland has made a successful transition to a free-market
economy. Since 1993, Poland has had one of the highest growth
rates in Europe, with annual growth of 5 percent to 7 percent.
The sweeping economic reforms implemented in 1989 have paid
off, and the private sector today accounts for almost 70
percent of economic output. Small and medium-scale
privatization has proved successful, but the privatization of
large enterprises is proving difficult. A mass privatization
voucher plan has spread ownership of more than four hundred
enterprises broadly among the population.
Most of the Polish officer corps was trained in Moscow
during the days of the Warsaw Pact, and some Communist patterns
of thinking remain. During the last 16 months, though, the
Polish military has undergone huge change. The General Staff,
paramount until Kwasniewski's election, has been included in
and subordinated to the Ministry of Defense. A land force
command has been created. Overall, the military has been
downsized to 220,000 men, a drop of 50 percent since the days
of the Warsaw Pact, and the intention is to reduce the size of
the army further to 180,000 over the next 5 years. Plans call
for 50 percent of the armed forces to be professionals. The
Polish cabinet has introduced legislation on reducing mandatory
military service from 18 to 12 months. The army has reorganized
itself from a regimental to a brigade structure in order to
participate in NATO and has redeployed away from its western
border into four military districts.
On March 10, 1997, the Kwasniewski government replaced
Chief of Staff General Tadeusz Wilecki, who had stubbornly
refused to acknowledge civilian control of the military, with
General Henryk Szumski. A few days before my arrival, several
Wilecki subordinates such as the commander of the Warsaw
district and some deputy chiefs of the General Staff were
relieved of their commands, although they remain active duty
officers. General Wilecki could conceivably come back to a
powerful position in some function, but it seems unlikely.
The new Polish military structure is an amalgam of NATO and
Polish forms. The quality of life for Polish soldiers has gone
down, but nearly all of the military wants to join NATO. It
will take five to 10 years to develop true civilian military
expertise, including members of Parliament who can adequately
supervise the uniformed military. Presently, for example, there
is only one Parliamentary staffer working on military affairs.
While not a direct cost of joining NATO, procurement of new
military equipment will be the most costly aspect of upgrading
the Polish armed forces. The four main items for procurement
are a multi-role fighter aircraft; anti-tank missiles and
avionics, both for the Polish-made Huzar helicopter; and radio
equipment (this contract already has been let to the French
firm Thompson).
Poland may have to procure additional new equipment after
it joins NATO and is assigned a role in the common defense of
the alliance. The civilian defense ministry has taken over the
procurement function from military officials, but questions
remain about the openness of the bidding process. Equipment
modernization is estimated by the defense ministry to cost
$7.76 billion over 15 years, equal to an additional 20 percent
of defense spending.
As for the direct costs of enlargement, Polish political
leaders are unanimous in their commitment to assume this
burden. According to the recent study by the Euro-Atlantic
Association, the costs of achieving Interoperability for Poland
will be about $1.26 billion over 15 years, and the total cost
of Polish membership in NATO will be $1.5 billion over 15 years
(adding in Poland's share of NATO's common budgets). This cost,
about $100 million per year, represents about 4 percent of the
defense budget.
Polish officials recognize the importance of
Interoperability to their candidacy, and they have undertaken a
number of technical steps to achieve this. These include
English-language training for liaison officers so they can
communicate with Allied units, mapping software that converts
Polish symbols to NATO standard symbols so plans can be shared,
and secure phones so Polish officers can speak with NATO
officers. To date, 3,540 officers have been rated proficient in
a Western language--2,730 of those in English--and plans call
for achieving the necessary level of language skill among the
officer corps by 1999.
Poland has adapted its regulations, planning and command
procedures to meet NATO standards, and it is decentralizing its
command structure. Documents pertaining to NATO military
procedures are being translated. An Identification Friend or
Foe (IFF) system compatible with NATO's is in place, and
efforts continue to reorganize the air traffic control system.
Poland is focusing first on core units that would participate
in NATO out-of-area missions and need to be interoperable
shortly after Poland joins NATO. There are plans to extend an
interoperable capability to other units over time.
The air and naval forces are the most advanced in
Interoperability, with 95 percent of those having ``fast-
alert'' communications capability with NATO. The army, while
only 45 percent interoperable in this manner, should reach 100
percent by 2002. In addition, the Polish battalion with the
SFOR mission in Bosnia is implementing NATO procedures through
first-hand cooperation with the alliance.
In January 1997, Poland reported that of the 20
Interoperability Objectives Poland accepted in 1995 a total of
six had been completed, 11 had been partially completed, and
three had not yet been started. New Interoperability Objectives
are being negotiated and should be agreed upon by May 1997.
Future plans for achieving Interoperability will certainly
include command exercises at the corps level, operational and
tactical training, tactical exercises, and computer-simulation
exercises. Other changes, like integration into the NATO
command structure and upgrading some military infrastructure,
will have to wait until Poland actually joins NATO--this
because the alliance must draw up plans for the defense of
Poland and because Poland does not yet have access to
classified NATO documents. The recent Pentagon study states
that initial levels of Interoperability need not be achieved
until 2001 because of the current benign threat environment.
Active Polish participation in NATO/Partnership for Peace
(PFP) exercises has allowed mid-level officers the chance to
familiarize themselves with NATO procedure, improve language
skills, and build contacts with future allies' officers. Poland
hosted the first PFP exercise and in 1996 took part in 18
exercises. In 1997, Warsaw plans to join in 26 NATO/PFP
exercises and in 24 ``In the Spirit of PFP'' exercises.
Polish officials see their country as playing a role in
reaching out to Eastern European countries like Ukraine and the
Baltic states, helping to integrate those countries into a
united Europe. Poland's relations with all its neighbors are
good (though they maintain contacts with opponents of the neo-
dictatorship in Belarus and raise human rights concerns with
the ruling Lukashenka regime). Warsaw is an advocate of early
NATO membership for the Baltic states, especially Lithuania,
with whom it is developing a joint peacekeeping battalion,
which is expected to be ready in 1998.
Polish military cooperation with the Federal Republic of
Germany, its large and powerful neighbor to the west, is
extensive, second only to that with the United States.
The Polish Sejm, or lower house of Parliament, must approve
NATO membership by a simple majority. No opposition is
foreseen. A proposal by some government politicians to hold a
referendum has drawn criticism as an unnecessary measure.
Despite Poland's progress toward NATO membership, there is
a pervasive fear that something will go wrong in the end.
Interior Minister Siemiatkowski (the functional counterpart to
the American FBI Director) recently stated that Polish
counterintelligence had uncovered a KGB plot to subvert
Poland's candidacy before the Madrid summit, and there is
concern that NATO's efforts to placate Russia over enlargement
will somehow result in Poland's becoming a second-class member
of NATO. The abortive French plan for an April 1997 five-power
summit to discuss European security was strongly opposed by
Poland, which saw it as another Yalta deciding Polish security
by outside powers, i.e. Warsaw's ultimate nightmare.
B. The Czech Republic
The Czech Republic is widely considered to be an early
candidate for NATO membership, having been so designated by
Congress in the 1996 NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act. The
country's split from Slovakia in 1993 was peaceful, and its
potential invitation is not expected to be linked to Slovakia's
increasingly poor prospects for early NATO membership.
Prague sees NATO as the guarantor of European security.
Czech governmental leaders have consistently expressed a
priority interest in early entry into NATO and a stated
willingness to bear the burdens and responsibilities involved
in such membership.
By most accounts, the Czech Republic meets the general
condition of adhering to NATO norms and principles, and it has
a democratically elected government with effective democratic
institutions. The Czech government under Prime Minister Vaclav
Klaus has given priority to the country's transformation to a
free market economy. The country has a history of democracy
dating back to the 1918 founding of Czechoslovakia, the only
democracy in Central Europe between the World Wars.
The Czech Republic held fully free and fair elections in
1996, electing the lower house of Parliament in the spring and
the newly created Senate in the fall. Both elections returned
Prime Minister Klaus to power as head of a three-party center-
right coalition.
Czechoslovak armed forces were already undergoing
restructuring and redeployment at the time of the 1993 split of
the Czechoslovak federation. By mutual agreement, the assets
and equipment of federal armed forces were split on a 2:1 ratio
(Czech to Slovak). The division was basically completed and the
Army of the Czech Republic was created by the time the split
became effective on January 1, 1993. The Army of the Czech
Republic, which includes land, air, and air defense forces,
embarked on a major transformation and down-sizing effort in
July 1993.
The Czech government adopted a ``Military Strategy of the
Czech Republic'' in December 1994. The document included a set
of principles related to international security and the defense
of the country, and outlined plans for the further
restructuring of the armed forces. The Czech government is
currently preparing an additional ``legislative package'' of
defense-and security-related laws, which it aims to complete by
July 1997, when the Madrid summit takes place.
Prague maintains mandatory conscription, but has reduced
the term of service to 12 months and aims to move toward a
professional army. The uniformed military of the Czech Republic
has been reduced from 106,000 in 1993 (year of the split) to
about 61,000 in 1996. Currently the armed forces are 44 percent
professional; the intent is to raise that to 53 percent by
2006.
The Czech Ministry of Defense, headed by a civilian Defense
Minister, oversees the Army of the Czech Republic, civil
protection, and other agencies. The General Staff is
subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. By the Czech
constitution, both houses of Parliament must consent to the
stationing of Czech troops abroad. The Senate must approve the
stationing of foreign troops on Czech soil.
In 1995, the Czech Republic undertook twelve PFP
Interoperability Objectives. Naval Interoperability Objectives
do not apply to the Czech Republic. In the view of the Czech
Republic, as of January 1997 it had completed none of the
objectives. Plans are in hand to reach the Objectives by 2005,
and this estimate is probably accurate in light of the time
required to train the requisite number of English or French
speaking members of the armed forces, equip all aircraft with
Western standard air navigation and Identification Friend or
Foe (IFF) equipment, and convert all Czech maps to NATO
standard.
The Czech authorities and NATO officials plan to reach
agreement on 1997-99 Interoperability Objectives, which will
introduce increments to the 1995-97 Objectives and add new
Objectives, by May 1997.
The Czech Republic has contributed a mechanized battalion
and staff officers, totaling about 700 men, to IFOR and SFOR.
At home, this participation has improved the relatively low
public opinion of the country's armed forces. It should also be
noted that Czech soldiers served with the U.S.-led coalition in
the Persian Gulf War.
Czech participation in Partnership for Peace activities has
been high. In 1996, the Czech armed forces participated in 11
NATO/PFP exercises, three national PFP exercises, and 17
national ``in the Spirit of PFP'' exercises. Participation in
more than 60 PFP exercises is planned for 1997. Prague has
bilateral programs in support of PFP and NATO Interoperability
with 20 NATO and other PFP countries. The Czech Republic also
participates in the U.S. regional Airspace Initiative (RAI).
The U.S. State Department characterizes the Czech
Parliament as a ``vociferous and increasingly powerful player
on defense issues.'' While lacking trained civilian defense
experts, a legacy of the Warsaw Pact that also affects the
Defense Ministry, Parliament's oversight ``has been real and
effective, and Members have not been shy'' in questioning
military restructuring plans and proposed defense budgets.
Parliament is expected to enact a law this year that will
codify the mission of the armed forces and the civilian command
structure mandated in the Czech constitution.
Defense spending in 1997 is to comprise 1.8 to 2.0 percent
of GDP, and the government has committed to increase this
figure by 0.1 percentage point every year, until it reaches 2.1
to 2.3 percent in 2000.
There is concern among some in the Czech defense
establishment that these modest increases will prove
insufficient to undertake needed equipment modernization,
including the purchase of advanced fighter aircraft, at the
same time the government attempts to raise officer salaries and
make other quality of life improvements for soldiers. The
government maintains that continued strong economic growth,
combined with cuts in headquarters and defense ministry staffs,
will result in enough money being available for these areas.
The Czech economy benefited from the rapid stabilization
and liberalization measures adopted by the Klaus government
soon after it came to power in the wake of Communism's
collapse. Economic growth was 4.7 percent in 1996 and is
projected at about the same in 1997. Inflation is 7.4 percent,
the lowest in the region, and unemployment is also low, at 3.5
percent. Per capita income is about $5,100. About 70 percent of
economic output comes from the private sector.
Serious problems, however, have recently emerged. Financial
scandals affecting the country's stock market and banking
system have come to light. Moreover, after the harsh winter of
1996-97, industrial production has slowed, the budget deficit
remains high, the foreign trade deficit is skyrocketing, and
wages are rapidly out-pacing the growth of labor productivity.
The Czech government claims that these problems are not
systemic and can be rectified. In mid-April, Prime Minister
Klaus announced a budget package cutting about $900 million in
projected expenses for this year. In deference to the country's
NATO candidacy, defense expenditures will suffer less than
other sectors.
After many years of difficult negotiations, government
leaders from the Czech Republic and the Federal Republic of
Germany signed a declaration on bilateral reconciliation in
January 1997. The final text included an expression of regret
for the Nazi crimes inflicted on the Czech people, as well as
an expression of regret on the Czech side for the suffering
caused by the post-war expulsion of 2.5 million Sudeten Germans
from Czechoslovakia. It also included a German pledge to
promote the Czech Republic's bid to join NATO and the EU. The
declaration was approved by both houses of the Czech Parliament
after stormy debates.
For years the Czech government had de-emphasized regional
approaches to Western integration. Recently, however, it has
moved toward a trend of greater coordination with other
countries in Central Europe aspiring to NATO membership,
especially Poland and Hungary. The form of this cooperation has
involved intensive bilateral consultations and exchanges of
information. The Czech Republic and Poland may issue a joint
memorandum before the July NATO summit.
Relations with Slovakia are generally good, although in
April 1997, subsequent to my trip, a public personal squabble
erupted between Czech President Vaclav Havel and Slovak Prime
Minister Vladimir Meciar. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright quickly reassured the Czechs that this dispute would
not adversely affect their NATO candidacy. Most matters related
to the split-up of Czechoslovakia have been resolved, including
a minor border adjustment, and there remain strong people-to-
people contacts between the two states. Relations with Austria
are warm, with strong economic links.
Just a few days before the Helsinki summit, Russia's
Ambassador to the Czech Republic publicly warned Prague that
key bilateral agreements on arms purchases and energy
deliveries might be jeopardized if it joined NATO. President
Havel and Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec reacted
strongly against this clumsy threat, saying that it
demonstrated precisely why it was important for the Czech
Republic to join Western political, security, and economic
organizations as quickly as possible.
Public support for NATO membership, as gauged in various
public opinion surveys, has remained somewhat low and some
polls have recorded a decline in support in the last few years.
According to a Czech poll taken in December 1996, 38 percent
responded favorably while 35 percent responded negatively. A
USIA survey taken earlier in 1996 recorded a higher percentage
of those polled in favor of NATO membership (51 percent in
favor vs. 33 percent opposed).
A majority of the Czech public opposes the deployment of
nuclear weapons or foreign troops on Czech territory, neither
of which, however, are currently conditions to NATO membership.
In January 1997, the Czech Ministry of Defense announced a
public relations campaign on the country's entry into NATO to
boost popular support for the alliance. President Havel has
also begun to speak on increasing domestic support for NATO
enlargement.
Should an accession protocol with NATO be reached, the
Czech President will seek the consent of both chambers of
Parliament, which must approve the treaty by simple majority.
Two parties in Parliament, the right-wing Republican Party and
the Communist Party, are against NATO membership. The Czech
Republic is scheduled to hold its next general elections in
June 1998.
The governing coalition and opposition are currently split
over whether to hold a referendum on NATO entry. The leading
opposition party, the Social Democratic Party (CSSD), supports
membership in NATO, but insists on holding a referendum. Some
parties favor holding a referendum on membership in the
European Union, which involves issues of national sovereignty,
but not in NATO. President Havel and Prime Minister Klaus have
stated that they see no reason why the Czech Republic's entry
into NATO should be subject to a referendum.
C. Hungary
Hungary has consistently expressed high interest in joining
NATO and is widely considered to be an early candidate for NATO
membership, having been so designated by Congress in the 1996
NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act. A concern over the years
regarding Hungary's prospects for integration with NATO has
been over unresolved tensions with Hungary's neighboring states
that could affect regional security and stability; this concern
has been largely alleviated by the conclusion and ratification
of bilateral treaties with Slovakia and Romania.
Entry into NATO and the European Union has been the top
foreign policy priority of successive Hungarian governments
since the end of Communist rule. Moreover, the foreign policy
objective of joining the NATO alliance has remained universal
across the political spectrum. All seven parties represented in
Parliament share NATO membership as a foreign and defense
policy priority. The Hungarian government maintains a permanent
liaison office to NATO and the WEU in Brussels. Since late
1995, Hungary has completed four rounds of intensified dialog
on NATO enlargement in Brussels.
In late 1995, the Parliament passed a Law on the
Restructuring of the Hungarian Defense Forces that streamlined
the command structure, spelled out civilian defense oversight,
and ordered a ``build down'' with the end strength of the
uniformed military mandated not to exceed 52,200 by the end of
1997. To put this down-sizing in perspective, the armed forces
numbered more than 140,000 as recently as 1990. A long-term aim
is to achieve an all-volunteer armed force.
The Hungarian government is retiring its senior officer
corps as rapidly as possible and has established training and
retraining centers for commanders and officers. Already most of
the senior military leadership have received some Western
military training, including the current occupant of the merged
position of commander and chief of staff of the armed forces
who is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College, as is his
deputy.
The Defense Act of 1993 established a system of civilian
control over the military. The Act gave the Ministry of Defense
administrative responsibility for the armed forces, while
Parliament controls the defense budget and must approve the
deployment of the armed forces abroad. The defense committee of
Parliament has been active in the area of budget and
expenditure issues. Additional power-sharing refinements are
likely to be outlined in a new constitution, which may be
considered by Parliament in late 1997.
After the democratic changes in 1989-90, the share of the
national budget for defense underwent a 6-year decline. This
year for the first time in 7 years, the government increased
the defense budget, by 22 percent to $604.7 million. The
official defense budget still represents only about 1.4 percent
of GDP. This figure, however, does not include funding for
border guards, civil defense, military owned industries, the
value of Russian equipment obtained as debt offset, or funding
support from the U.S. added to the official budget, these items
raise military related activities to approximately 2.0 percent
of GDP. Major procurement items such as short-range defensive
missiles fall outside the defense budget, further complicating
comparisons with Western defense budgets. The Hungarian
military budget is only partially funded by the central
governmental fund, so the Ministry of Defense must generate a
portion of its income from ministry-owned property. For the
1997 budget this amounts to 14 percent.
Western officials who meet regularly with Hungarian
governmental agencies on the NATO membership issue report that
the Hungarians do not approach the problem by saying, ``here is
the dollar-amount that our membership will cost.'' Rather, they
ask what they have to do to qualify for membership and how far
along they are. These officials believe that the Hungarians
understand the costs, but many of them feel that the West can
afford them better than they can.
(Two weeks after my visit to Budapest, the Hungarian
Atlantic Council and the Defense Ministry released a cost study
of enlargement. Based on the Pentagon study's assumptions and
on only Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary entering NATO
in the first round, the Hungarians calculated a total
enlargement cost to their country of between $2.6 billion and
$3.5 billion, representing an increase of slightly more than
one-third over current defense spending. No attempt was made to
calculate the necessary increase in defense costs if Hungary
did not enter NATO.)
An additional factor in defense costs in Hungary is a gap
between policy and implementation; the top government officials
understand the issues, but the middle-level ones are slow to
carry out the orders. A particularly irritating example of this
behavior concerns the draft ``Omnibus Agreement'' on issues
affecting the Status of Forces Agreement on U.S. forces in
Hungary. The Hungarian tax and customs officials haven't gotten
the message and continue to tax the U.S. forces stationed
there.
To be fair, however, when assessing defense outlays, one
must keep in mind that a few years ago Hungary was the next
candidate for bankruptcy a la Mexico. It now seems to have
turned the corner. As Hungary's economy improves, it will be
able to commit more resources to defense.
The current limited resources have severely constrained
procurement and modernization possibilities, forcing Budapest
to delay heavy equipment purchases like planes for 1 year.
Instead the Hungarians are concentrating on achieving
Interoperability with regard to language, radios, maps, and the
like.
The Hungarian government implemented economic reform
measures in March 1995 that have been successful in stabilizing
the economy and cutting budget deficits. Economic growth,
though, remains modest, with an increase of 1.0 percent for the
year ending September 30, 1996. Unemployment hovers between 10
percent and 11 percent. Inflation was 23 percent in 1996 and is
expected to drop to 17-18 percent in 1997. The government
budget deficit was 3.7 percent of GDP in 1996, below the
International Monetary Fund target of 4 percent. The private
sector now accounts for 75 percent of Hungarian economic
output, and 70 percent of trade is with advanced industrial
countries. While the general economic situation is starting to
look better, farmers and professionals remain dissatisfied.
Hungary is one of 27 participant countries in NATO's
Partnership for Peace program. Hungary signed the PFP framework
document on February 8, 1994 and submitted its Individual
Partnership Program, the blueprint for each partner's planned
areas of cooperation with NATO, on November 15, 1994. Hungary
also participates in other PFP programs such as the Planning
and Review Process, launched in January 1995, which is designed
to further Interoperability and transparency in defense
planning.
In 1995, Hungary undertook 17 Interoperability Objectives.
Some Objectives do not apply, since Hungary has no Navy. A
national plan was agreed upon to segment the approach to the
Objectives into three phases of 6 months each. Hungary has
reported to NATO that it has reached one of the Objectives and
that it expects to complete the remaining 16 by September 30,
1997. This may be an overly optimistic assessment in view of
the volume of material requiring translation into Hungarian and
the lead-time required to receive, fit, and train on new
equipment before initial operational capability can be met.
Not surprisingly, given the totally different structure of
Hungarian, a Finno-Ugric--not an Indo-European--language,
capability in English is the greatest problem facing the
Hungarian officer corps. At present only about 10 percent of
them have achieved a working knowledge of English. Hungary is
training nearly 35 potential NATO staff officers per year at
its national language center, emphasizing English skills to
improve Interoperability with NATO and peacekeeping operations.
Top priorities for achieving Interoperability include joining
the U.S.-sponsored Regional Airspace Initiative, developing a
``NATO brigade'' that can work closely with the alliance, and
building peacekeeping capacity.
In contrast to exercises and planning, NATO launched its
first large-scale peacekeeping mission in Bosnia beginning in
late 1995. Several non-NATO countries have served in NATO's
Implementation Force (IFOR) and follow-on Stabilization Force
(SFOR). Hungary contributed an engineering battalion of 350
troops to IFOR, based in Okucani, Croatia through December
1996. A similar Hungarian engineering battalion of up to 500
troops was approved for SFOR by the Hungarian Parliament in
December 1996.
In a deal overwhelmingly approved by the Hungarian
Parliament in late 1995, the United States leased part of a
military base at Taszar in southern Hungary as a staging and
logistics area for thousands of U.S. troops en route to and
supporting NATO operations in Bosnia. In addition to serving as
an important component of the IFOR operation, the Taszar base
has become part of an educational process that is enabling the
Hungarian armed forces to ``think and act NATO,'' according to
a U.S. defense official. The presence of NATO forces in Hungary
has also bolstered general optimism in Hungary regarding
Hungary's prospects for joining the alliance. In December 1996,
the lease was extended for another 2 years. Hungarians also
point out that several years earlier they provided airspace for
NATO use to orbit AWACS aircraft so that the aircraft could
have a better viewing angle into Bosnia and Herzegovina.
After the 1994 elections, the government of Prime Minister
Gyula Horn emphasized reconciliation with Slovakia and Romania,
two countries with large ethnic Hungarian minorities and with
which Budapest has had territorial disputes whose roots date
back to the Trianon Treaty after World War I. The prospect of
NATO membership is widely credited as a prime motivation for
Hungary to resolve outstanding issues with these two neighbors.
After difficult negotiations, the Horn government was
successful in reaching two landmark basic treaties with
Slovakia and Romania, which called for a full normalization of
bilateral relations and recognition of mutual borders. The
treaty with Slovakia was signed in March 1995 and ratified by
the Hungarian Parliament in June 1995. The treaty with Romania
was signed in September 1996 and ratified by the Hungarian
Parliament in December. Hungary has also concluded numerous
military agreements, including an ``open skies'' accord, with
Romania.
Hungarian politicians have emphasized that it would be in
their country's interest to have neighboring Slovakia and
Romania also join the Atlantic Alliance and that it would
promote their respective candidacies. They have opposed,
however, any formal linkage of Hungary's admission with that of
any other country.
In 1996, Hungary also normalized relations with the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, where there is a sizable ethnic
Hungarian minority in the Serbian Vojvodina, but it has not
embarked on negotiations on a comprehensive bilateral treaty.
Hungarian public opinion continues to favor membership in
NATO, though slightly less fervently than in other countries
such as Poland. The latest USIA poll of the Hungarian general
public demonstrated a 2-to-1 majority of those surveyed
generally in favor of NATO membership. Less support, however,
was registered for various specific actions that might (but not
necessarily) accompany NATO membership, such as the stationing
of foreign troops in Hungary (1996: 49 percent against vs. 44
percent for--a significant increase in support since 1995 when
only 34 percent was for vs. 59 percent against), increasing
Hungary's military budget, or allowing regular, routine
overflights over Hungarian territory (36 percent for vs. 57
percent against in 1996, virtually unchanged since 1995).
Should an accession treaty with NATO be reached, the
Hungarian government will submit it to the unicameral National
Assembly for ratification by majority vote, as with any other
international treaty. Ratification is highly likely, but there
is an interesting mirror-image between the United States and
Hungary. In the U.S. older Senators tend to be Euro-centric,
while younger ones tend to focus on Asia and Latin America and
increasingly question the relevance of NATO. In Hungary the
older people who grew up under Communism tend to harbor anti-
Western feelings, while the younger people are overwhelmingly
pro-Western.
At the beginning of its term in mid-1994, the Horn
government indicated that the question of membership in both
NATO and the European Union should be subject to a popular
referendum at the appropriate time. At this point, the
Hungarian government does not have specific plans to hold a
referendum on joining NATO. Under Hungarian law, any group may
initiate a popular referendum after collecting 100,000
signatures.
The moral issue is a strong one in Hungary, where older
people feel doubly betrayed by the West: at Yalta in 1945, and
in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Hungarians feel that they
are no less worthy of NATO membership than the Turks or the
Spaniards. In addition, they argue that American private
investment would be reassured by Hungarian membership.
D. Slovenia
Slovenia, the final of the four leading candidates for
admission to NATO in the first group, is unique in several
ways. First of all, it is the only serious candidate for
admission that was never a member of the Warsaw Pact--the
former Yugoslavia of which Slovenia was a part until 1991 was a
leader of the nonaligned movement. As a result, Russia does not
harbor the visceral hostility to Slovenia's joining NATO that
it reserves for former Warsaw Pact members, and especially to
former republics of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Slovenia is not
saddled with a huge inventory of non-state-of-the-art
equipment.
Second, Slovenia is by far the wealthiest of all the
candidates for NATO admission. Its per capita GDP now exceeds
that of two European Union members--Greece and Portugal--and
will probably pass that of EU members Ireland and Spain in the
near future. Hence, more than other candidates Slovenia should
be capable of paying the costs of modernization and
integration.
Third, Slovenia is the only candidate to have recently
fought, and won, a war--albeit a short and limited one. In 10
days in the early summer of 1991 the fledgling Slovenian Army,
which was essentially only a Home Guard, managed to inflict
enough damage on the Serb-led Yugoslav National Army to induce
it to withdraw and tacitly recognize Slovenian independence.
Finally, unlike Poland and, to a lesser extent the Czech
Republic and Hungary, Slovenia cannot count upon a large
population of Americans who trace their roots to Slovenia and
can mount well-financed advocacy campaigns for Senate
ratification on Slovenia's behalf.
A potential negative factor for NATO admission is that,
like Hungary, Slovenia borders upon an area of conflict, part
of the former Yugoslavia. Its border with northwestern Croatia,
however, is now more placid than Hungary's with Eastern
Slavonia and the Serbian Vojvodina. Moreover, Slovenia's
geographical position in one way works in its favor for NATO
membership. It would provide geographical continguity between
Italy and Hungary.
A final important point is that Slovenia's admission in the
first group would show the rest of the successor states of the
former Yugoslavia that creating a political democracy, building
a free-market economy, and fulfilling other NATO criteria can
result in their admission--i.e. Despite the appalling conflict
of the 1990's, they will not be eternally consigned to the
``outs'' in Europe. On the other hand, postponing the admission
of the candidate country with the best record of meeting NATO
criteria and fulfilling objectives would send a chilling
message to the democrats who hope to succeed Croatian President
Tudjman. I feel that it would be a serious mistake to hold back
any country now deserving of NATO membership in order
artificially to strengthen the pool for the second round of
enlargement.
Slovenia has been mentioned as a possible first round
candidate for NATO membership only recently. The Biden language
in the 1996 NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act included Slovenia
with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland as a country having
made significant steps toward qualifying for NATO membership.
In a speech to Slovenia's Parliament in January 1997,
Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek said that NATO
membership is ``one of Slovenia's foreign policy priorities''
and is ``very important for Slovenia's long-term security.'' He
said the processes of joining NATO and joining the European
Union, another main goal of Slovenian foreign policy, are
closely connected.
In an October 1996 interview, Drnovsek said Slovenia wanted
to be included in the first round of NATO enlargement and
stressed that NATO membership would have positive, indirect
effects on Slovenia's economy.
Slovenia meets the political criteria for NATO membership
set out in the 1995 Enlargement Study. The 1996 State
Department Human Rights Report says that Slovenia has a
``vigorous, open, and democratic system,'' with an independent
judiciary. The report says the government ``fully respected the
human rights of its citizens'' and that ethnic minorities are
treated fairly.
Slovenia's armed forces are engaged in a reform and
restructuring effort. Government officials note that less
reform and restructuring is needed for Slovenia than for other
NATO candidate members, since Slovenia was never part of the
Warsaw Pact, and indeed never had a fully fledged army until
after independence. For this reason, they argue, Slovenia has a
nearly clean slate on which to create a new, NATO-oriented
army.
At the time of Slovenia's independence in June 1991,
Slovenia's armed forces consisted of territorial defense
forces, somewhat similar in nature to U.S. National Guard
units. Since that time, Slovenia has taken steps to form
``mobile units,'' which are active duty, professional forces.
There are about 5,000 professional officers, NCOs and soldiers
in Slovenia's army of 12,000 men. About 7,000 men are
conscripted each year into the army, and serve for 7 months.
The territorial defense reserves are being reduced from 75,000
men to 45,000-50,000 men in order to free up resources for the
professional core of the army.
An important part of Slovenian army reform efforts is the
creation of a 700-man motorized infantry battalion that will be
earmarked for participation in international peacekeeping
activities. Slovenian army procurement efforts are focused on
supplying this unit with modern, NATO-compatible equipment. The
first company of this battalion is scheduled to be ready this
year, and it is planned that the entire unit will be ready in
1998.
Other structural modifications underway include the
conversion of infantry units to artillery, communications, and
engineering units. Aside from equipping the peacekeeping
battalion, other procurement priorities for Slovenia are air
defense, anti-armor weapons, and communications systems.
Slovenia's 1997 defense budget is $250 million. In
addition, a separate military procurement budget provides
another $60 million. Slovenia's defense spending comprises 1.7
percent of the country's GDP. Until recently it seemed,
however, that there might be limits to the willingness of
Slovenia to increase defense spending to modernize its armed
forces. In December 1996, then Defense Minister Jelko Kacin
said that neither his Liberal Democratic Party nor any other
Slovenian political party supports increasing defense
expenditures beyond 2 percent of GDP. Subsequent to our visit--
and perhaps influenced by it--on April 17, 1997 in a joint
declaration all the parties represented in the Slovenian
Parliament voted not only to support NATO membership, but also
stated that Slovenia is able and ready to cover its share of
the costs of membership.
Slovenia has made rapid progress in economic reform. It has
the highest per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Central
and Eastern Europe, as well as the highest international credit
rating of any country in the region. The average annual wage is
$12,300. Slovenia's budget deficit is a mere 0.2 percent of
GDP, compared to the EU average of 4.7 percent.
Economic growth was 3.5 percent in 1996 and is forecast at
4 percent in 1997. Following the loss of traditional markets in
the other republics of Yugoslavia, Slovenian businesses have
found markets in Western and Central Europe, which now account
for 75 percent of Slovenian exports. Inflation is 9.5 percent,
and unemployment is 14 percent. As of 1995, the private sector
accounted for 45 percent of the Slovenian economy. With ``A
grade'' credit ratings awarded in 1996 by all three leading
international credit rating agencies, Slovenia is the highest
rated country in the region.
Yet during the past several months doubts have arisen about
Slovenia's ability to maintain its fast track reform and,
especially, over its apparent unwillingness to open its economy
to foreign participation. Slovenes seem unsure about the price
they are willing to pay to enter Western institutions. This
insecurity has shown itself most clearly in a debate over
whether foreigners should be allowed to buy property (a debate
that also occurred in Austria and Finland before they joined
the European Union). In addition, there are concerns in
Slovenia about too much foreign investment and anxiety about
losing control over key sectors of industry and commerce. The
central bank recently took actions to curb foreign capital
inflows and restrictions were put on some direct investments by
non-residents. Largely because of these moves, share prices on
the new Ljubljana stock exchange fell nearly 25 percent in the
early spring of 1997.
Civilian control of Slovenia's military is exercised in
several ways. According to the constitution, the National
Assembly approves the defense budget and conducts oversight of
military and intelligence programs. The defense minister, a
civilian, exercises control over the development and
organization of the armed forces through the General Staff. The
President is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and
appoints top military officers.
In 1995, Slovenia undertook seven Interoperability
Objectives. Ljubljana reported that as of January 1997 all are
at least partially completed. Since Slovenia has no combat
aircraft or naval vessels, many Interoperability Objectives do
not apply. Slovenia is providing officers with English-language
training, including sending about 25 officers per year to study
at U.S. military institutions as part of the U.S. international
Military Education and Training (IMET) program. It has also
sent officers to study in Germany and Austria.
Officials note that Slovenia has bought and will continue
to buy NATO-compatible weaponry for its units, as well as NATO-
compatible communications equipment. Slovenia also plans in the
future to develop an air defense system that will be compatible
with NATO. Slovenia joined NATO's Partnership for Peace program
in March 1994 and has participated in many PFP exercises.
In May 1996, Slovenia signed an agreement with the United
States on military cooperation, which contained provisions for
the exchange of classified information. Slovenia has offered to
assist the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. It
offered the use of a Slovenian airport, landmine removal
training, the services of logistics officers, and 1,000 beds in
Slovenian hospitals for use in case of an emergency. There are
no Slovenian ground forces in Bosnia.
Since gaining independence, Slovenia has had some
difficulties with two of its neighbors, Italy and Croatia. In
the case of Italy, the dispute has been resolved, and Italy now
supports Slovenian membership in NATO and the EU. The dispute
centered on the property of between 100,000 and 350,000
Italians who left their communities after World War II, when a
slice of formerly Italian territory became part of Communist
Yugoslavia. Italy wants Slovenia to allow these Italians the
right to reclaim their former property or at least have the
same right as Slovenian citizens to purchase their former
property. Slovenia's Parliament last year agreed to allow
foreigners to own real estate in Slovenia within 4 years of the
coming into force of an EU association agreement, which was
signed in June 1996.
Slovenia's relationship with Croatia has been somewhat
clouded by disputes arising from the breakup of Yugoslavia,
including the division of property and assets and the exact
demarcation of the Slovenia-Croatia border, particularly the
sea border in Piran Bay. Slovenia notes that the way the sea
border is now drawn blocks her access to the open sea, and it
wants to modify the border to rectify the situation, which
Croatia has refused to do. Although not all of these issues
have been settled, observers believe that they are normal
disagreements between largely friendly neighboring states, and
not serious enough to pose a threat to regional stability.
According to the Slovenian constitution, the National
Assembly adopts international agreements by a majority of
deputies present and voting. The constitution also contains
provisions for holding referenda, whose questions are adopted
by a simple majority of those voting.
A majority of Slovenes appears to favor NATO membership. A
USIA poll, conducted in the spring and summer of 1996, showed
32 percent of those polled ``strongly favoring'' NATO
membership for Slovenia and 39 percent ``somewhat favoring''
it. Thirteen percent ``somewhat oppose'' NATO membership and 11
percent ``strongly oppose'' it. A more recent poll taken on
March 1, 1997 by Delo, the leading daily newspaper in Slovenia,
showed 66 percent for membership in NATO and strong support for
meeting the costs of admission.
According to the 1996 USIA survey, a majority of Slovenes
opposes the stationing of NATO troops in Slovenia (63 percent
to 32 percent), regular overflights of Slovenia by NATO planes
(59 percent to 37 percent), sending Slovenian troops to defend
other NATO countries (58 percent to 38 percent), and increasing
defense spending at the expense of social spending (63 percent
to 9 percent). Slovenes are divided nearly equally (49 percent
for vs. 48 percent against) on the question of holding regular
NATO exercises on Slovenian territory.
As noted above, except for Poland, groups polled in the
USIA survey from other potential candidates for membership in
NATO showed a similar pattern of support for NATO membership in
general, but ambivalence or opposition to accepting some of the
responsibilities that may come with that membership.
The polling data suggest that, just as U.S. Members of
Congress must take to the American people an open and frank
debate on the merits of enlarging NATO, so too must European
candidate country legislators take an informal debate to their
publics. The challenge of the next several months is to ensure
that a stronger, more secure Europe emerges, based on informed,
democratic consensus.
IV. Roster of Meetings in Russia and Central Europe
(March 23-28, 1997)
Moscow, Russian Federation
Grigorii Yavlinsky, Member of the State Duma and Duma Leader of
the Yabloko Party
Gennadiy Zyuganov, Member of the State Duma and Leader of the
Communist Party
General (ret.) Aleksandr Lebed', Chairman, Russian Popular
Republican Party
Ivan Rybkin, Chairman, National Security Council
Iurii Baturin, Secretary, National Defense Council
Artur Chilingarov, Deputy Speaker and Member of the State Duma
(Russia's Regions Party)
Mikhail Iur'ev, Deputy Speaker and Member of the State Duma
(Yabloko Party)
Ella Pamfilova, Member of the State Duma (Russia's Regions
Party)
Vladimir Semago, Member of the State Duma (Communist Party)
Evgenii Kozhokin, Director, Russian Institute of Strategic
Studies
Andrei Fedorov, President, Polis Foundation
Sergei Rogov, Director, U.S.A. And Canada Institute
Sergei Oznobishchev, Director, Institute of Strategic
Assessments
Dmitrii Trenin, Senior Associate, Moscow Carnegie Center
Warsaw, Poland
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Prime Minister
Marek Siwiec, Secretary of State and Head, National Security
Committee
Eugeniusz Wyzner, Acting Foreign Minister
Andrzej Karkoszka, Deputy Minister of Defense
General Henryk Szumski, Chief of Staff, Polish Army
Krzysztof Wegrzyn, Deputy Minister of Defense
Henryk Szlajfer, Director, Institute of International Affairs
Marek Dukasziewicz, Undersecretary, National Security Bureau,
Presidential Chancellery
Jan Borkowski, Deputy Foreign Minister
Adam Struzik, Marshal of the Senate
Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Vice-Chairman, Sejm Defense Committee
Wlodzimierz Konarski, Advisor to the Prime Minister on Foreign
and Defense Policy
Radek Sikorski, Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (ROP)
and former Minister of Defense
Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, President, National Bank of Poland
Longin Pastusiak, Member, Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee
Romuald Szeremetiew, Defense Advisor, Solidarity Electoral
Action (AWS)
Krzysztof Kalicki, PEKAO S.A. Bank and former Deputy Finance
Minister for Military Procurement
Andrzej Ananicz, Lech Walesa Institute
Boguslaw Grabowski, First Petrol Bank and Member, Solidarity
Electoral Action (AWS)
Adam Bromke, Advisor to the Prime Minister
Cezary Stypulkowski, Chairman, Bank Handlowy
Kazimierz Dziewanowski, Former Polish Ambassador to the United
States
Jadwiga Staniszkis, Professor, Warsaw University and Advisor to
Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS)
Prague, Czech Republic
Vaclav Havel, President
Josef Zieleniec, Foreign Minister
Miloslav Vyborny, Minister of Defense
General Jiri Nekvasil, Chief, General Staff
Vladimir Suman, Deputy Minister of Defense
Milos Zeman, Speaker of Parliament and Leader, Social
Democratic Party
Michael Zantovsky, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
and Chairman, Civic Democratic Alliance
Egon Lansky, Senator (Social Democratic Party) and Foreign
Policy Advisor to the Speaker
Hana Sevcikova, Director, North American Department, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs
Jaromir Novotny, Chief, Foreign Affairs Directorate, Ministry
of Defense
Pavel Telicka, Director-General of Multilateral Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Pavel Seifter, Foreign Policy Advisor to the President
Jan Kramek, Vice Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(ODS Party)
Vitezslav Matuska, Vice Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee (CSSD Party)
Oldrich Docekal, Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(KDU-CSL Party)
Vilem Holan, Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee, Chamber of
Deputies (KDU-CSL Party)
Petr Necas, Chairman, Defense and Security Committee, Chamber
of Deputies (ODS Party)
Michal Lobkowicz, Vice-Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee,
Chamber of Deputies (ODS Party)
Milos Titz, Vice-Chairman, Defense and Security Committee,
Chamber of Deputies (ODS Party)
Daniel Kroupa, Member, Chamber of Deputies (ODA Party)
Budapest, Hungary
Gyula Horn, Prime Minister
Laszlo Kovacs, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Andre Erdos, Deputy State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Geza Jeszenszky, Member, Foreign Affairs Committee of
Parliament (Hungarian Democratic Forum), and former
Foreign Minister
Istvan Gyarmati, Deputy State Secretary for International
Affairs and NATO Integration, Ministry of Defense
General Janos Sagi, Chief of Staff, Hungarian Air Force
Matyas Eorsi, Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament
Andras Barsony, Vice Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee of
Parliament (Socialist Party)
Bela Gyuricza, Vice Chairman, Defense Committee of Parliament
(Alliance of Young Democrats)
Tamas Bauer, Member of Parliament (Free Democratic Party)
Imre Szekeres, Parliamentary Leader, Socialist Party
Tamas Sepsey, Member of Parliament (Hungarian Democratic Forum)
Istvan Varga, Member of Parliament (Hungarian Democratic
People's Party)
Ferenc Szakal, Member of Parliament (Christian Democratic
Party)
Gabor Szentivanyi, Spokesman, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Csaba Korosi, Deputy Director, NATO Department, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
Istvan Emri, Deputy Director, North America Department,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ljubljana, Slovenia
Milan Kucan, President
Janez Drnovsek, Prime Minister
Zoran Thaler, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Tit Turnsek, Minister of Defense
General Albin Gutman, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces
Janez Podobnik, Speaker of Parliament
Jelko Kacin, Chairman, Parliamentary Committee on International
Affairs, and former Minister of Defense
Ivo Vaigl, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Lojze Peterle, Member of Parliament and Leader, Christian
Democratic Party
Janez Jansa, Member of Parliament and Leader, Social Democratic
Party
Borut Pahor, Member of Parliament and Leader, United List -
Social Democrats
Zmago Jelincic, Member of Parliament and Leader, Nationalist
Party
Dimitri Rupel, Mayor of Ljubljana and former Foreign Minister
Ernest Petric, Slovenian Ambassador to the United States
ADDENDA
A. Speech by Senator Biden at Warsaw University, March 25, 1997
POLAND AND NATO
Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
speech before the euro-atlantic association warsaw university, warsaw,
poland
I would like to thank Mr. Onyszkiewicz for his kind
introduction, and to thank the Euro-Atlantic Association for
the invitation to speak here today at Warsaw University. I am
privileged and honored to appear before so many of Poland's top
minds in the field of international security. Your association
has made a solid contribution to the cause of cooperation
between Poland and the Euro-Atlantic Community, and it is clear
from your reports that the men and women in this room today
understand the solemn responsibilities and burdens that Poland
must assume if it joins the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
I thank you for your work in this area.
Before I discuss Poland's progress toward qualifying for
alliance membership, I would like very briefly to make clear my
own feelings at the present time with regard to NATO
enlargement. As I have said in my country on numerous
occasions, I am in favor of enlargement in principle, but there
are several questions that need answering to my satisfaction
before I would vote to admit any candidate country.
These issues include an understanding in candidate
countries of all the obligations that go with membership, many
details of candidates' political and military readiness,
popular willingness to sacrifice in order to pay for costs of
enlargement, willingness on the part of our current European
NATO allies to pay their fair share of enlargement costs, and a
well conceived NATO policy toward Russia.
I hope to gain an insight into many of these issues on my
current fact-finding trip. Other answers may emerge in the
coming months. So to sum up--while I am a proponent of NATO
enlargement, I would not want anyone in this room to believe
that I have already made up my mind about how I might or might
not vote some time next year when the U.S. Senate will probably
decide whether to amend the Washington Treaty to allow one or
more Central European countries to join the alliance.
Having said all that, I would now like to narrow my focus
and return to a discussion of Poland. In the 8 years since the
Communist government and Solidarity sat down for roundtable
talks on the future of Poland, your country has made remarkable
progress toward returning to its historic Western orientation
and toward ensuring political and economic freedom for its
people. The shock therapy program that many questioned early on
has proven to have been the right course, as Poland has enjoyed
growth rates for the past 5 years that rival those of the
world's most dynamic economies.
In the political field, Poland has shown that its
democratic roots never died. Changes in political power have
come peacefully, at the ballot box, and once again this fall
the Polish people will freely decide the composition of their
government.
Regardless of who wins those elections, I believe that one
unchanging attitude will be Poland's desire to join NATO. I met
today with many of the top leaders of your government and
Parliament, and it is clear to me that joining the alliance is
the top foreign policy priority of all leading politicians and,
most likely, of everyone in this room. Poland is moving in the
right direction to meet the criteria for membership set out in
NATO's 1995 Enlargement Study. But now is not the time to sit
back and declare victory.
Let me, then, touch on five areas of my concern in deciding
whether Poland should be invited to become a NATO member. Some
of these are purely political or economic, like minority
rights, freedom of the press, and privatization. Others are
military-specific, like civilian control of the military and
Interoperability. In some of these areas Poland has already
answered my concerns and now must only avoid backsliding. In
others, while progress has been made, further work remains.
First, I would like to address one of the truly great
accomplishments of the current government and the
administration of President Kwasniewski: the tremendous
progress toward better relations with Poland's minority
communities. Although relations with Poland's German,
Belarusian, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian communities are of
interest to us in the United States--and, I might add, seem to
be in good shape--our largest concern has been the relations
between the Polish government and the Jewish community.
The history of Polish-Jewish relations has been a tragic
one of two peoples who have suffered greatly and endured brutal
foreign occupations throughout the centuries. The greatest
tragedy, of course, came during World War II. Six years of
fighting and occupation cost the Polish nation millions of its
best and brightest, and it cost the Jewish people in Poland
their very existence, as Nazi criminals exterminated an entire
culture in Central Europe. The war was followed by
reprehensible instances of anti-Semitic violence and
discrimination against survivors, which the Communist
authorities either tacitly accepted or even instigated for
their own purposes.
Understandably, the Jewish people have a special concern
that the Holocaust be remembered in a manner consistent with
their cultural and religious sensibilities. The Polish
government is to be commended for working with local
authorities to ensure that the death camp at Auschwitz-Birkenau
is preserved in a manner that honors the memory of the one
million Jews who were killed there.
Moreover, the Polish Jewish community has a right to expect
protection from physical persecution. In this regard, I was
heartened to see the quick condemnation by Polish political
leaders of the dastardly fire bombing of the synagogue in
Warsaw last month. Such acts of hatred clearly must not, and
will not be permitted in a free Poland.
NATO is an alliance of democracies, so I hope you--as a
candidate for membership in that alliance--will allow me to
offer as my second theme some advice on a cornerstone of
democracy: a free press. In 1791, the same year that Poland
promulgated the first constitution in Europe, our American
forefathers proclaimed a Bill of Rights that would protect the
liberties essential for a free people. The First Amendment
guaranteed the freedom of the press, because our founders
recognized that this was paramount in a democracy.
Today in Poland, while the printed press is completely
free, I have some concerns about the broadcast media,
particularly of Polish state television. Government
interference in the content of the television news is not
acceptable in any democracy. State-owned television must offer
editorial independence to its journalists. The government
cannot hire and fire journalists because it likes or does not
like what they report.
I tell you here today as a politician that a free press can
be a great source of distress, but you are going to have to get
used to it if you are going to lead a democracy. Harry Truman,
the American president who oversaw the creation of NATO, once
said of politics: ``If you can't stand the heat, get out of the
kitchen.'' I say to the leaders of this vibrant democracy: you
will have to learn to take the heat from independent media.
Considering the great strides you have taken so far, I have
little doubt that you are up to the challenge.
Every country, of course, has the right to choose its own
economic system. Here again, though, we see that all NATO
member states have free-market economies with the private
sector playing the leading role. In that context, the third
area I would like to address is privatization. Again, I commend
the steps that you have made in this area. Small and medium
enterprises are in private hands, and new, private businesses
continue to be created. In addition, the mass privatization
plan represents a major step toward giving the Polish people a
direct stake in the economic future of their country.
But this is not the time to stop. I believe that large,
state-owned enterprises should also be placed into the hands of
private owners, so that they can be operated with economic,
rather than political, interests in mind. For Poland to be in
the vanguard of Western economies in the 21st century,
businesses like banks, the energy sector, the state airline,
the state copper producer, and the telecommunications monopoly
will have to be privatized.
The final two issues I would like to address have a more
direct relationship to Poland's bid for NATO membership. The
first of these is civilian control over the military. Ever
since we began to consider Poland's request to join the
alliance, this has been one of the areas of greatest concern.
It is unthinkable for the leadership of the military in a NATO
country to dictate who will be its country's minister of
defense. It is unthinkable for the leadership of a NATO
military to raise any doubt about its willingness to carry out
the commands of elected officials and their duly appointed
ministers.
Earlier this month, Poland took a significant step forward
in this direction with the appointment of General Szumski, whom
I met this morning, to be the Chief of the General Staff. I was
pleased to hear the general state his vision for a military
``that is apolitical, skilled, and well-organized.'' His
appointment helps to assure us that control of the Polish
military is in civilian hands.
Again, however, the task needs to be completed. Poland must
root out any remnant of the old resistance to civilian control.
Of course, I am not telling the members of this distinguished
audience anything that they do not already know. Your 1995
study, entitled ``Poland-NATO,'' called for all of these
developments in the Polish defense establishment. This kind of
clear, forward thinking translated into policy has surely
helped Poland's bid for NATO membership.
The final issue on which I would like to focus is
Interoperability. Poland has taken great strides toward
implementing NATO's recommendation on how to allow its military
to work with alliance forces in joint operations. While areas
like language training, mapping software, and radios may seem
mundane, they are at the heart of Interoperability. The work
that is being done is these areas is essential if Poland is to
join the alliance.
Here too, I should note the role that the Euro-Atlantic
Association is playing in this process. The cost study that you
released earlier this year represents--to the best of my
knowledge--the first effort in a Central European country to
estimate what it would cost to join NATO. Achieving
Interoperability is the one direct cost of NATO enlargement,
and it is the one cost that all members must share if the
alliance admits new members. Although the United States will
contribute to meeting common alliance costs, it will subsidize
neither Western Europe's nor Central Europe's share.
The government and Parliamentary leaders I met with today
were firm in their commitment to pay Poland's share of the
costs of enlargement. This is a fundamental issue: a
willingness to assume this responsibility is essential if
Poland and some of its neighbors are to join NATO. As I said
earlier, one of my main concerns is that NATO enlargement not
place an undue burden on the American taxpayer. While the
United States will pay its fair share of the direct costs of
enlargement, others must do their part too.
In addition to the direct costs related to
Interoperability, there are indirect costs related to
enlargement. First is the cost of modernizing Central European
militaries. I have learned today about the Polish government's
plan for modernization, which Poland must undertake whether or
not it joins NATO. I will evaluate this plan in the months
ahead as I make up my mind about NATO enlargement, and I expect
that the other leading candidates for membership will offer
similar plans to pay for their own defense modernization.
While the United States may offer some modest, technical
assistance, the burden of military modernization must be borne
by you and your neighbors. As you have learned throughout your
country's difficult history, freedom isn't free, and security
is not cheap. Today, when 6 percent annual economic growth is
rapidly raising the Polish standard of living, the political
will is present. My friends, nothing is permanent, and that
political will must continue if growth slows or the economy
turns downward.
I am well aware that 90 percent of Poles want to join NATO.
I remind them today that if you do join, just as NATO will
stand ready to assist Poland in its hour of need, so too must
you commit your country to contribute to the defense of your
new allies. This would entail a financial cost to your people
and a human cost to your soldiers.
The other indirect cost of NATO enlargement must be borne
by our current allies. In the post-cold war world, NATO is no
longer directed against a common threat. NATO is transforming
itself to meet new challenges outside the territories of its
member states, in regions where stability is not assured. In
order to carry out these missions, NATO must develop new
capabilities to allow its members to project power beyond their
borders and lift troops, equipment and supplies to areas where
the conflicts of the future may arise.
I am troubled by indications in some West European
countries that there may be resistance to funding this power
projection capability. For 40 years American taxpayers
undertook the obligation of helping to defend Western Europe,
thereby allowing that region to recover from the devastation of
World War II and enjoy unprecedented prosperity. Now it is time
for the people of Western Europe to invest in the security of
their continent for the next century. If NATO is to remain
viable, our allies must commit themselves to develop the
capabilities that will be needed for new roles and missions,
the same capabilities that would allow the alliance to defend
new members if enlargement occurs.
Let me be blunt: if our West European allies shrink from
this responsibility, not just enlargement, but NATO itself will
be in jeopardy.
Let me also say a word here about Poland's efforts to join
the European Union. I am fully cognizant of the unique
experiment in governance upon which the EU has embarked. It is
an immensely complex undertaking. Nonetheless, I find it
unconscionable that the richest countries on the Continent are
delaying membership for the countries of Central Europe. I see
no justification for keeping countries with vibrant market
economies outside the European Union, special interest groups
and institutional growing pains notwithstanding.
Poland has taken giant steps toward making its laws
compatible with those of the European Union, and its commitment
to a free-market economy is unquestioned. The countries of
Central Europe that meet the criteria for EU membership should
be admitted to the Union in the very near future, and I hope
you will press this point with EU leaders whenever the
opportunity arises.
As for NATO, we must be attentive to the effect that
enlargement will have on those countries not invited to join in
the first group. I will not support any enlargement that does
not enhance the security of the United States, of our current
allies, of new members, and of those countries remaining
outside of NATO.
The most important country in this last category is, of
course, Russia. We all understand that a new European security
architecture will collapse without a strong Russian pillar. We
must understand Russia's legitimate security concerns, and to
the extent we can, we should work to ensure that these concerns
are heard and taken into account by the alliance.
This does not mean, however, that the West should calmly
leave unchallenged the old, stale, Stalinist stereotypes of
NATO. NATO has always been a purely defensive alliance, and it
will remain so. NATO is speaking out for reduced armament
levels in Europe, not increased. However forthcoming NATO is,
it must not make concessions either on the enlargement process
or on the ability of current and future NATO members to take
whatever action they deem necessary to maintain the readiness
of the alliance.
In the months ahead, the governments of the United States,
our NATO allies, and the Central European democracies will work
to devise a plan for allowing the alliance to admit new
members. When this work is completed, perhaps by the end of
this year, it will become the duty of the U.S. Senate and of
the 15 other member countries, according to their own
procedures, to review this plan to be certain it is in their
interests. It will be my duty, and that of my colleagues, to
ask the hard questions about this plan: Will it add to the
security of our country? Will it add to the security of our
allies? Will the costs be distributed fairly?
I can tell you today that I am very impressed by the steps
that Poland has taken to meet the political and military
criteria for NATO membership. Poland has come far in
transforming a failed political and economic system into a
thriving free-market democracy. I encourage you to persist in
your efforts, to continue working closely with us and our
partners, and to prepare your people to assume the burdens of
helping to defend the Western Alliance.
But this role is nothing new for the Polish nation.
Throughout history, your soldiers endeavored to fight and die,
as they said so eloquently, ``for your freedom, and for ours.''
I hope the Polish people remain firm in their commitment to
defending democracy, both at home and in the larger Western
community.
Thank you for your attention.
----------
B. The North Atlantic Treaty (Washington, DC, April 4, 1949)
The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations
and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all
governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom,
common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on
the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of
law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North
Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for
collective defense and for the preservation of peace and
security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:
Article 1
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the
United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which
they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security and justice are not
endangered, and to refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with
the purposes of the United Nations.
Article 2
The Parties will contribute toward the further development
of peaceful and friendly international relations by
strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a
better understanding of the principles upon which these
institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of
stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict
in their international economic policies and will encourage
economic collaboration between any or all of them.
Article 3
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this
Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of
continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will
maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity
to resist armed attack.
Article 4
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion
of any of them, the territorial integrity, political
independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened
Article 5
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more
of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an
attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if
such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the
right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist
the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith,
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action
as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to
restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result
thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council.
Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has
taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain
international peace and security. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies
was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty
on the accession of Greece and Turkey and by the Protocols signed on
the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany and of Spain.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Article 6
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or
more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:
on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or
North America, on the Algerian Departments of France
\2\ on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under
the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North
Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; on the
forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties,
when in or over these territories or any other area in
Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties
were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into
force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic
area north of the Tropic of Cancer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ On January 16,1963, the North Atlantic Council heard a
declaration by the French Representative who recalled that by the vote
on self-determination on July 1, 1962, the Algerian people had
pronounced itself in favor of the independence of Algeria in co-
operation with France. In consequence, the President of the French
Republic had on July 3, 1962, formally recognized the independence of
Algeria. The result was that the ``Algerian departments of France'' no
longer existed as such, and that at the same time the fact that they
were mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty had no longer any bearing.
Following this statement the Council noted that insofar as the former
Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of
this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Article 7
This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted
as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the
Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations,
or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the
maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 8
Each Party declares that none of the international
engagements now in force between it and any other of the
Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions
of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any
international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.
Article 9
The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of
them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the
implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so
organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The
Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be
necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a
defense committee which shall recommend measures for the
implementation of Articles 3 and 5.
Article 10
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other
European State in a position to further the principles of this
Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic
area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become
a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession
with the Government of the United States of America. The
Government of the United States of America will inform each of
the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of
accession.
Article 11
This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried
out by the Parties in accordance with their respective
constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall
be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the
United States of America, which will notify all the other
signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force
between the States which have ratified it as soon as the
ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the
ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have
been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other
States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.
Article 12
After the Treaty has been in force for 10 years, or at any
time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests,
consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty,
having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security
in the North Atlantic area, including the development of
universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of
the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace
and security.
Article 13
After the Treaty has been in force for 20 years, any Party
may cease to be a Party 1 year after its notice of denunciation
has been given to the Government of the United States of
America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties
of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.
Article 14
This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the
Government of the United States of America. Duly certified
copies will be transmitted by that Government to the
Governments of other signatories.
----------
C. Chronology of NATO Enlargement
04/04/49--The United States, Britain, France, Italy,
Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Iceland, Canada, and the Benelux
countries (12 in total) sign the Washington Treaty on forming
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (Greece and
Turkey join NATO in 1952, Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982.)
01/10-11/94--At a summit meeting in Brussels, Belgium, NATO
countries launch the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program of
cooperation to former Warsaw Pact countries. The summit
document also states that the alliance ``expects and would
welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to
our east as part of an evolutionary process.''
11/02/94--President Clinton signs into law P.L. 103-447,
which includes the ``NATO Participation Act of 1994.'' The Act
expresses the sense of Congress that Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, and Slovakia should be considered for NATO
membership.
12/01-02/94--At a North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting in
Brussels, NATO foreign ministers initiate a study process that
is to determine the ``how and why'' of enlargement of the
alliance. It is agreed that the results of the study will be
presented at the December 1995 ministerial meeting.
09/28/95--NATO releases its ``Study on NATO Enlargement.''
12/05/95--On the basis of the study on enlargement, NATO
foreign ministers decide that the next phase of the enlargement
process will entail: intensified, individual dialogue with
interested partner countries; enhancement of the Partnership
for Peace; and further consideration of internal adaptation of
the alliance in preparation for enlargement. Since then, 12
countries express interest in joining NATO and enter the so-
called ``16+1'' dialogs: Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
02/12/96--President Clinton signs into law P. 104-107,
which contains the ``NATO Participation Act Amendments of
1995.'' The act expands military assistance programs to a
number of Central European countries, but does not designate
specific countries as eligible for NATO membership.
09/23/96--The Fiscal Year 1997 Defense Authorization bill
(S. 1745) becomes law (P.L. 104-201). It includes an amendment
calling for a study to be conducted by the administration and
transmitted to Congress that will analyze the potential costs
and strategic implications of alliance expansion.
09/30/96--The President signs into law P.L. 104-208, an
omnibus appropriations bill for Fiscal Year 1997, which
includes the ``NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996.'' The
Act authorizes funds for the military assistance programs
established in the 1994 NATO Participation Act. It designates
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia as having
made the most progress toward achieving the stated criteria for
NATO membership.
10/22/96--At a re-election campaign speech in Detroit,
Michigan, President Clinton pledges that, ``by 1999 . . . the
first group of countries we invite to join should be full-
fledged members of NATO.'' The President does not specify which
countries will be invited.
12/09-10/96--At a ministerial meeting in Brussels, NATO
foreign ministers announce that the leaders of NATO countries
will convene a summit meeting in Madrid on July 8-9, 1997, and
will formally invite ``one or more'' countries to begin
accession negotiations with the alliance. The NAC also declares
that NATO counties have ``no intention, no plan, and no reason
to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members,''
nor does it foresee any future need to do so.
02/24/97--In accordance with P.L. 104-201 (Section 1048),
the administration issues a report to Congress on the
enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance.
05/28-30/97--NATO's North Atlantic Council ministerial
meeting in Sintra, Portugal.
06/12-13/97--NATO Defense Ministers' meeting in Portugal.
NATO enlargement will be among the subjects of discussion.
07/08-09/97--NATO summit in Madrid. The principal issues
will be enlargement, NATO's new missions, Bosnia, and combined
joint task forces (CJTF). NATO has stated that it will invite
``one or more'' countries to begin accession negotiations.
end of 1997--NATO hopes to complete accession negotiations
with candidate states for membership.
spring-summer 1998--The U.S. Senate may vote on accession
protocols for candidate countries seeking NATO membership.
April 1999--Target date for entry of new members into NATO.
----------
D. Helsinki Summit Declaration
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
Helsinki, Finland
For Immediate Release
March 21, 1997
Joint Statement
joint u.s.-russian statement on european security
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin discussed the present
security situation in the Euro-Atlantic region. They reaffirmed
their commitment to the shared goal of building a stable,
secure, integrated and undivided democratic Europe. The roles
of the United States and Russia as powers with worldwide
responsibilities place upon them a special requirement to
cooperate closely to this end. They confirmed that this
cooperation will be guided by the spirit of openness and
pragmatism which has increasingly come to characterize the
U.S.-Russian relationship in recent years.
Recalling their May 1995 Joint Statement on European
Security, the Presidents noted that lasting peace in Europe
should be based on the integration of all of the continent into
a series of mutually supporting institutions and relationships
that ensure that there will be no return to division or
confrontation. No institution by itself can ensure security.
The Presidents agreed that the evolution of security structures
should be managed in a way that threatens no state and that
advances the goal of building a more stable and integrated
Europe. This evolution should be based on a broad commitment to
the principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, the Budapest
Code of Conduct and other OSCE documents, including respect for
human rights, democracy and political pluralism, the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, and their
inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own
security.
The Presidents are convinced that strengthening the OSCE,
whose potential has yet to be fully realized, meets the
interests of the United States and Russia. The Presidents
expressed their satisfaction with the outcome of the Lisbon
Summit of the OSCE and agreed on the importance of implementing
its decisions, both to define further the goals of security
cooperation and to continue to devise innovative methods for
carrying out the growing number of tasks the OSCE has assumed.
They underscored their commitment to enhance the
operational capability of the OSCE as the only framework for
European security cooperation providing for full and equal
participation of all states. The rule of consensus should
remain an inviolable basis for OSCE decisionmaking. The
Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to work together in the
ongoing OSCE effort to develop a model for security in Europe
which takes account of the radically changed situation on the
eve of the 21st century and the decisions of the Lisbon Summit
concerning a charter on European security. The OSCE's essential
role in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its ability to develop new
forms of peacekeeping and conflict prevention should also be
actively pursued.
In their talks in Helsinki, the two Presidents paid special
attention to the question of relations between the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation. They
continued to disagree on the issue of NATO enlargement. In
order to minimize the potential consequences of this
disagreement, the Presidents agreed that they should work, both
together and with others, on a document that will establish
cooperation between NATO and Russia as an important element of
a new comprehensive European security system. Signed by the
leaders of the NATO countries and Russia, this document would
be an enduring commitment at the highest political level. They
further agreed that the NATO-Russia relationship, as defined in
this document, should provide for consultation, coordination
and, to the maximum extent possible where appropriate, joint
decisionmaking and action on security issues of common concern.
The Presidents noted that the NATO-Russia document would
reflect and contribute both to the profound transformation of
NATO, including its political and peacekeeping dimension, and
to the new realities of Russia as it builds a democratic
society. It will also reflect the shared commitment of both
NATO and Russia to develop their relations in a manner that
enhances mutual security.
The Presidents recalled the historic significance of the
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in establishing
the trust necessary to build a common security space on the
continent in the interest of all states in Europe, whether or
not they belong to a military or political alliance, and to
continue to preclude any destabilizing buildup of forces in
different regions of Europe. The Presidents stressed the
importance of adapting the CFE Treaty. They agreed on the need
to accelerate negotiations among CFE parties with a view to
concluding by late spring or early summer of 1997 a framework
agreement setting forth the basic elements of an adapted CFE
Treaty, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the
Document on Scope and Parameters agreed at Lisbon in December
1996.
President Yeltsin underscored Russian concerns that NATO
enlargement will lead to a potentially threatening buildup of
permanently stationed combat forces of NATO near to Russia.
President Clinton stressed that the alliance contemplates
nothing of the kind.
President Yeltsin welcomed President Clinton's statements
and affirmed that Russia would exercise similar restraint in
its conventional force deployments in Europe.
President Clinton also noted NATO's policy on nuclear
weapons deployments, as articulated by the North Atlantic
Council on December 10, 1996, that NATO members have ``no
intention, no plan and no reason'' to deploy nuclear weapons on
the territory of states that are not now members of the
alliance, nor do they foresee any future need to do so.
President Clinton noted NATO's willingness to include specific
reference to this policy in the NATO-Russia document.
President Yeltsin spoke in favor of including such a
reference in the document. The Presidents agreed that the
United States, Russia and all their partners in Europe face
many common security challenges that can best be addressed
through cooperation among all the states of the Euro-Atlantic
area. They pledged to intensify their efforts to build on the
common ground identified in their meetings in Helsinki to
improve the effectiveness of European security institutions,
including by concluding the agreements and arrangements
outlined in this statement.
FOR THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
/S/
FOR THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
/S/
----------
E. North Atlantic Council communique December 10, 1996
Press communique M-NAC-2 (96)165
held at nato hq, brussels, 10 dec 1996
Final Communique issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the
North Atlantic Council
1. As we look ahead, the new NATO is taking shape,
reflecting the fundamental changes in the security environment
in Europe and the enduring vitality of the transatlantic
partnership which underpins our endeavors. The broad vision of
this new NATO and its role in the development of a new European
security architecture was set out at the 1994 Brussels Summit
and further defined at our last meeting in Berlin.
The alliance's adaptation and reform is well underway. We
will take this process forward today. The alliance is resolved
to preserve its political and military strength, ensuring its
ability to carry out the full range of its missions--as IFOR
and its planned successor SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina
clearly show. We have issued a separate statement in this
regard. The alliance will continue to strengthen European
security by maintaining its capability for collective defense,
admitting new members, expanding and strengthening cooperative
relationships with all partners, including building a strong
security partnership with Russia and a distinctive relationship
with Ukraine, and realizing the European Security and Defense
Identity within the alliance.
The evolution of the alliance takes place in the context of
our aim to help build a truly cooperative European security
structure. We welcome as a contribution the important decisions
taken at the recent OSCE Summit in Lisbon and the decision by
the States Parties to the CFE Treaty to begin negotiations in
early 1997 with a view toward adapting the Treaty to the
changing security environment in Europe.
2. Against this background, we have decided to recommend to
our Heads of State and Government to convene a Summit meeting
in Madrid on 8/9 July 1997 to set the course for the alliance
as it moves toward the 21st century, consolidating Euro-
Atlantic security. To achieve this aim, major decisions will
have to be taken by the time of the Summit concerning NATO's
internal adaptation, the opening of the alliance and its
ability to carry out all its new roles and missions. The agenda
for our Summit will include:
agreeing a new command structure, which enables all
Allies to participate fully, and further advancing the
implementation of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF)
concept, in order to enhance the alliance's ability to
carry out the full range of its missions, while
preserving the capability for collective defense, based
on a strong transatlantic partnership;
finalizing, to the satisfaction of all Allies, all the
necessary arrangements for the European Security and
Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO, which will allow
for the preparation and conduct of WEU-led operations
with the participation of all European Allies if they
were so to choose; inviting one or more of the
countries which have expressed interest in joining the
alliance to begin accession negotiations;
pledging that the alliance will remain open to the
accession of further members and will remain ready to
pursue consultations with nations seeking NATO
membership, as it has done in the past;
strengthening cooperative relations with all our
partners including through an enhanced Partnership for
Peace (PfP) and the initiative to establish an Atlantic
Partnership Council;
intensifying and consolidating relations with Russia
beyond the Partnership for Peace by aiming at reaching
an agreement at the earliest possible date on the
development of a strong, stable and enduring security
partnership;
further developing an enhanced relationship with
Ukraine;
enhancing our Mediterranean dialog;
further developing our ability to carry out new roles
and missions relating to conflict prevention and crisis
management; and further enhancing our political and
defense efforts against the proliferation of nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons and their delivery
means.
3. We warmly welcome the decision of the Government of
Spain, endorsed by the Spanish Parliament on 14 November 1996,
to take the necessary steps to participate in the alliance's
new structure. Spain's participation will further strengthen
the cohesion and military effectiveness of the alliance, as it
takes on new roles and missions, reinforce the transatlantic
link and help develop ESDI within the alliance.
4. Stability and security in the whole Euro-Atlantic area
are our primary goal. We want to help build cooperative
European security structures which extend to countries
throughout the whole of Europe without excluding anyone or
creating dividing lines. Recent decisions at the OSCE Summit
meeting in Lisbon on European security cooperation and the
decision to adapt the CFE Treaty to the new European security
environment establish a cooperative foundation for our common
security. The alliance, for its part, has developed a broad
pattern of intensive cooperation with North Atlantic
Cooperation Council (NACC) and PfP Partner countries and with
other international organizations and is thereby contributing
to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. With the
same aim, we are now working toward opening the alliance to new
members; developing ever-closer and deeper cooperative ties
with all Partner countries who so wish; building a strong,
stable and enduring security partnership with Russia;
strengthening our relationship with Ukraine; and enhancing our
Mediterranean dialog.
5. We reaffirm that the nuclear forces of the Allies
continue to play a unique and essential role in the alliance's
strategy of war prevention. New members, who will be full
members of the alliance in all respects, will be expected to
support the concept of deterrence and the essential role
nuclear weapons play in the alliance's strategy. Enlarging the
alliance will not require a change in NATO's current nuclear
posture and therefore, NATO countries have no intention, no
plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory
of new members nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's
nuclear posture or nuclear policy--and we do not foresee any
future need to do so.
6. A number of countries have long-standing aspirations to
become full members of our alliance and have undertaken
intensive and wide-ranging preparations and reforms with this
aim in mind. We are now in a position to recommend to our Heads
of State and Government to invite at next year's Summit meeting
one or more countries which have participated in the
intensified dialog process, to start accession negotiations
with the alliance. Our goal is to welcome the new member(s) by
the time of NATO's 50th anniversary in 1999. We pledge that the
alliance will remain open to the accession of further members
in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. We will
remain ready to pursue consultations with nations seeking NATO
membership, as we have done in the past.
We are satisfied with the intensified, individual dialog
which the alliance has been conducting throughout this year
with interested partners. This dialog has improved their
understanding of specific and practical details of how the
alliance works. It has provided the alliance in turn with a
better understanding of where these countries stand in their
internal development as well as in the resolution of any
external issues with neighboring countries. We have tasked the
Council in Permanent Session to prepare comprehensive
recommendations for decisions to be taken by the Summit on
which country or countries to invite to begin accession
negotiations. The process should include:
an intensified dialog with interested Partner countries
including in a ``16+1'' format, as appropriate;
analysis, on the basis of further political guidance to
be elaborated by the Council in Permanent Session, of
the relevant factors associated with the admission of
potential new members;
preparation of recommendations on the adaptation of
alliance structures necessary to integrate new members
into the alliance;
preparation of a plan for conducting the accession
talks with one or more new members.
7. We look forward to tomorrow's meeting of the NACC, which
will mark its fifth anniversary. The NACC has provided us over
the years with a valued opportunity to consult regularly with
our partners on political and security issues. Through NACC and
Partnership for Peace, we have achieved the development of
common approaches to European security and brought the NACC
countries closer together in a spirit of cooperation and a
common commitment to European security. We are committed to
ensuring that the NACC goals of enhancing transparency and
confidence in security matters among member states remain
central to future cooperation. In order to derive maximum
benefit from our NACC meetings, we want to move toward further
deepening our political dialog and giving it more focus.
8. We are pleased with the dynamic development of
Partnership for Peace and the role it plays in building
European security cooperation. The Partnership for Peace will
continue as a permanent element of the alliance's cooperative
effort to contribute to the development of a more stable
European security area and, with those partners seeking to join
NATO, will also facilitate their preparations to meet the
responsibilities of membership in the alliance. Substantial
progress has been achieved in enhancing the scope and substance
of our Partnership cooperation, in particular the growing range
of exercises, the broadening and deepening of the PfP Planning
and Review Process, the intensification of work on civil-
military relations, and civil emergency planning and disaster
relief. In the current IFOR operation, in which 13 Partner
countries are cooperating with alliance armed forces, the
Partnership for Peace has proved its value with regard both to
political commitment to joint crisis management and to military
Interoperability.
We want to develop on the basis of transparency ever-closer
and deeper cooperative ties open to all Partner countries by
making the Partnership more operational; strengthening its
political consultation element, taking full account of the
respective activities of the OSCE and the relevant European
institutions such as the WEU and the EU; and involving partners
more in operations planning and Partnership decisionmaking. To
this end, the alliance has set up a Senior Level Group to
develop by the time of the Summit meeting a clearly
strengthened and thus more attractive Partnership for Peace. We
have received an interim report on the ongoing work and agree
that work should begin without delay to implement its
recommendations. These include:
enhancing the political dimension of the Partnership
through increasing opportunities for political
consultations;
expanding the agreed fields of military missions within
PfP to the full range of the alliance's new missions,
as appropriate, including Peace Support operations over
and above previously agreed areas;
broadening the NATO/PfP exercise program in accordance
with the expanded scope of the Partnership;
enabling Partner countries to participate in the
planning and execution of PfP activities (exercises and
operations);
involving partners more substantively and actively in
PfP-related parts of the regular peacetime work of
NATO's Military Authorities;
affording the appropriate opportunity to partners who
join future NATO-led PfP operations to contribute to
the provision of political guidance for oversight over
such operations, drawing on the experience gained in
Operation Joint Endeavor;
examining, together with partners, the possible
modalities for the elaboration of a political-military
framework for PfP operations, building on the current
work of the Political-Military Steering Committee;
enhancing Partner participation in decisionmaking for
PfP programs issues;
increasing regional cooperation within the Partnership
provided it remains open to all partners and remains an
integral part of the overall PfP;
expanding the Planning and Review Process; and
as soon as the Brussels Agreement on the Status of
Missions and Representatives of Third States to NATO
comes into force, offering partners the opportunity to
establish diplomatic missions with NATO.
