[Senate Hearing 105-620]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 105-620
CRISIS IN SOUTH ASIA: INDIA'S NUCLEAR TESTS; PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR TESTS;
INDIA AND PAKISTAN: WHAT NEXT?
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 13, JUNE 3 & JULY 13, 1998
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
48-627 cc U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1998
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
James W. Nance, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
India's Nuclear Tests--May 13, 1998
Ikle, Fred C., Ph.D., Former Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency............................................. 32
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Inderfurth, Hon. Karl F., Assistant Secretary of State for South
Asian Affairs, Accompanied by Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, Bureau of Political
Military Affairs............................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Solarz, Hon. Stephen J., Former U.S. Representative from New York 36
Woolsey, R. James, Former Director, Central Intelligence Agency.. 29
Pakistan's Nuclear Tests--June 3, 1998
Haass, Dr. Richard, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings
Institution, Former Senior Director, Near East and South Asia,
National Security Council, Washington, D.C..................... 76
Inderfurth, Hon. Karl, Assistant Secretary of State for South
Asian Affairs.................................................. 55
Schneider, Hon. William Jr., President, International Planning
Services, and Former Under Secretary of State for Security
Assistance, Science and Technology, Washington, D.C............ 72
India and Pakistan: What Next?--July 13, 1998
Inderfurth, Hon. Karl F., Assistant Secretary of State for South
Asian Affairs, Accompanied by Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, Bureau of Political
Military Affairs............................................... 94
Prepared statement........................................... 100
(iii)
CRISIS IN SOUTH ASIA:
INDIA'S NUCLEAR TESTS
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WEDNESDAY, MAY 13, 1998
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m. in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback,
chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Brownback, Helms, Grams, Hagel, Robb,
Feinstein, and Biden.
Senator Brownback. I would like to go ahead and call the
meeting to order and thank you all for joining us. Good
afternoon. I should begin by saying I believe there is no way
to sugarcoat the events, the shocking events that have occurred
overnight.
The U.S. relationship with India has changed for the worse.
Our Ambassador has been recalled, sanctions have been imposed,
and our relationship that should have been blooming is in
crisis. Monday's, and now today's, developments underscore what
we have known all along, that our relationship with India
cannot be viewed in simply economic or political terms, but
must be evaluated in terms of larger regional security and
nonproliferation matters.
India's renewal of nuclear testing puts nuclear
nonproliferation front and center and is the overriding
bilateral foreign policy concern between the United States and
India today for three reasons. First, not a single nonnuclear
weapons State has overtly tested a nuclear explosive device
since 1974, and that was India that did that in 1974.
Consider also that Russia is helping India build a sea-
launched ballistic missile which will extend India's nuclear
reach beyond Southeast Asia to the world. The new Government of
India, a Government which has been in power less than 2 months,
committed to Ambassador Bill Richardson that there would be no
change in India's strategic posture for the time being.
Indeed, India did all it could to deny the international
community forewarning of these tests, and at this moment the
United States has to ask itself how we can ever trust this
government again.
Second, India's lack of restraint is a signal to the rogues
of this world that they, too, can flout international opinion
and international norms. I commend President Clinton for his
decision to sanction India under the Arms Export Control Act. I
hope that during the coming days at the G-7 meeting he will be
able to prevail on our allies to follow suit and
multilateralize the sanctions. The world must know that the
United States and all other peaceful nations will not tolerate
India's actions.
Third, we must alert India's neighbors to our concerns.
Neither Pakistan nor China should be provoked by India's
irresponsibility. India's neighbors know the terrible
consequences of any nuclear response to India's nuclear
testing. I believe Pakistan is strong enough of a nation unto
itself to avoid being sucked into an insane arms race with
India.
Now, there is a group of historians and thinkers that
believe we are at a point in the cycle of history where we will
see ongoing clashes of civilizations no longer in a bipolar
world of conflict built around government ideologies, that we
are proceeding into a period of history where civilization
centered around different core beliefs enter into cold or even
hot conflicts.
Let us hope and pray and do everything we can to prevent
this from being the case; and let us also prepare if, indeed,
it is the case. Now, to illuminate us on the consequences of
the actions this week taken by the Government of India we have
several excellent witnesses.
We will have two panels that will present the
administration's view, and there will be a significant number
of questions as well of the administration's response, and then
a panel of individuals very familiar with India to look at the
consequences for India, for India-U.S. relationships, and for
relationships throughout the region, and I look forward to
hearing from those panels.
I am very pleased that we have been joined by the chairman
of the committee, Senator Helms, who is with us today; and I
would like to turn to Senator Helms for his opening statement
as well.
Senator Helms. Mr. Chairman, if you will permit me, I would
prefer to yield to the distinguished Ranking Member of the
subcommittee, Mr. Robb, for his statement; and then I will
follow him, if you would.
Senator Brownback. I would be more than happy to. Thank you
for that gracious statement.
Senator Robb, the Ranking Minority Member of the
subcommittee.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
distinguished chairman of the full committee for his courtesy,
and I will be very pleased to proceed.
I would like to join you, Mr. Chairman, in expressing very
serious, indeed, grave concerns about India's decision to
engage in this series of nuclear tests. If Indian officials
believe the decision to test bolsters their international
credibility and enhances national security of their country,
they are wrong. To the contrary, these nuclear tests
destabilize an already fragile subcontinent and undermine
global efforts at nuclear nonproliferation.
The administration has moved swiftly, slapping
comprehensive sanctions on India; and I strongly support these
punitive steps, notwithstanding my longstanding support for
India and my reservation about the utility of sanctions in many
circumstances.
I hope President Clinton will seriously consider as well
canceling his trip to South Asia planned for later in the year,
a trip I had strongly encouraged until this series of nuclear
tests began.
Congress and the executive branch have worked assiduously
in the last few years toward achieving an international
moratorium on testing, culminating in the opening for signature
of the comprehensive test ban treaty in late 1996. Indefinite
extension of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty signified a
commitment by nearly every country in the world to limit the
scourge of nuclear weapons.
India's provocative actions strike a blow against those
important multilateral regimes. Pakistan's Ambassador to the
U.S. stated this week that India's actions show nothing less
than contempt for nuclear nonproliferation generally, and I
share that view.
Nationalistic fervor in India probably underlies the
decision to engage in nuclear testing. It raises a whole series
of concerns in my mind, including whether there will be an
interregnum in the ratification of CTBT by numerous signatory
countries, whether Pakistan and China respond with tests of
their own, with cascading effects to nuclear aspirants like
Iran, the increased likelihood of a conventional Indo-Pak war,
which would be the fourth since 1947, the possibility of either
country shifting from its embryonic nuclear status to overtly
deploying a weapon, accelerating the missile competition
already underway between Islamabad and Delhi and so on.
I have long considered myself a friend of India and enjoyed
a productive working visit to Delhi late last year. In my
meetings with senior Indian officials, including then-Prime
Minister Gujral, I received no hints of plans to move ahead
with testing.
In any event, in my judgment Indian officials have badly
miscalculated the overall effect and strategic implications of
moving forward with their nuclear program. Sadly, they have
moved India closer to being ostracized in the world community
rather than being welcomed as a member of the nuclear club.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and in
the hope of further understanding Indian motivations and
identifying the new security risk evident in the subcontinent.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and I look forward to
hearing first from our distinguished chairman of the full
committee and then from our witnesses.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Senator Robb.
Senator Helms.
Senator Helms. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much.
Let me begin with a confession. I am absolutely astonished
that the Indian Government was able to catch the U.S.
intelligence capability so sound asleep at the switch,
revealing the stark reality that the administration's 6-year
cosying up to India has been a foolhardy and perilous
substitute for common sense.
A small squadron of Cabinet officers had visited in the
past two years in India; and President Clinton, as has been
mentioned here, had been planning a trip later this year. Even
so, the Indian Government has not shot itself in the foot. Most
likely it shot itself in the head.
By conducting five nuclear tests India made a major
miscalculation, not merely about the United States, but about
India's own capability. The Indian Government has deluded
itself into the absurd assumption that the possession of
nuclear weapons will make India a superpower at a time when
hundreds of millions of India's people are in abject poverty.
The fact is that India is tangled in economic knots.
Disease and misery are rampant, hence the absurd assumption
that a big boom would make them a big power. Not so.
This mentality is not merely dangerous. It is incredible.
But the proliferation of nuclear weapons is certainly no
laughing matter; and, pursuant to the Nuclear Proliferation
Prevention Act of 1994, all manner of U.S. assistance to India,
ranging from foreign aid to U.S. support for India in global
financial institutions has been terminated.
For whatever it is worth, I had hoped that India would
march sensibly and with caution into the 21st century. I have
tried to be a friend to India, but for so long as there is
breath in me, Mr. Chairman, I will never support the lifting of
the Glenn amendments sanctions on India unless they abandon all
nuclear ambitions.
Now, regarding Pakistan in all of this, I understand the
position that Pakistan is in today. They are threatened
politically and militarily, and no doubt the Pakistanis feel
enormous pressure to act; and to Prime Minister Sharif I offer
my advice, for whatever it is worth. This is the moment of
truth for Pakistan as a nation as well.
This is the moment of truth, indeed. Pakistan can be a
partner to the United States in fighting nuclear proliferation,
or it can be a schoolyard rival to India and engage in the
folly of nuclear weapons testing; and I hope Pakistan will
choose to be our partner.
Additionally, Mr. Chairman, India's actions demonstrate
that the components of a test ban treaty from a
nonproliferation standpoint is scarcely more than a sham, and I
hope that the Clinton administration has learned from its
mistakes sufficiently to refuse to allow India to pay for its
actions by signing this CTBT; because I, for one, cannot and
will not agree to any treaty which would legitimize de facto
India's possession of these weapons just so long as they are
not caught further testing them.
The appropriate U.S. response must be vigorous
international sanctions against India to be lifted only after
India's nuclear attack had been rolled back; and mind you,
there are aspects of India's nuclear detonations which are
extremely troubling.
Today's two tests were clearly intended to fall below any
seismic detection threshold, which is a clear indication that
India intended to remain a nuclear power at all costs, which
demonstrates India's intent to exploit the verification
deficiencies of the CTBT by testing new designs in an
undetectable fashion. I will be particularly interested in what
former Director of Central Intelligence Jim Woolsey thinks
about this, because he always comes up with a sound
observation.
Indeed, if the administration plans to pressure India
regarding arms control treaties, it should focus on the nuclear
nonproliferation treaty, Indian ratification of that treaty as
a nonnuclear weapons State; and that will do infinitely more
than Indian ratification of the comprehensive test ban treaty.
We do not need to worry about the Indian nuclear test if India
has agreed not to have these weapons in the first place.
Now then, India's nuclear testing is compelling, additional
evidence pointing to the need for national missile defense to
protect the United States of America and the American people.
Because India has a space launch capability which can readily
be configured as an intercontinental ballistic missile, India's
actions clearly constitute an emerging nuclear threat to the
territory of the United States.
It is high time that the antiquated 1972 antiballistic
missile treaty which prohibits a national missile defense, and
which hamstrings even U.S. theater missile defenses, is
relegated to the ash bins of history.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, India's actions underscore how vital
the U.S. deterrent, nuclear deterrent, is to our national
security. What is needed at this time is not a scramble for an
arms control treaty that prohibits the United States from
guaranteeing the safety of the American people and the
reliability of its nuclear stockpile.
What is needed, Mr. Chairman, in the judgment of this
Senator, is a careful, top-to-bottom review of the state of our
own nuclear infrastructure, and there should be no delay
whatsoever in getting about it.
I thank the chair.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
We now have Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and
South Asian Affairs, Karl Inderfurth, who will testify. With
him is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Bob
Einhorn.
And Secretary Inderfurth, when we first set this hearing up
about a month ago we had a different topic in mind. It was
India, but it was about the booming relationship between the
United States and India and where the BJP party might take that
nation. I dare say this week has changed all of that. We have
changed the other panels after you and examine this
relationship, and what should be a growing relationship is in
crisis.
So we look forward to your testimony today, and then there
will be questions, obviously, from members of the committee.
Thank you for joining us.
STATEMENT OF HON. KARL F. INDERFURTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT EINHORN,
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NONPROLIFERATION,
BUREAU OF POLITICAL MILITARY AFFAIRS
Mr. Inderfurth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Helms,
Senator Robb, members of the committee. I do apologize for not
getting my testimony to you the required 24 hours in advance. I
think this was unavoidable, given the circumstances. I do
apologize.
You have introduced my colleague, Mr. Einhorn, who is our
top nonproliferation expert in the Department, and he has
graciously joined me for the opportunity to address the
committee and answer your questions.
Mr. Chairman, before I begin, I will, with your permission,
read the President's statement this morning that he made in
Germany announcing his decision to invoke sanctions against
India for conducting nuclear tests, and this is what he stated.
The President said:
I think it is important that I make a comment about the
nuclear tests by India. I believe they were unjustifiable. They
clearly create a dangerous new instability in the region and,
as a result, in accordance with the United States law, I have
decided to impose economic sanctions against India.
I have long supported deepening the relations between the
United States and India. This is a deeply disappointing thing
for me personally, but the nuclear tests conducted by India
against the backdrop of 149 nations signing the nuclear
nonproliferation treaty demand an unambiguous response by the
United States. It is important that we make clear our
categorical opposition. We will ask other countries to do the
same.
The President went on to say:
It simply is not necessary for a nation that will soon be
the world's most populous nation, that already has the world's
largest middle class, that has 50 years of vibrant democracy, a
perfectly wonderful country, it is not necessary for them to
manifest national greatness by doing this. It is a terrible
mistake.
I hope that India will instead take a different course now,
and I hope they will adhere without conditions to the
comprehensive test ban treaty; and, as I mentioned to the
Pakistani prime minister, Mr. Sharif, today, I also urge
India's neighbors not to follow the dangerous path India has
taken. It is not necessary to respond to this in kind.
Now, Mr. Chairman, let me return to my statement. As you
noted in your opening remarks, I, too, am deeply disappointed
that I am compelled to deliver testimony that is far different
than you and I had originally envisioned when we began planning
for this hearing. I had hoped and expected to talk about our
efforts to move forward with India across a full range of
issues and to establish a new relationship befitting the size
and strength of our two democracies.
As you know, however, recent events in India have altered
significantly the message that I am delivering today and will
affect far more than just our discussion. These events will
have a significant impact on the substance of our relationship
with India and our overall approach to the South Asia region.
On May 11, 1998, India announced it had conducted three
underground nuclear tests. An official Indian spokesman said
that these detonations occurred simultaneously, about 330 miles
southwest of New Delhi, some 70 miles from the Pakistani
border, at the Pokhran testing facility, the same location
where India conducted its first test in 1974.
On May 13, just this morning, the Indian Government
announced that it had conducted two more tests at Pokhran.
After the first test, the spokesman amplified that the tests
were of a fission device, a low yield device, and thermonuclear
device.
This morning, a spokesman said that two more subkiloton
nuclear tests were carried out. The official Indian spokesman
stated that the first tests were intended, and I quote, ``to
establish that India has a proven capability for a weaponized
nuclear program.''
He added that the government is deeply concerned, as were
previous governments, about the deteriorating nuclear
environment in India's neighborhood, and that these tests
provide reassurance to the people of India that their national
security interests are paramount and will be promoted and
protected.
After the second test, the spokesman said that the tests
have been carried out to generate additional data for improved
computer simulation of designs and for attaining the capability
to carry out some critical elements if considered necessary.
Indian officials in contact with us after the first test
have been more specific. They have cited a variety of issues as
a rationale for testing, all of which, I should add, we firmly
reject as providing sufficient justification for this most
unwise act.
Specifically, they have pointed out two unresolved border
problems with China, the great concern over China's ties with
Pakistan, and to what they view as continuing hostility from
Pakistan and Pakistani support for terrorism in the disputed
territory of Kashmir. We cannot see, Mr. Chairman, how any of
these concerns will be effectively addressed by testing nuclear
weapons.
We have also heard the argument from Indian officials that
Indian military capabilities are no longer respected in the
region and, thus, this series of tests were necessary. We find
that, too, to be unpersuasive as a rationale, despite the
reaction from India itself, where the decision to test has been
greeted almost universally within India with firm support, but
bordering on euphoria.
Mr. Chairman, the international community clearly rejects
India's decision to conduct these tests. Reaction by other
nations has been swift and uniformly negative, and it accords
with the sentiment that you expressed in the resolution that
you introduced last night condemning India's actions.
To give just a flavor of what has been said, Japan, the
largest bilateral donor of economic assistance to India,
denounced the test, urged India to stop development of nuclear
weapons immediately, announced a suspension of grant aid, and
undertook consideration of suspending loans and indicated its
intention to bring the issue before the G-8 meeting in
Birmingham.
China expressed its grave concern, and pointed out the test
would be detrimental to peace and security in South Asia.
Malaysia deplored the action, calling it a setback to
international efforts to ban testing.
Russian President Boris Yeltsin criticized the tests,
saying that India has let us down.
Ukraine invoked the tragic memory of Chernobyl to
underscore its view that the test was unjustified.
Canada's foreign minister called these tests a major, a
very major regressive step backward.
Both Australia and New Zealand have lodged official
protests with India and have recalled their ambassadors.
France voiced its concern, as did Denmark, Sweden, and
Finland.
South Africa, a long-time friend to India and a country
uniquely placed to comment, having given up its own nuclear
program, likewise expressed its deep concern.
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed his
deep regret and noted that the test was inconsistent with
international norms.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the reaction of
the United States has been equally swift and determined. I have
already read to you the President's statement from this
morning. Yesterday, the President stated that he was deeply
disturbed by the nuclear test, and that he does not believe
that India's action contributes to building a safer 21st
century.
The President added that this action by India not only
threatens the stability of the region, it directly challenges
the firm international consensus to stop the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. The President called upon India to
announce that it will conduct no further test, and it will sign
the comprehensive test ban treaty now and without conditions.
The Secretary of State exercised her authority to invoke
Eximbank sanctions and announced that we have recalled
Ambassador Celeste to Washington for consultations.
The President's action today places sanctions against India
pursuant to section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act,
otherwise known as the Glenn amendment.
These actions, which meet the terms that you, Mr. Chairman,
and your colleagues put forth in your resolution, will place
stiff penalties on India and will affect a wide cross-section
of our current activities in India, including development
assistance; military sales and exchanges; trade in specified
dual use goods and technology; U.S. loans, guarantees and
credits to India; loans and credits by U.S. banks to the
Government of India; and support for India within the
international financial institutions.
As this is the first ever instance in which we have invoked
the Glenn amendment, we are still in some respects entering
uncharted territory. We are working hard and will keep you and
your colleagues fully informed as we develop the mechanisms and
procedures for implementing these sanctions.
I am certain that India will soon understand the far-
reaching impact of the President's decision. For instance, our
current level of development assistance to India is
approximately $143 million. By global standards this is not a
particularly large figure, and a substantial portion of it is
PL 480 food debt, for which there is a specific exemption under
the law, but it does represent by far our largest program in
South Asia.
The requirement to oppose loans and assistance in the
international financial institutions could potentially cost
India billions of dollars in desperately needed financing for
infrastructure and other projects.
The prohibition on loans by U.S. banks to the Government of
India and on Exim and OPIC activities could cost hundreds of
millions of dollars, affect projects already approved or in the
pipeline, and could cause major U.S. companies and financial
institutions to rethink entirely their presence and operations
in India.
We are currently in the process of compiling a
comprehensive study of the programs and activities to be
affected, and the implementation process; and we will share
this information with you as soon as it is available.
Mr. Chairman, India's decision to conduct these nuclear
test explosions is a serious violation of international
nonproliferation norms and a repudiation of international
efforts to contain the further spread of nuclear weapons and
pursue nuclear disarmament. This action constitutes a dangerous
precedent for the international nuclear nonproliferation
regime.
India is the only country defined by the NPT as a
nonnuclear weapons state to have tested a nuclear explosive
device now, three times over a 24-year period, twice within the
last 3 days alone.
Clearly, India's nuclear tests are a serious setback. They
highlight the risks associated with the proliferation of
nuclear weapons, and raise the specter of further proliferation
on the subcontinent and in other regions of the world.
But while India's tests have created new challenges for the
international nonproliferation regime, we will continue to seek
ways to create new opportunities. We will use these
developments to call attention to the inherent risks associated
with nuclear weapons proliferation, and to mobilize
international support for all possible steps to guard against
an escalation of confrontation and tension in South Asia.
In announcing its decision to conduct these tests, India
indicated some willingness to show flexibility on a
comprehensive test ban treaty and to participate in a fissile
material cutoff negotiation, although its statements fell far
short of indicating any meaningful commitment to either accord.
In the post test environment we will need to move
energetically to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime
and to take full advantage of any Indian willingness to move
toward acceptance of international nonproliferation norms. In
particular, we will intensify our efforts to achieve entry into
force of the CTBT, to commence negotiations on and complete at
an early date a fissile material cutoff treaty, and to promote
nuclear and missile restraint in South Asia and beyond.
Mr. Chairman, I join the President and the Secretary and,
indeed, the sentiments that you expressed and other members of
the committee in our deep dismay over the recent events. In the
time since I assumed my position as Assistant Secretary for
South Asian Affairs, I have worked hard, in accordance with a
well-considered administration decision, to broaden and deepen
our relations with India and the rest of South Asia, and to
pursue our nonproliferation objectives vigorously within the
context of our overall relationship.
During my most recent trip to India, where I accompanied
Ambassador Richardson and Bruce Riedel from the National
Security Council, we were continuously reassured by the most
senior levels of the new BJP Government that India appreciated
our efforts to strengthen ties, and was looking forward to the
President's scheduled trip and a far-reaching dialog on a vast
array of issues.
At the same time, we were assured privately and publicly
that India would continue to show restraint in the
nonproliferation field, and would do nothing to surprise us.
As a direct result of India's decisions and actions, we are
now compelled to look again at our approach to India. Instead
of highlighting our cooperative efforts with India to promote
trade and investment, to work toward protecting the
environment, halting the spread of AIDS and other infectious
diseases, and to emphasize science and technology cooperation,
we will now need to put much of the cooperative side of our
agenda on hold and deal with the consequences of India's
actions.
We must focus anew on seeking a meaningful Indian
commitment to cease from further testing, to join the
comprehensive test ban treaty immediately and without
qualifications, and to respect other international
nonproliferation norms.
We will need to assess how we will deal with India in
accordance with the Glenn amendment and other U.S. laws which
require sanctions far more restrictive than those placed upon
Pakistan under the Pressler amendment.
Looking ahead, we will need to try to engage India on a
number of issues, aside from the immediate crisis, but I must
caution that India's actions have made such engagement far more
difficult than would otherwise have been the case.
At the same time, we will need to work closely and
cooperatively with Pakistan, whom we judge also to have the
capacity to test a nuclear device, and to show restraint in the
face of India's provocative actions.
Pakistan has the opportunity, now, to take the
statesmanlike course in South Asia and to demonstrate that, as
Chairman Helms said, it is committed to a peaceful future on
the subcontinent. This is, indeed, a moment of truth.
I know that Prime Minister Sharif is committed personally
to improving relations with India and understands that
Pakistan's long-term interests rest on regional stability
through increased cooperation. Although Mr. Sharif's task has
been made significantly more difficult with the events of this
week, we hope very much that he will persevere with the course
he has charted and avoid the temptation to demonstrate a
capability which the world already believes to exist.
Pakistan will earn the gratitude of the international
community and will actually enhance its own security by
following a policy of restraint.
Mr. Chairman, we have arrived at an historic juncture in
our relationship with India. We continue to respect India as a
complex democratic society, and we wish neither to diminish
India's achievements nor underestimate its potential; but we
regret, we deeply regret, that its current leaders believe that
they must detonate nuclear weapons in order to be taken
seriously as a nation.
There are reports from the Indian press which cite gleeful
claims that India has now become the world's sixth superpower,
a fact which is apparent only to those making the claim.
Clearly, the world thinks otherwise.
We deplore India's new tests not only because of the breach
they represent in global nonproliferation policy, but also
because of the harm that it does to India's reputation and
stature. We and, I trust, the international community, still
desire productive and cooperative relations with India; but we
are now forced to move ahead under the burden of these tests
and their inexorable consequences.
The Government of India has chosen to separate itself from
the responsible consensus of the world community on an issue of
critical importance, and we must act accordingly.
Let me end, Mr. Chairman, on a hopeful note, despite this
week's very bad news. Last year we were encouraged by the
resumption of high level dialog between India and Pakistan, and
we were equally encouraged earlier this year when both Prime
Minister Sharif and Prime Minister Vajpayee pledged to go the
extra mile to improve relations between their two countries.
I harbor no illusions about the difficult challenge that
the current environment poses to the resumption of the Indo-
Pakistani dialog, but let me emphasize that the future
prosperity and stability of the region depends upon it and we
remain hopeful that progress can and will be made.
I will now be happy to answer your questions and to hear
your views and recommendations, along with my colleague, Mr.
Einhorn.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Inderfurth follows:]
Statement of Karl F. Inderfurth
Mr. Chairman, before I begin, I will with your permission read the
President's statement this morning in Germany announcing his decision
to invoke sanctions against India for conducting nuclear tests:
Now, Mr. Chairman, let me return to my statement. I am deeply
disappointed that I am compelled to deliver testimony that is far
different than you and I had originally envisioned when we began
planning for this hearing. I had hoped and expected to talk. about our
efforts to move forward with India, across a full range of issues, and
to establish a new relationship befitting the size and strength of our
two democracies. As you know, however, recent events in India have
altered significantly the message that I am delivering today, and will
affect far more than just our discussion. These events will have a
significant impact on the substance of our relationship with India and
our overall approach to the South Asia region.
On May 11, 1998, India announced that it conducted three
underground nuclear tests. An official Indian spokesman said that these
detonations occurred simultaneously, about 330 miles southwest of New
Delhi some 70 miles from the Pakistani border at the Pokhran testing
facility--the same location where India conducted its first test in
1974. On May 13, just this morning, the Indian government announced
that it had conducted two more tests at Pokuran. After the first tests,
the spokesman amplified that the tests were of a fission device, a low-
yield device, and a thermonuclear device. This morning, a spokesman
said that ``two more sub-kiloton nuclear tests were carried out.''
India's Rationale
The official Indian spokesman stated that the first tests were
intended ``to establish that India has a proven capability for a
weaponized nuclear program.'' He added that, ``the Government is deeply
concerned, as were previous Governments, about the deteriorating
nuclear environment in India's neighborhood,'' and that, ``these tests
provide reassurance to the people of India that their national security
interests are paramount and will be promoted and protected.'' After the
second tests, the spokesman said that, ``the tests have been carried
out to generate additional data for improved computer simulation of
designs and for attaining the capability to carry out subcritical
elements, if considered necessary.''
Indian officials, in contacts with us after the first tests, have
been more specific. They have cited a variety of issues as a rationale
for testing--all of which, I should add, we firmly reject as providing
sufficient justification for this most unwise act Specifically, they
have pointed to unresolved border problems with China; to great concern
over China's ties with Pakistan; and to what they view as continuing
hostility from Pakistan and Pakistani support for terrorism in the
disputed territory of Kashmir. We cannot see, Mr. Chairman, how any of
these concerns will be effectively addressed by testing nuclear
weapons. We have also heard the argument from Indian officials that
Indian military capabilities are no longer respected in the region, and
thus these series of tests were necessary. We find that, too, to be
unpersuasive as a rationale, despite the reaction from India itself,
where the decision to test has been greeted almost universally within
India with firm support, bordering on euphoria.
International Response
Mr. Chairman, the international community clearly rejects India's
decision to conduct these tests. Reaction by other nations has been
swift and uniformly negative, and it accords with the sentiment that
you, Mr. Chairman, and your colleagues Senators Feinstein and Glenn
expressed in the resolution that you introduced last night condemning
India's actions. To give just a flavor of what has been said, Japan--
the largest bilateral donor of economic assistance to India--denounced
the tests, urged India to stop development of nuclear weapons
immediately, announced a suspension of grant aid and undertook
consideration of suspending loans, and indicated its intention to bring
the issue before the G-8 meeting in Birmingham. China expressed its
``grave concern,'' and pointed out that the test would be detrimental
to peace and security in South Asia. Malaysia deplored the action,
calling it a setback to international efforts to ban testing. Russian
President Yeltsin criticized the tests, saying that ``India has let us
down.'' Ukraine invoked the tragic memory of Chernobyl to underscore
its view that the test was unjustified. Canada's Foreign Minister
called these tests ``a very major, regressive step backward.'' Both
Australia and New Zealand have lodged official protests with India and
have recalled their Ambassadors. France voiced its concern, as did
Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. South Africa--a long-time friend of India
and a country uniquely placed to comment, having given up its own
nuclear program--likewise expressed its deep concern. United Nations
Secretary General Annan expressed his ``deep regret,'' and noted that
the test was inconsistent with international norms.
U.S. Response
The reaction of the United States has been equally swift and
determined. I have already read to you the President's statement from
this morning. Yesterday, the President stated that he was ``deeply
disturbed by the nuclear tests,'' and that he does not believe that
India's action ``contributes to building a safer 21st century.'' The
President added that ``this action by India not only threatens the
stability of the region, it directly challenges the firm international
consensus to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.''
The President called upon India to ``announce that it will conduct no
further tests, and it will sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty now
and without conditions.'' The Secretary of State exercised her own
authority to invoke EXIM bank sanctions, and announced that we have
recalled Ambassador Celeste to Washington for consultations.
The President's action today places sanctions against India
pursuant to Section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act, otherwise known
as the Glenn Amendment. These sanctions, which meet the terms that you,
Mr. Chairman, and your colleagues put forth in your resolution, will
place stiff penalties on India, and will affect a wide cross-section of
our current activities in India, including development assistance,
military sales and exchanges, trade in specified dual use goods and
technology, U.S. loans, guarantees, and credits to India; loans and
credits by U. S. banks to the government of India; and support for
India within the International Financial Institutions. As this is the
first ever instance in which we have invoked the Glenn amendment, we
are in some respects entering uncharted territory. We are working hard,
and will keep you and your colleagues fully informed, as we develop the
mechanisms and procedures for implementing these sanctions. I am
certain that India will soon understand the far-reaching impact of the
President's decision. For instance, our current level of development
assistance to India is approximately $143 million; by global standards,
this is not a particularly large figure and a substantial portion of it
is PLA8O food aid, for which there is a specific exemption under the
law. But it does represent by far our largest program in South Asia The
requirement to oppose loans and assistance in the International
Financial Institutions could potentially cost India billions of dollars
in desperately needed financing for infrastructure and other projects.
The prohibition on loans by U.S. banks to the government of India and
on EXIM and OPIC activities could cost hundreds of millions of dollars,
affect projects already approved or in the pipeline, and could cause
major U.S. companies and financial institutions to rethink entirely
their presence and operations in India. We are currently in the process
of compiling a comprehensive study of the programs and activities to be
affected and the implementation process, and we will share this
information with you as it is available.
Impact on Nonproliferation Efforts
Mr. Chairman, India's decision to conduct these nuclear test
explosions is a serious violation of international nonproliferation
norms, and a repudiation of international efforts to contain the
further spread of nuclear weapons and pursue nuclear disarmament. This
action constitutes a dangerous precedent for the international nuclear
nonproliferation regime. India is the only country defined by the NPT
as a non-nuclear weapon state to have tested a nuclear explosive
device--now three times over a twenty-four year period, twice within
the past three days alone.
Clearly, India's nuclear tests are a serious setback. They
highlight the risks associated with the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and raise the specter of further proliferation on the
subcontinent and in other regions of the world. But while India's tests
have created new challenges for the international nonproliferation
regime, we will continue to seek ways to create new opportunities. We
will use these developments to call attention to the inherent risks
associated with nuclear weapons proliferation and to mobilize
international support for all possible steps to guard against an
escalation of tension and confrontation in South Asia. In announcing
its decision to conduct these tests, India indicated some willingness
to show flexibility on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a to
``participate'' in a fissile material cutoff negotiation--although its
statements fell far short of indicating any meaningful commitment to
either accord. In the post-test environment, we will need to move
energetically to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime and to
take full advantage of any Indian willingness to move towards
acceptance of international nonproliferation norms. In particular, we
will intensify our efforts to achieve early entry into force of the
CTBT, to commence negotiations on and complete at an early date a
fissile material cut-off treaty, and to promote nuclear and missile
restraint in South Asia and beyond.
Impact on U.S. Relations
Mr. Chairman, I join the President and the Secretary in my deep
dismay over the recent events. In the time since I assumed my position
as Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs, I have worked hard, in
accordance with a well considered administration decision, to broaden
and deepen our ties with India and the rest of South Asia, and to
pursue our non-proliferation objectives vigorously within the context
of our overall relationship. During my most recent trip to India, where
I accompanied Ambassador Richardson and Bruce Riedel from the NSC, we
were continuously reassured by the most senior leaders of the new BJP
government that India appreciated our efforts to strengthen ties, and
was looking forward to the President's scheduled trip and a far-
reaching dialogue on a vast array of issues. At the same time, we were
assured privately and publicly that India would continue to show
restraint in the non-proliferation field, and would do nothing to
surprise us.
As a direct result of India's decisions and actions, we are now
compelled to look again at our approach to India. Instead of
highlighting our cooperative efforts with India to promote trade and
investment, to work towards protecting the environment, halting the
spread of MDS and other infectious diseases, and to emphasize Science
and Technology cooperation, we will now need to put much of the
cooperative side of our agenda on hold and deal with the consequences
of India's actions. We must focus anew on seeking a meaningful Indian
commitment to cease from further testing, to join the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty immediately and without qualifications, and to respect
other international non-proliferation norms. We will need to assess how
we will deal with India in accordance with Glenn Amendment and other
U.S. laws, which require sanctions far more restrictive than those
placed upon Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment. Looking ahead, we
will need to try to engage India on a number of issues aside from the
immediate crisis, but I must caution that India's actions have made
such engagement far more difficult than would otherwise have been the
case.
At the same time, we will need to work closely and cooperatively
with Pakistan, whom we judge also to have the capacity to test a
nuclear device, to show restraint in the face of India's provocative
actions. Pakistan has the opportunity now to take the statesmanlike
course in South Asia and to demonstrate that it is committed to a
peaceful future in the Subcontinent. I know that Prime Minister Sharif
is committed personally to improving relations with India and
understands that Pakistan's long-term interests rest on regional
stability through increased cooperation. Although Mr. Sharif's task has
been made significantly more difficult with the events of this week, we
hope very much that he will persevere with the course he has charted,
and avoid the temptation to demonstrate a capability that the world
already believes to exist. Pakistan will earn the gratitude of the
international community, and will actually enhance its own security, by
following a policy of restraint.
Mr. Chairman, we have arrived at a historic juncture in our
relationship with India. We continue to respect India as a complex,
democratic society, and we wish neither to diminish India's
achievements nor underestimate its potential. But we regret deeply that
its current leaders believe that they must detonate nuclear weapons in
order to be taken seriously as a nation. There are reports from the
Indian press which cite gleeful claims that India has now become the
world's sixth superpower--a fact which is apparent only to those making
the claim. Clearly, the world thinks otherwise. We deplore India's new
tests not only because of the breach they represent in global
nonproliferation policy, but also because of the harm that it does to
India's reputation and stature. We, and I trust the international
community, still desire productive and cooperative relations with
India, but we are now forced to move ahead under the burden of these
tests and their inexorable consequences. The government of India has
chosen to separate itself from the responsible consensus of the world
community on an issue of critical importance, and we must act
accordingly.
Let me end, Mr. Chairman, on a hopeful note despite this week's
very bad news. Last year, we were encouraged by the resumption of high-
level dialogue between India and Pakistan, and we were equally
encouraged earlier this year when both Prime Minister Sharif and Prime
Minister Vajpayee pledged to ``go the extra mile'' to improve relations
between their two countries. I harbor no illusions about the difficult
challenge that the current environment poses to the resumption of Indo-
Pakistani dialogue. But let me emphasize that the future prosperity and
stability of the region depends upon it, and we remain hopeful that
progress can and will be made. I now will be happy to answer your
questions, and to hear your views and recommendations, along with my
colleague, Mr. Einhorn.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Secretary
Inderfurth. We will go back and forth on the committee with 5
minutes for each Member to either make a statement or questions
as we go through the process, if we have somebody run the time
clock so that people can know what time they have.
