[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RESULTS OF SECURITY INSPECTIONS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S LAWRENCE
LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 20, 1999
__________
Serial No. 106-146
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
58-496CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE
TOM BLILEY, Virginia, Chairman
W.J. ``BILLY'' TAUZIN, Louisiana JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
MICHAEL G. OXLEY, Ohio HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
JOE BARTON, Texas RALPH M. HALL, Texas
FRED UPTON, Michigan RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
Vice Chairman SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania BART GORDON, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER COX, California PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
STEVE LARGENT, Oklahoma ANNA G. ESHOO, California
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina RON KLINK, Pennsylvania
BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California BART STUPAK, Michigan
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
GREG GANSKE, Iowa THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio
CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland
TOM A. COBURN, Oklahoma GENE GREEN, Texas
RICK LAZIO, New York KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
JAMES E. ROGAN, California DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona LOIS CAPPS, California
CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING,
Mississippi
VITO FOSSELLA, New York
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
ED BRYANT, Tennessee
ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland
James E. Derderian, Chief of Staff
James D. Barnette, General Counsel
Reid P.F. Stuntz, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
______
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
FRED UPTON, Michigan, Chairman
JOE BARTON, Texas RON KLINK, Pennsylvania
CHRISTOPHER COX, California HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BART STUPAK, Michigan
Vice Chairman GENE GREEN, Texas
BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
GREG GANSKE, Iowa DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
ROY BLUNT, Missouri JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan,
ED BRYANT, Tennessee (Ex Officio)
TOM BLILEY, Virginia,
(Ex Officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
Page
Testimony of:
Podonsky, Glenn S., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oversight,
Office of Environment, Safety and Health, Department of
Energy..................................................... 7
Tarter, C. Bruce, Director, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory; accompanied by: Martin Domagala, Richard
Mortensen, Jim Hirahara, Dennis Fisher, Don Wentz, Bill
Hensley, John Jones, and Barbara Stone..................... 11
Turner, James, Manager, Oakland Operations Office, Department
of Energy.................................................. 19
Weigand, Gil, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Strategic Computing
and Simulation, Department of Energy....................... 17
(iii)
RESULTS OF SECURITY INSPECTIONS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S LAWRENCE
LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 20, 1999
House of Representatives,
Committee on Commerce,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Fred Upton
(chairman) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Upton, Burr, Bilbray,
Ganske, Blunt, Bryant, Klink, Stupak, Green, McCarthy,
Strickland, and DeGette.
Also present: Representatives Norwood and Shimkus.
Staff present: Tom DiLenge, majority counsel; and Reid
Stuntz, minority staff director and chief counsel.
Mr. Upton. Good morning, everyone. The subcommittee will
come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting this morning to hold a hearing
on the results of recent security inspections at the DOE's
Lawrence Livermore lab. After members and witnesses have been
recognized for opening statements, the Chair will make a motion
to hold the remainder of the hearing in executive session. The
Chair will recognize himself for an opening statement.
This hearing is a continuation of a classified briefing
held for members 3 weeks ago on the results of a recent DOE
inspection of security at Lawrence Livermore. While that
briefing certainly was illuminating, the ability of members and
staff to question the witnesses, many of whom are here again
today, was limited by the Department's decision to withhold the
inspection report and related documents from the committee
prior to that briefing.
Now that we do have the necessary materials and have had a
chance to review the inspection report in detail, we have
called today's hearing to dig deeper into some of the issues
raised by this recent inspection. While much of what we discuss
today will be classified and thus discussed behind closed
doors, some of what we have learned so far is unclassified and
can be and should be discussed publicly. In particular, those
issues that bear on the seeming inability of the lab and
Department to conduct effective security management and
oversight, to provide accurate information about the state of
security to policymakers in the Department, the White House and
certainly in the Congress, and to take prompt and effective
corrective actions with respect to identified vulnerabilities.
For example, there are numerous references in the recent
inspection report to past findings of a similar serious and
recurring nature, findings that went uncorrected for years. In
other cases, the lab and Department field offices failed during
their own security reviews to identify serious issues found by
the recent independent inspection team and apparently did not
even evaluate some significant areas of potential security
concern.
In still other cases, the lab and field office security
assessments did reveal vulnerabilities similar to those
identified by the outside inspectors, but either corrective
action was not taken or the program officials determined that
the risk was somehow acceptable; that is, until the independent
inspectors recently put this unwanted spotlight on these
issues. Despite the recurrence of unresolved deficiencies year
after year, we have found that Livermore has never been
financially penalized for these significant security problems
by the Department in its annual performance evaluations, at
least not in recent memory.
But even if Livermore had been given unsatisfactory
security ratings by its Department managers, security measures
impact only a very small portion of the financial performance
fees that the lab can receive under the current contract. I
believe that without a closer link between security performance
and financial performance, lasting change at Livermore and
elsewhere in the DOE complex will continue to prove elusive.
Finally, we have also learned from this recent Livermore
inspection that we cannot always believe what we hear about the
status of security reforms at the Department. In particular,
the lab directors and Secretary Richardson announced with much
fanfare back in March a 9-point plan to undertake ambitious
computer security upgrades on an even more ambitious timetable,
reaching significant milestones within 30 days. And we were
told in mid-April that those milestones were reached or would
be reached within those 30 days, permitting these computer
systems to be brought back on line with enhanced security.
Yet now we find that not only did Livermore fail to reach
some important milestones as claimed, but that the lab thought
it didn't really need to do what it had promised to do. And we
found out as well that some of what the lab directors and
Secretary Richardson promised would be done simply is not
technologically feasible at this time and certainly not within
the 30 days, which causes us all to worry that either they do
not know what they are talking about, or they are more
interested in the sound of the message than the reality of
computer security.
I hope to explore these and related topics in detail after
we move into closed session. But I want to let the American
people know that this committee will continue to press the
Department and its labs, including Livermore, to make the
necessary changes to improve their security. And we will
continue to dig behind the rhetoric to unmask the reality so
that policymakers in both the executive and legislative
branches have accurate information upon which to make reasoned
policy judgments in this area.
I thank our witnesses for appearing before this committee
today, and I will recognize the ranking member, Mr. Klink.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Fred Upton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Fred Upton, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations
Today's hearing is the continuation of a classified briefing held
for Members three weeks ago on the results of a recent internal
Department of Energy inspection of security at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory. While that briefing certainly was illuminating,
the ability of Members and staff to question the witnesses--many of
whom are here again today--was limited by the Department's decision to
withhold the inspection report and related documents from the Committee
prior to that briefing. Now that we finally have received the necessary
materials and have had a chance to review the inspection report in
detail, we have called today's hearing to dig deeper into some of the
issues raised by this recent inspection.
While much of what we discuss today will be classified and thus
discussed behind closed doors, some of what we have learned so far is
unclassified and can and should be discussed publicly--in particular,
those issues that bear on the seeming inability of the lab and the
Department to conduct effective security management and oversight, to
provide accurate information about the state of security to policy
makers in the Department, the White House, and in Congress, and to take
prompt and effective correction actions with respect to identified
vulnerabilities.
For example, there are numerous references in the recent inspection
report to past findings of a similar, serious, and recurring nature--
findings that went uncorrected for years. In other cases, the lab and
Department field offices failed, during their own security reviews, to
identify serious issues found by the recent independent inspection
team, and apparently did not even evaluate some significant areas of
potential security concern. In still other cases, the lab and field
office security assessments did reveal vulnerabilities similar to those
identified by the outside inspectors, but either corrective action was
not taken or the program officials determined that the risk was somehow
acceptable--that is, until the independent inspectors recently put this
unwanted spotlight on these issues.
