[Senate Hearing 105-444]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 105-444
IRAQ: CAN SADDAM BE OVERTHROWN?
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 2, 1998
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
__________
You may access this document on the Internet at: http://
www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate11.html
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
47-150 CC WASHINGTON : 1998
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
James W. Nance, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Chalabi, Ahmed, President of the Executive Council, Iraqi
National Congress, London, England............................. 3
Haass, Richard N., Ph.D., Director, Foreign Policy Studies, The
Brookings Institution.......................................... 30
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Khalilzad, Zalmay, Director, Strategy and Doctrine Program,
Project Air Force, RAND Corporation............................ 24
Prepared statement........................................... 27
Woolsey, R. James, Former Director, Central Intelligence Agency.. 20
(iii)
IRAQ: CAN SADDAM BE OVERTHROWN?
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MONDAY, MARCH 2, 1998
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m. In
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam
Brownback, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Brownback and Robb.
Senator Brownback. Let us call the hearing to order, if we
could, and have our first witness, if you would care to go
ahead, and you can sit up front, if you would like to.
I would like to welcome everyone to this very important
hearing on Iraq, and I thank our witnesses for agreeing to
testify, particularly on such short notice.
The Secretary-General's agreement with Iraq has generated a
great deal of criticism, and most of it, I think, is well-
deserved. For that, though, I do not fault Mr. Annan. Barring
his own personal responsibility for some highly inappropriate
statements about U.N. inspectors, who I believe to be real
heroes, the fact is that Mr. Annan works for the Security
Council.
The problem is truly quite simple, if also very difficult
to resolve. Despite Mr. Annan's statements that Saddam can be
trusted, the truth is that he cannot. Why? Because he does not
want to give up his weapons of mass destruction and desire for
regional domination, so unless we are prepared to keep
sanctions on Iraq forever, we must be prepared to do something
about the root cause of the problem, and that is Saddam Hussein
himself.
The question before us today is how. The United States has
in the past backed the Iraqi National Congress, an umbrella
group for many of the different factions inside Iraq. Many
critics believe that the INC no longer has the networks on the
ground or the cohesiveness to present a real challenge.
I understand we have also backed the Iraqi National Court,
a group of Iraqi ex-military men. Most of them were killed back
in 1996, but neither of these groups, nor anyone else, has
changed the bottom line Saddam Hussein is still in power.
Today, I would like our witnesses to think about the
following question: What can the United States do to ratchet up
pressure on Saddam?
Given the past failures of the opposition and the
unwillingness of U.S. officials to back them up, is it
realistic to support any opposition group? Even if the U.S.
went forward with a program to stabilize or oust Saddam, can
anyone seriously hope to dislodge him?
Our witnesses today are Mr. Ahmed Chalabi, president of the
Iraqi National Congress. We also have presenting the Hon. R.
James Woolsey, the former director of the CIA, and Dr. Zalmay
Khalilzad of the Rand Corporation.
This is a difficult hearing, but one which must be held. If
the problem is Saddam, we must see if there are alternatives to
him, and God help us all around the world here and in Iraq as
we consider these and deliberate on this topic.
We will have tough questions for the panelists. We need
tough questions to be put forward to you and very clear answers
from you as much as we possibly can, so we will look forward to
your testimony.
I am delighted that joining me today is the ranking member
of the subcommittee as well, Senator Robb from Virginia, who
has a statement to make, and we may have some other members
joining us as well as we go along, but Senator Robb, if you
have a comment.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing. It is obviously an important hearing. We
are dealing with a very sensitive and dicey subject matter, and
almost every Member of Congress has his or her own prescription
for how to resolve the current dilemma. That is one of the
difficulties.
There are clear precedents for many of the activities that
have been suggested, and there are very clear dangers to the
United States and the international community for our failure
to successfully complete any one of a number of options that
may be considered.
I would say this topic in particular deserves as much
bipartisanship as we can bring to the table. It is one where I
think that clearly our national interest is very much involved
and at stake, and it would be my hope that not only in this
hearing, obviously, but in all of our deliberations, that we
would consider the implications of whatever we may have to say
in terms of what effect it might have on those who are most
intimately involved with the decisionmaking process and the
consequences of failing to take or failing to complete actions
that may be suggested.
So again, Mr. Chairman, I acknowledge that this is an
extraordinarily important and certainly timely topic, but I
think it is important that we exercise much caution as we
proceed so that we do not provide anyone with misunderstandings
that might complicate the process for those who actually have
to make the very difficult decisions involved and in which all
of us will be asked to provide our advice and counsel at the
appropriate time.
But with that, I thank you for calling the hearing, for
chairing the hearing, and I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Senator Robb.
Mr. Chalabi, as the president of the Executive Council of
the Iraqi National Congress, will be our first witness. We are
delighted to have you here. There has been much written about
the Iraqi National Congress and what it has gone through, its
continued viability today.
I look forward to your testimony and then we will have a
number of questions for you afterwards, but welcome to the
committee. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF AHMED CHALABI, PRESIDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL,
IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS, LONDON, ENGLAND
Mr. Chalabi. Thank you very much, Senator.
I am honored to be here this afternoon to speak to your
distinguished committee. Let me start by saying that I am Ahmed
Chalabi, president of the Executive Council of the Iraqi
National Congress. I am here as an elected representative of
the Iraqi people, and in their name I am proud to speak with
you today.
I think that it is important that the appeal of the Iraqi
people for freedom be heard by the American people whom you
represent. For too long, U.S.-Iraq policy has been decided by a
small group of so-called experts who view the Iraqi people as
incapable of self-government, as a people who require a brutal
dictatorship to live and work together. Such a view is racist.
It runs counter to 7,000 years of Iraqi history and to the
universality of the principles of liberty and democracy central
to United States foreign policy.
I am here today to appeal to the larger America, the
America that believes in liberty and justice for all. I welcome
the opportunity.
Iraq is the most strategically important country in the
Middle East. It has a central geographical position, a talented
and industrious population, abundant farmland and water, and
lakes and lakes of oil. Iraq has the largest oil reserves of
any nation on Earth. Iraq has so much oil that most of the
country is still unexplored. This enormous wealth, this
enormous potential is the birthright of the Iraqi people. It
has been stolen from them by a tyrant.
You must realize that the Iraqi people are Saddam's first
victims. Saddam and his gang of thugs took absolute power in
1968. Since that time, the Iraqi people have been driven into
slavery, murdered by the hundreds of thousands, and shackled to
a rapacious war machine responsible for the deaths of millions
and, if the appeasement recently negotiated by the United
Nations Secretary-General, now being debated in the United
Nations Security Council, is allowed to stand, it is the Iraqi
people who will be the first to suffer another slaughter.
Kofi Annan went to Baghdad to negotiate with Saddam
Hussein. Kofi Annan is proud of the fact. Kofi Annan said that
the agreement he negotiated was different, because he
negotiated with President Saddam Hussein himself. Kofi Annan
praised Saddam as a decisive man, as a man he could do business
with, as a man whose concern was for his people.
Saddam is a mass murderer who is personally responsible for
the genocidal slaughter of at least 200,000 Iraqi Kurds,
250,000 other Iraqis, Arabs in this case, and tens of thousands
of Iraqi dissidents in the last 10 years.
Max van der Stoel, the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human
Rights in Iraq, has documented the repression of Iraq as the
gravest violation of human rights since the second world war.
I might add that the Secretary-General has ignored last
year's diplomatically inconvenient conclusions of the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights and the United Nations
General Assembly, deploring Saddam's atrocities. The Iraqi
people cannot ignore this horror. They must live with it every
minute of their lives.
I have fought Saddam from the very first days of his
terror. I have lost family members, thousands of friends and
associates, and millions of countrymen to Saddam's death
machine. I am sickened to see the Secretary-General of the
United Nations smile and joke and shake hands with this despot.
I am only comforted by the fact that the civilized world
and the American people will not stand for it. The U.S. House
of Representatives and the United States Secretary of State
have and soon, I hope, the U.S. Senate will call for Saddam's
indictment on charges of genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity. The evil of Saddam must be confronted with
the strong arm of justice, not with the limp handshake of
appeasement.
To make matters even worse, the Secretary-General also
found it expedient to criticize UNSCOM, the United Nations
Special Commission charged with disarming Saddam's nuclear,
chemical, biological, and missile programs.
Kofi Annan called Captain Scott Ritter and UNSCOM
inspectors cowboys, and implied that they should respect
Saddam's sovereignty. I know from my own sources in Baghdad
that Scott Ritter is an American hero. During the June 1996
stand-off with Saddam, while Scott Ritter was parked outside
the infamous Abu Ghrayb Prison and Presidential complex, Uday
Hussein, Saddam's son, issued orders to a band of his drunken
friends to have him assassinated.
The attack was carried out, but by the grace of God and the
dissolution of the attackers it failed. In their drunken state,
the men machine-gunned the Nissan Patrol of the Iraqi minders
rather than that of the inspectors.
Scott Ritter is no cowboy. He is a former United States
marine who fought against Saddam in the Gulf War and has been
working selflessly for the United Nations to make Saddam honor
the terms of the cease-fire ever since. Rather than attack him,
the Secretary-General would do well to honor him. He is one of
the best warriors the international community has produced in
its quest to control Saddam's weapons of mass destruction.
But perhaps the Secretary-General's craven behavior does
reflect the hard reality. Iraq will never be free of weapons of
mass destruction as long as Saddam is in power. Iraq will never
be at peace with its neighbors as long as Saddam's war machine
is in place.
United Nations diplomats treat Saddam as Iraq's legitimate
government. They cannot be expected to work for his removal
from power. That is the work of the Iraqi people; and I say to
you, in the name of the Iraqi people, Saddam is the problem. He
can never be part of any solution.
The Iraqi people do not support Saddam Hussein. They never
have, and they never will. God knows, they do not support
Saddam's insane acquisition and use of weapons of mass
destruction. The Iraqi people know full well the horror of
chemical and biological weapons. Saddam has gassed both the
Iraqi Kurds and the Iraqi Arabs, killing tens of thousands of
them. Thousands more Iraqi political prisoners have been
subjected to torture and experiments with chemical and
biological toxins.
Saddam's chemical and biological warfare industry enslaves
tens of thousands of Iraqis who are virtually unprotected from
the poisonous production. All of Iraq is threatened with
annihilation if Saddam is ever able to launch the war of Middle
Eastern domination he intends.
The Iraqi National Congress is committed to a future Iraq
without weapons of mass destruction, to a future Iraq which
renounces aggression as State policy, and to a future Iraq at
peace with all its neighbors.
The Iraqi National Congress asks your help in removing the
threat of Saddam's doomsday weapons from our people, from the
region, and from the world. Helping the Iraqi people regain
their country is the only solution. Saddam cannot be trusted.
Saddam cannot be negotiated with. Saddam has proven that he
will starve and murder every Iraqi and every person with the
misfortune to fall under his control until he has enough horror
weapons to dominate the Middle East and threaten the world. It
is time to help the Iraqi people remove Saddam from power.
The only good thing about the agreement that was negotiated
with Saddam was that it bought time and stopped a futile
bombing campaign which would have killed thousands of Iraqis.
Without the political program to accompany military action,
military action is worse than useless. It is counterproductive.
Will you bomb my country now more than you did in 1991?
Saddam does not care how many Iraqis are killed. He is
executing and starving them himself by the tens of thousands
right now. The Iraqi people do not need to be bombed for
Saddam's sins. The Iraqi people need to be supported as they
regain their country and reestablish Iraq as a productive
member of the international community.
Such an Iraqi political program, consonant with both United
States and Iraqi interests, is already in place in the Iraqi
National Congress. The Iraqi National Congress was founded in
1992, with democratic conferences of Iraqi political forces in
Vienna, Austria, and Salahuddin, Iraq.
The Salahuddin Conference of October 1992 was a defining
moment in Iraqi politics. Parties from all over the country and
all political strands came together on Iraqi soil and agreed to
a future Iraqi representative government, organized as a
parliamentary democracy. United States political support,
particularly the support of the U.S. Congress, was critical in
providing the hope of a free Iraq that was crucial in forging
this consensus.
From mid-1988 until March 1991 there was an order, issued
by the Secretary of State, that banned any member of the State
Department from even meeting the Iraqi opposition. Pressure
from Congress opened the door and led to the fruitful political
discussion and past cooperation between the U.S. Government and
the Iraqi National Congress. Cooperation can begin again,
perhaps with another meeting of the Iraqi National Assembly in
Washington, D.C. to encompass the whole opposition and to elect
a new leadership for the INC.
With United States political support and United States
military protection, the Iraqi National Congress was able to
build headquarters and bases inside Iraq, establish and program
television and radio stations, organize medical clinics, and
conduct intelligence and military operations against Saddam.
These activities were undertaken by Iraqis on Iraqi
territory, using primarily Iraqi resources. At the height of
the INC's operations, before Saddam was allowed to mass 400
Russian T-72 tanks against us, the INC directly employed nearly
7,000 Iraqis and had organized in-country networks involving
thousands more. All were, and many are still, engaged in the
fight against Saddam.
It is true that INC was hurt when Saddam's tanks were
allowed to invade Arbil, our headquarters, slaughter our
lightly armed troops, imprison and torture and execute our
computer programmers, our TV engineers, and our medical relief
staff. It is also true that the INC had open political
assurances from the highest levels of the U.S. Government that
the U.S. Government would protect the inhabitants of northern
Iraq from Saddam's repression.
On the strength of these assurances, the INC did not
acquire antitank defenses. In fact, the INC was actively
discouraged by U.S. officials from doing so. We do not, and we
hope you do not, intend to make the same mistake again.
It is important to realize that the strength of the Iraqi
National Congress, as is the case with all democratic
movements, is in the people of the country. Through INC
broadcasts and INC networks and INC diplomacy, the INC is well-
known inside Iraq and has a large but unorganized following.
I offer you an example with which you and your constituents
might be familiar. During the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, the Iraqi
Olympic flag-bearer defected to the Iraqi National Congress.
