[House Hearing, 106 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] EXAMINING THE DRUG THREAT ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER ======================================================================= HEARING before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES of the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ SEPTEMBER 24, 1999 __________ Serial No. 106-135 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house http://www.house.gov/reform ______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 66-078 CC WASHINGTON : 2000 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York STEPHEN HORN, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania JOHN L. MICA, Florida PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington, MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio Carolina ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois BOB BARR, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois DAN MILLER, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas LEE TERRY, Nebraska THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee GREG WALDEN, Oregon JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois DOUG OSE, California ------ PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont HELEN CHENOWETH, Idaho (Independent) DAVID VITTER, Louisiana Kevin Binger, Staff Director Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian Carla J. Martin, Chief Clerk Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director ------ Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman BOB BARR, Georgia PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas DOUG OSE, California JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois DAVID VITTER, Louisiana Ex Officio DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California Sharon Pinkerton, Staff Director and Chief Counsel Gilbert Macklin, Professional Staff Member Carson Nightwine, Professional Staff Member Lisa Wandler, Clerk Cherri Branson, Minority Professional Staff Member C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on September 24, 1999............................... 1 Statement of: Fiano, Richard, Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice; Dorian Anderson, Commander, Joint Task Force Six, Department of Defense; Michael Pearson, Executive Associate for Field Operations, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, accompanied by Gus De La Vina, chief, U.S. Border Patrol; and Samuel Banks, Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service, Department of the Treasury........................ 93 McCaffrey, Barry R., Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy............................................. 9 Rodriguez, Raul, Lieutenant, Metro Task Force, Nogales, AZ; Dennis Usrey, Director, Southwest Border High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, San Diego, CA; and Tony Castaneda, chief of police, Eagle Pass, TX............................ 54 Letters, statements, et cetera, submitted for the record by: Anderson, Dorian, Commander, Joint Task Force Six, Department of Defense, prepared statement of.......................... 111 Banks, Samuel, Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service, Department of the Treasury, prepared statement of.......... 139 Castaneda, Tony, chief of police, Eagle Pass, TX, prepared statement of............................................... 84 Fiano, Richard, Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, prepared statement of......................................................... 97 McCaffrey, Barry R., Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, prepared statement of...................... 17 Mica, Hon. John L., a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida, prepared statement of.................... 5 Pearson, Michael, Executive Associate for Field Operations, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, prepared statement of............................. 121 Rodriguez, Raul, Lieutenant, Metro Task Force, Nogales, AZ, prepared statement of...................................... 56 Usrey, Dennis, Director, Southwest Border High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, San Diego, CA, prepared statement of..... 68 EXAMINING THE DRUG THREAT ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER ---------- FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1999 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m., in room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Mica (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives Mica, Barr, Ros-Lehtinen, Souder, Hutchinson, Ose, Mink, and Kucinich. Also present from the House Border Caucus: Representatives Bilbray, Kolbe, and Reyes. Staff present: Sharon Pinkerton, staff director and chief counsel; Gilbert Macklin and Carson Nightwine, professional staff members; Charley Diaz, congressional fellow; Lisa Wandler, clerk; Cherri Branson, minority counsel; and Earley Green, minority staff assistant. Mr. Mica. Good morning. I would like to call this meeting to order. This morning our Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources is going to review some of the problems relating to our U.S. Southwest border, examining the threat among our various activities in regard to illegal narcotics control. I am going to open the subcommittee hearing this morning with an opening statement. We want to go ahead and get started because we will have votes this morning, and will be joined by various Members, and I will recognize them as they come in. But we do have the Director of our Office of National Drug Control Policy and other witnesses. I think we have three panels today that we want to hear from, and so we do want to proceed. This morning our subcommittee is holding this oversight hearing to examine our Federal policy to combat the flow of illegal drugs and illegal aliens across our Southwest border. The importance and difficulties of this mission are in fact enormous. The Southwest border is the most active border in the world. It is estimated that almost 4 million trucks, 100 million cars, and a quarter billion persons cross the border annually through more than three dozen entry points. From a law enforcement perspective, control of the U.S. border in this area is becoming more and more elusive. Evidence of the problem mounts every day. We have been told that in 1998 the U.S. Customs Service alone seized almost 32,000 pounds of cocaine, 850,000 pounds of marijuana, and 407 pounds of heroin along the Southwest border. Furthermore, the implementation of NAFTA has made it easier for drug traffickers and those entering the United States illegally to use the cover provided by legitimate cross-border commerce and normal traffic. It is estimated that up to 70 percent of the cocaine, 50 percent of the marijuana, and more than 20 percent of the heroin in the United States now comes across the Southwest border. Eventually, these drugs end up in our cities, in our schools, businesses, and homes throughout the United States. A recent DEA report indicates, ``It is now common to find hundreds of traffickers from Mexico, many of them illegal aliens, established in communities like Boise, Des Moines, Omaha, Charlotte, and Kansas City, distributing multi-pound quantities of methamphetamine.'' This border has also become the crossing point for an incredible amount of methamphetamines that we have found throughout the United States in various hearings that we have conducted of this subcommittee. The correlation between a loose border and human misery in this country is obvious. With the Southwest border now representing a major factor in the illegal trafficking of drugs into this country, and with 14,000 drug-related deaths occurring each year in the United States, our control of the Southwest border represents a significant national security threat. The statistics on drug use, particularly among our young people, is a constant worry in every American community for every parent, and for every Member of Congress. Heroin use is continuing to rise dramatically. Drug overdoses and deaths continue to plague our metropolitan areas, our suburbs, and our schools. Among our 12th graders, more than 50 percent of them have tried an illicit drug, and more than one in every four may be current users. The statistics, too, as I point out often on the House floor, relating to heroin production in Mexico, should be a warning sign to everyone. Once a small producer of heroin, Mexico now is the source of a much larger percentage of the heroin consumed in the United States. That heroin then travels across this border into our communities. As chairman of this subcommittee and a close observer for decades of our efforts to combat the scourge of drugs, I am particularly concerned about our law enforcement strategy and its implementation along our Southwest border. Congress has poured substantial moneys into Southwest border initiatives to combat drug trafficking and the entry of illegal aliens across that border. Today, it is critical that we examine the results of these efforts and review our plans for the future. Are we making progress, or are we losing ground? What more should we do? The entry of illegal aliens and the border crossings of drug traffickers must be stopped. Since 1993, the Immigration and Naturalization Service budget has increased from approximately $1.5 billion to nearly $4 billion. During the same period, INS staff grew from approximately 17,000 to more than 28,000 full-time employees, as of June 1999. Today, INS is the largest Federal law enforcement agency in the U.S. Government. Our subcommittee needs to know how this increase in funding and staffing has slowed illegal immigration and illegal border crossings, activities that result in more drugs, more crime, more negative economic and social impacts on both our States and our communities. The Border Patrol has grown from 4,000 to 8,000 agents in 5 years. Where are these agents, and what are they doing? Are they in the right places and assigned to the right tasks? We have numerous agencies represented here today involved in our Southwest border efforts. How effectively do they communicate and share information? The administration has suggested that a strong bilateral approach to law enforcement with Mexico is necessary to achieve our mutual interests in controlling our border and protecting our citizens. What evidence is there that Mexico today is cooperating fully with our efforts? How many drug cartels responsible for cross-border trafficking have been dismantled? How many continue to operate? Today, we will hear more about what the administration is attempting to do, as well as the efforts of local law enforcement officials who enforce laws daily along the Southwest border. Still, we must face certain irrefutable facts: increasing and dramatic amounts of illegal narcotics are still coming through this border from Mexico. They are ending up on American streets. These drugs, and those who traffic in them, spread and finance gang violence, destroy young lives, and undermine our communities and the quality of life. We have with us today law enforcement representatives from local, regional, and Federal organizations who will tell us more about these growing challenges. I am also pleased today that we have with us a number of my colleagues in Congress, particularly those who have worked with the Congressional Border Caucus, who, are committed to addressing these challenges and threats. I welcome their continued efforts and support in this area, and I also welcome their participation in this hearing. Earlier this year, the ranking member and I led a delegation to the Southwest border of the United States. We did see in February, firsthand, some of the challenges that we face. I can assure you that we do have some major problems. Also, in a hearing and meetings that we conducted there, we also heard of disorganization, lack of cooperation, and a general disarray of our U.S. agency activities to bring our borders and, again, drug trafficking under control. We believe that we must move immediately to address these problems more effectively. This is not a partisan issue. This is not a Republican or Democrat issue. This is an issue that faces our Congress very squarely as a challenge we must meet together. I must say that I am pleased with the announcement 2 days ago just before this hearing that a major drug bust was conducted along the Southwest border. I believe this operation was called ``Operation Impunity.'' Still, it appears that such busts should be a matter of routine if we are to fulfill our border control responsibilities. I must ask our witnesses: Are we going to see more of these enforcement activities, and how soon? We strongly support these efforts, and we want them to continue. The protection of our citizens, the enforcement of our immigration laws and policies, and putting a halt to border trafficking in illegal narcotics, and the protection of our territorial sovereignty are among the issues that we will discuss today. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, as we seek a better understanding of our border control efforts and the national priority that it must represent. I am pleased now to recognize our ranking member, the gentlelady from Hawaii, Mrs. Mink. [The prepared statement of Hon. John L. Mica follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.001 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.002 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.003 Mrs. Mink. I thank the chairman for convening this hearing. As he indicated, several of us traveled the early part of this year on an extensive investigation and inquiry as to not only the trafficking of these drugs across the border, but the extent to which we are really exerting the maximum energies, expertise, and technology in interdicting the drugs that are coming across the border. And as we indicated at the time that we made the stopover at the border, we were going to continue to investigate this matter. So I welcome the convening of this hearing today, and I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses that have been called to testify. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Mica. I am also pleased to recognize for any opening comment Mr. Reyes, the gentleman from El Paso, TX, also a member of the Armed Services and Veterans Affairs Committees, and active in these Southwest border issues. Mr. Reyes, you are recognized. Mr. Reyes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I, too, would like to echo my colleague's appreciation for calling this hearing; and more than that, for calling attention to a very serious issue that affects not just border communities, but our whole country. I also want to commend you for the diversity of the witnesses this morning. And as you may or may not know, I spent 26\1/2\ years, prior to coming to Congress, as a border patrol agent, the last 13 as a chief, both in south Texas and in El Paso. I am pleased to see a number of my former colleagues that are going to be offering testimony here this morning. So I think this is certainly a step in the right direction. There are a lot of things that we need to focus in on to help our various law enforcement agencies, among the local, the State, and the Federal level, to work together, to coordinate, and ultimately, to make the streets of America safer. So I appreciate this opportunity, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Mica. Thank you. And thank you again for joining us this morning. I am pleased now to turn to our panels. We have our first panel of one individual who is key to this entire effort, who probably has the most difficult responsibility of anyone in this administration for any assignment, and that is trying to bring together our national effort on drug control policy. He has done an outstanding job in trying to pull together various activities that are so crucial. Among them, of course, is trying to bring our agencies and the local governments, States, and other efforts together into some coherent effort to bring drug trafficking and the borders under control. So we are pleased to welcome the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, General Barry McCaffrey, back to our subcommittee. General, as you know, this is an investigations and oversight subcommittee. If you would, please stand and be sworn. [Witness sworn.] Mr. Mica. Thank you, and welcome back, General. We are pleased to recognize you for your statements in regard to this issue before the subcommittee. STATEMENT OF BARRY R. McCAFFREY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY General McCaffrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative Mink and Congressman Silvestre Reyes who has been a tremendous leader and example and a source of wisdom on this issue. We have welcomed the chance to appear before Congress to discuss the Southwest border. It has generated a very useful review of ``Where are we?'' I think the subsequent panels will, obviously, flesh out our view. What I will offer, if I may, is a few short minutes of formal remarks: First of all, I would like to place in the record our written statement. Mr. Pancho Kinney from my office has pulled together throughout the administration, from law enforcement, from the State Department, from the Department of Defense, our best views on the current state of affairs. So I offer those. Mr. Mica. Without objection, the entire statement will be made part of the record. General McCaffrey. Also, Mr. Chairman, I have asked my staff--particularly Mr. Joe Peters, who is our Acting Director of State and Local Affairs--to go through our own organizational concepts and offer for you and your staff and your committee members the organizing documents that we have in play. First of all, you have in your packet the aspects of the ``strategy'' which we