Secretary Inderfurth, I appreciate your statement. I
certainly agree with your push toward Pakistan and to urge the
Pakistan Government show all restraint possible in this
situation. I think that would be very appropriate.
I want to direct your attention to the need for a
multilateral response, the president's with the G-7 countries.
Now, the U.S. has automatic sanctions that kick in under the
Glenn amendment. I think we all know the history of unilateral
sanctions from the United States being less than a solid
response. I think it is the appropriate thing, but a lot of
times it does not get at what needs to be done.
Will the President be pushing strongly for multilateral
sanctions, and not just that India, say, sign on to the
treaties now, but rather, roll back its nuclear program from
where it has taken it today?
Mr. Inderfurth. Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin with a
response and also ask Mr. Einhorn, because this is very much
his bailiwick at the Department. We recognize this must be
multilateralized.
I my statement I gave to you the reactions of many
Governments around the world, all of whom have made strong
statements about the Indian nuclear test as well as several of
them taking strong actions, including our Japanese friends. We
expect other Governments to be taking similar steps as well
over the days ahead.
We are also working at this time at the United Nations and
the Security Council, where Britain and Sweden have taken a
lead in drawing attention to this, and work is progressing
there in the Security Council, and also the G-8 meeting in
Birmingham will be a further opportunity, so now that we have
made our determination nationally we will be working with
friends in other countries to see what can be done on the
international level.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Inderfurth, I would push, too, that
we not just push for India to sign these treaties, which I
think you will find different Members on this committee finding
of greater or lesser utility, but to roll back their nuclear
program from where they are today, that is our focus and that
is our effort, and I hope the administration takes an
aggressive position to push that, that they eliminate their
stockpiles and their nuclear program altogether.
Mr. Einhorn. Senator, it certainly is our ultimate goal to
have all nonnuclear weapons States join the NPT and give up the
nuclear option. We think it is important to be realistic about
what can be achieved in the near term.
In the near term, the highest priority is to try to put a
lid on the emerging nuclear and missile competition we see
developing in South Asia, so while we fully support your goals,
we have to set our sights on what is achievable, and we think
in the near term what is achievable is to ban all nuclear
testing and ban additional production of unsafeguarded fissile
material, that is, material that can be used to make bombs, and
to constrain missile programs in a variety of ways.
We have to take it a step at a time, and we think this is
the most realizable next step.
Senator Brownback. I appreciate that. I just think that if
we push that they join the CTBT, that this is not a verifiable
step on their part.
Now we have a Government that Ambassador Richardson was
just there 2 weeks ago, that the foreign minister was here very
recently, no clue that this was going to take place, and we did
not know of the two additional nuclear weapon, or nuclear type
of devices that were just exploded.
We were not able to test that or to verify that, and to ask
them to join a treaty that possibly we are not going to be able
to verify their actions, my question is, is there validity to
this treaty?
Mr. Einhorn. Senator, we do believe there is validity to
this treaty. Other administration officials have testified to
that effect and explained the reasons why we believe this
treaty is effectively verifiable and will protect U.S. national
security interest.
We believe it is important for India to join the treaty at
the earliest possible date and, if India does, we believe there
would be very good prospects for Pakistan to follow suit and to
enable this treaty to enter into force, so this recent
development in our view, as unfortunate as it is, could enable
us to generate increased momentum toward entry into force of
this agreement, which we think would be in everyone's best
interest.
Senator Brownback. But Mr. Einhorn, did we know that India
set off these additional two devices within the past 24 hours,
separate from their announcing it?
Mr. Einhorn. Senator, we read the announcement, as you did,
and our analysts are looking at the data now and assessing the
situation, and I do not have any more to say at this point as
they conduct their analysis.
Senator Brownback. We did not know about it ahead of time
on the additional two devices, not the first three, but the
additional two?
Mr. Einhorn. I understand the question.
Senator Brownback. Is that correct?
Mr. Einhorn. I understand the question, but as I say, we
are allowing our analysts to look at the data. I do not have
any further comment on it at this stage.
Senator Brownback. You did not know about it ahead of it
being announced by the Indian Government?
Mr. Einhorn. Again, I would leave it to the analysts to
sift through the data.
Senator Brownback. I understand, but you did not know about
it, did you?
Mr. Einhorn. I personally woke up this morning and I did
not know about it.
Senator Brownback. Neither did the rest of us.
Senator Robb.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I might add that
I am not sure whether it is going to be an open or a closed
hearing, but there will be a hearing by the Intelligence
Committee tomorrow to look into some of those questions, and I
suspect that whether it is open or closed, that there will be
some announcements at least by the chairman and the vice
chairman about some of the questions that you raise and are
obviously on the minds of many.
Secretary Inderfurth, you indicated, and it was on the news
this morning, that the President had a phone call with Prime
Minister Sharif. Do you know if, in the course of that
conversation, Prime Minister Sharif was able to give President
Clinton any, either guarantee or reassurance that their
response to the testing by India would not be a testing by
Pakistan?
Mr. Inderfurth. He was not able, Senator, to give that
assurance. He told the President that he appreciated his call.
He told the President that he was under tremendous pressure to
respond to the series of tests by India. He said that he would
certainly take into account what the President had said to him.
The President also offered to send to Pakistan a high level
delegation to discuss this further with the prime minister and
other Pakistani officials, and the situation in South Asia as a
result of these tests.
That delegation will be led by Deputy Secretary of State
Strobe Talbott and General Zane. I will take part in that, and
we leave tonight. We hope we will be able to have those
discussions, and we hope that the Pakistani Government and
Prime Minister Sharif will not move ahead with the tests.
Senator Robb. We wish you well. I join the--the chairman
made a comment that I think is very important here, in
suggesting that Pakistan could enhance its stature in the
international community in a very significant way if it is able
to control what would be the natural, emotional reaction by the
people of Pakistan to what is obviously a very provocative act
on behalf of the Indian Government.
I mentioned in my opening statement that I hoped the
President would reconsider his planned trip to India this fall.
Do you happen to know at this point whether any decision has
been made, or whether any advice has been given to him by the
State Department with regard to that particular trip?
Mr. Inderfurth. That reconsideration is underway right now.
I am not in a position to tell you the outcome of that review.
Ambassador Celeste has been recalled. He is back at the
Department. We are discussing that now.
Senator Robb. What kinds of risks might the region, the
international community be subjected to if India were to move
forward beyond the stage that it is engaged with the first five
tests in this series of two groupings of underground testing?
Mr. Inderfurth. I would like to ask Mr. Einhorn to join me.
I will tell you from my standpoint, looking at the overall
relationship, what we are very concerned about is that we have
seen the briefest of hints that these two countries, after 50
years of hostilities and three wars, were beginning to move
away from that.
Last summer at the SAARC summit in the Maldives there was a
handshake between the two prime ministers and they set up a
mechanism at the foreign secretary level to start talking about
all issues. They set up eight different issue areas, the first
being peace and security, which is a way of talking about
nuclear and missile competition, second, Kashmir, which has
been the longstanding dispute between the two countries.
We were hoping that they were moving in that direction,
which is precisely why President Clinton met with the two prime
ministers at the United Nations in September last year to try
to give that very early process a nudge forward.
We are therefore greatly disappointed that rather than
pursuing talks they are pursuing tests, and that is a turn of
events which we think will have significant implications for
the region and for a global nonproliferation regime, but I
would like to ask Mr. Einhorn to discuss that as well.
Mr. Einhorn. The risk involved, Senator, in this testing
activity is that, if either India or Pakistan engages in this
kind of testing activity, the other feels strongly motivated to
follow suit in part for technical and strategic reasons, but in
part because of the strong domestic support to react in kind.
And with this kind of cycle of action and reaction it is
very difficult to break this chain of events and it continues
to escalate, not just in the nuclear area, but almost as
dangerous is you have the efforts by both sides to develop
longer and longer range missile delivery systems, which
increases instability.
Senator Robb. You mentioned domestic reaction. Could you
comment on that? In Secretary Inderfurth's testimony was one of
the most troubling in terms of, I believe you used the word
euphoria. I was following your text as you were delivering it.
Could you comment on the extent of that euphoria and how or
if it was promoted by the Government in any way, shape, or
form, either in immediate anticipation of the tests without an
announcement, or after the tests were completed?
Mr. Inderfurth. Well, it is a nationalistic response to an
achievement, as seen by the Indian people, which demonstrates
scientific and technological prowess. It indicates that India
has stepped onto the world stage, that it can do those things
which only the major powers have been able to do in the past.
We have five declared nuclear weapons States. It is an
indication that India has arrived on the world stage, that it
should be taken seriously, that along with China it is the
important player in Asia. It will become the most populous
nation.
It is all of those things tied together. It is, we think, a
mistake to be seen in those terms. Nuclear weapons do not make
a great power. The principles and values that India has we
think are far more important as a democratic society than the
number of weapons they have of a nuclear variety, but
nevertheless, it has created that reaction and it has probably
been a boost to the Government as opposed to a setback, which
will make our task of convincing them that this was a mistake
that much more difficult.
Senator Robb. Thank you. My time has expired. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you.
Chairman Helms.
Senator Helms. You know, Mr. Inderfurth, one of the sad
things that has not been mentioned, but I have been thinking
about it all day long, is how many Indians of dual citizenship,
U.S. and India, and there has been for several years a
concerted effort by these people with dual citizenship to build
the relationship between the United States and India.
Now, I myself visited with about 1,000 such people, good
citizens who are prominent in business and have--several
medical doctors right here in this area who are leaders in
their particular fields, and they have been working hard to
build this relationship, and I thought this morning when I was
getting dressed that all of this has been wiped out, at least
temporarily, all the work they have done, all the public
relations and all the working together and so forth. I hope
that something can come out of this that will be valuable to
them, and to us.
Now, having said that, it is my view that India at a
minimum must sign the nonproliferation treaty and roll back its
nuclear program completely prior to any lifting of U.S.
sanctions. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Inderfurth. Mr. Chairman, I want to first agree with
what you just said about the Indian-American community, over 1
million Indian-Americans in this country making an enormous
contribution to our society, and I hope that what you said at
least temporarily will prove to be the operative language.
I hope that we can get this relationship back on track. It
is too important to all of us for the future, which is
precisely the theme, if you will, of the President's visit that
had been planned for November, which is to look to our future
relationship for the 21st Century and those areas where we have
so many common interests.
On the question of the NPT and a roll-back, again I would
like to ask Mr. Einhorn to comment, but it is very clear that
significant concrete steps will have to be taken by India
before the administration will ever recommend to Congress any
action with respect to removing the sanctions.
This will be your action. We will have to recommend it, and
I think we have a long way to go before we see concrete steps
by India that would put us in a position of making that
recommendation.
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, could I amplify a bit on that,
on Ambassador Inderfurth's answer? We think it is too early to
try to formulate the conditions under which these sanctions
would be terminated. They have just only been imposed today. It
is necessary to let them settle in, and we can begin to measure
their impact, but it is clear, and this was the intention of
the Congress in adopting this legislation, that these sanctions
would be very hard to lift.
In fact, the Glenn amendment does not even provide for the
lifting of sanctions. What you need is new legislation that
enables the administration to terminate, so this is a joint
effort. We need the affirmative action of both Houses of
Congress in order to terminate the sanctions, so you can be
sure that we will be consulting with you and your staffs, and
to figure out what are the appropriate conditions under which
the sanctions would be terminated.
Senator Helms. Well, I would say to you that, speaking only
for myself, this having come up of late, if anything less than
a roll-back happens I hope the administration will tell us that
they agree with some of us that nothing happens about
restoration of our relationship with them.
I am going to yield back the balance of my time so there
can be time for other Senators.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. May I
ask that my statement be entered into the record, please?
Senator Brownback. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Feinstein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Feinstein
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for calling today's
hearing. When this hearing was first announced, it was intended to
provide an opportunity to discuss the growing U.S.-Indian trade
relationship, and strategies to give new momentum to what at times has
been a strained political and security relationship.
With the announcement of the three underground nuclear tests
conducted by India on Monday, and the two additional tests today,
however, I believe that we are now faced with the need not merely to
review, but rather to reexamine virtually every aspect of U.S.-Indian
relations. This hearing could not be better timed.
As someone who has considered herself in the past to be a friend of
India, I must say that I am somewhat saddened by this turn of events.
Indeed, freed by the constraints of the Cold War, the past few
years--until Monday--have seen several positive developments in U.S.-
Indian relations. It was my hope that our hearing today would provide
an opportunity to discuss how we could build on this record.
With these tests, however, I fear that U.S.-Indian relations may be
irretrievably damaged.
The three underground nuclear tests on Monday, the two additional
tests today, and the statement by the Indian government that ``[T]hese
tests have established that India has a proven capability for a
weaponized nuclear program'' are, to say the least, deeply troubling
signs for future cooperation and partnership on nuclear and missile
proliferation.
Mr. Chairman, I can hardly think of a more important issue to the
interests of the United States than preventing the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. Each state that acquires nuclear weapons
creates additional complications in maintaining international security.
In South Asia today it appears to be too late to talk about
preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons. India has demonstrated
her capabilities, and it is clear to all that Pakistan also has
achieved the capability to assemble nuclear weapons. Both India and
Pakistan are developing sophisticated ballistic missiles which can
deliver nuclear warheads as well.
The international community cannot successfully impose
nonproliferation policies on India. Ultimately, India must determine
for itself that its interests are best served by ridding South Asia of
weapons of mass destruction--and not by turning the region into a
potential nuclear battleground. We must seek ways to work with India to
help it reach that determination, and structure our policies to make
that outcome, even at this stage of the game, more likely.
Yesterday, the Chairman of this Subcommittee, Senator Glenn, and I
introduced a Resolution which expresses our condemnation, in no
uncertain terms, of the decision of the Indian government to conduct
these tests, and calls on the President to impose those sanctions
specified by the Nuclear Proliferation prevention Act of 1994. The
Resolution also calls on India to work to reduce tensions in the
region, and to work with the international community to lessen the
dangers of nuclear war in South Asia. It calls on the other states in
the region to act with restraint.
Earlier today the President announced that he would be implementing
the sanctions called for under the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention
Act. Although I believe that sanctions are sometimes too blunt a tool
to be effective in pursuit of U.S. interests, in this case the law is
clear, the violation is clear, and I applaud the President's actions.
I believe that the United States and India the world's oldest
continuous democracy and the world's most populous democracy--still
have the opportunity for a constructive partnership. Mr. Chairman, I
thank you for calling today's hearing, and I look forward to the
testimony and discussions with our witnesses.
Senator Feinstein. Let me just begin by saying this to both
of the gentlemen in front of us. I think it is well- known that
the two riskiest potential nuclear flashpoints in the world
today are, 1) North Korea and 2) India and Pakistan. North
Korea is being worked on, I hope successfully. So far, so good.
Mr. Einhorn, for whom I have a great respect, you have
briefed me on this situation between India and Pakistan on a
number of occasions now, and I think it is a fairly foregone
conclusion to the world that both these countries have nuclear
capacities and therefore there is extreme danger.
I, for one, think the President has done the right thing.
He has moved forcefully. He has moved rapidly. I would like to
thank him for that.
I would also like to respectfully suggest that the next
step ought to be American leadership in the organization of a
wide international effort at condemnation of this detonation.
Without it, I am afraid all is lost, because it is my deep
belief that this is a political kind of nationalistic effort
more than anything else.
I am very concerned about what Pakistan might do in
response and would be hopeful that Pakistan, whose Government
officials have reassured this country and many of us in
specific, that they have no nuclear intent and no intent on
developing these nuclear materials, would certainly show to the
world that they have not lied to us.
I think we would urge restraint in the strongest of terms
and, Mr. Inderfurth, I think in your comments you put it much
more diplomatically than I would. Pakistan has nothing but to
gain if they are restrained at this point in time, and this
comes from one who has been a longstanding friend of India, who
has tried in my small way to reconcile concerns with prior
Ambassadors to the two countries related to certain problems.
This explosion was a major shock and a major jolt to me. I
do not believe that if the Congress Party were in control this
would have happened, and so my first question to you is, to
what degree do you attribute these nuclear tests to the
domestic political weakness of the BJP Government?
Mr. Inderfurth. Well, I think whether it be domestic
political weakness or domestic political strength, the BJP has
had a long period of time making its way to leading the
Government in India, which it now is doing with Prime Minister
Vajpayee, so it has arrived, and I guess it has signaled its
arrival with these nuclear tests, which is extremely
regrettable.
There is no question that the decision to test had a very
large domestic political content we have also seen in the
statements, and that is why I wanted to read for you the
rationale that the Indian Government gave for the testing.
They see this as their security environment. They point to
China, which has clearly a much larger nuclear and missile
capability. They also point to what they refer to as the other
neighbor, and the concerns it has about its nuclear capability,
but I think that this was largely a domestic political
decision.
The BJP, in statements prior to taking office, had called
for nuclear testing at times, had called for inducting nuclear
weapons at times, had called for declaring formal nuclear
status, so the answer is very much a domestic political
consideration. We are hoping that the restraint that you said
we should call for in the strongest possible terms will be
followed.
I should tell you that in every meeting that I have
attended since taking office, in the meeting with the President
in New York, in the meeting that Secretary Albright had when
she traveled to India and Pakistan in November, in meetings
that Under Secretary Pickering has had in pursuing our
strategic dialog with India, in meetings that we attended with
Ambassador Richardson, we always talked about nuclear
restraint, not to move forward in nuclear programs, and with
the new Government in India we had proposed to both countries a
strategic pause.
As you know, there was a Pakistani missile test just a few
weeks ago. We had been saying, pause. Think about how to
respond to the new political environment before any further
actions are taken. Regrettably, that pause was not adhered to.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you. I have one other quick
question. I see the yellow light. Let me get it out there.
In addition to concerns which have been raised about
India's nuclear weapons potential there has also been concerns
about its development of advanced ballistic missiles. What is
your assessment of the capabilities of the Prithvi and Agni
systems, and what is the status of India's Russian-assisted sea
launch ballistic missile program? Does this program violate the
missile technology control regime?
Mr. Inderfurth. Mr. Einhorn can talk about both Prithvi and
Agni and the sea-launched.
Mr. Einhorn. The Indians have a very active ballistic
missile development program. Its most advanced system is the
short-range Prithvi. The Prithvi comes in three different
versions, a short-range Army version, about 150 kilometers in
range, a longer-range Air Force version, about 250 kilometer
range, and a sea-based version that the Indian defense minister
spoke about several weeks ago.
About 16 flight tests have been carried out of the Prithvi
missile. We do not assess that the Prithvi is operationally
deployed. We believe that the units that have been produced are
still in storage.
As far as the Agni program is concerned, this started out
as what the Indians called the technology demonstrator. They
conducted three flight tests. We would categorize this as a
medium-range ballistic missile. The last flight test was in
1994.
They have not flight-tested since then, but they have
continued to do developmental work on what they now call the
Agni-plus, and there have been official statements by the
Indian Government recently that, especially in the wake of the
Pakistani medium-range ballistic missile test, that the Indian
Government would pursue and even accelerate a follow-on to the
Agni. In other words, they will pursue the Agni-plus program.
India is also working on submarine-based missiles. There is
an Indian plan for a nuclear-powered submarine that would carry
missiles, but the submarine itself is a long way off. It is in
the development stage, and we do not anticipate operational
capability for quite some time.
They are also looking at missiles to be carried on that
submarine, but those, too, we think are a long way off.
Mr. Inderfurth. I think you can see, Senator, why I asked
Mr. Einhorn to join me for this.
Senator Feinstein. Yes. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Senator Brownback. Thank you. Senator Grams.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I also
have a statement I would like to submit for the record.
Senator Brownback. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Grams follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Grams
Mr. Chairman, I share my colleagues' anger and disappointment with
India's decision to conduct three underground nuclear tests near the
Pakistani border on Monday--and two more yesterday in the face of
widespread condemnation. This is obviously a destabilizing development
for South Asia--India has made it clear that these tests were conducted
to establish that India has a proven capability for a weaponized
nuclear program.
The regional Cold War between India and Pakistan, which up until
now has involved the development of missiles with increasing ranges,
could openly escalate to the nuclear realm. The Pakistani Foreign
Minister has already declared ``a headlong arms race,'' promising that
his country would keep pace with India ``in all fields.'' But Pakistan
is not the only country that is directly effected by this latest
development. India's Defense Minister identified China as the principle
military threat to his country, and we must ensure China keeps its
promises and commitments not to transfer nuclear weapons technology to
Pakistan.
While the geopolitical ramifications of India's actions must be
considered, I am particularly concerned about the failure of the
Administration to detect that these tests were about to occur. It's
hard to believe that our intelligence services were unable to detect
the preparations for tests on this scale--not once, but twice. The
possibility that India would take this path should have been on this
Administration's radar screen. Pakistan test-fired a missile capable of
carrying nuclear warheads that it claims has a range of nearly 1,000
miles. We should have expected that India would counter with such a
response.
Both the campaign platform and the stated agenda of the newly
elected Hindu nationalist party promised to ``exercise the option to
induct nuclear weapons.'' The nuclear tests were conducted at the same
site and on the same festival day as India's 1974 test. clearly, this
had symbolic importance for a nationalist party. Pakistan warned our
government last month about India's intentions So when a U.S. satellite
clearly depicted activity last week at the ``wellheads'' where devices
were ultimately detonated, I find it incredible that our analysts were
not put on alert, and were asleep in their beds when the tests
occurred.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for being
here today. While the geopolitical ramifications of India's
actions need to be considered, I am particularly concerned
about the failure of the administration to be able to detect
that these tests were about to occur.
I find it hard to believe that our intelligence services
were unable to detect the preparations for these tests not
once, but twice. The possibility that India would take this
path should have been on the administration's radar screen.
As you mentioned, Mr. Inderfurth, there was a test by
Pakistan just a couple of weeks ago of a missile with a range
of nearly 1,000 miles, and maybe we should have expected this
type of a response. In a letter to the President the Indian
prime minister stated that China's aid to Pakistan has helped
Pakistan become a covert nuclear weapons State.
I do not want to justify the actions by India this week at
all, but Congress has repeatedly called on the administration
to address this very concern. Is the administration willing to
step up to the plate and confront the proliferation of missile
and nuclear technology to Pakistan as well?
Mr. Inderfurth. Again, Mr. Einhorn--but I would say that
only in terms of the possibility of this. We were quite aware
of the possibility that there would be further steps by both
Governments in the nuclear missile field. We have been watching
that very carefully.
That is why, as I mentioned in the earlier response, we
have been raising it at every opportunity from the prime
minister, to the foreign secretaries, to the defense ministers,
in each of our meetings urging there to be no further steps.
The fact is, this could get worse, much worse, before it
gets better. They have not deployed nuclear-capable missiles.
They have certainly not exported nuclear missile technology
beyond their borders, India or Pakistan, and so there are a
number of things which could take place which would make this
situation even worse than it is today, so we have been
following it closely.
We think your questions about what we knew and when are the
right questions. I am afraid you have the wrong witnesses to
answer those questions, but I am sure you will pursue that.
But I would like Mr. Einhorn to say about the other
question.
Mr. Einhorn. Senator, the reality is that there is a lot of
momentum in the strategic programs, including the ballistic
missile programs of both India and Pakistan. I think it would
be in the interests of both of those countries to curb this
momentum and to put a lid on these strategic capabilities.
In terms of the U.S. effort, as Ambassador Inderfurth has
pointed out, we put a very high priority in trying to promote
restraint in the ballistic missile capabilities of both sides,
and I can say without fear of contradiction I believe that if
it had not been for the persistent efforts of the U.S.
Governments these missile programs would be much farther
advanced than they are now. I would suspect we would see
missiles operationally deployed today.
Because of U.S. efforts with other supplier Governments,
our multilateral efforts to constrain the export of missile
technology, we believe we have managed to inhibit these
programs because to varying degrees they depend on external
sources of supply, the Pakistani program more than the Indian
program.
Senator Grams. Despite the sanctions by the U.S. and world
condemnation, it appears both countries, Pakistan and India,
feel that it is in their best interest to continue to move
forward with these type of programs. Mr. Inderfurth, you
mentioned that the President placed a personal call to
Pakistan. Aside from threatening to impose the sanctions on
Pakistan that are now being applied to India, is there anything
else the administration is doing now to convince Pakistan that
it is not in its best interests to continue to pursue or
escalate its nuclear program?
Mr. Inderfurth. I mentioned the President offered to send a
high level delegation to Pakistan, which will depart this
evening. I think we have to try to make our way through the
next several days in terms of a possible Pakistani response and
to see where we are.
We will make the point that a test by Pakistan will bring
about the same sanctions on Pakistan that we have now placed on
India and, quite frankly, because of the already existing
Pressler amendment sanctions on Pakistan, these will be very,
very significant for Pakistan to have these sanctions placed
upon that country.
So we also--as I mentioned, we are working with others at
the United Nations and the G-8 as well as going out to other
capitals to see what can be done. We think right now the
international community is responding in a very unified fashion
to this. We want to see, as I think everyone wants to see, not
only words but actions. I think that is our primary focus.
The more fundamental issue is, why are they pursuing these
programs, which we in the international community find to be so
mistaken? It is because of their history.
It is because of 50 years of hostility going back--and this
is the fiftieth anniversary of both countries. One only has to
read about those early days of partition, what happened there,
and the lingering historical problems that that has created, to
understand something of why they feel compelled to move ahead
in these programs, including for India with the Chinese
program.
It is through those countries resolving their differences
themselves and lowering their own view of the threat that they
pose to each other that we will see a rolling back and
hopefully an elimination of their nuclear and missile
capabilities.
Senator Grams. Mr. Chairman, I have just a parting comment
about the bilateral sanctions. I think it is very important
that we get our allies or other world members to condemn this
as well. Is that something the administration also is working
on very hard right now?
Mr. Inderfurth. We are very much working on--in our
discussions with other Governments either bilaterally or
multilaterally we are working in that direction.
But I will also tell you, as a case study in sanctions,
there are 28 F-16's that are still sitting out in the desert
which have gone nowhere that have already been paid for by the
Pakistani Government and, despite their feeling that they have
fallen further and further behind on the conventional side,
they will not budge on their nuclear program to see those
aircraft released.
So sanctions can work to a point, but national security
considerations by countries will often override even the
harshest of sanctions.
Senator Brownback. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much. Gentlemen, let me begin
where you just left off, Mr. Secretary.
You said until the mutual threat is perceived to have
diminished, you are not likely to see a rolling back of any of
these programs. I think that is what you said, the essence of
what you said. I think you are right, if that is what you said.
If you did not say it, you should have said it. It is a good
idea.
Mr. Inderfurth. We said we can have some impact.
Senator Biden. I agree with you completely, and I would
like to ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, that my opening
statement be placed in the record, if I may.
Senator Brownback. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Biden
Mr. Chairman, this has not been a good week for nonproliferation.
India's five nuclear detonations have reminded us in the most dramatic
terms of the continuing perils of nuclear weapons proliferation.
One would have hoped that the international outcry after Monday's
tests would have convinced the Indian government to behave more
responsibly. Instead, India has effectively thumbed its nose at the
international community by conducting two additional tests this
morning.
These tests are sure to alter fundamentally the U.S.-India
relationship which had begun to blossom in recent years after a lengthy
chill.
It is difficult to see what benefits India derives from its
irresponsible actions.
As required by law, the President has imposed sweeping sanctions on
India. Other important donor nations such as Japan and Germany have
also taken punitive economic steps.
These measures and others promise to set back an economy that has
only recently begun to show signs of improvement.
India's claim to global leadership and its bid for a United Nations
Security Council seat will certainly suffer because of an act that so
clearly violates an international norm.
If India thought that demonstrating its nuclear know-how would
enhance its prestige, it thought wrong. These tests have stained
India's reputation as a responsible member of the international
community.
It seems, Mr. Chairman, that a weak, minority government in India
has thrown good international citizenship by the wayside for the narrow
calculations of domestic political advantage.
Mr. Chairman, let me outline a series of steps that I think are
important at this point.
First, preventing a Pakistani test should be our top priority.
Pakistan faces enormous domestic pressure to respond in-kind. I commend
the President for engaging Pakistan at the highest levels.
The imposition of sanctions on India should be seen as an important
signal to Pakistan. But disincentives may not be enough for a country
that is already under a stiff sanctions regime for its own nuclear
weapons activities. It may also be necessary to consider extending
security assurances to Pakistan in order to dissuade it from conducting
its own tests.
Second, we need to coordinate our actions with key donor countries
and step up the pressure so that India will cease and desist from
further testing. If India is truly committed to promoting international
security it should immediately and unconditionally sign the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Third, we should talk to China to ease any anxiety in Beijing.
Recent comments by India's Defense Minister that China was his
country's number one security threat created tensions between the two
Asian giants. It is vital for Asian security that Sino-Indian relations
not deteriorate.
Fourth, we should step up our efforts to curtail missile
development in South Asia.
Fifth, and finally, we need to increase diplomacy to address the
underlying sources of tension in South Asia.
Mr. Chairman, in spite of our justifiable outrage at this moment, I
think it is important to keep in mind our long-term strategic
interests. We also need to make distinctions. Despite its grave
miscalculation this week, India is not a rogue state. It is not a
Libya, a North Korea, or an Iraq. It is the world's largest democracy
and it is a country with which we share much in common.
It is a country with which we should have good relations. But these
tests will make a better relationship much more difficult.
India should pay a steep price for its irresponsible acts, lest we
encourage others to follow the Indian example.
But a nation of India's size, importance, and stature cannot be
isolated forever. We will have to engage India. India can hasten that,
but only if it undoes some of the damage it has done. It can do that by
signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty immediately and without conditions.
Finally, Mr. Chairman let me conclude by echoing comments President
Clinton made this morning in Germany. India did not need to conduct
these tests in order to be considered a great country. It already is.
I only hope that it realizes this soon and comes to its senses.
Senator Biden. This is a big problem, and big problems
require big ideas, and we need a new idea. I support sanctions.
I think they are the only alternative available at the moment,
but you do not have to be--no pun intended--a rocket scientist
here to figure out that you can trace India's nuclear program
back to getting drubbed and humiliated in 1962 by China.
You do not have to be a rocket scientist to understand
Pakistan's lack of confidence when it is out numbered 100
million to a billion, roughly, in terms of population.
All you have to be is a plain old politician, an honest
politician in the Democratic or Republican Party of the United
States, to understand that when you have a real problem of
putting together a majority, the one thing that unifies a
country, that moves you from a minority position to a majority
mode, is to do something that your whole country is going to
rally around.
I do not think you have to be real smart to figure out what
that is. That may not have been the objective, but I would be
dumbfounded if that was not the objective. They are dumber
politicians than in most countries if that was not the
rationale, because why would you risk going from being a good
international neighbor to being a temporary and maybe long-term
pariah? Well, the answer is real simple: solidification of your
political position at home.
I do not know many international leaders who have concluded
that it is better to lose support at home in order to gain the
international recognition, rather than have it at home, even if
it is against your long-term interest. We have even seen that
in America once in a while.
So that all leads me to a couple of questions that I have
not resolved in my own mind because, to be honest with you, I
have been thinking in the traditional box that we have been
operating in, in terms of how we deal with India, Pakistan,
China, actually South Asia generally.
Afterall, it has always kind of worked. There is a whole
fiction associated with all of this. It is what we don't want
to acknowledge, that there are those other countries that have
nuclear capability. We all know they have it, but if they
acknowledge it and we bring them in, then somehow we are
encouraging other folks, the argument goes, to think they need
not pay a price for seeking nuclear capacity and capability. We
already know the countries that have the nuclear capacity and
capability. We can name the countries.
So I have two questions. Actually, three, and you might not
get a chance to answer all three. The first one is, has there
been any discussion--I am sure there has been no decision--
about whether or not there is a way in which the international
community, we being part of it, could essentially become some
form of a guarantor for Pakistani security in return for them
acting appropriately from our perspective--that is, not
testing, not matching, not dealing with India's tests? The
irony is that Senator Helms, I think, has been right about
this, although I think he is wrong on the test ban treaty, by
pointing out he was one of the ones hollering the longest and
loudest about China's sale of M-9 and M-11 technology to
Pakistan. I cannot believe that has not significantly impacted
upon the attitude in India about whether or not they should be
doing what they are doing now. I think China is the bigger
deal, but I cannot believe this does not feed on concern over
Pakistan, and there has got to be something to a tourniquet
here. Has anyone thought about or discussed the possibility of
guarantee for Pakistani security relative to India? Now,
granted, that then raises guarantees to India against China,
but Pakistan is where we are now.
The second question, and maybe you can answer them all at
the same time, is that one of the most imaginative guys I ever
served with is a guy who is going to testify next, Mr. Solarz,
and he is going to make a proposal, as I understand it, that
essentially says, hey, look, we know who they are. Let us bring
them in.
Now, regarding various countries, in this case particularly
Pakistan and India, we could bring them both in, get them to
sign the test ban treaty, get them to sign the nuclear
nonproliferation treaty, acknowledge them as nuclear powers,
and lock it down and be done with it, because South Asia is a
particularly unique circumstance.
You may not want to answer either of those, because I
realize this is pretty short notice, but do you have any
thoughts, even if there is no discussion now? What do you think
about those two notions? I have not made up my mind on them,
but it seems like we have got to move out of the traditional
box here to figure out how to deal with this.
Mr. Inderfurth. Senator, I think we do have to move out of
the traditional box. Quite frankly, we have tried that in a
traditional way, if you will, over the last several months by
trying to place our concerns about nuclear and missile
competition in the context of our broader relationship, tried
to make it clear that the United States has an interest in the
region that goes beyond the fact that they have fought three
wars and the fact that they have a nuclear capability.
We have been trying to focus on the economic dimension to
the relationship. With economic reforms in India in 1991, this
country is one of the big emerging markets.
Senator Biden. Beyond that, India is not China. It is a
democracy. This is a country that in the middle of the next
century is going to have a larger population than China if the
rates continue.
Mr. Inderfurth. And that is precisely why we have wanted to
establish a new relationship with India so they did not think
that the only thing we talked to them about was their nuclear
missile program, so we have tried to place in the context of
all of these things, hoping that they would almost sort of have
a drag effect, if you know auto racing, pulling things along.
We are now at a point that has not been a productive
approach with Pakistan. We also want to broaden that
relationship. With the end of the cold war and the end of the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan we are trying to build a
relationship with Pakistan for the future that is not going to
be the one we had in the past, but we need new ideas, because
quite frankly they keep coming back.
We are now back in that box. We are now back in the
traditional box, and whether it be guarantees for Pakistani
security, or whether it be items that Congressman Solarz has
talked to me about as well, about bringing them in, these are
things that we I think will have to look at, because I also do
not believe that sanctions in and of themselves will bring
these countries around where we would like them to be. They are
necessary, but I do not believe they will be sufficient for
that purpose.
Senator Biden. As a technical point, the test ban treaty
does not speak to whether a country is nuclear or not, and were
India to agree to cease further testing, it seems to me, all by
itself, that would be a good idea, and so I disagree with
Senator Helms about the test ban treaty.
Mr. Einhorn. Senator Biden, that would be a good idea, also
agreeing on a commitment not to produce more unsafeguarded
nuclear material, so-called fissile material. Cutoff would be a
good idea, even though it does not go all the way in giving up
these nuclear options.
Let me just say, the traditional approaches to
nonproliferation in South Asia have helped. They have slowed
things down. They have complicated these programs.
Senator Biden. I am not criticizing.
Mr. Einhorn. I accept the premise, though, that these
traditional approaches have not succeeded. Clearly, this week
demonstrates they have not succeeded. We need to think outside
the box.
On the two ideas you mentioned, the first one I am not
going to comment on much, the question of security guarantees
to countries in South Asia. You all have come through a debate
on the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance, where solemn
guarantees were extended. This is always a tricky matter.
Senator Biden. I agree. It is a big deal.
Mr. Einhorn. It takes a lot of careful thought.
On the more specific question, I have not seen Congressman
Solarz' suggestion. You mentioned, I think, what if----
Senator Biden. On what subject? [Laughter.]
Senator Brownback. If we could, we are going to need to
wrap this up. Senator Feinstein has one final question and
quite an excellent resolution that I would recommend for a lot
of Members to look at that I am cosponsoring on this issue.
And if we could, then I would like to go to the next panel.
