[House Hearing, 106 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] STATUS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROGRAM TO DEVELOP A PERMANENT GEOLOGIC REPOSITORY AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NEVADA ======================================================================= HEARING before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND POWER of the COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ JUNE 23, 2000 __________ Serial No. 106-151 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 65-916CC WASHINGTON : 2000 COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE TOM BLILEY, Virginia, Chairman W.J. ``BILLY'' TAUZIN, Louisiana JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan MICHAEL G. OXLEY, Ohio HENRY A. WAXMAN, California MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts JOE BARTON, Texas RALPH M. HALL, Texas FRED UPTON, Michigan RICK BOUCHER, Virginia CLIFF STEARNS, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey Vice Chairman SHERROD BROWN, Ohio JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania BART GORDON, Tennessee CHRISTOPHER COX, California PETER DEUTSCH, Florida NATHAN DEAL, Georgia BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois STEVE LARGENT, Oklahoma ANNA G. ESHOO, California RICHARD BURR, North Carolina RON KLINK, Pennsylvania BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California BART STUPAK, Michigan ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York GREG GANSKE, Iowa TOM SAWYER, Ohio CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland TOM A. COBURN, Oklahoma GENE GREEN, Texas RICK LAZIO, New York KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming TED STRICKLAND, Ohio JAMES E. ROGAN, California DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin BILL LUTHER, Minnesota LOIS CAPPS, California James E. Derderian, Chief of Staff James D. Barnette, General Counsel Reid P.F. Stuntz, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel ______ Subcommittee on Energy and Power JOE BARTON, Texas, Chairman MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida RICK BOUCHER, Virginia CLIFF STEARNS, Florida KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri Vice Chairman TOM SAWYER, Ohio STEVE LARGENT, Oklahoma EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts RICHARD BURR, North Carolina RALPH M. HALL, Texas ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia SHERROD BROWN, Ohio TOM A. COBURN, Oklahoma BART GORDON, Tennessee JAMES E. ROGAN, California BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico TED STRICKLAND, Ohio JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona PETER DEUTSCH, Florida CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING, RON KLINK, Pennsylvania Mississippi JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan, VITO FOSSELLA, New York (Ex Officio) ED BRYANT, Tennessee ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland TOM BLILEY, Virginia, (Ex Officio) (ii) C O N T E N T S __________ Page Testimony of: Berkley, Hon. Shelley, a Representative in Congress from the State of Nevada............................................ 10 Crowley, Kevin D., Staff Director, Board on Radioactive Waste Management................................................. 41 Gibbons, Hon. Jim, a Representative in Congress from the State of Nevada............................................ 8 Itkin, Ivan, Director of Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. Department of Energy...................... 24 Knopman, Debra S., Board Member, U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review..................................................... 29 Page, Stephen D., Director, Office of Radiation, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency............................ 34 Paperiello, Carl, Deputy Executive Director, Materials Research and State Programs, Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 20 Material submitted for the record by: Cohon, Jared L., Chairman, United States Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, letter dated August 31, 2000, enclosing response for the record.......................... 121 Colvin, Joe F., President and Chief Executive Officer, Nuclear Energy Institute, prepared statement of............ 106 Crowley, Kevin D., Director, Board on Radioactive Waste Management, letter dated August 18, 2000, enclosing response for the record.................................... 103 Page, Stephen D., Director, Office of Radiation, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, letter dated September 18, 2000, enclosing response for the record.................... 127 Rathbun, Dennis K., Director, Office of Congressional Affairs, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter dated August 28, 2000, enclosing response for the record................ 115 (iii) STATUS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROGRAM TO DEVELOP A PERMANENT GEOLOGIC REPOSITORY AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NEVADA ---------- FRIDAY, JUNE 23, 2000 House of Representatives, Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy and Power, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Barton (chairman) presiding. Members present: Representatives Barton, Bilirakis, Largent, Burr, Shimkus, Bryant, and Boucher. Staff present: Kevin Cook, science advisor; Elizabeth Brennan, legislative clerk; and Sue Sheridan, minority counsel. Mr. Barton. The Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the Commerce Committee hearing on the status of the Department of Energy programs to develop a permanent geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, is underway. Today's hearing will address the Department of Energy's program to develop an underground repository for the permanent disposal of nuclear spent fuel and high level radioactive waste. Solving the disposal question is absolutely essential if we are to maintain our existing nuclear generating capacity to meet the Nation's present and future energy needs. Members of the subcommittee are all too aware of how much time and energy has been spent wrestling with this issue in recent years. The Department of Energy has a clear statutory and contractual responsibility to begin accepting spent fuel beginning in January 1998, which is a year and a half ago. The government's failure to meet that obligation has resulted in a growing financial liability that may eventually cost the taxpayers tens of billions of dollars. But the Department tells us that the earliest the repository will actually be ready for operations is in the year 2010. We must find a way to take acceptance of spent fuel from the utilities and move it to the repository some time sooner than 2010 if at all possible. Yet the Clinton administration has resisted all efforts to accelerate the acceptance date giving us veto threats rather than constructive solutions. The focus of today's hearing is not on interim storage nor on a take title option or any of the other areas of contention. Today, we want to talk about the Department's plan to get the repository ready for operation by 2010. We have to find out whether that schedule, even though it is 12 years too late, is realistic and achievable. To meet that schedule, the Department must first complete several near-term milestones. Late this year, the Department is to issue a site recommendation consideration report followed by final site recommendation and a final environmental impact statement next summer. These documents are essential, and I want to repeat, these documents are essential to support the final selection of the Yucca Mountain site; and in turn, the license application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the fiscal year 2002. All of these steps are on the critical path if the repository is to open in 2010. Yet, there are grave concerns about the ability of the Department to meet this near-term schedule, and therefore, doubts about whether 2010 date is, in fact, feasible. The first of these concerns deals with the adequacy of funding. Secretary Richardson finally admitted to this subcommittee last year that the repository will not be built by 2010 unless there are major changes as to how the program is funded. Unfortunately, that admission was followed by a veto threat regarding our committee's bill to take the repository program off budget to ensure adequate future funding. We are still waiting for the administration and the Department to send us a constructive proposal on how it intends to resolve the long-term funding profile problem. Today, however, we also have to address the short-term funding situation. The Department did not receive all of the funds it has requested for the fiscal year 2000. And it looks like the fiscal year 2001 budget appropriation that is pending also will be less than the Department's request. We need to understand the impact of these near-term funding constraints on the ability of the Department to meet its milestones for the final environmental impact statement, site recommendation requirement, the licensing, and the licensing application, all of which are critical steps if the repository is to open on time in 2010. As chairman of this subcommittee, I am very concerned about the Department's recent decision to recompete the management operation contract for the civilian radioactive waste management program. The contracts that the Department should be recompeting, such as the one for the management of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Department has never completed in over 50 years, despite the University of California's appalling mismanagement of security matters. But where the contractor appears to be performing well, and the program is coming up on several key milestones, this Department of Energy decides that recompetition is absolutely essential. Go figure. I need to be persuaded that the recompetition of the Yucca Mountain contract at this juncture is really in the best interest of the program. I don't see how the committee can tolerate the Department claiming that the transition to a new contractor is an excuse for any schedule slippages. Mark my words, if they do recompete the contract, I will almost guarantee you there is going to be a slippage, and I will also guarantee you the Department is going to claim it because of the new contractor coming online. I hope that I am not a prophet and am proved wrong on that, but I just feel it in my bones as I sit here. The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board was established to provide independent technical oversight of DOE's work on the repository. As DOE approaches these critical program milestones in the near future, I would expect that the role of the Technical Review Board will become more important than ever before. The Board has already surfaced a number of technical concerns about the Department's planning and design work. We need to understand these concerns better and find out if DOE is paying proper attention to the scientific advice that it receives from this review board. The most complex, but possibly the most important issue that we have to address today, is an appropriate radiation standard for the repository. The Environmental Protection Agency was directed in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to promulgate public health and safety standards to protect against release of radioactive materials from the Yucca Mountain site. Such standards are to be based on and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences. Last summer, the EPA finally circulated a draft rule which proposed, in addition to an all-pathways individual protection standard of 15 millirems, a separate standard for the protection of groundwater. It is my understanding that the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the National Academy of Sciences Board on Radioactive Waste Management, all have significant disagreements with the EPA over this proposed stand-alone separate standard for the protection of groundwater. Hopefully, we will be able, after today's hearing, to understand the scientific rationale for the need for the separate EPA groundwater standard, if there is such a need, and specifically, whether the proposed standard is consistent with the legislative mandate in the 1992 Act. We also need to understand the basis for the concerns that have been expressed by the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the National Academy of Sciences about the EPA's proposed standard. Selecting the proper standard and doing it in a timely manner is essential for the repository project to move forward. [The prepared statement of Hon. Joe Barton follows:] Prepared Statement of Hon. Joe Barton, Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Power Today's hearing will address the Department of Energy's program to develop an underground repository for the permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Solving the disposal question is absolutely essential if we are to maintain our existing nuclear generating capacity to meet the Nation's present and future energy needs. The Members of this Subcommittee are all too aware of how much time and energy we have all spent wrestling with this issue in recent years. The Department has a clear statutory and contractual responsibility to begin accepting spent fuel starting in January of 1998. The Government's failure to meet that obligation has resulted in a growing financial liability that may eventually cost the taxpayers tens of billions of dollars. But DOE tells us that the earliest the repository will be ready for operations is the year 2010. I continue to believe that we must find a way to take acceptance of spent fuel from the utilities and move it to the repository site sometime sooner than 2010. Yet the Administration has resisted all of our efforts to accelerate the acceptance date, giving us veto threats rather than constructive solutions. However, the focus of today's hearing is not on interim storage, nor on take title, nor any of those other areas of contention. Rather, we are here today to talk about the Department's plan to get the repository ready for operation by 2010. We have to find out whether that schedule, even though it is twelve years too late, is realistic and achievable. To meet that schedule, the Department must first complete several near-term milestones. Late this year, the Department is to issue a Site Recommendation Consideration Report, followed by a final Site Recommendation and final Environmental Impact Statement next summer. These documents are essential to support the final selection of the Yucca Mountain site and, in turn, the License Application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Fiscal Year 2002. All of these steps are on the critical path if the repository is to open in 2010. Yet I have concerns about the ability of the Department to meet this near-term schedule, and therefore doubts about whether the 2010 date is feasible. The first of these concerns deals with the adequacy of funding. Secretary Richardson finally admitted to this Committee last year that the repository will not be built by 2010 unless there are major changes to how the program is funded. Unfortunately, that was followed by a veto threat regarding our Committee's bill to take the repository program off-budget to ensure adequate future funding. We are still waiting for the Administration and the Department to send us a constructive proposal on how it intends to resolve that long-term funding shortfall. Today, however, we also have to address the short- term funding situation. The Department did not receive all of the funds it requested in Fiscal Year 2000, and it looks like FY2001 appropriations will also be less than the Department's request. We need to understand the impact of these near-term funding constraints on the ability of DOE to meet its milestones for the final EIS, the site recommendation, and the license application, all of which are critical steps if the repository is to open on time in 2010. I am very concerned about the Department's recent decision to re- compete the M&O contract for the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management program. The contracts that DOE should be competing, such as the one for the management of Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Department has never competed in over 50 years, despite the University of California's appalling mismanagement of security matters. But where the contractor is performing well and the program is coming up on several key milestones, then the Department decides that recompetition is absolutely essential. I need to be persuaded that re-competition of the Yucca Mountain contract, at this critical juncture, is really in the best interests of the program. We absolutely will not tolerate DOE claiming that the transition to a new contractor as an excuse for any schedule slippages. The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board was established to provide independent technical oversight of DOE's work on the repository. As DOE approaches these critical program milestones in the near future, I would expect that the role of the Technical Review Board will become more important than ever before. The Board has already surfaced a number of technical concerns with DOE's planning and design work to date. We need to understand these concerns better and also find out whether DOE is paying proper attention to the scientific advice it receives from the Technical Review Board. The most complex but possibly the most important issue we have to address today is the appropriate radiation standard for the repository. The Environmental Protection Agency was directed in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to promulgate public health and safety standards to protect against the release of radioactive materials from the Yucca Mountain site. Such standards are to be based on and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences. Last summer, the EPA finally circulated a draft rule last summer which proposed, in addition to an ``all-pathways'' individual protection standard of 15 millirems, a separate standard for the protection of groundwater. I understand that the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the National Academy's Board on Radioactive Waste Management all have significant disagreements with EPA over this proposed standard. We need to understand the scientific rationale for the EPA standard, and specifically whether the proposed standard is consistent with the legislative mandate in the 1992 Act. We also need to understand the basis for the concerns expressed by the DOE, NRC, and the National Academy about EPA's proposed standard. Selecting the proper standard, and doing so in a timely manner, is essential for the repository project to move forward. I welcome my colleagues from the Nevada Congressional delegation here today, as well as our distinguished witnesses from the federal agencies and independent technical boards. Today's hearing should answer the question of whether DOE is on the proper ``glide path'' to meet its milestones and open the repository in 2010, or whether the Department is flying along on a mere ``wing and a prayer.'' Mr. Barton. I see that my other colleague from the Nevada Congressional delegation is here and I think I am right that we have got the entire House delegation. Ms. Berkley. Yes. Mr. Barton. That is great. I want to welcome Mrs. Berkley in addition to Mr. Gibbons. We look forward to their testimony as soon as we have our finished opening statements. This is a very important oversight hearing for the Yucca Mountain site. And it would not be appropriate to do it without having the input of our colleagues that represent the great State of Nevada in the Congress. With that, I would like to turn to my ranking member, Congressman Boucher, and for an opening statement. Mr. Boucher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you for conducting the hearing this morning on the status of the Yucca Mountain repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste. The Energy and Power Subcommittee has a long tradition of working on a bipartisan basis to address our Nation's energy security in a manner that is both serious and thoughtful. Nowhere has that bipartisan spirit been more in evidence than in our efforts to solve our Nation's nuclear waste problems. And in that tradition, I want to say a word of welcome this morning to our colleagues from Nevada, Shelly Berkley and Jim Gibbons, who are appearing as our first witnesses. In the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Congress assigned to the Federal Government a responsibility for the permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel that is generated as a result of commercial research or defense processes. And amendments that we adopted to that Act in 1987, the Congress identified Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the site to focus upon for the construction of the disposal facility. Since 1987, the Department of Energy has been conducting the site and technical studies that were necessary for the design and the construction of the repository. The Yucca Mountain facility is scheduled to begin accepting shipments in the year 2010. In order for the facility to meet that goal, and to be prepared for the acceptance of shipments, the Department of Energy must meet two important deadlines next year. The first of these is the issuance of the final environmental impact statement, and the second is the final site recommendation. I am highly concerned that recent decreases in the funding appropriated by the Congress for DOE's Yucca project will have a material adverse affect on the Department's ability to meet both the short goal of insuring these important reports, and the long-term goal of having the facility ready to accept shipments by the year 2010. I look forward to hearing this morning from witnesses on the status of the project and on the projected ability of the Department of Energy to meet both the near-term goal of having these reports issued next year and the long-term goal of having the facility ready by the year 2010. Of even greater concern, although it is not precisely the focus of today's hearing, is the adequacy of funding for seeing the repository through the construction phase. H.R. 45, which the chairman mentioned in his remarks, was reported by this committee last year by our full Commerce Committee on a broad bipartisan vote of 40 to 6. And it would have taken the nuclear waste fund off budget to ensure that that fund, like the Highway Trust Fund, can be used for its intended purpose and for no other purpose. The Department of Energy has indicated that unless Congress restores access to the roughly $9 billion in the fund, the program will face major shortfalls within the next 3 or 4 years. While it is unlikely that Congress will enact legislation addressing the matter this year, I think it is imperative that we take up this cause early during the course of the next Congress. I also want to thank Chairman Barton for inviting the Environmental Protection Agency to testify about its pending rulemaking on environmental standards for the repository. I recognize that the agency is somewhat constrained in the degree to which it can answer questions about the direction that the final rule is likely to take, since that matter is still under active consideration at the EPA. Nevertheless, I think it would be useful to hear from EPA about the status of the rule and those matters which the agency can address with respect to progress toward its completion. Mr. Chairman, I commend you for this timely discussion and I join with you in looking forward to our witnesses' testimony. Mr. Barton. Thank you, Congressman Boucher. Mr. Bryant of Tennessee is recognized for an opening statement. Mr. Bryant. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief in recognition of our two outstanding members. Having roomed for a couple of years with a former member in your State and one who whom I expect will return shortly as a Senator, I learned very quickly that the correct pronunciation of the State is Nevada. And they are probably too nice to point that out to us today. Mr. Shimkus. But you are not. Mr. Bryant. But I am not. I would point out it is Nevada, I believe. Mr. Barton. Well, it ain't Texas, so I am not too worried about it. Mr. Bryant. I would say, again, in deference to our panel, and this, our outstanding second panel also, I simply agree with what has been said already. I have concerns with this idea of rebidding the operation and management recompeting for that as well as other issues. I'd like to see us stay on track. And with that, I would apologize too. I know we are going to be in and out today, many of us have other competing committees and appointments. So please, don't take that personally as we come and go and with that, I will yield back the balance of my time. Mr. Barton. Okay. The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Shimkus, for an opening statement. Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In lieu of time and having gone over this now in my 4th year of talking about Yucca Mountain and understanding both sides of the issue, I will just yield back my time and wait for the panelists. Mr. Barton. The ranking member and the chairman have great sympathy, since we have been doing this for 14 to 16 years. You are a novice, if you have only had to do it for 4 years. Mr. Shimkus. But I stop talking and you continue. Mr. Barton. Well, that may be the last time you get the microphone. The gentleman from North Carolina. Mr. Burr. I will also say ditto, only to add to it, Mr. Chairman, if we don't succeed now, Texas will be the target site for this facility. I yield back. Ms. Berkley. Perfect. Mr. Barton. Give us enough money, we may think about it. Mr. Burr. Isn't there a hole already in the ground down there? Mr. Barton. There is in my district, actually. [Additional statements submitted for the record follow:] Prepared Statement of Hon. John B. Shadegg, a Representative in Congress from the State of Arizona Chairman Barton, I commend you for continuing the Subcommittee's oversight into the issues of nuclear power and waste disposal. Nuclear power is a safe and efficient source of energy production which allows the generation of vast amounts of electricity while avoiding the air quality concerns raised by many other sources of power. Electricity consumption is expected to increase at the rate of one to two percent per year for the next twenty years and nuclear energy is needed to meet this growth without increasing air pollution. To ensure the continued viability of nuclear energy in the future while dealing with existing waste, it is absolutely essential that we put the permanent repository for this waste into operation as soon as possible. This is not optional: nuclear waste is currently stored at dozens of power plants throughout the United States, and many of these plants are running out of storage room. The permanent waste repository at Yucca Mountain has been under intensive study since 1987 and, by July, 2001, a final recommendation on whether to proceed with construction will be delivered to the President. Key to the President's decision is the use of sound, unbiased science to determine the parameters of the repository. Unfortunately, the importance of sound science appears to have escaped the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in their attempts to set radiation standards. There are numerous crucial aspects of these standards on which the EPA has failed to follow the science, including setting a standard which is lower than national and international standards and far below the amount of radiation which the average person receives in the course of normal, everyday life. Let us examine in greater detail one of the aspects in which the EPA has failed to use sound science: the EPA proposal to set a dose- based standard for radiation exposure. This proposal is in direct contradiction to the risk-based standard recommended by the National Research Council, an independent, unbiased scientific institution affiliated with the National Academy of Sciences. As the National Research Council enunciates in its November 26, 1999 letter to EPA Administrator Carol Browner: ``The Board believes that EPA's rationale for proposing a dose- based standard is flawed for the following reasons. EPA's statement in its reason 93 that a `risk-based standard . . . depends upon current knowledge and assumptions about the chance of developing a fatal cancer from a particular exposure level' is incorrect. A risk based standard is not based on scientific assumptions. Instead, it is based on a public-policy determination of acceptable risk levels to individuals or populations . . .'' (Emphasis in original) There is a public policy dispute over what role nuclear energy should play in the nation's future mix of generation assets. This is a legitimate dispute and should proceed openly. What are not legitimate are backdoor attempts to foreclose the option of increasing nuclear capacity by blocking the safe disposal of existing waste. Permanent storage of nuclear waste is an issue which must be decided on the basis of sound science, not emotion or a desire to derail debate on the larger issue of nuclear power. The EPA should concentrate on the job which Congress gave it to perform, the setting of scientifically-based standards to allow the safe permanent storage of nuclear waste. ______ Prepared Statement of Hon. Tom Bliley, Chairman, Committee on Commerce Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just two weeks ago, this Subcommittee held a hearing that addressed the future of nuclear power. It was clear from that hearing that one of the key impediments to nuclear power in this country is the lack of a safe, centralized facility for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel. DOE was explicitly directed by Congress back in 1982 to develop a permanent underground repository and to begin accepting spent nuclear fuel by January 31, 1998. In 1987, Congress further directed DOE to focus its attention on Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the most promising site for the repository. Yet DOE tells us that it is still at least 10 years away from having a repository. The hearing today is to investigate whether DOE is truly on track, as it claims it is, to open the repository in 2010. There are technical challenges, financial challenges, and contracting challenges that call into question DOE's ability to meet this schedule. We also must address the fundamental question of the appropriate radiation standard for the repository, which the Environmental Protection Agency is preparing to issue as a final rule later this summer. The Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the National Academy of Sciences all have significant disagreements with the standard that EPA is proposing. We need to understand the scientific and policy basis for EPA's proposed standard and the effect of that standard on the repository program. Today's hearing will help the Committee understand whether DOE really is on the right track to open the repository in 2010, and whether all the technical, financial, contracting, and environmental pieces are in place to support that schedule. I look forward to the testimony of our distinguished witnesses today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Mr. Barton. Let's hear from our senior member, Mr. Gibbons, for 7 minutes and then we will hear from the junior member, Mrs. Berkley, for 7 minutes. Welcome to the subcommittee. STATEMENT OF HON. JIM GIBBONS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEVADA Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I realize this is simply an oversight hearing on the status of Yucca Mountain, but I do appreciate the cordial and congenial welcome of the committee as well as the interest of the chairman in hearing from us on this issue as well. And Mr. Chairman, I would like to have a full and complete written copy of my statement entered into the record. Mr. Barton. Without objection. Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Chairman, as you well know, I have, all along, adamantly and consistently, opposed any legislation or concept that would create or further develop Yucca Mountain as areas for nuclear waste in Nevada. Ever since I have been elected to Congress, I have consistently voted against the annual Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act, which annually funds the studies, development and construction of Yucca Mountain. And this repository is a travesty and an injustice to the citizens and residents of Nevada. It has a great potential to destroy the economy and the environmental future of our State. And long before I came to this House, as you have heard already, Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress to store America's high level nuclear waste with the 1987 ``Screw Nevada Bill,'' as it was titled and the only issue left, Mr. Chairman, today is science. It makes sense that factual standards based upon sound science and reason, along with protection and welfare of this Nation's citizens, should not be drawn upon when we address nuclear waste storage. Secretary Richardson himself stated that Yucca Mountain site, ``will be based on science, pure science, not politics.'' I would question the Secretary's statement because of a $1.4 million study he commissioned wherein it appears that we are attempting to put the square peg in a round hole. A team of experts are using this money to determine if tiny fluid inclusions which are bubbles in mineral deposits within the mountain are the result of hot, rising water which flooded the repository in previous eras. If this is the case, Yucca Mountain should be disqualified because it will happen again and release potentially deadly nuclear waste into the environment and cause great harm to the area as well as to any base water or aquifer system in the area as well that the region and the people depend upon. It now appears, however, that Secretary Richardson, in his haste to complete Yucca Mountain, will not even wait for his study to be completed before he makes his recommendation. In February he states, and I quote again, ``I have got a lot of good science, I will have sufficient information.'' I would ask this committee to talk to the Secretary and ask him to take this vital information on fluid inclusion studies into his account if we are to truly and factually base Yucca Mountain on sound science. Yucca Mountain should be disqualified, Mr. Chairman, for at least two other very important reasons, one being that rainwater containing the isotope chlorine 36, which is less than 50 years old, have been detected far below the surface in the underground site. Chlorine 36 comes from above-ground nuclear tests that Nevada endured during the post-World War II and that timeframe era. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act does mandate that because of this extremely fast-surface-water-travel-time to the repository, the Yucca Mountain site should be disqualified. I am not an engineer or a mathematician, but I think you and the members of this committee can see the point. The second reason for disqualification is the geologic barriers of Yucca Mountain will not limit radionuclide releases, thereby polluting groundwater supplies that are currently used for human consumption and crop irrigation. This again meets the condition for disqualification and is a true show stopper. It is important, in fact, it is very important to ensure that the Department of Energy does not ignore these facts or attempt to alter their regulations. This scientific approach dictates that DOE disqualified the site, not the regulations. Members of Congress also need to recognize the fact that these studies are credible, and future legislation must address these fatal findings. The art of political persuasion has no place in this fight. Members of Congress and the DOE must look to the hard scientific evidence that proves the site is unsuitable. Mr. Chairman, I and the rest of Nevada will never relinquish our fight against Yucca Mountain. We didn't ask for it, and we don't want it, no matter how much money you offer us. I will continue to be adamantly opposed to the Energy and Water Appropriations Act, which further funds construction and study of Yucca Mountain. Recently, the President vetoed Senate bill 1287, the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 2000, and I congratulate him. I plan to contact the President and encourage him to further his commitment to protecting the citizens of Nevada by vetoing this year's Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act. With that, Mr. Chairman, I will thank you for your time here today, and with the indulgence of the chairman in letting our views and the views of Nevada to be aired before your committee, I would ask that in light of the fact that I have an additional appointment, I know there may be questions of the committee, but ask to be excused at this point in time. Mr. Barton. Obviously, since we have such power over you, if we said no, you could get up and walk out of this room a free man. Mr. Gibbons. Out of the courtesy of the chairman, I would stay if it were requested. Mr. Barton. We understand the constraints of the time. We are glad for you to be here and put your views on the record, because it is a very important issue for your district. We'd now like to hear from the gentlelady from Nevada. Nevada. That sounds like yankee to me. STATEMENT OF HON. SHELLEY BERKLEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEVADA Ms. Berkley. Well, there are a lot of Yankees now in Nevada. Mr. Barton. Making a lot of money. Your complete statement is in the record in its entirety. We would recognize you for 7 minutes to elaborate on it. Ms. Berkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'd like to thank you and the rest of the members of the committee for affording me the opportunity to speak about an issue that affects every single person in my district and the entire State of Nevada. Oversight of the Department of Energy's Yucca Mountain project is crucial to the continued growth and development of my State, crucial to the health and well-being of all Nevada families, and crucial to the health of our environment. And that is why I testify before you today, to share with you my concerns and the concerns of my constituents about the status of the Yucca Mountain project. I understand that the purpose of this hearing today is to address the oversight concerns surrounding the Yucca Mountain project. I realize the subcommittee is discussing the time line, engineering and regulatory aspects of the project, but when discussing oversight issues, we must also look at the scientific evidence and problems that have been raised regarding the suitability of the Yucca Mountain to hold radioactive waste. On three separate occasions, the State of Nevada has demonstrated using DOE's own data that the site should be disqualified under both the EPA standard and DOE's own internal site screening regulation, and each time the DOE or Congress has changed the regulations to ensure that Yucca Mountain would not be disqualified, regardless of the health and safety consequences to Nevadans. In fact, DOE has found that geology at Yucca Mountain is so poor that over 95 percent of the waste isolation capability of the proposed site would have to be provided by metal waste containers and other so-called engineering barriers around the waste with only about 5 percent of the site's waste isolation performance, depending on the natural conditions. When this project started, the idea was to find a place with natural geologic features to contain the radiation. Clearly, that standard cannot be met at Yucca Mountain. Yucca Mountain is located in the young, geologically, area with four volcanos within 7 miles of the site. Yucca Mountain is surrounded by 34 known earthquake fault lines and has experienced over 620 earthquakes in the last 20 years. One of these earthquakes measured 5.9 on the Richter scale, and caused over a million dollars in damage to DOE's own surface support facilities. An aquifer flows beneath Yucca Mountain with water moving so rapidly that even with all the engineering barriers, radiation will unavoidably escape from the repository and contaminate the water flow. As recently as yesterday, it was reported again that scientists have found strong evidence that the Yucca Mountain repository floor was once flooded with hot water and feared that water could rise again. These are the real oversight concerns. I urge my colleagues to take into consideration the alarming scientific evidence when determining the status of the Yucca Mountain project. The real question here, are we going to continue allowing political expediency to determine our Nation's nuclear waste policy or will we listen to the science? The Yucca Mountain project is a failed one. We need to invest in our future and the future of generations to come, and work together to find a responsible and safe solution. And I would echo what my distinguished colleague from northern Nevada said, not only are there Yucca Mountain appropriations in the Energy and Water bill and applaud him for his efforts there, but there is also a great deal of Yucca money in the Defense appropriation bill as well. I thank you for allowing me to testify before the subcommittee on this important issue. I would also like to submit as part of my testimony a recent article that has appeared in the Las Vegas Review Journal and the Las Vegas Sun that further detailed the scientific findings that disprove Yucca Mountain as a suitable site to hold radioactive waste. And I thank the committee very much for their cordial acceptance of my testimony. [The prepared statement of Hon. Shelley Berkley follows:] Prepared Statement of Hon. Shelley Berkley, a Representative in Congress from the State of Nevada I would like to thank Mr. Barton and Mr. Boucher for affording me the opportunity to speak about an issue that affects every single person in my district, and the entire State of Nevada. Oversight of the Department of Energy's Yucca Mountain Project is crucial to the continued growth and development of my state, crucial to the health and well-being of all Nevada families, and crucial to the health of the environment. That is why I testify before you today--to share with you my concerns, and the concerns of my constituents, about the status of the Yucca Mountain Project. I understand the purpose of this hearing today is to address the oversight concerns surrounding the Yucca Mountain Project. I realize the subcommittee is discussing the time line, engineering, and regulatory aspects of the project. But when discussing oversight issues, we must also look at the scientific evidence and problems that have been raised regarding the suitability of Yucca Mountain to hold radioactive waste. On three separate occasions the State of Nevada has demonstrated, using DOE's own data, that the site should be disqualified under both the EPA standard and DOE's own internal site screening regulation. And each time, the DOE or Congress has changed the regulations to ensure that Yucca Mountain would not be disqualified, regardless of the health and safety consequences to Nevadans. In fact, DOE has found the geology at Yucca Mountain so poor that over 95% of the waste isolation capability of the proposed repository would have to be provided by metal waste container and other so-called engineered barriers around the waste, with only about 5% of the site's waste isolation performance depending on the natural conditions. When this project started, the idea was find a place with natural geologic features to contain the radiation. Clearly, that standard can not be met at Yucca Mountain Yucca Mountain is located in a young geologically active area, with 4 volcanoes within 7 miles of the site. Yucca Mountain is surrounded by 34 known earthquake fault lines, and has experienced over 620 earthquakes in the last 20 years. One of these earthquakes measured a 5.9 on the Richter Scale and caused over a million dollars in damage to DOE's own surface support facilities. An aquifer flows beneath Yucca Mountain, with water moving so rapidly that even with all the engineered barriers, radiation will unavoidably escape from the repository and contaminate the water flow. As recently as yesterday it was reported--again--that scientists have found strong evidence that the Yucca Mountain repository floor was once flooded with hot water, and fear the water could rise again. These are the real oversight concerns. I urge my colleagues to take into consideration the alarming scientific evidence when determining the status of the Yucca Mountain Project. The real question is, are we going to continue allowing political expediency to determine our nation's nuclear waste policy--Or, will we listen to science. The Yucca Mountain Project is a failed one. We need to invest in our future, and the future of generations to come, and work together to find a responsible and safe solution. I thank you for allowing me to testify before the subcommittee on this important issue. I would also like to submit as part of my testimony recent articles that appeared in the Las Vegas Review Journal and the Las Vegas Sun that further detail the scientific findings that disprove Yucca Mountain as a suitable site to hold radioactive waste. ______ [December 1, 1999--Las Vegas Sun] Critics: DOE has changed Yucca rules By Mary Manning The Department of Energy offered new rules on the approval of a proposed high-level nuclear waste repository site at Yucca Mountain Tuesday--rules that were greeted with howls by national and local critics who accused the DOE of changing the guidelines to ensure that the repository will be built. The DOE wants to change siting guidelines issued in 1996 that spelled out certain findings that would stop a Yucca Mountain repository, such as ground water moving too fast, an earthquake or volcanic activity at the mountain. Yucca Mountain, 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas, is the sole site under study by the DOE for the world's first high-level nuclear waste repository. The mountain has not yet passed scientific muster and will not be ready to accept 77,000 tons of highly radioactive waste until 2010 at the earliest. The DOE proposes to use complex computer models with whatever scientific information it has in hand to prove a repository will work, but no single fact should disqualify Yucca Mountain, the new rules say. The proposal was published in the Federal Register on Tuesday. The DOE's proposal would eliminate individual problems such as rapid ground water flow from stopping the DOE from building the repository, Nevada's technical coordinator Steve Frishman said. ``What they're trying to do is change the law by regulation,'' Frishman said. ``It's a simple attempt to avoid the law.'' Both Sens. Harry Reid and Richard Bryan, D-Nev., denounced the DOE guideline. In a letter sent to President Clinton today, Bryan said, ``As it has become increasingly clear that the Yucca Mountain site cannot meet the existing siting guidelines, the DOE has attempted to . . . evaluate the suitability of Yucca Mountain based on a single, and far less stringent, total system performance assessment.'' ``Such a change,'' the letter stated, ``would destroy and remaining public confidence in the site characterization process and place the health and safety of over 1 million Nevadans in serious jeopardy.'' ``It's more of the same old game-playing,'' Bryan's chief of staff, Jan Neal, said this morning. ``The site doesn't meet the criteria so instead of disqualifying the site they change the criteria.'' Reid said he had ``crave concern'' with the DOE's proposal. He noted that atomic weapons fallout from Pacific Island nuclear tests reached the repository's level 1,000 feet deep inside Yucca in less than 40 years. ``That characteristic surely violated the earlier criterion that such water migration must take more than 1,000 years,'' Reid said. ``Generally, the changes cited in your proposed rulemaking do very little to dispel the perception that earlier guidelines are being abandoned because they would disqualify Yucca Mountain from any further consideration as a permanent disposal site,'' Reid wrote in a letter to Energy Secretary Bill Richardson. ``This is a transparent effort to change the rules of the game in the third quarter,'' Reid said. ``It's a rule change that could threaten the health and safety of the people of Nevada.'' Reid and Sen. Richard Bryan, D-Nev., were successful this year in forcing Senate Republicans to abandon efforts to store nuclear waste temporarily at the Nevada Test Site, a former proving ground for nuclear weapons experiments. Public Citizen's Mass Energy Project senior policy analyst Amy Schollenberger called the DOE proposal ``another blatant attempt to ensure that Yucca Mountain is approved as a geologic repository for radioactive waste, even though all of the evidence suggests that it will endanger the public, the environment and future generations.'' Public citizen, a nonprofit consumer advocacy group launched by Ralph Nader, has been a leading critic of the DOE's attempt to weaken safeguards at the site. Shollenberger said if DOE is successful and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which must license the site, can eliminate a ground water radiation limit, the region's aquifer could be destroyed. ______ [June 22, 2000--Las Vegas Review-Journal] Yucca hot water report could burn Richardson By Keith Rogers While Energy Secretary Bill Richardson was treading political hot water Wednesday over his agency's handling of a nuclear secrets security lapse, scientists studying what some believe is ancient evidence of hot water rising within the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste site were still at odds over their observations. The team of scientists who met Wednesday at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas are in the midst of a two-year, $1.4 million study led by associate professor Jean Cline. The study should be completed in April, she said. The team of experts from federal agencies, universities and the state--including Yuri Dublyansky, Nevada's consulting geologist from the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences--probably won't have their conclusions ready for an agency report this year. Richardson will use the report when considering whether to recommend Yucca Mountain as the place to entomb the nation's high-level radioactive wastes. Some 77,000 tons of waste--mostly spent fuel pellets encased in metal rods from nuclear power reactors--will be destined for a repository in the mountain, 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas, by 2010 if the site is deemed suitable and a repository can be licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Richardson, who called for the UNLV study in 1998, said then that his recommendation for the Yucca Mountain site ``will be based on science, pure science, not politics.'' More recently, on a Feb. 11 trip to the agency's Nevada Operations Office in Las Vegas, Richardson said he will remain on course to make his recommendation this year even though the findings from Cline's group probably won't be part of the report he will consider. ``I've got a lot of good science. I'll have sufficient information,'' he said in February. But Nevada officials say Richardson should wait until questions about the rising thermal water theory are answered--if they can be answered conclusively. Richardson could face legal action from the state if he makes a recommendation without knowing the answers. At issue are tiny bubbles in mineral deposits from deep within the mountain. Scientists want to know whether those bubbles hold fluids that show hot water rose in the recent geologic past--1.6 million to 2 million years ago--and flooded what would be the repository floor. If that's the case, state scientists fear it could happen again, after waste packages have been put in the mountain, risking a potential release of deadly nuclear remnants into the environment. Joseph Whelan, a geochemist from the U.S. Geological Survey's Denver office, said his associates believe the calcite mineral features stem from rain or snowmelt that percolated downward from the rocks above the proposed repository site. ``If this calcite formed from upwelling water flooding these rocks, as has been proposed, then that water would have entirely filled all of those fractures and cavities and it would have deposited calcite in them all. This is not what we observe,'' he said during a briefing at UNLV. Dublyansky, who has been gathering samples from the mountain independent of the team, said he disagrees with Whelan's statements. Cline, however, said the group's results concerning the temperatures of the fluids trapped in the minerals ``are very consistent with Yuri's. They're also very consistent with Joe Whelan's. All three parallel studies are consistent,'' she said. The temperatures that were measured average about 122 degrees, but a few of the 40 samples that have been analyzed contained fluid that was about 176 degrees, or 36 degrees less than the boiling point of water. Dublyansky believes this bolsters his theory that hot water came from below the repository site and not above, as the federal scientists contend. But a key element in proving the theory is to determine when the minerals were deposited in relation to the mountain's formation 13 million years ago. Cline said the scientists will attempt to age-date the minerals through uranium-decay methods using equipment at Canada's Royal Ontario Museum Laboratory. ``We cannot say whether fluids went up or down, and we probably won't be able to say that with any surety at the end of the study,'' she said. Mr. Barton. Thank you. The Chair is going to recognize himself for 5 minutes. We are going to try to get through the question period fairly quickly so we can get to our other panels. But I think we should ask a few questions. All of the problems that you just highlighted in your testimony, those are well known to the scientific community and to the technical experts. Haven't they all, in various reports, passed the scrutiny? I mean, I didn't hear anything new. I understand where you are coming from. Look, I am not at all surprised to hear what you just said, but haven't all of those been analyzed and passed muster in terms of it being safe to put the material in Yucca Mountain? Ms. Berkley. With all due respect, Chairman Barton, as late as yesterday, it was reported in the Las Vegas newspapers that the scientists that are continuing these studies have just come up with the finding of hot water having flowed under Yucca Mountain, not that many years ago in geological years, and have a tremendous concern that that water may rise again. So this is yet another scientific finding that is as new as 24 hours. So I think until the scientific studies are completed, that we should not be shipping or even thinking about Yucca Mountain as a potential site. But I do think that hole in the ground in your district might be a suitable location if they studied that as well. Mr. Barton. I wouldn't have a problem with that, to be honest about it, if it underwent the scrutiny that Yucca Mountain has. Ms. Berkley. Perhaps we could work on a dual-track scientific study. Mr. Barton. Well, I could take 10 casinos and a billion dollars a year and give you, you know, some old rubber tires or something that might be a fair trade. Ms. Berkley. My concern, of course, representing Las Vegas, which is the major population center in the State of Nevada, located only 90 miles away from Yucca Mountain, that if, God forbid, there was an accident, there is no amount of money that Congress could have given the State of Nevada to compensate for the loss of health, loss of health in the environment and the loss of our economy and continued growth and prosperity. Mr. Barton. I understand your concern. I am not at all being frivolous about that. But there has been more scientific review of this particular site, and it is under more scrutiny by the environmental groups so that, you know, at some point in time, at least I think that you do have to make a decision. And it certainly appears to me, based on the evidence that the decision to build it there, if, in fact, that is what it is, is a safe decision. I am not going to say it is a non controversial decision. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Boucher. Mr. Boucher. I don't have any questions. Mr. Barton. Okay. In order of appearance, the gentleman from Illinois. Mr. Shimkus. I would just make a point that I have young children 7, 5, and 8 months. And there was a very popular show that I think about a lot these days, called The Magic School Bus. And in one show the Magic School Bus goes from, if you believe in evolution, goes back through time through the millennium, it really stays in one location, but it goes through deserts, through swamplands, through ice age, through, you know, through the billions of years that--I am a creationist, but if you go to the extent there probably was water flowing there a few millennia ago. You know that there probably will be water flowing there again a few millennia from now. But I agree with the chairman, one site is better than over 60 sites for nuclear storage and the desert is better than the temperate zone. Underneath a mountain is better than above ground, and a location where there has been nuclear activity is better than a place where there has never been. I applaud the defense of your constituents. I think the science will bear out that this is the best hope for us to move this issue forward. And I thank you for your defense of your State and your citizens. I really, if you want to add---- Ms. Berkley. To my distinguished colleague, I had the wonderful opportunity to meet your family when they visited Las Vegas, and they are worth protecting and defending, just as the children that live in any district are. But if I thought for 1 minute making Yucca Mountain the national repository for nuclear waste would solve the nuclear waste problem in this country, I would probably be for it. All you are going to be doing is create yet another waste site, and once the 100,000 tons of nuclear waste that is deposited across this country gets trucked or taken by rail to Yucca Mountain, it will not solve the problem, because nuclear waste will continue to be produced as long as we have this type of technology. And I would recommend to this Congress that rather than spending the billions and billions and billions of dollars that it is going to take to ready Yucca Mountain in order to accept this nuclear garbage, that we start working on a scientific way of solving this problem so that the nuclear waste we produce is less toxic, less radioactive, and we have less of a problem in this country. Yucca Mountain is not going to make this problem go away. It is going to exacerbate it because it is going to give me the problem. Mr. Shimkus. Just reclaiming my time, we already transport high level nuclear waste all over this country, and we have done it safely for many, many years. And I think we will continue to do so. Having nuclear waste in some of the major metropolitan areas of our country, Chicago, Illinois, being an example, is more catastrophic than, again, underneath a mountain in the desert. Now, if we could ship this to Vieques Island and we could use Yucca Mountain as a naval training assault area, I may support that. But you understand that we have our concerns of our constituents as much as you do. And I think Congress has spoken and the science will prove it out and we will eventually move that. I yield back my time to the chairman. Mr. Barton. Thank the gentleman from Illinois. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Burr. Mr. Burr. Mr. Chairman, I haven't got a question of the gentlewoman, I would only make this statement. That this issue and probably more than anything else that we have dealt with at least in the 6 years that I have been here, displays the great difference that exists in the definition of good science. Your argument, Mr. Gibbons' argument is very compelling and the test that is the State of Nevada does in response to the test that the Department of Energy has done and nuclear regulatory--and others, we see it again with the EPA's current study and the questions that have been raised about that. If we get nothing else out of this, then the right definition that everybody can use for good science so that we can have an environmental policy that produces an outcome versus a continuation of complaints about the process, then I believe today we will have accomplished a tremendous amount. In the meantime, I think what Mr. Shimkus was trying to say is that every State in this country, somewhere in that State we have nuclear waste stored. Sometimes we make a decision based on what's good for the entire country and consolidation of that storage. In this particular case seems to be the will of Congress, and my hope is though I believe that you will vigorously fight it, and you should, that we can have some finality to this and soon. Ms. Berkley. Mr. Burr, if I could correct one thing you said. There is one State that doesn't have nuclear waste and that is the State of Nevada. Mr. Burr. The gentlewoman's point is made. I am sure that we could find some radioactive areas out there, though. Thank you. Ms. Berkley. I think what my colleague who spoke before me said, the people of the State of Nevada don't want this. They have spoken loud and clearly to their representatives in Congress and we have an obligation to those families to protect them to the best of our ability. And because other Members of Congress have a problem regarding nuclear waste in their district near their population centers doesn't make it any better or easier for us to accept it to alleviate your problem in order to exacerbate my own. Mr. Barton. Would the gentleman yield? I just want to ask when we had an active military testing program for our nuclear weapons, wasn't that done in Nevada? Ms. Berkley. Of course that was long before I was born. Mr. Barton. I understand that. Actually, some tests were done as late as the 1980's underground. Ms. Berkley. That is correct. No, if I could answer and I don't mean this to sound sharp or---- Mr. Barton. You can be sharp. You have got the right to be sharp. I have to be polite, but witnesses can be sharp. Ms. Berkley. Well, I would hope to match your politeness, and this is said with all due deference and respect, but I grew up in Las Vegas, a lot of my friends had pains, particularly dads in those days that worked at the Nevada test site. When they were told by this Federal Government that it was perfectly safe not only to be at the Nevada test site but to participate in the both above-ground and underground tests, and all they had to do was go home and take a shower and they would be fine. Well, I just attended a hearing a couple of months ago in my district, where all the Nevada test site workers that are dying of cancers and some of the most hideous, heinous cancers that you and I have ever seen and hope to God none of us ever experience. And this is the same government that is now telling the State of Nevada that it is perfectly safe to store 100,000 tons of nuclear waste under Yucca Mountain. They misled the Nevada public and the American public back in the 1950's and the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's; I believe the Federal Government is misleading us now. Mr. Barton. Well, I can't comment on the 1960's and 1970's and 1980's, but I can assure the gentlelady from Nevada that nobody is misleading anybody in any State of the Union right now. That is why we have the technical review board. That is why we are doing the environmental impact statement. That is why this subcommittee has done a half a dozen hearings on this. That is why I met with the county commissioners from your district. That is why I met with State representatives and the State senators, why I have been out there twice. I think it ought to be located at Yucca Mountain. But I don't think we ought to mislead anybody. And I don't think that the Clinton administration or the Bush administration or the Reagan administration or any of the administrations that have been in office since the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was passed in 1982 have done anything but try to be above board, so that there is informed consent, at least informed discussion and debate. Obviously, there is going to be a difference of opinion in democracy about some of these issues, that is why this hearing is being held today. This subcommittee is not in the business of misleading anybody in the United States of America, any constituent of any Congressional district about what the true facts are. Ms. Berkley. I appreciate that. And I have seen you, I know that you have come to Las Vegas because we once shared a plane ride together, and I knew that you were going to Las Vegas on behalf of Yucca Mountain. I don't think it is an intentional misleading, but I don't think anybody, scientists or government officials, could guarantee to the people of the State of Nevada that this nuclear waste will never have a problem, there will be no groundwater problems, there will be no volcanic activity, there will be no earthquake activity that would disturb the nuclear waste and create a problem. And if I thought that anyone could give me that guarantee, I would feel a whole lot better about this. But I am not talking about the short run, 5, 10, 15, 20 years from now, in my lifetime, talking about what may happen 100 years from now, and that is a blink of an eye. I don't think I could rest well in any grave knowing that I have created this problem for my constituents and my children and my children's children if we didn't vigorously defend against putting nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain. And I know that you understand my position. Mr. Barton. I understand that. The gentleman from Oklahoma. Mr. Largent. Ms. Berkley, I'd just like to ask you, can you give us some examples of guarantees that you could make for 100 years from today? Ms. Berkley. That is exactly my point, Mr. Largent. Exactly my point. Mr. Largent. So we should do nothing ever, because you can't guarantee anything. Ms. Berkley. No, of course not. What I think we should be doing---- Mr. Largent. That is my point. My point is you can't guarantee anything 100 years from now. But that doesn't mean that we should do nothing today because we can't guarantee something 100 or 1,000 years from now. I'd like to ask you this question, and that is this, simply, a not-in-my-back-yard, or do you just totally oppose all nuclear activity? Ms. Berkley. Oh, no, not at all. Mr. Largent. We should have nuclear activity in terms of generation of electricity? Ms. Berkley. What I think the solution is---- Mr. Largent. Let me ask this question first. Do you support nuclear energy production of electricity? Ms. Berkley. If, in fact, we could find a way of disposing with the by-product of nuclear energy, I would not be opposed to its creation. Prior to Congress, in a past life I was in- house counsel for Southwest Gas Corporation. I have an energy law background. So this is an area that I know a little bit about. Now, I am not opposed to nuclear. What I am opposed to is this country hasn't come up with a policy of dealing with the nuclear waste other than dumping it in the ground. What I would--I mean, this is a great country. This is an extraordinary country. And we are at the beginning of a new millennium and the dawning of the 21st century. Certainly there will be scientific breakthroughs in the next several years that will afford us an opportunity of handling this very dangerous by-product of nuclear energy in a more efficient safer way. I don't believe dumping it in the Nevada Desert is going to be the ultimate solution. Let us take the billions of dollars, extend the areas that the nuclear waste is being stored at at the nuclear repositories now, do dry-cask storing, which is adequate for the next century, and during that time, let us use these billions and billions of dollars and come up with a scientific way of rendering this stuff less toxic, less harmful, less dangerous. I would be all in favor of that, because we still don't have a good nuclear energy policy in this country. Mr. Largent. First of all, if you do know anything about this issue, and I assume you do, then you know that we don't have the capacity to go another century with storing it in onsite facilities. I mean, that just simply cannot happen. What I would say to you is that do you believe that there is a scientific solution that is out there that would guarantee us 100 years from now that there won't be a problem with it? Is there a scientific solution that would meet the demands and the hurdles that you are placing on Yucca Mountain? Ms. Berkley. I am a great optimist, and I believe in this country. If we could put a man on the moon with a concerted effort of a 10-year plan, then if we put our minds together and put the scientific minds working on this and make this a national priority, we could come up with a solution of rendering the toxic weight less dangerous, less toxic and more safe so that we wouldn't have to keep relying on burying it under the ground. What happens when Yucca Mountain is full and we keep producing this nuclear waste? What is the next State that is going to be assaulted with this? And how many more years are you, Congress, going to be considering the next national repository? Yucca Mountain is another temporary solution. We still will not have gotten to the major problem. And what happens when it is filled up? Where do we go from there? Is it Texas next? Is it Oregon, Washington? I mean, which one of us wants to accept this stuff? None of us. So let's roll up our sleeves, work together in a bipartisan way, and figure out what we are going to do to render this stuff less toxic and dangerous for all of us, for my sake as well as yours. I don't want to leave it in anybody's district. And I don't want to take it in mine. Mr. Largent. You can filibuster in the Senate. My question was do you believe that there is a technological solution out there? Ms. Berkley. Yes, I do. Mr. Largent. That will guarantee us that 100 years after implementing this solution, that they can guarantee you that there won't be any problems whatsoever? Ms. Berkley. The scientific solution may not be discovered at this moment, but I believe it can be. Mr. Largent. It is just a yes-or-no question. Ms. Berkley. I think it is more complicated than a yes or no. If you ask me does a scientist have a solution today as of June 23, that I cannot answer. Do I think that if we spend-- take the billions of dollars that we are using now to ready Yucca Mountain and invest it in scientific studies, I do believe that we can come up with an answer. I do believe in our scientists and I do believe in America. Mr. Largent. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. I will just say that I think that some of our best and brightest have come up with a solution. It is Yucca Mountain. I hope we can do better in the future as well. But at this point in time, I think we have invested a lot of time. This committee has spent a lot of time, and I yield back. Mr. Barton. Well, before we let the gentlewoman go, we want her to know that the subcommittee goes on record as we support America also. Let's end this on a positive note that we can agree on that. Ms. Berkley. Well, I have to thank all of you. This is the first time in the entire 18 months that I have served in Congress that I have ever had the pleasure of being grilled by an entire subcommittee. Mr. Barton. Grilled? You haven't seen grilled. Wait until next week when Secretary Richardson is here. You will see grilled. Ms. Berkley. I look forward to the opportunity of watching somebody else in this seat. Thank you very much. Mr. Barton. Come back next week. Thank you. Let's hear from our second panel now, if they will come forward. We have Dr. Ivan Itkin, who is the director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management at the Department of Energy, and I have had the privilege of meeting Dr. Itkin in my office. He is a distinguished gentleman who volunteered for that job, which shows how much he loves his country that he took that position. We have Mr. Carl Paperiello, who is the deputy executive director for Materials Research and State Programs for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. We have Mr. Steve Page, director of the Office of Radiation for the Environmental Protection Agency. We have Dr. Debra Knopman, who is a board member of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board. Last but not least, we have Dr. Kevin Crowley, who is the staff director of the Board of Radioactive Waste Management for the National Research Council. Welcome, lady and gentlemen. Your testimony is in the record in its entirety. We will start with Mr. Paperiello and ask you to summarize in 7 minutes, and we will go right on down the line. Welcome to the subcommittee. STATEMENTS OF CARL PAPERIELLO, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, MATERIALS RESEARCH AND STATE PROGRAMS, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION; IVAN ITKIN, DIRECTOR OF OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; DEBRA S. KNOPMAN, BOARD MEMBER, U.S. NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW; STEPHEN D. PAGE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF RADIATION, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; AND KEVIN D. CROWLEY, STAFF DIRECTOR, BOARD ON RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT Mr. Paperiello. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, the staff of the NRC is pleased to testify about our regulatory oversight of the management and disposal of high level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. Among the subjects I will discuss today is the status of our review of DOE's program to characterize the Yucca Mountain site as a potential geological repository and our progress in establishing site- specific licensing requirements for the proposed repository. The Commission continues to believe that a permanent geologic depository is the appropriate mechanism for the United States to ultimately manage spent fuel and other highly radioactive wastes. The program remains on course consistent with our responsibilities under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 and the Energy Policy Act of 1992. We are in the middle of an important transition. The staff is moving from the prelicense consultative role defined for the NRC in the statute to its role as regulator and licensing authority as we prepare for possible submittal of a DOE license application. And I will note a number of the important milestones and activities that comprise our program during this transition. On February 22nd of last year, the commission published a proposed regulation 10 CFR part 63 for public comment. This is a site-specific--we have a high-level waste rule. This is a site-specific rule for Yucca Mountain based on our experiences to that date on studying the mountain. As soon as we proposed our regulations, we embarked on a series of public meetings to encourage involvement by members of the public most affected by the decisions we face in establishing our final rule for Yucca Mountain. From these meetings, together with written submittals, we received more than 900 comments for proposed criteria. The NRC staff has carefully considered and analyzed these comments and has incorporated many of them in a draft final rule that the commissioners now have before them. Later last year, after the comment period for the NRC's proposed regulations closed, the EPA proposed standards in 40 CFR 197 for Yucca Mountain. The NRC has provided extensive comments on the EPA proposal. The NRC has identified serious concerns with the proposed standards that if unchanged in the final standards, will increase significantly the complexity of the NRC's licensing process without commensurate increase in the protection of public health and safety in the environment. That being said, however, we have made clear in our proposed rules that once final EPA standards for Yucca Mountain are in place, the NRC will amend its regulations as needed to confirm to the final standards as required by law. In July of last year, the DOE published for public comment its draft environmental impact statement for proposed Yucca Mountain repository, and the NRC provided detailed comments on the DEIS in February of this year. On May 4 of this year, DOE forwarded its revised siting guidelines at 10 CFR 963 to NRC for concurrence. We expect that the Commission will reach concurrence finding on DOE's draft guidelines later this year. We suspect that DOE will prepare to issue a site recommendation in July of 2001. Before then, the NRC expected to review a proposed DOE recommendation and provide comments as required by statute on sufficiency of DOE site characterization and waste form proposal. If DOE makes a recommendation on the Yucca Mountain site, and if the President and the Congress affirm that recommendation, the DOE will then apply to the NRC for a license to construct a repository. The NRC has 3 years to determine whether to approve or deny the application, except that the Commission may extend the deadline by not more than 1 year. Through early NRC staff identification and clarification of key technical safety issues, we are optimistic that we will be prepared to complete this demanding and first-of-a-kind review in the time allotted. Consistent with this objective, we have completed rulemaking to establish a licensing support network using Web-based technology to promote access to documents and thereby hasten review of the license application. I would like now to turn to the subject of DOE's quality assurance activities involving Yucca Mountain. DOE has experienced problems in the past in carrying out its QA program. In general, DOE has done an acceptable job in uncovering its own quality assurance problems, but has been less successful in taking prompt corrective action and preventing recurring problems. I am pleased to be able to say that recent DOE actions have improved the picture considerably in this area. However, the task is not complete and reflecting the need for continued vigilance, we have strengthened our oversight of DOE's quality assurance activities. In conclusion, it is important to stress that DOE bears the responsibility for demonstrating that licensing and certification requirements are met to protect public health and safety and the environment. The Commission independently must assess and find that such a demonstration has been made before we can issue a license for any geological repository. Among other things, completion of NRC's review of a potential license application depends on the timely establishment of scientifically sound standards and regulations, the receipt of a high quality license application from DOE, and sufficient resources for the agency to maintain its independent technical review capability. I want to thank you for the opportunity to review the status of the NRC's high level waste regulatory program and will gladly answer any questions that you have. [The prepared statement of Carl J. Paperiello follows:] Prepared Statement of Carl J. Paperiello, Deputy Executive Director for Materials, Research, and State Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Overview Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is pleased to testify about our regulatory oversight of the management and disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. Among the subjects I will discuss today are the status of our review of the Department of Energy's (DOE's) program to characterize the Yucca Mountain Site as a potential geological repository and our progress in establishing site-specific licensing requirements for the proposed repository. The Commission continues to believe that a permanent geologic repository is the appropriate mechanism for the United States to ultimately manage spent fuel and other high-level radioactive waste. We believe the public health and safety, the environment, and the common defense and security will be protected best by the development of a comprehensive system for the management and disposal of high-level radioactive waste, that includes storage, transportation and deep underground disposal. In our view, a deep geologic repository is a sound and technically feasible solution to the problem of final disposition of spent nuclear fuel and other high-level radioactive wastes. Status of NRC's HLW Regulatory Program The NRC's High-level Waste (HLW) regulatory program remains on course, consistent with our responsibilities under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, and the Energy Policy Act of 1992. This legislation specifies an integrated approach and a long-range plan for storage, transport, and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and HLW. It prescribes the respective roles and responsibilities of the NRC, the DOE and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the nation's HLW program. The Congress assigned NRC extensive prelicensing responsibilities and the regulatory authority to issue a license, if appropriate, only after deciding whether a DOE license application for a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, complies with applicable standards and regulations. The NRC staff is in the midst of an important transition--from the prelicensing, consultative role defined for NRC in statute, which has been our emphasis to date, to the role as regulator and licensing authority, as we prepare for a possible submittal of a DOE license application. In my testimony today, I will highlight a number of the important milestones and activities that comprise our program during this important transition. Among these are: (1) establishment of a regulatory framework; (2) comment on the DOE's draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for a proposed repository at Yucca Mountain; (3) review and, if appropriate, concur in the revised DOE siting guidelines; (4) comment on a DOE site recommendation, should the DOE elect to pursue development of a repository at Yucca Mountain; and (5) if a license application is received, preparation for making a licensing determination in the time allotted by statute. In addition, I would like to say a few words about NRC's oversight of the DOE's quality assurance activities and provide a brief update of our transportation safety activities. Establishment of a Regulatory Framework We take seriously our obligations to provide a regulatory framework for the possible licensing of a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain; and to consult with the DOE and other stakeholders, including the Nevada public, in advance of any license application should one be received. We plan to have risk-informed regulations specific for Yucca Mountain in place by the end of this year. Under the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the Commission must modify, if needed, its regulations to be consistent with final EPA standards within a year of their issuance. Because in 1998 we expected only a very short period in which to issue final implementing regulations after final EPA standards are issued, the Commission initiated its own rulemaking in parallel with that of the EPA in formulating its standards. The NRC was concerned about its responsibility to make public, as soon as possible, how we plan to implement the health-based standards called for by the Congress. In our view, prompt, public access to our regulatory intentions was necessary, not only to enable the DOE to begin preparing a possible license application but, just as importantly, to allow for timely and meaningful public involvement in the development of our implementing regulations. After EPA issues final standards, we will act promptly to prepare needed conforming revisions, if any. On February 22 of last year, the Commission published proposed regulations at 10 CFR Part 63 for public comment. As soon as we proposed our regulations, the NRC staff embarked on a series of public meetings to encourage involvement by members of the public most affected by the decisions we face in publishing final regulations for Yucca Mountain. From these meetings, together with written submittals, we received more than 900 comments on our proposed criteria. The NRC staff has carefully considered, and analyzed these comments, and has incorporated many of them in a draft final rule that the Commissioners now have before them. Later last year, after the comment period for NRC's proposed regulations closed, the EPA proposed standards at 40 CFR 197 for Yucca Mountain. The NRC has provided extensive comments on the EPA proposal. The NRC has identified serious concerns with the proposed standards that, if unchanged in the final standards, will increase significantly the complexity of the NRC's licensing process without commensurate increase in the protection of public health and safety and the environment. That being said, however, we made clear in our proposed rule, that after final EPA standards for Yucca Mountain are in place, the NRC will amend its regulations, as needed, to conform to the final standards, as required by law. NRC Reviews of DOE's Draft EIS, Siting Guidelines and Site Recommendation In July of last year, the DOE published, for public comment, its draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for a proposed Yucca Mountain repository. The NRC provided detailed comments on the DEIS in February 2000. The NRC comments identified several broad issues and a number of specific topical areas that the DOE should address to make the final EIS complete. The DOE is now completing its final EIS which must, eventually, accompany DOE's license application to construct a HLW repository. The NRC is required, by law, to adopt, to the extent practicable, the final DOE EIS. On May 4, 2000, the DOE forwarded its revised siting guidelines at 10 CFR Part 963 for NRC review and concurrence. The DOE proposes to use the revised guidelines to review and evaluate Yucca Mountain for recommendation as a potential repository site. We expect that the Commission will reach a concurrence finding on DOE's draft final guidelines later this year. If the DOE elects to pursue development of Yucca Mountain as a repository, we expect the DOE will prepare to issue a site recommendation in July of 2001. Before then, the NRC expects to review a proposed DOE recommendation and provide comments, as required by statute, on the sufficiency of DOE's site characterization and waste form proposal. The NRC expects that it will take six months to complete the necessary review of any site recommendation, and provide comments. Preparation for Making a Licensing Decision As part of our overall prelicensing strategy, we continue to focus our review on the nine key technical issues that are most important to repository safety and, therefore, to licensing. Since we redirected and streamlined our program several years ago, the NRC staff has completed a number of significant reports on the status of resolution, at the staff level, of each of the nine key issues. Now, we are applying the experience gained in preparing these reports to the development of a Yucca Mountain review plan that will eventually guide our review of a license application. As this development progresses, we also continue to conduct public technical exchanges between members of the NRC and DOE technical staffs and with NRC's Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste. If DOE makes a recommendation on the Yucca Mountain site, and if the President and Congress affirm that recommendation, the DOE will then apply to the NRC for a license to construct a repository. The NRC has three years to determine whether to approve or deny the application, except that the Commission may extend the deadline by not more than one year. Through early NRC staff identification and clarification of key safety issues, we are optimistic that we will be prepared to complete this demanding and first-of-a-kind review in the time allotted. Consistent with this objective, we have completed a rulemaking to establish a Licensing Support Network, using web-based technology to promote access to supporting documents and, thereby, hasten review of the license application. A further rulemaking with regard to the Licensing Support Network is now in preparation. Quality Assurance I would now like to turn to the subject of the DOE quality assurance activities involving Yucca Mountain. DOE has experienced problems in carrying out its quality assurance program. In general, the DOE has done an acceptable job in uncovering its own quality assurance problems. However, it has been less successful in taking prompt corrective actions and preventing recurring problems. I am pleased to be able to say that recent DOE actions have improved the picture considerably in this area. However, the task is not complete and, reflecting the need for continued vigilance, we have strengthened our oversight of DOE's quality assurance activities. Safety of Packages for Spent Fuel and HLW Transport In addition to our oversight responsibilities for any potential geologic repository, the NRC is charged with certifying the safety of the packages used to transport spent nuclear fuel and high level waste. NRC continues to support the requirement that waste shippers use NRC- certified packages for transport of spent fuel and high-level waste. In the past year, NRC has reviewed and approved three dual-purpose cask systems for storage and transport. We are also reviewing four more dual-purpose cask system designs. The shipment of spent nuclear fuel in NRC-approved transportation containers continues to have an unparalleled record of success from a safety perspective. To date, there has not been a release of radioactive material from an accident involving an NRC-approved spent fuel transportation container. In March 2000, NRC completed a safety study on spent fuel shipment risks. This study found the risks associated with transport of spent nuclear fuel by truck or train are even lower than earlier risk estimates. NRC held a series of meetings in 1999 to interact with interested stakeholders in a public forum to discuss the issues related to spent fuel transport. The NRC has more meetings planned for later this year. Conclusion It is important to stress that the DOE bears the responsibility for demonstrating that licensing and certification requirements are met to protect public health and safety and the environment. The Commission independently must assess and find that such a demonstration has been made before we can issue a license for any geologic repository. Among other things, completion of NRC's review of a potential license application depends upon: the timely establishment of scientifically- sound standards and regulations; the receipt of a high-quality license application from the DOE; and sufficient resources for the NRC to maintain its independent technical review capability. I want to thank you for the opportunity to review the status of NRC's HLW regulatory program, and will gladly answer any questions you may have. Mr. Barton. Thank you, Doctor. We would now like to hear from Dr. Itkin, and your statement is in the record. We recognize you for 7 minutes. Welcome to the subcommittee. STATEMENT OF IVAN ITKIN Mr. Itkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I am Ivan Itkin, Director of the Department of Energy's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. I appreciate the opportunity to provide an update on the status of our program and to address the issues of concern to the committee. Over the past few years, the Department has made significant progress toward a recommendation on the permanent solution for spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste. We are on schedule to make a decision in 2001 on whether or not to recommend the Yucca Mountain site as a repository. With sufficient appropriations, and if the site is suitable for recommendation and is designated so by the Congress, we are on schedule to begin emplacement of the waste in 2010. Let me again emphasize that the overriding goal of the Federal Government's high level radioactive waste management policy is the establishment of a permanent geologic repository. Permanent geologic disposal not only addresses the management of spent nuclear fuel from commercial electric power generation, but is also essential to advancing our nonproliferation goals. The repository will secure highly enriched spent nuclear fuel from foreign and domestic research reactors and surplus plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons. A repository is necessary to support our nuclear powered Naval fleet. Finally, a permanent geologic repository is vital for cleaning up the legacy of our past nuclear weapons production at sites throughout the country. In the next year, we expect to complete the near-term scientific and engineering work for a Secretarial decision on whether or not to recommend the Yucca Mountain site for further development. We are on schedule to complete the documentation required by law. A Presidential decision to go forward with Yucca Mountain must be based on science, and we are conducting a world class scientific and technical program at Yucca Mountain. We have had almost 5 years of direct examination of the geology underneath Yucca Mountain, and we completed a 2,000 meter cross-drift tunnel in December 1999 to develop a more complete three-dimensional model of the geologic formation. We continue to conduct the world's largest thermal tests to assess how long-term exposure to heat from waste packages might affect the hydrology and near-field environment within the tunnels that may be constructed within Yucca Mountain. Since the release of the viability assessment in December 1998, we have focused on reducing uncertainty in the models we use to predict repository performance. We have refined our repository design to be flexible and robust. And we can adjust the period of ventilation, vary fuel staging at the waste packages, and adjust waste package spacing. Let me now turn to the program's current activities. The program's focus for early fiscal year 2001 is to complete the site recommendation consideration report. This report will be made available to the State of Nevada, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the public to inform them of our findings and to facilitate public comment on a possible recommendation. The program issued the draft environmental impact statement for a geologic repository in July 1999. More than 2,700 individuals attended public hearings on the draft statement and more than 700 provided comments. We are presently analyzing the comments, preparing responses, and continuing the development of the final environmental impact statement. Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the final environmental impact statement must accompany a recommendation from the Secretary to the President to develop this site. The Department has requested $437.5 million for fiscal year 2001. This funding is necessary to complete the activities needed for an informed policy decision. The full fiscal year 2001 request is also necessary for critical work related to the preparation of a license application that was deferred in past years due to funding levels below those published in the viability assessment. Let me address the program's efforts to recompete the current management and operating contract. The program's current M&O contract was awarded in 1991 and will expire in February of 2001. Consistent with the Department's contracting policy, we are recompeting our M&O contract. We received three proposals on June 8, 2000, at the close of the bidding period. We expect to award a follow-on later this year, and after awarding the contract, we expect--no, in fact, we will demand an orderly transition, and have allocated funds for contractor transition in our fiscal year 2001 budget request. Both the Environmental Protection Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have proposed regulations for radiation dose limits at Yucca Mountain and to license a repository at the site. To align our site suitability criteria to the proposed regulations, the Department has proposed 10 CFR 963, the Yucca Mountain site suitability guidelines. We are hopeful that the Environmental Protection Agency will establish reasonable standards that are protective of the public health and safety and the environment, and that these standards can be implemented by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in a rigorous licensing process. It is our understanding that the Environmental Protection Agency will finalize the radiation protection standard for Yucca Mountain this summer. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, we have made significant progress. Since we set out to characterize the Yucca Mountain site after enactment of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, we knew we would face many challenges. I believe by the end of next year, we will have met the most difficult of those challenges. There will likely continue to be additional scientific and institutional issues to be addressed during any licensing process, but I believe that the program is well positioned to move forward. Thank you. I appreciate being allowed to present this testimony, and I will be happy to answer any questions that you may have. [The prepared statement of Ivan Itkin follows:] Prepared Statement of Ivan Itkin, Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. Department of Energy introduction Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I am Ivan Itkin, Director of the Department of Energy's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. I appreciate the opportunity to provide an update on the status of our Program and to address issues of concern to the Committee. Over the past few years, the Department has made significant progress toward a recommendation on a permanent solution for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. We are on schedule to make a decision in 2001 on whether or not to recommend the Yucca Mountain site as a repository. With sufficient appropriations, and if the site is suitable for recommendation and is designated by Congress, our current schedule is to submit the license application for repository construction to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2002, to begin construction in 2005 upon receipt of construction authorization, and, if the site is licensed, to begin emplacement of the waste in the repository in 2010. background The overriding goal of the Federal Government's high-level radioactive waste management policy is the establishment of a permanent geologic repository. Permanent geologic disposal addresses the management of spent nuclear fuel from commercial electric power generation and from past Government defense activities, and it is essential to advancing our non-proliferation goals. A permanent disposal solution will also secure highly enriched spent nuclear fuel from foreign and domestic research reactors. It will also provide for the disposition of surplus plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons. A repository is necessary for the disposition of spent nuclear fuel from our nuclear-powered naval vessels. Finally, a permanent geologic repository is vital for cleaning up the legacy of our past nuclear weapons production at sites throughout the country. program status The near-term scientific and engineering work that will be the foundation for a Secretarial decision on whether or not to recommend the Yucca Mountain site to the President is expected to be completed next year. A Presidential decision to develop a repository must be based on sound science. It must not only be accompanied by the documentation required by law, but also inform our policy makers, our regulatory oversight agencies, and the public regarding the scientific basis for the decision. We are conducting a world-class scientific and technical program at Yucca Mountain. Through the Exploratory Studies Facility, we have had almost five years of direct examination of the geology underneath Yucca Mountain. From this study, our scientists and engineers, including experts from our nation's universities and our National Laboratories, have advanced our understanding of a potential repository system. This understanding led us to further focus our investigations, responding in part to the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board and other experts. In response to requests from the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, we completed a 2000-meter cross-drift tunnel in December 1999. This year, we will complete niches and alcoves in the cross-drift tunnel that will assist us in developing a more complete three- dimensional model of that geologic formation. For nearly two years, we have gathered and integrated into our performance models data from the cross-drift tunnel inside the mountain to refine our predictions of repository performance. Within the Exploratory Studies Facility, we continue to conduct the largest thermal test of a geologic formation in the world. This test, commonly known as the drift-scale test, assesses how long-term exposures to heat from waste packages might affect the hydrology and near-field environment within tunnels that may be constructed within Yucca Mountain. This work will help determine the effects of heat on waste package performance and assist in the further refinement of repository design as we move forward toward licensing a repository, if the site is deemed suitable. Since the release of the Viability Assessment in December 1998, the primary objective of the program's scientific and technical work has been reducing uncertainty in our predictions of repository performance. Our repository design has been refined to better manage thermal loads and reduce uncertainty. It is a flexible and robust design that can accommodate various operational modes, including adjusting the period of ventilation, varying fuel staging and loading into waste packages, and adjusting waste package spacing to manage thermal loads. This approach will permit future generations to evaluate actual repository performance, learn from the operations and monitoring, and close the facility when appropriate. A repository that is flexible to accommodate technical advances or future changes in priority is one way to address concerns regarding the need for additional information due to uncertainty. planned activities Let me now turn to the Program's current activities, and the major events on the horizon. The culmination of the Program's site characterization efforts is to prepare the documentation required under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to support a decision on whether or not to submit a site recommendation to the President. The Program's focus for early Fiscal Year 2001 is to complete the Site Recommendation Consideration Report. This report will present background information and descriptions of the site characterization program and the site. It will also include descriptions of the repository design, the waste form, and waste packages; a discussion of data related to the safety of the site; and a description of the performance assessment of the repository. The Site Recommendation Consideration Report and its supporting documents will be made available to the State of Nevada, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the public to inform them and to facilitate public comment on a possible recommendation. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act requires a final environmental impact statement to accompany a site recommendation to the President, if the Secretary decides to recommend the site for development as a repository. The Department issued the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada in July 1999. The draft environmental impact statement provides information on potential environmental impacts that could result from the construction, operation and monitoring, and eventual closure of a repository at Yucca Mountain. We conducted a public comment period on the draft environmental impact statement from the end of July 1999 through February 28, 2000. Twenty-one hearings were held, eleven throughout the country and ten in the State of Nevada. More than 2700 individuals attended those hearings and more than 700 provided comments. We are presently analyzing the comments, preparing responses to be documented in the comment response section of the final environmental impact statement, and continuing development of the final environmental impact statement. Our plan for Fiscal Year 2001 and beyond reflects the evolution of the project emphasis from scientific investigations to data synthesis, model validation, repository and waste package design, safety analysis, and documentation. The Program's near-term priorities upon completion of site characterization will be to enhance and refine repository design features and to develop the remaining information required to continue to a license application if a decision to recommend the site is made by the Secretary and approved by the President and Congress. fiscal year 2001 budget To support our future activities, the Department has requested $437.5 million for Fiscal Year 2001. The funding we have requested is needed to complete the activities that are necessary for an informed policy decision. In addition to compiling the remaining information that is necessary for a possible site recommendation, the full Fiscal Year 2001 request is also necessary for critical work, related to the preparation of a license application, that was deferred in past years due to funding levels below those published in the Viability Assessment. The Program has been able to maintain its schedule for major milestones over the past years despite significant reductions from our request level, but only by deferring critical work that still must be completed. Regaining momentum with the Fiscal Year 2001 request will enable the Program to be more responsive to emerging scientific issues, such as those raised during our extensive ongoing interactions with the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Now, when we are so close to significant milestones, we should not allow insufficient resources to be a cause for delay. contract recompetition The Program's current management and operating contract was awarded in 1991 and will expire in February 2001. Consistent with the Department's contracting policy regarding management and operating contracts, and in conformance with direction provided in the enacted Energy and Water Development appropriations, we are recompeting our management and operating contract. The Department received three proposals on June 8, 2000, which was the close of the bidding period. We have begun to evaluate submittals by the three teams, which are led by MK Nevada LLC, Bechtel SAIC Company LLC, and TRW Parsons Management and Operations LLC. We expect to award a follow-on performance-based contract late this summer or early in the fall. After awarding the contract, we expect an orderly transition. We have allocated funds for contractor transition in our Fiscal Year 2001 budget request. regulatory activities We have proposed 10 CFR 963, Yucca Mountain Site Suitability Guidelines, for use by the Department in evaluating site suitability. This proposal is intended to align the suitability criteria in the Department's evaluation process with the standards being promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency and the licensing criteria being promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Specifically, the Environmental Protection Agency and Nuclear Regulatory Commission are each revising the regulatory framework for standards involving radiation dose limits at Yucca Mountain and for licensing this site, respectively. We are hopeful that the Environmental Protection Agency will establish reasonable standards that are protective of public health and safety and the environment, and that these standards can be implemented by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in a rigorous licensing environment. It is our understanding that the Environmental Protection Agency will finalize the radiation protection standard for Yucca Mountain this summer. Soon afterwards, we expect the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to modify its licensing criteria to be consistent with the standard. conclusion As I noted at the beginning of my testimony, we have made significant progress. Since the enactment of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1982, our nation has made a substantial investment in permanent geologic disposal. Approximately four billion dollars and years of cutting-edge science and engineering have brought us to this point. When we set out to characterize the Yucca Mountain site through an ambitious scientific program, we knew we would be faced with challenges. I believe by the end of next year we will have met the most difficult of those challenges. There will likely continue to be additional scientific and institutional issues to be addressed during any licensing process. But, I believe the Program is well positioned to move forward. Thank you. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. Mr. Barton. Thank you, Doctor. We now would like to hear from another doctor--we are getting overwhelmed with Ph.D.'s today--Dr. Debra Knopman, who is the board member from the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, which is tasked with overseeing all the scientific analysis on these decisions. Your statement is in the record in its entirety and we would welcome you to summarize it for 7 minutes. STATEMENT OF DEBRA S. KNOPMAN Ms. Knopman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee. I am a member of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board. My full-time job is director of the Center for Innovation and the Environment of the Progressive Policy Institute. As most of you may know, the Board members serve in a part-time capacity. I am pleased to act as the Board's representative today. Our Chairman, Dr. Jared Cohon, President of Carnegie Mellon University, sends his regrets at not being here. I will make summary remarks. Mr. Chairman, when Congress created the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board in the 1987 amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, it gave the Board a very important and unique mandate. That mandate is to conduct an independent review of the technical and scientific validity of activities conducted by the Secretary of Energy in implementing the Act, including characterization of the Yucca Mountain site and packaging and transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste. I would like to update the subcommittee this morning briefly on some of the Board's most recent recommendations on the DOE safety strategy for the Yucca Mountain site, methods for predicting repository performance, and scientific studies of Yucca Mountain. I would like to make four points. Point 1: Representation of uncertainties about the Yucca Mountain site will be an important component of a site recommendation decision document. The Board continues to endorse the use of performance assessment, sometimes called TSPA, supplemented by other lines of evidence for making a site suitability determination. While the numerical models in a performance assessment help us to understand and estimate how a repository might perform at Yucca Mountain, the models are based on many assumptions. For example, underlying the models are assumptions about the natural environment, including climate, water movement, chemistry, et cetera, and about the engineered system, including corrosion and other processes. The Board believes that explaining the uncertainties inherent in the PA and the underlying assumptions as clearly and fully as possible is essential for technical credibility and sound decisionmaking. The board is concerned that a performance assessment without such an explanation could deprive policymakers of critical information on possible tradeoffs between projected performance and uncertainty in those projections. Let me give you an example. One policymaker might be willing to accept development of a repository that would release half of the allowable dose and have only a 1-in-1,000 chance of exceeding that limit. However, that same policymaker might decline to develop a repository that is expected to release only a 10th of the allowable dose but has a 1-in-4 chance of exceeding the limit. Another policymaker's preferences might be the opposite. Because the uncertainties about repository system performance may be substantial, estimates of uncertainty about doses are at least as important as estimates of performance. DOE and the Board have had numerous exchanges on this point, and we understand that the program is making an effort to respond to the Board's concerns. The second point I would like to make: A case for repository safety must be built on multiple lines of evidence, not just a complex computer model. Although we endorse the use of performance assessment modeling, the Board believes that the modeling should not be used as the sole source of guidance about long-term performance of the repository system. The Board supports the DOE's use of multiple and independent lines of argument and evidence, including defense-in-depth, safety margin, natural analogs and performance confirmation testing to supplement the use of TSPA, the total system performance assessment, in its case regarding Yucca Mountain site suitability. In other words, this is a matter of not putting all the scientific eggs in one basket of computer modeling. The Board believes that the program is making an effort to develop these additional lines of evidence. It is unclear at this time how far along DOE will be in their development at the time of the site recommendation consideration report. Third point: There are important connections between repository design and uncertainties in the safety case. In other words, evaluation of the site's suitability is dependent, to a considerable degree, on confidence in the technical case made for performance of a proposed repository and waste package design. That is the reason why one way to address uncertainties in the safety case is to reduce them by modifying repository design. In particular, the Board has suggested that the DOE investigate the effects of heat on the waste packages, repository tunnels, and hydrologic and hydrogeochemical processes at the site. The Board made this suggestion because higher temperatures, especially if water is present in repository tunnels, appear to carry additional uncertainties in estimating repository system performance in comparison to lower temperature below-boiling conditions in the rocks surrounding the tunnels. In the past, DOE has maintained that above-boiling repository designs have the potential to vaporize water in the rocks surrounding the repository tunnels, thereby keeping the waste packages essentially dry for up to 1,000 years. The Board is concerned that the performance assessment may not, in its current state of development, capture adequately how the thermal, hydrologic and other processes in the mountain interact. And if this is the case, then the PA model may not be able to accurately represent the uncertainty associated with this above-boiling design. A below-boiling design may have the potential to reduce concerns about these coupled processes, but more thorough analysis is needed before any judgment is made about the optimal thermal conditions for the repository operation. The Board is very pleased that DOE has begun preliminary work in this area. Fourth point: Important scientific studies are still going on at Yucca Mountain. The primary focus of the scientific work now in progress at Yucca Mountain is to reduce uncertainties through the acquisition and analysis of additional relevant data. For example, the Board believes on the basis of current knowledge that the DOE has chosen the best materials available for the waste package. However, our experience with the materials extends only over a few decades a short time relative to the tens of thousands of years of their intended life in a repository. The Board is closely following the DOE's efforts to address questions about stress corrosion cracking and about dissolution of the passive layer around the waste package that would act as a barrier--corrosion barrier in the alloy being proposed for the package. The east-west cross-drift recommended by the Board and completed in October 1998 by DOE continues to yield scientific dividends and will help address some of the current questions about the rock where the proposed repository would actually be located. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the Board believes that the DOE's efforts to develop the site recommendation consideration report have been very useful to identify issues that they would need to resolve or clarify in a final site recommendation report. At this point, the DOE has not encountered any single issue in characterizing the Yucca Mountain site that automatically eliminates it from consideration as the location of a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste. However important technical questions remain about Yucca Mountain, especially about the effects of heat on the movement of water in the mountain and on the associated transport of radionuclides. DOE is taking steps to address these uncertainties, but some uncertainty will inevitably continue about predictions of repository performance. This may be true to some extent at any site. At the time the decision is made onsite recommendation, the Board believes it is critical that DOE not only offer estimates of performance, but also clarify the extent and significance of the scientific uncertainties that are a vital part of decisionmaking. Thank you very much for this opportunity to provide the Board's views. I would be happy to respond to questions. [The prepared statement of Debra S. Knopman follows:] Prepared Statement of Debra Knopman, U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. I am Debra Knopman, a member of the Nuclear Waste Technical Board. My full-time job is Director of the Center for Innovation and the Environment of the Progressive Policy Institute. It is my pleasure to act as the Board's representative this morning and to express the views of the Board on progress in the Yucca Mountain site-characterization program. The Board's Chairman, Dr. Jared L. Cohon, sends his regrets at not being able to be here today. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will make some brief summary remarks and ask that my full statement be entered into the hearing record. The Board's Mandate Mr. Chairman, when Congress created the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board in the 1987 amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA), it gave the Board a very important--and unique--mandate. That mandate is to conduct an independent review of the technical and scientific validity of activities conducted by the Secretary of Energy in implementing the NWPA, including characterization of the Yucca Mountain site and packaging and transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Congress intended the Board to communicate its findings and recommendations to the Secretary and to Congress in a timely fashion before important decisions are made, not after the fact. The Board takes its charge very seriously, Mr. Chairman, and we are pleased to have this opportunity to update the Subcommittee on the Board's view of the Yucca Mountain program before the release of the Department of Energy's (DOE) site recommendation consideration report, or SRCR, which currently is scheduled for the end of this year. In particular, I would like to update the Subcommittee briefly on some of the Board's most recent recommendations on the DOE's safety strategy for the Yucca Mountain site, methods for predicting repository performance, and scientific studies of Yucca Mountain. The DOE's Site Recommendation Consideration Report As I mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the DOE intends to issue a site recommendation consideration report on Yucca Mountain at the end of this calendar year. The DOE plans to update the SRCR and use it along with other information called for in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act as the basis of a site recommendation, currently scheduled for mid-2001. According to the DOE, the SRCR will include four elements: a comprehensive computer model called the ``total system performance assessment,'' or TSPA; a qualitative description of the attributes of the Yucca Mountain site; a repository design and safety case; and an outline of future research needs. Over the last few months, the Board has commented to the DOE on some of these issues. I will briefly summarize some of our most recent comments. Representation of uncertainties about the Yucca Mountain site. The Board continues to endorse the use of performance assessment, or PA, supplemented by other lines of evidence, for making a site-suitability determination. While the numerical models in a PA help us understand and estimate how a repository might perform at the Yucca Mountain site, the models are based on many assumptions. For example, underlying the models are assumptions about the natural environment, including climate, water movement, chemistry, seismicity, and volcanism, and about the engineered system, including corrosion and other processes. The assumptions may be based on field and laboratory data, on the results of expert judgment, or on detailed conceptual and numerical analyses. The Board believes that explaining the uncertainties inherent in the PA and the underlying assumptions as clearly and fully as possible is essential for technical credibility and sound decision-making. The Board is concerned that a PA without such an explanation could deprive policy-makers of critical information on possible trade-offs between projected performance and the uncertainty in those projections. For example, one policy-maker might be willing to accept development of a repository that would release half of the permitted dose and have only a 1 in 1,000 chance of exceeding the permitted dose. However, that same policy-maker might decline to develop a repository that is expected to release only a tenth of the permitted dose but that has a 1 in 4 chance of exceeding the permitted dose. Another policy-maker's preferences might be the opposite. Because the uncertainties about repository system performance may be substantial, estimates of uncertainty about doses are at least as important as estimates of performance. To help decision-makers better understand estimates of repository performance in the PA, the Board recommends that the DOE include in a site recommendation document a description of critical assumptions, an explanation of why particular parameter ranges were chosen, a discussion of data limitations, an explanation of the basis and justification for using expert judgments, and an assessment of confidence in the conceptual models used. In addition, the Board recommends that the uncertainties associated with the performance estimates be identified and quantified well enough so that the performance estimates can be put in the context of what is well known, what is less well known, and what is unknown (or unknowable) about Yucca Mountain. The DOE and the Board have had numerous exchanges on this point, and we understand that the program is making an effort to respond to the Board's concerns. Building a case for repository safety. Although we endorse the use of PA, the Board believes that PA modeling should not be used as the sole source of guidance about the features, events, and processes that might affect the long-term performance of the repository system. Therefore, the Board supports the DOE's use of multiple and independent lines of argument and evidence, including defense-in-depth, safety margin, natural analogs, and performance confirmation testing, to supplement the TSPA in its case regarding Yucca Mountain site suitability. These additional elements, combined with a clear description of uncertainty as described above, will present a more technically defensible demonstration of repository safety than would any element by itself. In other words, this is a matter of not putting all the scientific eggs in one basket of computer modeling. The Board believes that the program is making an effort to develop these additional lines of evidence, but it is unclear at this time how far along DOE will be in their development at the time of the SRCR. Connections between repository design and uncertainties in the safety case. One way to address uncertainties is to reduce them by modifying repository design. In early1999, the Board recommended to the DOE that it analyze alternatives to the repository and waste package designs included in the DOE's 1998 viability assessment. In particular, the Board suggested that the DOE investigate the effects of heat on the waste packages, repository tunnels, and hydrologic and hydrogeochemical processes at the site. The Board made this suggestion because higher temperatures, especially if water is present in repository tunnels, appear to carry additional uncertainties in estimating repository system performance in comparison to lower-temperature, below-boiling conditions in the rock surrounding the tunnels. In the past, the DOE has maintained that above-boiling repository designs have the potential to vaporize water in the rock surrounding the repository tunnels, thereby keeping the waste packages essentially dry for up to a thousand years. Understanding the differences in estimated performance and associated uncertainties under different temperature conditions is an important component of our overall understanding of potential repository performance at the Yucca Mountain site. However, the Board is concerned that PA may not in its current state of development capture adequately how the thermal, hydrologic, mechanical, and chemical processes in the mountain interact. If this is the case, then the PA model may not accurately represent the uncertainty associated with above-boiling designs. A below-boiling design may have the potential to reduce concerns about these ``coupled processes.'' Nonetheless, more thorough analysis is needed before any judgment is made about the optimal thermal conditions for repository operation. In any case, Mr. Chairman, the Board believes that an analysis of the tradeoffs between estimates of performance and the uncertainties in those estimates is essential before a technically-defensible decision can be made on repository design. The Board is pleased that the DOE has begun preliminary work in this area. Important scientific studies continue at Yucca Mountain. An important aspect of reducing uncertainties is obtaining relevant data. For example, the Board believes, on the basis of current knowledge, that the DOE has chosen the best materials available for the waste package. However, experience with the materials extends over only a few decades--a short time relative to the tens of thousands of years in their intended life in a repository. The Board is closely following the DOE's efforts to address questions about stress corrosion cracking and about dissolution of the passive layer that acts as a corrosion barrier in the alloy that has been selected for the exterior of the waste package. Answering these questions should help reduce uncertainties and increase confidence in predictions of waste package performance that are extrapolated from present-day experience. The east-west cross drift recommended by the Board and completed in October 1998 by the DOE continues to yield dividends in scientific information that help to address some of the current questions about the properties of the layer of rock where most of the waste would be placed and about how liquid water and water vapor will move within that layer. In addition, the ongoing drift-scale heater test, now in its third year, should provide important information on the general effects of heat on the mountain. Conclusion In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, on the basis of what we know at this time, the SRCR will provide an important analysis of key issues that are likely to be included in a final technical document accompanying a site recommendation. Although the Board cannot say whether the SRCR itself will be sufficient for determining site suitability, the Board believes that the DOE's efforts to develop the SRCR have been very useful in helping the DOE identify issues that would have to be resolved or clarified in a final site recommendation report. At this point, the DOE has not encountered any issue in characterizing the Yucca Mountain site that automatically eliminates it from consideration as the location of a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. However, important technical questions remain about Yucca Mountain, especially about the effects of heat on the movement of water in the mountain and on the associated transport of radionuclides. The DOE is taking steps to address these questions, but some uncertainty will inevitably continue about predictions of the performance of a potential repository system. This may be true to some extent at any site. At the time a decision is made on site recommendation, the Board and the scientific community are likely to be asked at least two questions: (1) Is the underlying science broadly regarded as technically credible and sound? and (2) Are the uncertainties in estimates of performance displayed clearly and openly, especially about the major factors that may lead to a potential radioactive release? A major question for policy-makers at that point may be whether the site is suitable, given the level of uncertainty associated with the DOE's site-suitability determination. The Board believes it is critical that the DOE not only offer estimates of performance but also clarify the extent and significance of the technical and scientific uncertainties. Understanding uncertainties is vital for sound decision-making. Thank you very much for this opportunity to provide the Board's views. I will be happy to respond to questions. Mr. Barton. Thank you, Doctor. We now would like to hear from the director of the Office of Radiation at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Mr. Steven Page. Your statement is in the record in its entirety and we ask you to summarize it in 7 minutes. STATEMENT OF STEPHEN D. PAGE Mr. Page. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee. I will focus my brief remarks on the issues that I understand are of particular interest to you and the subcommittee this morning. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 directed EPA to set site specific public health and safety standards for Yucca Mountain. That legislation also required the National Academy of Sciences to conduct an analysis of the scientific basis for the standards to be applied to Yucca Mountain. Since then, EPA has finalized its generic high level waste standards and certified a deep geological repository that complies with those standards. During the past 10 years, EPA has been working closely with DOE, NRC, OSTP, and the National Academy of Science to apply these standards and to develop site specific standards for Yucca Mountain that are technically sound and achievable, legally defensible, and above all, are protective of public health and the environment. In August 1999, we published our proposed Yucca Mountain standards. We received approximately 800 public comments from 70 groups or individuals which we will be responding to in writing at the time we issue our final standards. We received extensive comments from DOE and NRC as well as other government entities, the National Academy of Sciences, industry, and environmental groups, tribal organizations, scientific associations, and members of the general public. Now, I would like to turn to the three main elements in our proposed disposal standards: Individual protection, human intrusion, and groundwater protection. We received more comments on these three issues than on any other aspect of the proposed rule. The individual protection standard focuses on exposures to an individual whose lifestyle is similar to people living today in the Yucca Mountain region and who obtains drinking water and food from local sources. The human intrusion standard focuses on evaluating the ability of the repository to withstand a single intrusion event. And third, the groundwater standard protects important natural resources by focusing on the quality of the aquifer supplying water to downgradient communities. As directed by the Energy Policy Act, our proposed Yucca Mountain standards are based on and generally consistent with the recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences. The NAS commented that the individual protection standard of 15 millirem is within the risk range they recommended, and that the human intrusion standard very closely follows their recommendations. However, there were some differences on the proposed groundwater protection standard, which I would like to address briefly. The NAS said that a separate groundwater standard is unnecessary and that it lacks a sound scientific basis. However, the NAS also recognized that EPA does have the authority to consider policy issues in setting a separate groundwater protection standard. They recommended that we clearly identify the standard as an implementation of policy. Historically, this administration as well as previous administrations have had a policy of protecting groundwater resources that currently are being used, or that potentially could be used as a source of drinking water. More than 50 percent of the U.S. population draws on groundwater for its potable water supply. Proper cleanup of contaminated groundwater is often difficult, if not impossible, to achieve and it is very expensive if it can be done at all. It is important to remember that the aquifer under Yucca Mountain currently is used as source of drinking water. Therefore, we proposed protection of groundwater at Yucca Mountain to the same level as the maximum contaminant levels, or the MCLs, for radionuclides that we established under the authority of the Safe Drinking Water Act. As you may be aware, virtually every State has taken steps to comprehensive groundwater protection. Forty-one States have numeric or narrative groundwater standards to protect their groundwater currently. Groundwater protection is also applied to every hazardous waste facility in this country. The citizens of Nevada, particularly in a region growing as rapidly as the Las Vegas metropolitan area should be extended the similar type of protection for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste in the Yucca Mountain repository. An important question that some commenters raise is the need for a separate groundwater protection standard in addition to at all-pathways individual protection standard. Our proposed rule contains two complementary standards: A 15 millirem all- pathways individual protection standard and a 4 millirem groundwater protection standard. While the 15 millirem proposed standard directly protects individuals who may receive exposure from radionuclides released from the repository, the 4 millirem level protects the groundwater resource, as we mentioned earlier. This level of protection is derived from the MCLs that are used to define acceptable supplies of drinking water. Similarly, should groundwater that is or could be used for drinking water be a significant pathway, present and future users of the groundwater resource are adequately protected. By extension, it provides protection to individuals who now live, or may live in the future, in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain. We understand that DOE still has to undergo the NRC licensing process. However, to date, DOE's ongoing studies show compliance with the proposed groundwater standard, although EPA is still considering options and alternatives for the final rule. DOE's costs for the facilities are driven by many external influences, including EPA's proposed standard, all of which strive to enhance repository safety. Other more notable influences include the recommendations of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board and the rigorous NRC licensing process. Further, EPA's current schedule to issue the final standard this summer does not adversely impact DOE's ability to make a site recommendation as planned. Thank you again for inviting me to testify before the subcommittee today, and I am happy to answer any questions that you may have. [The prepared statement of Stephen D. Page follows:] Prepared Statement of Stephen D. Page, Director, Office of Radiation and Indoor Air, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency introduction Good morning Chairman Barton and Members of the Subcommittee. It is my pleasure to appear before you today to provide you with an update on the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) environmental protection standards for the proposed geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. I will update you on the status of our final standards and focus on issues of interest to the Subcommittee. I would like to begin by reviewing EPA's statutory authority for issuing the Yucca Mountain standards and the process that we are following in developing the standards. I also will discuss the National Academy of Science's (NAS) technical recommendations, and some important elements of our proposed standards, including the proposed ground water protection standard for Yucca Mountain. Finally, I will generally address the expected impact of our proposed standards on the cost of the repository. We believe that, as a matter of policy, the environmental protection standards that EPA ultimately issues should consider four primary principles: good science, cost-effectiveness, equity, and pollution prevention. statutory authority The Energy Policy Act of 1992 [Pub. Law No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 10141 n. (1994)] gives EPA the authority to establish public health and safety standards for Yucca Mountain. This Act states that EPA shall promulgate ``public health and safety standards for protection of the public from releases from radioactive materials stored or disposed of in the Yucca Mountain repository'' [Sec. 801(a)(1) of the Energy Policy Act]. The Act further states that EPA's standards ``shall be the only such standards applicable to the Yucca Mountain site.'' Prior to the enactment of the Energy Policy Act, EPA developed generic radioactive waste disposal regulations that applied to all radioactive waste disposal sites, including Yucca Mountain, which was currently under consideration as the Nation's first geologic repository for commercial nuclear waste. These regulations are found at 40 CFR Part 191 (50 FR 38066, September 19, 1985). These generic disposal regulations were applied to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico, which EPA certified in 1998, and is currently operating as the Nation's first geologic disposal facility for transuranic radioactive waste produced as a result of our Nation's defense programs. In 1987, EPA's generic disposal regulations were remanded by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit [NRDC v. EPA, 824 F 2d 1258 (1st Cir. 1987)], because, among other things, we had not properly considered ground water protection. Also in 1987, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was amended (NWPAA, Pub. L. 100-203), selecting Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be characterized for high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel disposal. Then, in 1992, the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (WIPP LWA, Pub L. 102-579) was enacted, which directed EPA to finalize the generic disposal regulations at 40 CFR Part 191 and certify whether WIPP was a suitable site for transuranic waste disposal. The WIPP Land Withdrawal Act also exempted Yucca Mountain from the 40 CFR Part 191 generic radioactive disposal standards. So, in 1992, with the enactment of the Energy Policy Act, EPA was directed by Congress to set site-specific environmental protection standards for Yucca Mountain. In doing so, EPA was to consider technical recommendations from the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). The NAS issued its Yucca Mountain report in 1995. Between 1995 and 1999, when EPA issued our proposed environmental protection standards for Yucca Mountain, we held technical discussions with the NAS, as well as numerous interagency discussions with DOE, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Office of Management and Budget, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and other federal agencies to discuss important technical and policy issues associated with the development of the standards. standards development process EPA published its proposed standards in the Federal Register on August 27, 1999 (64 FR 46976). We are working on developing the final rule, and we anticipate promulgating the final rule this Summer. We received extensive comments from DOE and NRC, as well as other government entities, NAS, industrial and environmental advocacy groups,Tribal organizations, scientific associations, and members of the general public. We received approximately 800 public comments from 70 groups or individuals which we will be responding to in writing at the time we issue our final standards. We have made every effort to consider all sides of the issues that have come to our attention. This includes meetings with interested parties and discussions within the Administration. A significant amount of this time has been spent addressing scientific issues in coordination with NAS, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, DOE and NRC. EPA has worked diligently with these organizations to resolve the many complex issues. We are currently in the final stages of drafting the final rule and supporting documents for our internal Agency review process. These documents include the preamble and rule, extensive technical background information document, economic impact analysis, and detailed response to comments document. Once these documents have been reviewed within EPA, we will begin the inter-agency review process administered by the Office of Management and Budget, in which DOE and NRC will participate. We are taking the necessary time to ensure that we prepare standards that are technically sound, legally defensible, can be implemented reasonably, and are protective of public health and safety from potential releases from Yucca Mountain. During the public comment period, and thereafter, EPA staff traveled to local communities to hold public hearings and meetings to discuss the standards, EPA's role with respect to the other agencies' roles, and to answer general questions about the Agency's process for setting the standards. These meetings were held with community and Tribal leaders, as well as with state and county representatives. national academy of science's recommendations and comments The Energy Policy Act required us to contract with the NAS to conduct a study to provide findings and recommendations on reasonable standards for protection of the public health and safety. On August 1, 1995, the NAS released its report (``the NAS Report''), titled Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards. Since 1995, EPA has thoroughly studied the NAS report and the public comments received on the report in order to propose the standards for Yucca Mountain. The EPA's proposed Yucca Mountain standards are based on and consistent with the recommendations of the NAS. Where our proposed rule departed from a strict reading of the NAS report, we made a special effort to explain our reasoning. The development of the proposed rule for Yucca Mountain was guided by the findings and recommendations of the NAS because of the special role Congress gave the NAS and because of the NAS's scientific expertise. We worked very hard to incorporate NAS's comments into our proposed rule; and, in some cases we have used NAS's recommendations to inform our policy decisions. In its comments on our proposed standards for Yucca Mountain, the NAS is supportive of many aspects of our proposed rule and provides recommendations for improvement in areas where we disagree. important aspects of epa's environmental protection standards The three main elements proposed in our proposed standards are the individual-protection standard, the ground water protection standard, and the human intrusion standard. Each standard must be met for DOE to be in compliance with our rule. Provided below are some of the issues on which NAS and others had important comments. The individual-protection standard focuses on exposures to an individual whose lifestyle is similar to people living today in the Yucca Mountain region, and who obtains drinking water and food from local sources. The ground water protection standard protects important natural resources by focusing on the quality of the aquifer supplying water to downgradient communities. The human intrusion standard focuses on evaluating the ability of the repository to withstand a single intrusion event. Individual Protection In its proposal, EPA adopted an annual dose of 15 millirem from all exposure pathways as protective. This is equivalent to the NAS- recommended annual risk range of 1 x 10-6 to 1 x 10-5, which translates to a dose range of 2 to 20 millirem/ year. The annual risk associated with EPA's proposed 15 millirem standard and 4 millirem standard for ground water fall within this range. In its comments on the proposed rule, NAS determined that the individual protection standard proposed by EPA fell within the range of values it suggested. In those comments, the NAS stated that, ``EPA appears to recognize that its standard must be written in a way that provides appropriate protection to the individuals who have the highest potential for exposure . . . while avoiding unrealistic and unnecessarily conservative assumptions for individual exposure.'' Human Intrusion In our proposed rule, EPA followed the NAS recommendations on human intrusion. We did this by including a scenario for inadvertent human intrusion that is analyzed using similar methods as the undisturbed case (i.e., without intrusion). We were prescriptive in specifying the intrusion event in order to make implementation a more reasonable process for DOE and NRC. Regulatory Time Frame We proposed that DOE meet numerical standards for 10,000 years after repository closure. The 10,000-year limitation was set to reduce speculation about the application of a regulation beyond 10,000 years and to be consistent with previous regulation of the WIPP geologic repository. In its report, NAS recommended that the period of compliance should extend to a time when the potential peak risks may occur (this could be several tens of thousands years for Yucca Mountain). NAS determined that there is likely little difference between its recommendation and EPA's proposed standard because although EPA's standard applies for only 10,000 years, EPA also proposed to require DOE to consider the performance of the disposal system at the time of peak dose, whenever that occurs, as part of the environmental review process. ground water protection The NAS report concluded that an individual protection standard is sufficient for the protection of public health from radiation releases from the Yucca Mountain repository. The NAS did, however, state that, under the Energy Policy Act, EPA has the authority to set a separate ground water standard as a matter of policy. EPA has proposed the ground water standard as an implementation of policy which we plan to articulate more clearly in the final rule. Ground Water Protection Ground water is one of our Nation's most precious resources; more than 50 percent of the U.S. population