And, despite the recurrence of unresolved deficiencies year after
year, we've learned that Livermore has never been financially penalized
for these significant security problems by the Department in its annual
contract performance evaluations--at least not in recent memory. But
even if Livermore had been given unsatisfactory security ratings by its
Department managers, security measures impact only a very small portion
of the financial performance fees that the lab can receive under the
current contract. I believe that, without a closer link between
security performance and financial performance, lasting change at
Livermore and elsewhere in the D-O-E complex will continue to prove
elusive.
Finally, we've also learned from this recent Livermore inspection
that we can't always believe what we hear about the status of security
reforms at the Department. In particular, the lab directors and
Secretary Richardson announced with much fanfare back in March a Nine
Point Plan to undertake ambitious computer security upgrades on an even
more ambitious timetable--reaching significant milestones within only
30 days. And we were told in mid-April that those milestones had in
fact been reached or would be reached within those 30 days, permitting
these computer systems to be brought back on-line with enhanced
security.
Yet now we find out that not only did Livermore fail to reach some
important milestones as claimed, but that the lab thought it didn't
really need to do exactly what it had promised to do. And we find out,
as well, that some of what the lab directors and Secretary Richardson
promised would be done simply is not technologically feasible at this
time or certainly not doable within 30 days--which causes me to worry
that either they don't know what they are talking about, or they are
more interested in the sound of the message than the reality of
computer security.
I hope to explore these and related topics in detail, after we move
into the closed session. But I want to let the American people know
that this Committee will continue to press the Department and its labs,
including Livermore, to make the necessary changes to improve their
security. And we will continue to dig behind the rhetoric to unmask the
reality, so that policy makers in both the executive and legislative
branches have accurate information upon which to make reasoned policy
judgments in this area.
I thank our witnesses for appearing before this Subcommittee today,
and I will now recognize Ranking Member Klink, for an opening
statement.
Mr. Klink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman for holding this follow-
up hearing. This committee was responsible for the
establishment of the Office of Security Evaluation back in the
late 1980's because of previous security crises at the Nation's
weapons facility. Yet the Congress and the country has been
rocked again by allegations that year of espionage and poor
security of all types at the Nation's weapons laboratories.
Both the Rudman report and internal reports from the Department
of Energy have made it clear that security directives, even
when issued by the President of the United States, were ignored
and even flaunted by the laboratories and their scientists.
Senator Rudman spoke eloquently of the arrogant culture of
the laboratories but, inexplicably, he didn't think that the
contractors who run the facilities were responsible for
security, although their contracts specifically do give them
those jobs. All we have to do is look at Dr. Tarter's testimony
today to find out who is in charge. Dr. Tarter magnanimously
states that he is committed to DOE, that he will fund and
implement the Secretary's 9-point information security action
plan. Until reading his testimony, I didn't know Dr. Tarter had
that choice.
One of the key questions I hope that we can answer today,
and I want to ask him, is whether Lawrence Livermore's contract
gives the University of California the responsibility and the
budget for providing security for the Nation's weapons secrets,
and if he has ever been hindered by the Department from
carrying out those responsibilities. Then I want to ask if he
considers that this is an optional responsibility, depending on
whether or not he would like to carry it out.
Surprisingly, the response in Congress to these new
allegations has been to propose legislation to give the
laboratories, the field offices that directly supervise them,
and the Defense Programs operation more independence and lack
of oversight than ever before. The Assistant Secretary for
Defense Programs, who was finally asked to resign a few weeks
ago, last week came before another House committee and said
these problems were everyone's fault, but mostly they were not
his. He was praised for his fine work. This is the same person
who, according to testimony in the Senate by Notra Trulock
earlier this year, stopped Mr. Trulock in 1997 from briefing
former Secretary Pena about alleged spying at Los Alamos
because it might have a negative effect on his budget request.
Nothing we have heard in our recent hearings gives any
indication that these changes will have the desired long-term
effect in security, safety, or in any other areas. Last week in
the committee's hearing on the reorganization of the Department
being proposed by various congressional committees, a variety
of experts stated that these reorganizations would very
possibly make the accountability situation worse than it is
now. This can only have a negative effect on security efforts.
Two weeks before that, we held a hearing on radiation
safety enforcement security at DOE weapons facilities, at which
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory was prominently featured because
of the assessment of the largest fine in history of the
Department for safety violations. And, again, there was great
frustration expressed by the Department's enforcement staff
because of the recalcitrant attitude of the laboratory and the
failure of the field offices to force change.
The historically poor state of security at Lawrence
Livermore's laboratory is more than evident from the lab
director's testimony today of all the steps he is now taking to
improve security. I must ask why these actions were not taken
years ago. I look forward to obtaining a clear statement from
Lawrence Livermore and the University of California of their
responsibility for maintaining adequate security. Then perhaps
the next time this happens, perhaps the Congress will not fool
itself about where the blame should lie.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
Mr. Upton. Are there other members seeking to give an
opening statement?
Mr. Burr. Mr. Chairman, just a brief one. I thank the
chairman and I thank our witnesses for returning and for the
addition of other ones. Let me suggest to you today that as we
have looked at this, three things have popped up: culture,
contractors and complacency, and I think those are the three
areas that we need to deal with.
Culture, something that was not a factor over the last 12
months but possibly 12 or 20 years, the culture that has to be
changed, and that in fact the inspectors have recognized and
highlighted as one of the challenges that they have.
Contractors. From a standpoint that these in many cases are
projects that have never been bid, we have to look at the
relationship of the contract. We have to look at certain areas
of the contract. One very glaring thing in your public
statement, Mr. Tarter, is that you refer to the marginal rating
in materials and control and accountability as in the Annual
Report to the President. Yet the report to the President under
materials control and accountability is unsatisfactory.
Marginal and unsatisfactory are completely different, by
definition, but I think this gets at the heart of the cultural
and the complacency problem, that we read them as in fact the
same. Complacency not only by contractors, but DOE, about a
sense of urgency of addressing things that deal with national
security, deal with security of any corporation about secrets
or about sensitive material that they have.
I am hopeful that as we move through this, Mr. Chairman,
that in a bipartisan way we can work with inspectors to make
sure that we have an accurate way to gauge in the future not
only our progress but our success at maintaining the safeguards
and securities that are needed.
I thank the chairman for the time and I yield back.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Stupak.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. Mr.
Chairman, we have had a number of hearings on this whole
situation, and I think back to the April 20 hearing in which we
talked about the real fundamental problem is the lack of
accountability; that when things happen we, the U.S.
Government, are not holding people accountable. And I think
that if we would do that, then these things would not recur
with such frequency.
Let me go back to what we have learned. We have had these
concerns brought up in 1976, 1982, 1988, 1992, 1997, and now
1998 and 1999. And we always get assurances things will be
different, but they never are. They never are.
From the chairman's comments to Ranking Member Klink, to
everybody here, they are frustrated and really not quite sure
what we should do. So I think we should go back to our
fundamental problem here, which is lack of responsibility and
accountability.
So why we ever approved another 5-year extension for
Livermore Lab is beyond me. I think we should start with
accountability and responsibility and pull that contract today.
Maybe then--maybe then people will understand we are serious
about this. I am not trying to pile on anyone, but I am just as
frustrated as anybody up here, and if we are really going to
have accountability and responsibility, then let us begin by
pulling that contract.
I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton. Other members? Mr. Shimkus.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to follow
up on my colleague from Michigan's point. I believe that the
only way you can change the corporate culture is you remove the
people who are established in the culture of whatever, the
corporation, and we just don't do that. And some are the rules
that we have put in place protecting employees or contractors.
I would like to see swift change in that and I agree with
my colleague from Michigan that we ought to--this is something
we ought to micromanage for a while through yearly contracts,
and I am willing to be involved in that. We have had enough,
and I think the displeasure of Congress is going to be felt. I
yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Upton. Other members?