Before his defection, he had never spoken to an INC member, and
yet from INC radio he was familiar enough with the INC program
for a democratic Iraq that within hours he was speaking for the
INC on U.S. and international network television.
The INC's popular base is its greatest strength and
Saddam's greatest weakness, and it is for this reason that I am
here to ask for overt U.S. support, not covert U.S. action.
Saddam can only be removed by a popular insurgency. He is coup-
proof.
The Iraqi National Congress does not support the program
now being attributed to the United States Central Intelligence
Agency to use mercenary agents to conduct sabotage against the
Iraqi people's infrastructure. The Iraqi National Congress
rejects the Central Intelligence Agency's characterization of a
small group of ex-Iraqi army officers as a major Iraqi
opposition party.
The INC deplores the recent CIA-sponsored broadcasts
promoting military rule in Iraq. It is not up to the CIA to
determine Iraq's leadership. It is up to the Iraqi people.
The Iraqi National Congress is a democratic movement open
to all Iraqi political parties. I am here in the name of the
INC and the Iraqi people it represents to ask for an open U.S.
commitment to support Iraqi democracy. Open U.S. support for
the Iraqi National Congress and the process of Iraqi democratic
reconstruction is the best guarantee of U.S. interests.
International support for the dictatorship of Saddam
Hussein has cost the Iraqi and the American people dearly. No
matter what, another dictator cannot be allowed to replace
Saddam. The cost to both our peoples would be enormous.
What should replace Saddam is a representative Iraqi
Government. The Iraqi National Congress provides the Iraqi
political movement. We look to the United States to provide the
political, logistical, and military help the INC needs to
confront and replace Saddam.
I want to emphasize that the INC does not request any U.S.
occupying force. The Iraqi people are in Iraq. They already
occupy Iraq. What is needed is not a U.S. army of occupation,
but an Iraqi army of liberation.
Even so, United States leadership is required. Over 250,000
Iraqis were killed in 3 weeks after they heeded President
Bush's call to rise against Saddam, only to find that General
Schwartzkopf had carefully preserved and allowed the use of
helicopter gunships and tanks that Saddam's thugs needed to
slaughter the Iraqi people. They have the right to be afraid.
The regional States are also afraid. King Hussein of Jordan
is a case in point. In 1995, he was enlisted by the United
States in a hopeless coup-plot against Saddam Hussein from
Jordanian territory. He was encouraged by the United States to
call for Saddam's overthrow and yet, for the past month, senior
U.S. officials in the administration have been at great pains
to insist that they are not working to oust Saddam. Is it any
wonder that King Hussein is now calling for dialog and
reconciliation with the Iraqi dictator?
Absent U.S. leadership or a WMD capability, no regional
State can stand against Saddam. The United States must lead.
The United States cannot hide behind the fictions of United
Nations enforcements or the will of the international
coalition.
It was U.S. force that devastated Iraq in 1991. It is U.S.
force that is on war alert in the Gulf now. Saddam knows he is
at war with the United States, and I am sure that the United
States servicemen and women deployed in the Gulf know this
also, yet the Iraqi people do not resent this force. They
embrace it.
This week, I was talking to Colonel Ken Bryer, now in the
Pentagon's Office of Low Intensity Conflict, who recounted his
experiences with tens of thousands of Iraqi POW's after the
cease-fire. To a man, he said, their complaint was not that the
United States had fought Saddam, but that the United States had
not helped the Iraqi people remove Saddam from power.
The Iraqi National Congress believes that the proper
response to Saddam Hussein's continued violation of the Gulf
War cease-fire, to his continued criminal repression of the
Iraqi people, and to his ongoing campaign of international
terror is an open United States commitment to the overthrow of
Saddam and to the establishment of a representative Iraqi
Government.
Immediate actions include a United States declaration that
Saddam is in material breach of United Nations Security Council
resolution 687, the Gulf cease-fire resolution, and a United
States declaration of military exclusion zones, in which
Saddam's armored forces and his artillery would not be allowed
to operate south of the 31st parallel, north of the 35th
parallel, and west of the Euphrates River.
In these areas, the United States would lift sanctions and
assist the INC in establishing institutions for humanitarian
relief of the liberated population, the maintenance of law and
order, and the provision of basic services leading to the
establishment of an effective provisional government.
This provisional government would commit to restore the
independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Iraq. As a
means of international reconciliation, the United States would
declare its willingness to work with the provisional government
and concurrently move to indict Saddam and his top henchman
under U.S. and international law.
The Iraqi National Congress has the operational experience
to make such a plan work. Right now, the INC is confronting
Saddam on the ground and has the support of thousands of
Iraqis, and the INC knows that, given any chance of success,
millions of Iraqis are willing to risk their lives to fight
Saddam.
In March 1991, only 7 years ago, 70 percent of the Iraqi
population, over 15 million people, were in open revolt against
Saddam. They will rise again. Give the Iraqi National Congress
a base, protected from Saddam's tanks, give us the temporary
support we need to feed and house and care for the liberated
population, and we will give you a free Iraq, an Iraq free of
weapons of mass destruction and a free market Iraq.
Best of all, the INC will do all this for free. The U.S.
commitment to the security of the gulf is sufficient. The
maintenance of the no-fly zones and the air-interdiction of
Saddam's armor by U.S. forces assumed in the INC plan is
virtually in place. The funds for humanitarian, logistical, and
military assistance requested by the INC for the provisional
government can be secured by Iraq's frozen assets, which are
the property of the Iraqi people.
Once established in liberated areas, the wealth of the
Iraqi people can be used for their salvation. All the Iraqi
National Congress and the Iraqi people ask is a chance to free
their country.
Seven years ago, the United States thought it had won a war
with Saddam. The Iraqi people knew it was not so. In these 7
years we have fought and we have died in the hundreds of
thousands at the hands of Saddam Hussein. Now that Saddam again
threatens not only the Iraqi people but the region and the
world, the Iraqi people ask you to give us the tools and let us
finish the job.
Saddam is the Iraqi people's problem, and we are prepared
to bear any burden to remove him from power. All we ask is a
chance to free ourselves. We look to the United States to give
us that chance.
Thank you.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Chalabi, you put forward a very
powerful statement. There are a number of questions that I want
to ask you about that, and I hope none of them are interpreted
by you or anybody else as a lack of resolve or a question on
this Senator's part, but simply that there are a number of
logistical questions that people have about the viability in
this area.
A number of us strongly support destabilizing Saddam
Hussein, recognizing that the problem is Saddam, it is not the
Iraqi people, and that we have got to get rid of the problem.
We have a lot of questions about whether we can get just that
done, and I do not want to trivialize at all the number of
lives that have been lost by the Iraqi people in fighting
Saddam, and your own statement about even the number of family
members that you have lost is very touching to me, and I note
those, and I know you have paid a very heavy price for standing
up to this dictator and I thank you for it, and the American
people thank you for that.
But I want to ask you some direct questions. The basic--and
it is probably--this will boil everything down to the nutshell
of it, is most of the American people, if not all of the
American people support the removal of Saddam.
In 1991 we had half-a-million troops on the ground of a
multilateral force in the region. We had defeated his army, and
yet we did not remove that regime from power. What kind of
commitment would be involved were the United States to commit
itself to this goal now that we did not get accomplished in
1991?
Mr. Chalabi. Senator, in 1991 let me say that Saddam was
almost overthrown. 14 out of 18 provinces were in open
rebellion against him. It was only the decision by the U.S.
Government to permit Saddam to use combat helicopters and tanks
that crushed the uprising. I know for a fact from many people,
generals who were with Saddam at the time who had defected to
us since, that Saddam was finished. It was only the permission
given by General Schwartzkopf to Saddam's generals to use
combat helicopters and to permit the use of armor that crushed
the rebellion.
But you ask, what now? I do not believe that there is a
need for U.S. ground troops to enter Iraqi territory. I believe
that the military exclusion zones we are asking for can be
enforced from the air. I believe, Senator, that this will be
confirmed to you by many military experts in those areas, and
limited exclusion zones. Saddam's tanks and artillery will
either have to defect to the opposition or to leave the area.
This is the place where the Iraqi people will establish a
provisional government. We have experience with that. When
people believed that Iraqi Kurdistan in the north was a safe
haven, we went there on the ground, established ourselves, and
established a very effective program of countering Saddam, of
confronting Saddam, and of dealing with officers and soldiers
and bureaucrats and officials and ministers within Saddam's
government, so we have experience with that.
We need a commitment, a political commitment and a military
commitment in terms of establishing the military exclusion zone
for us to operate.
And we believe that we are not calling for a civil war.
Saddam's divisions, even his Republican Guards, will come over
to us. This was demonstrated by us in 1995, when we carried out
operations against Saddam with no U.S. support and with some
active U.S. discouragement at the time.
We were able to knock out two divisions and over 1,000
officers and men came over to us. They were interviewed by U.S.
military intelligence personnel, who could verify to you the
state of mind of these people and how they wanted to come over
to us. We can attract Saddam's military if we have a base on
Iraqi territory to operate from.
Senator Brownback. You noted in your testimony that your
coalition was harmed significantly when Saddam was able to move
into an area in the north and attack a number of people
associated with your coalition. What is the current status of
your coalition today, the Iraqi National Congress? Can you give
us some description of where it stands today as a group, and
the number of people or groups that you have working with your
coalition today?
Mr. Chalabi. The Iraqi National Congress continues to have
the membership of most of its original founders. Very few of
the people who founded the Congress have pulled out. However,
several important members hold their membership in abeyance
now. That is because of two things. First, we lost Iraqi
Kurdistan in the north as a base to operate from. It is no
longer a friendly area, because Saddam has penetrated that
area. That is one of the reasons that people hold their
membership in abeyance.
And the other factor is, people perceive the United States
to have pulled their support from us, which is true. We have
received no United States support for at least 18 months now.
Now, we say that we are in a much better position than we
were at 1992, when we established the Iraqi National Congress.
There was nothing there. Now, we have people working and
reporting from Iraq, reporting on activities and carrying out
operations.
To give you some examples, we brought out the names of 160
people, specific details, about those people who were executed
by Saddam in December.
We have on our Web site on the Internet a whole list of the
Iraqi intelligence organizations, their members, their
personnel, where they live, and the structures of these
organizations.
In addition, I will give you another example of how we can
operate inside Iraq. There is a campaign where the Iraqi
National Congress is participating in the international
campaign to indict Saddam. We were able to distribute a letter
from the leader of this campaign, Ann Kluett, a member of the
British Parliament, through the military mail of the Republican
Guard, to 75 leading officers asking them to help us indict
Saddam, on their desks. This caused major furor.
I can go through many things. However, I would say to you
that I have reason to believe that, given an indication of U.S.
support, the Iraqi people, through their political parties,
will come over. The Kurds are a case in point.
The Kurdish parties now have been told by the United States
that northern Iraq is no longer of interest to the United
States. They were told this by leading officials in 1996, and
that the north is not of strategic interest. The south is.
They have little choice but to try to accommodate
themselves with Saddam. This is the reality. Saddam is the head
of a totalitarian regime. If the Iraqi people do not get help,
and if they do not feel the Iraqi National Congress which
represents their aspirations does not have United States
support, they cannot hold a hope for success. Given your
support, we can be stronger than we ever were.
Senator Brownback. And you believe that if we establish
these military exclusion zones, the parameters of which you
described, that the safe havens will flourish? If we just
establish those military exclusion zones, you believe strongly
that that will indeed occur?
Mr. Chalabi. No. It is not an automatic process. We have to
have the means to go in there and to manage this operation. We
have plans for this. We have plans for both civil and military
things to do.
The first 10 days, the first 20 days, the first 100 days,
it is not an automatic thing. We need support and we need funds
that are required to make this thing run.
Senator Brownback. Let me go at you very particularly on
this point and, again, I mean no disrespect at all. You have
suffered a great deal, and the Iraqi people have as well, but
two of the major Kurdish groups have not been able to remain at
peace with each other.
How can we expect the INC to hang together well enough to
fight Saddam to maintain a viable coalition government even
after he is no longer in power, if we were successful in doing
that? Would we be able to, and what assurances can you give us
that that would occur?
Mr. Chalabi. Senator, the Kurdish civil war is one of the
greatest tragedies in modern Iraqi history. It is a personal
tragedy for me, because it has shown me how fragile Saddam has
made the Iraqi body politic, but let me tell you this, the
Kurds are primarily to blame for fighting each other.
However, the Kurds overcame decades of rivalry and were
united in the Iraqi National Congress for 2 years. They held
up--they were given no hope. The feeling that they had was the
United States will not assist the Iraqi National Congress in
removing Saddam.
I will tell you an incident that has happened in
Salahuddin. A high-level American delegation from the State
Department and the NSC came to northern Iraq and met with both
Kurdish leaders in my presence. In the first meeting with Mr.
Massoud Barzani they were quite happy--in fact, they were
ecstatic about the achievements that we have made.
They turned to Mr. Barzani and said to him, what can we do
to raise the profile of the INC? He said, help us take the city
of Mussad, in northern Iraq. It is an Arab city.
There was stunned silence. They said nothing, and the
subject was never opened again. After they left, he turned to
me and said, look, they are leading us down a blind alley. That
is the kind of situation that prevailed then.
However, the Iraqi National Congress was very successful in
conflict resolution and policing the cease-fire when the
fighting broke out. We succeeded in stopping the fighting and
helping to negotiate an agreement between the Kurdish parties.
We were for 6 months we deployed about 1,200 troops to separate
the two sides. We were promised U.S. help. No help was given to
us. We ran out of resources. We pulled them out. The fighting
started again in 1995.
Until Saddam came to Arbil there were seven meetings
chaired by the United States State Department. At every time,
every one of those meetings, we are about to reach an agreement
which requires funding, which was finally reduced to $1 million
to start operation and it would be self-funding.
The U.S. delegates would feel very encouraged, and when
they are in the meetings they say, we will go and get
everything. They go back to Washington, silence for 2 months
until fighting restarts, and they start again.
We believe that we are successful at conflict resolution.
We believe that we are successful in resolving the differences
that may arise, and you can test that as we go along. Our
performance is the answer to the guarantees.