Senator Feinstein. Just a final question that I did not get
an answer to was when I was talking about the missile programs
and you mentioned the submarine sea launch program. Do any of
these programs violate the MTCR?
Mr. Einhorn. The programs themselves do not violate the
MTCR, which has to do with importing or exporting goods and
technology. The question is whether any of the transactions
themselves have to do with it. For India, most of these
programs really are indigenous, very little outside assistance
at this stage.
We have raised questions about Russian cooperation, the
cooperation of certain Russian entities with the submarine
missile.
Senator Feinstein. Yes. This would be the one, the Russian
contributions to these programs.
Mr. Einhorn. This is what we are exploring. We are
exploring that now with the Russian Government. As you know, we
have been dealing with the Russians on missile technology
exports to Iran on a very intensive basis, but we also need to
talk about India.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, and we may have
some additional written questions. We would appreciate it if
you could get back to us in a timely fashion, and any
statements any people want to put in will be included in the
record as well for the witnesses that testified.
I would particularly be interested in some of the dual use
technology that has flowed to India recently, in looking at
that, and also further into the future use of dual use
technology.
So I thank the panel very much. I appreciate you coming
here.
I thank the panel. I am sure we will have further
discussions.
Response to Additional Question Submitted for the Record by Senator
Thomas to Secretary Inderfurth
Question. One of the functions of the Indo-U.S. Economic
Subcommission, chaired on the U.S. side by Undersecretary Eizenstat, is
to address major policy issues that affect the bilateral realtionship.
In this regard, what steps is the State Department considering in
response to the two and one half year Indian embargo on U.S. soda ash,
one of this country's largest chemical exports.
The September, 1996, Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices
Commission injunction, which was requested by India's monopolistic soda
ash producers, remains in place. This highly protectionist and
anticompetitive action was taken by the local producers shortly after
the Indian Government reduced the import tariff on soda ash and after
one U.S. shipment entered the country. If the Commission's action isn't
onverturned, not only will tens of millions of dollars in U.S. soda ash
exports be lost but other Indian industries will see this as a
successful blueprint for circumventing new trade liberalization reforms
to keep out U.S. goods.
Answer. Following the decision by the Government of India in May,
1998, to test nuclear devices, the U.S. government implemented
Congressionally-mandated seanctions affecting our bilateral exonomic
relationship. The sanctionsresulted in indefinite postponement of the
next meeting of the Indo-U.S. Subcommission of Economic and Commercial
Affairs which had been planned for July, 1998, in New Delhi.
The Departments of State and Commerce and the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative have and will continue to place the resolution of
the soda ash embargo at the top of our trade agenda notwithstanding
India's decision to test and the resulting change in our economic and
commercial relations. Most recently, Ambassador Celeste met with Indian
Minister of Industry Sikander Bakht on June 22 and forcefully raised
the soda ash issue. In a May 29, 1998 letter to Indian Minister of
Commerce Hegde, Ambassador Barshefsky stated that ``the facts in the
Soda Ash case demonstrate forcefully that there is no basis for the
Indian industry allegation of predatory pricing or for the Indian
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (MRTPC)
injunction, and that the Indian producers have sought this avenue of
restriction in the absence of being able to quialify for WTO-compatible
relief * * * I request your assistance in obtaining immediate relief
from the preliminary injunction and expeditious and objective review by
the MRTPC of the facts of the American Natural Soda Ash Corporation
petition.''
I now call up the next panel: the Hon. James Woolsey,
former Director, Central Intelligence Agency. The second
presenter will be Dr. Fred Ikle, former Director, U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency. And the final witness will be
the Hon. Stephen J. Solarz, the former U.S. representative from
New York and the former Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian
and Pacific Affairs for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Gentlemen, we very much appreciate you joining us today.
What I will do is I think run a time clock on 7 minutes, if you
do not mind, so that you can see how much time you have got
pending up here. I will not hold you too much to it, but do not
push me too much either, if you would not mind, so that we
could have your testimony and then go to a series of questions.
I appreciate you joining us on such short notice, Mr.
Woolsey.
STATEMENT OF R. JAMES WOOLSEY, FORMER DIRECTOR, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. Woolsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the
opportunity. If it is all right, I will, for the second time
this spring, speak extemporaneously under the circumstances.
Senator Brownback. That would be fine.
Mr. Woolsey. There are two points to make, I think, with
respect to the Indian test. First, their substantive effect;
and, second, the issue about warning and the role of
intelligence.
With respect to the substantive effect, clearly this was a
major and very negative development. Mr. Chairman, your opening
statement, I think, said it well in addressing the key issues.
It pushes the world toward proliferation and toward an arms
race in South Asia. I am glad that the President promptly
invoked sanctions.
We have been treated for some decades now to Indian
Government officials and diplomats dining out by striking very
moralistic stances with respect to the United States and a
number of other countries on weapons issues. And I believe that
memory, plus the fact that the world really expects something
better from Mahatma Gandhi's nation, adds a certain particular
poignancy and feeling of betrayal, essentially, to the world's
reaction to what India has done here.
Clearly, the impact on Pakistan and its possible move
toward nuclear testing is salient. My own view is that Iraq and
North Korea are likely to do whatever they are going to do
anyway and are not too likely to be affected by this. Over the
long run, Iran, however, may learn some lessons about how to
move into the nuclear club from India's tactics. And all of
these effects are ones that we should be concerned about.
The Speaker of the House appointed me to a commission
chaired by Don Rumsfeld that reports in July on ballistic
missile threats to the United States. And I am sure the issues
that are raised by these Indian tests, as well as the many
other things we are studying, will be more fully explained to
the Congress then. But it is, I think, important to note, as
the Wall Street Journal did today, that India was, in this
matter, taking a leaf from the book that was written by France
and China in 1995 and 1996. This did not come out of nowhere.
Ultimately, one of the serious problems, I believe, is
going to be the encouragement, directly and indirectly, of
other countries to move in the nuclear direction. That means
more fissionable material in the world. That means the
possibility of nations and also terrorist groups finding it
easier to get their hands on nuclear materials for weapons.
Part of the lesson here, I think, for the United States is
that to some extent weakness begets weakness. We have not taken
a strong stance up until the last two days or so with respect
to Indian proliferation, just as we have, I think, been too
weak with respect to dealing with Russia's aid to Iran, China's
aid to Pakistan, and others. And we signed on to an agreement
with North Korea that, although on balance probably was the
best we could have done, nonetheless led many in the world to
believe that a vigorous nuclear program could get you some
substantial benefits from the West.
I have testified before, before you, Mr. Chairman, on what
I have termed our flaccid and feckless policy toward Iraq since
1991, and I will not burden these hearings with any further
description of that.
So, substantively, I think we have a very negative
development. Part of it we can understand from South Asian
history. Part of it we can understand from some of our own
steps over the course of the last several years.
Let me turn to the issue of warning and the role of the
intelligence community about this particular event. You should
always divide warning into two parts. Fred Ikle will talk about
it in terms of strategic and tactical. One could talk about it
in terms of long term and short term. But long-term or
strategic warning is often given in rather vague indications,
which look clear when you look back with 20/20 hindsight. But,
nonetheless, if you assess it accurately, when you think you
should have had strategic warning events should have put you at
least on notice that something was likely to happen.
Here--and I want to stress this--the elements of strategic
warning with respect to what this Indian Government might do
were not matters of subtlety, not matters only available to the
intelligence community. Insofar as there has been a failure of
the U.S. Government or anyone else to understand what direction
the BJP might take, it is a failure of academics, of think
tanks, of the press--if I may say so--of the Congress, of the
executive branch as a whole, and is not just an intelligence
failure, per se.
The BJP has a platform which quite clearly issued a blast
at what they called nuclear apartheid. When Mr. Vajpayee was
Prime Minister-designate in mid-March he stated publicly that
he was not at all worried about American annoyance about
nuclear proliferation. The Economist magazine, one of my
favorites, on March 28th ran a lead article on India as a
nuclear power, and included the following:
What cause would be served by setting off a nuclear chain
reaction? The answer lies in the weakness of India's
Government. The new coalition will be fractious. With the
nuclear issues popular with voters, proud of India's
technological prowess, building nuclear weapons could be one of
the few policies the coalition can agree on, and thus the
easiest way for the BJP to trumpet its Hindu nationalist pride.
Another issue which should have given us all some strategic
warning is that the Indian Government has for many months, back
before the BJP became the governing party, been maintaining
their nuclear weapons test facility in a very high state of
readiness. They probably learned--in late 1995, early 1996,
when we protested--what we knew about their test program, and
decided to bring the test range up to a state such that they
could test with very, very little advance warning.
They probably learned something about our own
reconnaissance satellite capabilities by the way in which we
delivered our demarche. This often happens. I have had
demarches delivered over my objections when I was DCI. And, if
I am to be fully honest about this, I would have to admit that
I have delivered remonstrances to Soviet diplomats when I was
an arms control negotiator that disclosed indirectly
information from reconnaissance satellites; I did this when
Washington approved it, but I knew there was a debate in
Washington about whether or not it was a good idea. So I have
been on both sides of this argument. It is a natural tension.
But it is important to realize that insofar as we go around
delivering demarches to the world on what they should and
should not do, almost always the information comes from
intelligence, and it therefore reveals something about
intelligence sources and methods. It is also, I think, clear
that over the course of the last several years, beginning in
the late 1980's, the beginning of the nineties, we have been
through inflation, principally, cutting the intelligence budget
substantially.
I said when I was DCI that the number of reconnaissance
satellites were unfortunately going to have to be cut in about
half during the 1990's. I had many debates with Senator
Shelby's predecessor once removed, Senator DeConcini, about
cuts in reconnaissance satellite programs, which I did not
believe were wise. And reconnaissance satellites are a bit like
aircraft carriers. No matter how capable they are, if you go
from a large number to a small number, no one of them can be in
two places at once.
So, the fact that the intelligence community did not detect
the immediate event within a day or so of--when the Indians
were probably giving some type of last-minute indication that
they were going to do something on the range--I think should
not be particularly surprising. It is unfortunate, but we all
had some degree of strategic warning. If the intelligence
community had been tweaked to be watching specifically that
test range, day in, day out, 24 hours a day, they might have
given the government another day or so of warning.
My hunch is that would not have been enough time for the
United States to have dissuaded the BJP from the course of
action it was embarked on, certainly given the strength of its
position. It would have prevented a lot of people in Washington
from being embarrassed by having the announcement made by India
rather than by the U.S. Government, but that is a somewhat
different matter.
Let me close, Mr. Chairman--I know I am over time--with one
point that I know was of interest to Senator Helms. With
respect to these two most recent tests announced by the Indians
to be of sub-kiloton yield, it is important to realize that
once one gets down in the range of a kiloton, and certainly
below, the capacity to verify detonations from afar is limited
in the extreme--almost, I would say, to the vanishing point,
particularly if those detonations underground are isolated from
the Earth by taking place in caverns, either natural or
artificial--as it is called ``decoupled'' from the surrounding
geology.
Under those circumstances, seismic signals are really
virtually nonexistent that could distinguish these types of
low-yield detonations from normal seismic events. Consequently,
as one is thinking about a comprehensive test ban treaty with
an absolutely zero yield limitation--not a ton, not 20 tons,
not 100 tons, but zero nuclear yield is permissible under the
CTBT as negotiated--one has to realize that law-abiding nations
will of course, if they sign and ratify it, go along with it
and behave themselves under such a regime. But nations that are
willing to cut corners, whether it is India or any others, in
my judgment, would probably find it quite easy to have sub-
kiloton-yield detonations in secret, even after they have
signed a CTBT.
So if that should occur at some time in the future, I would
simply like to suggest to the committee that the cause will not
be an intelligence failure.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. Woolsey. And I
look forward to some good questioning. And thank you for your
statement, and on short notice. Dr. Ikle, thank you for joining
us.
STATEMENT OF FRED C. IKLE, PH.D., FORMER DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Dr. Ikle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me.
I would like to draw some lessons from this experience we
are talking about today. My first one relates to intelligence.
I think Mr. Woolsey made the point so well I shall skip over
that essentially to save time, except to put down the other
side of the coin of strategic intelligence. As we gnash our
teeth and castigate the poor intelligence community for not
having given us tactical warning to make us feel better, we
should remind ourselves--Congress, the public--that we have a
lot of strategic warning about things for which we are not
making the effort properly to prepare ourselves.
What comes to mind here, just to mention one example, is
the many warnings about the loose nukes, the tens of thousands
of nuclear weapons, inherited from the Soviet Union, in various
areas, which may be stolen, diverted, get on a journey by a
ship or airplane, with the destination of this country, reach
this destination. Here is something to which we are woefully
unprepared.
But let me move on--the rest Mr. Woolsey said much better
than I could--let me move on to the second lesson learned. And
that is the inseparable entanglement of military and peaceful
uses of nearly all important technologies. High-powered
computers can be used for improving nuclear weapons or for
predicting the weather, plutonium to fuel reactors or to make
nuclear weapons. And there is ample evidence in the case we are
discussing today that India's nuclear weapons capability was
accelerated and enhanced by the assistance India received since
the 1950's which was intended for peaceful purposes--assistance
from Canada, the United States, Great Britain, and other
countries.
Now, in our lawyerly fashion, we usually ask the nations to
whom we give assistance, technological assistance intended for
peaceful purposes, to sign a promise that they will not use it
for weapons. And sometimes we even try to add an elaborate
verification system. But now, some 30 years later, we should be
wiser and should have realized that this can easily be
circumvented.
One of the clearest recent examples of course is North
Korea, which had an IAEA inspection, but they simply shoved the
IAEA inspectors aside; or Iraq, before the Gulf War, which got
a clean bill of health from the IAEA inspection. (The IAEA is
the International Atomic Energy Agency.) And this lesson will
be particularly serious for biological technology, where the
peaceful and the weapons applications are even more
inextricably intertwined, back in the laboratory.
So let us absorb this lesson. But somehow with a triumph of
hope over experience, we keep perpetrating the same mistake. In
his State of the Union Address this year, President Clinton
told Congress that he is seeking a treaty to verify the
existing ban on biological weapons, and thus ``enforce'' the
ban. But the administration's proposal provides for no
enforcement whatsoever. It provides for an elaborate
verification scheme, which every competent scientist will tell
you cannot work. So, that is going down a blind alley at best.
And this leads into the third lesson relevant for today,
that the global spread of technology is a force so powerful, so
elemental, that it cannot be stopped with dikes and dams made
of the parchment of arms control treaties. To be sure,
sometimes these treaties can keep the good intentions on the
right track. But they can also be bypassed, even by relatively
friendly nations, as is the case with India with the peaceful
assistance it got on nuclear reactors, or with impunity almost
openly by dictators.
Let us remember again what happened not too long ago with
North Korea. After they violated the Nonproliferation Treaty
that that country has signed, it got rewarded with the gift of
oil deliveries--and Congress is being asked this week, I think,
to make the appropriations for the reward to North Korea--and
with a gift of two reactors, costing billions, for which we put
pressure on our allies to put up the money.
And this leads to my last point, the lessons we ought to
teach, not the lessons we ought to learn. If halting nuclear
proliferation is really so high on our priority, as the
language here in Washington seems to suggest, then we should
seek to convince other countries that acquiring nuclear weapons
will cost more than it is worth. Instead, we often purchase
ambiguous promises from these countries for which we then pay
with handsome gifts. I mentioned the Korea example.
Now, I had made a prediction--and I wrote this in my
written testimony last night--that was a bit more pessimistic
than what Assistant Secretary Inderfurth mentioned today that
tentatively may promise a more effective response. But let me
give you the pessimistic prediction if the more effective
response does not materialize, which is quite possible because
our allies, our close allies, will not support us in the
sanctions, particularly in the World Bank, where it would
count.
I think then we will be under pressure to minimize the
economic sanctions. And I think Congress will be under
pressure. I would not be surprised if some of you, when you go
back to your office, already find lobbyists saying that we
should not be too harsh, it would hurt exports, it would hurt
business in your district. And the President has announced, of
course, as we heard, that he will try to induce India to sign
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. There is some differences
about the language. I could easily foresee some compromise will
be reached with New Delhi, and that the compromise will be
sweetened with the promise of then resuming U.S. technical
assistance, computer sales, aid, and get the Test Ban signed
with India and this will be presented by the spin masters as a
great victory in nonproliferation.
Now, if this happened, what will we have taught Pakistan
and Iran and other countries?
We will have taught them: ``go ahead, carefully design a
series of five or seven tests, accept the American tongue
lashing, let it roll off your back; then sign on to the
Comprehensive Test Ban; then hold out the tin cup for more aid
from the Japanese, from the Europeans, from the Americans
again; and by signing the Comprehensive Test Ban you are then a
member in good standing in the international nonproliferation
community and you will not be prevented from building a large
nuclear arsenal with the weapons that you had just tested.''
Now, maybe the fissile material restriction that Mr.
Einhorn mentioned would make a difference here. But maybe,
again, it would not. These materials are good for peaceful as
well as for military purposes. And you again get back into the
problem of that hard to define dividing line.
Well, that is a pessimistic prediction. Let me close with a
more positive note. Since the beginning of the nuclear age more
than 50 years ago, the United States policy has been to fight
against nuclear proliferation, in our own interests of course.
And it can be said with all our hindsight that we have
succeeded--we the United States--in slowing down the spread of
nuclear weapons significantly. Each administration has
contributed some successes and some mistakes to this long-term
policy.
I think if we can learn from our mistakes, stop repeating
them, we will be more successful in the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Ikle follows:]
Prepared Statement of Fred C. Ikle
The Lessons from India's Nuclear Tests
Mr. Chairman, we have important lessons to learn from India's most
recent series of nuclear weapons tests.
The first lesson is about our intelligence capability--or rather,
about our expectations that our fine intelligence services are so
omniscient that the United States will not have to wake up to
unpleasant surprises from time to time. To be sure, I agree with the
deep concern expressed by Senator Richard Shelby and other members of
Congress that in this instance we did not take advantage of long-term
strategic warning to use our capabilities for timely tactical warning.
But that is an old story, it goes back to Pearl Harbor.
A more important aspect of the intelligence lesson, I believe, is
our difficulty to respond to strategic warning, not necessarily by
trying to prevent every untoward happening--we are not so omnipotent--
but by being prepared to cope with the calamity when it occurs. We now
have strategic warning, plenty of it, that among the tens of thousands
of nuclear weapons left behind by the former Soviet Union, one (or
more) might be diverted by theft, by accident, or a combination of
mishaps, and then begin a journey--by ship, by airplane, or other
means--that ends in our country. We do have the strategic warning now!
But we are woefully unprepared. Likewise, for similar warnings about
biological weapons.
Our reliance on precise intelligence warnings must not become an
excuse for being unprepared should the feared event, one morning, come
as a surprise.
The second lesson to be learned, or re-learned, Mr. Chairman, is
the inseparable entanglement of military and peaceful uses of nearly
all important technologies. Highpower computers can be used for weather
predictions, medical research--and to perfect nuclear weapons.
Plutonium can be used to fuel nuclear reactors and to build bombs.
There is ample evidence that India's nuclear weapons capability was
greatly accelerated enhanced by the assistance on ``peaceful'' nuclear
technology that India received since the 1950s from Canada, the United
States, and other countries. (This is not to belittle the great
competence of Indian scientists and engineers).
In typical American lawyerly fashion, we ask the nations to whom we
sell or donate these technologies to sign a piece of paper promising
they won't divert the technology to make weapons. With countries that
are truly determined to misuse the technology, the piece of paper will
not help much. And elaborate international inspection regimes to back
up such promises can always be circumvented, especially by the most
dangerous and secretive regimes like Iraq and North Korea, but even by
an open democracy--as we discovered in 1974 when India exploded a
nuclear bomb it called ``peaceful.''
This lesson is particularly serious for biological technology,
where the most beneficial peaceful uses and the most evil weapons uses
are much more intertwined than in nuclear technology. Yet, with a
triumph of hope over experience, we keep repeating the same mistake. In
this year's State of the Union address, President Clinton told Congress
that he is seeking a treaty to verify the existing ban on biological
weapons and thus to ``enforce'' the ban. The Clinton Administration's
proposal here provides for no enforcement whatsoever, and the
verification envisaged--every competent scientist will tell you--cannot
work.
This leads to the third lesson, that the global spread of
technology is a force far too powerful, too elemental, to be stopped
with dikes and dams built with the parchment of arms control treaties.
Sometimes these treaties help to reinforce and keep on track good
intentions. But they can be by-passed even by relatively friendly
countries, and can be violated--usually with impunity--by
dictatorships. We did not punish North Korea for violating the Non-
Proliferation Treaty it had signed. The Clinton Administration rewarded
North Korea with the gift of oil deliveries (which Congress is being
asked to pay for) and with the gift of two new nuclear reactors (which
the Administration presses our allies to pay for).
Now my last point--the lessons we ought to teach. If halting
nuclear proliferation was as high a priority for the United States as
the talk and complaining here in town pretends, the United States would
seek to convince other countries intent on nuclear arms that acquiring
these arms costs more than it is worth. Instead we purchase ambiguous
promises from these countries by offering handsome gifts. We purchased
an ambiguous promise from North Korea to halt their illicit bomb
program with the billion dollar gifts I just mentioned. My prediction,
Mr. Chairman, is that we will do the same for India. The Administration
will seek to minimize the impact of the economic sanctions (mandated in
1994 by Congress); and Congress will come under fierce pressure from
the business community to wink and to blink. The President, as he has
already announced, will try to cajole India into signing the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Perhaps some compromise in the treaty
language will be offered to New Delhi; a compromise sweetened with new
US computer sales to India, more US technical assistance, more aid. And
when this treaty is signed by India, it will be presented by the White
House press office as a victory over proliferation.
And, by the way, we will have taught a lesson to Pakistan, to Iran,
to every aspirant for building some nuclear bombs. Go ahead! Carefully
design a series of five or seven tests and let the American tongue-
lashing roll over you. Then sign the Comprehensive Test Ban. Hold out
the tin cup for US aid, Japanese aid, European aid; and make the
donations pile in by going along with the charade that this Test Ban
will somehow prevent you from building an arsenal of the weapons you
just tested.
Let me not end, however, on so pessimistic a note. Nuclear
proliferation has been slowed down significantly by American policy
since the beginning of the nuclear age. Each administration has
contributed some successes and some mistakes to this long-term policy.
Let's learn from the mistakes to enhance our success rate.
To date, the only response from Administration officials has been
shock that their diplomatic counterparts in India were not more
forthcoming with their plans. John Holum, the Acting Undersecretary of
State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, commented
that India had promised restraint in the nuclear area until it
completed its review. Not all countries find it in their interest to
telegraph their punches; that is not an adequate explanation--that is
not an adequate excuse.
This is just the latest example of the Clinton Administration
reacting to foreign policy developments, instead of shaping them
according to a coherent foreign policy. The Administration has lurched
from one crisis to another, acting on an ad hoc basis according to the
developments of the moment, confusing our allies and emboldening rogue
nations. North Korea was emboldened to further the development of their
nuclear weapons capabilities; Saddam Hussein was emboldened to
strengthen his position in northern Iraq; and now India has been
emboldened to conduct nuclear tests near the border of Pakistan.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Dr. Ikle. A very wise
statement.
Representative Solarz, thank you for joining us. I
appreciate your being here. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, FORMER U.S. REPRESENTATIVE
FROM NEW YORK
Mr. Solarz. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is good
to be here and to see some of my old friends on the other side
of the table.
Let me begin by paying tribute to you for your exquisite
sense of timing in scheduling the hearing this afternoon. If it
is true, as I am told it is, that you picked this date for the
hearing several weeks ago, it strongly suggests that unlike the
CIA, unlike the State Department, unlike the Pentagon, unlike
the White House, unlike even our embassy in New Delhi, you knew
what lay ahead. And that is a truly impressive feat.
Senator Brownback. If this panel had been invited at that
point in time, I would take credit for that. We had planned a
different type of hearing; unfortunately, it went another
route.
Mr. Solarz. Let me also say, Mr. Chairman, particularly in
light of some of the observations I will offer toward the end
of my testimony, that I fully share the concerns which have
been expressed by all of the members of the committee, as well
as the previous witnesses and the administration.
The events which have taken place in India in the last
couple of days are, to put it mildly, not a very positive
development. It will stimulate an overt nuclear arms race on
the Subcontinent. It will almost certainly lead to a decision
by Pakistan to test its own nuclear devices. It has put a deep
chill on Indo-American relations. And it could easily lead to a
significant downward spiral in the relationship between the
world's most powerful and the world's most populous
democracies.
Under these circumstances, and particularly given the
mandatory character of the sanctions that were enacted a few
years ago, the President clearly had no choice but to impose
the sanctions which were required by American law. Yet it is
important, I think, to keep in mind that however unwanted and
unhelpful these tests may have been from an American
perspective, they do not really tell us anything we have not
already known for close to a quarter of a century about India's
nuclear program.
Now, the chances that India will totally abandon its
nuclear option under existing circumstances, however desirable
that would be--and it clearly would be desirable--are somewhere
between nil and negligible--probably closer to the former than
to the latter. At the same time, I think it is probably fair to
say that the prolonged application of these sanctions,
especially if they lead to a suspension of lending to India by
the World Bank and the other international financial
institutions, could put the relationship between the United
States and India into a deep freeze for a prolonged period of
time in a way that cannot possibly serve our longer-term
political, economic, humanitarian, and even strategic
interests.
Yet it is also clear, I think, that absent some change in
Indian policy, there is no prospect whatsoever that the
administration would request, or that the Congress would enact,
legislation to repeal or waive the sanctions imposed by the
Glenn amendment.
So what can be done? Senator Biden asked if there was any
new thinking here.
Is there a way out of this mess? Can we find a formula
acceptable to both the United States and India which would
simultaneously enable us to advance our nonproliferation
objectives and avoid a deepening and downward spiral in our
bilateral relationship with India?
I believe there is a way to reconcile these seemingly
conflicting objectives in a way that would be entirely
consistent with our national interests and values. But first,
and very briefly, some home truths. Because this is, I think, a
moment when we need to go back to basics and to consider not
only what is desirable, but what is possible. Too much is at
stake to let our policy be shaped by either legitimate outrage
or wishful thinking.
From an American perspective, it would obviously be
desirable, as Senator Helms and others have suggested, if India
entirely abandoned its nuclear weapons program. India, of
course, has said that it would forego its nuclear option in the
context of universal nuclear disarmament.
The truth of the matter is, as we all know, that China is
not going to give up its nuclear weapons so long as Russia has
them. And Russia will not give them up so long as we have them.
And we are certainly not going to give them up so long as there
are rogue regimes like Iran and Iraq which are trying to obtain
them. And even if Iran and Iraq did not exist, we all know
there is no way the Senate would ever ratify a treaty, nor
should it, which is not verifiable. And no such treaty would be
verifiable.
Some will say that just as other countries, such as
Germany, Japan and Korea, that have also faced nuclear armed
adversaries have unilaterally foregone a nuclear option, so too
should India. Yet, if you think about it, each of these other
countries, particularly Germany, Japan and Korea, has been
placed under the American nuclear umbrella. And I see no
indication whatsoever that we have been prepared, in the past
or in the future, to give such a commitment to India.
Yet without such an assurance, and perhaps even with it, I
fear that so long as a nuclear armed China continues to hold
large swathes of Indian territory, there will be no way to
convince India to unilaterally abandon its nuclear project.
So what can be done?
After the dust settles, I believe we should invite India to
join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a declared nuclear
weapons state, and to simultaneously sign the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and to
join in a new treaty banning the unsafeguarded production of
fissile material. This would of course require an amendment to
the NPT. But if it were amended to permit India, and presumably
Pakistan, to join the NPT as a declared nuclear weapons state,
I believe that India--which would at long last be treated on an
equal basis with the other members of the nuclear club--would
accept and would be willing not only to join the NPT but to
sign the CTBT, the MTCR and a new treaty banning the
unsafeguarded production of fissile material.
Looked at in these terms, the real issue is whether we want
a nuclear-armed India, constrained by the nonproliferation
provisions of the NPT, the CTBT, the MTCR and a treaty
prohibiting the unsafeguarded production of fissile material,
or whether we would prefer a nuclear-armed India which is
unconstrained by the international nonproliferation regime.
Now, the argument against this approach, obviously, is that
it would send the wrong signal about the determination of the
U.S. and the international community to prevent nuclear
proliferation. In the abstract, as we have just heard, this
argument has considerable merit. But looked at closely, I
believe that it is not very convincing.
The truth is that it is impossible to think of a single
country that is now trying to obtain nuclear weapons, such as
Iraq or Iran, that would desist from their effort to produce or
acquire such devices merely because of the prolonged
application of sanctions against India. If far more
comprehensive sanctions against Iraq and Iran have not
convinced them to abandon their nuclear ambitions, I rather
doubt that sanctions against India will do so.
Conversely, I find it hard to believe that the admission of
India as a declared nuclear power to the NPT, combined with
India's acceptance of the CTBT, the MTCR and a new treaty
prohibiting the unsafeguarded production of fissile material
would induce any country that is not already trying to obtain
nuclear weapons to embark on a nuclear weapons program they had
previously eschewed.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
let me just say that as we all know, the perfect is often the
enemy of the good. In this case, by eschewing an unachievable
perfection, we may be able to achieve a demonstrable good by
bringing India largely into the international nonproliferation
regime in a way that would justify, after they took these
actions, a decision to waive these sanctions, thereby avoiding
a totally counterproductive and perhaps quasi-permanent
downturn in the Indo-American relationship.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. Solarz.
We will go through a round of questioning, where each
member will have 5 minutes to question. And we would appreciate
short, concise answers, if that would be possible, as well, so
we can get in as many questions as possible.
Mr. Woolsey, let me start with you if I could. You had
stated sometime back, perhaps clairvoyantly as well, that the
most likely flash point in the world for nuclear war is the
Asian subcontinent. Obviously, with the recent developments
this week, whether you foresaw those or not or just the
confluence of events, do you believe that will move on forward,
that Pakistan will be able to resist setting off a nuclear
weapon? And do you have any advice for us on dealing with
either Pakistan or China at this point, given the state of
events now set up by India?
Mr. Woolsey. I believe I said that when I was Director of
Central Intelligence several years ago, Mr. Chairman, and I
believe it is even more true today. The fact that neither India
nor Pakistan threatens the United States, and therefore we are
not intimately involved in this in the same way we are, for
example, in protecting our troops in South Korea from a
potential North Korean weapon of mass destruction--even though
that is in fact the case--it seems to me that if one looks at
it objectively from the point of view of where in the world
might a nuclear weapon most likely be used in anger by a
government in combat--set aside terrorism for a moment--I
thought several years ago, and I think now, that the Asian
subcontinent, and particularly an Indian-Pakistani war, would
be the most likely circumstance.
One has now, with the BJP, a strongly religious/nationalist
party. One has the festering dispute over Kashmir. One has the
history of 1947. And one has three wars since then.
The one halfway bright spot--I would not put it more than
that--is that these are, at least up until now, two more or
less rational states, and most of the time both of them are
democracies. And the possibility of some type of long-term
stand-off is certainly what one would hope for, if we cannot
have a better solution. Neither one is a rogue regime in the
same sense that, say, North Korea or Iraq is. But it is still a
very serious circumstance.
I think the cutting edge of the problem here now is
Pakistan. I think if I were a Pakistani politician, I would
feel under exactly the same type of pressure that the Prime
Minister said he was, apparently in the conversation with
President Clinton in the last day or so. This is Pakistan's
traditional enemy. Pakistan is outnumbered 10 to 1 by India.
And India's technology is better on most major matters. And
India has now tested.
So, it will be a real act of statesmanship and courage for
the Pakistani Government to forego testing. And in my judgment,
we should do everything we can to try to encourage that. I
would suggest including making it clear that many in Congress
and the administration would stand behind repeal of the
Pressler amendment if Pakistan were willing to forego testing.
I think it is worth a great deal of hard effort right now.
I do not know that it would succeed. My hunch is it is
considerably less likely to succeed than not. But it is worth a
good college try.
Senator Brownback. That is a good point.
Are we, in a long-term basis now, past the bipolar world?
Are we heading into this sort of clashes of various
civilizations that the United States is going to have to
prepare differing types of responses to head that off?
Mr. Woolsey. I hope not. I have been a long-time admirer of
Sam Huntington. But I believe that thesis is somewhat
overdrawn. I think that--and I hope India and Pakistan are not
the first major exception--generally speaking, democracies do
not go to war with one another. And the spread of democracy in
the world has been, indirectly at least, a move toward peace.
I think that people of different cultures--any of the half
dozen or so that the Huntington thesis has emphasized may
clash--I think the peoples of those cultures can work things
out between themselves. And with our help and the help of our
friends and more prosperous allies, including Europe and Japan,
I think we can help avoid hostilities in places like the Asian
subcontinent.
But it takes continual effort. It is a lot of work. And
this last few days has been a big setback.
Senator Brownback. Senator Robb.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Solarz, provocative as usual, stimulating. Let me play
the devil's advocate for just a minute with you, and suggest
that the plan that you have suggested--and I fully appreciate
the wisdom of the perfect being the enemy of the good, and we
frequently see that in other situations where we are sometimes
just too stubborn to recognize that part of a loaf is better
than no loaf at all, so I do not take issue with your basic
premise, but would you not suggest to other wannabes as members
of the nuclear club a rather different scenario than they might
believe was in their best interest by, in effect, saying you
are free to bully your way into the club, and if you can make
it through all of the obstacles that we in the international
community put up for you, then we will put out the welcome mat
and you will get a locker number and the whole 9 yards?
Just respond to that if you would, please.
Mr. Solarz. Senator, I do not deny the force of that
argument. In the abstract, I think it in fact is a compelling
argument. What I am trying to suggest is that in the
particulars of the case that confronts us, not just with India
but with the countries that we know are trying to obtain
nuclear weapons, I do not believe, if you think about it hard
and deeply, that it is likely to produce the result which at
first blush, as your argument suggests, it will produce.
Because who are we really talking about here? Essentially,
we are talking about Iran and perhaps to some extent Iraq. I
gather Iraq seems to have momentarily stopped its nuclear
weapons program, but no one doubts it will resume doing so as
soon as it feels it has the chance, in spite of the sanctions
that have been imposed against it.
And my point here is that we already have far more
comprehensive sanctions against Iran, which have been imposed
to a large extent precisely because of their nuclear weapons
program. Those sanctions--and I am not suggesting we lift them,
because I do not think under existing circumstances we should--
but those sanctions have apparently not succeeded in inducing
Iran to give up its nuclear weapons program. And I see no
indication that they are about to do so.
Consequently, I fail to see how lifting sanctions against
India in the context of India's agreeing to all of these other
things, which so far they have not agreed to do, would send the
clear signal to Iran or Iraq that it is permissible for them to
continue with their nuclear weapons program because you know
and I know--and I would hope the Iranians know, and I believe
they do know--that so long as they continue their nuclear
weapons program, far more comprehensive sanctions will remain
in place by the U.S.
So, I think, set against these considerations, the ones you
have advanced and the ones I have advanced, there is another
set of realities which need to be taken into account. And that
is, is it in the long-term political, economic, humanitarian,
and strategic interests of the U.S. to have a frigid
relationship with India for the next 20 years?
I do not think anybody here thinks that it is.
Senator Robb. Indeed, it is clear that the United States
and most of those who consider themselves friends of India were
working in exactly the opposite direction.
Mr. Solarz. Right. If we could get India to agree to
abandon its nuclear weapons program and do all of these other
things, without admitting them as a declared nuclear power to
the NPT, I would be next in line after Senator Helms and
yourself and the chairman and others in celebrating. I think it
would be wonderful.
What I am trying to suggest is we have tried that approach
for close to 25 years. It has not worked. I think we can get
India into these agreements if we recognize them as a nuclear
power. And if we were to do that, I do not think we would be
saying anything to the world it did not already know for over
two decades. Everybody knows India and Pakistan have nuclear
weapons. Better sometimes to adjust to reality if by so
adjusting you can get some significant progress on related
issues than continue to sort of bay into the wind like a wolf,
hoping that the prey will fall into your clutches when there is
no chance that it will do so.
Senator Robb. I see my time has expired. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Senator Robb.
Senator Helms.
Senator Helms. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to direct a question to the Hon. Ambassador, and
perhaps to Fred Ikle, as well. Now, as I understand it--and if
I am not correct about this--when India detonated the two low-
yield devices this morning, neither of were detected by the
United States; is that your understanding, as well?