[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Tom Bliley, Chairman, Committee on Commerce
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today's hearing is the continuation of
what I promised back in March. At that time, I promised that, in light
of the breaking reports about lax security at our nuclear weapon labs,
this Committee would take a long, hard look at security at each of the
major Department of Energy nuclear facilities, whose general management
falls within this Committee's primary jurisdiction.
But well before this recent security scandal, I directed Committee
staff to work with the General Accounting Office to re-evaluate the
status of security at these facilities. I did so because of the
Department's poor history in implementing lasting reforms--the last
wave of which occurred in the early 1990s under then-Secretary Watkins.
That G-A-0 review is still underway, and today's hearing will
complement that work by providing very timely information about one
particular and troublesome lab--Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
in California.
Let me state at the outset that Livermore is not being singled out
by this Committee for criticism. Nor do I believe it is the worst
offender. But Livermore was the first of the major labs to receive an
internal security inspection following the Department's claims of major
security reforms. Despite all of the high-profile attention that this
topic has received at Livermore and across the D-O-E complex since
earlier this year, Livermore simply did not hold up well under this
latest scrutiny. While we cannot discuss the specifics of the report's
findings in this open session, I can say that some of them are simply
stunning--and have left me scratching my head, wondering how on earth
things like this could have been happening for so long at a nuclear
weapons lab without someone standing up and saying ``this must stop.''
Well, let me say that this, indeed, must stop. It is clear to me
that, without aggressive and sustained internal and external oversight,
Livermore will never fully correct these deficiencies, and I hope that
this Committee's efforts to shine a spotlight on Livermore's troubles
will assist those within the lab and the Department who truly want to
achieve reform rather than just talk about it.
I understand that the Department's internal inspection team is
currently reviewing Sandia National Laboratory and plans to inspect Los
Alamos in the near future as well. I expect that we will hold similar
hearings on the findings of those inspections, too. I hope that the
Committee will not have to be prevented from gaining timely information
about those inspections as it was with respect to the Livermore report.
It troubles me that the Department forced excessive delays and my
issuance of subpoenas to secure important materials for today's
hearing.
This Committee has the absolute right to gain real-time and candid
information about security at the Department's facilities. I am not
interested in DOE whitewashing, defensive posturing, or the
Administration's ``all is now well'' spin. And I intend to continue to
take whatever steps are necessary to secure security information in a
timely fashion. If the Secretary needs to rearrange his schedule to
keep one step ahead of this Committee's work, that's fine with me--I
don't know what other issue could be more important to him right now
anyway. But I certainly won't let the Department continue to delay our
review of this matter, which is of pressing concern to our Nation's
security and to the American public.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your continuing focus on this matter.
Mr. Upton. Okay. If not, if there are no further opening
statements, the Chair will recognize our witnesses: Dr. Gil
Weigand, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Strategic Computing and
Simulation at the Department of Energy; Mr. Glenn Podonsky,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oversight, Office of
Environment, Safety and Health at Department of Energy; Dr.
James Turner, Manager of the Oakland Operations Office at the
Department of Energy; and Dr. Bruce Tarter, Director of
Lawrence Livermore National Lab.
I think all of you are aware that this subcommittee is an
investigative subcommittee and, as such, we have always had the
long-term practice of taking testimony under oath. Do any of
you have objection to doing that?
We also advise you that each of you, under the Rules of the
House, you are entitled to be advised by counsel. Do any of you
have desire to be advised by counsel?
If not, in that case if you would stand and raise your
right hand, and also, I guess, include the folks that may be
testifying with you later on.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Upton. You are now under oath and you are now allowed
to give, hopefully, a 5-minute summary of your written
statement and we will start with Mr. Podonsky. Welcome back.
TESTIMONY OF GLENN S. PODONSKY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
OVERSIGHT, OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY AND HEALTH, DEPARTMENT
OF ENERGY; C. BRUCE TARTER, DIRECTOR, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE
NATIONAL LABORATORY; ACCOMPANIED BY: MARTIN DOMAGALA, RICHARD
MORTENSEN, JIM HIRAHARA, DENNIS FISHER, DON WENTZ, BILL
HENSLEY, JOHN JONES, AND BARBARA STONE; GIL WEIGAND, DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, STRATEGIC COMPUTING AND SIMULATION,
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; AND JAMES TURNER, MANAGER, OAKLAND
OPERATIONS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Podonsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to again appear before the committee to discuss the
Office of Independent Oversight and Inspection of the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory. Just for clarification, I am now
the director of the newly created Office of Independent
Oversight and Performance.
As you know, we provided a classified briefing to members
of this committee on July 1 on the results of our May 1999
inspection of safeguards and security programs at the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory. At the briefing, we also
provided copies of the classified inspection report.
At this time, I would also like to introduce Ms. Barbara
Stone who is sitting behind me, who is the Director of the
Office of Security Evaluations. Ms. Stone was unable to appear
at the July 1 briefing as she was away on a much needed
vacation. At that briefing we had Mr. John Hyndman, who is now
engaged in the inspection of Sandia National Laboratory where
Ms. Stone and I will be proceeding immediately following this
hearing.
For the benefit of those who were unable to attend the July
1 briefing, I would like to provide some background on who we
are. My office is responsible for providing the Secretary an
independent, impartial view of the effectiveness and safeguards
of security, cybersecurity and emergency management policies
and programs throughout the Department of Energy. The Office of
Security Evaluations which performed the inspection at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory is one of the three offices that
report to me.
As you may recall, the Office of Security Evaluations was
originally established in 1984 to provide the Energy Department
an independent assessment on the effectiveness of safeguards
and security policies and programs throughout the Department.
Congressman Dingell and Congressman Bliley were instrumental in
the formation of that office.
As part of Secretary Richardson's recent effort to
strengthen independent oversight of safeguards and security,
the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance has now
been elevated to report directly to him.
Now, I would like to take a minute to provide an
unclassified summary of the May Livermore inspection. Our
overall conclusion was that improvements were being made at
Livermore but significant weaknesses remained to be addressed.
For example, we saw improvements in the intrusion detection
systems and significant progress to improve classified
information on computer systems. However, we identified
weaknesses that warrant continued attention in a number of
areas. One of the weaknesses involved inadequate vulnerability
assessments of the Superblock which is the area at Livermore
where special nuclear material is used and stored. We also
noted weaknesses in some aspects of Livermore's ability to
accurately measure some types of nuclear materials. Other
weaknesses were evident in Livermore's programs for protecting
classified and sensitive information.
We identified weaknesses in their methods for storage of
classified parts and some of the control of access areas
containing classified matter. We were also concerned about
foreign nationals being able to access Livermore unclassified
computers through dial-up access. We noted that some aspects of
the 9-point security plan for cybersecurity, which is a plan
for improving classified information, required some work. Let
me emphasize that these weaknesses warrant significant
attention and require prompt action; however, as I told this
committee during the briefing on July 1, we believe that the
responsible line managers which are here today from the Office
of Defense Programs, the Oakland Operations Office, and
Livermore National Laboratory, are taking the inspection report
seriously now.
Although the formal inspection ended in May, the Office of
Independent Oversight has continued to follow up on the
progress to address identified deficiencies. We have been in
frequent contact with the responsible DOE and Livermore
managers since the inspection ended. Our follow-up efforts
indicated that corrective actions are underway. For example, at
the time of our July 1 briefing to this committee and as part
of our follow-up, my office sent our inspectors back to
Livermore to review progress at Superblock in the areas of
modeling and testing, which is needed to verify the
effectiveness of the protective strategy and response plan at
Livermore.
Since the May 1999 inspection, Livermore has developed and
is implementing a program of testing and modeling that is
appropriate for verifying the effectiveness of protective force
response. Livermore has also placed additional protective force
personnel in the Superblock to improve response capability
under the new protective strategy as defined. The Office of
Oversight will continue to conduct follow-up visits and perform
independent testing to verify the effectiveness of Livermore's
corrective actions.