submitted for congressional consideration in 1999 that relate to the Southwest border. That is what we are trying to do, what we wrote in the strategy. I have also extracted from the ``Performance Measures of Effectiveness'' how we say we are going to assess how well we are doing. And so these PMEs, which are really only a ``C- minus'' state of execution right now, will be the organizing way in which I try and monitor the compliance of my Federal partners with this ``strategy.'' You also have in your packet the ``threat assessment.'' As you know, Dennis Usrey, our Southwest border HIDTA Director, is here. This is local, State, and Federal law enforcement's viewpoint along the five Southwest border HIDTAs on the threat they face. We are going to be updating this this coming winter, but this is now the picture we see of where these criminal organizations are trying to penetrate the Southwest border. Two documents I think--first of all, they are a compliment to the Congress--come from my own Center for Technology Assessment. I have one document, ``Southwest Border Technology Interest Areas,'' and the other one, ``The Counter Drug Technology Transfer Program.'' Congress has put a significant amount of money into this effort--I would argue, not yet enough--in which we are trying to give local and State law enforcement throughout the United States in this case, I will address the Southwest border some of the tools that they can use to more effectively protect the American people. I think it is a well regarded program, and one you may wish to question your later witnesses about. Two final documents, if I may: One is an attempt to capture in a snapshot form Mexican achievements in the counter- narcotics arena. And we have just given you some insights into where we are now. Of course, we have a formal assessment we will have completed by February 2000, but this gives you an update from my last written input to your committee. The final document is ``Counter Drug Intelligence Architecture Review.'' The Congress asked me in the law to look at the connection between U.S. intelligence collection and support for law enforcement on the drug issue. This has been a brutally painful and extended debate inside the administration. There is a thicket of U.S. laws that we had to take into account as we went about this analysis. They are sort of obvious. You do not want to take your foreign intelligence collection system and jeopardize it by putting in play sources and methods in a Federal court hearing that might betray a program that cost us millions of dollars and years to develop. And conversely, you cannot afford to have your intelligence system in any way violating U.S. Federal protection of privacy of U.S. citizens. But we have completed this process. The Attorney General, the CIA Director, and I have agreed on the outcome. All other Federal actors took part in it. We are going to now try and set up a sensible, three-tier way of dealing with the intelligence support responsibility we have to local and State law enforcement in particular. And I would argue that currently it is completely inadequate. We have the best intelligence system in the world; but at the end of the day, it does not connect effectively to law enforcement leadership. Let me, if I may, Mr. Chairman, just take note of some of the witnesses who are in the room, as well as others who are listening. We welcome the presence today of Samuel Martinez, who is the executive committee member of the Hispanic-American Police Commanders Association. Second, Mr. Al Zapanta, President and CEO of the United States-Mexico Chamber of Commerce, who has been an enormous help to me throughout the last several years. And finally, Mr. Jim Polly, director of government affairs, the National District Attorneys Association. And I mention him in particular, because it is obvious to most of us who have studied this issue that we have a responsibility to have a balanced system approach to the border. And where we put resources in one area--for example, the Border Patrol--but we do not have a corresponding support mechanism to ensure that local prosecuting attorneys and local law enforcement have the resources they need, we will break the system. And so we very much welcome the involvement of the National Sheriffs Association, the National District Attorneys, and others. My staff also had an extended meeting yesterday, and I had an excellent session this morning, with representatives from all five of our Southwest border HIDTAs. I would argue this is one of the best programs that Congress has put together and then supported financially in the last several years. As you know, when we started this program in 1992, there were five total HIDTAs. Now there are 31. You have given me the resources we need to provide modest but effective support to these efforts. So this morning I had a meeting with the supervisor, David Torres, of the California Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement; Lieutenant Jim Burns, from the California Sheriff's Office, Imperial County; New Mexico HIDTA Sheriff John Lee, sheriff of Otero County, who I found enormously helpful in developing my own thinking. You have appearing as a witness Director Dennis Usrey, who possesses great experience. He is our director of the entire Southwest border HIDTA effort. And Lieutenant Raul Rodriguez, who will also be one of your witnesses, is a metro task force commander out of Nogales, AZ. He has done this his entire adult life, and knows what he is talking about when it comes to the support he expects to see. Finally, again, we are grateful for the National Guard Bureau support across the entire Southwest border, and Colonel John Mosby, director of NGB Counterdrug Programs, was also part of my preparation for this hearing. Let me, if I may, start again by taking into account the ``National Drug Strategy.'' You have increased funding for the ``strategy'' in 4 budget years, from $13.5 billion to $17.8 billion. And a lot of that--thankfully--a 55 percent increase went into prevention and education. The heart of this ``strategy,'' clearly, is goal No. 1: How do we minimize the number of American adolescents who are exposed to gateway drug- taking behavior? You have given us a 26 percent increase in funding in 4 years for goal No.'s 2 and 3, relating to dealing with the 6 percent of us, the 13 million Americans, who are abusing drugs; and in particular, the 4 million of us who are chronically addicted. In today's hearing you are asking me to focus in on goal No. 4: How do we more effectively shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat? And clearly, the biggest threat to our defense against illegal narcotics still comes across this enormous Southwest border, the biggest open border on the face of the Earth. Now, let me give you the bottom line. Mr. Chairman, in 1997, I reported to the President, ``Our current interdiction efforts almost completely failed to achieve our purpose of reducing the flow of cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines across the border.'' I went on to argue, ``We need to shift from a manpower, physical inspection approach to one that is intelligence driven and that employs emerging technologies to conduct non-intrusive searches.'' My fundamental assessment has not changed. I believe we are moving in the right direction. The resources you have given us are being gainfully employed. The manpower is beginning to take effect. But we have not yet achieved our purpose of significantly reducing the flow of cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines across the border. As you mentioned, it remains a principal threat. Some 55 percent of the drugs in the United States pass through the Central American-Mexico corridor, and then across the United States, generally speaking, by land, although some of it by air. Clearly, we have an enormous problem, and I have a little chart that gives you a snapshot of it. We have a huge effort. This is a $2 billion program, 11,000 Federal officers. It is largely an open border; 1 percent of it is fenced. Much of it is water that is easily crossed. A lot of it is remote, rugged land area which is barely marked. There are innumerable places where you can drive unimpeded across that border with four-wheel-drive vehicles. And we are facing people who have been smuggling across that border literally for generations, and who know the terrain and are willing to employ violence to achieve their purpose. So that is the challenge as we look at it. We also note, favorably, the 100 million Mexicans to our south, are our second-largest trading partner on the face of the Earth. So we are trying to sort out criminal activity from among 278 million people crossing that border a year, 86 million cars, 4 million trucks and rail cars. That is the challenge that is summarized on this chart. Now, how are we doing? I would say, if you look back over the last 4 years in which I have been studying the issue: Not very well. When you look at inspection of trucks and rail cars, which is essentially where a lot of this illegal cargo is concealed, if you try and get at it with physical searches, with downloading 18-wheelers of frozen food cargo, of drilling holes in the wall, of inspecting it manually, of looking for other intelligence tips and then trying to pull aside the right vehicle out of these millions of POVs and rail cars: It simply will not work. In 1997, six truck or rail cars found with cocaine; in 1996, 16. There is just no reason why brute force will solve the problem. We do believe that the technology--and I am going to talk about this--that you have deployed to the border will change the shape of the smuggling envelope. So I think that and the intelligence program, which are moving ahead, are going to make this a quite different viewpoint from the criminal organization effective in the coming years. Now, if you will, let me also note that Congress recognized the problem 2 years ago. You instructed me in the 1999 Omnises Appropriations Act to study the problem, along with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General; a review to include consideration of all Federal agencies' coordination with State and local law enforcement agencies, and to report back to you. We are going to comply with that law. I have tasked the Interdiction Committee, which is chaired by Mr. Ray Kelly, the Customs Director--who I would argue is one of the best cops we have had in this country--to put together a comprehensive assessment of counterdrug efforts along the Southwest border, and present for inter-agency consideration an operational concept, a force structure, and a coordination mechanism that will address the issue. Let me also tell you that we are aware that you have given us significantly enhanced resources. Just taking snapshots of what has happened in the last 4 years: You have upped the Customs budget for Southwest border programs by 72 percent. You have increased DEA special agents that we have been able to assign down there by a third. You have increased INS agents since fiscal year 1993 by more than 100 percent. We have doubled. The DOD drug control budget for the Southwest border has gone up 53 percent. The number of U.S. attorneys has gone up by 80 percent. So the manpower is starting to come online to get a handle on this problem. I would argue, even more importantly, you have given us non-intrusive inspection technologies. And a lot of this material is new. It has only been down there in the last year or two. Until it is at all 39 border crossings, we are not going to have presented a wall of resistance to drug smuggling. But you do have eight fixed truck x-ray sites, and two mobile truck sites, and one fixed gamma-ray inspection system now deployed. There are other efforts that we are now undergoing. And by the way, let me, if I may, quickly put in context that although Mexico is where the drugs, 55 percent of them, we say cross our frontier, that is not where a lot of it starts. If you want to find the center of gravity of the drug problem, it is Colombia, as you so well brought out in the last hearing we had here. Eighty percent of the cocaine that enters America originated in, or transited through, Colombia. Probably, 70 percent or so of the heroin that we seized--and I underscore ``seized''--originated in Colombia. And a good bit of the rest of it in Mexico, especially in the western half of the United States. I underscore seizures because I think the percentage is that high because of good police work by the DEA and Customs in particular, and the Coast Guard, because it represents that higher proportion of the total heroin use. But they have focused on it. There is the picture that evolves. The Defense Intelligence Agency does the cocaine flow analysis for us. I believe we now know what we are talking about, as we watch the movement of cocaine and heroin from the production area, through the transit area, into the arrival area. That picture is updated formally every 6 months. Here is where we seized the drugs, and we get a lot of it. We should never disregard the impact of moving out of public consumption, literally, hundreds of tons of drugs: methamphetamines, heroin, marijuana, et cetera. Here is where it comes in. The Southwest border, as you are looking at it, accounts for half the drug seizures we make with Federal authorities. A huge problem: What is the most dangerous drug problem in America? It is an American adolescent, probably in the 7th grade through about the 10th grade, who is involved in heavy use of marijuana, alcohol, and other drugs, inhalants, heroin, et cetera. We should not disregard the enormous destructive impact of significant use rates of cannabinoids in our society, and it is coming across the Southwest border. Some of it does not originate there. It comes out of Colombia or elsewhere; but it is crossing the border in record amounts. When you look at the seizure rates, it is almost unbelievable. Methamphetamines: Arguably, the most destructive drug that we have ever seen in America. It started as a sort of a niche market, West Coast biker drug. It is now all across the country. It is a huge problem, obviously, in the Western States. It is now probably the major drug problem in the central part of America and it has hit the East Coast. It is all over Georgia and other places. It is tremendously addictive and destructive of human development. It creates people who are extremely dangerous, in particular to law enforcement authorities. And unfortunately, it can be manufactured easily. The recipe is on the Internet. The compounds are available in many pharmaceutical houses, and it is being manufactured all over the United States. Literally, 2,000-some-odd cooking operations were taken down in the last 18 months. Now, a lot of these are ``Beavis and Butthead labs'': a few grams, people cooking for their own use, for their friends. But it is an enormously destructive drug, not only to the individual using it, but to the family that is associated with its use or cooking, and to law enforcement authorities, and to the ecology. And there are two major methamphetamine producing locations on the face of the Earth. One is Mexico; the other is California. It is also, of course, throughout the Midwest. And now it is showing up in Georgia and other places. That is where the seizures are. Then heroin, finally: Although seizures are constant, that is more a reflection of the cunning of these criminal organizations, with this enormously valuable cargo. Heroin availability in the United States has never been greater. Purity has never been higher. The price is low, and American adolescents are unaware of the addictive and destructive potential of heroin, even when snorted or ingested. A lot of our youngsters think that if you are not injecting it, it could not be all that dangerous--And correspondingly, we have seen in your district among others, an enormous death rate among American kids from this very potent form of heroin. Finally, let me mention that we do have a series of initiatives that we are now working in the inter-agency process. There has been some first-rate cooperation, particularly Donnie Marshall and DEA, the INS team along the border, Ray Kelly in Customs, and others, and all the law enforcement agencies involved. The HIDTA program, which Dennis Usrey will talk to you about, has been a great payoff. I would make one point, if I may, Mr. Chairman. These five Southwest border HIDTAs tend to be in areas with extremely low population density. A lot of Americans do not live there. So a local sheriff's department or police department has modest resources at their disposal. As we find a major threat to the entire 270 million of us developing along the border, I would argue we need to provide Federal resources to back up these local and State authorities, because they are acting on behalf of all of us as a law enforcement shield on that border. And they are simply being overwhelmed. When I say that, I do not mean just the sheriff's department. I also mean the prosecutor, the local detention facilities, et cetera. Our prosecutorial guidelines now, with this level of drug smuggling, have gone up to the point where, literally, at 500 pounds of marijuana and below this is a ``Turn it over to State and local authorities'' situation. We are going to have to provide them meaningful levels of support. I am going to ask Congress to seriously consider substantial increases in funding for the five Southwest border HIDTAs. Bullet No. 2, the Border Coordination Initiative, you will learn more about this by talking to Treasury and Justice representatives. The BCI initiative is an attempt to get 23 Federal agencies and four major departments of government to operate more coherently at the border. It took two of those departments, Treasury and Justice, and gave them coequal coordinators and a plan to manage their affairs at the 24 ports of entry. I applaud the initiative. I think it is going to be extremely helpful. But I must be unequivocal in saying it is an inadequate approach to providing a coherent Federal management response, in my judgment, either at the POEs, in the four border States, or across the border in general. One of the major failures is it still does not give local and State law enforcement a single point of contact in their sector that they can go to and expect to get intelligence support and operational responses. And I think, if you talk to local law enforcement, which I do up and down that border continuously, they feel our efforts in support of their very courageous defense of their own counties is inadequate. Now, that even includes things like intelligence. We have the best intelligence in the world now coming online at EPIC, the El Paso Intelligence Center. But it does not connect reliably to sheriffs and police chiefs along that 2,000-mile border. No. 3, the Port and Border Security Initiative: That is up, and moving forward. I think it is going to have a big payoff. The bottom line is, use technology cued into intelligence, and you will find the drugs. There are some spectacular successes, particularly at the Miami port of entry; New York; Eagle Pass, TX; El Paso--some really excellent work going on. We have talked about harnessing technology. I think Congress is giving us the tools to do our job now. Drug control cooperation with Mexico: It is going to be a challenge; there is no question. I have included in your packet the ``U.S.