Mr. Woolsey. I believe that is true, Senator Helms. But I
am not certain of that. I have not had any direct contact or
information from the people who would know. But I believe it is
the case that we all learned about it through the Indian
announcement.
Senator Helms. Well, let us assume just for the purpose of
discussion that it is true. In that case, I want you to think
with me what in your opinion--and both of you are experts--are
the implications for this for verifying the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty?
Mr. Woolsey. I will take a first cut at that, Senator
Helms.
I believe that a zero-yield comprehensive test ban treaty
is extraordinarily difficult, to the point of near
impossibility and possibly to the point of impossibility, to
verify from afar. I suppose I do not have a view yet on how
verifiable it would be with a very large number of extremely
intrusive presences in a country, with sensors and the like at
many, many locations. But if one gets down, let us say, below a
few hundred tons, down into a few tons of equivalent high
explosives in a very small experimental nuclear detonation, I
think verifying that through such things as seismic sensors and
the like is virtually impossible.
Now, frankly, I would have preferred a CTBT--if we were
going to have one--with a yield permitted something below a
kiloton. I do not know how many tons would have worked, but I
believe the possibility of maintaining the reliability of the
stockpile would have been greater with the possibility of some
of these very low yields. And most importantly, in a way, I
think the possibility of ensuring that we could disarm and
neutralize small terrorist weapons, roughly constructed,
primitive nuclear weapons, would be much greater if we were
able to have yields down in this sub-kiloton range be legal and
proper under the treaty.
With the yield at zero, I have very serious doubts that we
would be able to verify. It is difficult to go into many of the
details of this in open session. And anyway, you are talking to
a lawyer/history major here, not a physicist. But this is
something that I think deserves extremely careful and thorough
study, especially because of the zero-yield part of the CTBT.
Senator Helms. I agree with you. And I want to ask you and
Fred Ikle--and maybe Steve will want to chime in--do you think
that the Test Ban Treaty is effectively verifiable, yes or no?
Mr. Woolsey. I have a hard time giving an absolute yes or
no answer on that. But with a zero yield, I am skeptical to the
point of just about saying it is unverifiable. I am willing to
listen to other views. I am willing to look at what types of
extremely intrusive verification procedures might be proposed.
So I am not ready to plant my flag in the sand here today and
say it simply cannot be verified. But I am quite far along the
spectrum in that direction, Senator Helms.
Senator Helms. So am I.
Fred?
Dr. Ikle. I do not think it is effectively verifiable if
effective means low yield and if it means you have to have
evidence on which you could act. But if I would be permitted,
despite the yellow light, to also answer the gentleman on my
left who argued rather persuasively that Indians cannot be
easily dislodged from the course they are set on; I would say
it sometimes happens. Brazil and Argentina were on the track of
building nuclear weapons. They both gave it up. South Africa
was.
On another issue, my friend, Steve Solarz, and I were
totally in agreement: the only solution for the nuclear and
biological programs in Iraq is a change in regime.
Now, if you reward the BJP with all these treaties, which
cannot be verified in the fine detail, then we entrench and
empower them. If, in contrast, our sanctions make things go a
bit sour in India, and instead the people in the streets of New
Delhi and Bombay do not dance and celebrate the nuclear tests,
but demonstrate like they do now in Indonesia, you may get a
regime again, as we had in India before, which is much more
restrained, which will pull things back; they will not go down
to zero, I agree, but we will accomplish more.
Senator Helms. I ask unanimous consent that Steve have an
opportunity to comment, too.
Senator Brownback. Absolutely.
Senator Helms. But before I do that, I want to make clear
that my question is prompted by the administration's claim that
it is effectively verifiable. And I do not believe it is. And I
do not think the American people ought to be misled on that
point.
Steve?
Mr. Solarz. Thank you, Senator and Mr. Chairman. Three very
brief points.
First, on the verifiability of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, I was no longer here when that came up. I had been
involuntarily retired, so I am really not fully competent to
address the question. But I will say this. I do not believe we
should sign on to any arms control treaties which we do not
believe are verifiable.
Dr. Ikle. We would not have any treaties then.
Senator Helms. Now we are getting down to the nitty-gritty,
Mr. Chairman.
Go ahead.
Mr. Solarz. We can differ about whether a particular treaty
is verifiable. From my view, a principal position is that if it
is not verifiable, we should not enter into it.
As for the other points, I do not think we would be
rewarding India if India agreed to sign the various
international proliferation regimes. I think that has been an
objective of American policy for some time. And I think it is
far better to have India constrained by the provisions embodied
in these treaties than to have them outside them.
Finally, if the prolonged application of American sanctions
against India produces demonstrations, if I know anything about
my Indian friends, those demonstrations are much more likely to
be in front of the American embassy than in front of the Prime
Minister's residence.
Senator Helms. Next-to-the-last word, Fred.
Dr. Ikle. It is a risky cause whichever way we go. But
making the nuclear testing a portal to become a great power
status could stimulate others. Maybe not in this decade, but in
the next decade. Brazil again comes to mind. They are capable
of building nuclear weapons. Who knows how things will develop
in Nigeria. They make a claim to Security Council membership.
So instead of closing a door, we tend to open it and make it
attractive to walk through it.
Senator Helms. All right.
And quickly, Ambassador?
Mr. Woolsey. I tend to agree with Dr. Ikle on this point.
Senator Helms. Very well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Senator Helms.
Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, gentlemen. And, Mr. Solarz, good to see you again.
Mr. Woolsey, help me understand some of this. Because, like
other members, I have seen some pretty sophisticated satellite
photos, particularly in desert areas, where you can virtually
identify a single individual. You have said that it is not
possible to verify the explosion of a device of a kiloton or
below, and yet Hiroshima was 10 to 15 kilotons. And I can see
the devastation that was done at Hiroshima. So if we cannot,
either by satellite photos or human intelligence, tell if
huge--oh, I have lost the word for what you carry wires in or
implanted under the desert; I have just lost the word--but if
we cannot detect the wiring----
Mr. Woolsey. Those are seismic sensors, right, yes.
Senator Feinstein. If we cannot detect unusual movements
around the facility, I would have to assume that the nuclear
facilities in both India and Pakistan are sort of on a constant
watch now with what we all know is possible in this area of the
world, and yet this could not be detected. And it makes me
wonder, you know, if Senator Helms really was not correct that
this means that we really cannot have any kind of meaningful
verification, because obviously most of these explosions or
detonations are going to be to avoid knowledge of others.
Mr. Woolsey. Senator Feinstein, this is a question of
degree. Again, you are getting this from a lawyer/history
major, but I will tell you at least my----
Senator Feinstein. No, I am not a lawyer; I am a history
major, too.
Mr. Woolsey. I meant me. I am the lawyer/history major.
Senator Feinstein. Oh, I see.
Mr. Woolsey. That is why I am saying this with a sense of
hesitancy, because you really ought to be getting this from a
physicist. But, first of all, tests will be undertaken
underground. Second, if one decouples the nuclear device from
the surrounding ground, by detonating it in either an
artificially constructed cavern or a natural cave of some sort,
that radically reduces the amount of seismic activity that the
test produces.
This is a question of degree. And it depends probably in
part on how near the test site would be to some sensors that
might be deployed. It depends on a number of factors of that
sort. And clearly a 1-kiloton test is going to be easier to
verify than a 100-ton test. So there is sort of a sliding scale
here.
My concern is that the CTBT is set at absolute zero. And
there are things, useful things, one can learn from the point
of view of developing nuclear weapons in tests of, let us say,
tens of tons or a few hundred tons, well below the 1-kiloton
level. So what I was referring to was the possibility that
under a CTBT, India or, if it should sign one, some country
that we know would cheat, such as say North Korea or Iraq,
could take a public posture that it was abiding by the treaty,
but in reality be undertaking some tests. They would not be as
useful as large tests, but they could be extremely useful in
perfecting nuclear weapons and in maintaining their reliability
and the like.
So I would simply encourage the committee, as this issue
comes up, to get a spectrum of scientific opinion from
physicists, including, if I may say so, people who are retired
from places like Livermore and Los Alamos, not only people who
are there now, and to get a full spectrum of views about
verifiability and what would be required.
The reason I was not willing to go the entire way on
Senator Helms' question is I think this could vary with the
number of sensors that were deployed, the degree of
intrusiveness and the like. But at this level of zero yield,
which is being negotiated--and we were not always on that
wicket; there were other important countries that wanted
somewhat higher levels, above zero but well below a kiloton--if
we had done that, verification would be easier. At zero, I
think it may be difficult, as I said, to the point of virtual
impossibility.
Senator Feinstein. One more quick question.
Senator Brownback. Sure.
Senator Feinstein. The good Doctor mentioned something
that, Mr. Solarz, Steve, I would like you to comment on. One
has to speculate on why now. Why was this done now? Things
seems to have been engaging into some period of rapprochement
between the two countries. The only kind of new addition is a
new party in power. And therefore, as the good Doctor
speculated, American policy is left with the concept that there
is now a ruling government in India which is very different in
its approach to these matters, and would cause some major alarm
for us in developing a policy to deal with a country, a
democracy, a booming economy, a very significant country as a
friend of the United States.
Would you comment on that, and do you agree?
Mr. Solarz. It is a very thoughtful question. And my answer
is that, as best I can determine, Senator, the decision had
much more to do with the imperatives of domestic politics than
the requirements of nuclear strategy. It resulted, I think,
from several factors. First, you have a narrowly based
government, with a fragile coalition of eight different
parties, and a relatively small margin in the Lok Sabah, the
Indian lower house.
In order to create that coalition and to stitch together
this disparate governing majority, the BJP, which constitutes
the main phalanx in this political formation, was obligated to
back away from most of the essential planks in its party
platform, precisely because those planks were very
controversial in a domestic political context.
For example, they abandoned their commitment to build a
Hindu temple on the site of the Babri Massid, the Muslim mosque
that had previously been destroyed. They walked away from their
commitment to have a comprehensive secular code that would
apply to all of the groups in India, as distinguished from the
current arrangement in which the Muslims are governed for
social and family matters by Islamic law. And they put on hold
their commitment to repeal Article 370 of the Indian
Constitution, which accords a special status to Kashmir.
The one element of their party platform which distinguished
them from the other parties, which they had not definitively
walked away from, was the commitment to make India a declared
or overt nuclear power. Unlike the other provisions, however,
which were all very controversial, in an Indian political
context, the commitment to go overtly nuclear was actually, and
as we can see from the events of the last 2 days, quite
popular. I mean, this has been supported, rightly or wrongly,
not only by their own activists, but even by the opposition, by
and large, and by the Indian press.
So I think they saw in this an opportunity to solidify
their position by taking an action that would be widely
approved.
And, finally, even though those of us who run for office
periodically tend, over the years, to get a little bit cynical,
one can never completely dismiss the extent to which, from time
to time, there are parties and political leaders who believe
what they say. And I think the BJP, and particularly the
current Prime Minister, genuinely believe that India, as they
see it, is a great power, it is a great civilization, it does
face threats which look much more serious to them than they
perhaps do to us. And I think he genuinely felt the time had
come for India to come out of the nuclear closet and openly
demonstrate its nuclear capabilities.
Now, I gather, in his previous incarnation as Prime
Minister, which lasted about 12 days or so, he wanted to move
in that direction, but was told, according to reports in
today's press, by the technocrats that they did not want to go
ahead with an explosion until his government received a vote of
confidence in the Lok Sabah. It never got that vote of
confidence.
Now, I think he felt he had gotten that vote of confidence,
he had a governing majority, and why wait. And in the internal
discussions that must have taken place about what to do here, I
suspect the argument must have been made that in terms of the
international implications of such an action, in terms of its
implications for the Indo-American relationship, no time is a
good time. It will generate a furor no matter when they do it,
so let us get it behind us and move on. Show the faithful that
we keep our commitments when we can, solidify our position in
the Parliament, and demonstrate to the rest of the world that
we are entitled to do the same things that China and Russia and
the U.S. and others have done to protect their security.
That, I would imagine, is why they came to the decision
they did. I do not believe it reflected a careful strategic
analysis. Indeed, one of the reasons I think we were put off
and did not anticipate this is that when the government was
established, at the same time that they said we are putting all
these other commitments on hold--on the mosque, on 370, on the
secular code for the Muslims--they also said, with respect to
the nuclear project, we are going to appoint a commission to
study it, with a view toward inducting nuclear weapons into the
Indian arsenal.
But that was almost universally regarded by our people as
an Indian version of the classic political technique in our
country, where executives appoint commissions to avoid having
to make decisions. And, in any case, we certainly thought, if
they did make the decision, they would wait until the study had
been completed. My impression is the study has not even
commenced. Or, if it is has, it has not gotten very far.
So, if you ask me why they did it and why they did it now,
that is basically what I think is the reason.
Senator Feinstein. I think Dr. Ikle wanted to say
something.
Senator Brownback. Yes, Dr. Ikle, we wanted to hear from
you, as well.
Dr. Ikle. Yes, I have a very brief point. Another
possibility is, in addition to the political reasons that I
largely agree with, that the timing was also primed by the very
desire of this government to have good and expanding economic
and technical relations with the United States, but they found
themselves under pressure to sign this CTBT, this comprehensive
test ban, and they did not want to stop their nuclear ambition,
as Steve Solarz correctly says.
How do you get out of it? You do your tests and get it over
with, and then you sign the Test Ban and you continue with the
economic expansion and relations with the United States. So,
paradoxically, the pressure on the CTBT could have accelerated
the decision to test.
Senator Brownback. That seems to make some sense to me,
Because although what you say, Representative Solarz, makes
some good sense about here is a political party complying with
a promise that they had made during the campaign, and it is one
we can do and we are going to get it done, but they did five
tests of weapons--three yesterday and two today--which would
also seem to signify not only a domestic political component,
but also a component of saying we want to get past the Test Ban
Treaty, let us get all this done, let us get all the data we
need; we will be a certifiable power; therefore, we have
accomplished what we want to, and we can move on forward--that
there was also a military objective, along with the domestic
one.
Mr. Solarz. I think that is a very intriguing analysis. And
if in fact India now indicates that it will sign the CTBT on
the same basis as the other signatories, I think that would
tend to confirm the accuracy of what Dr. Ikle has suggested.
But if India, as it turns out, is not prepared to sign the
CTBT for the same reasons it has not signed it until now, which
I suspect is likely to be the case, then I would think, in
retrospect, it would turn out that analysis is not accurate.
So, the proof will be in the pudding.
My view has been--and I may be wrong here, but my view has
been that we could get India to sign the CTBT if we could get
them admitted to the NPT as a declared nuclear power. Because I
think one of the major motivations for the India nuclear
weapons program has been the extent to which, politically and
psychologically, they have genuinely felt diminished and
discriminated against by virtue of the fact that the rest of
the world treats China and the other members of the nuclear
club differently. And I think if they were accorded that equal
status, which they believe as a great civilization and country
they are entitled to, that most of their objections to these
other treaties would vanish very quickly.
Senator Brownback. My problem with that analysis--and I
understand your point, and I think it is well made--is you seem
to set the template for other nations that seek to do that same
route, whether it is the Iranians or if it is the Brazilians,
in the future. You almost say, OK, you want to get in the club,
here is the way to do it. And it is a very dangerous mode.
Plus, if I might point out, I have been notified that the
Indians have offered to sign the CTBT today, but only as a
declared nuclear power.
Mr. Solarz. Well, I would say to you, Senator--and, you
know, we are talking about a very complex question; obviously
there are good arguments on both sides--I would say to you the
difference between India--and, by the way, everything I said to
India more or less applies to Pakistan--the difference between
India and Pakistan and Brazil or Nigeria, for example, is that
everybody knows India and Pakistan have had nuclear weapons for
a long time--India longer than Pakistan. So, it is not as if a
country which has never had them suddenly develops them and
then we say, OK, join the nuclear club. These people have been
de facto members of the nuclear club for a long time.
Yet, by virtue of the fact that they are not in the NPT,
they have no legal obligation to refrain from exporting nuclear
weapons or nuclear weapons technology. And therefore, I think
admitting India and Pakistan as declared nuclear powers does
not tell the world anything the world did not already know. I
think a distinction in that sense can be made between India and
Pakistan and these other countries.
And, finally, the Indian and the Pakistani nuclear programs
clearly emanate from what are directly perceived serious
threats to their security--in the case of India, first, from
China; in the case of Pakistan, from India--which, in their
view, requires them to have a nuclear deterrent. I do not see
the same kind of analysis being applicable to Brazil or
Nigeria.
Senator Brownback. But to Iran it certainly would, Mr.
Solarz.
Mr. Solarz. On Iran, we have comprehensive sanctions, and I
do not think the Iranians would believe for a moment that we
are going to lift our sanctions against them if we were to do
what I suggested vis-a-vis India.
Mr. Woolsey. Mr. Chairman, just one sentence.
Senator Brownback. Yes, please.
Mr. Woolsey. If I were the Prime Minister of Pakistan, I
would say that is an interesting proposal and I would be
willing to consider seriously joining the NPT, the CTBT, the
MTCR and this new treaty barring unsafeguarded production of
fissile material as soon as my five-test series is completed.
Senator Brownback. This has been a very good panel. I
appreciate all of your thoughts on it. I particularly
appreciate the thought about repealing the Pressler amendment
and its notion as a statement toward the Pakistanis that,
please do not--and here is something we are going to try. We
are going to look at that very carefully, very quickly, because
I think time is absolutely of the essence on that.
I might say, as well, I think our initial and our near-term
goals have to be to assure Pakistan in order to forestall their
testing of a nuclear device--of a premier, near-term action--
that is something that we have got to do in the utmost. I hope
the President--and I understand from the administration's
testimony today they will be calling for multilateral responses
to India, and hopefully to push toward the rollback of the
nuclear program, which to me is the standard we should push
toward.
And, finally, I hope we will consider U.S. actions to
protect ourselves in broader, long-term interests the United
States has. We are approaching, and I think have entered into
now, a new phase of world history. And I think we are going to
need to really be thinking about how do we respond in these
sorts of circumstances. It is not as simple and clear perhaps
as it was, and we have now entered the more complicated phase.
Thank you very much. This was an excellent panel.
The hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the
hearing was adjourned.]
CRISIS IN SOUTH ASIA:
PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR TESTS
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 3, 1998
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam
Brownback, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Brownback, Hagel, and Robb.
Senator Brownback. In the interests of time and everybody's
timely attendance that's here, I think we will go ahead and
start the hearing. Senator Robb will be joining us shortly--he
is coming from another meeting--and I think we will also be
joined by some additional members as well. I appreciate all
those in attendance and the witnesses that are here.
It is a bit unusual that we are holding the hearing. It is
a tough topic, and the Senate is not in session today in honor
of Barry Goldwater and his funeral that is taking place, but we
decided that the importance of the hearing was such that we
wanted to go ahead and hold it today, but in deference to
Senator Goldwater's funeral I wonder if you might all join me
in a moment of silence just in recognition of him.
[A moment of silence was observed.]
Senator Brownback. Thank you.
The world became a much less stable place just 3 short
weeks ago. I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that as
the world looks on, India and Pakistan are playing nuclear tic
tac toe. South Asia is in a nuclear cold war and an unstable
one at that. Neither State has a nuclear doctrine. Neither
State has made a credible commitment to forswear first use.
Indeed, neither State has promised to end testing. Nuclear war,
the horrible potential of it, is only a small step away.
In May, I introduced an amendment to the Defense Department
authorization bill repealing the Pressler amendment. In doing
so, I hoped to give Pakistan a tangible alternative to
conducting its own nuclear tests. My efforts, as well as
incentives offered by the administration, were rebuffed.
Needless to say, I am withdrawing my amendment to repeal
Pressler and, at the same time, I intend to offer a resolution
strongly condemning India and Pakistan for conducting these
nuclear tests.
However, the question before us today is simply what to do.
While the imposition of wide-ranging sanctions was an
inevitable first step, given the Glenn amendment, we are going
to have to look beyond sanctions to solve the current crisis.
There are a number of key steps which I believe we can take. It
is not enough that the United States sanction India and
Pakistan. We must get the international community to act in
concert with us toward South Asia, and I am hopeful we can hear
about some positive results even today at this hearing about
United international action.
We must begin to focus on the heart of the India-Pakistan
conflict, Kashmir. We are not only talking about the fate of a
disputed State in the Himalayas. We are talking about the
national security interests of the United States and its
allies, indeed, the rest of the world, in averting war. We
plead with the leaders of India and Pakistan not to make any
provocative moves or actions in or around Kashmir.
I believe we must continue to engage India and Pakistan. To
do otherwise would be folly. Yesterday, I met with the Pakistan
Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman, and tomorrow I
will meet with the Indian ambassador to the United States. I am
hopeful, as well, that we can have a congressional delegation
going to India and Pakistan to engage in a dialogue, a
discussion with the leaders of those countries.
Today's hearing is an indication of the concern we have in
the Senate over events in South Asia. I look forward to a good
discussion with our witnesses about, what do we do.
We have with us today Assistant Secretary of State for Near
East and South Asia, Hon. Karl Inderfurth; Dr. William
Schneider, Jr., president of International Planning Services,
Inc. and an adjunct fellow of the Hudson Institute--Dr.
Schneider formerly served as Under Secretary of State for
Security Assistance, Science and Technology--and, finally, we
have Dr. Richard Haass, director of foreign policy studies at
the Brookings Institute. Dr. Haass formerly served as Senior
Director for Near East and South Asia at the National Security
Council.
I am joined on the dias by several of my colleagues who I
am delighted to have here with us today as well, and I would be
happy to turn the floor over to Senator Robb for an opening
statement. Senator Robb.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am a little out of
breath, because I was racing over from another distinguished
group gathering to discuss the same topic to which you and I
and Secretary Inderfurth were all invited. The Center for
Strategic International Studies is having an all-morning
session, and because of the time of this hearing I moved my
presentation up a little over there and came over here, but it
is certainly timely and I thank you for calling this hearing.
Mr. Chairman, let me begin by saying that Pakistan's
decision to test last week was as predictable as it was
lamentable. Islamabad and New Delhi are engaged in a test of
wills that not only undercuts concerned efforts these last few
years to reinforce global nonproliferation regimes such as the
NPT and the CTBT, but more critically raises the stark
possibility of a fourth war between India and Pakistan since
1947.
A few weeks ago, I mentioned Kashmir when Secretary
Inderfurth appeared before the subcommittee, and again I would
like to urge American policymakers to focus their diplomacy on
new ways to improve the situation there. There is no doubt in
my mind that Kashmir is the spark for renewed, deadly, and
widespread conflict between India and Pakistan.
When the Permanent five foreign ministers gather tomorrow,
after the meeting that the President and Secretary Albright are
having this morning to consider what steps might be taken, I
believe it is imperative that they consider all the options for
what can be done to cool the short-term fires, building on the
line of control between Pakistan and India.
Reports that conventional forces have already clashed there
again in recent days are especially troubling. While defining a
freeze in cap strategy to head off a nuclear arms race on the
subcontinent is of primary importance, western nations need to
forthrightly address the most imminent threat and that, in my
judgment, is a military confrontation over Kashmir.
In the short term, Pakistan's exercise in nuclear chest-
beating by law requires punitive action on our part, yet
Islamabad deserves at least some measure of credit for
receiving a high level U.S. delegation and listening to our
concerns. I do not believe Pakistan would have tested on its
own. Prime Minister Sharif, for a variety of reasons, was
virtually compelled to respond to India's provocation for
purely internal reasons, much as Prime Minister Vajpayee and
the PJP decided to test in the first place.
Not that this makes any nation's decision to test any more
excusable. I had hoped that Pakistan would take the high road
and not test, and I believe that they squandered an opportunity
to gain unparalleled support and respect from the international
community. Unfortunately, the Pakistani people will now pay
heavy economic price for the decision to move ahead on the
nuclear front.
Over the longer term, I believe a series of confidence-
building measures designed to restore a semblance of order and
stability in the region ought to be aggressively pursued by the
administration to stem the tide of growing discord between
India and Pakistan. Congress can help by giving the President
the flexibility he needs in responding to the crisis at hand.
The Glenn amendment rightly metes out punishment for
testing. All bilateral economic and military assistance has
been stricken and international loans and credits are clearly
in doubt, given American opposition, but the President at this
point does not have a free hand to act, since the law offers no
waiver authority for the executive branch to implement policy
as it sees fit in close consultation with Congress in
persuading India and Pakistan to step back from a missile and
nuclear arms competition.
The fact that Congress must pass another law to revoke
comprehensive sanctions now in place borders on invasion of the
President's constitutional prerogative to conduct foreign
policy. Although I serve on all three national security
committees, I do not believe that I am qualified, nor do I
think anyone in the Senate is qualified to implement de facto
control over our foreign policy in this region. In due course,
it is my hope that the Congress will provide the President the
statutory authority to act in this area in the best interest of
the country.
Regarding the specific actions that might be taken, I am
not at odds with some of the ideas I have heard directly from
the administration officials and in the media. First, on
testing, it makes sense to intensify bilateral and multilateral
dialogue with both Pakistan and India. We should press for, but
not expect any sign soon, both sides constraining the nuclear
program specifically deciding not to weaponize their nuclear
arsenals or produce and stockpile any weapons.
Clearly, the comprehensive test ban membership and a
fissile material cut-off should be on the agenda.
Formalizing non-first-use pledges is an area worth
exploring, even if the two sides have contrary views on the
issue for now.
In exchange, I think we need to elevate India's and
Pakistan's political, economic, and security status in the
world, short of welcoming either member into the nuclear club
at this time.
The idea to help provide civilian nuclear power centers,
perhaps in line with what we are doing in North Korea, is
intriguing, but administration officials should not
underestimate the enormous complexity of such a task.
Second, on Kashmir we ought to bolster our intelligence
collections efforts to head off any potential confrontation
between India and Pakistan regarding the territory in question.
While we cannot impose a solution, we can help keep the
respective conventional forces at a peaceful arm's length by
undertaking a comprehensive information campaign on troop and
missile movements, carefully watching military exercises,
encouraging the use of existing hot line and promoting force
structure transparency generally.
I recognize the diplomatic sensitivities involved in
encouraging a larger solution to Kashmir, but the difficult of
solving the problem in my judgment should not deter the U.S.
and the international community from taking this on as a high
U.S. priority.
We should not be afraid of failure in this particular area.
Renewed commitment on Kashmir, given the new and dangerous
nuclear context in which India-Pakistan relations have now
evolved may be the spur for new thinking on the subject. At
least, I hope so.
With these thoughts, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to
hearing the testimony of Secretary Inderfurth, who will be
integrally involved in the decisions in the months ahead, and I
thank you.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Senator Robb. That is a very
thoughtful statement and a lot of good suggestions, and I hope
the administration can respond to those and the ones that I put
forward as well.
We have been joined by Senator Hagel as well. Senator
Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, Thank you. I just wish to add
my thanks to you and to our colleague, Senator Robb for your
leadership on this issue and the timeliness of the hearing, and
I look forward to hearing our witnesses. Thank you.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much.
Secretary Inderfurth, thank you very much for joining us,
and we look forward to your statement and some questions and
answers afterwards.
STATEMENT OF HON. KARL INDERFURTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
Mr. Inderfurth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Robb,
Senator Hagel, may I just briefly join you in the moment of
tribute to Senator Goldwater. A number of years ago I served on
the staff of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and he was
member of that committee. He was, without any doubt, an
American original, and it was an honor and privilege for me to
have some time to be associated with him on that committee, so
I very much wanted to associate myself with that tribute.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, since I last
testified before this committee only 21 days ago, events in
South Asia have continued to proceed in a very dangerous
direction. In addition to the series of nuclear tests conducted
by India, Pakistan tested nuclear devices on May 28 and May 30.
India and Pakistan have declared themselves nuclear powers and
made statements from which they have since backed away, but
they intend to fit their ballistic missiles with nuclear
warheads.
Indian leaders have expressed their intention to conduct a
national security review to include plans for the development
and possible deployment of nuclear weapons, a threshold that,
if crossed, could cock the nuclear trigger.
In Kashmir, there has been continuing worrisome activity
along the Line of Control, including exchanges of fire and
troop movements. Such events have been common in the past, and
it is difficult to determine the level of threat these most
recent incidents pose.
Neither side appears intent on provoking military
confrontation, though we cannot rule out the possibility for
further provocative steps by either side, and we remain
concerned about the potential for miscalculation and
escalation. We have informed both New Delhi and Islamabad about
our concerns in this regard in the strongest possible terms.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, Pakistan's decision to test was
not entirely unexpected and the administration and, in
particular, the President worked diligently to try to persuade
the Pakistani Government to capture the political and moral
high ground. The President said it best. Pakistan missed a
priceless opportunity to gain the world's support,
appreciation, and assistance. Indeed, as Senator Robb said,
they squandered the opportunity.
I am very grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, for all that you
did in the 2-week period after India tested, including your
introduction of legislation to repeal the Pressler amendment.
While we did not succeed in our ultimate objective, I believe
we did the right thing and, in the process, established a
benchmark for how the executive branch and the Congress can and
should cooperate when important national interests are at
stake.
The back-to-back tests by India and Pakistan unquestionably
represent a setback for the search for peace and stability in
the South Asian subcontinent and, indeed, for the cause of
global nonproliferation and moving towards a world where fewer
States are relying on nuclear weapons for their greatness or
for their defense.
But that cause, if anything, is even more important today
than it was even a few short weeks ago, before the Indian
tests. The United States is going to stay at it, and we are
working very hard to come up with the most promising and
appropriate next steps.
Much as we responded to the Indian tests, the United States
has moved swiftly to invoke sanctions and to condemn Pakistan's
reciprocal tests. This type of behavior, Mr. Chairman, we find
especially troubling, as it threatens to spiral out of control.
Both India and Pakistan have taken pains to assure us that
they do not wish to start a conflict, yet when each has found
itself the object of international outrage, it has acted
provocatively in an effort to get the other to respond, thereby
shifting blame. We can only hope that the two countries realize
where such behavior can lead, and that they cease and desist
immediately lest this tit-for-tat cycle lead to military
confrontation with potentially devastating consequences.
In the short term, Mr. Chairman, we are focusing our
efforts on ways to prevent further provocative acts to get both
sides to end further tests and to prevent related escalation
such as missile testing and deployment. We are encouraging the
immediate resumption of direct dialogue between India and
Pakistan and are working to shore up the international
nonproliferation regime.
In the end, Mr. Chairman, no effort to restore regional
stability and resolve Indo-Pakistani tensions can be effective
unless the brunt of the work is borne by India and Pakistan
themselves. Now is the time for them to demonstrate to the
world that they are responsible nations capable of talking to
one another and willing to address seriously the issues between
them.
These are sovereign nations, democracies both, and they
must find ways to communicate, as they have in the past,
particularly in view of the gravity of the current state of
affairs. We and the rest of the international community urge
them to do so.
Now and for the foreseeable future, Mr. Chairman, we will
enforce sanctions firmly, correctly, and promptly, in full
compliance with the Glenn amendment and other legislative
authorities. We will continue working to ensure the widest
possible multilateral support for the steps we have taken.
A vigorous enforcement regime will be necessary for India
and Pakistan to perceive that their actions have seriously
eroded their status in the international arena, it will have a
substantial negative impact on their economies, and that they
have compromised rather than enhanced their security.
We will firmly reject any proposal for India or Pakistan to
join the nuclear nonproliferation treaty as a nuclear weapons
state. We do not believe that nations should be rewarded for
behavior that flies in the face of internationally accepted
norms. At the same time, we do not wish to make international
pariahs out of ether India or Pakistan.
We believe the purpose of these sanctions should be to
influence behavior, not to simply punish for the sake of
punishment. They should not be used to cause the economic
collapse of either State, or prevent the meeting of basic
humanitarian needs. Wherever possible and as the law permits we
should work to reduce adverse effects on the competitiveness or
operations of U.S. businesses.
In the longer term, Mr. Chairman, we will seek
international support for our goals, including the need to
secure active and responsive, responsible adherence to
international nonproliferation norms and a qualitative
improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations.
We will be looking for both parties to take steps such as:
sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty without delay or conditions;
halt production of fissile material and participate
constructively in FMCT negotiations;
accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear facilities;
agree not to deploy or test missile systems;
maintain existing restraints against sharing nuclear
missile technology or equipment with others, and
agree upon a framework to reduce bilateral tensions,
including on Kashmir.
In order to do this, we will need to work cooperatively
with the international community and will seek to establish a
common approach. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we are in the
process of organizing a meeting of the foreign ministers of the
five permanent members of the U.S. Security Council tomorrow,
which will bring the full force of the P-5 behind the search
for effective ways to ensure no more tests or escalation in the
region.
The meeting will also allow the P-5 to reaffirm its
commitment to global nonproliferation through such mechanisms
as the NPT, CTBT, and negotiation towards a fissile material
cut-off treaty. We will urge signing and ratification of CTBT
by India and Pakistan under the terms I just mentioned, and
explore ways to de-escalate tensions between the two countries
and provide them the means to air their legitimate concerns.
We will work to keep the international community engaged
and will follow up with a meeting of the G-8 in London next
week.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, let me conclude by
saying we believe that the approach we have laid out is sound,
and that the P095 conference can help us achieve over time the
objectives we have established. We will work very hard to see
that these significant steps will be taken and that they will
result in a more stable region and help to repair the damage
done to the international nonproliferation regime.
That said, Mr. Chairman, I regret that I must conclude on a
somber note. Even if we succeed in meeting these difficult
challenges, it will be some time before the world looks at
India and Pakistan through the eyes as it did before May 11
when India tested. Then we were making serious progress in
establishing that the United States wanted to enhance its
relationship with both countries on a full range of issues as
together we approach the 21st century.
We saw great promise in a region where democracy had a
solid foundation, where U.S. trade and commercial interests
were firmly established and beginning to flourish, where
significant opportunities existed for expanding cooperation on
such issues and matters as health, education, and the
environment and, finally, where we were working with the two
main protagonists on establishing areas of restraint on our key
concerns about nonproliferation.
Today, regrettably, that view of the region has been dealt
an enormous setback. In the past three weeks, India and
Pakistan have conjured up all of the old and regrettable images
of two nations hostage to 50 years of bitter enmity, and of the
region as a place where only one issue, nonproliferation,
matters.
I would not want to leave you with the impression that we
have foregone our desire to resume productive, cooperative,
indeed, warm relations with either India or Pakistan, or that
we have lost faith in either government to do the right thing.
We have not, but one of the legacies of recent events will be
the resurrection in world opinion of the old narrow view of the
subcontinent, India versus Pakistan, zero-sum game.
That legacy will probably endure for a long time. Speaking
as one who has worked to change attitudes, perceptions, and old
prejudices about the region, I am both saddened and deeply
concerned by the recent turn of events.
Recently, one alarmed Indian politician asked a very simple
question: where does all this lead? The leaders of India and
Pakistan have, in our view, the immediate responsibility to
answer that question for the people of their countries and for
the international community.
Thank you very much.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Secretary Inderfurth, for
your statement and for all your work since the Indian tests
took place, because I know you have been very actively engaged
and you did everything you possibly could, and yet we are still
where we are today after those tests taking place, but I do
appreciate and want to acknowledge all the world you have put
forward in trying to do that.
Let me ask you, if we could--and let us run the time clock
on 7 minutes each, and we will just go down the road, and we
may go a second round. We will probably go a second round,
because I think all of us have quite a few questions to ask.
You mentioned we all have watched with some hopefulness
about the Security Council meeting tomorrow, of the foreign
ministers of the Security Council countries tomorrow. Can you
give us any preview as to what they may come out with tomorrow
in multilateralizing the situation? Will they come out with
multilateral sanctions? Are they going to come out with a
multilateral plan to try to reduce the tension in and around
Kashmir? Could you give us any preview of what may come out?
Mr. Inderfurth. Mr. Chairman, the meeting tomorrow in
Geneva we think is a very important further step in the effort
of the international community to address this issue. As you
know, there was discussion about the tests by India at the
Birmingham G-8 meeting. There will be a further meeting of the
G-8 in London on June 12.
This meeting of the Permanent 5 members we believe is
especially important because of the responsibility, the special
responsibility the P095 have for international peace and
security. We see this as an opportunity to address three
principal areas of concern. We want to diffuse the current
tensions, including an immediate end to provocative steps,
either rhetorical steps or specific steps such as further
testing or any attempt to weaponize or deploy missiles.