In summary, I would like to say that the deficiencies at
Livermore appear to be receding with a high level of management
attention now. It is clear throughout the DOE management chain
that the efforts to improve safeguards and security have the
personal attention and support of Secretary Richardson. While
not diminishing the significance of the deficiencies identified
by my inspectors, our follow-up efforts indicate that
corrective actions are being taken to address the
vulnerabilities that we have identified.
As I previously stated on July 1, this has not always been
the case in our experience at the Department of Energy. We have
seen countless reports, including many of ours, where plans and
corrective actions were made with little effect. But we believe
Secretary Richardson has made and continues to make a
significant difference. He is a Secretary who is completely
engaged. This is why we are confident that corrective actions
will now be taken.
However, I assure you that the Office of Independent
Oversight will continue to follow up and make certain that
these corrective actions are effective. And as I stated in the
July 1 briefing, we will trust but we will continue to verify.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Glenn S. Podonsky follows:]
Prepared Statement of Glenn S. Podonsky, Office of Office of
Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, Department of Energy
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to again
appear before this committee to discuss the recent Office of
Independent Oversight inspection of the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory.
I am the Director of the newly created Office of Independent
Oversight and Performance Assurance. As you know, we provided a
classified briefing to members of this committee on July 1st on the
results of our May 1999 inspection of safeguards and security programs
at the Livermore National Laboratory. At that briefing, we provided
copies of the inspection report to the Committee.
At this time, I would like to introduce Ms. Barbara Stone, Director
of the Office of Security Evaluations. Ms. Stone was unable to attend
the July 1st briefing as she was away on a much-needed vacation. At
that briefing, Mr. John Hyndman provided some details on the Livermore
inspection results. Mr. Hyndman is now engaged in an inspection of
Sandia National Laboratories as part of our ongoing effort to review
all three of the major weapons laboratories.
For the benefit of those who were unable to attend the July 1st
briefing, I would like to provide some background on who we are. My
office is responsible for providing the Secretary an independent,
impartial view of the effectiveness of Safeguards and Security, Cyber
Security, and Emergency Management policies and programs throughout the
Department of Energy. The Office of Security Evaluations performed the
inspection of the Livermore Laboratory. It is one of three offices that
report to me. As you may recall, the Office of Security Evaluations was
originally established in 1984 to provide the Energy Department an
independent assessment of the effectiveness of Safeguards and Security
policies and programs throughout the Department. Congressman Dingell
and Congressman Bliley were instrumental in the formation of this
office. As part of Secretary Richardson's recent efforts to strengthen
independent oversight of safeguards and security, the Office of
Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance has been elevated to
report directly to the Secretary.
Now, I will take just a minute to provide an unclassified summary
of the results of the May Livermore inspection. Our overall conclusion
was that improvements were being made at Livermore, but that
significant weaknesses remain to be addressed. For example, we saw
improvements in the intrusion detection systems and significant
progress to improve the security of classified information on computer
systems. However, we identified weaknesses that warrant continuous
attention in a number of areas. One of the weaknesses involved
inadequate vulnerability assessments of the Superblock, which is the
area at Livermore where special nuclear material is used and stored. We
also noted weaknesses in some aspects of Livermore's ability to
accurately measure some types of nuclear materials. Other weaknesses
were evident in Livermore's programs for protecting classified and
sensitive information. We identified weaknesses in the methods for
storage of classified parts and in some of the controls on access to
areas containing classified matter. We were also concerned about
foreign nationals being able to access Livermore's unclassified
computers through dial up access. We noted that some aspects of the
``nine-point'' plan, which is a DOE plan for improving security of
classified information, required work.
Let me emphasize that these weaknesses warrant significant
attention and require prompt action. However, as I told you during the
briefing on July 1st, we believe that the responsible line managers,
which include the Office of Defense Programs, the Oakland Operations
Office, and, and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory contractor
management team, are taking the inspection report seriously.
Although the formal inspection ended in May, the Office of
Independent Oversight has continued to follow-up on the progress to
address identified deficiencies. We have been in frequent contact with
the responsible DOE and Livermore managers since the inspection ended.
Our follow-up efforts indicate that corrective actions are underway.
For example, at the time of our July 1st briefing to this committee,
and as part of our follow-up efforts, my office sent our inspectors
back to Livermore to review progress at the Superblock in the areas of
modeling and testing, which is needed to verify the effectiveness of
the protection strategy and response plan at Livermore. Since the May
1999 inspection, Livermore has developed and is implementing a program
of testing and modeling that is appropriate for verifying the
effectiveness of the protective force response. Livermore also has
placed additional protective force personnel in the Superblock to
improve response capability until the new protection strategy is
determined.
The Office of Independent Oversight will continue to conduct
follow-up visits and perform independent testing to verify the
effectiveness of Livermore's corrective actions.
In closing, I would like to say that the deficiencies at Livermore
appear to be receiving a high level of management attention. It is
clear throughout the DOE management chain that the efforts to improve
safeguards and security have the personal attention and support of
Secretary Richardson. While not diminishing the significance of the
deficiencies identified in our report, our follow-up efforts indicate
that corrective actions are being taken on the vulnerabilities we have
identified. As I have previously stated, this has not always been the
case in our experiences with the Department. We have seen countless
reports, including many of ours, where commitment, plans, and
corrective actions were made with little results. But, we believe
Secretary Richardson has made, and continues to make, a significant
difference. He is a Secretary who is completely engaged. This is why we
have confidence that corrective actions will be taken. However, I
assure you that the Office of Independent Oversight will continue to
follow-up to make certain that the corrective actions are effective. As
I indicted at the July 1st briefing, we will trust, but we will verify.
Thank you again Mr. Chairman, we are now ready for your questions.
Mr. Upton. Dr. Tarter--by the way, Mr. Podonsky, we did
want to receive copies of your testimony in advance. Would it
be possible maybe for one of our clerks to get a copy of your
opening remarks there, and we will make copies for members here
in time for the questions. Could someone maybe do that for me?
TESTIMONY OF C. BRUCE TARTER
Mr. Tarter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin with a
brief statement which is, I think, part of the opening page in
my testimony. But, as I think all of you know, we are a
national security laboratory. Nearly all of the work of the
laboratory is focused on national security. And my particular
highest responsibility each year is to certify certainly to the
President of the United States that the United States stockpile
of nuclear weapons is safe and reliable. That is the focus of
the laboratory. And obviously being able to carry out
operations in a safe and secure manner is an essential
ingredient in making that annual certification to the President
which we have now been able to make--this year will be the
fourth year we have formally made that recommendation on the
weapons in our stockpile.
To do that, we have three kinds of security at the
laboratory. There is physical security, there is cybersecurity,
and there is essentially what I would call personnel security.
And I think the OSE evaluation focused primarily on physical
security and cybersecurity, and I will make a comment or two
about those, and then I will also make an additional comment
about personnel security, which I think is equally important
but is not the specific subject of the OSE evaluation.
In physical security, I think the area which Mr. Podonsky
has mentioned of greatest concern, and I think to some degree
of greatest difficulty, is that involving the guarding of
special nuclear materials. And I think in all of these areas in
physical security and cybersecurity as well as the personnel
security, three factors come into play. One, the threat
changes. The threat evolves. And I think one of the major
features of the annual OSE evaluation is not to review the same
set of issues each year, but to engage the threat as it's
evolving and also technology as it's evolving in order to meet
that threat.
In the area of physical security, I think, as Mr. Podonsky
indicated, that we are focused very well on a plan involving a
higher level of technology to provide the assurances and
simulations to guarantee the safety of the special nuclear
materials. And I think that plan--he described it both in your
previous hearing, and we are in an iterative process with the
Department to assure that we will reach closure on that in the
near future.
In the area of cybersecurity--and I have testified to this
in several other hearings in the past months--I think it is a
complicated area for the U.S. Government. And I think Dr.