We have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to ensure
implementation of these recommendations without delay and to
continue the work on the enhancement of Partnership for Peace
and also to review its common funding and resource
implications, with a view to providing a further report by the
SLG with recommendations for decisions at the time of the
Spring Ministerial meeting.
9. With the rapid growth of our activities under both NACC
and PfP, we have identified a need for greater coherence in our
cooperation in a framework which will establish with partners a
more meaningful and productive cooperative and consultative
process, building on the elements of NACC and PfP which we and
our partners deem most valuable. To this end, we have agreed to
work with partners on the initiative to establish an Atlantic
Partnership Council (APC) as a single new cooperative
mechanism, which would form a framework for enhanced efforts in
both practical cooperation under PfP and an expanded political
dimension of Partnership. We have accordingly tasked the
Council in Permanent Session to draw up the modalities for such
a council, in close coordination with partners, by the time of
our next meeting.
10. We affirm our support for the political and economic
reform process in the Russian Federation. We welcome the
landmark Presidential elections in Russia. We applaud the
progress toward a lasting, peaceful settlement of the conflict
in Chechnya.
A broad process of integration and cooperation is underway
in Europe; Russia is a part of it through its membership in the
OSCE and the Council of Europe and its relationship with NATO
as well as the European Union and the WEU. The pattern of
consultations anchored by our regular ``16+1'' discussions,
provide a firm foundation on which to build. We welcome
Russia's participation in Partnership for Peace and encourage
it to take full advantage of the opportunities which the
Partnership offers.
We value the close and effective cooperation between Russia
and NATO in IFOR. This cooperation demonstrates that NATO and
Russia can collaborate effectively in the construction of
cooperative security structures in Europe. We appreciate and
welcome Russia's readiness to contribute to a follow-on
operation to consolidate peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We
look forward to continuing the experience of working closely
together, which we believe will have a lasting, positive impact
on our relationship.
Today, we reiterate our commitment to a strong, stable, and
enduring security partnership between NATO and Russia. This
partnership demonstrates that European security has entered a
fundamentally new, more promising era. It constitutes an
important element of the developing European cooperative
security architecture to which Russia has an essential
contribution to make. It will further enhance stability and
security in the Euro-Atlantic area. By the time of the Summit,
we aim to reach agreement with the Russian Federation on
arrangements that can deepen and widen the scope of our current
relationship and provide a framework for its future
development. We want to ensure that NATO and Russia have a
strong, flexible means to consult and cooperate as part of our
evolving relationship. Agreement might be expressed in a
document or could take the form of a Charter, which could
encompass:
the shared principles that will form the basis of our
relationship;
a broad set of areas of practical cooperation in
particular in the political, military, economic,
environmental, scientific, peacekeeping, armaments,
non-proliferation, arms control and civil emergency
planning fields;
mechanisms for regular and ad hoc consultations; and
mechanisms for military liaison and cooperation.
We therefore task the Council in Permanent Session to develop
further guidance on these matters on the basis of which the
Secretary General could explore with Russia the possibility of
such agreement.
11. We continue to support Ukraine as it develops as a
democratic nation and a market economy. The maintenance of
Ukraine's independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty
is a crucial factor for stability and security in Europe.
Ukraine's development of a strong, enduring relationship
with NATO is an important aspect of the emerging European
security architecture. We greatly value the active
participation of Ukraine in the Partnership for Peace and look
forward to next year's exercise near Lviv. We also value
Ukraine's cooperation with European institutions such as the EU
and the WEU. Ukraine has made an important contribution to IFOR
and UNTAES, and we welcome its commitment to contribute to a
follow-on operation to consolidate peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
We welcome the continued development of our broad
cooperation beyond PfP. We note with satisfaction the recent
meeting between the alliance and Ukraine on issues related to
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We welcome
the progress made toward establishing a NATO information office
in Kyiv, and look forward to its opening in the near future. We
welcome Ukraine's active interest in further enhancing its
relations with the alliance. We are committed to the
development in coming months, through high level and other
consultations, of a distinctive and effective NATO-Ukraine
relationship, which could be formalized, possibly by the time
of the Summit, building on the document on enhanced NATO-
Ukraine relations agreed in September 1995, and taking into
account recent Ukrainian proposals.
12. We support the Middle East peace process, and urge all
participants to remain firmly committed to it.
We reaffirm our conviction that security in Europe is
closely linked with security and stability in the
Mediterranean, and that the Mediterranean dimension is
consequently one of the various components of the European
security architecture. In this regard, as part of the
adaptation of the alliance, we will work toward enhancing our
relations with non-NATO Mediterranean countries through our
dialog.
The dialog complements other international efforts, such as
those undertaken by the Barcelona process, the OSCE and the WEU
without creating any division of labor. We welcome the report
of the Council in Permanent Session on the progress of and
recommendations for future steps to develop the dialog with
Mediterranean countries through political dialog and other
activities agreed by the alliance. Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia have reiterated their interest
in the development of our relations. We have decided to enhance
our Mediterranean dialog in a progressive way and have tasked
the Council in Permanent Session to report at our next meeting
on the implementation of the activities foreseen in the report
as well as on the scope for further development.
13. We are carrying forward the process of the alliance's
internal adaptation, with the fundamental objectives of
ensuring the alliance's military effectiveness, maintaining the
transatlantic link, and developing the ESDI within NATO. In
keeping with the decisions taken by NATO Heads of State and
Government at the 1994 Summit Meeting and by the Ministerial
meetings in June this year in Berlin and Brussels and with a
view to preparing for the Summit next year, our primary focus
has been on three closely linked issues: the development of a
new command structure for the alliance; the implementation of
the CJTF concept; and the development of the ESDI within NATO.
14. We welcome the progress made in the development of the
future command structure, noting that two structural
alternatives have been selected by the Military Committee for
future assessment and subsequent political consideration and
agree the proposed way ahead. We urge the Council in Permanent
Session and the Military Committee to complete the work as
quickly as possible. Once approved, this new command structure
will help ensure the alliance's military effectiveness so that
it is able, in the changing security environment facing Europe,
to perform its traditional mission of collective defense and
through flexible and agreed procedures to undertake new roles
in changing circumstances and to provide for increased
participation by Partner countries. It will constitute a
renovated, single multinational command structure, reflecting
the strategic situation in Europe and enabling all Allies to
participate fully.
15. We welcome the progress made toward realizing the CJTF
concept, on the basis of the Overall Politico-Military
Framework approved by us last June. We direct the Council in
Permanent Session and the NATO Military Authorities to pursue
vigorously their work on this concept, bearing in mind its
importance for future alliance operations, including the
possible involvement of nations outside the alliance, as well
as for the development of ESDI.
16. We are pleased with the progress made in developing the
appropriate arrangements for ESDI within NATO, as decided at
the Brussels Summit and at our meeting last June in Berlin. The
newly created Policy Coordination Group has contributed
significantly to this process.
17. We note in particular the steps taken toward
implementing the concept of separable but not separate
capabilities:
the decisions of the Council in Permanent Session on
political guidance concerning the elaboration of
European command arrangements within NATO able to
prepare and conduct WEU-led operations;
the decisions of the Council in Permanent Session
regarding the arrangements for identifying NATO
capabilities and assets which might be made available
to the WEU for a WEU-led operation;
the progress to date on arrangements for the release,
monitoring and return or recall of alliance assets and
capabilities;
the decision of the Council in Permanent Session with
respect to modalities of cooperation with the WEU;
the progress on work regarding planning and conducting
exercising for WEU-led operations, following receipt of
illustrative profiles for WEU missions.
18. We have directed the Council in Permanent Session to
submit to the Spring 1997 Ministerial meetings a report on the
adaptation of alliance structures and procedures related to the
future command structure, on the implementation of the CJTF
concept, and on further progress with recommendations for
decisions in the development of ESDI within the alliance.
19. We welcome the close and intensifying cooperation
between NATO and the WEU. At their meeting in Ostend on 19
November 1996, WEU Ministers agreed that it would be valuable
for WEU to become actively involved in the alliance's defense
planning process and expressed their readiness to participate.
Early agreement is now being sought in the WEU on the
participation of all European Allies in WEU-led operations
using NATO assets and capabilities, as well as in planning and
preparing for such operations. This would be a key contribution
to the development of ESDI within the alliance. We have tasked
the Council in Permanent Session to develop the NATO-WEU
relationship further in order to ensure effective cooperation
in preparing for possible WEU-led operations.
20. We are pleased with the successful outcome of the OSCE
Summit in Lisbon and, in particular, the adoption of a
declaration on security as a result of work on a Common and
Comprehensive Security Model for the 21st Century. The Lisbon
Summit has created a security framework in which all European
states can participate on an equal footing. The Security Model
adopted in Lisbon is a comprehensive expression of the endeavor
to strengthen security and stability. It complements the
mutually reinforcing efforts of NATO and other European and
transatlantic institutions and organizations. We attach great
importance to the role of the OSCE as a primary instrument in
preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, post-conflict
rehabilitation and regional security cooperation, as well as to
the enhancement of its operational capabilities to carry out
these tasks. We believe the OSCE, as the only pan-European
security organization, has an essential role to play in
European peace and stability. We are committed to supporting
its comprehensive approach to security. The principles and
commitments on which the OSCE is built provide the standards
for the development of a comprehensive and cooperative European
security structure.
We commend the OSCE for its essential contribution to the
implementation of civil aspects of the Peace Agreement for
Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in supervising the
preparation and conduct of the elections, in promoting and
monitoring human rights and in overseeing the implementation of
agreed confidence--and security--building measures and sub-
regional arms control agreements. The OSCE thereby demonstrates
its central role in contributing to regional stability and
security.
We are pleased with the support given by IFOR to the OSCE
in carrying out its tasks. The cooperation between OSCE and
IFOR is a good example of our concept of mutually reinforcing
organizations. The practical assistance given by NATO to the
OSCE in helping to establish measures to verify the confidence-
building and arms control agreements of the Dayton Accords
testifies to a growing cooperation between NATO and the OSCE.
We reiterate our readiness to further develop the cooperation
between the two organizations. The democratic and economic
development, independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity of all states are essential factors for stability and
security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We commend the OSCE for its
mediation efforts in a number of regional conflicts through its
various missions, and recognize the valuable work of the High
Commissioner on National Minorities. We support the efforts of
the Minsk Group to achieve a political settlement of the
conflict in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.
The OSCE acquis in the field of disarmament, arms control,
and confidence-and security-building measures continues to
contribute significantly to political and military stability.
We consider the full implementation, the further development,
and if necessary, the adaptation of these measures to be
indispensable elements in our effort to further enhance the
European security architecture. We welcome the recent adoption
by the Forum for Security Cooperation of the Framework for Arms
Control and its Future Agenda.
21. The CFE Treaty is a fundamental cornerstone of security
and stability for all in the Euro-Atlantic area. We are
committed to maintain and strengthen it. Consistent with our
broader goal of enhancing political cooperation and military
stability in a Europe without dividing lines, we welcome the
decision of the 30 States Parties to the CFE Treaty on 1
December 1996 in Lisbon to launch negotiations to adapt the
Treaty to the changing security environment in Europe. We look
forward to beginning negotiations in the Joint Consultative
Group in Vienna in January 1997 on the basis of the scope and
parameters (Terms of Reference) document agreed in Lisbon.
Our common goal is to enhance security for all States
Parties, irrespective of whether they belong to an alliance,
and preserve their right to choose and change their security
arrangements. Within the broader political context of enhanced
security for all, this process should strengthen the
cooperative pattern of relationships between States Parties,
based on mutual confidence, transparency, stability and
predictability. Committed, like the other States Parties, to
adapting the Treaty by developing mechanisms which will enhance
the Treaty's viability and effectiveness, we will pursue steps
to review the Treaty's group structure, to adapt the Treaty
system of limitations and to enhance its verification and
information provisions. To that end, the members of the
alliance will develop and table proposals for the negotiations
in Vienna.
We reaffirm our support for the CFE Flank Agreement,
reached at this year's Review Conference in Vienna. We urge all
States Parties who have not yet done so to approve this
Agreement before the end of the extended provisional
application period.
We will play our full part in the intensive continuing
efforts directed at resolving outstanding implementation
issues.
The members of the alliance reaffirm the commitment made at
Lisbon to exercise restraint during the period of negotiations
as foreseen in the document in relation to the current postures
and capabilities of their conventional armed forces--in
particular, with respect to their levels of forces and
deployments--in the Treaty's area of application. As decided in
Lisbon, this commitment is without prejudice to the outcome of
the negotiations, or to voluntary decisions by the individual
States Parties to reduce their force levels or deployments, or
to their legitimate security interests. We believe that the CFE
Treaty must continue to play a key role in ensuring military
stability into the 21st century, and are committed to adapting
it expeditiously in order to take account of new security
challenges.
22. We emphasize the importance of the START Treaties for
international stability and security. We note with satisfaction
the progress made by the United States and the Russian
Federation in the implementation of START I. We urge the
Russian Federation to follow the United States in ratifying the
START II Treaty. We welcome the successful conclusion and
signing by the great majority of U.N. Members of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and we urge all other nations to
sign this important international arms control agreement. We
look forward to the early start of negotiations on a Fissile
Material Cut-Off Treaty.
We are pleased that the Chemical Weapons Convention will
soon enter into force and we look forward to its early
implementation. We welcome the fact that States Parties to the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention have at the Fourth
Review Conference in Geneva in December 1996 again solemnly
declared their recognition that effective verification could
reinforce the Convention.
Recognising the heightened concern of the international
community of the suffering and casualties caused by anti-
personnel mines, we support the vigorous pursuit of an
effective, legally binding international agreement to ban the
use, stockpiling, production and transfer of antipersonnel
mines and, as an important step to this end, support the early
ratification of the revised Second Protocol of the Convention
on Inhumane Weapons.
We urge the early ratification of the Treaty on Open Skies
by those states which have not already ratified.
23. Proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons and their delivery means continues to be a matter of
serious concern to us. Progress in expanding and intensifying
NATO's political and defense efforts against proliferation, as
directed by NATO Heads of State and Government in January 1994,
is an integral part of NATO's adaptation to the new security
environment. These efforts also contribute to NATO's ability to
conduct new roles and missions. We remain committed to
preventing proliferation in the first place, or, if it occurs,
to reversing it through diplomatic means. The alliance is
improving its capabilities to address the risks posed by
proliferation. We welcome further consultations and cooperation
with Partner countries to address the common security risks
posed by proliferation. We note with satisfaction the report of
the alliance's Joint Committee on Proliferation on the
activities of the Senior Political-Military Group on
Proliferation and the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation and
direct them to continue their vital efforts.
We attach particular importance to a solid preparation of
the first preparatory committee of the strengthened review
process of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
scheduled for April 1997. This process will significantly
contribute to the further strengthening of the NPT, which is
the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation system.
24. We reaffirm our commitment to the alliance's common-
funded programs.
We note with appreciation the progress made in moving
existing resources to the highest priority programs, such as
Partnership for Peace and the support of enhanced information
activities in Moscow and Kyiv. We have directed the Council in
Permanent Session to keep under review the allocation of
resources in order to ensure their optimal use. We have also
directed the Council in Permanent Session to identify the
implications of adaptation for NATO's common-funded budgets and
to make appropriate recommendations for dealing with these.
25. We continue to support all efforts to combat terrorism,
which constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and
stability.
26. The Spring 1997 meeting of the North Atlantic Council
in Ministerial Session will be held in Sintra, Portugal, on 29
May.
----------
F. Statement by the North Atlantic Council, March 14, 1997
Press Release
(97)27
At its meeting today, the North Atlantic Council, under the
chairmanship of the Secretary General, Mr. Javier Solana,
decided to issue the following Unilateral Statement:
``In the current and foreseeable security environment,
the alliance will carry out its collective defense and
other missions by ensuring the necessary
Interoperability, integration and capability for
reinforcement rather than by additional permanent
stationing of substantial combat forces.''
----------
G. NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996
Making Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1997 Title
VI--NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996
sec. 601. short title.
This title may be cited as the `NATO Enlargement
Facilitation Act of 1996'.
sec. 602. findings.
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) has played an essential role in guaranteeing the
security, freedom, and prosperity of the United States and its
partners in the alliance.
(2) The NATO alliance is, and has been since its inception,
purely defensive in character, and it poses no threat to any
nation. The enlargement of the NATO alliance to include as full
and equal members emerging democracies in Central and Eastern
Europe will serve to reinforce stability and security in Europe
by fostering their integration into the structures which have
created and sustained peace in Europe since 1945. Their
admission into NATO will not threaten any nation. America's
security, freedom, and prosperity remain linked to the security
of the countries of Europe.
(3) The sustained commitment of the member countries of
NATO to a mutual defense has made possible the democratic
transformation of Central and Eastern Europe. Members of the
alliance can and should play a critical role in addressing the
security challenges of the post-cold war era and in creating
the stable environment needed for those emerging democracies in
Central and Eastern Europe to successfully complete political
and economic transformation.
(4) The United States continues to regard the political
independence and territorial integrity of all emerging
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe as vital to European
peace and security.
(5) The active involvement by the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe has made the Partnership for Peace program an
important forum to foster cooperation between NATO and those
countries seeking NATO membership.
(6) NATO has enlarged its membership on 3 different
occasions since 1949.
(7) Congress supports the admission of qualified new
members to NATO and the European Union at an early date and has
sought to facilitate the admission of qualified new members
into NATO.
(8) Lasting security and stability in Europe requires not
only the military integration of emerging democracies in
Central and Eastern Europe into existing European structures,
but also the eventual economic and political integration of
these countries into existing European structures.
(9) As new members of NATO assume the responsibilities of
alliance membership, the costs of maintaining stability in
Europe should be shared more widely. Facilitation of the
enlargement process will require current members of NATO, and
the United States in particular, to demonstrate the political
will needed to build on successful ongoing programs such as the
Warsaw Initiative and the Partnership for Peace by making
available the resources necessary to supplement efforts
prospective new members are themselves undertaking.
(10) New members will be full members of the alliance,
enjoying all rights and assuming all the obligations under the
North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949
(hereafter in this Act referred to as the ``Washington
Treaty'').
(11) In order to assist emerging democracies in Central and
Eastern Europe that have expressed interest in joining NATO to
be prepared to assume the responsibilities of NATO membership,
the United States should encourage and support efforts by such
countries to develop force structures and force modernization
priorities that will enable such countries to contribute to the
full range of NATO missions, including, most importantly,
territorial defense of the alliance.
(12) Cooperative regional peacekeeping initiatives
involving emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe
that have expressed interest in joining NATO, such as the
Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion, the Polish-Lithuanian Joint
Peacekeeping Force, and the Polish-Ukrainian Peacekeeping
Force, can make an important contribution to European peace and
security and international peacekeeping efforts, can assist
those countries preparing to assume the responsibilities of
possible NATO membership, and accordingly should receive
appropriate support from the United States.
(13) NATO remains the only multilateral security
organization capable of conducting effective military
operations and preserving security and stability of the Euro-
Atlantic region.
(14) NATO is an important diplomatic forum and has played a
positive role in defusing tensions between members of the
alliance and, as a result, no military action has occurred
between two alliance member states since the inception of NATO
in 1949.
(15) The admission to NATO of emerging democracies in
Central and Eastern Europe which are found to be in a position
to further the principles of the Washington Treaty would
contribute to international peace and enhance the security of
the region. Countries which have become democracies and
established market economies, which practice good neighborly
relations, and which have established effective democratic
civilian control over their defense establishments and attained
a degree of Interoperability with NATO, should be evaluated for
their potential to further the principles of the Washington
Treaty.
(16) Democratic civilian control of defense forces is an
essential element in the process of preparation for those
states interested in possible NATO membership.
(17) Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and
human rights is an integral aspect of genuine security, and in
evaluating requests for membership in NATO, the human rights
records of the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern
Europe should be evaluated according to their commitments to
fulfill in good faith the human rights obligations of the
Charter of the United Nations, the principles of the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, and the Helsinki Final Act.
(18) A number of Central and Eastern European countries
have expressed interest in NATO membership, and have taken
concrete steps to demonstrate this commitment, including their
participation in Partnership for Peace activities.
(19) The Caucasus region remains important geographically
and politically to the future security of Central Europe. As
NATO proceeds with the process of enlargement, the United
States and NATO should continue to examine means to strengthen
the sovereignty and enhance the security of United Nations
recognized countries in that region.
(20) In recognition that not all countries which have
requested membership in NATO will necessarily qualify at the
same pace, the accession date for each new member will vary.
(21) The provision of additional NATO transition assistance
should include those emerging democracies most ready for closer
ties with NATO and should be designed to assist other countries
meeting specified criteria of eligibility to move forward
toward eventual NATO membership.
(22) The Congress of the United States finds in particular
that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have made
significant progress toward achieving the criteria set forth in
section 203(d)(3) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994 and
should be eligible for the additional assistance described in
this Act.
(23) The evaluation of future membership in NATO for
emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe should be
based on the progress of those nations in meeting criteria for
NATO membership, which require enhancement of NATO's security
and the approval of all NATO members.
(a) IN GENERAL-The following countries are designated as
eligible to receive assistance under the program established
under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994 and
shall be deemed to have been so designated pursuant to section
203(d)(1) of such Act: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
(b) DESIGNATION OF SLOVENIA-Effective 90 days after the
date of enactment of this Act, Slovenia is designated as
eligible to receive assistance under the program established
under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994, and
shall be deemed to have been so designated pursuant to section
203(d) of such Act, unless the President certifies to Congress
prior to such effective date that Slovenia fails to meet the
criteria under section 203(d)(3) of such Act.
(c) DESIGNATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES--The President shall
designate other emerging democracies in Central and Eastern
Europe as eligible to receive assistance under the program
established under section 203(a) of such Act if such
countries--
(1) have expressed a clear desire to join NATO;
(2) have begun an individualized dialog with NATO in
preparation for accession;
(3) are strategically significant to an effective NATO defense;
and
(4) meet the other criteria outlined in section 203(d)(3) of
the NATO Participation Act of 1994 (title II of Public
Law 103-447; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note).
(d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION--Nothing in this section precludes
the designation by the President of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Albania, Moldova, Ukraine, or any
other emerging democracy in Central and Eastern Europe pursuant
to section 203(d) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994 as
eligible to receive assistance under the program established
under section 203(a) of such Act.
sec. 607. authorization of appropriations for nato enlargement
assistance.
(a) IN GENERAL--There are authorized to be appropriated
$60,000,000 for fiscal year 1997 for the program established
under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994.
(b) AVAILABILITY--Of the funds authorized to be
appropriated by subsection
(a)--
(1) not less than $20,000,000 shall be available for
the cost, as defined in section 502(5) of the Credit
Reform Act of 1990, of direct loans pursuant to the
authority of section 203(c)(4) of the NATO
Participation Act of 1994 (relating to the ``Foreign
Military Financing Program'');
(2) not less than $30,000,000 shall be available for
assistance on a grant basis pursuant to the authority
of section 203(c)(4) of the NATO Participation Act of
1994 (relating to the ``Foreign Military Financing
Program''); and
(3) not more than $10,000,000 shall be available for
assistance pursuant to the authority of section
203(c)(3) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994
(relating to international military education and
training).
(c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION--Amounts authorized to be
appropriated under this section are authorized to be
appropriated in addition to such amounts as otherwise may be
available for such purposes.
sec. 608. regional airspace initiative and partnership for peace
information management system.
(a) IN GENERAL--To the extent provided in advance in
appropriations acts for such purposes, funds described in
subsection (b) are authorized to be made available to support
the implementation of the Regional Airspace Initiative and the
Partnership for Peace Information Management System,including--
(1) the procurement of items in support of these
programs; and
(2) the transfer of such items to countries
participating in these programs.
(b) FUNDS DESCRIBED--Funds described in this subsection are
funds that are available--
(1) during any fiscal year under the NATO Participation
Act of 1994 with respect to countries eligible for
assistance under that Act; or
(2) during fiscal year 1997 under any Act to carry out
the Warsaw Initiative.
sec. 609. excess defense articles.
(a) PRIORITY DELIVERY--Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, the delivery of excess defense articles under the
authority of section 203(c) (1) and (2) of the NATO
Participation Act of 1994 and section 516 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 shall be given priority to the maximum
extent feasible over the delivery of such excess defense
articles to all other countries except those countries referred
to in section 541 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1995 (Public Law 103-
306; 108 Stat. 1640).
(b) COOPERATIVE REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING INITIATIVES--The
Congress encourages the President to provide excess defense
articles and other appropriate assistance to cooperative
regional peacekeeping initiatives involving emerging
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe that have expressed
an interest in joining NATO in order to enhance their ability
to contribute to European peace and security and international
peacekeeping efforts.
sec. 610. modernization of defense capability.
The Congress endorses efforts by the United States to
modernize the defense capability of Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Slovenia, and any other countries designated by the
President pursuant to section 203(d) of the NATO Participation
Act of 1994, by exploring with such countries options for the
sale or lease to such countries of weapons systems compatible
with those used by NATO members, including air defense systems,
advanced fighter aircraft, and telecommunications
infrastructure.
sec. 611. termination of eligibility.
(a) TERMINATION OF ELIGIBILITY--The eligibility of a
country designated pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of section
606 or pursuant to section 203(d) of the NATO Participation Act
of 1994 may be terminated upon a determination by the President
that such country does not meet the criteria set forth in
section 203(d)(3) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994.
(b) NOTIFICATION--At least 15 days before terminating the
eligibility of any country pursuant to subsection (a), the
President shall notify the congressional committees specified
in section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 in
accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming
notifications under that section.
sec. 612. conforming amendments to the nato participation act.
The NATO Participation Act of 1994 (title II of Public Law
103-447; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note) is amended in sections 203(a),
203(d)(1), and 203(d)(2) by striking ``countries emerging from
Communist domination'' each place it appears and inserting
``emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe''.
----------
H. Selected Bibliography on NATO Enlargement
Albright, Madeleine, ``Why Bigger is Better,'' The
Economist, February 15, 1997, pp. 21-23.
Albright Press Conference at NATO Headquarters, Transcript,
February 18, 1997.
``Americans on Expanding NATO: a Study of U.S. Public
Attitudes,'' by Kull, Steven. Program on International Policy
Attitudes, University of Maryland, February 13, 1997.
Blackwill, Robert; Horelick, Arnold; and Nunn, Sam,
``Stopping the Decline in U.S.-Russian Relations,'' RAND Paper
P-7986, December 1996.
Blackwill, Robert; ``Russian Policy toward the CFE
Regime,'' Paper commissioned for the Center for European
Strategy Research, 25 November 1996.
Central European Defense Industries and NATO Enlargement:
Issues for U.S. Policy, by Szayna, Thomas S. RAND Corporation.
January 1996. 32 pages.
Clinton, President William J. Remarks to the Community in
Detroit, Michigan, October 22, 1996 (call for ``next historic
step'' in evolution of NATO). Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents, Vol. 32, No. 43, pp. 2137-2144.
The Costs of Expanding the NATO alliance. Congressional
Budget Office. March 1996. 71 pages.
The Defense Program Question: The Military and Budgetary
Dimension of NATO Expansion, by Kugler, Richard L. RAND
Corporation. April 24, 1995.
``Don't Isolate Us: a Russian View of NATO Expansion,'' by
Pushkov, Alexei K. National Interest, No. 47, Spring 1997: pp.
58-63.
``Enlarging NATO: the Russia Factor,'' by Kugler, Richard
L.; Kozintseva, Marianna V. Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation,
1996. 267 pages.
The European Defense Pillar of the Transatlantic Alliance,
ed. by Grapin, Jacqueline. Washington, DC, The European
Institute. 1997. 52 pages.
Final Communique of the NAC Ministerial Meeting, December
10, 1996.
Hoffman, David, ``Few Russians Worry About Bigger NATO,''
Washington Post, February 7, 1997.
``Military Dimensions of NATO Enlargement,'' Address by
Naumann, General Klaus, to the North Atlantic Assembly, 16
February 1997.
NATO and Bosnia: A Looming Transatlantic Debate, by Sloan,
Stanley R. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.
CRS Report 97-480F. April 22, 1997. 6 pages.
``NATO and the Have-nots; Reassurance after Enlargement,''
by Asmus, Ronald D.; Larrabee, F. Stephen. Foreign Affairs, v.
75, Nov.-Dec. 1996: pp. 13-20.
NATO: Congress Addresses Expansion of the Alliance, by
Gallis, Paul. Congressional Research Service. Library of
Congress. CRS Issue Brief 95076, updated regularly.
NATO Enlargement: NATO and U.S. Actions Taken to Facilitate
Enlargement. U.S. General Accounting Office. May 6, 1996. 31
pages.
``NATO Enlargement: What's the Rush?'' by Garfinkle, Adam.
National Interest, No. 46, Winter 1996-97: pp. 102-111.
NATO Enlargement and Russia, by Woehrel, Steven J.
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. CRS Report
97-477F. April 21, 1997. 6 pages.
NATO Enlargement and the Former European Neutrals, by
Sloan, Stanley R. Congressional Research Service, Library of
Congress. CRS Report 97-249F. February 18, 1997. 6 pages.
``NATO Enlargement's American Hurdle; the Perils of
Misjudging our Political Will,'' by Rosner, Jeremy D. Foreign
Affairs, v. 75, July Aug. 1996: pp. 9-16.
NATO Expansion: Senate Advice and Consent, by Ackerman,
David M. Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress.
CRS Report 97-170A. February 4, 1997.
NATO Expansion: Time to Reconsider, by the British American
Security Information Council and the Centre for European
Security and Disarmament. November 25, 1996. 14 pages.
NATO Handbook, 1996, NATO Office of Information and Press,
Brussels.
NATO: July 1997 Madrid Summit Agenda, by Sloan, Stanley R.
Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress. CRS Report
97-443F. April 10, 1997. 6 pages.
Prague, NATO, and European Security, by Blank, Stephen J.
Carlisle Barracks, PA., Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army
War College, 1996. 37 pages.
Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and
Implications. Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs. U.S.
Department of State. February 24, 1997.
Report to the U.S. Congress by the Secretary of Defense on
Allied Contributions to the Common Defense. U.S. Department of
Defense. March 1997.
Should NATO Expand? Report of an Independent Task Force.
New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1995. 33 pages.
``Small is Beautiful: the Case Against the Enlargement of
NATO.'' RUSI (Journal of the Royal United Services Institute
for Defense Studies), V. 141, August 1996. Pp. 58-64.
Study on NATO Enlargement, North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, September 1995.
Study on NATO Enlargement: Destabilizing Europe, by
Butcher, Martin; Kokkinides, Tasos; Plesch, Daniel. British
American Security Information Council and Centre for European
Security and Disarmament. 1997. 18 pages.
U.S. Military Strategy in the 21st Century, by Blechman,
Barry M.; Nagy, Paul N. Arlington, VA, 1997. 107 pages.
U.S.-Russia Summit, March 20-21, 1997: Outcome and
Implications, by Nichol, James P. Congressional Research
Service. Library of Congress. CRS Report 97-419F. April 3,
1997. 6 pages.
``What Will NATO Enlargement Cost?'' by Asmus, Ronald;
Kugler, Richard; and Larrabee, F. Stephen. Survival, Autumn
1996, pp. 5-26.
Will NATO Go East? The Debate Over Enlarging the Atlantic
Alliance, ed. By Haglund, David G. Kingston, Ont., Canada,
1996. 234 pages.
----------
I. Members of NATO and the Partnership for peace Program
Prepared Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Secretary Albright.
As you know, this is the first of five scheduled hearings on the
question of the proposed expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, arguably one of America's most important post-war
alliances.
Today, we have the honor of hearing the testimony of our esteemed
Secretary of State who will give us an overview of the Administration's
strategic rationale behind the decision to support NATO's invitation to
three potential new members. I am sure she will explain this in the
clear, eloquent fashion that is typical of her style, and I look
forward to hearing from her.
Throughout the last half of this century, NATO has been a critical
force in maintaining peace and security in Europe. Following the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the members of the alliance faced a new
challenge: what would be the role of NATO in the new world order?
In September 1995, NATO members began to investigate in earnest the
possibility of expanding to include former Soviet satellites, and
issued guidelines for potential new members. These guidelines include
an established democracy, economic reforms, respect for human rights,
good relations with neighboring countries, a civilian-controlled
military, and ability to contribute to the security interests of NATO.
For the time being, the United States and our NATO partners have
determined that three countries meet this criteria: Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic, as was announced in July of this year. After
the alliance formalizes the process in December, a ``protocol of
accession'' will have to be ratified by each member Parliament.
Today, the Senate begins its constitutional responsibility to
provide advice and consent to the President on the proposed amendment
to the historic North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, the protocol of
accession to include these three new members. Although this will be the
fourth time the Senate will consider enlarging the alliance, this
decision is likely to impact U.S. foreign policy for years to come.
Clearly, we are now at the beginning of an historic debate.
And, like in any decision that will have such weighty consequences,
we will have very serious questions to ask. Many members of this
Committee, or of the Senate at large, have specific concerns about the
three countries that were invited to join the alliance. Was three the
right number? What happens to the nations that were left out? Will the
Baltic countries and the Ukraine face new dangers?
Other members may worry about the economic consequences of NATO
expansion. Will the economic benefits that new NATO members receive
cause unnecessary conflict with those countries that did not qualify
for membership? How will the United States react to such conflict?
Let me take this opportunity to express my concern, and the concern
of my constituents, that the people of Eastern Europe must never again
be subjected to the kind of tyranny they endured under the Soviet
regime. I understand the aspirations of these countries to protect
their new-found freedom and I sympathize with those in Eastern Europe
who feel an expanded NATO will offer a critical firewall against any
new threat to peace and democracy. I am hopeful that I will be able to
support the enlargement of NATO as a way to insure there will be no
return to the domination of the past.
I do have some concerns about the specifics that I know are shared
by many other Members of Congress, about the commitment -- financial
and otherwise -- the United States will undertake as it pursues
enlargement of the alliance.
How much is this really going to cost us?
There have been at least three major studies conducted to assess
the potential costs of NATO expansion by highly respected governmental
and non-governmental entities. Yet each of these analyses makes
different assumptions about what types of costs actually can be
attributed to expansion, per se, and different assumptions about the
potential threats that NATO will face over the next decade. Depending
on which study you read, the U.S. share of the costs of NATO expansion
could be anywhere form $2 billion to $7 billion. What that means is we
could be up or down $5 billion depending on whose assumptions you
believe.
Now I know it is extremely difficult to make an accurate assessment
of costs when there are probably hundreds of variables that we can not
control. But we are talking about a commitment on the part of the U.S.
taxpayer to support a military alliance against a somewhat undefined
threat, and $5 billion is a lot of money.
I recognize that these higher figures assume a resurgent Russian
threat, an assumption that I hope is as unlikely as I think it is. But
even if you remove this assumption, we are still playing with numbers
that differ by hundreds of millions of dollars.
In the same year that we have finally passed legislation that will
help us get to balanced budget, what are the implications of assuming a
new commitment where our cost estimates may be off by hundreds of
millions of dollars?
As I have indicated, this is certainly not to say that I oppose the
plan for expansion that the Secretary will present to us today. What I
am saying is that I have some serious concerns about the extent of the
commitment that we are making here, and I hope the Secretary will be
able to respond to some of these concerns today. I also look forward to
participating in the series of hearings that the Chairman has planned,
during which I know we will pursue this issue of cost and burden-
sharing more thoroughly than may be possible at this hearing.
Clearly, this issue is enormously important for the President, for
the Congress, for the American public, and for the people who suffered
under the Soviet yolk for so long. I am honored to be able to
participate in this debate as a member of this Committee and I look
forward to hearing the testimony of Secretary Albright.
__________
United States Department of State,
Washington, DC. 20520,
November 25, 1997.
The Hon. Jesse Helms,
Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Following the October 7, 1997 hearing at which
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright testified, additional questions
were submitted for the record. Please find enclosed the responses to
those questions.
If we can be of further assistance to you, please do not hesitate
to contact us.
Sincerely,
Barbara Larkin,
Assistant Secretary,
Legislative Affairs.
__________
Responses of Secretary Albright to Questions Asked by Senator Helms
Question 1. Secretary Albright, in your testimony you indicated
that from the Founding Act, and through the Permanent Joint Council
(PJC), that Russia will have a voice but not a veto in NATO decision
making. What reciprocal access will NATO have in Moscow, with the
Russian government and the Russian military General Staff, that will
ensure that NATO has a reciprocal voice but not a veto in Russian
political-military decision making?
Answer. The Founding Act, and the Permanent Joint Council it
created, are based on the principles of reciprocity and transparency.
The PJC is very much a two-way street: it gives Russia a voice on
European security issues in which it has a legitimate interest; but it
does not give Russia a role in the decision-making of North Atlantic
Council or a veto over NATO's decision making or actions. At the same
time, it provides a forum through which NATO has a voice on Russian
policies/issues that affect the Alliance's broader security interests
in Europe; but neither does NATO receive a veto over Russian decision
making. It is a forum where both sides can voice their views on
relevant security issues.
The PJC also provides NATO the means to insist upon the same
degree of transparency and candor from Russia regarding its own
policies, and an opportunity for the Alliance to formally offer its
views on those policies.
The Founding Act also provides for creation of reciprocal military
liaison missions at respective headquarters. Just as we expect Russia
to establish a mission at SHAPE, so NATO expects to establish a mission
at the Russian military's General Staff Headquarters or the Russian
Ministry of Defense. Formal arrangements for the reciprocal military
missions have not been agreed.
Question 2. What is the universe of issues which NATO has agreed to
discuss in the PJC? (Please submit in unclassified form.)
Answer. Section III of the Founding Act lists a menu of issues on
which NATO and Russia can consult and strive to cooperate, and where
appropriate, act together. NATO is not required to discuss at once all
the issues for consultation provided for by the Founding Act or to
begin work on them in the PJC. In fact, the initial NATO-Russia work
program is limited to only some of these issues. Holding consultations
does not mean soliciting Russian input prior to NATO deciding its own
policy. On matters of NATO policy, NATO will decide its own position
among its own members before consulting with Russia. NATO also remains
free to make its own independent decisions. Possible areas for
consultation include:
issues of common interest related to security and stability
in the Euro-Atlantic area or to concrete crises, including the
contribution of NATO and Russia to security and stability in
this area;
conflict prevention, including preventive diplomacy, crisis
management and conflict resolution taking into account the role
and responsibility of the UN and the OSCE and the work of these
organizations in these fields;
joint operations, including peace keeping operations, on a
case-by-case basis, under the authority of the UN Security
Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, and if Combined
Joint Task Forces (CJTF) are used in such cases, participation
in them at an early stage;
participation of Russia in Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
and Partnership for Peace:
exchange of information and consultation on strategy,
defense policy, the military doctrines of NATO and Russia, and
budgets and infrastructure development programs;
arms control issues;
nuclear safety issues, across their full spectrum;
preventing the proliferation of nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons, and their delivery means, combating nuclear
trafficking and strengthening cooperation in specific arms
control areas, including political and defense aspects of
proliferation;
possible cooperation on Theater Missile Defense;
enhanced regional air traffic safety, increased air traffic
capacity and reciprocal exchanges, as appropriate, to promote
confidence through increased measures of transparency and
exchanges of information in relation to air defense and related
aspects of airspace management/control. This will include
exploring possible cooperation on appropriate air defense
related matters.
increasing transparency, predictability and mutual
confidence regarding the size and roles of the conventional
forces of Member States of NATO and Russia;
reciprocal information exchanges, as appropriate, on nuclear
weapons issues, including doctrines and strategy of NATO-and
Russia;
coordinating a program of expanded cooperation between
respective military establishments;
pursing possible armaments-related cooperation through
association of Russia with NATO's Conference of National
Armaments Directors;
conversion of defense industries;
developing mutually agreed cooperative projects in defense-
related economic, environmental and scientific fields;
conducting joint initiatives and exercises in civil
emergency preparedness and disaster relief;
combatting terrorism and drug trafficking;
improving public understanding of evolving relations between
NATO and Russia, including the establishment of a NATO
documentation center or information office in Moscow.
Question 3. What are the agreed rules and procedures for
establishing an agenda, conducting meetings, and implementing any
action from the PJC? (Please submit in unclassified form.)
Answer. The PJC rules of procedure is a NATO classified document.
The U.S. cannot unilaterally declassify the document or distribute its
contents in unclassified form. Consistent with the terms of reference
for the Senate NATO Observer Group (SNOG), the Department made
available the classified version of these rules to the SNOG. The
Department of State would be happy to provide a classified briefing in
a secure room on Capitol Hill for interested Members of Congress and
their staff.
Question 4. If Russia brings up an issue that NATO has decided is
not appropriate for discussion in the PJC, how will that issue be
resolved?
Answer. If NATO decides not to address an issue within the PJC, it
will not be addressed, let alone resolved, within that forum. If Russia
proposes or raises an issue that NATO has decided it will not discuss,
within the PJC or that is not subject to discussion in the PJC (e.g.
internal Alliance matters, such as enlargement), the Secretary General
and Allies will apprise the Russian representatives either prior to or
during a PJC meeting that the Alliance will not agree to discuss the
issue. If the issue is the purview of another forum or negotiating
body, such as the OSCE or one of its constituent elements, NATO will
suggest that Russia raise the issue in that forum.
Question 5. How are financial contributions shared between NATO and
Russia to pay for the Permanent Joint Council?
Answer. NATO and Russia have agreed to share all costs associated
with the Founding Act, including operation of the Permanent Joint
Council and activities conducted under its auspices. NATO and Russia
are currently engaged in working out the detailed arrangements for
determining and distributing those costs, including how to evaluate
such in-kind contributions as interpreting services.
U.S. policy is to ensure that costs are shared equitably between
NATO and Russia. Russia's willingness to assume an equitable share of
the costs is one of the factors NATO will consider in assessing the
degree of Russian interest in and commitment to developing the NATO-
Russia relationship.
Question 6. Please describe the location, composition, and purpose
of any delegation of Russian civilian or military officials who are or
will be assigned in any capacity to NATO, to SHAPE, to any regional
command of NATO, or any other facility which has as its purpose making
or implementing NATO policies?
Answer. Unlike many of NATO's Partners, Russia does not have a
Mission or Liaison Office located at NATO Headquarters. Under the
Founding Act, Russia agreed to create a mission to NATO which would
include political and military representatives to the respective
components of the PJC. Presently the Russian bilateral Embassy in
Brussels also serves as the Russian Liaison Office to NATO. This
facility is not co-located with any NATO facilities or installations.
In preparing for and participating in the meetings/activities of the
PJC, Russia has to date relied upon existing personnel at its Embassy
in Brussels.
The PJC has been working since late July. Its military component
has not yet begun work, however. On October 20, Russia named its
military representative to the PJC, Lt. General Viktor Zavarzin. The
Founding Act provides for Russia to establish military liaison missions
at various levels at NATO; the Alliance will establish reciprocal
missions in the. Russian military command structure. The detailed
arrangements to implement this commitment remain to be worked out
between NATO and Russia. This will be one of the first issues taken up
by the PJC's military component when it begins work.
As part of the SFOR operation, there is a Russian Liaison Office at
SHAPE, which is responsible for coordinating Russian participation in
SFOR. The office is headed by General Krivalopov, Commander of the
Russian forces in SFOR.
Question 7. The Committee has been informed that agreement has
already been reached at NATO to accept a Russian military
representative at SHAPE, as well as Russian military observers at
SACEUR and SACLANT. What measures will be taken to ensure that such
representatives and observers do not have or gain access to sensitive
information that would damage the security of NATO or its members?
Answer. Russia named its military representative to NATO on October
20, but work on the PJC's military component has not yet begun. Nor
have any arrangements been agreed regarding reciprocal military liaison
missions provided for in the Founding Act.
The U.S. and the Alliance take the issue of security very
seriously. The U.S. and Allies will not allow Russian military
officials access to sensitive information that would damage the
security of NATO, the U.S., or other Alliance members.
The Alliance already has some experience with sharing sensitive
information with Russians and ensuring that this takes place without
damaging the security of NATO, the U.S. or other Alliance members. As
part of NATO's SFOR operation, the Alliance is sharing some sensitive
operational information with participating partners, including Russia.
The Alliance has put in place mechanisms which allow the Russian
Liaison Officer at SHAPE responsible for coordinating Russian
involvement in SFOR access to information on a need-to-know basis on
the same basis as other Partners.
The Alliance is also sharing tactical information with Russian
military units in Bosnia.
Question 8. What reciprocal access is being provided by Russia to
allow NATO military observers to be assigned to any Russian equivalent
of NATO regional commands?
Answer. To support the military components of the Permanent Joint
Council and the enhanced military cooperation envisioned by the
Founding Act, the Act provides for NATO and Russia to establish
military liaison missions at various levels on the basis of
reciprocity. To date, NATO and Russia have not made any arrangements to
establish military liaison missions, either at NATO or in Russia.
The NATO-Russia relationship is a two way street. The Founding Act
explicitly commits NATO and Russia to develop their relationship on the
basis of reciprocity. This commitment was undertaken at the highest
political level both within the Alliance and in Russia and applies to
military as well as diplomatic relations. The NATO-Russia Work Plan
calls for both NATO and Russia to establish military liaison missions.
In other words, any Russian military liaison missions will have
appropriate NATO counterparts.
Question 9. With the exception of the ill-considered Perry-Grachev
agreement, by standard practice the United States works to achieve
consensus at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) prior to forwarding
positions related to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)
Treaty to the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) in Vienna. will any NAC
decisions be discussed at the PJC before being presented at the JCG?
Answer. There is a fundamental difference between the NATO High
Level Task Force on Arms Control (HLTF) and the NATO-Russia Permanent
Joint Council (PJC).
The HLTF coordinates Alliance.policy with regard to the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The U.S. has consistently
sought the maximum possible degree of Allied discussion and
collaboration within the HLTF in the development of NATO negotiating
positions. We will continue to do so.
As discussed during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's
hearings on the ratification of the CFE Flank Agreement last May, the
content of discussions between Secretary of Defense Perry and Russian
Defense Minister Grachev on the CFE flank issue was factored into
intra-Alliance discussions that formed the basis for subsequent HLTF-
agreed negotiating positions.
By contrast, the PJC provides a forum for the general exchange.of
views between NATO and Russia. While arms control issues in general,
including CFE, may be raised by either side in general terms within the
PJC, we have made clear that the PJC is not for prior coordination of
negotiating positions or joint decision-making on CFE ``at 17.''
Neither, we have stressed repeatedly, can it be seen as a substitute
for the Vienna negotiations on CFE, where all states party to the
Treaty are represented.
The HLTF occasionally conducts informal consultations with CFE
Treaty partners outside the Alliance in ``16-plus'' format. Following
its meeting on October 7-8. the HLTF initiated a regular series of
``16-plus-3'' consultations with invitee states Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic. On past occasions, the HLTF has also conducted ``16-
plus-1'' consultations with Russia and Ukraine, and broader
consultations with all 30 CFE states. These are not decision-making
sessions but informational in nature.
Question 10. Will any issues related to future NATO enlargement,
including the process of negotiating membership of the current
candidates be allowed on the agenda of the PJC?
Answer. No. Section II, paragraph two of the Founding Act states
very clearly that ``consultations will not extend to internal matters
of either NATO, NATO member states or Russia.'' Enlargement, both the
present accession negotiations with Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic, and possible future rounds, is an internal Alliance matter
and not subject to consultation in the PJC. As in the past, NATO may
inform Russia of decisions and actions it has taken regarding
enlargement, but such decisions will not become the subject of decision
making in the PJC.
Question 11. Can you assure the Congress that under no
circumstances would any deliberations occur in the Permanent Joint
Council regarding the stationing of nuclear weapons on the soil of new
members or the stationing of conventional forces on the soil of new
members?
Answer. The Permanent Joint Council (PJC) is not a negotiating
forum. NATO's position on these issues is clear, as expressed in
unilateral Alliance policy statements and reflected in the NATO-Russia
Founding Act. On nuclear weapons, the NAC Ministerial Communique of
December 10 declared that ``NATO countries have no intention, no plan,
and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members
nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or policy -
- and we do not see any future need to do so.'' In the NATO-Russia
Founding Act, it is recognized that NATO's statement means that it has
no plan and no reason to establish nuclear weapon storage sites on the
territory of new members, whether through the construction of new
nuclear storage facilities or the adaptation of old nuclear storage
facilities. On conventional forces, NATO has said that ``in the current
and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its
collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary
interoperability integration and capability for reinforcement rather
than by additional permanent stationing of combat forces.'' These are
statements of Alliance policy, and not legally binding constraints.''
To the extent that Russian officials raise issues related to NATO
nuclear policy and the future stationing of NATO conventional forces on
the territory of new member states, it is our strong view that Allies
should respond by reiterating established and well-known Alliance
policy.
Question 12. Do Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have any
input into the decisions formulated by NATO prior to meetings of the
Permanent Joint Council?
Answer. NATO has agreed to appropriate arrangements during the
period leading to the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic to involve them in Alliance activities. This is in keeping
with the commitment made by NATO Heads of State and Government at
Madrid. The goal is to keep the invitees as up-to-date as possible on
major Alliance policy issues, including developments in the PJC,
without involving them directly in decision-making prior to their
accession. Between now and December when the accession protocols are
signed, this will involve briefings on the activities of major NATO
committees, and in some cases, participation in meetings as observers.
After the accession protocols are signed, Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic will be allowed to participate in Alliance fora and will
be able to speak and offer their views without taking part in decision-
making. They will also participate in the biannual NATO Ministerials.
They will not be permitted to participate in meetings of the Permanent
Joint Council or in decisions on the conduct of business in the PJC.
The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the supreme decision-making
body of the Alliance. Only NATO members enjoy decision-making authority
within the NAC. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will not have
the same rights to participate in the formulation of Alliance policy
until they accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. Allowing the invitees
to participate in decision-making before they are members of the
Alliance is inconsistent with the Article 9 of the North Atlantic
Treaty and could be seen as a violation of the prerogatives of the U.S.
Senate or Allied legislatures, which must ratify the accession
protocols.
Question 13. What status will Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic have at NATO and at the Permanent Joint Council after the
expected signing of membership protocols in mid-December?
Answer. From the signature of the accession protocols to accession,
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will be involved in Alliance
activities through both briefings and participation in Alliance fora,
including the NAC. They will have the opportunity to speak, but will
not be able to take part in decision-making.
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will not be given the
opportunity to attend:
restricted sessions of the NAC;
meetings when issues related to their accession are
discussed;
meetings when a NATO ally requests a discussion among NATO
Allies only.
With the exception of the Nuclear Planning Group, the invitees will
be present at Ministerial meetings, either during the meetings as
appropriate or in a separate 16+3 session.
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will not participate in PJC
meetings, meetings of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, or in Mediterranean
Cooperation Group meetings, but they will receive briefings on these
meetings.
Question 14. What is the value of discussing NATO nuclear doctrine
at the PJC?
Answer. NATO nuclear doctrine has evolved to reflect the changing
political and security environment in post-Cold War Europe. We have
made this clear to the Russians and other countries in the context of
discussing NATO enlargement. We are prepared to explain this evolution
to Russia so that Russia may gain a better understanding of NATO's
nuclear deterrent and its continued value in today's environment.
The PJC is designed to encourage a two-way discussion on these
issues. We would like to gain greater insight into Russia's nuclear
doctrine, how it has changed over the past few years, and future plans.
The PJC provides a unique opportunity to engage Russia on these very
important matters.
We believe that discussion of NATO nuclear doctrine will enhance
stability in the overall strategic relationship between NATO and
Russia.
Question 15. NATO is reportedly undertaking its own study of the
costs of enlargement. When will that study be completed? Is there a
significant difference between the Clinton Administration and the
Allies on the costs being discussed? Will you accept a Cost estimate
that is different from the one that the Defense Department reported to
Congress in February 1997? How do you respond to the charge of some
British officials that the Administration cost estimate is driven by a
U.S. effort to pressure the allies to meet force goals?
Answer. NATO's work on enlargement costs is scheduled to be largely
completed by the end of November and will be considered by NATO
Ministers at the December Ministerials.
The NATO cost study will estimate costs of enlargement in all three
of NATO's common budgets; the civil budget, the military budget, and
the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP)(infrastructure). While the
NATO study should provide an accurate estimate of common costs, the
study will likely not address other costs, such as the direct, national
costs that will be paid by new and old members to improve their
military capabilities to meet the military requirements of an enlarged
NATO. These direct or national costs were included in the Department of
Defense study. The U.S. study also was based on 4 new members, not just
the 3 that have been invited. In addition, the initial results of work
being conducted by NATO military staff suggest that the military
infrastructure in the three invited States is more readily usable by
NATO than previously anticipated. For all these reasons, the NATO cost
study will develop a different estimate than the earlier U.S. study.
For the reasons stated above, we expect the NATO cost study to
generate a lower estimate than the earlier Department of Defense study.
A lower NATO estimate could be acceptable provided that the military
requirements and capabilities have been correctly defined by the NATO
military authorities, and endorsed by the North Atlantic Council. We
are working closely with the Department of Defense to ensure that NATO
establishes requirements for military capabilities that are
commensurate with our assessment of the security environment and the
forces and capabilities we believe will be needed to defend an enlarged
NATO and effectively conduct other operations.
Our desire for Allies to meet their agreed force goals is a
continuing priority. Obviously, there is cause for concern that
existing shortfalls in established force goals could be exacerbated in
an enlarged NATO if Allies do not continue to take steps to correct
these deficiencies. This could be the case, for example, in the
capability to provide reinforcement. That said, the cost study was
conducted on the basis of assumptions that certain military
capabilities will be required by an enlarged alliance, and not as a
tool for exerting pressure on Allies.
Question 16. What are the potential security risks of discussing
NATO military strategy at the PJC?
Answer. We do not envisage security risks as a result of discussing
nuclear doctrine at the PJC. NATO's nuclear doctrine is decided only by
members of NATO and the decisions are made by the NAC.
The discussion with Russia are designed to lead to a better
understanding on the part of NATO and Russia on the nuclear doctrine of
each. NATO's nuclear doctrine is well known and we do not intend to
delve into any issue that would compromise NATO's security
arrangements.
Question 17. What is the value of discussing NATO military strategy
at the PJC?
Answer. The Founding Act provides for the exchange of information
and consultation between NATO and Russia on strategy, defense policy
and military doctrines. This is consistent with NATO's past approach to
relations with Russia, which included providing explanations on NATO's
general policy on a full range of issues, including the Alliance's
basic military doctrine and defense policy.
Under the Founding Act such consultations will only occur after
NATO has decided its strategy for itself, and only after its members
have all agreed that they wish to hold such discussions with Russia.
They will not extend to a level of detail that could in any way
compromise the effectiveness of NATO's military forces.
This arrangement serves our interest because NATO-Russia
cooperation and consultation is a two way street. For example, we can
use such discussions to raise our concerns about Russia's military
developments and to promote greater transparency between NATO and
Russia.
Question 18. What are the potential security risks of discussing
NATO nuclear doctrine at the PJC?
Answer. We believe that there are few or no potential security
risks associated with explaining NATO military strategy to Russia in
the PJC because these discussions will not involve sensitive
information whose compromise would be damaging. Furthermore, NATO will
enter these discussions only after the Alliance has reached consensus
on its own policies, and on how it will present and address this issue.
Question 19. Do Europeans support the findings of the February 1997
Department of Defense study that projects fifty percent of the direct
costs of NATO enlargement will be carried by Canada and the European
members of NATO (fifteen percent by the United States and thirty-five
percent by the new members)?
Answer. Our European allies have neither formally accepted nor
rejected the Department of Defense notional estimate of enlargement
costs, but during the NATO Summit in Madrid they reaffirmed that the
costs of enlargement will be borne.
NATO itself is now working on an enlargement cost study that is
scheduled to be completed by the end of November and will be considered
by NATO Ministers at the December Ministerial. The NATO study will
estimate costs of enlargement borne by all three of NATO's common
budgets; the civil budget, the military budget, and the NATO Security
Investment Program (NSIP) (infrastructure).
In part, the NATO study will be based on detailed site surveys by
NATO military experts, at the actual facilities that will require
upgrading. This will lead to a more accurate estimate of common costs
than DoD's. The NATO study likely will not address other costs, such as
the direct, national costs that will be paid by new and old members to
improve their military capabilities to meet the military requirements
of an enlarged NATO. In addition, the U.S. study was based on 4 new
members, not just the 3 that have been invited; therefore, the NATO
cost study will develop a different estimate than the earlier U.S.
study.
For the reasons stated above, we expect the NATO cost study to
produce a lower estimate than the earlier Department of Defense study.
A lower NATO estimate could be acceptable provided that the military
requirements and capabilities have been correctly defined by the NATO
military authorities, and endorsed by the North Atlantic Council. We
are working closely with the Department of Defense to ensure that NATO
establishes requirements for military capabilities that are
commensurate with our assessment of the security environment and the
forces and capabilities we believe will be needed to defend an enlarged
NATO and effectively conduct other operations.
In preparing its notional estimate of enlargement costs, the
Department of Defense assumed that NATO would consider common-funding
of enlargement-related requirements in the three invited countries that
fall within these general principles and criteria.
Funding of equipment and personnel costs are examples of
requirements that would very likely not meet the criteria for common-
funding, and would therefore fall under national responsibility for
funding.
The estimated U.S. share of about $1.5-2.0 billion for NATO common
funds is based on the assumption that criteria and cost shares would
remain relatively constant. Therefore, any significant change to either
the criteria for what kinds of programs will be common funded, or the
allocation of cost shares for those common funded programs, would
change the DOD estimated U.S. costs. No such changes are expected.
NATO is currently completing its own enlargement cost study. The
NATO study will be finished by the end of November and will be
considered by NATO Ministers at the December Ministerial. While final
cost estimates have not yet been determined, the .modalities for
arriving at these numbers has been agreed by all NATO nations. The
agreed modalities require that existing criteria will be used to
determine which items will receive common funding, and the respective
cost shares for nations.
Question 20. Secretary Albright, in response to a question you
indicated that the other NATO allies are current in paying for the
obligations of NATO membership. Yet, in a report provided to the
Congress earlier this year, the Administration estimated that the other
NATO allies must pay $8-10 billion from 1997-2009 for regional
reinforcement enhancements. Are non-U.S. allied expenditures' for
regional enhancements obligations that the allies already have agreed
to fulfill, notwithstanding NATO expansion? When did the allies agree
to those obligations? Are the Allies current in meeting those
obligations: Do projections of allied defense expenditures show a
commitment to meeting those obligations: Please provide as specifically
as possible, a breakdown of those obligations. Please identify on a
country-by-country basis a comparison of obligations and actual
capabilities for all NATO members.
Answer. The statement that the other NATO allies are current in
paying for the obligations of NATO membership specifically refers to
payment of the three common budgets; the civil budget, the military
budget, and the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP)
(infrastructure).
As part of the NATO defense review process, nations consider
military requirements identified by the NATO military authorities for
Alliance missions. Nations indicate their willingness to support these
requirements by agreeing to accept as ``force goals,'' the provision of
specified capabilities. Force goals are not NATO common funded, but are
largely nationally funded programs. Once accepted by nations, force
goals serve as a statement of national intent to provide a given
capability.
In 1991, NATO completed a comprehensive review of the changing
European security environment, and published its new Strategic Concept.
A key element of the 1991 Strategic Concept was agreement to rely less
on forward-deployed, pre-positioned troops, and more on reinforcement
capabilities. Many allies accepted force goals to improve their overall
ability to provide reinforcement forces. We knew in 1991 that this was
to be a long-term project, just as the United States expects it to take
a number of years whenever we field completely new capabilities. The
necessity to improve Alliance reinforcement capability will become even
more important with NATO enlargement,
Although we believe that we still have a long way to go, we are
nonetheless encouraged by the considerable progress made by several
allies:
The UK, for example already has the capability to deploy and
sustain a division-size force of 20-25,000 troops in a Gulf
war-style scenario;
France is establishing a Rapid Reaction Force (FAR) designed
for rapid response in both European and overseas contingencies;
Italy is upgrading its ability to project forces to crisis
areas as they recently demonstrated through their leadership
role in Albania; and
Germany is also increasing its capability to deploy forces.
A Crisis Reaction Force (CRF) of 50,000 troops is being formed,
with the first 10,000 troops to be ready by late 1997. Clear
evidence of Germany's commitment to this goal is seen in its
contribution of 2,500 troops in Bosnia.
It is clear that more work needs to be done to improve the
capability of the European forces for mobility, deployability and
sustainability, and senior U.S. officials in Washington and NATO
continue to press them to do so. However, it must be noted that the
Europeans have agreed to these commitments, and that they continue
working toward their fulfillment. We will continue our vigilance in
encouraging further progress.
Question 21. Do you envision a scenario in which NATO should first
seek approval of the United Nations or the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)? Does the United States feel that a
consensus from either the OSCE or the U.N. Security Council -- with
Russia and China as members -- is an appropriate precondition for NATO
missions?
Answer. The North Atlantic Council is the supreme Allied decision-
making body. Neither the United Nations Security Council nor the OSCE
can prevent NATO from taking military action it deems appropriate. The
United States does not believe that a mandate from the U.N. or the OSCE
is or should be required for NATO to undertake military missions.
The North Atlantic Treaty makes several references to the United
Nations Charter and its principles. As signatories to the North
Atlantic Treaty, Allies explicitly reaffirm their faith in its
principles. The Treaty's most important article, Article 5, which
pledges signatories to consider an attack on any party to the Treaty as
an attack on all NATO members, is explicitly built upon the right of
individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter. Similarly, NATO members have agreed to uphold and support
the principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe. NATO's enlargement study makes support for these principles a
prerequisite for NATO membership.
Support for the principles of the U.N. Charter or the OSCE does not
translate however, into a requirement for a mandate from one or both
organizations before NATO can act.
Question 22. Will NATO retain as its central mission the collective
territorial defense of its membership? Will all current and future
members be required to maintain forces to meet this mission?
Answer. NATO remains first and foremost a collective defense
Alliance and in admitting new members, the Alliance will provide those
countries the security guarantee contained in Article V of the
Washington Treaty. In 1991 under the strategic concept adopted by NATO
heads of state and government, it was recognized that the Alliance with
its military capabilities could make a contribution to overall
stability in Europe in the period after the end of the Cold War. These
new missions will not replace NATO's basic collective defense role but
they will complement it and permit NATO to deal with sources of
instability in Europe. In the current security environment, the force
requirements for collective defense are similar to those for new
missions like Bosnia.
Article 3 of the Washington Treaty specifically requires the
Parties to ``...maintain and develop their individual and collective
capacity to resist armed attack.'' Obviously the threat to members of
the Alliance including the potential new members has been significantly
reduced since the end of the Cold War and NATO has said that it no
longer sees Russia as a threat. At the same time, to fulfill its
commitments under Article V the Alliance must plan for and maintain the
capabilities to meet potential new threats to Alliance members.
All current members (with the exception of Iceland which has no
military forces; as well as Spain and France which are not yet
integrated into NATO's military structure) commit forces for the common
defense of the Alliance. 'All Allies have indicated a willingness to
contribute to the common defense under Article V if the requirement
arises.
A condition of eligibility to be invited to join the Alliance
expressly carries with it, a commitment for prospective new members to
agree to all provisions of the Washington Treaty. We will expect the
new members of the Alliance to make their own contribution to NATO's
collective defense capabilities and they have indicated that they will
do so.
Question 23. Has Russia asked to be admitted to NATO?
Answer. No.
Question 24. Under what circumstances would Russia be admitted to
NATO?
Answer. Russia has not expressed an interest in joining NATO, nor
has NATO been contemplating Russian membership, so this is a highly
speculative question.
NATO membership is open to all European democracies who express
interest, meet the requirements for membership and whose inclusion the
Alliance believes will contribute to the overall security of its
members. We believe that there is a value in not preemptively excluding
any European state. And for that position to be credible, it must
include Russia.
Question 25. Why is membership in the European Union not sufficient
in addressing the security concerns of countries in Central and Eastern
Europe?
Answer. NATO and EU membership are not an either/or choice. Both
NATO and the European Union are embarked upon significant processes of
internal and external adaptation aimed at meeting the challenges of the
post Cold War era. Both institutions have unique contributions to make
in developing a new political structure in Europe. But the two
institutions do not serve the same purpose or have the same
capabilities. Through the accession process, the EU will encourage
applicants to demonstrate their commitment to democracy and market
economies and to establish good relations with their neighbors. This
process has already led to more stability and more economic and
political reform. The EU, however, lacks NATO's military capability and
it is only European, not Transatlantic. The U.S. is not a member of the
EU.
We are not in Europe to take care of their security needs; we are
there to defend our own security interests. If there is one thing this
century has taught us, it is that an unstable Europe is as dangerous
for us as it is for them.
It is also in our interests to remain engaged in Europe because our
security interests extend beyond Europe -- to the Middle East, the Gulf
and beyond -- and our NATO allies have been invaluable partners in many
of our efforts in these regions.
While we believe it is important for us to remain involved . in
Europe, we are at the same time building a stronger role for the
Europeans within the Alliance. NATO enlargement is one element of
NATO's adaptation, which includes building a European Security and
Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO. ESDI will enable our European
allies to act alone, without us, using NATO assets.
__________
Responses of Secretary Albright to Questions Asked by Senator Feingold
Question 1. What does the NATO experience in Bosnia tell us about
the expansion of the Alliance? Is Bosnia the new face of NATO? How does
U.S. Policy in the Balkans over the next several months impact on U.S.
Policy towards NATO expansion? How closely are these two issues
related?
Answer. In 1991 under the strategic concept adopted by NATO heads.
of state and government, it was recognized that the Alliance with its
military capabilities could make a contribution to overall stability in
Europe in the period after the end of the Cold War. NATO's force (IFOR
and now SFOR) in Bosnia is such a contribution and is one type of the
future new missions of the Alliance. These new missions will not
replace NATO's basic collective defense role but they will complement
it and permit NATO to deal with sources of instability in Europe. In
the current security environment, the force requirements for collective
defense are similar to those for new missions like Bosnia.
NATO efforts in Bosnia have made a significant contribution to the
implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords and if a similar
contribution could be made in another area of instability, NATO should
consider if it could play a role. IFOR and now SFOR have included the
participation of all NATO member nations, many Partnership for Peace
countries (including the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), Russia
and other non-NATO countries.
NATO remains first and foremost a collective defense Alliance and
in admitting new members, the Alliance will provide those countries the
security guarantee contained in Article V of the Washington Treaty.
Obviously the threat to members of the Alliance including the potential
new members has been significantly reduced since the end of the Cold
War and NATO has said that it no longer sees Russia as a threat. At the
same time, to fulfill its commitments under Article V the Alliance must
plan for and maintain the capabilities to meet potential new threats to
Alliance members. We will expect the new members of the Alliance to
make their own contribution to NATO's collective defense capabilities.
Question 2. Many observers are concerned that the round of NATO
enlargement that is currently being debated will leave Ukraine and the
Baltics exposed to greater Russian pressure. The potential danger of
this could worsen in the coming years, as these countries seek to gain
NATO accession themselves. My colleague in the House, David Obey has
warned that this region could become a ``no-man's land'' between NATO
and Russia that is in danger of becoming a battle-ground in some future
conflict. How do you respond to this analysis? Do you think that
expanding NATO eastward will create an artificial focus of conflict
that might not otherwise be there?
Answer. I would not agree with this analysis. Our purpose in
enlarging NATO is not to create divisions, but to end them. That is why
we insisted upon strong open door language in the Madrid Declaration
whereby the process of enlargement can continue.
At the same time, we have created institutional relationships with
all of these countries through the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace
which manifest the Alliance's interest in maintaining strong relations
with them. With Ukraine, NATO has established a Charter on a
Distinctive Partnership, reflecting the Alliance's view that Ukraine is
of special importance to European security and warrants a special
approach.
We have also stated consistently that NATO enlargement is an
transparent process that does not threaten the security of any country.
We have also stated that no emerging European democracy is excluded by
reasons of geography from membership in the Alliance.
Finally, we have worked within NATO to develop a constructive
relationship with Russia through the Founding Act and the creation of
the NATO-Russia PJC to ensure that Russia plays an appropriate role in
Europe's security structures In the Founding Act, we reaffirmed the
principle that every state has the inherent right to choose the means
to ensure its own security. This principle was also reiterated by
President Clinton and President Yeltsin in Helsinki.
Question 3. In your April testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, you said that if an institution like NATO did not
exist that we would want to create one. ``We would want to build the
strongest possible partnership with those European nations that share
our values and our interests,'' you said.
If NATO did not exist today and we did want to create such an
organization, what would it look like? Which countries would it
include? What do you think Russia's role would be?
Can you envision a time when Russia might be a part of such an
entity? Why or why not?
Answer. NATO has been the most successful Alliance in history. If
NATO did not exist today and we were to create such an organization, I
expect it would look very much like the NATO that will be the result of
our current process of adaptation: A NATO that is larger, stronger, and
able to address the new security situation in Europe and prevent new
conflicts from arising.
The goal of NATO' s adaptation is to create a new NATO, internally
restructured, fully able to carry out its core and traditional
missions, also equipped for new roles and missions, and open to new
members and deeper partnerships with the rest of Europe. Enlargement is
one key element of this adaptation. By admitting new members to NATO,
we extend the zone of stability and security which NATO provides and we
expand the area in Europe where wars are not likely to happen. By
keeping the door open to membership, we foster continued efforts at
integration and cooperation. The door will be open to any European
country which is willing and able to shoulder the responsibilities and
obligations of membership; the open door remains open in concept to
Russia as well, although Russia has not expressed an interest in
joining the Alliance.
Other key elements include enhanced Partnership for Peace and
creation of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which strengthen
NATO's relations with its partners; the NATO-Russia Founding Act and
establishment of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, which begins
a new chapter in the relationship between NATO and Russia; and the
NATO-Ukraine Charter.
Internal adaptation, including the Combined Joint Task Force
concept, building a European Security and Defense Identity within the
Alliance, and restructuring NATO's military commands, will make NATO
stronger and better able to deal with the challenges of the current and
future European security environment.
Question 4. The allies say that their forces will leave Bosnia in
June 1998 if U.S. forces depart. When might the allies be able to
manage operations such as the one in Bosnia by themselves? Do you
believe that the allies are developing sufficient logistics and
communications to share an appropriate part of the burden for future
such operations?
Answer. The NATO-led operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (IFOR and
now SFOR) has been effective because it has involved the participation
of the whole Alliance as well as many non-NATO countries. About 3/4 of
SFOR's personnel come from European Allies or non-NATO partners of the
Alliance. All our NATO Allies and many PfP partners have made
contributions to IFOR and SFOR. Our European Allies have also provided
substantial contributions to other aspects of the peace effort in
Bosnia.
To maintain NATO's capability as a collective defense Alliance
capable of providing a credible security guarantee to its members, it
is important that it maintain its unified command structure and
integrated capabilities. It is for that reason that we have resisted
efforts to develop a totally separate European collective defense
structure. Even in this period of reduced threat, we believe it is
important to maintain NATO as an Alliance predicated on the
participation of every member nation, not made on the basis of
individual countries or groups of countries.
That said the United States has strongly supported the development
of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), within NATO.
Building ESDI within NATO will give the European Allies greater
responsibility and visibility within the Alliance while at the same
time maintaining its strategic unity. In that case, it has been agreed
that European Allies would be able to draw on the common assets of the
Alliance rather than developing costly and new independent ones.
Whether a unified NATO operation or one by Europeans alone drawing on
NATO assets is appropriate for any given mission including Bosnia in
the future should be determined by the actual situation and
capabilities required.
Question 5. As you know, there are three key analyses of the
potential costs of NATO expansion currently circulating: one prepared
by the Administration in a report to Congress, one by the Congressional
Budget Office, and one by the RAND corporation. In response to a
congressional request, the General Accounting Office prepared a report
to compare the findings, and the relevant assumptions of these three
studies. In general, the GAO found that the Administration's
assumptions were reasonable, but noted that it was difficult, if not
impossible, to verify some of the Administration's cost estimates
because there was insufficient supporting documentation. In some cases,
Administration estimates were base on ``expert judgment,'' rather than
on surveys of actual facilities. As a result, GAO warns that the actual
cost of NATO expansion could be substantially higher or lower than the
Administration's estimate of between $27 and $35 billion.
Can you explain a little of the methodology used in arriving at the
Administration cost estimates? Without supporting documentation, how
confident is the Administration about its estimates?
Answer. Since the invited countries had not yet been selected, it
was not possible for any of the three cost studies mentioned here to be
based on thorough site surveys of actual infrastructure and facilities.
The principal difference between the studies lies in the assumptions
upon which the estimates are based. In the case of the Administration's
study, the Department of Defense based its estimate on a
``capabilities-based'' analysis to ascertain the costs of developing
the kinds of military capabilities that the Alliance would need from
both new and current members, in the projected European security
environment. The CBO study, on the other hand, based its estimates on a
renewed imminent and significant Russian threat and a commensurate NATO
response that included prepositioning of material and forward-
stationing of troops in new member countries. Finally, the RAND study
differed from the Department of Defense less in its underlying
assumptions, than in the degree to which certain capabilities would be
upgraded. The RAND study, for example, calls for slightly more
extensive upgrading of air command and control, logistics, and
infrastructure, as well as a more ambitious program of exercises. While
the GAO critique stated that much of DoD's cost estimates were
unverifiable, they also acknowledged that the methodology and
assumptions were reasonable, given the analytic situation confronted,
as well as the fact that none of the candidate countries could be
visited and analyzed directly.
Question 6. The Administration's cost estimates of NATO expansion
also assume that current NATO members would on average maintain
constant, real defense spending levels through the year 2009. Some
analysts argue that this assumption may be unreasonably optimistic,
particularly given the economic requirements associated with entry into
the European Monetary Union.
What assurances, if any, have you received from our European allies
regarding their NATO-related defense spending over the next decade or
so? How do these negotiations affect U.S. policy toward NATO expansion
and/or the assumptions used to estimate the cost of expansion?
Answer. It is an indisputable fact that NATO enlargement will
entail some additional costs to current members. At the NATO Summit in
Madrid, Allies agreed there would be costs; that the costs would be
manageable; and that the resources needed to meet them would be
provided. It is impossible to predict the future with absolute
certainty, and while some analysts may question the willingness of
current NATO members to maintain constant, real defense spending
through the year 2009, we are confident that our allies will meet their
obligations. This is not based on wishful thinking, but on a proven
track record. The fact is that our NATO allies consistently pay
approximately 75% of all NATO common costs, while the U.S. pays about
25%.
Question 7. As part of the rationale for its analysis in the
Administration's report to Congress, the Department of Defense, the
lead agency preparing the report, made several assumptions, including
that NATO would continue to use existing criteria for determining which
items would be funded in common and for allocating costs among members.
Can you elaborate on what this assumption means and how it impacted
DOD's cost analysis?
Answer. One of the basic assumptions of the DoD study was that NATO
will continue to use existing criteria for determining which items
would be funded in common and for allocating costs among members. As
you know, the DOD study explained that there would be three types of
costs estimated to total $27-35 billion over the period 1997-2009:
the ``direct costs of enlargement'' about 60% of which would
include all NATO common funded costs (about $9-12 billion, of
which the U.S. share would be $1.5-2.0 billion);
the cost of military restructuring for new allies ($10-13
billion); and
the cost of improving regional reinforcement capabilities
for current allies ($8-10 billion)
The basic principle for NATO common funding of infrastructure needs
is that they will be based on the security needs of the Alliance, with
particular emphasis on meeting requirements for the provision of common
communications, command and control, information gathering, mobility,
flexibility of employment, reinforcement activities, logistics and re-
supply, training support, exercise facilities, and consultation. To
balance resource limitations against priorities of military necessity,
NATO common funding eligibility is focused on provision of
infrastructure requirements which are over and above those which could
reasonably be expected to be funded from national resources.
Question 8. Please elaborate on how the criteria for membership in
NATO, including respect for human rights, good relations with
neighboring states, and civilian control of the military, are
compatible with United States national interests-in-Eastern Europe.
Answer. While there are no set criteria for membership in NATO,
there are several basic principles, including the ones mentioned, which
underpin democratic societies and which are benchmarks each prospective
member must meet. These principles are not hurdles to NATO membership,
but rather are guarantees that the Alliance will continue to be as
effective and capable in the future as it has been in the past.
Countries which meet these benchmarks have demonstrated that they share
NATO's principles and values. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
have met all of these benchmarks.