I cannot give you a guarantee of the future. What I can
tell you, measure me, judge me as I go along. Judge us as we go
along.
Senator Brownback. I want to have another round of
questioning to come back to, but I would note the Foreign
Relations Committee hopes to take up shortly an indictment
resolution on Saddam Hussein, as one of the statements that you
have made and a number of us believe should be taken and
brought on forward as well.
We would like to go another round of questioning, but for
the moment I will turn it over to Senator Robb.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chalabi, I think that you may have been alluding, in
your last response to the chairman's question, to the specific
sentence from your testimony that I would like to inquire about
first, since you are on that topic.
You said, and I quote, it is also true that the INC had
open political assurances from the highest level of the U.S.
Government that the U.S. Government would protect the
inhabitants of northern Iraq from Saddam's repression. There is
not much ambiguity in that statement. Are you suggesting that
the President of the United States directly conveyed to you or
to others the assurances that that statement would suggest?
Mr. Chalabi. The Vice President did so in a letter
addressed to me dated August 4, 1996--1993, I am sorry.
He says in that letter the President and I will continue to
support the coalition and prevent Saddam from repressing the
inhabitants of Northern Iraq. That letter exists. I have a copy
of it.
Senator Robb. And you interpreted that to mean, in an
absolute sense, that the United States would intervene directly
against Saddam if he should attack any of the Kurdish
opposition in northern Iraq?
Mr. Chalabi. Yes. Not only I interpreted it, but the
thousands of people who came, and the hundreds who got killed.
We established the INC bases in northern Iraq based on this
letter, and the President said it to the INC delegation.
That letter goes on--it is quite detailed. It says that we
will provide--he said Secretary Christopher, National Security
Advisor Lake and myself have given you solid commitments to
help you establish a democratic Iraq.
Senator Robb. To establish a democratic Iraq, et cetera,
but----
Mr. Chalabi. The first clause, yes, about protecting the
inhabitants of northern Iraq from Saddam.
Senator Robb. But you interpreted that to mean direct
military intervention by the United States. Did you have any
followup correspondence with anyone in authority to provide
that kind of assurance that such a reaction or plan of action
was actually contemplated in response to any of the actions
that the Kurdish opposition in northern Iraq might have been
contemplating?
Mr. Chalabi. I had many discussions over that period, but I
was mostly in northern Iraq. I stayed most of my time in
northern Iraq from 1995 until 1996. I had no reason to believe
the United States would not protect the area from Saddam. They
had the no-fly zone.
Senator Robb. Again, I am not attempting to debate at this
point. I am just trying to make sure that I understand the
nature of the commitment that you have suggested and the nature
of the communications, and any implications that flow from it.
Mr. Chalabi. I have had verbal assurances from various U.S.
officials that, in fact, the United States will not stand idly
by and let Saddam march into the northern safe haven.
Senator Robb. But were you ever given any specific reason
to believe that there were forces tasked to respond to a
specific provocation by Saddam?
Mr. Chalabi. There were U.S. aircraft flying all over
northern Iraq. I believe that those aircraft would have been
there flying on a daily basis.
Senator Robb. In other words, your reliance on the
characterization of the correspondence that you just alluded to
from the Vice President was based on your belief that whatever
protection rendered would have been from the air assets that
were flying out of the northern launching points for U.N. and
U.S. no-fly suppression?
Mr. Chalabi. Yes, sir. Those aircraft we believe were there
to protect the inhabitants.
Senator Robb. Do you think those aircraft themselves would
have been adequate to provide the kind of protection you have
suggested?
Mr. Chalabi. More than adequate, sir, had they bombed a few
times Saddam's tanks.
Senator Robb. What would you have desired the aircraft that
were operating in the northern no-fly zone to do that they did
not do?
Mr. Chalabi. They did not interfere with Saddam's massing
of his armor against the city of Arbil. It took him about 11
days to do that, and they did not prevent him from launching
his attack when he did against the city of Arbil with 400
tanks, but we believe they could have done it.
Senator Robb. I do not want to pursue this beyond where we
are right now in this forum, but you believe that you had a
commitment to act against that kind of a buildup? I will just
leave it at that.
Mr. Chalabi. OK.
Senator Robb. But that was your understanding?
Mr. Chalabi. Our understanding was yes.
Senator Robb. OK. Let me ask you another question that
relates to the latter part of your testimony, and that regards
the funding.
The very last paragraph of your prepared testimony you
said, best of all the INC will do all of this for free, and
then you talk about the number of assets that the international
community and specifically the United States already has in
place and then you talk about, military assistance requested by
the INC for the provisional government can be secured by Iraq's
frozen assets, which are the property of the Iraqi people.
First of all, do you know what constitute the frozen
assets, and by what claim do those belong to the Iraqi people?
Mr. Chalabi. Those are held now in the name of the Iraqi
Government, and they are frozen. We know there are claims
against them from American companies who have debts now.
However, those assets are still held in the name of the Iraqi
Government.
If there is a provisional government and if Saddam is
delegitimated, then one would expect that it would be possible,
although complicated, for the United States to say that we can
block a certain amount of these funds and lend money against
them to the provisional government. That is the idea.
Senator Robb. Again, I am in sympathy, empathy with the
desire to find an alternative to the current government in
Iraq, make no mistake about that, but I want to also make sure
that we understand, even on the basis of your statement, what
you are asking the United States to do.
Now, as you suggested, what are referred to as frozen Iraqi
assets are, in fact, international claims, international
payments that happen to be frozen because of the fortuity of
that particular action. They do not represent the kind of
assets that would provide a base of support.
I know they have been referred to by any number of
commentators as a source of potential funding because of the
difficulty of the process of direct appropriations here in the
United States for activities that might be either overt,
covert, whatever the case may be, and a current desire to find
a ``pot of money,'' but it is important to understand what
those assets represent and what they do not represent in terms
of essentially government assets that are available to some
other entity that might represent in provisional form the
people of Iraq.
Is this the only way that you can see to fund any potential
provisional opposition by the Iraqi National Congress and
others that might be brought into some common undertaking to
eventually displace, without going into details, Saddam and his
current regime?
Mr. Chalabi. No, Senator. There are several other
alternatives. There is an alternative of, if the United States
would support the provisional government it can appropriate
money for a loan to this provisional government which would be
repaid immediately out of oil that would be produced from the
areas in the south.
Senator Robb. To whom would the U.S. Government appropriate
this loan, I think is the way you are describing it?
Mr. Chalabi. To the provisional government that would be
established, the Iraqi provisional government. Sir, this has
been done in the past. The money was given to the president of
Haiti from Haitian accounts in Panama. It was done the same
way, also. There are precedents farther back.
The point is that it is a legal issue. If the United
States, as a sovereign State, decides that Saddam no longer
represents the Iraqi people, that he has hijacked the territory
he is in, and that somebody else represents the Iraqi people,
they can with all due process provide a loan to this other
entity, which they would--which they are ready to deal with.
That also would be enforced by an indictment against
Saddam. How can he be legitimate if he is indicted as a war
criminal?
Senator Robb. As you know, there are some technical and
legal complications that are involved, but I will not go into
those right now. My time on the first round has expired.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Senator Robb.
Do you have a copy of the letter from the Vice President
with you, Mr. Chalabi?
Mr. Chalabi. Yes, I do, but not on me right now. I can
produce it. I have it here in Washington.
Senator Brownback. Would you give that to the committee,
and we will enter it into the record.
Mr. Chalabi. I will do so, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Vice President,
Washington, DC,
August 4, 1993.
Mr. Ahmad Chalabi,
President of the Executive Council,
Iraqi National Congress,
Trevor House, 100 Brompton Road,
London, SW3 1E8, United Kingdom.
Dear Mr. Chalabi:
Thank you for your letter of May 12, 1993 on behalf of the
distinguished leadership of the Iraqi National Congress (INC). It was a
privilege for me to meet with these spokespersons for millions of
oppressed Iraqi citizens and to convey my country's respect,
admiration, and support. The President and I share the concerns you
raise in your letter, and I assure you that we will not turn our backs
on the Kurds or the other Iraqi communities subjected to the repression
of Saddam Hussein's regime.
Our policy toward Iraq is clear. We insist on full Iraqi compliance
with all of the United Nations Security Council resolutions. This
includes U.N. Resolution 688, which demands an end to Iraq's repression
of its people and highlights the plight of the Kurds. Since April 1991,
coalition forces have protected the inhabitants of northern Iraq from
Baghdad's repression, and the Administration is committed to continuing
that effort.
The Administration also fully supports humanitarian relief efforts
in Iraq and a robust U.N. guard presence there. We recently took the
lead in organizing a donors conference in Geneva to assist the relief
operations in northern Iraq, and we are seeking additional
international funding for the U.N. escrow account that finances U.N.
programs in Iraq.
Secretary Christopher, National Security Advisor Lake, and I made a
solid commitment to INC representatives in our meetings, and we pledged
our support for a democratic alternative to the Saddam Hussein regime.
I can assure you that the U.S. intends to live up to these commitments
and to give whatever additional support we can reasonable provide to
encourage you in your struggle for a democratic Iraq.
Sincerely,
Al Gore
Senator Brownback. I want to go into another particular
line of questioning, if we could, on what happens to Iraq if
Saddam is removed. I think we need to get him out of there, and
he is the problem. But, obviously, one of the risks in
supporting some of the groups fighting against Saddam is that
we may end up promoting the dissolution of Iraq, into a Kurdish
state, a Shiite state, a Sunni state. And how do you see this
risk, in happening? And that is what some experts are putting
forward would actually happen.
What is your response to their assertion?
Mr. Chalabi. Sir, no Iraqi leader of any faction has called
for the dissolution of Iraq. The Kurdish leaders of Iraq have
not called for an independent Kurdistan in Iraq. The Shia have
no reason to secede from Iraq. They happen to be a majority of
the population, as a sect.
However, it is only experts in Washington and other
capitals who say that there is a danger of the dissolution of
Iraq. Let me put it to you this way. How would a Kurdish state
survive? It would be surrounded. It has no ports. It has no
access to the world except through Iran, Turkey, Syria, and
Iraq. And all of them would be hostile to it.
Why would the Kurdish leaders do that? They have no reason
to do it. And the linked that are forged between the Iraqi
population as a whole will demonstrate to you that the Kurds
have very little incentive to do that.
As for the Shia and the Sunnis, they are both Arabs. Iraq
preceded Saddam. If we go into history, one will discover that
there was a parliamentary government in Iraq under the
Monarchy. The parliament was not perfect, but there were
elections. The elections were no more corrupt than the British
elections of a century ago--1860, for example. There were
elections. There were cabinets, and they had to get a vote of
confidence in parliament. Iraq will not break up.
The other thing I would like to tell you is that the civil
service in Iraq is not all lackeys of Saddam. They have
experts. They have people who have demonstrated their ability
to run things. That would still be in place.
Besides, there is another factor which is very important.
One, we are calling for the indictment of Saddam and a handful
of his closest associates. We are calling for an amnesty for
everybody else. So that we can start the process of
reconciliation.
The forces that are portrayed as splitting up Iraq are
simply not there. The United States can play a role to stem
foreign influences which would take advantage of the situation
in Iraq. Iraq's neighbors have not shown restraint in dealing
with Iraq.
I believe that the United States, externally, can contain
the problem and can help the Iraqi people remain as one
country.
Senator Brownback. You call for the United States to
establish these military exclusion zones by some support. No
one can foresee the future, but how long would you project you
would need U.S. protection of these zones established in the
region if we were to go forward with such a strategy?
Mr. Chalabi. Sir, I think this would not be a very lengthy
process.
Why do I say that? My view is that if Saddam loses the
access to the sea and loses most of Iraq's oil production--and
anyway, he would have no way to get it out to the world, and he
would lose his access to the world--the people around Saddam
who are very close to him would begin to question his
capability of getting out of this.
We have experience with that, again, when we were
established in Iraqi Kurdistan in the north. We had many
contacts from leading elements within Saddam's government who
wanted some sign that we would be supported to take power in
Iraq. And they have said that they would be prepared to deal
with us.
If these things--if the issue of a military exclusion is
established and if we have a presence in those zones, and we
are--it is perceived that we have the support of the United
States, by enforcing this military exclusion zone, we believe
that almost virtually all Saddam's military force, within a
matter of months, will be over.
I would remind you here, Senator, that the United States
thought that they were going to have a no-fly zone for a short
period of time. We are 7 years now.
Senator Brownback. Yes.
Mr. Chalabi. Yes. I mean, half measures will drag on. Full
measures will come to closure.
Senator Brownback. What does it do to the Iraqi people and
to your group, with the administration here saying, well, we
are not going to actively insist on the ouster of Saddam? You
note that in your statement, that this has created difficulties
for you. What does that do to you?
Mr. Chalabi. It removes--you see, people think of the
United States in the Middle East as able to do almost
everything. You do not think so. Many Americans do not think
so. But the impression that people have of the United States in
the Middle East is that it can do a lot. If the United States
says, Saddam, we do not want to remove Saddam or we are not
working to remove him, they conclude they want him to stay.
That is devastating for the Iraqi people and for opposition
forces. And it is devastating for the regional states who want
to oppose Saddam, when they hear that the United States does
not want to remove him, and they seek to come to some
compromise with him.
Senator Brownback. So let me put the corollary to that.
What if we declare that our objective is the destabilization
and ultimately the ouster of Saddam Hussein?
Mr. Chalabi. If you declare that and if you then take
practical steps to demonstrate your seriousness, almost
everybody in the Middle East, in the Arab world, will fall in
line behind you.
Senator Brownback. Senator Robb, another round?
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just to be clear on the last point that you made, if we
take practical steps, the steps that you outlined, which would
in effect constitute a continuation of current activities, plus
some means to fund the activities of the Iraqi National
Congress, is that what you are suggesting would be practical
steps? Or are you suggesting something that would involve more
overt and specific military action directed against Saddam
Hussein or the leadership structure in Iraq?