Weigand may in his own testimony--Dr. Weigand is a particular
expert in this area--make additional comments. This is not a
simple thing, whether you are the Bank of America, a national
security laboratory, or perhaps even Congress.
Technology is evolving very rapidly, and I think this is a
complex area.
I believe you, Mr. Klink, asked about our commitment. My
commitment in the area of cybersecurity goes beyond that needed
to simply satisfy the OSE evaluation. I think because of the
high reliance on cyberwork in our programmatic work, as well as
its high vulnerability as part of intrinsic security, I am
committed to not just passing the bar, but passing it with a
significant gap. I think we have to do much better and I think
we have begun to be engaged with the other pieces of the U.S.
Government, the National Security Administration, the
Department of Defense and other areas to try to make the best
technology fit into cybersecurity.
Let me remind the committee of one issue which has been
brought out in the evaluations, but just again to reemphasize--
at Livermore, as is true at other national security
laboratories, there are two kinds of computers and computer
networks. There is a classified computer network in which
almost all of the national security work is done, the design of
bombs, the assessment of nuclear intelligence from other
countries, all of those issues. And that computer system has no
electronic links to any of the unclassified computer systems.
It can't get there. There is an air gap as big as between your
desk and mine. There is no way to transmit information between
those two systems.
In the area of cybersecurity we have, I think on our own
but also as a result of the Secretary's strong emphasis in this
area, reinforced the security of the classified network and all
of the classified computing.
In addition, I think we have as part of the 9-point plan,
as part of the additional measures we have taken, we have taken
a number of steps to enhance even further the general security
of the unclassified computer networks. Again, as I think all of
you know, that is not a technologically simple exercise to do.
And I think Dr. Weigand may wish to comment on that, but I
think we are putting major resources and major effort into the
technology and the interactions necessary to accomplish that.
The third piece of security at the laboratory involves
personnel security. And this is a matter of basically having
the people who work at the laboratory and national security be
reliable and be trusted people. Now, that is not the job of the
laboratory, that is the job of the Department of Energy to
clear them at the proper level. But it is the job of the
laboratory to basically have a counterintelligence program
which assesses threats, assesses interactions, and makes
recommendations on how we can best both train the employees,
train the system to sense vulnerabilities and to sense the
threat, and the whole variety of issues that come under the
word ``counterintelligence.''
I believe at our laboratory--and it has been put into the
record in testimony not by people from the laboratory but by
people from the Department--that we have an excellent, an
outstanding at some levels, counterintelligence program. And I
think in many respects, ensuring that that program is on a par
with the best in the world is equally important to the physical
and the cybersecurity. And I think we have spent a great deal
of time in the two standdowns, security immersion things in
training and educating the people on a threat, on the
vulnerabilities, which both because of technology and because
of the evolving world general political structure, are very,
very different than they were in 1985 or 1990; and that, I
think, is why I believe the OSE inspections are a healthy
thing. I think finding issues--an OSE team that could not find
issues, I think wouldn't be a good OSE team. The laboratory
that did not have corrective action plans to respond to those
would not be an appropriate thing. To have a clean perfect
record is neither testing us nor their system.
So I believe that process is a healthy process. I think the
tension is a healthy tension and I think we're engaged in that
process very well today. And when I made my comment about
commitment, I think the commitment again is not this year, or
other years, simply now to pass the bar but to pass the bar
with a sufficient measure, a gap that in fact it will provide
confidence in the Congress as well as in the Department that in
fact the laboratory and its facilities are secure. Thank you
very much Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of C. Bruce Tarter follows:]
Prepared Statement of C. Bruce Tarter, Director, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, University of California
OPENING REMARKS
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am the Director of the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). Our Laboratory was
founded in 1952 as a nuclear weapons laboratory, and national security
continues to be our central mission. Livermore is a principal
participant in the Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship
Program, heavily involved in programs to prevent the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and engaged in energy, environmental, and
bioscience R&D as well as industrial applications of our core
technologies.
Our National Security mission and safeguards and security are
inextricably linked, and we take both of them very seriously at
Livermore. We cannot carry out our National Security mission
effectively without appropriate protection of classified and sensitive
information and materials. Like National Security, safeguards and
security continues to evolve in terms of requirements and objectives.
We have an extensive security and counterintelligence infrastructure in
place at our Laboratory, and we continually make adjustments and
upgrades to address new threats and concerns. Through a process of
internal self-assessments, technical consultants, and external reviews,
we ensure our readiness to deal with a broad spectrum of threats. At
Livermore, we believe our Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) and sensitive
and classified information are secure.
The review recently conducted by the Office of Security Evaluations
(OSE) was helpful in identifying areas for improvement. The OSE
concluded that in two key areas, Physical Security which deals with the
technical systems that help protect Special Nuclear Material, and
Classified Cyber Security, which deals with the protection of our
classified computing networks, the Laboratory received the highest
possible rating.
That is not to say we do not have work to do. Opportunities for
improvement were noted in all areas of the OSE report, and the
Laboratory is firmly committed to addressing them. I would like to
assure you that the concerns raised in the OSE report are receiving
high priority, and resources are being made available by the Laboratory
to address them.
We have invested heavily in enhanced employee training in security
at Livermore. In April, we underwent an intensive two-day cyber
security stand-down in which we addressed not only cyber security, but
also conducted formal sessions on general security requirements and
counterintelligence. In June, in response to Secretary Richardson's 5-
point Security Immersion Program, we ceased all normal operations for
two additional days of security training. Our employees were fully
engaged in these training programs, and have made many suggestions for
further improving security.
One concern raised by the OSE team had to do with the mixed Q and L
clearance environment in the Limited Area of the Laboratory. In recent
years, DOE's goal has been to reduce the number of Q clearances. This
has been accompanied by an increase in the number of individuals having
an L clearance. These are individuals who are allowed physical access
to the Limited Area but who do not have access to weapons data. For the
record, I would like to note that there are no foreign nationals at
LLNL with an L clearance. Any LLNL foreign national visiting the
Limited Areas has always required an escort. Within the Limited Area,
we rely largely on administrative controls to prohibit access to
classified information by L-cleared personnel. We believe that,
although well intended, the reduction in Q clearances has lessened
security, and we would like to see funding made available for Q-
clearances for all personnel requiring access to the Limited Area of
the Laboratory.
The Annual Report to the President on Safeguards and Security rated
LLNL ``Unsatisfactory'' in the area of Materials Control and
Accountability (MC&A) and ``Marginal'' overall. More recently, the
April/May OSE Inspection rated LLNL ``Marginal'' in this MC&A area. In
a letter to Assistant Secretary Vic Reis dated May 14, 1999, I
personally assured him that the Laboratory was committed to rectifying
the rating in MC&A before the end of the calendar year. I would like to
note that we are on schedule in our action plan, with most actions
already complete. Similarly, in that same letter to Dr. Reis, I
committed to funding and implementing the LLNL Tri-Lab INFOSEC Action
Plan as approved by DOE. Again, many actions have already been
completed and we continue to be on schedule. I note these formal
commitments in that they also address some of the concerns raised in
the OSE evaluation.
The OSE team was careful to note in their report major improvements
made in the Safeguards and Security program to address past concerns,
and these improvements are continuing. There have been important
technical upgrades to the Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Alarm
System (PIDAS) that surrounds our Superblock, which contains our
Plutonium facility, to provide early detection of both airborne and
bridging attacks. We have recruited and put in place an offensively
trained Special Response Team having the training necessary to
implement a recovery or recapture action. One hundred percent searches
are conducted at material access area portals in the Plutonium
Facility. Over 100 simulations of adversary attacks have been
completed, and we are continuing to refine our simulation methodology,
attack scenarios, and defensive strategies. We have engaged an external
advisory group of very senior former military and FBI experts to advise
us in this work. Since the completion of the OSE SE we have committed
additional officers to the Superblock and taken other compensatory
measures to assure the security of our SNM assets.