draws on ground water for its potable water supply. If radionuclides migrate into this valuable resource, there are multiple routes of exposure. In addition to serving as a source of drinking water, ground water may be used for irrigation, stock watering, food preparation, showering, and various industrial processes. Ground water contamination is also of concern to us because of potential adverse impacts upon ecosystems, particularly sensitive or endangered ecosystems. For these reasons, we believe it is a resource that needs special protection. Therefore, we proposed a level of protection of ground water at Yucca Mountain at the same level as the maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) for radionuclides that we established previously under the authority of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). As you know, EPA has a long-standing policy of emphasizing the protection of ground water resources in other contexts from all sources of pollution. We developed a formal Agency strategy in 1990. Key elements of our ground water protection and cleanup strategy in other contexts are the overall goals of preventing adverse effects on human health and the environment and protecting the environmental integrity of the Nation's ground water resources. Ground water should be protected to ensure that the Nation's currently used and reasonably expected drinking water supplies do not present adverse health risks and are preserved to present and future generations. It should also be protected to ensure that ground water does not interfere with the attainment of surface-water-quality standards that are necessary to protect the integrity of associated ecosystems. The pollution prevention approach to protecting ground water resources avoids requiring present or future communities to implement expensive cleanup or treatment procedures. This approach also protects individual ground water users. Moreover, absent the protections in our proposed rule, EPA believes the ground water in aquifers around the repository itself could be subject to expensive cleanup by future generations if releases from the repository contaminate the surrounding ground waters at levels that exceed the drinking water standards. A guiding philosophy in radioactive waste management, as well as waste disposal in general, has been to avoid polluting resources that reasonably could be used in the future rather than imposing cleanup burden on future generations. Virtually every state has taken steps toward comprehensive ground water protection. Forty-nine states have developed programs to protect current ground water sources of drinking water through the Wellhead Protection Program. Forty-one states have numeric or narrative ground water standards to protect their ground water supplies. As EPA has said in testimony to this Subcommittee before, the people of Nevada should not be exposed to higher risks than the people in any other state in the U.S. EPA believes that ground water in a region growing as rapidly as the Las Vegas metropolitan area should be protected from pollution ``up front,'' rather than becoming polluted, and then forcing the residents to bear the cost of the environmental cleanup afterwards. An important question that has been raised by some commenters is the need for the separate ground water protection standard, in addition to the all pathways individual protection standard. Our proposed rule contains two standards for disposal of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste in the Yucca Mountain repository: a 15 millirem all- pathways individual protection standard, and a 4 millirem ground water protection standard. It is critical to understand the relationship between these two separate, but complementary, standards. We proposed an all-pathways individual protection standard and a separate ground water protection standard because it was our view that it was appropriate to do so in order to comply with our statutory mandate to promulgate ``public health and safety standards for protection of the public from releases from radioactive materials stored or disposed of'' in the Yucca Mountain repository [Sec. 801(a)(1) of the Energy Policy Act]. The 15 millirem standard is an all-pathways standard that directly protects individuals who may receive exposure (through any pathway) from radionuclides released from the repository. The 15 millirem all pathways standard is the same standard that we included previously in our generic standards for geologic repositories (40 CFR Part 191). Should any pathways including a ground water pathway prove to be significant, the all-pathways standard serves to limit radiation exposures to affected individuals. However, should the ground water pathway be the most significant source of exposure, then an all pathways standard would allow groundwater concentrations that exceed 4 millirem/year. The 4 millirem standard is the MCL, promulgated pursuant to the Safe Drinking Water Act, and is used to define the allowable level in drinking water. If ground water that is or could be used for drinking water, among other uses, is a significant pathway, present and future users of the ground water resource would be protected at the level of the current drinking water standard by a ground water standard. By extension, a ground water standard would provide this protection (albeit indirectly) to the individuals who now live, or who may live in the future, in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain. In its report on the technical bases for Yucca Mountain standards, NAS identified ground water as the pathway likely to lead to the greatest exposure of the public and the environment to releases from the Yucca Mountain repository. With respect to radioactive waste disposal, we believe the fundamental principle of inter-generational equity is important. We should not knowingly impose burdens on future generations that we ourselves are not willing to assume. Disposal technologies and regulatory requirements are developed with the aim of preventing pollution from disposal operations, rather than assuming that cleanup in the future is an unavoidable cost of disposal operations today. Designing a disposal system, and imposing performance requirements that avoid polluting resources that reasonably could be used in the future, therefore is a more appropriate choice than imposing cleanup burdens on future generations. The approach to ground water protection in our proposed regulation is consistent with our overall approach to ground water protection: it limits the contamination of current and potential sources of drinking water in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain. In designing our proposed ground water protection standard, EPA offered as much flexibility as possible, while still ensuring adequate environmental protection. For example, to facilitate implementation of the standard, we proposed the concept of a ``representative volume'' of ground water in which DOE and NRC would project the concentration of radionuclides released from Yucca Mountain for comparison against the MCLs. In addition, we proposed the concept of a ``point of compliance'' whereby EPA would establish the area where the concentration of radionuclides would be measured. Our proposed standards offered several options and explained the rationale for each in detail. Our proposed standard requires that DOE provide a reasonable expectation that, for 10,000 years of undisturbed performance after disposal, releases of radionuclides from the disposal system will not cause the level of radioactivity from combined beta and photon emitting radionuclides in the representative volume at the point of compliance to exceed 4 millirem per year to the whole body or to any organ. Put simply, under our proposal, DOE must provide a reasonable expectation that the Yucca Mountain disposal system will meet the same levels as the current MCLs for radionuclides under the Safe Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 300f to 300j-26). We frequently require compliance with the MCLs in our regulations. When we developed the current MCLs in 1975, we based them on the best scientific knowledge regarding the relationship between radiation exposure and risk that existed at that time. In the near future, we intend to update the existing MCLs based on a number of factors, including the current understanding of the risk of developing a fatal cancer from exposure to radiation; pertinent risk management factors (such as information about treatment technologies and analytical methods); and applicable statutory requirements. Particularly relevant statutory requirements, in this context, are the requirements (1) that MCLs be set as close as feasible to the Maximum Contaminant Level Goal (MCLG) [42 U.S.C. Sec. 300g-1(b)(4)(B)] and (2) that revised drinking water regulations provide for equivalent or greater human health protection than the regulations they replace [42 U.S.C. Sec. 300g- 1(b)(9)]. Our preliminary analysis of the current MCLs, which are being revised under a separate Agency rulemaking, indicates that, when updated for the latest scientific understanding, the radionuclide concentrations to meet the current MCLs mostly fall within the Agency's range of acceptable risks of 10-4 to 10-6. This means that there will be no more than one in 10,000 to one in 1,000,000 chance of excess cancer deaths. This is not unique to Yucca Mountain, as it is the risk range that has governed the Nation's drinking water regulations for the last 25 years. Based on the statutory requirements and the factors identified above, we proposed allowable concentrations for the radionuclides of concern at Yucca Mountain at levels that are comparable to current standards. effects of our rule on the repository's costs and doe's schedule An EPA draft study (which will be available when the final rule is issued) indicates that EPA's proposed standards will not have a significant impact on the cost of the repository. We support DOE's efforts to design the repository in such a way as to prevent or to the extent possible limit any releases from the repository in order to avoid passing on the costs of clean up to future generations. We understand that DOE still has to undergo the NRC licensing process; however, to date, DOE's ongoing studies show compliance with the proposed ground water standard, although EPA is still considering options and alternatives for the final rule. As our economic impact analysis for our final standards will illustrate, DOE's costs for the facility are driven by many external influences, including EPA's proposed standards, the recommendations of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board and the rigorous NRC licensing process, all striving to enhance repository safety. A primary concern relates to minimizing the technical uncertainties of modeling and enhancing repository performance through certain engineered enhancements to the repository design (e.g., an improved canister, drip shields). conclusion Thank you again for inviting me to testify before the Subcommittee today. I would be happy to answer any questions that you may have. Mr. Barton. Thank you, Mr. Page. We now would like to hear from Dr. Crowley. Your statement is in the record in its entirety and you are recognized for 7 minutes. STATEMENT OF KEVIN D. CROWLEY Mr. Crowley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the invitation to testify. For the record, my name is Kevin Crowley. I am the director of the National Research Council's Board on Radioactive Waste Management. BRWM was established by the National Academy of Sciences in 1958 to provide scientific and technical advice to the Federal Government on the safe and responsible management of radioactive waste. The BRWM recognizes the importance of the Yucca Mountain radiation protection standards and has been interacting in a cooperative spirit with EPA and the other Federal agencies at this table to help ensure that these standards are based on sound science. As Mr. Page mentioned in his statement, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 directed the EPA administrator to obtain advice from the NAS on the technical basis for Yucca Mountain standards. The NAS's advice to EPA was provided in the 1995 National Research Council report entitled ``Technical Basis for Yucca Mountain Standards.'' That is this report which I will refer to as the TYMS report in the remainder of my testimony. After EPA issued its draft standards in August 1999, the BRWM wrote another report to the EPA administrator that compared those standards with the recommendations in the TYMS report. The purpose of the comparison was to determine whether EPA followed the recommendations in the TYMS report and if not to suggest how EPA could modify its draft standards to make them consistent. The 1999 BRWM report concluded that EPA's draft standards were consistent with the TYMS report in several important respects, and I have reviewed those in my full written testimony. The BRWM also identified several points of disagreement, and I would like to focus the remainder of my oral testimony on those three points. The first significant point of disagreement concerns the form of the standard. EPA proposes a standard that is based on the dose that an individual may receive from repository releases. The TYMS report specifically recommended against basing the standard on dose, but instead recommended the establishment of what it calls a risk-based standard. A risk- based standard, a standard that is based on the likelihood of a health effect; in this case, the likelihood of contracting a fatal cancer from radiation releases from the repository. The TYMS report noted that the question, what is an acceptable risk, is a societal judgment to be established through the rulemaking process. Once a risk level is established, then a dose value can be derived using existing scientific knowledge. The adoption of a risk-based standard as recommended by the TYMS report would have several benefits, and I would like to list those. First, there would be clear traceability between the numerical value of that standard and the public policy decision on what is an acceptable risk. Second, the standard would be more readily understood by nonexperts, which could help promote more meaningful public input to rulemaking and greater public confidence in the final standards and recommendations for Yucca Mountain. Third, this approach would promote consistency between the Yucca Mountain standards and regulation for other hazards such as toxic chemicals. And fourth, a risk-based standard would not have to be revised by subsequent rulemaking as advances in scientific knowledge improve our understanding of radiation effects on human health. The second point of disagreement concerns EPA's inclusion of a groundwater standard in addition to an all-pathway standard. The all-pathway standard, of course, also applies to groundwater. The TYMS report recognized that groundwater is likely to be the primary source of individual exposure to any radioactive materials that escape from Yucca Mountain. And the report found that an adequate set-all-pathways standard could protect both individuals living near the repository and populations distant from the repository, including those populations that would use the groundwater. Therefore, the report did not recommend a separate groundwater standard. The 1999 BRWM report concluded that the imposition of a separate groundwater standard may greatly complicate the licensing process for Yucca Mountain and have a negative impact on the protection of the public. I have provided more extensive comments on this in my written testimony. I hope we have a chance during the Q and A session to talk about the groundwater standard in a little more detail. The third and last point of disagreement concerns the time period over which the standard should be applied. The main concern identified in the BRWM report is an EPA requirement that repository performance be examined beyond 10,000 years to see if dramatic changes could be anticipated. EPA provides no guidance as to what qualifies as a ``dramatic change,'' nor does it state the purpose of this examination. The BRWM report notes that this aspect of the standard will provide no real benefit to protection of the public. Yucca Mountain repository must isolate waste from the environment for many millennia. It is essential that the standard for this repository be scientifically sound. The overall conclusion of the 1999 BRWM report is that the current EPA draft standards fall short of this goal in some important respects. The BRWM hopes that EPA will accept the suggestions it has made for improvements in the proposed standards. That concludes my oral remarks. Again, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify. [The prepared statement of Kevin D. Crowley follows:] Prepared Statement of Kevin D. Crowley, Director, Board on Radioactive Waste Management, National Research Council Chairman Barton and subcommittee members, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Energy and Power Subcommittee to testify on the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) draft radiation protection standards for Yucca Mountain. I am the director of the National Research Council's Board on Radioactive Waste Management (BRWM), which was established by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) in 1958 to provide scientific and technical advice to the federal government on the safe and responsible management of radioactive waste. My testimony to the subcommittee today will focus on recent reports from the BRWM and committees under its oversight that bear directly on the question of radiation protection standards for Yucca Mountain. In particular, I will discuss the findings and recommendations from two reports: Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards, also known as the ``TYMS report,'' which was published in 1995, and a 1999 BRWM report entitled Comments on Proposed Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada by the Board on Radioactive Waste Management. As you know Mr. Chairman, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 directed EPA to promulgate radiation protection standards specifically for a potential repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. The Act directed the EPA Administrator to obtain advice from the NAS on the technical bases for radiation protection standards, and the Act further mandated that EPA base its standards on the NAS recommendations. To respond to this request, the National Research Council, the operating arm of the NAS and National Academy of Engineering, appointed a BRWM committee in early 1993 to provide advice to EPA on the standards. The committee held a series of information-gathering and deliberation meetings (many in Nevada) over a period of about two years and issued its recommendations in the 1995 TYMS report. In developing its recommendations, the TYMS committee was very careful to distinguish between scientific and policy judgments. The committee recognized that some elements of the standards could be addressed using scientific data and understanding, whereas other elements required societal value judgements. For example, the committee recognized that there is no basis in science for establishing acceptable radiation exposure limits but, rather, ``acceptability'' was a societal value judgement that was best established through the rulemaking process. Similarly, the TYMS committee noted that the time period of applicability of the standards has both scientific and policy aspects. EPA published its draft radiation protection standards in the Federal Register (64 FR 46976-47016) on August 27, 1999. The BRWM, acting under its own initiative and with approval of the National Research Council's governing board, decided to issue a report that compared the draft EPA standards with the recommendations in the TYMS report. The purpose of this comparison was to determine whether EPA followed the recommendations laid out in the TYMS report and, if not, to suggest how EPA could modify its draft standards to make them consistent. The BRWM's report was submitted to the public docket during the comment period for EPA's draft standards. This report reflected the consensus of the BRWM and was approved for release by the National Research Council after being subjected to the Research Council's review process. The BRWM found that EPA's draft standards were consistent with the 1995 TYMS report in several important aspects, the most significant of which are the following:Who is Protected. The TYMS report recommended that the radiation protection standard be applied to representative individuals who have the highest risk from radiation releases from the repository. EPA proposed a standard to protect individuals living near the repository--using a reasonably maximally exposed individual (RMEI)--that is broadly consistent with the TYMS report's recommendation. Level of Protection. The TYMS report concluded that the numerical value for the radiation protection standard was a policy decision to be established through the rulemaking process. EPA has used rulemaking to establish an ``all- pathways'' standard. This standard sets an upper limit on the exposure the RMEI can receive from radiation releases through all potential release pathways, including groundwater and the atmosphere. The numerical value of this standard proposed by EPA falls within the range of values suggested in the TYMS report. Human Intrusion. EPA follows the TYMS report's recommendations that the standards should require active and passive institutional controls to prevent human intrusion into the repository in the near term; that the standard should be based on explicitly defined assumptions about how human intrusion could occur in the long term; and that the standard should set limits on radiation exposure to individuals as a result of a human intrusion that are no more stringent than the all- pathways standard. Exposure Scenarios. The TYMS report concluded that there is no scientific basis for predicting future scenarios by which humans could be exposed to radiation from a Yucca Mountain repository. Therefore, the report recommended that such scenarios be established through the rulemaking process. EPA has used rulemaking to define exposure scenarios based on the state of society, human biology, and knowledge that exists at the time of submission of the license application for the repository. There are also several elements of EPA's proposed standards that are inconsistent with the recommendations in the TYMS report. My testimony will focus on the three most important elements: risk- versus dose-based standards; the inclusion of a separate groundwater standard; and the time period over which the standard should be applied. Risk- Versus Dose-Based Standards EPA proposes a standard that is based on the dose an individual may receive as a result of radioactive releases from the repository. The TYMS report specifically recommended against basing the standard on dose. Instead, the report recommended that the standard be based on the risk to individuals of an adverse health effect from radiation releases, and the report further recommended that rulemaking be used to establish an acceptable risk level. The TYMS committee recommended a risk-based standard for several reasons. First, the committee recognized that a risk-based standard is more understandable to the public than a dose-based standard and its use would therefore promote more meaningful public involvement in what truly is a public-policy decision. A risk-based standard can be expressed as a simple probability of developing a fatal cancer--for example, a standard that has a numerical annual risk value of 10-4 would mean that an individual living near the repository could have no greater than a 1 in 10,000 chance per year of developing a fatal cancer from radiation releases from the repository. A dose-based standard, in contrast, provides no indication of hazard levels and is understandable only by experts. The proposed EPA all- pathways dose standard of 15 millirems per year, for example, provides no indication of the number of fatal cancers that could be expected in a given year from repository releases. Second, a risk-based standard for Yucca Mountain can be compared directly to other risk-based standards, such as EPA's standards for toxic chemicals, because they use common units of measurement. Also, the magnitude of the risk value corresponds directly to the level of hazard. For example, a 10-5 (1 chance in 100,000) risk standard for Yucca Mountain would provide the same level of public protection as a 10-5 risk standard for regulating a particular toxic material, assuming of course that both standards were based on the same health effect such as fatal cancers. EPA currently regulates hazardous chemicals on the basis of risk, so the adoption of a risk-based radiation protection standard for Yucca Mountain would promote uniformity across EPA's family of regulations. Third, a risk-based standard would not have to be revised by subsequent rulemaking as advances in scientific knowledge improve our understanding of radiation effects on human health. There have been significant improvements in our understanding of radiation effects on human health over the past few decades, and dose-based standards have had to be adjusted as our knowledge has improved. There is reason to believe that these improvements will continue and that adjustments to dose-based standards will be necessary in the future. For a risk-based standard, the level of acceptable risk would be established during initial rulemaking. This level would not have to be changed if new science indicated a change in the relationship between dose and health effects. EPA's use of a dose-based standard not only makes it difficult for the public to provide meaningful input to the rulemaking process, but it may also lower public confidence in the output from that process. Take, for example, the disagreement between the EPA and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) over radiological criteria for unrestricted use of nuclear sites. The EPA standard (based on 40 CFR Part 191) is 15 millirems per year, whereas the USNRC regulation (10 CFR 20.1402) is 25 millirems per year with ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable). Both agencies claim that their release limits are protective of public health. What is the public to think when the two federal agencies charged with protecting public health cannot agree on what the protective limits should be? The reason the EPA's and USNRC's limits are different is that each agency has a different starting point for establishing the exposure limit values, and neither agency uses risk to establish such limits. EPA points out in the preamble to its draft standards that it was directed by the Energy Policy Act to develop a ``dose-based standard.'' The TYMS report's recommendation that the form of the individual- protection standard be based on risk does not preclude EPA from expressing the numeric value of the standard in units of risk and in derivative units of dose, so long as the risk value is clearly understood as the underlying basis for the proposed dose standard. In its 1999 report, the BRWM noted that such an approach ``would achieve the aims of the TYMS report's recommendations and it would allow EPA to meet its Congressional mandate.'' To summarize, the use of a risk-based standard in the Yucca Mountain rule would have several benefits: there would be clear traceability between the numerical value of the standard and the public policy decision on what is an acceptable risk; the standard would be more readily understood by nonexperts, which could help promote more meaningful public input to rulemaking and greater public confidence in the resulting regulations; this approach would facilitate uniformity of the standard with regulations for other hazards such as toxic chemicals; and if a risk-based approach were implemented for all elements of the Yucca Mountain standard, it would eliminate the current problem with the groundwater element of the standard, which I will discuss next. The 1999 BRWM report noted that a risk-based standard would be more difficult to implement than a dose-based standard, and that EPA might find it far more difficult to ask the public about acceptable risk levels than to follow established precedents. Nevertheless, a risk- based standard was recommended both in the TYMS report and the 1999 BRWM report because it requires public involvement in what is fundamentally a public-policy decision. Inclusion of a Separate Groundwater Standard EPA has included a standard for the protection of groundwater in its proposed rule in addition to the all-pathways standard described previously. The proposed groundwater standard appears to be designed to protect both individuals living near the repository and the general public living at some distance from the repository. The groundwater standard is a holdover from EPA's 1985 disposal regulations (40 CFR Part 191) and is taken directly from the EPA's safe drinking water regulations (40 CFR Part 141). In incorporating the groundwater standard into the Yucca Mountain standards, EPA has made several modifications from the safe drinking water regulations. First, the groundwater standard in EPA's safe drinking water regulations applies to public water systems. For the Yucca Mountain standards, EPA proposes to apply the groundwater standard to a groundwater aquifer some 2,000 feet below the Earth's surface at the Yucca Mountain site and at some as-yet undetermined distance from the repository boundary--the point of compliance for alternatives being proposed by EPA range from 5 to 30 kilometers (3 to 19 miles) from the repository boundary. The Yucca Mountain standard also applies to a volume of groundwater in the aquifer rather than to water delivered by a public water system--EPA has proposed a value of 1,285 acre-feet (about 420 million gallons) but has also asked for comments on values that range from 10 to 4,000 acre feet (3 million to 1.3 billion gallons). The numerical value of the standard itself is based on 40-year-old dosimetry and does not conform with current international standards, and it represents a different level of risk than the all-pathways standard of 15 millirems per year. The TYMS committee recognized that groundwater is likely to be the primary source of individual exposure to radioactive materials that escape from Yucca Mountain, and that committee found that the all- pathways standard would protect both local and distant populations. Therefore, the TYMS committee did not recommend a separate groundwater standard. The 1999 BRWM report concluded that the imposition of a separate groundwater standard ``may greatly complicate the licensing process [for Yucca Mountain] and have but a negligible impact on protection of the public.'' The 1999 BRWM report concluded that there was no basis in science for establishing a separate groundwater standard and recommended that EPA either ``make more cogent scientific arguments to justify the need for this standard,'' or if it wishes to establish a separate standard as a matter of policy, that it ``explicitly state the policy decisions embedded in the proposed standard and ask the public to comment on those decisions.'' The 1999 BRWM report did not suggest what scientific arguments EPA could use to justify a separate groundwater standard, but I would like to close this part of my testimony by suggesting one possible approach for resolving the BRWM's objections. I believe that EPA could justify a separate groundwater standard by adopting the risk-based approach recommended in the TYMS report. If EPA based its Yucca Mountain standards on a SINGLE VALUE OF ACCEPTABLE RISK, it could express that risk in terms of two elements, one for radiation exposures through the groundwater pathway (a groundwater standard) and one for exposures through all pathways (an all-pathways standard). These two elements would be scientifically consistent so long as they are based on a single value of acceptable risk. To implement this approach, EPA would have to modify the dose values for the all-pathways and groundwater elements that currently exist in its proposed rule so that they represent the same value of acceptable risk. Time Period Over Which the Standard Should be Applied EPA proposes that the radiation protection standards at Yucca Mountain be applied over a time period of 10,000 years. The TYMS report concluded that (1) an arbitrary time limit such as 10,000 years has no scientific basis, and (2) peak risks from radiation releases from the repository are likely to occur beyond 10,000 years. The report recommended compliance be assessed for the site's period of geologic stability and noted that a technical assessment of the site should be feasible for on the order of one million years. After the TYMS report was published, EPA asked for public comment on the timescale issue, and the majority of those commenting stated that compliance should be assessed at the time of peak risk. EPA has nevertheless retained its earlier recommendation for quantitative compliance assessment only up to 10,000 years and has given a series of policy and technical arguments for this choice. The TYMS report excluded policy considerations from its deliberations on this issue, but concluded, as noted previously, that ``there is no scientific basis for limiting the time period to . . . 10,000 years. Clearly, the 10,000-year limit is strictly a policy choice and should be acknowledged as such'' by EPA. As the proposed standards currently read, the policy origin of the limit is not evident. Though compliance is assessed for a period of 10,000 years, EPA requires that the repository performance be examined past this point ``to see if dramatic changes . . . could be anticipated'' (64 FR, p. 46993). Here EPA provides no guidance as to what qualifies as a dramatic change or as to the purpose of the examination. The BRWM believes that this aspect of the standard will provide ``no real benefits to protection of the public.'' The BRWM noted that EPA ``may wish to be more specific in providing guidance on how the analyses beyond 10,000 years could be used in determining compliance'' or explicitly pass this task to the USNRC. In conclusion Mr. Chairman, a Yucca Mountain repository must isolate waste from the environment for many millennia. It is essential that the standard for this repository reflect the best thinking that science has to offer. The overall conclusion of the 1999 BRWM report is that the current EPA draft standards fall short of this goal in some important respects. The BRWM hopes that EPA will accept the suggestions it has made for improvements in the proposed standards. This concludes my testimony to the committee. I would be happy to clarify my comments or answer committee members' questions. Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify. Mr. Barton. Thank you. Let's do 7-minute question rounds, but we will have numerous rounds. The Chair will recognize himself first. First, let me say that we cannot have a democracy if we do not have debate. So it is good to have this panel here. But I want the record to show, because of what our two Nevadans said, this is not a hearing that is about politics. There is not one member on this dais right now that is going to get any political plus of sitting through 3 hours of technical details about what the radiation standard or the groundwater standard at Yucca Mountain ought to be. The members that will get political support and send out press releases have already been here--the two Nevadans. And they will send out press releases saying they stood up to the Congress and they spoke in no uncertain terms about how it shouldn't be Yucca Mountain, and that is how should be. But none of us are going to send out press releases about how we sat through 3 hours of some of the most boring information you are ever going to have to listen to because we want what is good public policy, and that is why we are here. That is why this subcommittee is here is because this is an issue that is very important. If you assume that each Member of Congress represents about half a million people you have members that represent 3 million people, or 3 percent of the American population sitting at this hearing. And we are all in this together. As Congresswoman Berkley said, we are for America, and I happen to think that the United States of America should have a comprehensive nuclear policy that includes a repository, or a depository, where the high level nuclear waste can be safely stored. Now, we are not technical experts; you folks are. So we have got to ask you some questions, and we have got to have this debate. After 18 years, I was a White House Fellow in the Department of Energy in 1981 and 1982, and participated in policy debates at a minor level about what has come to be known the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. Eighteen years later I am the subcommittee chairman and we are basically having the same debate, although at, admittedly, a higher technical level. So I just want to get that on the record before we get into the questions. Now, Mr. Page, you represent the Environmental Protection Agency. Are you the decisionmaker on this separate groundwater standard that is currently pending? Mr. Page. No, sir, I am the office director of the Office of Radiation Indoor Air. Carol Browner, my boss, will be taking the recommendation forward to the administration, and that is where that will get resolved. Mr. Barton. Who made the decision within the EPA to go to a separate groundwater standard? Mr. Page. That decision was across EPA looking at what we do in the rest of our environmental programs. And it is consistent with that. Mr. Barton. Did you have any influence in that decision? My question is, are you a decisionmaker or are you a message- giver? Mr. Page. I participate in the meetings where the decisions are made. Mr. Barton. So you are at least high enough in the EPA that you have some influence in the decisions? Mr. Page. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Mr. Barton. That is good. That is not bad. Now, does EPA have a problem with the concept of an all- pathways standard? Mr. Page. No, sir, we recommend an all-pathways standard. Mr. Barton. I know there is a disagreement about the level of all-pathways standard. I think the Nuclear Regulatory Commission recommended 25 millirems and the EPA all-pathways is 15; is that correct? Mr. Page. That is correct. And I would also note that the National Academy of Sciences recommended their range, which is consistent with ours, with EPA's. Mr. Barton. So we could have a real good debate between 15 and 25, in the spirit of the congressional give-and-take, we would agree on 20. But that is a different debate. But there appears to be, in the academic community, in the technical community, not too much support for the EPA position that there should be a separate groundwater standard. And if you look in the law, there is no requirement for that. It appears that it is an EPA policy decision that, in addition to protecting public health and safety, the Carol Browner administration has decided to also protect resources. Am I wrong in making that last assumption? Mr. Page. The protection of groundwater policy is the policy of this administration as it was previous administrations. Yes, sir. Mr. Barton. But it is not a Federal law? You have got to protect public health. You do not have to necessarily protect resources? Mr. Page. Correct. Mr. Barton. But you have decided that it is in the public good to protect resources, and that is a good public policy. Mr. Page. Especially as these resources are being used as sources of drinking water, which these are. Mr. Barton. Under the Safe Drinking Water Act, la-dee-da- dee-da, which I think is in the 1970's, the groundwater standard has been implemented, so that it is enforced and measured at the tap; is that not correct? Whatever the standard is, you regulate it and monitor it at the tap where the water comes out and people actually get ready to drink it. Mr. Page. That is true for drinking water. Mr. Barton. Now, the standard that is pending, as I understand it, you are setting this 4 millirem not at the tap but at the source; is that not correct? Mr. Page. That is correct. Mr. Barton. Okay. Now, is it not technically possible-- let's assume because it is a big assumption that we agree that there ought to be a 4 millirem standard for groundwater, wouldn't it be just as defensible to enforce it at the tap as opposed to at the source? Mr. Page. We believe---- Mr. Barton. I am not real interested in what you believe right now. I am interested though in whether, if we agreed with the 4 millirem that we could enforce it, you know, where the people are actually getting ready to drink it as opposed to wherever it might emigrate from? Mr. Page. Mr. Chairman, EPA and many, many states use the 4 millirem to protect future or current sources of drinking water. It is true what you are saying that you can regulate that at the tap. That is the bottom line, if you will. But prevention in this case very often, especially in the case of Yucca Mountain, if you can develop designs that are reasonable and can prevent the initial pollution of the resource---- Mr. Barton. But that is not a technical necessity nor is it a Federal law. Mr. Page. That is a policy call, sir. Mr. Barton. That is an EPA policy call. Does anybody else in the Clinton administration, other than EPA, support that policy call? Does the Department of Energy? Does the Nuclear Regulatory Commission? Does the Department of Agriculture? Does the Department of Defense? Do any of them support that EPA policy call? Mr. Page. I guess I haven't polled all of those agencies that you named. I can tell you that many, many States who carry out---- Mr. Barton. I did not ask you about the States, I asked you about within the Clinton administration, because we have--I shouldn't admit this, but that was kind of a set-up question because we can put into the record that all of those agencies, I think all of those agencies do not support that. Mr. Page. I can tell you that, from the Department of Energy and from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and others who comment on the Yucca proposal, they expressed their concerns with that policy. And that is what we have up ahead of us. Mr. Barton. I think they opposed it, other than expressed concerns with it, but that is, again, semantics. The Chair would recognize Mr. Boucher for 7 minutes. Mr. Boucher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend our witnesses this morning for informing us about these technical and policy matters. I agree with the chairman that this is where we earn our salary. There is not a lot of political benefit in listening to this, but it is extraordinarily important information, nonetheless. In the rank of importance, I think the budget is fairly far up the scale. Dr. Itkin, I would like to engage in a discussion with you about that. In 1982, in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, we established the Nuclear Waste Fund. It is comprised of a fee of 1 mill per kilowatt, which the utilities are required to pay into the fund. They pass that charge along to their ratepayers. And in the years that this fund has been in existence, that 1 mill per kilowatt has accumulated $10 billion in principal for the fund. That $10 billion in principal has accrued $4 billion in interest. So $14 billion in potentially expendable funds have been made available through the Nuclear Waste Policy Fund. But of that $14 billion, Congress has appropriated to the DOE only $5 billion for your various activities. The balance of that fund remains subject to appropriations, and in the current state of play under the current law, you would only have access to the balance of it through the grace of the appropriation process in the Congress. Now, if you look at that appropriations process, starting in 1996, the administration's requests have not been met by the congressional appropriations. In fact, in the year 1996, the administration's request was $630 million. Congress provided exactly half of that amount, $315 million. And in each succeeding year since 1996, Congress has appropriated less than the administration has requested for your activities to prepare Yucca Mountain. And it appears that the trend is continuing even today. We are prepared to bring the energy and water appropriations bill to the floor of the House next week, and that bill, once again, falls short of the administration's request. I think Congress has a clear responsibility to meet our need to keep this program on track, and I really question whether this appropriations history complies with that responsibility. I would welcome your comments concerning the general subject. Let me just phrase a precise question to you. The Department of Energy historically has made projections of the extent to which it will be able to continue its work in a timely fashion, given the appropriations that you receive. And you make several assumptions as you make projections of your ability to perform. One of those assumptions is that the continual trend of appropriations will be pursued, that it will continue and that you will get roughly the same level of appropriations that you have. The other assumption that you have made for purposes of the projection is that the balance of the Nuclear Waste Fund will not be made available to you. That legislation, such as H.R. 45, will not be enacted into law, and that you would continue to have to get annual appropriations. Now, given those assumption, and given the appropriations history that we have seen, and given the level of appropriations that you might reasonably be able to expect for fiscal year 2001, at what point in time would you anticipate that the Department of Energy is going to fall behind its schedule for the activities that are necessary to finish the design and construction of Yucca Mountain, to load Yucca Mountain, and then to engage in the sealing of the repository under the schedule that you currently have? At what point in time do you think if these trends continue that you are going to fall behind schedule? Mr. Itkin. Thank you very much, Congressman, I am very pleased to address the subject. It is a very important one for our agency, and you have correctly characterized the lack of funding to the office in order to carry out its mission of characterizing the Yucca Mountain site. In the short term, we are somewhat gratified by at least the initial reaction of Congress toward our appropriation. I would like to preface that by saying that before we went to the Congress, my office went to the department and to the administration asking for a budget proposal that was 25 percent higher than what we had gotten traditionally. Our current budget this year is $351 million. We asked the administration for $437.5 million. We made our case and the administration did, in fact, recommend to the Congress the full $437.5 million. What that level would do would be allow us to continue and to finish the site suitability studies, the scientific work necessary for a Presidential decision, and would allow us to catch up and to prevent any further delay in the next process if there is a positive recommendation. And that is in the licensing stage. So in order to ensure that we do not fall behind further, we need the full $437.5 million. The House Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee did give us a mark which is far higher than the House has ever done before of $413 million. I think that they were under a misimpression that at $413 million, it would fully fund our program. It will fully fund making a decision next July. In other words, we will have the resources necessary to do the scientific work to inform the Secretary, and if he so chooses, to inform the President. And we think that is very, very important. But it will not allow us to catch back up to the deferred work that we have had to do because of these cuts with licensing application. So if I have an opportunity to get on my soap box, I am asking Congress for the full $437.5 million. And I am hoping that the other body will, in fact, provide with us a higher appropriation and hopefully get this thing resolved in conference. Mr. Boucher. But you are concerned that if you do not get the full appropriation, that fact will result in delay; is that correct? Mr. Itkin. Yes, if we get the $413 million, we will make our fiscal year 2001 milestone, but we will probably have to defer perhaps some months, maybe a year, getting our license application submitted and approved. Which I think from many Members of Congress, it is not these interim points that are important, it is a desire by at least 2010 for us to accept the waste. And I am trying to keep that schedule, and I will--if I get the 437.5, we will be able to do the Presidential recommendation and also provide the necessary makeup work that is required so that we can get a license application on time. Mr. Boucher. Mr. Chairman, if you will indulge me just for one additional question. Mr. Barton. Sure. Mr. Boucher. My really deep concern is that as we approach the time and perhaps the year 2003 when construction of the facility is scheduled to begin, and your costs are going to escalate dramatically, that we are going to really find a crunch, and you are going to have difficulty moving forward at that time, unless you get access to the full fund. Is that a realistic concern or are you less concerned for some reason? Mr. Itkin. Congressman, it is a real concern that we have to adjust the outyear funding. We are trying to moderate some of our needs. I have taken the initiative of trying to develop a modular procedure in the construction activities that would tend to smooth out the cost so it wouldn't be such a burden or spike in certain years. But even doing that, we will need to work together, the administration and the Congress, to come out with a new funding mechanism to deal with this problem, because we will probably need, at the minimum, two to three times our current funding levels. And having said that, it becomes--you mentioned about having full access to the fund. You know as well as I, there is approximately $10 billion, $9-, $10 billion sitting there, and that it is being used both by the Congress and the administration to take care of other matters, to so-call balance the budget. Mr. Barton. I am sure you are aware that the House-passed bill freed the waste depository fund. You are aware of that? Mr. Itkin. I appreciate the House doing that. The law of the Congress requires both Chambers to act in unison. That did not occur. I am a legislator, at least a State legislator for 26 years. I understand how the legislative process works. But having said that, I want to work with you, the committee and the subcommittee, and the Congress in general because we do have to solve this problem. Mr. Barton. Next year, assuming that we are here and that you are there, and we are doing this as an early hearing before we move another waste depository bill, will the administration, if you are still a part of it, put a proposal on the table that addresses the issue that my good friend from Virginia has put on the table? In other words, we never saw a Clinton administration proposal this year that solves the funding problem. We got a lot of reports about all the problems they saw with our way to solve it. But thankfully, Mr. Dingell, Mr. Boucher and Mr. Hall worked with Mr. Bliley and myself, and we went ahead and went to the Budget Committee and the Appropriations Committee and the Speaker of the House, and our bill solved that problem. So can we expect to see reciprocal problem solution to this funding issue next year if you are still in charge? Mr. Itkin. Mr. Chairman, we are working on that problem. We recognize for our own future well-being in carrying out our mission as directed by the Congress, that we will have to resolve this. I cannot speak for the next administration in terms of what they---- Mr. Barton. I said if you are still where you are. I am not tying your hands to the future administration. But my guess is that you are going to be here next year, even if there is a change in political calculus at the White House because it takes a while for those transitions to occur. Mr. Itkin. Well, I will go on record saying it needs to be changed and I want to be part of that solution. Mr. Barton. That is mighty big of you. Mr. Boucher. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence and I yield back. Mr. Barton. In order of appearance, we are going to go with Mr. Shimkus unless there is another member that has a pending-- Mr. Shimkus for 7 minutes. Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am shocked that the ranking member started at 1996, and I did not have any of the numbers from 82 to 95 to be able to evaluate the budgetary aspects of the whole program. But I would like to join my colleague on the mandatory process of the appropriation bills. And if we can find a way to rob Peter to pay Paul to make folks better served, understanding budgetary constraints, and look for waste fraud and abuse in other areas of the Federal Government, then I would be happy to join with him to address those issues. First of all, I want to ask a question to all of you at table. Do any of you have any black helicopters? Do you know in your agencies is there any black helicopters? No? Any of the roofs painted blue, do you know, on any of the buildings? Because of the different agencies involved, and there was a statement I think by Dr. Crowley that you are working in a cooperative spirit. Does that mean that you are in collusion with each other to try to deceive the public and rain bad science and ill-gotten gains from those who are participating, destroying the health and the welfare of the citizens of this great country? No? For the record, everybody is shaking their head ``no'' for all of these questions. And for all of those conspiracy theorists out there, I am glad to say that you are on record saying that there is no great conspiracy to game the system for whatever organization--nefarious organization that may be out there, and that you are all working diligently trying to move public policy in a direction that will, in the end, protect the safety, health and welfare of all the citizens in this Nation. Can I make that assumption to you all? Is that correct? And for the record, everybody is shaking their head ``yes,'' and I appreciate that. That is kind of in response to my colleagues who made some implications based upon past practices and current practices that--may be current practices. And I think that the fact that we have in this debate and the fact that there is disagreement and that we have outside people being brought in to review the technical aspects, is a good response to my colleagues who may not believe that we are attempting to move public policy in a scientific manner, and that is probably why it has taken us so long to get through this process to begin with. I have been told and I tried to confirm this during some of the testimony, that if you work in the Library of Congress for a year you are subject to 700 millirems in that year. If you work in this building for a year, probably 300 millirems. Does--because of the millirem standard the EPA is proposing for groundwater, wouldn't you think it would be in the EPA's best interest to call for the immediate vacation of all the Federal buildings in Washington, Mr. Page, based upon those standards? Mr. Page. No, sir, I don't think EPA would agree with that. Mr. Shimkus. Maybe your building we might agree. No, I am just joking. But the--I think that is really the debate, especially on this issue of groundwater; and I don't have all the terminologies correct, but the other type of water evaluations and---- Mr. Crowley. All-pathway standards. Mr. Shimkus. Obviously, that is an area of debate and a difference. And, Dr. Crowley, can you talk to me about--and I think it was the National Academy of Sciences that said the groundwater issue raised by the EPA, there is no basis in science. Can you elaborate on that? Mr. Crowley. Thank you for asking that question. I can. The issue of a groundwater standard, conceptually, it is really very difficult to understand, even for experts. So I took the liberty of scratching down some notes here so that I was very careful in how I answered the question. What I am going to do is, I am going to give you a short answer. Then I will give you a slightly longer rationale for it. The short answer, the reason that the groundwater standard is not based in science is that if you adequately protect people with an all-pathway standard you protect groundwater as a resource. In other words, you do not need a separate groundwater standard. Let me explain why that is true. Firstly, you should understand that when the National Academy undertook its work, the committee that was charged with that, the TYMS Committee,was actually charged with asking--it was asked to recommend standards to protect people, not groundwater. The TYMS Committee concluded that an all-pathways standard would protect people if it was set at an adequate level and that an additional groundwater standard was not needed. The committee reasoned if you protect the people with an all-pathway standard then at each leg of the pathway, the groundwater leg of the all-pathway standard, the atmospheric leg of the all-pathway standard would be protective. The phrase groundwater is a resource as EPA uses it in the standard. I personally interpret that to mean groundwater for future human use. As a resource, we are going to use it either now or in the future. EPA notes that future users include both individuals living close to and some distance from the repository who might use groundwater from Yucca Mountain. In other words, the EPA groundwater standard is also designed to protect people. EPA has proposed, as you know, to establish two standards, the all-pathways standard and a separate groundwater standard. The important things about these standards is each is really based upon a different level of risk. In other words, you are providing a different level of protection to people who might be exposed to radiation from a particular pathway. This really has very important implications because it means that for some radionucleides the groundwater standard actually provides more protection to the groundwater than an all-pathway standard provides to people. But this is illogical because EPA states that it is protecting groundwater as a resource for use by people. So it really doesn't make sense to provide more protection for groundwater than the people who consume that groundwater. The TYMS Committee concluded that if you set an adequate all-pathway standard you have protected people. Mr. Barton. Would the gentleman yield? Is there any correlation mathematically between the 15 millirem all-pathway standard that EPA recommends and the 4 millirem groundwater standard? Is there any way to compare the two standards or are they noncongruent? Mr. Crowley. I will take a swing at that, and perhaps Mr. Page could also take a swing at that. The 15 millirem all-pathways standard and the 4 millirem groundwater standard really have different pedigrees. They come from different parts of EPA. The 15 millirem standard comes from 40 CFR 191. The 4 millirem groundwater standard comes from the Safe Drinking Water Act. They are related in a very gross way but not in a very exact way. If you look at the details of the groundwater standards, you find that the different radionucleides within that standard provide different levels of protection. Mr. Barton. Mr. Page, you want to comment on that? I want to yield back to Mr. Shimkus if he---- Mr. Shimkus. That is fine. I just don't know if I had any idea what he just said. Mr. Barton. That is why I am the chairman and you are not. Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am done, but I want to ask just this one other question. Mr. Burr. Mr. Page, then Mr. Paperiello wanted to say something. Mr. Shimkus. That is fine. Mr. Page. Mr. Page. Sure. The 15 millirems all pathways is designed-- it has a risk base to it. And what it is designed to do is land where EPA typically carries out environmental regulations for hazardous waste, drinking water the 10-\4\, 10-\6\ risk for cancer. Mr. Barton. And to convert, 10-\4\ is 1 in 10,000 and 10-\6\ is 1 in a million. Mr. Page. Yes, sir. Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Page. The 4 millirem as well, if you look at the MCLs and look at what they were based on back in 1975 when they were developed, what you have there if you look at all the radionucleides, all the radioactive materials that could be in the drinking water, they also land in that range, in that risk range. Most of them do. The 10-\4\, 10-\6\. So there is the correlation that I think that you were asking. Mr. Shimkus. We are going to let Dr. Paperiello answer, but I want to follow up on one question. Four millirems at the source, 15 millirem at the faucet, is there any--is there--do we see an increase in radioactivity, an increase as the stuff gets into the groundwater, the groundwater flows toward the faucet? Is there a possibility of more millirems being glommed on as it goes downstream to make it obviously more powerful? My position is, you would think there would be a higher standard at the site because there is going to be some dissipation down the stream. But, in this case, you have a higher standard at the source and a weaker standard at the faucet. Is that--can I make that assumption? Mr. Page. Let me respond to your question. I think you are raising a point that was raised a lot in the comments that we had on our rule, and I think it is a good one. First of all, the 4 millirem, again, at the risk of belaboring the issue, the 4 millirem is the level of protection we offer all across the United States around hazardous waste site facilities' wellhead protection, that we don't want that amount of more than that amount going into the resource. Now, Congressman, you said, what about close to the site? How about further away? It is possible that somebody can draw up because of how a plume has behaved in moving downgradient that it is possible that you could have something show up that is higher away from the site than it is close to the site. Normally, you would expect it to dilute, et cetera, but these travel in plumes; and this is part of the uncertainty that has to be taken into account. The point that I would make is the--the important question I think that you have to ask on the 4 millirem, is it prudent, you know, by cost or feasibility to protect at that level? That has to be judged by that standard. And is it worthwhile offering that amount of prevention? Because as that plume moves down and hits the tap, the people at the tap are going to have to pay for the cost. If that hits there and it is over the 25 or the 15 issues, the people have to pay the tap, have to pay the cost of the cleanup. Mr. Shimkus. I know I am way over, but if Mr. Paperiello-- and I will---- Mr. Barton. Mr. Paperiello answer. Then we are going to go to the long-patient Mr. Burr. Mr. Paperiello, if you want to answer the question for Mr. Shimkus. Mr. Paperiello. Let me talk about the drinking water standard, which, of course, the commission objects to. I want to make something clear. It is not a 4 millirem standard. The MCLs are based on old science which is inconsistent with current science. In fact, the current science which EPA has put into Federal Guidance 13, the doses vary by a factor of almost a hundred. And, in fact, for Yucca Mountain, the MCLs, not 4 millirem, is the standard, corresponds at the end of 10,000 years for the most mobile isotope to a dose of two-tenths of a millirem per year. Congressman you are correct. The average background to a citizen of the United States is about 300 millirems from natural background. It can vary a lot easily, a factor of 2. Our standard is 25. If you use the models, the linear model of risk, it is in the right risk range in the National Academy. Mr. Barton. Can I ask you, just--if the average around the country is 300 millirems, do we know what the average is in the Yucca Mountain area? Is it 300? Mr. Paperiello. Congressman, we do know that. I don't know it off the top of my head. Mr. Barton. Whatever it is--and we can get that for the record--are these standards that we are debating today, are they going to be in addition to the normal background naturally occurring radiation that the folks are exposed---- Mr. Paperiello. They would be additional to the normal background. Mr. Barton. So is it technically possible--let's--assuming that the--if the national average is 300, it is possible that the Yucca Mountain average is 200. So if you add 15 or 25 or 40 or whatever, they are still going to be under the national average. It is also possible they could be over if it is in the background. Mr. Paperiello. Let me give you an example. I am going to be in Denver next week. Denver is a mile above sea level. It is also in the middle of the Rocky Mountains. That has been the typical example in radiation protection, any field of a high natural background where the doses are approximately a hundred to 150 millirem higher than what I get living in the DC area. Mr. Barton. So that is 450. Mr. Paperiello. That is right. There is no empirical evidence that that represents a risk to the citizens of Denver. I am just giving you a perspective. I know all the theory--I know theory. I know how to derive the risk from radiation. It is my field. I am just giving you a fact that the--empirically you don't see an effect. Mr. Barton. We would like to have for this subcommittee's record what the natural occurring background radiation is in Yucca Mountain. I think that is--if we are going to get into this millirem debate, that would be a good number to have. Mr. Paperiello. I will see what I can do, Congressman. [The response had not been received at time of printing.] Mr. Barton. Continue on your answer to Mr. Shimkus. Are you concluded with it? Mr. Paperiello. I just want to point out the fact that the groundwater standards if it were 4 millirem would be one thing, but it is not 4 millirem. It varies widely because of the old science that was used. And, in fact, for Yucca Mountain it will translate effectively into a two-tenths of a millirem standard. Mr. Barton. Mr. Burr. Mr. Burr. I won't even pretend that I understood everything that you said, but I believe I heard you to say that there is currently new science available, but the EPA, to set the standard, used old science because it made it work out in their behalf, is that---- Mr. Paperiello. For a variety of reasons, they have chosen to stick with the old science. Mr. Burr. Is that common in the scientific community when there is new science available to revert to old science to come to new conclusions? Mr. Paperiello. In the scientific community, no. However, when you get into law and regulations, the time that it takes to change can allow old science--laws and regulations based on old science to remain in effect until somebody can affect a change. Mr. Burr. Clearly, the EPA is concerned with law because Mr. Page said in his opening statement--I didn't catch the whole phrase--that it was legally defensible. So, you know, I am sure that there is some consideration that has already been put to that. Let me move to Dr. Itkin real quick, because I am concerned and inquisitive on the recompete decision. It is my understanding that the policy says you can recompete or extend contracts, correct? Mr. Itkin. Yes. That is correct. Mr. Burr. Tell me where TRW has openly underperformed in their 10-year contract. Mr. Itkin. I am not going to suggest that TRW did underperform. There is Department policy, and also directives of the Congress and appropriations act, that we recompete these contracts when those contracts expire. And TRW had a 10-year contract from 1991, and their contract will expire in February of 2001. Mr. Burr. But the agency has the ability to extend that. Mr. Itkin. We could have extended it. We felt that there was no good time to do this---- Mr. Burr. Was that the recommendation of you and your team, that this contract be recompeted? Mr. Itkin. It was the recommendation of the Department to do that. Mr. Barton. Would the gentleman yield on that point? Mr. Burr. I would yield. Mr. Barton. You gave a very careful answer to that. Now, I am told that it was the internal recommendation that it not be recompeted, that it actually be extended and that the Secretary of Energy overruled that, and it is the Secretary of Energy who made the decision against the recommendation internally to recompete. Have I been told correctly or have I been told incorrectly? Mr. Itkin. Let me say that there were differences of opinion within the internals of the Department that the--the decision was made by the Department, and I interpret that to mean the Secretary concurred in that decision. Mr. Barton. Was this decision made before you became--you obtained the position that you currently hold or---- Mr. Itkin. No, this decision was made subsequent to my appointment. Mr. Barton. Subsequent. Mr. Itkin. Subsequent. Mr. Barton. That means after. Mr. Itkin. After. Mr. Barton. Let's talk Texan here. Mr. Burr has raised this. You know, sometimes we have to be a little pushy. And I am going to be a little bit pushy. What was your recommendation to the Secretary on recompete or extend? Mr. Itkin. I was concerned about it, but I had mixed feelings as to which way to go. Because, as a new person in this position, I was concerned about what the effects might be to the operation of the activity. Mr. Barton. You share the concerns that I expressed in my opening statement. Mr. Itkin. Yes, but I have been now feeling--after managing the program through the recompetition, as we go to recompetition, I feel that my fears were not called for. Mr. Barton. Before the decision was made to recompete, did you make a recommendation to the Secretary on recompete or extend? Mr. Itkin. There were discussions that---- Mr. Barton. Did you make a recommendation, either verbally or in writing? Mr. Itkin. I don't remember personally making that recommendation to the Secretary, although there were concerns about recompetition. Mr. Barton. So you made no recommendation. Mr. Itkin. We basically made the--entered into discussion as to the pros and cons of such recompetition. Mr. Barton. You personally--the office that you represent made no recommendation. The Secretary of Energy just had to take--call these concerns, and then he made the decision. He got no recommendations, he got pros and cons, and then he made the decision. As opposed to you sending him a decision memo initially---- Mr. Itkin. We did not send him anything in writing, as I recall, in terms of a formal recommendation. There may have been some internal discussions. Mr. Barton. Did anybody within the Department of Energy make a written recommendation to the Secretary whether to recompete or renegotiate--or extend? Mr. Itkin. One moment. Not to my knowledge. I am told--I checked with my deputy to make sure that he was not--may have been knowledgeable. To the best of our knowledge, there was no formal recommendation not to recompete. Mr. Barton. So there were no recommendations yes or no. It was simply a debate, pros and cons, and then the Secretary took that debate and he made the decision. Mr. Itkin. There was a discussion about the concerns raised about what recompetition might do. We also, on the same point looked at when we would recompete, what the problems would be in the future. And it was the Secretary's feeling that the Department should observe the departmental policy and that the--and also respond to congressional directives which have repeatedly been placed in the appropriations documents about going ahead and recompeting. Mr. Barton. I guarantee you there is no congressional directive to recompete this contract at this time. Mr. Itkin. I can't say that. Mr. Barton. I can say that. There is no congressional directive to recompete this particular contract. Now, we have done everything we could to direct the Secretary of Energy to recompete the Los Alamos contract with the University of California but not on this one. So when the Secretary is here next week, if we have a chance--it is going to be a broader subject, but I will ask him this question, too. But from all of your hemming and hawing and dodging and weaving and bobbing and everything, I still take it that you would admit if we were under oath, which we are not, this is not the oversight subcommittee, that it was the Secretary's decision to recompete this contract? Mr. Itkin. Let me say this, in our Department the Secretary is responsible for the conduct of the operation. Any decision made by the Department obviously is something made with his concurrence. Mr. Barton. Okay. Mr. Burr. We will give you quite a bit of time, since I took about 6 minutes on that. Mr. Burr. I thank the chairman. I probably am concerned more at the conclusion of the answer then I was when I originally asked it. Because I think what, in fact, you said to me, Dr. Itkin, if you are accurate, is that--do you consider this a major contract? Mr. Itkin. Oh, yes, it is a major contract. Mr. Burr. I consider it a major contract, too. What you have told me is that the Secretary didn't ask line management for recommendation as to whether a major contract was extended or recompeted. Is that an accurate depiction of what you told me? Mr. Itkin. That he asked--obviously---- Mr. Burr. The Secretary of Energy did not ask for a recommendation from his line management on a major contract as to whether it should be recompeted or extended. Mr. Itkin. No, we had input in terms of--as I mentioned. Mr. Burr. Input is significantly different than a recommendation. And I have yet to find through my service as vice chair of the oversight committee any major contract where there was not paperwork involved for a recommendation. Mr. Itkin. Just to reiterate, there is--there was no formal recommendation on the part of my office to recompete or not to