By extending the zone of stability and security which NATO provides
to the countries to NATO's east, we further our goal of an undivided,
democratic, and peaceful Europe.
The United States is a European power. Two world wars in this
century have taught us that when Europe and America stand apart, we pay
a terrible price. We know that we cannot take Europe's security for
granted.
By enlarging NATO to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, we
expand the area in Europe where wars are not likely to happen. By
making clear that we will fight, if necessary, to defend our allies, we
make it less likely that our troops will ever be called upon to do so.
We have seen in Bosnia what happens when instability and insecurity in
Europe are allowed to fester. We have an opportunity to make it less
likely that such a conflict will happen again.
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are committed to NATO and
accept its shared responsibility. Their admission will make NATO
stronger and more cohesive, and will decrease the likelihood of
conflicts that could involve our troops or threaten our security. That
is why a stronger NATO is in our interests.
Enhancing security in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will
help consolidate democracy and stability in these countries. We want
them to succeed and we want them to be safe. Enhancing their security
by admitting them to NATO is the surest and most cost effective way to
prevent a major threat to security in the region.
Appendix 2
Hearing of October 9, 1997
NATO Expansion: A Bridge to the Nineteenth Century
Michael Mandelbaum
June 1997
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Executive Summary...............................................420
II. Arguments for Expansion.........................................421
III.National Attitudes Toward Expansion.............................427
IV. The Costs of NATO Expansion.....................................430
V. Conclusion......................................................436
About the Author................................................. 438
I.
Executive Summary
The extension of full membership in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) to three Central European countries,
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, which the Clinton
administration plans to announce at a NATO summit meeting in
Madrid in July 1997, would be, in the words of the
distinguished historian and diplomat George Kennan, ``the most
fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War
era'' \1\. This is so for two related reasons.
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\1\ George F. Kennan, ``A Fateful Error'', The New York Times,
February 5, 1997.
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First, expanding NATO would bring no benefits. None of the
reasons cited in favor of it stands up to scrutiny. It will
promote neither democracy nor stability; nor will it fill a
security vacuum between Germany and Russia or discharge a
Western moral obligation to the Central Europeans. It is also
unnecessary to proceed with expansion in order to avoid a
damaging blow to Western credibility that the failure to
proceed would inflict. Finally, enlarging the alliance is an
unnecessary and ineffective way to contain a potentially
resurgent Russia.
Because there is nothing to be gained from it, NATO
expansion is a bad idea. It is also a dangerous idea, because
there is a great deal to be lost if it goes forward. Expansion
would impose costs on Europe and the United States. Just how
great they would be cannot be known in advance: the future is,
after all, unpredictable. But they might be substantial. This
is the second reason that expansion would be a fateful blunder.
The prospect of expansion has already damaged the West's
relations with Russia. Furthermore, the reality of expansion
would draw a new line of division in Europe, creating a ``grey
zone'' of vulnerable countries between NATO's new eastern
border and Russia. In this geopolitical no-man's land would be
located new democracies whose survival and prosperity are
important to the West but whose security the expansion of NATO
would jeopardize.
There is a final danger to Western interests from NATO
expansion that is little discussed but potentially serious.
Because its costs military and political as well as economic
could be steep, and because expansion would create a number of
difficult problems that the American Congress and the American
people would have to confront, it could undercut public support
for Alliance membership in the one country that is
indispensable to NATO: the United States.
II.
The Arguments for Expansion
NATO expansion, its proponents claim, will consolidate
democracy in the countries that join \2\. And, in fact, such an
outcome is virtually guaranteed: Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic are already democracies. But they will remain
democracies regardless of whether they join the Atlantic
Alliance. Democracy is threatened in none of them. Freedom of
speech, of assembly, of the press and of religion are firmly
established in every one. Each has conducted free, fair
elections regularly since 1989. \3\
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\2\ ``The second reason [for expanding NATO] is to defend Europe's
gains toward democracy, peace, and integration''. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, April 23, 1997, Transcript p. 12.
\3\ The political scientist Samuel Huntington has posited the ``two
turnover test'' for democratic stability, according to which democracy
may be considered firmly established when political power changes hands
peacefully not just once but twice. Counting the surrender of power by
their Communist regimes, all three countries have passed this test.
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When the three Central European countries seek inclusion in
the European Union (EU) an organization considerably more
relevant to their present needs than is NATO they themselves
emphasize, rightly, their impeccable democratic credentials. It
verges, in fact, on an ethnic insult to suggest that they are
incapable of governing themselves in a democratic fashion
without assistance from the West. Finland and Israel, for
example, established solid democracies after World War II under
far less favorable circumstances. The Finns had a long border
with the Soviet Union, against which it had fought in World War
II. The Israelis, who lacked any history of independence, let
alone democracy, had to absorb several times their original
population in refugees from every continent in the world, and
were surrounded by countries sworn to their destruction. It
would be insulting to suggest that Poles, Hungarians, and
Czechs are less capable of democratic politics than Finns and
Israelis. It would also be untrue.
Nevertheless, if democracy were threatened in any of the
three countries, there is no basis in logic or history for the
belief that NATO membership would be an effective way to
reinforce it \4\. While most NATO members have been democracies
for most of the history of the Alliance, the one is not
necessarily the cause of the other. The German Federal Republic
did become democratic after World War II, but the fact that it
was occupied by the Western powers was of greater importance
than its membership in the Atlantic Alliance into which it was
not in any case fully integrated until the mid-1950s, by which
time West German democracy was well established. Furthermore,
Greece, Turkey, and Portugal have all had spells of
undemocratic rule while members of NATO.
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\4\ The international organization in which membership could have
salutary effects on the health of democracy in formerly Communist
Europe is the European Union. See Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace
in Europe, (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1996), p. 50.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, if the assumption that NATO membership is an
effective way to promote democracy is correct, the planned
expansion will admit the wrong countries. In Russia and Ukraine
democracy is shakier than it is in Central Europe, and the
stakes for the West are far higher. But Russia and Ukraine are
not being considered for NATO membership. \5\
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\5\ Publicly the Clinton administration maintains that no country,
including Russia, is ruled out for NATO membership. Privately,
apparently, the message is different. According to Russia's Ambassador
to the United States, Yuli Vorontsov, ``When the decision [to expand
NATO] was originally floated, I came to the State Department and had a
long talk with the then assistant secretary of state, Mr. [Richard C.]
Holbrooke. I said, `have you thought about Russia while you were
putting forward this idea of enlargement of NATO?' And his answer was
very honest. He said, `No, not at all; you have nothing to do with
that.' `Aha,' I said, `that's very interesting, and what about
invitation for Russia to join enlarged NATO?' He said, `Anybody but
Russia; no.' . . . And from all the quarters I received that kind of
answer: `Anyone but Russia; not you.' '' Transcript of Panel II, ``The
Emerging NATO-Russia Charter and Relationship,'' Conference on Russia
and NATO, Washington, D.C., The George Washington University, February
4, 1997.
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The democracy-promotion rationale for expansion, baseless
as it is, has spawned a variant: NATO should expand to Central
Europe because the countries there are already democracies. \6\
In this way, what was originally and essentially a military
alliance would become a club of democratic sovereign states. It
is not at all clear, however, why there needs to be such a
club, or what it would do, or why the already-existing Council
of Europe does not suffice for this purpose. And even if there
were answers, let alone good answers, to these questions, a
final question would remain: why aren't the other democracies
of formerly Communist Europe being admitted to NATO? \7\
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\6\ One feature of internal governance that proponents of expansion
sometimes cite as a criterion for, and sometimes as consequence of,
Alliance membership is civilian control of the military. (``We are
looking [in assessing potential NATO members] to make sure that there
is civilian control over the military . . .'' Secretary of Defense
William Cohen, Senate Armed Services Committee, April 23, 1997,
Transcript p. 38.) Desirable as this undoubtedly is under most
circumstances, civilians do not fully control the military in all
countries that currently belong to NATO. Civilian control has almost
never been part of the political life of modern Turkey. (Nor, given the
present Islamic government in Ankara, would unchallenged civilian
control necessarily have happy consequences for Turkey or for the
West.) Nor, finally, does civilian control of the military necessarily
go hand in hand with democracy. Stalin, after all, exercised effective
control over his military.
\7\ The Clinton administration asserts, without being specific,
that the first wave of expansion will not be the last one. But this
begs the question of why, if the Alliance is to become a club of
democracies, other democracies will have to wait to join.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Along with the promotion of democracy, the reason most
often cited for expanding NATO to Central Europe is that this
will promote ``stability'' there. What this seems to mean is
that NATO membership will prevent outbreaks of Bosnia-style
ethnic conflicts. \8\ As in the case of democracy, stability of
this kind, within the three countries to be admitted, is
guaranteed with NATO membership because it is also guaranteed
without NATO membership. There is no chance of Bosnia-style
eruptions of ethnic strife in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic, which are now among the most ethnically homogeneous
countries in Europe. \9\
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\8\ ``The enemy today is not the former Soviet Union. The enemy
today is instability. The enemy today we can see taking place in
countries like Albania, Bosnia, where you have ethnic rivalries, where
you have religious confrontations . . . All of that instability is
something that we have to face. And if we have countries who have
longed for participation in the kind of democratic ideals that we
share, to make them part of NATO would help stabilize the region and
make peace and prosperity that much more secure''. Cohen, Senate Armed
Services Committee, April 23, 1997, p. 31.
\9\ Janusz Onyskiewicz, formerly Minister of Defense in Poland and
before 1989 a hero of the Solidarity movement, is reported to have
said: ``The fact is that all of our countries have elements like those
that destroyed the former Yugoslavia''. (Strobe Talbott, ``Why NATO
Should Grow,'' The New York Review of Books, August 10, 1995, Reprint
p. 4.) Just what or where these ``elements'' are in Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic neither he nor anyone else has ever specified.
On the other hand, NATO membership is not necessarily the solution
for ethnic conflict where it does exist. Turkey, a long-time NATO
member, is host to a protracted, bloody conflict between the government
and ethnic Kurds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If there were the remotest possibility that any of the
three would become ``another Bosnia'' it is unlikely that the
Clinton administration would be seeking to take responsibility
for them by including them in an American-led alliance. The
American public has displayed no enthusiasm for intervening in
bitter, tangled ethnic conflicts in the formerly Communist
world. And, in fact, the formerly Communist countries that do
have ethnic problems are not being invited to join the Atlantic
Alliance.
The argument that expansion will promote stability, like
the democracy-promotion argument, also has a variant namely
that the mere prospect of NATO membership has already helped to
calm potentially explosive quarrels. Cited as evidence are the
accords signed by the Hungarian government with the governments
of Romania and Slovakia, both of which have ethnic Hungarian
minorities within their borders. \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ ``And just the prospect of NATO membership has, in fact,
helped deal with a long-standing problem between Hungary and Romania.''
Albright, Senate Armed Services Committee, April 23, 1997, p. 62.
The prospect of NATO membership has apparently also, however,
helped to worsen relations between Central European neighbors. See
Christine Spolar, ``Bids to Join NATO Put Czech and Slovak at Odds,''
The Washington, Post, April 13, 1997, p. A26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This assumes that these governments would never have made a
good-faith effort to resolve their differences without the
incentive of NATO membership; such a presumption belies their
status as civilized peoples who are capable of acting
reasonably without being bribed to do so. Moreover, if the lure
of membership in a Western international organization is
necessary to induce good behavior by those Central European
democracies, it stands to reason that the prospect of European
Union membership is at least as potent an incentive as that of
belonging to NATO, if not more so.
Finally, even if the prospect of NATO membership could
have, or even has had, a beneficial effect on the relations
among some of the countries of Central Europe, this does not
mean that expansion serves vital American interests.
However important the stakes in these disputes may be for
the parties directly concerned, they are of far less
consequence for the United States. \11\ Indeed, it is the
United States that would have the chief responsibility for the
security guarantee that is allegedly necessary to settle them.
At issue between Hungary and Slovakia is, among other things,
the right of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia to use the Hungarian
language. Perhaps Bratislava, the Slovak capital, ought to have
Hungarian-language street signs, but this is hardly the
business of the United States or the Atlantic Alliance. America
cannot and should not be held responsible for settling every
ethnic and national dispute everywhere. It is the countries
directly involved that bear that responsibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ The Clinton administration has sought to connect stability in
Central Europe to American interests by invoking the great European
disasters of the twentieth century. The version of history on which
this is based is, to put it charitably, dubious. NATO expansion,
according to Secretary Albright, is designed to prevent ``the
instability within the region which has, in fact, created two world
wars''. (Senate Armed Services Committee, April 23, 1997, p. 85.) This
is wrong on two counts. First, World War I did not begin in the region
that the administration is planning to incorporate into NATO. It began
in southern, not central Europe, in the Balkans--in fact in the city of
Sarajevo where, in June 1914, the heir to the imperial Austrian throne
was assassinated by a Serb nationalist. Second, the cause of the two
world wars was not instability rooted in ethnic conflict. It was
aggression--in both cases by Germany. This is neither an obscure nor a
contentious point. Hitler's responsibility for World War II was clear
from the moment that conflict began. German responsibility for the
first war was the subject of political and historiographical
controversy for decades but that controversy was settled by Fritz
Fischer's two volumes, Germany's Aims in the First World War and The
War of Illusions, both available in English translation. (New York: W.
W. Norton, 1970 and 1975.) In both 1914 and 1939 a world war began
because Germany sought to expand its power and the sphere of its
control in Europe by force. Instability, of the kind that is possible
in formerly Communist Europe (although not in the three countries the
Clinton administration proposes to admit to NATO) was the occasion for
a major war in 1914 but not in either 1908 or 1912-13, when lesser wars
were fought in the Balkans, by the choice of the European great powers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President Clinton won reelection in 1996 with the slogan
``opportunity and responsibility.'' While the government can
help to provide opportunity for American citizens, he said, it
is up to them to take advantage of it. Surely this applies to
Central Europe as well. By winning the Cold War, the United
States and its allies have given the countries of the region
the opportunity to determine their own destinies. It is up to
the Central Europeans to do so in appropriate ways. All the
evidence to date suggests that they have done and will continue
to do just that, whether or not they join NATO.
A third argument advanced for extending NATO membership to
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is that the United
States and the West have a special moral obligation to do so.
This is not true, either.
In its most strident form, this proposition holds that the
United States and Great Britain ``sold out'' the Poles at Yalta
in 1945, deliberately consigning them to the Soviet sphere of
influence when they could have been saved from Communist
tyranny, \12\ and that Washington deliberately invited the
Hungarian people to rise up against Moscow in the fall of 1956
with the promise that the West would come to their aid if they
did, only to break that promise. Both assertions are false. The
conduct of Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill at Yalta is
open to retrospective criticism, as are American-sponsored
radio broadcasts to Hungary at the time of the uprising in
Budapest in 1956. But the United States could not have
dislodged Soviet troops from Poland in 1945 (who arrived there
as part of the war against Hitler, in which the Soviet Union
was an American ally) without another war. Nor was the United
States exclusively, or even mainly, responsible for the
Hungarian uprising, which also could not have been effectively
supported without running the risk of war with the Soviet
Union, a war that in 1956 could have involved the use of
nuclear weapons by both sides.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ ``For all of them [current and former American officials
supporting NATO expansion] there was a moral dimension to the issue.
Abandoned to Stalin's tender mercies at the 1945 Yalta summit, the
captive nations of the Soviet empire had a clear right to be drawn into
and embraced by the security of the West''. Martin Walker, ``East looks
West to escape bear hug,'' Guardian Weekly, February 23, 1997, p. 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even though American leaders were not responsible for the
Cold War fate of Poland and Hungary, the United States did not
simply abandon them to it. On the contrary, Washington led a
forty-year struggle against the Soviet Union, the occupier of
Poland and Hungary, which ended in their liberation in 1989. To
be sure, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia suffered under
Communist rule, but so did others, like the Balts and the
Ukrainians, who are not being offered membership. Suffering
does not, in and of itself, create for the United States a
moral obligation to offer anyone NATO membership. Indeed, if
suffering is the standard, Russia should be a prime candidate
for NATO membership. After all, judged by the criterion of
numbers of citizens killed under Communist rule, no European
people suffered more under Communism than the Russians.
There is a fourth argument advanced in favor of expansion,
and it is one that at least bears on the Alliance's actual
mission: security. In the wake of the Cold War it is argued
that there is a ``vacuum'' in Europe between Germany and
Russia. Ultimately something will fill it. That something ought
to be NATO instead, presumably, of something less benign. \13\
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\13\ ``A security vacuum in Central Europe exists today and could
arouse unnecessary temptation among nationalists and those we suspect
of nostalgia for power blocs and regional dominance''. Vaclav Havel,
``NATO's Quality of Life'', The New York Times, May 13, 1997, p. A25.
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In fact, there is no security vacuum in Europe. Instead,
there is already in place a new unprecedented and highly
desirable system of security, which is described in depth in my
book The Dawn of Peace in Europe. \14\ This ``common security
order'' is made up of the changes in the map of Europe brought
about by the collapse of the Soviet Union; the transformations
in the governments that have occurred in the wake of the end of
Communism; and the changes in the military balance produced by
the series of treaties to reduce nuclear and non-nuclear
weapons in Europe, concluded between 1987 and 1993. This common
security order gives Europe the best of all possible worlds. It
ought to be the purpose of American policy to reinforce it.
Whatever else it may accomplish, NATO expansion fails to do
that.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ See chapters 4-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The arms accords deserve special mention. They are similar
in form to those signed earlier in the Cold War but radically
different in content. Two of their features make Europe a more
secure place than it has ever been in its modern history: the
first is transparency--according to which all signatory
countries can know what arms all others have and what the
others are doing with them; and the second is defense
dominance-- meaning that military forces are configured to make
them useful for defending, but not for seizing territory. \15\
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\15\ See The Dawn of Peace in Europe, Chapters 5-6.
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It is odd that these accords have received so little post-
Cold War attention in the United States, for they reflect well
on both major American political parties. During the last two
decades of the Cold War, Democrats were devoted to arms
control, which they regarded as central to American foreign
policy. Yet now, when more sweeping and important agreements
are in place than even they ever imagined were possible during
the 1970s and 1980s, the Clinton administration has chosen to
downgrade their importance for European security in favor of
NATO expansion.
Republicans placed less emphasis on arms control as a
vehicle for enhancing Western security. They were often
skeptical of, and sometimes explicitly opposed to, the treaties
of the 1970s. But the accords that form the heart of Europe's
new post-Cold War common security order were designed and
concluded by two Republican presidents, Ronald Reagan and
George Bush, with precisely the aim of correcting what they saw
as the flaws of the earlier accords. These later agreements are
considerable diplomatic achievements. If they, and the common
security order to which they are central, endure they will be
seen in retrospect as monuments to far-sighted American foreign
policy. In the best case, they will be for the post-Cold War
era what the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine were for the
Cold War.
NATO has an important place in this new order and it is,
therefore, important that NATO remain in place in its present
form. In its current configuration it is at once an
organization that can build confidence among all the sovereign
states of Europe, a mechanism for assuring the security of
Germany and thereby relieving the Germans of the need to
conduct an independent security policy, and provide insurance
against the resurgence of Russian imperial policy to its West,
in which case the Atlantic Alliance would be needed to counter
the threat. It is not true that a single, formal, overarching
security organization is necessary to ensure peace in Europe.
Such an organization is not possible, nor is it required for
the purpose of preventing the kind of major war that would
directly affect the United States. \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ On the infeasibility of a European police force to cope with
conflicts like the one in Bosnia, see The Dawn of Peace in Europe,
chapter 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If neither democracy, stability, morality nor security is a
good reason to expand NATO, then why proceed with it? The
proponents have an answer: credibility. The process of
expansion, they say, has gone too far to stop because stopping
would have devastating consequences for America's standing and
leadership in the world. \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ ``Since there can be no going back--to abandon long-standing
promises because of a Russian tantrum would bust the alliance . . .''
``NATO goes a-wooing'', The Economist, January 25, 1997, p. 15. In
fact, going forward with expansion is more likely to ``bust the
alliance'' than stopping it. (See below, Section IV). For that reason,
a decision to stop would be greeted by current NATO members with a
collective sigh of relief.
The Clinton administration's political strategy for securing the
two-thirds vote in the Senate necessary to expand NATO is apparently to
issue invitations to the prospective new members in July, then assert
that, no matter how high the costs involved, the failure to approve
expansion would have dreadful, earth-shattering results.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the other arguments in favor of expansion are hollow,
this one is merely outdated. It made sense during the Cold War,
when the United States and its allies confronted a hostile,
militant, heavily armed adversary around the world. Communism
was a global movement, whose branches were connected through
its world headquarters in Moscow. From this feature of Cold War
international politics arose the fear that a Western defeat,
retreat, or show of irresolution in one place would invite
pressure, even aggression, elsewhere. Such was the logic behind
the American decision in June 1950 to fight in Korea, a place
of no intrinsic importance to the United States but where a
defeat could, American policymakers feared, have adverse
effects in places that were important. It was the reason for
standing firm in West Berlin, which, because it was located
inside East Germany, could not be successfully defended against
a determined Communist assault. It was also the reason for
fighting in Vietnam and for the decision of the Nixon
administration, upon inheriting responsibility for the war in
1969, to continue rather than abandon it even though the
American public had turned against it and the chances of
prevailing were slight. \18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ In the words of Henry Kissinger, in an article originally
published in January, 1969, just before he joined the Nixon
administration: ``Unquestionably, the failure to analyze adequately the
geopolitical importance of Vietnam [in 1961 and 1962] contributed to
the current dilemma. But the commitment of five hundred thousand
Americans has settled the issue of the importance of Vietnam. For what
is involved now is confidence in American promises. However fashionable
it is to ridicule the terms `credibility' or `prestige,' they are not
empty phrases; other nations can gear their actions to ours only if
they can count on our steadiness''. ``The Vietnam Negotiations'',
reprinted in Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, New York: W. W.
Norton, 1969, p. 112.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether the failure to stand firm in these past episodes
would have triggered the adverse consequences American
officials feared cannot, of course, be known. But their fears
were not groundless; the dangerous consequences were at least
conceivable. In the wake of the Cold War, however, such
consequences are not conceivable. The circumstances that made
Cold War fears plausible have disappeared. Communism in Europe
is gone; the Soviet Union has disintegrated; the armed forces
that made them both dangerous are in a state of collapse. If
NATO does not expand to Central Europe, this will not bring the
Soviet army into West Berlin: Berlin is no longer divided and
the Soviet army no longer exists. The end of the Cold War means
that the world is safe for the United States to reconsider ill-
advised foreign policies and correct them.
There is a final purpose that expanding NATO to Central
Europe is supposed to serve: containing a resurgent Russia
that, some day, will again threaten its neighbors to the West.
This pro-expansion argument differs from the others in two
important ways: it is both coherent and logical, and it is at
least plausible.
The source of its plausibility is Russian history. Russia
has recurrently threatened, and often occupied, its neighbors
to the west. In truth, it is the fear that this pattern will
one day be repeated, amid doubts about the sturdiness of
Russia's own commitments to democracy, that lies behind the
Central Europeans' desire to join the Atlantic Alliance. \19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ ``At a recent Budapest seminar, a small group of conservative
foreign-policy experts discussed tactics for winning U.S. Senate
ratification of a revised NATO treaty. `Why can't we tell the truth?
That we need membership because we're afraid of Russia?' someone in the
audience asked. The evening's speaker, a visiting American professor,
delicately suggested that Hungary would do better `emphasizing the
positive.' '' Carla Anne Robbins, ``Hungary's NATO Bid Illustrates the
Hopes, Risks in Central Europe'', The Wall Street Journal, January 2,
1997, p. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The possibility that circumstances will arise under which
it might be sensible to expand NATO eastward cannot be ruled
out. But such circumstances lie far in the future. Russia does
not now threaten its western neighbors. The war in Chechnya,
awful as it was, bears eloquent testimony to the utter
incompetence of the Russian military, which would be hard-
pressed to invade its western neighbors successfully when it
has proven incapable, in Chechnya, of successfully invading
itself. \20\ Nor is there any chance that Russia could regain
the social cohesion, economic productivity and military power
necessary to mount such a challenge for years, perhaps even for
decades. If Russia should embark on a course of overturning the
post- Cold War settlement, as Hitler did to the post-World War
I settlement, the West would have considerable advance warning
and, thus, ample time to prepare a response.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ On this point see Anatol Lieven, ``Russia's Military Nadir'',
The National Interest, Summer, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The anti-Russian case for the immediate expansion of NATO
rests on three propositions, all of which are without
substance. The first is that Russia is bound to resume an
imperial foreign policy to the west. \21\ But Russia is not
bound to do anything. Aggression is not programmed into Russian
genes. The Russian nation can change its historical patterns of
behavior. Other nations have done so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ ``Russia is already getting back on its feet geopolitically,
even before it gets back on its feet economically. The only potential
great-power security problem in Central Europe is the lengthening
shadow of Russian strength, and NATO still has the job of
counterbalancing it. Russia is a force of nature; all this is
inevitable''. Peter Rodman, ``4 More for NATO'', The Washington Post,
December 13, 1994, p. A27. ``Russia, with its resources and educated
population, will rise again and--if history is guide--will threaten
again . . . '' William Safire, ``Clinton's Good Deed'', The New York
Times, May 7, 1997, p. A35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second proposition is that the West must respond to
what will ultimately be a threat from Russia now because when
the threat materializes the West will be cowed into passivity.
The precedent for such Western behavior is, of course, the
dismal response of the democracies to Hitler between the two
world wars. But American foreign policy throughout the Cold War
teaches precisely the opposite lesson. The United States did
respond--some would say over- responded--to real or perceived
challenges from the Soviet Union. \22\ Not only is Russia not
predestined to threaten its neighbors, but the West is not
predestined to flinch if this does happen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ On this point see The Dawn of Peace in Europe, pp. 165-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The third proposition is that NATO expansion will decrease
the likelihood of a revival of Russian imperial behavior toward
its western neighbors and strengthen democracy at home. \23\
This view is vehemently and virtually unanimously contested,
however, by those who have the greatest stake in Russian
democracy and in peaceful Russian relations with the rest of
the world: Russian democrats themselves. They oppose NATO
expansion precisely because they believe it will give aid and
comfort to the worst elements in Russian public life, the
forces of nationalism, chauvinism, and imperialism. \24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, ``We should not be shy in
saying that NATO expansion will help a democratic Russia and hurt an
imperialistic Russia.'' Quoted in George Melloan, ``Russia's Neighbors
Worry About `Yalta II,' '' The Wall Street Journal, February 24, 1997,
p. A23.
\24\ It is not only Russians with impeccable democratic credentials
who say this. According to General Alexander Lebed, briefly President
Yeltsin's national security advisor and considered a leading candidate
for the Russian presidency in the future, writing in the newspaper
Izvestia in March, 1997, ``If the sense of loss and humiliation that
comes with defeat is allowed to fester in the Russian mentality, it may
lead to an inferiority complex that can only be overcome by gaining new
victories, preferably over old rivals. That is also a big mistake.
Unfortunately, the political and military expansion of NATO to the East
makes it probable that both of these mistakes will be committed''.
Translation distributed by the LA Times Syndicate, March 17, 1997.
Nor is such an analysis confined to Russians. Professor Richard
Pipes of Harvard, perhaps the most distinguished historian of the
Russian revolution and, on the basis both of his scholarship and
service in the Reagan administration, hardly someone who is unaware of
or insensitive to historical Russian patterns of imperialism, has
written: ``First and foremost among Western initiatives likely to
provoke a violent reaction and to intensify chauvinism is the proposed
expansion of NATO to Eastern Europe. This action, intended to enhance
the sense of security of the Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs, will
produce the contrary effect among the Russians''. Pipes, ``Russian
Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective'', Harvard International
Review, XIX:1, Winter, 1996-7, p. 57.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even assuming, however, that the pro-containment arguments
were valid, the particular expansion that is being planned is
ill-conceived, for it does not extend membership far enough to
the east. Even if it is inevitable that Russia will pose a
threat to its neighbors, it will not threaten the countries
slated for NATO membership. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic are no longer Russia's neighbors. None has a real
border with Russia. The countries that do share borders with
Russia and thus would be threatened--Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, and Ukraine--are not being invited to join the
Alliance. In this sense the Clinton administration's policy on
NATO expansion is perfectly nonsensical: those who--under the
only set of assumptions under which expansion makes sense--need
NATO won't get it; and those who get it don't need it.
III.
National Attitudes Toward Expansion
If the expansion of NATO to Central Europe is a bad idea,
if there is so little to be said for it--indeed if, as is
argued here, there is nothing to be said for it why was it
proposed in the first place? Why has it attracted the support
it now enjoys?
Even in the countries of Central Europe that are scheduled
to join, support is uneven at best. In the Czech Republic, for
example, a December 1996 poll revealed that ``only 38% of
Czechs are in favor of their country joining NATO . . . . Some
35% were opposed, while 27% were undecided''. \25\ Popular
support is more substantial in Poland, but Poland is a special
case. For one thing it was occupied by Russia not for 50, but
for 200 years. For another, it has more pressing security
concerns than the other two because of its border with
Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave on the Baltic. While these
concerns are legitimate, they are not urgent--though they
should be addressed. \26\ But formal NATO membership is not the
optimal way to do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Open Media Research Institute Daily Digest, December 5, 1996.
\26\ See the suggestions in section V, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is the political elites in Central Europe who wish to
join NATO, for reasons that are rooted in their histories.
Theirs are small, weak, vulnerable countries, located between
two more powerful and often predatory European nations: Germany
and Russia. The lesson they draw from history is that Europe
may once again be divided between or among rival powers, in
which case they will be forced to be part of a bloc dominated
by those more powerful than they. In those circumstances, they
understandably wish to have chosen their affiliation rather
than having had it imposed on them, as it was after World War
II and so often before. \27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Some of them give reasons that bear little resemblance to the
Alliance's original and essential purpose. For example, Czech President
Vaclav Havel has said in an interview that ``NATO will have to
transform itself significantly as it expands `so it can deal with
completely different tasks than it dealt with in the Cold War,'
including combating the movement of crime and drugs into member states,
regional conflicts such as Bosnia, and terrorism''. Jim Hoagland, ``At
Center Stage for Havel: NATO'', The Washington Post, May 9, 1996, p.
A23. If NATO is an effective force for restricting the flow of
narcotics (something for which there is no evidence) then the leading
candidates for NATO membership from the American point of view ought to
be Colombia and Mexico.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By declaring that NATO must and will expand, and through
the emphasis on the further integration of the EU under the
terms of the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, the West has
mischievously, if unintentionally, reinforced the idea of a
``membership'' or ``fortress'' Europe. These initiatives have
helped to propagate the image of a Europe in which each country
is either fully European--that is a full member of the two main
organizations, NATO and the EU, and therefore inside the
fortress and safe--or not a full member, not a full-fledged
European, and thus outside the fortress and vulnerable. The
Central Europeans' anxieties are compounded by the fact that,
for both good and bad reasons, they are not being offered
immediate membership in the European Union. NATO membership has
thus become a kind of consolation prize.
But history is not destined to repeat itself. Europe is not
destined to be polarized again between rival camps or blocs.
\28\ This picture of Europe was valid during the Cold War. It
is not valid now. It would be absurd, for example, to maintain
that Finland, Sweden and Switzerland, none of them full members
of both the EU and NATO, are somehow not European. It is also
dangerous to define Europe in this way. For it is desirable
that Russia be as fully a part of Europe as is possible. But
Russia cannot now be a full member of the two Western
international organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ If this should occur, it will not, given Russia's present
weakness, occur quickly. There will be considerable advance warning,
and thus ample opportunity to ensure that Central Europe remains part
of the West.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The main impetus for expansion comes from the executive
branch of the American government. And if the rationales for
the American push for expansion are hollow, the origins of that
policy are mysterious. \29\ At the end of 1993, it was American
policy to bring Russia into the international community and to
assist the Russians in their historic transition from a
centrally- planned to a market economy. The Clinton
administration had introduced an ingenious and constructive
innovation in European security, the Partnership for Peace,
which made possible military cooperation between NATO and non-
members of the Alliance without alienating or excluding any of
them, including Russia. Suddenly, without warning, on a trip to
Central Europe at the beginning of 1994, President Clinton
announced that the question was no longer whether, but rather
when, NATO would expand to Central Europe. Why did he do so?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ The Administration's decision to expand NATO was made ``in
characteristic Clinton administration style, without a structured
evaluation of competing viewpoints, without political debate, and over
the initial objections of senior military officers''. R.W. Apple Jr.,
``Road to Approval is Rocky, And the Gamble is Perilous'', The New York
Times, May 15, 1997, p. A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One journalistic reconstruction of this decision imputes it
in no small part to considerations of domestic politics. The
president, according to this account, was concerned about being
vulnerable, in his anticipated reelection campaign in 1996, to
the charge that he had done too little for the countries of
Central Europe, a charge that would resonate with American
voters of Central European ancestry, many clustered in
electorally important states. NATO expansion was driven,
according to this account, by ethnic politics in the United
States. \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ See the three articles on NATO expansion in The Washington
Post, July 5, 6, and 7, 1995. For another perspective on the origins of
the Clinton administration's policy on this issue see Tyler Marshall,
``NATO's Eastern Growth a Giant Step or Stumble?'', Los Angeles Times,
April 13, 1997, p. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ethnic politics in the United States are neither avoidable
nor necessarily undesirable. It is a good, not a bad thing for
the United States to have close relations with Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic, which are, after all, friendly,
democratic, and decidedly pro-American countries. But there is
no reason that these relations should take the form of official
membership in NATO, and there are very good reasons, to be
discussed below, \31\ that this should not be the case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ See section IV below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Western Europeans, the defense of whom was, after all,
the founding rationale for NATO, are decidedly unenthusiastic
about expanding the organization eastward. Germany is a partial
exception, and an important one. The Germans have officially
declared their support for expansion; at the same time, they
have emphatically stressed the need to conciliate Russia. The
German government has been torn: it has felt that, on the one
hand, it would be wrong for Germany to oppose what Poland
favors because of Germany's brutal treatment of the Poles
during World War II. On the other hand, it is convinced that
good relations between Russia and the West are essential for
European, and especially German, security.
In addition, the Germans and the other Western Europeans
have been cajoled into going along with expansion by the
contention of American officials that this is necessary for
what really matters to them: sustaining the commitment of the
United States to Europe. The abiding European fear is that the
United States will go home. They are right that this would be
bad for them as well, ultimately, as for the United States. But
they are wrong if they believe that expanding NATO to Central
Europe will strengthen American security ties to Europe.
Unfortunately, it is likely to have exactly the opposite
effect. \32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ See section IV below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One European country does, of course, have strong and
entirely unambivalent feelings about NATO expansion. The entire
Russian political class, representing all points of the
political spectrum, opposes it. Still, it is important to
distinguish among different bases for opposition. While Russian
Communists and Russian nationalists are publicly opposed,
privately they are not entirely displeased at the prospect
because NATO expansion gives them an issue on which they can
hope to mobilize public support for themselves. The Russian
public is, on this issue, generally uninterested and
uninformed; it is far more concerned with domestic matters.
Although it is not yet intense, however, opposition to NATO
expansion is widespread in the Russian public. A January 1997
poll found that 50 percent of respondents opposed the admission
of former Soviet republics into NATO and 41 percent said former
Warsaw Pact members should not join. The proportion of
respondents supporting the idea of admitting former Soviet
republics to the Atlantic Alliance was 13 percent; in the case
of former Warsaw Pact members it was 15 percent. \33\ In
Russia, as in other countries, it is the political elites who
define the desirable foreign policies and then seek to mobilize
support for them. The poll findings confirm what observers of
Russia have warned: that NATO expansion is an issue that has
the potential to arouse popular feelings of danger and
vulnerability and discredit those who argue in favor of cordial
relations with and integration into the West. \34\ Expansion
is, in addition, a step toward redividing Europe, which
Communists and nationalists tend to favor. For these reasons,
of course, Russia's democrats are deeply opposed to expansion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Open Media Research Institute Daily Digest, January 21, 1997.
\34\ ``Paranoia in Russia feeds on itself, seeking and finding
confirmation in everything that happens--emphatically including the
recent Western decision to expand NATO up to the very borders of the
former Soviet Union. . . I know no Russian, regardless of political
orientation, who favors it. To the contrary, NATO's projected expansion
plays directly into the hands of the nationalists who exploit fears of
the West to argue that Russia must reconstruct the empire and rebuild
the military in order to hold its own in an unfriendly world''. Richard
Pipes, ``Russia's Past, Russia's Future'', Commentary, June, 1996, p.
35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indeed, these democrats feel betrayed by the plan to expand
NATO. They believe that it reneges on the terms on which
Germany was unified and the Cold War ended. At the time of
unification, they believe, Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard
Shevardnadze, the leaders of the Soviet Union, were promised,
by officials of the United States and the German Federal
Republic, that if a united Germany were included in NATO the
alliance would not expand further eastward. There is now a
debate about whether there was such a pledge, the form the
pledge took if there was one, and whether it was meant to apply
only to the territory of the former German Democratic Republic
during the transition period when Soviet troops were still
stationed there. The Russians believe it was intended to cover
all of Europe east of Germany indefinitely. \35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ On this debate, which is far from settled, see The Dawn of
Peace in Europe, pp. 62-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to high level accounts, the West conveyed
assurances of some kind. \36\ Embracing the narrowest
interpretation of what these assurances were puts the United
States in the position of saying to the Russians that they have
no standing to complain that the United States has gone back on
its word because what they received were only spoken words.
Russia is, in effect, out of luck because it didn't get
Washington's promises in writing. This is not the basis on
which American foreign policy has traditionally been conducted,
nor is it a good basis for conducting it in the future, toward
Russia or any other country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Testimony to Congress, Ambassador Jack F. Matlock, Jr., May 3,
1995, page 1 and 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whatever the precise details of the assurances the West
conveyed to Moscow in 1990, NATO expansion would violate the
spirit in which the Cold War was ended. That spirit of
cooperation and friendship can be seen in retrospect to have
been based on three principles that were, until 1994, broadly
understood and faithfully observed if not officially codified.
The first of them was transparency, which means that no secret
agreements or private deals are permitted in matters of
security. The second was the principle of consensus, according
to which every country must consent to any major change in the
architecture of European security. The third principle was
inclusion, which implies that Russia will be welcomed into the
Western and international community.
NATO expansion, as contemplated, would violate the third of
these principles by excluding Russia. It would violate the
first because the Clinton administration has steadfastly
refused to say what other countries will be admitted, when, or
by what criteria they will be selected. And it would violate
the second because expansion is being undertaken against the
wishes and over the objections of Russia. NATO expansion would
in fact be the first major change in the security architecture
of Europe since the deployment of Western intermediate-range
missiles in 1983 to be undertaken against Russian wishes. All
the other changes were made with the consent first of the
Soviet Union and then, after 1991, of Russia. The common
security order that emerged from these changes is
extraordinarily favorable to the West, in general, and to the
United States, in particular. This new order was made in
America--the terms of the arms treaties were largely drawn up
in Washington--with the exception of those parts so favorable
to Western interests, Ukrainian independence above all, that
they were never even thought possible. Russia accepted all of
these changes, which gives them legitimacy in Russian eyes,
legitimacy that is, in turn, a priceless asset for the West.
And to the extent that Russia considers these new security
arrangements legitimate, the West does not have to enforce
them. \37\ NATO expansion would discard this asset, and the
West would get nothing in return. This is a considerable cost
of expanding NATO, but it is not the only one.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ The reverse is also, of course, true. According to former Bush
administration official Robert Zoellick, a supporter of NATO expansion,
``This is one of those times in history where the world's leading
nation has to determine the rules for the future''. (Marshall, ``NATO's
Eastern Growth . . .'', p. 1.) If the Russians do not accept these
rules, however, and there is no evidence that they will be reconciled
to an expanded NATO, especially one including former Soviet republics,
the ``world's leading nation,'' the United States, will have to enforce
them. This will not necessarily be cheap.
IV.
The Costs of NATO Expansion
In its relations with Russia the West is already paying a
price for NATO expansion. The relationship with Russia that the
United States enjoyed from 1990 to 1994 is gone. Perhaps the
high point of that relationship came in 1994 when President
Clinton was able pick up the telephone, call his friend the
President of Russia, ask that Russia remove its remaining
troops from the three Baltic countries, and have Boris Yeltsin
comply. The withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states
had, to be sure, a number of causes, but not the least of them
was the context in which it took place: a particular
relationship between Russia and the West, one based on common
interests and goals, one that presumed cooperation between
them.
In the wake of the announcement of the intention to expand
NATO, and in no small part because of that announcement, the
fundamental presumption of Russian foreign policy has been
reversed. It has now become a matter of principle for Russia
not to cooperate with the West, to demonstrate that it is not
subservient to the United States, that it cannot be pushed
around, and that it remains a forceful and independent presence
on the world stage. NATO expansion has helped to dislodge a
Russian foreign policy of cooperation with the West and replace
it with a foreign policy of pique. Resentment of the United
States was, for example, one motive for the meeting between
Yeltsin and Chinese leader Jiang Zemin in April 1997, at which
the two leaders pointedly declared their opposition to what
they termed American aspirations for global hegemony. The
resentment that has resulted from the plan to expand NATO has
reduced Russian willingness to cooperate with the United States
in the ongoing American efforts to isolate and deter Iraq and
Iran. To be sure, Russia, like Western Europe, has economic
reasons for friendlier relations with both than the United
States deems appropriate. But NATO expansion has weakened the
counterbalancing motive to side with Washington.
The most serious damage to relations with Russia inflicted
by the prospect of NATO expansion is on the issue that affects
the United States the most directly: the control and reduction
of Russia's nuclear weapons. There are thousands of them, many
aimed at North America. \38\ The principal treaty designed to
reduce them, START II, must be ratified in the Russian
parliament, the Duma. But the Duma has refused to do so because
of the prospect of NATO expansion. Thus Americans will pay for
NATO expansion by forfeiting the opportunity to reduce the
threat to themselves. And, because the arguments in favor of
expanding NATO are hollow, they will pay this price for no
benefit to themselves.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ At the Paris signing ``what was intended as a strictly
ceremonial occasion . . . took an uncertain turn. The ensuing confusion
showed vividly how the West's relationship with Russia can still be a
frustrating and uncertain affair . . . As if to demonstrate [Yeltsin's]
goodwill, he then made an impromptu announcement that . . . [Russia
would make] a unilateral pledge to remove the nuclear warheads from
Russian missiles aimed at NATO nations. . . A Yeltsin spokesman said
his boss was not promising to remove the missiles' nuclear explosives,
only to `deprogram' them so they are not targeted on NATO nations. This
is a symbolic gesture, since missiles can be reprogrammed within
minutes; Russia has already reached deprogramming agreements with the
United States, France and Britain''. John F. Harris, ``Russia-NATO Pact
Gives Moscow a Voice on European Security'', The Washington Post, May
15, 1997, p. A30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Clinton administration claims that it has a strategy
for minimizing the damage NATO expansion inflicts on the
American relationship with Russia: the negotiation of a charter
governing relations between NATO and Russia. This ``Founding
Act'', signed on May 27 in Paris, however, is all too likely to
lend itself to differing interpretations, then disappointment,
then acrimony. This was, after all, the fate of the Soviet-
American ``declarations of principle'' signed by Richard Nixon
and Leonid Brezhnev during the period of detente in the early
1970s. Disagreement about the status of this charter surfaced
even before it was concluded. At their meeting in Helsinki,
Finland, in March 1997, Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton were
each asked what role, under the terms of the charter, Russia
would have in NATO's affairs. They gave incompatible answers:
Yeltsin said that decisions about European security would be
reached by ``consensus''--implying that Russia would have a
veto over them. Clinton denied this. Russia would have, he
said, ``a voice not a veto'', which is, of course, precisely
what Russia would have without a charter. \39\ Ironically,
Russia has already effectively exercised a veto over NATO's
policy on expansion: the fear of an angry Russian reaction is
the only reason that the Baltic states, whose claims to NATO
membership are far stronger than those of the Central
Europeans, are not being invited to join the Alliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ This potentially explosive dispute continued when agreement on
the terms of the ``founding act'' was announced. In an address to the
Russian public, Boris Yeltsin said: ``Just as this document says,
decisions are to be made only by consensus...If Russia is against any
decision, this decision does not go through. I believe this is
critically important''. Unnamed Clinton administration officials,
however, ``brushed aside this assertion, saying it applies only to
decisions by the new NATO-Russia council, which will deal with such
matters as joint peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention and
combating terrorism. They said the alliance has reserved the right to
continue making its own decisions through the North Atlantic Council,
its principal political organ, and other bodies on which Russia will
have no seat. A senior White House official said the alliance will not
`in any way be subordinated' to the NATO-Russia council''. David
Hoffman, ``NATO, Russia Agree on New Ties'', The Washington Post, May
15, 1997, p. A30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nor will Russians regard the charter as the product of a
genuine negotiation with NATO, for the simple reason that it
was not. The Clinton administration has insisted that it will
expand NATO regardless of Russia's wishes, and that some issues
will be off limits to negotiation even if Russia seeks to
include them. Russians will, therefore, be correct in
concluding that the charter is as much the result of American
dictation as of Russian-American negotiation.
Furthermore, what the administration has advertised as the
likely contents of the new arrangements between NATO and Russia
are not strategically sensible. The American government has
said that NATO ``has no plans'' to station any of its troops or
its nuclear weapons on the territories of the new Central
European members. But including the Central Europeans in the
Alliance makes sense only if they are threatened by Russia. And
if they are threatened, it is foolish, indeed dangerous, not to
take the military measures necessary to deter a Russian attack
on them. In this way--but not in this way alone--NATO expansion
as planned is either unnecessary or irresponsible.
While the principle of consensus is fundamental to the
post-Cold War settlement in Europe, Western policy toward
Europe cannot be based on the requirement for Russian consent
under any and all circumstances. It was desirable, and
necessary, to adopt policies to which Russians objected during
the Cold War, and it might some day be necessary to do so once
again. But Russian objections, Russian unhappiness, and the
lack of Russian cooperation on issues of importance--the direct
and unavoidable consequences of NATO expansion--are a cost to
the United States. It is foolish to pay such a cost without
getting a compensating benefit in return. Yet this is precisely
what will happen if the Alliance expands as planned. NATO
expansion thus offers the United States the worst of both
worlds: provocation without compensation.
The second great and unnecessary cost of expansion, as the
Clinton administration envisions it, is the creation of a grey
area, a no man's land--where none now exists--between what
would be the new eastern border of NATO and Russia. Creating
such a grey zone would increase the vulnerability and potential
instability of the countries within it, new democracies that
are important to the United States and the West for both
strategic and moral reasons: the three Baltic countries and
Ukraine. Expansion, as planned, would draw a new line of
division in Europe. Even proponents of expansion concede this
when they argue that NATO should be expanded because the
current dividing line, marked by NATO's current borders, is
obsolete and unacceptable. \40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ ``If we do not enlarge NATO we will be validating the dividing
line Stalin imposed''. Albright, Senate Armed Services Committee, April
23, 1997, p. 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Why moving the line of division in Europe further to the
east is an improvement on the status quo is never explained by
the Clinton administration. In fact, however, NATO expansion
would not move a European line of division; it would create
one. For the western border of the Atlantic Alliance does not
now constitute a dividing line. During the Cold War there was
such a line, which divided those Europeans who were free from
those who were not. But now the Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs
are free, and there is no external threat to their freedom.
Moreover, the present NATO is accepted as a legitimate and
permanent part of Europe by all parties, including Russia. With
the Partnership for Peace, the Alliance has transformed itself
into an organization with which every country in Europe can be
affiliated. It is a vehicle for promoting confidence throughout
Europe, while at the same time retaining the capacity to deter
or fight a war if necessary. \41\ NATO expansion would, thus,
recreate further to the east the line of division that existed
during the Cold War but that has now disappeared.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ See The Dawn of Peace in Europe, p. 101.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Clinton administration suggests that this would not be
the case: `` . . . the enlargement of NATO is a dynamic
process'' according to Secretary Albright. ``We are beginning
it this summer, but it is something that will go on.'' \42\
However, the administration has conspicuously, indeed
energetically, avoided making any specific commitments about
further expansion. \43\ The Baltic states, nonetheless, believe
that they have received exactly such a commitment. After
meeting with Secretary of State Albright in April 1997,
Vytautas Landsbergis, the chairman of the Parliament of
Lithuania, according to a press report ``said Lithuania has
received an `open-ended' invitation to enter NATO. The question
is not `if' but `when,' he was told.'' \44\ This is the formula
that President Clinton used when he announced his decision to
expand NATO in the first place, at the outset of 1994. The
Ukrainian government has not formally requested NATO
membership, but is seeking the functional equivalent: a
separate agreement with the Alliance spelling the details of a
special NATO relationship with Ukraine.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Albright, Senate Armed Services Committee, April 23, 1997,
p.36. Elsewhere: `` . . . when we say that the first new members will
not be the last, we mean it''. Madeleine Albright, ``Why Bigger is
Better'', The Economist, February 15, 1997, p. 21.
\43\ The following exchange took place at a hearing of the Senate
Armed Services Committee:
Sen. [Jeff] Bingaman [D-New Mexico]: ``Let me ask about the
Baltics. You mentioned a Baltic action plan. If the Baltic countries
want to be part of NATO, as they obviously do, is--should we proceed to
admit them?''
Sec. Albright: ``Again, we are not going to name names at this
stage. We have said that NATO is open to membership to democracies that
fulfill the number of these criteria that both Secretary Cohen and I
have mentioned''. (April 23, 1997, p. 59)
\44\ Nora Boustany, ``Chretien Finds the Hill Isn't Laughing'', The
Washington Post, April 11, 1997, p. A31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The question of Baltic membership poses enormous problems
for which there are no obvious solutions. Bringing the Balts
into NATO would impose large, indeed probably prohibitive,
costs on the Alliance, which its current members might well
refuse to pay. The Russians have made it clear that while they
may accept, grudgingly, the addition of three Central European
countries to the Western military alliance, they would respond
sharply if NATO were extended all the way to their borders, as
would be the case if the Balts joined. \45\ This would pose a
challenge to the Russian military, whose principal duty is,
after all, to defend the country. It is not likely to be
persuaded by NATO's protestations of peaceful intent that it
need do nothing in response. How it would respond is uncertain;
but it is unlikely to do nothing at all.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ ``Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov told reporters on
a trip to Denmark that the Baltic states' entry into NATO would be
`unacceptable' to Russia and would `undermine our relations with NATO
entirely''. David J. Kramer, ``Who isn't invited to the NATO party?'',
The Washington Times, March 19, 1997, p. A21. The tiny Russian enclave
of Kaliningrad, on the Baltic, does abut Poland. It is heavily
militarized, but could not serve as a staging area for a full-scale
invasion of Poland.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because the Western Europeans know this full well,
attempting to incorporate the Baltic states into NATO would
prompt a major, perhaps even terminal, crisis within the
Alliance, with the Europeans unwilling to run the risks Baltic
membership would raise. \46\ Nor would the American military be
willing to certify, as it apparently is prepared to do for the
three Central European countries, that it could assume
responsibility for the security of the Baltic states--as their
inclusion in NATO would require--without stationing American
troops or nuclear weapons there and while accepting steadily
declining defense budgets. That, in turn, means that the cost
of including the three Baltic states could not, in contrast to
the Administration's claims about the cost of the expansion, be
modest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ They say this privately. See James M. Klurfeld, ``Needed: More
Voices Against Bigger NATO'', Newsday, May 5, 1997, p. A31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indeed, the administration is able to arrive at a modest
estimate of the financial cost of expansion by assuming that
only three new members will join NATO over the ten to fifteen-
year period of its forecast. \47\ Having apparently privately
assured the Balts that they would be admitted, on the one hand,
the administration bases its estimates of the cost of expansion
on the assumption that these same Balts will not be admitted
for at least ten, and perhaps fifteen, years after the initial
planned expansion, which is set to take place in 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ On this issue, as on others involving the Baltic states, the
administration's official position has been vague and evasive. A
typical example is an exchange at a press briefing on the
administration's estimate of the cost of expansion:
Question: ``I'm just curious. In coming up with this study--I know
you're not prepared to say what nations might be--you don't know the
answer to that. Did you assume three nations, or does it matter?''
Answer: ``We assumed a small group. We're not prepared to give the
exact number. It's a reasonable projection of those that might enter''.
U.S. Department of State, ``Special Press Briefing on the Enlargement
of NATO: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications'', February 24,
1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If extending membership to the Balts would be dangerous and
expensive, excluding them violates the promise they say they
have received from the Clinton administration, which is the
same promise to the Central Europeans that the administration
asserts it must fulfill to protect America's international
credibility. Furthermore, excluding the Balts would make a
mockery of the idea of expansion. For the Baltic claim to
membership is not simply as strong as that of the Central
Europeans, it is stronger. Unlike Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic, the Balts do have borders with Russia. Unlike
the three countries the Clinton administration has chosen for
NATO membership, the Balts would be directly and immediately
threatened by a resurgence of Russian imperial behavior to the
west. It is the Baltic states, along with Ukraine, that have
the most to lose from NATO expansion. Because of their size and
their location, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania can be secure in
one of two ways: they can be part of a military alliance that
protects them; or they can be part of a Europe in which they do
not need such protection. NATO expansion, as planned, risks
giving them the worst of both worlds: denying them the second
without giving them the first. Thus, in excluding the Baltic
states, the planned expansion of NATO is either unnecessary or
irresponsible.
Proponents of the planned expansion sometimes argue that
enlargement will enhance the security of the excluded countries
because at least they will have NATO members in their
neighborhoods and will be able to draw strength from their
proximity. \48\ There appears, at first glance, to be a Cold
War precedent for this. The European neutrals Austria, Finland,
Switzerland, Sweden and Yugoslavia although not part of NATO,
derived a measure of protection from the existence of the
Alliance. \49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ ``And we expect the new members to export stability eastward,
rather than viewing enlargement as a race to escape westward at the
expense of their neighbors''. Albright, ``Why bigger is better'', p.
22-3.
\49\ See Michael Mandelbaum, The Fate of Nations: The Search for
National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 202-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Upon closer scrutiny, however, the precedent proves to be
irrelevant to the status of the countries in the ``grey zone''
that the proposed NATO expansion would create. The Cold War
neutrals were small, strategically insignificant countries; in
contrast Ukraine is large and important. The neutrals were
strategically unimportant because they were not situated on the
main axis of confrontation--and the principal invasion routes--
between east and west. Ukraine is. The neutrals drew benefit
from NATO, as well, because American forces were stationed in
the NATO countries on their borders. But the Administration has
promised that this will not be the case for the prospective new
NATO members of Central Europe. The European neutrals
complemented the Cold War protection that they received from
NATO with robust military forces of their own. To follow their
example, the Baltic states and Ukraine would have to spend far
more on defense than they currently plan to do. Finally, the
Baltic states and Ukraine are vulnerable to Russia in a way
that the neutrals never were because they have large ethnic
Russian minorities within their borders.
The status of Russians in the Baltic states and Ukraine is
a potentially explosive matter. In the worst case, these
minority communities could be mobilized against their own
governments, creating pressure within Russia to come to their
aid. Although there are tensions between Russians and Balts in
the Baltic states, fortunately nothing like this has occurred
thus far. But the expansion of NATO, by triggering Russian
resentment at the West and seeming to establish new spheres of
influence in Europe, is hardly likely to promote communal
harmony in the grey-zone countries. While there is no chance of
Bosnia-style ethnic conflict in Poland, Hungary, or the Czech
Republic, there is a chance of exactly such conflict in the
excluded countries. At the very least, NATO expansion will not
make such a prospect more remote than it is today.
There is a third potential cost to NATO expansion: the
erosion of the American commitment not just to an expanded NATO
but to an ongoing American role in European security of any
kind. Both Western and Central Europeans assume that because
expansion is an American-driven project the United States will
see it through to completion, paying the political and economic
costs involved no matter how steep. This is a shaky assumption.
Estimates of the economic costs of expansion vary widely,
not to say wildly. The Administration claims that they will
amount to between $27 and $35 billion over 13 years. The
Congressional Budget Office, by contrast, puts the figure as
high as $125 billion, almost five times the administration's
estimate. \50\ Both estimates, furthermore, are based on a
premise that the administration has elsewhere suggested is not
true: that only three new members will be admitted over the ten
to fifteen year period in question.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ William Drozdiak, ``NATO Expansion `on the Cheap' May Have
Surcharge'', The Washington Post, March 12, 1997, pp. A1, A22. ``
`There was a strong political imperative to low-ball the
[administration's] figures,' said a senior U.S. official. `Everybody
realized the main priority was to keep costs down to reassure Congress,
as well as the Russians.'' ' Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The administration's modest estimate of the American share
of the total, moreover, is based on another questionable
assumption: that the costs of expansion--upgrading the armed
forces and military facilities of the new members--will be
evenly spread among all NATO members, old and new. But the
Central Europeans themselves are unable to spend more on
defense. They are fiscally strapped by budget deficits, partly
the result of social welfare obligations they inherited from
the Communist period. The democratic governments of these
countries can neither afford economically to fulfill these
obligations in full nor take the political risk of repudiating
or trimming them. \51\ Central Europe's defense budgets have
declined steadily since 1989. \52\ Nor are the parliaments of
the Western European members of NATO likely to contribute much,
if anything, to the costs of NATO expansion. Most are
indifferent, at best, to expansion; and they, too, find
themselves under pressure to reduce spending, in order to
qualify for inclusion in the European Monetary Union that is
scheduled to be launched in 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ On this issue see the essays in Ethan Kapstein and Michael
Mandelbaum editors, The Social Safety Net in Post-Communist Europe, New
York: The Council on Foreign Relations, 1997.
\52\ In Poland, for example, ``the armed forces' strength has been
cut from around 430,000 men to 230,000 over the last seven years.
Military budgets have been cut and morale among officers facing the
sack is understandably low. General Tadeusz Wilecki, the military chief
of staff who won the support of President Lech Walesa in his efforts to
limit the cuts, was sacked . . . '' Christopher Bobinski, ``Nato
membership will ensure future security'', Financial Times, March 26,
1997, p.III. Polling in the region shows that ``when confronted with a
possible trade-off, most central and east Europeans oppose increasing
the percentage of their national budget spent on the military at the
expense of social services. Two in ten or fewer in most surveyed
countries say they support an increase in military spending over
education or health care''. The New European Security Architecture
Volume II: Public Attitudes Toward European Security, Washington, D.C.,
Office of Research and Media Reaction, United States Information
Agency, September, 1996, p.27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
That leaves the United States to foot the bill for
expansion. \53\ But how likely is it that Members of Congress,
at a time when they may confront the prospect of reducing
Social Security and Medicare benefits for their constituents
who can express their displeasure in the voting booth, would
authorize funds from American taxpayers to upgrade the Czech
air force? It is not a foregone conclusion that they would.
\54\ At the very least, therefore, expansion would trigger a
transatlantic row over the familiar Cold War issue of burden-
sharing. Americans would ask why they should bear what they
would consider an unfair share of the cost of defending Europe,
which in any case is no longer threatened, when wealthy
Europeans could contribute more. The resulting recriminations
would weaken the basic consensus underlying the American
commitment to Europe.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ `` `If you are serious about providing equal security, the
basic defense needs of the new members will raise the enlargement bill
to $70 billion,' said Walther Stuetzle, a former senior defense planner
for the German government. `So who will pick up the tab? I think it
will have to be the United States.' '' Drozdiak, ``NATO Expansion `on
the Cheap' . . .'', p. A22.
\54\ ``So there's no threat, and yet you're asking for increased
spending in NATO. I do not see the staying power of this country behind
that decision. I do not think America wants to foot that bill''.
Senator John Warner, Senate Armed Services Committee, April 23, 1997,
p.42. Moreover, the United States will be hard-pressed to pay for the
defense program for which the Defense Department is already planning
all apart from the cost of NATO expansion. Already personnel is being
reduced to pay for equipment. See, for example, Bradley Graham,
``Pentagon Outlines Cost-Saving Moves'', The Washington Post, May 7,
1997, p. A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, the one that
commits each signatory to come to the aid of any other
signatory that is under attack, would also be called into
question. Americans are unlikely to be willing to commit
themselves to siding with Hungary in a conflict with Romania.
\55\ But that is what Hungarian membership in NATO, by a
literal reading of the Treaty, would mean for the United
States. If, however, in the process of expanding NATO, Article
V should be diluted, reinterpreted, or abandoned for the new
members in order to accommodate these reservations, this would
call into question the American commitment to the existing
members, and perhaps ultimately the entire Alliance itself.
\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ On this point see David Fromkin, ``Hidden Danger in a New
NATO'', The New York Times, December 18, 1996, p. A27.
\56\ Even if these countries do receive an Article V commitment, it
is far from certain that this would mean all that it did during the
Cold War. See Edward Luttwak, ``Add Poland and NATO is No More'', Los
Angeles Times, April 16, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet another feature of the present Alliance is likely to
prove controversial if expansion proceeds as planned: the
stipulation that all members must approve the addition of any
new one. Turkey has already suggested that it will not approve
the admission of the Central European countries to NATO unless
it is, in turn, accepted as a full member of the European
Union. \57\ Turkey will not get full EU membership and the
Turks presumably know this. Thus they may have been signaling
that, if excluded from the EU but called upon to approve NATO
expansion, they will want some compensation. But if the Turks
are compensated, it is unlikely that all other members of the
Alliance will resist the temptation to demand similar
treatment. If so, expansion will entail an additional cost, one
not accounted for in the administration's estimates. Who will
pay it?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ Robert Graham, ``Turkey seeks support in drive for EU
admission'', Financial Times, January 30, 1997, p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beyond these specific considerations, NATO expansion would
weaken American support for NATO because it would divide the
foreign policy community and the wider public in the United
States. If the proposal for expansion reaches the Senate, a
divisive debate will ensue. Supporters of expansion will argue
that rejection of the plan would cripple the Alliance. In fact,
it is expansion itself that poses the greater danger to NATO.
Pressing forward with it would call the Atlantic Alliance
itself into question. There is no significant opposition to the
American commitment to the existing NATO, \58\ but there will
be, indeed there already is, serious opposition to NATO
expansion. And if expansion should take place, this would risk
a backlash in the United States against NATO itself because it
would extend the nation's most important international
commitment, which is meant to endure indefinitely, on false
pretenses. Americans are being told that expansion will bring
them important benefits. It will not. They are being led to
believe that the project will be virtually cost-free. It will
not be. And they are being reassured that expansion will not
alienate Russia. But it will; indeed it already has \59\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ On public attitudes toward NATO expansion see ``Public
Indifferent About NATO Expansion'', Washington, D.C.: The Pew Research
Center for the People and the Press, January 24, 1997, and Steven Kull,
``Americans on Expanding NATO: A Study of US Public Attitudes,
Washington, D.C.: Program on International Policy Attitudes'', February
13, 1997.
\59\ National polls show that most Americans know and care little
about the issue of NATO expansion. When pressed, a majority of
respondents favors including the countries of Central Europe; but
virtually the same proportion of the public favors including Russia as
well. ``The biggest doubt about NATO expansion was that it might
exclude Russia''. Kull, p. 24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When the American public decides that an international
commitment has been extended under false pretenses, or that
such a commitment is more expensive than its government has
promised, or that whatever the government has promised the cost
of the commitment is too high, it tends to withdraw its
support, which causes the commitment in question to collapse.
In the 1970s Americans turned, gradually, against the war in
Vietnam, and the United States left Vietnam. In the 1980s they
turned sharply against the deployment of American marines in
Beirut, and the United States left Beirut. In the 1990s the
American public turned just as sharply against the mission in
Somalia, and the United States left Somalia. To be sure,
Vietnam, Beirut, and Somalia are not Europe, where the American
commitment is of much longer standing and is far more
important. But that is the point. The consequences of
withdrawing from Vietnam, Beirut, and Somalia were manageable.
A withdrawal from Europe would be a far more consequential
matter. NATO expansion risks setting in motion a sequence of
events that will culminate in the rejection by the United
States of a central role in European security and runs this
risk for no benefit whatsoever.
V.
Conclusion
If expanding NATO to Central Europe is foolish and
dangerous, what is the alternative? What should the Alliance
and the United States do instead? The best alternative is to do
nothing. NATO as it now exists, particularly with the addition
of the Partnership for Peace, is a useful part of the post-Cold
War common security order and is politically sustainable in the
United States.
If NATO decided not to proceed with expansion the effects
would be negligible. The Central Europeans would no doubt be
disappointed, but they would be no less secure because they are
not currently threatened. They would be no less democratic or
internally stable because democracy and stability do not depend
on NATO membership. The Clinton administration might well be
embarrassed, having so publicly committed itself to expansion.
But avoiding personal embarrassment to a small group of public
officials hardly justifies pursuing a course that threatens
real harm to the national interests of the United States.
It might be politically more palatable, and would certainly
be strategically useful, to make abandoning the plan for
expanding NATO part of a package of measures: further
reductions in nuclear and non-nuclear armaments, the
demilitarization of Kaliningrad, and assurances concerning the
continued independence of Belarus. These are desirable in their
own right and, unlike NATO expansion, would actually contribute
to making Europe a more secure place.
One alternative to expanding NATO to Central Europe
deserves special comment: the inclusion of all European
countries to the east in the Alliance, including Russia. This
course is less desirable than doing nothing. It would transform
the Alliance. With Russia as a member, NATO would no longer be
NATO. Still, no less an authority than the current American
Secretary of State has declared that NATO has already been
transformed. The Russians ``need to understand'', she has said,
``that this is not the old NATO'' \60\. While including Russia
in the Atlantic Alliance would bring enormous changes and pose
substantial problems it would however, offer at least four
advantages. First, it would better serve American interests
than what the Clinton administration is proposing to do.
Second, it would be consistent with one of the principles on
which the post-Cold War settlement is based: inclusion. Third,
including Russia in NATO has the potential to increase Western
and American leverage over the one issue that matters most for
their security: Russian nuclear weapons. Fourth and finally, if
NATO does expand to Central Europe, the Alliance would then
face a series of unhappy options: retreat to its original form;
stop after the initial expansion; expand up to Russia's
borders; or expand to include Russia. In that case, the fourth
of these choices might come to seem, with all its attendant
drawbacks, the least worst of them. \61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ Albright, Senate Armed Services Committee, April 23, 1997, p.
80.
\61\ Madeleine Albright has spelled out the criteria for choosing
new NATO members as follows: `` . . . if we were creating a new
alliance today . . . we would not leave a democratic country out in the
cold because it was once, against the will of its people, part of the
Warsaw Pact. The only question we would consider is this: Which
democratic nations in Europe are important to our security, and which
are willing and able to contribute to our security?'' (Senate Armed
Services Committee, April 23, 1997, p. 11) By these standards it is
Russia, whose citizens were certainly not consulted about joining the
Warsaw Pact and whose officials have several times expressed the wish
to belong to the Atlantic Alliance (see, for example, Boris Berezovsky,
``Integrate Russia, Don't Isolate It'', Los Angeles Times, March 19,
1997) that is by far the leading candidate for NATO membership. It is a
curious feature of the Clinton administration's case for expanding the
Alliance that, insofar as its arguments--about democracy, stability,
and security--have any validity at all, they do not apply to Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the countries the administration is
planning to admit, but do apply to the one country it seems determined
to keep out: Russia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If NATO does expand to Central Europe, what will be the
consequences? In the best case, the damage to Western and
American interests would be minimal. Russia would grumble, but
do nothing more serious. The NATO-Russian charter would not
become an additional source of friction. Rather, it would be
ignored and then forgotten because none of the contentious
issues it was intended to regulate would arise. The Russians,
and the other Europeans, would turn their attention to other
matters. Somehow a way would be found to cope with the problem
of the ``grey zone'' between NATO and Russia that expansion
would have created. The arms control accords negotiated between
1987 and 1993 would remain in place and would ultimately be
extended, with weapons of all kinds further reduced. That is to
say, in the best case, the expansion of NATO would have no
effect at all. Or, to put it differently, the best outcome of
the expansion of NATO would be precisely the same as the
outcome of a decision not to expand NATO.
In the worst case, by contrast, NATO expansion would touch
off a spiral of acrimony and mistrust that would return Europe
to conditions not unlike the armed division of the Cold War
era. It would restore the conditions that made the
international relations of Europe tense, if not precarious, for
four decades, conditions that were abolished by the ending of
the Cold War and that the Clinton administration, perhaps under
the mistaken assumption that they still exist, says NATO
expansion is designed to overcome.
To be sure, the line of division on the continent would be
drawn further to the east than it was during the Cold War. And
Russia would not for many years, if ever, be able to prosecute
the conflict with the West on the same scale as the Soviet
Union did. This, however, is not necessarily an unmixed
blessing: with the collapse of most of its armed forces, Russia
is likely to rely ever more heavily on the one part of its
military establishment that remains in decent working order--
its nuclear arsenal. \62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ ``Security Council Secretary Ivan Rybkin said in an interview
with Rossiiskaya gazeta on 11 February that Russia should reserve the
right to use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional weapons
attack, particularly in view of the current weakness of Russia's armed
forces''. Open Media Research Institute Daily Digest, February 12,
1997. See also David Hoffman, ``Yeltsin Approves Doctrine of Nuclear
First Use if Attacked'', The Washington Post, May 10, 1997, p. A21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Perhaps the likeliest result of NATO expansion falls
between the best possible outcome the continuation of the
unprecedented tranquillity that Europe now enjoys without it
and the worst case, the return of some of the most dangerous
features of the Cold War. This intermediate outcome would be
marked by the restoration of a tradition of European
international relations that predates the Cold War, a tradition
featuring great power rivalry, shifting alliances, and
continuing concern with an unregulated military balance. In
this third case, the future would turn out to be a version of a
more distant and now dimly remembered past. NATO expansion
would fulfill one 1996 campaign promise that Bill Clinton did
not make. It would be a bridge to the nineteenth century.
About the Author
Michael Mandelbaum is the Christian A. Herter Professor of
American Foreign Policy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University. He is
also Director of the Project on East-West Relations at the
Council on Foreign Relations and a regular foreign affairs
columnist for Newsday. He is the author or co-author of
numerous articles and essays and seven books, most recently The
Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund,
1996.)
Appendix 3
Hearing of October 22, 1997
October 16, 1997
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Members, Committee on Foreign Relations
THROUGH:
James W. Nance and Edwin K. Hall
FROM:
Steve Biegun, Beth Wilson, and Mike Haltzel
SUBJECT:
Hearing on the Qualifications of Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Re-
public for NATO Membership
On Wednesday, October 22, 1997 at 2:00 p.m., the Committee on
Foreign Relations will hold a hearing on the Qualifications of Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic for NATO Membership.
Senator Smith will preside.
Overview
The Foreign Relations Committee has scheduled a series of six
hearings this fall to examine all elements of NATO enlargement. (One or
two additional hearings will be scheduled early next year after the
treaty is formally transmitted to the Senate). This is the third
hearing in the series. Previous hearings have examined the strategic
rationale and the pros and cons of NATO enlargement. Later in the
month, the Committee will examine the costs, benefits, and
burdensharing of NATO enlargement; the relationship between NATO and
Russia; and public views.
This memo, prepared with the assistance of the Congressional
Research Service, provides an overview of the qualifications of the
three candidate countries.
Background
The three countries that have been invited to seek membership in
NATO do not constitute a single or unified region. They are, rather, a
collection of states that have each demonstrated an advanced level of
democratic and economic development and western orientation since 1989,
the year when the Berlin Wall fell, the Soviet East bloc disintegrated,
and the totalitarian communist political systems in these states were
overthrown.
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic share the legacy of
Europe's wars and the Cold War. During the volatile inter-war period in
Europe, these three newly-independent and relatively small states
struggled to survive between the competing great power interests of
Germany and Soviet Russia. The new state of Czechoslovakia's success in
becoming a democratic and advanced industrial country did not prevent
it from dismemberment at the hands of Germany, with western
acquiescence, in 1938. Poland, partitioned since the 18th century, was
ruled by a military regime from 1926 to 1939. Before World War II,
Germany and the Soviet Union agreed to carve up Poland; Germany's
invasion into Poland in 1939 officially launched the Second World War.
After World War I, Hungary lost most of its former territory and was
ruled by a regency under Admiral Miklos Horthy. Hungary first allied
itself with Nazi Germany and fell under occupation in 1944 after it
tried to switch sides in the war. In 1945, Soviet, not western, forces
liberated eastern Europe from German occupation. Postwar settlements
involved large shifts or restoration of borders and population
resettlements. Soviet-style leaderships quickly assumed power and
imposed totalitarian systems in each country. Within the Soviet-led
bloc, each country's practice of and experience with communism varied
to a certain extent, but none exercised full independence or
sovereignty from Moscow. The three countries' militaries were
integrated into the Soviet-led Warsaw Treaty Organization.
Since the end of the Cold War, the former communist countries of
east central Europe have sought to join the process of west European
economic and political integration and to share the security guarantees
of the western military alliance. The former Warsaw Pact countries
first gained institutional access to NATO in late 1991 through the
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), a forum that included all
former Warsaw Pact members. At the January 1994 NATO summit, the
alliance launched Partnership for Peace (PFP), a U.S. initiative
designed to develop concrete aspects of political and military
cooperation. Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic were early
signatories to the PFP framework agreement. All have actively
participated in PFP military exercises. All have also contributed
troops and other forms of assistance to NATO peacekeeping operations in
Bosnia. At the January 1994 summit, NATO also endorsed the principle of
enlargement. NATO approved a study on the implications, or the ``how
and why,'' of enlargement, on September 20, 1995. Going into the July
8-9, 1997 summit meeting in Madrid, the United States expressed support
for the candidacies of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, while
several other NATO members preferred the inclusion of Romania and
Slovenia as well.
At the NATO summit in Madrid on July 8-9, 1997, Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic were invited to open accession negotiations with
NATO. NATO members pledged to keep an ``open door'' to other
prospective countries. Individual negotiations on accession with each
country began in September and are expected to be completed in October.
The focus of the talks is on the Treaty obligations associated with
joining the alliance. NATO ministers intend to sign a Protocol to the
North Atlantic Treaty on enlargement at its ministerial meeting in
December 1997. The Protocol must be approved by all alliance members.
NATO wishes to formally admit the new members in April 1999, the date
of the 50th anniversary of NATO's founding.
Of the three prospective members, only Poland brings a large
military establishment. However, the Hungarian and Czech armed forces
are equal or greater in size than those of several current NATO members
(e.g., Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal). In accordance with
NATO consultations, they have put interoperability of air traffic
control and air defense as the first modernization priority. This would
enable NATO to extend its formidable air power capabilities over their
countries, and would facilitate rapid reenforcement in the event of a
crisis. Each country has made significant progress in adopting the NATO
unit structure. In addition, ground force units deployed in accordance
with the former Warsaw Pact's offensive doctrine are being re-located
to reflect NATO's defensive posture.
Each country has demonstrated the ability to meld battalion-sized
or smaller units into NATO operations through participation in
operations in Bosnia, training exercises under Partnership for Peace,
or, in the case of the Czech Republic, participation in the U.S.
coalition during the Persian Gulf War. This remains, however, only the
first step toward the level of integration that would be required for
any full-scale combat operations.
None of the countries is expected to begin ``big ticket''
modernization programs before 2000. They are expected to look toward
Western manufacturers, and to seek extensive co-production agreements
to lower costs and increase public support for larger defense
expenditures. Russia, however, may be competitive in some areas,
particularly when upgrading existing equipment is a more attractive
option than new purchases. Nevertheless, NATO membership is expected to
heavily favor strong defense procurement ties to current members.
Poland
Democracy/Governance
Poland's democratic political institutions have operated smoothly
since 1989. Poland has held numerous free and fair elections for
different levels of government. The judiciary is independent. In 1997,
Poland adopted a new constitution after it was approved in a popular
referendum. It replaces the ``little constitution'' adopted in 1992.
Poland has ratified numerous international conventions on human rights
and is a member of the Council of Europe.
Poland's last parliamentary elections were held on September 21,
1997. The opposition Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS), a bloc of over
thirty largely conservative groups, came in first place with about 34%
of the vote. The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), a coalition partner in
the outgoing reformed communist government, came in second with about
27%. A likely coalition partner for AWS is the pro-reform Freedom Union
(UW - also a post-Solidarity party), which won about 13% of the vote.