Other improvements noted in the OSE report include the installation
of an intrusion detection system in a building inside the Limited Area
used for the storage of classified non-SNM weapons parts. Alarm systems
are now in design for two other facilities in the Limited Area. Foreign
Ownership, Control or Influence (FOCI) reviews of all contractors have
been completed. A baseline inventory of plutonium has been completed,
and improved procedures to ensure effective and timely accounting for
any inventory differences have been put in place.
In the area of cyber security, we have already implemented many
elements of the Tri-Lab Committee's ``nine point plan.'' For example,
steps have been taken to ensure the physical incompatibility of
removable media between classified and nearby unclassified computer
systems. Scanning of outgoing e-mail has been instituted, and funding
has been committed for implementation of a multi-level system that will
separate sensitive unclassified computer processing from the remainder
of unclassified processing. The frequency of vulnerability scans of
network computers is being increased, and unclassified archives are
being scanned for classified content. To date over 4 million files have
been scanned, and no classified content has been found. Procedures for
authorizing access to unclassified computers by foreign nationals have
been tightened, and today no foreign nationals have access to Livermore
unclassified computer networks without having gone through an indices
check and having a formal computer security plan approved by the
Laboratory. All dial-up access by foreign nationals is routed through a
common terminal server which has special intrusion detection software.
In summary, safeguards and security go hand in hand with our
National Security mission at Livermore. We are committed to an
excellent safeguards and security program, and have been taking, and
will continue to take, the steps necessary to achieve it.
PHYSICAL SECURITY AT LIVERMORE
Livermore's security construct is based on a series of defensive
layers--a graded approach that provides increasing barriers that
correspond to the increasing value of critical Laboratory assets.
Clearances, badging, and background checks on Laboratory employees
(including subcontractors) constitute a first line of defense. Those
people with access to classified assets undergo background
investigations associated with DOE Q, L or sensitive compartmented
information (SCI) clearances as appropriate. Reinvestigations are
scheduled automatically at five-year intervals or as needed on a for-
cause basis.
Livermore uses a defense-in-depth approach to physical barriers--
fences, doors, repositories, and vaults. The Laboratory's outer
perimeter fence provides the basic physical protection to U.S.
government property. Additional protection is provided for ``limited''
areas where classified assets are present. The level of clearance
required to freely transit these areas is also higher. Classified parts
and materials are provided additional physical protection and access
control. Significant quantities of special nuclear material receive the
highest level of protection, with vault-like physical protection as
well as aggressive armed defense and response capabilities.
At each physical barrier (e.g., fence, building, vault), there are
various levels of access control. Access control is performed either by
security officers or automated security access portals. At more
restricted areas, access is checked against specific access lists.
Need-to-know is required, in addition to the appropriate clearance,
before an individual is allowed access to classified assets.
The Laboratory employs security officers who are fully trained and
accredited to meet DOE criteria. The level of training varies with the
assignment (defensive, offensive, or special response). We currently
have over 40 offensively trained officers in our Special Response Team
and have a new group beginning academy training next month. Training is
extensive and performance based. The security force undergoes regular
performance tests, self-assessments, DOE surveillance, and inspections.
Physical security is designed into new facilities and facility
modifications. Detection systems are continuously monitored and
routinely tested. The Laboratory's security system is prepared for
armed response to all unauthorized intrusions.
In the Annual Report to the President on Safeguards and Security we
received a ``Marginal'' rating overall but, an ``Unsatisfactory''
rating in MC&A. The issue involved our inability to meet SNM inventory
requirements at a time when the Plutonium Facility was shut down to
address safety concerns, preventing monitoring and measurements. Now
that safety concerns have been addressed and the facility reopened, we
have resumed all special nuclear material measurements and inventory
monitoring and we believe we will be in compliance with DOE
requirements.
We have high confidence in our Safeguards and Security programs and
in the security of our critical assets. We have implemented technical
and procedural enhancements to strengthen our physical security,
remedied material control and accounting deficiencies, and fully
upgraded our strategy to protect nuclear material at our Laboratory.
CYBER SECURITY AT LIVERMORE
Cyber or computer security is a critical element of Livermore's
overall security construct. The Laboratory has both classified computer
networks and unclassified computer networks. The two are separate and
are not connected. We also have numerous stand-alone computer systems
and local area networks in both classified and unclassified areas.
There are no connections from Livermore's classified computers to the
outside world except through NSA-approved encryption.
In addition to physical barriers between the unclassified and
classified computing environments at Livermore, there are need-to-know
barriers within the classified computer systems. Access to a classified
computing network does not grant users access to all the information in
that network. The same need-to-know requirements that apply to verbally
communicated information and documents also apply to computer-stored
information.
Recent concerns about espionage involving computer-based
information and codes spurred a thorough reassessment of computer
security at our Laboratory, including threat awareness and training. We
support the Secretary of Energy's cyber security initiative and are
contributing to his INFOSEC planning.
On April 2, 1999, the Secretary of Energy called for a stand-down
of all classified computing at the three DOE national security
laboratories. At Livermore, we went even further and shut down all
classified computing, all co-located unclassified computing, and all
unclassified supercomputing. The stand-down was the first step of a
Tri-Lab INFOSEC Action Plan that has been developed and approved by
Secretary Richardson. The plan consists of nine action items with
specific scheduled milestones. We have met all milestones to date. We
will continue working with the DOE Office of Chief Information Officer
(CIO) to fully implement the Tri-Lab INFOSEC Action Plan and further
enhance cyber security at the Laboratory.
In addition, on June 21-22, we conducted a two-day-long Security
Immersion Program at Livermore to accelerate the security initiatives
launched by Secretary Richardson in April. Supervisors were instructed
to ensure that all Laboratory employees complete the program, which was
directed toward five objectives identified by the Secretary to
strengthen security at the laboratories, assessing security issues in
individual work areas, and applying what has been learned to each
individual's workplace.
We have taken dramatic steps to focus the attention of all
Laboratory employees on the threat of foreign intelligence sources as
related to cyber security. All employees (including those who do not
normally use computers but could have need or access in the future)
received special computer security training. We also trained
subcontractor employees and consultants. All computing was discontinued
until training was complete for all employees on site. Employees who
were on travel or leave were trained immediately upon their return. In
addition, we have since expanded our on-going computer security
training and threat awareness training for all Laboratory personnel
using classified computers. This training is unclassified and
accessible via a website to make it readily available to our employees
and easy to update.
Every computer work area and environment at Livermore was evaluated
and changes were made as necessary to ensure that LLNL classified and
sensitive computing meet the highest standards of information security.
In particular:
We have also taken measures to preclude the transfer of
information from classified to unclassified computers in a
single work area by the use of removable media.
We have instituted two-person controls over the authorized
transfer of unclassified information from classified computers
to unclassified computers.
Until a more permanent security fix is in place, since April
2, 1999, we have temporarily disabled the file interchange
system on the classified supercomputer so that it is impossible
to transfer files from the classified supercomputers or the
archives to an unclassified computer.
We also have begun to scan outgoing presumably unclassified e-
mail as well as computer files for possible sensitive or
classified information. To date, we have scanned over 4 million
files in our effort to ensure there is no classified material
in unclassified computer files. No issues have arisen.
We have strong need-to-know controls on our classified
network; yet we are investigating ways to provide an even
greater level of protection. We are also studying how to apply
these same concepts to the unclassified systems to provide
better protection to unclassified sensitive information.
In addition, I have also created a Computer Security Policy Board
comprised of senior managers to both develop policies and advise me on
matters related to unclassified computer security. (Classified computer
security policy is defined by DOE Orders.)
On our unclassified computing network, we are improving the way we
protect unclassified sensitive information. Some information must be
available worldwide, but other information must be protected for
privacy, proprietary, or export control reasons. We are implementing
additional ``firewalls'' within our unclassified network to separate
fully accessible information from unclassified sensitive information.
