[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE NARCOTICS THREAT FROM COLOMBIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
AUGUST 6, 1999
__________
Serial No. 106-132
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
65-738 WASHINGTON : 2001
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
Carolina ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
BOB BARR, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas
LEE TERRY, Nebraska THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
GREG WALDEN, Oregon JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California ------
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
HELEN CHENOWETH, Idaho (Independent)
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
Carla J. Martin, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources
JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman
BOB BARR, Georgia PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas
DOUG OSE, California
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Robert B. Charles, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Gilbert A. Macklin, Professional Staff Member
Sean Littlefield, Professional Staff Member
Amy Davenport, Clerk
Cherri Branson, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on August 6, 1999................................... 1
Statement of:
Beers, Randy, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State;
Brian E. Sheridan, Assistant Secretary, Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict, Department of Defense; William
E. Ledwith, Chief of International Operations, Drug
Enforcement Administration; and Michael Shifter, senior
fellow, Inter-American Dialogue............................ 104
McCaffrey, General Barry, Director, Office of National Drug
Control Policy............................................. 65
Letters, statements, et cetera, submitted for the record by:
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Maryland, prepared statement of................... 153
Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Indiana:
Letter dated October 2, 1997............................. 17
Prepared statement of.................................... 22
Hutchinson, Hon. Asa, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Arkansas, prepared statement of................... 60
Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Ohio, prepared statement of................... 150
Ledwith, William E., Chief of International Operations, Drug
Enforcement Administration, prepared statement of.......... 118
McCaffrey, General Barry, Director, Office of National Drug
Control Policy, prepared statement of...................... 71
Mica, Hon. John L., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida:
Article dated November 29, 1997.......................... 5
Prepared statement of.................................... 147
Rohrabacher, Hon. Dana, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California, prepared statement of................. 152
Sheridan, Brian E., Assistant Secretary, Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict, Department of Defense, prepared
statement of............................................... 106
Shifter, Michael, senior fellow, Inter-American Dialogue,
prepared statement of...................................... 130
THE NARCOTICS THREAT FROM COLOMBIA
----------
FRIDAY, AUGUST 6, 1999
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:10 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John L. Mica
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Mica, Barr, Gilman, Souder,
Hutchinson, Ose, Towns, Cummings, and Kucinich.
Also present: Representatives Reyes and Schakowsky.
Staff present: Robert Charles, staff director and chief
counsel; Gilbert A. Macklin and Sean Littlefield, professional
staff members; Cherri Branson, minority counsel; and Earley
Green, minority staff assistant.
Mr. Mica. Good morning. I would like to call this meeting
of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human
Resources to order.
The subject of the hearing this morning is the narcotics
threat from Colombia. As our regular order, I would like to
start with an opening statement and then yield to those Members
that are with us. We will be joined by some other Members, but
we want to get started as we have several panels to hear from
today.
This is a very important hearing since our hemisphere in
the United States is facing one of the greatest challenges to
regional and national security as the situation with Colombia
continues to deteriorate. During the past few days, the United
States military lost five American lives in the war on drugs
being waged in Colombia. The influx of illegal drugs to the
United States is our Nation's No. 1 social challenge and the
most insidious national threat we have faced. Because three-
quarters of the heroin on the United States streets and
virtually all of the cocaine comes from Colombia today, this
subcommittee is once again investigating and conducting
oversight of our administration's counterdrug activities in
Colombia.
For the record, I have been to Colombia several times over
the past few years, most recently in February. I have seen
firsthand the enormity and complexity of the drug insurgency
problem there. Even since February, the threat has grown
substantially. Events in the country appear to be spiralling
out of control. Colombia is now what military officials call
situation critical. Many of us on the Hill saw the situation
coming years ago as this administration repeatedly ignored the
problem. As a result, Colombia now supplies 80 percent of the
cocaine entering the United States.
More disturbing, in just the past 5 years there has been an
absolute explosion of poppy cultivation in Colombia. High
purity Colombian heroin in tremendous quantities is now
flooding our communities. Heroin overdoses have doubled in the
past 2 years, and that is those ending in fatalities. Since
1992, heroin use by our teenagers has soared 825 percent.
Our DEA heroin signature program indicates that 75 percent
of the heroin seized in the United States originates in
Colombia. This chart was provided to us by Tom Constantine, the
former DEA director. If you took this chart several years ago,
it would be almost zero. Most of it would be coming in from
southwest Asia, Asia, and Mexico wasn't even on the charts.
Cocaine was merely processed in Colombia some 5, 6 years
ago. Now, Colombia is the major producer of cocaine in the
world.
Compounding the problem, Colombia faces a full-scale
guerilla war, one that is financed almost entirely by narcotics
trafficking. By recent accounts, the armed conflict is now
raging out of control in Colombia. Rebel insurgents are
becoming more and more aggressive and killing people
indiscriminately. In fact, more people have been displaced in
Colombia than in Kosovo even at the height of the recent
conflict, and there are indications of a potential mass exodus
from Colombia. More than 300,000 Colombians were internally
displaced just in 1998, compared to 230 in Kosovo during that
same period of time. In short, despite 5 years of congressional
pleas for assistance to Colombia, countless hearings and
intense congressional effort, resources approved by Congress
have failed to be provided to Colombia.
Two weeks ago today, five American men and one woman from
the United States Army were killed in the line of duty in
Colombia when their United States reconnaissance plane crashed
on a mountain on a counterdrug mission into narcoguerrilla
territory. This marks the first time in United States history
that American military personnel have been killed in action in
Colombia's drug war.
American blood has also been spilled on Colombian soil in
other ways. In addition to these five Americans, three contract
pilots have been killed in Colombia over the past 2 years.
Three Americans were abducted and brutally murdered by the
FARC, still not brought to justice. We will show some tape in a
few minutes that raises questions about why the murderers of
these Americans have not been captured. They were killed by
Colombia's largest group of drug trafficking guerrillas earlier
this year, and numerous Americans have been kidnapped by
Colombia narcoguerrillas.
The longest held U.S. hostages are three American
missionaries from my district, which have been unaccounted for
since 1993. Additionally, nearly 5,000 Colombian policemen have
been killed by narcoguerrillas, and nearly 40,000 Colombians
have been murdered in this conflict over the past decade. In
fact, more deaths occurred in Colombia last year from the drug
war than in Kosovo during the recent inhumanity we saw in that
country. Yet, this war is not recognized by the United States
and has been largely ignored by this administration.
Our U.S. drug czar recently confirmed that the dual threats
of narcotic trafficking and the rebel insurgency have become
indistinguishable. While the administration grasps for an
effective policy to deal with what they have now termed an
emergency, Colombia's narcoterrorism now poses the single
greatest threat to the stability of our entire hemisphere.
What brought about this situation and what brought us to
the brink of this disaster? Today, we will examine this
question along with a series of other critical issues,
including this administration's inability or unwillingness to
deliver drug fighting support and equipment even today to our
trusted allies in Colombia. Time and again, this administration
has ignored the emerging situation in Colombia despite
congressional oversight hearings that have tried repeatedly to
call attention to the impending crisis.
In February and July 1997, the subcommittee held oversight
hearings on the counterdrug problem in Colombia. In March 1998,
the subcommittee held an oversight hearing on regional
counterdrug efforts. At the same time, the House International
Relations Committee held a hearing on Colombia's heroin crisis
in June 1998. They also held a hearing on the implementation of
the western hemisphere drug elimination act in March 1999, and
recently they also held hearings on Colombia and Panama and the
situation there.
By contrast, this administration has compounded the
situation in Colombia by reversing course on important policy
issues. Just recently, this administration issued a policy
reversal on information sharing with the Colombian military.
In 1996 and 1997, when this administration decertified
Colombia without a national interest waiver, it severely
undermined the legitimate drug fighting efforts of General
Serrano, who heads the Colombian National Police, and also
cutoff IMET training and critical equipment so badly needed in
that country at that time.
Executing any effective antinarcotics program has been
fatally handicapped by the absence of United States'
intelligence sharing due in part to the reduced air coverage
after the forced closure of Howard Air Force base in Panama. It
wasn't bad enough that we did not give them information that we
should be sharing. We now have a situation, with the forced
closing of the Panama Air Force base and the United States
being kicked out of Panama, in which our forward surveillance
flights are down to almost nothing. This gap in surveillance
capability has put the entire region at risk now and for many
months to come.
This administration has also displayed a schizophrenic
approach to providing aid to Colombia. While very publicly
calling for $1 billion in emergency aid last week, the same
administration requested only $40 million for Colombia just 6
months ago and blocked assistance--all assistance there 2 years
ago. Indeed, in a bold display of hypocrisy, the
administration's fiscal year 2000 budget request did not
include a single dollar of the $280 million authorized by
Congress for Colombia under the Western Hemisphere Drug
Elimination Act, an emergency congressional appropriation which
was initiated by the former chair of the Drug Policy oversight
Committee, Mr. Hastert, in the last Congress.
Yesterday, I found that Mr. Hastert, now Speaker of the
House, again chaired this responsibility in the previous
Congress. Saturday, November 29, it is an op-ed, Voice of the
People, in the Chicago tribune. It is 1997, and this is just
two sentences out of his statement: With 60 percent of all
heroin seizures being Colombian dope--now, I showed you the
chart that we got. We are up to 75 percent, but this was at
that particular time--what has the Clinton administration done
to combat this latest craze? The short answer is nothing but
vacillate.
Then he also went on to say, the White House and its drug
czar, Barry McCaffrey, must develop a strategic plan for
combating the looming heroin problem. He asks why helicopters
that are Huey helicopters, which can operate safely at
altitudes, and ammunition must get to Colombia. These are
questions that he asked in 1997, why they were not getting
there.
Without objection, I would like to make this part of the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5738.001
Mr. Mica. This administration has resisted congressional
efforts to ensure that needed drug fighting equipment makes its
way to Colombia in a timely manner. The administration has
fought us on Black Hawk utility helicopters getting to Colombia
for the past 3 years and to date not a single Black Hawk
helicopter has yet made it to Colombia. Notably, there is one
sitting right now on a tarmac in Stanford, CT.
Likewise, this administration fought us on upgraded Huey II
helicopters for the Colombian National Police. Again, to date,
only 2 of 12 upgraded Huey II helicopters have made it to
Colombia despite the fact that right now 4 Huey II helicopters
outfitted and ready to go are sitting on a Tarmac in Ozark, AL.
These Huey II helicopters are vital to protecting planes which
conduct crop eradication in Colombia and vital to getting the
cocaine labs and vital to eliminating high altitude heroin
poppies.
I will show a tape in a few minutes, and you will also see
the results on the Colombian forces and what has happened by
not getting the adequate equipment there.
Today, there are reports of increased activity by the
15,000 Marxist narcoterrorist guerrillas also known as the
FARC. This army of insurgents, heavily financed by the drug
traffickers, controls nearly one half of Colombia and now
actually threatens the hemisphere's second oldest democracy.
As chairman of this subcommittee, I am deeply concerned
that the FARC army has gone largely unchecked and is expanding
now beyond Colombia's borders. The United States can ill afford
further instability in this region. With 20 percent of the
United States' daily supply of crude and refined oil imports
coming from that area and with the strategically important
Panama Canal located just 150 miles to the north, the national
security implications of Colombian rebel activity spilling over
into neighboring countries are now enormous.
I just spoke about 20 percent of our oil supply. I obtained
some tapes from a private firm, videotapes, and with
permission, I would like to show them. It takes approximately
3\1/2\ to 4 minutes. This graphically displays what we are
facing.
Could we play those tapes, please?
These are private tapes by a commercial. Can we advance
that a little bit? I think they didn't start it at the right
point. I just want to show 3\1/2\ minutes of it.
These tapes were taken by a private firm that was hired by
the oil pipelines to try to protect the oil pipelines there,
but it shows the kind of equipment that we have been attempting
to get to the national police, which they don't have. It is
absolutely incredible that a private firm can get this
equipment--has gotten this equipment down there. These pictures
were taken in 1997 and 1998.
[Tape played.]
Mr. Mica. Again, we did not get the helicopters that they
requested there.
[Tape played.]
Mr. Mica. These pictures were all taken with night vision
equipment. Everything you see is at night, and they have never
been shown before. Again, this is all commercial equipment.
[Tape played.]
Mr. Mica. This is a commercial firm identifying the murders
of three American citizens. Again, all infrared at night.
Mr. Reyes. What kind of infrared is being used here?
Mr. Mica. Just a sophisticated infrared, but it is
commercial.
This gives you an idea of what is going on there, the
difficulty we face. The helicopters that were requested by
Chairman Hastert when he was chairman were not there. The
equipment is not there. The insurgency that we face, the
inability of us to even go after--provide equipment to go after
the murderers of Americans, and yet a commercial firm can
easily identify them.
Finally, the ecological damage that is being done to that
country and the attempts by the Marxist guerrillas to cutoff
the oil supply, which certainly is in the vital interest of the
United States.
In conclusion, with drugs flooding our borders and this
pending regional turmoil, our vital national interests are
undeniably at stake in this situation. We face a very serious
and growing challenge. The question is what policies and
strategies our country and our executive agencies in this
administration will adopt to meet the threat and protect the
vital interests of the United States in this region.
Excuse me for taking more than my time, but we wanted to
provide the subcommittee with that information.
I am pleased at this time to yield to Mr. Towns, who is
acting as our ranking member this morning.
Welcome, and you are recognized.
Mr. Towns. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. When you are
the chairman, you can use a lot of time.
Mr. Mica. I learned that from you, sir.
Mr. Towns. Let me begin by first thanking you Mr. Chairman,
the ranking member, Mrs. Mink, and the members of the committee
for the work that you are doing in this area. Mr. Chairman,
thank you for holding this hearing on the narcotics threat from
Colombia.
Between 1990 and 1998, Colombia received about $625 million
in United States counternarcotics assistance. In addition, the
United States military provides 160 United States service
personnel as military advisors to the Government of Colombia.
This infusion of aid has made Colombia the third largest
recipient of United States military assistance in the world.
Despite this commitment of money and manpower, the GAO
estimates that coca production in Colombia has increased by 50
percent since 1996. In a June 1999, report, GAO estimated that
Colombia currently produces 80 percent of the world's cocaine
and 60 percent of the heroin used in the United States. Given
our level of support and our level of effort, these results
call our current policy into question. What they would say in
my neighborhood back in Brooklyn, it appears that we are
hustling backward.
It is my understanding that recently there have been calls
for an additional $1 billion in assistance for Colombia.
However, given the dismal results we have seen for the money we
have spent thus far, I am not sure that more money is the
answer to this question. Additionally, many aspects of the
situation in Colombia seem to require our reexamination. There
is a civil war in Colombia that has been going on for
approximately 40 years. The Government of Colombia has lost 40
to 50 percent of the country's territory to left wing rebels.
The State Department and numerous human rights groups have
reported that paramilitary groups aligned with the army of
Colombia murder and kill civilians because of their political
beliefs. And drug traffickers may have corrupted every side of
this conflict by supplying vast amounts of money and means to
continue the kind of chaos that allows the traffickers to
continue their illegal operations.
Mr. Chairman, there are many problems in Colombia. It seems
to me that additional military spending will only exacerbate
the chaos in Colombia. Unilateral United States action is not
the answer, and I am convinced of that. The Colombians need to
reignite the peace process. The United States needs to involve
the international community and especially other Latin American
countries in a peacekeeping effort. We need to provide
humanitarian and development assistance to the people of
Colombia. I think that is important, but, most of all, we need
to address the cocaine threat here at home by increasing our
prevention and treatment efforts. We need to have more slots
for treatment of people, and we need to have a stronger
education and prevention program.
Again, Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for holding this
hearing today. It suits you for all the work that you do in
this area, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. I
see we have two outstanding Members of Congress who have
visited that country many, many times, Congressman Gilman and
Congressman Burton. I look forward to hearing from them as
well.
At this time I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica.
Thank you. I would like to recognize our vice chairman, Mr.
Barr, the gentleman from Georgia.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just heard one of the most amazing statements I have ever
heard, that we are here trying to assist against the
narcoterrorist war down there, and we have had somebody say
that trying to provide additional U.S. military assistance,
much of which has been promised and not delivered for many
years, will exacerbate the situation.
I don't know how to respond to that sort of statement. In
looking at the crisis in Colombia and trying to think up an
analogy that fits it, I thought of several--the tail wagging
the dog for many years, where our State Department zooms in
with an electron microscope and looks at some allegation of
human rights violation, never mind the vast human rights
violations perpetrated by the FARC and the other groups.
I have also thought of Nero fiddling while Rome burns,
except Nero was replaced by the State Department; or what many
have tried to do in the State Department over the years and
that is simply hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil and
refusing to acknowledge for years until, apparently, today. I
see at least the State Department representative will
acknowledge that there is indeed a narcoterrorist problem
facing this hemisphere in Colombia.
But the situation is far beyond trying to find ways of
describing the mismanagement of the U.S. State Department in
responding to this threat to our hemisphere. The only bright
spot is it could be much worse were it not for the work of DEA
and our military in trying desperately to assist our allies in
Colombia, most notably the heroic General Serrano, in meeting
this tremendous threat,despite what seemed to be deliberate
efforts recently by the State Department to thwart the efforts
of DEA, refusing to fill billets authorized by Congress for
additional DEA slots, refusing to allow the provision of
additional helicopters and gun mounts, and even today
helicopters that were promised to be down there by the end of
last month are still sitting stateside somewhere.
It indeed is a crisis made worse by the fact that the
United States is going to completely withdraw its forward
military operations, which have been very important in the
counternarcotics efforts,from Panama,turning the Panama Canal
and all of its military assets that we have shared and operated
with the Panamanians in a very successful effort over the years
back over to Panama without any provision for continuing that
very, very strategically important base of operations.
It will be very interesting to hear from General McCaffrey,
who has just recently returned; and of course I suppose we
should thank the State Department for,at least now,recognizing
that there is a narcoterrorist problem in Colombia. But there
is indeed a crisis down there, and rather than turn a blind eye
to it and say our military assistance is causing it, the most
preposterous statement I can imagine, we ought to be
desperately searching for ways to assist our allies in
Colombia. Because this indeed is a serious problem that is not
just a problem for the people of Colombia, the people of Latin
and Central America,and the United States,but the entire
hemisphere. I appreciate our colleagues being with us today to
share their extensive knowledge on this and look forward to the
additional panels.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. With the indulgence of the subcommittee, I am
going to recognize one person from the minority and then
recognize our two chairmen. have the chairman of the full
committee and a member of our subcommittee.
Mr. Cummings, did you want to make a brief opening
statement?
Mr. Cummings. Of course, Mr. Chairman. I certainly do.
First of all, good morning to everyone; and I am certainly
pleased to be here.
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have, serving on this
subcommittee, tried to address the problems of drugs throughout
the world and certainly this country; and I am sure that you
are well aware that I am a strong advocate of sound
counternarcotics efforts; and I will say it every single time I
have an opportunity.
Sometimes I really just think we don't get it. This morning
I left my community of Baltimore, a drug-infested area where a
lot of the drugs that we are talking about today have already
taken the lives of so many children, the same children that I
watched 14 or 15 years ago as they grew up now walking around
like zombies. This is only 40 miles away from here. I am very
concerned about what is happening in Colombia, and I think we
ought to do everything we can to address this issue.
I come here today to speak for the dead; the ones who don't
even know where Colombia is; the ones who, like I said, a few
years ago had hope; the ones who had become victims. And I call
them victims because every time I see one of them standing on a
corner like a zombie, the pain--I cannot begin to tell you how
painful it is because I know they are in so much pain that they
don't know they are in pain. And that is why it is so important
to me and to my district that we concentrate more of our
efforts on treatment.
I think Mr. Towns said it quite nicely. He used the term
``hustling backwards.''
Let me tell you something. If you don't have a demand, you
don't have to worry about Colombia. You don't have to worry
about it. But neighborhood after neighborhood throughout this
country--and if it has not hit yours, it will. Neighborhood
after neighborhood. People who cannot afford these drugs right
now as we speak are breaking into houses to get $5, $10 or
whatever for crack cocaine.
What are answers? We have one level of sentences for powder
cocaine, another for crack. In Baltimore, our jails are filled
with black men and black women rotting away.
And so it is that today you say that we come here to
address this whole issue of Colombia. And sure it is Colombia,
but there is a direct link--and I admire you, Mr. Burton, and I
admire you, Mr. Gilman, but I want you to do me a favor. I want
you to come to my neighborhood and understand why I push for
treatment so very hard. There are not enough treatment slots.
We probably have--for every treatment slot that we have, we
probably have a demand for 100 people who want to get off of
drugs.