We want to secondly explore ways to stave off a nuclear
missile race in the subcontinent, and there we believe the
international nonproliferation regime, the CTBT, the fissile
material cut-off treaty, are important steps and we want to see
how we can bring the two countries toward a more constructive
approach toward those treaties.
And finally, we do want to reaffirm the global
nonproliferation regime and what the Permanent 5 members can do
in that respect.
We are not looking at sanctions as an element of the P-5
meeting. We believe that the countries there have expressed
their views on that issue and we believe each of the countries
in their own way should bring their influence to bear on the
parties.
Clearly, if you look at the make-up of the P-5, each member
has in its own way influence that they can bring to bear, the
Chinese, the Russians, the French, and the British. All have
important reasons for engaging in the subcontinent, and we
believe that all, which we hope we can agree to in Geneva, will
bring their respective assets to bear on the problem.
We also want to make certain that this meeting is done in a
way that does not seek to isolate the two countries. We want to
engage the two countries in a positive and constructive
fashion. We believe they have made a terrible mistake, and that
has been stated. There has been worldwide condemnation for the
steps that the two countries have taken, but we believe that
the only way we can bring them around to joining with the
international community is to engage them.
And I particularly appreciate your comment in your opening
statement about, we must continue to engage the two countries.
Absolutely. If they stand outside the international community,
we will get nowhere. We will not sanction them into compliance.
We will not condemn them into compliance. We have to engage
them into compliance with the international community.
Senator Brownback. If I could, Secretary Inderfurth--and I
hate to interrupt, but we are going to run the time clock, so I
want to try to keep the questions pointed, and if we could have
that in answers, too.
I would hope that if the P-5 is meeting and we are not
considering sanction regime, we have not had good success with
unilateral sanctions on our part, and it seems to me that we
ought to engage them in a discussion. An aggressive discussion
of multilateral sanctions would be something, or else the
unilateral sanctions of the United States are unlikely to do
much good from our history that we have had with sanctions.
That is one point.
The second one is that I think clearly we can all agree, as
those nations, that no provocative actions in or around Kashmir
should be taken, that that is clearly in the best interest and
supported by the Chinese, by the Russians, by the Brits, by the
French, that we should clearly be able to get those countries
to agree that we would pursue aggressively with the two
antagonists no aggressive actions in and around Kashmir, that
nobody could be opposed to that.
I would hope both of those issues could come up and be of
some thorough discussion and pushing, because we have got to
multilateralize the leadership of this effort to stop the
escalation taking place in India and Pakistan.
Mr. Inderfurth. Mr. Chairman, we will and we are seeking to
multilateralize this effort. Several countries, including
Canada, Australia, the Nordic countries, German, Japan, have
imposed unilateral sanctions along with the United States on
India and several have also taken steps with respect to
Pakistan, although of somewhat lesser elements.
We will be discussing our position and what we intend to do
in Geneva, but each of the countries in the P-5 have already
expressed their views on what steps they will take with respect
to sanctions. We believe that--again we will express our views
on that. We will hear what they intend to do to try to focus on
the immediate issues, including the one that you just
mentioned.
We fully believe that diffusing tensions, making sure that
there is no military flashpoint in Kashmir, and what steps we
can take, that will certainly be on the table for discussion.
It will be a key element of that meeting.
The G-8 meeting will be another opportunity to discuss our
approach, including sanctions, with another grouping of
countries and hopefully, as we tried in Birmingham to convince
countries that an approach that combines both positive and
negative incentives will be the appropriate one to take.
Senator Brownback. Senator Robb. We will be coming back for
another round of questions.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just follow up on the meeting of the Perm 5 and,
Secretary Inderfurth, you suggested that each of the countries
has a unique perspective they can bring to the table, or words
to that effect, in addressing this particular question, that as
you have indicated sanctions are one of the areas where we have
received minimal support in terms of the U.S. position.
This is not peculiar to this situation. There has been
reluctance on the part of some of those countries to engage in
sanctions in other areas.
But what can we do to provide a little more oomph, if you
will, in terms of dealing with the other members of the
Permanent 5 in particular?
You mentioned things that they can bring to the table.
Maybe you could be a little more specific as to what you think
each country could put on the table in order to advance this
cause, or whether or not you think that the United States in
its role in the international community and in the P-5 could
play in terms of bringing about some degree of consensus.
I have a long-time bias with too much attention to protocol
and any reservations that are expressed by other sovereign
nations being accepted at face value without necessarily
reengaging those nations and/or putative partners in their
responsibilities to meet some of the international crises that
the United States is often forced to face without their active
participation, but it seems to me that, given the potential
consequences of a situation that could very quickly get out of
hand and affect all of the Perm 5 members as well as the entire
international community, that this is going to require a little
more assertiveness and--I do not like to use words like
backbone, or whatever, but at least a less passive approach to
other nations' participation.
Can you give us some sense of what precisely other nations
might be able to do if they are not able to support the U.S.
position with respect to sanctions or other initiatives that we
might offer? Could you give us some indication of what you
think they might most effectively put on the table and follow
through on?
Mr. Inderfurth. All very good questions, Senator, and we do
need more assertiveness, as you said, or more oomph in terms of
our international effort.
The P-5 are all nuclear weapons States, as you know. They
therefore have a certain been-there, done-that quality to what
they can bring to the table that no one else can.
Senator Robb. A vested interest in pulling the ladder up
after at least perceived by other potential wannabes in terms
of the nuclear club to have a certain rather closed interest, I
understand.
Mr. Inderfurth. Now, that--and we understand the attitudes
of others, including the Indian Government, about a
discriminatory international system which does not accept India
in that group of nuclear weapons States as defined by the
nuclear nonproliferation treaty.
It is very clear that the view of the Permanent 5 is not to
amend the NPT, to include India and Pakistan in that regime,
and that will be a continuing source of discussion and some
controversy as we try to engage India and Pakistan along the
way.
The countries that are part of the P-5 again have a special
perspective to bring to bear and perhaps can share in some
fashion the experiences of nuclear weapons States with respect
to nuclear risk reduction measures and the rest, so there is a
hopeful, positive quality there to the discussion that the
nuclear weapons States can have.
We should also look not only, as you said, at the wannabes
but the could-have-beens. There are several countries in the
world today that walked up to the nuclear threshold and decided
that they do not want to continue in that direction--South
Africa, Brazil, Argentina. These are countries we also want to
engage.
We also want to bring them into this process--
Senator Robb. Do you think there is any chance of near-term
reversal in decisions that were made by those countries or some
of the former Soviet States that gave up their nuclear capacity
and returned the weapons to Russia?
Mr. Inderfurth. No. The other could-have-beens, Kazakhstan,
Belarus, Ukraine, certainly are in that category. Near-term
possibility of reversal I would place at zero. The tensions,
the programs, the policies are not moving in that direction.
What we hope to do is to take steps that would bring to a
conclusion now the further testing, and especially crossing any
new thresholds. That is the immediate focus.
The P-5, as I said, each of the members have their own
history and respective influence with the parties. As you
looked at the Indian statement of why they tested, a greater
focus was on China--
Senator Robb. No question about that.
Mr. Inderfurth. --than on the other neighbor, as Prime
Minister Vajpayee's letter stated.
China has also had, as we well know, a longstanding close
relationship with Pakistan. China has actually had a
constructive role to play with respect to Kashmir, urging the
parties to address that in a more realistic fashion. This was
when President Jiang Zemin visited the region in 1996.
So we are hoping that China will play a constructive role
in this regard. We believe that it has been playing a more
constructive role on nonproliferation issues of late. China is
the coordinator of the P-5 for this meeting, and so the
Secretary has been working directly with her counterpart,
Foreign Minister Tang, to see this meeting come about in a
hopefully constructive and positive way.
Senator Robb. How about France and Russia in particular?
Mr. Inderfurth. Russia, of course, has its longstanding
ties with India, and not only has the Secretary been in touch
with Foreign Minister Primakov, but in Birmingham President
Clinton and President Yeltzin had long discussions on this
issue, and we believe very much that Russia wants to have a
positive role to play here.
The French, on sanctions, they have said no. They have
said, however, that because of President Chirac's recent visit
to India they want to move India and Pakistan in a positive
direction.
Britain, of course, has its longstanding ties in the
region.
So we believe each of these countries has a role, but we do
not believe that we can stop with the P-5. We need to get other
countries involved, especially Japan. Japan has an enormously
important role to play. It will be a member of the G-8 meeting
in London. Japan we want to work with very closely.
So I wish that I could go into greater specifics. I think
that I would need to come back after the P-5 meeting to see
what comes out of it, but as I mentioned to the Chairman just
briefly before the hearing started, we are getting very good
positive reports from our expert's team, Mr. Einhorn, who you
remember was with me at the last meeting, is over there leading
our delegation. We are getting positive reports, so we think
some positive things can come out of this.
Senator Robb. Thank you. That completes my time for the
first round. I will wait for the second round.
Senator Brownback. Good. Good. Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Mr. Secretary,
thank you for sharing with us this morning the administration's
thoughts on where we go from here.
I would like to pick up on one point that Senator Robb
made, and it was included in your statement, regarding firmly
rejecting any proposal for India or Pakistan to join the NPT as
a nuclear weapons State. Isn't that going to be rather
difficult to do, considering that both these nations have
invested their national interest, their national pride, their
national manhood in doing this, to have them back out of that
club now?
In fact, it was made quite clear--in fact I was in that
general region last week. The reports that I got from
presidents, prime ministers, ambassadors all along the way, it
was quite clear to me as to why, or at least a good reason, one
of the good reasons why Pakistan did this was to be seen as an
equal to India, so realistically, Mr. Secretary, is that really
feasible, to back out of this club?
Mr. Inderfurth. Well, the feasibility also relates to the
provisions of the nonproliferation treaty, which would require
amendment by all parties.
The 186 members I think of the NPT--and again, there is no
disposition to reward any nation for, if you will, blasting its
way into that Nuclear Weapons State category. This would be
something that would run counter to the views of the
international community and, indeed, may be seen as an
encouragement to others to think that the best way that they
could become a nuclear weapons state as defined by the NPT
would be to conduct nuclear testing. I mean, that is not
something we want to encourage.
Now, we recognize that they are declared self-declared in
their nuclear status, and we will have to find ways to deal
with that and, indeed, part of the discussions in Geneva will
be about how to approach that issue.
Their nuclear ambiguity has gone. The veil has been lifted.
They have tested, and so we now have to adjust ourselves to
that reality and to see how we can proceed toward our
nonproliferation goals in light of that.
Senator Hagel. Well, that is exactly my point, and I know
this is a difficult situation. They are there now.
Mr. Inderfurth. They are there.
Senator Hagel. And to back them back out of that, or
approach this on the basis of, to your point, one of the
approaches, which I completely agree with, is engage, and the
other issues that you focused on, is, in my opinion, the right
way to do this. There is no other way around this.
Sanctions are folly, and that is past. We are done now. We
have to deal with reality as it is, and it is a very dangerous
reality, and to go in with an attitude it seems to me we will
further isolate them in a sense. In one sense acknowledging
that they are there, but in another sense they are not there,
is a little schizophrenic it seems to me.
And I know this is difficult, and none of us are wise
enough to have all the answers here, but I would suggest, Mr.
Secretary, that as--I am sure Secretary Albright and others who
have to live with this daily are working their way through it,
but it seems to me you cannot go in half-way on things like
this and then believe that you are going to be able to get
their attention.
You used the term, urge them. We want to urge them to do
things. Well, how do you urge them if, in fact, you do not
recognize what they have wanted to be all along, and
essentially why they tested.
But again, that is not for this hearing, and I wanted to
get your thoughts on it.
If I could move on to a couple of other points, Senator
Brownback made, on isolating on the main problems, how do we
get our arms around some of the conflict and the contention
areas between India and Pakistan? Obviously, Kashmir is at the
top. There are other areas. Maybe you could identify some of
those other areas, aside from Kashmir, that we are going to be
talking about tomorrow in Geneva and in London next week.
Mr. Inderfurth. Well, I do think, as I think there is
general agreement, that Kashmir is the flashpoint. It has been
the flashpoint for 50 years of existence for the two countries.
The Line of Control is not only subject to shelling and firing
but also cross-border activities, which are extremely
dangerous, and we have urged both Governments to address.
We want to see the rhetoric lowered. Statements made by
Indian Home Minister Advani we thought were quite provocative,
when he referred to hot pursuit across the line of control.
So those are issues that we believe must be addressed by
the parties directly, and what we are seeking to do is to find
ways that we can promote and encourage them to do that and
provide whatever assistance that we or other States concerned
can provide, so that is number one.
Number two, the broader area of peace and security, that
relates to their nuclear and missile activities. The Indians
have declared a unilateral moratorium on further testing,
nuclear testing. We would like to see Pakistan, if you will,
have a tit-for-tat response there, since they seem to have tit-
for-tat responses on other issues, and declare also a
unilateral moratorium.
We would like to see them move forward with a joint
declaration, the two of them, that they will not weaponize and
that they will not deploy any of their variety of missiles,
whether they be Prithri or Agni or Gowri, or others that they
may be contemplating.
We think there are steps that they can take that would
reduce those tensions. We think that there are steps that they
could take to think seriously about nuclear risk reduction
activities.
Interestingly, when Secretary Raganoth was here, the Indian
Foreign Secretary, on May 1, after his meetings at the
Department we took him to the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center at
the State Department for him to see how that is established,
what the procedures are, and how we communicate in that room,
on the sixth floor of the State Department, to see that we do
not have miscalculation or mishap. Those are steps they can
take.
We also believe that it is important for there to be a
discussion between China and India. They have been having
border discussions going back to their conflict in 1962. The
Chinese army chief of staff recently visited New Delhi. We
would hope that they could have discussions to ease concerns
between the two giants of Asia so that the reasons that Prime
Minister Vajpayee said were part of their calculation in
determining that they would test, that they could be used as
well.
So all of those things we think are the important security
issues that need to be addressed immediately.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Senator Hagel.
Secretary Inderfurth, by our analysis, how many weapons,
how many nuclear devices did India test, and how many did
Pakistan test, by our determination?
Mr. Inderfurth. Less than they said. The precise numbers I
think are still being looked at, and I think that may be one of
those areas where I would need to discuss with you and members
of the committee more privately.
The assessment is being done of the two separate series of
tests that both countries conducted. In terms of our assessment
of how many test yields, implications for weapons design or
other elements, I think I would rather ask some of our experts
to sit down with you on that.
Senator Brownback. Do we know how many different devices
were tested by both India and Pakistan?
Mr. Inderfurth. Again, we believe less than publicly
stated, but there are some highly technical issues as far as
the simultaneity of some of these tests that are still being
looked at very closely. We have good information, information
that is not only ours but others, in terms of seismic
monitoring that we are going through.
Senator Brownback. There has been--what I have seen today
is, we are not certain exactly what was tested on both sides.
We know that there were tests, but there are questions as
to exactly what was tested and the number of devices which, as
you might guess, leads a number of people here on the Hill to
have questions about verifiability of the test ban treaty.
That is something the administration has raised a number of
times, and legitimately so, as a key issue involved here, but a
number of people on the Hill have grave questions about
verifiability, because we have been down this road so much
before of having treaties that were then not verifiable, so
this is something we are going to want to have good answers to,
whether we knew this time around or if we did not know this
time around.
Mr. Inderfurth. I think these, Senator, are perfectly
legitimate questions, and I think that if you will this can be
something of a case study of our capability, and I think that
the administration would be very pleased to sit down with you
and other members of the committee and other committees to go
through this in closed session.
Senator Brownback. One thing I noted in your testimony, in
looking through it, you were talking about the steps we were
going to try to get in cooperation with the international
community and what we wanted these two parties to do. You
listed sign and ratify CTBT without delay or condition, and
then five other items.
You did not list join the NPT, and you note earlier about,
we firmly reject any proposal for India or Pakistan to join the
NPT as a nuclear weapons State. It seems to me that we need to
put in that list of things join the NPT as a nonnuclear State,
and I know you have had discussions here with other members.
You are going to have a lot of discussions about this very
point, but it seems to me really quite critical, their
membership of the NPT as a nonnuclear State, that you cannot
blast your way into a nuclear State, and that this is going to
be a very big issue not only with these two nations, but as we
look down the road towards Iran, a possibility of other nations
wanting to take a similar path into this.
So I would ask that you look at that very carefully,
because I think we are setting the example for what happens
into the future and I again want to press my point that I think
the administration should be doing all it possibly can,
sanctioning companies that are supplying technology to the
Iranians that are nuclear or missile technology.
That is off of this hearing, but really it is not, because
you are setting the course for how a country gets into the
nuclear club, and it is terribly destabilizing around the
world, so choices made now will have consequences for years to
come and I hope you would continue to push them to be a part of
it as a nonnuclear State no matter the difficulty with that
taking place.
Mr. Inderfurth. The steps that we have laid out here, those
things which we are looking for both parties to do--and this is
an illustrative series of steps, not a definitive series of
steps at this time and, indeed, it is something that we will
want to discuss further with Members of Congress for your
ideas. Indeed, on the NPT, that, of course, is something that
we have looked at.
If we say that India and Pakistan are not to be admitted to
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty through amendment and
become Nuclear Weapons States as defined by the treaty, the
only other way they could become a part of the NPT is to come
in as a Nonnuclear Weapons State, which would mean that they
would commit themselves at this time to eliminate totally their
arsenals of nuclear weapons and to cease and desist all of
their programs relating to their nuclear activities.
We do not believe that that is a reasonable demand to make
of them at this stage. We are saying that they are escalating
up, not de-escalating down. We think that our goal and
objective should be for them to take the steps that other
States have taken, which is to eliminate their programs, and we
will continue to urge them to do that.
But in terms of where we are today, and what reasonable
prospect we have for getting them to join with the
international community to address this problem in a serious
fashion, we think asking them to join as a nonnuclear weapons
State is simply beyond the pale.
At a later stage, that would certainly be our hope and
intention.
Senator Brownback. Well, what is the statement you just
made to Iran, then?
Mr. Inderfurth. Our statement to Iran is being pursued in a
variety of ways, including hopefully with some of those members
of the P-5 that we will be working with.
We do not think that we are, in terms of the Iranians,
doing anything that will encourage them. In fact, the sanctions
that we have placed, the work that we are doing to see that
this situation does not get further out of hand, all of these
steps we think will have a message in Tehran, but I take the
point, and I understand. There are no simple answers in this
strategy to stop further proliferation around the world.
Senator Brownback. And I would note, too, the
administration just waived sanctions on Iran, and we have had
spirited discussion about this. I think that is an
inappropriate step.
I think we will live to regret it sooner rather than later,
and I would ask you to rethink about the long-term strategy
that the statements that are being pursued at this point by the
administration--we are entering a new chapter here, and we all
know it is a dangerous chapter, and how you play that first few
steps is going to determine where we are going to be down the
road, and I think we are going to get down this road pretty
fast.
I am afraid we are going to get down this road pretty fast,
and I do not know that these are the wisest routes for us to
pursue, so I hope you will circle back around and look at that
fork in the road again as to which way you are going with it,
and I will certainly be putting forward my suggestions on that.
Senator Robb.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I might just add parenthetically that in the Intelligence
Committee we have had some briefings, and you might want to
take advantage of information that we have available on some of
the questions that you raised earlier.
Let me ask if you think, Secretary Inderfurth, a
nonproliferation summit--number 1, is it possible to include
both Sharif and Vajpayee and, if it is possible, is it--in your
judgment, is it wise and could we expect any real progress to
be made?
There are a number of folks that believe that knocking some
heads together, or at least bringing the heads in a serious
discussion, is going to be crucial. Would you comment on,
number 1, the doability and the likelihood of any success, if
in your judgment it is doable in the near term for some sort of
a nonproliferation summit?
Mr. Inderfurth. Senator Robb, I think that it is going to
be terribly important for Prime Minister Sharif and Prime
Minister Vajpayee to be part of this process.
I would suggest that rather than a nonproliferation summit
that it should be a security summit because from their
perspective it is security that is at stake and not
nonproliferation, if we come at this through meeting security
concerns.
Senator Robb. I will take that exception--I mean, that
suggestion as a way to reposition it so that it might be more
broadly acceptable. Would you respond, then, in that context?
Mr. Inderfurth. In that context, I would say this is
certainly something that would be a positive step to have them
involved in a summit which addresses security concerns and how
they and we go about defusing the situation and what steps the
international community can do in support of--regrettably, even
though there is a hot line that exists between New Delhi and
Islamabad--
Senator Robb. Do you have any reason to believe it has been
used since it has been installed?
Mr. Inderfurth. It has been used since it has been
installed, but not in the present crisis, to our knowledge, and
that is very regrettable, particularly since there have been
statements made by high Indian officials, including Mr. Advani,
high Pakistan officials, including the Foreign Minister and
regrettably scientists and engineers on both sides who keep
touting what they can and cannot do and when they intend to do
it, which has inflamed the situation.
We think it would be most appropriate if the two prime
ministers picked up the phone as Prime Minister Sharif and
Prime Minister Gujral did in the past and say, okay, let us
lower the rhetoric. Let us start talking. We want to see them
resume that dialogue that a year ago we thought had some
promise to it, and we have been very disappointed, but we think
that a summit and engaging India and Pakistan at that level
would be a very appropriate step.
Senator Robb. Some of the comments by former Prime Minister
Gujral have been consistent with his approach during the 11
months, or whatever it was, that he was prime minister in
recent days.
Mr. Inderfurth. He said recently that if one report
indicated that nuclear weapons had been transferred to the
armed forces--
Senator Robb. God help us.
Mr. Inderfurth. God help us, right.
Senator Robb. I remember reading that.
Let me ask you whether or not you think this process would
benefit from the dispatch by the United States of a Holbrooke-
type figure or person to work that issue exclusively in a
shuttle or other arrangement for some extended period of time
until such time as we brought about results and even in the
context of an earlier question would a Madrid-type 1992 summit
be a good example?
Mr. Inderfurth. All of these are options, quite frankly,
that we are looking at. An important prerequisite will be the
willingness of the two Governments to accept and work with any
such approach, whether it be a shuttle approach, or a Madrid
approach, or any combination thereof.
What we will be doing, obviously, in Geneva and then in
London is to explore this with our colleagues in the P-5 and
the G-8 as well as with others to see what would be the best
way to do it.
We do not have at this stage a plan to dispatch a team.
Quite frankly, we would like to hear from the Indians and the
Pakistanis what their intentions are, what their plans are. We
would like to hear from them.
We have had contacts at the State Department and we
recently had the delegation from Pakistan with Senator Zaki as
well as Colonel Siman. I think they came up on Capitol Hill and
met with many of you.
We want to hear from them, especially what their intentions
are to try to diffuse the situation, but we are looking at a
variety of options about how to diplomatically address this,
but we are going to need their help and their agreement and
cooperation if we are going to make any progress.
Senator Robb. Both countries, I might add, are in the
process of dispatching a number of high level and intermediate
figures to consult with both the administration and the
Congress.
I understand the chairman made a suggestion for a CODEL to
visit the region. I wonder what your reaction--with the
specific purpose of focusing on the issues that we have talked
about.
I would have to say that first of all I join in and would
be delighted to pair with my chairman in this instance. My
track record in most recent visits to the region was not good.
2 days after visiting with then-Prime Minister Gujral his
Government fell, and 5 days after leaving Islamabad the
President's authority was significantly undercut.
In any event, it seems to me that there is considerable
anxiety on the part of Members of the Congress, particularly
those who are not involved in national security or
international affairs, in getting some reliable information and
participating to the extent that it can be constructive and
helpful, as opposed to some of the other possibilities for
congressional participation, which do not always fall in that
category.
Any comment?
Mr. Inderfurth. Senator Robb, I want to let you know that
in terms of track records, that none of our track records are
unvarnished in this respect, so I hope you do not feel alone in
that category. Some very unfortunate events occurred shortly
after my last trip to the region, so I think we all feel that.
I think it would be a very useful thing for a congressional
delegation to go to the two countries. I think that we need to
see a little bit further in terms of the P-5 meeting and the G-
8 so that we can inform you of where we think we are.
I think it would be very important for them to hear
directly from Members of Congress our concerns, our
suggestions, and to solicit or elicit from them their
intentions, let them know that this is a concern that is across
the board in terms of Washington as well as the international
community. I think a congressional delegation could serve a
very useful purpose in that respect.
I also appreciate the comments you made earlier about the
President needing some greater degree of flexibility in dealing
with this, and I think this is something we would like to
pursue with you and discuss, because I think we do need that
element of flexibility right now in the situation that we have
not been confronted with before, and we need to see how best we
can respond to it.
Senator Robb. In that regard, I am not suggesting we do
anything to undercut the response that is required by current
legislation.
Mr. Inderfurth. Nor are we.
Senator Robb. I want to make that clear, but looking down
the road it seems to me additional flexibility and the ability
to employ both carrots and sticks if they can be effectively
factored into the equation may be useful.
At the very least it seems to me this is an area where the
greater flexibility given to the President is going to
ultimately pay some dividends and the Congress ultimately does
not want to be in a position of having tied the President's
hands in areas where a little more flexibility might rapidly
advance the goals that some are seeking.
In any event, my time has expired.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you.
Senator Brownback. Thank you. It strikes me if we go we
need to do quite a bit of listening, too, and to try to hear
what it is that we can hear that can be useful and helpful to
the countries involved.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I might add, Mr. Secretary, that I agree with Senator Robb.
I made a couple of remarks on the floor of the Senate yesterday
morning and one of the things that I said was that I think
there has not been a time since World War II when it is more
important and especially for the future of this country and the
world, when a strong bipartisan American foreign policy should
be put in place.
That means the Congress needs to work with the
administration, and I went further in saying it is important
that we not allow any foreign policy differences to unravel in
front of the world at this particular time.
We have got differences. We have constitutional
responsibilities up here, as you know, as the President does.
We can differ on things, but to the outside world we need to be
united, and these kinds of particular activities like CODEL's
to regions working with the administration I think are
extremely important, that acknowledging not only that we are
together on this, but acknowledging this is a very dangerous
and complicated world, full of great hope and opportunity, but
nevertheless, if we make some wrong decisions here in the next
few years we will suffer the consequences, and so I add my
support, Senator Robb, to your remarks.
A couple of areas I want to go back to. Your reference to
dialogue in urging and not isolating these nations, which as I
have already said I agree with, are we going to be framing this
up and paying particular attention to trying to define the
mutual interest common denominator in this case of India and
Pakistan, trying to develop an agenda where both these nations
have, as they do, significant mutual interest, where we can
start in a positive way as we engage them?
Mr. Inderfurth. Senator, that has been precisely the
approach we have been following during my tenure as Assistant
Secretary to try to encourage them to focus on those positive
elements. Trade, cultural, energy cooperation, all of those
areas are the ones that we have been trying to encourage them
to devote their resources and their own activities.
We continue to believe that if they could move in that
direction it would unlock great potential in South Asia, so we
will, of course, continue to encourage them to do that.
Regrettably, they keep getting drawn back into the mutual
hostility which they have had for these past 50 years.
I mean, again, this is the 50th Anniversary. It will be the
50th Anniversary until August 15. This was not the way they
should be celebrating it. They should have been moving to the
next 50 years with this behind them.
So the answer, yes, certainly we will be looking to
encourage them in more positive directions.
Senator Hagel. On a couple of the questions that have been
raised previously concerning the next outer ring of, Senator
Robb put it nuclear wannabes, are we in touch with that group,
with nations--
Mr. Inderfurth. Yes. We are in touch with those nations in
a variety of ways through our public statements and through
third parties. We are very aware of the implications for what
we are doing here, and this goes back to something the chairman
raised with respect to the NPT, very aware of the implications
of how we handle this, what signal that will send to the
wannabes.
What I would like to suggest there is that we continue our
discussions with you on that. We have again--I regret that I do
not have Mr. Einhorn to be able to turn to, since he is our
lead nonproliferation expert at the Department. He will be
back, along with myself, from Geneva on Friday morning in the
early morning hours.
I think that is something that he would be more than
pleased to come up and sit down with you in a hearing, or
however you wanted to proceed with that discussion, but we are
very aware of the implications of what we are doing now for our
nonproliferation policy and those that would like to blast
their way into the scene.
Senator Hagel. Are we communicating with Iran in any way?
Mr. Inderfurth. Senator, the only communications that I
personally am aware of in terms of Iran are the ones that I
have been taking part in as part of my South Asia portfolio.
On the issue of Afghanistan there is in New York a group
called the Six Plus Two, which are the neighbors of
Afghanistan, plus the U.S. and Russia, where we have been
trying, again unsuccessfully, to move the Taliban and the
Northern Alliance towards some peaceful resolution of their
conflict.
In that connection, the Iranians are in the room; but there
are no other communications beyond that in this U.N. context.
That is the extent of my involvement with Iran in my South
Asian capacity, but we will certainly provide you additional
information on that.
Senator Hagel. One additional comment, and I know my time
is up, but I think this might present some opportunities for us
as well as for the world. It gives us an opportunity to start
to open up, the complications, in this particular part of the
world, but also it allows us an opportunity to focus on the
completeness of the interconnects here in this part of the
world.
You know as well as anyone geopolitical, military, economic
power shifts that are occurring in the world today in the
alliances, alignments, and this gives us an opportunity to get
into it in a very legitimate, basic way, to help forge some
policies for the future, and I would hope that this opportunity
is not lost and that we are looking at this in a very expansive
way, not just isolated on the complications of today.
Thank you.
Mr. Inderfurth. I understand the point.
Senator Hagel. Thank you very much.
Senator Brownback. Some have suggested we have been living
a lie for a while in denying these nations nuclear capacity,
and we are just looking the other way, and now we can no longer
do that and it is a chance to open up and deal openly with
this, but I do hope as we start doing that, the other nations
that are watching, that we put a right course on this, and we
will be working with you and pushing that aggressively both
with you privately and publicly, that we set a striking course
so that our children and our children's children can feel safe
and secure in this world.
Secretary Inderfurth, thank you for joining us. We
appreciate that very much. Godspeed to you. You are going to
need it. There are a lot of tough days ahead. Good luck.
Mr. Inderfurth. Senator, may I first thank you for that,
and may I just make one comment.
In terms of the nuclear programs and looking the other way,
we have been looking very closely at this. Obviously we have
not been as successful as we would have liked to have been, but
as a result of recent events and Pakistan's decision to go
ahead with a nuclear test, I reread the conversation that
Secretary Albright had with Prime Minister Sharif in Islamabad
in November and in that conversation she identified Pakistan's
nuclear policies as the key problem in our effort to create a
modern U.S.-Pakistan relationship, and encouraged Sharif to
rethink Pakistan's weapons programs. That is a brief extract
from that.
We have been focusing on this very diligently to try to get
them to address this issue both in Islamabad and New Delhi.
Regrettably, we have not been successful. We now have to
redouble our efforts and see what we can do in light of this,
but the nuclear ambiguity has gone. The veil has been lifted.
Perhaps that will provide us some new opportunities, and we
will be looking at those.
Thank you very much.
Senator Brownback. Thank you.
The next panel will be the Hon. William Schneider,
president, National Planning Services, former Under Secretary
of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, and
Dr. Richard Haass, director of foreign policy studies,
Brookings Institution, and former Senior Director, Near East
and South Asia Bureau for the National Security Council.
We would call those two gentlemen to the table.
Mr. Schneider, thank you very much for joining us. The
floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, JR., PRESIDENT,
INTERNATIONAL PLANNING SERVICES, AND FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I have a brief
statement which I have prepared and, with your permission, I
can submit it for the record and make a few remarks.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I am William
Schneider, Jr., and serve as adjunct fellow of the Hudson
Institute and have my own international trade and financial
services business. During my service in the Federal Government
I was Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance,
Science, and Technology, and was responsible for, among other
areas, our military assistance program with Pakistan.
The question of security in the region is of great interest
to me, and I was very reassured by Secretary Inderfurth's focus
on the question of security in response to Senator Robb's
remarks about a security-oriented conference.
Just a few remarks first on the question of the India and
Pakistan nuclear tests. I think first we should understand
that, although the veil of nuclear ambiguity is lifted, neither
country needed to conduct the tests to demonstrate its ability
to produce a device with nuclear yield.
Indeed, Pakistan did not need to weaponize, because they
received a nuclear device that had been obtained from China, or
received the design for a nuclear device that was tested by
China in 1966 and, of course, India had a nuclear test in 1974
and so it had resolved the problem of achieving a nuclear
yield.
The current series of tests are likely to be associated
with weaponization of a device, rather than the ability to
demonstrate nuclear capabilities.
I want to just make a few remarks about the proliferation
problem and then, in response to the chairman's opening
remarks, perhaps a few suggestions about how we might be able
to deal with this.
The focus on security I think is very important, because
any resolution of this problem will need to engage the question
of incentives. What kinds of incentives can be created by the
international community that will produce behavior that will
take nuclear weapons out of the conduct of foreign policy in
this region, or for that matter other regions as well?
The incentives that have been created by the
counterproliferation regime have had a number of perverse
effects and, over time, are magnifying the problem rather than
containing it. This leads to a few conclusions.
First, I think the counterproliferation activities of the
international community have not been successful, and this
reflects three decades of an approach that has been based
largely on multilateral arms control arrangements and bilateral
diplomatic efforts.
The second point is that both nations and, indeed, several
of the other nuclear wannabes have developed an infrastructure
producing ballistic missile delivery systems and fissile
material that poses a problem that may be exacerbated by the
sanctions.
The excess capacity that may be provided by this
infrastructure may be sold to other countries, and to the
degree that sanctions are effective in crippling or severely
damaging the economy, it may increase the incentives to market
some of these dangerous technologies to other countries outside
of the region.
Third, the exports of China and Russia, both of whom are
members of the counterproliferation regime, have contributed to
the flow of proliferation-enabling technology in South Asia
that sustains the problem. The absence of a consensus among the
major powers concerning the imposition of sanctions makes it
less likely that other proliferators will be deterred by
sanctions. Sanctions are just not likely to be a major feature
of the international regime dealing with this, apart from the
United States and perhaps a few other countries.
Fourth, with respect to the general environment, the high
cost of modern conventional systems is making the acquisition
of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles the low-
cost solution for countries to achieve their security. This is
indeed a very dangerous threat, and one that I think we need to
engage in as a dimension of the approach that Secretary
Inderfurth mentioned.
Finally, there seems to be a correlation between membership
in strong mutual security arrangements, whether bilateral or
multilateral, and a willingness to abstain from the development
of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
NATO member countries, for example, or countries with whom
the United States has bilateral mutual security arrangements,
seem to find an effective linkage to a security arrangement as
being satisfactory, offsetting any need they might otherwise
have for developing weapons of mass destruction.
Finally, with respect to some suggestions about how the
United States might approach dealing with this, I think the
major flaw in U.S. security policy relating to the
counterproliferation problem has been the failure to integrate
local or regional security concerns into the discussion with
potential proliferators.
Mr. Chairman, your remarks about the sense we have been
living a lie about proliferation in the region has been
reflected in the views that I am sure you have heard of
professional diplomats and analysts of the region, who have
long recognized that India would never accept the status quo of
China's legitimate and exclusive regional possession of nuclear
weapons. Pakistan's poverty, and absent security support from
another powerful nation, has been driven to offset India's own
military advantage through its own weapons of mass destruction
policy.
The U.S. needs to alter the policy to distinguish between
proliferators who are adversary States and proliferators who
are friendly States. The policy has been counterproductive, as
can be illustrated by the fact that we supply or are prepared
to supply a nuclear reactor to North Korea but are unprepared
to provide these kinds of things to India and Pakistan.
In the domain of incentives, one point I would raise as a
way of trying to diminish the incentive to proceed with weapons
of mass destruction and ballistic missiles is to consider the
possibility of providing access to technology of active
defense, ballistic missile defense.
The countries who are building weapons of mass destruction
now are not putting them on aircraft. They are not putting them
on cruise missiles. They are putting them on ballistic missiles
because there is no defense against ballistic missiles, and
this subject deserves more comment than I can give here.