Mr. Chalabi. Sir, I would suggest, first, a political
action. Which is working to indict Saddam Hussein. This is not
military action. This is a political statement and a pursuit of
a political and judicial objective by the United States. This
would be taken very seriously, as a fact that the United States
will not deal with Saddam as they would not deal with Karadich,
for example.
Senator Robb. I am not quarreling with that. And I
understand that.
Mr. Chalabi. The next thing that would be required is some
form of demonstrable support for the opposition, a place where
the opposition can operate from Iraq, as they did back before
1996 August, from northern Iraq, where they were established
with perceived United States protection.
Senator Robb. But, again, does that involve, then, in
your--in the case that you are suggesting, a specific
commitment to use military force, whatever force might be
necessary, to protect an area from Saddam's tanks, aggression
of any kind, so that the Iraqi National Congress or some other
fully constituted body or opposition body could operate with
relative impunity in that area?
Mr. Chalabi. Sir, we require an umbrella until we are armed
ourselves by adequate weaponry.
Senator Robb. But, again, umbrella can be a somewhat
ambiguous way to describe it. Again, you specifically took
issue with the failure to provide what you believed was the
necessary support in northern Iraq in a previous instance. What
are you suggesting the United States would make a commitment to
do to fulfill the kind of an obligation that you have just
suggested?
Mr. Chalabi. To interdict the movement of Saddam's tanks
and artillery from the air. That is the extent of what----
Senator Robb. In other words, a no-fly, no-drive zone in
and around the protected area would constitute, in your
judgment, the practical limitations of the kind of support that
you believe is necessary?
Mr. Chalabi. Direct U.S. military support, plus acquiring
arms, weapons, for us to deal with the smaller issues.
Senator Robb. By acquiring arms, you mean providing arms or
providing resources so that you can acquire arms?
Mr. Chalabi. Either, sir. Either one will do. There are
plenty of arms around the world available. If we have the
resources, we can buy them. But we prefer that the United
States provides them.
Senator Robb. Well, this is departing just a bit from what
was described earlier as free. Again, I am not attempting to
take issue with you specifically, because I share and I think
that the chairman is correct in saying that virtually all
Members of Congress, and certainly the administration believes,
that the Iraqi people would be far better off in a post-Saddam
environment than they are today. I do not think anyone would
question that. The means to accomplish that particular
objective are disputed.
Let me ask one other question.
Mr. Chalabi. But, sir, may I say that if the decision is
made to provide a loan to the provisional government, then part
of this money would be used to purchase those things.
Senator Robb. I understand that aspect of it. Again, I am
going back to what additional commitment the United States
would have to make to permit you and the Iraqi National
Congress and any others who might act in concert with you to
carry out the mission that you believe would ultimately result
in a new government for the Iraqi people.
Mr. Chalabi. Yes.
Senator Robb. And as I say, we share the ultimate
objective.
You made a specific point of singling out King Hussein of
Jordan in your testimony earlier, about having been enlisted by
the United States in a hopeless coup attempt against Saddam
Hussein from Jordanian territory, et cetera. I understand that
Jordanian officials have raised some serious questions about
activities that you may have been connected with, with
Petrobank. For clarification and for our understanding of the
relationship, and particularly the transfers of money that
might be involved, could you clarify any misunderstandings that
might exist on that front?
Mr. Chalabi. Yes, sir. If you recall, during the eighties
and the early nineties, Jordan was an ally of Saddam Hussein. I
have and my family has a very longstanding relationship with
the Jordanian Royal family. And we were invited to make this
institution in Jordan.
I built this institution. However, my opposition to Saddam
Hussein was known. In 1989, Saddam exerted pressure on the
King. And the friends of Saddam came to power in Jordan. And I
became a victim of a coup, a martial law coup, to take over
this institution. And that is what happened. They took over the
bank by a martial law coup. And they tried to run it for a
year. They were unable to. They liquidated it. And I became a
victim of a martial law military tribunal. That is the story.
Now, I have a written document, which I can provide for
you, explaining this and explaining all these things. However,
I should point out to you----
Senator Robb. Let me just add that any information you have
that would bear on this subject that you could provide to the
committee would be very much appreciated.
Mr. Chalabi. I have that with me today. I can provide it to
you.
However, I would like to point out to you that I met with
King Hussein subsequent to that incident several times. And he
embraced me and we talked about the political future of Iraq. I
also met with the Crown Prince several times in public areas,
and we continue to conduct a relationship with them. They tried
to solve this problem, but the current situation on the ground
in Jordan now is very difficult. They cannot appear to be
helping a leading opponent of Saddam Hussein. They would run
into difficulty inside the country.
Senator Robb. But may I interpret from your response to
that question that if the situation with respect to Saddam
Hussein were resolved to the satisfaction of the Iraqi National
Congress and the regional countries that are most concerned
about his potential threats and intimidation in the absence of
any resolution to this question, that the concern that has been
expressed by Jordanian officials would disappear? That this is
the type of concern that must remain alive in the context of
the uncertain environment that we are experiencing today, but
would not continue beyond the resolution of the Iraqi
leadership question?
Mr. Chalabi. I believe so, sir. I think that any concern
would disappear right away. But I believe that the leading
Jordanian officials will tell you privately that the concern is
no longer there.
Senator Robb. Well, if you would provide that to the
committee, it would be very much appreciated.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Senator Robb.
Mr. Chalabi, thank you very much for your courage and your
commitment. You have presented a very clear statement and
commitment and concern and direction for us to be able to mull
over. Some of those actions this committee will be taking up in
considering shortly. So, thank you for that and Godspeed.
Mr. Chalabi. Thank you.
Senator Brownback. We will call up the next panel, the Hon.
R. James Woolsey, former Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency here in Washington, D.C.; Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad, Director
of the Strategy and Doctrine Program, Project Air Force, for
the RAND Corporation; and Dr. Richard N. Haass, Director of
Foreign Policy Studies of the Brookings Institute.
We appreciate you gentlemen very much for being here and
for sitting through the prior testimony. You may want to--and
we will take all of your written statements in for the record.
I think you can get a flavor of what the committee is
interested. And certainly all of you are familiar with this
discussion taking place. So I think you are very cognizant of
what Congress is chewing on. And that is, how do we get rid of
the real problem, and can we get rid of the real problem, which
is Saddam Hussein?
And so we hope you can give us very clear and forthright
testimony as we go forward.
Mr. Woolsey, we have got you first down on the program, so
if you would care to present your statement, we would
appreciate that. Thanks for joining us.
STATEMENT OF R. JAMES. WOOLSEY, FORMER DIRECTOR, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. Woolsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the
committee's indulgence. When I received the call about
testifying today, late last week, I was out of town. I got back
last night. So I have no prepared written statement. If it is
all right, I will speak extemporaneously for just a few minutes
on four points: What I perceive to be the essence of the
problem, what mistakes we have made in the past, what we ought
to do now, and what we ought not to do now.
As the chairman knows, I was Director of Central
Intelligence from February 1993 to January 1995. And so for the
last 3-plus years, I have been an outside observer of this
issue, and I have no inside knowledge dating from after January
1995. In my judgment, the essence of the problem is the
Baathist nationalist regime, which Saddam heads--it, and he as
its head--are guilty of murder of both the Iraqi people, to a
great extent, and also of aggression against Iraq's neighbors,
on certainly more than one occasion.
This is a major matter for the United States, I believe,
for three reasons. First of all, because of our concern for the
Iraqi people and their neighbors, both those who are oppressed
and those who would be oppressed if Saddam's aggression
succeeds in the future. Second, his possession of weapons of
mass destruction and the wherewithal to make more of them, and
ballistic missiles to carry them. And, third, the fact that
this whole dispute sits right at the heart of approximately 80
percent of the world's proven oil reserves. About 65 percent of
those reserves lie in the Persian Gulf, and perhaps another 15
percent or so in the basin of the Caspian Sea just north of the
area we are talking about.
So approximately 80 percent of the world's oil reserves,
over the long run, are essentially held by one of two types of
regimes now: psychopathic predators, such as Saddam's regime,
or vulnerable autocrats. And that is not a happy situation for
the world, for any of us.
Second, what mistakes have we made in the past with respect
to dealing with Iraq?
In my judgment, beginning almost in the closing hours of
the Gulf War, at the end of the Bush administration and for the
first 5-plus years of this administration, our policy with
regard to Iraq has been both flaccid and feckless. We have had
no long-run strategy for dealing with this nation and the
threat that its government poses.
In 1991, as Mr. Chalabi said, we abandoned the Marsh Arabs,
the Shia of the South, to being murdered in large numbers by
Saddam's forces, when we had the forces there to stop it. In
1993, it was as demonstrable as these things ever get that
Saddam and his regime attempted to assassinate former President
George Bush. The U.S. Government, at the time, fired a few
cruise missiles at night into an empty building so that no one
would be hurt, a pinprick response. And in 1996, when Saddam
came north into Arbil, murdering hundreds of Iraqis, perhaps
thousands, the United States and its military force,
particularly its air power, also stood silent.
Why did we follow these policies from the spring of 1991
until today?
I believe there are two reasons. First, there has been a
general view, I suppose, among government policymakers that it
is better to bear those ills we have than fly to others that we
know not of. People have been concerned to some extent about
the dissolution of Iraq and the uncertainties that would be
produced by some future absent Saddam. And, second, we have
listened rather closely to some of Iraq's neighbors, our
friends in Saudi Arabia and otherwise, who were particularly
concerned about uncertainty.
On the whole, I believe this has been a bad call. It has
been a mistake to avoid the uncertainty of the future and to
believe we could deal with a weakened Saddam instead. I believe
both the Bush administration and the Clinton administration
have made that mistake.
Third, what should we do now?
We have not had a long-term strategy, and we need one. I
agree with Mr. Chalabi, what we need is an open program, no
more covert than absolutely necessary. I would hope that it
could be entirely open. I might call it containment-plus, but
that is a big plus.
I believe we need to espouse democracy and representative
institutions for Iraq. I believe that the desire of the Iraqi
people on this can be made clear and will become clear as that
goal becomes more likely. I believe the Iraqi people and their
neighbors and the world deserves an Iraqi Government with
leaders who exhibit the values for which Mr. Chalabi speaks,
rather than the danger for all of us exhibited by Saddam's
regime.
The only point at which I would differ with him is that I
believe such a policy is not easy, and it may take years. We
have already wasted over 6 years by the feckless and flaccid
policy we have had since the spring of 1991. And it may well
take a long time before what he has suggested, and others will
suggest and I am suggesting, will take effect. Nonetheless, one
has to begin when one can begin.
I believe it would be wise for us to recognize a government
in exile. Probably the Iraqi National Congress is the only
realistic place to start. We should use sea power to stop
Saddam's smuggling of oil from which he gains substantial
resources today. I would not object to fully controlled sales,
such as the Security Council has approved, the proceeds of
which would go to the Iraqi people for food and medicine. But
the smuggling which goes on in the Gulf, we should stop.
Insofar as it is possible, we should provide any frozen
assets or loans based on such assets to such a government in
exile, either to make it possible for it to arm itself or to
assist with arms, particularly some specialized arms such as
antitank weapons.
I believe we should remove the sanctions from the liberated
areas of Iraq. And if those areas expand, continue to remove
sanctions from areas that are not under Saddam's control. If
possible, any liberated areas should be able to export oil and
to profit thereby.
I think it is wise and important to bring charges against
Saddam and others senior in his government for war crimes
before international tribunals. I believe that we should
protect the north and the south with air power, as Mr. Chalabi
suggested--as we did not do in 1991 and as we did not do in
1996--whenever Saddam seeks to exercise military power in those
parts of the country.
Saddam is in breach of the current cease-fire, which has
been in effect since the spring of 1991. And I believe we need
no further authority to conduct ourselves in such a way as to
enforce that cease-fire.
I believe broadcasting into Iraq is an excellent idea. Lech
Walesa and Vaclev Havel both said that Radio Free Europe was
the single most important thing that the United States did
during the cold war.
Based on my prior occupation for 2 years, a bit of pride
suggests that I should at least remind this committee that for
most of its existence, Radio Free Europe was a CIA covert
action. It ceased being covert in the 1970's. It is now a fine
functioning institution. I know that the head of Radio Free
Europe, Mr. Thomas Dyne, would be delighted to begin
broadcasting into Iraq, and it would also be fine, I believe,
for the Iraqi government in exile, of course, to do that.
I believe that we should prepare to use force from the air
when--and I do not say if--when Saddam violates the most recent
agreement that was negotiated by Kofi Annan. When that
violation occurs, when he blocks inspections, we should not
limit our air strikes to sites where there might or might not
be weapons of mass destruction or the wherewithal to produce
them. The latter would be very difficult to do, to have any
particular effect on weapons of mass destruction, because the
ones we are most concerned about--for example, biological
weapons--are not only small themselves and easily moved, but
they are also made by equipment which is small and easily
moved.
Making anthrax is just about as difficult as running a
microbrewery attached to a restaurant, with one or two added
steps added. And the equipment can be packed up just about that
easily. There are 100 million lethal doses in a gram of
anthrax, at least theoretically. And Secretary Cohen's 5-pound
bag of sugar, if distributed properly, could kill hundreds of
thousands of people.
So I believe that it is important for us to realize that as
the Special Republican Guard and the Special Security
Organization, which are responsible for Saddam's security,
themselves move around the country, hiding him and also moving
weapons of mass destruction and the wherewithal to make them,
it is going to be very difficult for us to find important and
useful targets associated, for example, with anthrax
production. But we should prepare, of course, when he next
blocks inspections, to destroy the air defenses of Iraq, to
have a major effect by using air strikes on the infrastructure
of his government--and by that I mean the Republican Guard and
their weapons--and to destroy, if we can, some of the sites
that might be associated with weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missiles.
I believe we should also use that opportunity to establish
a no-fly zone over the entire country. If Saddam had not been
able to move infantry around by helicopter in the past, he
would have had more difficulty than he has had in putting down
revolts and rebellions in the north and the south.
What should we not do?
I believe, first of all, we should not deceive ourselves
that this agreement of the last few days is going to last. My
attitude toward it is very much the one that Mr. Chalabi
expressed.