The chairman said something that I agree with. He said, we
must look again, in his opening statement, we must look again
at our strategies and policies and protect the vital interests
of the United States. Mr. Chairman, I agree with you 100
percent. We must look at them and reevaluate them. Because as I
see this Colombian war with these rebels and folk going against
each other, I don't know how much we can do there, but I know
what can be done in my neighborhood when some high schools have
80 percent of the young people dropping out between 9th grade
and 12th grade, many of them standing on corners going nowhere
fast. And so if we are going to reevaluate, let us make sure we
reevaluate to provide more treatment.
Sixty percent of the heroin used in the United States is
from Colombia. The Maryland Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene has estimated 55,000 heroin addicts are in the State of
Maryland and 71 percent of them live in Baltimore city. Keep in
mind, Baltimore only has a population of 674,000. I have a
serious crisis in my district.
Although I have some concerns regarding the large amount of
funding requested to address the complex problems in Colombia,
I am eager to hear from the witnesses today as to how we can
work together to get these drugs off of our streets. And I
thank you, and I look forward to the testimony.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman from Maryland.
I am now pleased to recognize a gentleman who serves on our
subcommittee and also chairs one of the most important
committees in the House of Representatives, the chairman of the
House International Relations Committee, Mr. Gilman.
Mr. Gilman, you are recognized.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our colleagues on our subcommittee for
holding today's very important and timely hearing on the
narcotics threat from Colombia and also what we should be doing
in reevaluating our drug strategy. I appreciate what Mr. Towns
and Mr. Cummings have said with regard to their concerns and
criticisms of our existing strategy.
I want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for your continuing
efforts through this committee giving attention to the
effectiveness of our drug war and focusing the Nation's
attention on what we should be doing. The presence this morning
of two full committee chairmen with oversight responsibility in
the international fight against illicit drugs I think is
indicative of the seriousness of this problem, especially as
related to Colombia.
You have pointed out some very important statistics, Mr.
Chairman. We all recognize that Colombia is probably one of the
most significant drug-producing nations in the world, producing
some 80 percent of the world's cocaine. As if that were not bad
enough, in the last 6 years and while the administration seemed
to be looking in another direction, Colombia captured 75
percent of the American heroin market. It is now producing 80
percent of the world's cocaine and capturing 75 percent of our
heroin market.
Colombia is in our own backyard. It is not over in Asia. It
is not thousands and thousands of miles away. Its capital city,
Bogota, is just 3 air hours from Miami. What happens in
Colombia is immediately effective in our cities and our
streets, in our school yards and our communities. The deadly
drugs it produces and exports and the sophisticated drug-
dealing organizations that are in charge of the world's
trafficking of drugs impact our Nation.
Illicit drugs are directly linked to the growing strength
and aggressiveness of the narcoguerrillas who today threaten
Colombia's very survival as a democracy. Congressman Rangel and
I, when we were working on the Select Committee on Narcotics,
stood in the plaza of the capital city of Colombia and saw how
the drug traffickers had invaded the Supreme Court of that
country and taken it over and held the judges hostage. I don't
know if Mr. Towns was with us at that time. It was appalling to
see how the drug traffickers had their impact on the very core
of the government of that country. The narcostate status, is a
term used today very often when they discuss Colombia. Columbia
is on the verge of becoming a narcostate.
Our Nation's response under the current administration to
both the increasing drug threat and the growing insurgency
menace in Columbia has been benign neglect at best and I
venture to say gross negligence at worst. We have been
providing significant funding in many areas, but we have not
been providing an effective strategy and effective resources.
The response to the contention that the answer to all of
this is to reduce demand I think leaves something to be
desired. I think those of us who have been involved in the drug
problem--and I have been involved since my coming to Congress
some 27 years ago--I think we all recognize in examining
various strategies that you must not just reduce demand, and
that is important, but you must also reduce supply, and you
must do both simultaneously. And you reduce supply by going to
the sources, by eradicating. And then when it gets into the
mainstream of distribution you interdict, and then when it gets
to our shorelines you convict and make sure that our police
agencies have the wherewithal to do that, and then associate
that with reducing demand through education through our
curriculum in our schools and then also to treat and
rehabilitate. But we can't take money from one to give it to
the others.
I mentioned to Mr. Cummings, the mayor of Baltimore had
thought that legalization for a long period of time was the way
to go. I don't think legalization is the way to go. It only
proliferates the problem. I think some of the countries
overseas such as Netherlands and Great Britain tried that and
found it not to be effective. We must bear in mind that we have
to focus our attention on all of these areas and do it
simultaneously and not take the funds from one to give to the
others as we regrettably have done by our present
administration. The lives of thousands of our children have
been affected by the administration's neglect on the source
side.
Mr. Cummings, I went to Baltimore. Kweisi Mfume took me
there to examine some of the problems years ago. And we
recognized that there are problems in each of our major cities
and we have to do a better job of educating but also we have to
cut down the supply that goes to those cities, especially a
failed one-dimensional drug policy based on treating the
wounded from drug use here at home. It has not been effective.
Recognizing that burgeoning Colombian heroin problem in our
Nation and an absence of an effective strategy by the
administration, a number of us in the Congress as far back as
1996 pushed for more aid, more resources to try to stem the
flow from Colombia. We called for better helicopters for the
hard-hitting antinarcotics police in Colombia to pursue the
opium poppy and its source and to get to the higher Andes
plateau where a good deal of the opium for heroin was growing.
It has long been our United States' law enforcement
consensus that getting the Colombian poppy before it is
processed into heroin was the most cost-effective strategy,
particularly with the limited growth of some 6,000 hectares of
Colombian opium. It is a plan that would most likely succeed.
Geographically, Colombia is bigger than the States of Texas and
Kansas combined. Its rugged, high-altitude terrain makes
operations difficult for the law enforcement community.
Accordingly, air mobility for antidrug operations is critical.
The courageous Colombian National Police, have lost over
4,000 in fighting this war. Through the drug eradication
program, they estimated they have a need for 100 helicopters to
be able to do the job properly and that they could eradicate if
they had that kind of equipment; 90 percent of their antidrug
operations requires helicopters and 40 percent of their time,
they face hostile fire. You saw what happened to one of the
helicopters under hostile fire in that short video we just saw.
Today, the drug police in Colombia have less than 25
helicopters operating. Only two of the six twin-engine
helicopters the State Department provided them for opium
eradication last year are flying today. The rest are ``hangar
queens.'' You might examine some of the photos over here of
what they look like. They are sitting in the hangars, incapable
of conducting the kind of operations that are needed. Is there
any wonder then why the drug battle at the source has been so
ineffective in Colombia?
Yes, we are spending money, but we are not doing it
effectively or in the right direction. We in the Congress have
appropriated sufficient money to purchase and directed the
delivery of over 30 new high-performance, long-range, high-
altitude-capable helicopters to the drug police in Colombia to
eradicate drugs at their source; and we have continuously urged
an increased mobility approach since 1996. And, to date,
despite our continuous urging, regrettably the administration
has delivered only two of these new helicopters to the drug
police flight line in Colombia. Regrettably, both of those
choppers were ill-fitted, ill-equipped, and one was damaged on
arrival.
As a result of these kind of failures, the Colombian heroin
availability in our Nation has been extremely high. The price
of this deadly Colombian heroin on our streets remains low
while the purity is higher than we have ever seen, and that
results in the deaths and overdoses in our communities unabated
from Colombian heroin that could have and should have been
eradicated of the source in the high Andes years ago. Yes,
reduce demand, but also reduce the kind of supply that is
increasing the demand.
Mr. Chairman, the administration's failure to get to the
opium poppy fields of the high Andes in Colombia is directly
responsible for the massive heroin crisis on the East Coast and
the United States, and it is not just Baltimore. Our cities in
New York State are facing a severe heroin impact as well as
cities across the country.
If the administration were to devote the same amount of
effort to the real war on drugs in Colombia as the State
Department does in explaining to our committees and yours why
already paid for helicopters have not arrived to Colombia, I
think we would have won that war by now. If the administration
was serious about stopping drugs at its source, those high-
performance helicopters would have been in Colombia long ago
doing the job that Congress intended to do, eliminating hard
drugs at their source before they reach our shores and before
they get into cities like Baltimore and elsewhere.
Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, I urge that when we hear these
new pleas on some in the administration for massive amounts of
emergency aid to Colombia for the fight against drugs, let us
ask why anyone should take them seriously based on the abysmal
track record of providing aid to date.
We will hear today about the massive increase in coca
production in Colombia. That, too, is partially the result of
this failure to deliver the kind of equipment that is needed by
the Colombian National Police [CNP].
Mr. Chairman, Colombia's development as an expanding
narcostate is not new. In 1997, Colombia overtook Peru as the
world's No. 1 producer of cocateal. We in Congress pleaded with
the administration for immediate action, and all we got was
more dithering. Peru's willingness to take the steps necessary
to drastically reduce coca production forced producers to move
across the border into southern Colombia. There the CNP is
unable to reach the numerous remote coca fields without the
armed long-range choppers that Congress has demanded.
There are fundamental differences in philosophy between
those of us in the Congress who monitor the Colombian situation
closely and the administration. The administration, without a
significant counternarcotics strategy of its own, has been
willing to sit back and has become a cheerleader for President
Pastrana's fizzling peace process without backing it up with
aid and support to get at the heart of the problem, the illicit
drugs financing the growing insurgency in Colombia. President
Pastrana, Colombia's President, though well-intentioned cannot
achieve peace from a position of weakness.
Regrettably, our State Department has contributed to the
current confused policy of Latin America's oldest democracy.
That confusion has flowed from meeting with FARC leaders last
December in Costa Rica and failing in providing this basic
antinarcotics aid to take away much of the source of the
insurgency's strength the illicit narcotic moneys; and they are
substantial, in the billions of dollars.
Let us make no mistake that we in the Congress want peace
in Colombia but not on the terms of the narcoterrorists. I
think that is the direction in which Colombia is heading. The
actions of the FARC have demonstrated that it has no intention
of peaceful resolution. It is still kidnapping people, still
killing people, some of whom are Americans. The future of
Colombia and the issue of illicit drugs are intimately related.
The tragic loss of five American servicemen and their two
Colombian Air Force partners not long ago on a counter-
narcotics mission in the high Andes shows us that the fate of
that troubled nation and ours are closely linked. We ignore
events in Colombia at our own peril, and I hope the alarm bells
that General McCaffrey has recently sounded are not coming too
late, and we thank General McCaffrey for sounding that alarm.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman, member of our
subcommittee, chairman of the International Relations
Committee.
I am pleased to recognize at this time the chairman of our
full committee, also an ex-officio member of our subcommittee,
for his statement.
Mr. Burton. Thank you very much, Mr. Mica.
I would like to preface my remarks by saying to Mr.
Cummings and Mr. Towns that I share their concern about making
sure that the people that have become addicted have an avenue
for returning to society, but I would like to point out to them
that the administration's counternarcotics budget in fiscal
year 1998 was $16.5 billion for treatment and prevention and
only $1 billion for overseas eradication. That is not to say we
should not do more. Maybe we should do more, but we should
certainly provide more resources to fight the producers and the
drug cartels around the world.
There are a number of reasons why Colombia is important.
One of those is because, should democracy fall there and a
narcostate prevail, where a Marxist-led government run by the
FARC narcoterrorists succeed democracy, we are at severe risk
here in the United States. Colombia is the oldest democracy in
Latin America. It has vast oil reserves and plenty of untapped
natural resources.
The strategic importance of Colombia to the United States
is that it controls access to the Isthmus of Panama, which will
control the Panama Canal in just a few months. The world's
economies rely on access to the Canal. Should Colombia's
democracy fail, the result could be a domino effect through all
of Central America.
Is all this likely to happen? Probably not. But could it
happen? You bet. It could happen.
Back in the 1980's, we had a real problem in Central
America with the Sandanistas and the FLMN in El Salvador, so
Nicaragua and El Salvador and Guatemala and Honduras were all
at risk. We thought we had put all of those problems behind us,
but, in my mind, they have been resurrected by the
narcotraffickers in Colombia. Because if they succeed there and
Colombia becomes a narcostate, then the Panama Canal right next
door, right adjacent to it, is likely to be imperiled, and they
can move up right through the Central American region, and we
are going to have an immigration problem that you wouldn't
believe as well as more military problems.
The time for action has been upon us for some time. I am
encouraged that there is finally some concern by the
administration. They are finally recognizing the need for a
source country strategy in response to the influx of hard drugs
on American streets and American school yards.
Chairman Gilman, Speaker Hastert and Chairman Mica and
myself have been writing letters and holding hearings for
nearly 3 years trying to get someone in the White House to pay
attention. Instead of a source country strategy, we have gotten
an unbalanced approach, heavy on domestic treatment and
prevention, which statistics show has failed, and light on
interdiction and eradication, which is the preference of law
enforcement.
It is unfortunate that it took the tragic deaths of five
Army personnel in Colombia to enlighten this administration
that there is a problem down there. A blind person could have
seen there is a problem.
Colombian President Pastrana has underestimated the FARC's
capabilities. He has overestimated his own ability to hold
together a shaky democracy marred by four decades of civil
strife and supported by a false economy based in large part on
money from narcotrafficking. By capitulating to the FARC
demands in the peace negotiations, President Pastrana and
Colombia's democracy are in worse shape now than when the peace
process began.
If we haven't learned anything throughout history, we ought
to learn this. Appeasement does not work, and giving the
narcotraffickers an inch is going to encourage them to take a
mile.
Someone needs to ask, what does the FARC gain from peace?
And the answer is, they do not gain a darn thing. Currently,
the FARC has an estimated income of $100 million a month from
facilitating narcotrafficking, kidnapping and extortion. They
have a demilitarized zone the size of Indiana where guerrilla-
style, cowardly attacks are planned and launched and where
attackers can vanish back into oblivion. They have the Pastrana
government exactly where they want it, hunkered down, absorbing
repeated attacks with little ability to respond.
Clearly, the FARC has no incentive to reach peace, and
Colombia has endured a year's worth of escalated violence just
to prove it. Absent a peace strategy of its own, the U.S. State
Department has blindly backed Pastrana's fledgling peace
efforts. At Pastrana's request, American diplomats negotiated
with and legitimatized FARC leaders last December. This is the
same FARC that the State Department placed on its own list of
world terrorist organizations. It has been a policy of this
government for years and years and years not to negotiate with
terrorists, and yet our State Department went down there and
met with them and, as far as I know, are still negotiating with
them in one way or another. Despite this, one American diplomat
continued to contact the FARC leaders even after the murder of
the three Americans in March.
The lack of counternarcotic strategy by the Clinton
administration has never been more evident than in drug czar
Barry McCaffrey's $1 billion aid package. This is less than 1
year's income for the FARC guerillas. Think about that, less
than 1 year's income to the FARC, this money targeted the
Colombia Army, rampant with allegations of human rights abuses.
In Colombia in 1997, General McCaffrey said he supported Black
Hawk helicopters for the Colombian National Police [CNP], known
as the best counternarcotics police in the world.
However, days later in Washington, General McCaffrey
opposed counternarcotic aid to Colombia, the world's top drug-
producing country. He wrote that the Black Hawks ``would
threaten to undermine the objectives of the United States
international counterdrug policy.'' Two different opinions, and
I would like to submit these letters for the record, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Without objection. So ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Burton. How could Black Hawk helicopters hurt our
counterdrug effort?
He then complained that Chairman Gilman and myself were
trying to ``micromanage the war on drugs.'' Simply put, there's
no war on drugs being waged by this administration, unless you
count the nearly $200 million General McCaffrey spends annually
for ONDCP television ads and these frisbees, on these frisbees
and key chains that are up on the easel up there in front.
This is more than we spend our counternarcotic efforts in
Colombia, the source of more than 80 percent of the cocaine and
75 percent of the heroin in the United States. Counternarcotics
aid to Colombia has been abysmally low until this year, when
Chairman Gilman and I were successful in getting Black Hawks
funded for the Colombian National Police, which I want you to
know has not yet been delivered.
General McCaffrey should have been developing a heroin
strategy, but the fact of the matter is there has been no
heroin strategy from this administration. The Republican
Congress has been forced to do the administration's job and
then fight to get the necessary equipment down there.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter several op/ed pieces
into the record to clearly establish that Congress recognized
the heroin problems several years ago and has attempted to
force a reluctant Clinton administration to even address the
issues.
Mr. Mica. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Burton. General McCaffrey has just returned from
Colombia, and surely he will present you with his firsthand
account of the situation. News reports quote him as proposing a
$1 billion course of action, which will help save Colombia from
both the narcotraffickers and the FARC terrorists. $1 billion
is a lot of money, but as I said before, it's less than the
estimated $1.2 billion the FARC takes in every single year from
drugs, kidnapping and extortion.
General McCaffrey's proposal undoubtedly includes funds to
stand up a Colombia Army capable of counternarcotics
operations, which sound good on the surface, but given the
tainted human rights record of the Colombian Army, even in
vetted units, it is unlikely aid to them would pass the
administration's litmus test for the ``spirit of Leahy.'' This,
of course, is the law named after the Senator from Vermont
prohibiting lethal assistance without cutting through a
mountain of bureaucratic red tape.
This is the favorite first obstacle that the State
Department usually places in front of any assistance to
Colombia. The Colombian Army, while understandably a pet
project for a former CINC SOUTHCOM is in tatters, and even the
Pentagon estimates it would take a Herculean effort and more
than 5 years to vet, train and equip a Colombian Army capable
of handling this mission. Regrettably, Colombia may not have 5
years of democracy left.
The good news is there's a group in Colombia who is already
in place, are well trained, and are willing to do what needs to
be done to fight our war on drugs. They're the Colombian
National Police, headed by the legendary General Jose Seranno.
In a poll in last week's Colombian newspaper, El Tiempo,
Seranno's popularity, 71 percent, is second only to the
Catholic Church with 77 percent. Colombians proudly say, after
my God, my General Seranno. General Seranno's men have a clean
human rights record and the desire to do the job. All they need
is the equipment.
Mr. Chairman, actions speak louder than words. This
administration has promised Chairman Gilman and myself more
than 40 new helicopters for the Colombian National Police since
1996. As of this morning, only 2, only 2 of the 40 are on the
flight line in Colombia. Why can't the State Department get
these helicopters to General Seranno?
Mr. Chairman, out of curiosity, I checked with the Indiana
Army National Guard. They have 32 Hueys and 7 Black Hawks.
Today General Seranno has only 23 operating helicopters to
cover his entire country, where 95 percent of his missions
require helicopters, and that's the size of Texas and Kansas
combined.
Before Congress embraces or considers General McCaffrey's
$1 billion aid package, shouldn't the administration be forced
to make good on its commitments to General Seranno and the
Congress regarding helicopters for the Colombian National
Police? Congress has many questions, but General Seranno has
more than 4,000 questions, which represents the lives of the
men he's lost fighting our war on drugs.
The State Department's record on delivery of assistance to
the CNP is abysmal at best. Even if we pass this proposal today
and work every day for the next year, General McCaffrey knows
there are no way that that aid could reach Colombia next year
either due to incompetence or lack of will at the State
Department. Clearly, this is an effort to say the Clinton
administration finally did something about drugs before next
year's election cycle.
It is coming way too late. This chart shows the string of
unkept promises by the administration. It could be much longer,
but we chose only to highlight the helicopter situation.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to insert a stack of unkept
State Department promises, including dozens of letters on
everything from ammunition to weapons to helicopters, into the
record at this point.
Mr. Mica. With objection, so ordered.
Mr. Burton. I will turn my attention to the State
Department's insatiable desire to mislead Congress on what is
actually happening in Colombia. The Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement has a history of incompetence and
inability to deliver counternarcotics assistance, which is its
job. Every new Assistant Secretary who comes in, Secretary
Beers included, says they cannot be responsible for the actions
of the previous Secretary. Secretary Beers, the buck stops
here. You have told me and my staff on a number of occasions
that the first tranche of 35 new Huey II helicopters would be
in Colombia last fall, then you said in March, then April, then
June, then July. Now it's August. When are they going to get
there?
I was told by Ambassador Robert Gelbard in September 1996
that 10 of these were going to be delivered. That was 3 years
ago. There was only two on the flight line this morning. There
have been four Hueys, Huey IIs, ready for shipment from Alabama
for a number of weeks. Why haven't they been delivered?
Your department dropped the ball on this, and it is not the
first time. In June of last year, you sold Mr. Hastert, Mr.
Callahan and Mr. Souder on trading three Black Hawks for six
Bell 212's and 10 Huey II helicopters. Chairman Gilman and
myself reluctantly accepted your compromise because you gave us
your word.
Today, I'm told by narcotics affairs section personnel in
Colombia, four of those six Bell 212's are not flying.