Just let me conclude with that point, and then I will be
glad to go into it further, and questions if you care to do so.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schneider follows:]
Prepared Statement of William Schneider, Jr.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Sub-Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before this subcommittee
today. I am William Schneider, Jr. I serve as an Adjunct Fellow at the
policy research organization, Hudson Institute, and operate an
international trade and financial service business in Washington. From
1982-86, I served as Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance,
Science and Technology. Among the responsibilities of the office at the
time were those associated with export controls, arms transfer, foreign
assistance, and regional security policy. I subsequently served as
Chairman of the U.S. General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and
Disarmament from 1987-93. My remarks will address some the major policy
issues raised by the nuclear test series conducted by India and
Pakistan last month, and draw from an analysis of these developments,
some implications and policy recommendations.
The India and Pakistan nuclear tests
The eleven nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan last month
ended nearly a quarter century of nuclear ambiguity by India, and
eliminated the last shred of doubt about the aims of Pakistan's nuclear
activities underway since the early 1980s. In both cases, the test
series is likely to be linked adapting a nuclear device to a specific
delivery system (e.g. a ballistic missile) because both India and
Pakistan already possess tested nuclear devices.
India tested a nuclear device in 1974. China provided Pakistan with
the design of a nuclear device it tested in 1966 according to press
reporting. As a result, neither India or Pakistan required nuclear
testing to be assured that it had a nuclear device that would produce
nuclear yield. Adapting the nuclear device to be used in a delivery
system such as a ballistic missile or aircraft could require additional
testing for safety and reliability purposes. The ability of both
nations to test a significant number of devices in a short period of
time suggests both an ample inventory of fissile material, and a
scientific and industrial base able to support the introduction of
nuclear-armed delivery systems rapidly.
Both India and Pakistan have recently tested advanced ballistic
missiles making it likely that the nuclear devices tested are being
prepared for specific delivery systems. Both India and Pakistan have
several choices of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and tactical
aircraft depending on the range required for their purposes. However,
the most likely delivery systems for India and Pakistan's nuclear
payloads are ballistic missiles rather than long-range aircraft or
cruise missiles. None of the nations India and Pakistan seek to deter
have ballistic missile defenses, but they do have air defenses. The
general absence of ballistic missile defense is driving proliferators
to favor ballistic missiles as the delivery system of choice for
weapons of mass destruction.
Implications for international security of the India and Pakistan
nuclear tests
The India and Pakistan nuclear tests have a number of serious
implications for the international security environment. As further
evidence becomes available, our understanding of both the direction of
India and Pakistan's program may be achieved, and with it, our
assessment of the implications may improve as well.
The counter-proliferation activities of the international community
have not been successful, despite three decades of multi-lateral arms
control and diplomatic efforts at bilateral dissuasion.
Both nations have developed an infrastructure for producing fissile
material and ballistic missile delivery systems. The extreme poverty of
both nations, and an interest on the part of other nations in acquiring
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles converge to produce serious
incentives for further proliferation. Ironically, to the degree that
economic sanctions are effective against India and Pakistan, they may
produce a perverse outcome. A serious economic recession in either or
both nations may have the effect of stimulating efforts to earn foreign
exchange through the export of nuclear weapons or technology and
ballistic missiles.
The exports of China and Russia of proliferation-enabling
technology and hardware to South Asia has compressed the time required
for both nations to develop and deploy a functional nuclear weapons
capability. This has consequences outside of the South Asian region.
For example, China sold medium-range ballistics missile to Saudi Arabia
in the mid-1980s. This missile was designed to deliver a nuclear
warhead, although it is not generally believed that these were supplied
by China. With Pakistan's successful test, the possibility of its
readiness to transfer nuclear weapons to other users of Chinese
missiles cannot be dismissed as a possibility.
The absence of a consensus among the major powers concerning the
imposition of sanctions or other measures after-the-fact makes it less
likely that other potential proliferators will be deterred from
embarking on WMD or ballistic missile developments if compelling local
or regional security concerns are present.
The high cost of a modern conventional defense is making the
acquisition of WMD and ballistic missiles the least-cost security
solution for some of the world's most impoverished states. The cost of
developing nuclear weapons has declined by an order of magnitude in the
past half-century, but appears likely to decline even more rapidly in
the next two decades. These trends are likely to further stimulate WMD
and ballistic missile developments by nations who perceive a nuclear
capability to be in their interest.
Membership in strong mutual security agreements (e.g. NATO or US
bilateral security arrangements) appear to be a more effective
instrument for deflecting nuclear weapons aspirations than broad multi-
lateral arms control agreements. Linking arms control behavior to
mutual security arrangements appears to be the approach most highly
correlated with non-proliferation behavior.
Implications for US counter-proliferation policy
The India and Pakistan nuclear tests reveal the limits of the
counterproliferation activities of both the United States and the
international community. Starkly expressed, US counterproliferation
policy has failed, and we have no ``Plan B.'' There is a legitimate
argument over whether or not the US policy could have been successful
in the long-term. However, it is now apparent that the underlying
architecture of current policy will not permit the US to achieve its
counterproliferation aims in the future. The proliferation of advanced
industrial technology has made many aspects of the design and
manufacture of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery widely
accessible in commercial markets. Nuclear weapon design, development
and manufacturing information has become widely available. To cite only
one extreme example, a US environmental advocacy group, has published
nuclear weapon design information on the Internet that can provide
material assistance to a potential proliferator. The restraints of the
Cold War period in China and Russia concerning the export of enabling
technologies faded during the latter part of the Cold War, and have now
largely evaporated.
The proliferation problem appears destined to become a more serious
one for the United States unless it modernizes its counterproliferation
strategy and policy. The subject deserves more a detailed discussion
than is possible here, but I will offer a few of the contours of a
modernized counterproliferation strategy and policy that could be
helpful in coping with the consequences of the India and Pakistan
nuclear tests.
US proliferation policy failed to integrate the local or regional
security concerns of potential proliferators. Professional diplomats
and analysts of regional affairs have long recognized that India could
not accept the status quo of China's legitimate and exclusive regional
possession of nuclear weapons. Pakistan's poverty, absent security
support from another powerful nation, has driven them to offset India's
military advantage through its own WMD and ballistic missiles.
A new policy needs to be able to distinguish between proliferators
who are adversary states from those who are friendly. US
counterproliferation policy has had perverse characteristics. North
Korea, an adversary proliferator has been authorized to receive
advanced civil sector nuclear power facilities, while such facilities
have been denied to India and Pakistan who are friendly states.
The United States needs to provide access by friendly states to
ballistic missile defense technology or hardware to offer an
alternative to such states to obtaining WMD.
US proliferation sanctions and restrictions have had a counter-
productive impact. The Pressler amendment made Pakistan less secure and
diminished the effectiveness of internal restraint on exercising the
nuclear option. US pressure on India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) intensified their sense of nuclear isolation and
vulnerability, and may have precipitated the test series. A modernized
US counterproliferation posture needs to reflect these concerns and
integrate them into the full range of policy instruments available to
the President. These instruments should include such measures as arms
transfers, diplomatic and military support, foreign assistance, and
other measures. The President's inventory of instruments should be
enriched, and not impoverished by offering sanctions as the only policy
alternative to engage the proliferation problem.
The proliferation problem is a real one, but it has not emerged
with the India and Pakistan test series. The problem has been
developing for more than a quarter-century. The test series ended the
basis for US complacency based on its efforts to implement a noble, but
flawed policy. I urge the Congress to collaborate with the Executive
branch to develop a modern, comprehensive, and flexible
counterproliferation strategy and policy that will enable us to better
cope with WMD and ballistic missile proliferation by friend and
adversary.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much. I appreciate that.
Dr. Haass, Thank you for joining us. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD HAASS, DIRECTOR OF FOREIGN POLICY
STUDIES, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, FORMER SENIOR DIRECTOR, NEAR
EAST AND SOUTH ASIA, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, WASHINGTON,
D.C.
Dr. Haass. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to be back.
Senator Robb, Senator Hagel. Also in the interests of time I,
too, would like to put my whole statement in the record and
just make a few remarks.
Senator Brownback. Without objection.
Dr. Haass. Obviously, the Indian and Pakistani tests were
and are unhelpful and unwelcome. Still, it is important to keep
matters in perspective. There are several scenarios that would
be worse than testing for South Asia. Among them would be the
actual deployment of nuclear weapons in the field, secondly,
their use, or third, their transfer to third parties.
It must be, then, the goal of American foreign policy to
see that none of these three possible future scenarios comes
about.
The possibility of a fourth scenario, Mr. Chairman, that of
roll-back--that is, to bring about a nonnuclear South Asia is
not a realistic policy option for the United States at this
time.
As a result, I would describe the foreign policy challenge
facing the United States for the foreseeable future in this
part of the world as one of management, not prevention.
Current U.S. policy, which is the implementation of
punitive economic sanctions, is almost certain to be irrelevant
to the management challenge and, at worst, counterproductive.
Let me cite four reasons.
First, the United States has important interests in both
India and Pakistan, whether it is the promotion of democracy
and human rights, commercial development, and cooperating on a
host of regional and global challenges, some of which are quite
strategic. We do not have the luxury of simply mortgaging or
holding all of this hostage to our disagreements in the nuclear
area.
Second, we may need to provide both India and Pakistan
incentives and technology and various forms of assistance to
help them manage the nuclear jam they have gotten themselves
into. It may be in their interests and ours to actually provide
some tools to help manage or stabilize their new situation.
Thirdly, in the case of Pakistan in particular, there is a
real risk that U.S. economic sanctions, given Pakistan's
fragile economic state, could push Pakistan over the economic
brink and--I will be blunt and, since I am no longer in the
Government, I have the luxury of being undiplomatic--a Pakistan
that is stable and in possession of nuclear weapons is bad
enough. A Pakistan that would be unstable and in possession of
nuclear weapons would be a nightmare.
Fourth, one other aspect of U.S. policy I would question is
the whole rush to put this in the so-called P-5, the five
members of the Security Council who also happen to be the five
haves under the nonproliferation treaty. This is exactly the
discriminatory grouping that in some ways provokes India, so it
is very hard to see how this group, acting as the five, could
play much of a helpful role. It will probably compound the
problem.
This said, and like you, I recognize that sanctions are a
fact of life. As a result, the immediate goal of American
foreign policy ought to be to negotiate a package of measures
that stabilizes the situation in South Asia and that is
acceptable to India, to Pakistan, the administration, and to
yourselves in Congress.
Or, to put it another way, diplomacy must now try to come
up with the exit strategy that the Glenn legislation fails to
provide.
What might such a package look like? Well, let me suggest
that India and Pakistan should be urged to agree to four steps:
First, no further testing of nuclear devices.
Secondly, no deployment of missiles with nuclear warheads.
Thirdly, no transfer of nuclear or missile technology to
any third party.
And fourth, to enter into confidence-building measures, and
let me just give you three examples:
regular, high-level meetings between the two sides;
secondly, exchanges of observers at military exercises;
and thirdly, no missile flight tests in the direction of
one another's territory.
Indeed, as a corollary to that last item, I would urge them
to both undertake something of a pause on missile flight tests
of any kind during the current situation that we find ourselves
in.
What would we then have to do in return? The United States
would remove the punitive sanctions and keep in place only
those sanctions that would specifically block the transfer of
technology that would contribute to Pakistani and Indian
nuclear and missile programs.
In a more positive way, in addition to rolling back
sanctions, we would consider providing intelligence or
technology to the two sides that would help them stabilize
their relationship. We would also make available any diplomatic
assistance the two sides may want, be it for Kashmir or any
other problem.
While I am mentioning the things that we should do, let me
suggest two things that we ought to avoid.
First, the United States ought not to be introducing new
political sanctions at this time. I know a lot of people are
suggesting that the President cancel his planned visit to South
Asia this fall, scheduled for November. I think it would be a
big mistake to cancel the visit.
Here is an opportunity for him to make his arguments to the
Pakistan and Indian Governments. Here is a chance for him to
make his arguments to their publics. If our arguments are so
strong, they will help influence what policymakers and publics
think there.
We should not approach this trip as some sort of a reward.
It ought to be a tool of American foreign policy and should go
ahead.
Secondly, we ought to avoid providing security assurances
to either side. This idea has been suggested. I think it is a
dangerous and risky one.
Based on history, no American security assurance would be
enough to actually assure the parties sufficiently to alter
their behavior. But it might just be enough to get us involved
in some very complicated situations. So I would avoid the idea
that the United States would offer security assurances as a
kind of buy-out of Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs.
Having heard this morning some of the comments you made,
Mr. Chairman, I would surmise that you might think that the
kind of approach I am laying out would be inadequate. I
understand the desire to punish India and Pakistan as well as
to send a message to what I believe was described here earlier
this morning as nuclear wannabes, or would-be nuclear States.
I would resist that. One result of my suggesting that we
not go down that road is that any sort of package we do
negotiate for India and Pakistan is not going to contain
several of the things that people in the Congress and beyond
would like.
In particular, I do not think there is any chance of
getting formal Indian and Pakistani adherence to the NPT. I do
not think there is a chance to get either of them to formally
sign up to the CTBT, and I do not think there is any chance at
this point to get both of them to sign up to no-first-use
pledges.
That said, even if we could, I would be prepared to explain
how I do not think it would do us much good.
I also do not think that there is a chance at the moment to
get them to sign on to a fissile material cut-off treaty,
although I think in that case it would be something desirable,
because it would place a ceiling on the amount of material that
could be used for weapons.
Let me just make one more point, and then I will stop. I
want to return to the idea of the relationship between what we
do in South Asia and what happens in the rest of the world.
India and Pakistan are paying a price for what they have
done. They are certainly paying a price economically. Their
nuclear and missile programs will be expensive. We just saw in
the newspapers, I believe yesterday, information about India's
new defense budget. It is going down an expensive path and, as
we have seen with the U.S. and Soviet history, nuclear weapons
establishments eat up an awful lot of resources.
Strategically they will pay a price. They are going to have
to live with much greater uncertainty and with much greater
cost should deterrence break down. Again, though, I would think
the goal for us is to manage the situation and not make it
worse.
I do not see why a policy of managing proliferation in
South Asia is in any way inconsistent with a policy of
preventing it in other parts of the world. We should therefore
use every tool in our foreign policy arsenal to discourage
proliferation in North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya, or any
other country that we would classify as a potential or actual
rogue. Discrimination has always been at the core of American
policy in this area.
The NPT and the nonproliferation regime itself is based on
discrimination. It separates the world into two groups, the
five haves, and the have-nots.
U.S. policy has further refined this discrimination. We not
only have the five haves, but we have three countries--India,
Pakistan, and Israel--the United States has placed in a
separate category. U.S. policy has treated them differently
from the rogues. That is realism. It is not theology. But I
would suggest that realism is what American foreign policy
needs to be based on.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Haass follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard N. Haass
Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for providing me this opportunity to share my thoughts
with you and your colleagues. The decision by India and then Pakistan
to test nuclear devices is one of the defining events of the first
decade of the post-Cold War era. It tells us that democracy and markets
are no panacea, that American primacy is not the same as hegemony, and
that while the world may be more whole economically, it remains
fragmented both politically and militarily.
The Indian and Pakistani tests are both unhelpful and unwelcome.
South Asia has moved to a new level, one of two explicit nuclear
weapons states that have openly tested. U.S. efforts to prevent this
new situation from coming about--a policy predicated on deterrence
through the threat of comprehensive economic sanctions--failed in the
aftermath of the election of the new Indian government.
Still, it is important to keep matters in perspective. Even before
these tests were carried out both countries were de facto nuclear
weapons states that in one case (India) had tested overtly and in
another (Pakistan) had developed a capability without visible testing.
Moreover, there are several scenarios that can be imagined that
would be far worse than testing for South Asia and the world, including
actual deployment of nuclear weapons, their use, or their being
transferred to third parties. It must be the goal of American foreign
policy to prevent any of these outcomes. ``Rollback'' to a non-nuclear
South Asia is simply not a realistic policy option for the foreseeable
future. As a result, U.S. policy toward this region must be one of
management, not prevention.
Current U.S. policy--in this case, the implementation of punitive
economic sanctions--is almost certain to be irrelevant to this
management challenge and at worst counter-productive. The United States
has important interests in both India and Pakistan, including the
promotion of democracy and human rights, expanding economic
cooperation, and cooperating on a host of regional and global
challenges. In addition, we need to provide India and Pakistan
incentives and possibly assistance to help them manage their new
nuclear challenge. At the same time, it makes no sense to introduce
broad sanctions that could actually weaken political authority in
Pakistan, a state already burdened by economic and political problems.
To be blunt, a stable Pakistan in possession of nuclear weapons is
reason enough to worry; an unstable Pakistan would be that much worse.
This said, sanctions are a fact of life, and the immediate
objective of U.S. foreign policy should be to negotiate a package of
measures that stabilizes the situation in South Asia and is acceptable
to India, Pakistan, the Administration, and a majority in Congress.
Diplomacy must provide the ``exit strategy'' that the relevant
legislation fails to lay out.
What might such a package look like? India and Pakistan could agree
to the following steps:
no further testing;
no deployment of missiles with nuclear warheads;
no transfer of nuclear or missile technology to any third
party;
new confidence-building measures (CBMs), including regular
high-level meetings, exchanges of military observers, and no
missile flight tests in the direction of one another's
territory.
In return, the United States would agree to remove the punitive
sanctions and keep in place only those sanctions that block the
provision of technology that has the potential to contribute to Indian
and Pakistan missile and nuclear efforts. We should also consider
providing intelligence and/or technology that could contribute to
regional and nuclear stability. U.S. diplomatic assistance ought to be
made available where both countries desire.
There are two steps the United States should not take. We should
not introduce additional political sanctions, including the
cancellation of the President's long planned trip to the region this
autumn. Such a visit is an opportunity to address the problems caused
by the recent tests and to build both bilateral relationships. Nor
should the United States offer security assurances to either
protagonist. It is not at all obvious that U.S. assurances would be
enough to prevent a crisis from materializing--but they could be enough
to draw us into a complicated and dangerous situation.
There are other potential elements in any negotiated package,
including formal adherence by India and Pakistan to the NPT and the
CTBT, ``no first use'' pledges, and mutual cessation of fissile
material production. It is my judgment that it will not be possible to
get both to formally sign on to the first three commitments and that it
would not make much difference if they did. A freeze or ceiling on
fissile material production would be more meaningful but also extremely
difficult to achieve and monitor.
For some in the Congress and beyond, the approach recommended here
will not be enough. There is a desire to punish India and Pakistan and
to send a message to other would-be nuclear states that proliferation
doesn't pay.
This desire to send a message is understandable but should be
resisted in this instance. India and Pakistan will pay a price--
economically and strategically--for their decisions. The goal for U.S.
policy must now be to manage the situation as it exists. We do not have
the luxury of doing otherwise.
Moreover, there is no reason that a realistic policy of management
for these two countries need lead to proliferation elsewhere. We should
continue to use all our foreign policy tools to discourage and prevent
the spread of nuclear weapons to such countries as North Korea, Iran,
Iraq, and Libya.
Discrimination has long been at the core of U.S. non-proliferation
policy; after all, the NPT itself treats the five nuclear ``haves''
different from everyone else. Also, the United States has always viewed
the nuclear programs of Israel, India and Pakistan as something
distinct from the programs of the so-called rogues. Such realism is
what a successful foreign policy requires.
Thank you.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Dr. Haass, for your
presentation. I would suggest principles is what foreign policy
needs to be based on, and you need to deal from those
principles.
I recognize we have a very complex and difficult world, and
I noted earlier we have been living a lie for some period of
time that either of you might describe more artfully than what
I have put forward, but we have been about a task, and trying
to reduce the threat of nuclear holocaust in this world for
some period of time, and that has been a principle of U.S.
policy.
You can say we have achieved more success at times than at
other times and, frankly, with all of the Soviet Union and some
of those new nations actually giving up their nuclear weapons,
we have been on a pretty good roll of actually nations giving
it up.
Now, you can say, well, they did not develop, they really
did not have a use for it, they are not as threatened as what
happened in the India and Pakistan, all of which would be true.
But to walk away from that strategy now and to say, okay, we
are just in a different chapter and there is just going to be
more nuclear weapons, is not a step I am willing to accept, and
I think the signal that it sends to too many other places is so
dangerous and so provocative that it just provokes unacceptable
sorts of consequences.
So I understand you have spent a lifetime studying this,
and my simplistic look at it may not be acceptable to many, yet
it is a path that the United States has been on for a long
period of time, and I do not think it wise for us to go another
route at this point. We will be looking at ways that we can go
differently.
In the interests of time for both of you I would like to
pose--Dr. Schneider, you are raising an issue of ballistic
missile defense system, and I realize this is a bit off the
path, but some have suggested that if we are going to see more
proliferation of missiles, more proliferation of atomic
weaponry, that we are going to have to look more at these
defense systems. Is that your estimation?
Mr. Schneider. The point in my remark was to try and build
or create an opportunity for a disincentive for potential
proliferators to build a reciprocal ballistic missile threat
capability because a neighboring country does so, and one of
the ways of doing this would be to provide access for countries
threatened by ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction. Access to ballistic missile defense technology so
that they will enable them to deter ballistic missile and WMD
threats with defensive systems, rather than to feel that they
have to have a reciprocal threat to be able to get there.
This was a suggestion as a subset of the broader issue of
trying to develop some incentives for people not to
proliferate, rather than trying to sustain the prevention
regime which, while I think is well-intentioned, is of
diminishing practicality because of the widespread access to
knowledge of ballistic missile design and weapons of mass
destruction.
There is an environmental advocacy group that has on the
Internet a detailed description of the information that would
provide material information to a potential proliferator
seeking to develop nuclear weapons, so the information is out
there. The civil space launch sector provides enough
information to develop ballistic missiles, so I think it is a
question of, with countries that face the threat situation, can
our diplomacy and foreign assistance and other mechanisms
develop some incentives that could cause countries not to take
this step?
I mentioned the diplomatic effort, the correlation between
countries that have strong security relations with other strong
powers and their willingness to abstain from WMD and ballistic
missile development. There may be some way in which we can
develop an arrangement with Pakistan or India, perhaps a
security guarantee, and the classic form is not the right case,
but some related form of assurance that would diminish their
anxieties about their neighbors to the point where they would
be willing to de-tune the investment that they might otherwise
make in weapons of mass destruction and their means of
delivery.
Senator Brownback. Could I ask both of you or either of
you, how many additional nations can we anticipate over the
next 3 to 5 years going down this path of nuclear development
and testing, or even if you could give me a potential number of
countries, or list of countries that you would anticipate will
start down this road.
Dr. Haass. I would say that our goal ought to be none, and
it is not inevitable that will be any. It is not a bad new
situation. It is not as though what has happened in South Asia
necessarily breaks the dam. There are three countries that are
the most obvious candidates, and they are each separate cases.
One is Iraq, and so long as the international community
remains at all vigilant, we have the inspections process, and
are willing to back it up with force, I think we are okay
there. We will keep Iraq essentially out of the nuclear weapons
business.
The second is North Korea. There, the question is whether
we will continue to be able to implement the agreed framework
and, if so, again I do not think we will have a problem.
Thirdly is Iran, and that might be the most difficult of
the three, possibly within the next couple of years, although
they may still be some distance away.
So I do not think that any of these three states
necessarily will be testing. Indeed, I would right now bet
against it.
And coming back to conversation here before, we ought to
think about different tools to make sure we do not get there.
We can use one set of tools for South Asia, to manage the
situation there, while in other parts of the world we may
emphasize export controls or inspections or, in the case of
North Korea, an incentive strategy.
We may need to think about the use of force if everything
else fails: for example, preventive military strikes. We may
need to think about ballistic missile defense. We are moving
away from a one-size-fits-all nonproliferation strategy, and we
are certainly moving away from a policy where sanctions can
bear the full burden of trying to make sure that proliferation
does not happen.
Mr. Schneider. Just a couple of points on that. While I do
not think it is inevitable that the number of nuclear weapons
states will expand, even though the ability to do so is
becoming increasingly practical from both a cost perspective--
that is, the costs of becoming a nuclear State are declining,
and the ability to access the pertinent technologies is
increasing.
It is more a question of what incentives exist for doing
so? A scenario that could proliferate the nuclear weapons
problem in East Asia would be a withdrawal of the United States
from the region, if the United States were no longer prepared
to extend its security interest to the region.
The concern that we have seen in India, where a nonnuclear
State faces a nuclear State, they would look for a reciprocal
capability in the case of several countries in East Asia.
So a lot of these depend on how the international security
situation spins out over the next number of years, and why it
is so important for the United States to remain involved.
Senator Brownback. So you are saying that more countries
may start up programs as these develop in some of the countries
identified by Dr. Haass?
Mr. Schneider. The States that Dr. Haass mentioned of North
Korea and Iran have well-identified interests in this subject
and have moved fairly far along. I would think that they would
continue, because they have an incentive to develop nuclear
weapons, will continue to do that.
It is a question of whether there are other States out
there that will take advantage of the ease of access to the
pertinent technology and the underlying industrial capability
necessary to implement it, and that depends upon the security
environment, which we can influence substantially, and I hope
we do so.
Senator Brownback. That is a good point, and you mentioned
earlier Israel was in a special category.
Senator Robb.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Schneider, let me just clear up something, if I may. I
was taking notes, and I am not sure that I accurately reflected
what you said. You made the statement, nuclear reactors or
light water, as opposed to graphite reactors, were being
provided, and you did not use that terminology, to North Korea
but nothing to India and Pakistan.
I am not sure what you meant to imply by that, whether or
not we should explore the possibility, particularly under the
arrangements that we set out in the North-South framework
agreement, and I would welcome your comment on how well you
think that is working, if you are, in effect, proposing that
that is something we ought to do with India and Pakistan.
Mr. Schneider. I was merely citing it as an example of the
inconsistency in the way in which we treat friends, or, let us
say, distinguish between adversaries and friendly States in the
implementation of our counterproliferation policy.
North Korea, which is an adversary State, we nevertheless
are prepared to provide light water reactors under some
circumstances, whereas India and Pakistan, who are friendly
States, we are resistant to doing that because of the
proliferation problem.
What I was suggesting was that a reconstruction of our
policy might look to having differential policies between
nuclear weapons wannabes who are adversaries vis nuclear
weapons wannabes who are friendly States, and one of the issues
might be, look to a differential set of incentives that could
include access to civil nuclear power if that turned out to be
a constructive incentive.
Senator Robb. But the fact that in the North-South
framework agreement South Korea is providing the principal
dollars for such investment, and the next biggest chunk was
supposed to come from Japan, and the U.S. was the third
principal, and they were blamed for some of the heavy fuel, and
there have been all kinds of disputes now and no one seems to
be willing to go forward. That was with a vested interest on
the South in terms of resolving the tensions that they had.
And here you have India and Pakistan across a common
border. It seems to me the source of funding for that type of
activity.
Mr. Schneider. The funding issue is an important one, but
it is also a question of deauthorization and whether you see
that as part of the strategy.
Senator Robb. Let me proceed. Obviously, we have some
different interests, given the number of troops we have
stationed there, et cetera, and so we have a variety of
interests.
India is in the process of trying to formulate some sort of
a nuclear doctrine. In your judgment, what would the U.S., what
ought the U.S. try to get New Delhi to include in such a
blueprint, and what would the U.S. try to get them to exclude?
Mr. Schneider. First, in a nuclear doctrine they need to
have a very clear command and control link to appropriate
political authority.
The remark that was made about concern of the equipment
being in the hands of the armed forces, one of the areas that
is vitally important is to make sure that there is a command
and control system that links the authority to use the system
to the highest political authority in the country, and not the
armed forces.
Senator Robb. Putting aside the question of whether or not
it should be lodged in terms of responsibility in the armed
forces, do you think either country at this point has the
capability of providing the near-term stable and reliable
infrastructure that, say, the U.S. and its allies developed
vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union and its allies?
Mr. Schneider. No. This is a problem with all small nuclear
weapons States, is they do not have the infrastructure to
manage these things, and this is particularly a problem as the
types of delivery systems are likely to be mobile rather than
fixed-site systems.
Senator Robb. Dr. Haass, you seem to want to respond to
that question. I have a couple I would like to address to you,
but I would allow you to address that.
Dr. Haass. Just very quickly, right now we want to prevent
them from deploying weapons. I think that ought to be the
principal focus of American foreign policy. If we fail at that
focus, and if one or the other actually deploys weapons on
missiles in the field, we may actually have to think very hard
about ways that we could shore up command and control and so
forth just to make sure that we do not have unauthorized or
accidental deployment.
Senator Robb. This is probably our most urgent near-term
need in this whole area, to keep from having an escalation that
would go beyond anything that we could control, or would have
any confidence in.
What would you propose specifically to deal with that
question? You talked about some confidence-building measures
that go to the relationship generally, but those do not really
address the near-term threat that has been certainly bandied
around in the press in the region about both the ability, the
capability of the immediate weaponization and the transfer to a
missile that is capable of delivering some of these potential
miniaturized warheads in the near term.
I mean, you have got a lot of very practical advice. You
always do that. You take a complex situation and eliminate a
lot of the more interesting but frequently unworkable solutions
and come down with a relatively modest set of doable things,
but in this situation we are talking about something that could
be very short-term, depending on whether or not we have any hot
pursuit type comments, or what else?
Admittedly, that is a different situation, but it is the
sort of frenzy we are dealing with right now in terms of the
nationalist spirit that has clearly motivated the nationalists
to take the actions taken to date.
Dr. Haass. I only know two things, Senator. It is not a
very full cupboard. Again, if they were to take the step of
putting weapons on missiles, I think it would be extremely
destabilizing.
I am not sure they have thought through the consequences. I
am not persuaded that you have an incredibly elaborate,
sophisticated set of thinking on both sides, one that has
assessed the consequences for warning and decision-making time.
As a result, I do not think we should rule out the
possibility that having Government officials or others explain
some of the problems the United States and the Soviets went
through, say, in the fifties, would be a good thing to do.
Indeed, it might be something the Americans and Russians could
even do together at this point, to talk to them about the
difficulties and the risks of going down that path, and at
least make them think twice about it.
The other policy option is a more basic question of de-
sanctioning, to link a rolling back of the punitive sanctions
to their agreeing not to take this very dangerous step. That
would be at the heart of the package that I would like us to
offer.
Senator Robb. Well, let me address that for just a second,
because you had suggested no additional sanctions, and you
specifically mentioned do not cancel the President's planned
trip.
Well, the truth is that he has a planned trip to China
right now with a fixed date. The trip to India and Pakistan
later in the year is still in the planning stages.
I personally believe that, given the deliberate failure to
communicate, in the case of the Indians, and the failure to
heed a very personal plea from the President to Prime Minister
Sharif makes it awkward, at the very least, to say well, the
fact that you either deceived or rejected specific advice in
the near term does not do anything to deter my plans from
coming to see you right now, and I put it somewhat--I would
draw an analogy to China. I find a very different situation,
and a different number of factors.
Let me give you a question I think we might be able to come
together on. Could we not make the setting of a specific date
contingent upon progress in some of these areas that we have
already outlined as necessary?
And I do not know that we should absolutely say you must
comply with provisions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. If they were
to comply with 7 and not 8, I would like to see perhaps some
flexibility there, but it seems to me that this is one of the
areas where we have a little leverage that we ought to use and
say, not in effect that we are canceling it, or that we do not
want to maintain communications, or whatever, but before we are
able to finalize this we need to demonstrate that we are at the
very least moving in a direction that would clearly reduce
tensions, reduce the likelihood of having the kind of reaction
in this very volatile region that could prompt military
activities that would be very difficult to bring under control,
to say the least.
Dr. Haass. I think it is a good idea. We lose nothing for
keeping open the possibility of the trip, and it may give us
some leverage. We could send a signal that the President will
factor into the determination of whether to go in November what
sort of steps are or are not taken, as well as statements that
are made or not made by the two sides, and that might get us
some leverage.
But even if things escalate in ways we do not want, or
evolve in ways we do not want, it is important not simply to
see American Presidents going places as a reward. It also gives
us a great opportunity to make our case.
Senator Robb. Which is precisely the reason that I have
encouraged a regular schedule for Head of State visits in terms
of some important relationships that may have all kinds of ups
and downs in the road.
But in this particular case, since we are talking about
something that was related as much to the 50th Anniversary
celebration and other matters as the establishment of a
permanent summit-type arrangement, it seems to me that we can
slow-walk the approval and base it--and it seems to me the
White House has already done that in the way it has proceeded.
They said it was under review, and I think the statement
was issued yesterday that under review should now be
interpreted not that it is on course and we just have not
announced it, but it will require an affirmative decision to go
ahead and make the trip, is probably the best place to leave
it.
And I am not trying to inject Congress into a role that
exceeds what we ought to be exercising here. I personally
stated my concerns about going ahead with the trip under the
circumstances, but again it seems to me the circumstances are
quite unique and very specifically related to the Heads of
State relationship rather than a broader relationship and some
other concerns that we have.
I gather that we are not too far apart on that particular
question.
Dr. Haass. We are not too far apart.
Senator Robb. Let me just make a comment, and I have
already said that--acknowledged that you have frequently taken
complex situations that appear to have lots of little, neat
handles, and shown why those handles are either dangerous or
nonproductive.
But you seem to have taken off the table almost everything
that has been proposed by any number of people who are
interested in the topic and said we ought to limit ourselves
to, if you are going to test, test in the other direction, send
some folks back and forth, establish some contacts and a
dialogue, and do not have much hope for anything beyond that.
Am I being too minimalist in describing your expectations
for what we ought to be doing affirmatively?
Dr. Haass. Based upon my own experience with India and
Pakistan, even a modest package is quite ambitious. So, what
you describe as minimalist, I would break out a bottle of
champagne if we could get it all.
Secondly, I think there is a danger in us getting too
wrapped around the formal arms control axle here, in putting so
much emphasis on formal adherence to the CTBT or the Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty and so forth. There is so much symbolic
and ideological baggage with those things, particularly with
India, that I do not think we now ought to make that a big part
of what it is we want to get.
If we can get a no-testing understanding as opposed to a
formal CTBT signing, I would be pretty happy. If we get some
serious, specific confidence-building measures--it may not have
the big-package sex appeal of some of the arms control stuff--
but it may actually do more to stabilize the situation in South
Asia.
So, as a rule of thumb here, I would get very specific and
very focused on South Asia. And I would not allow ourselves to
approach this through the lens of what can we do here to shore
up the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. I would really
focus on what can we do here to shore up stability in South
Asia, and look to other policies and other tools to shore up
the global nonproliferation regime.
Senator Robb. With respect to the NPT, do you think it
would be a good idea, given the difficulties that you have
already described, for the Perm 5 to consider amending the NPT
to provide for this new category of membership--that you are
not a member of the club, but we acknowledge you have got it,
and we are not going to force you to get rid of it?
Dr. Haass. My hunch is no. I do not think it would be
feasible. And I am not sure it is desirable either to open that
up. Some things in life are almost better dealt with tacitly or
finessed. And we will want to leave to ourselves the discretion
of making some distinctions. And it would be easier and more
practical for our foreign policy to have latitude about which
countries we want to come down on like a ton of bricks and
which countries we may be more tolerant of in this area as we
see either a larger set of interests or some rationale for why
it is they are taking certain steps.
Senator Robb. Speaking of interests, we have normally taken
the position that there are certain areas in which the U.S. has
a vital strategic interest. India/Pakistan has not quite been
in that category. Should we reconsider, given events of the
last few weeks?
Dr. Haass. I would think that avoidance of nuclear weapons
use in South Asia or anywhere ought to be of vital national
interest. Which means that it ought to receive a greater
priority in the intelligence area--in terms of trying to
monitor or use intelligence to be able to help prevent it--and
diplomatically.
It is hard to think of another part of the world where
there is a greater inequality, or gap, between the objective
importance of the part of the world and how much attention and
resources the United States devotes to it. South Asia probably
comes out the worst, given that we are talking about a fifth of
the world's people, all the strategic and economic and other
forms of importance it has, and the historical lack of
attention that we have given it. Maybe one of the salutary
effects of recent events will be to help us close that gap.
Senator Robb. One final question, and I would direct it to
both of you if I could, in terms of how visible or high profile
the U.S. role in addressing this new or enhanced challenge that
we face in the area ought to be?
Dr. Haass. Based on my own experience with dealing with
issues like Kashmir, our role should be as visible as it is
welcomed. The purpose here is not, as you know, to score
debating points, it is to get the Indians and the Pakistanis to
do some smart things and not to do some dumb things.
And if a more active, visible U.S. role would facilitate
it, I would say great. If it would not, I would pull back.