I believe that we should also not, at least at the present
time, consider invading Iraq with ground forces. I do not
believe that is necessary, and also I do not believe there is
the support here or in the Congress or among our allies to do
it.
I also do not believe that we should attempt to assassinate
Saddam or even arrange a coup against him. This is not
Afghanistan. We do not have an outside base of operations in
order to support activities such as those we supported in
Afghanistan in the 1980's. And as far as assassinations go, at
the present writing, they are of course a violation of American
law, since they violate the executive order. Executive orders
can, in principle, be changed.
But, in practical terms, it would be impossible, I believe,
to find Saddam, in case anyone should actually want to try such
an undertaking. If he were killed, I believe that we would be
most likely to get a continuation of the Baathist nationalist
regime and in individuals making decisions who are as
undesirable and virtually lawless as he.
And, finally and most importantly--although if I had been
other than an infant during the time of World War II and had
been in a position of government decisionmaking--yes, I would
have supported American assistance to the assassination of
Hitler, if we had been able to figure out how to do that. But
World War II was a struggle to the death, a world war between a
whole totalitarian system and our own way of life. I believe
that as the world's dominant political, economic and, in many
ways, cultural power, the United States should not tell the
world now that we support assassination as a tool of
statecraft.
I believe it was wrong for us to try such assassinations of
Fidel Castro in the early 1960's. I believe that by making
assassination a tool of foreign policy in ordinary times, times
other than something like World War II, we send a signal to the
world that undercuts American values. That also signals to much
of the world that we believe it is appropriate for them to use
assassination as such a tool.
The United States has dealt with terrible dictators before,
over the course of many years. And we have triumphed. We are
still here and most of them are not. We can triumph again. But
I believe the only way we will triumph--and it will probably be
something that will take a number of years--is by cleaving
objectively and clearly to our democratic values and to
institutions of Iraqis who support those values.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Woolsey.
And I certainly agree with your statement, that we should
not revert to the use of assassination attempts as a nation. It
does undermine us severely, I think, in what we stand for. And
it seems like to me, a number of people are making the case
here that we should be very open and very clear about what our
intents are in the Middle East, particularly dealing with Iraq.
I look forward to some questioning.
Dr. Khalilzad, thank you very much for joining us today,
and we look forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF ZALMAY KHALILZAD, DIRECTOR, STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE
PROGRAM, PROJECT AIR FORCE, RAND CORPORATION
Dr. Khalilzad. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I should like to begin my statement with four broad points
on our objective and strategy toward Iraq. First, since the end
of the Gulf War, one of our main objectives in dealing with
Iraq has been the elimination of its weapons of mass
destruction and its long-range missile programs. Although
significant progress has been made, Iraq has refused to come
clean and give up completely its weapons of mass destruction
and long-range missile programs.
The recent agreement brokered by Kofi Annan will probably
do little to change this. Saddam has repeatedly agreed to
cooperate with the U.N. before, and has just as frequently
broken his promises.
Second, a gap is evident between our objectives, the
elimination of Iraq's WMD and missile programs and our
containment strategy as practiced, which has included, among
other things, no-fly zones and the occasional use or threat of
use of military strikes. This strategy has not produced the
elimination of the WMD programs. Although some argue that we
may eventually succeed if we stay the course in the coming
years, this is becoming increasingly difficult. Support for our
strategy is eroding, both in the region and in the world.
Third, if we continue with our current approach, we will
probably ultimately confront two alternatives. One, abandoning
our objective and allowing Iraqi WMD and missiles, or sending a
large number of U.S. air and ground forces to Iraq for combat
to eliminate both Saddam and his WMD program.
Fourth, we can still avoid these unpleasant alternatives.
In addition to maintaining a robust military capability in the
region and pressing Iraq to allow UNSCOM to do its job, we
should seriously consider encouraging the establishment of and
support for a broad-based opposition to remove Saddam from
power. The ultimate goal should be to establish a regime that
has peaceful intentions in the region, pursues good relations
with the United States, and respects the rights of the Iraqi
people.
Can Saddam Hussein be overthrown?
That is the question, Mr. Chairman, that you asked. In my
judgment, overthrowing Saddam will be difficult. He has a large
security and intelligence apparatus devoted to his personal
security. He is brutal and has killed, as Mr. Chalabi
mentioned, tens of thousands of his people. Nevertheless, he
can be overthrown. There are, in my judgment, several options.
First, a U.S.-led military operation to liberate Iraq. This
will require a large-scale military operation, involving air
and ground forces. An invasion of Iraq could involve
significant casualties and might risk involvement in a
protracted war. Once Saddam is removed from power, the United
States would incur long-term obligations and costs of
occupation.
Air strikes are unlikely to do the job by themselves, even
if a carefully considered decision was made to go after Saddam.
He moves frequently, employs deception, and maintains tight
security about his location and his movements. To succeed, one
would need real-time intelligence on his location and the
capability to strike targets effectively within the window
provided by intelligence.
Second, encouraging the Iraqi military to remove him from
power. Since Desert Storm, this has been the option tacitly
sought by the United States. According to press reports, we
have provided support and encouragement to former military
officers for such an operation.
However, all attempted coups against Saddam have failed. He
has been both efficient and ruthless in crushing coup plotters.
Whether future coup attempts will succeed remains uncertain.
Equally uncertain is the type of regime that might be produced
by a military coup. It is likely that a coup would produce
another dictatorial regime.
Three, supporting the Iraqi people in establishing a broad-
based and democratic opposition, and assisting it in starting
an effective insurgency, aimed at liberating the country from
Saddam Hussein. A new regime produced by such a movement is
likely to be better in terms of Iraqi and U.S. interests than
continued rule by Saddam or another military regime.
Why have past efforts to support the Iraqi opposition
failed?
The best opportunity to remove Saddam from power was in
1991, when Iraqis in the southern and the northern parts of the
country rebelled. The Iraqi opposition included some senior
military officers, who wanted U.S. assistance to liberate their
country. The U.S. could have helped the opposition efforts by
allowing them access to captured Iraqi military equipment and
by preventing Saddam's use of helicopters and tanks to put them
down.
Once it became clear that Saddam would not fall without any
U.S. role, the United States changed course and began to
encourage unrest. Starting in 1991, the U.S. sought to remove
Saddam by encouraging coups and providing limited support to
opposition movements, such as the National Congress that Mr.
Chalabi represents, and the Iraqi National Accord.
The U.S. efforts, while well intentioned, were flawed. The
U.S. effort had serious limitations. First, the U.S. spent
roughly $100 million to aid the opposition. But much of that
money was spent for public relations and propaganda, not
military aid. The military arms of the opposition remained
weak.
Second, the U.S. was not willing to compensate for
opposition military weakness by providing direct military
support when the opposition forces engaged the Iraqi armed
forces. This refusal resulted in the opposition's loss of
confidence in the United States. As a result, U.S. influence
over the opposition also declined over time.
After 1991, the U.S. had developed excellent ties with the
two main Kurdish groups. But by 1996, one of the groups had
come under Iran's influence and the other under Saddam's.
Third, the U.S. also did not convince key regional states,
such as Turkey, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, that
effective support for the opposition was in their strategic
interest.
Fourth, and finally, the U.S. refused to protect Saddam's
opponents in 1996, when he moved against them in the Northern
Security Zone. Hundreds of opposition members who worked with
the U.S. were evacuated to Guam, and hundreds more were killed.
What can be done now?
In my judgment, it is not too late to build a broad-based
resistance movement to Saddam Hussein that could, in time,
overthrow the current regime. Success will require a determined
effort and cooperation from regional states. Such an effort
would require the following measures:
First, we must regain the confidence of the Iraqi people.
Since 1991, they have had the worst of both worlds: Saddam and
sanctions. Given their experience, many Iraqis do not believe
that we want Saddam removed. To change their mind about U.S.
intentions will require both forceful statements supporting the
overthrow of Saddam Hussein and concrete actions.
Second, Washington should encourage establishment of a
broad-based opposition, including Kurds and Arabs, both Shiite
and Sunnis. In cooperation with Turkey, we should seek an end
to the war between the two Kurdish factions, the Kurdish
Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.
In addition, the resistance forces should expand their
activities from the Shiite south and the Kurdish north to the
tribal regions in western Iraq.
Third, the resistance forces will need to develop a strong
military arm. And here perhaps I differ a little bit with Jim.
To do this, they will need military assistance, including
antitank equipment, intelligence, training, and logistical
support. The opposition will also need political support,
including the establishment of a Radio Free Iraq.
Fourth, the resistance forces will need support from key
regional states, such as Turkey, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and
Jordan. Getting the regional states to go along will require
U.S. leadership. Turkey is likely to become willing to provide
a logistical base of support for the Iraqi resistance forces if
it is assured a key role in the distribution of assistance.
Such a role will alleviate Turkish fears and concerns that a
strong Kurdish movement in Iraq will spread to Turkey or
produce an independent Kurdistan.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, both of which have expressed
support for the establishment of a new regime in Iraq, should
provide logistical support and share the cost of supporting the
anti-Saddam resistance movement.
Jordan can play a key role in support of resistance in
western Iraq. Amman already is home to some of the opposition
groups.
Fifth, as the resistance grows, it will require more
financial support. The U.S. should consider supporting the
lifting of sanctions on areas of Iraq that come under the
control of the provisional government. On this I agree with
what Jim has said. Similarly, we should be willing to support
the release of frozen assets, as Mr. Chalabi mentioned, which
amount to over $1.5 billion, to the provisional government.
Sixth, the U.S. should maintain a robust military
capability in the area, both to coerce Saddam and to support
the Iraqi resistance. Moreover, should we use force against
Saddam the next time he violates his agreements, we should
launch a campaign that also takes the needs of the Iraqi
resistance into account. Targets could include Saddam's pillar
of power, such as the Republican Guards, his intelligence
organizations, and part of his control apparatus. Air power
could also help create safe havens in the south and in the
west.
We could go further and use our forces in the region to
protect the areas that come under the control of the
provisional government.
The above strategy, I do not want to mislead, will be very
difficult to follow. And success is not certain. However, the
current policy of mixing sanctions with the threat of force is
losing support.
Thus, unless we are willing to accept an Iraq armed with
weapons of mass destruction, we must consider adjusting our
strategy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Khalilzad follows:]
Prepared Statement of Zalmay Khalilzad
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify
before this subcommittee on Iraq and to commend you for holding this
hearing. Now is a good time to review our objective and our strategy.
The views expressed here are my own and should not be interpreted as
representing those of the RAND Corporation or any of the agencies or
others sponsoring its research.
I should like to begin my statement with four broad points on our
objectives and strategy towards Iraq.
(1) Since the end of the Gulf war, one of our main objectives in
dealing with Iraq has been the elimination of its weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and its long range missile programs. Although
significant progress has been made, Iraq has refused to come clean and
give up completely its weapons program. The recent agreement brokered
by Kofi Annan will probably do little to change this. Saddam has
repeatedly agreed to cooperate with the UN and just as frequently
broken his promises.
(2) A gap is evident between our objective--the elimination of
Iraq's WMD and missile programs--and our ``containment'' strategy,
which has included among other things sanctions, ``no fly'' zones, and
the occasional use or threat of military strikes. This strategy has not
produced the elimination of the WMD programs. Although some argue that
we may eventually succeed if we stay the course in the coming years,
this is becoming increasingly difficult. Support for our strategy is
eroding, both in the region and in the world.
(3) We will probably ultimately confront two alternatives:
abandoning our objective and allowing Iraqi WMD and missiles or sending
a large number of US air and ground forces to Iraq for combat to
eliminate both Saddam's regime and his WMD program.
(4) We can still avoid these unpleasant alternatives. In addition,
to maintaining a robust military capability in the region and pressing
Iraq to allow UNSCOM to do its job, we should seriously consider
encouraging the establishment of and support for a broad-based
opposition to remove Saddam from power. The ultimate goal should be to
establish a regime that has peaceful intentions in the region, pursues
good relations with the United States, and respects the rights of the
Iraqi people.
Will Saddam's Overthrow Be Beneficial?
The removal of a leader does not always produce positive results.
In the case of Iraq, however, things cannot be worse. Saddam has killed
hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, invaded two of his neighbors, used
chemical weapons with disturbing regularity, spoiled the Gulf
environment with oil slicks and burning the Kuwait oil fields,
supported international terrorism, pursued weapons of mass destruction,
and sought regional hegemony. Thus, it is hard to imagine a successor
regime worse than Saddam. But the question is not just would a new
leader be better, but how to ensure that the successor government was
the best possible one for the United States, the region, and the people
of Iraq.
The replacement of Saddam by another strongman, while a marginal
improvement, is not enough. Another dictatorship bent on regional
hegemony is unlikely to seek regional peace or give up Iraqi weapons of
mass destruction. Only a broad-based democratic regime offers the best
prospects for an Iraq which pursues peace at home, with the Gulf states
and with the United States. Such an Iraq can be integrated in regional
security arrangements and can have the confidence to give up its WMD
and long range missile programs.
Can Saddam Hussein be Overthrown?
Overthrowing Saddam is difficult. He has a large security and
intelligence apparatus devoted to his personal security. He is brutal
and has killed thousands of his opponents. Nevertheless, he can be
overthrown. There are several options:
(A) U.S.-led military operations to liberate Iraq. This will
require a large-scale military operation involving air and ground
forces. An invasion of Iraq could involve significant casualties and
might risk involvement in a protracted war. Once Saddam is removed from
power, the United States would incur long-term obligations and costs of
occupation. Air strikes alone are unlikely to do the job even if a
carefully considered decision was made to go after Saddam. He moves
frequently, employs deception, and maintains tight security about his
locations and his movements. To succeed, one would need real-time
intelligence on his location and the capability to strike targets
effectively within the window provided by intelligence.
(B) Encourage the Iraqi military to remove him from power. Since
Desert Storm, this has been the option tacitly sought by the United
States. According to press reports, we have provided support and
encouragement to former military officers for such an operation.