Secretary Beers, despite your testimony at the International
Relations Committee in March, they have never had more than
four in the air at any one time. Chairman Gilman, I am sure,
remembers it very vividly as well. You told us, ``Congressman,
I can assure you these will not be hangar queens.'' And as
Chairman Gilman pointed out, they are.
I don't know that we have those up there again, but I hope
before this hearing is over, we will once again be able to look
at the condition of the helicopters that were in when Secretary
Beers gave them to the CNP. They spent several million dollars
to repair these aging helicopters. Further INL got rid of these
helicopters just before they were scheduled to go down again
for 6 more months for the mandatory 5-year checkup. So we are
sending them junk. Will these piles of metal ever be of use to
General Seranno?
So it is a facade, it's a facade. General McCaffrey would
have to rely on this same State Department crowd to get this $1
billion aid package delivered. By the time this assistance
would arrive in Colombia, we would be trying to figure out who
is going to be the last--who is going to be in the last
helicopter off the roof of the American Embassy in Bogota.
Because of inaction by this administration, the risks to
freedom we helped eliminate in the 1980's in Central and South
America could very well reemerge, and reemerge with a
vengeance.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I am glad Colombia is finally
on the radar screen of this administration. Maybe someone at
the White House will finally hear our pleas to get General
Seranno the helicopters and the equipment he needs. I just hope
the 4,000 CNP officers have not died in vain and that democracy
will prevail.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your statement.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Dan Burton and the
information referred to follow:]
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Mr. Mica. I would like to recognize Ms. Schakowsky from
Illinois.
Ms. Schakowsky. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the opportunity to hear the testimony of these
two esteemed chairmen and my colleagues.
I want to take a moment to make a statement which actually
is more in the way of a series of questions. The recent call by
General Barry McCaffrey to increase spending on drug
enforcement in Colombia puts the United States at a crossroads.
Do we invest in a militaristic drug war that escalates the
regional conflict, or do we attack the drug market by investing
in prevention and treatment at home and seek to assist in
stabilizing Colombia?
According to the GAO, ``Despite 2 years of extensive
herbicide spraying, U.S. estimates show there has not been any
net reduction in coca cultivation. Net coca cultivation
actually increased 50 percent,'' and this 50 percent increase
in coca cultivation comes after $625 million in
counternarcotics operations in Colombia between 1990 and 1998.
Considering the demonstrated failure of militarized
eradication efforts to date, why should we believe that
investing even more money in this plan will achieve a different
result? And what will it take to achieve total victory in
Colombia? Are we prepared to make that type of investment in
dollars and in lives? And if not, what is the purpose of this
aid?
Considering the fact that more than 100,000 civilians have
died in Colombia's civil war and five servicemen recently on a
reconnaissance flight, is it ethical to escalate the war in
Colombia in order to prevent Americans from purchasing cocaine?
Will the aid achieve a 10 percent reduction or a 20 percent or
50 percent reduction in drugs? What is the target amount, or is
the purpose to degrade the military capability of the FARC or
bomb them to the negotiating table?
Exactly what is it that we believe this aid will
accomplish? Is it the first in a series of blank checks for a
war that has no foreseeable end game? What is the exit
strategy? With the continued failure of a military solution to
drug production in Colombia, why shouldn't an innovative
alternative development approach be used instead? Why not spend
half or all of the money on crop substitution or development?
A landmark study of cocaine markets by the Rand Corp. found
that providing treatment to cocaine users is 10 times more
effective than drug interdiction schemes and 23 times more
cost-effective than eradicating coca at its source.
If decreasing drug use in America is the ultimate goal, why
aren't we putting equal resources into domestic demand
reduction where each dollar spent is 23 times more effective
than eradication? Today, we're discussing $1 billion for
Colombia, but yesterday, we cut $1 billion from the COPS
program here at home.
A recent study by researchers at SAMHSA, the Substance
Abuse and Metal Health Service Administration, has indicated
that 48 percent of the need for drug treatment, not including
alcohol abuse, is unmet in the United States. Why is it that we
can find emergency funds for overseas military operations while
continuing to ignore the enormous lack of drug treatment here
at home?
Mr. Chairman, before becoming entangled in a foreign war,
it seems to me that the Congress should use its oversight
authority to require the administration to explain how this
escalation will reduce illicit drug use at home better than
investment in prevention and treatment in the United States.
The administration should also explain how increasing funds for
a policy will change the result when past increases in support
have not changed the outcome. These troubling strategic issues
need to be resolved in a satisfactory manner before we increase
our involvement in Colombia.
I appreciate the opportunity to make this statement.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentlelady for her statement.
I would like to recognize the gentleman from Arkansas Mr.
Hutchinson.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate this hearing, and I want to express my thanks
to Mr. Burton and Mr. Gilman for their testimony today and
their leadership on this issue. After Mr. Burton's testimony, I
certainly am looking forward to hearing the testimony of the
State Department in reference to those helicopters.
And, Mr. Gilman, I couldn't agree with you more in regard
to the balanced approach that we have to maintain, reducing the
demand for cocaine in this country, the demand for drugs, while
also going after the source countries.
I, as many members of the subcommittee, have been to
Colombia and met General Seranno and appreciate the work that
he's doing there, and they do need our assistance. And I
respect the questions that have just been raised by the
gentlelady from Illinois, very appropriate questions as to what
our strategy is. Hopefully, we can answer some of those
questions today. I thought for a moment she was speaking of our
intervention in Kosovo, what our plan is for an exit stategy.
And this region is very, very close. When you look at the
New Tribes Missionaries that have been captured, perhaps killed
by the FARC guerillas there, and then you look at the
servicemen that we've lost, this impacts the lives of
Americans. And so I think it's appropriate that we address our
role there and our commitment there. And I'm delighted with
this hearing.
While this hearing is primarily designed to highlight the
precarious situation in which Colombia finds itself, I want to
take a moment, Mr. Chairman, to honor an Arkansan who was on
the front lines of our war against drugs in that country. Chief
Warrant Officer Thomas Moore, a fellow Arkansan, has paid the
ultimate price for the defense of his country. In a little
noticed incident last month, Moore and four of his compatriots
lost their lives to keep our kids safe from the scourge of
drugs.
On July 23rd, Moore and his fellow air crew took off for a
routine intelligent mission over southern Colombia. The crew
was tasked with gathering information to support Colombia's
counterdrug efforts. The craft disappeared from radar screens
while over rebel-controlled territory and later was discovered
in the mountains along Colombia's border with Ecuador. There
were no survivors.
Moore joined the Army in 1988 after attending the Air Force
Academy. In 1991, he served with distinction in Southwest Asia
during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. After 4 years of
enlisted service, Moore was selected for the warrant officer
program. He graduated from flight school in 1993 as a scout
helicopter pilot, and in 1996 was selected to attend a fixed
wing qualification course. He graduated and joined the 204th
Military Intelligence Battalion, and as a result of his
excellent performance was selected to fly the RC7, the Army's
premier reconnaissance plane. Moore had deployed several times
on missions to South America from his post at Fort Bliss, in El
Paso, TX.
His awards include the Kuwait and Saudi Arabia Liberation
Medals, the Army Achievement Medal and the Army Commendation
Medal.
Moore is from Higden, AR; and is survived by his wife and
two children.
Mr. Chairman, this happened 1 month ago. And I do not
believe it has captured the attention, the recognition that is
deserved for these brave soldiers who have really committed
themselves to serving our country.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for this opportunity to
pay tribute to Chief Warrant Officer Thomas Moore and his
fellow soldiers. They embodied the spirit that undergirds our
determined efforts to fight narcotraffickers wherever they seek
to ply their poisonous trade. They are indeed unsung heroes.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman for his statement.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Asa Hutchinson follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5738.039
Mr. Mica. I am pleased now to recognize Mr. Reyes, who has
joined us. He's a member of the Armed Services Committee. We
thank you for joining us this morning, and you're recognized,
sir.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to participate as part of your committee. I want to
tell you that I hold both chairmen in the highest esteem. I
know they worked very hard on this and many other issues,
including annually on the issue of certification of Mexico,
which I think is one of the most important things that we do in
this Congress is recognize the efforts that other countries are
making on behalf of fighting drug traffickers and international
drug smuggling.
It occurs to me that in the context of what we're doing
this morning and what your committee does, it's very important
that we have a clear understanding of what the challenges and
what the accuracy is. I came to Congress after 26\1/2\ years
service in the U.S. Border Patrol, part of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, and I will tell you that Border Patrol
agents as part of Operation Snowcap have been at the forefront
of this Nation's war on drugs since the early 1980's.
I had the opportunity to travel to Colombia and observe the
activities of the Colombian National Police, as well as the
participation by DEA and by the United States Border Patrol as
a result of Operation Snowcap, so I have a good understanding
of the issue. I have a good perspective based again on
experience of what is going and what has been going on in
Colombia for literally several decades. I have experience under
the Reagan administration, under the Bush administration, and
obviously under this administration, and it occurs to me that
we in Congress do a lot of political jousting, and part of what
I think is important is that we be accurate about framing the
argument and not allow politics to interfere with what is very
dangerous work for our men and women fighting both in this
country and internationally to stop narcotics trafficking.
I would tell you that the loss of five soldiers. I
represent the 16th District of Texas, which includes Fort
Bliss, and the loss of five soldiers occurred not a month ago,
but literally less than 2 weeks ago. They included Captain
Jennifer J. Odom, Captain Jose Santiago, Warrant Officer Thomas
Moore, as my colleague from Arkansas has already mentioned,
Specialist Bruce Cluff and Specialist Ray Kreuger.
I would also remind this committee that of all of the five
soldiers, we have actually only recovered the remains of three,
two are still on that mountaintop in Colombia. And I mention
that because it's important that we keep in mind why we're
here. It's important that we understand that in order to
overcome and to be successful in fighting narcotics trafficking
and the scourge of narcotics in our neighborhoods, and we go
through this every year when the issue of certification comes
up.
I heard mention this morning where the administration was
being criticized because they decertified Colombia on two
separate occasions. Members here this morning want to see
Mexico decertified. So it brings to my mind that there's an
issue here of either confusion or hypocrisy at play, and it's
not helpful to the efforts and the sacrifices that are being
made not only by the five soldiers who already have lost their
lives, but by the efforts of the U.S. Border Patrol as they
participated in this endeavor in past years, by DEA today, by
members of the military even as we speak here this morning.
Part of the challenge is, as I see it, is to work together.
And, again, I get back to accuracy. I asked you what kind of
infrared system was on that video, because from my experience,
that looked more like daylight video than infrared. You cannot
see smoke from a helicopter after it's been shot and flames
coming out in the way that that came out in terms of infrared.
So, again, I make mention of these things so that we can
work jointly, both as Democrats and Republicans, both as
liberals and conservatives, both as those that have an
understanding of the issue not only locally in our
neighborhoods, but internationally in scope, as I do, and bring
forward people that understand in order for us to succeed in
fighting international drug trafficking, in order for us to
succeed in being able to come up with a solution, we have to
approach this thing from the proverbial three-legged stool, and
that's with education, with treatment, and with interdiction,
law enforcement, however you want to phrase it.
All three are important; all three are critical. And it
doesn't do us any good to sit here and nitpick when there are
the lives of our men and women both in the military and in law
enforcement at risk both in this country and internationally.
I hope that, and I am willing to lend my expertise, Mr.
Chairman, in any way that I can and that if you see fit, to
help us frame the larger issues, to help us frame the challenge
that we face so that together we can reach a successful
conclusion to the scourge that frustrates all of us in our
neighborhoods and all of us in our capacity as representatives
of the people of this country.
And I thank you for the opportunity.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman for joining us.
Now, last but not least, the gentleman who has been very
active on our subcommittee on this issue, Mr. Souder, the
gentleman from Indiana. You're recognized.
Mr. Souder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I also want to,
before I make a statement here, pay tribute to Chairman Gilman
for his leadership in the Narcotics Select Committee, as well
as International Relations Committee; to Chairman Burton not
only for his work in Government Reform, but also in
International Relations in Central America, because it's the
committed efforts of both of you, in addition to your work on
this subcommittee, but particularly with your leadership at the
full committee chairman level and being able to keep the focus
on, or we would really be in bad shape, probably be gone by now
in the sense of what's been happening not only in Colombia, but
Peru and Bolivia and Central America.
It was very disturbing to me to hear somehow that we
haven't somehow totally wiped out the drug problem is grounds
that we should back up. General McCaffrey frequently compares
the drug battle to cancer. We spent billions in fighting cancer
in America, but we haven't stopped cancer. So should we cut all
of our funding out and give up on fighting breast cancer and
other forms of cancer in America? It's an absurd argument that
we heard just a little while ago.
If you want to try and focus on the treatment problem, then
focus in addition to the other things on the treatment problem.
Congressman Ramstad has an access bill that I'm a cosponsor of,
and we need to move access for drug treatment.
Nobody here today is against drug treatment. We have the
safe and drug-free schools bill moving through the committee
and many other things that will be in the Labor-HHS bill, and
we're moving those this Congress. We heard, oh, we're spending
far more on the domestic side than in targets.
But my former boss, former Senator Dan Coats, used to have
a story that he liked. I would like to paraphrase here, and
that is that people--it would be similar to coming up to a
river where the babies are drowning, and then you're busy
pulling these babies out like crazy trying to save their lives,
and somebody says, I wonder how the baby is getting in here. I
wonder what is happening upriver. Well, Colombia is the source
of the river. It's coming from Colombia.
We're sitting here how we're going to help our communities,
how we're going to get the drowning babies out. We ought to
look at the source, too, because if we do not get to the
source, we cannot handle it in Fort Wayne, we cannot do enough
in our schools, we cannot do enough in our streets, we cannot
build enough prisons, because it is both a supply and a demand
problem.
One other thing that really has disturbed me, and I was
interested if Chairman Gilman has any comments on this, too,
because you said you had been in Congress 27 years, and that
means at the start you were there as we were coming out of
Vietnam. And one thing we seem to be fighting here is this
Vietnam phobia that we have in this country of everything is
like Vietnam, is it like Vietnam, and there are several clear
things here that are not like Vietnam, in my opinion.
One, it's in our hemisphere; Colombia is 2 hours from
Miami. This is not something that's overseas or far away.
Second, it's not Vietnam in the sense that drugs that are
coming in from Colombia are coming in to my hometown, into my
district and into every other area of America, threatening the
lives of all of us in this country. It's not a hypothetical
battle which I feel it is important to fight around the world.
But it is also one that's of direct, clear compelling national
interest in the United States.
It's also not Vietnam in the sense that the CNP, as we
heard from both of your testimony, wants to fight. They are
trained to fight. We just aren't giving them the materials with
which to fight. And in the military, certainly General Wilhelm
on the ground working now, they're trying to clean up what has
been a weakened military, but they want to do it, and they want
to be helped. That is not like Vietnam.
But my concern about how it is like Vietnam is that we will
give them just enough to never quite win, to never quite
succeed, and possibly fail. But we will never give them enough
early enough to get the jump on those that are fighting.
That's the parallel to the Vietnam is that we don't have
the courage to get in at the front, and then, in effect--then
say, oh, well, they can't win. And I would like to hear in
particular Chairman Gilman's comment, because you've seen now
both ends of this, and it is one of the stories that we're
clearly fighting in the media, is this turning into a Vietnam,
and, oh, we need to back up. And we heard it here just a little
bit ago.
Mr. Gilman. Well, if I might, Mr. Chairman, just a brief
response, let me note that between 1985 and 1992 with a
balanced drug-fighting strategy on both supply and demand at
the same time, along with Mrs. Reagan's excellent public
relations campaign of ``just say no,'' we were able to reduce
monthly cocaine use by nearly 80 percent, which is a
demonstration of the fact that by applying an effective
strategy, we can make progress.
And this is not the time to retreat. We have, as you so
forcefully mentioned, an effective drug-fighting force in
Colombia that has the will and the wherewithal that they lack--
they lack the wherewithal, the ability to do the job. All
they're asking for is some support from our Nation, so let's
give them the support that they need.
And General Seranno, who is an outstanding drug fighter,
has said that with proper equipment, he could eliminate the
opium supply for the heroin within a 2-year period. All we say
is, the administration people, our DEA and our State Department
working together can be very helpful to him in providing
resources he needs, and he would eliminate that source.
We must not take from one to give to the other. We have to
fight these on several fronts at one time of both reducing
demand and reducing supply. And I thank you for your supportive
remarks.
Mr. Souder. Thanks. And Mr. Chairman, this is a war in
Colombia we cannot, nor the world cannot afford to lose.
Whatever it takes, it must be one that cannot be a narcotic
state.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman.
I think we've concluded all of the opening statements--oh,
I'm sorry. I beg your pardon. I apologize deeply, Mr. Ose, the
gentleman from California, I didn't see you at the end. You're
recognized.
Mr. Ose. I'm a Stealth helicopter down here. Mr. Chairman,
I don't have an opening statement.
Mr. Mica. You're very kind, because we have taken quite
some time to hear from these Members.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. I would like to excuse our witnesses who are also
members of the panel, ask them to join us if they would.
And now if we could call our second panelist. The second
panel and only witness on this panel is General Barry R.
McCaffrey. Mr. McCaffrey is the Director of the Office of
National Drug Control Policy. He has testified before us
before, and he is back with us.
General, you know, I think, the protocol. If you would
stand, sir, and raise your right hand. [Witness sworn.]
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
General, we're not going to run the light on you this
morning. You're the only witness on this panel, and I know many
are anxious to hear from you. So we welcome you back. We salute
you for your efforts. You are recognized, sir.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL BARRY McCAFFREY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
General McCaffrey. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me thank you,
you and your colleagues for the chance to come down here and
testify. I was able to listen to the opening panels and all of
your opening comments, and I really must applaud you and the
other members of the committee for drawing the attention of the
country to what I would characterize as an emergency situation.
And I think it's going to require a very careful analysis
by the administration and the Congress in the coming months to
sort out exactly how do we take on these enormous dilemmas that
President Pastrana and his colleagues face in confronting a
problem of gigantic dimensions that is worsening over time.
And specifically I would say there are three elements of
that problem. The one that very directly affects my own
portfolio, of course, is drugs in which we have seen a doubling
of coca production in the last 3 years. And so poor Colombia,
these 36 million very brave people have now become the No. 1
country on the face of the Earth in terms of undercultivation
for cocaine, and indeed in a very short period of time have now
become, as has been previously commented on, some 6 metric tons
of heroin drug dimension that is simply astonishing.
And I might add it's not just affecting United States
citizens, this is affecting Colombians, and the drug abuse
problem in that country is skyrocketing, and it's spilling over
into their neighbors.
Now a second problem that Colombia faces, however, needs to
be taken into account, is a huge economic crisis. It's also
clearly linked to the lack of security, which in most ways is
fundamentally driven by this explosion of drug production.
We're seeing astonishing 20 percent unemployment rate and 45
percent devaluation of the peso and massive economic flight of
investor capital.
Who in his right mind would invest in Colombia at this
moment? And indeed, not just in terms of foreign capital, but
domestic also, how can you try and do cattle ranching if you're
fearful of leaving the confines of the major cities?
Then finally, as has been accurately pointed out by some of
your earlier witnesses, President Pastrana--and I think this is
the will of the Colombia people--is trying to bring to an end
40 plus years of the most mindless violence imaginable, and
it's a dynamic process, you know. The FARC and the ELN and the
other guerilla groups may have originally had an ideology, and
it's not clear to most of us that they have become anything
more than terrorist organizations which are fueled by hundreds
of millions of dollars of drug-created money.
Now, I heard 1.2 billion mentioned by Chairman Burton.
That's the highest number I've heard; the minimal numbers, 215
million a year. Clearly, it's resources on a level that have
allowed them to have double the number of automatic weapons and
a FARC battalion as the Colombia Army and to pay their
narcoguerilla fighters in some cases up to $1,000 a month,
while the Colombian Army is paying their kids $200 a month.
The peace process is an important one not just to Colombia,
but to all of us. It's a regional problem, and it's going to
require a very multifaceted approach, clearly one aspect of
which may well be enhanced support for the security forces at
Colombia.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I have tried to pull
together in writing in the statement our own views, not just of
ONDCP, but obviously those of the Attorney General, Secretary
of the Treasury, Defense, and State. And I offer that for the
record. And then I put together some charts that I will run
through very quickly that I would like, with your permission,
to offer for the record.
Mr. Mica. For the record they will all be made a part of
the record. Thank you.
General McCaffrey. If I may make some very quick comments.
And I might add that my colleague over here that will be
pulling the slides for me is an intern working with me, Air
Force Second Lieutenant Chris Rainy, on loan for the summer
from the School of Public Policy. There will be a little bit of
flair that may be lacking in my normal presentation.