The share of the vote (about 7%) for the former coalition partner
Peasants' Party was much reduced from its showing in the 1993
elections. Political parties had to reach a five percent threshold in
order to enter parliament. Other parties that passed this threshold
include the rightist Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland, and the
leftist Union of Labor. Election analyses have suggested that the
Polish electorate was motivated by various social, ideological, and
``value'' issues over strictly economic or political policies. The new
parliament, comprised of the 460-seat lower house, the Sejm, and the
100-seat upper house, the Senate, is to convene on October 20.
Aleksander Kwasniewski of the Democratic Left Alliance remains
President of Poland. Kwasniewski defeated incumbent President Lech
Walesa in the second round of direct presidential elections in October-
November 1995. The President must nominate the Prime Minister.
Observers anticipate that Kwasniewski's cohabitation with a Solidarity
Electoral Action-led government might be contentious, given the AWS'
ideologically rigid anti-communist stance.
Economy
Poland was the first centrally planned economy to launch drastic
economic reforms in 1990. Early reforms focussed on price and trade
liberalization, small-scale privatization, currency convertibility, and
structural reforms. As a result, Poland was the first country to emerge
from economic decline and has experienced GDP growth since 1993, with
growth rates exceeding 5% from 1994 through 1996. The basic tenets of
economic reform have been sustained through numerous changes of
government. Private sector activity, especially new enterprises, grew
rapidly and currently accounts for about two-thirds of GDP and two-
thirds of employment. Privatization of large-scale industries has
remained slow. About one-quarter of Poland's labor force works in
agriculture. However, the agricultural sector's share of GDP has
declined steadily since 1989. Growth in industry, especially
manufacturing, has fueled the country's economic recovery.
Military Capabilities
U.S. officials have judged Poland to have the most capable armed
forces in Eastern Europe. Relatively large (Army-- 152,000; Air Force--
56,000; Navy--14,000), well-trained and disciplined, the major
challenge facing them is improving interoperability with NATO and
quality of their military equipment. Unit structure reorganization and
redeployment from Warsaw Pact dispositions are progressing smoothly.
Polish officers and non-commissioned officers are participating in NATO
and U.S. military and English language training programs. Polish
participation in the U.N. Multinational Force in Haiti, NATO's Bosnia
operations, and in over 50 Partnership for Peace exercises has
demonstrated the ability to carry out at least battalion-sized
operations in conjunction with NATO forces. It should be noted,
however, that these have been peacekeeping operations involving no
combat, and do not reflect the demands of a large- unit high-intensity
conflict.
Equipment modernization is the largest challenge facing the Polish
military. As a result of NATO requirements, the early focus has been on
upgrading air traffic control and air defense communications.
Additional large-scale procurement programs are not expected to begin
prior to 2000, though negotiations are underway with Western firms
concerning fighter aircraft purchases. Priority areas for modernization
are:
Ground attack aircraft
Fighter aircraft
Attack helicopters
Main battle tank (T-72 upgrade)
Armored fighting vehicles
Poland's defense budget in 1996 was $3.1 billion, approximately 2.4% of
GDP, which is comparable to most other NATO countries. Military
spending declined steadily through 1995, and increased slightly in
1996. The Polish government has endorsed a principle of increasing
defense spending by 3% per year above GDP growth. The Ministry of
Defense estimates that defense spending after 2000 may reach 2.7% to
3.0% of GDP.
Hungary
Democracy/Governance
Hungary is a stable parliamentary democracy. Hungary adopted a new
constitution in December 1990, and is currently working on a revision
of the constitution. Hungary has held two free and fair elections to
the national parliament. It has stable governmental institutions and an
independent judiciary. Hungary is a member of the Council of Europe and
has ratified numerous international conventions on human rights.
Hungary's last parliamentary elections were held in April 1994, and
the next elections are scheduled to be held in Spring 1998, presumably
in April. Prime Minister Gyula Horn leads a center-left coalition
government comprised of the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Alliance
of Free Democrats. The coalition commands a two-thirds majority in the
386-seat, unicameral legislature. Horn's Socialist Party is not
expected to undergo major changes before the next elections, although
the party has not yet selected its next Prime Minister-designate.
Despite periodic crises in the coalition, Free Democrat leaders predict
that the party will remain part of the government until the next
elections. Other parties vying for better positions in the next
elections include the centrist Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian
Civic Party and the populist Independent Smallholders' Party.
A foreign policy priority for Hungary has been relations with
neighboring countries that have large ethnic Hungarian minorities. Both
NATO and the European Union (EU) emphasized that regional disputes must
be resolved prior to entry into either institution. In 1996, Hungary
ratified basic treaties with Slovakia and Romania that included
provisions on ethnic minority rights and the inviolability of
frontiers.
Of the three countries, Hungary is the only one that will hold a
binding referendum on NATO membership. On October 7, 1997, the
Hungarian parliament approved a set of government-endorsed questions on
NATO membership and on land ownership. The joint referendum is
scheduled to be held on November 16, 1997.
Economy
Hungary's approach to economic transformation from a command
economy built upon its longstanding experience with gradual reforms
under communism. After 1989, Hungary adopted price and trade
liberalization and institutional and legal changes. Hungarian
industries attracted the highest levels of foreign investment in the
region. Hungary has a heavy foreign debt burden but has been
consistently able to meet its debt service obligations. In early 1995,
the Horn government embarked on an extensive economic stabilization
program designed to redress Hungary's budget and current account
deficits. The austerity program, while hugely unpopular, did much to
reverse the imbalances and restore international confidence in the
Hungarian economy. Hungary's economy experienced modest growth in 1994
and 1995, but declined to 1% growth in 1996, largely as a result of the
austerity program. Overall, the private sector produces approximately
75% of GDP in Hungary.
Military Capabilities
Never large, the Hungarian armed forces now total about 60,000
personnel (Army--45,000; Air Force--15,000). Unit restructuring in
accordance with NATO brigade/corps organization is well underway. The
officers and NCOs of a designated ``NATO Brigade'' are undergoing
military and English-language training sponsored by current NATO
members. Hungary currently has a battalion (550+ personnel)
participating in NATO's Bosnia operation and hosts a major NATO
logistics facility in southern Hungary in support of those operations.
To facilitate the U.S. presence, Hungary has brought into force a
bilateral supplement to the NATO PFP Status of Forces Agreement,
granting additional privileges and immunities to U.S. forces and
contractors. Hungarian armed forces have participated in over 50
Partnership for Peace exercises with NATO.
Very austere defense budgets have led Hungary to continue procuring
some military equipment from Russia as part of a debt-forgiveness
program (e.g. MiG-29 fighters, S-300 air defense missiles). Other
recent modernization efforts have focused on meeting NATO air traffic
control and air defense communications standards. After a six-year
decline, defense spending increased in 1997 by 22% to 96.8 billion
forint ($484 million), although this amount is expected to represent
less than 1.5% of GDP. The Ministry of Defense will request a dramatic
increase in the 1998 defense (160 billion forints/$800 million);
however, Parliamentary Defense Committee Chairman Imre Mecs estimates
that a 15%-20% increase to 104-115 billion florints ($520-$575 million)
for defense spending may be more realistic. Hungary has restructured
and downsized its military force to be NATO compatible and more readily
attain NATO standards. Top priorities include the U.S.-sponsored
Regional Airspace Initiative, the development of the NATO brigade, and
building peacekeeping capability. The budget for the Ministry of
Defense increased in real terms in 1997, and plans are to do so again
in 1998. If, as pledged, defense spending increases over the next
decade, priority modernization efforts will include:
Fighter aircraft
Main battle tanks
Armored fighting vehicles
It is not yet clear to what extent Hungary will begin to turn to
Western defense firms to fulfill its modernization requirements or will
continue to use Russia and Belarus as cheaper sources for needed
equipment. It could be expected that NATO membership will significantly
increase the pressure to rely upon military equipment produced in NATO
countries.
Czech Republic
Democracy/Governance
The Czech Republic is a parliamentary democracy. The state's
democratic institutions and charter of fundamental rights are
established in the December 1992 constitution. Members of parliament
have gained their mandates through free and fair elections. The central
governmental institutions function smoothly, and the judiciary is
independent. The Czech Republic is a member of the Council of Europe
and has ratified numerous international conventions on the protection
of human rights. Czech President Vaclav Havel, himself a former
political prisoner of the communist regime, is a world-renowned
advocate of human rights and social justice. The Czech Republic's Roma
(Gypsy) minority population has been targeted with forms of
discrimination and violence; a recent surge in the number of Czech Roma
seeking to leave the country has heightened international scrutiny of
the Roma situation in the Czech Republic. Some observers contend that
the Czech citizenship law discriminates against the Roma minority.
Since 1992, the Czech Republic has been governed by a center-right
coalition headed by Vaclav Klaus of the Civic Democratic Party. The
last parliamentary elections were held on May 30-June 1, 1996, for the
Chamber of Deputies and on November 15-16/22-23, for the Senate. The
ruling three-party coalition lost its parliamentary majority by two
seats. The opposition Social Democratic Party gained substantially from
the last election and won the second largest number of parliamentary
seats. The next elections for the Chamber of Deputies are scheduled to
be held in mid-2000; however, some observers doubt that the current
government will complete its term if it cannot broaden its political
support. On June 10, 1997, the Klaus government barely passed a vote of
confidence in parliament by a vote of 101-99. In September, Klaus
asserted that the political situation had since stabilized.
Economy
The Czech Republic's transformation from a centrally planned
economy has progressed steadily since 1991. Early elements of the
reform program included price liberalization, tight monetary and fiscal
policies, and large-scale voucher privatization. Industry remains the
largest productive sector, with services, including tourism, growing
rapidly. Since mid-1996, the political stalemate between the governing
coalition and opposition has contributed to adverse macroeconomic
conditions after years of steadfast and successful reforms. In April
and May 1997, the Klaus government imposed harsh austerity measures
designed to redress economic imbalances and spur economic growth. The
reforms included large budget cuts, a currency devaluation, stronger
regulatory mechanisms, and swifter large privatization. In 1996, the
Czech economy grew by about 4%. GDP growth for 1997 was estimated to
drop to 2.7%; however, devastation of much of the country because of
severe flooding in mid-year may take its toll on economic growth for
1997.
Military Capabilities
U.S. defense officials recently warned the Czech government that
its defense spending levels were unacceptably low, and that its efforts
to achieve NATO-interoperability and force modernization were lagging
behind those of the other prospective members. The Czech Republic has
the smallest military of three, with about 56,000 personnel (Army--
38,000; Air Force--14,000; logistics corps - 4,000). As with Poland and
Hungary, unit restructuring and redeployment is ongoing; select
officers and NCOs are being trained in NATO schools, and modernization
programs have focused on air traffic control and air defense
communications. The Czechs have a battalion (600+ personnel) serving in
Bosnia, and have contributed troops to the ongoing U.N. peacekeeping
mission in Croatia. A Czech chemical warfare defense unit joined the
U.S.-led coalition in the Persian Gulf War, and Czech troops have
participated in 27 Partnership for Peace exercises.
In 1996, the Czech parliament voted to increase defense spending by
0.1% of GDP each year for the next four years. The 1996 defense budget
corresponded to about 1.8% of GDP, using Czech methodology; this amount
does not include costs of the Czech contribution to SFOR or the budget
for civil defense. The Czech government draft budget for 1998 includes
an increase in the military budget despite deep cuts in other spending.
Defense officials expect that the indirect costs of membership, i.e.
costs for modernization, will be high for the Czech Republic, but that
costs for this purpose were necessary before the invitation to join
NATO and had already been planned. It is expected that about 20% of the
defense budgets will be devoted to modernization.
Assuming that the parliament approves the government's proposed
defense spending increases over the next several years, priority needs
for the Czech armed forces will include:
L-159 light attack aircraft (domestic production)
Fighter aircraft
Attack helicopters
Air-to-air and air defense missiles
Upgrade T-72 tanks to NATO standard
Command and control communications
Czech officials emphasize the participation of Czech defense industries
in the procurement effort as a means to maximize spending for
procurement.
EXCERPTS FROM: ``NATIONS IN TRANSIT
1997
civil society, democracy and markets
in east central europe
and the newly independent states''
Edited by Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander Motyl and Boris Shor
Published by Freedom House, Inc., through the suppport of the U.S.
Agency for International Redevelopment
CZECH REPUBLIC
Freedom in the World Ratings, 1988-1997
1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97
Political Rights 7 6 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
Civil Liberties 6 6 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Status NF NF F F F F F F F
Polity: Consolidated Democracy
Economy: Consolidated Market
Population: 10,357,000
PPP: $7,690
Ethnic Groups: Czechs (94 percent), Slovak (3 percent),
Roma (2 percent)
Capital: Prague
_______________________________________________________________________
Political Process 1.25/7
1. When did national legislative elections occur? The first post-
1989 national legislative elections in Czechoslovakia in June 1990 were
won by dissident Vaclav Havel's Civic Forum movement, which led
peaceful demonstrations that brought down the hard-line Communist
government. In the June 1992 national elections, two opposing parties
each gained clear majorities in the different republics. Vaclav Klaus'
center-right and pro-radical reform Civic Democratic Party (ODS),
emerged victorious in the Czech lands. In the Slovak Republic, the
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) headed by Vladimir Meciar was
the clear winner. Irreconcilable differences between the parties and
their leadership led to the breakup of the Czechoslovak federation.
With the countries divorce on January 1, 1993, Klaus and Meciar became
the prime ministers of their respective republics.
The June 1996 parliamentary elections for the Chamber of Deputies
heralded the end of the transitional phase in the Czech political
scene, with two strong parties on the left and right in the Western
European mold, emerging from transition. As expected, the ODS won
nearly 30 percent of the vote (68 seats) a nearly identical result to
1992. The big winner on the opposition side was the center-left Czech
Social Democrats (CSSD), led by Milos Zeman, who with 26 percent (61
seats), quadrupled their returns from 1992. Unlike the typical social
democratic party in the region which is a ``reformed" communist party,
the CSSD comes out of a long pre-Communist tradition of center-left
politics.
The other parties winning seats in the Chamber were: the
unreconstructed Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) with 10.3
percent (22 seats), the Christian Democratic Union (KDU) with 8 percent
(18), the extremist nationalist Republican Party with 8 percent (18),
and the free-market Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) with 6.3 percent
(13). Foreign observers deemed the 1990, 1992, and 1996 elections free
and fair.
The CSSD victory does not, however, reflect a fundamental shift to
the left among the populace; rather, the party has successfully
gathered most of the votes scattered among various leftist parties.
However, the disappointing results for the governing coalition in a
climate of continuing economic growth give evidence to the damage
wrought by various scandals.Unlike elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the
Communists and Republicans remain marginal political forces unlike
elsewhere in Eastern Europe.
The parties of the governing coalition only managed ninety-nine of
200 seats, down from the 105 seats before the election. As a result of
failing to win an outright majority, the ODS-led coalition was not
assured of forming a government. The CSSD extracted concessions from
the ODS led coalition in return for its acquiescence in the formation
of a minority government, which occurred in July 1996, with Klaus as
prime minister. The CSSD received leadership positions in five
parliamentary committees and the speakership of Parliament for Zeman in
return. The CSSD was unable to force the dismissal of Klaus, Ruml, and
Jindrich Vodicka (labor).
In December 1996, two CSSD deputies (Budget Committee chairman
Jozef Wagner and Tomas Teplik) who voted for the government's 1997
budget were expelled from the party and now give the governing
coalition a one-seat majority in the Chamber. This move, and the
undemocratic means by which it was carried out, has damaged the
reputation of the party. It also underscores the major divisions that
are present in the CSSD between its moderate wing led by Karel Machovec
and its strident leftist faction.
The 1992 constitution established a Senate along with the dominant
Chamber. However, lack of clarity in the constitutional text and
political wrangling over electoral procedure postponed Senate elections
for four years. Two rounds of Senate elections were held in November
1996. Some 570 candidates registered to compete for Senate seats in
eighty-one electoral districts, but 100 of these registrations were
rejected by the Central Electoral Commission because of technical
mistakes (some of which were subsequently overturned by the
constitutional court). Only three parties, ODS, KSCM, and CSSD,
nominated a candidate in every district. ODS won the election, but not
overwhelmingly so, with 32 seats and a 39.6 percent share of the vote.
The Social Democrats followed with 25 seats and 30.9 percent of the
vote. The Christian Democrats won 13 seats, the ODA 7 and the
Communists 2. The second round vote was viewed as a referendum on the
ODS. Seventy-six ODS candidates made it to the second round, but only
40 percent won. This was after all the other parties, even ODS
coalition allies, united to back whoever was opposing the ODS candidate
in that district. Over the objections of the ODS and with the support
of the Social Democrats, the KDU successfully nominated its candidate,
Petr Pithart (the Czechoslovak premier from 1990-1992), as Senate
chairman.
2. When did presidential elections occur? Vaclav Havel was elected
President of the Czechoslovak federation in December of 1989 by the
Federal Assembly. He was then elected President of the Czech Republic
by the Czech Chamber of Deputies in January 1993. The constitution
stipulates that presidents serve five-year terms. Since the dissolution
of Civic Forum, Havel has had no political party affiliation.
3. Is the electoral system multiparty-based? Are there at least two
viable political parties functioning at all levels of government? The
electoral system is multiparty-based. Article 5 of the constitution
notes that ``the political system is based on free and voluntary
formation of and free competition between political parties."
Parties began forming in late 1989 and early 1990 for the June 1990
legislative elections in Czechoslovakia. At least two political parties
function at different levels of government. Candidates often run
independently in local elections, where personal popularity can be more
important than party membership. About 40 percent of the vote in the
November 1994 local elections went to independents. One newly elected
senator is an independent, and another is a member of the extra-
parliamentary Democratic Union Party.
4. How many parties have been legalized? More than fifty parties
have emerged since the revolution of 1989. Fewer than twenty-five
parties registered for the local elections in November 1994, and fewer
than ten of these are of national importance. Twenty parties registered
for the June 1996 parliamentary elections, but only six managed to
clear the 5 percent threshold necessary for representation.
In the run-up to the July 1996 elections, small parties complained
discrimination by the Central Electoral Commission, composed of
representatives from individual parties who make decisions by a
majority vote. The Commission ruled that the Free Democrats--Liberal
National Social Party (FD-LNSP) was a coalition and not a single party,
which raised its required share for Chamber representation from 5 to 7
percent. The party complained that the Social Democrats and the other
leftist parties were attempting to disqualify them through legalistic
means. The Constitutional Court stepped in and ruled in favor of the
FD-LNSP. Nevertheless, the FD-LNSP was unable to break even the 5
percent barrier.
In March 1996, Internal Affairs Minister Jan Ruml announced that he
would attempt to outlaw the new Party of Czechoslovak Communists (PCC),
led by Miroslav Stepan (the only communist imprisoned after 1989).
Arguing that Stepan sought a ``renewal of socialism," Ruml wanted to
use the authority of the Crimes of Communism Act; however, Vaclav Klaus
eventually vetoed the move.
5. What proportion of the population belongs to political parties?
The number of party members registered is between 8-12 percent of the
adult population, but is not a very accurate measure of support given
the relatively high level of voter turnout.
6. What has been the trend of voter turnout at the municipal,
provincial and national levels in recent years? Voter turnout in the
Czech Republic has fallen since transition. In the first post-
transition election in 1990, more than 90 percent of citizens voted. In
the 1992 federal (Czechoslovak) elections, 85 percent of the population
voted, although turnout was higher in the Czech republic than in the
Slovak republic. Turnout in the November 1990 Czechoslovak local
elections was 73 percent in the Czech lands and 63 percent in Slovakia,
for an approximate national average of 70 percent. Excluding Prague,
turnout in the November 1994 local elections averaged 54 percent in
large cities and about 64 percent in towns and villages.
Voter turnout in 1996 was split. The Chamber election turnout was
relatively high at 76 percent. On the other hand, the voter turnout for
the 1996 Senate election was extraordinarily low: 35 percent in the
first round, and 30 percent in the second. The fact that the Senate is
an unpopular institution (even more so than the Chamber), combined with
the election-weariness of having two nationwide polls close together,
help account for this result.
Civil Society 1.50/7
1. How many nongovernmental organizations have come into existence
since 1988? How many charitable/nonprofit organizations? As of mid-1995
there were about 2,500 foundations and over 25,000 civic associations
(compared to about 2,000 in 1988) existing in the Czech Republic,
including approximately 50 Romany associations. Some international
charitable organizations such as the Salvation Army, have extensive
operations in the Czech Republic.
The growth of the so-called Third Sector has been obstructed by
delays in the passage of legislation on nonprofit organizations, as
well as, economic constraints. These entities did not have a special
legal status until the adoption of this legislation. In addition, a tax
law passed in 1994 rescinded past favorable treatment of nonprofit
organizations, over the objections of President Havel. In a compromise,
the legislature empowered the Finance Ministry to enact appropriate
regulations for nonprofits. Draft Laws on nonprofit organizations were
long delayed until late 1995 when three bills came up for passage.
Foreign sources of funding have supplied about half the revenue
consumed by Czech nonprofits. Nongovernmental organizations have come
to rely more and more on corporate and individual contributions as
governmental, U.S., and European Union (PHARE) assistance is slowly
being phased out.
2. What forms of interest group participation in politics are
legal? Such activities are not yet legally regulated, and some such
activity exists. However, interest groups have relatively little power
in the political process at this time. Public petitions and
demonstrations are legal and unrestricted.
3. Are there free trade unions? The Communist Revolutionary Trade
Union (ROH) was abolished in March 1990. Most unionized workers belong
to the Czech-Moravian Chamber of Trade Unions (CMKOS), which was
established in April 1990 and is currently constituted of thirty-five
individual unions. There are some unions outside CMKOS, but these
remain marginal.
About two-thirds of all workers are members of a union. Despite
this apparent strength, the CMKOS generally remains politically
independent. This is the result of many factors, foremost among them
being the severe mistrust unions earned in the Communist period as
puppets of the Communist party.
4. What Is the numerical/proportional membership of farmers'
groups, small business associations, etc.? There are at least three
farmers groups. They are not very large, as farmers make up only 5
percent of the workforce. Two small business associations merged in
1994 to consolidate their interests. Their membership and influence
continue to grow.
Indepdendent Media 1.25/7
1. Are there legal protections for press freedom? The Charter of
Basic Rights and Freedoms protects the right to a free press. While
there is currently legislation protecting both printed media and
broadcasting, they are out of date. The updates to much-debated laws
were still not adopted by the end of 1996. Czech journalists have
criticized the draft laws for not requiring that state bodies give
information to the press and for failing to protect journalists right
to keep the confidentiality of their sources.
2. Are there legal penalties for libeling officials? Are there
legal penalties for ``irresponsible'' journalism? In April 1994, the
Constitutional Court struck down a law that allowed for the prosecution
of those accused of defaming government officials. However, a provision
against defamation of the president and the Republic was retained, as
well as a provision allowing prosecution for the slander of government
officials or departments. There are no legal penalties for
irresponsible journalism.
Those guilty of defaming the Republic and the President can be
punished with prison terms of up to two years. However, the handful of
people actually convicted under this law have only been given suspended
sentences by the courts. What is more, Havel routinely pardons those
who are given even this punishment. In March 1996, for example, Havel
pardoned Pavel Karhanek, who had received a nine-month suspended
sentence for calling Havel a former alcoholic, swindler, and Communist
collaborator.
3. What proportion of media is privatized? The Czech Republic has
scores of private newspapers and magazines. Of the Czech Republic's
four television stations, two are private, TV Nova (71 percent market
share) and TV Prima (which emerged from the struggling Premiera TV).
There are sixty private radio stations, in addition to Czech Public
Radio. Some major cities can connect to cable stations. Local stations
are allowed but are not common (probably due to financial concerns).
One private news agency, CTA, began operations in October 1994, and
will compete with the state CTK agency.
4. Are the private media financially viable? From 1992 to 1995,
press media costs increased 300 percent. This combined with the
overcrowded nature of the market has caused major turbulence, with the
rapid disappearance of old publications and the rapid appearance of
new, merged, or reformed publications with a firmer financial
situation, mostly the result of foreign investment. By March 1996, over
half of the Czech press had foreign owners. The largest holders are the
Swiss, French, and especially Germans. Media without foreign
investment, government support, or party support often have only
limited solvency. Advertising rates and revenue have increased rapidly
and is expected to reach Kc 10.6 billion in 1996 ($393 million).
5. Are the media editorially independent? Apparently, the largest
threat to independent journalism stems from financial concerns. In
January 1994, the editor of Lidove Noviny, one of the largest and most
influential dailies, resigned, stating that the Swiss company holding
51 percent of the paper was compromising the publication's
independence. There is an independent journalists association.
The case of Vladimir Stehlik, owner of the giant and bankrupt Poldi
Steel Company, illustrates some of the problems with editorial
independence in the Czech Republic. Both the government and TV Nova
have been very critical of Stehlik and his business practices, which
are under investigation. He managed to purchasePrace, a trade-union
daily, which now regularly attacks both the government and TV Nova. Of
course, this is nothing new; Denni Telegraf is considered to be an ODS
mouthpiece.
6. Is the distribution system for newspapers privately or
governmentally controlled? There are three main printing companies in
the Czech Republic. Typografia, a large printing company in Prague, is
responsible for the printing of many national dailies. It is slated for
privatization.
7. What has been the trend in press freedom? Freedom House's
annualSurvey of Press Freedom rated Czechoslovakia Partly Free for
1989, and Free from 1990 through 1992. The Survey rated the Czech
Republic Free from 1993 through 1996. The Economist calculates that the
Czech Republic has the fourth most free press in the world, ahead of
Germany (seventh) and Britain (ninth). However, current press law does
not mandate the right of media to access state information, and the
protection of confidentiality of sources is not entirely clear.
Rule of Law 1.50/7
1. Is there a post-Communist constitution? In December 1992, the
Czech constitution was adopted by the Czech National Council. It took
effect in January 1993, with the dissolution of the federal state.
2. Does the constitutional framework provide for human rights? Do
the human rights include business and property rights? The Czechoslovak
Federal Assembly adopted the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms
in January 1991, which protects human rights. Although this charter is
not in the Constitution per se, according to Article 3 of the new Czech
Constitution, this charter is ``an integral component of the
constitutional system." Furthermore, Article 10 commits the Czech
Republic to abide by ratified international treaties on human rights.
Everyone has the right to own property according to Article 11 of the
Charter.
3. Has there been basic reform of the criminal code/criminal law?
While the criminal code has undergone many revisions and amendments
since 1989 (including a fairly significant law in 1993), an entirely
reformed penal code has still not been adopted. Former Justice Minister
Jiri Novak announced that the much-delayed code would come up for a
vote by October 1996.
The civilian Internal Security Service (BIS) is independent of
Ministry control, but reports to parliament and the Prime Minister's
office. Police and BIS authorities generally observe constitutional--
and legal protection of individual rights in carrying out their
responsibilities. However, there were occasional reports of abuses by
some members of the police, disproportionately directed at Roma and
foreigners.
The time it took for a case to go to trial has increased from 89
days in 1989 to 216 days in 1996. 39 percent of prisoners are awaiting
trial. This is due to the lack of experienced judges, investigators and
a still evolving legal environment.
4. Do most judges rule fairly and Impartially? How many remain from
the Communist era? Judges reportedly rule fairly and impartially. A
great number of judges were dismissed between 1989 and 1992 for
connections with the former Communist regime. Many resigned voluntarily
and now have private legal practices. The 1991 law on the judiciary
designated judges appointed after January 1990 to be life appointments.
Those appointed before 1990 were to be dismissed as of August 1992,
unless they were reappointed within twelve months. Once reappointed,
they can hold their positions for life. There are now fifteen judges on
the Constitutional Court with ten-year terms, appointed by the
president (court established in July 1993).
5. Are the courts free of political control and influence? Are the
courts linked directly to the Ministry of Justice or any other
executive body? Article 82 of the constitution notes that ``(1) Judges
shall be independent in the performance of their office. Nobody may
jeopardize their impartiality. (2) A judge may not be recalled or
transferred to another court against his will; exceptions, ensuing in
particular from disciplinary liability, shall be specified by law."
Justices of the Constitutional Court are protected from interference by
Article 86. Life tenure, and pay increases for judges have led to
improved judiciary independence.
However,judges retain administrative connections with the Ministry
of justice, through which judges are appointed and promoted. A 1995
Czech Helsinki Committee report notes frequent interference in ongoing
investigations and court trials by politicians making pronouncements
through the media.
The earnings gap between judges and private sector attorneys is
much bigger than in the West. Partly as a result of Czech legal
education policy, which separates training for lawyers and judges, and
partly because of the mistrust they earned under the Communists,
magistrates do not yet enjoy Western nonpecuniary benefits of prestige
and respect. Judges also do not always have adequate support resources
in the form of law clerks, court reporters, bailiffs, and legal
materials.
6. What proportion of lawyers is in private practice? It is
estimated that over half of all lawyers are employed by private groups
(Czech and foreign groups, legal firms and other corporations).
Salaries for lawyers in the private sector are substantially larger
than for those in the public sector. Lawyers must belong to the Czech
Bar Association in order to practice law.
7. Does the state provide public defenders? The Charter of
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms guarantees access to legal assistance
to indigent accused, and the state does indeed provide public defenders
in criminal and some civil cases. However, the International Helsinki
Committee notes that many who would otherwise be eligible for such aid
do not receive it because the process involved is complicated.
8. Has there been a comprehensive reform of antibias/discrimination
laws, including protection of ethnic minority rights? The Czech
Republic has few problems regarding minorities, partly because the
total percentage of minorities living in the country is between 2 and 6
percent. However, skinhead attacks, particularly against Romanies
(Gypsies) are not unusual. There were forty-two reported racially
motivated attacks in first two months of 1996.
There have been reports of neglect and even abuse by police who are
often slow to respond to calls for help by Roma who find themselves the
targets of hate crimes. Observers have noted that local courts
sometimes mete out minor penalties for hate crimes, and deal more
harshly with Roma than with Czechs. There are signs of pressure for
change from the center. In January 1996, a special department was
established to deal with extremist groups, and directives were issued
to prosecutors to seek higher penalties in hate crime cases. In May
1996, the Olomouc high court overruled a lower court in concluding that
the 1995 murder of Tibor Berki, a Romany, was racially motivated, which
led to a harsher sentence for the convicts.
Citizenship for minorities remains an unresolved issue in the Czech
Republic. Between 10,000 and 24,000 people, mainly the minority Roma,
are de facto stateless. This is due to the cumbersome and overly
bureaucratic naturalization procedures in Czech law. There are reports
of Roma being denied citizenship when all necessary requirements have
been met. However, fears of mass deportations have not been borne out.
The restitution of Jewish and church property has been a slow
process, partly due to administrative complications, but also due to
hesitation and even opposition from the political left.
Governance and public Administratioon 2.00/7
1. Is the legislature the effective rule-making institution? Yes,
the Czech parliament is an effective rule-making institution. In 1995,
the Chamber of Deputies adopted some 300 statutes. Vaclav Klaus and the
ODS effectively ran the legislature to push forward their reform
programs from 1992 to 1996. However, as a result of two inconclusive
parliamentary elections in 1996, a tense political stalemate descended
on the country which slowed legislative action on a host of pressing
issues.
2. Is substantial power decentralized to subnational levels of
government? In November 1990, under the Czechoslovak administration,
several regional reforms took place: the ten-region system (seven Czech
regions, three Slovak) used under communism was eliminated; districts
were placed under the administration of each republic; and municipal
governments were made self-governing bodies. Thus, the Czech republic
is subdivided first into seventy-six districts that are not autonomous
and second into thousands of local municipalities that are.
Article 8 of the constitution specifies that ``self-government of
territorial self-governing units is guaranteed," while Article 10 1
states that the ``State may intervene in the activities of self-
governing territorial divisions only if such intervention is required
by protection of the law and only in a manner defined by law." Chapter
7 of the Constitution deals specifically with local rule. It
establishes the division of the Czech Republic first into communities
``which shall be the basic self-governing territorial divisions" and
which shall be ``administered by a community assembly." These include
city councils which govern towns, villages, and small cities, as well
as district councils which govern sections of larger cities.
The constitution goes on to add, however, that ``the superior self-
governing territorial divisions shall be lands or regions" which shall
be ``administered by an assembly of representatives." Thus although the
constitution establishes the order of authority, it does not specify in
more detail the composition and features of this middle tier of
government.
The continued process of regional reform has been a subject of
intense debate in both successor republics to the Czechoslovak state.
In the Czech Republic, the establishment of self-administrative regions
has been complicated by fears of increased nationalist sentiment in the
historical lands of Moravia and Silesia, as well as conflicts among
parties. On the other hand, there is widespread feeling failure to
establish such regions could stall entry into the EU.
A constitutional amendment written by the ODA on the establishment
of a medium tier of elected government between the central government
and the community councils was debated in March and April 1996. It was
to establish nine regional bodies. The Constitution actually calls for
such bodies, but does not specify their composition or when they should
be created. The bill was opposed principally by the ODS, who questioned
whether creating these regional bodies was wise in a country as small
as the Czech Republic. A January 1996 poll showed lukewarm support for
such bodies: only 25 percent of Czechs considered the lack of them a
pressing problem, but 43 percent thought they would improve state
administration (29 percent thought the opposite).
The coalition agreement signed after the June 1996 elections
committed the government to establish these regions before the end of
its term in the year 2000. Jan Kalvoda, chairman of the ODA and then-
justice minister, proposed the establishment of thirteen regions with
fairly considerable authority, including management of roads, schools,
cultural institutions, health facilities, and forests.
3. Are subnational officials chosen in free and fair elections?
Article 102 of the constitution mandates that ``Assembly members shall
be elected by secret ballot on the basis of universal, equal and direct
suffrage." According to the 1990 reforms, municipal or communal
governments consist of assemblies chosen in local elections. These
bodies then elect mayors and their deputies. District officials are
appointed by the state, as districts are branches of the state. The
first post communist local elections in 5,766 municipalities were held
under these new rules in November 1990. Civic Forum won those elections
with 35.6 percent of the vote. This victory, coming in the midst of a
national debate about economic reform, gave a mandate to the government
to continue on the radical reform path.
The ODS won the largest percentage of the vote in the November 1994
local elections, gaining 28 percent of the vote in the district
councils and nearly 11 percent in the city councils. It was also
victorious in Prague, with 41.2 percent of the vote. However, Josef
Lux's Christian Democratic Union received the greatest actual number of
seats because its strength was in the more rural city councils where
fewer voters were apportioned per seat. Despite expectations that they
would do well, the Communists fared quite poorly. Independent
candidates were a significant factor in the election, winning a bit
under half of the city council seats and 13 percent of the district
council seats.
The 1990 and 1994 local elections were generally deemed free and
fair. The next local elections are scheduled for November 1998.
4. Do legislative bodies actually function? In theory, the presence
of the Senate should help stabilize politics in the Czech Republic.
Article 33 of the constitution stipulates that if the Chamber is
dissolved, the Senate would take over until new elections. Due to the
absence of a Senate, there was no practical constitutional way to
dissolve the Chamber before November 1996. However, the low turnout in
the Senate elections and its low popularity as an institution could
undermine its legitimacy.
Local assemblies have the power to pass ordinances, call local
referenda, and approve budgets. They have executive and legislative
powers. Districts function as branches of the state and appear to work
smoothly.
5. Do the executive and legislative bodies operate openly and with
transparency? Article 36 of the constitution guarantees that ``meetings
of both chambers [of Parliament] shall be public. The public may be
excluded only under conditions defined by law." Legislative sessions
are generally open to the public in practice and new laws are
published. The transparency of local actions depends largely upon the
quality of local media, which varies among regions.
6. Do municipal governments have sufficient revenues to carry out
their duties? Do municipal governments have control of their own local
budgets? Do they raise revenues autonomously or from the central state
budget? Article 101 of the constitution stipulates that the self-
governing regions have their own budgets and may have their own
property. Former ODA Chairman Kalvoda's proposed regions would have
control of their own budgets. They would draw revenue from local taxes,
property income, administrative fees, and state subsidies. Municipal
governments have the power to approve budgets. It is estimated that
municipalities received 43.5 percent of revenues from the state budget
in 1995, versus 40.6 percent in 1994. Apart from Prague, selling and
renting real estate is an important source of revenue.
Municipalities are generally financially strapped and mayors of
small communities often do not receive financial compensation.
Municipal governments in poor, industrialized areas such as northern
Bohemia have reported difficulty in raising funds to attend to their
communities needs.
7. Do the elected local leaders and local civil servants know how
to manage municipal governments effectively? There is substantial
inefficiency at the local level due to the presence of incompetents
appointed by the communists because of political connections,
inexperience, as well as uncertainty about the procedural changes
accompanying multiple reforms. These problems should diminish with
time. The number of municipalities increased by 50 percent without
regulatory consent between 1989 and 1990 as some municipalities
splintered. This situation has led to increased inefficiency. Petty
corruption (such as small bribes to expedite matters), according to
observers, is fairly common. For example, there have been allegations
that civil servants request bribes in order to speed installation of
telephone lines.
8. When did the constitutional/legislative changes on local power
come into effect? Has there been a reform of the civil service code/
system? Are local civil servants employees of the local or central
government? A reformed civil service law has yet to be adopted in the
Czech Republic. This has led to confusion about civil servants status
and responsibilities. Debate on drafts of such laws has been extensive.
Local reforms were enacted in November of 1990. Further reforms
were tabled until after the division of the Czechoslovak state, and
concrete legislation has not yet been passed. Reforms of the civil code
have not yet been passed. Local civil servants are paid out of
municipal budgets. District officials are state appointees.
Privatization 2.00/7
1. What percentage of the GDP comes from private ownership? In
1990, Czechoslovakia had the largest state sector of all the East-
Central European countries entering transition, with a negligible
portion of national output coming from the private sector. As of the
end of 1996, about 80 percent of GDP was produced in the private
sector.
2. What major privatization legislation has been passed?
Restitution of Communist-confiscated property began in November 1990
and lasted until September 1991. Some Kcs 75-125 billion worth of
property was moved into private hands through restitution, including
some 100,000 physical properties (houses, farms, shops, and the like).
Small privatization of enterprises like shops, service
establishments, and restaurants followed restitution and was slightly
more controversial. Despite strong pressure for insider (manager and
worker) preferences in the form of closed rounds of auctions restricted
solely to employees of the firms being privatized, the parliament voted
down any such preferences in the summer of 1990. Once assets were
selected to be privatized, the auctions were open to all Czech
citizens, with no special preferences. The auctions began in January
1991 and were concluded at the end of 1993, although the majority of
small enterprises were sold by April 1992. Over 22,000 small
enterprises were sold, with shops constituting 58 percent of sales,
service establishments 18 percent, restaurants 8 percent, and motor
vehicles 7 percent. The total value transferred through the small
privatization program amounted to a little over Kcs 30 billion (over US
$ 1 billion).
The foundation for large-scale privatization was laid in April 1990
when laws establishing the legal foundation for converting state-owned
enterprises (SOES) into joint-stock companies. In the first half of
1990, the 100 large trusts which dominated the state sector were split
into 330 independent enterprises, while the vast majority of communist-
appointed top directors were dismissed in favor of their deputies. With
the need for speed and competition in mind, the large scale
privatization law was passed in April 199s1. The initial large-scale
privatization program was divided into two waves, the first beginning
in February 1992 and the second in April 1994. Privatization of each
enterprise was centered around the ``privatization project." These were
proposals for the future of each firm, including restructuring and some
combination of five different privatization instruments: transformation
into a joint-stock company (so-called voucher privatization), direct
sale to predetermined buyers, public auction, or free transfer to
municipalities or trust funds. Management was required to submit a
basic privatization project, but anyone was allowed to submit competing
projects. These projects were submitted to a ``black box" decision
making process at the Ministry of Privatization. There was, however, no
institutional bias in favor of insiders.
Mirroring the experience with restitution and small privatization,
the deadlines in large privatization were extraordinarily tight, and
were only prolonged by several months at most. For example, the
compilation of assets to be privatized in both waves was due by July
1991. Management's basic projects for the first wave were due by
November 1991 to their founding ministry, and one month later to the
Privatization Ministry. Competing projects were due by January 1992. In
the second wave, most projects were due by July 1992. Thus, only six
months and one year elapsed between the selection of projects due to be
privatized in the first and second rounds, respectively.
The requirement of speed served several major goals. The firsts
mainly economic; to increase enterprise efficiency and resume economy-
wide growth as soon as possible. The second was ideological; the reform
team's economic philosophy of a radical break with the past required
this speed. Third, there was a continuing desire on the part of
reformers to show initial successes to citizens and to maintain a
certain pace of privatization in order to continue the momentum of
reform in general. Fourth, rapidity coupled with the transparent and
widely publicized privatization process limited the scope for
``spontaneous privatization" actions by management to illegally strip
assets for personal gain. Finally, the reform team's continuing push
for speed minimized political opposition by creating what has been
called a ``feeding frenzy" and a ``gold rush," which forced insiders to
concentrate on submitting winning privatization projects rather than
massing political opposition to the process.
The Ministry of Privatization's project selection criteria gave
priority to mass privatization components in competing proposals, and
this institutional bias made the core of the large privatization
program the so-called voucher program. Three-fourths of medium and
large enterprises in the beginning of the reform program had mass
privatization components. The Czech mass privatization program was
created by Dusan Triska, who had seen the idea suggested in a 1989
paper by Polish economists, and had heard about a similar experiment in
British Columbia, where the province had given away shares of a power
utility to the public in the 1970s. It had never been actually tried on
a large scale. Most Western academics and observers predicted the
failure of the large-scale voucher scheme.
Beginning in 1991, all Czechoslovak citizens 18 and over were
eligible to purchase a voucher booklet from one of 648 distribution
centers. The purchase price was nominal at Kcs 1,000 (about $35, or one
week's worth of average wages). Trading was disallowed until the
secondary market began following share allocation. Participation in the
program was only moderate by January 1992, when only 2 million booklets
had been sold. Then, a firm called Harvard Capital and Consulting
entered the scene. The firm promised an astounding 1,000 percent return
to people entrusting it to manage and invest their vouchers in the mass
privatization rounds. This was followed by the entry of similar
organizations. These investment privatization funds (IPFS) piqued
public interest in vouchers and the voucher privatization participation
rate jumped enormously, to 8.5 million. Approximately 72 percent of
voucher purchasers invested their points in IPFS.
Eventually, 264 IPFs formed in the Czech lands for the first wave
and another 353 formed in the second-wave. The largest IPFs were run by
commercial and savings banks as well as insurance companies. The
emergence of these funds actually caught the government by surprise,
and while they may not have saved the mass privatization program, they
certainly were one of the most important factors in its success.
The privatization process has generally been free of major
scandals. In October 1994, however, Jaroslav Lizner, the Director of
the Coupon Privatization Center, was arrested and charged with
corruption in the privatization of the Klatovy Dairy. Lizner apparently
accepted a Kc 8 million ($300,000) bribe from a police sting operation.
The affair created some dark clouds over the second voucher
privatization wave, and a December 1994 poll revealed 40 percent of
respondents felt that the scandal had undermined the voucher
privatization program. The continuing popularity of the voucher
privatization program suggests that this particular scandal, though
touching one of the very highest offices in the privatization effort,
was viewed more as an isolated incident than a systemic problem.
The final results of large privatization show the institutional
bias in favor of voucher privatization. By the end of December 1993, 87
percent of the book value of enterprises were converted into joint
stock companies for voucher privatization, 7 percent were sold by
direct sale, less than 1 percent were made available by public auction,
2 percent were given over to public tender, and 3 percent were
transferred for free to other governmental units. Competition was high,
with an average of 17 proposals were received for each state firm.
Privatization has slowed considerably since the heady early years
of transition. Shares worth Kc 229 billion ($8.3 billion) are still in
state hands. Part of this is due to the fact that all the easy sell-
offs have already been made. Currently, seventy-seven percent of these
unsold shares are in fifty-six ``strategic" enterprises and will be
exceedingly difficult to privatize for political reasons. The
privatization of the remaining enterprises, owned directly by the state
or indirectly through the National Property Fund (NPF, the state body
holding unprivatized equity), will be made on a case-by-case basis. The
other reason for a slowdown has been the influence of the CSSD, whose
cooperation is necessary for the weakened governing coalition to make
major economic policy decisions. It is opposed to further privatization
in the health care and energy sectors, as well as to restituting Church
property.
The other major portion of privatization is the gradual sell-off of
residual state shares in enterprises privatized in the two waves of
voucher privatization. By the end of 1995, these had been valued at Kc
52 billion ($2 billion). The government sold these shares at the pace
of Kc 2 billion per month through 1996, and intends to finish entirely
by the end of 1997.
3. What proportion of agriculture, housing and land, industry, and
business and services is in private hands?
Agriculture: Most agricultural land was privatized under
restitution, a process that began in 1991. Other farms were put up for
auction. As of mid-1995 it was estimated that about 90 percent of
agriculture had been privatized, including all former cooperatives and
most state farms.
Housing and Land: As part of property reform, the government passed
a law soon after the 1989 revolution giving housing and land to the
municipality in which it was located. Those living in these units could
then apply to buy them from the municipal government at a discounted
price. This process may vary by municipality. In 1994, legislation was
passed allowing for the purchase of apartment houses by cooperative
groups at a discounted price if members reside in the building. As of
late 1994, it is estimated that approximately 40 to 60 percent of all
housing units were privatized.
Industry: It is estimated that the private share of industry topped
80 percent by early 1996. The remaining industries will be much more
difficult to privatize. These industries are the so-called strategic
sector: communications, energy, mining and metallurgy, and
transportation. However, there have been some recent major
developments. A Dutch-Swiss consortium purchased a 27 percent stake in
the SPT telecommunications monopoly in June 1995; 26 percent of the
enterprise was sold for vouchers while the rest is held by the NPF.
Another important factor is the retention of ownership by the
government through two major mechanisms. The first is the National
Property Fund, which holds minority shares in firms sold through mass
privatization. However, studies have shown that the NPF board members
have been extremely passive. Thus, state ownership of enterprise shares
has not necessarily led to a politicization of business decisions. The
second mechanism of government ownership is the complex webs of cross-
ownership in the financial sector. The largest banks are still state-
owned, and they hold large equity stakes in investment funds, which in
turn own newly-privatized companies. While there has not been
significant evidence of government interference through these links in
privatized firms, there is still some legitimate cause for caution. The
ongoing privatization of state-owned banks is an important step to
finding a long-term solution to this problem.
Business and Services: Nearly all small businesses and services
have been privatized. Out of a workforce of five million, the Czech
Republic now has nearly 900,000 entrepreneurs, mostly involved with
newly founded businesses rather than former state companies. By 1995,
the privatization of family doctor, dental, and outpatient clinic
practices was completed.
4. Has there been reform of the state sector? (What major
legislation has been passed? Do authorities and state managers act
within the law? Is the state sector performing more efficiently? Does
it require fewer subsidies than before?) Prior to 1989, Czechoslovakia
had been spending an astonishing 25 percent of GDP on industrial
subsidies, and it was the massive cutback of this spending that
provided the bulk of the reduction in government expenditures from 1990
to 1992. Subsidies fell to only 4.6 percent of GDP--average for market
economies. Curtailing the growth in the money supply and inexpensive
credits to SOEs drastically reduced a large indirect subsidy. Together,
these reductions in subsidies represented a real hardening of budget
constraints of SOES.
Particularly large subsidies remain in the agricultural sector,
transportation, housing, and household energy use. Efforts to balance
the budget as well as to cut taxes will increase pressure to cut
subsidies further. In the 1997 budget, industrial subsidies were cut
with the exception of transportation subsidies. The latter will total
Kc 5.8 million ($215 million). Other subsidies include agriculture,
forestry, and water management (Kc 8 billion, or $296 million), and the
mining industry (Kc 5.1 billion, or $189 million).
One route the government takes to push reform through hide bound
state-owned monopolies is to ignore unorthodox and possibly gray-market
alternatives to their service. For example, the telecommunications
monopolist SPT Telecom charges extravagant prices for its slow and
inefficient services. Czech regulators have effectively ignored
unlicensed call-back services which base operations in low-price
markets, usually the United States. Another alternative, especially for
data transmission, is satellite technology which bypasses SPT entirely.
SPT has begun responding to these competitors by offering improved
services to corporate clients and introducing radical service
improvements like itemized billing.
Economy 1.75/7
1. Has the taxation system been reformed? (What areas have and have
not been overhauled? To what degree are taxpayers complying? Has the
level of revenues increased? Is the revenue-collection body
overburdened?) The old tax system was only slightly reformed from 1990-
1992. This tax system relied mainly on implicit taxation in the form of
turnover taxes and confiscation of SOE profits. The Czech Republic
introduced a major tax reform in January 1993, featuring new corporate
and individual income taxes, and a value-added tax (VAT). There have
been three major goals of tax reform since the transition. The first of
these was to subject the mushrooming private sector to normal taxation,
especially as the government was essentially giving away its tax base
through privatization and restructuring of SOES. The second goal was to
broaden the tax base; services were included for the first time. The
final goal was to reduce the overall burden of taxation. This was done
by lowering tax rates (which had been as high as 85 percent with
further levies on profits) and increasing depreciation allowances. The
new taxes also achieved this goal by being much less distortionary,
which reduced taxation's excess burden on the economy.
The following taxes are currently levied in the Czech Republic:
corporate income tax (39 percent), investment/pension fund tax (25
percent), value-added tax (22 percent and 5 percent for food,
pharmaceuticals, books, and paper products), personal income tax (15-40
percent), social insurance tax (35 percent total), dividend tax (25
percent), interest tax (15-25 percent), royalties and fees (25
percent), and local tax on property transfers (4 percent up to Kc 20
million, 20 percent marginal rate above). There is no capital gains
tax.
The VAT was reduced 1 percent in January 1995. Another tax
reduction took effect in January 1996, with all income taxes, corporate
and personal, dropping several percentage points. Given the current
governing coalition's commitments and track record, along with the
Social Democrats' willingness to reduce the national tax burden, future
tax reductions are likely.
Enforcement of taxes is relatively lax, especially in small-scale
enterprises. Underreporting profits and keeping two sets of accounting
books (one for real, and the other for the tax collector) are fairly
widespread practices. Some shops reportedly asked customers if they
want to buy a product ``with Klaus or without Klaus," that is to say,
with or without sales tax. Czech police and tax authorities complain
that irregularities in the tax and commercial codes prevent proper
investigation and prosecution of tax violations. In one police
estimate, only 10 percent of tax violators are caught. This problem is
compounded by the frequent changes in the tax code in the early
transition years, as well as the prevalence of easily hidden cash
transactions.
The most spectacular decline in tax revenue in East-Central Europe
over the 1989-1993 period was recorded by the Czech Republic. While
this record improved in the following years, a fall off in tax revenue
in the second half of 1996 has increased the government's keenness to
increase tax compliance, especially in the area of the VAT.
2. Does macroeconomic policy encourage private savings, investment
and earnings? (Has there been any reform/alteration of revenue and
budget policies? How have any such changes served to advance economic
objectives?) Czech radical reformers pushed for their reform plan to be
adopted before the June 1990 election, an outline of which was agreed
to in May 1990. Following the elections, the new OF government accepted
the May program and announced its commitment to radical reform. After
vehement debate, the parliament adopted the more detailed ``Scenario on
Economic Reform" in September 1990, and in November 1990 it passed the
comprehensive Transformation act.
The bulk of macroeconomic reform began in September 1990. This
included stabilization of the economy through a restrictive fiscal and
monetary regime, and the reduction in the size and interventionism of
government. Czechoslovakia had inherited not only a swollen state
enterprise sector, but also an expansive and intrusive government, even
by the standards of Communist Central Europe. Government revenue and
expenditure amounted to 6 2.1 percent and 64.5 percent of GDP in 1989,
respectively, compared with 41.4 percent and 48.8 percent for Poland.
The governing coalition has reiterated its commitment to lowering
government expenditures as a proportion of GDP by 1 percent yearly.
The Czech Republic has come closest to the balanced budget ideal of
all transition economies, actually running a surplus in 1993, 1994, and
1995. Local governments budgets are also balanced. Fiscal discipline is
in large part responsible for the moderate inflation record of the
Czech Republic, which is the best in post-Communist Europe. Inflation
dropped to 10 percent in 1994, 9.1 percent in 1995 and 8.8 percent in
1996. All of this allowed the Czech Republic to repay its $430 million
loan to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1994 a full year ahead
of schedule.
The economy has grown respectably since emerging from the post-
transition recession in late 1992, with a growth of 4.8 percent in 1995
and 4.1 percent in 1996. The country also boasts one of the lowest
unemployment rates in the region: 3.3 percent in 1996. This low rate is
not simply a reflection of an unreformed labor market. Studies have
shown that while Czechs face similar chances of becoming unemployed
compared to Poles and Hungarians, although Czechs face better chances
of becoming re-employed more quickly.
From 1990 to 1992, the government used direct controls to constrict
growth in the money supply, including interest rate ceilings (initially
set at 24 percent) and credit limits on large commercial banks. Since
1992, the government began to use familiar indirect monetary policy
instruments: open market operations (selling and buying state bonds),
reserve ratio requirements for banks, and modified central bank
discount rates. Monetary policies also drastically lowered state bank
credit to SOES. This credit declined 50 percent in real terms in 1991
and 13.2 percent and 29.3 percent in 1992-3. The massive declines of
this bank credit reflect the credibility of government monetary policy
and the perception by state banks that it had shifted permanently.
The currency has remained remarkably stable in relation to the U.S.
dollar since transition, thanks to a determined Central Bank and plenty
of foreign exchange reserves. This is in line with government policy to
maintain a stable exchange rate as one of the pillars of its economic
reform policy. The Czechoslovak koruna was devalued three times against
convertible currencies in 1990. In January 1991 it was pegged to a
basket of five Western currencies dominated by the German Deutchemark
and the U.S. dollar. It was also unified and made internally
convertible in the beginning of 1991. By the second quarter of 1991,
the parallel market exchange rate premium had virtually disappeared.
Since May 1993, the koruna has been tied to a two-currency basket,
consisting 35 percent of the dollar and 65 percent of the Deutchemark.
Still, the currency was not fully convertible on the current account
and for capital transactions.
The koruna was initially very undervalued. This protected firms
from foreign competition in both the export market (since Czech exports
became even cheaper) and the domestic market (since prices on imports
rise). However, the Czech government has been the most successful in
maintaining a fixed exchange rate as a nominal anchor in the economy:
there have been no additional devaluations since 1990. In October 1995,
the Czech koruna became fully convertible for current account
transactions and partially convertible for capital account
transactions. Firms are not restricted in borrowing funds from abroad.
In February 1996, the central bank widened the band it uses to fix the
exchange rate from 0.5 percent to 7.5 percent.
A balanced budget, moderate monetary expansion, a stable currency,
falling inflation, and rising currency reserves all paint a picture of
consolidating macroeconomic stability. This has been confirmed by
private and government credit rating agencies. Standard and Poor's, for
example, raised the Czech Republic's credit rating from BBB to BBB+ in
July 1994, in the same category as Chile and Israel and far ahead of
the other Central European states. In November 1995, Standard and
Poor's gave the Czech Republic an ``A-stable" investment grade rating,
symbolizing capital markets regard for Czech economic reforms. It was
inducted into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) in December 1995, the first post-Communist nation to become a
member. The credit rating of the country and of its firms has improved
since December 1995. The Czech Republic along with Slovenia is rated
the highest in the Eastern European region for credit worthiness by the
Economist Intelligence Unit World Risk Ratings Review.
Unexpectedly low tax revenues in the second half of 1996 caused a
balanced-budget obsessed government to make more than Kc 9 billion
($341 million) of budget cuts in this period. By year's end, the budget
deficit reached Kc 1. 2 billion ($44 million)--2.3 percent of GDP.
The adoption of the 1997 budget in December 1996 represented a
victory for the governing coalition, and it was accomplished because of
the defection of two CSSD deputies, both of whom were later expelled
from the party. The budget is balanced, and includes provisions to
lower taxes by raising the taxable income threshold and expanding
individual tax brackets.
Subsidies for housing will cost, 13.7 billion Kc ($507 million) in
the 1997 budget, and heating subsidies will cost Kc 4.5 billion ($167
million), decreased from the previous year's Kc 6.9 billion ($256
million). The new power of the CSSD-led opposition in parliament might
lead to an increase in social expenditures, since its cooperation in
other areas of economic policy is needed. Nevertheless, real reform is
needed in health insurance and pension programs, where an awkward mix
of state and market manages to be both insecure and inefficient.
3. Are property rights guaranteed? (Are there both formal and de
facto protections of private real estate and Intellectual property? Is
there a land registry with the authority and capability to ensure
accurate recording of who owns what? What are the procedures for
expropriation, including measures for compensation and challenge?)
Restitution of property nationalized by the Communists was completed by
1992. Nevertheless, because of the slow pace of courts, not all title
has been transferred to new owners. This means that it is not always
known who actually owns a particular property.
The Czech Republic adopted a patent code in 1990, a trademark law
in 1988 and 1990. Amendments to the trademark law passed in June 1995
harmonize Czech intellectual property rights (IPR) Law on Trademarks
and Copyrights with EU and TRIPS standards. These amendments make it
easier to enforce, register and sell trademarks, even foreign-
registered trademarks. The latter was implemented after a small scandal
in which the brother of a high-ranking government official registered
names like Jaguar, Toyota, Chevrolet, and Audi as his own. The Czech
Republic is a signatory of the following conventions on IPR: Bern,
Paris, and the Universal Copyright Convention. In April 1996, the
Parliament adopted laws which strengthen protection of software.
While Czech legal protections for intellectual property are
adequate, enforcement is rather problematic, as in all other post-
communist countries. For example, one major difficulty in
implementation is long delays in enforcing IPR laws against violators.
The backlog of cases in the courts is about two years--enough time for
substantial damage to have been incurred. As of the end of 1995, for
example, only 366 people have been convicted of IPR crimes. U.S. firms
have estimated that more than $210 million are lost yearly to copyright
violations. This gap between law and practice has been recognized by
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) which has recently
suggested placing the Czech Republic on the list of countries impeding
trade.
4. Is it possible to own and operate a business? (Has there been
legislation regarding the formation, dissolution and transfer of
businesses, and is the law respected? Do there exist overly cumbersome
bureaucratic hurdles that effectively hinder the ability to own and
dispose of a business? Are citizens given access to Information on
commercial law? Is the law applied fairly?) Approximately 85 percent of
government-controlled producer and consumer prices were liberalized in
the beginning of 1991. After the first year of liberalization, 18
percent of GDP was valued in regulated prices, and by the end of 1992,
this figure fell to 5-6 percent (down from 85 percent in 1990). The
following commodity groups prices are still regulated: energy, housing
rents, water, transportation (especially passenger),
telecommunications, health care, and some agricultural products.
However, the government has made public its commitment to
liberalizing these prices in the next several years. Even where prices
are controlled, adjustments have been made consistently in the upward
direction. The government has effectively suspended national wage
bargaining between labor, employers, and the government under the
Tripartite Council. In July 1995, wage regulation by the government was
eliminated.
The Czech Civil and Commercial Codes (adopted in 1992) are based
heavily on the German and Austrian codes. The Commercial Code, adopted
in January 1992, replaced eighty scattered regulations and codes in
establishing the framework for inter business transactions. The
Commercial Code was amended in early 1996 to increase protection of
both majority and minority shareholders. Many of the provisions of the
codes, however, remain vague.
The courts are frequently not effective in settling disputes. This
is due to the burden of a tremendous amount of new cases, an inadequate
number of judges, as well as the inexperience of these judges in
dealing with complex commercial issues. This leads to large time lags
in rendering judgment. A large body of established precedent has also
yet to take hold. The Czech Republic is a member of the New York
Convention on arbitration, and as such, it is legally bound to
recognize and enforce arbitration decisions.
No expropriation has taken place since the end of Communist rule.
Application of eminent domain is done under standards of international
law: with due process and in a nondiscriminatory fashion.
The first Czech bankruptcy law was adopted in 1991, and was
followed by another in 1993. The revised bankruptcy law of March 1996
streamlines and simplifies the bankruptcy process, eliminating old
bureaucratic obstacles. It now permits forced debt restructuring and
prevents ``looting" transactions. However, as earlier, the major Czech
banks who are the largest creditors remain hesitant to force their
debtors, inefficient and large ex-state owned enterprises, into
bankruptcy. The political repercussions to these state-owned banks from
idling thousands of workers still, for now, outweigh the financial
costs incurred by not initiating bankruptcy proceedings. Moreover,
bankruptcy remains an uncertain proposition for both debtor and
creditor, given the three to four year backlog in bankruptcy courts and
the lack of an established secondary market for seized assets. As with
dispute resolution, courts do not have enough experience and resources.
However, bankruptcy statistics show that, even before the recent
amendments, firms and courts are gaining experience with the procedure
and are disposing of cases more efficiently.
5. Is business competition encouraged? (Are monopolistic practices
limited in law and In practice? If so, how? To what degree is
``insider" dealing a hindrance to open competition?) The Czech
competition office, as elsewhere in East-Central Europe, is dominated
by staff from the price control ministries of the old regime. These
people and by extension, the ministry, often see their role as
enforcing economic policy rather than establishing fair rules of the
game. For example, competition authorities have been involved in
investigating the justification for insurance price hikes. They also
meddled in industrial policy-making, allowing a firm to acquire 60
percent of the Czech coffee market in return for employment and
investment guarantees. In addition, the problem of industry ``capture"
of regulatory agencies seems particularly acute across post-communist
Europe and the Czech Republic is no exception. A snug relationship
between managers and regulators has often led to competition policy
regulators actually deterring new competition.
Nevertheless, the Czech Republic has been judged to have created
one of the best institutional structures for competition policy in the
whole of East-Central Europe. It also has created a solid foundation
for improvement. An agreement was reached in January 1996 to coordinate
and harmonize the Czech and the European Commission competition
policies.
One important area of enforcing fair competition rules is
government procurement policy. The Czech procurement procedures are
generally fair and open for large contracts at the central level.
However, this is often not the case at local levels where political
connections often count for much in awarding contracts. Another problem
is that state-owned entities not receiving large budget transfers (such
as utility monopolies) are not required to adhere to government
procurement procedures. Finally, domestic firms receive a 10 percent
price advantage over their foreign competitors. The impact of this is
negligible, however, given the fact that most foreign investors
establish Czech legal entities. Amendments to the procurement law,
pushed forward by the Competition Ministry, went into effect in July
1996. These include clarification and simplification of public tender
procedures on both the local and federal levels. In addition, they
institutionalize transparency-building devices, such as publishing
winners and winning amounts, and they force government bodies to reveal
selection criteria for tenders.
6. Are foreign investment and international trade encouraged? (To
what degree has there been simplification/overhaul of customs and
tariff procedures, and are these applied fairly? To what degree is
foreign investment encouraged or constrained? Is the country overly
trade-dependent on one or two other countries?)
Investment: Generally, there is no legal discrimination against
foreign firms. Foreigners can establish any form of business
organization permitted to citizens. As part of its OECD accession
agreement, it promised not to give preferences to domestic firms in
privatization sales. Profits earned on Czech investments can be
repatriated, but with a 25 percent tax (standard for EU countries),
which is lowered if double-taxation treaties are in effect. There are
no land-ownership restrictions on foreigners.
Nevertheless, in practice, there have been a few instances where
foreign firms have been treated differently: petrochemicals,
telecommunications, mass media, and the brewery industries. These
sectors are highly visible as well as dominated by giant firms, and are
thus politically sensitive. Moreover, there are certain sectors that
are explicitly reserved for domestic firms. These so-called strategic
sectors include defense-related industries, pure-alcohol distilleries,
national monuments, and at least for now, telecommunications and
banking. Finally, government procurement procedures, though liberalized
in 1996, still give a 10 percent price advantage to domestic firms.
The government has largely ignored calls, to offer special tax
incentives to foreign investors, considering them less than conducive
to efficiency. Tax incentives and a temporary protective tariff on
automobiles was granted to Volkswagen in 1990 in return for an
investment of what was to become $3 billion in the Skoda factory.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) reached a record $2.5 billion in
1995 (on the strength of several major investment deals), but fell to a
disappointing $900 million in 1996. Cumulative FDI over the 1990-1996
period was $6.4 billion. Germany is the top investor with a 30 percent
share, the United States, Switzerland and the Netherlands follow, all
with approximately 14 percent.
Trade: Since the Czech Republic adopted the GATT/WTO tariff code,
its average tariffs are in the 5-6 percent range. Nevertheless, some
imported goods (such as certain foods) are charged as much as 68
percent. The government often applies lower tariffs to European
exporters than it does to non-Europeans. However, import protection
levels are substantially below OECD averages.
With the exception of controlled goods, no export controls exist.
Exports account for a large proportion of the Czech economy: 61 percent
of 1995 GDP. The government established the Czech Export Bank in May
1994 to encourage exports by providing access to state-subsidized
medium and long-term financing.
Quantitative controls on imports were almost entirely abolished in
1990. Nontariff restrictions are few, very liberal, and generally
transparent where they exist. Certain imported goods require a license,
but these are not difficult to obtain. Product and labelling standards,
while fairly strict, are rapidly being harmonized with European and
international standards. Product testing regulations were streamlined
and liberalized in reforms which took effect in January 1997. In the
early years, product testing was often a bureaucratic nightmare,
performed at state-run testing stations. Now testing for most products
is voluntary and performed at efficient private testing stations. One
problem that still exists is the lack of a national products database.
This leads to duplication as importers bringing in products tested
elsewhere often have to resubmit for testing. Border customs stops are
generally fairly simple for goods traveling to and from Western Europe,
but much more onerous for Eastern Europe.
As a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
the Czech Republic acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
January 1995. The Czech Republic is a founding member of the Central
European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), which also includes Poland,
Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia. All nonagricultural and food trade
within CEFTA is scheduled to become duty-free in 1998. It is also a
member of the European Free Trade Associate (EFTA), and has an
association agreement with the European Union. The Czech Republic
formally submitted its membership application to the EU in January
1996.
Since the downfall of the Communist CMEA trading bloc, Czech trade
has been radically reoriented. In 1989, 44.7 percent of the Czech
Republic's exports and 44.4 percent of its imports were to and from
former fellow CMEA members. in the first quarter of 1996, 65-70 percent
of Czech trade was with advanced Western industrial countries, and only
29 percent with post communist nations in Eastern Europe. In 1995,
exports totalled $17.1 billion, and imports were $20.9 billion. Germany
is the Czech Republic's single largest trading partner, accounting for
31.8 percent of exports and 25.8 percent of imports in 1995.
7. Has there been reform of the banking sector? (is the central
bank independent? What are its responsibilities? Is it effective in
setting and/or implementing monetary policy? What is the actual state
of the private banking sector? Does it conform to international
standards? Are depositors protected?) In 1990 the state monobank was
split between two state-owned banks, Komercni Bank (for commercial
activities) and Investicny Banka (for long-term investment). The State
Bank of Czechoslovakia (now known as the Czech National Bank, or CNB)
was established as the independent central bank in charge of monetary
policy. The CNB began operations in January 1993. It is independent by
law--Article 98 of the Constitution notes that ``the main purpose of
[the CNB'S] operations shall be to care for the stability of the
currency; intercessions in its operations may be effected only on the
basis of law." it is also autonomous in practice. It is responsible for
money market policy, the money supply, regulating the banking sector,
and setting interest rates.
Headed by Josef Tosovsky, one of the architects of the Czech
economic reforms, the CNB is moving closer to the model of the German
Bundesbank. The CNB's supervisory authority was augmented by two
amendments to the banking code adopted in 1994. These amendments also
established deposit insurance, which guarantee deposits up to Kc
100,000 (about $3,600).
In 1996, the Czech banking system underwent a severe crisis. The
Kreditni and Investicni Banka, the nation's six largest, collapsed in
August. Its fall entailed the loss of 12 billion crowns ($440 million).
In September, the CNB announced that Agrobanka, the largest private
bank and the fifth largest overall, was suffering from extreme
liquidity problems connected with the Kreditni collapse, and that it
had named an administrator to temporarily take over the bank. In all,
twelve of sixty banks have failed in the last two years. Six of these
are in bankruptcy and the rest under forced administration.
These collapses have shown the problems of Czech banking, including
management and lending inexperience, cases of outright fraud, and
inadequate supervision from above by the CNB. However, the public
nature of the 1996 bank crisis has spurred the CNB into proposing
needed reforms to the banking code, including the use of external
auditors and the adoption of international accounting standards.
In September 1996, Czech police charged five people with fraud in
connection with the Kreditni collapse, two of whom are connected with
Motoinvest, a financial group which has become a large shareholder in
several important Czech companies. Motoinvest also holds 13 percent in
Agrobanka. The government soon established a special investigative team
to examine issues of bank fraud to follow up on the collapse of the
several large Czech banks. A special parliamentary commission was also
constituted by an agreement between Prime Minister Klaus and CSSD
leader Zeman. A state company was established in October 1996 to buy
bad loans from small banks, which have been disproportionately
troubled, in order to help stabilize them. Another casualty of the bank
crises has been the scheduled privatization of the state shares in
banks.
The banking sector is not an entire failure: the four largest
banks, Komercni Banka, Ceska Sporitelna, Ceskoslovenska obchodnibanka,
and Investicni a postovni banka, have a market value of 110 billion
crowns ($4.1 billion), and constitute 70 percent of the banking sector.
Thus far, the collapses have only affected 4 percent of all banking
assets, a large but not devastating amount. On the other hand, the four
largest banks are still essentially state-owned and have not undergone
the reconstruction necessary to transform them into efficient, profit-
making banks in the Western mode.
One problem in the banking sector is the complex web of
interlocking ownership and credit arrangement, between the banks, the
investment funds, the government, and the National Property Fund. For
example, the Investicnia postovni banka (IPB) directly or indirectly
owns many Czech companies. At the same time, these companies are owners
of the IPB bank. This sort of confused ownership undermines shareholder
control of banks and leaves management free from the discipline of
profit-maximizing owners. However, the CNB proposed reforms in early
1997 to begin addressing this problem. These include restrictions on
ownership of nonbank firms as well as, a ban on shareholder ownership
of more than a 10 percent stake in a bank.
8. Is there a functioning capital market Infrastructure? (Are there
existing or planned commodities, bond and stock markets? What are the
mechanisms for investment and lending?) The Prague Stock Exchange (PSE)
is the highest-capitalized equity market in the region. There are some
1,700 companies on the exchange, the majority of which were created by
the two waves of voucher privatization. In fact, the presence of the
exchange is critical for the ultimate success of the Czech
privatization program. This is because, as its creators foresaw, the
dispersed ownership structures created by free voucher distribution to
the entire population would not be efficient and operational along
Western lines until a secondary market helped consolidate ownership and
distribute it to efficient proprietors.
Unfortunately, since its creation, the PSE has experienced numerous
problems and has acquired the reputation of being an insiders market.
The biggest of these problems is the lack of transparency. Many of the
traded companies fail to give information about themselves to potential
investors, nor do they inform current shareholders about arguably
important events like earnings and mergers. They are not forced to do
so because a U.S.-style securities and exchange commission does not
exist as yet (however, with the support of Tomas Jezek, the director of
the PSE, a regulatory commission is expected in the medium-term).
Liquidity is low as most of the companies on the exchange are not
regularly traded on the PSE itself. Most transactions happen privately.
Average daily trading volume in 1995 was only $30.9 million, an
increase from 1994's average of $14.3 million.
Amendments to securities law took effect in July 1996. They
increased protections for minority shareholders by requiring new
majority owners to offer a buy out to all shareholders at a weighted
six-month PSE share price. In addition, boards will be prevented from
taking a company private without a 75 percent majority decision by all
shareholders. They also increase transaction transparency by requiring
the disclosure of major share acquisitions, mandating that listed firms
publish their annual statements three months after the close of the
fiscal year, and by establishing stock lending (previously unregulated)
as a ``legally binding contractual relationship."
The amendments also require licensing of investment funds,
requiring the use of international accounting standards, mandating the
segregation of investment fund assets from the assets they manage for
their clients, and making them file quarterly reports on their
portfolios. The enforcement of the last of these will be key, as
investment funds in the past have ignored already--existing reporting
rules.
However, the administrative capacity of the Ministry of Finance may
not be up to the task of Western-style regulation of the securities
industry. Jan Ververka, the head of capital markets supervision in the
Ministry, complained in November 1996 that his department is only able
to actively regulate 20 percent of the 800 investment funds and
brokerages. Several Western investors have noted that regulators
already sometimes ignore clear violations of existing rules.
Two commodity exchanges exist in the Czech Republic. The first is
the Brno Farm Produce Exchange, which was founded in July 1993 and
deals mainly with agricultural commodities. The more general Czech-
Moravian Commodity Exchange in Kladno was established in November 1995,
trading a wide variety of commodities.
As a result of a tight and well-managed fiscal policy, the Czech
Republic's bond market is dominated by long-term private sector debt.
However, the market is fairly small and, as a result, a mature
secondary market in bonds has yet to emerge. The total nominal value of
publicly traded bonds was 10.7 percent of GDP in June 1996, and bonds
accounted for 3 5.7 percent of PSE trading in 1995. Liquidity and
transparency in the bond market, as in the equity market, leaves much
to be desired. The bond derivatives market is immature.
9. Has there been reform of the energy sector? (To what degree has
the energy sector been restructured? Is the energy sector more varied,
and is it open to private competition? Is the country overly dependent
on one or two other countries for energy [including whether exported
fuels must pass through one or more countries to reach markets]?)
Energy sector reforms in the Czech Republic date from 1992, when the
distribution and production subsectors were separated. Shortly
afterwards, Ceske Energeticke Zarody (CEZ), the state electricity
monopoly, was ``privatized" (the state has yet to sell the National
Property Fund's 67 percent share). Later, the country's ten large heat
plants were sold to investment funds and individual shareholders.
Furthermore, the privatizing of state-owned enterprises was in itself
liberalizing the energy sector because these Brobdingnagian enterprises
operate their own power plants. In November 1994, the parliament passed
legislation establishing the legal framework for energy production and
trade.
Energy sector liberalization has stalled, however, since 1994.
Whereas in 1994 private firms were producing 20 percent of the
country's energy, by March 1996, the private sector share had only
increased to 30 percent. The inadequate 1994 energy law has not been
amended, the NPF stake in CEZ has not been sold, trade in electricity
on the CEZ network has not been legalized, the nation's eight
distribution companies have not been privatized, the creation of an
independent regulatory commission has been delayed, and pricing is
still not market-driven.
Because of state regulation and subsidy policy, the price of energy
does not cover production costs. These controls ensure that households
receive a far lower price for electricity by being subsidized through
high prices charged to industry. This has led to the inefficient use of
electricity in homes for such purposes as heating. Prices are currently
increased twice a year in 15 percent increments. The government's
economic ministers recommended in September 1996 the total
liberalization of energy prices over a two-year period. Of course,
given the government's track record in the energy sector, these
proposals have to be read with a grain of salt.
Domestic coal supplies a little more than half of Czech energy
requirements. The country imported 80 percent of its natural gas needs
from Russia. Nuclear energy supplies 22 percent of Czech energy
requirements. Oil used to be imported entirely from Russia until 1995,
when the construction of an oil pipeline from Germany was finished.
This new pipeline will carry 2 million tons of crude oil, as compared
with the 5 million tons transmitted by the Russian pipeline.
Recent developments have shown the state's willingness to allow
foreign involvement in the energy sector. In October 1995, the Czech
electricity transmission network was connected to UCPTE, the European
transmission network. A consortium of Western oil companies, including
Shell, Conoco, and Agip, finalized the purchase of a 49 percent ($138
million) stake in Ceske Refinerska in February 1996. The consortium has
promised $480 million in investment. Unipetrol, the state owned holding
company, controls the other 51 percent.
HUNGARY
Freedom in the World Ratings, 1988-1997
1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97
Political Rights 5 4 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
Civil Liberties 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Status PF PF F F F F F F F
Polity: Consolidated Democracy
Economy: Consolidated Market
Population: 10,230,000
PPP: $6,451
Ethnic Groups: Hungarian (96 percent), Romanian, Slovak
German, Roma, Croat and Bosnian Muslim refugees
Capital: Budapest
_______________________________________________________________________
Political Process 1.25/7
1. When did national legislative elections occur? The first
multiparty national legislative elections since 1945 occurred in March
1990. The Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) won the elections and its
leader, Jozsef Antall, was elected prime minister in May 1990. The most
recent national elections occurred in May 1994, and were declared free
and fair by a number of international organizations. Following the 1994
elections, which led to a governing coalition of the victorious (former
Communist) Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the liberal Alliance of
Free Democrats (SzDSz), the distribution of seats in the National
Assembly was as follows: MSZP, 209 seats (54.2 percent); SzDSz, 70
(18.1 percent); MDF, 37 (9.6 percent); Independent Smallholders' Party,
26 (6.7 percent); Christian Democratic People's Party, 22 (5.7
percent); Federation of Young Democrats, 20 (5.2 percent); Agrarian
Federation, 1 (.25 percent); Republican Party, 1 (.25 percent). The
Agrarian Federation and the Republican Party joined the SzDSz
parliamentary group.