Given how rubbed raw the U.S./Indian relationship is at this
point, it is hard to see how a high-level U.S. role would help.
I just do not think a lot of the situations are yet ripe for
it. The Kashmir diplomacy is not at a point where some sort of
diplomatic intervention could move it forward. Relations
between India and Pakistan are truly undeveloped, not simply as
a result of the new government in India, but for historical
reasons.
I do not see this as a situation where the U.S. needs to
take the lead. Which does not mean we need to fall back on the
P-5 or the G-8. There is something in between. What we may want
to end up thinking about is some sort of a diplomatic division
of labor, where we do some things unilaterally, we look to
others to do things that they can and we cannot anymore because
of our sanctions, and we may want to do some things in tandem.
Maybe we and the Russians can talk, as we said before, about
certain nuclear risk prevention measures. Maybe the British or
others could say certain things.
South Africa, Ukraine, the countries that have forsworn a
nuclear option, they have a certain capacity now to make
relevant points. We may want to think of an international
division of labor, where the U.S. is part of the mosaic rather
than necessarily the point person.
Senator Robb. Mr. Schneider, do you want to address that
question?
Mr. Schneider. Just one point. I do think on the
proliferation dimension of the problem, the U.S. level of
activism should be substantially higher than it has been. And
in terms of objective, I would put it equally high with
avoiding weaponization of these programs, to prevent the export
of these capabilities.
I am very concerned about a second wave of proliferation.
The State Department spokesman mentioned on April 10th that the
Pakistani missile originated in North Korea. And if we are
going to have a second wave of proliferation rather than
proliferation coming out of the nuclear powers, to coming out
of collaboration between nuclear wannabes or rogue nuclear
states or something like that, I think it is a much more
dangerous and much more difficult situation to control.
So, I think we ought to put the prevention of transfer of
this technology at a high diplomatic level, in terms of our
aspirations.
Senator Robb. I will yield back to you, Mr. Chairman. I
just have one or two other things I wanted to cover.
Senator Brownback. If you want to close, because I was
going to ahead and make some closing comments and close the
hearing, but if you have a couple more you would like to make.
Senator Robb. Just a quick question on the World Bank or
IMF--who was it yesterday--the World Bank suspended prospective
loans of about $1 billion I think for some period of time. But
given the fact that the other countries that would be involved
in that decision are not necessarily sharing our enthusiasm for
that approach and/or there is some other disagreement, how
likely, in your judgment, is it that our approach through at
least that part of the sanctions effort will, number one,
prevail and, number two, have an effect?
Dr. Haass. The likelihood that our position will prevail in
the Bank is no better than 1 in 10. Which is another way to say
I think these loans will go through--certainly to Pakistan, and
probably to India, as well. And I believe, by the way, that it
is the correct policy. And it is even consistent with elements
of the Glenn legislation, which do not want to penalize these
countries in the humanitarian realm.
A lot of these World Bank-type loans call for things like
rural development and education and health, depending upon how
broad a definition of humanitarian you take. It is not clear to
me how it would serve U.S. foreign policy objectives to
penalize either of these countries in this area.
Senator Robb. One final question about the photograph that
was put on the wire and everyone saw, when the Iranian Foreign
Minister and I guess it was the Foreign Minister in Pakistani--
I cannot remember--but, in any event, the clear implication was
this is not just a Pakistani development; this is an Islamic
bomb, if you will. How seriously do you take that interest? And
what do you believe are the potential ramifications for any
aggressive follow-up by Iran to claim the mantle for a broader
group than Pakistan?
Dr. Haass. Well, I do associate myself with something Bill
Schneider just said. The prevention of leakage to third parties
ought to be at the top of our list, along with the prevention
of nuclear use in this part of the world.
Up to now, both when I was in government and from what I
understand since, there has been a pretty good record on the
part of Pakistan and India against third party transfer--at
least to the best of our knowledge. Obviously things can go on
and, for all I know, do go on that we cannot monitor. It is
very hard, for example, when individual scientists meet at some
conference to know what is passed between them. That sort of
leakage is almost impossible to monitor.
With Pakistan, non-transfer should be very closely linked
to de-sanctioning, and include some very firm understandings
about the steps they would take to block transfer. And they
ought to understand that that is a great concern of the United
States. And this issue also ties into the punitive economic
sanctions.
One of the reasons that I am more concerned in the case of
Pakistan about the impact of economic sanctions is I do not
want Pakistan to increasingly have to turn to the Irans of the
world to remain solvent. I do not want to alienate and isolate
them more than they already are, and make that their lifeline,
so that you have a kind of ``Pariahs International'' that
Pakistan ultimately joins. They are already too close to Iran
and North Korea. So I do not want us to do things that
necessarily reinforce those bonds.
Senator Robb. Okay, I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you.
And thank you, gentlemen. You are some of our best minds on
dealing with India and Pakistan, and we very much appreciate
your willingness to join us. And we are going to need more
minds focused in this region of the world.
It seems to me that the world has now read the first couple
of pages of the next chapter in world history, and it is a very
dangerous setting. We need to focus on it with clarity and
vision as to how we want to deal with the situation. If we do
have further hearings, we will be trying to listen to other
people on what their suggestions are that we should be doing.
Or if we have a congressional delegation, I think our first
objective needs to be, first, to listen for what we can do to
make the world a safer place. Which is what we have been about
for years and years as a Nation and want to continue to do.
Thank you, all, for joining us. I thank the panel for being
here. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
INDIA AND PAKISTAN: WHAT NEXT?
----------
MONDAY, JULY 13, 1998
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:05 p.m. In
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam
Brownback, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Brownback and Robb.
Senator Brownback. Good afternoon. Thank you all for
joining us this afternoon. We are going to be meeting to
examine the impact of sanctions on India and Pakistan under the
Arms Export Control Act and other legislation. These sanctions
are unilateral, and they cut across a wide swath of Indian and
Pakistani society. They prohibit a variety of assistance and
commercial transactions between the United States, India and
Pakistan.
We are also here meeting today to look at where we go from
here. How do we move forward with India and Pakistan in a
constructive way?
There has been a lot of talk about sanctions in the last
couple of months. It has consumed the Congress, the
administration and others as everybody grapples with the issue.
It is clear from the bind we find ourselves in that our
sanctions law is due for an overhaul, not just as it applies to
India and Pakistan but as an instrument of foreign policy.
Senator Robb and I were in India and Pakistan just 2 weeks
ago. We were the first high level delegation from the United
States to meet with both Prime Ministers of both India and
Pakistan, and along with other Members of the Cabinet in those
countries, I have to say that the economic situation in India
and Pakistan, particularly for Pakistan, was not very good
before we imposed sanctions, and now it is even worse.
In 1997, U.S. Exports to India were $3.6 billion, and
imports totaled $7.3 billion, and although India has been
making progress on economic reforms, there remains a number of
problems in the area of market access, intellectual property
rights and protection, and the financial services sector.
Last year, the prospects for greater U.S.-Indian
cooperation in all of these areas looked promising, but now
sanctions have cat a pall on our bilateral relationship.
Pakistan's situation is far worse. In 1997, U.S. Exports to
Pakistan totaled $1.2 billion and imports totaled $1.4 billion
in U.S. Dollars. Pakistan faces a hefty foreign debt of over
$30 billion, and Pakistan's foreign reserves have dipped to $1
billion. They are less than 2 months from defaulting on their
foreign loans, and we heard reports while we were there of
their stock market valuation falling in half since the testing
and the sanctions being put in place.
In recent years, Pakistan has been plagued by double digit
inflation and an economy which has grown modestly at 2 to 3
percent. The Government has been making some efforts to change,
but have not been overall successful.
Last week, the Agricultural Export Relief of 1998 was
passed by the Senate by a vote of 98 to zero. This bill exempts
farm credit programs from the economic sanctions imposed on
India and Pakistan. I was a cosponsor of this bill, and believe
it is important not only for India and Pakistan but also for
the United States.
Food should never be used as a political weapon. Food
should never be used as a tool of foreign policy. It does not
work, and it is not a wise use of a tool that one might have at
all. It should never be used.
Additional economic and defense-related waivers were part
of the original draft of this bill, but they were excised
following threats of a filibuster. I strongly support economic
waivers for India and Pakistan, but believe we need to be
careful in reviewing any defense-related waivers which might
impact negatively upon our own national security interest.
As I said before, sanctions are an instrument of foreign
policy. They are not a substitute for a foreign policy. We need
to rethink our sanctions legislation. They should provide the
President with enough flexibility in consultation with the
Congress to waive sanctions subject to progress in the area
being sanctioned.
In the case of India and Pakistan we need to be engaged,
not only on nonproliferation but on democratization, human
rights, trade, economics, counternarcotics, and military
cooperation. If we are not, if we are simply content to levy
sanctions and watch South Asia slide into a greater security
and economic abyss, we will pay a heavy price for our neglect
in the future.
With that stark image in mind, we need legislation to
enhance the President's waiver authority for India and
Pakistan. Features should include an immediate 9-month waiver
on current sanctions to be followed by a graduated waiver based
upon Presidential certification that India and Pakistan have
made progress in the requisite areas.
We have laid down markers where India and Pakistan can
demonstrate progress against these important nonproliferation
objectives. They range from India and Pakistan increased
transparency in adopting confidence-building measures to
joining the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.
Today, we will have with us testifying Assistant Secretary
of State for South Asia, the Hon. Karl Inderfurth. We thank him
for appearing today, and we look forward to his testimony, and
the idea is that he will be sharing with us in the question and
answer session and we also have the Hon. Bob Einhorn, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation, who I understand will
be able to take questions on nonproliferation specific issues
should they arise, and we welcome him.
Before I turn this over to Senator Robb, I will just note
for everyone in attendance that hopefully this week the U.S.
Senate will be considering further legislation regarding the
sanctions on India and Pakistan. Pakistan has been a long ally
of the United States, and I find ourselves in a situation today
where I do not think we are working very constructively with
Pakistan.
India, I think has the potential and desires to be a strong
friend, working with the United States, and yet we find
ourselves in a position of punitive measures toward them when
each of those countries, both India and Pakistan, in the
meetings we went through, were acting in their own perceived
best security interest, India toward China, as I state, and
Pakistan toward India.
It is a difficult situation that we find ourselves in as a
country and as a world. We look forward to exploring some of
the options for some way out and how the U.S. Can reengage in
the region in South Asia, and that will be the topic of our
discussion today, and I think of action probably later this
week on the Senate floor, following the action last week on
dealing with the agricultural assistance area.
I would like now to turn it over to my cotraveler to South
Asia, Senator Robb.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I enjoyed our 96-
hour visit to South Asia a couple of weeks ago, and we have had
any number of discussions since then, before then, and will
continue to have about this important topic in the hearing we
have today.
I am pleased to join you in welcoming Assistant Secretary
Inderfurth and Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation, Mr.
Einhorn, on this important subject. I believe it is imperative
that we establish a basis for working constructively with the
administration officials on the sanctions question, and this
hearing affords us an opportunity to hear their views as we
formulate our own legislative plans which, as you already
indicated, are well along, at least in the near term.
Last week, as you indicated, we addressed the issue of
rolling back parts of the Glenn amendment on the Senate floor,
eventually agreeing to a consensus amendment, the Agricultural
Export Relief Act of 1998. In honesty, it was prompted more by
considerations on the domestic export side, I think, than it
was dealing specifically with some of the problems we have to
address regarding the impact on both India and Pakistan.
Original language in that measure, however, compelling the
administration to seek congressional approval of any negotiated
settlement with India and Pakistan that lists sanctions was
stricken for a variety of concerns. Some believed the provision
was too lenient. I argued that it was too onerous and undercut
the administration's diplomatic bargaining power with New Delhi
and Islamabad to find a comprehensive solution for lifting
sanctions.
Without focusing on the minutiae, I believe it is important
that Congress provide the administration as much flexibility
and discretion as possible in addressing this critical issue.
In drafting appropriate legislation, my sense is that we should
focus on ensuring that our oversight role is properly
maintained, requiring stringent time periods of consultation
while granting the administration full authority to actually
make policy in this area.
As we consider the issue, I am reminded of the debate we
had last year on fast track trade authority. Foreign nations
were not prepared to make real compromises on their trade
negotiating positions with the knowledge that Congress could
significantly alter any agreements that they might reach with
administration officials.
Given those circumstances, I supported granting the
administration it needed up front to negotiate comprehensive
trade agreements with foreign nations that were in our national
interest.
The same reasoning and logic applies here, it seems to me.
India and Pakistan will offer relatively few concessions in the
most critical areas with administration officials, whether it
be CTB membership and agreement on fissile materials, or a
range of other subjects, knowing that Congress could alter or
nullify any specific provisions.
So I am prepared to grant the administration full waiver
authority conditioned on sufficient assurances being given that
close and meaningful consultations will occur between the two
branches of Government on this issue.
As a start, I hope Secretary Inderfurth will begin today in
this public forum a comprehensive dialog with us regarding the
steps he intends and the administration intends to take toward
improving the current situation in the subcontinent region, and
how he envisions Congress supporting the efforts of Congress in
this regard.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for calling this
timely hearing, and I look forward to hearing from our
distinguished witnesses.
Senator Brownback. Rick, Bob, welcome to the committee. We
are delighted to have you here The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. KARL F. INDERFURTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT EINHORN,
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NONPROLIFERATION
Mr. Inderfurth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Robb, we
do look forward to talking with you about----
Senator Brownback. Can you get the microphone up a little
closer? It is pretty directional.
Mr. Inderfurth [continuing]. We do look forward to
discussing with you the steps the administration plans to take
to improve the situation in the region, and Mr. Chairman, we
very much agree with your comment that we need to engage both
India and Pakistan.
I would only say as a first comment that, although we are
absolutely committed to that engagement, and as you will see in
my testimony we have been pursuing that in recent days in a
variety of locations, we also want to stress that it is
absolutely essential that the parties themselves engage each
other.
That is why we are looking forward to the meeting that is
now set in Colombo, in Sri Lanka, between Prime Minister
Vajpayee and Prime Minister Sharif at the annual SAARC summit
that will take place on July 28. We are very hopeful that the
discussions that we are having with Indian and Pakistani
officials, that you both have had with the prime ministers and
other officials in New Delhi and Islamabad.
All of this will help pave the way for them to better
understand our concerns so that when they meet in Colombo they
can address their concerns, because unless they do that, we are
not going to make the progress that we need to.
So I wanted to start my comments about engagement not only
with them, but between the two parties themselves.
Mr. Chairman and Senator Robb, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before your subcommittee today to
continue our discussions about the critical situation in South
Asia. In our previous meetings we have discussed how the
nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan in May have
dramatically altered the context of our South Asian policy.
We have also reviewed the definitions and scope of
sanctions that have been applied against both countries, as
required by law, as well as our efforts to reestablish a basis
for resuming the type of broadbased cooperative relations that
we had hoped to promote with both countries prior to the tests.
Today, I wish to review briefly for you the developments
that have occurred in our diplomatic exchanges with the Indian
and Pakistani Governments, as well as certain issues with
regard to the sanctions regimes, as you discussed in your
remarks.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, we have begun in earnest a
process of reengagement with both India and Pakistan in an
effort to secure genuine progress on our nonproliferation
concerns and in improving relations between the two countries.
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, who has been
given the lead by the President and the Secretary of State for
our contacts with the Indian and Pakistani Governments, has
held two productive sessions with Indian Deputy Planning
Commissioner Jaswan Singh, who is Prime Minister Vajpayee's
designated envoy to the United States on these matters.
I was pleased to accompany the Deputy Secretary to
Frankfurt this past week for his most recent meeting with Mr.
Singh, and Mr. Einhorn was in Frankfurt with us as well.
Similarly, with Pakistan, the Deputy Secretary has held
separate and useful meetings with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's
envoy, former Foreign Minister Shahabzada Yaqub Khan, as well
as Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed.
We are grateful for the constructive efforts of you and
Senator Robb to address the policy dilemmas of South Asia in
the wake of the nuclear tests. In particular, we noted with
great interest the conversations the two of you had with key
players in both New Delhi and Islamabad on your recent trip. We
believe that it is critical that the Governments, press and
publics of both countries develop an understanding and
appreciation of the role that both the executive branch and
Congress plays in these issues.
As a result of these various diplomatic exchanges and
efforts, it appears we are making progress in defining the
principles that will underpin U.S. Relations with India and
Pakistan in the posttest environment and laying out our
nonproliferation and other objectives, and in discussing the
steps and activities that will be necessary to get us there. We
will not let our current momentum slip.
The Deputy Secretary plans to travel to both Islamabad and
New Delhi next week, where I will accompany him, along with the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Ralston,
and the NSC Senior Director for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, Bruce Riedel.
Mr. Chairman, we have discussed in earlier hearings the
sanctions that we are required by law to place against both
India and Pakistan, and for your convenience I have brought
with me a fact sheet on the sanctions that have been provided
to the committee previously.
I ask your permission to include the fact sheet in the
record of today's proceeding.
Senator Brownback. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
Fact Sheet on India and Pakistan Sanctions
The United States imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan as result
of their nuclear tests in May.
In imposing these sanctions, we seek: to send a strong message to
would-be nuclear testers; to have maximum influence on Indian and
Pakistani behavior; to target the governments, rather than the people;
and to minimize the damage to other U.S. interests.
Our goals are that India and Pakistan: halt further nuclear
testing; sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) immediately and
without conditions; not deploy or test missiles or nuclear weapons;
cut-off fissile material production for nuclear weapons; cooperate in
fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) negotiations in Geneva; maintain
and formalize restraints on sharing sensitive goods and technologies
with other countries; reduce bilateral tensions, including Kashmir.
Accordingly, the United States:
Terminated or suspended foreign assistance under the Foreign
Assistance Act, with exceptions provided by law (e.g.
humanitarian assistance, food, or other agricultural
commodities.
--$21 million in economic development assistance and housing
guarantee authority for India terminated.
--$6 million Greenhouse Gas program in India suspended.
--Trade Development Agency will not consider new projects.
--Most assistance to Pakistan had already been prohibited.
Terminated Foreign Military Sales under the Arms Export
Control Act and revoked licenses for the commercial sale of any
item on the U.S. Munitions List.
--Suspended delivery of previously approved defense articles
and services to India.
Halted any new commitments of USG credits and credit
guarantees by USG entities (EXIM, OPIC, CCC).
--Administration will support legislation to permit CCC
credits for food and agricultural commodities.
--OPIC had only recently reopened in Pakistan; however, India
was one of OPIC's top five countries receiving and average of
$300 million annually in OPIC support.
--EXIM had only recently reopened in Pakistan with one
expression of interest pending for $1.1 million; $500 million
in pending financing in India will not go forward.
Gained G-8 support to postpone consideration of non-basic
human needs (BHN) loans for India and Pakistan by the
International Financial Institutions (IFI) to bolster the
effect of the Glenn Amendment requirement that the U.S. oppose
non-BHN IFI loans.
--$1.17 billion in IFI lending postponed for India.
--although no IFI loans for Pakistan have been presented for
board consideration, $25 million in IMF assistance has been
postponed for failure to meet economic benchmarks.
Will issue Executive Orders to prohibit U.S. banks from
extending loans or credits to the governments of India and
Pakistan.
Will deny export of all dual use items controlled for
nuclear or missile reasons. Will presume denial for all other
dual use exports to entities involved in nuclear or missile
programs.
--Will toughen existing controls for government military
entities.
--Will continue denial of nuclear exports licensed by NRC or
authorized by DOE.
--Will continue to favorably consider on a case-by-case basis
other transactions which do not support nuclear, missile, or
inappropriate military activities.
Mr. Inderfurth. As you know, we are implementing these
actions firmly and correctly. They will result in significant
economic and political cost for both countries. That said, our
purpose, as we have said before, is not to punish for
punishment's sake, but to influence the behavior of both
Governments.
We do not wish for unnecessary harm to fall upon the
civilian populations of either country, particularly the poor
and less fortunate, or on U.S. Businesses. For this reason, we
are pleased that the Senate acted last week to correct an
obvious unintended consequence of the sanctions law, preventing
the provision of credits for agricultural commodities.
It is too early to quantify, Mr. Chairman, the effect that
the sanctions will have on economic growth or business activity
in either country. Even prior to the onset of the sanctions
regime, however, both India and Pakistan had been encountering
difficulties in their economies.
In India sluggish industrial production, high tariffs,
oppressive bureaucratic red tape, infrastructure bottlenecks,
massive subsidies, and scarce funds for investment had all
contributed to lower rates of economic growth and a serious
decline in investor confidence. U.S. Sanctions will amplify
some of those trends.
To date, we have not seen from Indian policymakers or
commentators a serious recognition that the sanctions, much
less the underlying structural inequities, require serious
economic policy adjustments. As you had referred to in your
remarks, the introduction of a lackluster budget by the
Government only weeks after the nuclear test took place
underscores that point.
We are concerned that these developments, which come in the
midst of significant economic turmoil in Asia, will put at risk
all of the important economic progress that India has made
since the onset of liberalization.
In Pakistan the situation is even more complex, and
potentially of grave concern. Pakistan has been grappling for
months with a significant balance of payments shortfall, and
its economy suffers from similar, if more acute structural
deficiency.
The Pakistani rupee has been under serious pressure. On
Friday it plunged past the 60 per dollar threshold, and the
stock market has been dropping steadily. Pakistan is
particularly dependent upon external financing from the IMF and
the multilateral development banks, and we are concerned that
with dwindling foreign exchange reserves Pakistan could soon
begin defaulting on its international obligations.
We are deeply troubled that Pakistan's leadership does not
appear to be taking the necessary steps to deal with the
country's difficult economic position. Not only has Pakistan
been slow to implement tough economic reforms mandated by the
IMF and ostensibly espoused by the Prime Minister, it has
inexplicably acted to alienate the vanguard of the foreign
investment community, the independent power producers.
For months, and with what has been increasing intensity,
the IPP's have been faced with what can only be described as a
shake-down effort by the Government to conserve hard currency.
Recently, the Government of Pakistan announced arbitrary
termination of a number of the IPP contracts, calling into
question its understanding of and commitment to a fundamental
business principle, namely, the sanctity of contracts. Pakistan
can ill afford to act in such a way at this critical time.
Mr. Chairman, when we last met with you and Senator Robb
and Senator Hagel, I discussed the effectiveness of the
sanctions regime, and whether the law permits the President
sufficient flexibility to maximize his ability to influence
events and behavior. That discussion, along with Thursday's
debate on the Senate floor, has put this question into sharp
relief.
To the extent that it is possible to discern a common
thread among the various statements that have been made, it
appears safe to say that both the administration and the
Congress share a desire to inject a greater degree of
consistency, flexibility, and effectiveness into the sanctions
regimes against India and Pakistan and, indeed, our entire
approach to sanctions in general.
That is a very welcome development, and it is absolutely
vital that we buildupon this very strong foundation to effect
the requisite changes in our policy and in our laws.
In the Department of State, Under Secretaries Stewart
Eizenstadt and John Holum have the lead responsibility for our
sanctions policy. They have both articulated to the Congress a
number of principles and objectives that we seek for the
various sanctions regimes that are already in place, and for
future instances where sanctions may be needed.
If you will permit me, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
address briefly some of the issues that apply specifically to
the sanctions against India and Pakistan. First, let me be
clear that we have already laid out a number of objectives that
we seek in implementing the sanctions. We have consistently
articulated these objectives in our meetings with the Indians
and the Pakistanis in previous testimony to this committee and
others in the Congress, and in our bilateral and multilateral
exchanges with others. By no accident, they reflect the
objectives, some shorter term, others longer term, that were
spelled out in the communiques adopted in the recent meetings
of the P-5 in Geneva, in the G-8 in London, and in U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1172.
To reiterate, we have established that we want to see both
Governments do the following:
Conduct no further nuclear tests;
Sign and ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty
immediately without conditions;
Refrain from deploying nuclear weapons or missile systems;
Halt the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons;
Participate constructively in negotiations toward a fissile
material cutoff treaty;
Formalize existing policies not to export weapons of mass
destruction and missile technology or equipment; and
Resume direct dialog to address the root causes of tension
between them, including Kashmir.
Again, Mr. Chairman, these are steps we want to see both
Governments take. They are not demands. We fully recognize that
New Delhi and Islamabad will have to assess them in light of
their own national security requirements. At the same time, we
believe these steps cover the full range of what will be
necessary to make real progress in South Asia.
We will need to engage with both Governments to explore
fully how best to pursue each of these objectives in the
shortest possible timeframes. It is clear that we will need
greater flexibility than the law currently allows to tailor our
approach, influence events, and respond to developments.
In this regard, Mr. Chairman, we seek waiver authority for
all of the sanctions currently in place against India and
Pakistan. Of course, we would not utilize that authority until
such time as substantial progress has been made or achieved on
the objectives outlined above, or in the event that there were
a serious negative and unintended consequence to a specific
sanction, such as impending financial collapse, leading to
economic chaos and political instability.
We also would like additional flexibility to guard against
an overwhelmingly disproportionate effect of these sanctions on
one country versus another. Ideally, the sanctions should have
roughly the same effect on India as they do on Pakistan.
That said, we do not believe it would be advisable, nor
could we support efforts to codify or legislate the steps that
India and Pakistan would need to take in order to gain relief
from sanctions, or to match specific actions by India and
Pakistan to the lifting of particular sanctions.
While I believe there is substantial agreement between the
administration and the Congress on the objectives, we would
tremendously complicate our efforts to bring about change if we
were bound by a series of benchmarks and law. Our experience
with India and Pakistan tells us that neither would respond
well to such an approach.
We believe the steps we are encouraging them to take are in
their own national security interests, and we hope they will
share this view, but writing such steps into law would create
the impression that India and Pakistan would be acting under
pressure, and simply to ensure the lifting of U.S. Sanctions.
This would, in our view, greatly constrain our chances of
achieving the outcomes we all seek.
Mr. Chairman, if I may leave you with one thought, it is
the conviction that our discussion of these matters should not
leave India and Pakistan with the impression that a lifting of
sanctions is imminent. Affirmative, positive steps will be
necessary by both parties if sanctions are to be lifted and our
relationship restored to where it had been heading prior to
events of May, including the Presidential visit later this
year.
The sanctions have been imposed for specific purposes, and
India and Pakistan are well aware of them. As I have already
mentioned, the administration does not plan to ask for easing
sanctions unless India and Pakistan have achieved significant
progress in meeting our nonproliferation objectives.
That said, it seems we have a rare opportunity to have a
serious discussion and adopt some changes in law and policy.
These will better serve our national interests, and better
position us to deal effectively with both India and Pakistan on
the critical issues that are at stake.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and we look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Inderfurth follows:]
Prepared Statement of Karl Inderfurth
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before your
Subcommittee today to continue our discussions about the critical
situation in South Asia. In our previous meetings, we have discussed
how the nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan in May have
dramatically altered the context of our South Asia policy. We also have
reviewed the definitions and scope of sanctions that have been applied
against both countries, as required by law, as well as our efforts to
re-establish a basis for resuming the type of broad-based, cooperative
relations that we had hoped to promote with both countries prior to the
tests. Today, I wish to review briefly for you the developments that
have occurred in our diplomatic exchanges with the Indian and Pakistani
governments, as well as certain issues with regard to the sanctions
regimes.
Diplomatic Efforts
As you know, Mr. Chairman, we have begun in earnest a process of
re-engagement with both India and Pakistan in an effort to secure
genuine progress on our non-proliferation concerns and in improving
relations between the two countries. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe
Talbott, who has been given the lead by the President and the Secretary
of State for our contacts with the Indian and Pakistani governments,
has held two productive sessions with Indian Deputy Planning
Commissioner Jaswant Singh, who is Prime Minister Vajpayee's designated
envoy to the United States on these matters. I was pleased to accompany
the Deputy Secretary to Frankfurt this past week for his most recent
meeting with Mr. Singh.
Similarly, with Pakistan the Deputy Secretary has held separate and
useful meetings with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's envoy, former
Foreign Minister Shahabzada Yaqub Khan, as well as Foreign Secretary
Shamshad Ahmed.
We are grateful for the constructive efforts of you and your
colleagues to address the policy dilemmas in South Asia in the wake of
the nuclear tests. In particular, we noted with great interest the
conversations that you and Senator Robb had with the key players in
both Delhi and Islamabad on your recent trip. We believe that it is
critical that the governments, press and publics of both countries
develop an understanding and appreciation of the role that the Congress
plays on these issues.
As a result of these diplomatic efforts, it appears we are making
progress in defining the principles that will underpin U.S. relations
with India and Pakistan in the post-test environment, in laying out our
non-proliferation and other objectives, and in discussing the steps and
activities that will be necessary to get us there. We will not let our
current momentum slip: the Deputy Secretary plans to travel to both
Islamabad and New Delhi next week, where I will accompany him along
with the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Ralston,
and the NSC Senior Director for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
Bruce Reidel.
Impact of Sanctions
Mr. Chairman, we have discussed in earlier hearings the sanctions
that we are required by law to place against both India and Pakistan.
For your convenience, I have brought with me a fact sheet on the
sanctions that has been provided to the Committee previously. I ask
your permission to include the fact sheet in the record of today,s
proceedings.
As you know, we are implementing these sanctions firmly and
correctly. They will result in significant economic and political costs
for both countries. That said, our purpose is not to punish for
punishment's sake, but to influence the behavior of both governments.
We do not wish for unnecessary harm to fall upon the civilian
populations of either country--particularly the poor and less
fortunate--or on U.S. businesses. For this reason, we are pleased that
the Senate acted last week to correct an obvious unintended consequence
of the sanctions law preventing the provision of credits for
agricultural commodities.
It is too early to quantify, Mr. Chairman, the effect that these
sanctions will have on economic growth or business activity in either
country. Even prior to the onset of the sanctions regime, however, both
India and Pakistan had been encountering difficulties in their
economies. In India, sluggish industrial production, high tariffs,
oppressive bureaucratic red tape, infrastructure bottlenecks, massive
subsidies and scarce funds for investment had all contributed to lower
rates of economic growth and a serious decline in investor confidence.
U.S. sanctions will amplify some of those trends.
To date, we have not seen from Indian policymakers or commentators
a serious recognition that these sanctions, much less the underlying
structural inequities, require serious economic policy adjustments. The
introduction of a rather lackluster budget by the government only weeks
after the nuclear test took place underscores that point. We are
concerned that these developments, which come in the midst of
significant economic turmoil in Asia, will put at risk all of the
important economic progress that India has made since the onset of
liberalization.
In Pakistan, the situation is even more complex and potentially of
grave concern. Pakistan has been grappling for months with a
significant balance of payments shortfall, and its economy suffers from
similar, if more acute, structural deficiencies as India's. The
Pakistani rupee has been under serious pressure--on Friday it plunged
past the 60 per dollar threshold--and the stock market has been
dropping steadily. Pakistan is particularly dependent upon external
financing from the IMF and the multilateral development banks, and we
are concerned that with dwindling foreign exchange reserves, Pakistan
could soon begin defaulting on its international obligations.
We are deeply troubled that Pakistan's leadership does not appear
to be taking the necessary steps to deal with the country's difficult
economic position. Not only has Pakistan been slow to implement tough
economic reforms mandated by the IMF and ostensibly espoused by the
Prime Minister, it has inexplicably acted to alienate the vanguard of
the foreign investor community--the independent power producers. For
months, and with what has been increasing intensity, the IPPs have been
faced with what can only be described as a shake down effort by the
government to conserve hard currency. Recently the government of
Pakistan announced arbitrary termination of a number of the IPP
contracts, calling into question its understanding of and commitment to
a fundamental business principle: the sanctity of contracts. Pakistan
can ill afford to act in such a way at this critical time.
Sanctions and Flexibility
When we last met, Mr. Chairman, you, Senators Robb and Hagel and I
discussed the effectiveness of the sanctions regime and whether the law
permits the President sufficient flexibility to maximize his ability to
influence events and behavior. That discussion, along with Thursday's
debate on the Senate floor has put this question into sharp relief. To
the extent that it is possible to discern a common thread among the
various statements that have been made, it appears safe to say that
both the Administration and the Congress share a desire to inject a
greater degree of consistency, flexibility and effectiveness into the
sanctions regimes against India and Pakistan, and indeed, our entire
approach to sanctions in general. That is a very welcome development,
and it is absolutely vital that we build upon this very strong
foundation to effect the requisite changes in our policy and in our
laws.
In the Department of State, Under Secretaries Stuart Eizenstat and
John Holum have the lead responsibility for our sanctions policy. They
have both articulated to the Congress a number of principles and
objectives that we seek for the various sanctions regimes that are
already in place, and for future instances where sanctions may be
needed. If you will permit me, Mr. Chairman, I would like to address
briefly some of the issues that apply specifically to the sanctions
against India and Pakistan. First, let me be clear that we have already
laid out a number of objectives that we seek in implementing the
sanctions. We have consistently articulated these objectives in our
meetings with the Indians and the Pakistanis, in previous testimony to
the Congress, and in our bilateral and multilateral exchanges with
others. By no accident, they reflect the objectives--some shorter term,
others longer term--that were spelled out in the communiques adopted in
the recent meetings of the P-5 in Geneva and the G-8 in London and in
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1172. To reiterate, we have
established that we want to see both governments do the following:
conduct no further nuclear tests; sign and ratify the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty immediately and without conditions; refrain from
deploying nuclear weapons or missile systems; halt the production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons; participate constructively in
negotiations towards a fissile material cut-off treaty; formalize
existing policies not to export weapons of mass destruction and missile
technology or equipment; and resume direct dialogue to address the root
causes of tension between them, including Kashmir.
Again, Mr. Chairman, these are steps we want to see both
governments take. They are not demands. We fully recognize that New
Delhi and Islamabad will have to assess them in light of their own
national security requirements. At the same time, we believe these
steps cover the full range of what will be necessary to make real
progress in South Asia. We will need to engage with both governments to
explore fully how best to pursue each of these objectives, in the
shortest possible timeframes. It is clear that we will need greater
flexibility than the law currently allows to tailor our approach,
influence events, and respond to developments.
In this regard, Mr. Chairman, we seek waiver authority for all of
the sanctions currently in place against India and Pakistan. Of course,
we would not utilize that authority until such time as substantial
progress has been achieved on the objectives outlined above, or in the
event that there were a serious negative and unintended consequence to
a specific sanction--such as impending financial collapse leading to
economic chaos and political instability. We also would like additional
flexibility to guard against an overwhelmingly disproportionate effect
of the sanctions on one country versus another; ideally, the sanctions
should have roughly the same effect on India as they do on Pakistan.
That said, we do not believe it would be advisable, nor could we
support efforts to codify or legislate the steps that India and
Pakistan would need to take in order to gain relief from sanctions, or
to match specific actions by India or Pakistan to the lifting of
particular sanctions. While I believe there is substantial agreement
between the Administration and the Congress on the objectives, it would
tremendously complicate our efforts to bring about change if we were
bound by a series of benchmarks in law. Our experience with India and
Pakistan tells us that neither would respond well to such an approach.
We believe the steps we are encouraging them to take are in their own
national interests, and we hope they will share this view. But writing
such steps into law would create the impression that India and Pakistan
would be acting under pressure and simply to ensure the lifting of U.S.
sanctions. This would greatly constrain our chances of achieving the
outcomes we seek.
Conclusion
If I may leave you with one thought, Mr. Chairman, it is the
conviction that our discussion of these matters should not leave India
and Pakistan with the impression that a lifting of sanctions is
imminent. Affirmative, positive steps will be necessary by both parties
if sanctions are to be lifted and our relationship restored to where it
had been heading prior to the events of May--including the Presidential
visit later this year. The sanctions have been imposed for specific
purposes, and India and Pakistan are well aware of them. As I have
already mentioned, the Administration does not plan to ask for easing
sanctions unless India and Pakistan have achieved significant progress
in meeting our non-proliferation objectives. That said, it seems we
have a rare opportunity to have a serious discussion and adopt some
changes in law and policy. These will better serve our own national
interests, and better position us to deal effectively with both India
and Pakistan on the critical issues that are at stake.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your questions.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Inderfurth. Do you have
anything to add, Mr. Einhorn?
Mr. Einhorn. I do not, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. You are just available to answer
questions?
Mr. Einhorn. That is correct.
Senator Brownback. Let us run the time clock and go back
and forth. Let me start with a point that you made at the end,
Secretary Inderfurth, on the President's visit to the region.