For several years, Livermore has had an ongoing program to annually
scan/audit a sub-set of its unclassified computer systems for security
vulnerabilities. We have expanded this policy so that now all
unclassified computer systems must be scanned at least once a year and
that appropriate correction/fixes to detect vulnerabilities must be
undertaken immediately.
The Laboratory has long had a policy of monitoring users accessing
our computer resources via the Internet. We have now expanded our
monitoring to cover all dial in access to Livermore computers. Any
Foreign Nationals (FNs) with dial-in capabilities are monitored.
Additionally, any FN granted access to unclassified computer resources
must first have a programmatic justification of need by the sponsoring
Laboratory program and an approved security plan on record for each FN.
The Laboratory required that all FNs with access to computer resources
had to be recertified by June 30, 1999. No one was ``grandfathered'' in
under our process and those not recertified are being denied access to
the computer resources. Certification refers to having a programmatic
justification and a security plan in place. Livermore will require that
all FNs granted access to Laboratory computer resources must be
processed through the Foreign Visits and Assignments Office. This will
ensure that any FN with access to Laboratory computer resources will
have met the necessary criteria and that their access to computer
resources is being monitored.
Finally, our Laboratory is working with personnel at Sandia, Los
Alamos, and DOE to develop a ``best in practice'' plan for cyber
security. So far, we have completed a benchmarking of several
organizations inside and outside of the government to determine what
others are doing to protect information from both outsiders and
insiders. This planning activity has an oversight board that is
currently being staffed with cyber security professionals from industry
along with the CIOs from the three laboratories.
Our approach to cyber security goes beyond addressing
vulnerabilities or problems that we identify or that are brought to our
attention. We are using this cyber security upgrade as an opportunity
to apply our multi-disciplinary approach to science and technology to
become a model for cyber security. Leading-edge cyber security is vital
to our programmatic missions and is an area where we can leverage our
expertise to enhance national security in the broadest sense.
CLOSING REMARKS
Accomplishing our national security mission requires outstanding
science and technology. Simultaneously, we must ensure that the
application of that science and technology to national security is
protected at all levels. We have long recognized the inherent challenge
involved in protecting national security information while fostering
the interchange of ideas required for cutting-edge science and
technology. Indeed, to a considerable degree, the nation's security
rests on the technological advances that arise from the world-class R&D
conducted at Livermore and the other national security laboratories.
A multi-faceted security apparatus is in place at our Laboratory,
including physical security, operational security, personnel security,
information security, communications security, cyber security,
counterintelligence, and employee security awareness. We continually
make adjustments and upgrades to address new threats and concerns. We
take strong positive action on security and counterintelligence issues,
whether they are anticipated or identified by us or others, or are
brought to our attention in the form of executive or departmental
orders or inspections. Proactive and effective security and
counterintelligence allows us to meet the challenge of ensuring
national security while operating in a global world.The recent
evaluation conducted by OSE noted many improvements to LLNL's security
system while identifying areas for further improvement. We have
prepared an aggressive corrective action plan that, technology
permitting, will resolve any issues by the end of the year. I have
committed the resources and established the priority to ensure that
this plan is executed. Corrective actions have already been taken on
many issues and, as appropriate, compensatory actions are in place. I
am confident that at LLNL, our Special Nuclear Material and sensitive
and classified information are secure.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. Dr. Weigand, would you like to
comment?
STATEMENT OF GIL WEIGAND
Mr. Weigand. I will make a set of very brief comments. I
would like to give you the opportunity to ask me any questions
that you would like.
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and subcommittee members. I am
Dr. Gil Weigand. I am the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Research Development Simulation and Defense Programs. That is a
slightly different title than you utilized. We are in the
process of reorganization, as you are well aware, trying to
define line management a little bit better, and two
organizations have been combined and now I am responsible. I
have been in this position for 8 months and this position is
responsible for the laboratories.
I was put in this position because I bring to that position
industry and DOD program management experience. As I indicated
in the July 1 testimony to the subcommittee, Defense Programs
recognizes that our job is to fix the problems. We agree
substantially with the issues identified by Mr. Podonsky and
his team and have taken both immediate and interim actions to
address their concerns. I want to point out that since taking
this position in this area that involves Livermore and the
security, I have put in place no less than four corrective
action plans. And those corrective action plans have milestones
that have weekly or monthly obligations by the laboratory, and
to date the laboratory has not missed a single one of them.
I also, when finding out the results from Mr. Podonsky,
before he even left the site we were in the process of doing
what I call a path forward plan, which was an immediate layout
of the plan that ultimately became part of the broader planning
for corrective action on this in the area of special nuclear
materials. It is extremely important that we protect those
materials, but it is also extremely important that I have those
facilities available and open to me, since I am equally
responsible now for the facilities and for the conduct of the
research and development at the laboratories. A draft of that
plan, by the way, has been reviewed by Mr. Podonsky's team and
we have incorporated their comments.
As a result of the cybersecurity concerns, we directed the
formation of a cybersecurity integrated security management
plan. The first step is the development of a plan by August 1
which will create the most aggressive, across-the-board advance
in cybersecurity at the labs. Not on my account. That will not
be me that is basically saying that, but by the account of some
of the Nation's foremost experts in cybersecurity.
The management team is headed by Bill Crowell, former
deputy director of NSA. Last the Department, at the direction
of Secretary Moniz, have taken parts of the corrective action
plans that we have created and incorporated those into the
Department's goalposts plan which will result in a green
designation for safeguards and security at LLNL, the Livermore
labs, by the end of the year.
As you recall, Mr. Chairman, Bill Hensley and I briefed you
in the last hearing on some of those actions and we will be
happy to more extensively amplify on those in the closed
session. The detailed are classified.
Since the July 1 hearing, the corrective action plan has
been finalized, with specific milestones assuring the concerns
identified by Mr. Podonsky are appropriately addressed by the
end of the calendar year. Since I now have a completed and
corrective action plan, I intend to also implement some
measures by which there is accountability. And I intend to hold
both Federal managers accountable and laboratory managers
accountable.
In addition to that, I have directed that there be the
creation of a tracking system to specifically track each issue
as corrective actions and associated milestones are completed
or not completed. Mr. Hensley, who directs our security office
at Defense Programs, has created three viewgraphs that we will
take up with you in later session. They are very brief, but we
wanted to give you a status of where we stand.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to provide you with
another update on the progress of security, and I am available
for questions.
[The prepared statement of Gil Weigand follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gil Weigand, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Research, Development and Simulation at Defense Programs, Department of
Energy
Good morning Mr. Chairman and Subcommittee Members: I am Dr. Gil
Weigand, I am the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research, Development
and Simulation at Defense Programs. I have been in this current
position for about 8 months. I was put in this position because I would
bring to this position industry and DoD program management experience.
As I indicated during the July 1, 1999 testimony to the
Subcommittee, Defense Programs (DP) recognizes that our job is ``TO FIX
THE PROBLEMS.'' We agree substantially with the issues identified by
Mr. Podonsky and his team and have both immediate and interim actions
to address their concerns. I have directed that a corrective action
plan in general for safeguards and a path-forward plan specifically for
the special nuclear material areas be developed which addresses each of
the concerns in Mr. Podonsky team's findings. A draft of that plan has
been reviewed by Mr. Podonsky's team and we have incorporated their
comments. Furthermore, as a result of cyber-security concerns, I
directed the formation of a cyber-security integrated security
management plan. The first step is the development of a plan by August
1 which will create the most aggressive across the board advance in
cyber-security at the labs, not by my account, but by the account of
some of the nations foremost experts in cybersecurity. The management
team is headed by Bill Crowell, former Deputy Director of NSA. Lastly,
the department under the direction of Undersecretary Moniz we have
created plans, the Department's Goal Posts Plan, which will result in a
``green'' designation for safeguards and security at LLNL by the end of
the year. As you will recall, Mr. Hensley and I briefed you during the
last Hearing on some of those actions.