2. When did presidential elections occur? In May 1990, Arpad Goncz,
a member of the SzDSz, was elected president for a five-year term by
the Parliament. President Goncz was reelected to a second five-year
term in June 1995. The second presidential election was controversial,
as some political parties had pushed for direct election of the
president. The Independent Small Holders Party presented a petition
signed by more than 200,000 citizens favoring a referendum to determine
the method of presidential elections, but the petition was ruled
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. The Independent
Smallholders Party boycotted the elections. Hence only 360 out of 386
members of the Parliament voted in the second presidential elections.
3. Is the electoral system multiparty-based? Are there at least two
viable political parties functioning at the level of the government?
Yes, the electoral system is multiparty-based since 1989-1990.
Currently there are six political parties represented in the National
Assembly, and local elections are contested by a range of political
parties and individuals. After the 1994 elections, the ruling coalition
reduced state support for political parties. This decision may benefit
the ruling MSZP in the next elections. On the local level there were at
least two viable parties competing in each electoral district.
4. How many parties have been legalized? The Budapest City Court
has registered close to 200 political parties since 1989, in addition
to many movements and associations.
5. What proportion of the population belongs to political parties?
No official figures of party membership are available. No more than 5
percent of the electorate are members or active supporters of political
parties.
6. What has been the voter turnout at the municipal, provincial and
national levels in the recent years? In the first round of the 1990
legislative elections the turnout was 65.1 percent. In the first round
of the May 1994 legislative and local elections the turnout was 68.9
percent, the turnout in the second round was 55.1 percent. The increase
in voter turnout in the first round run counter to pessimistic views
expressed in the media that people had lost interest in politics. The
turnout during the 1990 municipal elections was at or below 20 percent
in many areas.
Civil Society 1.25/7
1. How many nongovernmental organizations have come into existence
since 1988? How many charitable/nonprofit organizations? There has been
an explosion in the number of NGOs registered since 1988. Charitable/
nonprofit organizations have been set up by the hundreds during the
course of the past eight years. The number of registered NGOs
(nonprofit charitable organizations, associations, trade unions,
interest groups) swelled to 40,000 in 1995, and some 1.2 million
citizens are active members of these organizations.
There are three basic types of NGOs in Hungary. First, there are
organizations representing professional bodies. The government gives
them considerable authority; for example, certain lawyer associations
allow individuals to practice law. This type of NGO is close to the
government and may be influenced by it. Second, there are political
lobbying or pressure groups, which are often composed of members of
failed political parties. Third, there are service agencies, which
include organizations involved in welfare, culture, education, health,
and various foundations.
The structure of civic organizations and associations also went
through significant changes between 1990 and 1996. Organizations that
functioned mostly on a local level developed national networks and
centers, and they established interest representation and
reconciliation forums and joined the general system of interest
reconciliation. Thus, beside the trade unions, NGOs are also actively
involved in the civil round table negotiations with the government. The
general agreement among the representatives of NGOs is that the law on
nonprofit organizations ensures the independence of civic
organizations.
2. What forms of Interest group participation in politics are
legal? Except for specific rules disqualifying judges, MPs, armed
forces personnel, civil servant, and so on, all forms of interest group
participation in politics are legal if they are not prohibited by the
penal code. Only political parties are barred from conducting their
activities at the workplace.
3. Are there free trade unions? Close to 30 percent of workers,
approximately 1.2 million employees, belong to trade unions. Of these,
about 400,000, or one-third of all union members, are members of the
unions established since 1988. The two largest independent trade unions
are the Democratic Confederation of Free Trade Unions (LIGA) with
100,000 members and the Hungarian Workers Council with 150,000 members.
Hungary's former Communist organization of trade unions, the National
Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions (MSzOSz), survived the political
changes of 1990 and now enjoys a considerable political and social
influence. The MSzOSz, which represents the majority of organized
workers in Hungary, is controlled by the MSZP, and is therefore not
free and independent. It claims to have 1.2 million members, although
the figure is probably closer to 800,000.
In the Interest Reconciliation Council (ET)--a formal forum set up
by the Horn government, where government representatives discus and
mediate disputes between the representatives of employers and
employees--the following six trade unions are represented: 1) the
MSzOSz, 66.6 percent; 2) the association of autonomous Trade Unions
(ASzSz), 20.3 percent; 3) the trade Unions' Cooperative Forum (SzEF),
4) the Council of Interest-Representation Associations (ESzT), 5) LIGA,
6.4 percent; and 6) the Worker's Councils (Munkastanacsok), 2.5
percent. In general, the trade unions opposed the austerity measures
proposed by the government and the employers, and defended the
interests of their members. The forty major strikes organized by trade
unions in 1995 and 1996 suggest that these organizations--including the
majority MSzOSz--are free and independent from the government.
4. What Is the numerical/proportional membership of farmers groups,
small business associations, etc.? Many small holders associations
exist and are active. Similarly, a plethora of independent
entrepreneurial associations operate currently in Hungary, although the
majority are localized and concentrated in Budapest. According to the
National Statistical Bureau (KSH) the membership in farmer's
associations is approximately 8,000, and the membership of small
business associations, including regional chambers of commerce, is
27,000. In addition, it is important to note that some registered NGOs
are actually businesses which sought legal classification as
foundations because of the enormous tax advantages involved. These
advantages include the ability to pay tax-free ``scholarships" to
employees rather than wages. A Budapest pizzeria, for instance, has
been designated a foundation.
Civic NGOs are numerically much larger than the ones representing
commercial interests (with the exception of the trade unions). The most
significant civic associations are organized in the Union of Civic
Associations (TESz), with 464 NGOS, and the Council of Interest-
reconciliation Associations (TET), with seventy-four NGOS. The largest
NGOs (outside the trade unions) are the National Association of Large
Families (NOE), with registered 120,000 members, the National Chamber
of Retired People (ONK), and the Association of Hungarian Women (MNSz).
This suggests that among the 40,000 registered NGOs many are marginal.
Independent Media 1.50/7
1. Are there legal protections for press freedom? Yes. Although no
media law had been passed until December 1995, legal protections for
press freedom are explicitly guaranteed by the constitution. Though
freedom of the press was nominally guaranteed even before 1989, it has
been respected only since the sweeping political transformation of
1989-1990.
The Parliament passed a law regulating television and radio
broadcasting in December 1995. The law has three basic sections. The
first concentrates on broadcasting for general audiences. Local
broadcasts have to be at least 20 percent of total by January 1999,
while commercial programs should not exceed 20 percent of the total.
The second section sets the rules for public and commercial
broadcasting, and stipulates that the commercials should not exceed six
minutes per hour. The third section deals with the regulations of
public programing: 51 percent has to be made in Hungary, and 70 percent
of all programs should be made in Europe. Most media experts agree that
the new media law is one of the most comprehensive ones in the post-
Communist states of East Central Europe, yet they suggest that the law
dictates an untenable pace of change in the state-owned Antena
Hungaria.
2. Are there legal penalties for libeling officials? Are there
legal penalties for ``irresponsible'' journalism? The law stipulates
penalties for the unfounded libeling or defamation of any individual,
including officials. The Criminal Code specifies a number of offenses
which might be committed via the press, such as defamation or
incitement to hatred against the community. In those cases it is the
individual writer who is primarily responsible for the criminal offense
and who is sentenced, but under the general rules of the criminal law
the editor may also be held responsible. Apart from liability under
criminal law, there is also liability under civil law. The defendant
maybe sued for damages in the case of a violation of personal rights.
However, punishment for libel is extremely light and has little if any
deterrent impact, particularly for the large publications.
In March 1996, the Parliament passed an amendment to the penal code
that stipulates that ``anyone who incites hatred or acts in any other
way that is capable of inciting against the Hungarian nation or any
other national, ethnic, or religious minority or race, must be punished
by up to three years of imprisonment." The law was passed after several
well-publicized incidents of racial hatred in recent years ended with
the acquittal of the defendants based on their constitutional right to
free speech. Some contemporary developments suggest, however, that the
controversy between what should qualify as an incitement to hatred and
what as an example of free speech, is far from being resolved. The
state prosecutor, for instance, has banned not only the Magyar
translation of Mein Kampf, but also the English version, although the
work is being routinely used at Western universities.
3. What proportion of media are privatized? Some small local radio
stations exist in limited markets. No national radio stations are
privately owned; however, several regional stations such as Radio
Juventus and Radio Bridge can be heard throughout the nation by using
transmitting stations. Local cable companies are owned privately, and
cable dominates the Hungarian media. Several local television stations
broadcast on AM micro-channels, and there are some small private
channels servicing single districts of large cities. No national
television station is owned privately. Today there is a wide variety of
generally high-quality, uncensored national and local papers, 80
percent of which are in private hands. There is no government-owned
daily newspaper. The largest daily is a former Communist party paper
that is now owned by the Bertelsmann company (BMG) based in Germany.
The Communists privatized the paper before the change in the political
system. The Hungarian government owns no stock in the paper.
Nevertheless, what is decided by the ruling Socialist Party is
reflected in the paper, since the daily is close to the governing
party. There is one government agency that is responsible for sending
out news received from official sources. Besides the state-owned MTI
wire services there is also a private Ferenczi wire service owned by
MTM Communications.
In November 1996, the draft for ten-year concessions for two
national television channels was published in a bid to privatize a
large part of the state-dominated television market by May 1997. The
plan for privatization includes three national public service channels
and two commercial channels for television viewers in Hungary. The two
largest companies interested in the concessions are Compagnie
Luxembourgeoise de Telediffusion (CTL), which recently merged with
Germany's Bertelsmann, the Central European Development Corporation,
the Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung group and France's TF1. In
addition, today there are around twenty-six private commercial
television stations in Hungary, and thirty-one radio stations.
4. Are the media financially viable? Yes, in most cases. Given the
transitional character of the Hungarian media market, there has been a
relatively high turnover of new publications and many of them proved
not to be viable. Generally speaking, however, private media,
especially organizations with a high percentage of foreign ownership,
perform successfully.
The state owned Hungarian Radio and Television are reportedly in
deep financial trouble and have requested 18 billion forints from the
government. Due to budgetary constraints, the government granted only
2.5 billion forints as a loan, with real estate being used as
collateral. Most media experts agree that both state owned media
organizations, the Hungarian TV and Radio, are chronically overstaffed
by thousands of in-house employees, and that both organizations will
have to make significant cuts in staff and broadcasting time to remain
competitive.
5. Are media editorially independent? Legally, the media are
editorially independent. Some newspapers, however, are owned by banks
and trusts that are in government hands, and some local papers are in
the hands of local self-governing bodies (administrations). For
example, the majority state-owned Posta Bank owns at least four papers
and a large private radio station, Radio Bridge. In addition, since
many major publications were privatized before 1989, the leaders of the
opposition argue that many editors have remained loyal to the Communist
successor MSZP. State-owned radio and television, according to
opposition leaders, are not editorially independent, because their
heads were fired by the government in the spring of 1994. The
government also announced plans to dismiss 1,000 state radio and TV
employees, citing financial constraints. Critics of this move charge
that it is politically motivated.
The opposition has been unable to substantiate its charges of
political pressure on the media. The state radio and TV continue to
suffer from significant over-manning and inefficiency; yet no employees
have been fired. Reports of major corruption scandals involving members
of the government suggest that the media have been able to maintain
their independence. There is not a single daily newspaper that shows a
clear pro-government bias. On the contrary, in May 1995, for instance,
information was leaked relating to a secret transfer of state funds to
the majority state-owned Budapest Bank, the president of which was the
Finance Minister, Lajos Bokros. The Bank was found to have violated the
law by keeping the $10 million transfer secret from shareholders and
Bokros was forced to resign.
6. Is the distribution system for newspapers privately or
governmentally controlled? The major newspaper distributor in Hungary
is a government entity, the Hungarian Distributor's Office, not
necessarily because the government wants to control or influence
distribution, but rather because the distribution process is
prohibitively expensive when done privately. Nevertheless, a new
distribution service was created in 1995 by foreign-owned publications
in response to the reported inefficiency and high cost of the state
system. The new organization operates as a limited partnership.
7. What has been the trend in press freedom? Freedom House's Annual
Survey of Press Freedom rated Hungary Not Free for 1988, Partly Free
for 1989, Free from 1990 through 1992, Partly Free for 1993, Free for
1994, and Partly Free again for 1995, due mainly to mass-firings from
the state owned media, and the increased pressure to reflect pro-
government views. In sum, the absence of a single daily newspaper,
radio or TV station that shows a clear pro-government bias, the
reporting of corruption scandals involving MPs and ministers of the
Horn cabinet, as well as the positive international reaction to the new
media law, all suggest that the media is editorially independent from
the government and its reporting is objective. There were, however,
several cases of corruption in print media, where commercial
organizations bribed newspaper editors in order to get favorable
reports on their products and business ventures.
Rule of Law 1.75/7
1. Is there a post-Communist constitution? The present Hungarian
constitution is a patchwork of amendments introduced in 1989 and 1990,
when the parliament changed practically the entire wording of the
Communist constitution dating from 1949. While most legal experts agree
that the amended constitution conforms with the requirements of a
parliamentary democracy, they point out that its wording is often
vague. This has led to jurisdictional conflicts among various
government institutions and offices. After the 1994 legislative
elections the six parliamentary parties agreed to draft a new
constitution.
The six parliamentary parties selected the members of the
constitutional committee, and agreed on the procedural rules that would
guide the drafting and approval of the new constitution. The coalition
parties agreed that the opposition will have a substantial say in the
preparation of the new constitution, as well as in any changes to the
Standing Order in Parliament. In addition the ruling coalition agreed
that the constitutional committee will have twenty-four members instead
of the proposed twenty-seven, four from each party represented in the
parliament, reflecting the current proportional representation in the
legislative body. Finally, Parliament amended the Constitution by
saying that the new rules in the Standing Order that describe the
constitutionalization process, can only be enforced by a four-fifths
majority. The draft of the new constitution had not yet been approved
in 1996, and it does not seem likely that the draft will be ready
before the 1998 elections.
2. Does the constitutional framework provide for human rights? Do
the human rights include business and property rights? The present
constitution declares that Hungary recognizes the inalienable and
inviolable basic rights of man and it is the foremost responsibility of
the state to ensure the observance of these rights. Individual and
human rights, freedom of speech and assembly, social and property
rights are extensively covered in the constitution. Accordingly,
parliament passed a number of amendments to the penal code, including
laws regulating freedom of the press and defamation, and laws on
defense of minorities in 1996. According to the experts, laws governing
business and property rights in Hungary are fair and meet western
standards. Yet, it has to be acknowledged that the courts and the legal
bureaucracy are overburdened and rulings even on relatively simple
cases can take years.
3. Has there been basic reform of the criminal code/criminal law?
Since 1989 there has been substantial reform in the Hungarian criminal
code. The death penalty for political crimes, aggravated detention,
penal idleness, as well as reformative-educative labor have all been
abolished. A new article supplementing the criminal code states that a
person who violates the freedom of conscience and religion of another
individual by force shall be punished with imprisonment for up to three
years. The crime of ``incitement against the community" was inserted
into the penal code to ensure that national, religious and linguistic
minorities are protected under criminal law. Finally, drug traffickers
are liable to receive much more severe punishments than before, while
individuals using drugs in small quantities receive offers to undergo
treatment. If they agree to be treated, no criminal proceedings are
initiated, or proceedings already under way are discontinued.
Between 1994 and 1996, four significant criminal laws were passed
by the parliament. Amendment IX/1994 to the penal code regulates the
sale and use of fire arms; amendment XLI/1995 changed the age limit for
the prosecution of juvenile delinquents in cases of serious crimes;
amendment XVII/ 1996 to section IV/1978 of the penal code prescribes
harsh punishment for offenses against minorities; and amendment LII/
1996 deals explicitly with crimes related to the smuggling of nuclear
materials and acts causing environmental destruction.
4. Do most judges rule fairly and impartially? How many remain from
the Communist era? The decisive majority of judges is respected for
being impartial and fair. The percentage of the judges appointed before
1989 is approximately 55 percent.
5. Are courts free of political control and influence? Are the
courts linked directly to the Ministry of Justice or any other
executive body? As established by the constitution, the judiciary is
independent from the other branches of government and subordinate only
to the law. To shield the judiciary from political influence, the
constitution stipulates that judges cannot be members of any political
party, nor can they engage in any political activities.
The independence judges in Hungary is guaranteed in several ways.
First, the judiciary is financially independent from the executive
branch of the government. Legislation in Hungary stipulates that the
courts budget is also separate from the Ministry justice. Second, the
system for the promotion and remuneration judges is determined
exclusively by law, with no derogations allowed. Third, with the
exception of the president of the constitutional court who is elected
by Parliament,judges are appointed by the president of the republic on
the recommendation of the Minister justice, but with the consent of the
judicial Council. Fourth, a judge ceases to perform his duties either
at his own request, because he is declared incapable by his peers, or
because of professional misconduct when the disciplinary council
recommends to the president of the Republic that the judge should be
removed from his function. Finally,judges enjoy immunity from
prosecution and therefore cannot be arrested and detained, or be the
subject of criminal proceedings except by authorization of the
president of the republic.
In 1995, the constitutional court overturned portions of law,
passed by the legislature, related to economic austerity measures
introduced by the Finance Minister. This was the first constitutional
court ruling against the current government, and it signaled that the
court will continue to function independently. Together, the
constitutional court ruled on 169 cases. On average, the constitutional
court rules on approximately 150 cases every year. Of these, some 35
percent are found to be unconstitutional. Experts agree that the
constitutional court in Hungary is one of the most active and
independent among the post-Communist states.
6. What proportion of lawyers is in private practice? Currently,
about 6,000 lawyers are employed by private law firms. Companies,
firms, trade unions, and associations, as well as various other
organizations, employ close to 25,000 counsels, solicitors, and
advisors. Together, there are close to 30,000 lawyers in private
practice, which is more than 80 percent of the total. The rest are
employed in the judiciary and governmental organizations. According to
Istvan Soltesz, the secretary general of the Hungarian Parliament,
close to 60 percent of the MPs are lawyers (including himself).
7. Does the state provide public defenders? According to the
constitution and to the penal code the state is liable to provide
public defenders if the accused have no means to obtain, and/or to pay
for a private defense lawyer.
8. Has there been a comprehensive reform of ant-bias/discrimination
laws, including the protection of ethnic minority rights? In July 1993,
Parliament passed a Law on National and Ethnic Minority Rights. Two
years of preparatory work and several draft texts went into it. The law
bans discrimination against minorities and regards their rights to
national and ethnic self-identity as part of universal human rights and
basic freedoms. The law recognizes all ethnic groups that have lived in
Hungary for at least a century, and whose members are Hungarian
citizens but have their own language, culture and traditions. These
groups include Armenians, Bulgarians, Croats, Germans, Greeks, Poles,
Roma, Romanians, Ruthenians, Serbs, Slovaks, Slovenes and Ukrainians.
Nevertheless, Hungary's estimated 500,000 Roma (Gypsies) continue to
suffer de facto discrimination in employment and housing, and have been
hit especially hard by the effects of economic restructuring. They have
also been the victims of skinhead attacks and vigilante justice.
Parliament passed an amendment to the penal code that stipulates
that anyone who incites hatred or acts in a way likely to incite hatred
against the Hungarian nation or any other national, ethnic, or
religious minority, will be punished by up to three years of
imprisonment. The law was passed after several well-publicized
incidents of racial hatred in recent years ended with the acquittal of
the defendants based on their constitutional right to free speech. In
addition, the 1994 election results suggest that the 3 percent minority
candidates elected into local representative organs corresponds to the
proportion of minorities living in Hungary. Yet only 1 percent of
minority mayors were elected. Proportionally, the strongest
representation was gained by the German minority, while weakest are the
gypsies.
Governance and Public Administration 1.75/7
1. Is the legislature the effective rule-making institution? There
is consensus among legal experts that the Hungarian Parliament is
fulfilling its function as the country's supreme legislative body.
Between its first session in May 1990 and March 1992, the Parliament
passed over 180 laws, compared with an average of four or five per year
under Communism. Beginning in the early 1990s, the substantive nature
of the legislation passed indicated that a true democratic lawmaking
body was emerging. Also in contrast to lawmaking during the Communist
period, government decrees are now subordinate to legislative
enactments.
During its 1993 session, Parliament voted on 117 Acts, 103
Resolutions, and it issued two Statements; one was the proposition of a
principle ``On the Interpretation of the Limitation of Culpability,"
and the other was a declaration ``Against Hate Provoking Extreme
Manifestations." In 1994, 105 laws were passed, in 1995, 126 laws, and
until November of 1996 some 70, including the Media Law.
2. Is substantial power decentralized to subnational levels of
government? According to Chapter IX of the constitution on local self-
government, there is substantial decentralization of political power to
the subnational level. Administratively, the territory of Hungary is
divided into a capital city, counties, towns and communities, with
their own, subnational governments. These governments have equal
rights, but their obligations may differ. The rights of subnational
governments are protected by the courts, and they often turn to the
constitutional court to protect their rights. Local representatives are
elected through local plebiscites for a four-year term. They may
develop their own framework of laws and ordinances (if not contrary to
higher statutes), and may affiliate with other local bodies of
representatives. A legal framework is in place which provides for the
right to autonomous policy making at this level. However, some local
and regional governments are in a weak financial position. Thus, the
limits on their power are not necessarily politically motivated but
largely the result of economic and financial constraints.
3. Are subnational offices chosen in free and fair elections? Yes,
local, regional and other subnational officers are chosen in free and
fair elections. An exception is at the subregional level, where
Commissioners of the Republic are appointed by the government to
supervise more than one county. These commissioners ensure that all
local decrees correspond to national laws, and they can suspend the
application of local decrees that run counter to national laws. The
most recent subnational elections were held in December 1994. The 1994
Law LXII on subnational elections states that 1) the electoral system
shall have one round relative majority elections at the local level,
and 2) all communities (together 3,147) shall elect mayors locally.
Before the 1994 law was enacted, only communities with more than 10,000
inhabitants held such elections. The turnout in the 1994 local
elections was 43.4 percent (3.4 percent higher than in the 1990
elections). Together 95,000 candidates ran for office and 21,495 were
elected.
4. Do legislative bodies actually function? Yes, national, regional
and local legislative bodies do function. The National Assembly
(Parliament) has been especially active in debating and passing laws.
Local legislative bodies have enacted a large number of rules and
regulations within their respective jurisdictions. According to Istvan
Kukorelli, a Hungarian political scientist, the activity of local
legislative bodies seems to correspond to the size of the electoral
district, where larger districts are more active than the smaller ones.
Hence, Budapest has the most active, as well as the most influential,
subnational legislation. Most of the legislative activity on the
subnational level is directed toward raising revenues at the local
level, and the regulation of commercial activities.
5. Do the executive and legislative bodies operate openly and with
transparency? Yes, they operate, openly and with transparency under the
scrutiny of the public, and the press, as well as the State Audit
Board, the Central Audit Office, and the Government Control Bureau.
During first two years of the Horn government eleven ministers either
resigned or were dismissed, the latest ones in the wake of a corruption
scandal involving payments of millions of dollars by the State
Privatization Agency (APV) to a consultant. Lajos Bokros, the Finance
Minister Involved in the $10 million transfer to the Budapest Bank, was
the first among ministers who resigned in 1996.
The State Audit Board was created in 1990, and the Central Audit
Office in 1993, to control the economy and manage the publicly financed
central institutions. By the end of 1994, the Central Audit Office was
replaced by the Government Control Bureau, an independent national
organ of state administration. The bureau has the right to control the
two subsystems of public finance; the central budget and the separate
national funds. It can also explore how cabinet decisions are
implemented. Finally, the president can veto bills passed by the
legislature. In December 1996, for instance, President Arpad Goncz
vetoed two bills backed by the government. Political scientist Attila
Ledenyi pointed out that Gonzc, a former Free Democrat (SzDSz), vetoed
the bills backed by the SzDSz to show his nonpartisanship; others
pointed to corruption scandals involving members of the Horn
government.
6. Do municipal governments have sufficient revenue to carry out
their duties? Do municipal governments have control of their own local
budgets? Do they raise revenue autonomously or from the central state
budget? Generally speaking, municipal governments do have revenues to
carry out their duties, although the country's difficult economic
situation places a significant burden on them. A part of municipal
revenues is provided directly by the central state budget, and the
other part raised locally, from real estate and business taxes. Local
governments raise this portion of revenues autonomously, while the
portion provided from the central state budget is often earmarked for
specific projects. The XLVI Law of 1996, for instance, ear-marked funds
for Budapest for the construction of hospitals, the reconstruction and
maintenance of national historical sites and monuments, and for the
modernization of infrastructure. In addition to municipal revenues tied
to administrative districts, the central state budget earmarks funds
for the self-government of minorities living in Hungary These funds are
proportional to the size of the respective minorities. The National
Roma Minority Self-Government, for instance, received most of its
revenue from this source (90 million forint) for 1997, while the
Bulgarian, Greek, Polish and Armenian minority self-governments
received the least (7 million forint).
7. Do the elected local leaders and local civil servants know how
to manage municipal governments effectively? Yes, most of the local
leaders elected during or after 1990 have proved to be competent and
able to manage municipal government. To keep up with the complexities
created by the transitional processes, large-scale programs to deepen
the professional knowledge of those managing local government are
currently under way. These programs are financed by the central state
budget.
8. Has there been constitutional/legislative reform regarding local
power? Has there been a reform regarding the civil service code/system?
Are civil servants employees of the local or central government? In
1991, law reforming the Local Administration of Self-Governing Bodies
was passed. The current socialist government modified and simplified
the law in 1994, providing for single-round local elections and direct
elections of mayors in every community. The civil service code/system
was reformed in 1991. Unified requirements and standards were
established for an exam in public administration for all those in, or
wishing to enter, the civil service. This reform applies to those
public officials working at both the local and the national levels.
Local civil servants are the employees of local governments, although
their official status as civil servants is identical with those
employed by the central government. No significant changes were made in
the civil service code in 1995 and 1996.
Privatization 150/7
1. What percentage of GDP comes from private ownership? As of late
1994 about 58 percent of GDP came from private ownership. The World
Bank estimated in mid-1995 that the private share of GDP had reached 60
percent. According to the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) Country
Report, Hungary's privatization continues to be a success story. The
private sector generates some 75 percent of Hungary's GDP, and the
government considers that its privatization program will be virtually
completed by the end of 1997.
2.What major privatization legislation has been passed?
privatization started with the passage of Act No. 13 in 1989 that
governs the transformation of state companies into joint-stock and
limited liability firms. According to the legislation, privatization in
Hungary has to take place through sale, or open or closed tender. The
national (state-owned) property is privatized under the supervision of
the Property-managing Organization of the National Treasury (KVS), the
State Property Agency (AVU) and the State Property Management Holding
Co. (AVRt), which was changed into the State Privatization and Property
Management Holding Co. (APVRT) in 1995. Act No. 74 of 1990 also known
as ``Pre-Privatization"--set the rules for the privatization of small
businesses through auctions. Act No. 7 of 1990 outlined the practical
steps to be taken in cases of various types of privatization suggested
in Act No. 13. Act No. 10 of 1992 declared that the goals of
privatization were: 1) the modernization of technology, 2) increase of
working capital, 3) import of know-how and marketing experience, 4)
support for domestic and foreign entrepreneurs, 5) the development of
the domestic capital market, and 6) creation of work opportunities.
A New Privatization Law was drafted in November 1994 by the Horn
government, and it passed in January 1995 with ninty-nine changes. The
law focuses on the privatization or liquidation of state owned,
strategic industries--primarily mining, communications, transportation,
banking, and energy. Instead of the three entities that ran
privatization from 1990 to 1995, the APVRT was put in sole charge. The
privatization process consists of two rounds. in the first round, the
APVRT announces publicly the terms of a concourse for a list of state
owned companies and private (domestic and foreign) entities make their
bids. In the second round, the agency develops new terms for those
companies which were not sold in the first round. In the first round,
held on September 29, 1995, 73 companies were listed; 104 bids were
made on 71 companies, and 42 were sold. In the second round, held on
January 10, 37 companies were listed and only 4 were sold. The
remaining 33 companies are to be liquidated.
3. What proportion of agriculture, housing and land, industry, and
business and services is In private hands?
Agriculture: The Agriculture Ministry estimates that approximately
90 percent of agricultural land is in private hands, but adds the
caveat that up to half of this number is made up of limited
cooperatives. The state's share in forestry remains still at 94 percent
according to the 1995 data.
Housing and Land: The Agriculture Ministry estimates that
approximately 97 percent of housing and land is either in private or
municipal hands. Foreigners could not purchase housing or land until
the law was changed in 1994. These figures did not change in 1995.
Industry: Up to 65 percent of industry was in private hands by the
end of 1994. In 1995 and 1996, the proportion of industry in private
hands increased to approximately 70 percent, mainly through the
privatization of strategic and financial industries, as well as the
sale of state utilities to foreign and domestic investors.
Manufacturing, mining, utilities, transport, communications and
financial services account for approximately 43.8 percent of Hungary's
GDP. The ratio of domestic to foreign ownership in the private sector
in industry is approximately 2 to 1.
Business and Services: From 1991 through June 1994, the number of
small businesses which had been privatized was as follows: 4,066 in
1991; 3,571 in 1992; 1,428 in 1993; and 416 in 1994. Added to the
relatively large number of companies privatized prior to 1989 and the
plethora of newly-founded companies, over 70 percent of business and
services were in private hands by the end of 1994. However, there is
only one private bank, and no known health or transportation services
are provided by the private sector.
By the end of 1995 only the legally approved minimum 25 percent
share of the National Saving and Trade Bank (OTP) remained under state
control. The share of the state in transportation, postal services, and
communications remains 72 percent, but by the end of 1997 this is
estimated to decline to the desired 25 percent minimum. The private
sector share in health, education and agriculture reached 45 percent in
the first quarter of 1996. It is debatable, however, whether banks and
health services should be included in the small business and services
category, because they are classified as strategic industries.
4. Has there been reform of the state sector? (What major
legislation has been passed? Do authorities and state managers act
within the law? Is the state sector performing more efficiently? Does
it require fewer subsidies than before?) By the end of 1994 only so-
called strategic industries remained in the state sector: 1) the
Hungarian Electric Energy Industry (MVM); 2) the natural gas
distribution; 3) the Hungarian Oil Industry (MOL); 4) state radio and
TV (Antenna Hungaria); 5) the Hungarian Long Distance Telephone and
Telegraph (MATAV); and 6) banking, including the National Saving Bank
(OTP), Budapest Bank (BB), MH Bank and K&H Bank. In June 1995,
parliament passed a law that established The Joint-Stock Company for
State Privatization and Property Handling (APV). Some eight state firms
and 737 industrial companies created the initial portfolio of the APV.
The law also stipulated that state-owned strategic industries have to
be made available on condition that they allow private investors to
turn a fair profit, and that by the end of 1997 the state's share would
be no more than 25 percent.
The new law for privatization of the strategic industries created a
number of controversies, where, for instance, the Antenna Hungaria was
placed on the market in 1995, but no interested investors were found.
The insolvent media company requested 18 billion forints from the
government for restructuring, but received only 2.5 billion. The APV
hopes that it will find investors in 1997, under the terms of the new
Media Law. The privatization of utilities also ran into difficulties
when the government was forced by foreign investors to raise energy
prices, but had to retreat in the face of massive public protest.
Recently a Belgian investor threatened to sue the APV because he could
not turn a ``fair profit.''
Economy 1.75/7
1. Has the taxation system been reformed? (What areas have and have
not been overhauled? To what degree are the taxpayers complying? Has
the level of revenues Increased? Is the revenue collecting body
overburdened?) The taxation system has undergone a number of reforms
and changes. Between 1990 and 1996, parliament passed thirty-four laws
and amendments that regulate taxation. The most significant is Law XCI/
1990 on the Regulation of Taxation. It offers a draft of laws
regulating taxation and tariffs; determines the state agencies which
will monitor and enforce; and outlines what objects and real estate are
subject to what taxation and tariffs. Taxes on sales, income, and
social security make up most of the revenues.
Mainly because of problems with the budget deficit financing,
several changes in taxation were proposed by the Horn government. In
1996, for instance, it suggested an increase in social insurance taxes
for small businesses from the current 10 percent to 45 percent of net
income. The government argues that the increase is necessary because of
the generous social rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The Chairman
of the National Business Association (IOSZ) claimed that tens of
thousands of small business owners would return their licenses because
of the increase.
Revenues from taxation posted the most significant increase in the
1994 fiscal year, but in 1995 they remained virtually the same in spite
of the hike in social security insurance. This could be attributed to
taxpayer noncompliance. In 1995, tax and social insurance fraud cases
numbered 480, and the amount of taxes owed in 50 of the most
significant cases--committed mostly in the small business sector--
surpassed the 20 billion forint mark. The scale of tax fraud suggested
that the National Customs and Revenue Office (VPOP) and the Tax and
Finance Control Office (APEH) were overburdened. In response, the
government established a separate Department for Major Taxpayers OAFH)
in February 1996 to deal with the largest taxpayers.
2. Does macroeconomic policy encourage private savings, investment
and earnings? (Has there been any reform/alteration of revenue and
budget policies? How have any such changes served to advance economic
objectives?) The Socialist-led coalition government has made massive
efforts to enact tougher macroeconomic policies. In 1995 the
legislators passed a budget that would restrict social entitlements;
enacted laws on supplementary budget; abolished the tax on interest
from savings; and established the Committee for Coordination of
Economic Protection to deal more effectively with economic criminality,
estimated to be responsible for losses amounting to 30 percent of GDP.
However, the constitutional court ruled that the austerity measures
were not in accord with the constitutional guarantees on social
entitlements. Moreover, the Interests Reconciliation Council has been
unable to stifle public protest against unpopular economic measures.
This suggests that the success of economic reform hinges to a
considerable degree on the passage of the new constitution, in which
the Socialist government intends to scale back the ``social rights"
that hinder the economic transition. The public is increasingly
unwilling to accept the dismantling of Hungary's ambitious social-
welfare system, and in 1995 and 1996 the trade unions organized strikes
in education, public transport, and the nuclear and electricity
sectors. Public support for the MSZP dropped from 33 percent in 1994 to
20 percent in 1995.
Analysts estimate that the 1997 budget deficit is going to be
between 310 and 380 billion forint ($2.39 billion) by the expected GDP
growth rate of 2.39 percent, or 4.9 percent of the total GDP. Yet,
second quarter 1996 economic indicators show a massive 8.9 percent
growth of the industrial output (4.9 percent for the year), a steady
inflation of approximately 22 percent for the year, steady unemployment
of 10.6 percent, and a decline in interest rates from 35 percent to 27
percent. This may lead to higher than expected economic growth and
hence, a lower deficit. Experts believe that a reform of the social
security sector, which has a deficit of 13 billion forint, is going to
be instrumental for sound budgetary and fiscal politics in Hungary. The
IMF announced on December 18, 1996 that Hungary met the qualifications
for a $381 million stand-by loan.
3. Are property rights guaranteed? (Are there both formal and de
facto protections of private, real estate and intellectual property? Is
there a land registry with the authority and capability to ensure
accurate recording of who owns what? What are the procedures for
expropriation, including measures for compensation and challenge?) The
property rights are formally guaranteed by the constitution, and are de
facto upheld by contract and property laws. Article 9/Chapter I of the
constitution states that 1) public and private property is to be
equally respected and granted equal protection, and 2) that the
Republic of Hungary acknowledges and promotes the right to free
enterprise and the freedom of economic competition. Moreover Article
14/Chapter I guarantees the right to inheritance. The land registry
accurately records the ownership and transfer of real estate, and
according to Balazs Pastory, the head of a U.S. law firm in Budapest,
the Central Land Registry Office does not seem to be overburdened with
the increased number of claims brought by privatization. Restitutions
are less common as a direct form of property transfer. Former owners
and their heirs are usually granted vouchers according to the size of
their claims. The vouchers can be applied toward the purchase of other
state-owned property.
4. Is It possible to own and operate a business? (Has there been
legislation regarding the formation, dissolution and transfer of
businesses, and is the law respected? Do there exist overly cumbersome
bureaucratic hurdles that effectively hinder the ability to own and
dispose of a business? Are citizens given access to information on
commerce law? Is the law applied fairly?) Besides the protection of
private enterprises guaranteed by the constitution, there are numerous
laws designed to regulate the formation of private enterprises. The
Commerce Law consists of approximately 350 pieces of legislation, and,
according to Dr. Pasztory, is up to Western standards, being
transparent, and is applied fairly to all subjects. The Commerce Court
(Ceg Birosag) is inefficient. Many complaints have been filed against
it on account of its slowness.
5. Is business competition encouraged? (Are monopolistic practices
limited in law and in practice? If so, how? To what degree is
``insider" dealing a hindrance to open competition?) Fair competition
is guaranteed by the Commerce Law and by the elimination of state
monopolies. The pace of privatization in Hungary suggests that the
government made substantial efforts to relinquish state monopolies in
all spheres of production, and encourage competition. But the process
was stained by several corruption scandals that led to the dismissal of
the entire APV board and the minister in charge.
As far as competition in strategic industries is concerned,
domestic investors complained that they are disadvantaged by large
Western corporations. They urged a more protectionist policy in the
privatization of these industries. Neither the scandals nor the
complaints of domestic investors seemed to hamper the performance of
the Hungarian economy in 1996. The government continued with the
privatization of strategic industries and the GDP posted a robust 8.6
percent growth in the first two quarters of 1996.
6. Are foreign investment and international trade encouraged? (To
what degree has there been simplification/overhaul of customs and
tariff procedures, and are these applied freely? To what degree is
foreign investment encouraged or constrained? Is the country overly
trade dependent on one or two other countries?) Hungary leads by far
the post-Soviet countries of Central and Eastern Europe (including
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states) in the proportion of
direct foreign investment. Hungary is currently holding 32 percent of
direct foreign investment ($8,506 million), compared to only 22.5
percent or $6,000 million provided to the former Soviet Union. Hungary
is attractive to foreign investors because its legislation provides
more safeguards than in many other countries in the region. The
legislation on the privatization of strategic industries, for instance,
guarantees that an investor can obtain solvent companies and their
market share for a fair price through a transparent privatization
process, and at a fair profit for the investor. This led to several
lawsuits against the APVRT, the latest from a Belgian investor who
purchased a share of the state-owned utility company, but, contrary to
the legislation, the government failed to deregulate the energy prices.
Moreover, the labor force in Hungary is relatively cheap and highly
skilled, the country is centrally located, and enjoys a relatively high
degree of political stability.
Finally, Hungary is trade-dependent. The first three quarters of
1996 show an international trade deficit of 314.4 billion forint ($2.6
billion), or 9.2 percent of total international trade. The largest
trade deficit has been shown in energy ($1.26 billion), finished goods
($1.28 billion), and machinery ($1.26 billion). This is also one reason
why advanced industrial countries find Hungary attractive for
investment. On the whole, more that thirty of the world's top fifty
multinational corporations invested in Hungary, and the average per
capita foreign investment is $5 28, compared to the regional average of
$41. In 1993 there were 4,286 new businesses in foreign ownership and
the number of joint ventures totaled more than 20,000 in 1995.
7. Has there been reform of the banking sector? (Is the central
bank independent? What are its responsibilities? Is it effective in
setting and/or implementing monetary policy? What is the actual state
of the private banking sector? Does it conform to international
standards?) The banking sector was reformed after 1989, and according
to the vice president of the National Bank, Dr. Szapari, the central
bank operates independently of the government. Yet, he also suggested
that a three year term is insufficient. Five years would ensure more
independence and stability within the central bank.
By the end of 1995, the first year of the privatization of the
state-owned banking sector, 58 percent of banks were privately owned.
By the end of 1997, the government hopes to increase the private share
to 75 percent. In addition to domestic banks, a number of foreign banks
operate in Hungary, including Citibank, Deutsche Bank, Hipo Bank and
Bank of America, proof that banking candidates conform to international
standards.
In the first two quarters of 1996, the banking sector showed a
staggering 30 percent growth in net income. In some cases, however, the
government was forced to repurchase insolvent banks from foreign
investors because of their poor performance. The latest such case was
the repurchase of the Polgari Bank from GE Capital in December 1996,
after the bank posted a huge loss.
8. Is there a functioning capital market infrastructure? (Are there
existing or planned commodities, bond and stock markets? What are the
mechanisms for investment and lending?) The Budapest Stock Exchange
(BUX), established in 1990, was one of the first such in the region.
The BUX index contains seventeen stocks. To qualify for the index, a
stock has to comply with three out of five criteria, including a
minimum face value, defined minimum price, a minimum number of
transactions, and a cumulative minimum turnover of 10 percent of the
registered capital during the six months preceding the revision of the
index. If more than twenty-five stocks met at least three of the five
qualifications, they are selected according to their weighed average
calculated across the five criteria.
The Dutch DAX index served as a blue-print for the construction of
BUX. The base value of the BUX was set for 1,000 points on January 2,
1991. Through most of 1996, the BUX index operated in the range of
3,500-3,600 points, and remained mostly flat. During the end of the
year rally, however, the BUX for the first time crossed the 4,000 point
barrier, and on January 8,1997 it reached 4,562.83.
Total turnover on the BUX reached 1.67 2 billion forint (over $10
billion) in 1996, or over 25 percent of Hungary's GDP. Close to 75
percent of the share value was owned by foreign investors, 10 percent
by domestic private investors, and 15 percent by the state. Analysts
attribute the surge in BUX to the fact that the Central Bank held the
interest rates steady throughout the last quarter of the year, and that
the market enjoys enormous investor confidence. Morgan Stanley rated
the BUX the third best exchange in the world in 1996, after the Russian
and Venezuelan exchanges.
9. Has there been reform of the energy sector? (To what degree has
the energy sector been restructured? Is the energy sector more varied,
and is it open to private competition? Is the country overly dependent
on one or two other countries for energy [including whether exported
fuel must pass through one or more countries to reach markets]?) The
privatization of the energy sector started in 1995, and presently 70
percent is held in private hands. An independent oversight body, the
Hungarian Energy Office, was set up in July 1994 to regulate energy
sales and price levels and to ensure a minimum distance between the
government and the privatized entities in the energy sector. The first
round of energy sector sales was held on September 18, 1995, and a 51
percent stake was sold for $460 million to eighteen investors. Six
distributors and two generating plants of the electric energy sector
were sold in early December 1995, and the following foreign investors
acquired between a 47 percent and 49 percent share in the individual
electricity-distribution companies: Electricite de France; the Belgian
Powerfin; the German Bayernwerke; and the German Isaar Amperwerke. The
revenues from sales totaled $1.3 billion. Domestic energy production is
distributed among coal (23 percent), oil (30 percent), gas (29
percent), and nuclear and hydroelectric energies (17 percent).
Approximately 50 percent of oil and gas is imported from Russia.
POLAND
Freedom in the World Ratings, 1988-1997
1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97
Political Rights 5 4 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
Civil Liberties 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Status PF PF F F F F F F F
Polity: Consolidated Democracy
Economy: Consolidated Market
Population: 38,613,000
PPP: $4,380
Ethnic Groups: polish (98 percent) German
Ukrainian, Belarusian
Capital: Warsaw
_______________________________________________________________________
Political Proces 1.50.7
1. When did national legislative elections take place? Elections
for the 100-seat Senate and the 460-member Sejm were held in September
1993. The Sejm is dominated by two ``post-Communist" forces, the
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL)
which, as a result of the election law, were able to translate 36
percent of the popular vote into a ``constitutional" majority of 66
percent of the seats in the Seim and 73 percent in the Senate. In the
Sejm, the SLD held 171 seats; the PSL, 132; the Democratic Union (UD),
74; the Social Democratic Union of Labor (UP), 41; the nationalist
Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN), 22; President Walesa's
Non-Party Bloc to Support Reform (BBWR), 16; and the German Minority,
4. In the Senate, the SLD captured 37 seats; the PSL, 36; and
Solidarity, 9. The rest were split among 10 parties. The elections were
free and fair. Prime Minister Jozef Oleksyof the SLD--who replaced PSL
Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak in March 1995--resigned in January 1996
amid allegations that he collaborated with Soviet and Russian
intelligence. He was replaced by Sejm Speaker Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz
in February.
2. When did presidential elections occur? In November 1995,
Alexander Kwasniewski, leader of the SLD, defeated incumbent Lech
Walesa, who had led Poland's independence movement as head of the
Solidarity trade union in the 1980s. After the first round, Kwasniewski
led Walesa, 35.1 to 33.1, winning the runoff with 51.7 percent.
3. Is the electoral system multiparty-based? Are there at least two
viable political parties functioning at all levels of government? Yes,
Poland is a multiparty democracy. The Communist Party monopoly ended
following round table negotiations between the non-Communist opposition
and the military regime in 1989, which led to the legalization of
Solidarity and other political reforms. The Interim Constitution
adopted in 1993 enshrines political pluralism. Parties function at all
levels of government.
4. How many political parties have been legalized? Most of Poland's
estimated 100 political parties and associations are small. A new
electoral law, adopted in April 1993, aimed at reducing the number of
parties in Parliament (twenty-nine political groupings were represented
in Parliament after the 1991 vote, none with more than 13 percent of
the vote). Parties that failed to get 5 percent (8 percent for parties
campaigning in coalition) of the national vote would not be
represented. Only seven groups secured parliamentary representation
after the 1993 vote.
5. What proportion of the population belongs to political parties?
Despite the large number of parties, less than 2 percent of the
population claims membership in any political party.
6. What has been the trend of voter turnout at the municipal,
provincial, and national levels in recent years? Since 1989, overall
voter turnout has decreased slightly in local elections. The turnout
for elections since 1989 is as follows: June 1989 (parliamentary): 62
percent; May 1990 (local and regional): 42 percent; November 1990
(presidential): 60 percent; December 1990 (presidential run off: 53.4
percent; October 1991 (parliamentary): 43.2 percent; September 1993
(parliamentary): 52 percent; June 1994 (local and regional): 34
percent; 1995 (presidential, second round): 68.23 percent.
Civil Society 1.25/7
1. How many nongovernmental organizations have come into existence
since 1988? How many charitable/nonprofit organizations? International
organizations have estimated that there are over 25,000 nongovernmental
organizations in Poland. These include professional, cultural, youth,
sports, political, ecological, religious, women's and single-issue
organizations. Voluntary charities, many associated with the Catholic
Church, are active, as are international groups such as the Red Cross.
NGOs and voluntary organizations have received broad support and
technical assistance from the UN Development Program and the Open
Society Network.
2. What form of interest group participation in politics are legal?
The existing constitution does not include the right to petition the
Constitutional Court and the public does not have the right of
initiative for law- or rule-making. Article 8 of the Consultation and
Referendum Act of 1987 states that authorities can carry out public
consultations either at their own initiative or upon the request of
trade unions, farmers' unions, or other associations and NGOS. If the
request is refused, reasons must be given, but the petitioner does not
have the right to appeal in court. Most lobbying activities are legal
and political endorsements are permitted, Citizens use petitions,
public demonstrations, letters to newspapers, and media access (radio
call-ins) to air their views publicly.
3. Are there free trade unions? There are four national inter
branch industrial unions registered, along with seventeen other major
independent industrial branch unions and three agricultural unions. The
Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity (NSZZ) claims a
membership of 1.4 million as of 1996. Offshoots of mainstream
Solidarity include the Christian Trade Union Solidarity and Solidarity
'80. There are no reliable estimates of their membership. The National
Alliance of Trade Unions (OPZZ)--the successor of its Communist-era
namesake--claims 4.5 million members, but polls in early 1996 suggest
that its dues-paying membership may be less than Solidarity's. Over 100
SLD deputies are, or have been, members of the OPZZ, which sponsored 63
``trade union deputies" in the 1993 elections. Other unions include the
Free Miners' Union, which claims more than 300,000 members, and the
National Teachers' Union. There were several strikes in 1996, including
ones by coal miners and doctors. Estimates of union participation range
from 30 to 40 percent of Poland's roughly 20 million workers, and the
rate of unionization is low within the growing private sector.
4. What is the numerical/proportional membership of farmers'
groups, small business associations, etc.? Farmers and agricultural
workers are organized in local and regional associations, unions and
cooperatives, although exact membership figures are unavailable. They
are a potent political force, and their interests are represented
politically by the Polish Peasant Party, Rural Solidarity, the
Christian Peasant Alliance, and other smaller parties. There are
numerous business and professional associations and groups in Poland,
though membership and statistics vary widely or are incomplete. Among
them are the Polish Chamber of Commerce (in most major cities), the
Business Center Club, etc. There are over 400 NGOs concerned with the
economy, finance, insurance and the labor market.
Independent Media 1.50.7
1. Are there legal protections for press freedom? The Bill on the
Annulation of the Law on Control of Publications and Performances, the
Abolition of its Control Organs and the Change in the Press Law,
adopted in April 1990, declared censorship to be abolished and
confirmed agreements reached during 1989 round table discussions
between the opposition and the military regime. Since then, laws and
amendments have sought, in some cases, to inhibit press freedom,
particularly through statutes dealing with defamation of officials and
the state.
2. Are there legal penalties for libeling officials? Are there
legal penalties for ``irresponsible" journalism? Article 270 of the
Penal Code states that anyone who ``publicly insults, ridicules and
derides the Polish Nation, Polish People's Republic, its political
system, or its principal organs is punishable by between six months and
eight years' imprisonment." Article 273 imposes a prison term of up to
ten years for anyone who violates Article 270 in print or through the
mass media. The law has been enforced on several occasions, bringing
protests from international human rights group. The 1994 Law on State
Secrets was also considered overly broad. In January 1995, the Supreme
Court ruled that journalists could be forced to reveal sources whenever
it was requested by prosecutors or judges. But in April 1995, the Sejm
rejected a measure that would have forced journalists to reveal their
sources only in the most serious of crimes. In February 1996, the
editor-in-chief of the satirical weekly, Nie, was convicted of
publishing secret documents, given a one year suspended sentence and
fined $4,000. Amendments to the press and penal codes in December 1996
held journalists responsible not only for deliberate, but also
unintentional, infringements on personal property. The regulation
provided that no materials concerning a person's private life may be
published, unless they are strictly connected with his or her public
activities.
3. What proportion of the media is privatized? Since a 1992 law
abolished media monopoly by the government, private media have
mushroomed in Poland, accounting for 85 percent. There are some 3,300
newspapers and magazines (100 dailies out of 380 papers), 119
commercial radio stations (six national stations, four of which are
state-owned), as well as ten commercial TV stations. The four most
popular national dailies are independent: Gazeta Wyborcza (formerly
linked to Solidarity), Sugar Express, Express Wieczorny, and
Rzeczpospolita. State-run television stations, TVP-1 and TVP-2,
dominate the market. Foreign ownership of newspapers and magazines is
limited to no more than 45 percent. Polsat remains the most popular
commercial television network. A license for central Poland was granted
to TVN, which is owned by the Polish company ITI and the Central
European Media Enterprises Group. There are several cable stations.
4. Are the private media financially viable? Yes, though
competition among media is stiff. Annually, some 1,500 print titles
appear or disappear. Market saturation, lack of advertising revenues,
and printing costs are key factors in the failure of many newspapers or
magazines.
5. Are the media editorially Independent? Newspapers and magazines
reflect political diversity, and run the gamut from the far-left to the
far-right. Party papers reflect the views of their publishers. The
National TV and Radio Council (KRRT) is ostensibly independent of the
government, but since its nine members are nominated by Parliament, the
Senate and the president's office, politics plays a role in the
Council's makeup. Personnel changes at TVP-1 led to the cancellation of
programs too critical of the Communist era. Tomasz Siemoniak, director
of the most popular television station, Channel 1, was fired by a TVP
board of directors dominated by the ruling coalition. In March 1996,
Wieslaw Walendziak resigned as TVP president after his decisions were
overruled.
6. Is the distribution system for newspapers privately or
governmentally controlled? Private distributors, and transport and
dissemination by publications themselves are the chief means of
distribution.
7. What has been the trend in press freedom? Freedom House's annual
Survey of Press Freedom rated Poland Not Free for 1988, Partly Free for
1989, and Free from 1990 through 1996.
Rule of Law 1.50/7
1. Is there a post-Communist constitution? Poland is technically
governed by a 1952, Stalin-era document, frequently amended since the
fall of Communism. In November 1992, President Lech Walesa signed into
law the so-called Little Constitution which mandated a strong
presidency. The constitutional balance of power between the presidency,
the government and the legislature remains amorphous, pending the
adoption of a formal constitution. In 1996, Solidarity and other
opposition groups wanted the constitution to be adopted after the 1997
elections. The new draft diminished presidential powers, widened the
prerogatives of the Constitutional tribunal and allowed citizens a
greater say in legislative matters. While a preamble was adopted in
November, the PSL and the Union of Labor Party held up parliamentary
ratification by opposing the three tier territorial administration,
arguing that the constitution did not guarantee basic social rights
such as free medical care and public schooling.
2. Does the constitutional framework provide for human rights? Do
the human rights include business and property rights? The Little
Constitution guarantees basic human rights. Two governmental
organizations monitor human rights in Poland: the Office of the
Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection (the Ombudsman), established
in 1987, and an independent internal body with broad authority to
investigate alleged violations of civil rights and liberties. Poland
signed the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, which came into effect in January 1993, providing recourse to
the Council of Europe's legally binding machinery in the event of
alleged violations of civil or political rights. Property and business
rights are safeguarded. President Walesa's attempts to implement a
Human Rights Charter and an Economic Principles Charter after the
passage of the Little Constitution were stalled by the Sejm.
3. Has there been reform of the criminal code/criminal law? Reform
of the Penal Code and the Penal Procedure Code began in 1989-90. Most
of the offensive provisions dealing with political crimes were removed
or changed. Subsequent draft laws introduced new offenses in the area
of economic crime. There are new procedural guarantees for defendants,
and limits on the use of phone tapping and house searches. Some changes
have been controversial, such as measures on libel and defamation of
public officials by the press, the definition of state secrets, and
other infringements on freedom of the press and expression. Reform is
an organic, ongoing process; in March 1996, the government submitted a
draft penal code that provided for more lenient treatment of prisoners,
allowing anyone sentenced to life imprisonment to petition to be
released after twenty-five years. At the end of 1996, the Sejm sent
several bills back to committee dealing with provision of the penal and
penal procedures codes, and amended an article easing an appeal for
presidential clemency.
4. Do most judges rule fairly and impartially? How many remain from
the Communist era? Most judges reportedly rule fairly, and many, though
not all, of the pre-Solidarity judges have stepped down or been
removed. The Ministry of justice can remove judges for ``betraying the
principle of court independence." Trials are generally open, though the
courts reserve the right to close a trial to the public in some
circumstances such as divorce cases, trials in which state secrets
maybe disclosed, or cases whose content can offend ``public morality."
This prerogative is rarely invoked.
5. Are courts free of political control and influence? Are the
courts linked directly to the Ministry of Justice or any other
executive body? Poland's three-tiered court system consists of regional
and provincial courts and a Supreme Court. A Constitutional Tribunal
may offer opinions on legislation, but its authority is limited. judges
are nominated by the National Judicial Council and appointed by the
president. Judges are appointed for life and can be reassigned but not
dismissed except by a decision of the National Judicial Council. In
July 1993, a law dealing only with appeals based on procedural issues
introduced appellate courts into the Polish Judicial system for the
first time since World War II. The justice Ministry faces such problems
as differences of opinion about the role and position of the
prosecutor's offices--in particular, whether they should return to
being free from government supervision. There exists a hazy
relationship between prosecutor's offices and the State Security Office
(which is under the jurisdiction of the minister of internal affairs).
Political parties, parliamentary commissions, the State Security
Office, the government and the president's office continue to exert
political pressure on the justice minister and his prosecutors.
6. What proportion of lawyers is in private practice? Privatization
and the proliferation of Western companies and law firms in Poland has
provided opportunities for thousands of lawyers to work full- or part-
time in the private sector, but a sizable majority remain employed by
the state.
7. Does the state provide public defenders? Yes. Once formal
charges are filed, the defendant is allowed to study the charges and
consult with an attorney provided at public expense if necessary
8. Has there been comprehensive reform of antibias/discrimination
laws, including protection of ethnic minorities? The constitution and
laws provide for equal rights regardless of sex or ethnic origin.
Poland's population is 98 percent ethnically homogenous, with small
Ukrainian, Belarussian, Slovak, Lithuanian and German minorities. The
electoral law exempts ethnic minority parties from the requirement to
win five percent of the vote nationwide for parliamentary
representation. Minority groups enjoy cultural autonomy, and many have
established institutions and native-language publications. In the 1996-
97 school year, Lithuanian was taught to pupils of Lithuanian descent
in twelve schools in northeastern Poland. Bilateral treaties with
Belarus and Poland contained provisions relating to the rights of those
national minorities. In Przemysl, a cupola was torn down in the spring
of 1996 from a Ukrainian Catholic Church, reportedly for safety
reasons, without the consent of the Ukrainian minority in the city, an
event that further fueled ongoing tensions between the Roman Catholic
majority and the Ukrainian minority there. There have been sporadic
incidents of anti-Semitism and anti-Gypsy violence.
Governance and Public Administration 1.75/7
1. Is the legislature the effective rule-making institution? The
legislature, consisting of a Senate and a lower house, the Sejm, is the
effective rule-making institution. Before the election of President
Kwasniewski, Parliament and then-President Lech Walesa often clashed
over the extensive power granted to the president by the interim
constitution. The 1995 and 1996 constitutional drafts--which were never
ratified because of political disagreements--would have reduced
presidential powers. With the SLD and its allies controlling almost
two-thirds of seats in both houses of Parliament, the president and
Parliament have worked closely together.
2. Is substantial power decentralized to subnational levels of
government? Yes, in 1990 the first Solidarity-led government introduced
a local self-government law that laid the foundation for a completely
new and decentralized system of local government. The gmina, or
community of local residents, became the basic administrative unit,
acquiring legal status, ownership of local assets, and responsibility
for its own budget. The gmina elected a council, which appointed
executive officials to run it in accordance with the councilors'
resolutions. There are 2,465 gminas. In December 1996, the government
coalition proposed the introduction of a third level of government, a
district-county (Powiat ), to the provincial and municipal levels.
3. Are subnational officials chosen in free and fair elections?
Poland has had two elections (1990 and 1994) for over 52,000
councillors to 2,383 local councils. The elections were free and fair.
The results confirmed the popularity of the two partners in the ruling
``post-Communist" coalition-the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the
Polish Peasant Party (PSL).
4. Do legislative bodies actually function? On the national level,
Parliament drafts, debates and passes laws. There has been considerable
devolution of power, with local and regional councils now exercising
extensive powers.
5. Do the executive and legislative bodies operate openly and with
transparency? The lack of a new constitution has not helped the cause
of transparency. While texts of most decrees and laws are published and
available to the mass media (which enjoy free access to government
officials), the Consultation and Referendum Law of 1987 does not
require that all draft laws, rules, government programs and plans be
publicly available.
6. Do municipal governments have sufficient revenues to carry out
their duties? Do municipal governments have control over their local
budgets? Do they raise revenues autonomously or from the central state
budget? Municipal and provincial governments have sufficient means to
carry out their duties and have control of local budgets. Municipal
governments raise revenues autonomously through taxes, which are
supplemented by state funds.
7. Do elected local leaders and civil servants know how to manage
municipal government effectively? In many instances, local authorities
tend to have a better idea of funding priorities and spend a reported
20 to 40 percent less than the central administration on the same
tasks. Poland now has an increasingly competent cadre of local
officials and civil servants who manage effectively.
8. Has there been constitutional/legislative reform regarding local
power? Has there been a reform of the civil service code/system? Are
local civil servants employees of the local or central government? The
first Solidarity-led government introduced and implemented self-
government legislation in 1989-90. Reforms of the civil service code
and system are ongoing, and an elite school of public administration
has been established to train qualified candidates to serve in
government. In October 1996, under a new Civil Service Law, the prime
minister appointed twenty-four politicians, civil servants and
academics to a new Civil Service Council. The Council will pronounce on
civil servants' professional ethics and also advise on the criteria for
evaluation and promotion.
Privatization 2.25/7
1. What percentage of the GDP comes from private ownership? In
1989, the private sector accounted for 18 percent of GDP. Today, an
estimated 55 percent of GDP is produced by the private sector. It also
accounts for 60 percent of total employment. The expansion of the
private sector in Poland has been largely driven by the spontaneous and
vigorous emergence of new enterprises, rather than privatization.
Nevertheless, a relatively large state sector remains, and
privatization has been rather slow.
The informal economy is estimated to account for about 15 percent
of GDP.
2. What major privatization legislation has been passed? The first
phase of privatization occurred during the final months of Communist
rule with the introduction of legislation in 1987-88 that allowed
state-owned firms to issue stock and transform themselves into joint-
stock companies. In August 1990, the Ministry of Ownership
Transformation was created by two separate laws: The Office of the
Ministry of Ownership Act and the Privatization of State-Owned
Enterprises (SOES) Act.
Early Polish law defined several principal privatization
strategies: sales to foreign investors; mass privatization, initial
offerings on the newly organized stock exchange; and the ``insider"
(management and/or worker) takeover of firms through leasing or
outright ownership. Due to a number of political factors such as the
powerful political connections of managerial elites and strong trade
union influence, Polish privatization has generally followed the
``inside" path. In addition, privatization projects have mostly been
handled by regional voivodship (county) offices (and not the central
Privatization Ministry), making the process more spontaneous and
decentralized. For these reasons, the pace of privatization has been
haltingly slow and intensely controversial. As of mid-1996, Poland had
still not adopted restitution (reprivatization) legislation returning
properties expropriated by Germans during World War II and the
Communists afterwards.
In 1990-1991, the government announced a ``mass privatization"
program that envisaged the commercialization of 450 of the largest
state-owned industrial firms. After considerable delay, an amended
version of the plan, the Law on National Investment Funds and Their
Privatization, took effect in June 1993. Due to start in the summer of
1994, mass privatization was stalled by the ``post-Communist"
government until June 1995. These delays were the result of the PSL's
and the ROP's hostility to giving foreigners property rights to Polish
companies.
Mass privatization in Poland was based on giving citizens vouchers
which represented an ownership stake in all fifteen National Investment
Funds (NIFs), which are run by state-selected foreign and local
management groups. These vouchers went on sale in November 1995 for 20
zloty (approximately $7), with 15 million of 27 million eligible Poles
becoming purchasers. The distribution ended in November 1996.
These NIFs in turn took a controlling (33 percent) stake in each of
514 large and medium scale enterprises, while a 27 percent share was
distributed to the other fourteen NIFS, 10 percent to the firm's
workers, and 30 percent left to the state. In the next phase of mass
privatization, vouchers will be exchanged for stock in individual NIFs
by early 1997. With some exceptions, the process has been relatively
smooth. There are early signs that individual NIF management teams have
sought to become active in restructuring the firms they now control.
In February 1996, a referendum called by Lech Walesa and supported
by Solidarity sought to replace the government's piecemeal asset
disposal with faster privatization, but low turnout nullified the poll.
Apart from the NIFS, the pace of privatization slowed significantly
in 1995 and 1996. The privatization of several major SOES, including
the LOT national airline, did not take place as scheduled in 1996, and
has been postponed until mid-1998--as has that of the copper giant KGHM
Polska Miedz (the world's eighth largest producer).
The PSL bears a large portion of the blame. It continues to oppose
further sales of property and companies to foreigners. The PSL will
continue to be a factor in privatization through at least 1997.
Following the October 1996 government reorganization and after much
political infighting in the ruling coalition, the PSL's Miroslaw
Pietrewicz was appointed the head of the Treasury Ministry which is now
responsible for privatization. However, the liberal Wieslaw Kaczmarek
will continue to run the program.
3. What proportion of agriculture, housing and land, industry, and
business and services is in private hands?
Agriculture: In 1989, a fifth of the land was state-owned with the
rest in private hands. Today, 2.1 million private farmers work on 14.3
million privately-farmed hectares. The Agricultural Ownership Agency
was set up four years ago to take over and sell 1,495 state farms and
3.1 million hectares of land. By March 1993, new Polish owners were
found for a mere 24,000 hectares of former state land and another
204,000 had been leased to individual owners or employee-owned
companies. In the first quarter of 1994, the government took over 177
state farms.
The large private sector has not necessarily translated into a free
market in agriculture, however. Protection for the agricultural sector
in Poland is very significant. According to the National Bank of Poland
(NBP), this policy fuels price increases that continue to account for a
major portion of consumer inflation.
Housing and Land: Poles are allowed to own private housing and
land. In July 1994, the Polish Senate rejected legislation meant to
enact a market-oriented ``rent revolution." The bill would have
affected 3.5 million apartments owned by the state and municipalities,
or one-third of all units. There is a severe shortage of affordable
housing. To buy land or buildings, foreigners are still required to
obtain clearance from the Interior Ministry. Real estate may either be
owned or leased by way of a perpetual lease. High interest rates make
mortgage financing of property rare.
Industry: The private sector holds a 38 percent share of industry.
``Strategic" (that is, politically significant) industries such as oil,
telecommunications, metallurgy, shipbuilding, banking, insurance,
mining, airlines, armaments, and portions of the chemical and tobacco
industries are unlikely to be privatized for the foreseeable future.
The IMF and World Bank declared that Poland needed to accelerate the
pace of privatization in these sectors. The current trend, however, is
to form industry-wide holding companies (such as Nafta Polska in the
oil sector) and to ``commercialize'' rather than privatize.
Business: 89 percent of retail businesses are now private. Some
4,500 medium and large-scale firms have undergone privatization since
1990, and some 3,500 remain to be privatized.
``Small'' privatization--the sale or lease of state-owned stores,
shops and small firms to individuals or groups of private investors--
has been relatively successful. In 1990 alone, 35,000 state owned and
cooperative stores were transferred to the private sector. By September
1991, 75 percent of the retail trade was back in private hands. By
1996, over 90 percent of small business and service sector
establishments were in private hands.
4. Has there been reform of the state sector? (What major
legislation has been passed? Do authorities and state managers act
within the law? Is the state sector performing more efficiently? Does
it require fewer subsidies than before?) State-owned enterprises (SOES)
continue to be subsidized directly through budget and executive agency
remissions, and indirectly through tax amnesties, state guarantees of
credit, and political pressure on state-owned banks to extend credit to
favored enterprises. This discrimination in favor of SOEs continues
despite Poland's supposed commitment to its elimination. Direct
subsidies account for only 2.1 percent of budget expenditures in the
new 1997 budget, but critics charge that political--not economic--
considerations govern which industry receives them.
A government reorganization in October 1996 transferred
responsibility for the 1,300 SOEs from the various ministries to the
wojewodas (governors).
Economy 1.75/7
1. Has the taxation system been reformed? (What areas have and have
not been overhauled? To what degree are taxpayers complying? Has the
level of revenues increased? Is the revenue-collection body
overburdened?) The following taxes are levied in Poland: income
(ranging from 21 to 45 percent), social security (aggregate rate of
48.5 percent on income), VAT (22 percent generally and 7 percent on
specific goods such as food and medicines), and corporate income (40
percent). There are also taxes on property, agriculture and forestry,
inheritance (between 5 percent and 45 percent), and stamp duties on
certain transactions, such as property transfers (2-5 percent).
The current level of income tax rates was introduced in 1994 as a
``temporary'' measure. Following internal debate between the coalition
parties, the government announced in May 1996 that income tax rates
would be cut to a range of 20-43 percent beginning in 1997 (with a 2
percent reduction in the corporate income tax) at the same time that
tax breaks would be reduced. This set off a political battle to define
a new income tax rate structure. In September, the Sejm budget and
finance committees decided to scrap this reduction, while the Sejm as a
whole decided only to lower the minimum level for income tax rates to
17 percent in October. This was virulently opposed by the SDL-dominated
government and Finance Minister Grzegorz Kolodko, whose position was
supported by a November Senate decision to support a four-rate 20-44
percent income tax structure. The new taxes were signed into law in
late November by President Kwasniewski. Corporate income taxes were
also reduced by two points to 38 percent.
These high tax rates encourage private sector activity in the
informal economy. According to an Institute for Private Enterprise and
Democracy in Poland (IPED) survey, 15 to 22 percent of the labor force
is employed informally and 22 to 25 percent of salaries are paid
informally. Sixty percent of those working informally receive social
security system benefits. High tax rates on wage income also have the
unfortunate side effect of making the labor market more rigid. This
leads to high unemployment in spite of Poland's impressive growth rate.
While it has fallen recently, Polish unemployment remains high: 13.5
percent in September 1996. The character of the unemployed pool is also
problematic. Long-term unemployment represents 40 percent of total
unemployment. Many of those unemployed actually work in the informal
sector.
The introduction of the VAT has considerably improved revenue
collection. The biggest laggards in tax payments are large loss-making
SOEs in such sectors as mining, steel and shipbuilding.
2. Does macroeconomic policy encourage private savings, investment
and earnings? (Has there been any reform/alteration of revenue and
budget policies? How have any such changes served to advance economic
objectives?) Poland was the first post-Communist nation to embark on
macroeconomic reform. The ``Balcerowicz program,'' begun on January 1,
1990 in the face of hyperinflation (600 percent in 1990), made the
zloty internally convertible and pegged its value (on a downward
``crawling'' basis) to a basket of Western currencies.
Hyperinflationary pressures were extinguished by 1992, and Poland was
the first nation to emerge from the post-transition recession with real
growth in 1993.
The Finance Ministry controls the state budget. Real GDP grew by 6
percent in 1996, slightly below 1995's 7 percent. The dynamism of the
private sector accounts for the majority of this growth in output. In
1995, the deficit was 2.7 percent of GDP, and it has been under 3
percent of GDP since 1993. The public debt fell to 58 percent of GDP as
a result of low budget deficits and the London club debt reduction
plan. Government consumption grew by 2.6 percent in 1996. Foreign
reserves rose from $6 billion at the end of 1994 to over $18 billion in
mid-1996.
Retail prices increased by 18.5 percent in 1996, down from 1995's
21.6 percent. Wages rose 5.5 percent in real terms, and were 923 zloty
($330)per month after payroll taxes at the end of 1996. The 1997
budget, passed at the end of 1996, projects a deficit of 2.8 percent of
GDP.
Its macroeconomic progress was recognized by the West when Poland
acceded to the OECD in July 1996. Poland's debt rating was raised in
April 1996 by Standard & Poor's from BB to BBB. In general, Polish
credit ratings are now investment grade. Poland also repaid all of its
IMF drawings in 1995.
One of the most important issues facing Poland is the social
insurance system, particularly the national pension. Currently, Poland
has the youngest retirement age in Europe. It has more pensioners below
the age of sixty-five than above and 10.5 million contributors support
9 million pensioners. There is no relationship between contributions
and the benefits paid in retirement. The system represents 39 percent
of government expenditures and crowds out productive infrastructure
investment. Demographic trends indicate that this situation will
continue to deteriorate further unless reform takes place.
A 1995 move by Finance Minister Grzegorz Kolodko to index benefits
to wages rather than prices failed when the Labor Ministry and its
head, Leszek Miller, opposed the plan. In October 1996, union and
employer representatives on the Tripartite Commission for wage and
Social Issues rejected a government proposal to raise the retirement
age for men from sixty to sixty-five and for women from fifty-five to
sixty. Unions argued that the proposal was premature, while employers
maintained the necessity of a wholesale reform of the system. Observers
note that real reform of the pension system is unlikely before the 1997
parliamentary elections, given the political sensitivity of the issue.
According to a November 1996 survey, 49 percent of Poles have zero
savings, a decline from 58 percent in November 1995. Reflecting
increasing confidence in the currency, the number of Poles keeping
their savings in zloty-denominated accounts rose from 50 percent in
1995 to 56 percent in 1996.
3. Are property rights guaranteed? (Are there both formal and de
facto protections of private real estate and intellectual property? Is
there a land registry with the authority and capability to ensure
accurate recording of who owns what? What are the procedures for
expropriation, including measures for compensation and challenge?)
Article 7 of the amended 1952 constitution notes that ``The Republic of
Poland shall protect ownership and the right of succession and shall
guarantee comprehensive protection of personal property. Expropriation
may be allowed exclusively for public purposes and for just
compensation.'' Article 15.2 of the June 1996 draft of the new
constitution states that ``Expropriation is admissible only for public
purposes and upon fair compensation,'' while Article 38 adds that
``forfeiture of property may occur solely in cases specified by law,
pursuant to a legal court ruling.'' Article 216.4 states that ``Laws
may define the guidelines, scope, and procedure for the compensation of
property losses due to the suspension or abridgment of the rights and
liberties of man and citizen for the duration of a state of
emergency.''
Poland recently liberalized regulations on foreign property
holdings. Before, purchasing land by foreigners or foreign companies
necessitated a permit from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This
procedure sometimes added months to a property transaction. Now, the
following transactions can be performed without a permit: individual
purchase of a residential apartment; ownership of land after a five-
year residency period; and the purchase by foreign companies of up to
0.4 hectares of land in cities and up to one hectare of land in the
countryside.
Regulations and applications remain difficult and confusing.
Moreover, permits are not necessarily approved: between 1990 and 1995,
only 16.6 percent of permit applications by foreigners were granted.
Indeed, a new law requires all companies with majority foreign
ownership to obtain real estate permits by May 1997. The continuing
restrictiveness of these laws reflects the fears of the PSL, among
others, that foreigners will come to own Poland.
A Patent Law Act was passed in 1993, followed by a Copyright Law in
1994. Three executive ordinances have been enacted by the Minister of
Culture and Arts. A December 1994 ordinance establishes a Copyright
Commission. The Commission, composed of Culture and Arts Ministry
appointees, is charged with two tasks: approving tables of royalties
proposed by ``collective administration societies'' for the use of
works and performances; and to arbitrate disputes concerning royalties.
Poland also acceded to the Berne Convention in 1994. Together, these
changes in Polish legislation on the protection of intellectual
property represent a considerable advance.
Enforcement has also improved. In late 1994, the Polish government
closed major television broadcasters of pirated material. The
government has been less effective in curtailing software piracy. The
Business Software Alliance, a U.S. anti-piracy trade organization,
estimates that 91 percent of software in Poland is pirated. It also
estimates that U.S. software vendors lost $201 million as a result of
such piracy in 1994.
Registries in land, companies, and property liens are not fully
developed. For instance, if there is more than one lien on a property,
the most recent has priority--the opposite of what happens in the West.
One problem created by the lack of legislation on restitution of
German- and Communist Expropriated property is that land sales are
hampered--and development projects slowed--by confusion over the
progress of the legislation. A substantial amount of property,
especially in urban areas, has very unclear titles of ownership. When
such legislation is enacted, former owners will have first rights of
sale or disposal, according to a mid-1996 ruling of the highest
administrative court. This will create problems for the current
``owners'' of restituted property.
4. Is It possible to own and operate a business? (Has there been
legislation regarding the formation, dissolution and transfer of
businesses, and is the law respected? Do there exist overly cumbersome
bureaucratic hurdles that effectively hinder the ability to own and
dispose of a business? Are citizens given access to Information on
commercial law? Is the law applied fairly?) In general, Polish laws
regarding the creation of new businesses are fairly liberal and
transparent. There was an explosion of businesses created following the
transition, especially of small service firms. Thus, despite the
relatively slow speed of Polish privatization, the share of the GDP
produced by the private sector is in the top tier of the East-Central
European countries.
Nevertheless, there is some degree of complexity and lack of
transparency involved in starting and running a business. This is
related to the speed with which laws related to business activity are
amended. Over 220 laws, amended over 500 times, regulate business
activity. This often means that even small firms must employ
professional assistance to comply with the law.
Polish regulation remains a barrier to business formation and
management. Arbitrary enforcement of labor, health and safety
regulations is one facet of this problem. Another is access to
differential levels of protection from imports. Price controls still
exist on certain products such as fuel, transportation and rent.