-Mexico Drug Cooperation Strategy.'' We are working closely with Attorney General Madrazo, with Minister Cervantes. There are extraditions taking place. There have been nine this year for murder, drug related crimes, et cetera. They are trying to create a new counterdrug police agency. They have put their own efforts into a vetting system, so that their agents are polygraphed, drug tested, and financially over-watched. But having said that, it is clear to all of us that this is a generational effort for Mexico to create law enforcement agencies and a criminal justice system that is responsive to their own needs. They are doing a lot better, when you talk to these law enforcement officers, in cooperating with U.S. authorities on murder, or cross-border car theft. But when it comes to drugs, the money and violence associated with drugs is so intense that it provides a special limitation on our ability to work across that border. The counterdrug architecture, bullet No. 6, refers to intelligence coordination inside U.S. ranks. I think we are moving in the right direction. We have some more work to do, but I think now, between Director Tenent, Attorney General Reno, and I, we do have a scheme to move forward and be more responsive to our law enforcement counterparts. Finally, I think we ought to expect a lot out of public- private partnership. At the end of the day, we encourage the cross-border economic traffic. So you can have trusted travelers, trusted corporations, who invest in their own counterdrug programs at the factory site: that the inspection process is understood to take into account not just crossing the border, but from the time that truck is loaded in Mexico, all the way to its delivery point; and that you have technology now that will allow these vehicles to cross the border with machine-read license plates, with registered drivers; and where the corporation puts at risk this very good economic opportunity if they are caught not searching out and preventing drug smuggling. I think we are going to see a lot come out of this in the future, where business will be asked to pay for the enhanced economic cross-border activity. Finally, this is just a summary of some of the inspection systems that are going into place. I think they are beginning to pay off. But again, what the drug criminal organizations are doing is reading the battlefield with enormous effectiveness. When we do something that does not work, they ignore us. When we do something that does work, they adapt. And what they are doing now is going around the systems we are putting into place. That does not mean they are not working; they are. But it does mean that there will have to be a seamless web, not based on raw manpower, but on intelligence and technology up and down this border. There are some holes in this entire system. We still, in my view, have inadequate support to some sub-elements of the system. One of them is the U.S. Marshals Service. They are handling enormously increased requirements now based on drug smuggling, and I do not believe they have the manpower or the Federal transfer centers to support this Southwest border effort. We are going to have to think very carefully about that. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before your committee, and I look forward to answering your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. McCaffrey follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.004 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.005 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.006 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.007 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.008 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.009 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.010 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.011 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.012 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.013 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.014 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.015 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.016 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.017 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.018 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.019 Mr. Mica. Thank you, General, for your statement and testimony. A couple of questions, if I may. First of all, one of the points that you raised was that there was not a point of contact for the local officials, local and State officials. We have many Federal agencies involved in this effort, and we do have the problem of the lack of someone, say, in charge. Who would you recommend be in charge? If not you, then who? How would you structure this? When we were at the Southwest border, we heard problems of lack of communication, lack of coordination, and complaints about inter-agency turf wars. It seemed like there was no one in charge. You said that there is no point of contact for local officials to go. It appears that the Federal agencies are in disarray, with a lack of coordination, and each operating independently. How could we better structure this to put somebody in charge of these efforts? Also, we have this HIDTA structure. We have a number of HIDTAs along there. Should it be based around those efforts? But again, somebody in charge, or somebody coordinating this massive effort: Is it possible, and how should we do that? General McCaffrey. Mr. Chairman, one of the interesting aspects, when you start looking at the problem, there is something floating around called the ``Burkhalter Report, 1988,'' done for Vice President George Bush. It is not a bad snapshot of the problems. We are working on the same problems today in 1999. I do not think there is any particular magic to this. And let me again reiterate, just in the 4-years I have been privileged to watch this process, we have more resources, more technology, better intelligence, better coordination among Federal law enforcement, and better coordination across that border. I would argue it is still inadequate. And although I think it is a weak analogy, I would almost suggest, we went a couple of hundred years in the military service of the United States where no one had the authority to coordinate the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, until Congress passed a law and told us to do it. So I would argue for---- Mr. Mica. So are you recommending--And again, we are looking for solutions. Maybe we need to pass a law that says there must be a joint approach that someone is in charge. Would you do that on a unified basis across the board, or in divisions, or a combination, so that there is some structure? The problem is, again, you have a half-dozen, maybe a dozen, Federal agencies, local efforts, National Guard: again, just multiple partners and participants, but nobody really in charge. Plus, your focus has been to improve technology and intelligence. We are doing both, and I think we are making some progress in that area. But we have a mass of people that we have sent to this border, and they seem to be all going off in their own direction--and again, lack of some structure. Again, any specific recommendation as to how you tier this structure and organize it? General McCaffrey. I would like to offer a couple of comments. First of all, what I would not try and do is start over and create a single border agency for the U.S. Government. It cannot be done. We would waste years fighting with each other. So I would recognize that there will be, and should be, separate Customs Service, INS, DEA, et cetera, with their own budgets, manpower, unions, et cetera. The second thing is, I would not assert that we need operational direction at the border; that is, somebody in command of the DEA-Customs investigations, et cetera. Law enforcement and prosecution, particularly through the HIDTA, do extremely well pulling together complementary investigations. I do believe the problem is that there is no coordinator for any given POE or any sector of the border for Federal authorities. I still go to a border crossing, and I get a brilliant briefing by the port chiefs for the Customs Service, the INS, the Department of Agriculture, and anyone else who is there, the National Guard Bureau, et cetera. There ought to be a coordinator. In my view, that should be the U.S. Customs Service. Because primarily, what we have at the POE are millions of people and vehicles with the economic vitality of these two huge nations at stake. In sectors of the border, it seems to many of us that the Border Patrol is the obvious logical actor to coordinate Federal law enforcement efforts, and to do so in cooperation with Mexican authorities. We have thousands of National Guard troops out there, engineers, military intelligence, supporting the effort. The Department of Interior, Transportation, and other Federal agencies have huge responsibilities. Somebody has to coordinate it. And then finally, I have argued that El Paso already has Joint Task Force Six. You are going to have Brigadier General Dorian Anderson, one of our better soldiers we have on active duty. That is where we coordinate military support. We have EPIC there, the intelligence center. We have ``Operation Alliance'' there, where we try and broker law enforcement demands on the feds. A lot of the activity is there. I think there ought to be a border coordinator for counterdrug activities. Mr. Mica. Thank you. One final question. You have mentioned--well, we talked about cooperation among our agencies and local officials and that structure. One of the other elements of this has been--and the Administration has put an emphasis on it--cooperation among and with Mexican officials along the border. I am really concerned, dismayed, at recent reports I have had as recently as the last week, for example, along the Baja Peninsula. It appears that that State or province has basically been taken over by narcotraffickers, that the situation is basically out of control as far as corruption. There have been hundreds of deaths. And the corruption runs from the lowest level to the highest level. I am also concerned even with reports we have had in the last week. This Mario Mossieau, who committed suicide, he implicated, I guess, in his suicide note that even the Presidency of Mexico may be compromised. We have had testimony from a Customs official to that effect in a prior hearing that we had. Are we able to deal with these folks at all in some efforts to make some meaningful cooperation? Or are we dealing with the drug dealers and narcoterrorists at every level with Mexico today? General McCaffrey. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I think what we ought to do is watch what people do, not what they say. What we are trying to do is achieve the best possible defense of the American people by working with Mexican actors who we think are producing results for us. I think it is unarguable that when we deal with the Mexican Attorney General, with Mr. Mario Herran, who is the head of their counterdrug law enforcement effort, when we deal with the Minister of Defense and others, they are cooperating. There are actors who we can talk to and share intelligence with, and we are doing just that. Concerning the Mexicans, clearly, their people are getting murdered and kidnapped and brutally tortured. They are fighting back. When we pulled ``Operation Impunity''--one brilliant piece of work by Customs, DEA, and others, with the FBI involved in it--we did work with Mexican authorities during that investigation. As you know, they seized more than 12 tons of cocaine, $20 million, tons of marijuana, and arrested almost 100 people. And we were able to keep that one reasonably close hold. We have watched the Mexican Navy arrest at sea with two gigantic cocaine seizures. That is a fact. They have done that. We have watched the Mexican Army and police on their southern border, which is where they are putting their x-ray machines, down on their Guatemalan-Belize border. They have bought a couple of hundred small boats, and they are trying to seal off from the south entrance to Mexico. I think they are serious about it. Now, at the same time, it has never been more dangerous inside Mexico or on that border for United States law enforcement and Mexican law enforcement. One of the officers this morning told me the Mexican smugglers now get murdered if they do not get through. So these people and their families are at risk, they are armed, and they are dangerous. They are dangerous to the Beta Group in the south on the Mexican side of the border, and they are dangerous to our law enforcement officers. And we are losing local and Federal law enforcement officers. So I think it is a very challenging situation. But, yes, the Mexicans are working with us; and, yes, we are achieving results from it. Mr. Mica. Thank you. Mrs. Mink. Mrs. Mink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The issue is really quite mind-boggling. We have a dizzying array of individuals, agencies, local, State, Federal, involved in this whole matter of trying to bring under control the invasion of these drugs that are coming across our border. And if we read back or read through the transcript of your testimony this morning, I think we would pick out quite a number of places where you indicated that we were not doing enough, that we could do better, that we looked forward to better coordination or better efforts on the part of the Federal Government to look at this as a truly national problem, and not to leave the local and State officials dry in terms of intelligence and other kinds of technical assistance which might make their work more effective. So having said all of that, and understanding that the problem is very complicated, I am somewhat dismayed that you do not recommend that we institute some one agency or individual in charge of the Southwest border. I do not believe, frankly, that by having task forces, meetings, joint ventures and more coordination, or even one chief coordinator, you are going to find a solution to all of these areas which you have enumerated today as being areas of major deficits on the part of the national government. So I would like you to address that point. How could a coordinator do any more than what is already being done in joint task forces and HIDTAs and all these other operations that we have put into effect, from whom we have heard; each one indicating the maximum efforts that they are putting and trying to achieve their potential? And yet, when you as the person in charge of all of this overview recite to us these major deficits, it seems to me it is time for us to consider some very bold and much more decisive command. This is an invasion, and I regard it that way. And I do not think that we can say coordination is the answer. General McCaffrey. I think I basically agree with your sentiments. I think that in 1997 I went to the President and laid out the problem and gave him the general shape of how we ought to move ahead, and he agreed at that point, and so did the White House Chief of Staff. What we are trying to do now is struggle with 23 Federal agencies, and in particular four major departments of government, to come to a common viewpoint. These are professional people, by the way. This is not a lack of intelligence or responsiveness. It is not narrow-minded behavior. These are professionals who are very concerned about some very different institutional missions. The Border Patrol is not like the U.S. Marshals Service, which is not like the DEA mission. Mrs. Mink. Yes, but we cannot allow those bureaucratic definitions which we have to deal with---- General McCaffrey. Yes. Mrs. Mink [continuing]. To come to a point where it interferes, interrupts, creates a barrier from effective interdiction of all of these things coming across. General McCaffrey. Right. I think much of this can be solved. Mrs. Mink. It seems to me like somebody has to be in charge to solve those problems. General McCaffrey. You are certainly talking to a person whose background---- Mrs. Mink. Well, I was going to suggest that you start this, in terms of how the military might approach this---- General McCaffrey. Yes. Mrs. Mink [continuing]. From an overall command post. General McCaffrey. I think a significant move forward would be if there was a Federal coordinator from