Since the July 1, 1999 Hearing, the corrective action plan has been
finalized with specific milestones for assuring the concerns identified
by Mr. Podonsky are appropriately addressed by the end of the calendar
year. A tracking system is being developed to specifically track each
issue, its corrective action(s), and associated milestones.
Mr. Hensley who directs the security office at Defense Programs
will conclude our time here by providing you with a three slide summary
of the corrective action plan's status. We will provide for the record
the classified detailed corrective action briefing.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to provide you with another
update on our progress in security. Mr. Hensley please provide the
committee with you status report.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. Dr. Turner, do you have something you
would like to add?
STATEMENT OF JAMES TURNER
Mr. Turner. Yes, sir, I do. I appreciate the opportunity to
be here. I would like to start with some summary statements and
then step back from that to give you a quick overview of our
role as a field element.
First of all, back in April, Bruce and I, along with some
others, were involved in a video teleconference with the
Secretary. At that time I gave him my personal assurance that
we would do everything that was necessary to correct the items
that were found in the 1998 Report to the President, as well as
the things that Glenn's team came up with.
I saw the Secretary last week at an event and personally
reiterated my assurance. I spent part of last week going over
the issues regarding storage of classified parts. We were
briefed on the upgrades to the alarm system that was being put
in place, as well as continuously tracking the corrective
action plan. All the items are on track in that corrective
action plan. They are being completed on time. And I think this
represents a commitment from all of us at the table to make
that happen.
That being said, let me step back for a moment and talk
about our role and responsibility as a field element and the
team that we have here today. First of all, we're the
contracting officer for Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
In conjunction with headquarters, we set expectations for the
laboratory in a number of areas, including security, and we
assess their performance annually. We also provide Federal
oversight, and in that role we have the line management
function in safety and security at the lab. We provide
assurance to headquarters that not only are the provisions of
the contract being met, but also DOE policy objectives are
being met by the laboratory.
In the implementation of that security role, we develop an
annual a site safeguards and security plan which provides a
protection strategy for the laboratory as well as specific
performance measures in the contract on which the laboratory is
graded. We have an onsite presence which means that on a daily
basis people are walking through the facilities, checking
things and looking at how things are being done to understand
what the laboratory is doing. And, on occasion when it is
necessary, there are findings and concerns that are developed
out of that but it also provides us a direct way to track and
validate that corrective actions are in fact being done.
There is an annual survey report which summaries of these
daily operational awareness activities. The report goes into
the contract assessment as well as inputs provided to
headquarters. We, in turn, are overseen by headquarters.
Defense programs is our boss for everything that goes on at
Livermore. That is very clear to us. We have a management
agreement that has been signed with Gil Weigand, and there is
also another document that has been signed which has been
presented to Vic Reis for signature that spells out roles and
responsibilities for our office and defense programs.
We also appreciate the input from the Office of Security
Evaluations, Glenn's office, because they provide us with
increased confidence in what we're doing and what we're
finding. They also share with us their experience from other
parts of the complex. They see the whole picture while we only
see a part of it, and it is best practices that we can
incorporate.
We have reported on some progress at the July 1 briefing.
Since then, there has been additional progress. Glenn talked
about the progress that's been made in the protection strategy
for Superblock. Also, the laboratory has completed the second
of three bimonthly inventories for materials control and
accountability. We wanted them to complete three before we
would go back and look at our evaluation. They are also
upgrading the alarm systems for the storage of classified
parts.
As far as my role is concerned, I am a physicist. I have
been at Oakland for 5 years. I have been the manager there for
4 years. Prior to going to Oakland, I was the director of the
Defense Programs Office of Nuclear Weapons Security, and in
that capacity I had the responsibility for safety, security and
use control. So for me, it is more than an intellectual
exercise, it is something that I feel, something I live and
something I sincerely believe.
I am out at Livermore at least 1 day a week. We have weekly
meetings with our site manager where we talk about what is his
assessment of how we're moving on the corrective action plan. I
meet once a week with Livermore senior management and we
discuss security--an item on that agenda is always the
corrective action plan.
Again, speaking for the office, I will give my personal
assurance to the Secretary as well as provide it to you, that
we will do the things that are necessary to get the lab green
or satisfactory by the end of the year.
I would also like to take the opportunity to introduce the
members of our team that are here today. First of all, Marty
Domagala, our Deputy Manager is here. He led the team that came
back for the July 1 briefing. Jim Hirahara, our Assistant
Manager for Operations and Safe Management. One of his
responsibilities is the University of California contract. I
understand there were some questions that came up the last time
about that. And also Rich Mortensen, our Director of Safeguards
Security. With that, I am happy to answer any questions that
you may have.
Mr. Upton. Terrific. Having completed our witnesses' public
statements, the Chair will recognize himself for a unanimous
consent request and to offer a motion.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Chairman, before we do that, I hate to
interrupt you, but Dr. Weigand and Dr. Turner both had
statements before them. We never received copies of those.
Could we get copies of those statements I would like to look at
the in the future?
Mr. Weigand. Absolutely. I was not asked to provide--and I
apologize for not thinking forward on that.
Mr. Turner. I was under the understanding that an oral
statement--but we will certainly provide.
Mr. Upton. Terrific. Thank you. Without objection, staff of
the majority--my motion is this: Without objection, staff of
the majority and minority parties may be recognized to question
witnesses for equal 30 minute blocks pursuant to clause 2(j) of
rule XI of the Rules of the House. Is there objection? Hearing
none.
Mr. Barton. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Upton. The gentleman is recognized.
Mr. Barton. You want the staff to question the witnesses in
this hearing or later on?
Mr. Upton. Later on. It will be part of the hearing.
Hearing none, so ordered.
Further, the Chair moves that pursuant to clause 2(g) of
Rule XI, the Rules of the House, the remainder of this hearing
to conducted in executive session to protect information that
might endanger national security. Is there discussion on the
motion? If there is no discussion, pursuant to the rule, a
recorded vote is ordered.
All in favor of moving to executive session will indicate
by saying aye.
Opposed, say nay.
The Clerk will call the roll.
The Clerk. Mr. Barton.
Mr. Barton. Yes.
The Clerk. Mr. Barton votes aye.
Mr. Cox.
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Burr.
Mr. Burr. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Burr votes aye.
Mr. Bilbray.
Mr. Bilbray. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Bilbray votes aye.
Mr. Whitfield.
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Ganske.
Mr. Ganske. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Ganske votes aye.
Mr. Blunt.
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Bryant.
Mr. Bryant. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Bryant votes aye.
Mr. Bliley.
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Klink.
Mr. Klink. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Klink votes aye.
Mr. Waxman.
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Stupak.
Mr. Stupak. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Stupak votes no.
Mr. Green.
[No response.]
The Clerk. Ms. McCarthy.
Ms. McCarthy. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. McCarthy votes aye.
Mr. Strickland.
Mr. Strickland. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Strickland votes no.
Ms. DeGette.
Ms. DeGette. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. DeGette votes aye.
Mr. Dingell.
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Upton.
Mr. Upton. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Upton votes aye.
Mr. Upton. The Clerk will report the result.
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, on that vote there were 9 ayes, 2
noes.
Mr. Upton. Members having voted in the affirmative and a
quorum being present, the motion is agreed to. Accordingly, the
Chair declares the subcommittee in recess subject to the call
of the Chair, pending which all members, staff, witnesses, and
guests will leave the room.
The Capitol Police at this point will secure the room and I
would note that we will come back at 11:05 for members that are
going to be able to come back.
[Whereupon, at 10:45 a.m., the subcommittee recessed. To
reconvene at 11:05 a.m. executive session.]