However, all attempted coups against Saddam have failed. He has been
both efficient and ruthless in crushing coup plotters. Whether future
coups attempts will succeed remains uncertain. Equally uncertain is the
type of regime that might be produced by a military coup. It is likely
that a coup would produce another dictatorial regime.
(C) Supporting the Iraqi people in establishing a broad-based and
democratic opposition and assist it in starting a more effective
insurgency aimed at liberating their country from Saddam Hussein. A new
regime produced by a such a movement is likely to be better in terms of
Iraqi and US interests than continued rule by Saddam or another
military regime.
Why Past Efforts to Support the Iraqi Opposition Failed?
The best opportunity to remove Saddam from power was in 1991, when
Iraqis in southern and northern parts of the country rebelled. The
Iraqi opposition, including some senior military officers, wanted U.S.
assistance to liberate their country. The U.S. could have helped the
opposition efforts by allowing them access to captured Iraqi military
equipment and by preventing Saddam's regime from using helicopters and
tanks to put down the opposition.
Once it became clear that Saddam would not fall without any U.S.
role, the United States changed course and began to encourage unrest.
Starting in 1991, the U.S. sought to remove Saddam by encouraging coups
and providing limited support to opposition movements such as the Iraqi
National Congress and the Iraqi National Accord.
The U.S. efforts, while well intentioned, were flawed. U.S. efforts
had several limitations:
First, The U.S. spent roughly $100 million to aid the opposition,
but much of the money was spent for public relations and propaganda,
not military aid. The military arms of the opposition remained weak.
Second, the U.S. was not willing to compensate for opposition
military weakness by providing direct military support when the
opposition forces engaged the Iraqi armed forces. This refusal resulted
in the opposition's loss of confidence in the U.S. As a result, U.S.
influence over the opposition also declined over time. After 1991, the
U.S. had developed excellent ties with the two main Kurdish groups, but
by 1996 one of the groups had come under Iran's influence and the other
under Saddam's.
Third, The U.S. also did not convince the key regional states such
as Turkey, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Jordan that support for the
opposition was in their strategic interest.
Fourth, the U.S. refused to protect Saddam's opponents in 1996 when
he moved against them in the Northern Security Zone. Hundreds of
opposition members who worked with the U.S. were evacuated to Guam and
hundreds more were killed.
What is the Current State of the Opposition?
Saddam today lacks in popular support and terror is his main
weapon. A number of forces including some tribes, secular and religious
parties, and ethnically-based movements are willing to defy the Iraqi
dictator. However, the opposition is fractured. They do not coordinate
their activities, and some of the resistance forces might be penetrated
by Saddam. Although the potential for broad popular support is there,
the groups have been unable to mobilize it. In addition, the opposition
lacks substantial external support. Indeed, the limited support
provided by rival external powers actually hinders cooperation, as
Iraq's neighbors have different intentions and thus support different
opposition movements.
What Can be Done Now?
It is not too late to build a broad-based resistance movement to
Saddam Hussein that could, in time, overthrow the current regime.
Success will require a determined effort and cooperation from regional
states. Such an effort would require the following measures:
First, we must regain the confidence of the Iraqi people. Since
1991, they have had the worst of both worlds: Saddam and sanctions.
Given their experience, many Iraqis do not believe that we want Saddam
removed. To change their mind about U.S. intentions will require both
forceful statements supporting the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and
concrete actions.
Second, Washington should encourage the establishment of a broad-
based opposition--including Kurds and Arabs--both Shiites and Sunnis.
In cooperation with Turkey, we should seek an end to the fratricidal
war between the two Kurdish factions--the Kurdish Democratic Party and
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. In addition, the resistance forces should
expand their activities from the Shiite South and the Kurdish North to
the tribal regions in western Iraq.
Third, the resistance forces will need to develop a strong military
arm. To do so, they will need military assistance, including anti-tank
equipment, intelligence, training, and logistical support. The
opposition will also need political support, including the
establishment of a Radio Free Iraq.
Fourth, the resistance forces will need support from key regional
states such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan. Getting the
regional states to go along will require U.S. leadership. Turkey is
likely to become willing to provide a logistical base of support for
Iraqi resistance forces if it is assured a key role in the distribution
of assistance. Such a role will alleviate Turkish fears that a strong
Kurdish movement in Iraq will spread to Turkey. Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait, both of which have expressed support for the establishment of a
new regime in Iraq, should provide logistical support and share the
cost of supporting the anti-Saddam resistance movement. Jordan can play
a key role in support of resistance in western Iraq. Amman already is
home to some of the opposition groups.
Fifth, as the resistance grows, it will require more financial
support. The U.S. should consider supporting the lifting of sanctions
on areas of Iraq that come under the control of the provisional
government. Similarly, we should be willing to support the release of
frozen Iraqi assets, which amount to over 1.5 billion dollars to the
provisional government.
Sixth, the U.S. should maintain a robust military capability in the
area both to coerce Saddam and to support the Iraqi resistance.
Moreover, should we use force against Saddam the next time he violates
his agreements, we could launch a campaign that also takes the needs of
the Iraqi resistance into account. Targets could include Saddam's
pillars of power such as the Republican Guards, his intelligence
organizations, and parts of his control apparatus. Air power could also
help create safe havens in the South and West. We could go further and
use our forces in the region to help protect the areas that come under
the control of the provisional government.
The above strategy is difficult, and its success is not certain.
However, the current policy of mixing sanctions with the threat of
force is losing support. Thus, unless we are willing to accept an Iraq
armed with weapons of mass destruction, we must consider adjusting our
strategy.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, and for your clarity of
statement that you give us. And we look forward to some
questioning.
Dr. Haass, thank you very much for joining our committee
and for being so patient. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD N. HAASS, PH.D., DIRECTOR, FOREIGN POLICY
STUDIES, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Dr. Haass. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you and
Senator Robb for this opportunity. I am also glad to appear
next to my two colleagues here, who gave extraordinarily
thoughtful statements.
If it is acceptable with you, I will just make a few
remarks and have a formal statement for the record.
Senator Brownback. Without objection.
Dr. Haass. Thank you.
You asked the question, and it is an important one, which
is whether Saddam can be overthrown. The first question,
though, is should he be overthrown. And I do not think we
should assume that the answer to that is yes. I, however, would
argue--and I think most people here would agree--that clearly,
the people of Iraq would be better off if Saddam were to be
overthrown. But it is also important to recognize that simply
getting rid of Saddam is not a panacea. That alone will not
solve the problems posed by Iraq for the United States.
Second, to say that Saddam should be overthrown--or to put
it another way, and I think Senator Robb used this formulation,
that the people of Iraq would be better off if he were to go--
is not the same as saying that his overthrow ought to dominate
American foreign policy. It is not enough for a policy aim to
be desirable. It has also got to be doable.
And, secondly, you have got to look at the costs and
benefits of a particular policy, and weigh it against the
alternatives. To be specific, while I believe that the
overthrow of Saddam Hussein would be desirable, I am not that
sure it is doable. And I do not believe, on balance, that a
policy that is dedicated to that end would be the best policy
for the United States to adopt at this point.
Let me explain how I came to this conclusion. I can only
think of three ways to overthrow Saddam Hussein. First is
assassination. And there I essentially subscribe to everything
Jim Woolsey, the former Director of Central Intelligence, had
to say. It is hard to do. It is in some ways morally wrong to
do.
And the only point I would add to what he said is that we,
living in perhaps the most open society in the world, we have
got to think twice, and then some, before we try to make
assassination a more common practice of international
relations. Americans are members of what is the most vulnerable
of all societies to assassination. We really ought to think
long and hard before we try to make this a more acceptable
practice in international relations.
Secondly, many people have put forth the idea of
occupation, building on the model of Germany and Japan after
World War II or in some ways the model more recently of Haiti
and Panama; namely, that we would go in, we would occupy Iraq,
we would hunt down Saddam, we would arrest him, and we would
try then to set up a political process which brought about a
more desirable regime.
It would be too hard to do, too expensive to do. The
American people would have a real problem with the cost of that
policy. Even more so, people and governments of the region
would have real problems with it.
What began as a liberation would very quickly look like an
occupation. And I just think we would get bogged down in Iraq.
And it would be, again, terribly, terribly complicated and
expensive by every measure of the word ``expensive'' to pull
off.
What about the third approach? It is sometimes called the
Afghan model. It is sometimes called the liberation model. It
is essentially what Mr. Chalabi was talking about before you
today. And we heard versions of it both from Mr. Woolsey and
Dr. Khalilzad.
The more I look at it the less I am convinced that it is
viable. And I wish my conclusions were otherwise, but they are
not. And I have come to this conclusion for several reasons.
First of all, one cannot speak of the Iraqi opposition as if it
were a singular entity. Despite the existence of the
organization that Mr. Chalabi represents, there are really
Iraqi oppositions, in the plural. They are not simply rival
organizations, but there are very powerful factions within his
organization.
So the idea that one has sitting out there this Iraqi
opposition that is unified and ready to act cohesively is
correct. Were it only so, but I am afraid it is not.
Second, even an optimist would have to agree that a process
along these lines that we have heard explained here today would
take years. Which is another way of saying this proposed policy
of liberation does not offer an answer to the United States
during that time. We need a policy for the next several years
at a minimum. And I would argue that policy ought to be
containment. Because, even at best, a policy of liberation is
not a near-term answer.
Third, I think we have underestimated the risks, at least
in the conversation I have heard here today. Yes, one can speak
of historical parallels, but there are also negative historical
parallels. Hungary comes to mind in 1956, as does the Bay of
Pigs several years later.
So I think there is a real risk for the United States. What
happens if a little bit of American help is not enough? If a
little bit of help to protect an enclave is not enough? If a
little bit of air power is not enough? We are then on the hook
of one of two decisions. Either we leave people in the lurch,
which I would think is morally indefensible, or we have to get
involved completely, which leads us to the previous option,
which is essentially invading and occupying Iraq.
This option is fine--the liberation option, I mean, is
fine--but only if you assume it works. The real problem with
the liberation option is that it is all too easy to see why it
will not work. In which case, again, I think we are presented
with a terrible, terrible choice.
As others have pointed out, there is a lack of local
partners. I simply do not see who in this case would be our
Pakistan. What would be the country that would funnel in the
arms and provide a base for American support?
I do not see any local state ready to step up to that. In
part, this is because they are not 100 percent sure about the
goals of the Iraqi opposition. And, above all, the Turks are
not sure. Despite pronouncements to the contrary from the
Kurds, I have yet to meet a Turkish official who in his heart
of hearts was not worried that the real goal or the real
outcome of this process would be increased pressures for a
separate, independent Kurdistan, something that would threaten
the integrity of Turkey, which is, as you know, a NATO ally and
a close friend.
Let me state two other problems with what I see as the
liberation, or Afghan, model.
First, I fear it could be counterproductive. It could
actually reinforce the Sunni core. We saw something like that
in 1991 in Iraq, when largely geographically and ethnically
based opposition movements, in the north with the Kurds and in
the south with the Shia, had the boomerang effect of increasing
the disposition of the largely Sunni Moslem military core that
Saddam has wrapped himself in to rally around the flag. No
matter what the opposition said, the Sunnis saw the rebellion
as a threat to the integrity of their country, they saw it as a
threat to their position, and they saw it as a threat to their
lives.
And I do not believe today that any pronouncements by an
organized Iraqi opposition could allay those fears. The
consequence of that will again be that the very people whose
assistance we need, the Sunni core that surrounds Saddam, will
be more disposed to support Saddam if we were to support the
opposition.
Last, it is easy for me to see how this policy goes awry in
one or another way, which is that it leads to a civil war
amongst Iraqis and, perhaps more worrisome, to a regional war.
We have sense of this on a smaller scale in Lebanon. But I do
not think it takes a great leap of geopolitical imagination to
envision a scenario where Iraqis are at one another's throats
along ethnic lines, geographic lines and political lines, and
that Iraq's neighbors cannot resist the temptation to try to
influence the outcome of that struggle.
Indeed, I think it takes a much larger leap of faith to
imagine they would adopt a hands-off policy. At a minimum, they
would be funneling in arms and money. But they would probably
also be funneling in irregulars. And I think you would see
people from Iran, from Turkey and from Syria entering the fray.
And what had begun as an isolated civil war all too easily
could become an extraordinarily dangerous regional war.
So let me come back to the question you all raised: Can
Saddam be overthrown?
Probably, but not definitely, yes. But it would certainly
not be cheap and it would certainly not be easy.
Which leads me then to the real alternative, which is the
policy of containment. The goal of the policy would be to limit
the threat posed by Saddam, to promote compliance with his
international obligations.
What would it take?
Well, let me just say I agree with the others who have
criticized what I am about to say. It would be extraordinarily
difficult. We have reached the point where the United States
has no good options, no cheap options, no guaranteed options.
And I would put containment in that same area. Though I support
it, I support it in some ways as the least bad option now
available to the United States.
What it would take--and it would be very hard, as I said--
are steps to shore up the international coalition. Critical
here would be the Arabs. Two things more than anything else
would be needed to shore up Arab support. One is to do
something on the sanctions front. And we have already done
quite a lot with Resolution 1153, which provides Iraq
extraordinary levels of resources to buy any food and medicine.
But I would be willing to 1 day exercise paragraph 22 of
Resolution 687 if, as the Resolution requires, Iraq were to
comply fully with all the requirements in the area of weapons
of mass destruction and, second, only if we introduced an
escrow account, much as was done under Resolution 986. If this
were done, any revenues raised by Iraq from the export of oil
would not simply go into the pockets of Saddam Hussein or the
coffers of his government.
There has to be a capture mechanism to make sure that money
goes to compensating the victims of Iraqi aggression, to pay
for U.N. inspectors, and to ensure that money could not be used
to import arms. Because one of the things that would stay in
effect, even if we reach this point, is the ban on Iraqi
conventional military imports and the ban on Iraqi dual-use
imports.
And the only way I know of really making sure that these
bans stick is to make sure that Saddam Hussein does not get any
revenues directly, but rather they are captured by an escrow
account that is doled out to him only for specific and
controlled purposes.