Corruption, while present, is not seen as a significant obstacle to
doing business in Poland. In July 1996, the former mayor of Gdansk was
arrested for having accepted a 50,000 deutsche mark bribe from a German
company for a Gdansk insulation contract.
The Polish legal system is based on French and German models.
Polish accounting practice, regulated by the Ministry of Finance, is
moving slowly toward meeting international standards. Poland is a
signatory of four international agreements on dispute resolution: the
1923 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, the 1958 New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of International
Arbitration Awards, the 1961 Geneva European Convention on
International Trade Arbitration, and the 1972 Moscow Convention on
Arbitration Resolution of Civil Law Disputes in economic and scientific
cooperation. The threat of expropriation is minimal.
Trade unions are unusually strong in Poland compared with the rest
of East-Central Europe, and they have sometimes strongly protested
restructuring and management changes in enterprises, especially in
those that are newly-privatized. However, they have not seriously
disrupted Polish business activity.
5. Is business competition encouraged? (Are monopolistic practices
limited in law and in practice? If so, how? To what degree is
``insider'' dealing a hindrance to open competition?) Poland's anti-
monopoly commission has attempted to attack monopolies (defined as
market share by a single enterprise which exceeds 40 percent), although
these efforts are not always successful. In August 1996, the Anti
Monopoly Office threatened to charge Polish Telecommunications with
anti competitive actions it took with regard to Centertel, a wireless
phone service provider.
However, the creation of industry-wide holding companies (such as
Nafta Polska in fuels) of SOEs serves to increase monopolization.
6. Are foreign investment and international trade encouraged? (To
what degree has there been simplification/overhaul of customs and
tariff procedures, and are these applied fairly? To what degree is
foreign investment encouraged or constrained? Is the country overly
trade-dependent on one or two other countries?)
Investment: The Foreign Investment Act of 1991 and later amendments
to it secured the opening of Poland to foreign investment. With the
exception of ``strategic'' sectors mentioned earlier, Poland does not
require any local participation, ownership, or management in companies.
Foreigners can generally enjoy complete ownership of new or existing
Polish firms. Profits and dividends can be fully repatriated with no
permit requirement.
Generally, domestic and foreign firms are treated equally under
Polish investment law. One exception is bidding for public procurement
contracts. Polish firms enjoy a mandated 20 percent price advantage,
and 50 percent of materials and labor in all contracts are required to
be Polish.
However, foreign investors enjoy special tax privileges, provided
that the investment is at least ECU 2 million, exports total over 50
percent of production, or that the investment is made in areas with
high unemployment. Foreign partners are allowed to import inputs duty
free. Final restrictions on foreign investment in joint ventures were
removed by the March 1996jointVentures Law. In April 1996, Poland
eliminated controls on flows of capital.
Inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) from 1990-1994 has been
quite slow relative to the size of the Polish economy. This changed in
1995 when FDI grew by 60 percent to reach $2.5 billion ($6.8 billion
cumulative) in 20,000 Polish firms. The U.S. is Poland's major
investor, with a 25 percent share of total FDI in 1995.
One perplexing problem is that large foreign investors sometimes
demand protection from imports. GM made higher tariffs on auto imports
a precondition of its investment in the auto industry.
Trade: Poland's average trade-weighted tariff was 9.3 percent in
January 1995. The January 1996 revision of the customs tariffs
established an average 7.7 percent tariff on industrial products and a
19.5 percent tariff on agriculture goods. On top of these duties,
Poland charges a general import tax rate of 3 percent (down from 5
percent in 1995). The latter was removed on January 1, 1997. Finally,
certain ``strategic'' goods such as alcohol, cosmetics, cigarettes,
confectionary items, automobiles, and fuel are charged an additional
excise tax.
Poland acceded to the Uruguay round of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in July 1995, and as such is a member of the
World Trade Organization (WTO). As part of its agreement with the EU,
Poland has agreed to lower tariffs on European manufactured goods by 20
percent a year over five years beginning in 1996. Poland is also a
member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the Central
European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA),both of which obligate a
substantial reduction in import duties.
The optimistic and probably unattainable goal is to have a
completely free trade regime by 1999 as Poland gears up to join the
European Union. However, Poland is still plagued by a proliferating
number of barriers to imports (affecting some 4,000 product groups and
25 percent of imports). Political, not economic considerations, dictate
which sector will enjoy protection.
Nontariff barriers such as certification requirements (for
cosmetics, among others) and quotas (especially in agriculture, fuels,
alcohol and tobacco products) are growing in number. Safety Testing is
yet another kind of barrier because of its nontransparent nature.
Overworked officials, antiquated methodology, and slow communication
between Warsaw and the borders do little to facilitate trade.
The level of import protection in some sectors, such as
agriculture, automobiles and steel, is enormous. The PSL, which
controls the Agricultural Market Agency (ARR), has attempted to fight
agricultural imports through a series of fragmented legal regulations.
This tactic has been called ``creeping protectionism.''
Polish trade has shifted radically since transition. CMEA business
with the USSR and its satellites dominated foreign transactions through
the late 1980s. Since then it has become highly diversified. OECD
countries account for 70 percent of trade, with Germany alone
accounting for 30 percent. Russia is Poland's third-largest partner
(with 8 percent of the total trade).
An October 1996 government reorganization created a new Ministry of
the Economy which subsumed the former trade and foreign trade ministry
functions.
7. Has there been reform of the banking sector? (Is the central
bank independent? What are its responsibilities? Is it effective in
setting and/or implementing monetary policy? What is the actual state
of the private banking sector? Does it conform to international
standards? Are depositors protected?) Poland is unique in that the
National Bank of Poland (NBP), was strongly independent early on. Not
surprisingly, it has implemented significant monetary restraint. This
is especially so under the strong stewardship of NBP President Hanna
Gronkiewicz-Waltz.
The NBP is responsible for defending the value of the national
currency, the zloty, and sets exchange and interest rates. Since 1994,
zloty devaluation has slowed in response to massive inflows of short-
term capital. In June 1995, the IMF confirmed the zloty's full current
account convertibility. The NBP revalued the zloty in December 1995 to
control inflationary pressures.
The Foreign Exchange Law of October 1995 liberalized currency
exchange rules. First, it allowed Polish exporters to establish their
own payment deadlines (rather than the across-the-board three-month
deadline). Second, the law no longer forces Polish firms to immediately
resell foreign currency received from abroad. This means that it is now
possible to establish foreign currency bank accounts. However, Polish
firms are still required to obtain foreign exchange permits for
transactions involving foreign exchange credits and loans.
By October 1996 there were eighty-eight banks in Poland, twenty-
four of which were state owned. However, these state-owned banks have a
57 percent market share. The financial sector is dominated by nine
banking conglomerates, five of which have been privatized. A bad debt
crisis plaguing the Polish banking industry began in 1990. By 1995,
nonperforming assets had been significantly reduced system-wide. By the
end of the year, 16.1 percent of credit portfolios were estimated to be
nonperforming. Moreover, one-quarter of this amount was actually held
by one troubled bank, BGZ SA (40 percent nonperforming loans). Thirty-
two of Poland's leading fifty banks have 5 percent or less of their
portfolios nonperforming. The total assets of the banking system by the
end of 1995 was 136.7 billion zloty ($54.7 billion). Despite
significant de facto restrictions on the operation of foreign banks in
Poland, they increased their capital stakes in 1995.
Bank privatization has been beset by problems since the
controversial 1993 privatization of Bank Slaski. By the end of 1996,
however, the NBP planned to hold tenders for Polski Bank Inwestycyjny
and Prosper Bank. The tender for Powszechny Bank Kredytowy will be held
by March 1997.
8. Is there a functioning capital market infrastructure? (Are there
existing or planned commodities, bond and stock markets? What are the
mechanisms for investment and lending?) Polish capital markets have
been maturing slowly but steadily since 1990. The Warsaw Stock Exchange
(WSE) was established in April 1991 with five traded companies. By the
end of 1996, eighty-three firms were regularly traded. There are fifty-
one brokerage houses providing underwriting, auditing, marketing, and
consulting services. There are also 843,000 open investment accounts.
The WSE is comparable to the Greek and Portuguese stock exchanges in
terms of trading volume and quantity of transactions, but lags far
behind in capitalization ($9 billion as of November 1996, 7 percent of
GDP). In order to promote stability, the WSE limits daily price
movements to about 10 percent. Ninety-nine percent of the Exchange's
capital is held by the Ministry of Privatization.
The Polish bourse is still underdeveloped in that it lacks large
institutional investor-like pension funds, and intermediaries like
investment banks. Nonetheless, it is developing steadily. Further
liberalizing amendments to the Securities Law will probably be enacted
in early 1997.
By September 1996, trading in mass privatization ownership
certificates in Poland's fifteen national investment funds made up
about 10-15 percent of the daily trade volume on the Warsaw Stock
Exchange. The vouchers began trading on July 15, 1996. The stock
prospectus for the Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski Fund, one of the NIFS, was
submitted for review to the Polish Securities and Exchange Commission
in November, while the rest were submitted in December. Public trading
in individual NIFs will begin in the first quarter of 1997.
Other exchanges have been late in developing. The Warsaw Grain and
Feed Commodity Exchange, Poland's first commodity futures exchange, was
created in late 1995. In May 1996, the Council of Ministers Economic
Committee decided to establish eight national commodity exchanges and
twenty-five regional exchanges. Poland's over-the-counter securities
market, the Central Table of Offers, became operational in early
December 1996. It was organized by fifteen brokerage houses.
Another important development in the evolution of Polish capital
markets occurred in November 1996 when seventeen Polish financial
institutions created Poland's first credit rating agency, the Central
European Center for Ratings and Analysis. It will rate bond issues of
firms, banks and municipalities.
Short-term treasury bills used to finance the budget deficit have
been the major feature of Polish capital markets. This has been
changing, however. In 1995, Poland returned to international capital
markets with a very successful $250 million issue of Eurobonds.
The private capital markets reflect Poland's evolution. While in
1991, bank loans were the only source of capital for expanding
companies, today short-term commercial paper, bonds (including
convertible bonds) and share issues are now accepted methods of raising
short- and medium-term capital. Currency futures and stock market
options are also now available. Long-term financing is still difficult
to raise because of high inflation and general uncertainty.
By the beginning of January 1997, capital outflows were to be fully
liberalized.
9. Has there been reform of the energy sector? (To what degree has
the energy sector been restructured? Is the energy sector more varied,
and is it open to private competition? Is the country overly dependent
on one or two other countries for energy [including whether exported
fuels must pass through one or more countries to reach markets]?) The
1990 Law on the Liquidation of the Amalgamated Power Supply and Lignite
Authority and the 1993 Law on the Transformation of Strategic
Enterprises have shaped the reform of the electricity sector.
Polskie Sieci Energetyczne SA, a state-owned firm, has run the
Polish electricity grid since 1990. While there are plans to admit
private shareholders, the state plans to keep a controlling interest in
the company.
In May 1996, Poland merged seven state-owned oil refineries and the
main gasoline distribution network into Nafta Polska (an industry-wide
holding company) in order to increase efficiency. It was hoped that
this would attract foreign investment into the industry and the private
sector. Individual refineries will be able to offer 30 percent of their
shares to foreign investors within a year. The Central Petroleum
Product (CPN) distribution network, while no longer a monopoly, still
dominates energy distribution. It was to be incorporated into Nafta
Polska by the end of 1996.
The dissolution of state ownership in the energy sector has
consisted mostly of ``minor privatization'' or the contracting out of
support services such as repair, transport, storage, and administration
to private companies. The privatization of a large power plant, Zespol
Elektrowni Patnow-Adamow-Konin (PAK), set for 1996, has been subject to
continual delays.
The energy market is protected from imports by a number of barriers
such as tariffs and quotas. As a result, imports only account for a
fifth of total supply. The EU has recently agreed to allow Poland to
extend this protection to the year 2000. In 1996, oil import duties and
price caps were reduced so as to alleviate fuel shortages. Moreover,
Poland is to have a power plant built, owned, and operated by
foreigners.
The new 1996 Energy Law creates an Electricity Regulation Board,
which is responsible for licensing, supervising and approving rates,
levying fines, and arbitrating disputes between users and producers.
The Law downgrades the powers of the National Electricity Authority
which decides the fate of individual power plants.
Energy prices on the whole are controlled, but the state has pegged
any increases to inflation. Electricity prices are set by the minister
of finance for consumers and by the minister of industry for intra-
sector trade. A price increase from the current $0.053 per kWh, to a
break-even rate of $0.075 is scheduled to take place in the year 2000.
However, the attainability of this goal is in question because of
government-induced delays in scheduled price increases.
Electricity prices under the law will be set on a national
electricity exchange. At the beginning of May 1996, regional prices
were introduced for electricity. These prices will be adjusted based on
a number of factors, including reliability and continuity of supply as
well as distance.
The EU agreed in late 1996 to extend protection of the Polish fuel
market until the year 2000. Under the agreement, customs duties would
be gradually reduced beginning in 1997. In return, Poland is obligated
to continue fuel price deregulation, accelerate refinery privatization,
remove nontariff barriers such as quotas on fuels, and give equal
treatment to all firms dealing with Polish refineries.
Appendix 4
Hearing of October 28, 1997
October 24, 1997
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Members, Committee on Foreign Relations
THROUGH:
James W. Nance and Edwin K. Hall
FROM:
Steve Biegun, Beth Wilson, and Mike Haltzel
SUBJECT:
Hearing on the Costs, Benefits,
Burdensharing, and Military Implica-
tions of NATO Enlargement
On Tuesday, October 28, 1997, at 10:00 a.m., the Committee on
Foreign Relations will hold a hearing on the Costs, Benefits,
Burdensharing, and Military Implications of NATO Enlargement
Senator Helms will preside.
Overview
The Foreign Relations Committee has scheduled a series of six
hearings this fall to examine all elements of NATO enlargement. (One or
two additional hearings will be scheduled early next year after the
treaty is formally transmitted to the Senate). Previous hearings have
examined the strategic rationale, the pros and cons of NATO
enlargement, and the qualifications of the three candidate countries.
Later in the week the Committee will examine the relationship between
NATO and Russia, and on November 5 public views on NATO enlargement
will be heard.
This memo, prepared with the assistance of the Congressional
Research Service, provides an overview of the structure of NATO and the
costs--to the U.S., allies, and candidate members of NATO--associated
with NATO expansion.
Mission and Structure of NATO
Military Mission
The core of NATO's military mission is the North Atlantic Treaty's
Article V, in which it is agreed that an attack on one member shall be
considered an attack against all; and it is further agreed that each
member will individually and in concert take ``such action as it deems
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain
the security of the North Atlantic area.'' From this basis, and the
assumption that the Warsaw Pact was the most likely adversary, NATO
focused it military efforts for 40 years on 1) deterring and 2)
preparing for a high intensity conflict in Central Europe.
At their 1990 London summit, NATO heads of state reaffirmed the
basic aims of the alliance, but directed a comprehensive strategic
review in light of the collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. The
resultant new ``Strategic Concept'' was adopted at the 1991 Rome NATO
summit. The Strategic Concept provides a much more detailed set of
objectives, functions, and guidelines for NATO's military
establishment, of which the most salient are:
Maintain military capability sufficient to prevent war and
provide an effective defense.
Deter and defend against any threat of aggression against
the territory of any member.
Maintain the capability to manage successfully crises
affecting the security of members by reinforcing political
actions.
Be capable of participating in United Nations missions
Maintain an up-to-date appropriate mix of nuclear and
conventional forces in Europe to provide a broad range of
response options.
Provide enhanced flexibility and mobility, and assured
capability for reinforcement when necessary.
The Strategic Concept also urges priority attention to the
following military capabilities:
Surveillance and intelligence collection/processing.
Flexible command and control
Mobility within and between regions
Appropriate logistics capabilities, including transport and
war materiel reserves
Ability to reinforce quickly any area at risk within the
alliance's territory
To provide a framework for achieving or improving specified
military capabilities, so-called ``Force Goals'' and associated time-
lines are negotiated for each NATO member. The negotiations are closed,
and the resultant Force Goals remain classified. Consequently, detailed
public assessment of Force Goal achievement is not possible. In
general, however, it is widely believed that Force Goals are frequently
not accomplished on time, and their time-lines renegotiated. It is the
failure of some allies to meet Force Goals (that have been met by the
United States) that drives much of the burden sharing debate in NATO.
NATO Organizational Structure
NATO does not maintain a standing army of its own. The alliance
defense is maintained through an agreed allocation of national military
capabilities and is led by a permanent representation of its sixteen
member states called the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The NAC (NATO
headquarters) is located in Brussels, Belgium. The NAC consists of
permanent representatives of each member state at the ambassadorial
level, and meets twice a year at the level of foreign minister and
defense minister. Occasional summits at the head of state level are
held for major decisions such as the invitation of Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic to join the alliance, which was accomplished at a
July 1997, summit in Madrid, Spain.
The NATO civilian structure remains essentially unchanged from the
Cold War period. Below the North Atlantic Council is a Secretary
General (the senior civilian official at NATO), and the Defense
Planning Committee, the Nuclear Planning Group, and the Military
Committee. These latter, three organizations are the decision making
bodies for NATO's core functions. The Secretary-General, selected by
the NAC to manage the day-to-day operations of the NATO staff, oversees
the International Secretariat and chairs all but the Military
Committee. The Military Committee oversees NATO's Integrated Military
Command Structure (IMCS).
In addition to decision-making bodies, NATO has two consultative
and cooperative fora. The first is the newly formed Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council (EAPC), which melds the former North Atlantic
Cooperation Council and the on-going Partnership for Peace program. The
EAPC comprises most of the nations of Europe and the newly independent
nations of the former Soviet Union. The EAPC is consultative only, and
has no authority in NATO's decision-making or command structure. The
second consultative body, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council
(PJC), was established under the May 1997, NATO-Russian Founding Act.
The PJC has been described by NATO as a forum intended to promote trust
and the ``habit of consultation'' with Russia. The PJC has no role in
NATO's administrative structure or decision-making process, and is
specifically barred from discussion of NATO's or Russia's ``internal
matters.''
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO's Integrated Military Command
Structure (IMCS) has undergone substantial alteration. The number of
major and subordinate commands has been reduced. The two remaining
major commands are the Allied Command Europe (ACE), which comprises all
land, air, and naval forces in Europe and the Mediterranean, and the
Atlantic Command which oversees naval and amphibious forces in the
Atlantic. Both of these commands are headed by U.S. officers; the
Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the Supreme Allied Commander
Atlantic (SACEUR and SACLANT). Neither France nor Spain, though members
of NATO, are currently part of the IMCS, however, negotiations over
Spain's participation in the IMCS are in their final stages.
The subordinate commands have few, if any, active duty units under
their operational control in peacetime, but serve as coordinating
headquarters which will assume control of designated forces in time of
war or crisis. The exception to this are the Immediate Reaction Forces
discussed below, which are under SACEUR's control at all times.
Otherwise, each member nation is fully responsible for the maintenance
and deployment of its own armed forces whether in peacetime, crisis, or
war.
The new command structure reflects the significant reduction in
NATO's active duty forces over the last several years, and an
increasing reliance on mobilized reserves to deal with any major
conflict. According to statistics on force reductions (provided by NATO
Headquarters) the following reductions have taken place in NATO using
force levels in 1990 as the base line.
25% reduction in total peacetime force levels;
25% reduction of total ground force units including a 45%
reduction in ground forces in the Central Region (i.e.
Germany);
10% reduction in naval units deployed in the NATO region;
25% reduction in total combat aircraft assigned to NATO
including a 45% reduction in the Central and Northern Regions;
and
25% reduction in combat aircraft designated for
reinforcement from North America.
The ACE Mobile Forces Land/Air (a reinforced brigade-sized force)
along with the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean and the NATO Airborne
Early Warning System are generally the only units under SACEUR's
operational control in peacetime. The second readiness tier is the ACE
Rapid Reaction Corps (approximately 5 full divisions, and 5
``framework'' divisions) which comes under SACEUR control in times of
crises or war. It was elements of this Rapid Reaction Corps that
initiated the IFOR mission in Bosnia. Though other units have
subsequently rotated in for the SFOR operation, SACEUR retains overall
command.
Costs of NATO Membership
Common Costs
All sixteen members of NATO make annual contributions to the so-
called ``Common Costs'' of the alliance, which comprise three accounts:
1) Civil Budget; 2) Military Budget; and the Security Investment
Program. The Civil Budget provides for, among other things, the
operating expenses of NATO's civilian headquarters, the International
Secretariat (staff), NATO science and defense research activities, and
some Partnership for Peace programs. The Military Budget funds the
international military headquarters, the airborne early warning
aircraft operations, the NATO petroleum pipeline, and the NATO
Maintenance and Supply Agency.
The Security Investment Program (formerly called the Infrastructure
Fund) supports a broad range of projects recommended by the SACEUR and
SACLANT, in accordance with a specified planning cycle that generally
requires about two years to execute. Typical project areas include the
mobility and deployability of NATO forces, NATO command and control,
allied reconnaissance and intelligence, and maintaining logistics and
training facilities.
The total and individual contributions for the NATO Common Costs
are determined through alliance-wide negotiation. New cost projections,
taking into account the accession of the new members, are expected by
mid-December. At least slight increases are expected for the Civil and
Military Budgets to accommodate additional headquarters personnel from
the new members. It is, however, the Security Investment Program that
holds the greatest potential for significant increases because it
traditionally funds precisely the types of projects most needed by the
new members. NATO's European members have generally insisted that
dramatic increases should not occur, recommending instead that some
currently planned projects should be put aside in favor of more urgent
needs among the new East European members. It is also generally
accepted that a slight reduction in each member's percentage share of
contributions will result when the new members are included in the
calculation. The exact distribution of costs will be negotiated upon
the new members admission to the alliance.
The inclination to keep the Common Costs roughly in line with
current levels is rooted in the assumption that the threat of a major
conflict will remain very low, and that the current Bosnia peacekeeping
operation is representative of the most demanding scenario NATO forces
will be called upon to face in the foreseeable future. Some have voiced
concern, however, that without a firm commitment to a robust alliance-
wide defense capability from the outset, complacency and domestic
political pressures could erode NATO's ability to perform its core
mission of collective defense.
NATO headquarters and the Department of Defense have provided a
series of statistical breakdowns of U.S. and allied contributions to
the Common Costs and of comparative national defense spending. (See
Annex 2) The U.S. share for each element of the Common Costs is: Civil
Budget--24.3%; Military Budget--24.1%; Strategic Improvement Program--
23.8%. It should be noted, however, that funds actually appropriated
may be less than the United States' allocated share. The U.S. total
contribution to NATO Common Costs over the last several years, and
projected for 1998 are: 1993--$318 million; 1994--$342 million; 1995 -
$407 million; 1996 - $453 million; 1997 - $489 million; 1998 (est.) -
$493 million. This shows a steady increase, though the rate of increase
drops sharply in 1998.
In addition to funding the Common Costs, the United States has
provided bilateral security assistance to the prospective new members
in order to facilitate their qualification for NATO membership. The
U.S. assistance has been channeled primarily through International
Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) grants. IMET provides training in Department of Defense schools
for Central and East European officers and civilian defense managers.
The training focuses on the role and functions of the military in a
democratic society, and on civilian defense management. FMF grants have
been used to fund the prospective members' participation in Partnership
for Peace training exercises and to upgrade air traffic control and
communication facilities. The amounts appropriated from FY1996-FY1998
for these programs are: Poland-- $44.2 million; Hungary--$24.5 million;
Czech Republic--$28.6 million.
Current and Prospective NATO Allies' Defense Spending
Defense spending by the United States and the NATO allies has
decreased both in absolute terms and as a percentage of gross national
product for the last ten years (see Annex 2). Though this could be
expected with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact,
there is a growing concern that declining allied defense budgets will
not allow accomplishment of even the more modest military commitments
of the NATO's basic mission as outlined in the 1991 alliance Strategic
Concept.
The disparities between the U.S. and its NATO allies in transport,
logistics, communications, and intelligence capabilities (made apparent
in the Persian Gulf War and in the on-going Bosnia operations) have led
some to suggest NATO could devolve into a so-called ``three-tiered''
alliance, with the United States, current NATO allies, and the new
members having vast differences in capabilities. In order to prevent
these disparities the U.S. estimates that the current allies will have
to spend some $8-10 billion for force modernization (almost as much as
the new members) over the next ten years to modernize their forces.
Related concerns include the decline of allied government funding for
defense research and development, the lack of cooperation or
consolidation among European defense industries, and, despite pledges
to the contrary, continued European domestic political pressures to
reduce defense expenditures.
Most recently expressed by Secretary Cohen at the NATO ministers
conference on October 2, 1997, this U.S. position on required
modernization by the allies encountered predictable European
resistance. Some allies argued that their foreign aid programs to
Russia, Ukraine, and Bosnia are significantly greater than the United
States', and that these funds should also be counted as security
investments. In addition, there is some feeling that the United States
is pushing for more rapid modernization not because of immediate
security requirements, but rather to create additional markets for its
domestic defense industries. While acknowledging obvious disparities in
capabilities and their intent to address the problems, the NATO allies
nevertheless believe that modernization need not be carried out at the
pace or price indicated by U.S. NATO enlargement cost estimates.
With regard to the prospective NATO members, Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic, the cost analysis must consider whether candidate
states have sufficient domestic support for raising defense spending,
and whether their developing economies can bear such spending
increases. Complicating this latter consideration, the International
Monetary Fund recently recommended that all three countries avoid
excessive defense spending increases. At a recent of NATO defense
ministers, Secretary Cohen strongly emphasized that the new members
will be expected to pay their full share of enlargement costs,
including the adequate modernization of their armed forces. The
positions of the IMF and NATO are not irreconcilable, but obviously a
proper balance must be found. Currently, defense spending in the three
countries represents the following percentage of their gross domestic
product (GDP): Poland--2.2%; Hungary--1.7%, and the Czech Republic--
1.5%. The overall NATO average in 1996 was 2.9%, while the European
members of NATO averaged 2.3%, and U.S. defense spending stood at 3.7%
Of the three prospective members, Poland has received the highest
marks for its qualifications from U.S. officials. There is very strong
public support for NATO membership, and though still not on par with
the more developed of the Western allies, Poland's economy is improving
rapidly. In addition, Polish armed forces are generally considered to
be in better condition than others in Eastern Europe. Though Hungarian
armed forces are relatively small and in serious need of modernization,
there is strong public support for NATO membership which could make
increased defense spending more politically palatable. For U.S. Defense
officials, it is the Czech Republic's low defense spending, and polls
indicating around 50% public support (up recently from 35%) for NATO
membership, that present the greatest concern. The Czech government has
pledged a defense spending increase of .1% of GDP each year for the
next five years, though this spending plan has not yet received
parliamentary approval.
NATO Cost/Benefits
Since the collapse of the Soviet empire, the question of the cost/
benefit analysis of NATO for the United States has received increased
attention. It does not, however, appear to be a question answerable
solely in terms of dollars and cents. Even to determine NATO's costs to
the United States is very problematic. The amount the United States
appropriated for NATO Common Costs in 1995, for example, represented
less than two-tenths of one percent of the U.S. defense budget. The
costs of forward-deployed forces in Europe and the Mediterranean could
be ascribed to NATO membership, but their most significant operation
(and their only one involving combat) was in the Persian Gulf War.
Consequently, many argue that the United States would be spending as
much, if not more, to maintain its defense posture without the
alliance. They argue that U.S. global security challenges, not NATO
requirements, drive U.S. defense spending.
NATO membership provides the United States a very strong voice in
European security affairs, institutionalized with U.S. officers in key
command positions. NATO's contribution to a politically stable Europe
can be argued to provide substantial economic benefit to the United
States. The Administration has argued that the desire to join NATO has
led the newly independent East European states to abandon long-standing
ethnic and/or territorial rivalries that could have recreated the
tensions of the 1930s in the region. The cohesion of the alliance in
the conduct of the Persian Gulf War and the on-going enforcement
activities in the region lend some credence to NATO's also having an
out-of-theater deterrent capability.
ANNEX 1
Summary of NATO Enlargement Cost Estimates 1
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ From: U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service.
NATO Expansion: Cost Issues. By Carl Ek. CRS Rpt. No. 97-668 F. July 2,
1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Clinton Administration
On February 24, 1997, the Clinton Administration sent to Congress a
report detailing its rationale and cost estimates for NATO expansion.
2 The document, which may be viewed as the President's
statement of U.S. policy, outlines the defense posture the
Administration believes is necessary, presents the likely costs for its
scenario, and estimates the share of costs that would be assumed by the
United States, its allies, and new members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ U.S. Department of State. Bureau of European and Canadian
Affairs. Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and
Implications. Washington, D.C. February 24, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In developing its cost estimates, the Administration assumes that
``enlargement will take place in a European security environment in
which there is no current threat of large-scale conventional aggression
and where any such threat would take years to develop.'' With no
significant threat on the horizon, NATO will extend Article 5
assurances to new members through improving its ability to send
reinforcements if necessary, rather than through stationing substantial
forces in the new territories.
The Administration lists several priorities for attaining
interoperability--new members will need to train and exercise with
alliance forces to become familiar with NATO procedures; they also will
need to integrate with NATO's command, control, communications and
intelligence (C3I) network, be able to receive and support NATO troops,
operate with the alliance's air defense system, and field combat and
logistical support. The goal will be not only to ensure that these
countries can help NATO defend their borders, but also to enable them
to deploy their own forces to assist NATO in both mutual defense and
non-Article 5 missions.
The Administration notes some further assumptions for its estimate:
1) it applies to ``[a] small group of nonspecified Central European
countries;'' 2) it will be unnecessary for NATO permanently to station
a large number of forces in the new countries; 3) standard burden
sharing rules would apply (members pay for their own forces and share
the costs of infrastructure improvements); and 4) some of the
activities (e.g., language training and air traffic control upgrades)
are already underway.
The Administration states that its estimates are based not on total
defense spending, but on two types of measures that are associated with
enlargement: the first, those that would take place whether new members
are added or not, and the second, those that are tied directly to
expansion. It breaks these measures down into three categories: 1) new
members' military restructuring; 2) NATO regional reinforcement
capabilities; and 3) direct enlargement measures.
To restructure and modernize new members' armed forces, the
Administration estimates that, from 1997-2009, it would cost between
$800 million and $1 billion annually, or a total of $10- 13 billion.
This will include such measures as modernization of ground forces,
including artillery, armor and ammunition; procurement by each country
of surface-to-air missiles and one squadron of combat aircraft; and
training. The cost of these steps would be borne by the new countries.
For NATO regional reinforcement capabilities, the Administration
estimates alliance costs of $600-800 million per year, or $8-10 billion
total. This estimate is based on being able to deploy and sustain four
divisions and six NATO fighter wings to reinforce new members in the
event of a threat. Because the United States is already fully prepared
to deploy forces, these costs would fall largely on current NATO
allies, according to the Administration. Like restructuring and
modernization, most of these steps, it is reasoned, would take place
regardless of expansion plans as they are applicable to NATO's evolving
strategy regarding non-Article 5 missions.
Direct enlargement costs, according to U.S. calculations, would
average $700-900 million per year, or a total of $9-12 billion to
attain ``mature capability.'' These costs consist of upgrading and/or
ensuring interoperability of: command, control, communications and
intelligence (C3I); air defense systems; logistics support;
reinforcement reception; infrastructure; and exercise facilities and
staging. The report estimates that about 40% of the costs for direct
enlargement activities would be paid for by individual member
countries--both current and new--to improve their own forces, and the
remaining 60% would be financed by NATO common funds for
infrastructure. Divided in this manner, the new countries would pay
about 35% ($230-350 million per year, or $3-4.5 billion total); current
allies--other than the United States--would contribute 50% ($350-425
million per year, or $4.5-5.5 billion total); and the United States'
share would be 15% ($150-200 million annually, or $1.5-2.0 billion
total). Because common funding of NATO activities would commence only
after accession in 1999, the U.S. contribution is reckoned over the 10-
year period 2000-2009.
Total costs for the Administration's scenario consequently range
from $27 billion to $35 billion, of which new members would pay $13-
17.5 billion, current allies $12.5-15.5 billion, and the United States
$1.5-2.0 billion. The Administration notes that its estimates exclude
programs in support of relations with Eastern and Central European
countries, as well as U.S. funding for NATO's Partnership for Peace
program, since neither is directly related to NATO enlargement.
Congressional Budget Office
In March 1996, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) published The
Costs of Expanding the NATO Alliance, 3 a study that
estimates the amounts that would be necessary to fund several possible
expansion scenarios. The cost analyses focus on expanding the alliance
to include the four countries considered most likely at the time the
analysis was written: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ U.S. Congressional Budget Office. CBO Papers. The Costs of
Expanding the NATO Alliance. March, 1996. Washington, D.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBO assumes two levels of threat: regional dangers, which are more
likely, and a much less likely threat from Russia--the only power with
the potential to mount a significant threat to the alliance. The CBO
study presents five scenarios, with cumulative costs; that is, the cost
of each is added to the previous ones. Costs are for the period 1996-
2010.
Option 1--Strengthen Visegrad Defense Forces and Provide for NATO
Reinforcement ($60.6 billion). The most fundamental and least costly
single scenario, option 1 envisions current NATO members assisting the
four above-named countries in defending themselves against ``a border
skirmish with a neighbor or a limited war with a regional power.''
CBO assumes that three steps are key to enabling western NATO
allies to assist the new members. The first involves instruction in
NATO military doctrine and procedures, as well as large-scale exercises
with the alliance. The second consists of improvements in and
interoperability of new members' C3I systems. Finally, the new
countries would need to upgrade their air defenses. CBO estimates total
costs for such steps at $21.2 billion.
Various improvements in military capability are presumed necessary
under option 1. Nearly one-third ($19.2 billion) of the cost of this
option is dedicated to upgrading equipment (of new members and current
allies) and acquiring new stocks, including such items as fighter
aircraft and anti-tank weaponry. In addition, CBO also includes $5
billion for tanker aircraft, and nearly $7 billion for improving
Poland's army and navy. In order for the new members to receive
supplies and reinforcements from NATO, the alliance would also likely
need to upgrade infrastructure in the new member states, which would
consist of making improvements in transportation and fueling systems.
CBO budgets $3 billion for such work. CBO also factors in $4.7 billion
for the construction of training facilities, and $0.6 billion for
purchase of fuel and ammunition stocks.
CBO estimates the total cost of option 1 at $60.6 billion over 15
years, of which the United States would contribute $4.8 billion, the
new members $42.0 billion, and current members $13.8 billion. However,
the study adds that, if NATO chose simply to provide for a minimum
defense capability by employing the first three initiatives (C3I, air
defense, and training), the estimated cost of expansion would fall to
$21.2 billion, of which the U.S. share would be $1.9 billion.
Option 2--Project NATO Air Power East to Defend the Visegrad States
($79.2 billion). According to CBO, options 2-5 ``would attempt to
provide an Article 5 defense against an aggressive and militarily
potent Russia.'' Under CBO's second scenario, NATO would project air
power eastward by creating prepared or co-located operating bases and
would add $18.6 billion to the cost of the first option.
Option 3--Project Power Eastward With Ground Forces Based in
Germany ($109.3 billion). Option 3 adds ground forces to air power by
enabling nearly all of NATO's 11 divisions to move from Germany to the
Visegrad states in the event of an attack. Choosing this option would
add about $30 billion to the above two options, with the U.S. share
being $3.6 billion.
Option 4--Move Stocks of Prepositioned Equipment East ($110.5
billion). This option envisions storing equipment sufficient for five
brigades of U.S. troops, who would fly in directly from the United
States in the event of an emergency. Existing stocks of equipment would
be moved from their current west European locations to newly built
storage facilities in the Visegrad countries at an additional cost of
$1.2 billion, $290 million of it funded by the United States.
Option 5--Station a Limited Number of Forces Forward ($124.7
billion). The last option entails moving nearly three divisions of
U.S. and allied ground forces and two air wings from Germany to
renovated bases in the new member states, where they would be
permanently stationed. This option by itself would cost approximately
$14 billion, with $5.5 billion paid by the United States.
RAND
In the Autumn 1996 issue of Survival, three analysts at RAND
published another study of the possible costs of NATO expansion.
4 Like CBO, the RAND authors posit a series of enlargement
options. Rather than assigning a single cost estimate to each option,
however, RAND provides funding ranges for each, based on different
policy choices. RAND also assumes the Visegrad four to be the most
likely new members, though acknowledging that Slovakia's chances had
``clearly diminished.'' RAND posits four alternative defense postures,
somewhat similar to those constructed by CBO. RAND also develops
increasingly ambitious scenarios, but provides additional flexibility
within each option.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ What Will NATO Enlargement Cost? By Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L.
Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee. Survival. Vol. 38, No. 3. Autumn,
1996. pp. 5-26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Option 1. The ``self-defense support'' option assumes that new
member states will be responsible for defending their own borders, and
that western NATO member assistance might be limited to aiding in such
key areas as C3I and logistics; however, the alliance might provide
other forms of aid, such as assisting new members develop better air
defenses, infrastructure, munitions reserves, and helping them improve
their readiness. Option 1 costs range from $10-20 billion.
Option 2. RAND's second option adds air power, through such steps
as the upgrading of European air wings and the construction of co-
located operating bases with munitions storage facilities in the new
member territories. Once more, the cost of this option would depend on
the extent of the forces used. If five fighter wings were readied for
eastward deployment in the event of a crisis, costs would go up to $20
billion; if 10 fighter wings were equipped, costs would rise to $30
billion.
Option 3. The third option combines land forces with air power.
Current NATO member forces would remain where they are presently based,
but would be prepared to ``commit armored and mechanized forces to
perform a broad spectrum of missions in Eastern Europe, ranging from
border defense to peacekeeping and crisis management.'' RAND estimated
that costs for this option would range from $30-52 billion; the higher
estimate would combine 10 NATO divisions with 10 fighter wings. A
middle option with a $42 billion price tag is discussed in detail.
Option 4. Under the fourth option, set up to address a ``worst case
scenario,'' NATO would move significant forces--both land and air--
eastward. Estimated costs for this option range from $55 billion to
$110 billion; the latter estimate arises from forward deployment of the
10 divisions and air wings of option 3. RAND points out, however, that
because there is no imminent threat, ``[s]uch a posture is clearly not
needed today.''
On the topic of burden sharing, the authors note that member states
currently are responsible for funding their own forces, and pay a share
of the NATO common infrastructure costs. The amount that any given
country will contribute to expansion will depend upon how large its
share is of the common infrastructure budget and upon how extensively
its forces will be used. Thus, under the first option (self-defense
support), a larger share of the burden would be borne by the new
members, while projecting air and/or ground forces would entail greater
expenses by current members. Under RAND's above-mentioned $42 billion
``middle'' scenario, for example, current members would contribute
approximately $25.6 billion (61%), new members would pay $8.0 billion
(19%), and the remaining $8.4 billion would come from the NATO
infrastructure funds. Of this amount, the U.S. share of the total
package could range from $420 million to $1.4 billion--an estimate that
appears to assume a redistribution of contributions.
ANNEX 2
Comparative NATO Defense-spending Statistics
Table 1.--NATO ``Common Cost'' Budget Cost Sharing Formula in
Percentages of the total NATO Common Budget
Military Security Civil
Budget Investment Budget
United States....................... 24.12 23.2708 23.35
Belgium............................. 2.85 4.1260 2.76
Canada.............................. 5.6 2.75 5.6
Denmark............................. 1.68 3.33 1.59
France.............................. 16.50 12.9044 16.50
Germany............................. 15.54 22.3974 15.54
Greece.............................. 0.38 1.00 0.38
Iceland............................. 0.04 0.00 0.05
Italy............................... 5.91 7.745 5.75
Luxembourg.......................... 0.08 0.1973 0.08
Netherlands......................... 2.84 4.58 2.75
Norway.............................. 1.16 2.83 1.11
Portugal............................ 0.63 0.345 0.63
Spain............................... 3.5 3.2816 3.5
Turkey.............................. 1.59 1.04 1.59
United Kingdom...................... 17.58 10.1925 18.82
Table 2.--U.S. Contributions to NATO ``Common Costs''
(in $millions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY1998
FY1993 FY1994 FY1995 FY1996 FY1997 (est.)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Strategic Investment................................ 60 140 119 161 172 176
Military Budget..................................... 216 161 248 249 273 273
Civilian Budget..................................... 42 41 40 43 44 44
Total........................................... 318 342 407 453 489 493
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 3.--NATO Member Defense Expenditures as % of Gross Domestic Product
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average Average Average Average
Country 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996e
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on current prices
Belgium..................................................... 3.2 3.3 2.9 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6
Denmark..................................................... 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.8
France...................................................... 3.8 4.1 3.8 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.0
Germany..................................................... 3.4 3.4 3.0 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.7
Greece...................................................... 5.6 5.5 5.2 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.6
Italy....................................................... 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8 2.0
Luxembourg.................................................. 0.9 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8
Netherlands................................................. 3.1 3.1 2.9 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.0
Norway...................................................... 2.9 2.7 2.9 2.8 3.0 2.7 2.8 2.4 2.5
Portugal.................................................... 3.4 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.7
Spain....................................................... 2.4 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.5
Turkey...................................................... 4.4 4.0 3.3 3.8 3.9 3.9 4.1 4.0 4.4
United Kingdom.............................................. 4.9 5.2 4.5 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.0 2.9
NATO Europe................................................. 3.6 3.2 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.3
Canada...................................................... 1.9 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5
United States............................................... 5.0 5.8 6.3 4.9 5.1 4.8 4.3 4.0 3.7
North America............................................... 4.7 5.4 5.9 4.7 4.9 4.5 4.1 3.8 3.6
Nato total.................................................. 4.6 4.7 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.3 3.0 2.9
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: NATO.
Table 4.--U.S. and NATO Europe: Comparative Data on Military Spending, 1985-95
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military Expenditures (Constant Gross National Product (Constant Military Expenditures (Percentage of Population Military
1995$, Billions) 1995$, Billions) GNP) (Millions) Expenditures Per
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Capita (1995$)
---------------------
United NATO Europe United NATO Europe United NATO Europe United NATO United NATO
States States States States Europe States Europe
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1985........................... 353.8 213.4 5,758 6,159 6.1% 3.5% 238.5 372.9 1,483 572
1986........................... 374.9 213.7 5,920 6,347 6.3% 3.4% 240.7 374.7 1,558 570
1987........................... 373.0 217.6 6,085 6,526 6.1% 3.3% 242.8 376.6 1,536 578
1988........................... 365.9 213.5 6,321 6,786 5.8% 3.1% 245.0 378.7 1,493 564
1989........................... 364.3 215.2 6,533 7,026 5.6% 3.1% 247.3 381.5 1,473 564
1990........................... 351.9 216.7 6,625 7,237 5.3% 3.0% 249.9 400.8 1,408 541
1991........................... 309.7 213.6 6,555 7,373 4.7% 2.9% 252.6 403.8 1,226 529
1992........................... 328.2 204.0 6,729 7,446 4.9% 2.7% 255.4 405.7 1,285 503
1993........................... 312.0 197.5 6,881 7,416 4.5% 2.7% 258.1 408.4 1,209 484
1994........................... 295.3 192.2 7,106 7,614 4.2% 2.5% 260.7 410.9 1,133 468
1995........................... 277.8 183.9 7,247 7,784 3.8% 2.4% 263.0 413.4 1,056 445
Total........................
(Avg) 3,706.8 2,281.3 71,760 77,714 5.2% 2.9% 250.4 393.4 1,351 529
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1996, August, 1997.
Table 5.--U.S. and Selected Allies: Comparative Data on Military Spending, 1985-95
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military Expenditures (Percentage of GNP) Military ExpendituresPer Capita (1995$)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
United United United United
States France Italy Germany Netherlands Norway Kingdom States France Italy Germany Netherlands Norway Kingdom
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1985.............................. 6.1% 4.0% 2.2% 3.2% 3.0% 3.1% 5.1% 1,483 892 341 885 642 766 810
1986.............................. 6.3% 3.9% 2.2% 3.1% 3.0% 3.2% 4.8% 1,558 892 356 879 648 804 797
1987.............................. 6.1% 3.9% 2.4% 3.1% 3.0% 3.4% 4.6% 1,536 917 397 879 655 865 783
1988.............................. 5.8% 3.8% 2.4% 2.9% 2.9% 3.3% 4.1% 1,493 912 399 866 645 839 737
1989.............................. 5.6% 3.7% 2.3% 2.8% 2.8% 3.4% 4.1% 1,473 918 402 857 646 849 742
1990.............................. 5.3% 3.6% 2.2% 2.8% 2.6% 3.3% 4.1% 1,408 911 382 703 625 849 742
1991.............................. 4.7% 3.6% 2.1% 2.5% 2.5% 3.2% 4.3% 1,226 914 381 643 605 828 757
1992.............................. 4.9% 3.4% 2.1% 2.3% 2.5% 3.5% 3.8% 1,285 881 377 610 601 924 679
1993.............................. 4.5% 3.4% 2.1% 2.2% 2.3% 3.2% 3.6% 1,209 865 379 550 554 867 650
1994.............................. 4.2% 3.4% 2.0% 2.0% 2.2% 3.2% 3.4% 1,133 870 370 511 535 901 624
1995.............................. 3.8% 3.1% 1.8% 1.9% 2.1% 2.7% 3.0% 1,056 826 338 496 518 804 572
Average......................... 5.2% 3.6% 2.2% 2.6% 2.6% 3.2% 4.1% 1,351 891 375 716 607 845 718
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, ``World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1996,'' August, 1997.
Prepared Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As you know, this is one of a series of hearings on the question of
the proposed expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to
include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. This Committee, and
then the Senate at large, will soon be faced with a decision to ratify
an amendment to the NATO treaty of 1949, representing the fourth such
enlargement since the alliance was formed.
This will clearly be an historic decision, for, as we all know,
NATO arguably has been the most critical force in maintaining peace and
security in Europe over the past half century.
For the past several years, the peoples of east and central Europe
have enjoyed freedoms that were unavailable to them during the Cold
War. These countries have made substantial progress toward democracy
and free market economics. They are our partners and our friends.
Expansion of the alliance will help assure that the people of
Eastern Europe will never again be subjected to the kind of tyranny
they endured under the Soviet regime, by offering a critical firewall
against any new threat to peace and democracy. Curtailment of such
threats are goals we all share.
I am therefore supportive of the fundamental goals of NATO
enlargement. However, I do have some concerns, that I know are shared
by many other Members of Congress, about the commitment -- financial
and otherwise -- the United States will undertake as it pursues
enlargement of the alliance.
There have been at least three major studies conducted to assess
the potential costs of NATO expansion by highly respected governmental
and nongovernmental entities. Yet each of these analyses makes
different assumptions about what types of costs actually can be
attributed to expansion, per se, and different assumptions about the
potential threats that NATO will face over the next decade. Depending
on which study you read, the U.S. share of the costs of NATO expansion
could be anywhere form $2 billion to $7 billion. What that means is we
could be up or down $5 billion depending on whose assumptions you
believe.
Now I know it is extremely difficult to develop a truly accurate
assessment of costs when there are probably hundreds of variables that
we can not control. But we are talking about a substantial commitment
on the part of the U.S. taxpayer.
I recognize that the higher figures reflected in some reports
assume a resurgent Russian threat, an assumption that I hope is
unlikely. But even if you remove this assumption, we are still dealing
with numbers that differ by hundreds of millions of dollars.
Mr. Chairman, this year, we have finally passed legislation that
will help us arrive at a balanced budget. So I have to ask myself, what
are the implications of assuming a new commitment where our cost
estimates may vary by hundreds of millions of dollars?
As I have indicated, I clearly support the Administration's goals
with respect to NATO expansion. But I am somewhat disturbed that we do
not seem to have a good handle on expected costs here.
Even though this analogy may not hold up to heavy scrutiny, I can
not ignore the fact that the current estimate for the cost of U.S.
troop deployment in Bosnia is now up to about $7 billion, representing
a more-than-three-fold increase over the Administration's initial
estimate of some $2 billion. Undersecretary Slocum might respond to
that comment by explaining to me how there was little means to
anticipate some of the conditions our troops faced in Bosnia back in
late 1995 when the first estimates were developed. Well, that may be
true. But this was a very expensive lesson for us to learn. What the
United States is likely to spend in Bosnia over two and one-half years
is equal to just over half of the entire foreign operations budget for
fiscal 1997!
My point here is that -- in the midst of implementing what will be
the most significant shift in our collective defense strategy
represented by the enlargement of NATO -- I do not think the United
States can afford to get this wrong. We must have a clear understanding
of where this plan is taking us and what it is going to cost.
So that is why, Mr. Chairman, I welcome the zeal with which you are
pursuing this issue with this series of hearings. Clearly, NATO
expansion is enormously important for the President, for the Congress,
for the American public, and for the people who suffered under the
Soviet yolk for so long.
I am honored to be able to participate in this historic debate as a
member of this Committee.
__________
THE HIGH COST OF NATO EXPANSION
Clearing the Administration's Smoke Screen
by ivan eland*
Executive Summary
The Clinton administration's estimate of the costs of NATO
expansion is fatally flawed. Even if the dubious major assumptions--
that the current benign threat environment will continue and that no
NATO forces will need to be permanently stationed in new member states-
-are accepted, the administration's estimate that the total cost of
expansion will be only $27 billion to $35 billion is much too low. Its
paltry estimate of $1.5 to $2 billion for U.S. costs is even more
incredible.
The U.S. Department of Defense, which made the cost estimate for
the administration, did not develop a detailed list of military
enhancements needed for expansion, estimate the cost of each
enhancement, and add those costs up for a total. Instead, in many cases
DoD analysts used a ``macro'' approach to select a level of spending
(what they termed ``level of effort'') for a particular category of
military improvement, with little or no military rationale or analysis
to back it up. In other cases, where DoD made microassumptions, they
were very questionable and designed to hold costs down. In addition,
DoD analysts felt constrained in how much military infrastructure they
could assume would be built on the territories of new member nations.
All of those dubious methods were needed because the DoD's estimate
resulted from negotiations within the administration; it was not a
valid estimate of costs based on military requirements.
In this study, a detailed critique is offered of the
administration's assumptions and method of estimating the costs; and an
alternative cost estimate, which uses the DoD's major assumptions but
is based on more realistic micro assumptions and better methodology, is
presented. That estimate projects the total costs of expansion at about
$70 billion (although they could reach $167 billion), of which at least
$7 billion would accrue to the United States.
Introduction
On July 8, 1997, at U.S. initiative, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization decided to admit Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
as members. The U.S. Senate--as will the legislative bodies of the
other 15 members of the alliance--will be required to approve an
amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty ratifying the plans for
expansion. To make that ratification decision, those bodies will need
good estimates of what NATO expansion is likely to cost.
When admitting new members, the alliance--under article 5 of the
treaty--agrees to assist them if they come under attack. Thus,
enlarging the alliance will cost new members and existing members money
because armed forces will need to be improved and military
infrastructure in the substantially expanded territory will need to be
augmented to receive and support them. Although some observers argue
that collective defense is cheaper than unilateral defense, the real
question is, for whom? The new members are located near unstable areas
of Eastern Europe and would benefit greatly from admission to the
alliance. Even so, they expect that joining the alliance will lead to
increases in their defense budgets.\1\ Those nations, however, may not
be able to afford even the expenses required for collective defense,
because their economies are in transition from communism to capitalism
and polls show that their populations do not support increases in the
proportion of government spending devoted to defense.\2\ Thus, upon
entering the alliance, they may require subsidies from existing members
to help them finance improvements to their dilapidated infrastructure
and obsolescent armed forces. As a result, it is important to estimate
not only the costs of expansion for the United States and its existing
NATO allies but for new members as well. If the costs that new members
will face are too large for them to afford, those costs could very
easily become the responsibility of the alliance and its current
members--most notably, the United States.
*Ivan Eland is director of defense policy studies at the Cato
Institute.
Despite the Senate's need for good cost information on which to
make its ratification decision, the Clinton administration had to be
dragged into a discussion of the expenses of expansion. Although
expansion became an official goal of NATO in January 1994, it was only
in February 1997 that the administration issued its woefully inadequate
estimate of the costs of expansion. The administration did so then only
because it was required to by Congress and because estimates by the
Congressional Budget office and RAND were putting pressure on it to
develop an estimate of its own. The administration's attitude seemed to
be that any discussion of costs would harm prospects for ratification.
Yet members of Congress and the public, when passing judgment on
any public policy initiative, have a right to cost estimates that are
methodologically rigorous and reasonably accurate. In the case of NATO
expansion, the administration has failed on both counts. The
administration's cost figure resulted from a negotiation between the
White House and several offices in the Pentagon; it is not a valid
estimate based on the military requirements of expansion.\3\
The Administration's Cost Estimate
The administration's estimate, developed by the U.S. Department of
Defense, was that total costs of expansion during the period from 1997
to 2007 would be from $27 billion to $35 billion, with U.S. costs
amounting to a scant $1.5 billion to $2 billion. The estimate was based
on the following assumptions:
A direct conventional military threat to new members is
unlikely for the foreseeable future; such a threat, if it
appeared at all, would take many years to develop.
As long as the current benign threat environment continues,
the alliance will provide an article 5 defense of the
territories of new member states by reinforcing the militaries
of those nations with the forces of existing members (four of
the divisions and six of the air wings stationed in Western
Europe) rather than permanently stationing existing members,
forces in the new member states in peacetime.
The forces of new members must be able to operate with those
of existing members.
The forces of current NATO members must be able to reinforce
those of new members.\4\
As shown in Table 1, the administration's cost estimate was divided
into three categories: military restructuring by new members,
enhancements to regional reinforcement capabilities of current members,
and direct enlargement.
Curiously, the administration listed all three categories of costs
in its estimate but then stated that the
Table 1.--The Administration's Cost Estimate\1\
(billions of dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
United NATO New
Category of Costs States Allies Members Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military restructuring by new members........................... 10-13 10-13
Enhancements to regional reinforcement capabilities of current
members........................................................ 8-10 8-10
Direct enlargement.............................................. 1.5-2.0 4.5-5.5 3.0-4.5 9-12
Total....................................................... 1.5-2.0 12.5-15.5 13-17.5 27-35
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Source: U.S. Department of Defense, ``The Military Implications and Costs of NATO Enlargement,'' undated
briefing, p. 9.
``measures in the first two categories would, for the most part, need
to be pursued independent of enlargement.''\5\ Military restructuring
by new members included the modernization of their air and ground
forces and training. Enhancements to regional reinforcement
capabilities of current members included giving ground and air units
mobile logistics so they can project power east onto the territory of
new members to reinforce them if they come under the threat of attack.
Direct enlargement included ''costs directly and exclusively tied to
enlargement.\6\ Those direct costs included the following general
subcategories of improvements in the new member states: communication,
exercises, and reception facilities for reinforcements.
A breakout of costs was provided only for those three main
categories and subcategories. In the direct enlargement category, a few
more details were provided on what the subcategories of communication,
exercises, and reception facilities included, but no costs were
attached to them. The listed improvements in the new member states
under the subcategories included the following: educating officers,
renovating command centers, improving the communications of military
forces, enhancing air defense and air offense, increasing the amount of
equipment that can operate with the equipment of existing NATO nations,
and providing procedures and facilities to receive and fuel incoming
NATO reinforcements.
Problems with the Administration's Major Assumptions
The lack of detailed cost projections in the administration's
estimate is only the first indicator that something is awry. The first
two of the major assumptions in the estimate--no current threat and no
stationing of NATO forces in the new member nations--may prove
problematic.
Although the threat environment is benign at the moment, three
potential flashpoints exist that could drag a new member--and thus
NATO--into a regional conflagration. The first is Hungary's tension
with the belligerent Serbia over the Hungarian minority in the Serbian
province of Vojvodina. Serbia actually bombed a town inside Hungary
during the Yugoslav civil war. The second possible flashpoint is
Poland's border with Belarus, governed by the repressive and erratic
regime of Alexander Lukashenko. if unstable Belarus erupts, Poland will
expect NATO's help.\7\ The third flashpoint is Poland's border with the
isolated Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. Russian military and security
officials, concerned about the strengthening of Polish forces near the
enclave, have publicly announced that Russia intends to build up its
forces.\8\ The second and third flashpoints could involve a
confrontation between NATO and Russia. Furthermore, although Hungary's
disputes with Romania and Slovakia over the rights of the Hungarian
minorities living in those countries have subsided for the moment, they
could flair up again in the future.
Any one of those potential flashpoints could increase pressure for
NATO to permanently station forces on the territories of new members.
As Ted Galen Carpenter has written about that possibility,
On the surface that might appear to be an extremely remote
possibility. But it is worthwhile to recall that the prospect
of a permanent U.S. military garrison in Western Europe seemed
equally unlikely when NATO was created in 1949. In fact,
Secretary of State Acheson, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Gen. Omar Bradley, and other officials of the Truman
administration explicitly assured Congress and the American
people that the United States would not station troops on the
Continent. Less than two years after the North Atlantic Treaty
was safely ratified, however, some four U.S. divisions were on
their way to Europe.\9\
As Carpenter notes, one of the reasons that increased commitment
was deemed necessary was the slow pace of Western Europe's rearmament
after World War II. He also notes the gradually escalating nature of
the rhetoric justifying the increased obligations.
Administration leaders stressed that the assumption of
additional responsibilities was not intended to be permanent,
that the United States would bear them only until the West
Europeans could complete their rearmament efforts. The allies
had different ideas, however, and thus began the process by
which the United States would come to have primary
responsibility for Western Europe's defense instead of merely
backstopping Western European efforts.\10\
Those U.S. troops remain in Europe today long after the disintegration
of the Soviet Union.
NATO is an example of international commitments that mushroom out
of control as circumstances change. Another example is the entangling
alliances that led to World War I. Although a rough balance of power
existed in Europe before the war, there had sprung up on the Continent
a series of alliances--beginning in the 1870s and continuing through
the first decade of the 20th century--that had become outdated by 1914
as the international situation changed. Those entanglements dragged the
reluctant major powers--including Germany--into what turned into a
global war.\11\
Similarly, during a time of uncertainty and change in post-Cold War
Europe, admitting new members to an outdated NATO alliance may further
inhibit the flexibility of U.S. foreign policy to respond to unexpected
circumstances in the future. U.S. flexibility would be further
compromised if pressure built to permanently station forces in the new
member states. That scenario could easily happen--as it did in the NATO
alliance after World War II--if new allies are unwilling or unable to
bear the expenses of drastically transforming their marginal militaries
into effective fighting forces. As the Congressional Budget office
notes, Central European nations, in transition from communist to
capitalist economies, may be both unwilling and unable to afford such
expenses. According to public opinion polls in all of those states,
their populations do not support increases in government spending
devoted to defense.\12\ Jonathan Landay of the Christian Science
Monitor concludes, ``Even as talks on their admission gather speed,
doubts persist over whether they can rebuild armies equipped with
outdated Soviet technologies into assets that can contribute to NATO's
strength.''\13\
Thus, although the administration is currently selling the
expansion of the alliance by promising to eschew permanently stationing
NATO forces in new member states, the existence of potential regional
flashpoints combined with insufficient defense efforts by new member
states could require an abrupt change after ratification is secure. The
U.S. military establishment is now minimizing military threats in
Europe to ensure ratification of NATO expansion. It is curious that in
every case except NATO expansion, the Pentagon routinely plans for and
buys weapons for the worst case war scenario. After all, when was the
last time the United States fought two regional wars nearly
simultaneously, as the military currently plans to do? After
ratification is ensured, the Pentagon might have an incentive to return
to business as usual, maximizing military threats in the region to
support the argument that the forward stationing of troops is needed.
The U.S. military presence in Europe might be perceived as less
vulnerable to congressional pressures for reduction or withdrawal if it
were ``closer to the action'' instead of sitting awkwardly in Germany,
a nation that is no longer threatened. The Congressional Budget Office
also noted that permanently stationing military units in new member
states could raise the cost of NATO expansion to as much as $167
billion.\14\ But Congress might feel it had little choice but to fund
such costs if the actual or perceived threat seemed great enough. Thus,
the camels nose under the tent could lead costs to increase
dramatically.
Categories of Cost
Despite the problems with the administration's assumptions of a
continuing benign threat environment and a defense based on
reinforcement rather than the permanent stationing of forces, for the
purposes of analysis let us assume that both assumptions are valid.
Even with that generous concession, the administration's estimate of
the costs of expansion is questionable. Let us start with the way the
estimate is structured.
Three Categories and a Curious Assertion
The administration's inclusion of three major categories of costs
with the disclaimer that two of the categories--military restructuring
by new members and enhancements to reinforcement capabilities of
current members--were promised by those nations whether or not NATO
expanded allows the administration to have it both ways. Had the
administration omitted those two categories--which account for $18
billion to $23 billion of the $27 billion to $35 billion total
estimate--the remaining $9 billion to $12 billion covering only direct
enlargement costs would have been ridiculed in Congress as obviously
too low. By using the $27 billion to $35 billion figure but including
the caveat that most of the expenses would have been incurred anyway,
the administration gives the appearance of being comprehensive in its
methodology for costing while at the same time it touts lower costs.
Such accounting distinctions are helpful when selling the expansion
of the alliance, but they are not very helpful in determining the total
costs that NATO nations will probably incur or whether they can afford
them. Richard Kugler, a coauthor of the RAND study on the costs of NATO
enlargement and a proponent of expansion, termed the distinction
between direct costs and the other two categories ``gibberish.''\15\
The Congressional Budget Office's study included all three categories
of costs, and a study by the Potomac Foundation implicitly endorsed
that comprehensive analysis of costs.\16\
The argument that both new member nations and existing NATO members
would need to transform and improve their militaries whether NATO
expanded or not is suspect. There is a contradiction between the DoD's
assumption of a continuing benign threat environment and its assumption
that the new NATO nations would transform and improve their militaries
even without expansion. Why would they do so unless they perceived a
threat? Moreover, although all three new member nations may have
promised to increase spending and modernize their militaries, actions
speak louder than words. The post-Cold War track records of both
existing allies and new members are not good. The defense spending of
the Central European nations between the end of the Cold War and the
period of serious talk about NATO expansion should give some indication
of what their defense efforts would have been without expansion. From
the end of the Cold War in 1989 until very recently, when they were
being examined for admission to NATO, the prospective new members spent
declining real amounts on defense. During the same period, most of the
European allies also had declining defense budgets.
In fact, both the DoD and the new members argue that the new
members will restructure and modernize their armed forces whether or
not NATO expands, at the same time that the new members claim that
joining the alliance will increase their defense budgets. Hungary
claims that joining the alliance will require an increase in its
defense budget of 35 percent, Poland expects a 20 percent rise, and the
Czech Republic has pledged to double defense spending in the next two
years.\17\ An increase of nearly 60 percent in the collective defense
budgets of all three new members is a better estimate.
The Scope of Needed Military Improvements
Despite the decline in resources for defense, providing a credible
article 5 defense for an expanded NATO will require substantial
enhancements to the militaries of new member states, as well as
significant improvements in the forces of existing allies. In its
response to a General Accounting Office report, even the DoD admits
that the failure to make such improvements could ``seriously impair an
enlarged alliance's military effectiveness.''\18\
In our analysis, we set out some basic tasks connected with
enlargement, that an enlarged NATO will need to be prepared to
carry out if it is to be able to provide an effective Article V
collective defense of the new members. First, current members
must make additional progress in upgrading their regional
reinforcement capabilities to be able to more effectively
implement NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept. Second, new members
must continue restructuring and selectively modernizing so that
they can enhance their self-defense capabilities. Third, new
members must increase their forces' interoperability with
current members' forces and they, with the Alliance as a whole,
must establish the levels of command and control, air
surveillance, logistics, and the like necessary for collective
defense. only the last category is a direct result of
enlargement, and in that sense only that category is an
incremental cost of enlargement. However, without the other two
types of enhancements, an enlarged Alliance would not be as
militarily credible or effective as it should be, nor as
equitable in its sharing of defense burdens.\19\
That passage indicates that new members--in addition to enhancing
their forces so that they can better operate with those of NATO--would
need to restructure and modernize their forces to enhance their self-
defense capabilities. Another passage in the GAO report indicates that
the DoD assumed that NATO would continue relying on its post-Cold War
strategy that requires that every member have a ``basic self defense
capability.''\20\ Currently, the militaries of the new members are
excessively large and in a sorry state. They have obsolescent equipment
and an overly centralized command structure left over from their days
in the Warsaw Pact. Those forces would need to be reduced in size and
reorganized along western lines. The equipment, particularly command,
control, and communication devices, would need to be compatible with
that of NATO. The officers and senior enlisted personnel would need to
be trained in NATO procedures and English, the day-to-day working
language of the alliance. The infrastructure of new member nations--
both military and civilian--is dilapidated. Ports, rails, and roads are
in poor shape because of heavy use and little maintenance during the
years of the Warsaw Pact. Military bases are run down and in some cases
unusable because of environmental contamination. Substantial
improvements to the military infrastructure will be needed if it is to
adequately receive NATO reinforcements.
One French military officer is quoted as saying, ``There is a big
gap between [Eastern European] militaries and the European allies in
NATO.''\21\ That admission should give proponents of expansion pause
because even some of the militaries of existing allies are of
questionable quality-for example, those of Turkey, Spain, and Portugal.
The Clinton administration acknowledges the severe problems with the
armed forces of new members: ``These states emerged from the Warsaw
Pact with military forces that were poorly structured and inadequately
equipped for modern warfare.''\22\
Yet the administration keeps insisting that the new members were
planning substantial military improvements even in the absence of
expansion. The new members have an incentive to play along with that
line of reasoning, exaggerating what was planned. The more improvements
they say were already in their plans, the smaller the costs of
expansion. only a comprehensive accounting of all costs related to
expansion will end that game.
Furthermore, to make their armed forces compatible with those of
NATO, they will need to buy Western systems, which tend to be the most
expensive. That gives rise to a worrisome potential for hidden costs to
U.S. taxpayers. When new NATO members buy new equipment to replace
their aging inventories, there will be political pressure from U.S.
arms exporters on the U.S. government to provide financing for those
sales. Other Western governments will be providing such assistance, and
the argument will be made that U.S. sellers will lose out in the
already fierce competition for arms sales to the new members. Expenses
for U.S. government financing of such sales will accrue to the U.S.
taxpayer. That is one important reason why new members, expenses for
upgrading old equipment and purchasing new equipment should be included
when the total costs of expansion are considered, and U.S. financing of
those purchases should be included when U.S. costs are considered. Such
U.S. assistance, which could be substantial, was excluded from the
administration's estimate.
Also, U.S. allies would need to make significant improvements in
their forces in order to reinforce new member states in time of crisis.
Unlike U.S. forces, the armed forces of the West European allies still
have only a very limited ability to project power, even within the
European theater, according to U.S., European, and NATO officials.\23\
During the Cold War, the alliance strategy was to use an ``in-place
linear defense'' in Germany against any Soviet attack. That changed in
1991, when NATO adopted a post-Cold War Strategic Concept that
emphasized that alliance forces should enhance their flexibility and
mobility.\24\ Yet, since then, the European allies have had little
enthusiasm for making such enhancements. Declining real defense budgets
since the end of the Cold War in most allied nations indicate those
nations are reluctant to make such costly improvements to their forces
in the absence of NATO expansion. In fact, two proponents of expansion
even advocate using NATO expansion to prod the slumbering allies to
enhance the mobility of their forces so that they also can be used in
operations other than defending the treaty area.\25\ Those operations,
such as the NATO mission in Bosnia, are called ``out-of-area''
operations. The operation in Bosnia has highlighted the gap between
U.S. forces and those of existing NATO allies, especially in logistics
and communications.\26\
Contradictory Requirements
Implicit in that argument, and explicit in the arguments of other
proponents of expansion, is the assumption that the military
improvements heeded to make allied forces more mobile to reinforce new
members in any article 5 defense will also make them more mobile for
out-of-area missions called for in the 1991 Strategic Concept.\27\ To
some extent, the two missions would benefit from the same improvements
to forces. To improve the tactical mobility of rapid reinforcements on
the ground for article 5 defense, the allied ground forces would need
additional combat support (reinforcing artillery, air defense, and
helicopters) and combat service support (combat engineers, military
police, communications, medical units, maintenance and mobile repair
units, ammunition handling and storage, and trucks and heavy equipment
transporters). Allied tactical air forces would need mobile engineers,
maintenance units, medical units, and other support assets. Such
enhanced tactical mobility would also help allied forces conduct out-
of-area missions, especially those--such as the one in Bosnia--that
require overland movements from bases in Central Europe.
For some out-of-area missions, however, the allies would need to
buy expensive aircraft for airlift and ships for sealift to improve
strategic mobility. In addition, one NATO general has said that such
missions would require the alliance to lighten its maneuver units.\28\
Lightening the units will make them easier to transport by strategic
lift.
But buying assets for strategic mobility will cut into the
resources needed to make the aforementioned improvements in tactical
mobility. In addition, making units lighter for transport by strategic
lift might reduce their capability to fight in certain tactical
situations--for example, reinforcing Polish forces. Poland is the most
important of the three new members, if insulating Germany's eastern
border from attack is the primary goal of expansion (the primary goal
thus far has been hard to discern). Poland is large and flat and is
best defended by heavily armored forces. Lightening such heavy forces
so that they are more easily transported to out-of-area operations by
strategic lift will impair their ability to conduct an article 5
defense of Poland.
To a certain extent, the competing requirements for strategically
mobile forces and tactically mobile forces may cause funding dilemmas
in allied nations already unenthusiastic about spending money on
defense. Because any threat to new members that would require an
article 5 defense is perceived as low, any money spent by the allies
will probably be directed to improvements in strategic lift for more
immediate out-of-area peacekeeping missions. If that is the case, the
allies may have inadequate tactical mobility to reinforce new NATO
members in a crisis. Thus, the alliance might be stretched too thin if
it attempted to expand its mission and its territory at the same time.
In sum, to avoid impairing the effectiveness of an enlarged NATO,
existing allies must have an adequate capability to tactically
reinforce new members in time of crisis or war, and new members must
substantially improve their obsolescent forces and infrastructure so
that they can provide themselves with a basic defense. Those are
inherently costly requirements.
Reasons for Flaws in the Administration's Analysis
Despite the administration's perception of a mild threat to new
members, its cost estimate is supposed to be based on achieving a
``mature capability'' for article 5 defense of NATO states. To achieve
that capability, the administration states,
New members will continue to improve interoperability and
undertake other enlargement enhancements during this phase,
using a combination of national and common NATO funding. During
this phase, new members will replace aging equipment stocks and
it is expected that they will continue to downsize,
restructure, and modernize their forces, while increasing their
capacity to operate with other NATO forces in their own
countries and elsewhere. During the same period, current member
states will continue to modernize their forces and make them
more deployable and sustainable for both collective defense and
non-Article 5 operations.\29\
``Mature capability'' has been deliberately defined in a vague
manner, but it is supposed to be made possible by the three categories
of military improvements cited in Table 1 and the subcategories under
them. In reality, when the details of the subcategories are examined,
they fail to form a convincing case that sufficient improvements would
be made to the forces and military infrastructures of new member states
to enable them to provide an adequate article 5 defense capability
against even regional (non-Russian threats. (The administration's
projected improvements are woefully inadequate if a resurgent Russian
threat is posited.) Sometimes the details of the assumed military
improvements on which the cost estimates are based are simply
nonexistent, and other times the improvements are inadequate for the
task.
The ``Level-of-Effort'' Evasion
In short, the administration's estimate is not a cost estimate at
all but an ``affordability'' estimate. The administration did not
determine a list of detailed military improvements required for NATO
expansion, estimate the cost of each of the improvements individually,
and add up the total. Instead, for many broad categories of military
improvements, the DoD took what it called a ``macro,'' approach by
embracing the concept of ``levels of effort.'' The levels of effort
were based on DoD analysts' perceptions of how much new members could
afford to spend on particular categories, not on what was needed.
Moreover, no explanation was given of the genesis of those perceptions.
For example, DoD analysts simply chose a level of spending for
logistics improvements--$777 million to $1.076 billion--and decided
that logistics improvements would include a wide variety of items:
NATO-compatible fuel nozzles, fuel standards, radios, computer systems,
safety standards, host-nation support arrangements for equipment
warehouses, and personnel to support NATO deploying forces. Yet when
asked how many radios or how many fuel nozzles they assumed would be
purchased, DoD analysts replied that they could not specify the number
because the estimate was a ``level of effort.'' They made no attempt to
find out how many of those and other items new member nations would
need or how many their projected level of effort would purchase. In
other cases, such as improvements to road and rail systems of the new
member states to allow them to transport military cargo, DoD analysts
could not even specify how they arrived at their estimate or provide a
detailed list of enhancements, let alone their costs. They simply
decided, without any analysis, how much would be spent on that general
category. In short, DoD analysts came up with seemingly precise numbers
for each category, but they usually have little or no detailed cost
analysis to back them up.
An evaluation of the DoD's cost estimate by the General Accounting
office confirms that point:
Many of DOD's estimates for specific cost elements could not be
verified. DOD officials did not consistently document their
analyses. As a result, we were unable to audit or validate
estimates for most specific cost elements. DOD developed other
cost element estimates on a highly aggregated basis.\30\
Implicit Political Constraints
Another important general observation is that DoD analysts admitted
that they felt constrained in the amount of military infrastructure
they could assume would be placed in new member states. Therefore, they
tried not to leave a ``big footprint.'' They did not say why they felt
constrained. Was it the DoD's sensitivity to Russian opposition to
large amounts of new infrastructure in those nations? Or, more likely,
was it the DoD's sensitivity to Congress's mounting concern about the
cost of expansion? Does that caution make the new members suspicious
about how effective a defense based on reinforcement can be? Perhaps it
should.
Although skimping on military preparedness in new member nations
might dodge some Russian and congressional sensitivities, it will
probably not provide the new members with an adequate defense under
article 5. Thus, NATO will have expanded into a volatile region,
promising to defend new members, but be unable to do so effectively
because of political and budgetary constraints. The United States
should have learned its lesson in Vietnam about the perils of half-
hearted security guarantees to regions of little strategic value.
A Category-by-Category Critique of the Administration's Cost Estimate
To expose the shaky foundations of the administration's estimate,
it is necessary to explore certain very specific and meaningful
categories of costs. At this point, it is best to throw out the DoD's
three general categories of costs, because, as Kugler argued, they are
gibberish. They obscure rather than illuminate the true cost of
expansion. Instead of amorphous and undefined categories, such as
``direct enlargement,'' more specific categories of improvements that
have some military meaning should be used. In each specific category of
military enhancements, the administration's faulty assumptions, or lack
of specific assumptions, will be explored.
Training and Exercises
Total expenditures for this category were $2.5 billion to $4.2
billion. The administration estimates that the cost of ``increased
proficiency in individual and unit training'' for the armed forces of
new members would be $1 billion to $2 billion. Another $1.3 billion to
$2 billion would be spent for those militaries to train with NATO
units. About $200 million was added to expand International Military
Education and Training, a program created to expose foreign military
personnel to the methods of the U.S. military and help them to gain
technical, nation-building, and English language skills. Informally,
the DoD analysts who made the estimate admitted that they did not base
it on what those nations would require (that is, types and numbers of
exercises); they based their estimate on what they believed new members
could afford.\31\ They estimated expenditures for training and
exercises of new members, forces by using 80 percent of the per capita
costs of training and exercises for existing members' forces. That
equated to about 10 percent of the military operations and maintenance
budgets of the new member states.
The GAO report accurately describes the DoD approach:
DOD's estimated cost for training is notional and actual costs
may vary substantially from estimates. DOD analysts did not
project training tempos and specific exercise costs. Instead,
they extrapolated U.S. and NATO training and exercise costs and
evaluated the results from the point of view of
affordability.\32\
Specifying the types, numbers, and resulting cost of exercises
would have been preferable to choosing an arbitrary percentage of NATO
per capita training costs. Furthermore, because the forces of new
members were formerly part of the Warsaw Pact that was vastly different
in command structure and culture from NATO, they would probably need
more per capita training than NATO militaries. They also might need
fairly frequent exercises to learn how to operate with NATO forces. In
short, according to many military planners, before purchasing expensive
weapon systems, new members should spend their scarce defense resources
exercising with NATO forces and buying communications equipment to
facilitate such training. The $2.5 billion to $4.2 billion estimate for
training and exercises is based on artificially postulated
considerations of affordability. An estimate based on requirements for
specific exercises at a given frequency would yield a more realistic
cost estimate at the top of the range ($4.2 billion).