Please, if you will, first view graph--let me just say that
the President did dispatch me on a trip last week that took me
to Colombia, No. 1, Ecuador, and Venezuela; Ecuador to look at
the FOL at Manta Ecuador, to talk to their congressional
leadership, their government officials and the President; into
Venezuela to talk to President Chavez, his Defense Minister,
Interior Foreign Ministry; and then finally in Oranjestad
Aruba, to look at the forward-operating locations in those two
places.
I'm very upbeat, to be honest, about the value of our trip,
and would be glad to respond to your own questions.
At the end of this coming month, the President will send me
back to Brazil, Bolivia and Peru and Argentina. The whole
notion would be to pull together regional ideas about
continuing to successfully confront the drug issue, and to do
so not just on the basis of intelligence cooperation and
judicial cooperation and air and sea interdiction, which are
vitally important, but to see it in a larger context of what we
think are the major contributions that we started in the
Santiago Summit of the Americas. How do we make sure that 34
nations are engaged in this process, and this is not seen as a
United States problem that we're cajoling our Latin American
partners into participating in? That's where the trip took me,
and I will be glad to respond to your own questions.
Chris, the next chart if you will, sir. Why don't you put
them all up there so we can run through this a bit quicker.
Source zone strategy. Six years ago we put together PDD 14.
I think it was a sound piece of work. I thought so at the time.
It suggested you got to do it all; you've got to have a solid
domestic law enforcement and interdiction strategy. Yes, you do
have to go into the transit zone, the Caribbean, the Eastern
Pacific, Central America. We can talk about that. But at the
end of the day, the huge payoffs in terms of supply reduction
are going where the drugs are produced, and we're doing that
worldwide.
But certainly when it comes to cocaine and heroin in the
Latin American arena, our eradication concept in Colombia,
Peru, Bolivia and Mexico are vital to achieving some goal. And
I would just suggest to you, almost to my astonishment it's
working, more so than I could have envisioned in the 5-some odd
years that I've been working the issue. With a rather--in terms
of the entire national budget, with a rather modest financial
investment, we actually every--achieved a net reduction in
cocaine in 3 years. And I will go on to talk about that and why
it might be jeopardized in the coming years.
When I say we, this is not just the DEA, the Customs
Service, the Border Patrol, U.S. Armed Forces, the Agency; a
lot of it is the Peruvian Air Force, Colombian National Police,
the cooperation of authorities in the Caribbean. It's really
been a multinational effort, and it's pretty impressive.
Next chart, Chris.
Let me talk about Peru, because that's clearly the most
dramatic successes we've made. Three years, 56 percent
reduction in coca under cultivation. It's astonishing,
unbelievable what has been achieved. Now, a lot of that was not
just the incredible performance of the U.S. Air Force and
intelligence services supporting the Peruvian Air Force, it was
alternative economic development, it was smart political
operation by President Fujimori. It was a defeated Sendero
Luminosos. It was a reintroduction of civilian police in the
Huallega Valley. It was good eradication operations in the
Eberamag valley, but inarguably, that's where they've gone in 3
years.
And for that reason, for the first time in a decade there
have been less cocaine floating around the world on a net basis
then there were in previous years. That's jeopardized. We're
now seeing possibly some bad evidence of the reintroduction of
coca planting into the eradicated fields.
A lot of reasons why that may or may not be occurring, one
of which is the--as you get production down, the value of the
product goes up. More likely the important reason is these drug
criminal organizations are so flexible, they're adapting to
what we did and are now moving on the rivers, and they're
smuggling out in the eastern Pacific by noncommercial shipping.
They're getting around what we've achieved. They're out in
Brazilian air space. They're making short aircraft hops across
the Colombian border. They're moving east into Bolivia instead
of north into Colombia. So there's a dynamic process by some
very clever and dangerous criminal organizations. But Peru
ought to be proud of what it's done.
Next chart. Bolivia. Unusual, I watched this, as have many
of you, for a decade. For 7 years we put $1 billion in there.
We achieved enormous increases in legal cultivation. We helped
the police and the Army, but we had a zero impact on coca
production. In the last 2 years, President Banzer, Vice
President Quiroga, this administration has actually reduced
coca production 22 percent, and they've done it, thank God,
with a human rights equation taken into account, where there
has not been massive conflict, armed conflict between the coca-
ers and the police and the Army.
Now they ought to be proud of what they've done, but
they're also now getting into the heavy lifting, and how well
they can proceed will be a challenging concept to them. They've
gone out, they asked the Europeans and their global partner for
help. But this is another nation that's been on the right
track, and one element of it was stiff law enforcement and
eradication, very impressive work.
Colombia. A traditional ally, they fought with us in Korea.
They are enormously important economic partners, whether it's
coffee or flowers or whatever. Literally 30,000 jobs in
Florida, as you well know, Mr. Chairman, depend upon trade with
Colombia. An honest President, a good government struggling
with these huge challenges.
But when you back off of it and look at the global drug
threat that they pose, it's a huge problem. And I might add,
Mr. Chairman, I would volunteer later on to review the
transcript of this hearing. I'll pull together the other actors
in the government who watch this issue; let me try and get you
a fact sheet. Congressman Reyes I think quite correctly
suggested we have got to get on the same set of facts.
I think there's been an awful lot of good sound bites that
are well-meaning, but I need to paint the picture as I think it
actually is. I say that, because I think Colombia is a dynamic
situation, what we've done in the past may not be adequate.
We do need to think through the coming several years. It's
going to require a coordinated effort under the leadership of
Secretary Albright. I went to her when I got back to lay out my
own thinking. She is dispatching Under Secretary Pickering, one
of the most distinguished diplomats I've ever worked with. He
will go down there on Monday and try and work the issue.
So it's a changing situation, and I welcome, I think all of
us welcome, the oversight of Congress and the participation of
Congress, but we've got to get the same sheet of facts.
The peace process, the drug issue, the economic problem,
they are linked. The peace process is faltering. It's not
achieving its purpose. There's been no gesture of goodwill on
the part of FARC guerillas. It's outrageous. They have gone
into this, quote, demilitarized zone, cleared zone with
thousands of FARC fighters. There's 41 airfields in there.
There is some indication there is now coca production in there.
It is a laboratory operation. They are using it as an armed
base area, and during the July offensive they came out of that
DMZ and attacked the police and the Army as far as 75
kilometers away. They executed 30-some-odd people in the DMZ.
They are entering homes in the DMZ; 90,000 Colombians live in
there, and they're violating Colombian constitutional law by
exercising jurisdiction in the absence of Colombian law. It's a
huge problem. And I might add when they attacked the police and
the Army, it was a tremendous signal of determination on the
part not just of General Seranno, but all the Colombian armed
forces. Nobody surrendered. None of these besieged outposts
gave up. Many of the Colombian soldiers that were killed were
executed while wounded. They were shot in the head.
So this is a huge problem, and yet in saying that, I do not
imply that we should do anything but be entirely supportive of
continuing to engage on a negotiated--support Pastrana and his
colleagues on a negotiated end of the FARC, ELM and
paramilitary struggle against the government, but that's a
problem in sum right there, and it's spilling over, as I will
show in a subsequent chart.
Next. A lot of us should be proud about what we've done in
the last 3 and 4 years in the Andean Ridge. I'm not sure what
is coming up in the next 3 or 4 years. It looks to me like the
dynamic is shifting, and we're now moving in a different
direction. The Peruvian cocaine industry is coming back. It's
just beginning, and January, when we get our yearlong analysis
of the data, I will be able to give you a better overview. But
I think it's going in the wrong direction, and I will try and
learn more about that toward the end of the month.
Bolivia. Indeed we have done a magnificent piece of work,
``we'' meaning primarily the Bolivian police and human rights
activists and alternate economic development programs. But
again, I think the organizations, criminal organizations, have
now reneged themselves. The Colombians are gone. The Colombians
criminals are out of Bolivia, but Bolivian cocaine production
is still going out of country through Argentina, through
Brazil, to Europe. A lot of it is in Europe. It's not going up
now into Colombia to be turned into HCL. The laboratories are
in Bolivia. So it's a different problem and a very serious one,
and arguably some tough years are coming up.
And then finally we talked about Colombia, it doesn't need
to be repeated.
It's not the source of 80 percent of the cocaine. The facts
are that it's a No. 1 cultivation source of coca. And we're
seeing an improvement, I might add, in the quality of these
coca bushes; the HCL contents going up. It is arguably either
80 percent of the cocaine in America originated in or transited
through Colombia is a better way to look at it.
I would also argue that there's six metric tons of heroin,
high purity, low cost, now being--as Congressman Cummings
accurately pointed out, being dealt, distributed by the same
criminal organizations that are there to distribute cocaine,
which makes it even worse. That heroin is a new dynamic. It's
killing kids from Florida all the way to New York City and
Boston. They're sticking it up their nose, thinking because
they don't inject it, it's less dangerous probably. Although
the extremely good law enforcement work, particularly in Miami
and New York City, the seizures are up to 70 percent on the
East Coast.
I would argue that does not necessarily mean that's the
primary source of heroin. Poor Colombia produces 4 percent of
the world's heroin. The majority of it is still produced in two
places, Burma and Afghanistan. And one could argue in those two
countries the only thing that works is opium production. And
that stuff is still coming in--Burmese heroin is all over the
United States.
Next. One could argue Colombia is a trafficking center of
gravity. There's no question about it, a lot of the
laboratories are involved there. The precursor chemicals come
into Colombia from--through Venezuela, through Ecuador,
directly into Colombia. The money laundering, a lot of it is
either orchestrated or takes place in Colombian systems.
Clearly the FARC and the ELN and the paramilitary, we've had
this long sterile debate over whether to call them
narcoguerillas. I don't know what we ought to call them, but
without question, the FARC income depends upon drug production.
They're taxing it at every stage, they call it a tax, the
growing of it, the transportation, the laboratories, and so
when the Coast Guard and the DEA seize 6 pounds of Colombian
cocaine, the FARC already got paid, and that's why you see them
in shiny uniforms and brand new automatic weapons, and with
aircraft and helicopters and international legal talent. It's
the center of gravity, we could argue, for gigantic and
menacing criminal enterprise.
Next chart. Their neighbors are worried. They ought to be
worried. Colombia is incapable of controlling the land area,
particularly in the south, Caqueta and Putumayo provinces. When
I flew in the combat base at Tres Esquinas, right in the heart
of Indian country, and you look out the window, 30 percent of
the land area is coca production, and their FARC base area is
now operating, particularly in Ecuador, but also across the
border into Peru, into Brazil, Brazilian frontier, and in and
out of Venezuela land space. And then finally they're clear
across the border into Panama and the Darien Peninsula.
I mentioned that not just to indicate the regional nature
of the threat, but to underscore the requirement for regional
cooperation in solving it, which is one of the reasons that I
had gone to the surrounding countries and listened to their own
views.
Mr. Chairman, final quick comment, we've got a first-rate
CINC in Southern Command General Charlie Wilhelm. The Congress
gave us some money to set up United States Southern Command in
Miami, the crossroads of Latin America. We've got a problem.
We've closed down operations in Panama. As you pointed out,
some 2,000 counterdrug flights a year which took place out of
Howard Air Force Base, the capability is gone as of May 1st. It
was an $80 million-a-year operation. There were 2,000 airmen
there, so that 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, we were
supporting the U.S. Customs Service, which has indeed probably
the preponderance of counterdrug missions, the U.S. Armed
Forces, DEA aircraft, the Agency, Department of Transportation,
the Coast Guard tracker aircraft program. Now we're trying to
come up with new alternatives.
We're behind the ball on it. We kept negotiating with
Panama. We thought we had a solution that was good for the
region. We got interim access to Manta, Ecuador, Curacao and
Aruba. I believe we're going to be able to put together a
first-rate longer-term agreement. There's great receptivity in
the region, I think, to continue these cooperative fights.
And I've got to underscore, you know, I was out there with
Congressman Reyes at 2 a.m., with the Secretary of the Army,
the Chief of Staff of the Army, the old guard, the soldiers of
that 204th MI Battalion, to welcome home the first two remains
from those five brave young U.S. Army aviators. And the
President asked Janet Reno to head the U.S. Delegation that
went back to bring in Captain Jennifer Odom, a beautiful young
public servant, operational aircraft lost, supporting regional
counterdrug mission, and, in my view, directly protecting the
safety of the American people. It was a great honor, I know,
for Congressman Reyes and I, among others, to have taken part
of in that mission.
With your permission, I will end my formal remarks there,
and I look forward to responding to your own questions and
listening to your own ideas. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Thank you for your testimony.
[The prepared statement of General McCaffrey follows:]
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Mr. Mica. I will start with just a couple of questions, if
I may. You've been quoted as saying the line between
counternarcotics and counterinsurgency in Colombia no longer
exists. I notice that last week President Pastrana played that
down a bit. Do you believe that's the situation, and your
having been there, is there any reason that President Pastrana
would make those comments?
General McCaffrey. Well, President Pastrana is a good man,
and he's accountable to history for achieving peace in
Colombia. And to be blunt, I'm accountable to the American
people to protect them in the drug menace. I believe the only
way to do that is in cooperation with our regional partners. So
it's just a matter of perspective.
There is no factual argument that without 25,000 or so
FARC, ELN and paramilitary guerillas, this gigantic explosion
in drug production in Colombia could not exist. And the
Colombian police are not capable with 4,500 members at Danta in
interdicting and interceding in these coca-producing regions.
They've got to have the Colombian armed forces stand them with
them.
I think it is a difference in perspectives and possibly
semantics, but he's got to deal with these people.
Mr. Mica. But there's no division in your mind between
counternarcotics and counterinsurgence?
General McCaffrey. Well, I don't think I would go that far.
I think there is a distinction, but they're all related issues.
The spiralling economy, the peace process, and the guerilla
violence and the drug issue are all fueled by hundreds of
millions of dollars from coca production and opium.
Mr. Mica. One of the problems that we've had is getting
equipment to Colombia. The Congress last year appropriated $280
million, and you've heard testimony today about helicopters on
tarmacs, equipment not getting there. I met with the Vice
President of Colombia, I believe it was last week, when he was
in Washington, and we still seem incapable of getting that
equipment to that area.
Could you tell us of the $280 million that we appropriated
what's there?
General McCaffrey. Let me--I think that's one of the areas
that bothered me, you know, obviously, since Secretary Randy
Beers and Brian Sheridan and others who are here to testify can
with great, you know, knowledge of the issue talk to you about
it, and I would be glad to give you a report.
Mr. Mica. Would you give us an estimate?
General McCaffrey. Let me, if I can----
Mr. Mica. Our staff has reviewed it, and they find only a
few millions of dollars in equipment out of the $280. The press
continues to report that Colombia is now the third largest
recipient of aid.
General McCaffrey. Yeah.
Mr. Mica. Actually that is only in the money that's
appropriated this year, and very few of those dollars our
investigation indicates that have actually gotten there.
General McCaffrey. Mr. Chairman, if I can, rather than go
to which four helicopters on which day, let me go to how I've
watched it over the last 5 years. We--for example, in a
statement made there's no Black Hawks there, it's just simply
not the case. There's 7 Black Hawks there in the Army, and
there's 13 there in the Air Force. There's six more going in
for the police. There will be there in October and March, you
know--this best aircraft on the face of the Earth is the Black
Hawk. It's being modified to reach Seranno's specifications.
There are, if you will, Mr. Chairman, there are six Bell
212 helicopters have been provided to CNP. Only two are
currently operating. One was damaged in a hard landing; one
destroyed in an accident. Of the remaining four, two are in
maintenance. There are an additional eight going in darn quick,
four more in August, four more in October.
Mr. Mica. The Hueys are with the military? Blackhawks?
General McCaffrey. There are seven with the Army. There are
13 with the Air Force. There are six more going into the
police. There is an Army 7th group training session. The
counter-narcotics battalion at Tormita actually is being
equipped and trained and U.S. trainers are there. I think it's
inaccurate to get the impression that there isn't--Colombia is
the third largest recipient of foreign aid on the face of the
Earth. There are a lot of people down there trying to make that
happen.
Mr. Mica. But again, only $7 million in this recent
appropriations that we did in a supplemental was last year. The
equipment is actually there. We have been trying to get, I quot
Mr. Hannah from 1997, the Hueys to the Colombian National
Police. Mr. Reyes pointed out about the decertification. We
could have decertified with a waiver which we recommended,
which would have allowed us to get that equipment there. So
what we have is we have appropriated money but the actual
resources have not gotten to those who are--and the dispute in
the Congress or among folks here has been not providing the
military equipment to the military. It has been the military
have it. The police who are conducting the bulk of the
antinarcotics effort don't have it.
General McCaffrey. I don't think that's accurate. When I
went to Colombia 6 months ago, I got aboard Army Blackhawks and
flew out to the combat base in Guaviare with NAS-supported
helicopters moving Colombian police. I think there is a big
problem, potted radars being produced, Blackhawks being
produced and modified. Maybe it was inadequately done, but
there is a lot of stuff there. There is trainers on the ground.
Mr. Mica. General, we are just trying to get that equipment
to where it can effectively do the job, to solicit your
assistance. Finally, one question on the forward operating
locations. Our surveillance, which has closed down, there were
15,000 flights and 2,000 personnel. All of that stopped in
Panama.
General McCaffrey. 2,000 flights.
Mr. Mica. No, we have 15,000 flights.
General McCaffrey. I don't know where you got that.
Mr. Mica. That is the information we were given.
General McCaffrey. I ran the programs. 15,000 flights is
ludicrous. I don't know where that number came from, whatever
the number is.
Mr. Mica. We won't debate that. Again, we are using the
figures given to us by the Southern Command and others. In any
event, what percentage of flights are now being conducted? We
sent staff there about a month ago and staff found about one
third of the flights were being conducted that were previously
conducted. You could give us Manta and also Curacao.
General McCaffrey. That's where you have to be careful what
sound bites you use. If you take all of the flights flown in
the region during the month of June--listen to me, this is
factually accurate--it is 122 percent of the flights flown
during the same period a year earlier. What is deceptive about
that is most of those flights are flown in the transit zone,
Caribbean. We can support the Caribbean just as effectively out
of McDill Air Force base as we could out of Panama. The problem
is the source zone region. That's been a huge decrease. But
even then we got into Manta and we got into Curacao and Aruba
and were flying from all three locations.
Mr. Mica. What percentage of flights?
General McCaffrey. Well, the source zone I think has gone
way down. Part of that was tied up in Kosovo. We lost a lot of
these Intel aircraft, AWACs were all redeployed to fight the
air war in Kosovo. But I think we have a challenge. We have got
to get infrastructure support from Manta, Curacao, and Aruba.
We have got to get cooperation from regional authorities, or we
will have a problem supporting the source zone. You are quite
correct.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, General. Just as I conclude, let me
submit for the record the helicopter that was shot down in the
video was shot down at 18:38 to 18:40. It was right at dusk. It
was with an infrared camera, so that's the exact time on that.
Mr. Reyes has also asked about a balanced approach. I would
like to submit for the record these charts which show Federal
spending on international, which is source country, which was
decimated, cut about 50 percent we see during the beginning of
this administration. Only now, and if you look here, are we
getting back to the equivalent of 1991 to 1992 dollars.
Federal spending for interdiction was cut. Interdiction
decreased 51 percent, international funding levels fell 56
percent from 1992 to 1995, and for the record to look at the
balance from 1991 to 1999, we have more than doubled,
approximately doubled, the treatment money.
I just wanted to submit those for the record so that we
can, and possibly there would be some dispute about these, but
we were given these statistics from GAO reports, create a
balanced approach and look at what our strategy would be.
I would like to yield now to the chairman of the full
committee.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Chairman, would you like to go ahead and
recognize one of the Democrats first and then I will be----
Mr. Gilman. Mr. Chairman, since I have to go into another
briefing, I would welcome it if you would give me the
opportunity to ask some brief questions.
Mr. Cummings. I have absolutely no problem with that.
Mr. Mica. Then we will go right back to you.
Mr. Cummings. Yes, and I want to thank Mr. Burton for your
courtesy.
Mr. Gilman. I thank the gentleman. I thank the gentleman
for yielding. General McCaffrey, we want to commend you for
saying what Colombia needs now is $1 billion regional proposal.
But where is the White House on this? I haven't seen any
budgetary requests for that. I haven't seen any spelling out of
the details nor the implementation of your proposal. We would
welcome hearing about that.
General McCaffrey. Mr. Chairman, if I can correct you, I
don't have a $1 billion proposal for Colombia. What I have got
is a discussion paper that I put out about 3 weeks ago to all
14 of the President's Cabinet officers. It's a $1 billion
package for regional drug issues. It goes to Peru, Bolivia,
Colombian, the Caribbean, et cetera. It's not just military
police aid; it is also alternative economic development,
support for judicial training, and infrastructure. That
discussion paper I think needs to be addressed. I was
privileged to brief the Cabinet very succinctly on our
concerns. I have seen the Secretary of State, so I think we are
going to have to look at this very dynamic situation in the
coming months. We have got a challenge on the budget. No
question.