What else would have to be done to gain Arab support?
We have to have a more energetic policy toward the Middle
East peace process. I realize that while this matter comes
under the jurisdiction of this subcommittee, it is not a
subject of today. I would simply say that there is linkage
there. It is a fact of life. And Arab enthusiasm for working
with us to take on Saddam is diminished by the perception in
Arab eyes that we have a lack of enthusiasm for pursuing peace
in the Middle East.
We also have to make Iraq policy a priority with the
Europeans and the Russians. And that might mean adjusting other
policies that are important to them, such as the pace, for
example, of NATO enlargement or the question of secondary
sanctions that are being threatened to be introduced under the
ILSA legislation.
In the case of Iran, we need to think about a more nuanced
policy. That makes sense on its own merits. I also think,
though, that this shift would present Saddam with a degree of
encirclement and isolation that would help us in our larger
aims.
I would, though, emphasize two other things most of all.
One is to some extent echoing my colleagues here. Any use of
force must be intense, and it must go after Saddam's domestic
sources of support: the Republican Guards (the people and their
equipment), the internal security forces, and Saddam's ability
to communicate with his people. Any use of force ought to go
after that.
I would point out that was not something we did during
Desert Storm. Going after this sort of target was largely
incidental. We did a little bit of it, but we did not design
Desert Storm toward this end. Now, any military operation
should be designed toward this end.
Secondly, we need to adopt a new policy toward weapons of
mass destruction and their possible use by the Iraqi
Government. We should be clear and say the following: If you
ever use weapons of mass destruction of whatever sort, the
United States will adopt a policy of explicitly seeking your
ouster and a change in government. And those in any way
responsible for the use of weapons of mass destruction will be
held to account.
We ought to say that now as a deterrent against the Iraqi
Government actually using any weapons of mass destruction which
the inspectors prove unable to locate and destroy.
If we adopt the policy that I have laid out here, I believe
we will have a successful policy of containment. I also think
there is a potential bonus. If we pursue this policy and if we
are tested and we use force in the way I have described, I
actually think we can affect those closest to Saddam, those who
actually continue to have the best chance to get rid of him.
And I think we have the potential to move them to act.
I am not guaranteeing that. I am simply saying that is the
potential bonus of the sort of policy I have laid out. But we
have to go into this policy without expecting that bonus. And
we have to remind ourselves, containment worked in the Cold
War. Containment is working in Korea. Containment has worked
for nearly 7 years in the Gulf. It can continue to work. It is
doable. It is affordable. It protects our core interests.
I would simply say in closing that a policy of containment
succeeds if it is not allowed to fail. By contrast, a policy of
rollback fails unless it is able to succeed. For that reason I
believe that a policy of containment most serves the interest
of this country.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Haass follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard Haass
The immediate result of the recent stand-off with Iraq is that the
United States and the world community will continue to face an Iraq
headed by Saddam Hussein who possesses some weapons of mass
destruction. It is thus not surprising that this Committee has posed
the question ``Can Saddam be overthrown?''
A more basic question, however, is ``Should Saddam be overthrown?''
The short answer is ``yes.'' The people of Iraq and indeed people
everywhere almost certainly would be better off if Saddam were no
longer in power.
Still, it is important to keep in mind that getting rid of Saddam
is not a panacea. As we have seen in Afghanistan, ousting regimes is
one thing, restoring order and installing a better system something
else again. A policy that resulted in an Iraq that was the site not
only of prolonged civil war but also regional conflict involving Syria,
Iran, Turkey and possibly others would hardly qualify as a success.
Moreover, to say that the world would be a better place if Saddam
were to be overthrown is not to say that overthrowing Saddam should
become the central purpose of American policy toward Iraq. As a general
rule, a policy must not only be desirable but doable; in addition, the
expected benefits and costs of a particular course of action must
appear better than what could be reasonably expected from pursuing the
alternatives. By these criteria, a policy dedicated to overthrowing
Saddam does not appear to be the best option available to the United
States at this time.
In principle, one can design three variations of a policy that
would make Saddam Hussein's removal from power the core objective. The
three variations of such a roll-back policy are assassination,
providing support to Iraqi opposition elements, or by taking control of
the country. Each is discussed below.
Is assassination, as some have suggested, an option? The short
answer is no. As Fidel Castro's continued rule suggests, it tends to be
difficult to carry out. Moreover, assassination raises a host of legal,
moral and political problems. An Executive Order continues in force
that precludes assassination. Any change in this order would set off a
major domestic and international debate that would damage the
reputation of the United States. In addition, we need to think twice
before weakening this norm for more practical reasons. The United
States is the most open society in the world. We are as a result highly
vulnerable to assassination and retaliation ourselves.
A second version of roll-back would borrow from the experience in
Afghanistan. Thus, some individuals are advocating that the United
States promote Saddam's ouster by supporting the Iraqi opposition with
money, radio broadcasts, arms, and air power.
This proposal, however, overlooks the reality that the Iraqi
opposition is weak and divided. ``Oppositions'' would be more accurate.
Building a strong, united opposition is an uncertain proposition that
at a minimum would take years. During that time, the United States
would still require another policy to deal with the more immediate
challenges posed by the regime. A better parallel than Afghanistan
might be to Hungary in 1956 or the Bay of Pigs, where U.S. support for
local opponents of regimes was enough to get them in trouble but not
enough to put them over the top. Providing direct military help for the
Iraqi opposition would prove even more dangerous. We would be investing
U.S. prestige and risking U.S. lives in situations in which it could be
impossible to distinguish between friend and foe. Such a commitment
could lead the United States to undertake a full-fledged intervention
and occupation if limited support for opposition elements proved
insufficient. The parallel to Afghanistan breaks down in other ways as
well. Where is our ``Pakistan'' here? What local country is likely to
step forward to be our partner? Neighboring countries, including our
ally Turkey, are likely to oppose some of the goals of various Iraqi
factions, while U.S. support for Iraqi factions that are in any way
defined by geography or ethnicity could easily increase Iraqi military
(and Sunni Muslim). support for the central government.
More realistic in some ways than this indirect or ``lite'' form of
roll-back would be occupying Iraq with ground forces, akin to what we
did in Germany and Japan after World War II and on a far more modest
scale in Panama and Haiti. But such ``nation building'' in Iraq could
well take years, place U.S. forces in non-battlefield situations where
they could not exploit their stand-off and precision-guided munitions,
and generate intense resistance and casualties. Iraqi employment of
weapons of mass destruction against U.S. forces or those assisting them
cannot be ruled out. There would be little appetite here at home for a
course of action that would almost certainly prove expensive in both
financial and human terms. Nor would there be any more support in the
region for such a policy, one that would seem to many to constitute an
unacceptable form of ``neo-colonialism.'' What began as liberation
would likely come to be seen as occupation.
What, then, is the answer to the question that informs this
hearing? Can Saddam be overthrown? The answer is ``yes'', but not for
certain, and certainly not easily or cheaply. The only sure approach
would require a massive investment of time, resources and possibly
lives. We do not know how much resistance to us (and support for
Saddam) would materialize, how much terrorism might be unleashed in
retaliation, how much support we could expect in the region. Nor can we
be confident of what sort of leadership and system would come to
replace the current one.
The alternative to roll-back in any of its various forms is
containment. Under a containment strategy, the principal goal of U.S.
policy would be to limit Iraq's ability to threaten the region and to
encourage its compliance with the many resolutions passed by the UN
Security Council in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Getting rid of
Saddam would constitute a secondary aim.
Making containment work would be far from easy. It is beyond our
capacity to do alone. As a result, and more than anything else, we
would need to shore up the international coalition that has helped keep
Saddam in a box for some seven years now.
Regenerating Arab support--essential if we are to mount any
significant military operation--requires that we continue to support
generous Iraqi exports of oil if it needs revenue to pay for needed
food and medicine. More important, the United States should declare
that it is prepared to allow Iraq to resume unlimited oil exports if it
complies fully with the UN requirement that it not possess nor produce
chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or long range missiles and if
it accepts that any money earned from exports be funneled into a
mechanism controlled by the United Nations. This would ensure that no
funds could be use to purchase arms (which would remain forbidden) and
would pay for ongoing work of the weapons inspectors (to continue in
perpetuity). Proceeds would also be used to purchase food, medicine and
consumer goods for the Iraqi people, to compensate Kuwaitis and others
for war losses, and to pay Iraq's debts. This latter provision should
encourage France and Russia to support the introduction of such a
provision. Moreover, issuing such a declaration now will not change
anything regarding the status of sanctions unless and until Saddam is
certified by UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors. But even a change in
declaratory policy will have the immediate benefit of strengthening our
position in the Arab world where current U.S. policy--that Saddam
comply with every aspect of every resolution before he receives any
sanctions relief--is seen as unreasonable and unfair.
We also need a more energetic policy toward Middle East peace.
Linkage here is a fact of life. One need not and should not equate
Israel and Iraq (or ignore Palestinian and Syrian shortcomings) to
recognize that U.S. determination to press Saddam contrasts markedly
with American passivity when confronted with Israeli reluctance to
implement the Oslo accords or cease unilateral actions that complicate
the search for peace. The willingness and ability of Arab governments
to work with us against Saddam requires that we do something to reduce
this perceived double standard.
Rebuilding the coalition more broadly will require, too, that we
make Iraq a diplomatic priority. This may mean going slow on subsequent
phases of NATO enlargement--in particular, possible Baltic entry--so as
not to further alienate Russia. (That moving slowly may also be good
for NATO lest it dilute its capacity to act is an added benefit.)
Shoring up the anti-Iraq coalition may also mean eschewing secondary
sanctions that penalize France and others in Europe when they do not
join U.S. boycotts of Cuba or Iran.
A more nuanced U.S. approach toward Iran--one that embraced a
reciprocal ``road-map'' for improving relations--would help in other
ways, as it would threaten Saddam with further isolation or even
encirclement. The good news is that all these policy adjustments make
sense on their merits. No American interest would be sacrificed or
compromised to make our Iraq policy more effective.
Any use of military force should be large and sustained if Iraq
again seeks to block UN weapons inspectors or if it masses forces
against or attacks one of its neighbors. The target should be
Republican Guard troops and their equipment, other internal security
forces, communications networks--in short, Saddam's power base. To make
this possible, the United States should maintain an augmented military
capacity in the region on an open-ended basis.
An element of deterrence should also be introduced into U.S.
policy. Specifically, Saddam Hussein should be informed that if there
is any use of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq, or if there is any
use of WMD by others that can be traced back to Iraq, the United States
will do whatever is necessary to remove the regime and bring all those
responsible to justice.
A containment policy along the lines outlined here promises to be
better than explicit roll-back options. It may not offer the promise of
a near-term solution that Americans tend to favor, but it will limit
the problem. Moreover, it is both doable and affordable, something than
cannot be said of more ambitious proposals. As a rule, containment
succeeds unless it is allowed to fail; roll-back fails unless it is
able to succeed.
To make containment effective, though, will require that it become
a priority of American foreign policy. It is not enough for the
president and his chief lieutenants to turn their attention to Iraq
after Saddam creates a crisis. As was demonstrated in our struggle with
the Soviet Union, and as is demonstrated by what we are doing in Korea,
containment--``longterm, patient but vigilant'' in George Kennan's
original formulation--can work if we are prepared to commit to it.
Moreover, Kennan's original formulation teaches us something else.
A successful containment policy can set in motion forces that can
actually lead to the demise of the regime in question. Change, if and
when it comes to Iraq, is most likely to come from actions taken by
those in or near the center of power who have access to Saddam and who
would not be opposed by the majority of those in or near power. This is
what took place in the Soviet Union and much of the formerly communist
world. As a result, it is quite possible that the policy most likely to
result in Saddam's ouster is one that does not place this goal at the
center of what it is we are trying to bring about.
In the case of Iraq, this argues for a policy that would relax
export restrictions on Iraq only in the event of its full compliance
with WMD-related obligations, maintain critical import sanctions for
the foreseeable future, and regularly remind the Iraqi people of
improvements they can expect when they are led by a different
leadership that meets its international obligations. It would also
require a readiness to attack directly and with great intensity
Saddam's domestic sources of support on those occasions military force
is justified. If all this leads to a change in Iraq's leadership, so
much the better. But the advantage of containment over the alternatives
is that it protects our core interests even if Saddam manages to hang
on for months or even years.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Dr. Haass.
We are going to close this hearing at 5, if we can, so we
will each try to make our questions maybe as germane and as
short as possible. And if we can get as many answers as we
could, I would appreciate that.
Having said that, I want to violate that at the very
outset. I have the Vice President's letter to Dr. Chalabi that
is interesting from the standpoint of its statements in here.
And we will enter this fully into the record.
But it says in this August 4, 1993 letter:
The President and I share the concerns you raised in your
letter, and I assure you that we will not turn our backs on the
Kurds or the other Iraqi communities subjected to the
repression of Saddam Hussein's regime. Since April 1991,
coalition forces have protected the inhabitants of northern
Iraq from Baghdad's repression, and the administration is
committed to continuing that effort.
And then it states their pledge of support for a democratic
alternative to Saddam Hussein's regime:
I can assure you that the U.S. intends to live up to these
commitments and to give whatever additional support we can
reasonably provide to encourage you in your struggle for a
democratic Iraq.
I can see what they base their views upon. We will enter
that into the record.
Mr. Woolsey and Dr. Khalilzad, if we could, I take it
really from what you are stating, you think we should reject
the U.N.-negotiated agreement and pursue this different, long-
term strategy of destabilizing Saddam?
Mr. Woolsey. I would put it a little differently, Mr.
Chairman. I do not have any real confidence that the U.N.-
negotiated agreement is going to deter Saddam for more than a
very brief period, if at all, from interfering with the U.N.
inspections. But I would not advocate rejecting it out of hand.