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
The DoD's estimated total costs for improving command, control,
communications, and intelligence (C\3\I) were $2 billion to $3 billion.
The DoD assumed that the military headquarters of new member states
would be refurbished to take NATO equipment and estimated that cost at
between $1.1 billion and $1.8 billion. For communications gear, the DoD
added from $870 million to $1.2 billion, of which $390 million to $540
million was for a minimal number of tactical radios and $480 million to
$690 million was for interface boxes. (Interface boxes connect
otherwise incompatible national communication systems but only at the
headquarters level.)
The DoD relied on interface boxes because they are much less
expensive than providing more radios so that lower level military units
of varying nationalities can talk directly to each other in the heat of
battle. If interface boxes were used, two lower level units next to
each other on the battlefield would need to communicate through a
higher level headquarters. That could require too much time, especially
if one friendly unit was in danger of being hit by another. According
to the Hungarian defense attache in Washington, interface boxes are
inadequate for peacekeeping missions, let alone an article 5
defense.\33\ He noted that Hungary is buying tactical radios so that
lower level units can communicate with NATO militaries instead of
relying only on communications among headquarters.
The DoD analysts acknowledged that some people in the department
argued for a more ambitious effort to provide communications equipment
but failed to prevail in the debate. military planners believe that
modern command centers and compatible communications equipment are
vital to making an expanded alliance militarily effective. Thus, the
DoD's $2 billion to $3 billion estimate for C\3\I is too low. More
tactical radios would need to be purchased to give critical flexibility
on the battlefield. Doing so, however, would double the cost to $6.2
billion.
Air Defense
Air defense enhancement is the last of the three most critical
improvements for new members. The Central European nations are no
longer part of the integrated air defense system of the Warsaw Pact and
are vulnerable to attack from modern aircraft. The gap in air defense
coverage is particularly pronounced at medium to high altitudes.
Filling that gap accounts for the bulk of the expenses for air defense
improvements.
The DoD estimated that the cost of air defense improvements would
total $2.1 billion to $2.9 billion. That sum includes $20 million to
$23 million for identification friend-or-foe systems (those systems
identify friendly aircraft so air defenses do not kill friendly
forces), $185 million to $293 million for air sovereignty centers
(command centers for air defense operations) and air defense
surveillance, and $1.9 billion to $2.6 billion for ground-based
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
Because air defense is so critical, the DoD's estimate should have
assumed that new members would buy Patriot PAC-2 systems to fill the
requirement for medium-to high-altitude SAMS. Instead, the DoD, to
reduce its estimate, assumed that the three nations would buy the much
older Improved Hawk system, which was originally introduced in the
1960s. It is reasonable to assume that, because of financial
constraints, new members would probably not buy such systems until late
in the next decade. In 2020, when any system would still have to be
viable, the I-Hawk will be more than 50 years old. The life expectancy
of the I-Hawk system was 30 years. In air defense--where technology is
leaping ahead quickly--the value of such an old system would be nil.
Equally important, ground-based air defense systems are now being used
to attack the threat being posed by tactical ballistic missiles. If a
capability against that threat is desired, Patriot will provide some
capability, but the I-Hawk will provide little.
Although the DoD analysts acknowledged that air defense is a
critical area for improvement, they still assumed the purchase of I-
Hawks. Obviously, assuming that an obsolescent system is purchased cuts
the cost of NATO expansion. Although it is questionable whether the new
members can afford all of the military improvements needed to give them
a basic article 5 defense capability, air defense is so critical to
modern warfare that they should not skimp on it. The Patriot PAC-2
system is more expensive than the I-Hawk, but not prohibitive for new
members. Several nonindustrialized nations--Israel, Kuwait, Taiwan, and
Saudi Arabia, which have gross domestic products similar to Poland's--
have already purchased the system. In addition, South Korea and the
United Arab Emirates are actively exploring the purchase of the system.
If the assumption is changed from purchase of the I-Hawk to purchase of
a Patriot-like system, the costs for air defense improvements rise to
$8 billion. If the new members want a system that will be capable
against modern air threats into the future, however, they--or someone
else--have little choice but to spend the money.
Modernizing the Ground Forces of New Members and Making Them More
Mobile
The armored forces of the new members consist mainly of T-55 and T-
72 tanks. Although the T-72 could be effective if it were upgraded with
Western fire control systems and other new electronics, the T-55 is
obsolete and would need to be replaced. According to one press report,
``More than half of Poland's 1,700 tanks are Soviet T-55 designs from
1955 and are unusable.''\34\
In addition, as is the case for the forces of existing European
allies, added combat support and combat service support may be needed
to enhance mobility. That is particularly true in the case of Polish
forces. Poland is large and flat, making it an excellent venue for
mobile warfare. Yet about half of the Polish divisions (six) were
stationed in the western part of the country during the Cold War and
remain there today, away from the current threats to Poland's security
on the other side of the country. It is prohibitively expensive to
create new bases for six divisions in eastern Poland, so making them
more mobile is a cheaper alternative. (Although half of all Polish
divisions need to be made more mobile, Czech and Hungarian forces may
not need added mobility. Those forces have much smaller territories to
defend than do Poland's forces and can probably get by without too many
modifications.)
The administration assumed that ``deployable logistics
sustainment'' was to be added to 25 percent of the divisions (4.9
divisions) of all new member states. The military rationale for that
assumption is unclear. It looks as if the administration was outfitting
a limited number of units in each country for out-of-area peacekeeping
operations. Yet the administration's cost estimate was based on giving
new members a ``mature'' article 5 defense capability. The added cost
to make each division mobile was $925 million to $1.1 billion plus
costs for operations and maintenance.
In addition, DoD analysts assumed a level of effort for the
modernization of the ground forces of new members. The analysts said
that they assumed unspecified upgrades of armor but no new tank
purchases, even though the period of the estimate stretches through
2009 and many of the obsolete T-55s are already unusable. Also, DoD
analysts stated that they assumed artillery would be upgraded and
standardized. Otherwise, the analysts provided few specific details to
support the level of effort chosen. The GAO report was concerned about
the DoD estimate's lack of specifics. ``DOD's estimate for
modernization and restructuring of new members' ground forces was also
notional and was based on improving 25 percent of the new members
forces. However, it did not include specifics as to what would be done
to upgrade the equipment and how much it would Cost.''\35\
According to U.S. military planners, standardizing new members,
artillery to make it compatible with that of present NATO members is
very expensive (it requires the new members to buy new tubes, new
ammunition, and new logistics systems) and was not a high priority
militarily. Although guns from various nations that fire standardized
ammunition are a plus, guns that fire incompatible ammunition, using
compatible communications devices, can coordinate their fires well, the
analyst contended. The planners thought that it was more important for
new members to spend limited funds to train with NATO and improve air
defense and command, control, and communications. Yet, when asked how
many tubes they could standardize with a subset of the small amount of
money they allocated for the modernization of ground forces, DoD
analysts again replied that they could not specify the number because
their estimate merely assumed a level of effort.
When the level of effort for the modernization of ground forces was
added to the funds needed to provide deployable logistics for about
five divisions, the administration's total cost for this category was
$5.4 billion to $6.4 billion. A more realistic and specific program for
modernizing the ground forces of new member nations and making them
more mobile would add combat support and combat service support to one
more division (bringing the total to six divisions), rewire T-72 tanks
with Western electronics, replace a small number of T-55 tanks with new
tanks over the long term, and exclude artillery standardization because
of its limited military usefulness. Such a program would cost $7
billion.
Upgrading the Weapons of New Members or Buying New Ones
The administration included this category in its estimate so that
the analysis would appear comprehensive but then did not include all
the items needed to equip the armed forces of new members for modern
warfare. Recall that the administration admitted that ``these states-
emerged from the Warsaw Pact with military forces that were poorly
structured and inadequately equipped for modern warfare.'' \36\ The
administration's assumptions about weapons purchases by new members for
the 1997-2009 period are paltry and do not coincide with the more
ambitious defense plans of those nations.
Defense analysts project that by the end of 1998 one third of
military aircraft in Eastern Europe will be unable to fly. By 2005, if
no new aircraft are purchased, no East European country will have an
air force.\37\ Yet the DoD did not assume that existing Soviet-built or
new indigenously built aircraft would be wired with new electronics
(including electronic warfare equipment) until new aircraft could be
purchased. Even worse, the DoD assumed that each nation would buy only
one squadron (18 aircraft) of worn-out U.S. F-16 aircraft from the bone
yard. All of the bone yard aircraft combined were assumed to cost a
measly $725 million to $823 million. To add insult to injury, the DoD
underestimated the cost of even the bone yard aircraft. The GAO's
analysis showed that ``the cost of purchasing refurbished F-16 aircraft
would be at least 11 percent higher than the high end of DOD's
estimate.''\38\ (That example casts doubt on the accuracy of the DoD's
estimates in the other rare cases in which the costs of specific
military improvements were provided.)
In any case, instead of a limited number of bone yard aircraft that
do not provide much capability, the three new members say they are
planning to buy up to about 300 new (Western and indigenously produced)
aircraft.\39\ Although some of the new members may delay the purchase
of such aircraft, their obsolescent air forces will compel them to buy
aircraft within the period of the estimate.\40\ In fact, the DoD is
encouraging the sale of new U.S. aircraft by offering the new members
grants, discount loans, and free leases.\41\ The least the DoD could do
would be to reflect in its cost estimate the prospect of some new
weapon sales and concomitant security assistance to finance them.
DoD analysts assumed that air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons
would be purchased for 500 total aircraft in the three nations combined
but did not calculate the number of each kind of weapon needed per
aircraft. Instead, the analysts chose a level of effort of from
$700,000 to $800,000 per aircraft, leading to a total cost of from $350
million to $400 million. Of course, they could not specify how many
air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions they assumed would be purchased
with the estimated amount of money. They also specified $525 million to
$600 million as a level of effort for anti-tank weapons but again could
not cite the number of weapons that could be purchased for that amount.
In both cases, the amount to be spent was arbitrarily chosen, not based
on military requirements.
During the 1997 to 2009 period, the DoD estimated the costs for
only those meager weapons purchases. The total was an embarrassingly
low $1.6 billion to $1.8 billion. In contrast, weapons purchases to
give new members a ``mature'' article 5 defense capability against
lesser regional threats (assuming the absence of a resurgent Russia)
would cost about $11.5 billion over a 15-year period.
That figure does not ``gold plate'' the Central European militaries
by replacing one-for-one their obsolescent equipment with new Western
hardware. Instead, it often reflects the less expensive expedient of
upgrading or modernizing weapons only in areas deemed critical by
military planners. The figure includes improvements such as inserting
Western electronics (including electronic warfare equipment) into
existing Soviet-built and new indigenously produced aircraft until
about 200 new Western aircraft have been purchased gradually, according
the plans of the new member nations. The figure also assumes that
standard combat loads of less expensive air-to-air (Sidewinder) and
air-to-ground (Maverick) munitions would be purchased for those
aircraft. Specific numbers of relatively inexpensive anti-tank weapons
would be purchased to reduce the number of new tanks needed. The number
of anti-tank missiles purchased was based on how many standard-sized
divisions the new member armies would require. Adequate Soviet-built T-
72 tanks would be rewired with Western fire control devices and other
electronic devises. Gradually, one-third of the obsolete T-55 tanks
would be replaced with either indigenously produced or Western-built
tanks.\42\
Naval Improvements
The administration did not include any funds for improving the
Polish navy, even though it might need to help clear mines from Polish
ports to facilitate NATO reinforcement in a regional war--for example,
one between Poland and Belarus. Belarus might profit greatly from
sending aircraft to drop mines near Polish ports, thus preventing or
slowing resupply by NATO. If Russia were helping its ally, the Polish
navy might also need improved anti-submarine warfare sonars to help
NATO watch or even destroy Russian subs trying to interdict supplies
moving into Polish ports. In any reasonable cost estimate, Poland
should be responsible for helping to keep its ports and sea-lanes open.
Some new electronics for Polish ships and new coastal radars are also
needed. Even such modest improvements would cost $1.1 billion.
Port, Road, and Rail Improvements
Improvements to ports and dilapidated road and rail systems would
also be needed to facilitate NATO reinforcement and resupply during a
crisis. DoD analysts assumed that most port, road, and rail
improvements would be undertaken for commercial reasons. For militarily
critical road and rail improvements that the commercial sector would
fail to undertake, the analysts simply used an aggregate number ($258
million to $462 million). When asked from what data it was aggregated,
they could not provide an answer. They provided no better answer for
their cost estimate for port improvements ($172 million to $201
million). It is quite curious that they can provide no details because
their numbers--including the total for the entire category of $430
million to $663 million--seem very precise.
DoD analysts were right to assume that most of the improvements to
infrastructure would be undertaken by the commercial sector. But they
appeared to have just picked a number for militarily critical
improvements.
In reality, only modest militarily critical improvements need to be
made to Poland's ports. However, Szczecin, the westernmost port that
would be the farthest away from any potential front, is obsolete, has
poor rail access, and has a shortage of facilities for unloading roll-
on, roll-off ships that haul military vehicles. Like Poland's other two
ports of Gdansk and Gydnia, Szczecin would need to be dredged to
accommodate fully loaded military sea lift ships.
The road and rail systems in the new member nations are another
story. During the Warsaw Pact years, the road and rail systems were
used heavily but received little maintenance. Detailed data from the
U.S. Transportation Command, the World Bank, and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development indicate specific improvements that are
needed or planned. For a crude estimate of the militarily critical
improvements, 10 percent of the total cost of this list of enhancements
can be used. If this alternative assumption is used, a better estimate
of port, road, and rail costs is $3 billion.
Exercise Facilities
DoD analysts assumed that five brigade-sized and one battalion-
sized exercise facilities would be upgraded. Their estimate failed to
specify, however, what upgrades would be made. Nevertheless, the
specificity of the DoD's assumptions for this category of improvements
was greater than for most other categories of costs, which contained
levels of effort based on affordability. Yet the DoD's cost estimate--
$325 million to $490 million--is still probably too low.
It is widely accepted that military bases and infrastructure in the
former Warsaw Pact nations are in very poor condition and some
installations may be unsafe because of environmental contamination. It
would be prudent to assume that new large-scale exercise facilities
would need to be built, or at least that the cost of needed extensive
repairs and modifications to existing facilities would approach the
cost of new ones. If those assumptions are used, the expenses in this
category rise to $4.7 billion.
Stockpiling Fuel and Ammunition for the Forces of New Members
DoD analysts assumed that hardened bunkers would be refurbished to
store ammunition for only 10 days at a cost of $100 million to $200
million. However, they assumed that no ammunition would be purchased to
go in the bunkers. In addition, they did not assume that hardened fuel
facilities would be built or that stocks of fuel would be purchased.
They assumed that fuel would be available on the commercial market even
during a crisis.
In wartime, it is questionable whether adequate fuel supplies would
be available from commercial distribution systems, which might be
damaged or in disarray. It seems possible that competition for limited
supplies might arise between the forces of new members and incoming
NATO forces. In addition, the DoD assumed that a war would last only 10
days. Some wars might last only that long, but many might not.
Furthermore, NATO, instead of permanently stationing troops in new
member states, has opted for a cheaper reinforcement strategy. New
member forces would have to hold out until NATO reinforcements arrived.
Therefore, a better assumption to hedge against a delay in the arrival
of reinforcements is that new members would need facilities for storing
30 days' worth of ammunition and fuel and the stocks of such supplies
to go in those facilities. The total cost of the facilities and stocks
would be $600 million.
Upgrading Airfields in New Member Nations
In time of crisis or war, the administration proposes a defense
concept that flies six wings of NATO aircraft from bases in Western
Europe to operate from airfields that are close to the front in new
member states. To make that possible, the airfields would be improved
at a cost of $2.9 billion to $3.3 billion. DoD analysts stated that
those improvements include maintenance facilities, added ramp space,
and base support. Runways were assumed to be adequate, and no upgrades
were included; no hardened shelters for aircraft were provided. Despite
listing specific upgrades, it appears that the DoD analysts did not add
up the cost of each to get the total cost of airfield improvements. DoD
analysts mentioned that the total cost was obtained by multiplying a
standard $70 million to $80 million per aircraft squadron (plus
operations and maintenance costs) times 19 or 20 squadrons (six wings)
of aircraft. Thus, it seems that the cost estimate per squadron is a
level of effort rather than the sum of the costs of individual
improvements.
In addition, the administration assumed that the six air wings
would be distributed among airfields in the three new member countries,
with two air wings in each. Thus, only enough airfields to house two
air wings were upgraded in each of the countries. A new member might be
disappointed to learn that NATO was planning to send only two wings of
aircraft--not six--to its defense if it were attacked. of course, if
one new member were attacked, NATO aircraft might fly missions from
airfields in the other two new members, provided neighboring countries
(Slovakia and possibly Austria) allowed overflights of their territory.
The main purpose, however, is to fly aircraft to operating bases close
to the front so that they can drop more weapons in less time using less
fuel.
Instead of using a level of effort per wing as a proxy to compute
the improvements needed to airfields, the DoD should have obtained cost
figures on a detailed list of enhancements for a standard NATO
Colocated Operating Base (COB) already created in a country whose
economic development, and thus cost of refurbishment, is similar to
that of the new member nations. The list of enhancements to existing
airfields includes adding air traffic control and communications
equipment, building hardened shelters for aircraft, upgrading barracks
and mess halls, and building maintenance shops. Given the very poor
state of infrastructure on military bases in former Warsaw Pact
nations, one should assume that runways would need to be repaired and
reinforced. Hardened shelters are a must for any airfield near the
front, otherwise aircraft might be destroyed by the enemy while they
were still on the ground. In addition, the assumption should be made
that sufficient COBs would be created in each of the three nations so
that all six wings of reinforcing NATO air power could be housed in any
of those nations in case of a threat. If those necessary measures were
implemented, the cost would be $4.3 billion.
Creatinq Reception Facilities in the New Member States to Receive NATO
Ground Forces
According to the administration's concept for defending new members
under threat of attack, four NATO divisions would move east from their
bases in Western Europe to ``reception facilities'' in new member
states. Yet DoD analysts assumed that reception facilities would be
created for only six brigades (two divisions), three of which would be
in Poland. Each facility costs only $15 million to $20 million plus
operations and maintenance costs. DoD analysts provided no description
of what that money would buy. They did not include the purchase of
short-range air defenses to protect the facilities, because they argued
that those defenses would be brought with the incoming forces. In
total, the reception facilities for two divisions were estimated to
cost a paltry $115 million to $144 million. Although it is unclear what
the DoD is buying for that small amount, it cannot be much.
Several problems exist with the DOD's assumptions. Creating
reception facilities for only two divisions would require four
divisions to go through them sequentially rather than simultaneously.
The DoD seems to think such phased deployment is acceptable. But such a
bottleneck could allow enemy forces to destroy the incoming divisions
sequentially before they could mass for an attack. In addition,
reception facilities are divided up among the new member countries,
creating an even worse problem than exists with COBs because there are
even fewer facilities per number of incoming units. For example, if
Hungary is threatened and has a reception facility for only two
brigades, four NATO divisions descending on it might allow the enemy to
have a field day attacking that bottleneck. The problem is further
exacerbated by the fact that ground forces, unlike aircraft, cannot
simply deploy to facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic and then
fly missions (albeit suboptimal ones) into Hungary. Ground forces must
deploy to reception facilities in Hungary or they are out of position
to defend against any attack on that nation.
Furthermore, reception facilities would need to consist of more
than NATO-compatible fuel facilities and host-nation support for
arranging logistics support. Money could be saved by building reception
facilities at abandoned Soviet bases in new member nations, but the
facilities would still need to include rail sidings and facilities for
unloading train cars, vehicle parking lots to rearrange equipment from
its configuration for transportation to its configuration for battle,
hangars for helicopters, upgraded barracks and mess halls, and
facilities for maintaining equipment. Reception facilities for ground
forces at air bases would require extra hangars for aircraft and
warehouses to store incoming airlifted equipment and supplies. Costs
for short range air defenses also need to be included in the price of a
reception facility, because forces being unloaded from trains will be
very vulnerable to attack until they get their air defenses set up. If
reception facilities are provided for four divisions in each of the
three countries, the cost will be $1.2 billion--nearly eight times the
Pentagon's maximum estimate.
Improving the Air Wings and Ground Forces of European Allies to Project
Power
Although NATO plans to move four ground divisions and six wings
from bases in Western Europe to reception facilities and airfields,
respectively, in new member nations, only three divisions and five air
wings need extensive modifications. One U.S. ground division and one
air wing already have most of the needed mobile support assets to
project power. In contrast, the forces of the European allies were
designed for an in-place linear defense of Germany during the Cold War
and, therefore, need significant enhancements to be able to move into
the territories of new member states during a crisis or war.
The administration's estimate provides ``deployable logistics
sustainment'' for three non-U.S. ground divisions and five non-U.S. air
wings.\43\ No specific definition of that term is provided. DoD
analysts said that providing deployable logistics for each ground
division would cost between $1.2 billion and $1.5 billion plus
operations and maintenance costs. No per unit cost to outfit each air
wing was cited. The estimate cites a total cost of $4 billion to $5
billion to outfit the ground divisions and the same amount to outfit
the air wings. Thus, the DoD projected the total cost of augmenting
allied ground and air forces at $8 billion to $10 billion.
The DoD's per unit and total cost figures to augment European
ground forces for power projection seem accurate. Although the DoD did
not list the specific items needed to make the ground forces of the
European allies more mobile, this paper earlier provided a list of
items for the ground forces of new members. The list is the same for
the forces of the European allies, but the higher cost per division can
be attributed to the larger size of allied divisions.
In contrast, the administration's estimate for augmenting the air
wings is too low. The cost of providing an itemized list of
enhancements--mobile engineers, maintenance units, medical units, and
other support assets--for five air wings should be about $6.9 billion.
Because the DoD provided no details on deployable logistics
sustainment, it is difficult to discern why the DoD's costs were lower.
With $4.5 billion needed to augment allied ground forces and $6.9
billion needed to augment allied air forces, a more realistic estimate
of the total cost of improved allied power projection is $11.4 billion,
not $8 billion to $10 billion.
Making U.S. Forces More Mobile
Although U.S. forces are able to project power much more
effectively than are those of the European allies, a deficiency still
exists in U.S. capabilities. During the Persian Gulf War, U.S. forces
had a shortage of heavy equipment transporters for transporting tanks.
While Germany's excellent rail system mitigated the effects of that
shortage during the Cold War, the poor rail systems of the new members
will not help much. The cost of adding heavy transporters for one U.S.
division is $400 million. The administration's estimate did not seek to
remedy the shortage and thus avoided accounting for those costs.
Systems for Storage and Transport of Fuel and Ammunition
The previous discussion of storage and transportation of fuel and
ammunition pertained to new member nations. There is also the matter of
fuel and ammunition for arriving NATO reinforcements.
DoD analysts admitted that they did not assume the stockpiling of
fuel and ammunition for NATO forces in new member states because
prepositioning is a sensitive issue. They felt constrained to minimize
the infrastructure or ``footprint'' they assumed would be placed on the
territory of new member states. In addition, they did not extend the
NATO fuel pipeline to reception facilities and COBs in new member
states. DoD analysts felt that incoming NATO forces could get fuel from
the commercial market or from the new member governments. They did add
$1.6 billion to $1.9 billion for NATO-compatible fuel systems. That sum
included $900 million for enhancing the fuel storage and distribution
system for air and ground forces, but the analysts never explained what
improvements that sum would finance. The estimate also included $389
million to $538 million for NATO-compatible fuel nozzles and standards
and $274 million to $438 million for NATO-compatible fuel facilities
and other support equipment at reception facilities.
As noted earlier, it seems questionable to assume that the
commercial market--which could be easily damaged or disrupted--could
provide fuel needs during a war. During wartime, where will the new
member governments get the fuel if it is not stockpiled (DoD added no
money for either buying or storing fuel) or transported by the NATO
pipeline? The forces of NATO and the new members might find themselves
competing for dwindling supplies. Notably, the DoD does not assume that
fuel will be readily available in its regional warfare scenarios in
Korea or the Persian Gulf.
Therefore, a 30-day supply of both fuel and ammunition for NATO
forces would need to be bought and stockpiled in the new member states.
Hardened bunkers and fuel facilities would be needed to store those
supplies. In addition, as a backup, the NATO pipeline would need to be
extended to supply bases on the territory of new members. If such
improvements were made, the cost would be $5 billion rather than $1.6
billion to $1.9 billion.
Distribution of Costs
Important details of how the administration distributed its
estimated costs among the United States, existing European NATO allies,
and new members are also sketchy. In its estimate, the administration
properly assigned to existing allies the entire costs of enhancing
their forces to project power. (The severe constraints on their defense
spending leave open to doubt whether they will actually make those
enhancements.) The estimate also assigned to new members all of the
costs of restructuring and modernizing their own forces. It failed to
assume that at least some of the cost of those efforts would accrue to
the United States. According to the Department of State study, ``Some
of the efforts have been modestly supported by U.S. assistance
programs. . . . Whether any such costs would be borne by the United
States in the future would depend on decisions by the U.S. Congress and
Executive Branch.''\44\
Saying that the U.S. government has not yet decided what future
assistance will be provided allows the DoD to avoid adding in what
could be substantial costs. Western arms manufacturers--including those
in the United States-will pressure their governments to provide
security assistance for sales in a competitive arms market. The small
amount of assistance already provided to the prospective new members
has come under the auspices of the Partnership for Peace program,
designed to make very modest improvements in the militaries of the
prospective members to prepare them for international peacekeeping
missions. The financial assistance provided for NATO expansion has the
potential to be much larger. The GAO reports that a Polish official
estimated that Poland would need $2 billion in credits just to buy
multipurpose aircraft.\45\ The total bill for security assistance for
the entire list of weapons purchases by new members could be much
higher. RAND estimated that arms purchases by new members could reach
$30 billion to $40 billion, which would require $1 billion to $3
billion annually in security assistance.\46\
The details on distributing expenses for direct enlargement are
murkier than they are on the administration's other cost categories.
The administration assumed that new members would pay 35 percent of
direct enlargement costs, the European allies would pay 50 percent, and
the United States would pay 15 percent. (That assumption is based on
another assumption: that 40 percent of direct enlargement costs would
be funded by member nations and 60 percent would be funded by the NATO
common budgets, to which nations usually contribute on the basis of
their gross domestic products.)\47\
The president's report to Congress implies, and DoD analysts
confirmed, that those percentages had been derived by separating out
the detailed expenses of expansion into U.S. costs, allied costs, and
costs to new members and then adding them up. Yet, in the DoD's macro
approach to costing, levels of effort were assigned to broad areas of
improvements, with no detailed costs to back.them up. How did a
nondetailed DoD estimate result in detailed costs to separate out and
add up into the three percentages that measure the relative sharing of
burden?
For example, the DoD estimated that $777 million to $1.076 billion
would be spent on logistics. That category included, among many other
items, NATO-compatible fueling systems and standards, as well as host-
nation support arrangements for equipment warehouses. The number and
cost of the individual items did not exist because it was a level of
effort estimate. Yet, presumably, NATO-compatible fueling systems and
standards would be financed with common NATO funds, while host-nation
support arrangements are the responsibility of the new member nations
that would host NATO reinforcements in time of crisis. Since there are
not enough detailed costs provided to indicate how much of the $777
million to $1.076 billion for logistics was funded commonly and how
much nationally, how could overall percentages be calculated? Other
broad areas of improvements that would probably have components funded
both commonly and nationally, which would be difficult or impossible to
sort out, would be enhancements to infrastructure; air defense; and
command, control, and communications. Those subcategories make up the
bulk of the direct enlargement category.
In short, the DoD's nondetailed estimate does not lend itself to
the segregation and addition of individual expenses so that such global
percentages could be calculated. Did the DoD just arbitrarily assign
percentages of direct enlargement expenses to be borne by the United
States (15 percent), existing allies (50 percent), and new members (35
percent)?
The Real Costs of NATO Expansion
In this study, for each category of expenses, a more realistic cost
estimate was developed and compared with the administration's estimate.
The alternative estimates were developed by accepting, only for the
purposes of analysis, the administration's assumption of a continuing
benign threat environment and the strategy of reinforcing new members
during a crisis with four NATO ground divisions and six air wings.
Adding the alternative figures gives a total cost for expansion of
about $70 billion. That number is twice the upper end of the
administration's $27 billion to $35 billion range (see Table 2).
Table 2--Comparison of DOD'S Estimate with an Estimate Based on More Realistic Assumptions
(billions of dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alternative
Category of Improvement Estimate DoD Estimate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Training and exercises.......................................... 4.2 2.5-4.2
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence.............. 6.2 2-3
Air defense..................................................... 8.0 2.1-2.9
Modernization of ground forces of new members to make them more
mobile......................................................... 7.0 5.4-6.4
Upgrading the weapons of new members or buying new ones......... 11.5 1.6-1.8
Naval improvements for Poland................................... 1.1 0
Port, road, and rail improvements............................... 3.0 .4-.7
Exercise facilities............................................. 4.7 .3-.5
Stockpiling fuel and armnunition for the forces of new members.. .6 1.2
Upgrading airfields in new member states........................ 4.3 2.9-3.3
Creating reception facilities for NATO ground forces............ 1.2 .1
Improving allied ground forces' and air wings' capability to
project power.................................................. 11.4 8-10
Making U.S. forces more mobile.................................. .4 0
Systems for fuel and ammunition storage and transport........... 5.0 1.6-1.9
Total....................................................... 69 (U.S.
share=7)\1\ 27-35 (U.S. share=1.5-2)\1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ both of these figures may increase. The $7 billion in U.S. costs will increase if the new members cannot pay-
-as is likely--the estimated $34 billion in projected costs that will accrue to them. The almost $70 billion
in total costs could increase to between $125 billion and $167 billion if the administration's dubious
assumptions fail to hold. Those assumptions are that the current benign threat environment will continue and
that no pressure will come from new members for the permanent stationing of NATO forces on their territories.
The cost of relaxing those assumptions is discussed in Congressional Budget Office, The Costs of Expanding the
NATO Alliance (Washington: CBO, March 1996), pp. xiv, 51-55.
U.S. costs are estimated to be at least $7 billion,
compared with $1.5 billion to $2 billion in the
administration's estimate. Even $7 billion could grow if, as is
likely, the new member states were unwilling or unable to pay a
more realistic estimate of the expenses that would accrue to
them ($34 billion). In that case, the European allies would
probably expect the United States to pay more of the new
members' bill because expansion was a U.S. initiative and
because European defense spending is under severe constraints
induced by the fiscal austerity needed to join the European
Monetary Union.\48\
The $34 billion in costs would require the three new
members to increase their combined annual defense budgets-
currently only $4.6 billion--by almost 60 percent. More
important, such expenses would require the new members to
increase their meager military investment (research,
development, and procurement) by about 10 times that
percentage. Such spending increases would be difficult, given
the transition of their economies from communism to capitalism
and polls showing that their populations do not support
increases in government spending for defense. In addition,
while the U.S. administration is encouraging the new members to
pay the bulk of the costs for expansion, the International
Monetary Fund--in which the United States is a driving force--
has become alarmed by that prospect and is pressuring them to
hold down such large defense spending increases to avoid
damaging their fragile economies.\49\
According to the Congressional Budget office, if the
administration's assumption of a continued benign threat
environment is abandoned and if permanent stationing of a
limited number of NATO forces in new member states and larger
reinforcing forces are required, the total costs of expansion
would increase to $125 billion. About $19 billion of that cost
would accrue to the United States.\50\
Again according to the Congressional Budget Office, if
large numbers of NATO forces needed to be stationed in new
member states, the total costs would escalate to about $167
billion.\51\ A large permanent presence might be needed if NATO
guaranteed the security of the new members and a militarily
resurgent Russia emerged, either independently or as a response
to a perceived threat from NATO expansion.
In sum, even if the DoD's dubious assumptions about a
continuing benign threat environment and the ability to avoid
pressure for the permanent forward stationing of troops hold,
the total costs of NATO expansion are likely to be much greater
than the administration's estimate would indicate. To guard
Congress's constitutionally mandated powers of the purse and
the Senate's informed advice and consent on treaties, Congress
has a right to a reasonably accurate and methodologically
rigorous analysis of how much expanding the alliance is likely
to cost. The administration's cost estimate is woefully
inadequate in both regards.
Notes
\1\ Jeff Gerth and Tim Weiner, ``Arms Makers See a Bonanza in
Selling NATO Expansion,'' New York Times, June 29, 1997, pp. 1, 8.
\2\ Congressional Budget Office, The Costs of Expanding the NATO
Alliance (Washington: CBO, 1996), p. 40. Ivan Eland and Jeannette
Deshong were the principal authors of the report.
\3\ Steven Erlanger, ``A War of Numbers Emerges over Cost of
Enlarging NATO,'' New York Times, October 13, 1997, pp. Al, A10.
\4\ U.S. Department of State, Report to the Congress on the
Enlargement of NATO: Rationale, Benefits, Costs, and Implications,
February 1997, pp. 10, 15.
\5\ Ibid., p. 16.
\6\ Ibid., p. 18.
\7\ Ted Galen Carpenter and Andrew Stone, ``NATO Expansion
Flashpoint No. 1: The Border between Poland and Belarus,'' Cato
Institute Foreign Policy Briefing no. 44, September 16, 1997, p 1.
\8\ Ibid., pp. 11-12.
\9\ Ted Galen Carpenter, Beyond NATO: Staying Out of Europe's Wars
(Washington: Cato Institute, 1994), p. 21.
\10\ Ibid., p. 32.
\11\ James Joll, The Origins of the First World War, 2d ed.
(London: Longman, 1992), pp. 42, 45-46, 47, 50-52, 54-55, 60, 62, 200,
201.
\12\ Congressional Budget Office, p. 40; and Jonathan Landay
``U.S.: No Free Lunch,'' Christian Science Monitor, October 7, 1997, p.
1.
\13\ Jonathan Landay, ``U.S. Military Outpaces Its NATO Peers,''
Christian Science Monitor, September 29, 1997, p. 1.
\14\ Congressional Budget office, p. 52. Page 35
\15\ Richard Kugler, now with the National Defense University,
Comments at a forum on Capitol Hill entitled ``NATO Enlargement--
Matching Requirements and Costs: A Transatlantic Forum Roundtable
Discussion,'' sponsored by the Potomac Foundation, 'September 8, 1997.
\16\ Congressional Budget office, pp. 26-40, 44-45, 47-48; and
Reiner Huber and Gernot Friedrich, A Zero-Cost Option for NATO
Enlargement: Arguments for a Comprehensive Approach (McLean, Va.:
Potomac Foundation, August 1997), pp. 10-11.
\17\ Gerth and Weiner, p. 8; and William Drozdiak, ``NATO Nations
Balk at Paying Large Share of Expansion,'' Washington Post, October 3,
1997.
\18\ DoD response, in General Accounting Office, NATO Enlargement:
Cost Estimates Developed to Date Are Notional (Washington: General
Accounting Office, August 1997), p. 11.
\19\ Ibid., pp. 23-24.
\20\ Ibid., p. 4.
\21\ Quoted in Landay, ``U.S. Military Outpaces Its NATO Peers,''
p. 1.
\22\ Bill Clinton, response to questions on NATO enlargement from
Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, September 10, 1997, response to question 8,
p. 11 (copy in author's files).
\23\ Douglas Berenson, ``Officials Say NATO Must Step Up Rapid
Reinforcement, Lift Abilities,'' Inside the Pentagon, July 31, 1997, p.
3; and Landay, ``U.S. Military Outpaces Its NATO Peers,'' p. 1.
\24\ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook (Brussels:
NATO Information and Press, 1995), pp. 244-45, 246-47.
\25\ Huber and Friedrich, Foreword and pp. 1-2.
\26\ Landay, ``U.S. Military Outpaces Its NATO Peers,'' p. 1.
\27\ Ronald Asmus, Richard Kugler, and Stephen Larrabee, ``What
Will NATO Enlargement Cost?'' Survival 38, no. 3 (Autumn 1996): 9-10.
\28\ Quoted in Berenson, p. 4. Page 36
\29\ U.S. Department of State, p. 12.
\30\ General Accounting Office, p. 9.
\31\ The DoD's assumptions for specific categories of costs were
discussed at a meeting with the author on April 2, 1997. DoD personnel
present were Ron Moore, an analyst in the DoD's office of Program
Analysis and Evaluation, and Barry Pavel and Lt. Col. Reginald Gillis
in the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and
Resources. Subsequently, the Pentagon's assumptions were confirmed in
writing.
\32\ General Accounting Office, p. 10.
\33\ Phone conversation with Col. Tamas Toth, Hungarian defense
attache in the United States.
\34\ Christine Spolar, ``Applicants Offer Lots of Heart but Few
Arms,'' Washington Post, June 17, 1997, p. A12.
\35\ General Accounting Office, p. 10.
\36\ Clinton, response to question 8, p. 11.
\37\ Christine Spolar, ``Aging Armies Grapple with Costly Overhaul:
E. European Nations Take Aggressive Steps to Amass Price of Admission
to NATO,'' Washington Post, June 19, 1997, p. A23.
\38\ General Accounting Office, p. 10.
\39\ Jeff Erlich and Brooks Tigner, ``Czechs, Poles Seek Fighter
Bids by Year-End,'' Defense News, September 22-28, 1997, p. 26; and
Spolar, ``Aging Armies Grapple with Costly Overhaul,'' p. A23.
\40\ Jeff Erlich, ``Central European Nations May Delay Fighter
Purchases,'' Defense News, October 6-12, 1997, p. 10.
\41\ Gerth and Weiner, pp. 1, 8.
\42\ Unlike the DoD's estimate, the $11.5 billion figure does not
include any funds for standardizing artillery tubes, ammunition, and
ammunition-handling equipment. Military planners believe that doing so
costs a great deal of money for only a modest gain in military
capability. Standardizing only a few guns, as the DoD assumed, would
have almost no military value. Nations facing severe constraints on the
resources they can spend on defense would best spend those Page 37
funds on higher priority items.
\43\ U.S. Department of Defense, ``The Military Implications and
Costs of NATO Enlargement,'' undated briefing, p. 8.
\44\ U.S. Department of State, p. 18.
\45\ General Accounting Office, p. 12.
\46\ Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee, p. 10; and RAND, ``The Costs of
NATO Expansion: Preparing NATO and ECE Forces to Carry Out New Treaty
Commitments,'' Santa Monica, May 1995, p. 10.
\47\ Ibid., p. 19.
\48\ Brooks Tigner, ``NATO Rift Widens over Expansion Costs,''
Defense News, October 6-12, 1997, p. 6.
\49\ U.S. Department of Defense; Landay, ``U.S.: No Free Lunch,''
p. 1; and William Drozdiak, ``NATO Nations Balk at Paying Large Share
of Expansion,'' Washington Post, October 3, 1997.
\50\ Congressional Budget Office, pp. xiv, 51-55. The CBO developed
several options for implementing expansion that ranged from a defense
that relied heavily on improved self defense capabilities under a
benign threat environment to the limited stationing of NATO troops in
new member states under a resurgent Russian threat. The $125 billion
represents the high-end cost.
\51\ Ibid.
----------
Other Studies in the Policy Analysis Series
285. The Advancing Nanny State: Why the Government Should Stay Out of
Child Care by Darcy Olsen (October 23, 1997)
284. Fighting Back: Crime, Self-Defense, and the Right to Carry a
Handgun by Jeffrey R. Snyder (October 22, 1997)
283. Ten Myths about Financial Derivatives by Thomas F. Siems
(September 11, 1997)
282. Campaign Finance ``Reform'' Proposals: A First Amendment Analysis
by Lillian R. BeVier (September 4, 1997)
281. How the Budget Revolution Was Lost by Stephen Moore (September 2,
1997)
280. Renewable Energy: Not Cheap, Not ``Green'' by Robert L. Bradley
Jr. (August 27, 1997)
279. The End of Representation: How Congress Stifles Electoral
Competition by Eric O'Keefe and Aaron Steelman (August 20,
1997)
278. The Threat to Independent Education: Public Subsidies and Private
Colleges by Gary Wolfram (August 15, 1997)
277. With Friends Like These: Why Community Radio Does Not Need the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting by Jesse Walker (July 24,
1997)
276. Should Congress Transfer Federal Lands to the States? by Randal
O'Toole (July 3, 1997)
275. Tobacco Medicaid Litigation: Snuffing Out the Rule of Law by
Robert A. Levy (June 20, 1997)
274. How Rent Control Drives out Affordable Housing by William Tucker
(May 21, 1997)
273. Help or Hindrance: Can Foreign Aid Prevent International Crises?
by Doug Bandow (April 25, 1997)
272. Emancipating America from the Income Tax: How a National Sales Tax
Would Work by David R. Burton and Dan R. Mastromarco (April 15,
1997)
271. Dereliction of Duty: The Constitutional Record of President
Clinton by Timothy Lynch (March 31, 1997)
Responses of Mr. Slocombe to Questions Asked by Senator Helms
(questions 8 and 11 have classified supplements stored by the committee
on foreign relations.)
Question 1. NATO is currently engaged in a review of the 1991
Strategic Concept. I am concerned that this review will de-emphasize
the role of collective, territorial defense of the alliance in favor of
operations other than war (e.g., the promotion of democracy, nation-
building, crisis management, and peacekeeping). Will the United States
government insist that any new strategic concept continue to emphasize
collective, territorial defense as the centerpiece of military strategy
in the NATO Alliance?
Answer. Yes. We have already made the point that the U.S. believes
that ``Article V'' defense of the territories of allies remains the
core NATO mission. The Strategic Concept was adopted by NATO in 1991.
At the July 1997 Madrid Summit, NATO allies agreed to examine the
Strategic Concept ``to ensure that it is fully consistent with Europe's
new security situation and challenges''. Since then, NATO has developed
an agreed Terms of Reference (TOR) document for the conduct of the
review, which was endorsed by Foreign and Defense Ministers during
their December 1997 meetings. The TOR confirms NATO's commitment to the
core function of Article 5 collective defense and the transatlantic
link.
Question 2. What are the key differences in force structure for the
new NATO members (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) that would be
implied by a Strategic Concept based on territorial defense, versus one
which is based on planning for operations other than war (OOTW)? Using
the five categories of equipment limited by the Treaty on Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) as a basis, please provide the Committee with an
illustrative, side-by-side comparison of the force structures that
would be possessed by each new NATO member depending upon whether
emphasis is placed on territorial defense or on OOTW.
Answer. The current force structure of the three invitees (as per
CFE limited categories of equipment) is as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CZECH
POLAND REPUBLIC HUNGARY
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tanks:.................................... 1,729 952 797
Artillery:................................ 1,581 767 840
ACV:...................................... 1,442 1,367 1,300
Helicopters:.............................. 94 36 59
Aircraft:................................. 384 144 141
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(Figures were reported at annual information exchange, as of 1 January
1997.)
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are working on improving
their ability to operate within NATO's integrated military command
structure. We do not expect that NATO will require the invitees to
significantly alter their existing force structure for operations other
than war in particular. As with current allies, NATO military planning
is centered on collective defense under Article Five, not on operations
other than war. It therefore would be speculative to try to determine
for, or compare force structures between, the two types of operations.
The term Operations Other Than War (OOTW) is defined in Joint
Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, as ``Operations that encompass the use of military
capabilities across the range of military operations short of war.
These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of
the instruments of national power and occur before, during and after
war. Also called MOOTW.'' Because the scope of MOOTW is so wide and can
encompass anything from a large-scale humanitarian mission to a small
contingent contribution to a peace enforcement operation, specific
information would be required to provide a detailed comparison
assessment between a territorial defense posture and one based on MOOTW
criteria. However, we believe that both current and new members' forces
will remain capable of unilateral defense, while also capable of
conducting a variety of other operations, including MOOTW.
Question 3. It has been suggested by some that the Administration
is urging new NATO members to adopt a rapidly-deployable force
structure, perhaps at the expense of the force configuration necessary
for the country's territorial defense. Can you assure the Committee
that this is not the case?
Answer. Yes. We have been urging the new NATO members to adopt more
deployable forces, but this does not come at the expense of territorial
defense. To the contrary, the keystone units that new NATO members have
been developing as their elite, most ready and deployable forces, would
also be critical for contributing to their initial self-defense in the
case of cross-border aggression. In order to participate in NATO
contingencies that increasingly require deployable forces, the new
members must continue their transformation from static defense forces.
These countries are in the process of determining what portion of their
forces will need to be deployable, and, in consultation with NATO, how
rapidly their forces should be available.
Question 4. I am concerned that NATO's proposal for a stabilized
area in Central Europe places the indigenous military capabilities of
the three new NATO members in direct conflict with NATO's capability to
station forces. The only way a country could make room for stationed
forces would be to reduce its own national holdings to create
``headroom'' under the territorial ceilings established in the adapted
CFE Treaty. While there may be no need for stationing at this time,
certainly one could envision scenarios where it would become necessary.
Please explain to the Committee NATO's strategy for defending the three
new NATO members while at the same time adhering to the constraints
that would be imposed under a stabilized zone in an adapted CFE Treaty?
Answer. We recognize the importance of assuring that the CFE Treaty
is not a constraint to fulfilling US or NATO obligations under the
Washington Treaty. The proposed NATO stabilized region does indeed
prevent upward revision of the territorial ceilings from their current
maximum national level of holdings for the Czech Republic, the Republic
of Hungary, and the Republic of Poland. Reciprocally, it also imposes
the same constraint upon the Republic of Belarus, the territory of the
Ukraine outside the Flank Zone, and the Kaliningrad Oblast of the
Russian Federation.
In a 14 March 1997 statement, the North Atlantic Council asserted
that ``... the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other
missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and
capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent
stationing of substantial combat forces.'' This statement succinctly
describes the strategy of both NATO and the United States for defending
the three new NATO members.
A critical objective of the United States in the on-going CFE
Treaty negotiations is to protect the capability to carry out U.S. and
NATO responsibilities with regard to defending Alliance members. We
will also ensure that the provisions for temporary deployment allow
needed scope for reinforcements and emergencies.
Question 5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have determined -- and have
circulated at NATO -- the minimum amount of equipment deemed necessary
for deployment, on a temporary basis, of equipment to the new NATO
members. Please provide the Committee with a detailed analysis of the
process by which these numbers were reached, including all threat and
response assessments and contingency planning conducted in connection
with this determination.
Answer. No answer was received.
Question 6. Has the United States and NATO developed contingency
plans for the defense of new NATO members under various scenarios? What
forces and operational capabilities would be needed to satisfy the most
demanding of these scenarios, such as a resurgent Russia or a nuclear
scenario? We will appreciate your providing to the Committee a
detailed, classified assessment which identifies possible threats to
the three new NATO members, from best to worst-case scenarios. Please
attach to this threat assessment an identification, using CFE Treaty
equipment categories as a guide, of each force package necessary to
respond to the given threat.
Answer. At this time, no contingency plans have been developed by
the US or NATO to defend the new NATO members. Prior to accession NATO
will initiate contingency planning for the Article V defense of the
Invited Countries. Prior to any contingency planning, the NATO Military
Committee will evaluate the spectrum of threat scenarios and provide
guidance to planners for contingency planning.
Question 7. It would appear that NATO intends to fulfill its
territorial defense commitments to the new NATO members using a
strategy of rapid deployment, rather than through pre-deployment of
substantial force enhancements in-country. What prompted this shift in
policy? What are the advantages and disadvantages of this approach?
Answer. There has been no ``shift'' in policy. NATO's adoption in
November 1991 of a new Strategic Concept signaled the Alliance's shift
away from a forward positional defense to a regional reinforcement
strategy. NATO took this important step in response to the vast changes
in the European security environment as a result of the end of the Cold
War. Most importantly, there was, and currently is, no significant
threat of large-scale, cross-border aggression, and any such threat
would take years to develop.
Question 8. Will the United States' ``nuclear umbrella'' be
extended to the three new NATO members? Given the Administration's
pledge not to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on the territories of
these new members, does this mean that the US intends to satisfy its
new nuclear guarantees with strategic nuclear weapons? Will other NATO
members provide an extended deterrence guarantee to the three new NATO
members? Has there been any discussion within the Administration or
NATO of withdrawing tactical nuclear weapons from the European theater
as a means of accommodating Russian concerns? If so, please describe.
Answer. The guarantees under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty
pertaining to assistance to any member state which is attacked will be
extended to the new NATO members upon their accession. With respect to
the United States' ``nuclear umbrella'', the Administration's 1994
Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed that nuclear weapons continue to play
a critical role in deterring aggression against the United States, its
overseas forces, its allies, and friends. That review also reaffirmed
the role of U.S. dual-capable aircraft (DCA) in Europe.
The NATO Strategic Concept states that the supreme guarantee of the
security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of
the Alliance, particularly those of the United States. It also states
that the Alliance will maintain sub-strategic forces, based in Europe,
which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces,
reinforcing the trans-Atlantic link. The U.S. DCA meet that
requirement.
The number of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe has declined
significantly since the end of the Cold War. However, there has been no
consideration of withdrawal of the remaining forces, for any reason,
including ``as a means of accommodating Russian concerns about
enlargement.'' The Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed that the United
States will maintain its current commitment of dual-capable aircraft
and nuclear weapons dedicated to NATO.
Question 9. Because Hungary is not territorially contiguous to any
other NATO member, some are concerned that - in some circumstances -
Hungary could be denied essential NATO reinforcements during a crisis.
What specific steps has the Administration taken to conclude a legally-
binding agreement with Austria to allow NATO forces to transit Austrian
territory in time of crisis? What steps have been taken to conclude
such an agreement with Slovenia?
Answer. In the current security environment, NATO should have no
difficulty in reinforcing Hungary. Both Austria and Slovenia are NATO
aspirants. Our policy has been and continues to be that the door to
NATO membership remains open. In the interim, as active participants in
the Partnership for Peace program, both are fully supportive of NATO
and could be expected to allow free passage in the event it became
necessary to send reinforcements to or through Hungary. In the worst-
case scenario that access to NATO was denied, NATO forces could
reinforce via airlift as we once did in Berlin. In its assessment of
the military requirements associated with enlargement, SHAPE has
assumed the presence of a political agreement to permit access to
Hungary. However, SHAPE has also identified a requirement for an Air
Port of Debarkation (APOD) to assure access if the worst-case scenario
were to occur. Any negotiations for NATO access would be undertaken by
NATO and would not be pursued bilaterally.
Question 10. Will NATO revise the Strategic Concept in order to
harmonize the mission of NATO with the level of commitment that members
are willing to provide in support of the 1991 Strategic Concept? For
all NATO members, please provide the Committee the Force Goals and
implementation timelines devised at NATO in support of the 1991
Strategic Concept (in unclassified form if possible).
Answer. The Strategic Concept is an over-arching policy statement
that establishes Alliance missions and requirements, and from which (in
its force planning process), NATO has derived its new force posture.
That new force posture has evolved from the Cold War-era's fixed
border-static defense to one emphasizing strategic mobility and the
sustainment of deployed forces; deployable C3I (Command and Control,
Communication and Intelligence) systems for joint operations and air
warfare; theater missile defense; capabilities to address the risks
posed by NBC weapons and their means of delivery; and provision of
combat support and combat service support for multinational reaction
forces.
These force goals represent a commitment of military forces and
capabilities to the Alliance in the future. As such, force goals are
targets for nations to achieve and do not reflect nation's actual
contributions in forces and capability. The planning cycle is biennial,
with force goals projected for a six year planning period into the
future. Implementation timelines are flexible and are driven by the
availability of resources of each committed ally. Each fall, NATO
verifies and reinforces individual Allied force goal commitments and
assesses the Alliance's overall capability to meet all aspects of its
Treaty responsibilities. The documents requested are classified by NATO
and are available to the Committee in that form.
Question 11. The report on costs of NATO enlargement provided to
the Congress in February 1997 indicates that existing NATO allies must
spend $8-10 billion to bring their forces in line with obligations from
the 1991 Strategic Concept. What countries specifically are failing to
meet their Force Goal commitments? Please break down this dollar
requirement by NATO member in approximate distribution.
Answer. Force goals reflect (and are reflected in) the guidance
documents, defense requirements, and national defense postures the
Alliance uses to meet its Article 5 responsibilities. Force goals are
biennially developed and projected for a six year planning period into
the future. They represent national commitments of military forces and
capabilities to NATO in the future. As a result, force goals are
targets for nations to achieve and do not reflect nations' actual
contributions in forces and capability. From that standpoint, Alliance
force goal shortfalls are defined in terms of capability shortfalls,
not by specific national shortfalls. In addition, force goals can be
addressed in a variety of ways: ``accepted,'' ``partially accepted,''
``under consideration,'' ``not accepted,'' or accepted/partially
accepted but under an extended timeline. The reasons for not accepting
a goal include national requirements, financial, political, and even,
in some instances, a national belief that the goal is not valid. In
addition, there are instances of a nation not meeting a specific goal
due to national requirements but offering the capability in some other
manner.
Annually, using the Defense Review Process, NATO assesses its
capability to meet agreed mission requirements in light of a number of
factors, including the prevailing security situation. The process
culminates in ``country chapters'' that review each nation's
contribution to the Alliance. This year, NATO determined that main
defense forces are generally capable of meeting current mission
requirements. Concurrently, NATO believes that capability shortfalls
exist in some combat support and combat service supports areas. These
shortfalls are identified, and the Alliance is taking steps to rectify
them through its normal force planning process. But, shortfalls should
always be taken in the context of overall contribution to the Alliance.
The attached classified annex is a compendium of the country chapter
sections addressing national responses to force goals. As such, it
presents only a part of NATO's exhaustive evaluation of each nation's
contribution, both positive and negative.
__________
Response of Mr. Eland to Question asked by Senator Biden
Thank you for your follow-up question, which I am pleased to
answer. However, I must first state the following: If your question
asks if my analysis of the costs of NATO enlargement was in any way
influenced by my views on the continued membership of the United States
in NATO, the answer is an emphatic ``no.'' Let me explain.
In my mind, the issue discussed at the October 28, 1997 Foreign
Relations Committee hearing--my estimates of the cost of NATO
enlargement--is a separate issue from my policy views on NATO
enlargement or U.S. membership in NATO. As the principal author of the
Congressional Budget Office report on the costs of NATO enlargement, I
could not and did not take a position on NATO enlargement nor on
continued U.S. membership in the alliance. Both assistance (in costing)
and supervision were provided by other CBO employees, who were also
committed to CBO's policies of neutrality and of not making policy
recommendations. All involved CBO analysts agreed with the resulting
analysis in the report.
In fulfilling my role as a CBO analyst, I developed a cost estimate
that is, if anything, conservative in its projections of the cost of
enlargement. I talked to military planners--both active and retired--
and developed a detailed list of only the most critical improvements to
armed forces and infrastructure that were needed for enlargement. The
Joint Staff told me that my detailed list was a good one. CBO then
simply estimated the cost of each detailed improvement--usually from
data provided by the armed services or international organizations and
added up the total. An example of this conservatism is in weapons
purchases for new members. The RAND study assumed that, over time, new
members would replace 50% of their obsolescent Soviet-built equipment
with new Western equipment, with expenses totaling as much as $30 to
$40 billion. CBO was more modest in its assumptions, upgrading existing
Soviet-built systems in the short-term and buying a limited number of
new Western systems in the long-term. CBO's estimate for such purchases
was only S19.2 billion.
The CBO study postulated five options for NATO enlargement ranging
from more modest security preparations in a lesser threat environment
to more ambitious defense measures in more severe threat scenarios. In
contrast, DoD's later cost estimate listed a very specific scenario,
which did not correspond exactly with any of CBO's options. Thus, the
two studies were not directly comparable, The Cato analysis merely
adjusts the CBO estimate to make it comparable to DoD's estimate, It
uses the same costing factors and methodology in the original CBO
report. Therefore, my policy views on whether NATO should be enlarged
or whether the United States should remain in NATO had no impact either
the CBO estimate or Cato analysis.
Reasonable people differ about whether NATO is the optimal
institution for securing and promoting U.S. interests in Europe. It
should be noted that many prominent defenders of NATO in its current
form nevertheless vehemently oppose enlargement. I personally believe
that we should at least consider options other than a ``NATO forever''
policy, but that is a separate issue from the Wisdom of proposals to
enlarge the alliance. It is even more distinct from the issue of how
much such enlargement will cost.
__________
Prepared Statement of Dr. Stephen A. Cambone, Senior Fellow, Political-
Military Studies Program Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, DC
Executive Summary
The CATO Institute has just released a new study on the cost of
NATO enlargement. ``The High Cost of NATO Expansion: Clearing the
Administration's Smokescreen'' is written by CATO's director of defense
policy studies, Ivan Eland, author of a earlier CBO study on
enlargement. That CBO study estimated enlargement costs to be as high
as $125 B.
The new CATO study sets the cost at $70 billion using what it says
is a more ``methodologically rigorous and reasonably accurate''
estimating process than the one used by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD).
CATO declares the cost of enlargement to be at least twice OSD's
high estimate of $35 B. CATO's $70 B figure is based on assigning new
members nearly $34 B in additional costs related specifically to
enlargement. But these additional charges are not justified by a
clearly articulated and validated set of requirements based on threat
analyses, force capabilities and operational plans. It is based on the
author's view-rejected by current and prospective allies--that NATO
should have a robust, forward deployed capability to defend the new
members and that new members themselves should be more robustly armed
to conduct intense operations for 30 days on the old Cold War model.
It is not surprising that this study is marred by the same
assumptions that guided the CBO study since it is done by the same
author.
Introduction
For more than a year the cost of NATO enlargement has been growing
as an issue. It began with an estimate provided by the CBO that put the
cost at anywhere from $60-125 B. This estimate followed one prepared by
the RAND Corporation that put the total at anywhere between $10-110 B
though a subsequent article in Survival by the report's authors
suggested $42 B as a reasonable estimate of costs. Both these estimates
were followed by a report from the DOD that put the costs at $27-35 B.
Most observers found the CBO numbers too high. The estimate was
rooted in an assumption that defense planning should be based more on
Cold War requirements than those likely to obtain in the coming
decades. The RAND estimates were not nearly as wide as they appeared at
first. Taking reasonable assumptions about the effort made by new
members to improve their national capabilities, the force package NATO
would need to provide to reinforce those national capabilities and the
cost of preparing the glue to hold it all together--C3I,
infrastructure, road, airfields, etc., RAND suggested a price of about
$42 B. OSD's estimate was greeted initially as being too low. But the
difference between it and the RAND estimate (apart from a few
differences in priorities internal to the estimates) can be accounted
for by the additional cost assumed by RAND in assigning one more ground
division to the NATO reinforcement package.
There the matter has sat for about a year. In the interim the GAO
issued a report suggesting that costs could be higher than OSD (and by
implication RAND) estimated due to a number of factors that have
historically, but not universally, affected cost estimates. But the GAO
also said that the CBO and RAND estimates were ``more reliable'' than
OSD'S.
A new round of debate is now likely to be touched off by a report
released in late October, 1997 by the CATO Institute of Washington, DC.
Prepared by one of the two analysts responsible for the CBO report,
Ivan Eland, the CATO report declares that the costs of enlargement will
be about $70 B and could rise to $167 B. The US share of the cost,
estimated by OSD at 1.5-2.0 billion over 10 years is estimated by CATO
to be $7 B over the same time frame.
The report appears at a time the US Senate is attempting to come to
grips with costs. This, by itself, would assure attention was given
CATO's effort. Additional attention is likely to be generated by allied
countries already worried that the approach to costing by the US--CBO,
RAND, OSD, GAO and CATO alike--are all to high and likely to reduce
support for enlargement among their publics. And in Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic CATO's numbers are likely to elicit both concern and
disdain. The concern is for the affect on public opinion which, while
it has finally come to accept the additional costs enlargement will
impose, is hardly ready to absorb the bill CATO would assign to it,
some $34 B. Governments are likely to be disdainful because they have
already begun to plan and calculate their own programs on the roughly
$10-13 B cost estimated by OSD.
But attention is likely to be focused on CATO's estimates for
another reason. The libertarian think-tank is noted for its opposition
to enlargement and, among some of its scholars, the view that the US
ought to withdraw from the alliance altogether. CATO's attitude toward
the alliance is evident in its characterization of NATO as ``outmoded''
and its worry that it is akin to the pre-WW I alliance system that
plunged the ``reluctant major powers... into a global war.'' In light
of the introduction one is put on notice by the author himself to look
for inflated military requirements and costs as the leading edge of a
broader argument that the US should reduce, and maybe even end, its
NATO commitments--whatever they may be. Being apprised of CATO's
attitude at the beginning of the report--no one can say they do not
know where it stands on the issues--the reader expects that the author
has taken pains not only to criticize what has been done by OSD, but to
be more accurate in his own estimates. In short, despite the provenance
of the report, indeed precisely because of it, and its potential
political effect, the reader is led to expect that CATO has held itself
to a higher standard and for that reason the report should be read with
care.
Categories of Cost
Three basic categories of cost are being used by all analysts.
The first relates to the expenditures by the new members to make of
themselves competent allies. These expenditures fall broadly in two
subcategories. The first is national expenditures, i.e., those
associated with providing national defense forces by downsizing and
modernizing forces acquired during the days of Warsaw Pact. The second
is expenditures specifically incurred to make those national forces
``interoperable'' and ``compatible'' with NATO forces. These two
subcategories can be very difficult to distinguish. What fraction of
the ground-force improvements made by Poland go in the first, and which
in the second, category? For some allies, like Germany, the difference
in the past has been non-existent in practical terms; all of its forces
were assigned to NATO. Nonetheless, Germany's defense costs were all
counted as national, and not NATO costs. Judgment is needed in
apportioning costs among the subcategories. This judgment is
particularly open to question because it will drive estimates of
enlargement costs dramatically up or down.
The second relates to the expenditures made by the current allies
to assure that they can meet their collective obligation to support the
new members in case any of them is subject to aggression. This
reinforcement capability is currently estimated at four ground
divisions and six air wings. But here again two categories of cost can
be identified. The first is the changes or additions being made to
force structures and postures among the current non-US allies (the US
is exempt on the belief that its forces are structured and postured
adequately) to enhance their role in strictly national policies. The
second category is that being done specifically to meet the needs of
reinforcing the new members. The distinctions here are even less
obvious than in the case of the new members. Most allies would argue it
is a distinction with no difference. The French effort to restructure
its forces, downsize them and develop a rapid reaction corps of 40,000
professional soldiers is not driven by NATO enlargement. The German
effort to develop the KRK, its crisis reaction corps, is not animated
by enlargement but a national decision that Germany should play a
larger role in NATO and EU security affairs in Europe and around its
periphery. The UK's restructuring and reposturing was begun long before
enlargement was mooted and its major procurement programs--C-13OJs,
APACHE helicopters and new amphibious shipping--set in place before
enlargement was agreed. The multinational and integrated Eurocorps,
German/Dutch brigade, Franco-Spanish-Italian naval units, etc., are
being animated by EU concerns, not NATO enlargement.
That said, all of the changes in hand will make the forces of NATO
allies far more compatible and far more capable of meeting NATO's new
``force projection'' doctrine for both collective defense and ``out of
area'' operations. Assigning these essentially national commitments to
NATO enlargement is an American habit strongly resisted by allied
governments. In their view it inflates the cost of enlargement in ways
that are both misleading and unnecessary. They might accept the
penchant of American's to mislead themselves into thinking that they
can so easily leverage and direct European national programs if it
weren't the case that the inflated costs unnecessarily drive down
public support for enlargement among allied publics. Thus, in making an
estimate it is important Americans distinguish what is integral to
enlargement and what is tangential. If we are not to count the costs of
procuring and operating our own military over the last ten years, an
effort costing hundreds of billions of dollars, then why should we
count what the allies will spend in the next ten years on their own
national programs?
The American answer, of course, is that the Europeans haven't spent
the money yet and the capability they promise to buy is essential to
fulfilling the collective defense commitments of the alliance. That is
fair enough; but both France and German are already embarked on the
modernizations outlined above. The KRK will begin standing up in 2000.
The French FAR is about two years behind the KRK. It would seem that
unlike the 1970s and early 1980s when its was to the advantage of the
allies to place the costs of European security on the US, today that is
no longer the case. The nascent EU is being nurtured in part on the
milk of defense industry spending and the honey of military
modernization and integration aimed at a common security policy.
Neither Germany nor France can falter in these efforts lest they cede
the leadership of the EU's security policy to the other. In this case
the interests of the US and its allies for a modem, force projection
capability among the European allies is quite similar, albeit generated
by very different motives.
The third category of costs is direct costs, i.e., those imposed on
all concerned to assure that forces are interoperable and compatible.
The first refers to different equipment operating effectively together.
The latter refers to employing equipment that meets the same standards.
For our purpose it is easier to refer to the two as rendering the
forces complementary. This latter term introduces the notion that a
certain amount of ``making do'' is both to be expected and acceptable.
The US is not buying nor will it operate the forces of new or old NATO
allies. It, and they, must settle for the friction imposed on
operations by equipment and procedures generated by the national
requirements of 16, soon to be 19, countries. That said, there are
agreed items and actions that need to be procured and funded. These
direct costs are distributed among the allies themselves as well as a
common NATO-funded account, the latter itself funded by assessments on
the members.
This brief review of cost categories makes it plain that
considerable discretion is permitted to an analyst in which category a
given cost is listed and then, within the category, where it
apportioned. What makes precision in such costing difficult--apart from
being certain that the requirements for capability are firm, that the
system-level costs are well known, that economic factors are agreed,
etc.--is that money is fungible. A zloty, forint or koruna spent on
radios can be assigned to at least two categories and charged against
at least four accounts. But the critical point is that the radios are
bought, distributed, deployed, and employed in exercises and training.
A second factor making precision difficult is the always vexing
questions, ``how much is enough?'' Up to a limit more radios are a good
thing; below a certain limit too few radios is a bad thing. The
question we are facing in costing NATO enlargement is how many are
needed between too few and too many when the same money used to buy
those radios can be used to upgrade artillery systems or to fund
airfield improvements? Again, one analyst is likely to differ from
another. In the end it comes to a judgment about priorities in
capability over time.
Comparing Analyses
Analytic outcomes depend in large measure on the methodologies used
to chose data inputs and to assess outputs. The CATO study promises ``a
detailed critique of the administration's assumptions and method of
estimating the costs...'' and promises a cost estimate that is
``methodologically rigorous and reasonably accurate.'' With these words
CATO implies the OSD study was neither rigorous nor accurate. To
underscore the point, CATO dismisses the OSD estimates by charging the
result it offered ``resulted from a negotiation between the White House
and several offices in the Pentagon; it is not a valid estimate based
on the military requirements of expansion.''
Evidence for this serious charge is drawn from a Washington Post
story, not from CATO's own knowledge. But this is beside the point. The
document produced by OSD was subject to interagency discussion and
coordination. That is how the work of government is done, irrespective
of administration, on matters of major policy importance. To charge
that ``negotiations'' took place as the final document was prepared is
of significance if, and only if, the charge is that the figures were
``cooked'' in this process--a charge implied but for which CATO
provides no evidence.
That brings us to methodology. CATO charges the OSD analysts used a
``level-of-effort'' methodology--given what the new members had to
spend, how much could be bought in the categories of capabilities
deemed appropriate. The OSD analysts have ``little or no detailed cost
analysis to back them up,'' charges CATO. In support of this position
they cite the GAO and statements by three OSD analysts. In place of
this level of effort analysis CATO implies that we will receive from it
an estimate that determines ``a list of detailed military improvements
required for NATO expansion, estimates of the cost of each of the
improvements individually, that add[s] up [to] the total.''
On the level-of-effort analysis, this criticism may have some truth
to it. However, the RAND analysis from which OSD drew the framework of
its own report was based on actual requirements. OSD's analysis,
drawing on RAND's work, was based on requirements; the costs were not
presented on a year-by-year basis but rather as a ``level of effort''
or average over the 1997-2009 period. Such an approach is not
illegitimate. The alliance as a whole and the individual allies are in
the midst, as suggested earlier, of recasting requirements and
restructuring forces. The candidate states are in the same position.
OSD analysts do have a good idea of what it takes for the US, and by
experience for a number of allies, to make a ground division more
mobile, to provide an air wing with a bare-base capability for a
forward deployment, etc. Treating this spending in aggregate--based on
expectations of allied resources and those of the new members--may not
yield the fine distinctions that ``counting of eaches,'' a term used by
the military for exaggerated and often misleading bean-counting, but it
certainly provides a good ``level-of-effort'' estimate.
It is doubtful CATO analysts went to the level of ``counting
eaches,'' either. The accounting systems and methods needed for such an
approach do not now exist. But the evidence that their approach was not
so fine is in the sections of the report that deal with estimates of
cost category by category. In the category of ``training and
exercises'' for example, we are told OSD analysts admitted to basing
the estimate on what new members could afford and setting costs at 80%
of that current members. CATO's conclusion: ``[t]he 2.5 billion to $4.2
billion estimate... is based on artificially postulated considerations
of affordability.'' This critique leads us to expect a more rigorous
treatment of the subject. Instead, CATO leaves us with the following:
``An estimate based on requirements for specific exercises at a given
frequency would yield a more realistic cost estimate at the top of the
range [provided by OSD] ($4.2 billion).'' No more than this is offered.
The same lack of rigor is evident in the discussion of C3I: ``Thus,
the DOD's $2 billion to $3 billion estimate for C3I is too low. More
tactical radios would need to be purchased to give critical flexibility
on the battlefield. Doing so, however, would double the cost to $6.2
billion'' No evidence is offered for the conclusion or the price.
The analysis improves in the discussion of air defense. Here CATO
makes a substantive argument that the I-HAWK systems OSD proposes for
the new members ought to be replaced by PATRIOT PAC-2. The reason
offered, primarily, is that HAWK had a life expectancy of 30 years; in
2020 it will be 50 and new technology will have passed it by rendering
``the value of such an old system ... nil.'' Perhaps; but in reaching
this conclusion (one shared by the RAND analysis) one might have
expected a discussion of the significance of the I-HAWK upgrades funded
by BMDO to enhance both their air defense capability and provide.a
measure of capability against short range ballistic missiles--a
deficiency CATO calls out as affecting I-HAWK. In addition, one might
have expected an analysis of the contribution of allied counter-air
operations to the missions of the alliance. But again, a lack of the
promised rigor leaves the reader without a basis for deciding whether
OSD's assumptions or those of CATO are more appropriate--assumptions
because no requirements are offered by CATO.
The section on modernizing ground forces returns to high-level
estimates, but this time coupled to a confused discussion of new
members' mobility needs. On this latter point we are treated to a long
discussion of bases, whether 5 or six divisions should be enhanced,
artillery compatibility, etc. OSD is criticized for assuming that five
divisions among the new members in aggregate need to be made more
mobile and that updating of T-55 tanks was not necessary and new tank
purchases not costed. But we know that the T-55s are being retired as
the candidates draw down their forces and that upgrades to the T-72s
are not prohibitively expensive (especially if the Israelis do them)
and that new tank fleets are not the first order of business in any
allied army. To be critical of OSD for not costing new tank purchases
would seem to miss the point of requirements on which CATO's analysis
is said to be based--that upgraded T-72s are equal to the threats they
will face. The discussion of artillery compatibility leads no where
productive and ignores the program the US has underway to buy kits to
allow its forces to fire ammunition of different caliber. After nearly
two pages of discussion, CATO concludes that its analysis, with neither
requirements nor specific programs provided, costs $600 million more
than OSD's top-end ``level-of-effort'' estimate!
CATO's discussion of the candidate's need for aircraft upgrades or
replacement seems more compelling than OSD'S. But the reason is not
increased rigor of analysis by CATO but the fact that OSD did not treat
this issue in detail. OSD proposed that only one squadron of
replacement aircraft would be provided to each new member, an approach
consistent with OSD's preference that new members not focus on
rebuilding their air forces. However, given the sorry state of air
forces in the three countries, and the likelihood that governments will
want to make a start on refurbishing their fleets, funds are likely to
be spent on aircraft.
But even if this is so, in the end CATO cannot account for the
$11.5 billion price tag it provides in this section. Industry estimates
for ``fly-away'' costs for early model F-16 A/B aircraft in US storage
is $1-2 million. An F-16 A/B with a mid-life upgrade of the kind
currently being done around the world would result in a fly away cost
of $12 million. A new F-16 C/D would cost $24 million to fly away. The
mix of possibilities here for replacing about 300 aircraft among the
candidate is quite broad. But even if we suppose all purchased at $12
million per aircraft, the total is still only $3.6 billion--$2 billion
higher than OSD estimated but well short of the CATO estimate. Even if
we add weapons for the 300 aircraft (and the other weapons CATO
includes as part of this discussion) it is difficult to understand how
the remaining $8.0 billion in their estimate is to be made up. CATO
provides no clue. Moreover, is not obvious that the costs, whatever
they might be, should be charged exclusively to the enlargement
account. Aircraft purchases are likely to be pursued on a national
rather than a NATO basis.
CATO adds a category of capability OSD did not estimate, i.e.,
naval improvements. After worrying a bit about Russia providing
landlocked Belarus (!) with submarine support (!), CATO adds $1.1
billion in cost.
Port, road and rail improvements are estimated to cost some $2
billion more than OSD estimated. After asserting that these facilities
received little maintenance during the Cold War and citing detailed
reports from the US TRANSCOM and from the World Bank and EBRD for civil
improvements, CATO then asserts that ``for a crude estimate of the
military improvements, 10% of the total cost of this list (presumably
compiled from the above organizations) of enhancements can be used.''
What relevance this ``list'' and the costs associated by CATO have to
the reports coming into OSD from its survey teams now in the field, who
are reporting that the facilities are not as bad as assumed, is hard to
know.
Exercise facilities are another category in which CATO does not
provide the rigor it promised. After dismissing the OSD estimate--which
had greater specificity than others according to CATO--CATO's report
reaches this conclusion: ``It would be prudent to assume that new
large-scale exercise facilities would need to be built, or at least
that the cost of needed extensive repairs and modifications to existing
facilities would approach the cost of new ones. If those assumptions
are used, the expenses in this category rise to $4.7 billion.'' This is
at least $4.2 billion more than OSD estimated. This could be a serious
problem. But we have no idea whether CATO's ``assumptions'' are any
better than OSD'S. CATO does not review the state of current
facilities, the improvements being made as a result of PFP training,
the use by the UK, Belgium and others of facilities in Poland, etc. One
longs for the rigor promised and in its absence is left to wonder why
it is not provided?
Stockpiles of fuel and ammunition is another category where the
issue of whether to charge costs to nations or enlargement is
appropriate. CATO faults OSD for costing only the refurbishment of
existing bunkers adequate to store only 10 days supply. Here CATO
offers differing assumptions about local fuel supplies and then worries
a war might last more than 10 days. On the basis of this worry it turns
to NATO's new doctrine of force projection and implies NATO could not
put its forces forward fast enough and the new members would have to
hold out--presumably with only modest help--not for 10 days but for 30.
This is certainly possible. But more likely is that NATO, currently
working to a standard that would allow it to project its ARRC
headquarters for nonarticle 5 operations in 10-14 days, could do better
under war time conditions--especially if it had any tactical warning,
leave aside strategic warning, at all. Moreover, NATO air forces are
the most modern in the world. The Polish plains are a ready-made
killing ground for all-weather aircraft. But these issues do not enter
CATO's analysis even though it adds $4-500 million to OSD's estimate.
The upgrade of airfields comes in next for treatment by CATO. In
this category we can see most clearly CATO's own concept of what an
Article 5 operation in the time frame of interest might be in terms of
threat and response. Both are substantially more robust than allied
governments foresee. While this does not make the allies right and CATO
wrong, there remains still the question of whether in a more stressful
environment CATO's recommendations--and the associated costs--make
sense.
After criticizing OSD for a level of effort estimate for forward
basing of only two of the six air wings designated by NATO to reinforce
the new members in the event of article 5 operations, CATO argues
estimates should be used derived from cost data for creating collocated
operating bases in countries of similar economic development and then
using the funds to assure that bases for all six reinforcement wings
are available in each new candidate country. In considering this
recommendation one looks for evidence that the improvements already in
hand are accounted for. Take for example the Regional Air Initiative
(RAI). The RAI will have already created a new air traffic control
system in the region in the next year or so and gone a long way to
assuring mutually recognizable IFF systems. Also, preliminary reports
suggest the airbases are not so bad as some supposed. Other
recommendations may not be appropriate. For example, the insistence
that hardened shelters for aircraft ``are a must'' is surely open to
question.