Mr. Gilman. General McCaffrey, when will we get beyond the
discussion stage and just the proposal stage? If we are going
to really help, when are we going to provide the kind of
funding that is needed and the resources that are needed?
General McCaffrey. Mr. Chairman, let me, if I may,
challenge all of us, because I really welcome your involvement
in this thing. We sent over an INL budget. The Senate cut it by
27 percent. The House just cut the INL budget by 10 percent. We
have got earmarking of money in the House for three A-10 tank
killing aircraft as crop spraying planes. We haven't--you
haven't funded, the administration hasn't funded----
Mr. Gilman. If I might interrupt you, what--the House and
Senate have complied even with more funding and resources than
the administration requested. According to ONDCP 1999 budget,
$48 million was budgeted for Colombia in fiscal year 1998; yet
the administration only requested $30 million in fiscal year
1999. That represents a 37 percent decrease in the request in
just 1 year. Why has there been such a significant decrease
request? In addition to the $30 million for Colombia in fiscal
year 1999, Congress passed an emergency supplemental
appropriations bill which brought the total allocations for
Colombia last year to about $256 million according to ONDCP
figures. Yet your fiscal year 2000 budget request for Colombia
was only $40 million this year.
Now, you are talking about a $1 billion emergency counter-
drug including 600 million for Colombia. So you have now gone
from $40 million request to over $600 million in just 6 months.
Why all of these discrepancies? Don't point the finger to the
Congress. We are asking the administration, why aren't you
coming forward to meet the crisis with the proper funding?
General McCaffrey. Well, Mr. Gilman, here is the answer.
Fiscal year 2000 request for international programs were $637
million. That is a 4 percent increase over last year's
requested amount. I do think it's an appropriate question to
ask, why did the House and the Senate both cut the INL budget
we sent over here. I don't understand how we can be doing one
thing and talking another. I do believe that we need a new look
at the region. If you will allow me to answer your question,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gilman. The House just passed $285 million for INL
antinarcotics efforts.
General McCaffrey. Mr. Chairman, you get to ask the
question, but you have got to allow me to respond to them.
Mr. Gilman. Your figures are wrong. We have accommodated
the White House request for the antidrug funding for INL. We
passed it.
General McCaffrey. Actually, Mr. Chairman, the figures are
quite correct. I think you are taking a bite out of them, which
I believe deserves a respectful response. But in fact there is
a 4 percent increase in INL budgets in fiscal year 2000, which
has not been acted on by the U.S. Congress. Now, I am also
going to propose a new look at the whole region. I will get an
answer out of the Government when they sort it out, these
conflicting peace process, economic challenge, and drug
problems. We do require a new look at it. That's why I welcome
your involvement. But I do believe that you ought to give us
the money that was in the INL budget. That's really what I am
trying to put on the budget.
Mr. Gilman. General McCaffrey, if we have such a crisis
confronting us, why isn't the administration asking for
additional funds to meet this crisis instead of just a paper
talking about some regional approach?
Let me move to address another area. With regard to Panama
and regard to Howard Air Force Base, we were engaged with the
foreign affairs directorate in Panama before we closed the
base. They were anxious to keep us there. Then they got caught
up in politics. Now we understand that the new President of
Panama is willing to discuss further negotiations in keeping
Howard Air Force Base instead of advertising Howard Air Force
Base for sale to a private developer.
Now we are hearing just recently that there is an
ammunition shortage in Colombia primarily because Howard Air
Force Base has been closed that used to supply the ammo. Right
now they have a critical ammo problem. What I am asking truly
is what can we do to reopen Howard Air Force Base by
negotiations with an administration in Panama that is
interested in doing that?
General McCaffrey. I certainly share your dismay that those
negotiations didn't come out positively. We clearly were
suiting the needs of the region. It was better for U.S.
national interests. It was better for Panama, and I think it is
a great disappointment. We negotiated in good faith. We had a
first-rate performance, in my view, by Ambassador McNamara and
the United States Ambassador to Panama. It's a shame that's
what happened. In the short run, I think we are out of Panama.
It's a closed question.
The new administration down there, when he gets in office,
perhaps then we ought to let them think through what they want
to achieve. But I think our CinC has got a decent way of
dealing with the problem. If we can get into Manta, Ecuador,
with an FOL and also into Curacao and Aruba and locate a third
FOL that can watch the eastern Pacific, and Panama is not the
only option, we will be able to satisfy our regional counter-
air requirements. I think President Balladares turned off the
process. Until he is out of office and this new administration
can look at it, I don't believe that it's fruitful to pursue
that.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General.
Mr. Mica. I would like to recognize now Mr. Cummings from
Maryland.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of
all, let me say this, General McCaffrey. As you know, I really
appreciate what you are doing. It seems like it all depends on
what day you appear here. Some days we think that you are the
greatest thing since ice cream, and other days it's like a slam
dunk against you. But the fact is that I do believe--and I know
that you know this--that on this day when the Congress is
basically out of session, for a total of 10 or 12 Members to
remain here to deal with this issue, it means that all of us
are very concerned about this, as I know you share our views
and our feelings and our passion about trying to rid our
country of, if not our world of, this drug problem.
In that light, you sent a letter--first of all, let's go
back to these helicopters. We spent a phenomenal amount of time
on these helicopters. It sounded as if--I know that we have got
some people from State, but I want to first of all figure out
what role you play in all of this. You have a strategy for
Colombia, is that right, pretty much?
General McCaffrey. I think the Colombians have a strategy
for Colombia. We are trying to figure out how to support it
effectively.
Mr. Cummings. These helicopters, do you see them as a very
important part of the strategy there in Colombia?
General McCaffrey. I think there is no question. Mobility
for the police and the Army is probably one of the greatest
tools we could give them in the short run.
Mr. Cummings. One of the things that you said, you were
talking about General Serrano. You said something that kind of
caught my ear. You said something about one of the problems was
trying to get helicopters to meet certain specifications of
General Serrano. I know that we may have testimony later on
about this, but can you elaborate a little bit on that?
General McCaffrey. It's been a very complex issue. For
example, I probably ought to clear up that I owe Mr. Burton a
response to his very legitimate concern about why would I
apparently be supporting the Blackhawks but writing a letter to
not support the Blackhawks. At one point 1\1/2\ years ago,
Congress said let's give six Blackhawks to the Colombian
police, but the money was going to come out of the existing INL
budget, which to me was a disaster. It would have immediately
stopped two-thirds of our support to Bolivia. So I opposed that
course of action. And, oh, by the way, the Colombians hadn't
budgeted for those Blackhawk flying hours. So they would have
stood down in my view the majority of their Huey helicopters.
So I said that's no good and I wouldn't support it.
Congress last year in the supplemental provided enough
money to pay for the training, the OPTEMPO, et cetera, at which
point I said OK it's a contribution. I also would tell you, I
think our support for mobility so far has been marginal. This
is sort of on the edge. There are 240,000 police-army, 25,000
for KLN and paramilitary guerillas, six helicopters. This is
not significant.
Mr. Cummings. But you don't have a problem with us getting
these helicopters? You are not pulling my time on me, are you,
Mr. Chairman?
General McCaffrey. No, I think we absolutely support it. We
absolutely support it.
Mr. Cummings. I thought my chairman wanted to stop me. I
just want him to know that I didn't have my 5 minutes.
General McCaffrey. Your light is OK, Mr. Congressman. I
don't know about----
Mr. Cummings. Let me just finish here. You sent a letter on
July 13 to Secretary Albright. You talk about the fact that we
had a--that the aid to Colombia was, ``inadequate to deal with
the enormous internal threats.''
There seems to be some question as to what that was all
about and how did you come to this revelation. Can you address
that for us? Then you had specific requests, and we want to
know what her response was.
General McCaffrey. Well, I think it's premature, to be
blunt. That was me laying down a marker suggesting--I know, for
example, there is an idea floating around in Congress of $940
million of support for Colombia. I tried to pull together some
good thinking as a discussion paper, not only to the Secretary
of State but others involved in this and said let's relook at a
dynamic situation that is going in the wrong direction. I think
that's exactly what is taking place. The administration will
look through the threat as it has evolved and try to sort out
what to do and we will consult with Congress. But we don't have
an idea on the table, OMB approved, yet to come down here and
present to you.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. I would like to recognize the chairman
of the full committee, Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. General McCaffrey, according to news accounts
in Colombia 1997, you said you supported Blackhawk helicopters
for the Colombian National Police, as you have stated here
today. Days later in Washington, DC, you opposed counter-
narcotics aid to Colombia and you wrote that Blackhawks would
threaten to undermine the objectives of the United States
international counter-drug policy.
Why did you have those two conflicting positions in just
such a short period of time?
General McCaffrey. Mr. Burton, I just answered that
question. You were involved in the discussion. Let me repeat it
if I may.
Mr. Burton. I appreciate that.
General McCaffrey. I just answered the question 2 minutes
ago. Let me again lay it out.
I do support mobility for the police and the Army. That's
unquestioned. What happened was we had a proposal where we
would pay for six helicopters for the Colombian police out of
the existing INL budget, which would have reduced the Bolivian
counter-drug aid by two-thirds that year. That was a disaster
for the U.S. Government, so I opposed it and I provided a
letter to that effect.
Now, later when we got the supplemental out of Congress,
which I think basically is a pretty good piece of work, it was
done too hurriedly. It wasn't thought through adequately, but
it was a pretty good piece of work. Congress provided the money
for the Blackhawks, the training, the spare parts, and the
OPTEMPO.
If we had taken those six Blackhawks and put them there,
minus funding from the Colombian Government--I might add they
did not budget for the operation of those aircraft--we would
have stood down every NAS Huey helicopter. We can't have, in my
view, congressional staffs micro-managing the Colombian police
and air force. They are not qualified to do it. We ought to
make the Colombians think through it. Let other CinC work with
the people who are doing that and present some coherent plan,
which is what we owe you.
Mr. Burton. General McCaffrey, it isn't our staff. I talked
to General Serrano personally, and I looked him in the eye much
closer than we are. He said, why are we being promised these
helicopters and why aren't they being delivered? You promised
40 helicopters. They are not down there.
And you said, well, we have got to be real careful because
we are going to hurt Bolivia if we take that money away. The
fact of the matter is we now have a situation that is virtually
out of control and you are saying, OK, we have got to do
something about that. In 1997 and 1998, nothing was done. In
Congress, you said that Chairman Gilman and I were micro-
managing, trying to micro-manage it.
The fact is we were talking to General Serrano on a
frequent basis. Our staffs were going down there on a frequent
basis to see what was being done and nothing was being done. We
have got junk helicopters down there. We have got 4,000
Colombian National Police being killed. They are now
negotiating from a position of weakness with the FARC guerillas
because we haven't done anything. Now, all of a sudden with
bravado, you are coming up here saying, oh, yeah, we are really
going to sock it to them and we are going to do something.
Why didn't we do it before?
General McCaffrey. Well, I would suggest that we--I
couldn't agree with you more. We need to relook the Colombian
problem. I think that you are right. I look forward to hearing
your own ideas. An enormous amount has been done. We have the
third largest recipient of U.S. aid on the face of the Earth.
There is a huge embassy and military effort going on to
support, where appropriate, training, equipment, intelligence
cooperation. But I welcome your own ideas, Mr. Chairman, and we
will try to support your thinking.
Mr. Burton. We will try to work with you. Let me just say
that I want to set the record straight on a few issues. The
reason we earmark funds for INL is because there are 40
helicopters that have not been delivered. INL has been fully
funded and we are the reason for it here in the House. We are
the reason that the Senate added that $70 million to INL's
budget. Earmarking was necessary to make sure that those
helicopters got down there because we didn't----
General McCaffrey. This is the fiscal year 2000 budget, Mr.
Chairman? Because that's just not the case.
Mr. Burton. Fiscal year 1998.
General McCaffrey. Fiscal year 2000 is the budget that I am
talking about. The one on the Hill, the House did not fund it
and neither did the Senate.
Mr. Burton. Let me give you the facts as I see them: one,
last year after administration cuts in source country programs
totaling more than $1 billion in 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996,
Congress acted decisively. Two, last year Denny Hastert, the
Speaker of the House, led a congressional effort to put $690
million into source country programs as the first year of a 3-
year effort to fund the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination
Act. Of that amount--that's law. But note, very little of that
aid is yet in Colombia, that $690 million.
No. 2, this year despite all of our efforts, despite the
U.S. Congress putting forward the crucial 3-year western
Hemisphere act, despite clear signals that we will support aid
to Colombia, the President asked for zero money for this year's
tranche of the western hemisphere Western Elimination Act. We
wanted to fund it. We gave $690 million for it. This year in
the President's request, zippo.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. I thank the chairman of the full committee. I am
now pleased to recognize Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, General
McCaffrey. I appreciate your tendering and trying to handle
some of the questions because, frankly, there are a lot of
issues that from my perspective are up in the air. I would look
forward and encourage you to come up with some specific facts
that we can all look at so that we can sort things out.
I think ultimately the ones that pay the price are those
five soldiers that you and I participated in those ceremonies.
Part of what I think is frustrating, at least for me, is the
fact that we do what I call political jousting in some of these
issues. When we talk about not fully funding the INL money;
when we talk about the Senate still not confirming the State
Department official in charge of North American relations; when
we talk about the kinds of things that we are dealing with as
we try to address drug trafficking on an international level,
and also on a domestic level, part of the frustration that I
think we all share regardless of political perspective has to
be a clear understanding of what our strategy is.
I think that--again predicated on my background and
alluding to the comments of my colleague on the other side of
the aisle on this committee where he was trying to
differentiate how this is different from Vietnam, I would
submit that we are engaged--I spent 13 months in Vietnam and I
know that you are also a veteran of Vietnam. Part of the
frustration that I see us participating in and fermenting is
the fact that we are doing the same kinds of things that
occurred in Vietnam, that is, we are interjecting politics when
we should be supporting an all-out effort that ultimately will
make a difference in keeping narcotics from our neighborhoods
and addressing the issue of how much is coming across the
border and from where. Having spent 26\1/2\ years doing that,
of my life doing that, I think it's critical and vital that we
work together.
I have a couple of questions for you, General. One of them
has to do with more the domestic; yet it's related to the
international. What is the status on your proposal for the
border czar? I think if we are going to be able to have a clear
understanding of our strategy, we have to start with the
strategy that calls for coordination. When we are talking about
our southern border, where the challenge is, as far as I am
concerned and based on my experience, we have to be paying
attention to coordination. We have to provide the kind of
support to our various agencies and our various assets that are
involved in this to be able to maximize and give them the best
kind of support, both political and otherwise. Can you tell me,
what is the status of your proposal?
General McCaffrey. Mr. Congressman, I think there is some
interim good news. There are 15,000 Federal agents involved in
the defense of the southwest border, a $2 billion operation.
Thanks to bipartisan support in Congress, we have dramatically
increased the resources; the manpower of the Border Patrol; the
amount of technology going into the Customs Service. The
coordination with Mexico, while imperfect, has improved.
The Customs and INL have come up with a notion called BCI,
Better Coordinated Action, at these 39 ports of entry. I think
arguably our intelligence flow to support Federal law
enforcement on the border is better. Our HIDTA, High Intensity
Drug Trafficking Area Program, on the five southwest border
HIDTAs is, I think, more effective than it was 2 years ago. At
the same time, I must admit that I think we need a renewed
discussion inside the administration so that there is a better
integration of the four major departments of the Federal
Government who work on border issues.
I have argued for a southwest border coordinating official
possibly to be collocated at El Paso, with EPIC, joint task
force six, and Alliance. I think there is a strong logic to
persuade my colleagues of that and we need to continue that
debate.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, General. Very quickly, can you
address the issue of the School of the Americas? We fight this
battle every year. It seems to me that the mission of the
School of the Americas is critical and vital to the context of
the conversation that we are having here this morning in this
hearing.
General McCaffrey. I wrote some letters over here to
support the School of the Americas along with two of the people
whose judgment I most trust in Government, Mr. Tom Pickering
and Mr. Walt Slocum in State and DOD along with the secretary
of the Army and others. The School of the Americas is an
enormous contribution, in my judgment, to allowing, in a
Spanish-language environment, military and police officials
from throughout the 34 democratic nations to come together and
train on a common U.S. Army doctrine basis.
I think that it's made a tremendous gift of
professionalizing and making more responsive to democracy the
rule of law of the military forces. It's been going on
essentially since the early 1950's. There were problems with
some of the graduates during the ideological wars of the 1970's
in Central America and South America. I think it's a great gift
to the hemisphere.
I also, to be honest, find that the criticism is not only
10 years out of date, it's insulting to the current leadership,
uniformed leadership of the U.S. Army. That school at Fort
Benning is under the same inspector general rule of law,
congressional oversight that any other U.S. Army installation
has to respond to. I think the American people properly have a
lot of confidence in the Army's leadership.
I think that we have got an old argument dragging us back
to the 1970's when we need to look at the future. And the
School of the Americas as well as the Air Force school in El
Paso--have I got it right? El Paso or San Antonio, excuse me,
and the Navy's efforts are all tremendous contributions to the
drug mission, also.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. I will recognize our vice chairman,
the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, you mentioned
briefly in your opening remarks about the policies that Peru
has implemented which resulted in a very, very marked decrease
in the drugs coming out of that country. Could you just very
briefly tell us what is the current status of the Peruvian
shoot-down policy.
General McCaffrey. They actually--I ought to be careful and
not use classified information in public. The numbers are
relevant. The Peruvians still have a shoot-down policy. Their
air force is still committed. We are still providing the
intelligence. Basically, it is sort of still working if you
look at it from a narrow perspective of air interdiction in the
growing fields. The problems is that drug criminals changed
their systems so now they are moving short air hops, they are
using the river systems, and there is some argument that we are
seeing new coca planting occurring in the formerly eradicated
areas. They are also moving out into Brazilian airspace, and
they are also using ground smuggling out of Peru and into
Bolivia.
Mr. Barr. I understand that. I just wanted to understand,
does the Peruvian Government still have the shoot-down policy?
General McCaffrey. Absolutely.
Mr. Barr. By the way, I appreciate your comments on the
School of the Americas. I think there was a very unfortunate
amount of misinformation that was used in the floor debate, and
I hope that you will help us to try to correct that mistake
that was made by the House.
With regard to the way that we characterize the situation
down in Colombia, and as I mentioned earlier, I am glad to see
the State Department is recognizing there is a narcoterrorist
threat or a narcoguerilla threat, that there is indeed a very,
very profound and deep relationship between narcotics
trafficking and the destabilizing terrorist and guerrilla
activity. I was somewhat surprised, though, in a recent story
to see the Colombian President denying the FARC or
narcoguerillas. How would you account for that? Does the
President there just not get it? Does this reflect fear on his
part, some sort of policy decision? Clearly, they are
narcoguerillas or narcoterrorists. Why would the President of
Colombia be hesitant to recognize that?
General McCaffrey. I think first of all, Mr. Pastrana is
trying to keep peace. And so he has got to deal with these
people. He is trying to set up a dialog. I am very respectful
of the problems he faces----
Mr. Barr. I presume it is not the way that you would go
about negotiating, giving away all of your chips up front?
General McCaffrey. I would prefer to not argue about their
name and to say that there is no argument that there is $200
million or more going from coca production into the FARC. That
is where the machine guns, the mortars, the legal talent, the
corruption, the violence affecting Colombian society and our
own is flowing from.
Mr. Barr. I don't want to get into an argument now. I don't
think that fundamentally you and I disagree on this. It is not
just a question of semantics. It's a recognition of what the
problem is.
General McCaffrey. I meant his semantics.
Mr. Barr. If we have people that say, OK, we have a
narcotics problem and let's deal with that; OK, we have a
guerrilla problem, let's deal with that, we are not recognizing
that there is a problem here and that the sum of its parts is
much worse than the individual parts themselves.
The proposal that you circulated in the administration last
month on the 13th, the discussion paper, recommending $1
billion in emergency counter-drug budget enhancements, do
others in the administration and specifically--because I agree
with you, and I want to be very supportive of that--but do
others in the administration, including specifically if you
could address this, the President, Secretary of State,
Secretary of Defense, DCI, and the national security advisor,
do they share your view that the situation in Colombia is an
emergency, and will they be supportive of requesting emergency
funds to address it?
General McCaffrey. I think there is no question that there
is a broad-gauged feeling on all my partners that there is an
emergency situation.