I do not believe it is inconsistent for us to insist on the
full observation by Saddam of the U.N. resolutions and this
agreement, and to go ahead and proceed to adopt a policy, that,
for as long as it takes, we will politically and economically
support a government in exile because we think his is
illegitimate. And if he moves against the Kurds in the north or
the Shia in the south, then we should protect them, as we did
not in 1991 and 1996. And if he gives us an opportunity, by--
and I think he will--interfering with U.N. inspections, then we
should then use that opportunity to execute the type of
military strikes I describe.
But I would not advocate simply rejecting the U.N.-
negotiated agreement as long as he permits inspections--perhaps
for a while--on an un-interfered basis. Then, fine. The more
those continue, the better off we are.
Senator Brownback. I think a number of us have been
critical that we have bought the same bad horse the third time
here. So let us get prepared for when the agreement gets
violated.
Mr. Woolsey. I agree with that. I do not think this
agreement is going to last, and I think we should get prepared
for when it is violated. But insofar as the combination of Mr.
Annan and Mr. Butler and the official from Sri Lanka, who has
been appointed the head of this commission, works in such a way
as to have the United Nations as a whole insist on full and
unfettered inspections, then we are better off. Because if
Saddam violates that, it will help draw support to the steps we
would then have to take.
The agreement does have some ambiguity in it in places. And
I think that what is really important, though, is for the
inspections to be carried out the way they were under Mr. Ekeus
and under Mr. Butler; namely, whether they are looking at
Presidential palaces or anything else, the only person who knew
where the inspectors were going was the head of the team. The
helicopters would take off without anyone on the team knowing
where they were going, much less the Iraqis. And that was one
of the things that led to a struggle in a helicopter between an
Iraqi and a U.N. official at one point.
I think it is very important that the UNSCOM work in such a
way that the diplomats who are along for the ride and the
window dressing not have any advance notice of where the
inspection is going and not be able to interfere with it. If
they want to sit there and say diplomatic things, I suppose
that is all right.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Woolsey, you have stated that the
development of these weapons of mass destruction is little more
complicated than a microbrewery associated to a restaurant.
Mr. Woolsey. Making them.
Senator Brownback. Making them. If that is indeed the case,
then we cannot eliminate his ability to produce weapons of mass
destruction, can we?
Mr. Woolsey. I think that is right. Not only can we not
eliminate the people who know how to do it, not only can we not
eliminate the equipment, which he could replace relatively
easily, but, most importantly, we cannot eliminate the
motivation of people who would do what he has done. This is one
of the main things that leads me to believe we should adopt the
long-term policy to get the regime removed, even if takes
years, that I described.
If the only problem was nuclear weapons, and if the only
way he was producing fissionable material was a big, fat target
like the Osirak reactor that the Israelis so wisely destroyed
at the beginning of the eighties, then the situation might have
some differences. But we cannot, as a matter of the physics of
the way these weapons are produced, actually take away his
ability to develop and produce them.
And particularly, if sanctions are lifted and Saddam has
billions a year coming in as a result of oil, there are lots of
places in the world you can buy extended range SCUD's and
anthrax grows in a lot of cow pastures. This is not rocket
science and it is not like building a large reactor to produce
fissionable material.
Senator Brownback. Dr. Haass, building on that statement, I
tend to--I agree with him, and I generally think most people
do, that we cannot eliminate his ability to develop weapons of
mass destruction, that the problem is Saddam. Yet you continue
to believe that the alternatives are such and the ability to
get to the alternatives of Saddam are so difficult that you
think containment is the strategy to pursue. It leaves him with
the weapons. It leaves him in power. It leaves him increasingly
in power. And containment has been falling apart for us. We are
not able to hold it together.
Why would you continue to support that strategy, which
seems to be falling apart on us?
Dr. Haass. Mr. Chairman, to say it has been falling apart
is a bit rough on the policy. True, it is weaker today than it
was 7 years ago--in some cases, considerably weaker. But I
would also say the glass is half full in a couple of areas. The
fact that sanctions are as robust as they are after 7 years is
extraordinary. I have just completed a study of the history of
sanctions. These really stand out on the positive side.
For all the differences, there still is a large degree of
international support for Saddam meeting his obligations.
Senator Brownback. Because my time is limited, I want to
get in here and make sure to get my point to you, and then ask
you to respond directly to it. It has been loosening. And if we
go further down this road, it is unlikely we will be able to
contain his ability to get more resources into his regime.
Dr. Haass. Two things on that very quickly, then. If we
were to simply leave the condition alone, it could get weaker.
I agree with you. That is a real risk. What I tried to lay out
and what I hope this administration adopts is an awfully robust
or muscular version of containment. But I take your point.
There is a risk. If we allow the policy to drift, it will
unravel.
Containment is at least as demanding, in certain ways, as
these alternatives policies. It is not the easy choice. So it
is asking a lot of the administration. It is asking a lot of
the countries in the region. I just think, all things being
equal, it is more doable, with less risk and cost, than the
alternative. But I do not argue your premise, that it is by no
means a guaranteed success. I take that as a real warning that
we had better put our shoulder to the wheel or our position
will continue to get weaker.
Senator Brownback. Senator Robb.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Given the time constraints that we are now under, let me
just ask a couple of general questions, I guess the first one
to my friend, Mr. Woolsey, here. Given your view, and I think
widely shared, about the virtual impossibility of complete
elimination of the current inventory, whatever it might be,
that has been undisclosed, and certainly the inability to
guarantee that no future inventory could be produced on
relatively short order, should we abandon as a principle tenet
of our policy an attempt to deal with that question altogether?
Mr. Woolsey. No, I do not think we should abandon it
altogether, because there may be some things we can do. For
example, on ballistic missiles, targeting the facilities that
manufacture the shorter-range and, theoretically, legal
ballistic missiles.
Senator Robb. Well, let me be more specific, then. With
respect to CW and BW, excluding delivery capability and
excluding nuclear, which I think all of us put in a separate
category, as you have suggested, should we be less concerned
about these terrible agents of death and mass destruction than
we are?
Mr. Woolsey. No. Some CW sites could probably be targeted.
BW is very difficult. But Saddam has been moving things around,
with this Special Security Organization and Special Republican
Guard that in fact guard him. And if the intelligence available
to UNSCOM is effective, they may, by being vigorous and having
no-notice inspections and the like in the way I describe, be
able to uncover some things. And although it is difficult, I
think it is worthwhile continuing to make it important. It is
just that what I object to is saying that it is the only thing
we are trying to do. Because that undercuts our ability, our
justification, for striking at the Republican Guard and the
infrastructure of his regime.
Senator Robb. But if it makes our objective always
unobtainable, in terms of an absolute sense, should we find
some way of modifying what would, in effect, be completion or
success on that particular aspect of our policy?
Mr. Woolsey. Well, the only way, I think, to succeed in
this objective is to get the regime out over the long run. I
think there may be some things we can do, and we should
continue to pursue them with respect to weapons of mass
destruction, but that the main thrust, however we describe it,
the main thrust of any air strikes ought to be to make it
harder for him to exercise power.
Senator Robb. That I understand. And I agree with that and
have focused on that for some time.
Let me ask a couple of questions about oil. Everybody has
made some reference to it in one way or another. And there is
an implicit suggestion, I think, that if we can carve out a
little territory and install a provisional government of some
sort and allow them to export oil without sanctions, although
continuing to keep sanctions on the part over which Saddam
maintains control, as a practical matter, is there sufficient
ability to produce and export oil by any prospective
provisional part of what could become a Balkanized Iraq if it
is not already?
Mr. Woolsey. Let me let the others speak to this. But I
believe that in the north, particularly if Mosul were taken by
the supporters of democracy in Iraq, and for some parts of the
south, it would be feasible, depending upon exactly what areas
were held, for a provisional government to export. It would
take some repair to infrastructure. It would take cooperation
in the north with Turkey and the like. But it is not
impossible.
Senator Robb. In other words, it is something that you
think is doable, to use a term that Dr. Haass was using earlier
in another context?
Mr. Woolsey. With some work and effort. And a lot depends
on how broad or how widely the writ of a provisional government
would run, especially in the north.
Senator Robb. All right. Now, let me ask a question then
about the possibility of placing money in escrow from the
export of oil under existing circumstances, if you will. If
Saddam is still in power and if we are putting the money in
escrow, what incentive is there going to be for him to even
export or in any way play that game, if you will? That removes
from him any incentive--and, again, I am not an advocate for
Saddam, so I do not want anything I might say to be
misunderstood or misconstrued--but what incentive remains for
Saddam to, in effect, let that happen?
Dr. Haass. Well, the incentive for him is that it still
gives him the potential access to a greater sum of money. And a
lot depends upon what the list is of things he can spend it on.
If we make the list inclusive, short of conventional arms
and certain dual-use technologies, that still gives him
considerable incentive to comply.
Senator Robb. In other words, you think that is a, quote,
deal that he would accept?
Dr. Haass. Well, he has already accepted less than that by
his acceptance, first, of Resolution 986 and, more recently
Resolution 1153, where he has accepted the right to produce
various amounts of oil, so many billions of dollars worth over
6 months, in order to buy a very narrow list of commodities--
initially, just food and medicine; more recently, food,
medicine and certain types of infrastructure to repair things
domestically within Iraq.
Senator Robb. But he has not permitted the free
distribution of the humanitarian items to the intended targets?
Dr. Haass. Senator, I do not think, with or without
sanctions, you are ever going to have Saddam Hussein allowing
the free distribution of----
Senator Robb. Well, that is really the point I am getting
at. I am trying to see if there is a way to have an agreement
that is binding and enforceable and doable, if you will, in
that area.
Dr. Haass. There are two obstacles. One is getting others
to agree that this ought to be a requirement. The Russians and
the French in particular will largely resist us. And they will
say, you are rewriting the resolution; it is not there. We will
argue there is a precedent for it. And, second, Saddam will
obviously try to get it unfettered. He wants the money to come
directly to him. There is the U.S. vote, though. Right now,
that process can only happen if we allow it to go forward.
Senator Robb. OK. Well, I think we are all essentially on
the same wavelength here.
Let me ask one question, if I may, of all three. And, Dr.
Khalilzad, you may want to take this one to start off with. But
the question of communications. We have talked about Radio Free
Iraq, some means of communicating effectively with, quote, the
people.
We know, in North Korea, that there are means that Kim
Jung-Il and his father, Kim Il-Sung, and what have you, had by
taking all but a single or a couple of bands out of the radios
and other real means of controlling the information that
actually reached the vast majority of the North Korean people.
In Iraq, we have a different situation. We do not have at least
that kind of control.
First of all, is enough of the international message, via
CNN and others, actually getting through, notwithstanding the
fact that it is illegal to have downlinks and whatever the case
may be? And is there an effective way to reach this population,
particularly those who are in a position to bring about change
in government and to encourage those who might support such
change if they felt there was a chance of succeeding?
Dr. Khalilzad. Mr. Chairman, I think you are right that the
situation in Iraq is not as bad as the one in North Korea, with
regard to the regime's control over the population, in terms of
access to information. However, what is missing is the ability
of the opposition to communicate broadly with the Iraqi people.
And Radio Free Iraq would perform that role.
We do broadcast to Iraq via VOA. And based on some
interviews that I have done on VOA and the reactions that I
have gotten from inside Iraq, people do listen to VOA. But VOA
reflects U.S. views. But what we are advocating is something
similar to Radio Free Europe, and available to the democratic
forces in Iraq, so that their message can reach the Iraqi
people.
Senator Robb. On the question of communication--and this is
my final question, just to followup, Mr. Chairman--do either
Mr. Woolsey or Dr. Haass have any additional thoughts on how we
can more effectively communicate? I cannot remember now who
said what about the morale of the Iraqi people. Certainly the
first witness had a lot to say about that and a lot of
speculation about what they might do under certain
circumstances.
In this capacity, would you comment on our ability to
communicate and the likelihood that this would succeed to the
degree that Mr. Chalabi suggested in terms of rallying the
Iraqi people to some cause that would be an alternative to
Saddam?
Dr. Haass. I would say two things very quickly. With radios
you could do something. The more local support you had, the
better it would be just in terms of transmission. You could
possibly do some things through leafletting. But I think you
have put your finger on the key issue. It is less how we get it
in there and more what the content of the message is.
And we have to think real hard about whether the message is
meant to stimulate any sort of general popular uprising, which
would be extremely dangerous, or more to simply send out a
signal to those who are close to Saddam, saying, here is the
shape of a better future without him, and lay out a course
where Iraq could once again regain entry into international
society.
But we need to be careful--and it is something that Dr.
Khalilzad mentioned--about how much it would be us and how much
of it would be in the hands of Iraqi opposition elements.
Because to the extent it was the latter, we would have to think
awfully hard about the control of the content.
Mr. Woolsey. If I could just add one quick point.
Senator Robb. Please.
Mr. Woolsey. VOA is sort of the American perspective on
things. The genius of Radio Free Europe was that it was the
radio that would have existed in, say, Poland if Poland had
been free. And a lot of it, of course, was staffed by
expatriates and the like.
I think two things would be very useful. One is to let
Radio Free Europe establish the U.S. Government broadcasting
into Iraq in the same way it broadcast into Eastern Europe and
into the Soviet Union with Radio Liberty during the cold war.
And, second, to provide some assistance to the government in
exile, so that it too could broadcast.
If we are talking shortwave and talking radio, the expenses
are not huge. Television is tough. Having a satellite dish puts
you under suspicion and all the rest. But shortwave radio, from
many places in the world, can reach Iraq. And I think there is
a role for both Radio Free Europe and for an Iraqi opposition
radio broadcast that they themselves would do.
Senator Robb. Thank you, gentlemen.
May I just join the chairman--I know he is going to thank
you--but for three very thoughtful statements, not entirely in
sync, but I think exhibiting the kind of range of obstacles and
challenges that we face in a more thoughtful way than an
occasional sound bite might suggest that the deliberations are
considering. And you have made a valuable contribution to that
effort, and I thank you.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Yes, thank you. This was the McNeil-
Lehrer version of discussion on this topic. [Laughter.]
Senator Brownback. I appreciate it very much. They were
thoughtful presentations, good fodder for us to chew on, on a
very tough, difficult subject.
Thank you all for attending. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]