Is that still under review, or do I hear you to say it is on
now? Could you clarify that statement?
Mr. Inderfurth. Mr. Chairman, that is very much the case.
It is under review. It is being considered. We do believe that
we will have to see progress on many of the steps we have
outlined here for that trip to take place.
In our discussions with both Indian and Pakistani officials
we have made it clear that while the President was greatly
looking forward to his visit to South Asia in November, that
under present circumstances that visit will be on hold until we
see progress in the direction we are discussing.
Senator Brownback. So you do not have a timeframe set for
deciding whether or not to go ahead with that trip. It is more
set on how the negotiations proceed forward with the Indians
and the Pakistanis?
Mr. Inderfurth. Precisely.
Senator Brownback. You asked for waiver authority for all
sanctions in the region, and I guess basically what you are
saying is, you would seek the broad authority to negotiate as
you see best in moving the relationship on forward, and I take
it from your statements as well you will be putting forward
suggestions or measurements that you would seek from the
Indians or the Pakistanis before you would actually then go
ahead and waive the particular sanction.
Is that a correct interpretation? You are not just asking
for it to waive it and then you will waive all authority. You
are going to be making that as part of the negotiation.
Mr. Inderfurth. What we are seeking, Mr. Chairman, is
waiver authority, and it is of all of the legislative
restrictions that we face right now with India and Pakistan,
not only the Glenn amendment but also Pressler and Symington.
We believe we need that full authority.
What we have done with India and Pakistan have been to lay
out the objectives we are seeking, the steps we would like to
see them take. We fully recognize that some of these are
shorter term, some of these are longer term objectives. Nothing
is expected that they would all be done at one step. We think
that significant progress would be forthcoming, would allow us
to exercise that waiver authority, but we would not move
forward until we had substantial evidence of that progress, and
in consultation with Congress.
We are not looking to have waiver authority which would
then eliminate our desire and indeed our perceived requirement
to come to Congress to discuss this with you and see what the
views are.
Senator Brownback. Can you share any more publicly than you
have in your statement of what you are looking for of progress
to be made by India and Pakistan in this area of nuclear
nonproliferation? Last time you were in front of us you made a
number of statements of things you were seeking. This time you
were more circumspect about what you were seeking. Can you be
any more specific about what you are actually seeking from them
that you have not already stated publicly?
Mr. Inderfurth. Mr. Chairman, there are really two parts to
what we are seeking. One is on the nonproliferation side, and
the other is on the political dialog side. Let me address the
political dialog side and then ask Mr. Einhorn to discuss the
nonproliferation side.
On political dialog, we are fully aware that we are in this
fix today, because of the security concerns both countries
have. For India, the concerns go beyond Pakistan. They include
others in the region, including China. Those security concerns
have driven these countries in the direction they have gone,
and to take actions that have run up against our
nonproliferation policies and, indeed, the global
nonproliferation regime, so those security concerns by the
countries have to be met.
That is why we want to see them enter into a serious
dialog, and that is why I mentioned at the beginning of my
statement the hope we have that when Prime Minister Vajpayee
and Prime Minister Sharif meet in Colombo this month at the
SARC summit, that they will begin that kind of negotiation,
that kind of discussion, that kind of dialog which will lead
them to address their concerns with each other.
Now, that will not resolve the entire security concerns of
the region and, indeed, of Asia itself, but it will address the
principal concerns between the two of them and hopefully will
lead them in a direction to resolve that 50-year-old conflict
of Kashmir, which is, as we state, one of the root causes for
the problems that we face.
So we will be encouraging dialog and, in fact, the
scheduled meeting is, we believe, a step in that direction, and
we very much support it and welcome it.
On the nonproliferation side, I think Mr. Einhorn can give
you a fuller description of those kinds of steps we are
seeking.
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, we have tried to be both
consistent and transparent about our nonproliferation
objectives.
In Assistant Secretary Inderfurth's testimony he mentioned
a number of them: no more nuclear testing, adherence to the
comprehensive test ban treaty without conditions, enter into
negotiations on a fissile material cut- off treaty, refrain
from producing fissile material pending completion of the
negotiations, no deployment of nuclear weapons or missile
delivery systems, formalizing existing policies of restraint in
the area of export controls.
So these are some of our critical benchmarks, and these
benchmarks are not just American benchmarks, American
objectives. They are formalized in the communique of the P-5
members, the permanent members of the Security Council, by the
G-8 group of industrialized States and, in terms of
international standing, most importantly, by U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1172.
Those are precisely the objectives we have put both to
Indian and Pakistani officials.
Senator Brownback. And those are ones you have publicly
stated for some time.
While my time continues on this round, I want to make sure
on Pressler and Symington toward Pakistan are you seeking
waiver authority or removal, elimination of those altogether?
Mr. Inderfurth. I think at this stage we are seeking waiver
authority. We would want to have the same authority with
respect to them as we do with the Glenn amendment.
Senator Brownback. And so that if those were actually
eliminated, the administration would not have a problem with
doing that on Pressler and Symington, to put us in an equal
position regarding India and Pakistan?
Mr. Inderfurth. I think putting us in an equal position is
a good idea. I would like to actually consult and get back to
you on precisely how our legislative affairs people look at
that issue.
Senator Brownback. OK. I look forward to another round
here. Senator Robb.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Inderfurth, one of the matters we discussed
briefly just before the hearing started had to do with the
pending World Bank and international lending institution
actions and the possibility of default.
I think you know that both the chairman and myself are
prepared to support some action in this area in the near term
to address the question of the kind of consequences that would
flow from default. Would you like to say anything for the
record on that particular point before I go on to other matters
of concern?
Mr. Inderfurth. Senator Robb, I would only like to
reiterate what I had said in my testimony, that Pakistan is
particularly dependent upon external financing from the IMF and
the multilateral development banks, and we are very concerned,
with the dwindling foreign exchange reserves, that Pakistan
could soon begin defaulting on its international obligations,
and that could lead to economic consequences in Pakistan that
we do not want to see, nor are they intended by these
sanctions.
This is an urgent matter. It is one we will want to be
discussing with the two of you and others, how we respond to
it, but it is of concern, because economic instability can also
lead to political instability, and in fact all of that would
run counter to our efforts that are underway now to engage the
Government of Pakistan to pursue the kind of steps on
nonproliferation and political dialog that are important.
I should also add, by the way--I feel quite confident this
is not something that India would want to see, either--India
does not want to have a neighbor who is going through economic
collapse. We have said consistently that a Pakistan that is
stable, democratic, and prosperous is in the interests of the
region and of India, and Prime Minister Vajpayee agrees with
that.
Senator Robb. And indeed reiterated that during our visit.
Mr. Inderfurth. It is clear that that is their view. For
that reason, I think that our concerns expressed here today,
and I know we will be pursuing further with both of you, are
ones that not only the will be considered by the G-7, but also
by those in the region.
Senator Robb. Well, to the extent that the chairman and I
reflect the thinking of other colleagues, and I certainly
underscore our own thinking in that particular area, the
concerns you have articulated and the possible consequences
that flow from them are shared, and we stand ready to assist in
the near term.
Let me ask about one of them questions that did not come up
in your list of issues that have been stated again with respect
to where you would like to see cooperation. Missile testing was
not on that list and, indeed, we were unable to elicit any
expressions of interest in making commitments along those lines
during the time that we spent with the leaders of those two
countries. Would you like to comment at all on that matter, or
maybe I should say, would you comment at all on that matter?
Mr. Inderfurth. I would, and I would also like Mr. Einhorn
to do it as well.
I would only preface what Mr. Einhorn will say. We must be
realistic about what we are asking the two countries to do.
There are things we believe that they can do because they will
determine that these are in their own national security
interest.
We believe that, in fact, although we condemned and we are
deeply disappointed by the fact that they conducted nuclear
tests in May, we believe that hopefully those tests will allow
them now to take some actions to become part of the
international community on nonproliferation concerns that
perhaps they might not have felt able to before those tests.
That is an optimistic assessment.
At the same time, we have had discussions with officials
there, as you both did in New Delhi and Islamabad, and I think
they have been candid with us in terms of what they can and
cannot do, what their plans are, what they may be able to agree
to down the road. And I think certain forms of development
programs will be going ahead, and I think we have to be
realistic about that and be keeping our eye on what is the end
result and where we are in terms of stability.
Senator Robb. Indeed, in that regard I think it is fair to
say the international community has begun to express itself on
that score, and the support for a lack of progress on our part
would put us on the opposite side of that question with most of
the members of the international community, would it not?
Mr. Inderfurth. I am not sure I exactly understand the
point, Senator.
Senator Robb. Well, in other words there has been an
erosion in support for any withholding of U.N. Or U.S. Approval
in this arena, and it seems to me we are being somewhat--or
undergo the risk of being isolated in terms of how we approach
that particular question.
I am not suggesting we should not stand alone in some cases
and, indeed, we do, but this is an area where it seems to me
public comments by other principal participants have not been
consistent with what our current position is, and that is one
of the reasons I was suggesting that we are prepared to work
with you. If you do not want to debate that particular topic, I
am not asking you to do so.
Mr. Inderfurth. In terms of the international support for
where we are going, I think the international community is
holding together very well and in fact Mr. Einhorn attended
meetings last week before joining us in Frankfurt, in Paris of
the P-5 and London of the G-8.
I think there is an international consensus holding
together on the steps we would like to see both countries take.
But again, I think that we do have to look at the steps that we
have enunciated, of the 13 items that are found in the P-5
communique, for example, look at those in terms of our shorter
term objectives, longer term, and see how we could go about
achieving those.
Mr. Einhorn. Senator Robb, in your specific question about
flight testing in the current situation, rather unsettled
situation, many members of the international community believe
that missile flight testing could be provocative, and that is
why both in the P-5 and in the G-8 and in the Security Council
resolutions they called for both countries to refrain from
flight testing.
In our view, an extended moratorium, an extended period of
restraint would be a good idea to help a cooling off that is
necessary. In the long term, we have placed a principal
importance on a commitment not to deploy either nuclear weapons
or missiles, and we want to be able to discuss that kind of a
constraint with the Indians and Pakistanis and believe that in
the long term that would be stabilizing.
Senator Robb. Thank you. My time on this round has expired.
Senator Brownback. We will be back another round here.
I want to look at a statement in particular. Secretary
Inderfurth, you put forward that India has security concerns
beyond Pakistan. While Senator Robb and I were there meeting
with Indian officials from the prime minister to the defense
minister, foreign ministry section, they were all pointing to
China as who they were concerned about, and this is at the time
that the President was on his summit to China.
The statement was made while we were there that China
should be involved in somehow mediating the dispute in South
Asia. That was not well-received in India, and the
administration later clarified that statement.
But Senator Robb and I both got an earful from Indian
officials about, not pleased with this situation, and they had
I thought a very good point that they were laying out, which
was toward their own security concerns that they have in South
Asia relative to China that is growing substantially
economically, growing substantially militarily, and is
supplying technology, then, to Pakistan, of what has been
reported of missile and other technology to Pakistan that is on
the other side of India.
I wanted to give you a chance to address that issue,
because I do not know how you have a dialog in South Asia on
security without involving China and not as a mediator in this
particular situation.
Would you care to respond to that, and I want to followup
with some specific points that have been raised.
Mr. Inderfurth. Mr. Chairman, we have received the same
earful that you did when you were on your trip, and in fact
Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, in an interview with The
Hindu, one of the leading Indian newspapers, tried to address
what we believe was a misunderstanding about the discussions
and the dialog that took place at the U.S.-China summit. We do
not believe, nor have we stated, that China should serve as a
mediator in South Asian security issues.
What we have said is that China needs to be involved in a
positive fashion in addressing the security concerns in South
Asia. We fully understand India's views with respect to China.
We understand the history of that. That goes back to their
border conflict in 1962, and therefore we have been discussing
with the Chinese ways that they can take positive steps.
Now, I want to remind you that in the P-5 communique issued
in Geneva, that we sought and, indeed, received a strong
Chinese commitment, and I will quote from the communique, to
prevent the export of equipment, materials, or technology that
could in any way assist programs in India or Pakistan for
nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering
such weapons. That was included in the P-5 communique.
This pledge was further strengthened in the joint statement
that we issued in Beijing by reiterating in the context of
U.S.-China bilateral relations, and by having the Chinese agree
to that end to strengthen their national export control
regimes. The Chinese also agreed to move toward joining the
missile technology control regime, and we believe that that is
a significant step forward, and it gives us more confidence
that China will play a positive, constructive role here.
There was a second objective beyond strengthening those
export control commitments. A second objective was to urge
China to engage with India bilaterally, just as we are. This
was something that the President stressed in his meetings with
President Jiang Zemin.
This was something that Secretary Albright focused on, and
in meetings at all levels we encouraged China to have the kind
of dialog with India to discuss security concerns and the
threats that are perceived by either side, so we believe that
they must deal with this directly.
Senator Brownback. What assurances did you receive from the
Chinese Government, or did the administration, that they would
engage bilaterally with India on security concerns?
Mr. Inderfurth. They listened very carefully to what we had
to say. They actually have made the point that they thought
they were in the process of doing that.
As you know, in 1996 President Jiang Zemin visited New
Delhi, and it was a sign of what we considered to be warming
relations between India and China and, indeed, just before the
Indian nuclear tests, the Chinese Army chief of staff had been
in New Delhi.
They intend to continue that dialog, and we intend to
continue encouraging them to have as frank and as full
discussions, in diplomatese, that they can with India to allay
the concerns, many of which you heard on your trip, and I
understand that you had a long discussion with Defense Minister
Fernandes on this issue.
So we want to see that go forward, but Mr. Einhorn has also
been dealing directly with the Chinese on this issue, so I
would like for him to speak for a moment.
Senator Brownback. Specifically, Mr. Einhorn, have we
received any assurances from the Chinese that they are going to
start addressing the bilateral security concerns between China
and India?
Mr. Einhorn. The Chinese believe that relations between
China and India were improving, and have been improving for the
last few years, and so the Chinese were disturbed by some of
the justifications given by India for carrying out the tests.
In other words, one of the justifications was that there
was a China threat, or a threat of Chinese encirclement that
compelled India to take these steps. The Chinese have said that
this was very disturbing to hear, especially in light of their
judgment that relations have been improving.
I think as a result of this, relations right now are not at
a very good state. I think high level discussions between China
and India are not going forward, but it is recognized by China
that this will have to be overcome. Present difficulties will
have to be overcome. The two will have to sit down bilaterally
and talk about some of their differences.
So I think there is a recognition, and it has been conveyed
to us, that sooner or later China and India will need to talk
about some of the problems that divide them.
Senator Brownback. I think it is an imperative. I do not
see how you get at the security situation in South Asia without
having that discussion move aggressively forward, and if I were
sitting in the Indian leadership position--a number of points
they were making sounded quite rational when you look at a
growing threat next to your border, when you look at supplying
of technology to a country that has engaged in three wars, that
you have been engaged in three wars in 50 years, and a growing
rapprochement between the United States and China that they
were pointing to.
They asked a question, and it was good and it was very
difficult to respond to. They said, now, why is it the United
States is building so strong a relationship with China, that is
a dictatorship, or a totalitarian regime, however you want to
rephrase it, that has the human rights issues that we have
raised with China, that has weapons proliferation issues that
we have raised with China, that we have concerns about Tibet,
what is taking place, and then we look at India, and we put a
set of sanctions that were legislated in but prior to that
period of time had not really engaged with them aggressively on
a rapprochement with them, when they are a democracy, do not
have the weapons proliferation issues that have been posed or
have been documented with China, do not have a number of the
disputes that we have with the Chinese?
They failed to understand our position relative to China
when it comes to then. I thought they had some pretty good
points they were making.
Mr. Einhorn. Well, of course, we have had deep differences
with China, and we continue to have some very serious
differences with China. We have begun to overcome those
differences, including in the area of nonproliferation, and
that has enabled us to improve our relationship with China.
Hopefully the same thing will happen with India. We now
have a difficult time. We have these sanctions imposed, but
hopefully over time we will be able to overcome these as well.
Senator Brownback. I think we need to, and I think that
China has to be engaged in this dialog and this discussion as
well for us to move forward on a longer term basis.
We are mostly focused here today on the sanctions relative
to India and Pakistan, and that is as it should be because that
is where our legislative action will be most focused, but I do
think in looking down the road to the future you have to engage
this broader issue to bring security and stability to the
region.
Mr. Inderfurth. Mr. Chairman, may I just add one point?
We fully recognize the distinctions between the political
systems of India and China. We fully recognize the democratic
traditions of India and indeed, as you will remember in my
previous testimony, that has been one of the major reasons why
we have felt that the President's decision to have greater
engagement with India was going forward.
In fact, had there not been Indian elections when they
were, the President's trip to India would have come earlier in
the year, not, as it was then scheduled, for November.
As the other great giant of Asia, we see India with great
potential. We see India as a democracy we want to engage, and
that has been the signals we have been sending in terms of
economic engagement.
The fact that China began economic liberalization much
earlier during the period of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970's
has given us a greater degree of activity with China than we
have had with India, which only began its economic reforms in
1991. We see great potential there, and we certainly want to
build on our democratic traditions.
So I understand the points that have been made to you, and
they have been made to us, but in terms of sanctions the law
was the law. The Glenn amendment was on the books and we have
been forced, under those conditions, to impose sanctions. Now
we are looking for a way to find some way to move forward.
Senator Brownback. Beyond that, we have a lot more to do in
our relationships within the region, and we have to be
involved.
Senator Robb.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I recall, India's
Defense Minister Fernandez told us that they had had one
meeting, I believe, of the bilateral working group, although it
was at a lower level, with respect to whatever potential
progress might come in that particular area.
Let me ask you a question that relates to the same kind of
concerns that the chairman just mentioned with respect to the
possible accomplishment of all or most of the criteria that we
and the P-5 and the G-7 and G-8, et cetera, have laid down with
respect to the kinds of areas where we want to achieve a great
deal of progress.
Let us assume that we make substantial progress in that
area. One of the concerns that have been raised is to the
disparity in the way we treat or deal with China and India with
respect to the sale of component parts, or any other matters
that would enhance a more mature nuclear relationship.
Could you comment on the possibility of the development
with both India and Pakistan--and I happen to believe we ought
to try to achieve as much parallelism as possible in our
dealing with both countries, but with respect to U.S. Policy
toward the sale of component parts to India and Pakistan on the
same general basis that we do today to China?
Mr. Einhorn. On this, Senator Robb, there is a distinction
in terms of our own domestic law and in terms of our
multilateral export control policy between our treatment of
India and China. The difference is this. China is a nuclear
weapons State, as recognized under the terms of the
nonproliferation treaty.
Senator Robb. I am acknowledging there is a difference in
law today. I am asking, would we consider, in effect, for the
purposes of that particular type of transaction treating India
and Pakistan in effect as a de facto nuclear State, even though
we would not bring them into the NPT?
Mr. Einhorn. The problem in doing that, Senator Robb, is
that if India and Pakistan were to achieve this new status in
terms of our law, in terms of their eligibility for nuclear
cooperation with us by conducting nuclear tests, we would have
to ask what kind of a precedent are we establishing for others
who are considered nonnuclear weapons States under the NPT?
Would other States who are less trustworthy and are less
friendly to us than India and Pakistan see a path ahead of them
that would enable them to conduct tests and declare their
eligibility for nuclear cooperation, so it is a difficult
problem.
Senator Robb. There is no question the precedent becomes a
difficult problem, but of course we have a problem right now
with respect to both India and Pakistan, notwithstanding the
sanctions that were on the books already and our subsequent
reaction not only with respect to our own domestic concerns but
our long term concerns about stability in the region and
economic prosperity, et cetera.
Let me move at this point, if I may, to--well, before we
leave the nuclear area, let me raise again the question of the
reliability of the command and control systems and any
discussions that are taking place today to reassure both
countries that the kinds of warnings, et cetera, that would be
available are being developed.
Maybe the way to discuss the issue would be to ask how you
would describe the State of their respective systems today, and
what progress is being discussed in terms of mutual assurance
with respect to accidental or unintended consequences that
might trigger a much more serious reaction.
Mr. Einhorn. Today we do not believe that either India or
Pakistan has deployed nuclear weapons, or has deployed
ballistic missiles. We hope that will continue to be the case
and, if it is, I think some of the instabilities that might
result could be avoided at the same time.
Senator Robb. Would you take at face value--and these are
all in the public arena. I am referring to claims by either or
both countries that they do, in fact, have a weaponized version
that is capable of delivery by some means.
Mr. Einhorn. Well, I do not know at what state each of
these countries may be in terms of weaponization. Weaponization
is a process, a lengthy process of adapting certain devices to
delivery systems, and it is hard to judge where they stand, but
I think the key threshold is deployment.
We do not believe the systems or these weapons are
deployed, and what we would like to do is to encourage both
Governments to consider various types of confidence-building
measures so that they could avoid inadvertent flash points,
inadvertent instabilities, and to ensure that the relationship
between them will be stable.
We have various ideas in mind on how to contribute to
stabilizing the situation in South Asia. Crisis communications,
more frequent and reliable use of crisis communications would
be one idea, the various constraints, prenotifications of
certain kinds of military movements.
India and Pakistan have adopted such confidence-building
measures in the past, but have not conscientiously implemented
those. If they did implement them and adopt additional
confidence-building measures, the situation would be
significantly stabilized.
We will encourage those CBM's, and we will do what we can
to assist the parties.
Mr. Inderfurth. Senator Robb, can I mention that, again,
referring to the meeting in Colombo at the end of this month
between the two prime ministers, we hope they will do certain
things, including reaffirming the confidence-building measures
they have already agreed to in the past. These include using
the hot lines that have been established, the military hot
lines as well as the hot line between the prime ministers. We
would hope that they would begin to have a more frequent
discussion between themselves on these issues.
As you know, in recent days we have seen some very strange
reporting, including the Pakistani defector that told reports
about preemptive strikes being planned. Now, we made it very
clear early on that we saw serious discrepancies in what he was
saying, and I think that that story has now found its
appropriate response in terms of how we view it.
But there were also reports, prior to Pakistan's nuclear
test, of possible Indian actions. That kind of thing is going
to continue. There are going to be the stories out there that
are going to cause one side or the other to be very nervous,
and we think it is terribly important that they establish now
that they have demonstrated the nuclear capabilities, establish
firm and frequent and regular communications so that stories
like this that come up can be addressed quickly so that they
can be either confirmed or denied in a substantive way.
Senator Robb. Let me move to another area where we have not
had much discussion today, but it is frequently a centerpiece
for discussions about disputes between India and Pakistan, and
that is Kashmir.
Senator Brownback and I went up to the line of control
during our visit, and one of the things that impressed me and
impressed both of us was the fact that more casualties by very
substantial majority appear to be occurring to civilians than
to military combatants.
There are respective rules of engagement that appear to
require both sides to shoot whenever they see somebody on the
other side, but they seem to be so well-entrenched that there
are not very many sightings of military combatants, and the
only sightings are of civilian movements, even when without
crossings, and that is a separate issue.
So the concern about that continuing armed presence, and
the fact that a disproportionate number of those on both sides
of the line that are being subjected to casualties are not the
principal combatants, but the more fundamental question, given
India's very clear reluctance to have any outside mediation or
third party participation in discussion of Kashmir, and
Pakistan's desire, believing, I think, that a different result
might obtain with international participation, what kind of
leverage, or what kind of potential positive impact can we or
the international community bring to bear on resolution of some
of the questions that go to Kashmir specifically?
Mr. Inderfurth. Senator Robb, we believe that international
attention, not international mediation, is the correct approach
to take right now with respect to Kashmir. It is clear that the
Kashmir dispute is not going to go away of its own will. The
two parties themselves have to address it. Civilians are
frequently in the line of fire.
There is no question at all that the two prime ministers
must establish some mechanism to resolve this issue over time.
International attention is probably the greatest, right now,
for Kashmir as a result of the nuclear tests in a very long
time. Newspaper articles, statements by the P-5, statements by
the Security Council in New York--the resolution was the first
time since 1965 that Kashmir has been mentioned, and statements
by the G-8.
So we think that international attention is important.
Offers of assistance by the international community, including
by the United States, for confidence-building measures would be
important, certain monitoring could be done.
We do believe that the Simla Agreement of 1972 is the
approach that must be taken, which is calling for them to
resolve this issue bilaterally, but they have been close in the
past to taking certain steps, including on the Siachin Glacier,
and that is probably the most strategically unimportant piece
of territory in the world. There is no reason they need to have
a dispute over it, but it has been caught up.
Senator Robb. And for which a higher cost is paid by both
sides to continue it.
Mr. Inderfurth. Exactly. So they were close to an agreement
there. They should look at that and take a step that would
reassure the international community that they are together
moving forward to resolve this.
So we hope that India will be more receptive to the calls
of the international community, and we also hope that Pakistan
does not consider that, because there is this attention, that
the international community can solve it for Pakistan. We
cannot do that. We cannot impose a settlement.
So let us see how they progress in July, but I think right
now international attention is the correct approach.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time for this
round has expired.
Senator Brownback. Thanks.
Mr. Einhorn, I want to look at the missile proliferation
issue in the region, particularly relative to Pakistan, because
that may be the next shoe that drops on further missile
testing.
The Clinton administration put sanctions on China for
missile proliferation to Pakistan. Those were done in August
1993 and November 1994, and then just this year, on June 11 of
1998 in this committee Gordon Ailers, former Director of the
CIA Nonproliferation Center, testified that the Chinese in
November 1992 had delivered 34 M-11's to Pakistan.
I think that we have widely looked at comments made, but
there still have not been issues regarding the category I set
of sanctions looked at, but beyond that issue--and I want to
leave that really for another day--do we have information that
China continues, China or any of its companies or entities, and
I want to be very broad on this question, continues to supply
missile-related equipment and/or technology to Pakistan?
Mr. Einhorn. I have not seen recent intelligence on this,
having a bearing on this issue, but we do believe that China
has certainly until recently continued to be supportive of
Pakistani missile programs through provision of components
technology.
China committed not to transfer finished missiles, complete
missiles. They committed not to do this in October 1994, and
since then we have no evidence that China has transferred
missiles, but since that date we do have information regarding
China's provision of components and technology which is
disturbing.
Senator Brownback. And those, I would take it we have sent
a very strong signal to the Chinese Government that we do not
agree with that continuing to take place, and continuing to ask
that it be stopped immediately.
Mr. Einhorn. We have, Mr. Chairman. This has been a
continuing source of disagreement between us and China.
Senator Brownback. But we do not know of resolution yet
regarding the Chinese shipment of these missile, either
technology or component parts to Pakistan?
Mr. Einhorn. We believe this has become less of a problem
than it previously was, but we do not believe this has been
resolved.
Senator Brownback. As would perhaps be obvious by my asking
these questions and the previous round, I think that we have to
get those sorts of issues resolved, and that one cannot look
past the role of China in this dispute and particularly if this
continues to take place, and I do not advocate that we limit
our relationship with China, but these sorts of issues cannot
be allowed to continue, given the predicament that South Asia
is in presently, and I would hope that the Chinese Government
would recognize that as well.
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, we have tried, as Assistant
Secretary Inderfurth has pointed out, at the Beijing summit to
make clear that China bears important responsibilities toward
stability in South Asia.
One responsibility is to make sure that its cooperation
with Pakistan, and it is certainly legitimate for China to
cooperate with Pakistan, is fully consistent with international
nuclear and missile nonproliferation norms. That is number 1,
and number 2, it bears a responsibility to engage with India,
to deal with Indian concerns that China is threatening.
A number of the statements that India has made about the
China threat in our view have been exaggerated, but if that is
the case, then China should be prepared to sit down with the
Indians and explain why China believes that some of those
statements are exaggerated, and to try to come to some
understanding for the future. That is critical.
Senator Brownback. I think it is critical, and it is also
in some cases rational for the Indian Government to be making
some of these assertions, given what actions they have seen
taking place. Not all of the assertions--certainly not all of
the assertions that Senator Robb and I heard while we were
there meeting with the Indian officials.
Yet when you have continued activity of the type we just
discussed taking place, it adds credence to a much broader area
of concern that should not be infiltrating the atmosphere, yet
it does, so I think we have to step up our efforts that much
more to make sure that those sorts of things are discontinued
immediately to help create a much better atmosphere for
security within that South Asian region.
The only final comment that I would make is, I look forward
to working with the administration on the legislative agenda of
how we provide some waiver authority as I look down the road in
dealing with this issue, and I am hopeful the Senate can take
action this week on providing some waiver and some stepped
authority.
I do think that China has to aggressively be engaged in the
security issues in this region, and it bears responsibility
along the lines of what we have talked about. It is not just an
India-Pakistan relationship that has brought us to the point
that we are today.
And I do not know if all the claims--well, I do not agree
with all the claims that have been made by the Indian
Government, nor by the Pakistani Government, but to the extent
that any of those claims can be given credence by evidence that
we know of, we have to deal with that piece of evidence that is
there to bring a security atmosphere into the region that
everyone can deal around.
So I hope we can work constructively with the
administration on the sanctions that we have in place, and
getting the waivers toward India and Pakistan in the longer
term. I think we need to work constructively together in
dealing with the entire security situation in South Asia.
With that, that is all I have.
Senator Robb.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just finish
up, because I think we may, with all of our discussions about
individual details, have missed--not missed, but have not
focused appropriately on a very important part of Secretary
Inderfurth's testimony.
I am referring to the last two paragraphs before your
conclusion. On the printed page, it is page 4. I am referring
to the paragraph that begins, in this regard, Mr. Chairman, we
seek waiver authority for all of the sanctions currently in
place against India and Pakistan. Of course, we would not
utilize that authority until such time as substantial progress
has been achieved on the outlines above, or in the event that
there were serious negative or unintended consequence to a
specific sanction, such as impending financial collapse leading
to economic chaos and political instability.
I happen to support that essential approach to the
question, but I think with all due respect my colleague and the
chairman and, indeed, the bipartisan committee is coming up
with a solution which would be more impacted by the paragraph
that follows.
You say that we do not believe it would be advisable, nor
could we support efforts to codify or legislate the steps that
India and Pakistan would need to take in order to gain relief
from sanctions, or to match specific actions by India or
Pakistan to the lifting of particular sanctions, et cetera.
At this point, there are a variety of individual views by
Members of Congress that were expressed on the floor in debate
recently. There are some that do not want to have any change to
the status quo at the moment, there are others that would like
to see sanctions lifted in their entirety, and there are a
number who would like to have some road map for the lifting of
sanctions, and I know that the chairman has been working for a
long period of time, and he and I have discussed the issue on a
number of occasions, about having a set of specific objectives
that would be achieved, and a concurrent relief that would be
accorded based on that particular approach.
It seems to me that the administration position is that
anything that codified specific quid pro quo type actions would
not be supported by, I guess is the way I should frame it, and
I am wondering if it goes beyond that.
Would the administration find anything that codified
specific requirements for actions to be taken before some
subsequent action would be taken in terms of lifting a sanction
or sanctions sufficiently unacceptable that it would veto
legislation that is designed with the purpose of providing
additional assistance to the administration in dealing with
this question, but does it in a way that might be overly
proscriptive from the congressional point of view and less
flexible form the administration point of view?
Mr. Inderfurth. Senator, I do not want to at this stage
start talking about vetoes.
Senator Robb. I did not really mean to take it that far,
but I am trying to highlight the difference that we are not
really talking about at this point, and that I know that both
the chairman in his consideration of the issue and the
bipartisan group have considered and, indeed, was inherent, at
least in part, in the section 3 of the matter that we took up
recently, but to a lesser extent, and I am just trying to find
out if there is room for compromise, if you will, between the
two.
Could you accept some proscriptive language in return for a
very full relief in terms of the ability for the administration
to grant waivers for all sanctions? Grab that hot potato and
run with it, if you will.
Mr. Inderfurth. I could preface it by saying I am not
authorized by the administration to state exactly how we would
respond to various Senate recommendations on this.
Let me just try to tell you----
Senator Robb. I did not mean to put you on the spot. I am
just trying to get some sense of the difference.
Mr. Inderfurth. I think I can help. I am engaged, as has
been Mr. Einhorn, in the discussions we are having with both
Indian and Pakistani officials, and it is clear, I think, that
the administration and Congress are moving in the same
direction in what we would like to see accomplished.
What we would be concerned about is a road map that only
gave us one route or one way to get there. We think that in the
discussions we are having--and we believe they are serious,
that there is an attempt by both Governments to discuss how we
can meet our respective requirements, that we will have those
discussions evolve and unfold in ways that we may not be able
to foresee at this stage. Therefore, specific requirements or
overly proscriptive language we think could complicate our
efforts.
I think that if we have guidance on where you would like to
see us be, allowing us some flexibility on how we get there,
with full consultation with you, I think that we can square
this circle.
I think that it is possible to move in that direction with
you, but we would not want to see the benchmarks, as we have
called those 13 items in the P-5 communique, in legislative
language, because some may be accomplishable short-term, some
may take a longer period of time, there may be other ways to
accomplish some of the same objectives. And so we are
concerned, as I state very clearly in my statement, about
trying to codify or place in legislative language specific quid
pro quos, or this step or that step, not to mention the fact
that it is our view that neither Government would respond well
to that.
They also have political constituencies to which they are
responsive, and countries do not like to be dictated to. That
is why I stated very clearly in my testimony, these are not
demands. We are stating these as those steps which we believe
are important to resolve our differences, and that they will
have to be done in the context of their own national security
requirements. We believe we can make that argument and, over
time, we can persuade them that these things are in their
interests.
But again, if it is placed in legislative language it could
prove to be more of a straitjacket for us than the kind of
flexibility we think we need to discuss this with them.
Senator Robb. These general concerns go to the question
that I would refer to as face, and there is a question of face
on both sides of the India-Pakistan divide, as well as other
bilateral relationships, and there is face on the U.S. Side as
well with regard to laying out or drawing the line in the sand,
so to speak, I.e., the various amendments, and saying if you
cross this line certain unfavorable consequences will flow from
it, undesirable consequences, and then immediately suggesting
we did not really mean it and, indeed, we want to change the
ball game altogether, which is the dynamic that we are
concerned with right now.
Let me just ask you this. Do you think it is more likely
that you will achieve a series of progress marks, and I do not
want to go back to the 13 objectives, but a series of less than
complete achievements, or is it more likely in this case that
we will have some sort of a grand bargain, where virtually all
of the matters can be negotiated and wrapped up in one package
that would include ultimately the pay-off in terms of face,
I.e. The President's visit to South Asia to wrap up an
agreement that would reflect the concerns laid out by the P-5,
the G-7, et cetera, and might be formally signed either in
conjunction with such a visit or at least as a condition
precedent to such a visit?
Is that a more likely scenario, with the possibility of
some interim relief to prevent imminent financial collapse or
political instability that might be required, or is the more
gradual progress with some incremental lifting of sanctions the
more likely scenario?
Mr. Inderfurth. Senator, quite frankly I do not want to
pre-judge at this stage. We have had two rounds of discussion
with Indian and Pakistani officials. As I said, we do believe
there are serious discussions, but I would not want to pre-
judge which of those two courses are most likely at this stage.
We do think that progress is possible. We do believe that
certain of those things which we would like to see done are
ones that they very much agree should be done, but in terms of
how much of these could be accomplished in one fell swoop with
a grand bargain or whether it would be progressive, I do think
we need a bit more time in discussions, and that is precisely
why we will be following your itinerary shortly by departing
for the region on Saturday, for both New Delhi and Islamabad,
and we will be there for 2 days of discussions in both
capitals.
As we see this unfold, however, either in hearings or
simply in office calls, we want to keep you informed on which
of those two directions we think we are moving.
Senator Robb. As you depart, as indicated by the chairman,
you may have some additional advice, if not consent, by the
Congress to take with you to put on the table.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you.
Senator Brownback. And hopefully we will be able to have
that to you, and I would also like to add my support to your
statement about taking actions, specific actions to halt
imminent financial collapse by the countries, which would seem
to be most germane toward Pakistan.
If the administration has the ability to do that, I think
that would be wise to do. The financial situation there is not
good, and we should not force them into a collapse type of
situation. That would be very destabilizing, very harmful to
our long-term relationship, and so any action that you can take
in that regard I think would be wise and good, and certainly
supported by this Senator.
Thank you very much for joining us. Godspeed this weekend.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]