the same department of government. Mrs. Mink. We have the authority to make a decision. General McCaffrey. Well---- Mrs. Mink. I do not mean to load on you today, General. General McCaffrey. Yes. Mrs. Mink. But I just feel so frustrated---- General McCaffrey. Yes. Mrs. Mink [continuing]. In getting to these hearings, and hearing the people discuss the issues, and this myriad of complexities and different agencies, different responsibilities. And it is agonizing to know that we do not have that ability to put it all together so that somebody can help that small sheriff---- General McCaffrey. Yes. Mrs. Mink [continuing]. In a small town get the intelligence that he needs, which is available, in order to do a better job. General McCaffrey. It goes beyond that. Basically, if you are a sheriff in a county or a police chief, or a Mexican law enforcement figure, who is it you are supposed to go to to begin the process of coordination? And since we have jurisdictions that are not congruent--the DEA, the FBI, the Border Patrol, the Customs Service do not have the same jurisdictions. Mrs. Mink. Well, I could not even tell you what it is. If somebody came to me, I would have to call up four people. General McCaffrey. Right. I share your concern. I think coordination is required. I am not sure we can ever get to command; nor do I believe it is required. But I think we do need to move forward. Mrs. Mink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Mica. Mr. Hutchinson. Mr. Hutchinson. General, good morning to you. Just following up a little bit, you mentioned the Burkhalter Report of 1988. What did it say in reference to coordination among our Federal agencies? General McCaffrey. Let me, if I can, extract from it what they recommended, because times have moved on and some of this is not entirely appropriate. The problem is, I would argue, they rented a very bright admiral and had him study the issue. He captured some findings that are remarkably similar to what I am now telling you. And 10 years later, we still have not overcome the coordination shortfalls that he identified in 1988. Mr. Hutchinson. What you are saying is, we have made enormous strides in the coordination--at least, that is my impression of law enforcement as a whole--through the HIDTAs, and through the drug task forces. There is more coordination between the agencies, but there is not any central command post. General McCaffrey. Right. Mr. Hutchinson. Is that correct? General McCaffrey. Neither at the POEs, the ports of entry; nor in the sector; nor in the Southwest border. Mr. Hutchinson. How much authority do you have? General McCaffrey. Considerable: For budgets, for policy. We have managed to pull together intelligence architecture. We have managed to pull together a coherent technology initiative. So a lot of that is moving in the right direction. Mr. Hutchinson. On the budget side. General McCaffrey. I have to certify everybody's agency budgets, and if they are not found adequate I can decertify them and order them to reconsider. I have to certify the department budgets. Mr. Hutchinson. Do you have authority to certify increases? Do you have authority to recommend cuts? General McCaffrey. Indeed. Mr. Hutchinson. I mean, that should be a lot of leverage, I would think. General McCaffrey. I think it is. That is why I think the budgets and the technology and the manpower are moving in the right direction. There are more people, more x-ray machines. Coordination architecture is better. I do not want to miss that, and that is why I read into the record huge increases in U.S. attorneys present on the border, 80 percent; 72 percent increase in Customs manpower. We are aware of an appreciative congressional response to our initiatives for 5 years running now. But I have also tried to outline for you the shortfalls. The shortfall is, there is still no coordinator at El Paso, TX, for Federal counterdrug efforts. Mr. Hutchinson. I think your point is right on target. I think there is agreement that there is a need there. But you indicated that we waste too much time trying to combine or put someone in charge. You pulled back from really having a coordinator with power and punch. You are saying a coordinator of information, and that is pretty weak. So how strong do you want to go in this regard? And you mentioned Customs. Would your office not be in a better position to provide coordination than Customs, for example? General McCaffrey. I think everything works better from the bottom-up than the top-down. So the thing I am most worried about is having a coordinator at each POE. I would rather have that than anything else. Then the second thing I would rather have is somebody in the States of New Mexico, California, et cetera, who is the Federal coordinator for counterdrug efforts on the Southwest border in that State. Finally, I would like to see somebody parked in El Paso, using the manpower of EPIC, Alliance, and Joint Task Force Six, who is charged only with watching the Southwest border and coordinating our counterdrug efforts. I want to be a policy guy; not an operational person. If Congress wants to change the law, I have spent most of my life in charge of things; I am a policy, budget, and spokesperson now. It will not happen here in Washington. Mr. Hutchinson. To accomplish that coordinated office, would it take legislative effort, or can it be handled at the administrative level? General McCaffrey. I have been trying to achieve it through dialog and logic. Mr. Hutchinson. OK. I yield back. I thank the General for his comments. Mr. Mica. Thank you. Mr. Reyes. Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to first say that I agree with the General, in terms of the necessity to have a coordinator. But let me, perhaps, put it in perspective of the context of how you are approaching a coordinator, as my colleague from Arkansas said, of information, and why not additional authority. Let me first give you some personal experience and personal frustration, and why I think it is very important that we do have a coordinator has some authority and decisionmaking capability between the Federal agencies. One of the big frustrations, even today, as a Member of Congress, is the fact that INS, even though we fund them for technology, can take that money and use it for something else. We know that Border Patrol, for example, is going to be falling short by some 650 agents in hiring the required 1,000 agents this year. In addition to that, there are gaping holes on the border where they do not have the elementary type sensors that have been around since I served in Vietnam some 30 years ago. So part of the issue is in following three examples: The ability of the border coordinator, border director, however we want to phrase it, to be able to dictate to INS that money that is to be spent for manpower or for technology be done accordingly. Part of the directive should be that if we have identified a shortfall with the U.S. Marshals who are charged with transporting our prisoners and making sure they show up for trials, et cetera, and if there is a shortfall, this coordinator should be able to have some influence over additional marshals, relocation of marshals, those kinds of things, to the border area. The last thing is a tremendous shortfall in U.S. attorneys and, by extension, Federal judges; although we get into another arena when we talk about confirmation of Federal judges. But the issue from my perspective--and I am talking from about 13 years frustration as a chief patrol agent--is we have a situation where border law enforcement agencies work together, not by design, but by the capability of individual chiefs, directors, special agents and all, to get along and to say, ``Look, our resources are finite, so we do more if we work together.'' This is well and good, if everybody is on the same page; but oftentimes, they are not. In regards to the issue of the port of entry, General, I think you are on target. We need one agency in charge of each port of entry, so they can make staffing decisions, so they can make decisions in terms of strategies and things along those lines. I appreciate your position, because in my conversations with members of the administration, I know that the administration is opposed to your idea of a coordinator. Mr. Chairman, that is something that we ought to seriously take a look at from a congressional perspective. Because if we leave it to the different Cabinet-level individuals, there is a possibility of turf battles right on the front lines of the war on drugs, and I have seen those same kinds of turf battles up here in the political and in the bureaucratic arena. So I would hope that we, as a Congress, take a look at this. If we need to change the law, let us change the law. Because in the long term, every year the issue of certification comes up. We tend to project our frustrations, in the case of the Southwest border, onto Mexico. I, for one, want to commend General McCaffrey for every year standing up and saying, ``Look, the Mexicans are paying a tremendous toll for their role in the war on drugs, and we ought to be looking at ourselves.'' This is an opportunity for us to look at ourselves, and to do something meaningful. The last thing I would like to ask the General by way of a question is, General, when we came up in 1992 with the HIDTAs, and we had five original HIDTAs, they were a priority in order to combat narcotics. From then to now, we have gone from 5 to 31, as you mentioned yourself. In my mind, one of the frustrations is that if everything is a priority, then nothing is a priority. They are no longer focusing in on areas like El Paso and the Southwest border in terms of funds and the ability for agencies and your office to provide the extra resources. I do not have anything against other parts of the country being able to participate, but I think their participation is at the detriment of those areas that are on the front lines. I would like your comment on HIDTAs going from 5 to 31 today, and perhaps 40 or 50 next Congress. General McCaffrey. Mr. Congressman, I think your comments are basically on the money. If I may, on the subject of coordination versus being in charge, I think we ought to go for what we can realistically achieve. I see no possibility of getting the various committees of Congress, the various departments of Federal law enforcement, to agree to place a person in operational control of multiple Federal agencies. I do not think it is achievable. And by the way, from the start, the President of the United States and the White House Chief of Staff have been supportive of me trying to organize, as best I can, agreement among competing interests. I think where we might get is to have a coordinator, the Customs Service, at the POEs, and a coordinator, Border Patrol, in sectors and States. So I would like to move in that direction. But if you think more is achievable, I would listen very carefully to your own viewpoints. Mr. Reyes. Well, General, if I could just interrupt you for a moment. In 1993, I was told that we could never control the border, when we put ``Operation Hold the Line'' and redefined the strategy from one of chaos and apprehension to one of prevention. General McCaffrey. I agree. If we put the manpower, the technology, the intelligence, and fencing in place, we can regain law and order control of our border, working in cooperation with Mexican authorities. I think we can do that. And the HIDTAs, Mr. Congressman, are working spectacularly. I would argue they would work with or without Federal dollars, because smart cops do cooperate, and the prosecutors do. I go to these HIDTAs in the Northwest and Minnesota and New York City. You have given me enormously increased money. In 1991 it started with five HIDTA's, $46 million. Now the total amount of money for all the HIDTAs is $186 million. I am an unabashed supporter of the HIDTA process. I do believe we need to be careful that this is not micro- managed by congressional actors, where the budget is placed for political reasons in support of certain programs. I think we are on the edge of losing control of it. You passed a law and told me to identify where HIDTAs should exist and to recommend to you that process, and then you asked me to identify the budgetary recommendations. I am getting way too much help on this process. Mr. Mica. I think we are going to have to turn to one of the other congressional actors. I appreciate your response. Mr. Souder. Mr. Souder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to make a couple of comments, and I have a few questions that I will put together and that you can address because they are similar. One is that I think anybody who looks at the numbers can get so frustrated that they say--and this is what we are starting to face at the grassroots level--``Well, this does not do any good.'' That is simply not true, as you have pointed out. Let me make first a political statement. I believe that in the first few years of this administration, drug use in this country soared, as we backed up. But I also believe that, just like your recent statistics you put out, we have made some progress in the last few years. It will take a lot more progress just to get us back to 1992; but at the same time, since you have been working aggressively in your office and given an organized public forum, and as this administration has joined with us in the fight, we in fact have made progress. And it is not true for people to say that we have not reduced drug use in the United States, or reduced violent crime in the United States. It is just very hard and very expensive. And the more pressure we put on, in effect, the marginal costs become greater. But I think it is very important to always have that in the record, that in fact we have been making some progress now for the last few years. It is not true that we are ``losing'' a drug war. We have in fact been gaining ground. We just lost so much ground that it is hard to get it back. Second, every time we visited Mexico or South America, there is no way to separate. I want to put a couple of facts into the record. Our exports to Mexico surpassed United States exports to Japan, now making Mexico the second-most important export market after Canada. We are Mexico's predominant trading partner, accounting for 85 percent of Mexican exports and 77 percent of their imports. We are the source of 60 percent of their direct foreign investment. There is no way we are going to stop this trade process. I say that as somebody who has had skepticism about NAFTA all the way along, and who 2 days ago just lost another plant of 450 well-paid employees to Mexico; which now makes my record going about every 30 days getting a plant closing in my district, moving to Mexico. But the fact is, that is not going to reverse itself. We have to figure out how to best deal with this. And when you have the amount of trade we have, and the immigration--in my district, I have seen a massive increase in the number of Mexican immigrants, because our unemployment rate is at 2.5 percent and the industry needs them. And we might as well acknowledge that we are having some major things interacting with the border control that make this question a very complicated one, both international and domestic. Now, I have a few questions that relate. I, too, am hopeful. You said there were nine extraditions. And I believe we have made some progress on the Mexican nationals that have been extradited on drugs. That is one of the things we are really watching. A second thing is, in the vetted units, is there anything we can do to accelerate that process, in training, in additional dollars? Because it is clear we cannot control this just on our side of the border; yet, there are nationalist things in Mexico that we can and cannot do. You referred to the importance of intelligence dollars. Does that include boosting dollars related to tips? What things can be done? You said they are working at the Guatemalan and the southern border, but we really need their help at the northern border as well. And my last question is--and that kind of ties in with the intelligence question--as we have seen in Miami, they moved to the airports and other things. As you have said, they are smart. In other words, wherever we put the pressure, they put around. Is it intelligence and some of the things like that you are putting emphasis on? And could you identify a little more what you mean by that? Because the general assumption that many of us have is that is exactly what is happening: Wherever we put the pressure, they adjust to that. So what are some ways to directly deal with that problem? Are there specific requests regarding intelligence, their vetting units, their dollars, things we can do to help strengthen their side of it, in addition to continuing to put the money into our side? General McCaffrey. The extradition process, Mr. Congressman, I would ask you permission to submit for the record a statement on how we are doing this year. There was one huge challenge to us and Mexico concerning cooperation: they got a bad court case they are trying to deal with. Essentially, it appeared to be barring further extraditions of Mexican nationals, in accordance with their own Constitutional restrictions. Mexican authorities are trying to work to deal with this in accordance with their own laws. But I believe there is a common agreement on both sides of the border that we will not allow a fugitive from justice to violate our laws or theirs and hide on the other side of the border. I think we are continuing trying to work that successfully. And the two Attorneys General have secure phones in their offices, and they do talk about not policy, but court cases, by name, ``How are we going to get this criminal suspect extradited to the other country?'' Vetted units: They are doing better. The sort of gross number is, they have now vetted 6,000-some-odd people. They have flunked a little under 1,000. They are trying to conduct oversight of their own law enforcement agencies. But there are huge institutional challenges to them building law enforcement operations that will work. There are vetted Mexican law enforcement military and police units and intelligence units that are working in cooperation with United States authorities, and that is something we ought to be proud of. At the same time, there is, as we understand, massive corruption implicit in local law enforcement, and in some cases in the judicial system. It is something to be dealt with, and I do not think we are going to see our way around that for a generation. When it comes to intelligence, I think we are making some enormous progress. In an open hearing, with your permission, I will be a little bit cautious about what I say. We are identifying vulnerabilities of these criminal systems. CNC, the CIA, acting as sort of the executive agent, has brought together--we have periodic inter-agency meetings: How are we going to target these people, collect evidence? How do we then disguise where we are getting it? How do we then find cuing systems so that U.S. law enforcement authorities, to include the Coast Guard, are tipped off, without betraying sources and methods? Then we are arresting people. This process is working. There are huge seizures going on. And this is, by the way, not just United States-Mexican cooperation; this is global authorities. We are working very closely with European Union partners, with Thai authorities. Probably in a closed session we would be glad to lay out more of that. I think we are moving in the right direction. Funding is an issue, and one that we have developed some new thinking that may require new ways of looking at resources. Mr. Souder. Mr. Chairman, if I may just make one small comment with that? If we can look at a discussion of what we can do, I do not know that we can afford a generation. I mean, I understand why you are saying that, as far as changing their law enforcement. If there are any things we can do to accelerate that, in boosting the pride, exchange programs with our police academies, ways to give awards through other means to get it to the Mexican Government to build the pride and income in their law enforcement. Because, I mean, a generation does not do much for us. And yet, I understand that unless we kick that process, that is exactly what we are looking at. General McCaffrey. Yes, I get your point. Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Souder. I am going to go to our vice chairman, and then I will go to you two gentlemen, if you do not mind. Mr. Barr, you are recognized. Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General McCaffrey, it is always an honor to have you here, and we appreciate your work, and I do personally very much, in support of our overall drug effort. Although I was not here to hear your direct testimony, I understand you commented on and provided some guidance and thoughts on creating a better coordinating structure for our Southwest border region. I think your ideas have a lot of merit, and I appreciate your providing those to us. Several years ago, when I served as the United States Attorney in Atlanta, we had the problem of trying to extradite individuals from Colombia to the United States. The Colombian Government at that time paid a dear price for beginning the process of trying to extradite some of their drug traffickers to the United States. They do not just have to deal with harsh words down there, the people, they bomb and kill large numbers of people, including supreme court justices and political figures. One of the very first individuals that was extradited up here to the United States was a cartel money launderer, and he was extradited to Atlanta. We had him under indictment there. Shortly thereafter, though--and I do not recall exactly when it was--Marion Barry was seen on international TV with the undercover tapes doing cocaine. And then shortly after that, the verdict was rendered in his case, in which I think he was convicted of a misdemeanor and did a small amount of time. That had a direct and very negative, almost a chilling effect--understandably so--on the willingness of the Colombian Government to stick its neck out to extradite individuals up here, because of the feeling that, ``The U.S. is not really serious about fighting drugs internally, where you have--'' as I remember seeing traffic ``--where you have the Mayor of your own Nation's Capital doing drugs and basically getting a slap on the wrist.'' It really chilled the process that was beginning to move forward before that time of starting to extradite some of these kingpins and top money launderers to the United States. We now have the prospect of drug legalization in the District of Columbia--not just a mayor doing drugs, but large segments of the population. We now know, for example, that almost 70 percent of those who voted in a drug referendum last year favor legalization of marijuana. And I have a great concern that, if this process moves forward, it will send a very, very negative message to those governments, those foreign governments, that are the source countries or the transit countries for the drugs moving into this country. Because whether we have problems with them from time to time on coordinating our activities or what-not, we do rely on them having faith in our system so that when they engage in activities in cooperation with us they are going to get the support here in this country of fighting drugs. So I do have a concern about the message that this will send--that has already been sent by this drug referendum having been on the ballot, and the results of it now being made public. But of course, the President has that D.C. Appropriations bill which contains, for example, the amendment that I proposed during the appropriations vote that would prohibit the District of Columbia from taking any steps to implement any drug legalization initiatives. Do you share my concern that we need to oppose efforts such as the one in D.C. to legalize drugs? General McCaffrey. Senator Inhofe has just invited me to testify next Wednesday on just this issue, and I told him yesterday I look forward to that opportunity. Unequivocally, we are opposed to a State or District of Columbia referendum to try and change the FDA-National Institute of Health system by which we adjudge compounds to be safe and effective as medicines. This is a goofy way to go about sorting out what works in the best medical system on the face of the Earth. We want to screen out Laetrile and Thalidomide. We want to screen in the magic drugs that have made our system of medicine so effective. We are unalterably opposed to doing that and we will go say that again Wednesday in front of the Senate committee. I would also agree with you that it is probably a bad signal. I am less worried about Colombian criminals reading this the wrong way than I am about American 12-year-olds. You know, ``If smoked pot is so effective as a medicine, if it is so positive a compound, then is it or is it not really a threat to my development as an adolescent?'' That would be my first concern. I think I would narrow the issue, though, Mr. Congressman, to say that medical pot is an issue that ought to be decided on science and medical basis, and not confused as a political issue. As long as we stay on that basis, we will end up with good policy. That is not what is happening. We have a very clever group who is pushing a drug legalization agenda, using industrial hemp and medical pot as their approach. I do not argue that all of those who support medical pot are for legalization of drugs. I think it has been a failure on the part of those of us who understand the drug issue to adequately communicate why these State referendums do not make sense. The American people, when they get a reasonable explanation of the pros and cons of the issue, normally end up with a pretty sensible decision. I think we are failing in our efforts to communicate that. Mr. Barr. And with the D.C. pot initiative in particular, I mean, there are all sorts--I mean, it is one of the goofiest of the goofy that I have seen, providing for best friends can grow the pot for you. It does not require even a piece of paper that a doctor has written something on. I mean, there are all sorts of easy ways to show why it is a bad idea. If I could, Mr. Chairman, I would just ask two very, very quick questions on followup. Has the President, or anybody on his behalf, asked your opinion on the D.C. pot initiative and the language in the D.C. Appropriations bill that would stop it from moving forward? General McCaffrey. Well, of course, Mr. Congressman, it would not be appropriate for me to tell you what advice I have given the President, or have not. It is clear that the administration position is, in public, in writing, we are opposed to deciding safe and effective medicines through public referendum. That is unequivocal. There are other issues that are going to be involved in this one, D.C. local authority. So there will be other issues that are outside of my purview. Mr. Barr. But on an issue within your purview, as Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and given your very strong opposition to these legalization issues---- General McCaffrey. Secretary Shalala and I and Dr. Alan Leshner and others are opposed to political initiatives which attempt to legalize specific medicines. We do not want heart medicines voted on in a public referendum; nor do we want smoked marijuana made available through that approach. Mr. Barr. But the language in the D.C. Appropriations bill that would prohibit the District of Columbia government from moving forward with any steps to legalize drugs or reduce the penalties provided under Federal law, you support that language, do you not? General McCaffrey. I have not read the language. From what you are saying, yes, I would support it. But again, what I would like to do is say, if this is really a medical issue, if you are talking about safe and effective medicine, then let us make that the purview of the NIH, FDA, and the American Medical Association, and make doctors stand up to the issue. They are hiding on the issue. Mr. Barr. Well, would your preference be for the President not to veto the D.C. Appropriations bill, or any bill, simply because it contains the language that prohibits D.C. from moving forward with drug legalization? General McCaffrey. We are adamantly opposed to the legalization of any agents under the CSA. That is in writing. There is no question of that. We are also adamantly opposed to smoked marijuana bypassing the FDA/NIH process. Mr. Barr. Therefore, would it be---- General McCaffrey. I really would not prefer to go ahead to discuss Presidential action on language I have not read. Let the lawyers read the action. What you have heard, though, is not just my viewpoint; it is the viewpoint of Secretary Shalala, Dr. Alan Leshner, and the others of us who watch this. Mr. Barr. If I could, I am surprised that you have not read the language. Would you take a look at that and give me your views on it? General McCaffrey. Sure. Mr. Barr. The language in the D.C. Appropriations bill that we inserted? General McCaffrey. Yes. Mr. Barr. Thank you. Mr. Mica. Thank you. I am going to recognize Mr. Bilbray. He is not a member of this subcommittee, but he is from California, represents Imperial Beach. And we have heard from Texas; we will get a chance to hear from California now. Mr. Bilbray. Thank you. The gentleman from Texas and I are probably the two who live and sleep within site of the border. And let me just followup on comments made by my colleague from Georgia. I would assume that the administration continues to oppose the California initiative that passed a few years ago, General? General McCaffrey. Absolutely. Mr. Bilbray. Does that include the President who opposes that initiative? General McCaffrey. There is no question that we are adamantly opposed to using local referendums to decide which medicines are safe and effective. Mr. Bilbray. I just hope that with all the talk about equity and local control, that the people of D.C. are given the same protection as the people of California that have been supported by the administration on this issue. But that aside-- I just want to point out that it is not just somebody picking on D.C.; that the California initiative is consistent with the administration's position on D.C. General McCaffrey, as somebody who has worked along the United States-Mexican border for over 20 years, I see a lot of perceptions about Mexico and about the Mexican Government not doing enough. And frankly, for those of us who have watched what has happened in Mexico, we have seen that Mexico finally woke up to the fact that you cannot sneak up on the drug problem; you are going to finally have to get totally committed and totally involved. Yet the corruption issue is raised again and again. My concern is that, as we point fingers on Mexico--remember, I have been probably one of the worst critics of Mexico on a lot of issues. But on this one, the fact is that Mexico took dramatic action a few years ago; they went in and totally changed their approach to drug interdiction along the border, did they not, with the restructuring? General McCaffrey. Exactly. They have made a major effort to change this. They have increased the amount of money they put in it dramatically, and they are trying to reorganize their effort. Mr. Bilbray. And not just that, but they changed who was in control, how it was going to be managed. General McCaffrey. They have, indeed. Mr. Bilbray. It was pretty dramatic in San Diego--and I do not know about along the rest of the border--where they actually called in Federal agents, lined them up in front of TV cameras, and said, ``We are going to ship you all to Mexico this afternoon, and the military is going to come in and preempt the operation, because of the concerns.'' I only wish that we will wake up and see this same kind of commitment and not find excuses. In fact, in looking at Mexico, I am trying to point out what they found about intercepting the drugs. I see searches every 50 miles along their highways. I see the military being totally committed. I see their efforts; some we would not even consider. And I think the reason why they have taken those steps is the fact that they realized that they are being taken over; that basically this issue is going to totally absorb them. With respect to the bureaucratic issue and coordination, in the San Diego sector, we saw Alan Bursen come in, be appointed by this President, and basically really come in, organize and coordinate that effort. We saw dramatic changes. We saw outreach across the border. And basically, as my colleague from Texas said, you started seeing an attitude change that quit finding excuses not to get the job done, quit walking around it, quit dancing around the issue and go right for it. Why could we not initiate that kind of policy across the entire frontier from Brownsville to Imperial Beach? General McCaffrey. Yes, I think that is exactly what is required. And Mr. Bursen, Rhodes scholar, All-American football player, remarkable personal leadership capabilities. And also, with a local community that was fed up. I do not need to tell you that. But southern California just had enough of this. So there was a dramatic response. And we see other people. Mr. Kelly in New Mexico is doing brilliant work. All five Southwest border HIDTAs are doing a tremendous job. So there is movement. But Mr. Kelly had no authority over anyone but Justice Department actors; not the Department of Agriculture, not the Customs Service, not the Coast Guard, et cetera. There was cooperation with his leadership. At the end of the day, I think we need institutional coordination of this issue. Mr. Bilbray. Well, but those of us that lived along the border and do so today, we keep hearing Washington find excuses of why extraordinary measures not only should not be taken, but cannot be taken. And in fact, we have heard the excuses for decades. Silvestre Reyes is a legend in San Diego, because he was one guy who was willing to stand up and he said, ``We not only can do it, we must do it.'' Now, Mr. Chairman, I would ask one question. How many drug smugglers are intercepted every year along the border? Do we know how many were intercepted last year? General McCaffrey. I have a chart that shows tonnages of drugs by types seized. I have a chart that shows number of arrests. It is mind-boggling. Mr. Bilbray. How many of those drug smugglers were processed through the Justice Department, and how many were released back into Mexico? General McCaffrey. Many of them. Mr. Bilbray. Now, if we are a country that says we are absolutely committed to stop drugs, how can we justify looking at the American public and saying, ``We are releasing drug smugglers out of this country without processing them?'' Is the excuse that we just do not have the resources? General McCaffrey. Let me, if I can, underscore, because I actually probably have a different viewpoint, Mr. Congressman. We arrested 1\1/2\ million people last year on drug-related crimes. We have now have 105,000 people in the Federal prison system. Two-thirds of them are there for drug-related offenses. That has doubled in 7 years. There is no question in my mind that there has been a blowtorch-intensity response by U.S. law enforcement and prosecution against drug-related crimes, particularly those at retail sales and above. Now, what we were almost overwhelmed by, and why I am in favor of fencing and manpower and working with Mexico, is that when you shotgun marijuana across the border and you are arresting--as you know, you can go down and stand at Otay Mesa and watch a drug bust every 30 minutes. We do not want to take a 25-year-old Mexican mother with