Mr. Barr. I really want to be very specific. Do those named
individuals, the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of
Defense, DCI, and national security advisor, not generically or
as a group, do they share--because I know you have talked with
them about this.
General McCaffrey. They do share a feeling we have an
emergency situation in Colombia and it requires a broad-gauge
response which may require additional resources. Now, we have
got to sort that out and end up with a sensible plan to send to
Congress.
Mr. Barr. As you sit here today, would you tell us whether
you are optimistic or pessimistic that your views will prevail?
General McCaffrey. Well, I am optimistic that----
Mr. Barr. I hope they do, but----
General McCaffrey [continuing]. That the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General,
Secretary Slater and others, all of whom have a piece of this,
are seriously looking at the issue. We put a tremendous amount
of resources in there already. But the dynamics have changed.
Now, we have got to sort out what do we do to support the peace
process, the economy, and the drug effort.
Mr. Barr. Do you think that you will prevail in getting
them to agree, not just that there is an emergency down there,
but they will request and support your request for emergency
funds?
General McCaffrey. First of all, there is no request on the
table yet. I am trying to pull together a conceptual agreement
among the administration. That includes I might add, I have got
to go consult with the leadership in Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru.
This is a regional problem, not just a Colombian problem.
That's the other thing that we have to remind ourselves. At the
end of the day, I hope that we will continue to evolve a policy
that meets the requirements. And it is an emergency
requirement, there is no question.
Mr. Barr. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. I am pleased to recognize now the
gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Souder.
Mr. Souder. Venezuela is our No. 1 supplier of oil to
America, far more than anywhere in the Middle East. A lot of
people don't realize that. Much of its border with the
Colombian Government now doesn't, in fact, control. Colombia is
the second, I think, in oil by-products to our country. You
mentioned earlier in your testimony the problems with,
particularly, in the Panama Canal and the FARC and the
narcotraffickers have moved into the Darian potentially with
Panama not really having the resources with which to defend
itself. We already have the financial people moving into
Panama.
I heard you testify on different committees on the drug
problems in our high schools and our cities. There is no
question that drugs are a huge killer in America. Do you
believe that the crisis we are currently facing, with possibly
a destabilization of Colombia or at least a dividing of the
country where many of the borders could not be controlled, is
as great a threat to our country as Kosovo?
General McCaffrey. I pretty much admired your earlier
comment about why this isn't Vietnam. I think this argument by
analogy gets us into trouble. Let me take Kosovo off the table.
I did that 5 years ago. Let me, if I can, just get to the part
of your concern in Colombia. I showed a chart that essentially
suggests, I think accurately, that if you are looking for the
serpent of the whole problem, it's Colombia and it is affecting
their international partners. And they are also concerned.
So before we are done with this, it seems to me there will
be a coming together of these democratic regimes to include us
as one of them with the support, I hope, of the European Union,
because we are absolutely going to work other partners to help
with this process. The Brits have been extremely supportive.
The Dutch have been supportive. The French. We have got to get
concerned about it because it is going to have an impact on
many of the rest of us.
Mr. Souder. I agree that analogies are dangerous. But if we
were simultaneously right now funding Vietnam versus Colombia,
we actually have to make some very tough budget decisions. We
are looking at putting a minimum of $4 billion to $8 billion
into the Balkans. I wanted to make an earlier comment which I
understand is disputed. Mr. Beers and I have argued this
before. But there is a disagreement in the INL. When I first
offered an amendment to move Blackhawks to the CNP many years
ago as to whether that money was coming from Bolivia and Peru
or whether it was coming because, against the will arguably of
INL and of the drug czar's office, resources were transferred
to Bosnia at that time.
There were multiple waves in the accounting, whether it was
a direct transfer or an indirect transfer. I in no way, nor did
other people, think we were taking it in Bolivia and Peru. Now,
we can dispute how the money gets moved around, but in fact it
isn't as simple as it looks just on the surface. Furthermore, I
believe that history in fact does matter, not only because you
don't want to repeat it, but because I know Mr. Reyes and
others have expressed concerns about our politics. We are an
oversight committee. We have to look through and say, well, we
have done this. If this didn't happen, how could we not have
that repeat again? That's what an oversight and reform
committee does.
I hope in the record of this hearing we can go through and
get some of the actual numbers because we have got numbers
passing across each other here. I do want to clarify a couple
of historical points which really are only minor, relative to
the problem we are facing now in Colombia but important in
trying to sort through how to get there. My understanding of
the 7 Blackhawks with the Army and the 13 with the Air Force is
those were not bought with our money. Those were bought by
Colombians----
General McCaffrey. True.
Mr. Souder [continuing]. And the reason that they were
bought by Colombians was because the Leahy rule says, in my
opinion correctly, for a long period of time that the Colombian
military was not screening their people enough; therefore, we
could not provide aid to the Colombian military. The only way
that we could provide aid was to the Colombian National Police
because they had been vetted. Southcom and General Wilhelm and
you and others have worked very hard to try to improve the
Colombian military. They are trying to get the vetted units,
but the only way that we could get additional Blackhawks with
American funding into the developing crisis was to try to do it
through the CNP, not that the Dante were sufficient to win a
war. We understand that, but that was our only vehicle with
which to do so. We are now, to add one other thing which I hope
we will get into in these budget questions, the House passed
the INL in general. We have increased it. We have had problems
in the Senate. We have the work together----
General McCaffrey. Minus $10 million.
Mr. Souder [continuing]. And then the sub-questions. The
second point is that, as we all know but very few people want
to admit, we are in the process of a very delicate dance about
the budget caps. We are in the early stages of the budget
agreement, not at the end stages. We know that we are facing
omnibus or some sort of combination of omnibus and emergency
supplemental. That's why you are hearing a lot of the questions
here today. Will the administration come to the table with an
emergency proposal that you are floating? You put everything in
your office behind that because we are going to need additional
money. The question is, is it going to go to INL or this kind
of effort? Is this crisis going to be as forefront as the farm
crisis, as the Y2K, as the many other things? That is partly,
do the American people understand what we are facing here? And
arguing over $10 million when your budget initially was $40
million I think and we came a little under that--not $40
million for Colombia, but the INL was--now you are saying maybe
$600 million just for Colombia. Hey, conditions have changed.
You said conditions have changed. So what are we going to do to
push this up? History does matter some, but at this point how
do we get to the next level?
General McCaffrey. Well, you can be assured, Mr.
Congressman, I agree with your point. I will argue forcefully
for a balanced coherent approach to this changing problem in
the region. Mr. Pickering goes down there on Monday. I believe
there is an enormous focus on the part of all of us that
Colombia is going in the wrong direction and it's affecting our
regional partners. I might add that we are concerned about Peru
and Bolivia and Panama and many of the Caribbean Islands. So we
will close on the issue. I will be prepared to discuss
rationally our options inside the Government, and I will
respond to the Congress in the fall.
Mr. Souder. Thank you.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman from Indiana, and I
recognize Mr. Ose from California.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, a couple of
questions if I might. If I understand, within the budget that
you have, you are able to move money back and forth between
accounts?
General McCaffrey. I apologize. I missed that.
Mr. Ose. If I understand correctly within the budget that
you have, you are able administratively to move money between
accounts?
General McCaffrey. There is a legal authority for me to
move a percent or so with the concurrence from the smaller of
two budgets with the total concurrence of the committee in
Congress from which the original budget came. So it's a tenuous
authority that exists, and it has never been exercised.
Mr. Ose. One of the things that I find most troubling about
this entire situation is that--and you are far more familiar
with the numbers than I am and I suspect that if we get into an
argument on the numbers I am going to look pretty foolish and
you are going to look pretty smart. I am willing to go through
that if I have to, but at some point I am reminded of that old
ditty that mine is not to question why, mine is but to do or
die.
I have to say, after 7 months up here, I don't care about
the next election. I don't care whether I win or lose. I just
want something to happen. We are tired of reading about the
kids in the streets of America dying from this poison. I know
that you are too. We moved a half million people and I don't
know how much war materiel, to Saudi Arabia in 6 months' time,
and we can't get 10 stinking helicopters to Colombia in 3
years? That's the level of my frustration. I am reminded of
General McClelland when he worked for President Lincoln. He had
all of the rationales for why he couldn't get out in the field
and beat Robert E. Lee. Give me some guidance here.
General McCaffrey. Well, I certainly agree with you on one
thing, Mr. Congressman, we shouldn't argue about facts. Logic
101 in college, don't argue about facts. They either are or
they aren't. We ought to argue about the implication of the
facts. I think that I owe the chairman of the committee some
layouts so that we can have a debate where we all agree on,
here are the numbers, and get down to micro-detail on which two
helicopters.
Make Mr. Beers and Sheridan answer those questions. I think
there is no question of this at all. Four years ago, the
counter-drug budget was $13.5 billion. This year the request on
the Hill is $17.8 billion. That includes a 21 percent increase
in support for the INL process in that same period of time; 36
percent increase in research; 52 percent increase in prevention
education; 26 percent increase in treatment. There are real
people, real programs, real adds, and, oh, by the way, there is
a real decrease in drug abuse among American adolescents.
So you ought to be frustrated, but don't you forget that
Congress has provided some serious sensible increases to
support this program. I am very well aware of it and supportive
of it. When it comes to helicopters and trainers and equipment
for the Colombian armed forces and police, we have had
problems. There are real increases in their capabilities over
the last 4 years. No question. I go down there and I get on
Blackhawk helicopters and I visit the counter-narcotics
battalion in Tolamia and the 7th special forces group is there,
and we are doing the right thing.
Now, I think we do, back to your point, we need a new
debate on it because coca protection has doubled. They are
attacking the police and the army in the outskirts of Bogota.
And the peace process is not working.
Mr. Ose. I don't care about the peace process in Colombia.
I just don't care. I don't care. I just want to know when are
we going to, as you have suggested, take a material hard look
at whether we are succeeding or failing on our--on our
standards? Just giving General Serrano a couple of helicopters
that can get to the elevations that he needs to go to seems
like an infinitesimally simple thing. I don't understand why we
can't do it.
General McCaffrey. I think the answer is, we are doing it.
That's the answer. There actually are six Blackhawk helicopters
that will show up in Colombia. There actually are NAS-supported
Hueys. There actually is a brand new intelligence coordination
center that I was just in. There actually are huge resources
flowing into Colombia and they are making a difference. Now, we
need to revisit, is this adequate not only for Colombia, but
for the region?
Mr. Ose. If it's not, the dilemma that we are going to be
faced is with the FARC growing ever larger, and threatening the
neighbors and a peace process in shambles or whatever. The
democratic institutions in these countries will be collapsing.
We are going to have a real hard choice. I would rather get
those helicopters there now. If it's the helicopters, if it's
the physical presence in the air of helicopters spraying coca
plants that sends the message or establishes the fact that the
FARC is not going to rule here, I just think that we ought to
send--I have read General Frank's book.
I know you're experienced in the Second Corps. I know if
there is anybody who can do this, you are the man. I don't
understand why we can't get 10 stinking helicopters to
Colombia. I am completely frustrated. We have kids dying in my
district. I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman. I would like to recognize
as we conclude for a couple of minutes Mr. Cummings is serving
as our ranking member.
Mr. Cummings. General, a few weeks ago one of my proudest
moments in sitting on this subcommittee, and on this committee,
came when we held a hearing with regard to a murderer from--I
think it was Florida, Deltoro. This guy had eluded extradition
to the United States. And they had been trying to get him
extradited from Mexico for something like 18 months, 2 years.
And in one hearing, in a bipartisan way, this subcommittee got
it done within about 2 weeks.
I think what you are hearing from Congressman Ose and
really Congressman Souder and all of us is that, first of all,
we acknowledge that you have probably the most difficult job in
this country. I don't think that anybody here would question
that. I think you are doing a great job. I think quietly others
might say the same thing. But at the same time when Mr. Burton
was questioning you, you said you agree with him and maybe we
need to get together. It's not going to take that long, to get
together to look at our policies with regard to Colombia. You
also said that, and I agree with you, that we have to be
careful about the Congress or the congressional staff micro-
managing what goes on as far as these policies are concerned.
I just come to one basic question, and that is how do we
help you accomplish what you have to accomplish? I, deep in my
heart, I believe that we are pretty much on the same page. We
may have different routes of getting there, but I mean, I can
hear the frustration in my colleagues because I feel the same
kind of frustration. I also feel the frustration from you.
Since we are all trying to get to the same place--if you don't
mind, can you just tell us--I think Mr. Reyes alluded to the
same thing--it's not a beatup session, but how can we work
together to take these dollars that our constituents are paying
in taxes and use them effectively and cost efficiently. That's
basically what I think would be helpful for us so that we can
receive a clear message from you so that when we walk out of
here we can say at least we know that the drug czar has come
in, he has laid out his problems. I don't care what anybody
says. It is much more complicated. You have made it clear that
it's much more complicated than I thought it was. So now, how
do we work with you to make this work?
General McCaffrey. Well, Mr. Congressman, first thing I
think the hearing is enormously helpful. I think the process of
bringing down the administration officials and asking us where
we are and what our evolving thinking is is enormously useful.
I think there is a follow-on step to this process, that clearly
the situation changed. Colombia today isn't what it was 2 years
ago. It's my own view it takes us about 3 years to see an idea
and turn it into money and in appropriations.
If you want to build a Blackhawk helicopter and send it to
Colombia, it is 25 months to build the thing, the best
helicopter on the face of the Earth. So it takes time to work
these ideas in a coherent fashion. I think we're doing that. If
you start looking back at the resources we've put in the
international piece of it, they've gone up substantially. It's
hard to throw money at Colombia, for example, or even
helicopters. You've got to find Colombian pilots to fly them.
That's a year of training. And meanwhile, they're fighting for
their lives. They're not going to be able to pull people
offline. Very complex issue.
I think in the fall I should come back and tell you where
we've taken our evolving thinking based on my visits to the
region, also Mr. Pickering and others, and let's see where we
ought to go from here.
Mr. Cummings. I'm sure the chairman will take you up on
that invitation and we look forward to continuing to work with
you as we address these very, very serious problems. And I
thank you for all that you do every day, every hour to uplift
our country and the wonderful citizens of this great America.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman and recognize for very
brief comments Mr. Souder.
Mr. Souder. I had a specific comment. I want to make two
other brief ones as well. First, I don't know where we would
be, General McCaffrey, if you weren't there, drug czar. So
whatever criticisms I may have of this administration or times
of you, I want to say that for the record. I said it before.
But if you were to leave, it would be a tremendous devastation
to our country. If you hadn't been there and using the moral
authority and your ability to articulate, we'd be in a lot
worse shape. I believe we need to move ahead and not look back
but I just have to say this for the record.
Every time I hear you refer to the training time, I'm
thinking that's why we were pushing this stuff 4 years ago. If
we had been a little farther ahead of the curve, we wouldn't be
potentially quite as bad. It would still be bad. I also want to
say one other thing for the record. It's not meant as a
criticism in any way. There were lots of conflict back and
forth but as a former staffer myself, I want to say a brief
word on behalf of staff. As I remember, when I was a Senate
staffer, we always said the scariest thing is when somebody
comes up and says my boss was talking to your boss in the
elevator because the plain truth of the matter is that whether
you're the head of GM, or the drug czar, or a Member of
Congress, we have to raise money. We're going back and forth to
vote on the floor. You hire people who become experts in that.
The first time I went to Colombia, one of the people we took
along with us as an expert was former Ambassador Buzby who had
been Ambassador to Colombia, when what was referred to earlier
as the courts problem there was there. He'd been over Latin
America issues. We need that expertise. It does not mean there
aren't going to be disagreements. It means ultimately we're
elected by the people and we have to make those final decisions
in this area.
I've been to Colombia four times. Mr. Mica has been there
many times. Mr. Barr spent much of his youth there in addition
to his trips back. So we are trying to stay engaged but we also
have to have experts on our staff. I wanted to make sure the
record reflected that. That's the only point I wanted to make.
General McCaffrey. If I may, because I share your
viewpoint, there are enormously bright, skilled, experienced
people on the congressional staffs. I have about 10 people
working for me who are the most knowledgeable folks I ever ran
into in the government on the Andean Ridge problems, but you
can't design the Colombian police and Air Force in Washington
with anybody's bureaucracy. It's got to be the Colombian
authorities, their strategy. They've got to budget for it.
They've--they can't just buy Blackhawks. They've got to get the
training package, the maintenance package, et cetera. They have
to see the tradeoffs. That's why I've argued push it out, let
our Ambassador, our CINC and Colombian authorities sort out
rational policies and then we'll decide whether or not to
support them.
Mr. Souder. I understand your principle, but remember in
the constitutional powers as the United States was developed,
we seek the advice of the administration for how to fund
things, but it is the responsibility of Congress ultimately to
make the funding decisions. We are saying because of your
expertise, the way the system has evolved as we've gone much
more to the executive branch to create offices like drug czar
because we seek that, but ultimately we in fact do have to make
the funding decisions as American dollars go to Colombia or
wherever and we should be careful not to overmicromanage. When
we feel the advisory and execution branch is not following that
policy it is our constitutional responsibility to do the very
thing which is if necessary to micromanage.
General McCaffrey. Sure. I understand.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Souder. Being chairman, there is
one benefit and I get to say the last word, General. We thank
you for your testimony today and look forward to cooperating
and working with you.
Just a couple of things for the record. I had staff check
on the number of flights from Howard Air Force Base and we sent
down the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics staff, Senate
Foreign Relations staff, House International Relations
Committee, our subcommittee, other staff. This is the latest
report I have, July 1999. American facilities, page 6, within
the former Panama Canal Zone, have provided vital
counternarcotics activities. Air operations from the base
ceased on May 1, 1999. Before that time the 8,500 foot runways
saw 15,000 flights annually. The base could handle up to 30
helicopters and over 50 planes. Now, I'm sure that they had
various missions but given 2,000 flights only would have left
40 something planes on the ground each day. I don't think that
was the case. And this may be incorrect. It's just the
information that was given to our staff.
General McCaffrey. It's a small effort, to be honest.
Mr. Mica. Just for the record, without objection, we'll
include that.
Additionally, you testified that we have had successes in
Peru and Bolivia, some of them initiated by the former chair of
Drug Policy and who is now Speaker of the House. I think if we
check the record, we'll find that we actually spent very few
dollars there and have had extremely good return. Peru had a
very difficult situation with its insurgency problem so it's
not dissimilar. It's not totally similar in any way but they
have been able to do it, and if we checked, it would be with
very few dollars from us.
And also let the record reflect that the administration did
transfer $45 million from that region, the South American
region. I remember going down there with Mr. Hastert. We were
looking for the money and they had transferred it to Haiti. And
you testified today, General, that some assets had been--had
been transferred or used in Kosovo and that was an emergency
situation. You have also identified an emergency situation
here. And then finally an interesting note, we had done some
surveillance with you, too. We found out when we were down
there we were doing that until the vice president sent the U-
2's that were doing drug missions to Alaska to check for oil
spills. So we do need to check what our priorities are and try
to get them in order and look forward to working with you in a
mutual effort to bring this situation under control.
We thank you for coming. We look forward to working with
you and I'll excuse you at this time.
General McCaffrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. I call our third panel. I am going to call
forward the Honorable Randy Beers, Assistant Secretary of the
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
of the Department of State; the Honorable Brian E. Sheridan,
Assistant Secretary of Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict with the Department of Defense; Mr. William E.
Ledwith, Chief of the International Operations of Drug
Enforcement Agency; and I'd also ask if we could have Mr.
Michael Shifter join us on this panel. He's the senior fellow
and program director of the Inter-American Dialogue.
I'd like to welcome this panel of witnesses and again this
is an investigations and oversight subcommittee of Congress. We
do swear in our witnesses. Some of you have been before us and
some of you haven't. If you would please stand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Mica. The witnesses answered in the affirmative. I'm
pleased to welcome our panelists. We have gone for some time,
and I am going to enforce the 5-minute rule. We'll put on the
timer. If you have lengthy statements, we can make them part of
the record just upon request or additional information or data
that you think will be of particular importance to the record
of this hearing.
So with that, I'd like to welcome back and recognize the
still standing or sitting Randy Beers, our Assistant Secretary
of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs for the Department of State. You're recognized.
STATEMENTS OF RANDY BEERS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT
OF STATE; BRIAN E. SHERIDAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, SPECIAL
OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE;
WILLIAM E. LEDWITH, CHIEF OF INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION; AND MICHAEL SHIFTER, SENIOR FELLOW,
INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE
Mr. Beers. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I will
make a very brief statement in opening. Thank you very much for
this opportunity. You have, as is quite often this committee's
role, brought us together on an absolutely critical issue that
we are facing at this time and we all appreciate that. I echo
General McCaffrey's statement in that regard.