Most questionable, however, is the assertion--based on CATO's own
notion of what an Article 5 contingency would be and how to meet it--
that facilities must be prepared in all three countries to receive all
six reinforcement wings. It is hard to see where the Czech Republic
would put them and why it is not acceptable to distribute them among
Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic when defending Poland. But these
are smaller points. The main point is that one looks in vain for the
military logic (other than being close to the front so aircraft ``can
drop more weapons in less time using less fuel'') and requirements
about threat characteristics, axes and rates of advance, range of
adversary air and missile threats, rotational schedules for allied
aircraft, etc., went into CATO's decision that the ``necessary
measures'' it says are needed for a cost of $4.3 billion, or at least
$1 billion more than OSD estimated.
CATO's Article 5 assumptions are also at the root of its
differences with OSD on ground reception facilities in new member
countries. Rather than prepare facilities sufficient for a phased
deployment of reinforcing units, CATO asserts that facilities for all
four reinforcing divisions are needed in each country. Otherwise,
bottlenecks would be created allowing an enemy--who and how they might
do so unsaid--to destroy incoming forces ``sequentially before they
could mass for an attack.'' The role of air power (and the additional
PAC-2 units CATO would purchase) in defending the facilities and
conducting offensive operations to disrupt and prevent such attacks,
the availability of aircraft to transport forces, the locus of a
battle, NATO campaign plans, etc., are all elements of analysis that
would help the reader to agree with CATO's preference for moving all
four divisions simultaneously to any country and to accept the
additional $1 billion cost.
CATO turns next to improvements to allied forces needed to make
them more capable of projecting forces to the east. They accept OSD
``level of effort'' estimate for ground forces, but reject them for the
air forces. It adds $2-3 billion in cost to provide mobility logistics
to allied air forces--with no evidence provided either of allied
estimates of equipment needed or how CATO arrived at its estimates.
The need to enhance US capabilities does not go without comment,
with an additional $400 million cited as needed to buy tank
transporters.
The last category of interest reviewed is systems for storage and
transport of fuel and ammunition. Here CATO criticizes OSD--fairly it
would seem--for not being more realistic in planning for the needs of
arriving allied forces. But the final estimate of $5 billion is driven
by the same 30 day war requirement as used earlier. If this is the
proper number, then evidence should be offered for it. Otherwise, we
have only CATO's preference.
Looking for Bottom Lines
The CATO analysis presents itself as a detailed cost analysis of
NATO enlargement. A closer looks leaves the reader uncertain on two
points: the source and veracity of the costs it purports to add up and
whether those costs are properly assigned to enlargement.
With respect to the costs themselves, the reader is rarely
presented with the cost analysis on which CATO's alternative estimate
is based. To take the last category, for example, the reader does not
know what mix of weapons CATO would stockpile and against what
requirement, by weapon type, drove the mix and the total. Nor is the
reader given a justification for the 30 day stockpile requirement
beyond CATO's own assumptions about Article 5 threats and operations.
To criticize OSD for over-reliance on commercial sources of fuel may be
reasonable; but that does not validate the conclusion.
The discussion of upgraded airfields again shows a lack of
thoughtfulness on CATO's part. The idea that all three new members need
bases for all of the reinforcing air wings seems false on its face, at
least as it applies to the Czech Republic. And, while it is true that
the presence of Slovakia between Hungary and Poland could render
assistance from one to the other difficult, the reader is curious to
know what contingency would require all four reinforcement wings and in
the context of which Slovakia's status would not be clarified? None
that CATO suggests would seem to require each new member to have a full
complement of air wings on its territory.
There are two categories of cost to which this critique of CATO's
costing does not apply: air defense and aircraft modernization. But in
each case the alternative CATO cost is derived not from a close
analysis of military requirements, but broad--dare one say ``level-of-
effort''--analyses. In the case of air defense the I-HAWK is declared
obsolescent and PATRIOT PAC-2 the preferred alternative. No effort is
made to examine I-HAWK's BMDO-sponsored upgrades nor the real value of
PAC-2, which by 2009 will be inferior to the PAC-3 model. No effort is
to made to evaluate the impact of offensive counter-air operations or
strategic warning in moving allies' PAC-2 systems forward and the need
to do so against the technically inferior (vis a vis NATO as a whole)
air and missile threats that would be present in the contingencies that
CATO postulates.
The discussion of aircraft modernization strikes the reader as a
reasonable concern. But even here the estimate of cost--$10 billion
more than postulated by OSD--is hard to understand. First, it is mixed
in with the purchase of anti-tank missiles, which does not help.
Second, fly-away and life cycle costs are not separated or identified.
Third, type of aircraft, the character of the modernization, etc., are
not detailed. But even assuming all of these can be reasonably
accounted for, we come to the issue with which this review of cost
estimates began--what fraction of cost is to be charged to
``enlargement'' and what to ``national'' costs. CATO has decided to
charge all of the aircraft modernization to NATO enlargement. This
would seem mistaken if no other reason than that the aircraft CATO
rightly points out need to be replaced would need replacing without
NATO enlargement.
Coming to Grips
CATO's analysis does not deliver on its promise. It charges OSD
with ``level-of-effort'' and ``macro'' analyses and promises to deliver
``rigorous and reasonably accurate'' estimate based on actual costs.
The reader is left to trust the authors with respect to the accuracy of
their estimates; no sources are offered. It is the rigor of the
analysis, however, that is hard to credit. The much higher costs
postulated by CATO derive from its own belief about the military
requirements to dampen the flashpoints it identifies--Hungary in
conflict with Serbia; Poland affected by Belarus or by Kaliningrad.
While one can agree that all three may be flashpoints, it is not
obvious that they are the source of ``regional conflagration''
approaching WW I standards that CATO implies. But even if we accept
that they can be dangerous and vexing, it is not obvious that the force
structure or posture that CATO recommends is necessary to meet these
contingencies. If CATO is to be persuasive in its recommendations, the
reader is going to need a discussion of adversary force capabilities,
NATO force capabilities, NATO strategy and operational plans, etc.
CATO is obliged to provide this information as part of its analysis
for one compelling reason: of the additional $35 billion it estimates
NATO enlargement will cost, nearly $34 B--for C3I, air defense, air
force upgrades, port, road, rail facilities, exercise facilities,
stockpiles of weapons and fuel, airfield upgrades and reception
facilities--is directly attributable to CATO's unstated assumptions
about threat, force capabilities, strategy and plans. The CATO report
carries over many of the same assumptions that marred the original CBO
report, undoubtedly because the two have the same author. In addition
to these assumptions, all of it is attributed solely to NATO
enlargement; none of the additional cost is seen as being home by
national budgets for national purposes. This does not seem, on its
face, to be a common sense allocation of cost. So large an increase in
estimated cost and so stringent an assumption about who pays has to be
explained and justified. CATO does neither. That there is room for
improvement in OSD's $27-35 B estimate is undoubtedly true; that those
improvements will result in the doubling of costs as asserted by CATO
remains to be proven.
It is equally true that OSD did not provide adversary force
capabilities, NATO force capabilities, NATO strategy and operational
plans, etc. But the burden of proof in this case is on CATO. It is CATO
that imposes military requirements drawn from its own analyses. It is
CATO that has based its additional costs on those requirements. It is
CATO that declared categorically that OSD's costs are ``not a valid
estimate based on the military requirement of expansion.'' On balance,
however, CATO does not measure up to the standard it has set for itself
and its readers. Until CATO can justify the more stressing technical
threat environment it implies, and then actually puts military
requirements on the table, presents an evaluation of existing and
planned allied capability and those of potential adversaries, and
provides the detailed costs for developing the capabilities they assert
as necessary for the defense of NATO, its charge against OSD rings
hollow. One is left to wonder if CATO is not guilty of the charge it
levels at OSD--that its interest in NATO enlargement (in CATO's case
its long-standing opposition to NATO and its enlargement) of the
alliance has colored its judgment.
Appendix 5
Hearing of October 30, 1997
October 29, 1997
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Members, Committee on Foreign Relations
THROUGH:
James W. Nance and Edwin K. Hall
FROM:
Steve Biegun, Beth Wilson, and Mike Haltzel
SUBJECT:
Hearings on NATO-Russia Relations
On Thursday, October 30, 1997, at 9:30 a.m. and at 2:00 p.m., the
Committee on Foreign Relations will hold a two-part hearing on the
NATO-Russia relationship.
Senator Helms will preside in the morning session and Senator Hagel
in the afternoon.
Overview
The Foreign Relations Committee has scheduled a series of six
hearings this fall to examine all elements of NATO enlargement. (One or
two additional hearings will be scheduled early next year after the
treaty is formally transmitted to the Senate). Previous hearings have
examined the strategic rationale for NATO enlargement; the pros and
cons of NATO enlargement; and the cost, burdensharing, benefits and
military implications of NATO enlargement. Thursday's hearings will
examine the NATO-Russia relationship, and next week the Committee will
hold a final hearing to solicit public views on NATO enlargement.
This memo, prepared with the assistance of the Congressional
Research Service, provides an overview of the evolving NATO- Russia
relationship.
The Origins of NATO Strategy Toward the Soviet Union
In 1949, after such events as the Soviet blockade of Berlin, a
Soviet-backed coup in Czechoslovakia, and Soviet support for Greek
Communists in the Greek civil war, NATO was formed to provide for the
collective defense of Western European democracies against the Soviet
Union. However, the North Atlantic Treaty, under which NATO was
created, makes no specific reference to the Soviet Union. Article 5 of
the Treaty states only that if an ``armed attack'' is made against a
party to the Treaty, each of the other parties will take ``such action
as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force to restore and
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.''
Throughout the Cold War, the United States deployed significant
conventional forces in Europe to back up its commitment to defend
Western Europe from the Soviet threat. However, the Soviet Union had
even more conventional forces in Europe, and U.S. nuclear superiority
remained the linchpin of NATO's deterrent. The growth of Soviet nuclear
capabilities in the 1950s and 1960s led the alliance to adopt the
doctrine of ``flexible response'' under which NATO would respond to a
Soviet conventional attack: first with conventional weapons and, if
necessary, with tactical and theater nuclear weapons and, ultimately,
with the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal. Acknowledging the beginnings
of detente, NATO adopted the ``Harmel doctrine'' in 1967, which called
for a dual-track policy of continued commitment to collective defense,
while working to ease tensions with the Soviet Union.
NATO-Russian Relations after the Cold War
The collapse of Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in
1989-1990, and of the Soviet Union in 1991, led NATO to revise its
fundamental strategic concept to de-emphasize the Soviet threat. NATO
forces and the U.S. military presence in Europe were dramatically
reduced and restructured. While collective defense remains NATO's core
function, NATO has agreed to take on new roles, such as crisis
management and peacekeeping. NATO also engaged in efforts to promote
cooperation and partnership with the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union. The North Atlantic Cooperation
Council (NACC) was set up in December 1991 to provide a forum for
consultation and cooperation on a wide range of political and security-
related issues among member states of the Conference (later
Organization) for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Russia joined the
NACC after the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of
December 1991.
In January 1994, NATO set up the Partnership for Peace (PfP)
program. The program was designed to build on the efforts of the NACC
to establish partnerships between NATO and NACC countries. Russian
officials initially hailed the PfP concept, mainly because they viewed
it as an alternative to NATO enlargement. However, Russia put off
joining the PfP program until June 1994, partly in anger over NATO air
strikes in Bosnia and partly because some in Russia felt PfP did not
sufficiently single Russia out as a ``great power.'' The signature of
Russia's Individual Partnership Program, which sets out specific
cooperation projects, was delayed until May 1995, due to Russia's
objections to NATO's enlargement plans. NATO-Russian relations finally
entered a new stage of semi-cooperation in December 1995, when Russia
agreed that its troops would serve under U.S. command as part of a
NATO-led Bosnia implementation force. Russia participates in the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council (which has replaced the NACC) and has
indicated that it will participate more fully in the enhanced PfP
program.
Russian Attitudes Toward NATO and NATO Enlargement
At the end of an August 1993 visit to Warsaw, President Yeltsin
signed a joint declaration with President Lech Walesa which said that
Poland's desire to join NATO did ``not run counter to the interests of
any state, including Russia.'' Soon afterwards, Russian officials
backtracked on this statement saying that although Poland as a
sovereign country had a right to join NATO, Russia was concerned that
NATO enlargement would isolate Russia.
In September 1993, Yeltsin sent a letter to the leaders of the
United States, France, Britain and Germany that reportedly stressed
that any enlargement of NATO must take into consideration Russian
security concerns. The Russia-NATO relationship was subsequently
strained for three years by strident Russian opposition to NATO
enlargement. The tone of the hardening Russian line was set at a time
when President Yeltsin dismissed most reformers from his government and
relied increasingly on hardline officials to shape Russian foreign
policy. In conjunction with this hardline shift were the Russian
refusal to observe elements of the CFE Treaty, Russian political
defense of the Bosnian Serbs against NATO efforts to end the war in
Bosnia, the brutal Russian invasion of Chechnya with tens of thousands
of civilian casualties, and Russian backed efforts to undermine the
sovereignty of neighboring states that once constituted the Soviet
Union.
Since the shift in 1993, most Russian political leaders have been
opposed to NATO enlargement. This anti-enlargement consensus permeates
all government institutions, from President Yeltsin's staff to the
foreign and defense ministries, to virtually all factions of the
Russian parliament. Only a handful of democrats, such as former Foreign
Minister Andrei Kozyrev, criticizes the anti-NATO enlargement consensus
that has developed in Russia. (The leaders of most countries formerly
in the Soviet Union openly support NATO enlargement, including Ukraine,
Georgia, Azerbaijan, as well as the non-Soviet states Lithuania, Latvia
and Estonia.)
Opinion polls have shown that many ordinary Russians instinctively
oppose NATO enlargement, but that the importance of the issue pales in
significance when compared to the very real challenges of their own
economic situations. For example, in an April 1997 USIA poll, 69% said
that they had heard or read ``not very much'' or ``nothing at all''
about NATO. (This despite a steady drumbeat of official criticism of
enlargement in the Russian media). Of the minority who claimed to be
fairly well- informed about NATO, 62% expressed opposition to
enlargement, 18% supported enlargement and 20% were unsure.
Most Russian leaders, with their views shaped largely by Soviet-era
propaganda, see NATO as a Cold War anachronism whose purpose is to
defend against a competing bloc (the Warsaw Pact) that no longer
exists. Many are skeptical that NATO can be reformed to take on new
functions more relevant to the demands of post-Cold War Europe (such as
peacekeeping and resolution of ethnic conflicts), let alone serve as
the centerpiece of European security. Most will admit that an expanded
NATO is not a military threat to Russia, although those that do think
so--especially some communists and extreme nationalists--make wild
statements about NATO's aggressive intentions without any challenge by
Russian officials who know better. NATO can do very little to assuage
such baseless, nationalistic concerns aside from the continued
dissemination of accurate information about the defensive nature of the
alliance and the stabilizing benefit of enlargement (NATO will operate
an information office in Moscow for this purpose), and a willingness to
invite Russia to participate in a dialogue with NATO.
The broadest concern among the Russian elite is that Russia will be
isolated by NATO enlargement and that key questions of European
security will be decided without its participation. Some observers
believe that NATO enlargement will give a political boost to anti-
Western forces in Russia, because the views of most ordinary Russians
of NATO remain colored by over 40 years of anti-NATO Soviet propaganda.
Some Russian leaders have claimed that NATO's commitment to enlarge
the alliance is a betrayal of an oral commitment by the United States
during German unification talks in 1990 that NATO would not expand to
the east of Germany. Those present at the talks in Germany, including
then-Secretary of State James Baker, then-Soviet Foreign Minister
Eduard Shevardnadze, and German government officials, deny that such a
commitment was ever given, although former U.S. Ambassador to Soviet
Union Russia Jack Matlock has said the United States did give Russia
such an assurance.
Although a few pro-Western Russian, non-governmental analysts have
advocated Russian NATO membership as a way of easing possible Russian
isolation, Russian government officials and most Russian analysts
sharply reject such an idea. They would be reluctant to tie themselves
into an alliance which puts Russian forces under U.S. command in NATO,
and they believe such a move would ease the way for NATO to admit an
avalanche of new members, including the Baltic States and Ukraine.
NATO-Russia Founding Act
The failure of Russian efforts from 1994 to 1996 to stop
enlargement by expressing unyielding opposition and threatening
countermeasures led Russian officials to alter their tactics. While
still opposing enlargement, Russia began to seek concessions from NATO
to ameliorate the potentially negative impact that it believed
enlargement would cause to Russian interests. In March 1996, Russian
Foreign Minister Yevgenii Primakov asked for legally-binding guarantees
that no nuclear weapons, foreign forces, or any NATO military
infrastructure would be moved onto the territory of new members.
NATO has resisted any permanent constraints on the military
capabilities that would lead new members in Central and Eastern Europe
to be less secure than other members of the alliance (``second class
membership''). Nonetheless, NATO formally declared on March 14, 1997,
that ``in the current and foreseeable security environment the alliance
will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring
the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for
reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of
substantial combat forces.'' In specific regard to the deployment of
nuclear weapons, NATO stated on December 10, 1996 that its members have
``no intention, no plan, and no reason'' to deploy nuclear weapons in
new member states.
In September 1996, in order to bridge differences with Russia on
NATO enlargement, Secretary of State Warren Christopher endorsed the
concept of a negotiated agreement to create the foundation for
cooperation between an enlarged NATO and Russia. NATO approved the idea
in December 1996, and NATO-Russia talks on the proposed document began
in January 1997. At the Helsinki summit between Presidents Clinton and
Yeltsin on March 20-21, 1997, President Yeltsin reiterated Russia's
opposition to enlargement, but dropped Russia's demand for a legally-
binding treaty, settling for a political document signed by the heads
of state of the NATO countries and Russia.
NATO and Russia formalized consultative procedures in a document
called the ``Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security
between NATO and the Russian Federation'', which was signed by
President Yeltsin, President Clinton and the leaders of other NATO
member states in Paris on May 27, 1997. The Founding Act established a
``NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council'' (PJC) to ``provide a mechanism
for consultations, coordination, and to the maximum extent possible,
where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to
security issues of common concern.''
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary
of State Albright said that the PJC is a ``forum for consultation,
cooperation, and--where possible--joint action. It will not have the
power to dilute, delay, or block NATO decisions, nor will it supplant
NATO's North Atlantic Council.'' The document says consultations will
not extend to internal matters of either NATO, NATO member States or
Russia. It adds that the Founding Act does not ``provide NATO or
Russia, in any way, with a right of veto over the actions of the
other...''. The Permanent Joint Council will meet at the level of
foreign ministers and defense ministers twice a year and at the level
of ambassadors monthly. The Council will be chaired jointly by
representatives of Russia, NATO and a rotating representative of NATO
member governments. Council working groups and committees may be set up
to deal with specific issues.
The Founding Act outlines many areas for possible NATO-Russia
cooperation. These include conflict prevention; peacekeeping
operations; Russian participation in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council and the Partnership for Peace; exchange of information on
strategy, defense policy, military doctrine and military budgets; arms
control; nuclear safety; non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction; ``possible cooperation in Theater Missile Defense''; air
traffic safety; ``possible armaments-related cooperation''; defense
conversion; civil emergency preparedness and disaster relief; terrorism
and drug trafficking; and other areas.
A particularly important section of the Founding Act deals with
nuclear weapons and conventional weapons deployments in new NATO member
states. The Founding Act says that NATO member states ``reiterate that
they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons
on the territory of new members...and do not foresee any future need to
do so.'' The document adds that NATO ``has no intention, no plan and no
reason to establish nuclear weapon storage sites on the territory'' of
new members or to refurbish old Soviet ones left over from the Warsaw
Pact.
On the issue of conventional forces, the Act calls for the
adaptation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, including
``a significant lowering'' of treaty limited equipment levels for all
parties to the Treaty. The Act says that CFE adaptation should also
``enhance military transparency by extended information exchange and
verification...'' The Act also says that ``NATO reiterates that in the
current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry
out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary
interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather
than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.
Accordingly it will have to rely on adequate infrastructure
commensurate with the above tasks. In this context, reinforcement may
take place, when necessary, in defense against a threat of
aggression...'', peacekeeping missions, or military exercises. Russia
pledged to engage in similar restraint in the deployment of its armed
forces.
The Permanent Joint Council
The first meeting of the Permanent Joint Council was delayed by
procedural disputes over who should chair Council meetings. After a
compromise was reached under which the Russian representative, the NATO
Secretary General and a representative of a NATO member state will
rotate chairing individual agenda items during each meeting, the first
meeting of the Permanent Joint Council took place on July 18, 1997. A
second meeting on September 11 focused on Bosnia. In a performance that
dashed the hopes of those who hoped that the PJC would usher in an era
of NATO-Russia cooperation, the Russian ambassador to NATO, Vitaly
Churkin, used the meeting to criticize NATO for putting pressure on
hard-line Bosnian Serbs and allegedly exceeding the mandate of the
NATO-led peacekeeping force.
The Council held its first ministerial-level meeting in New York on
September 26, 1997. Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, Secretary of
State Albright, and the other NATO foreign ministers discussed the
situation in Bosnia, the PJC work program for the rest of 1997, and had
an exchange of views on the issue of peacekeeping. The work program
will include discussions on proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, terrorism, defense and military cooperation and
transparency on military strategy and doctrine. Practical cooperation
activities will include civil emergency planning, scientific and
environmental projects and retraining of retired military officers.
Secretary of State Albright praised the results of the meeting, and
urged that by the end of the year a Russian military representative to
NATO be established, as well as liaison missions between Russian and
NATO military commands, and that NATO should open an information center
in Moscow. On October 20, Russia named Lieutenant-General Viktor
Zavarzin as Russia's military representative to NATO.
Implementation of the Founding Act may ease Russia-NATO tensions
over enlargement in the short term, but there are several potential
problems that could impair the effectiveness of the Founding Act in the
longer term. One is that Russian officials now appear to be trying to
draw another line against further enlargement to the east. President
Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Primakov have warned that if the Baltic
states, or any states of the former Soviet Union are invited to join
NATO, Russia would re-evaluate its policy of cooperation with the
alliance. NATO has refused to rule out membership for these or other
European countries.
A second potential problem is differing views over the nature of
the new Russia-NATO relationship as outlined in the Founding Act. In
the short term, the Founding Act may be useful to Russian leaders
because it gives them political cover for having been unable to stop
NATO enlargement. Nonetheless, U.S. and NATO officials have repeatedly
stressed that Russia will have no veto power over NATO decisions, a
position that has been publicly contradicted by some Russian government
officials.
Adaptation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
The Founding Act calls for adapting the CFE Treaty to the new
situation in Europe, including ``a significant lowering'' of treaty
limited equipment (TLE) levels for all parties to the Treaty. The Act
also calls for enhanced information exchange and verification
provisions in the adapted Treaty.
CFE adaption talks got under way in Vienna in January 1997. In
February 1997, NATO put forward its adaptation proposal. NATO proposed
that the outmoded bloc-to-bloc and zonal limits in the Treaty be
replaced by national limits for each country's forces, as well as
territorial limits that would include national TLE, plus TLE deployed
by foreign forces on that country's soil. NATO proposed the
establishment of a new stabilizing zone, which would include Poland,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Russia's Kaliningrad region,
Belarus and western Ukraine.
In this stabilizing zone, territorial limits would be set no higher
than the current entitlement levels for these countries or areas. This
means that if foreign forces were stationed on the territories of these
countries, they would have to reduce their own forces to remain under
the territorial limit. Additional information would be exchanged on the
stationing of foreign troops in the zone and on foreign troops
temporarily deployed there for military exercises. There would also be
special inspection quotas for certain sites in the zone.
In a March 1997 Russian CFE adaptation proposal, Moscow agreed to
move to national limits, but also sought limits that would have
prevented NATO from stationing any foreign TLE on the territory of new
member states. Russia also proposed overall TLE limits for alliances
(i.e. NATO).
On July 23, 1997, the United States, Russia and the other 28
signatories to the Treaty reached agreement on ``basic elements'' for
CFE Treaty adaption. These elements included an acknowledgment that the
bloc-to-bloc structure of the Treaty should be replaced by individual
TLE limits for each country's forces, and that these country limits
should not exceed current country allocations. Another element was that
each country would also have a territorial ceiling that would include
both its own national limits plus foreign troops stationed on its soil.
Although the ``Basic Elements Document'' represents significant
progress, difficult negotiations on the details lie ahead. Many
observers are nevertheless optimistic about a successful outcome to the
talks, given that NATO proposals do not significantly constrain
Russia's already weak conventional forces, while the proposals could
assuage Russian fears of an aggressive NATO buildup in Central Europe.
Competing Views on NATO-Russia Relations
The Clinton Administration hailed the Founding Act as a step toward
a Russia-NATO partnership. On July 3, 1997, President Clinton said that
the Founding Act ``would make it crystal-clear that NATO is no longer
an organization designed to contain Russia; NATO is an organization
designed to work with all free countries to respect the territorial
integrity of its members, to protect the security of its members, and
to work with its members and their allies--Russia, soon to be Ukraine,
and those in the Partnership for Peace--on common security problems
like the problem in Bosnia.'' President Clinton has also said that the
new consultative ties with Russia will give Moscow ``a voice, but not a
veto'' in NATO decisions.
Other Administration officials have stressed that the Founding Act
does not alter NATO's core mission of collective defense. They say the
Founding Act is an attempt by NATO to engage Russia in a cooperative
relationship but that NATO will still provide insurance in case of
negative developments in Russia.
Administration officials stress that the Act merely restates
current NATO policy on the deployment of foreign forces on the
territory of new members, the adaptation of the CFE Treaty to new
realities in Europe, and on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons on
the territory of new member states. They assert that the Founding Act
in no way limits the rights and responsibilities of the new member
states and that the door to NATO membership remains open for the Baltic
States and other countries not invited in this round of enlargement.
During an October 7, 1997 Senate Foreign Relations Committee
hearing, Secretary of State Albright stressed that NATO will not
negotiate with Moscow in the PJC over NATO's strategic doctrine,
strategy, readiness or any other NATO internal matter. She said all
NATO polices will be established by consensus within the alliance
before any discussions with Russia in the PJC. She added that, since
the agenda for the PJC is set by consensus, the United States will
always be able to prevent the PJC from discussing any issue that it
does not want to discuss for any reason.
Several NATO allies, particularly Germany, France, and Italy, were
initially concerned that enlargement would jeopardize improved
relations with Russia and inspire a nationalist backlash injurious to
Western interests. In this view, an angry Russia would cause
instability and tension in Central Europe. NATO endorsed the Founding
Act to avoid such a development. In fact, the Founding Act had its
origins in a French idea for a Russia-NATO charter. European officials
have stressed (perhaps as much if not more than U.S. officials) the
need to engage Russia in a cooperative relationship while moving
forward with enlargement.
Proponents of the Founding Act see this measure as a definitive
symbol of NATO's desire to work with, not against Russia. It addresses
a widely held view--including among potential members of NATO in
Central Europe--that isolating Russia would undermine European
security. It establishes a forum for Russia to have a voice in European
security, and it has allowed Russian leaders who have employed heated
rhetoric against NATO enlargement to save face as NATO proceeds toward
that goal.
Critics of the Founding Act contend that it will allow Russia to
obstruct NATO decision making. They point out that because difficult
decisions at NATO are not made by casting votes or using vetoes, but
rather through a careful process of building consensus, the ``voice but
not a veto'' construct actually gives the Russian government equal
footing with members of the alliance on virtually any subject
considered in the Permanent Joint Council.
On a separate matter, critics contend that the PJC provides Russia
with an official status inside NATO in advance of the Central and
Eastern European states seeking membership. Furthermore, Russia's
status has been achieved through a political agreement among NATO
members, while Central European states are required to gain the
approval of member states through ratification.
Finally, skeptics assert that while a NATO-Russia dialogue has some
appeal in the abstract, when held up against the concrete, contemporary
challenges of European security, the ability to reach a common approach
between NATO and Russia on issues such as Bosnia will be problematic if
not impossible.
In a June 8, 1997 op-ed article in the Washington Post, Henry
Kissinger said he was ``gravely concerned'' that the Founding Act will
dilute NATO into a ``U.N.-style system of collective security'' by
``grafting an elaborate and convoluted machinery for consultations with
Russia at every level of the alliance.'' Kissinger conceded that the
Founding Act gives Russia no formal veto over NATO decisions, since if
the Permanent Joint Council is deadlocked on an issue, the North
Atlantic Council (NATO's chief policymaking body), in which Russia does
not sit, could still act.
Finally, Kissinger warned that the NAC and the Permanent Joint
Council will tend to merge in practice, because countries will hesitate
to meet without Russia for fear of damaging ties with Moscow. Kissinger
urged the Senate in giving its advice and consent to enlargement to
make clear that nothing should detract from the NAC as NATO's chief
policymaking body. He added that Congress should adopt a joint
resolution calling for the countries invited to become new NATO members
to be admitted to the Permanent Joint Council while the ratification
process is underway.
Appendix 6
Hearing of November 5, 1997
October 21, 1997
The Hon. Jesse Helms
Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate
Dear Mr. Chairman,
We, the Ambassadors of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to
the US, warmly welcome the initiative of the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate to hold a series of hearings on the enlargement
of NATO.
We view the enlargement of the Alliance as a historic step that
will extend the zone of stability and security eastward. This is a
unique opportunity for our countries to rejoin the community of
democratic nations with whom we share the same values, interests and
goals. We are convinced that our accession to the Alliance will
contribute to further projecting stability, freedom and democracy in
our region.
As our Foreign Ministers jointly pledged at their meeting with you
and your fellow Senators on Capitol Hill in September, the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland intend to become full-fledged members of
the Alliance and are ready and able to assume all obligations, tasks
and responsibilities, as well as costs resulting from membership. Our
countries not only want to enjoy the benefits of security guarantees
provided by the Alliance but are also willing and able to contribute to
common security. We have all embarked on a comprehensive reform of the
armed forces with the ultimate objective of achieving the required
level of compatibility and interoperability. This will enhance our
capabilities to fully participate in all Alliance missions. To this
end, our countries have shown firm determination to allocate the
necessary financial and other resources to both individual and
collective defense.
As prospective members of the North Atlantic Alliance, our
countries are equally committed to good faith efforts to build
consensus on all issues, and in general to strengthen the cohesion of
the Alliance.
Mr. Chairman,
We, the Ambassadors of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
firmly believe that under your able leadership the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the US Senate will play an instrumental role in bringing
the historic process of NATO enlargement to a successful outcome.
Alexandr Vondra,
Ambassador,
Czech Republic.
Gyorgy Banlaki,
Ambassador,
Republic of Hungary.
Jerzy Kozminski,
Ambassador,
Republic of Poland.
__________
Supplemental material submitted by Paula Stern, U.S. Committee to
Expand NATO, Washington, DC
NATO ENLARGEMENT
Security, Prosperity & Freedom
NATO enlargement has been called ``the most far reaching U.S.
foreign policy initiative since the end of the Cold War'' for good
reason. It represents an historic opportunity to expand security,
peace, prosperity and freedom across Europe in a way that increases
American security, expands American prosperity, and reinforces American
freedom.
Nearly 50 years ago, twelve nations came together with a commitment
stated clearly in the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty, to
``safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their
peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, Robert B. Zoellick
individual liberty, and the rule of law.'' Those twelve nations grew to
16 and today, NATO enlargement offers this commitment and its promise
of security, prosperity and freedom to the nations of Central and
Eastern Europe.
NATO membership remains the best guarantee of European peace. NATO
no longer draws its strength from a common enemy but from a shared
vision of a secure, prosperous and peaceful future. It is a military
alliance, but it is and always has been much more, as Vaclav Havel,
President of the Czech Republic, wrote in the New York Times (May 13,
1997): ``It must see itself as a guarantor of Euro-American
civilization and thus as a pillar of global security.''
Security
NATO is a military alliance offering a collective defense against
military threats. There is a continuing need for this most effective
military alliance in history. The threats to U.S. security are as real
as war in the former Yugoslavia, rampant terrorism, and the spread of
nuclear weapons. In 1989, we were told the Cold War was over. Two years
later, America was in the Persian Gulf with the largest deployment of
U.S. troops since 1945.
NATO enlargement will strengthen NATO's collective defense
capability by expanding the number of countries willing to work
together and defend each other for a more stable Europe.
We are already seeing the contributions that nations such as
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic can make. They were with us in
the Gulf War. Their soldiers joined NATO forces in Bosnia. Hungary even
provided military bases. They are working to expand democratic
principles and respect for human rights. They are contributing to the
security and stability of Europe.
History shows that, when uncertainty and instability prevail,
conflict follows. NATO enlargement offers increased stability and
security. And a stronger, broader alliance in NATO makes the threat of
force more compelling while making it less likely NATO will need to
actually use that force.
Prosperity
History also has shown that security and prosperity are
inseparable. American leadership brought the Marshall Plan to help
rebuild a postwar Europe. NATO, since its founding, has helped secure
the peace that made prosperity possible. Enlarging NATO can help the
new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe work toward both security
and prosperity, expanded trade, increased investment, and economic
growth.
The prospect of NATO membership already is giving rise to new
regional agreements contributing to increased, long term security in
the region. That security is essential to growing businesses and jobs
and to sustaining the practices of a market economy. Already, Central
and Eastern Europe are growing faster than much of the rest of Europe
as nations move from the economic constraints of communism toward free
markets.
Increased stability, increased security and political democracy,
and free markets will make Central and Eastern Europe an increasingly
important trading and business partner for American exporters and
investors. These nations are growing at 4 to 5 percent annually in real
terms and our exports to the region are increasing by double digit
rates. State industries are being privatized. Infrastructure is
improving. Well-educated workers are eager for jobs. Demand is
increasing from everything from computer chips to home furnishings,
creating valuable opportunities for American businesses.
NATO enlargement will help preserve the security central to bring
prosperity and growth for Europe and the United States. Half a century
ago, NATO helped bring stability, security and economic growth to
Western Europe. Today, an enlarged NATO can do the same for Central and
Eastern Europe, ensuring that the region's strong economic growth is
sustained and free market democracies are fostered.
Freedom
Twice in this century Americans have crossed an ocean and given
their lives to defend freedom. Twice in this century, Europe has been
devastated by world war and then divided by Cold War. America has
invested heavily: more than a half million lives; more than $13
trillion. We have received much in return; security, prosperity, peace.
It is time once again to invest in freedom to preserve that security,
prosperity and peace.
NATO enlargement will bring into the alliance nations that share
our values and our dreams. Their struggle against totalitarianism
offers an impressive historical example of commitment to independence
and freedom. Hungarian freedom fighters died heroically in 1956. The
Prague Ppring in 1968 offered the hope of freedom only to be crushed by
Soviet tanks. Solidarity in Poland waged a decade-long campaign for
freedom that found success in the events of 1989. Few countries on
earth have bled more for their freedom.
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe should not be punished
because history left them on the wrong side of the Cold War line
between freedom and tyranny.
__________
NATO ENLARGEMENT
Key Questions Answered
Q: With the Cold War over, hasn't NATO outlived its purpose? Shouldn't
it be disbanded instead of expanded? Why does America still
need NATO?
America still needs NATO because America still needs a Europe that
is free and democratic, safe and secure. This is not a question of
idealism or charity. It is a question of self interest. Despite all the
recent attention given to the Asian market, Europe is still a critical
economic partner to an American economy increasingly dependent on trade
and investment abroad. But more than economics are involved here. It is
the nations of Europe that most share our basic values. It is the
nations of Europe who have been our most reliable allies in meeting
challenges to our interest and advancing our common values in the
world.
For Europe to play this critical role, it must be secure from
external attack and at peace within itself. Three times in this
century--two hot wars and one cold one--America has come to the defense
of Europe whether threatened by war, racism. or Communism. History has
taught us that only if the United States stays engaged in the security
of Europe can the safety and security of the continent be assured.
NATO is the vehicle for America's continued engagement in the
security of Europe. But it is also the vehicle by which the Western
Europeans have organized their own security and have learned to put
aside the historical rivalries and conflicts among themselves. For half
a century, NATO has in this way helped to ensure the stability,
security and economic growth of Western Europe. Today, by expanding
NATO, it can do the same thing for Central and Eastern Europe, and move
us closer to the goal of an undivided Europe, democratic, free, safe
and secure.
Q: Does NATO advance the national interests of the United States? How?
Since its inception, America has stood for freedom and democracy,
human rights and the rule of law, individual initiative and market
economy. It has believed that a world in which these principles are
broadly accepted is a better world not only for the people of--other
nations, but also for the people of the United States. No peacetime
alliance in history has been as successful as NATO in advancing these
principles. It protected Western Europe as it rebuilt its war-torn
political and economic systems based on these principles. It can
provide similar reassurance to Central and Eastern Europe as they
engage in the same task after the ravages of Communism. By enhancing
our values in the world, it advances our interests.
Just the prospect of NATO membership has given Central and Eastern
Europe greater stability than at any other time in this century.
Hungary has resolved border disputes and minority issues with both
Slovakia and Romania. Poland has resolved similar issues with Ukraine
and Lithuania. Romania has followed a similar course. An expanded NATO
can contribute to a more stable and secure Europe. In this way, an
expanded NATO will reduce, not increase, the risk that future American
men and women in uniform might have to give their lives once again in a
European conflict.
Q: If we enlarge NATO, don't we risk diluting the military
effectiveness and political cohesion of the most effective
military alliance in history?
No. A judiciously-expanded NATO would gain in military
effectiveness and political cohesion. At present, several NATO members
have considerable less military capacity than Poland, and a number have
less combat power than Hungary. The new states from Central and Eastern
Europe will increase the military capacity of the Alliance. Several of
them made significant military contributions, in terms of forces,
support and bases during the Gulf War and again during the Bosnia
crisis.
Perhaps as important, however, the infusion of fresh energies and
commitment from these enthusiastically democratic states will help
revitalize NATO. These states showed their commitment to freedom
particularly during the waning days of the Cold War. They understand
from their history the cost of inadequate national defense. They are
likely to be among the more sturdy members and contribute to a
stronger, not weaker, Alliance.
Q: Even if we wanted to enlarge NATO, isn't the cost prohibitive? Who
is going to pay the bill?
The costs directly attributed to expansion are those required to
make it possible for the forces of the new members to operate with
those of the Alliance. This requires such things as adopting NATO
procedures, assuring the forces can communicate with each other, and
training with NATO forces. These costs are estimated by the Pentagon to
run about $700 million to $900 million per year, of which the U.S.
share would be $100 million to $150 million per year. The remaining
costs attributed to NATO expansion are either costs associated with
steps that current members should take whether or not NATO expands, or
costs the new members must assume to upgrade their own forces.
Some of us forget the ``ground zero'' level of many European
militaries in the early days of NATO. Germany needed to start from
scratch in building the Budeswehr, which soon became central to NATO's
defense. That was at a time of much greater peril to the peace of
Europe. By contrast, the current security situation is much less
threatening. This allows the new member states to spread over a decade
or more the costs of improving their defense forces. These costs are
much less than the costs the new members would have to incur if they
were to try to provide for their security outside of the NATO alliance.
Even if all of these costs were attributed to NATO expansion, the
total would be modest compared to the benefits. And the potential costs
of not expanding would be vastly greater. For failing to pay now the
cost of assuring the stability of Europe may require the United
States--as it has twice before in this century--to bear again the much
more painful cost of instability and conflict in Europe.
Q: What countries are we inviting to join NATO? Why?
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will almost certainly be
among the first nations invited to join an enlarged NATO. These nations
played a critical role in the fight for freedom in Europe and the fall
of Communism. They have made great progress over the last seven or
eight years in developing democratic political systems, reformed market
economies, and the rule of law. They have worked hard to prepare
themselves through the Partnership for Peace program to become members
of the Alliance and assume the responsibilities that go with it. They
have resolved outstanding territorial and ethnic disputes.
Many of America's European allies and many Americans believe that
Romania and Slovenia are also ready to join the first round of NATO
expansion. Others believe that the extraordinary sacrifices of Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania argue for early consideration. How many countries
are invited in the first round and the timing of the following
invitations is a question for NATO authorities and the governments of
the member countries. President Clinton has said that the first
countries to be invited to join NATO will not be the last. This will
reassure those not included in the first round that the door to NATO
has not been closed on them.
Q: Aren't we really buying into a lot of border disputes and ethnic
conflicts that ultimately will cost American lives? Are we
really going to send U.S. troops to defend Warsaw?
Poland and the Czech Republic have no internal ethnic conflicts.
Only Hungary has an ethnic minority outside its immediate neighbors
(largely in Romania and Slovakia). Just the possibility of NATO
membership has become a catalyst for new regional agreements designed
to resolve these and other longstanding ethnic and border tensions. For
example, the Polish Lithuanian Treaty of 1994, the Hungarian Slovakian
Treaty of 1996, the 1996 agreements between Poland and Ukraine, the
1996 treaty between Hungary and Romania, and the 1996 agreement between
the Czech Republic and Germany.
By agreeing to the entry of Poland into NATO, the United States
will be committing itself to send U.S. troops to defend Warsaw--just as
it has committed itself to send troops to defend Oslo, Athens, or
Ankara. But the commitment is designed precisely to reduce the risk to
American lives. For it is the paradox at the heart of deterrence that
by committing to defend Warsaw--and unambiguously maintaining the
military capability to do so effectively--NATO in fact reduces the risk
of the kind of crisis that might require it to make good on that
commitment.
Q: The Founding Act was negotiated to answer Russian complaints about
NATO enlargement. Haven't we simply caved in to the Russians
and, in essence, allowed the ``fox'' into the ``chicken coop''?
The Founding Act, signed May 27, 1997 in Paris, gives Russia an
important voice and an important role in European security and
stability. It recognizes that Russia has as much to gain from increased
European stability, security, and prosperity as any other country. And
it recognizes that NATO enlargement is not about excluding Russia but
instead about encouraging democratic reform across a united Europe,
including Russia. It represents an historic change in the relationship
between the United States and Russia and between Russia and NATO. It is
a change that recognizes the positive transition Russia is trying to
make to democracy and free markets.
The Founding Act does create a number of forums for consultation
between NATO and Russia. Some have argued that an obstructionist Russia
could use such forums to disrupt the Alliance and compromise its
ability to make decisions and take action to protect the interest of
its members. But the Administration has said and the Congress can
confirm that this is not what the Founding Act contemplates or what the
United States will permit to occur. Rather, the North Atlantic Council
will remain the supreme body of Alliance decision making, will not be
subordinated to any other institution or procedure, and Russia's
``voice but not a veto'' will not diminish the Alliance's right and
ability to act to defend its members and its interest as it deems
necessary.
Q: Won't an expanded NATO place Russian democrats at risk and stall
progress toward democratic reforms?
Opinion polls reveal that Russian voters care very little one way
or the other about NATO expansion. The average Russian is concerned
about securing a job in a growing economy and about safety and
security. In the long run, an expanded NATO will further the case of
Russian democrats by guaranteeing the stability of nations near
Russia's borders and by encouraging democracy and economic prosperity
in these states. To give in now to the complaints of Russian extremists
would only undermine the democratic forces. And NATO enlargement has
motivated NATO to offer Russia a new partnership that will ultimately
strengthen the democracies by strengthening Russia's ties to the West.
As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright told the Senate Armed
Services Committee (April 23, 1997), ``The people of Russia have a
chance to achieve the deepest and most genuine integration with the
West that their nation has ever enjoyed.''
Q: What are the consequences for those countries not invited to join
NATO? Isn't this destabilizing?
The first new members invited to join an enlarged NATO will be just
that--the first new members. The door will be open to others and the
prospect of inclusion in a stronger, larger NATO will continue to be a
catalyst for reform in those states. The inclusion of a first set of
new members will strengthen the security of those not included by
bringing NATO closer to their borders.
Q: What the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe really need
are more economic opportunities not military expenses. Why not
just work to enlarge the European Union?
There is a critical link between security and prosperity and no
reason to believe that the new democracies of Central and Eastern
Europe will settle for anything less than full membership in all the
Western associations. Expanding the European Union is important but
prosperity will not come without the security NATO offers. In addition,
expanding the European Union will take time as nations must make
significant changes to their regulatory and legal systems. NATO
expansion can proceed today. NATO alone can ensure a stable Europe that
is strongly connected to the United States.
__________
NATO ENLARGEMENT & MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS
The addition of new NATO members from among the Central and Eastern
European states who have proven themselves ready for membership will
strengthen the Alliance. A number of NATO's current members have less
combat power than Hungary, for example, and Poland represents a
significant military contribution to NATO. These states showed their
commitment to freedom particularly during the waning days of the Cold
War. Several of them have made significant contributions both during
the Gulf War and in the Bosnia crisis. Because of their history, they
understand firsthand the cost of inadequate national defense and are
likely to be among the more sturdy members of the alliance on hard-core
military issues. On balance they will make a net contribution both to
the military capability of the Alliance and to its political cohesion.
Adding these new members will not overextend NATO or leave it with
defense commitments that are beyond its capabilities. Although the
defense budgets and military force levels of the United States and the
rest of the NATO allies have been significantly reduced since the end
of the Cold War, this simply reflects the fact that the massive Soviet
military threat that dominated NATO military planning during that
period no longer exists. The military forces currently available to
defend NATO and those planned for the future are more than adequate to
the task of defending an expanded Alliance from current and projected
threats.
No additional army divisions, combat air wings, or naval ships
above current levels are required to defend adequately a NATO that has
prudently expanded to include appropriate Central and Eastern European
states. NATO has revised its defense strategy from one of a massive
``forward defense'' to reliance on smaller, more capable conventional
forces able to move quickly to the area of conflict or need. For this
reason, NATO has no military requirement to station permanently
substantial combat forces or nuclear weapons on the territory of the
new member states and has said so publicly.
As a consequence, the cost of NATO enlargement is modest. The costs
directly attributed to enlargement are those required to make it
possible for the forces of the new members to operate with those of the
Alliance. This requires such things as adopting NATO procedures,
assuring the forces can communicate with each other, and training with
NATO forces. These costs are estimated by the Pentagon to run about
$700 million to $900 million per year, of which the U.S. share would be
$100 million to $150 million per year. The remaining costs often
attributed to NATO expansion are either costs associated with steps
that current members should take whether or not NATO expands, or costs
the new members must assume to upgrade their own forces. But these
costs can be spread over the next decade or two and the costs to new
members are much less--than the costs that the new members would have
to incur if they were to try to provide for their security outside of
the NATO alliance.
These costs are more than outweighed by the benefits and there are
potentially even greater costs if NATO does not expand. Failing to pay
now the cost of assuring the stability of Europe may require the United
States--as it has twice before in this century--to bear again the much
more painful cost of instability and conflict in Europe.
__________
NATO ENLARGEMENT & RUSSIA
As the North Atlantic Alliance takes its historic step of
enlargement, it is simultaneously engaged in a dialogue with Russia to
ensure a cooperative relationship with Moscow in building a new Europe
that is undivided, secure, and free. This dialogue has produced a
series of mutual understandings and reassurances that should ensure,
for example, that the achievements of arms limitation that marked the
end of the Cold War will continue. This dialogue culminated the summit-
level signing, in Paris on May 27, of the NATO-Russia ``Founding Act''.
As President Clinton declared at the signing, NATO ``will work with
Russia, not against it. And by reducing the rivalry and fear, by
strengthening peace and cooperation, by facing common threats to the
security of all democracies, NATO will promote greater stability in all
of Europe, including Russia''.
NATO's enlargement cannot threaten Russia. NATO has always been a
defensive alliance, and it poses no offensive military threat. Nor does
enlargement aim at anything other than consolidating the stability and
security of a region whose instability and insecurity have propelled
all of Europe--and the world into so many cataclysms in this century.
To foreclose, once and for all, future ambiguities or power vacuums or
crises over Central and Eastern Europe is a service to wider European
and global peace. Russia is invited to be a partner in this enterprise,
in collaboration with the Atlantic Alliance.
Russia's future relations with the West will depend on the
statesmanship with which all sides approach future challenges that may
arise. Opportunities for cooperation will be many--witness Bosnia. The
future of Russia's democracy rests with Russia's people and leaders; it
will depend above all on their ability to confront their many internal
challenges, from corruption to job creation. The Russian people,
surveys indicate, are not opposed to NATO enlargement; they are focused
on domestic issues such as jobs, housing, and crime.
President Clinton has also made clear that the new Permanent Joint
Council created by the ``Founding Act'' gives Russia a voice but not a
veto in NATO's own deliberations, which take place in the North
Atlantic Council. Nor does anything in the ``Founding Act'' or any
other document diminish the Alliance's right or ability to defend its
members or its interests as it deems necessary.
As Secretary of State Madeline Albright told the Senate Armed
Services Committee on April 23, 1997: ``In this new Europe, the United
States and Western Europe have a chance to gain new allies and partners
who can and will contribute to our common security. The people of
Central Europe have a chance to see the erasure of a Cold War dividing
line that has cut them off from the European mainstream. The people of
Russia have a chance to achieve the deepest and most genuine
integration with the West that their nation has ever enjoyed.''
__________
NATO ENLARGEMENT
The Road From Madrid
July 1997
Invitations extended:
At Madrid Summit, heads of
Government of NATO
nations invite at least three
Central European nations
(Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic) to join
NATO.
July 1997 -
December 1997
Agreements negotiated:
NATO officials will negotiate
with each of the nations
invited the terms of their
admission to NATO in so-called
ascession negotiations.
December 1997
NATO Ministerial:
NATO Ministers are expected to
sign an amendment to
the NATO Treaty
1998
Legislatures ratify:
The amendment to the NATO
Treaty adding new member
nations is sent to the
legislatures of existing NATO
members for ratification.
(Other NATO members are
expected to postpone meaningful
action until the U.S.
Senate takes action. U.S.
Senate action is hoped for by
mid-1998.)
April 1999
NATO 50th Anniversary
New nations admitted for
membership
__________
NATO ENLARGEMENT
Speaking of Support
``Today, I want to state America's goal: By 1999, NATO's 50th
anniversary, and 10 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the first
group of countries we invite should be full-fledged members of NATO.''
--President Bill
Clinton, Detroit,
Michigan
October 22, 1996
``Let us begin by reaffirming that Europe's security is
indispensable to the security of the United States, and that American
leadership is absolutely indispensable to the security of Europe.''
--Bob Dole,
Philadelphia, PA
June 5, 1995
``Now the new NATO can do for Europe's east what the old NATO did
for Europe's west: vanquish old hatreds, promote integration, create a
secure environment for prosperity, and deter violence in the region
where two world wars and the Cold War began.''
--Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright, The
Economist,
February 15, 1997
``...NATO remains a force for stability, as it has been for five
decades. It keeps America anchored to Europe and Germany peacefully
anchored to its neighbors. And once you recognize NATO's value, there's
no justification for excluding those reborn democracies of Central and
Eastern Europe, which the Soviet Union forcibly cordoned off and which
now want to resume their rightful places...''
--The Washington Post,
Editorial ``A NATO-
Russia
Agreement'', May 15,
1997
__________
U.S. COMMITTEE TO EXPAND NATO
The U.S. Committee to Expand NATO was created by American citizens
committed to the admission of additional European nations to membership
in NATO as a way to strengthen democratic institutions and market
economies in these nations
The U.S. Committee seeks broad bipartisan political and public
support for NATO enlargement, ultimately expressed by U.S. Senate
ratification of the accession of new members to the NATO alliance. The
Committee believes that such a course will promote the national
security of the United States and that of its allies by enhancing
security for all Europeans and by reaffirming U.S. leadership in the
Atlantic Alliance. The Committee believes that an expanded NATO will
play a critical role in promoting a Europe that is undivided,
democratic, and free. The Committee believes that such a Europe win be
a more secure Europe and one less likely to require American men and
women in uniform to go in harm's way.
The U.S. Committee is seeking to help support U.S. lawmakers in
their consideration of this important issue and to provide substantive
assistance to U.S. Senators as they prepare for their important role in
the ratification debate.
The U.S. Committee to Expand NATO was incorporated on November 1,
1996 as a Washington, DC nonprofit corporation. It is operating under
Section 501 (c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code. It is governed by a
bipartisan Board of Directors of up to 15 persons who share a common
commitment to the national security of the United States and to the
goal of expanding NATO. Its work is supported by a board of Senior
Advisors, including political leaders, former Secretaries of State and
Defense, retired senior military officers and prominent business
leaders.
__________
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Fact Sheet
Jenne Britell
Former CEO of Homepower, Inc., advisor to various public and private
organizations and institutions active in Central Europe, and holder of
senior positions with Republic New York Corporation, Citicorp, and Dime
Bancorp. A former Trustee of the Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Association (TIAA-CREF) and the Women's Campaign Fund, currently
President and General Manager of G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc.
Sheila Burke
Former Chief of Staff to Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole and Deputy
Staff Director of the Senate Committee on Finance. Currently serves as
Executive Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University.
Landon Butler
Former Deputy Assistant to the President in the Carter Administration;
coordinated the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty and SALT II
Treaty ratification efforts and for liaison with organized labor.
Currently Vice-chairman of Poland Partners, L.P., a venture capital
fund investing in Poland and President of Landon Butler & Company.
Julie Finley (Treasurer)
Former Co-chairman of the Dole for President National Finance
Committee. Currently board member and trustee for numerous
philanthropic organizations and Chairman of the D.C. Republican
Committee.
Dave Gribbin
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs in the
Bush Administration and former Chief of Staff for Congressman Dick
Cheney and for Senator Dan Coats. Currently Vice President for
Government Relations for The Halliburton Company.
Stephen J. Hadley (Secretary)
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy
in the Bush Administration and former member of the National Security
Council staff in the Ford Administration. Currently a partner in law
firm of Shea & Gardner.
Bruce Jackson (President)
Former staff officer in the Office of Secretary of Defense (Nuclear
Forces & Arms Control Policy). Served as co-chairman of the Dole for
President National Finance Committee and on the Platform Committee of
1996 Republican National Convention. Currently Director of Strategic
Planning, Lockheed Martin Corporation.
Sally A. Painter
Former Deputy Director, Office of Business Liaison of the Commerce
Department in the Clinton Administration. A member of the Board of
Advisors of the Democratic Leadership Council. Currently Director of
Government Relations, International for Tenneco Corporation.
Paige Reffe
Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of Advance in the
Clinton Administration and former Chief of Staff to Congressman and
Senator Tim Wirth. Currently a partner in law firm of Cutler &
Stanfield.
Peter Rodman
Former Deputy Assistant to and Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs in the Reagan and Bush Administrations and former Director of
the State Department Policy Planning Staff. Currently Director of
National Security Programs at the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom.
James Rowe
Former Chief Counsel and General Counsel for several House and Senate
committees, including Chief Counsel for the House Judiciary Committee
Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice. Former Vice President,
Washington, for NBC Inc. Currently Vice President for Government,
Community and Public Affairs for Harvard University.
Paula Stern
Former Commissioner and Chair of the U.S. International Trade
Commission and Senior Legislative Assistant to Senator Gaylord Nelson.
Currently President of the Stem Group, an economic analysis and trade
advisory firm in Washington, D.C.
Gregory F. Treverton
Former Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and former
member of the National Security Council Staff in the Carter
Administration. Currently Director of the Center for International
Security and Defense Policy at RAND.
Robert Zoellick
Former Undersecretary of State and White House Deputy Chief of Staff in
the Bush Administration and former Counselor to the Secretary of the
Treasury in the Reagan Administration. Currently serving as the Vice
President for Housing and Law at Fannie Mae.
__________
Prepared Statement of the Lithuanian-American Community, Inc.
It is with a deep of sense of history and moral obligation that the
Lithuanian American Community, Inc. adds its voice in support of NATO
enlargement and urges the members of the United States Senate to vote
for the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Distinguished and renowned scholars of foreign policy have already
addressed this committee over the past few weeks concerning the
fundamental issues at stake in NATO enlargement. It may seem a harsh
judgment, but the critics of NATO enlargement seem to us to be driven
by calculations of short-term gain. However, as recent history has
demonstrated, long-lasting security and long-term development are best
achieved by clear, serious, steady and firm investments. Whatever
short-term gains in reducing defense spending the United States might
achieve by failing to enlarge NATO would be outweighed by the risks to
security created by a weak eastern half of Europe never fully
integrated into transatlantic structures.
Half a century after WW II and the creation of NATO, the western
half of Europe still relies on the United States for leadership on key
issues of security and cooperation. This was amply demonstrated by the
West Europeans failure (first within a United Nations mandate and later
among themselves) to stop, let alone resolve, the bloody conflict in
southeastern Europe which created one of the worst genocides in recent
history. American leadership was the key element in mobilizing Europe's
resources, both West and East, and without that leadership the carnage
would have continued.
We view the present debate over NATO enlargement as a debate
concerning American values and American influence. The Russian
government's attempt to block NATO enlargement is a direct challenge to
the spread of American influence and the strengthening of American
values in the eastern half of Europe. There is nothing in the
historical experience of the nations of Eastern Europe that should
relegate them to a Russian sphere of influence for time immemorial. The
colonizing armies of Russia, whether Czarist or Soviet, failed to alter
the national traditions of these countries. Western beliefs, values and
customs survived even the totalitarian repressions of Soviet
imperialism during this last half of the twentieth century. We will see
a consolidation of democratic institutions and practices in the
countries of Eastern Europe, if American influence remains in these
countries.
American interests are already established in the nations of
Eastern Europe. Now the question remains as to whether the United
States government will support the growth of those interests. Our
members who have financial, professional and personal interests in
Lithuania are deeply concerned that the Clinton Administration, at
times, has not shown enough resolve in defending American interests in
Lithuania. For instance, in a report issued October 28, 1997 by
President Yeltsin's advisory Council for Foreign and Defense Policy,
entitled, ``Russia and the Baltics'', the report states that, ``... the
United States is prepared to allow the restoration of Russian influence
in the Baltic states...'' If the United States Congress would fail to
support the enlargement of NATO in this first round, thousands of
Americans would reconsider their commitments to the area, fearing a
return of Russian influence over the long term.
There is a tendency among some critics of NATO enlargement to
romanticize the development of Russian democracy, forgetting that the
resources of the Russian state can be harnessed to advance the economic
interests of Russia which are in large part in the hands of state and
private monopolies. Russian ideas and values are not attractive to the
peoples of Eastern Europe, nor do Russian economic interests compete
effectively in a free trade environment. If NATO fails to expand, we
will soon see momentum among the economic and political forces in
Russia urging the reestablishment of Russian military bases in Eastern
Europe as a way of securing a wider field of opportunity. It is highly
questionable if American business and professional interests would stay
to compete in an area where a foreign, non-indigenous, army holds fort.
Just as Russia has economic interests, it has geostrategic
interests as a continental power with nuclear weapons. One should not
underestimate the desire of Russian military planners to regain access
to strategic assets they have lost over the last decade. In Lithuania
alone, Soviet forces, inherited by Russia, numbered over 50,000 with
thousands of battle tanks and the largest strategic bomber base in the
entire region. The recent offer by President Yeltsin to Lithuania's
government to grant unilateral security guarantees to Lithuania is but
the first salvo in a political campaign to regain access to those
strategic assets, while denying them to NATO and the United States.
Numerous critics of NATO enlargement have invoked the security
status of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia as a reason to prevent NATO
enlargement arguing that the admission of Poland into NATO will provoke
a Russian pre-emptive strike against Lithuania. Even accepting the
sincerity of the critics of NATO enlargement, this seems a curious
scenario to advance. The Lithuanians, having fully considered the
risks, have themselves applied for NATO membership and are vigorously
working to achieve NATO interoperability. Therefore, the short-term
risk is overstated.
As Americans who regularly travel to the region, we can assure the
committee that the presence of NATO forces just across the border from
Lithuania will enhance the security climate for American business and
visitors in Lithuania. As the trans-atlantic zone of stability expands
into Eastern Europe, it will enhance the security of the democracies in
the region. If the United States remains engaged in Lithuania, helping
Lithuania achieve NATO interoperability, we have every confidence that
Lithuania will qualify for the second round of NATO enlargement.
However, we need a successful first round of NATO enlargement to
begin the process. The Lithuanian-American Community, Inc. supports the
admission of Poland into NATO because we understand how deeply the
Poles are committed to the development of a democratic, peaceful and
prosperous Europe. We are pleased to give testimony to this commitment
because we remember very well the risks taken by Poles a few short
years ago to come to the assistance of Lithuania's fledgling democracy.
In January, 1991 when Lithuania's democratically-elected parliament
was threatened with imminent attack by paratroopers of the Soviet Union
and dozens of Soviet battle tanks, a delegation of eight members of the
Polish parliament crossed the heavily patrolled border to come to the
assistance of Lithuania. They reached Vilnius and stayed inside the
parliament building with Lithuania's parliament members from January
13-17 until the immediate danger of attack had passed. Unlike the
American President, these Polish parliamentarians did not question the
necessity of taking risks in the defense of liberty and democracy.
Their names will long be remembered in the annals of East European
democracy: Adam Michnik, now the editor-in-chief of Gazeta Wyborcza,
the current Marshall of the Polish parliament Alicija Grzeskowiak,
Andrzej Selinski, Krzysztof Dowgela, Jacek Kuron, Jan Litynski,
Zbigniew Janaw, Boltromiej Kolodziej, and Antoni Tokarszuk.
Much like America's revolutionaries of the 18th century, the
democratic leaders of Eastern Europe have understood the necessity of
working together to ensure the success of democracy and freedom in an
area too long dominated by the forces of dictatorship and imperialism.
The words of Benjamin Franklin at the signing of the Declaration of
Independence, ``We must all hang together or assuredly, we shall all
hang separately.'' aptly describes the relationships forged over the
last decade of struggle in the region; although the Poles might rightly
invoke their eloquent battle cry of the 19th century, ``For your
freedom and ours''. The question now faced by Americans and America's
political leaders is whether we will remember our own commitment to
democracy and liberty? Can we be reliable allies to the democrats of
Eastern Europe?
If the United States Senate fails to ratify NATO admission for
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic over the coming months, the
democracies of Eastern Europe, including Lithuania, will continue their
everyday struggle to secure their future. All of them have armies with
fine young soldiers committed to defending their homes and their loved
ones. They will continue trying to build a zone of stability where free
markets can prosper and the full talents of their people can be
developed.
Lithuania and Poland have established joint institutions at the
presidential, ministerial and parliamentary level to enhance their
bilateral cooperation and geostrategic partnership. This is a serious
effort to achieve regional cooperation which still respects the
sovereignty of the people, unlike the commonwealth model promoted by
Russia in its relations with neighboring states. There is an intensive
working relationship between Lithuania and Poland in military affairs.
Poland has been generous in providing Lithuania's armed forces with
critical equipment: armored personnel carriers, light weapons and
ammunition, as well as five MI-2 helicopters. In January, 1997 the two
countries signed an agreement to create a Joint Peacekeeping Battalion
(LITPOLBAT) which will be fully trained and equipped by December 1998.
The battalion will be based in Orzysz, Poland and the battalion will be
commanded first by a Lithuanian, followed by a Polish officer assigned
in a yearly rotation.
The countries of Eastern Europe have a long and rich history. There
has been as much cooperation as there has been conflict in the region.
Lithuania enjoys a positive relationship with both the Hungarians and
the Czechs which stretches back to the XIV and XV centuries. At the
Battle of Tannenberg in 1410, Czech forces fighting with Lithuanians
under the command of Lithuania's Grand Duke Vytautas helped crush the
Order of the Cross, the germanic knights, who had been plundering and
subjugating the nations of the region. That battle also involved Polish
forces commanded by the King of Poland, an ethnic Lithuanian. In that
same century, Lithuanian students were attending the University of
Prague which was one of the few universities in Central Europe. In the
XVI century, the Hungarian Stephen Bator was elected the King of Poland
and the Grand Duke of Lithuania. In 1579 he signed the charter
establishing the University of Vilnius which continues today as a major
center of learning in Eastern Europe.
Today the cooperation between Lithuania, Hungary and the Czech
Republic is substantive and multifaceted. Hungary was the first of the
former Warsaw bloc countries to reestablish diplomatic relations with
Lithuania. In the interwar period Czechoslovakia maintained both a
legation and a consulate in Lithuania, and today maintains an embassy
in Vilnius which serves Czech interests in the wider region. The Czech
Defense Ministry has provided Lithuania armed forces with technical
equipment for both the army and air force. Lithuanian officers are
attending the Czech military academy at Brno. Shortly, when Lithuania
and Hungary sign their negotiated agreement, Lithuania will become a
member of the Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA). Although
Lithuania currently has a sizeable trade deficit with both Hungary and
the Czech Republic, entry into the CEFTA will aid the development of
Lithuania's industrial sector and lead to a more balanced trading
relationship. During this past summer's floods, Lithuania provided
financial, material and human resources to Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic to alleviate some of the hardship inflicted by the flood
waters and to help rebuild the towns and villages.
The democracies of the eastern half of Europe are building an
integrated network of prosperous and just societies. They seek to
contribute to the solution of humanity's problems, not create new ones.
The people of those democracies know full well the costs of freedom and
are prepared to make further sacrifices so their children will live in
freedom as well. That is precisely why they have applied for NATO
membership.
In the euphoria of 1992 as the Soviet Union and its Warsaw bloc
dissolved, there was great optimism for the future of all of the
countries stretching from the Baltic to the Black Seas. Today, a number
of those states have growing dictatorships such as in Belarus and are
lost to this family of new democracies. Looking back, who can pinpoint
the exact date that Belarus was lost to us? Or was it incremental; an
accumulation of missteps and missed opportunities? Without the
successful enlargement of NATO, we risk, over time and inattention, the
loss of more of these states. We therefore, urge the members of the
United States Senate to remember our American values and to vote for
the ratification of the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic in this first round of NATO enlargement.
The Lithuanian-American Community, Inc. is a non-profit, community-
based organization providing educational, cultural, and social services
to our membership in 67 local chapters in 28 states and the District of
Columbia. Serving the interests of over one million Americans of
Lithuanian heritage, LAC, Inc. is in the forefront of supporting the
growth of democratic institutions and economic reform in Lithuania.
Prepared Statement of Mr. Armand Scala, President of the Congress of
Romanian Americans
I am the President of the Congress of Romanian Americans. Romanian
Americans, approximately 1 million people in the U.S., join with some
22 million other Americans, whose origins are in Central and Eastern
Europe, to ask you, and your other colleagues in the Senate, to
overwhelmingly ratify the expansion of NATO, beginning with an
invitation to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
Since 1949, the NATO Alliance not only helped to protect its
members from outside aggression, but brought peace and stability within
its membership. Expansion now, and further expansion in the future,
will accomplish the same end for the nations and people of Central and
Eastern Europe. This furthers the interests of the United States and
the American people.
Some say there is no longer a threat in, or to, that part of the
world. That notion is wrong. On a daily basis, some nations' leaders
threaten the principles held high by NATO member nations and directly
threaten specific NATO member nations. The current NATO members,
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other prospective NATO members
have much in common with one another. Many of the remaining of the
world's nations do not share the values and heritage which characterize
the Europeans and the Americans. As Americans, we are fearful of the
result of extreme differences in values and heritage that may threaten
the future of our democracy, freedom and economic system. A strong,
fully developed, expanded NATO, to include all of those who wish to
participate, is the greatest deterrent to threats from the outside and
within NATO as well.
NATO's continuance is the most effective means for the U.S. to
maintain influence in Europe.
The expansion of NATO in stages is an excellent method to develop
and control an effective process. It sets attainable goals and
minimizes errors. Building on favorable experiences, the next stage and
the subsequent stages of expansion will proceed smoothly.
The cost of NATO expansion is a small price to pay if one considers
how much we have spent in funding the ``cold war''. It is the ``balance
due'' in an effort to obtain security and stability in Europe. We are
talking about approximately $150 million a year as the U.S. portion of
this project, a relatively small price to pay to insure, for our
children and grandchildren, the cherished conditions of life in the
U.S. today. The cost of NATO expansion is more reasonable today than it
will be at any other time.
Historically the U.S. and its people, have withdrawn from
international responsibility. We became isolationists following both of
the World Wars and, on each occasion, we paid dearly for our non-
involvement with the lives of courageous, peace-loving Americans and
monetarily as well. We fear that failure to expand NATO, or closing
NATO down, will repeat the past with the same or similar results.
An expanded NATO will result in economic growth and stability for
its new members who currently hold the U.S. and its products in high
regard. New members have excellent market potential for the U.S. and
its members quite well. It is the perfect vehicle to continue that
function. To continue effectively however, it must expand to include
other nations with characteristics and goals consistent with ours. As
their development is facilitated, a unified, powerful alliance will
emerge, able to protect the interests and values of each individual
country and of the allies as a whole.
NATO provides the U.S. with a strategic presence in Europe. A non-
expanded NATO will wither to non-existence and our presence and
influence in Europe will diminish.
In summary, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic should be
invited to join NATO in the expansion followed, in phases, by other
European nations. Ultimately all of the nations of Europe which desire
membership should be phased in, including Russia.
__________
Prepared Statement of the U.S.-Baltic Foundation
Thank you for your support of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and for
the opportunity to express our own support for a vigorous and continued
process of the enlargement of NATO.
The U.S.-Baltic Foundation. (USBF) is a national grassroots
organization of Americans and American institutions which are dedicated
to assisting the development of market democracies in the Baltics.
Since 1990--before the Baltics regained independence--USBF's extensive
network of professional associations, corporations, universities,
foundations and individuals has designed and conducted programs that
build civil society and an understanding of American values. Our
programs have focused, on local democracy and public administration,
independent media, NGO development, ethics in government, rule of law
and anti-corruption.
This may be the first statement you consider which begins with a
reference to local self government and public administration programs
in the Baltics. The Baltic leaders that USBF's programs arc training to
manage open, democratic institutions, will be the US's partners in the
discussion and development of NATO enlargement policy. USBF's democracy
building programs are helping the Baltic people use American resources
to construct free markets and a civil society--which are fundamental
components of the enlargement process we see today. Without the basic
building blocks of a democratic society existing in Central Europe
today, we would not be able to discuss NATO enlargement and we would
not be discussing the end of U.S. foreign assistance to Central Europe,
starting with the graduation of Estonia and the Czech republic last
year.
While we see the need for continued transition assistance
throughout the region, we believe that this should become a privatized
effort, modeled on, and guided by the regional experience and
demonstrated private commitment of the members of the U.S. Baltic
Foundation's network.
In the seven years since we accepted the challenge of engaging
Americans--sometimes one at a time through academic exchanges, other
times to a broader sponsored by America's largest corporate investors
in the Baltics--USBF has grown tremendously. Today, this group which
was started by a small group of Americans with private contributions,
has offices in Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius and Washington and has launched
seven local training institutions with our Baltic partners. In 1995,
after successfully managing local democracy and independent media
programs, USBF was selected to manage the $2.6 million U.S. Agency for
International Development funded Democracy Network program which is
strengthening the NGO sectors.
The Foundation's programs have attracted many of the best and most
qualified U.S. professionals to voluntarily transfer their skills and
understanding to their Baltic counterparts. This is reflected in our
highly diverse Board of Directors, funding sources and in-kind
contributors. These programs are true U.S. partnerships with Baltic
leaders, citizens, and non-governmental organizations. We have worked
with tens of thousands of Americans throughout the United States from
North Carolina to Oregon who are experts in municipal management, media
relations, municipal finance, environmental protection, economic
development, and many other areas that challenge local leaders. Our
program is unique since it taps into the rich experiences of Americans
in their own fields of study and work, We believe this American
contribution is at the heart of any successful assistance program.
Through USBF's seven years of program management and diligent
oversight and discussions with participants in our programs, we have
reason for our Baltic optimism. The Baltic people continue to
demonstrate the courage, intelligence and competence--which they
displayed during fifty years of Soviet occupation--which make them
viable and competitive as partners to NATO. Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania each have much to contribute to our security as well. Each
country in it's own way has adopted and begun to embrace Western and
American ideas and values and each will certainly continue on this
course, which will lead eventually to greater security in the region,
if the West continues to support and encourage the right steps. USBF's
experience has given us a unique perspective on the readiness and
abilities of the peoples of the Baltic nations to contribute to Western
security.
We appreciate the opportunity to express USBF's support and hope
that your considerations of the aspirations of the Baltic nations to
join NATO begin, but not end, with this hearing, We would like to
conclude by inviting you to learn more about the people and potential
of the Baltics by viewing the upcoming nation-wide broadcast premiere
of the PBS television documentary ``One World: The Baltic States,''
narrated by Charles Osgood and produced by the award-winning public
television company Cronkite Ward/Ward TV with assistance of the U.S.-
Baltic Foundation.
Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States,
November 4, 1997.
Hon. Jesse A. Helms,
Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States
strongly supports the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) to include the countries of Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic. In the midst of the rapidly changing political
situation in Eastern Europe, NATO has remained a stable, steadying
influence in the region. These countries now seek the benefit and
security of joining the most successful defense alliance in history.
While NATO's enlargement would extend the U.S. nuclear umbrella as
well as a commitment of U.S. forces to defend these countries, we
believe that a carefully paced, non-threatening enlargement of the NATO
alliance will enhance the peace and stability in Europe. As economic
stability and growth bolster our NATO allies in Europe and as Eastern
European countries clamor for membership in NATO, we recognize that
some are concerned that enlarging NATO might cause Russia and some of
the states of the former Soviet Union to form an opposing alliance.
While we acknowledge the risk of the possible formation of a counter-
alliance, we firmly believe the political and strategic benefits that
are likely to accrue by expanding NATO and bringing security and
stability to this troubled region outweigh such risk.
There are several reasons why we believe NATO enlargement
contributes not only to the security of the United States, but that of
our allies and friends.
First, such expansion makes NATO a stronger alliance, better able
to address Europe's security challenges in the future. The addition
of,these three countries to NATO strengthens the alliance by
integrating their existing military establishments and infrastructure
with those of the current NATO members. Strengthening NATO now insures
against any threat which might arise in the future.
Second, the NATO enlargement will encourage the continued
democratic reforms and economic development in these countries by
providing a positive atmosphere for growth and a more secure
environment in the European community.
Third, this enlargement encourages both current and perspective
members to resolve their differences peacefully.
Fourth, enlarging NATO erases the artificial dividing line which
was created after the end of World War II. It provides hope and promise
for the future of those Eastern European countries which were smothered
under fifty years of communist rule.
In support of the VFW position, I have attached a copy of the
Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States Resolution Number 426
entitled ``NATO Enlargement'' for your reference. This resolution was
approved by our organization's membership (2 million members) at our
98th National Convention which was held in Salt lake City, Utah, from
August 16-21, 1997.
In order to project a peaceful image, the VFW urges consideration
be given to the adoption of a declared policy that U.S. forces and
weapons will not be stationed, based or deployed (except for training)
in the countries of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
In conclusion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States
supports the enlargement of the NATO alliance and the extension of the
United States mutual defense commitment to the countries of Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic as it is important to our national
security and the security of the European region. We urge your support
and the support of your colleagues for timely consideration.
Respectfully,
John E. Moon,
Commander-in-Chief.
Resolution No. 426
NATO ENLARGEMENT
WHEREAS, in the midst of the rapidly changing political situation in
Eastern Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has
remained a stable, steadying influence in the region; and
WHEREAS, the former Warsaw Pact countries of Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic have thrown off the yoke of communism and reestablished
democratic governments and now seek the benefit of joining the most
successful defense alliance in history; and
WHEREAS, NATO's enlargement to include these countries would extend the
U.S. nuclear umbrella as well as a commitment of U.S. forces to defend
these countries; and
WHEREAS, there are some concerns that enlarging NATO might cause Russia
and the other states of the former Soviet Union to form an opposing
alliance and place additional financial burdens on the United States;
and
WHEREAS, these concerns overlook the political and strategic benefits
that would accrue by bringing security and stability to this troubled
region and would act as an inducement for democracy for Russia and the
other countries of the former Soviet Union; now, therefore
BE IT RESOLVED, by the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States,
that we support the enlargement of the NATO Alliance and the extension
of the United States mutual defense commitment to the countries of
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as it is important to the
security of that region, our own vital interests in the region as well
as world peace; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that this enlargement be accomplished in a non-
threatening manner so as not to force other countries into an opposing
alliance and that in order to project a peaceful image we urge
consideration be given to adoption of a declared policy that U.S.
forces and weapons will not be stationed, based or deployed (except for
training) in the countries of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
Adopted by the 98th National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars
of the United States held in Salt Lake City, Utah, August 16-21, 1997.
Resolution No. 426