recompete. Mr. Burr. And it is not a fault of yours for not making the recommendation, but, clearly, great concern as it relates to the Secretary's not requesting a recommendation from the line management of this project, which we consider to be a major contract. Let me move to Dr. Crowley, if I could. Let me read from your statement and just ask you one question. You said, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 directed the EPA administrator to obtain advice from NAS on the technical basis for radiation protection standards; and the act further mandated that EPA base its standard on NAS recommendations. Did they base their standard on the NAS recommendations? Mr. Crowley. I think the answer to that question, based on the report that the board did in 1999, is no. Mr. Burr. So the EPA has not followed the Energy Policy Act in its directions to the EPA administrator. Mr. Crowley. That is the judgment of the Board on Radioactive Waste Management, yes. Mr. Burr. I thank you, Dr. Crowley. Mr. Page, your turn. What is your background? Are you a scientist? Mr. Page. No, sir, general policy background. Mr. Burr. You graduated from the University of Southern California with a masters degree in public administration. Mr. Page. Yes, sir. Mr. Burr. Why did everybody else send scientists and the EPA sent public relations to this hearing? Mr. Page. I am sorry. I didn't---- Mr. Burr. Why is everybody else up here a scientist, Ph.D.; and the EPA on the issue of this technical aspect sends somebody with a public administration background? Mr. Page. I was sent because I head the Office of Radiation, Indoor Air. I am the senior person in the agency who makes recommendations to the administrator on radiation policy. Mr. Burr. But your background is not such that the technical aspects of it are something that---- Mr. Page. The operation of my office--within the operation of my office, we have many people. Mr. Burr. I am talking about you. Do you make technical recommendations or do you make---- Mr. Page. Yes, sir. Mr. Burr. [continuing] policy recommendations? Mr. Page. We are responsible for making---- Mr. Burr. You. You. Not your office, you. Mr. Page. In my position, I am responsible for making recommendations to the administrator that are both policy and science based. Mr. Burr. Based upon what your scientists found out or based upon what you determine to be---- Mr. Page. Based on the work that my scientists do at the scientific community. Based on other policy considerations that we take into account in addition to the science--cost effectiveness, practicality of implementation, things like that. Mr. Burr. What do you say to Dr. Crowley's statement that, in fact, the EPA has not followed the Energy Policy Act of 1992? Mr. Page. As I said in my testimony, in most of the areas I think we were generally consistent with the NAS. I think, as their testimony pointed out, that on the matter of, for instance, groundwater that is a policy call. I think they were right in saying that EPA needed to elaborate in its final rule if that is where it goes on the policy aspects of that and make that clear, that that is a policy, not a scientific judgment. Mr. Burr. How many times have you been to Yucca Mountain. Mr. Page. One time. Mr. Burr. One time. Mr. Page. Yes, sir. Mr. Burr. And you have been in charge of this area of responsibility for how long? Mr. Page. A year and a half. Mr. Burr. How long was that trip? How long were you at Yucca Mountain. Mr. Page. We were out there a full day and got a tour of the facility. Mr. Burr. Full day. Mr. Page. Yes, sir. Mr. Burr. What was the purpose of that? Mr. Page. To be briefed by the Department of Energy at what stage they were in the process, to get familiar with the facility and to try to--in addition to the studies that I have been looking at and studying and hearing from my staff, to kind of hear from them directly on any concerns or issues they have with the facility. Mr. Burr. Could you accomplish that, all of that, in this 1-day visit? Mr. Page. The site visit was to go through the facility and match up with things that I have read, diagrams that I have seen with the real situation. Mr. Burr. And from a standpoint of the individual--and I know the University of Southern Cal is a great school, but, from your background, 1 day at the Yucca Mountain, you could take all of the information that your scientific team has based their recommendations on and you could make that evaluation on that everything was accurate from a 1-day site visit to Yucca Mountain? Mr. Page. Mr. Burr, the site visit was intended to complement all of the other information that I had been presented and been collecting and have done over the last year and a half. I think you would probably be more upset with me had I not gone at all and sat in Washington behind a desk. Mr. Burr. Actually, I think that is the only reason you went, so you--if you were ever asked the question you could say, yes, sir, I have been to Yucca Mountain. Mr. Barton. You have been on 24 minutes, of which I took about 6. So I think---- Mr. Burr. The clock was on the chairman, and he took 12. But I will be happy to wrap it up. Mr. Barton. We are going to do more than one round. Mr. Burr. I appreciate the chairman's indulgence on this. One last question. Mr. Barton. All right. Mr. Burr. Is your policy based on old science or new science? Mr. Page. Which policy are you referring to, Congressman? Mr. Burr. The policy as it relates to what Dr. Paperiello-- -- Mr. Page. We are in the process right now of updating the MCLs, the maximum contaminant levels, for the drinking water. It is true that what we used for the purposes of the proposal was the best science that was available legally. We are in the process--though we were aware that the updated science is out there, we are in the process of updating it right now. Mr. Burr. I thank all of our witnesses. I am sorry I didn't have an opportunity to spend some time with the other ones. I yield back. Mr. Barton. The gentleman from Virginia is recognized for 7 minutes. Mr. Boucher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to inquire concerning another area; and, Dr. Itkin, I suppose this question should be directed to you. In the 1982 act, a requirement was made that the Federal Government begin to accept nuclear waste from the utilities beginning in 1998. Obviously, that didn't happen; and the utilities have filed suit. The U.S. Court of Appeals has held that the contract that DOE entered into with the various utilities pursuant to that statute to accept the waste was, in fact, breached; and now the Court of Claims is considering the damages that will be awarded. And I have got two questions about that. First of all, are these damages going to be significant, in your opinion? What do you think the size of the damages will be? And that question is important because of the second question. And that is, from what source will these damages be paid? The Federal Government has a judgment fund that is administered by the U.S. Department of Justice that is available for the payment of judgments against the United States. However, in the contract that was entered into between DOE and the utilities, under the terms of which DOE obligated itself to accept this waste, there are specific provisions that relate to any penalties that are assessed or damages that rise from a breach of the contract. And in those clauses the contract says that the utility is entitled to realize its damages by deducting its future payments under the waste management fund. So, in other words, if the utility is entitled to money from the government, it can recover that by just not paying its future obligations into the waste management funds. So we create a cycle through this. If this becomes the means by which the utilities are compensated, you wind up with a worsened problem with the perpetual inability of DOE to prepare the site and--because it doesn't have the funding to do it and then further claims by the utility being filed with that. I think that is a troubling potential scenario. So my two questions to you are, first of all, how significant are these damages likely to be? And, second, given the two potential funds that the government might use to pay those damages, what is your prediction of which it is going to be? Will it be the government's judgment fund or it will be this precise clause in the contract that would result in the waste management fund being reduced as a consequence of the damages? Mr. Itkin. Congressman, I will try to answer that question. The first question that you asked was on our failure to realize the provision of the contract on starting to accept the waste in 1998 if--and this is just very, you know, back of the envelope calculations in terms of what it might cost in the aggregate, you know. Looking at every utility, not just the ones that have sued us or utility by utility, it is going to be significant. It will probably run in the range of--for every year delay it probably could range a few hundred million dollars, which can add up, as you know, into substantial sums of money, into billions. Mr. Boucher. This is the total of all of the claims. Mr. Itkin. The total. We assume that whatever judgment is awarded, whatever claim is awarded to one will probably be replicated to the others in a similar fashion. So---- Mr. Boucher. All of those taken together would be---- Mr. Itkin. All of those taken together, we are talking about a few hundred million dollars a year. Which means to me, as I have characterized it, as rent. It is almost where we have bought the new home, and we are paying the mortgage, but we can't get into the new home, and we are still paying the landlord rent. It is an unfortunate circumstance which I would like to correct, and the easiest way of correcting it is to move as expeditiously as possible. We can, using--you know, making good determinations; and that is why I have asked Congress to fully fund our program this year. And with respect to an earlier comment, by 2003 is when we have to ramp up substantially in terms of the dollars we need. So that will have to be done. The second question, about who will pay or where will the money come from, you have correctly, I guess, determined that there are two possible sources. One is the nuclear waste fund, and the other one is the judgment fund. Since the Department of Justice will be making that decision, allow me the liberty of assuming that--out of whose pocket the Department would want that--Justice Department would want to take the money from. I am assuming that whatever liability we have will come out of the nuclear waste fund, not the judgment fund, although that is not a determination that I will be making. I am just assuming the bias that might occur on the part of the agency that will make that decision. Mr. Boucher. Well, if the funding comes out of the nuclear waste fund in any manner---- Mr. Itkin. What will probably happen is that if there is an adverse ruling, the judgment fund will pay it first, and then the Department of Justice will seek to have the waste fund repay the judgment fund for the amount of money that the judgment--the check will be originally cut from the judgment fund, and the judgment fund will seek recompense from the nuclear waste fund. In order to probably deal with this in an orderly and responsible fashion, we will probably seek to work with the utilities in terms of offering credits on what is to be paid up in the future. Mr. Boucher. Well, then do you get yourself into this syndrome that I described earlier where this rent that you then deduct from their future payments into the fund winds up diminishing even further your ability to prepare the site and therefore multiplies the number of claims in the damages and eventually you find yourself without the financial ability to go forward? I mean, is that a potential outcome? Mr. Itkin. Well, yes, it is a concern but--and we have looked at the projected income to the fund, and we have made some, you know, obviously some assessments as to what this might cost us, and we feel at this particular time we can accommodate it. But, obviously, I am not privy to, you know, a court of claims determination. I don't know what they will do. We are seeking to work with utilities in terms of arranging to deal with this problem out of court if we can. Mr. Boucher. Have all of the utilities that have nuclear facilities and with regard to whom you are currently under contract to accept their waste filed claims against you? Mr. Itkin. No, that is--they have not, not all have. Mr. Boucher. Are you anticipating that those that have not will eventually file claims? When you characterize this as basically a rent, it is kind of an open invitation for them, isn't it? Mr. Itkin. I would think that every utility would want to adjudicate its additional costs either with the Department directly or, as you indicated, by suing us in court. But we are hoping that we can be able to sit down and work with the utilities. After all, we--utilities want us to get along with our business. It is in their best interest for us to move this whole process along expeditiously, and I think they recognize that some of--some of them recognize, at least the operating ones, the ones that have a future, recognize that this is something that they would like to work out with us collectively. Mr. Boucher. So to summarize this discussion, your opinion is that the nuclear waste fund is going to have the ultimate financial liability for the damages that the utilities are claiming, even if the judgment fund has the first responsibility, is that correct? That ultimately the responsibility will rest with the nuclear waste fund. Mr. Itkin. It has been an opinion of mine. It is not legally binding. It is just you asked for my thoughts, and I presented you as I honestly believe the way it could happen. Mr. Boucher. My concern then is that at the time that the fund was structured and this one bill per kilowatt fee that creates the fund was established, I don't think that it was contemplated that the fund was going to have to be responsible for several hundred million dollars per year in payments to utilities because of the breach of the government's contract to accept the waste in a timely way. And if this fund is going to have to bear that financial responsibility, I really would question whether the fund is going to be adequate. Even if you get the whole thing--if Mr. Barton and I are eventually successful in having the Congress that grants the fund to you, I question whether it is going to be sufficient, given the fact that these costs are going to multiply. They are going to reach more than a billion dollars by that arithmetic, easily. Aren't you concerned? Mr. Itkin. I am concerned. I mean, I don't want to move over this lightly. Obviously, if we could have prevented this from happening, we would. Simply, we could not pick up the spent fuel from these commercial facilities because we had no place to put it. Mr. Boucher. I think, at minimum, this discussion underscores the importance of getting the full fund into your hands and making sure that you have access to it at the earliest possible time. Mr. Chairman, I think it is yet another argument in support of legislation that we are trying to process that would achieve that result. Mr. Itkin, thank you. I appreciate your responses. Mr. Barton. The chairman is going to recognize himself for 7 minutes. Before Mr. Boucher leaves, I want to get this on the record. We have had informal discussion up here. The Energy and Water appropriation bill is going to be on the floor next week. Under the rules that we operate in the House, any Member can offer an amendment. It is an open rule. And I am prepared and Mr. Boucher is at least prepared to discuss the possibility of an amendment that would restore your $26 million request to get you full funding for the coming Fiscal Year. But--and I am just speaking for myself--I am not willing to do that unless the Department of Energy is willing to work with us to find an offset within the Department's budget. In other words, so it is in order under our rules. I can say to add $26.6 million to this particular program, but I have to have an offset for it. I am willing to do that, and I think Mr. Boucher is willing to at least consider doing that in a bipartisan fashion. But at least I am willing to do that if you call me pretty quick and say we want the $26 million to come from A, B, C or A or A and B or an across-the-board cut in the discretionary programs under the Department's permission. Mr. Boucher. Would the gentleman yield to me? Let me say that I think it is a worthwhile endeavor, and what we are offering to you today is an opportunity, and that is our shared willingness to go to the floor of the House and offer this amendment. But we are going to need the help of the Department of Energy in suggesting to us the offset for the $26 million that would bring your appropriation up to the level of your request. I am not sure it is actually 26. It looks like-- is it 26? Mr. Barton. It is 413, 437. Mr. Boucher. So it is an opportunity. What you might do as a practical matter is go back and have some other conversations with DOE about it and just see if it is the policy of DOE to fully fund this program perhaps at the expense of some others. And if a consensus can be arrived at that to do that, we are happy to help. But we are going to have to hear back from you. We are going to need to hear from you pretty soon if you want to do it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Barton. Do you understand what we are saying? We are going to get you $26 million if you can show us where to get it from. Mr. Boucher. He has had more years in the legislative body than you or I. Mr. Itkin. Somebody has to pay within the Department for the $26 million we need. I can certainly inquire, but I am not in a position to make the call. But thank you very much for your offer to help. I wish it was more encompassing than just the Department. Mr. Barton. We have to work within the framework of the appropriations cycle. We want to get you your money. But since, you know, this is Energy and Water we think it is only fair that it come from other Department of Energy funds. At least, I think it is only fair. But think about it. If you want to pursue that, let my personal staff or committee staff know. We will get to work on it. Mr. Itkin. Thank you very much for, at least, the help. Mr. Barton. With the offer. Mr. Itkin. The offer to help. Mr. Barton. Let's be honest. We have not helped. Mr. Itkin. I understand your offer, but there is no commitment that it would work. You would offer an amendment. Mr. Barton. I think if Rick Boucher and Joe Barton offered the amendment in a bipartisan way and we would say that the Department of Energy supported it, I think it would pass. Mr. Boucher. I agree with that. Mr. Itkin. I understand. Thank you. Mr. Barton. Now I am going to ask my questions. Mr. Page, I hate to belabor this, but I am going to belabor it a little bit. I am going to read you some statements and tell me if you have ever heard of the statement and, if you have heard of it, who made it. These are direct quotes. This is on the proposed EPA groundwater standard. ``It is redundant and unnecessary for the protection of public health and safety.'' Have you ever heard of that? Mr. Page. I have heard of that. Mr. Barton. Do you know who said that, what agency said that? Mr. Page. Might have been the National Academy of Sciences. Mr. Barton. That is a pretty good guess, but if that is your final answer, that is not the right guess. That was made by the Department of Energy. I don't know if Dr. Itkin made that. Now let me read you another one, again on the EPA proposed groundwater standard: ``Would result in non uniform risk levels. They misapplied the maximum contaminant levels for radionuclides and they far exceeded what is needed for the protection of public health and safety.'' Have you heard that? Mr. Page. I have heard that. Mr. Barton. You want to make a guess? Mr. Page. I am not going to take that bait. I know somebody made that---- Mr. Barton. That is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that went on the record in a comment period and said that. One more. ``EPA's proposal to include a separate groundwater standard lacks a sound scientific basis and will add little, if any, additional protection to individuals or the general public from radiation releases from the repository.'' Have you heard that? Mr. Page. I have heard that. Yes, sir. Mr. Barton. That comes from the National Academy's Board on Radioactive Waste Management. 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So it doesn't appear to me that there is a lot of support out there among the groups that have shared responsibility or have at least an interest in this issue, supporting the separate standard. And in the face of this, I mean, this isn't a Congressman that is out to make a political statement. These are on-the-record comments by official agencies of the U.S. Government that have the scientific and technical background to comment on this proposed separate groundwater standard. Given that, wouldn't it be at least possible for EPA to consider going back to an all-pathway standard and to back away from this separate groundwater standard? Mr. Page. Mr. Chairman, we will be discussing that in the interagency process. I think you have in this hearing correctly identified the scientific concerns with the groundwater protection policy that EPA proposed. There are other reasons, other policy issues. That is coming up in terms of discussion across the agencies as to why that was done, what the rationale is for it; and, yes, it will be considered or reconsidered, yes. Mr. Barton. Now, Mr. Burr talked about in his questions that the science on which the 4 millirem groundwater standard is based is old science. Sometimes old is good. Old is not necessarily bad. I am 50, and I think old is good. But sometimes, in the scientific arena, old is not automatically good. You mention that there is a revision under way in the science. When do you think that might actually come to fruition, that you will have new data on which to look at groundwater standards? Mr. Page. That is handled by another office. I can't say exactly when. Mr. Barton. Within EPA. Mr. Page. Yes, sir, within EPA. My sense is that this would be looked at and revised prior to any final decisions on Yucca, the licensing. Mr. Barton. Within the next year, next 6 months? Give us some--you are not under oath. Mr. Page. I understand that. Mr. Barton. No danger here. Mr. Page. I know in discussions that we have had internally that the Office of Water is aware of the need to update this. They are aware of what the concern is as--specifically as it pertains to Yucca Mountain, and they have committed to getting that under way. I have not seen it, I am sorry to say. I can get back to you as to when that might be, but I have not seen what their schedule is. Mr. Barton. Dr.--I may say your name wrong--Knopman. I got it right then. You have been very quiet in this whole thing. But you represent the Technical Review Board, and you actually have a background, as I understand it, in some of this scientific area that is under discussion. What would your committee's recommendation be that you serve on today as to the need for a separate groundwater standard at Yucca Mountain? I think you all are on record that you don't need that separate standard, but I want to give you a chance to correct me if I am wrong about that. Ms. Knopman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I didn't mean to be quiet; nobody called on me. Mr. Barton. In this kind of a group, you have got to stand up. You can't just be shy and retiring or they will never let you talk. Ms. Knopman. I am not shy and retiring. The Board is very careful to stay on the side of technical judgment as opposed to policy judgment. So the Board has not made a statement on the appropriateness of including a separate groundwater standard. The Board, however, from a technical perspective, does believe that we need a better understanding of what the background levels are at the Yucca Mountain site. Mr. Barton. The natural background. Ms. Knopman. The natural background levels. And it is also, I guess, somewhat a matter of debate now as to what kinds of levels of dilution might occur in the saturated zone, the groundwater that would be likely to be tapped into as a resource. The assumptions made about how much dilution there might affect whether or not that standard--how that standard might be met or not. However, the Board has stayed out of this question as it is, in the end, a policy judgment. Mr. Barton. But doesn't the Board, if not have an obligation, wouldn't they want to take a position? Because, you know, some of these things are political. I mean, the Nevada delegation, they are going to be against it for political reasons. The industry--the private utility industry that has the waste stored all over the country, they are generally going to want to be for it just to get it solved. But it is the technical--the country, you know, puts faith in the technical experts. When we talk about science, it is assumed that scientists are not political, that scientists are purely objective, that scientists only make decisions based on hard facts. And you know that is not true. Scientists can be very political. But in this case the Technical Review Board is tasked with being the least political of the group. So if we are going to have a scientific debate about separate groundwater versus all pathways, I would think the Technical Review Board position would be listened to and given great credibility by all sides. Ms. Knopman. The Board is, I would say, is most concerned about what is the practical difference between an all-pathways standard and a separate groundwater protection standard. In the context of the overall uncertainty of our estimates, we are talking about a 10,000 year compliance period. The difference between 25 millirem, for example, on the individual pathways standard and the 15 millirem is insignificant relative to the overall uncertainty in our estimate. Mr. Barton. I agree with that. Ms. Knopman. So the question is, how close does a 4 millirem separate groundwater standard end up coming within that same range of or order of magnitude as the individual pathways? The Board will need to, I think, do further analysis to understand better the point that Dr. Paperiello made about how that standard in fact translates at the 10,000 year level, but we have not at present undertaken such analysis. Mr. Barton. Let me ask you one more question. Then I will go to Mr. Shimkus. Has the Technical Review Board taken a position on whether you should have a repository that cannot be reopened, that the material cannot be retrieved, versus a repository that if the technology changes, if there is a scientific breakthrough, you could go in and a hundred years from now or 200 years from now or 500 years from now use the best science available at the time to control this material? Ms. Knopman. I think the board has operated on the assumption that virtually any kind of repository will be--waste would be retrievable. It is just a matter of the degree of difficulty. Mr. Barton. The current proposal, though, is that it is not. Ms. Knopman. It is a matter of difficulty. You would mine it out. It might be very hard. But the Board has spoken before on the need for flexibility in designs and the need for performance confirmation testing, which means that even if a decision is made to proceed with this, with construction and with placement of waste, that there be continuous monitoring, particularly in the time---- Mr. Barton. You see, I have made comments to local officials in Nevada that I think we should have the flexibility that if we can find better science, find better ways to monitor, whatever we can do that, build that in. So the bill that is going to come out of the subcommittee next year, if I am the chairman still, is going to put that flexibility back in, as opposed to the current situation where we put in there we lock it up, we post it and we walk away from it. So that might be something to have your board take a look at. Ms. Knopman. It continues to be an open question as to how long the repository would stay open. I believe the document did assume a 50-year closure period or that the repository would be closed after 50 years. I am not sure that---- Mr. Barton. We want to limit--don't misunderstand me. We want to limit the amount of material that is in this repository. We don't want to leave it open-ended that you could put more material. But to satisfy the concerns that Congresswoman Berkley had, you know, you can't have absolute certainty for 10,000 years, but you should be able to build in flexibility so if we could figure out a better way to maintain it, dispose of it, to control it, we ought to have the ability to use the best available technology a hundred years from now, 200 years from now, whatever. That is my only point. The gentleman from Illinois. Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just stepped out of the room to call my chief of staff to see if it was--to get his recommendation whether I would be able to stay around for a second period of questioning. He gave me a recommendation. He said yes. The schedule looks like you can do it. No one is at the door. And, Dr. Itkin, you need to get better at this business. I think most of us find it very incredulous that something as important as a humongous, large contract--that the person in charge did not give a yes or no, I support this. And I don't know--and I don't think anybody in this room believes that you did not give a yes or no--yes, I support them; or, no, I don't. So, I would just respectfully request next time, when we review this again, that we fully vet out this and--and there is responsibility. It was just a very bad display of the worst problems of bureaucracy is no one wants to be held accountable or responsible. Mr. Itkin. Congressman, if I may respond, because since we--I gave my response, I have since learned that, in fact, there was a memorandum written prior to my---- Mr. Shimkus. We thought there would be. Mr. Itkin. What I am saying is I did not know. I learned now there was a memorandum written several months before my arrival that was from my office and my deputy, recommending a 10-month delay in the recompete. And if I could yield, if it would be appropriate, I could yield to the person who served as the acting director during that time period. Mr. Shimkus. I will let the chairman--I have some important questions that I want to get on to for the record. That satisfies my line of questions and I am glad that we were able to go through the paperwork and get an answer to that question, unless the chairman wants to jump in here. Mr. Barton. I was actually in a staff consultation. Mr. Itkin. I just want to advise the Chair that since we had that conversation on the decision on the recompete, I have been told that prior to my arrival at the Department, that--in this position--that there was a memo written to the Secretary from the previous director, acting director, to recommend a 10- month delay. Mr. Barton. Ten month delay in recompeting the contract? Mr. Itkin. Yes, recompeting the contract. As a matter of fact, if I might, may I allow my deputy who served as the acting director to comment at this time? Mr. Barton. I tell you what, let's let Mr. Shimkus get all of his questions. I will come back on that because I have a few more questions on that point. So if we will just delay until Mr. Shimkus gets his questions in, and you will have more than adequate opportunity, and I will give you some other opportunities to comment on that. Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The scientific community that is present here, do we accept the initial premise of the storage site that it would be a permanent geological repository? And if we could go down the table. Obviously, that was put into question by our previous panel. I would like for you all representing the different agencies and scientific community--is the premise still a permanent geological repository? Mr. Paperiello. That is the Commission's position, a permanent geological repository. Mr. Shimkus. Thank you. Dr. Itkin? Mr. Itkin. That is the position of this administration. Mr. Shimkus. Great. Dr. Knopman? Ms. Knopman. The Nuclear Waste Board oversees the work of the Department of Energy, and if they are working on a permanent repository, so are we. And I would just add, though, that a permanent geologic repository is largely an international consensus among many other countries that have nuclear waste and are also pursuing this. Mr. Shimkus. Thank you. And again, that is the importance of coming and that is new information that I did not know. Mr. Page? Mr. Page. Yes, sir, the standard that EPA will be developing will be assuming that it is a permanent repository. Mr. Shimkus. Dr. Crowley? Mr. Crowley. The Board of Radioactive Waste Management has looked at aspects of the Yucca Mountain repository in the past and it is the Board's understanding that the DOE is working toward a permanent repository. Mr. Shimkus. If I have time I may go back to that, but I want to ask another question. Based upon the history of the transportation of nuclear waste currently, is it the scientific community's view that it can be done safely today? Mr. Paperiello. Yes. Mr. Shimkus. Dr. Itkin? Mr. Itkin. Yes. Mr. Shimkus. Dr. Knopman? Ms. Knopman. Yup--yes, there have been. Mr. Shimkus. I like ``yup.'' That is a better one. Ms. Knopman. There have been numerous analyses that have showed low levels of risk under both normal and accident conditions. The safety record has been good to date and corroborates the low risks. And there has been fuel shipped safely for many decades. However, that does not mean the transportation problem is done with. There are lots of issues relating to emergency response and management and coordination and some further testing that the Board has recommended. Mr. Shimkus. Before I go to Mr. Page, I would have a little comment. I think Congress understands the need to help local communities be prepared to respond, and this whole appropriation issue and the transportation issue is up for debate. But I appreciate that response. Mr. Page? Mr. Page. We believe it can be done safely with the proper---- Mr. Shimkus. Dr. Crowley. Mr. Crowley. The national academy doesn't have a position on that, but in fact it is being done safely today. Mr. Shimkus. Mr. Chairman, I would like to go one more, but I will defer if we are out of--Dr. Knopman, in the discussion you mentioned about the science and the possibility of the dilutions of the rem standard, but I did not hear you talk about what Mr. Page had mentioned was a possibility of a re--my terminology is poor and I apologize for that--but the reconcentration of that, of a larger millirem than the initial position. Is that scientifically possible? Is that a criteria that is accepted in the scientific community? Ms. Knopman. What is--the dilution is the direction in which the plume and the concentration of radionuclide would proceed. However, what Mr. Page was referring to is that depending on how the radionuclides are transported in the groundwater system, they may remain in fairly concentrated plumes even at significant distances from the repository itself. So if you happen to stick a well right into one of these concentrated areas of the plume downstream, you would get a higher concentration than you might closer to the repository, but where there has been more dispersion. Mr. Shimkus. I will finish up with this. Is the real debate, Dr. Itkin, on this millirem standard, the fear of because of the higher standard, there is going to be an increased cost to the facility which, based upon all the budgetary constraints that the ranking member mentioned, could astronomically increase the already tremendous cost burden to the taxpayers, that through the rates have done to provide this location? Mr. Itkin. Well, that is a concern, that anytime you have a very difficult standard to meet, that you have to provide additional barriers, additional protections to guarantee that to occur. And so, yes, there are additional costs associated with very demanding standards. But more of a concern, or at least equal or a greater concern, is the fact that if we have a zero tolerance for leakage, we probably cannot succeed here with the licensing process. And so it would be a killer. Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Mr. Barton. Thank you. This is going to be the last question period because we have two pending votes on the floor and you all have been here for 3\1/2\ hours, so we will let you go pretty quick. The first thing I will do is ask unanimous consent to include in the record a letter from the Health Physics Society dated November 24, 1999, and it is to the United States Environmental Protection Agency. And I am told this has been cleared by the minority. So I am the only one here so I am not going to object. But obviously, we are not going to do anything that is not in good faith with the minority. [The information referred to follows:] Health Physics Society November 24, 1999 United States Environmental Protection Agency Central Docket Section (6102) ATTN.: Docket A-95-12 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 401 M Street, SW Washington, D.C. 20460-0001 SUBJECT: The Health Physics Society's Comments on Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada; Proposed Rule Dear Sir or Madam: On behalf of the Health Physics Society (HPS), of which I am President, I am writing with comments and recommendations regarding Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada, 40 CFR Part 197, promulgated in Federal Register Vol. 64, No. 166, August 27, 1999. These comments and recommendations were prepared by the Society's Legislation and Regulation Committee. The HPS is a professional organization of approximately 6,000 scientists, educators, engineers, and operational health physicists who are dedicated to developing, disseminating, and applying scientific knowledge of, and the practical means for, radiation safety. The primary objective of the Society is to protect people and the environment from potentially harmful exposure to ionizing radiation. The Society concerns itself with understanding, evaluating and controlling the potential risks from radiation exposure relative to the benefits derived. The Society's working principle is to keep radiation exposures from justified ``beneficial'' practices as low as is reasonably achievable. This basic tenet of radiation safety has resulted in an exceptional history of safety and will continue to do so as we address the important issue of high level radioactive waste (HLW) in the Yucca Mountain repository. In this context, the HPS appreciates the opportunity to comment on the United States Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) ``Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada; Proposed Rule''. The HPS believes that these standards are precedent-setting and likely to have profound impacts on future activities and standards, not only for radioactive waste, but also for non-radioactive hazardous materials. The HPS also believes that promulgation of the Yucca Mountain Standard (40 CFR Part 197) is fundamental to helping resolve some of the public safety issues being encountered at our nation's nuclear power reactors. With the operation and decommissioning of commercial nuclear reactors, a final repository for spent fuel and other HLW is vital to the public safety and health from existence of the nuclear fuel cycle. Numerous stakeholders have proposed that allowing indefinite storage of spent nuclear fuel at operating and decommissioned facilities is an option. However, the HPS believes that such an option avoids, rather than offers a solution to the HLW disposal issue. In addition, it ignores the legal obligation of the federal government to take possession of, and provide for safely disposing of spent nuclear fuel, not only from nuclear power reactors, but also from our national defense program. For these reasons, the HPS encourages the EPA to move forward expeditiously with issuing 10 CFR 197 as a final rule. However, we urge the EPA to consider changes to its proposed rule, as discussed below, to ensure that the final rule is: 1. focused on protection necessary for public health and safety; 2. consistent with applicable recommendations of relevant national and international scientific advisory organizations; and 3. in full compliance with statutory requirements. The HPS believes that the proposed use of a separate ground-water protection requirement is: 1) not necessary to ensure protection of public health and safety, 2) inconsistent with applicable recommendations of scientific advisory bodies, and 3) contrary to statutory requirements. Including a separate ground-water provision will detract from the rule's primary purpose and focus on public health and safety. A limit on dose received by an individual from all exposure pathways, as included in the proposed rule, is fully protective of public health and safety. The EPA's stated purpose for use of a separate ground-water provision, i.e., to protect ground water as a resource, does not meet the purpose of the regulation, which is ``protection of the public from releases to the accessible environment from radioactive materials stored or disposed of in the repository.'' \1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ From Section 801 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The proposed provision for groundwater protection utilizes maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) from EPA regulations implementing the Safe Drinking Water Act. The MCLs for radionuclides proposed for use in the rule are generally based on an outdated and superceded scientific understanding of radiation risk. The MCLs implied in this rule equate to a wide range of dose values (ranging over more than two orders of magnitude), that will be considerably more restrictive in some cases, and considerably less restrictive in others cases, than the proposed all-pathways individual dose standard. Therefore, the use of the MCLs will effectively over-ride the individual dose standard that is the essential element of the proposed rule. The use of a separate ground-water provision is not consistent with the recommendations of the relevant national and international scientific advisory organizations, including the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP), the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As endorsed by the EPA's Presidential Guidance of 1987, these organizations unanimously endorse the use of individual dose limits, taking into account all exposure pathways, to assure protection of public health and safety. Further, the use of a separate groundwater provision ignores the recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) committee that was established by statute to make recommendations on the scientific basis for a protective radiation standard for the Yucca Mountain repository. The NAS committee specifically did not use a separate groundwater provision because the committee ``based our recommendations on those requirements necessary to limit risks to individuals.'' \2\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ ``Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards,'' National Research Council Committee on Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards, National Academy Press (Washington, DC 1995) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Finally, the proposed use of a separate groundwater provision is contrary to statutory requirements. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 requires that the EPA ``shall, based upon and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences, promulgate, by rule, public health and safety standards for protection of the public [that] . . . shall prescribe the maximum annual effective dose equivalent to individual members of the public . . . and shall be the only such standards applicable to the Yucca Mountain site.'' The NAS committee found that a health standard based upon doses to individual members of the public will provide a reasonable standard for protection of the health and safety of the general public. Therefore, the use of a separate groundwater standard, as proposed by the EPA, would be in direct conflict with the statutory requirement that an individual dose standard be the only such standards applicable to the Yucca Mountain site. The HPS believes that a 250 Sv (25 mrem) all-pathways individual dose standard will be fully protective of public health and safety and is consistent with recommendations of relevant scientific advisory organizations and national and international regulations. In its request for public comment, the EPA has noted that ``. . . some countries have individual protection limits higher than we have proposed [and] other Federal authorities have suggested higher individual dose limits with no separate protection of ground water.'' The EPA has requested comments specifically on the use of an annual Committed Effective Dose Equivalent (CEDE) limit of 250 Sv (25 mrem), rather than the proposed annual CEDE limit of 150 Sv (15 mrem). International and national scientific advisory organizations, including the NCRP, ICRP, and IAEA, have recommended an annual limit of 1,000 Sv (100 mrem) Effective Dose Equivalent (EDE) as suitably protective to members of the public from exposure to all non- medical, man-made sources combined. (The EDE is inclusive of the CEDE). As stated earlier, this recommendation has been endorsed in Presidential Federal guidance as proposed by the EPA, and has been adopted in federal regulations. A 250 Sv (25 mrem) CEDE standard for Yucca Mountain would represent a small fraction of the nationally and internationally accepted annual limit of 1,000 Sv (100 mrem) EDE and is consistent with the source-specific limits in other Federal regulations, as well the regulations of many other countries. It also represents a small fraction of the average exposure of 3,000 Sv (300 mrem) per year received by members of the general population in the U.S. from background radiation. For these reasons, the HPS believes that a 250 Sv (25 mrem) standard for Yucca Mountain is fully protective. The justification provided by the EPA for proposing an annual CEDE limit of 150 Sv (15 mrem) is not convincing. The EPA states that it is based upon a review of various guidance, regulations and standards, as well as the NAS report. However, the majority of the references cited include an EDE of 25 mrem. Further, the EPA compares the proposed standard for Yucca Mountain with the 10 mrem per year limit in the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPS). However, the NESHAPS are used to regulate emissions from a large number of existing sources that represent actual exposures to the general population of the U.S., while the Yucca Mountain standard will be used to set an upper bound for analysis and assessment of hypothetical exposures to a postulated group of individuals over the next 10,000 years. The EPA clarifies that the existing 25 mrem per year limit for the Uranium Fuel Cycle (40 CFR 190), based on ICRP-2 dose methodology, ``is essentially equivalent to the risk associated with [the] proposed limit of 150 Sv (15 mrem) . . . [which] corresponds approximately to an annual risk of 7 chances in 1,000,000.'' There is an implication that there a is risk-based distinction between a 25 mrem per year and 15 mrem per year limit. The HPS has taken the position that this type of risk assessment should not be used at the levels of exposure being considered in this proposed rule. We believe that at these levels there is not a scientifically-validated basis for reaching conclusions about differences in implied risk. A copy of the HPS Position Statement, ``Radiation Risk in Perspective,'' is enclosed. Finally, the EPA has not provided any analysis of the costs associated with meeting a 150 Sv (15 mrem) versus a 250 Sv (25 mrem) standard as balanced against an expected increase in health and safety benefit. Even at the 250 Sv (25 mrem) standard, a number of conservatisms will necessarily have to be introduced in the licensing application to address the uncertainties and limitations in modeling for predicting potential exposures over such long time periods (e.g., 10,000 years). However, the incremental difference in costs associated with incorporation of additional conservatisms for a 40% lower limit could be enormous, without any demonstrated benefit to health and safety. The HPS believes that the final rule should employ the use of the concept of the ``average member of a critical group'' for applying the individual dose standard, because it is more consistent with national and international regulatory practice, as well as with specific recommendations of the NAS committee, and will help avoid unnecessary conservatism in dose analysis and assessment for the licensing process. The NAS committee recommended use of an ``average member of a critical group'' for applying the individual dose standard. The critical group concept is consistent with the recommendations of the ICRP and reflects standard national and international practice in the area of radiation protection. The EPA justifies its proposed alternative approach, the 44 reasonably maximally exposed individual [RMEI],'' as an agency preference that is consistent with its practices in other EPA programs. However, this concept has not been incorporated in an NRC licensing process, which is where the final rule will ultimately be implemented. The HPS believes that it is neither prudent, nor necessary, to invoke this application in this rule, especially when the EPA has noted that the RMEI ``provides a level of protection substantially equivalent to that which would be achieved by the [critical group concept].'' The extensive explanation provided by the EPA in the proposed rule regarding how the concept is to be applied goes well beyond the statutory authority assigned the EPA in the Energy Policy Act, since the implementing authority is reserved exclusively for the NRC. Accordingly, we recommend that the EPA limit the approach provided in the final rule to endorsing the ICRP-based critical group concept as recommended by the NAS committee. In summary, the HPS believes that adopting these recommended changes will result in a rule that will be more effective in ensuring protection of public health and safety. The HPS also believes it will be more suitable in supporting implementation of the national policy for safe disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste in a deep geologic repository. Sincerely yours, Raymond H. Johnson, Jr., C.H.P., P.E. President Mr. Barton. The Health Physics Society is a professional organization of 6,000 scientists, educators, and engineers and operational health physicists who are dedicated to developing and disseminating scientific knowledge of and the practical means for radiation safety. The Society's principle is to keep radiation exposures from justified--and I quote--beneficial practices as low as is reasonably achievable. So this is 6,000 scientists, educators, and engineers. And they sent this letter to the EPA on November 24th, 1999. I will put the entire letter in the record but I am going to read the key paragraph. It says the HPS believes that the proposed use of a separate groundwater protection requirement is, one, not necessary to ensure protection of public health and safety; two, inconsistent with applicable recommendations of scientific advisory bodies; and three, contrary to statutory requirements. So it would seem to me, Director Page, that this is yet one more indication that this policy of EPA to have a separate standard is not supported in the scientific community. Do you have any comment on this--you have not--we did not give you a chance to look at this letter before the hearing. So I am not going to ask you to comment on the specifics of it. But I mean, I would assume that your people are generally aware of this letter. Okay. You testified earlier in a question, in response to a question that I asked you, that EPA is in the process of updating the science on the maximum contaminant level for the Safe Drinking Water Act requirements, and I thought you told me that EPA was not going to issue a radiation standard for Yucca Mountain until that new science has been assimilated within the EPA. But I want to give you another chance to say that. Did you say earlier that you were going to wait until you get the new science in place before you--if you are going to continue to propose a groundwater standard? Or is the agency going to go ahead and try to promulgate a groundwater standard sooner than that? Mr. Page. Thank you for the opportunity to clarify that. Mr. Chairman, what I did say is that we were in the process of updating the science behind the MCLs. What I also said, which is different from what you were asking---- Mr. Barton. That is why--I thought I heard you say one thing and the staff heard you say another. Mr. Page. What I said was that I believed that the--when you were asking me a specific time when it was going to be done, it was my confidence that that process would conclude prior to any final decisions, licensing decisions by the NRC, that they would make so that process would not get in the way. Can I make one more clarification that I think is important for you to know? Using the only sciences, which is what we did when we developed our proposals, and using certain scenarios that we proposed in the groundwater or in the proposed rule, the assessments that the Department of Energy has done and the viability assessments and subsequent analysis that they have done shows that they can make the licensing. So I think that is an important clarification. We do intend to update those MCLs and do intend to have larger discussions on groundwater across the Federal agencies, but I just want to tell you--I am getting a sense that you are concerned that we might be in the way or driving costs up unnecessarily and based on the analysis done to date, we are not one of the more important factors in there in terms of what we are---- Mr. Barton. There was only a veto threat on the bill for this particular standard. I would think that certainly could be construed as being in the way, or at least being a factor, since the President of the United States said if you did not have this 4 millirem groundwater standard he was going to veto the bill. I kind of think that is a factor. Mr. Page. What I understood the veto was, there is an objection taken, among other things, to eliminating the role that the Environmental Protection Agency would play, or a delay. That is my understanding. I don't remember the 4 millirem being part of the Presidential veto. Mr. Barton. Well, maybe I misunderstood that. There were only three Presidential veto threats on the House-passed bill. This is one of them. I want to go back to Dr. Itkin. The dialog that we had about recompete, it would be helpful if the Department of Energy could give to the committee all documents that were prepared before the Secretary of Energy made the decision to recompete. You mentioned one document that the acting director made. If there are other documents--now, we will send you a letter and we are real good in drafting our letters, any and all, la-dee-da-dee-da. I used to be oversight chairman, so I guarantee you that I can get you a letter that covers the bases. Just--you generally said that most of the debate within the Department was more of a verbal nature between the Secretary and various people on the issue. But to the extent there were written documents--you mentioned one--we would like to have that one, plus any other documents before the Secretary made the decision. Is that understood? Mr. Itkin. That is understood. [The response had not been received at time of printing.] Mr. Barton. Now, on that point, it is not generally a bad thing to recompete contracts. Competition is good. It is not bad. In this particular contract, since the critical path is critical, it really seems inconsistent to, if you are trying to meet your milestones, to go into a recompetition mode right when it is time to make some of those decisions. Now, I understand that there are three groups competing. One is the existing group, TRW in conjunction with Parsons Brinckerhoff, I think. You are---- Mr. Itkin. No, that is true. Mr. Barton. I am getting--one the gentleman behind you is shaking his head and you are doing this. There is a little dichotomy there, but that is understandable. Hopefully it will not delay the decision. But--the decision on whether to go ahead or not go ahead and meet these critical path requirements that you have got to meet in the next year and a half. But I want to be on the record explicitly, if we get some song and dance next year that they are going to have to slip the milestone because of the recompetition, this subcommittee is going to be very, very upset. And I know you share that concern. I know you share that concern; you are just being a real team player here and not being as open as you could be if this was a private conversation as compared to a public conversation. Here is what I want the Department of Energy to do between now and next year, if at all possible. The subcommittee would like to see a proposal on funding to fully fund the construction phase of the depository. Not just that it needs to be done, but work with the minority, work with the majority, come up with a proposal that we can put into a bill that the Department will support. Okay? I would like for the entire scientific community, if it is at all possible between NRC and EPA and the technical review committee and everybody else, to let's solve this separate versus all pathways. The average citizen does not understand that from Adam. If, in fact, the scientific community wants to be scientific, we ought to be able to resolve whether you need an all-pathway standard or you need a separate groundwater standard, and it would be very helpful to have a meeting of the minds on that. And then we would obviously like to make sure that--this is on the technical review board--any outstanding issues that have not been addressed in the review board's opinion, we need to get those explicitly put forward so that the Congress can demand the Department of Energy and EPA and the various Nuclear Regulatory Commission address those issues. We have been messing with this for 18 years. It is really time to make a decision one way or the other on this. And the timeframe is the next 18 months, which means the next 6 months of the next Congress we are going to have a new President; maybe President Gore, maybe President Bush, but we are going to have a new President. Now is the time to really bring all of this to fruition, make these decisions, and go forward. And so with that, I am going to adjourn the hearing. I want to thank our witnesses. These are productive. I want to alert our EPA, NRC, and DOE folks we are going to have a very extensive list of written questions and we are going to ask that we get answers within a month of when you get the questions. Okay? Thank you, gentlemen, and thank you, lady, and this hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] [Additional material submitted for the record follows:] The National Academies Board on Radioactive Waste Management August 18, 2000 The Honorable Joe Barton Chairman Subcommittee on Energy and Power Committee on Commerce U.S. House of Representatives Room 215 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515-6115 Dear Chairman Barton: In response to your letter dated July 20, 2000, I am enclosing responses to your follow-up questions from the June 23, 2000 hearing on radiation protection standards for Yucca Mountain. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you need additional information. Sincerely yours, Kevin D. Crowley Director, Board on Radioactive Waste Management Response to Questions Regarding the June 23, 2000 Hearing on Yucca Mountain Radiation Protection Standards note: the following three references are cited in this document: 1. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], 1999: Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada, Proposed Rule: 64 Federal Register 46976-47016 (August 27, 1999). This document contains EPA's proposed radiation-protection standard for Yucca Mountain. 2. National Research Council [NRC], 1995: Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards: Washington, D.C., National Academy Press. This report was written for EPA at the request of the U.S. Congress and contains the National Academies' findings and recommendations on radiation-protection standards for Yucca Mountain. This report is referred to as the ``TYMS report'' in this document. 3. National Research Council [NRC], 1999: Comments on Proposed Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada by the Board on Radioactive Waste Management: Washington, D.C., National Academy Press. This report provides a comparison of the proposed EPA standards with the findings and recommendations in the TYMS report. It is referred to as the ``BRWM report'' in this document. Question 1: Please elaborate on the reasons for the Board's opposition to EPA's proposed separate 4 millirem groundwater protection standard. Response: The Board on Radioactive Waste Management [BRWM] has not taken a position either in favor of or in opposition to EPA's proposed groundwater standard for Yucca Mountain. Rather, the BRWM has stated (NRC, 1999, p. 11) that it ``does not believe there is a basis in science for establishing such limits'' to protect public health. The TYMS report (NRC, 1995) concluded that an individual-protection standard would be sufficient to protect public health from a repository at Yucca Mountain. In my written testimony to the subcommittee, I explained why there is no scientific basis for the proposed groundwater standard. EPA made what appear to be several arbitrary modifications in applying its safe drinking water regulations (40 CFR 141) to Yucca Mountain. In particular, the groundwater standard in EPA's safe drinking water regulations applies to water delivered at the tap through a public water system, whereas the proposed groundwater standard for Yucca Mountain will be applied to a volume of groundwater in an aquifer some 2,000 feet below the Earth's surface at some as-yet undetermined distance from the repository. Second, the groundwater standard is based on a different level of risk than the individual-protection standard and, for some radionuclides, may actually provide more protection to groundwater than the individual-protection standard provides to people. In my written testimony I also suggested how EPA could justify a separate groundwater standard for Yucca Mountain based on science: namely, by adopting the risk-based approach recommended in the TYMS report (NRC, 1995). I noted that if EPA based its Yucca Mountain standards on a single value of acceptable risk, it could express that risk in terms of two elements, one for radiation exposures through the groundwater pathway (a groundwater standard) and one for exposures through all pathways (an all-pathways standard). These two elements would be scientifically consistent so long as they are based on a single value of acceptable risk. To implement this approach, however, EPA would have to modify the dose limits for the all-pathways and groundwater standards that currently exist in its proposed rule so that they represent the same value of acceptable risk. Question 2: I understand that one of the first radionuclides that could be released from the repository would be iodine-129. What is the health risk associated with a 4 millirem dose from iodine-129? Is this within the risk range recommended by the National Academy of Sciences? Are there other radionuclides that would fall outside the NAS's recommended risk range under EPA's proposed groundwater standard? Response: I cannot provide the subcommittee with a direct answer to this question. The BRWM has not performed a detailed examination of the health risks associated with a 4 millirem dose from iodine-129 or any other radionuclides associated with EPA's groundwater standard. Moreover, given that the groundwater standard proposed by EPA is based on outdated dosimetry, as noted in the BRWM report (NRC, 1999, p. 12) and in my written testimony (p. 10), the risk values calculated by EPA may not be representative of actual risks. Question 3: The Conference Report accompanying the 1992 Act read as follows: ``The Conferees do not intend for the National Academy of Sciences, in making its recommendations, to establish specific standards for protection of the public but rather to provide expert scientific guidance on the issues involved in establishing those standards.'' The National Academy was not intended to usurp the EPA's rulemaking authority, but the direction to EPA is very clear in the 1992 law--the EPA Administrator is to set generally applicable standards for the Yucca Mountain site ``based upon and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences.'' Mr. Page suggested in his testimony the ``EPA was to consider technical recommendations from the National Academy of Sciences.'' However, the law says ``based upon and consistent with.'' In your view, are the proposed EPA standards based upon and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences? Response: As noted in NRC (1999) and in my written testimony to the subcommittee, many important elements of EPA's proposed standards are, either in design or implementation, based upon and consistent with the findings and recommendations contained in the TYMS report (NRC, 1995). These are discussed on pages 4-5 of my written testimony to the subcommittee and include who is protected, the level of protection for the individual-protection standard, human intrusion, and exposure scenarios. My written testimony also identified three elements of EPA's proposed standards that are not based upon and consistent with the recommendations in the TYMS report: (1) use of a dose-based standard; (2) the inclusion of a separate groundwater standard; and (3) the time period over which the standard should be applied. My written testimony explains the nature of these inconsistencies (see especially pages 6- 13). The BRWM considers the first two of these inconsistencies to be very significant. The third inconsistency is less significant, as explained in my response to the last question in this document. Question 4: The National Academy recommended that EPA adopt a risk- based standard for the protection of individuals, yet EPA proposed a dose-based standard. I recognize that the 1992 Act directed EPA to ``prescribe the maximum annual effective dose equivalent to individual members of the public. That statutory language could be interpreted to merely dictate the final form of the standard, and certainly does not prevent EPA from using risk, as the National Academy recommended, to derive a final dose equivalent. Is EPA, in fact, using a risk level to determine the final dose? Response: The BRWM noted (NRC, 1999, p. 4) that EPA did not use risk to establish dose limits for its individual-protection standard. Instead, EPA used dose-based standards that were carried over from existing regulations (40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 141) and derived equivalent risk values through arithmetic conversion. As noted in both the TYMS (NRC, 1995) and BRWM (NRC, 1999) reports, there is no scientific basis for setting a level of protection for either a dose- or risk-based standard. Rather, protection levels are a public policy decision, best established through rulemaking, based on the risk the public is willing to bear from radiation releases from a repository at Yucca Mountain. The TYMS report recommended (NRC, 1995, p. 64-65) that the Yucca Mountain standard be based on risk because (1) it would not have to be revised in subsequent rulemaking as scientific knowledge advances, and (2) risk is more readily understood by the general public than dose, and it provides a convenient way to compare hazards to public health from different sources. The BRWM recognized (NRC, 1999, p. 6) that establishing a risk- based standard would be a major departure from current EPA practice and that it would be far more difficult for EPA to ask the public about acceptable risk than follow established precedents. Nevertheless, the BRWM strongly recommended (NRC, 1999, p. 7) that EPA adopt a risk-based individual-protection standard precisely because it requires public involvement in what is, fundamentally, an important public-policy decision. Question 5: Could you please elaborate on the Board's concerns about the time period over which the radiation standard must be applied? Response: In its proposed rule, EPA has asked for comments on two alternative standards for the period of compliance. The first alternative is essentially that proposed in the TYMS report (NRC, 1995) in which the period of compliance extends to the time of peak risk from repository releases. The BRWM has no concerns about this alternative, and in fact believes that its adoption would be consistent with the recommendations in the TYMS report (NRC, 1995). The second alternative applies a quantitative dose limit for a period of 10,000 years, but it also imposes an additional requirement that repository performance be examined after 10,000 years to see if dramatic changes could be anticipated. The BRWM recognizes that EPA can choose, as a matter of policy, to adopt the 10,000-year limit in the second alternative. Nevertheless, the BRWM is concerned about this alternative because EPA provides no guidance on how the required analyses are to be carried out beyond 10,000 years or how the results are to be used in judging the acceptability of the repository. The BRWM noted (NRC, 1999, p. 13) that ``to mandate that these results become `part of the public record' but to give no indication of how they will be taken into account seems to postpone rather than solve problems associated with licensing and provide no real benefits to protection of the public.'' This is especially true given that peak doses from repository releases are likely to occur after 10,000 years. The BRWM recommended (NRC, 1999, p. 13) that EPA either be more specific in providing guidance on how the analyses beyond 10,000 years should be used in determining compliance, or else explicitly pass the task for developing such guidance to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which is responsible for establishing regulations consistent with the final EPA rule. ______ [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.026 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.027 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.028 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.029 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.030 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.031 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.032 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.033 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.034 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.035 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.036 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.037 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.038 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.039 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.040 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.041 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.042 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.043 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.044 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.045 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.046 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.047 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.048 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.049 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.050 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.051 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.052 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.053 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.054 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.055 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.056 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.057 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.058 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.059 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.060 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.061 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.062 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.063 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.064 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.065 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.066 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.067 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.068 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.069 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.070 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.071 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.072 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.073 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.074 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.075 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.076 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.077 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.078 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.079 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.080 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.081 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.082 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.083 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.084 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.085