Let me say also that General McCaffrey, I think, has done a
fairly respectable job in his opening statement of covering
most of the material that I will want to cover and I wish only
to say that the State Department, and INL in particular, are
committed to dealing with the problem in Colombia, to going
after drug traffickers in both the areas of cocaine and heroin.
And I look forward to your questions and an opportunity to
explain some of the questions which you all have raised in your
own opening statements.
Thank you.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Beers, that's probably the shortest statement
made by any official of the State Department in history. We
welcome it in a way, but we'll be back for questions after we
hear from Brian E. Sheridan, Assistant Secretary for Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict with our Department of
Defense. You're welcome and recognized, sir.
Mr. Sheridan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm also very
pleased to be here today to discuss the situation in Colombia.
I think we all share the committee's concern about recent
events there.
In your letter inviting me to come today, you asked four
questions. I would like to very briefly address those. In a
written form submitted to the committee are fuller responses,
but I would like to highlight a couple of key points.
You asked about the nature of the drug threat in Colombia.
To us we still see Colombia as a source of over 80 percent of
cocaine hydrochloride production. We see recently increased
fragmentation in the business and explosion in cultivation, a
continued heavy reliance on aircraft for internal flights by
drug traffickers within Colombia and what in our view is an
increased kind of intermingling or blurring between the FARC
and drug traffickers.
Second, you asked what are recent initiatives of the
Government of Colombia to address this threat. I can only speak
to the ones that the Department of Defense are involved in, and
as for recent initiatives, we're working with them on the
counternarcotics battalion, enhancing their air programs and
enhancing their riverine programs.
And then last you asked about the regional security
implications and for that I would simply say they are serious
today and potentially more serious as time goes on.
If I could close, I would like to make one pitch to the
committee for support going forward on keeping open the School
of the Americas. Congressman Reyes raised that a few moments
ago and I think General McCaffrey spoke of the importance of
the school. I think at a time when we're studying the situation
in Colombia and are concerned about it, it's worth noting that
over the last 5 years, 789 Colombian police and military have
attended the School of the Americas and from a regional
perspective, 310 Bolivians, 116 Ecuadorians, 22 Peruvians, and
177 Venezuelans, so from a Department of Defense perspective,
the School of the Americas plays a vital role in our engagement
in the region and in running good sound counternarcotics
programs.
With that, I will conclude my statement and I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sheridan follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Thank you. And we'd like to now recognize Mr.
William E. Ledwith, who is the Chief of International
Operations with the DEA. Welcome. You're recognized, sir.
Mr. Ledwith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
committee, for providing DEA the opportunity to testify at this
very important hearing. If I may, we have a short oral
statement and then I would request that our full written
statement be submitted for the record.
Mr. Mica. Without objection, your entire statement will be
made part of the record.
Mr. Ledwith. Chairman Mica and members of the committee,
DEA believes that the international trafficking organizations
based in Colombia who smuggle their drugs into our country are
indeed a threat to the national security of the United States.
As a law enforcement agency, DEA must hold to a high standard
of evidence our investigations aimed to gather evidence
sufficient to indict, arrest, and convict criminals. Our
evidence must be usable in a court of law and must withstand
severe scrutiny at every level of the criminal justice process.
With that in mind, my testimony will be limited to presenting
the evidence that DEA holds and drawing conclusions which we
can support given the legal standards we must meet.
Colombian traffickers control the vast majority of cocaine
in South America and their fingerprints are on virtually every
kilogram of cocaine sold in United States cities and towns. In
addition, Colombia alone now manufactures a minimum of 165
metric tons of cocaine hydrochloride directly from Colombian
grown coca leaf, with an almost equal amount being manufactured
or controlled by Colombians from Peruvian and Bolivian cocaine
base. Colombian traffickers are becoming increasingly less
reliant on Peruvian and Bolivian cocaine base.
As many of you are aware and as DEA has testified to in the
past, the United States is currently experiencing a significant
cocaine and heroin trade on the East Coast of the United States
franchising a significant portion of their wholesale and
cocaine operations is allowing the top level Colombians to
remain beyond the reach of American justice. The Dominicans in
the United States now, not the Colombians are the ones subject
to arrest while the top level Colombians control the
organizations from outside the United States.
This change in operations succeeds in reducing the
Colombian criminals' exposure to United States law enforcement
and extradition to the United States. Reducing their exposure
puts the Colombian bosses closer to their goal of operating
from a political, legal, and electronic sanctuary.
In addition to the Colombian organized crime groups
involved in the international drug trade, there is another
issue of great importance to both the United States and to
Colombia. There is deep concern about the connection between
the FARC and other terrorist groups and right wing groups in
Colombia and the drug trade. The Colombian Government is
responding to this armed challenge.
DEA has in the past demonstrated its ability and
willingness to fight drug trafficking organizations on a global
basis. For example, we participated in the struggle against
Pablo Escobar in Colombia, a trafficker who resorted to extreme
acts of violence as the net was closing around him. We will
work to indict and bring to justice any drug trafficker
regardless of his or her associations.
An alliance of convenience between guerrillas and
traffickers is nothing new. Since the 1970's drug traffickers
based in Colombia have made temporary alliances of convenience
with guerrillas and right wing groups to secure protection for
their drug interests. DEA intelligence indicates that many
elements of the FARC and the ELN raise funds through extortion,
taxation, or by directly selling security services to
traffickers. These terrorists extort from all manner of
economic activity in the areas in which they operate.
In return, the terrorists protect cocaine laboratories,
drug crops, clandestine air strips and other drug interests.
However, these terrorists are not the glue that holds the
drug trade together. If the traffickers did not buy security
from the FARC or ELN, they would certainly buy it from
elsewhere as they have done in the past. It is however true
that the cash cow represented by the drug trade has taken on a
major role in financing the terrorists.
The physical threat posed by the terrorists is very real.
The frequent ground fire sustained by CNP aircraft when engaged
in eradication missions over FARC or ELN controlled areas is
indicative of the extent to which the terrorists will go to
protect the drug interests.
DEA's partner in Colombia, the Colombian National Police,
is a major law enforcement organization with a long and honored
tradition of professionalism and sacrifice. CNP is aggressively
pursuing significant counterdrug operations against cocaine
processing laboratories, transportation networks, and
trafficker command and control elements.
By way of conclusion, we can and should continue to
identify and build cases against the leaders of the criminal
groups from Colombia. A number of initiatives hold particular
promise for success. DEA is fully committed to supporting
efforts currently under way to train and equip effective forces
within the Colombian military to counter the narco terrorist
threat.
The excellent working relationships DEA enjoys with the
Departments of State and Defense on counterdrug issues will
provide a foundation for sustained cooperative effort in these
undertakings. The United States Embassy's Information Analysis
and Operation Center will be increasingly utilized to
coordinate and analyze tactical information regarding the
transportation and production activities of drug trafficking
groups active in the Colombian territories south and east of
the Andes Mountains. Special Investigative Unit programs funded
under the Andean Ridge Initiative will continue to work closely
with DEA and conduct high level drug investigations against the
most significant violators.
The CNP, in concert with DEA and other law enforcement
agencies, is conducting several sophisticated investigations
which we believe will lead to the dismantling of major portions
of the most significant drug trafficking organizations
currently operating in Colombia. The DEA will continue to work
with our partners in Colombia to improve our cooperative
efforts against all those involved in drug trafficking.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the
subcommittee today. I will be happy to respond to any questions
you may have, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ledwith follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Thank you. We'll withhold questions until we hear
from Michael Shifter, who is a senior fellow and program
director at the Inter-American Dialogue. Welcome. You're
recognized, sir.
Mr. Shifter. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I
appreciate the subcommittee's invitation to testify at this
very important and timely hearing. Just a year ago I had an
opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere on the political and security situation in Colombia.
The main point I want to convey today is the following. The
goal of the United States should be to help improve the
Colombian Government's capabilities and effectiveness. We
should help the government reach a political solution to the
country's intense conflict from a position of strength. We are
currently not doing all we can to advance this goal.
Colombia desperately needs political reconciliation. This
is the first and critical step in what will inevitably be a
long-term process. The ultimate aim is to construct a more
inclusive society and more effective institutions. President
Pastrana, along with most Colombians, instinctively understand
this. It is hard to imagine a successful effort to fight drug
production and trafficking without a strong and stable
Colombian Government. It is crucial to first establish a
greater measure of authority and control over the forces in
conflict. For Colombians, this is the priority.
The Pastrana government faces two fundamental challenges.
The first is to, clear and comprehensive strategy to help
Colombia move toward greater reconciliation. The second is to
forge a national consensus behind such a strategy. The strategy
should attempt to do three things. Set firm goals, spell out
what the Colombian Government is prepared and not prepared to
accept in any negotiations, and organize resources accordingly.
Colombians will have to work out the details of such a strategy
and assume responsibility for carrying it out.
The strategy will no doubt include many aspects. These may
range from economic support to help with mediation efforts,
from development assistance to the strengthening and
professionalization of the military. The United States can and
should help Colombia deal with its difficult challenges. We
have many reasons to be interested in what happens in Colombia
and to do what we can to contribute to a more prosperous,
stable, and democratic country. This means engaging with the
Pastrana government in the most respectful and constructive
way. It also means consulting widely among our hemispheric
neighbors and other friends to mobilize and sustain adequate
backing for President Pastrana's approach.
It is crucial, however, that the support provided by the
United States or the international community be consistent with
and help reinforce the strategic purposes set by the Pastrana
government.
It is not surprising that some United States officials are
edging toward support for Colombian security forces. The key
question, however, is what the United States realistically
expects to accomplish with such support. Is it in fact the
purpose of United States/Colombia policy to defeat the
guerrillas? Is it to reduce drug production? Or is it to
enhance the Colombian Government's leverage to negotiate peace
with the insurgents?
For many the answer is simple. All of the above. They
regard the guerrillas and those involved in the drug trade,
producers and traffickers alike, as virtually
indistinguishable. These groups are in fact interconnected in
complex ways, but they're distinct and ought to be understood
as such. No one disputes that the guerrillas, the insurgents,
draw substantially from the drug economy for their strength.
Important consequences flow from failing to distinguish
between guerrillas on the one hand and drug producers and
traffickers on the other. For one, the tradeoffs among
different policy aims tend to be ignored. We should realize
that not all objectives have equal weight and not all policies
can be pursued at the same time. That is why we should keep our
main objective, improving the Colombian Government's
capabilities, in sharp focus. Achieving peace with the
guerrillas and reducing drug production will come about only as
a consequence of that improvement.
What is crucial is to face squarely what military aid to
Colombia actually means. Should the United States make
defeating the guerrillas its main goal? If so, how much would
that cost and how long would it take? Once undertaken, how far
is the United States prepared to go? The Colombian situation
has all of the elements of a slippery slope or mission creep
but military assistance is at best only part of what needs to
be a comprehensive approach to help Colombia deal with its
underlying problems.
That is why a wide ranging program of reform and
reconciliation in Colombia is essential. Increased United
States support for the Colombian armed forces should be
seriously considered but that step should be an appendage of a
broader strategy designed to strengthen democratic institutions
and obtain political reconciliation. Too often, pursuing peace
and supporting the military are regarded as mutually exclusive.
They should not be. That false dichotomy only further polarizes
the already difficult politics of Colombia's peace effort.
As I mentioned at the outset, the fundamental goal of the
United States should be to help improve the Colombian
Government's capabilities and effectiveness to enable it to
negotiate from strength. This is the best way we could
contribute to the kind of profound institutional change
Colombians desperately want and deserve.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Shifter follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Thank you for your testimony. Mr. Beers, as my
dentist said before he was going to take out my wisdom teeth,
I'll try to make this as quick and painless as possible.
Mr. Beers. That was my intent in not reading a longer
statement, sir.
Mr. Mica. Well, I think you see sort of unanimous consent
that we want the equipment to get there, that Congress has
appropriated a significant amount of money and we keep hearing
it over and over. It's now the third largest recipient of
foreign aid but the equipment isn't getting there and we still
have four upgraded Huey II helicopters sitting on the tarmac in
Ozark, AL, waiting to be shipped.
Mr. Burton, the chairman of the committee, went through a
litany of delays that we've had. Can you tell us where we are?
What's our hope of getting these there and the latest
timetable?
Mr. Beers. Yes, sir, I can. With respect to the 10 Huey
helicopters that were being upgraded to the Huey II
configuration, we began the contracting in March of last year.
The delivery of the kits, that is, the portion of the plane
that has to be installed in the older helicopter in order to
bring it up, were delivered according to a schedule that had
been proposed by Bell Helicopter. Those kits began arriving in
their full form in November of last year. There were some
delays in some portions of those kits which caused them all not
to arrive on their original schedule.
There was also a misestimate with respect to the amount of
time with which it would take to actually bring the helicopters
into the configuration required. That is a combination both of
taking older helicopters, which they were, and bringing them up
to full capability, and then also installing the kits. So there
was a delay which resulted there.
And third, there was some additional requirements that were
requested by the Colombian National Police after the first two
helicopters were supplied in the February timeframe which added
some time to submitting the design specifications and adding
that equipment. That amounted to what is for you and for me a
delay, which is far too long----
Mr. Mica. But they are on the tarmac now----
Mr. Beers. But they are on the tarmac. The first of the
four was received in June for transportation. The second two
were received after the middle of July and the fourth is in
receipt now. We contracted for the plane. After we have the
three, the Air Force provided us with transportation free of
charge for next week and that is the reason that there are----
Mr. Mica. That's what I was trying to get to----
Mr. Beers [continuing]. There are four now ready to go. We
don't ship normally smaller amounts than four or five.
Mr. Mica. They'll be there by next Friday or Saturday. The
next question would be Congress also authorized and
appropriated money last year for six Blackhawk helicopters for
the Colombian National Police. To date, how many of these
helicopters have been delivered, are actually in Colombia?
Mr. Beers. Sir, there are no Blackhawk helicopters in
Colombia at this particular point in time. The money was made
available for signing contracts in February of this year. The
contracts were signed immediately. The Army allowed us to move
to the front of the line to take Blackhawk helicopters for this
particular project. The specifications had been agreed upon
during the timeframe from the passage of the Western Hemisphere
Drug Elimination Act until the funds were provided to us in
final form, so there was no delay with respect to that.
So the helicopters, we'll have three of them that will be
delivered in November and three more which will be delivered in
March with pilots, mechanics, and spares so that they will all
be ready. The Colombia National Police had neither the pilots
nor the spares available at the time. They chose not to train
on helicopters other than the ones which they had ordered so
that a possible speeding up of the aircraft delivery time with
pilots might have been possible. That's their choice and that's
the delivery schedule.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Beers, one of the latest rumors to float is
that now the lawyers in the State Department have suggested the
need for an export license to transfer the Blackhawk
helicopters to Colombia. Is that the case? Have you heard that
may be required?
Mr. Beers. No, sir, I have not heard that may be required,
but we will comply with the law.
Mr. Mica. We also lost one aircraft, an ARL, airborne
reconnaissance low plane, and I think that there have been
listed as requirements that we may need as many as 15. We've
lost one and the cost of those is around $30 million a piece.
Mr. Sheridan, is there going to be a supplemental request for
this equipment?
Mr. Sheridan. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I'm not sure.
Certainly we have been in discussion with General McCaffrey's
office about a possible supplemental and what it would look
like within the department. We're certainly looking at the
various programs that would make good candidates for such a
list. Obviously with the loss of the ARL, that would be a
logical candidate, but it's pretty early.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Barr asked the question about if the
administration was preparing a supplemental--emergency
supplemental request and he named some agencies. Is your agency
working with either the drug czar or anyone else from the
administration to come up with numbers to present to Congress
for a new supplemental request or emergency supplemental?
Mr. Sheridan. I have to be careful, Mr. Chairman, because
I'm not a Comptroller type and I don't know what form it will--
such a thing if it comes to pass, will eventually take but I
know we are looking at programs right now. We are working with
our Comptroller. They are in discussions with OMB but it is
very, very early in that kind of process and how that all ends
up playing out is above my pay grade, but we are certainly
looking at it.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Beers, you are working on part of that
request with the drug czar?
Mr. Beers. We are, sir.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Ledwith, are you involved? Have they asked
DEA the figures?
Mr. Ledwith. Sir, I'm not personally involved but I'm aware
those discussions are under way at the more senior levels of
our agency and Department of Justice.
Mr. Mica. Finally, Mr. Beers, do you have any idea when the
agency or the drug czar might be coming back to Congress with a
supplemental request?
Mr. Beers. Sir, I can't say with precision when it will be
that that will be ready. I just don't know, although I think
Congressman Souder probably provided us with the most accurate
expression of how this is all going to take place when he spoke
about a mid-September timeframe.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
Mr. Cummings, you're recognized.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. If I were
just one of the many people watching this right now on C-SPAN,
I think I'd be a bit frustrated when we think about sending a
space capsule all around the--in outer space and then get it to
land at a precise moment in a precise place. I don't know that
much about the military, and then they sit here and they hear
all the difficulties that we are having with these Blackhawk
helicopters and the Hueys. I tell you, I'm sure it gets kind of
frustrating to them and I'm sure they're sitting there right
now just kind of scratching their heads and there are some of
them that are sitting in my district probably looking out a
window right now as drug deals are taking place and they're
tying to put the two together.
One of the biggest complaints I get in my district is that
drugs are flowing in but the people in my district own no
planes. They own no ships, no trains, no buses, and they're
coming from somewhere. And so when they hear this, and I go
back and I say to them this afternoon--I'll be back there in
about an hour or two--and they say we saw you on C-SPAN and you
see, I told you. I told you that we should be doing a better
job and I heard what they said about those Blackhawk
helicopters and see, Mr. Cummings, and see, they had become
very cynical and they believe that the government in some
instances is almost a part of allowing this--these drugs to
come into their communities.
With that statement, let me ask you this, Mr. Beers. You
told us a moment ago that--correct me if I'm wrong--that we'll
have three Blackhawks in November and three more in March; is
that right?
Mr. Beers. That's correct, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And as you were going down the list of the
problems with the Hueys, you said three things that I have
listed here. You said there were delays, there was a
misestimate, and then there were additional requirements. And
I'm just trying to figure out how--how do we--what happens to
us here as we get a little frustrated because we come back
and--how do we know we're not going to hear the same excuses
over and over again? I don't know whether you heard Mr. Ose's
comments a little earlier about his frustration because I'll
tell you, I think we're sort of--we're pretty much in agreement
on this. We want to see things happen and this is already a
slow process up here. But we do like to see things happen
because people are dying as we speak. People are getting
addicted as we argue.
So I'm just trying--can you give us some assurances so that
we--I always say a lot of times what happens is people get
caught up in motion, commotion, and emotion and no results. And
so the question is, is whether when the time comes in November
how can we be assured that these Blackhawk helicopters are
going to be where they're supposed to be, doing what they're
supposed to do, so that people watching this and the Congress
can have the kind of faith and confidence that they need? Can
you understand the frustration?
Mr. Beers. Sir, thank you for the opportunity to respond. I
answered the questions which were asked me. Let me give you the
answer now that tells the picture of the entire story.
We have focused on the delivery of some helicopters and
they are important and I don't mean to diminish that. Last year
INL and the Colombian National Police police sprayed 66,000
hectares of coca in Colombia. We sprayed 3,000 hectares of
opium poppy in Colombia. This year to date we have sprayed
7,500 hectares of opium poppy and we have sprayed 27,500
hectares of coca. That is the effort that INL and the Colombian
National Police make together.
In addition to that, we have raided labs. The Colombian
National Police captured approximately 30 metric tons of
cocaine last year and they are on a similar pace this year.
There has been no delay, no delay in the prosecution of the
campaign against opium poppy for lack of helicopters. We began
that campaign in earnest this fall and we have not had 1 day
that we didn't fly because those helicopters weren't there.
There are adequate helicopters that are there. They are flying
when they can fly because of the weather, but we still are
continuing to make that effort. These helicopters will help
expand that effort but we also have other needs. What we do
with most of our money, what we do with most of our support is
provide assistance to the Colombian National Police and their
air wing to keep their planes and our planes in the air. These
will be additional planes. They will help. But there's been an
effort that's been ongoing throughout this period of time. I
want these new helicopters to get there as quickly as possible
but we will go with what we have when we have it and we will
continue to make a significant effort, sir.
Mr. Cummings. I am so glad that I asked you that question
so that you could say what you just said. We need to hear that.
The American people need to hear that. And I'm glad you said it
the way you said it. I really mean that. Because those are the
kinds of things that we need to know. And I agree with you
after you said what you just said that maybe we are putting too
much of a spotlight on one thing and not dealing with all the
other good things that are happening. Now I feel a little bit
better about going back to my district this afternoon and I
can--I'm sure they'll quote you. They'll probably even remember
your name. Thank you very much.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman. I recognize now Mr.
Souder, the gentleman from Indiana.
Mr. Souder. Just so nobody thinks that we just do this to
have a public debate for television, we've argued in hotel
lobbies in Santiago. We've argued in bathrooms. And I have a--I
want to plunge into some of the particulars and some
clarifications but I have a couple of particular questions that
I want to clarify. Are the helicopters to Colombia the top
priority? In other words, are they designated what I understand
is FAD, force activity designator, so it's the top priority in
getting military equipment over to places like Chile,
Argentina, or other places where we're not at war? Is it the
top priority?
Mr. Beers. We have requested that of the Department of
Defense. We have not yet received an answer from that, sir, but
with respect to the helicopters themselves with respect to
INL's effort, they are our top priority at this point in time
in terms of the delivery of product here that needs to be down
there.
Mr. Souder. When did the request go to the Department of
Defense?
Mr. Beers. In June.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Sheridan, do you know why that hasn't been
acted on?
Mr. Sheridan. Congressman, I'll have to get back to you on
that. I will check into that.
Mr. Souder. Thanks. This is--I mean, this isn't years at
least. It's months, but when there is a war going on and we
heard about the nature of the crisis, I would hope that we
could move as fast as we seem to in other areas of the world
where we may not have the same compelling national police
interests, which was an editorial comment, I realize.
Another very specific question. We have really struggled
with the Leahy amendment and how to work with the applications
of the Leahy amendment, and my understanding is that there was
an allegation of a human rights violation lodged against a
senior officer of a brigade sized Colombian unit, the result of
blocking any United States assistance to that brigade and that
Colombia has very few brigade sized units which are capable of
conducting offensive operations, so the strict interpretation
of the Leahy amendment has resulted in weakening their ability,
and our ability to do that.
Would you have the State Department's legal advisor provide
this committee with some detailed recommendations and
legislative language to address the current limitations imposed
by the Leahy amendment? Because we have some belief that they
are willing to kind of work with this too, that part of the
problem here, and I have directly talked to their defense
ministers and military commanders too as have many others and
they are trying to vet the units.
In fact, we have said that we want to be so careful that
even when there is a complaint lodged, but if a complaint is
lodged, are there ways we can get the individual separated so
we don't in effect shut down a whole brigade because of a
complaint lodged against one individual? Because if we are in
the nature of the crisis that we've heard about today, this is
really micromanaging to the detriment of not only the United
States and Colombia but the entire world, as we hear it's going
to Europe and everywhere else.
Mr. Beers. Sir, I will take that question back and we will
provide you an answer in that regard. Let me say on behalf of
the Colombian Government and our effort to deal with this issue
to date, part of the reason that you all are hearing about this
counternarcotics battalion which is being established now is a
realization on the part of the government of Colombia in
conjunction with consultations with us to rebuild units in
order that these issues are not relevant to the discussion of
assistance to those kinds of units. That is, I think, a
valuable and important move on the part of the Government of
Colombia that will, even without any change in legislative
language, make this process a lot simpler in terms of our
ability to certify that the units are eligible for assistance
and to maintain constant oversight of that as the legislation
requires us to do.
Mr. Souder. Another question I have is that regarding these
counterdrug battalions, it is my understanding that they're to
be activated in December, that there is no particular budget
for air mobility for these units. I would hope that any
supplemental request that comes up or emergency requests would
address this question. We have worked for years.
I would argue we're at least 3 years behind where we wanted
the Blackhawks into the CNP and I'm very concerned that those
are going to be diverted into this other important battalion.
I'm not arguing against it because you have to have both
fighting but we had a specific intent of Congress and we want
to make sure on the record that there's an understanding that
there needs to be a budget for this battalion if we're going to
do that, not transferring what we committed to the CNP.
Mr. Beers. Sir, I can assure you that the Blackhawks that
you all asked be provided to the CNP will be provided to the
CNP and the ones that have come off the line will be the ones
that will be provided. There will be no substitute or any delay
caused by any displacement for another requirement.
Let me indicate to you that with respect to the issue of
the mobility of the counternarcotics battalion and the
counternarcotics effort on the part of the Colombian military
that we have proposed to them and they have accepted and we are
in the process now of working through the details an interim
lift capability which will involve the provision of certain
helicopters that are within the INL inventory to give them an
interim lift capability until such time as they have the
Blackhawks that they would like.
So we will be doing our part with respect to assets that
are already within INL's control in order to make sure that
this battalion is in a position to move as soon as they're
through with their training because, as General McCaffrey said,
if you wanted to buy a Blackhawk today and you put your money
on the table absent any other provisions, you have to wait 25
months before that Blackhawk comes off the line and is
available.
Mr. Souder. And I would again hasten to point out that I
agree with that point, which is why we started this process 4
years ago. I am not one who is going to take that real lightly
because if we would have started this process, we would now be
talking about how we would be addressing the full----
Mr. Beers. And my ability to have the aircraft in order to
provide the interim lift capability is a direct result of you
and your committee's and this Congress's efforts to provide us
with the resources and we appreciate that very much.
Mr. Souder. I'd like to move--I know Chairman Gilman came
in so I appreciate giving the extra time here to--you made some
comments earlier that I want to clarify and try to put this in
context briefly or we're going to get really arcane real fast
as we've argued over even the guns and the bullets in the
different helicopters we're sending down and the cost of the
bullets I should say as to which gun we were going to do. That
first off that I think there's no disagreement with your
earlier point in response to Mr. Cummings that nobody should
think that we've stopped efforts anywhere along the line and
that the State Department and the Colombian National Police and
Colombian Government have been aggressive in trying to do what
they can with the resources that they have.
However, we also heard earlier today that this has exploded
in Colombia and clearly those resources are not sufficient in
that as we were squeezing, particularly with President Fujimori
in Peru and President Banzer in Bolivia. We in effect moved the
problem and we should have been able to anticipate that some
because now we're in these 2-year lead times. General Serrano
said in fact he needs 100 helicopters to effectively do his job
because even if 80 percent of them are flying, the problem has
increased, the nature of the problem increased, and the interim
solution that we worked out as we've heard, the Bell
helicopters and, quite frankly, we had some discussion they
weren't in the greatest shape but they were in terrible shape
and that it costs extra funds.
I do want to say for the record too as we've discussed this
a number of times, some of the decisions in the alterations
were from General Serrano. Some of the decisions were in my
opinion the fault at our end. Certain basic things were not in
the helicopters that would have been expected to be there.
Other things we were arguing about changing, we wanted, as
some people said, the Cadillac version of the guns. There were
questions about the price of the bullets in relationship to
those guns and a number of things. Some of the helicopters
didn't even come with basic things and that the delays
implication here was--is that a significant part of the delays
were coming because of modifications from the Colombia National
Police and I believe some may have been but even those were
because of policy debates here as well. Things that would--you
would normally expect to have in it so they were not
unreasonable demands, for example, to have a gun or a gun
holder or a machine gun holder. There were some things that the
Colombian National Police were coming back with that weren't
kind of extras. They weren't like electric windows or
something. They were kind of basic things in helicopters that
in my opinion we should have had going down. Because I wanted
to clarify because it sounded like they were just being overly
picky as opposed to we in effect sent them some shells almost
in some of these cases.
Mr. Beers. Sir, if I gave the impression that there was one
particular area that was the primary area of responsibility for
the delay, I did not mean to do that and I'm not prepared to
assign responsibility, first responsibility here, there, or
elsewhere. I was simply trying to give the committee a sense of
the variety of issues that caused this.
First, let me say with respect to the issue of the first
two which arrived down there, they did not arrive down there
without the knowledge of the Colombian National Police of what
they were coming with. When they got down there and saw what
they had, they had some desires to make some changes. That's
understandable. This was the first time that they had received
this. So what we did was to try to make those changes to those
helicopters and to make sure that the subsequent helicopters
also had those changes on them.
Mr. Souder. Could I ask you a specific question related to
that specific point, that partly that was an agreement for
those helicopters that we struck. It was not originally the
request----
Mr. Beers. Are you talking about the Bell 212's, sir, or
are you talking about the Huey IIs?
Mr. Souder. Both of those were neither their choice. First
we upgraded the Huey IIs and then we did the Bells because the
Blackhawks had been delayed for such a long period of time, but
in those different cases why wouldn't you have talked to the
CNP first about that or more informed them because in effect
they were new in this. Here's what's--you said that once they
got them, they wanted no unreasonable modifications, but why
wouldn't that discussion have occurred at the front end?
Mr. Beers. We did have that discussion beforehand, sir, and
what I'm saying is when they saw them compared to other
helicopters, they had some changes that they thought they
wanted to have made and that's what we tried to do was to make
those changes so they would be available for them. There was
nothing that was withheld from them. These are discussions that
we have with them on a regular basis about what it is that we
purchase and provide for them. We don't just give them things
that we think that they need without talking with them.
Mr. Souder. I realize the chairman's been very generous. I
would just like to say that part of this I think is that they
are in this case the--they are adjusting as best they can to
get the best resources they can from us and then--but it is
not--because they say we would like this upgraded or compared--
they get new helicopters and say hey, we thought we would like
these to be like the other INL does not mean they're holding up
the process. It means that to some degree they're having to
take what they can and then seek out upgrades from us and we
need to continue to work through that. I'll yield back.
Mr. Beers. Yes, sir. That is absolutely our intent as well,
to work this as quickly as possible, to get them the equipment
as quickly as possible and to get it to them in the form that
they want it in.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman from Indiana. I'd now like
to recognize the chairman of the International Relations
Committee, also a member of our subcommittee, Mr. Gilman from
New York.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, I can't thank
you enough for continuing with this concern on our narcotics
strategy and what we can do to help Colombia. I regret I had to
leave to go to another meeting, but I'm pleased I was able to
get back here for this panel.
Secretary Beers, we're now convinced that we're going to
try to provide to General Serrano all of the helicopters that
he needs. He's talked about if he had 100 helicopters, he could
eradicate the whole crop within a 2-year period. Are we going
to be supportive of that request?
Mr. Beers. Sir, General Serrano has never requested 100
helicopters from me. I will talk to him about that, but I can't
say I've ever heard about that. We certainly talked on a
regular basis, including earlier this week, with respect to
various levels of requests. I have no requests for 100
helicopters.
Mr. Gilman. It was my impression that his staff had shared
that information.
Mr. Beers. I have not ever seen that request, sir. I will
check with my staff, but I can't say that I'm aware of it.
Mr. Gilman. If a request comes to you, will you be able to
support his request?
Mr. Beers. We will with the available funds look if we can
fulfill that request. I can't commit to you 100 helicopters
because I have to figure out how to pay for them or we have to
figure out how to pay for them.
Mr. Gilman. We'll work with you if you're in agreement that
this has to be done and you come back with us with a proposal.
I'm sure that a number of the members on this committee
particularly will try to be of help to you.
Mr. Beers. I appreciate that, sir.
Mr. Gilman. Secretary Beers, as to the helicopters assigned
to Colombia; 23 are in flying status and 15 are not flying
because of maintenance problems and lack of parts. Just in June
1998 you assured us that any twin engine helicopters going down
there, and I quote you, will not be hangar queens and yet he's
got about 15 that are ``hangar queens'' right now. A year and
several million dollars later only two of the six INL provided
Bell 212's are flying.
Can you tell us what we can do to beef that up, this
situation momentarily, without waiting for a whole new process
to go through to get additional flying equipment?
Mr. Beers. Sir, with respect to the six Bell 212's which
were provided, it is correct that today on the flight line two
are available to fly. Of the remaining four, one was crashed
not too long ago and has been destroyed. Of the other, the
second was the subject of a hard landing by the Colombian
National Police, which has caused significant damage to the
plane. That plane is currently being repaired by us and them,
and we will put it back on the flight line as soon as it is
available.
With respect to the other two, one is down for scheduled
maintenance; the other one is down for a fuel cell replacement
process, which is under way on a priority basis.
With respect to the helicopters, other than the one which
was crashed and the one which had the hard landing which has
had to be taken out of service, that is with respect to five
until just recently and with respect to four now, the
operational readiness rate of those helicopters has been at
about 65 percent, which exceeds the operational readiness rate
of any other element of the Colombian National Police Air
Service.
So to say that something was a hanger queen by definition
never flies. These Bell 212's fly. They don't fly every day,
but no plane does. They have to spend some time in maintenance.
You roughly fly for an hour and maintain something like that
for 2, 3, 4, 5 hours, depending upon the aircraft.
So I believe that I delivered helicopters that were
flyable, and that they have been flyable within the terms of
what one would normally expect out of helicopters.
Mr. Gilman. Secretary Beers--and I appreciate your
response. If that's a normal kind of problem, these maintenance
problems, crashes, et cetera--if he has only 23 that are
flyable right now, it would seem to me that we would want to
add something on an expedient manner to give them more air
capability, rather than wait for a whole new project. Can't we
move some additional equipment down now?
Mr. Beers. Sir, we will talk with the Colombian National
Police and see what we can do.
Mr. Gilman. We would welcome that, and anything we can do
to assist them in what they're trying to do I think would be
helpful. And if we're worried about the massive amount of
illicit narcotics coming out of that country, whatever we can
do to help them interdict, that would be very helpful and to
eradicate it at the same time.
Are you going to be making a new budgetary request for the
year 2000, and will that be in addition to what you've asked
for this year? Is it going to be an increase? What will be your
budgetary requests for the coming year?
Mr. Beers. For fiscal year 2000?
Mr. Gilman. Yes, fiscal year 2000.
Mr. Beers. With respect to the discussions which are
currently under way which General McCaffrey spoke of and others
have spoken of, there is a review under way of what the
situation in Colombia is like, and as we come to the conclusion
of that review, we will be back to inform you of what our views
are on that. But at this particular point in time, I can't tell
you that there will or will not be a budget request, because
that hasn't been decided yet, and it's not my position to say
anything about that, sir.
But we will--as General McCaffrey promised to you, be back
to you when we have----
Mr. Gilman. What is your general thinking right now?
Knowing what the problem is and knowing the inadequacy of what
we've been doing up to date, what is your thoughts? Are you
thinking about an increase right now or a decrease?
Mr. Beers. Sir, I'm not at liberty to tell you what the
deliberations within the administration are.
Mr. Gilman. I'm asking what your recommendations would be.
Mr. Beers. I understand, sir, and I'm part of an
administration and part of a team. In my written statement, I
submitted that I think and we all at the State Department
believe that this situation in Colombia is a very serious
situation and needs very careful review. Anything that we do in
Colombia--and we have heard from a variety of members of the
committees about how difficult the choices will be. You've also
heard from witnesses about how difficult the choices would be.
It would be premature at this point in time for me to tell
you what the recommendation could or should be, in part because
part of this process is critically dependent upon what the
Colombian Government is prepared to do and thinks. And while
General McCaffrey has had one round of discussions and Under
Secretary Pickering will have another round of discussions next
week, all of that is part of building the process to the point
that we actually have something that we have come to a judgment
on and something that we're prepared to do.
And at this point in time, Congressman, I'm not in a
position to tell you what that ought to be.
Mr. Gilman. Well, I would like to recommend--I'm sure my
colleagues would like to recommend to you that we make certain
that we provide the kind of resources that are needed down
there to accomplish what we're seeking to do and that's to
eradicate the supply and to interdict the supply coming to our
Nation.
Mr. Beers. Thank you, sir. We appreciate the support you've
given us over the years.
Mr. Gilman. Let me thank you, Mr. Beers.
Now, let me refer now to Mr. Sheridan of the Defense
Department.
As you know, Mr. Sheridan, we helped the Mexican military
obtain 70 or more excess Hueys several years ago. We've now
been informed that they plan to rid themselves of nearly 50 of
these old choppers. Can't we arrange to have some of those
choppers that are still operational be upgraded to superHuey
status by use by the police in Colombia to fight drugs at a
fairly reasonable cost to us, since the Mexicans are about to
unload those?
Mr. Sheridan. Well, let me first say that, regarding the
helicopters in Mexico, it is the case that we are bringing them
back. There will be, I believe, 20 that will remain. But I have
to be very clear that that Department of Defense authorities do
not allow us to spend funds for upgrading helicopters and then
transferring them to a third party. We're not permitted to do
that. What we usually end up doing is working with Randy on
those kinds of arrangements.
Mr. Gilman. Well, it seems you're pretty close to each
other even at this table.
Mr. Beers. And with our discussions about budgets and
activities and programs, yes, sir.
Mr. Gilman. But let's talk about the efficiency of this
kind of a project. Here you're taking 50 choppers back from
Mexico. When will they be back with us?
Mr. Sheridan. They will be back soon.
Mr. Gilman. How soon?
Mr. Sheridan. If my latest information is correct, the
first ones will be moved back by truck imminently, if not
already departed Mexico.
Mr. Gilman. So some are on their way already.
Mr. Sheridan. Yeah, could be.
Mr. Gilman. What will it take to make them operational for
Colombians?
Mr. Beers. Money.
Mr. Gilman [continuing]. How much would it take to make
these operational?
Mr. Sheridan. I think the first step--and we will have them
back in a central facility. The first step will be a very
detailed examination, tail number to tail number, just to----
Mr. Gilman. Just approximately what would it take to make
one of these operational? Most of them are operational now, as
I understand it.
Mr. Sheridan. Especially to upgrade, probably a couple
million, isn't it?
Mr. Beers. The upgrades, sir, the kit alone is $1.4
billion.
Mr. Gilman. For each chopper.
Mr. Beers. For each helicopter. To make a Huey II out of
it. To make them operational----
Mr. Gilman. I'm not talking about making the Huey II.
Mr. Beers. I'm trying to answer that, sir.
With respect to making them operational, it is entirely
dependent upon the review that Brian's people have to make to
see what the repairs required are. But the general review that
we and they conducted earlier was that they were in pretty bad
shape.
Mr. Gilman. What would you estimate--you both are experts.
What do you estimate it would cost to make a chopper of that
nature operational to send it back down to Colombia?
Mr. Beers. $300,000 to $500,000 a chopper, if they are in
as bad a shape as they are supposed to be.
Mr. Gilman. How much would a new chopper cost?
Mr. Beers. There isn't a new Huey 1H.
Mr. Gilman. The similar.
Mr. Beers. 412 runs on the order of $6 to $8 million.
Mr. Gilman. So there's a substantial savings between the $6
to $8 million to the $300,000 or $400,000 of making these
operational. Can't we explore the possibility of rehabing these
choppers and sending them back to help Colombia while we're
waiting for Black Hawks to be sent down?
I'm going to ask you to explore that and get back to our
committee. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, if you would
submit a report to our committee with regard to the possibility
of utilizing these choppers for the purposes that we're seeking
and that's to upgrade General Seranno's efforts in Colombia.
And I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Well, I want to thank you and the other members
who have participated with us today. I also want to thank our
panelists. We called you to testify so that we could work
together to solve some of these problems.
There is a level of frustration as a result of not being
able to get the equipment to Colombia and the resources so that
we could assist the Colombians, bring this situation under
control. It certainly is in the vital interests of the United
States when we have had last year over 14,000 Americans die
from drug-related deaths, and that's just part of the number,
and doubling in the number of heroin and overdose deaths.
Mr. Cummings and I have served together for so long, and he
tells me that the DEA reports 39,000 heroin addicts in
Baltimore, he tells me it's closer to 60,000, which is almost
10 percent of the population, an incredibly staggering amount.
And when I go home, I'm met by mothers--I have been met by
mothers who have lost a child--I come from an affluent area in
central Florida, and I'm accosted by mothers who've lost a son
or a daughter, and it's very hard for me to respond. And some
of them have taken heroin, maybe this high, pure, deadly heroin
one time and die as a result.
So it's affecting everyone, and dramatically the cost is in
the billions and billions to this Nation. So we're trying to
stop drugs at their source.
In September, we will be doing hearings on the southwest
border. We're also anticipating hearings on our drug education
program, where we funded $195 million, and we're going to see
how that money has been spent. And we will also be doing
hearings on the substance abuse programs, our grants through
HHS, our health grants and other drug programs. That will be in
September.
I have a request for an additional statement to be entered
into the record, this one by myself. Without objection, so
ordered.
[The prepared statement of Hon. John L. Mica follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Without objection, we will also, and with the
permission of the minority, leave the record open for
additional statements and questions for 3 weeks. And I might
say that we have substantial additional questions. I don't
think we've even scratched the surface of them for both the
Department of State and Defense on this issue. So they will be
submitted and be made part of the record.
There being no further business to come before the
subcommittee on criminal justice, drug policy and human
resources, I declare this meeting adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:24 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich, Hon.
Dana Robrabacher, Hon. Roscoe Bartlett, and additional
information submitted for the hearing record follow:]
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