two borrowed children and prosecute her, when she has carefully come in right under the prosecutorial guidelines. Mr. Bilbray. But what I am saying is, if I drove my two children across the border with the same amount of drugs, would you release me? General McCaffrey. Well, I hope not. I hope you would be doing California---- Mr. Bilbray. Well, doesn't this sound a little bit like a violation of equal protection under the law? Or unequal prosecution? That's the message here. Let me just say this. I have been asked by the counties along the border to say one thing to you. If you are not going to prosecute the drug smugglers, if you do not have the resources within the Federal system, then for God's sake, work with the counties and the States and allow them to prosecute. But as you release them, the message going back to Mexico is, ``Here is the game, guys. Stay under this artificial limit that some bureaucrat has set up, and you can play the game. Make sure you drip the drugs into America, and America will not only accept it, but they will give you a free ride back.'' This is the kind of process that I think that we have to take responsibility for. Mr. Chairman, I would just ask you to consider this. Can you imagine what the reaction of the United States people would be if Mexico was actively taking drug smugglers that they had captured and driving them to the border and saying, ``Here, go in the United States, and no problem''? That is the kind of thing we are doing. I am asking of one thing about that is substantive: the commitment by the administration to prosecute everyone who is in possession of drugs, be it a U.S. citizen or not, not to tell U.S. citizens, ``We catch you, you are going to be prosecuted. But we catch a foreign national, we are going to send them home.'' General McCaffrey. Presumably, Mr. Congressman, you are also talking about county prosecution and State prosecution, also. Zero tolerance of drug smuggling? You would have your local authorities do the same thing? Mr. Bilbray. Well, the local authorities will say they will do it. The trouble is to ask the counties, which tend to be some of the poorest counties in this country, to do the prosecution for the Federal Government without reimbursement. I think we need to seriously talk about providing a fund to reimburse for the prosecution. General McCaffrey. Ignoring Federal violations, you are suggesting absolute prosecution by county and State officials for all drug seizures of any amount? Mr. Bilbray. If possible. General McCaffrey. To include in Los Angeles foreign nationals encountered selling drugs in the streets of Los Angeles? Mr. Bilbray. No, look, I am talking about the fact that---- General McCaffrey. The only reason I point this out is, I have respect for your viewpoint. I think this is a resource issue. It is a prioritization issue. I think what many of us would like to do is make sure we have a clever, seamless web of Federal-State law and law enforcement across that border. But we do not want to prosecute a rented dupe from Mexico, a 25- year-old mother with a child with her. We want to go after the---- Mr. Bilbray. Excuse me, but this is the whole point of a ``rented,'' one who is being paid to smuggle drugs is a drug smuggler. This attitude of saying who is a dupe and who is not is a problem. The dupe is the American taxpayer and the American Government is sitting, allowing people to work the system by saying, ``I was just a dupe.'' General McCaffrey. Remember, 60 percent--And again, I say this respectfully, but it is put in context. Because I just had a conversation with the mayor of Los Angeles which I found curious. Sixty percent of the methamphetamines in America probably are manufactured in southern California. I think we have to remember that the problem of drug smuggling is not that of Mexico; it is involved with a lot of us. The same thing occurs up on our Northern border, for example, in Vancouver, Canada: a huge external drug threat to the United States. Mr. Bilbray. I want to just make one comment on that. The methamphetamine production in San Diego County was huge, and now has been almost eradicated. The reason is that we put the pressure on the county. They moved it to Tecate, the hills behind Tecate, and now it is coming through over the Federal border. What good is it for the local people to go after the local production and drive it out of their community, if it is just going to be moved south and the United States is going to continue to allow it to cross? General McCaffrey. I think the prosecution of methamphetamines, cocaine, heroin, we ought to have about zero tolerance. I could not agree more. Mr. Bilbray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman from California. I would now like to recognize the gentleman from Arizona, who also chairs one of the panels with great financial responsibility over this issue, Mr. Kolbe. Mr. Kolbe. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate your making it possible for members of the Border Caucus and those of us who are most affected by this problem of drugs along the border on a regular basis to sit in on your hearing today. I am very grateful for that. I will be very brief, because since I do chair the subcommittee that funds ONDCP I get an opportunity to have General McCaffrey and others from his organization before my subcommittee on a fairly regular basis. I am glad this hearing has really focused on the problem of drugs along the border. There is no doubt about it: We are facing an enormous problem. And it is a dual problem for those of us in Arizona, because we have become, unfortunately, the major crossing point now for illegal aliens coming into the United States. As we have been more effective in hardening the border in places like San Diego and El Paso, it has acted like a funnel. So we have the largest number of people who have been taken into custody coming across the border in the last year having been, ironically, in the rural parts of Arizona. We have even succeeded in some of our cities in hardening it in Arizona, but we have this massive flood of people coming through the fences in the rural areas. What we are finding as a result of that is that there is a lot more of the drug smuggling coming this way. The border and that area have become much more dangerous. There has been much more violence. There have been many more shootings that have been taking place along the border. It is a very serious problem. I have two questions that I would ask of you, General: What are we doing to get more of the technologies that we need down to the border? I do not mean just to the Federal law enforcement agencies, but to the local law enforcement agencies who are really on the front lines of dealing with this, as much as Customs and Border Patrol, every day. We have a lot of new technologies, and some of them are those that can be used in checking trucks and vehicles as they come across the border. It seems to me we are very slow in really getting this technology down to the border areas. General McCaffrey. I am not sure I disagree with you. It has taken us 2 or 3 years to really energize this process. You are giving us significant amounts of money. That is what we have done with it. Although it says over the past 5 years, essentially that is 2 years work. So it is starting to show up. It works. The training systems work. The maintenance program works. The problem is, as we have suggested, if you are at Otay Mesa and San Ysidro, but you are not at the next, Calexico crossing point, and if you are smuggling 200 kilograms of cocaine, you do not go through the border at Otay Mesa. You move down to Calexico. So we have said there has to be coherency, a seamless web, and it has to be keyed to intelligence. It is not going to sort out the truck with the cocaine unless the intelligence system tells it which ones to put through at nine per hour. But your money is going to pretty good work. I think as we see this go into place in the coming several years, it is going to pay off. We have also have the maritime flanks. The Coast Guard and the Border Patrol and Customs are also working. It is tied into a cross-border effort inside Mexico. I think the seizures, for example, this year are going to be up dramatically on the Southwest border and in Mexico. The Mexicans are doing pretty well. The second thing you have given us is money for a counterdrug technology transfer program--I would suggest not enough, although you give us more than we ask for each year. It is still a modest program. Those sheriffs departments and police departments along that border cannot afford--this morning I was listening to Sheriff Lee out of New Mexico--the vehicles to prosecute law enforcement in their own counties, given the level of threat they are facing. So we probably do need to look at enhanced resources for technology transfer. We are moving in the right direction; a lot of work to be done. Mr. Kolbe. Well, it seems to me, if that is the case, we are not getting enough to you, but it is more than the administration has requested. You need to be a louder voice within the administration for trying to beef up that transfer of technology. I happen to believe that that transfer of technology is exceedingly important to what is going on. General McCaffrey. I agree. Yes. Mr. Kolbe. Is the coordination along the border what it should be? We have these HIDTAs, we have the Southwest border, we have the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas in each of these areas there, we have JTF-6 in El Paso. Is the coordination of the effort what it ought to be? General McCaffrey. No, I do not think so. Mr. Kolbe. What have you recommended about changing that? General McCaffrey. We have a paper that I sent over to Congress that outlines the concept that we are trying to achieve. Pieces of it have happened. There is no question that the intelligence architecture that Congress asked me to pull together is now being completed, and Director Tenent from the CIA, the Attorney General, and I and the other actors will now move to create a better system to make sure intelligence supports law enforcement on drug systems. It is clear we have more manpower. You have given us more resources, so you are seeing now the payoff of those programs; in southern California certainly, and pieces of the rest of the Southwest border. You can see fencing going in, and adequate manpower and technology. Mr. Kolbe. Even though the fences were opposed originally? I point out fences were opposed originally. You know, all those physical barriers originally were opposed. General McCaffrey. There are a wealth of viewpoints on that, Mr. Congressman. Mine is very supportive of fencing, low- light TV, sensor technology, manpower, aviation to the Border Patrol. Mr. Kolbe. I, too. General McCaffrey. Bottom line, Mr. Kolbe, is I think what we lack is a coordinator at each port of entry who State and local authorities and Mexican authorities know is capable of integrating horizontally the activities of the Federal law enforcement in that zone or sector. I think we need that. I think we need one in El Paso to integrate the Southwest border. Having said that, there is a BCI initiative by Customs and INS, so each of the 39 border crossings now does have a committee which is pulling together in a very enhanced way those two departments of government. And that is good, and we ought to be proud of that. But there are four major departments of government, and 23 agencies involved. It is my own view that we can do better in orchestrating this, and make it simpler on the sheriffs and police chiefs who have to work with us. Mr. Kolbe. Well, I would agree with you. Mr. Chairman, I will not ask to have any further questions. I would just agree with you. I think we have a very piecemeal operation. I see it every day, when I am there and talking to these people. Coordination is missing. And I do not have an easy answer as to how to do it. There is a tremendous amount of turf protection by law enforcement at all levels. Everybody wants to have a piece of the action. Everybody wants to be top dog. And the only ones that must be laughing about all of this are the drug dealers, who benefit from our willingness to spend more of our time fighting each other than fighting them. I think that happens all too often. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Mica. Thank you. Thank you for your comments and your participation. Mr. Ose. Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, in terms of the drugs transiting the Southwest border, from a source standpoint, do they originate in Mexico, or elsewhere? General McCaffrey. All the cocaine originates elsewhere. What we have said is that 80 percent of the cocaine in America originates in or transits through Colombia, which is now the leading producer of cocaine on the face of the Earth. A tiny fraction of the world's heroin is produced in Mexico, about 5\1/2\ metric tons; another small amount, 6 metric tons, in Colombia. However, since we probably only consume around 11 metric tons, our law enforcement intelligence says that a little more than 70 percent of the heroin seized in America came out of Colombia, in particular. But a lot of that is just superb police work by Customs and DEA in particular. There are still huge amounts of Burmese heroin in America, as an example. Mr. Ose. The reason I ask that question is that we have a particular initiative we have been working on for 3 or 4 years relative to some assistance we are trying to provide to Colombia, as it relates to some helicopters. You know we have had this conversation before. I saw that we got six Hueys down there recently. Could you give us a status report on that particular initiative as it relates to the various helicopters we are trying to get to Colombia? General McCaffrey. It would probably be best to give you a written update from the State Department. Essentially, there are 150 helicopters there. There are more en route. I believe it is 18 UH-1Ns and 6 Blackhawks that are still to go. The UH- 1Ns, I believe some of them are now there, and others are being certified and shipped. The Blackhawks go in this fall. We are trying to train pilots, get maintenance systems, et cetera. But that is moving faster than I would have expected. It should have been a 3-year process to build the chopper and to bring together the crews. I think they will be in there this coming fall, or later. That is about where the mobility is. Mr. Ose. Fall started, I think, last night, technically. I do not know if that is accurate or not. But when you say fall, you mean prior to December 23rd? General McCaffrey. The six Blackhawks--I had better give you an answer for the record--you have to train the crews, get the maintenance system in place, and ship them. And it is moving forward. I believe they will be there in the fall, if I understand it. Mr. Ose. I do want to pass on a compliment. That is I did see where the six Hueys were delivered. I am appreciative of that. I do not think this is only along the border that we need to deal with this problem. General McCaffrey. Right. Mr. Ose. With respect to Colombia in particular, I cannot overemphasize my interest in providing our friends in Colombia with the tools in which we have committed, so that we can help them help us. With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. Mr. Mica. Thank you. I think we have run the full gamut here. If there are additional questions, I think we can submit them to the Director for response. Again, we appreciate your cooperation with our subcommittee. As you can see, there is incredible interest on behalf of the Members of Congress. I think we have every border State represented here, chairs of some of the subcommittees involved, and ranking members. So we are pleased that you have responded. We look forward to working with you. It is a tremendous challenge, but hopefully we can do a better job on the Southwest border while working together. There being no further questions of the witness, you are excused. Thank you. General McCaffrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Mica. I would like to call our second panel, if I may. We have Lieutenant Raul Rodriguez, who is with the Metro Task Force, Nogales, AZ; Mr. Dennis Usrey, Director of the Southwest Border High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, the HIDTA in San Diego, CA; and Chief Tony Castaneda, and he is the chief of police of Eagle Pass, TX. I think this may be your first time testifying before us. This is an investigations and oversight subcommittee of Congress. We do swear in our witnesses, so if you would stand, please, and raise your right hands. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Mica. The witnesses answered in the affirmative. I would like to welcome our three panelists. We do ask, if you have any lengthy statements, that they be submitted for the record, and I will be glad to recognize a request for those submissions. With that, I would like to recognize and welcome Lieutenant Raul Rodriguez, with the Metro Task Force in Nogales, AZ. You are recognized, sir. STATEMENTS OF RAUL RODRIGUEZ, LIEUTENANT, METRO TASK FORCE, NOGALES, AZ; DENNIS USREY, DIRECTOR, SOUTHWEST BORDER HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA, SAN DIEGO, CA; AND TONY CASTANEDA, CHIEF OF POLICE, EAGLE PASS, TX Mr. Rodriguez. Chairman Mica, present Representatives, distinguished Members, it is an honor to testify before you. Mr. Mica. You might pull the mic up as close as you can. Mr. Rodriguez. It is an honor to testify before you. I have some oral remarks I would like to offer, and I have also prepared a written statement which, with your permission, I would like to provide for the record. Mr. Mica. Without objection, the written statement will be made part of the record. Proceed. Mr. Rodriguez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am Lieutenant Raul Rodriguez, from Santa Cruz County in Nogales, AZ. I am commander of the Santa Cruz Metro Task Force. It is a multi- agency: a Federal, State, and local agency, investigative and interdiction centerpiece Task Force located in Nogales, AZ. The Task Force is co-located with U.S. Customs Investigations. Participants in the Task Force are the Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Office, the Nogales Police Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Border Patrol, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Arizona Attorney General's Office, the Arizona Department of Public Safety, Patagonia Marshal's Office, and the Santa Cruz County Attorney's Office. Our problem in Nogales, AZ and in Santa Cruz County is vast because we are one of the smaller counties in Arizona. It encompasses only 1,200 square miles. Nogales, AZ is the county seat, but Nogales, AZ is also the major port of entry for commercial and pedestrian traffic for Arizona. We have strong commercial ties between Nogales, AZ and Nogales, Sonora, Mexico, which is south of our city. Arizona shares approximately 370 miles of border with Mexico, which is approximately 25 percent of the total United States-Mexican border. Santa Cruz County has approximately 53 miles of border with Mexico. The Task Force efforts deal directly with marijuana, which continues to be the most abused and commonly encountered drug on the border. Backpacking of marijuana continues to be the most common method of smuggling from Mexico to Arizona. Tucson, AZ remains the transshipment location for marijuana cargo destined for other regions throughout the United States. The current trend is that marijuana is smuggled on a year-round basis. It used to be seasonal. Statewide seizures for marijuana total up to 228 metric tons for 1998. Cocaine remains the second popular drug of choice in the county and Arizona. Cocaine seizures in our county have increased by 194 percent, according to figures from 1998 and 1999, and we have not finished 1999. Nogales, AZ continues to be a focal point for cocaine seizures in southern Arizona. Tucson and Phoenix remain the primary transshipment location for transportation of cocaine via passenger vehicle and tractor-trailers. Heroin use is also on the rise in Arizona, also in our border community. Recently, we did an undercover operation with U.S. Customs O.I., which netted 2.4 pounds of heroin this year in Nogales, AZ. Our problem is established Mexican drug trafficking organizations operate freely and uninhibited within the border community of Nogales, AZ, Mexico, and the surrounding area. The corruption and the potential of violence along the United States-Mexico border are factors that directly and indirectly affect enforcement efforts. The influx of undocumented aliens has caused increased facade incursions along the border to hide illegal smuggled contraband along the border region. Established Mexican drug trafficking organizations have not eased their efforts to continue smuggling drugs across the border and into this country. The Task Force was the lead investigative agency which uncovered two secretly dug tunnels in January of this year. This case made national news. The tunnels were constructed and connected to a series of storm drains that led directly underground to Mexico. The investigation of this tunnel revealed that drug seizures made in California could be traced back to the covert operation of the drug tunnels. The drug threat in this community has affected the frequency of violent crimes that are committed against law enforcement and the public in this border region. In 1991, my supervisor for the Task Force, Sergeant Manny Tapia, was shot to death by a drug smuggler during an arrest. The 19-year-old suspect was transporting 140 pounds of marijuana in his vehicle when he shot and killed Sergeant Tapia. In April of last year, four marijuana smugglers on the west side of Nogales, AZ assassinated U.S. Border Patrol Agent Alex Kurpnick. Increased violence against U.S. Border Patrol agents along the border, with rock-throwing attacks, laser beam pointing, and actual incoming fire from Nogales, Mexico are on the increase. Our Task Force in 1998 was responsible for 53 percent of all felony filings in two superior courts within the jurisdiction of this county. The majority of crimes committed in this county are drug-related. Funding for the Task Force, however, has been stagnant. We receive our funding through the Edward Byrne Memorial Grant and the HIDTA grants. This year the Byrne Grant Fund was decreased by 8 percent; the HIDTA grant was not increased. Funding is a critical part of the joint policing efforts against drug crimes. Without the available resources, the Task Force will be hindered in its labors. That is all I have right now as a statement. I would entertain your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Rodriguez follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.020 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.021 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.022 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.023 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.024 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.025 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.026 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.027 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.028 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.029 Mr. Mica. Thank you. We will get back to questions after we hear from the other witnesses. Next, Mr. Dennis--is it ``Usrey''? Mr. Usrey. ``Usrey,'' yes, sir. Mr. Mica. ``Usrey,'' OK. The Director of the Southwest Border HIDTA, from San Diego. You are recognized, sir. Mr. Usrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Mica, Representative Mink, other distinguished members of the subcommittee and certainly the Border Caucus who have shown their interest here today, it is indeed an honor to testify before you. And I want to thank the committee for the opportunity to discuss the drug threat along the Southwest border. Your interest and support for this vital region of our country is evident, and sincerely appreciated. I have some more remarks I would like to offer, and I also have prepared a written statement which, with your permission, I would like to provide for the record. Mr. Mica. Without objection, that will be made part of the record. Mr. Usrey. Thank you. I have served as the Director of the Southwest Border HIDTA since 1995. Part of that time, I served as the first Director of the San Diego and Imperial County Narcotic Information Network, a HIDTA sponsored and funded intelligence center. I have had the opportunity to observe the positive impact of this program, but I am not here claiming success; only to say that we have made progress along a very long and difficult journey. Much is yet to be done. We operate with the premise that drug trafficking across the Southwest border affects not only our communities, but also the entire Nation. The Southwest border marks the end of a transit zone for South American cocaine, Mexican and Colombian heroin, marijuana, methamphetamine and, importantly, the chemicals that are used to manufacture methamphetamine. The Southwest border region has long been burdened with smuggling and drug-related crime and violence. Since designation in 1990 as a HIDTA, the Southwest border has taken an innovative approach to drug law enforcement. As one of the original gateway HIDTAs, the Southwest border is unique in its progress in integrating the efforts of 86 local, 17 State, and 12 Federal drug enforcement agencies. Throughout its 9 years of operation, and especially since the reorganization into the five regional partnerships in 1995, the Southwest border HIDTA has achieved an array of successes. Several examples are detailed in my written testimony, and you will hear others today, and have heard others. Funded at $46 million for fiscal year 1999, the Southwest border HIDTA supported 84 intelligence, enforcement, interdiction, prosecution, and support initiatives within the 45 designated counties located in the four border States of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. The Southwest border is a collaborative venture involving local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies that develop and implement regional threat assessments and strategies to reduce drug trafficking. This program is responsible for providing for a coordination umbrella for joint operations, instituting team work through continuous joint planning and implementation of enforcement operations, and providing for the promotion of equal partnerships amongst Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies. And I think it is unique in that context. Notwithstanding the successes of this program, the work is not over. Law enforcement agencies along the border need your continued support, if we are to make substantial and long- lasting impact on the problem. The entire criminal justice infrastructure at every level of government is severely taxed and unable to keep pace with the demands of enforcing the law along our border. Interdiction is primarily a Federal responsibility, but it cannot be successfully accomplished without State and local participation. These agencies do not shy away from the responsibilities in providing this assistance, but need additional resources to meet their many responsibilities. The Southwest border was quick to realize that the total infrastructure of narcotics law enforcement has to keep pace. The HIDTA program's initial emphasis on investigations and interdiction resulted in the impact in other areas of the criminal justice system; most specifically, prosecutions and jails. For example, increased emphasis and resources directed to interdiction initiatives at and between the ports of entry produced numbers of defendants that soon overloaded the ability of the U.S. Attorney's Office to prosecute. As a result, prosecutions initiatives were developed by the HIDTA to bring into play cross-designated local and State prosecutors to close this gap, by handling the dramatic increase in cases as a result of the enforcement efforts. For instance, the local prosecutors in San Diego at the D.A.'s office are prosecuting close to 2,000 cases per year, which can be primarily attributed to border interdiction efforts. It is likewise important to recognize that there must be sufficient detention facilities capable of handling the increased number of defendants as a result of the HIDTA enforcement initiatives. Often, defendants have to be lodged in facilities a substantial distance from the jurisdiction. I know we have prisoners from California housed in Texas for periods of time. And, you know, the logistics of that is mind-boggling, to say the least. Often, in more extreme cases, operations have been delayed until adequate jail space can be obtained for the people to be arrested. In summary, the agencies engaged in this effort have benefited greatly from the support you have already provided. The HIDTA program has increased in effectiveness and cooperation. However, our work is not done. As you have already heard, additional manpower, technology, and equipment are needed by the men and women who defend this Nation's border in a very difficult and dangerous environment. Thank you for this opportunity, and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Usrey follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.030 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.031 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.032 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.033 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.034 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.035 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.036 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.037 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.038 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.039 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.040 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.041 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.042 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.043 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.044 Mr. Mica. Thank you for your testimony. I would like to recognize now Chief Tony Castaneda, the chief of police of Eagle Pass, TX. You are recognized. Welcome, sir. Mr. Castaneda. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of this subcommittee, I sincerely appreciate the invitation that I received to come before you and express our concerns. I commend you for the effort that you are doing for the American people. I have prepared a statement that I would like to be entered into the record. Mr. Mica. Without objection, the entire statement will be made part of the record. Mr. Castaneda. This statement is prepared for the purpose of outlining concerns that we face along the Southwest border of the United States. On February 25, 1997, I appeared and testified before this U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee on ``Counter-Narcotics Efforts in Mexico and Along the Southwest Border.'' At that time, my testimony was to bring to light the lack of Federal law enforcement efforts in the areas of personnel, equipment, and other tangible resources on the Southwest border. Our citizens, mainly the ranchers and their families that lived along the Rio Grande River, lived in fear of narcotraffickers romping through their properties, spreading fear, and leaving behind paths of destruction of private property. Since that time, we have witnessed a steady but slow process of hiring Federal law enforcement personnel. During this same time, we continued to witness the steady increase of narcotics seizures and arrests. However, the true issue is that we are not stopping the steady flow of narcotics into our country. This is also a true reflection that the Southwest border of the United States is poorly understaffed to meet the challenging issues surrounding the fight against narcotrafficking. I represent a Texas community, Eagle Pass, of about 45,000 residents, that borders a Mexican community with a population of close to 350,000. Our local U.S. Border Patrol leads their sector in apprehension and seizures of narcotics and its traffickers. They have become our most important drug interdiction force defending the Southwest border of this country. I have been the chief of police of our department for the past 5 years, and over that time I have seen the steady increase of narcotics-related crimes in the community. Most of the apprehended criminals have an extensive history of involvement in narcotics. Over the years, we have established an outstanding professional relationship with our Federal law enforcement counterparts. Our department has six officers assigned to the local DEA office and three to the U.S. Customs Office of Criminal Investigations. Their efforts are commendable. It is an overwhelming battle, and certainly, Federal attention needs to be serviced in this area in order to maintain the American quality of life that all of us are entitled. The protection of our quality of life is essential to the economic and social stability of our border communities. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Mr. Castaneda follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.045 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.046 Mr. Mica. Thank each of you for your testimony and participation today. First question: You represent different border States: Arizona, California, Texas. I guess, generally, you are seeing an increase in narcotics trafficking along the border. Let's see, Arizona? Mr. Rodriguez. Yes, we are. Mr. Mica. You said you are seeing an increase in cocaine? Mr. Rodriguez. Yes, 194 percent. Mr. Mica. And heroin, also? Mr. Rodriguez. And in heroin. Mr. Mica. What about California? Mr. Usrey. Yes, sir. The statistics which have been displayed demonstrate that there has been an upsurge, at least in the amount of drugs that have been confiscated. Mr. Mica. Texas? Mr. Castaneda. Absolutely. In 1997, we seized 31,000 pounds. This year, 1999, with the fiscal year still not closing, we are at 41,000 pounds. Mr. Mica. Are you seeing also increased violence along these areas, Arizona? Mr. Rodriguez. I started office as a narcotics agent when the sergeant was killed in 1991. Then, we were three agents in the Task Force. Comparing then to now, the last two homicides of law enforcement officials in our county have been drug related during the course of a drug smuggling operation. Mr. Mica. So you are seeing increased violence? Mr. Rodriguez. Yes. Mr. Mica. In Arizona? Mr. Rodriguez. In Arizona. The rock-throwing incidents around the Nogales and Santa Cruz County areas is just as severe. Patrol agents have to have wrought iron metal plates over their windshields because they keep on breaking them. Mr. Mica. California? Mr. Usrey. Yes, sir. It is sort of a unique situation, if you will, because we are seeing some decreases in violence in some of our major cities. Yet, as we increase the tension on the border, as we become more successful, we have created a situation where the drug traffickers themselves become more violent. That violence has flowed over into the California side. We have seen Border Patrol agents taken under sniper fire. We have seen an increased evidence of weapons in vehicles, and so forth. So we are seeing some violence associated with drug trafficking, even though overall the statistics out of San Diego show an improvement in the homicide rate. Mr. Mica. Texas? Mr. Castaneda. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Within the city limits of Eagle Pass, we have confronted several high-speed pursuit chases involving narcotics traffickers, endangering our local residents, public streets, and highways. I have heard reports of Border Patrol agents encountering armed and violent narcotics traffickers. So the tension is there. The situation is there. The narcotics continue to be there. Mr. Mica. My last question is to each of you. You heard today the problem we have with 23 Federal agencies and four departments, plus local and State efforts, in trying to coordinate these border activities. You also heard concerns from the panel about no one being in charge. How would you make this process and these activities of Federal agencies more effective? What can we do? I think we had testimony in here that, of course, the resources to local governments and the decrease in the Byrne grants affected you. But structurally and operationally, as far as the Federal agencies, how could we do a better job? We will start maybe in reverse order. Chief. Mr. Castaneda. As I closed my statement, Mr. Mica, we have an excellent relationship that I can attribute to a good working relationship with our Federal counterparts. However, I see an attitude of turf. This is nerve-racking, and also unhealthy for our efforts. I have heard from my officers--as I mentioned that I have officers assigned to the DEA and to the Office of Investigations of the U.S. Customs Service--where one agency is spearheading, for instance, a wiretap that requires a lot of man-hours and a lot of time, and being limited in staff. They are not bringing in DEA resources to assist them. I see this as very counter-productive. You know, certainly, somebody needs to be overseeing this. I liked the comment that the gentleman from California mentioned about the Mexicans bringing the truckload and bringing the Federal officers and lining them up and saying, ``We are going to bring in the military and ship you all out, if you do not do what we pay you to do.'' Basically, that is what we need to do, to call the shots. Sir, I do not know if you are the one that made the comment, but I wholeheartedly agree with that. Mr. Mica. Mr. Rodriguez. Mr. Rodriguez. There are turf wars. There is no doubt about it, Representative, as you know, from being in the Border Patrol. I was born and raised in Nogales, AZ. I am a local boy. But when it gets down to doing an operation, a case, I have to be the mediator. Because I am a local; I have to play. You know, these people that come in and head up these eight Federal agencies, they see me coming, and they know what I am going to be asking. I am going to be asking for their help. And I am not going to leave them until they give me their help. Some of them do not like me coming around. The thing is, I am not going to protect my community and my officers with turf wars. The only way we are going to put bad people in jail is by working together, which is what we have been doing. Operation Cebias with the HIDTA initiatives is working. We are talking to each other. We are co-located, which we never were, with the U.S. Customs Office on Enforcement. It is improving, but there is a lot of work to be done. Mr. Mica. Mr. Usrey. Mr. Usrey. Thank you. And I certainly share the concerns of the committee, General McCaffrey and my cohorts here. But I would like to briefly discuss operation COBIJA an initiative that was touched on. That operation brings together the Federal, State, and local agencies in a coordinated fashion, through the use of regional coordination centers. These regional coordination centers--and they are located in the counties of San Diego, Imperial Valley, in Arizona and New Mexico--are under the joint supervision of the Border Patrol and the local sheriffs. Under that umbrella, everyone comes to lay out their plans and to coordinate operations. An interim step, but it seems to be a step in the right direction. I think the officers out there want to do the right thing and they want to be operationally effective. Sometimes turf issues come from areas higher than the officers on the street who are out there doing the job. The point that was made by Lieutenant Rodriguez was very good. The State and local officers in leadership along the border, play a very important role as mediators. They are able to come to a HIDTA executive committee--and Representative Reyes has sat on those committees--and mediate and bring everyone to a common purpose. It is awfully hard to have disagreements among the Federal agencies in front of their State and local counterparts. I think that is a very positive influence, and has worked well as a start toward this area of coordination and mediation. Mr. Mica. Thank you. Mr. Reyes. Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to start by thanking all three gentlemen for being here, and for the job that you do and the role that you play on the front lines of the Nation's war on drugs. I want to ask you to comment on a number of different areas. The first one is, as Mr. Usrey had mentioned I definitely appreciate the role that you play in funding the HIDTAs. The question that I asked the General earlier, in terms of the number of HIDTAs that exist today versus the initial five that we started out with in 1992, can I get an opinion from you in terms of my comment that if everything is a priority then nothing becomes a priority? What is your perspective of the Southwest border being the focal point in terms of this Nation's war on drugs, and then not getting, perhaps, the attention or the support for those five HIDTAs? Mr. Usrey. Thank you. I do share that concern. I think it is shared by all of us particularly, the original five gateway HIDTAs. It was clear that these HIDTAs were not only attacking the drug trafficking problem in their area, but also they had an impact outside that area. And, while I think that there is a compliment there someplace that the HIDTA system must be working, because people want to copy it and have more HIDTAs throughout the country--I think that is probably a positive thing--we have been very concerned that it would take away from the prioritization and the resources to the border. I will say that we have received increases. As late as the Emergency Appropriations bill, we received additional money for the Southwest border. So it has not been a totally bleak picture, but basically one of level funding. The other thing that has impacted us, and General McCaffrey addressed it, is that some of the discretion has been taken away from ONDCP. So where there is a necessity for additional resources--say, in El Paso and New Mexico, or any one of the other areas--there has been very little discretionary money. And some of that new money has been prioritized prior to the time it reaches ONDCP. I think has created some difficulty. Mr. Reyes. In your role as the director or overseer of the five HIDTAs for the Southwest border, what is the process in terms of funding those within the money that you get for the Southwest border? I ask that question because we have all heard the testimony, and I have recently seen the statistics from EPIC about the West Texas HIDTA in El Paso and the west Texas- southern New Mexico area being the major entry point for narcotics; yet it ranks, I believe, last in funding for the Southwest border HIDTAs. Can you explain to us how that process works? Mr. Usrey. ONDCP is the funding mechanism, and they make the funding decisions; of course, in accordance with the guidance provided to them by Congress. And that, I think, is a direct result, as I mentioned, of the lack of discretionary funds; that when there is a need, such as in El Paso, there is no money there that can be programmatically provided. Instead, it has taken exterior efforts to identify money to put into the program earmarked for particular HIDTAs. My role is as an advocate. I try to look at all the programs along the border, each one of the five regional HIDTAs; determine where the needs are; and then go forth and try and advocate for additional resources, both to ONDCP, the congressional Representatives and so forth. Mr. Reyes. Then are you in agreement that the West Texas HIDTA faces the largest challenge, in terms of the statistics, and has the lowest funding of the five HIDTAs? Mr. Usrey. It is like talking about my five children here. I think that they all have individual problems. They all have individual needs. It is hard to say that any one of them needs more resources than any of the others. But El Paso certainly has a major problem. They have continued to have a problem. They have been very successful in the development of some of their initiatives which, you know, are really successful and the types of initiatives that we try to duplicate along the border. And yet they are the lowest funded, and definitely deserve more money. Mr. Reyes. Thank you. In the context for the other two gentlemen, explain to us your opinion, or your concerns. Because often in Congress, we hear a lot about the corruption that comes with drug trafficking. Can you give us an opinion on what you have seen there at the front lines regarding corruption? Mr. Rodriguez. Corruption on the United States or Mexican side? Mr. Reyes. Well, in general. Because I know it exists on both sides. Mr. Rodriguez. We are one of the few HIDTA initiatives to have actual corruption agents from the FBI corruption squad assigned to the Metro Task Force. We are real fortunate to work with them, because our source was involved directly with the actual arrests and prosecution of four INS agents down in Nogales, AZ. There is a corruption issue. There is a corruption element there. There is a price that we all pay in law enforcement when that happens. But we have to learn how to deal with that, and foresee and act on those aggressions toward our unity, I think, in fighting drugs. It is a large money. We seized about $300,000 in that operation. But the FBI does have a corruption squad in southern Arizona to combat that. On the Mexican side, we do have working relationships with the Mexican authorities in Nogales, AZ. We do have a working relationship with the consulate in Nogales, AZ. But we are aware, I am aware, the agents are aware, of the corruption issue that is in Mexico. We take it on a case-by-case basis. Based on the homicide of Border Patrol agent Kurpnick last year, they were very helpful. Groupo Vetto was very helpful in apprehending one suspect in Nogales, Sonora. The FBI was very successful in extraditing two of those suspects, and they just prosecuted one of the smugglers that was involved in that assassination. Mr. Reyes. OK, thank you. Chief. Mr. Castaneda. As you know, corruption wherever it is-- local, Federal--it always leaves a black eye on police personnel. In 1997, when I came here and reported to a similar question of yours, we had several officers within my department that were suspected of that. I am glad to report that those officers are no longer with us. It is something that we keep an eye on, on things of that nature, because in the narcotics trade, as my colleague Lieutenant Rodriguez mentioned, large sums of moneys exchange hands, and the integrity level of the individual engaged in the counteroffensive has to be real high. So it is something that is always under the watchful eye. As far as my Mexican counterparts, recently in late July, I was a special guest to President Zedillo in Mexico City. We had a private audience with Mr. Medrazo. As General McCaffrey was reporting, Mexico was reporting to us at the time of their efforts to implement basic things that we usually do when we recruit people: polygraph, background investigations, urine analysis. I am talking about their Federal preventative police that they are trying to get off the ground. I left with very mixed emotions, along with my colleagues that were present at the seminar. Nevertheless, it is a clear indication that Mexico is trying to remedy a problem they recognize that they have been having in their back yard for so many years. Now they are trying to clean it up, in order for them to maintain good grace with us. Mexico is one of our biggest trading partners. Certainly, it is something that pressure needs to continue to be applied by our end for them to be doing this reform in their policing. Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Mica. Thank you. Mr. Bilbray. Mr. Bilbray. Thank you. I appreciate the testimony. I want to just clarify one thing, though. I think too many people in the United States miss the point that Mexico is not fighting corruption, or any issue short of their own national sovereignty. And I want to say that to the chairman, that we have just got to understand that Mexico right now is under the greatest threat to their national sovereignty. It dwarfs General Scott marching into Mexico City. And so it really is not just a PR thing. It is the fact that an elected official, like the Governor of Baja, lives in fear, not just for himself, but his family and anyone else he knows. It's a matter of survival. And they are fighting for their national sovereignty. And I think we need to remember that. The corruption issue, though, when we talk about it, I worry that Americans talk about corruption and think about the dollar signs, and do not realize that the ``mordida'' is only half of the issue. The other half, at least on Mexico's side, is the assassination attempts and rates. There is a term in Mexico, and I am sure my colleague can articulate it appropriately, that is basically ``Lead or Gold.'' Do you want gold, or lead? Do you want to get paid off, or do you want to be killed? And we have seen that extensively, have we not, south of the border? Do you want to talk in public about our assassinations north of the border? Which is a concern that I have. Mr. Chairman, I just want to point out a mile north of where I live we have had over three assassinations along the Silver Strand by hired hit-people. It is something that I think that we need to be very concerned about; not just because of Mexico. I would ask you this, gentlemen. I got a lot of credit for asking for an investigation in San Diego, that someone said, ``Well, did you have inside information about corruption?'' when I asked about it. It was not that; it was just that when someone has to work in close proximity to an environment where there is so much corruption, so much violence, so many problems, and so much money, I think it is rather naive, if not ridiculous, for us in the United States to think that international border, that artificial line, is going to stop that from crossing into our infrastructure. I am just worried that if we do not wake up to the fact that the violence side of the corruption does not end up with our agents: with the low morale, or the problem of morale, of not having the infrastructure; the morale of releasing people that they wish they did not have to release, because there are not enough jails; added into that, the huge amount of money involved; and then, if we get to the next step, the threat of violence, not just to the agents and the people on the border, but the fact that these assassins are working in the United States. Do you guys want to comment on that aspect of it, and try to educate this body about just how great that potential is and how it is so unique to the border region? Mr. Castaneda. I would like to lead off on that, because in my area we have witnessed several assassinations on the Mexican side. One of the unique cultural aspects of living on the border is the enmeshing of the families. I have a lot of family in Mexico, myself, and as Mr. Reyes will attest. It makes it hard to penetrate narcotics rings. We have officers that are involved with families on the Mexican side. But Mexico, like you mentioned, Congressman, ``Plata O Oro,'' you know, meaning ``Bullets or Gold.'' It is so prevalent and so very real, and has filtered into this country. I do not have the intelligence to put the numbers and say how many of these murders that have occurred on this side of the border originated from orders from Mexico. Nevertheless, it is an issue that needs to be dealt with and needs to have a very serious look. Mr. Rodriguez. In my area, it is along the same lines. But we, as citizens of the United States, should be vocal, and not seeing their actoins 2 miles away from the border as acceptable. The term in Nogales, AZ, in translation, is ``The Settling of Accounts.'' They settle accounts, all accounts. It does not matter who you are, or from where you are. We have been fortunate that we live on the border. I also am aware. I know the threat. I keep it away from my family. At the same time, I will never answer the door without knowing who is there. Mr. Usrey. I would certainly agree with my fellow panel members here and the observations you have made. I have been in law enforcement for over 30 years, and I thank God no one ever put a gun to my head and said, ``Here, take this $100,000, or I am going to blow your brains away, and I am also going to assassinate your family.'' I have a lot of sympathy for the individuals who find themselves in that situation. Irrespective of how they got there, that has to be a very, very difficult situation. We have had a number of threats that have been made, particularly against Federal law enforcement personnel on our side of the border. For the most part, those are designed as retribution for doing a good job. The key officers and agents that are out there have been identified in the forefront of some of the efforts, as Lieutenant Rodriguez said, and that is of continued concern. So I concur with your observation that is a potential that we have to look forward to, and not readily, it is something that could happen. We do know that drug traffickers use what works. And if it works in Mexico, I would be very concerned that they would try those same tactics here in the United States. Mr. Bilbray. I only want to point out that there was 1 year, Mr. Chairman, where we lost nine police officers in Tijuana who were assassinated. A police chief was assassinated and two Federal prosecutors were assassinated. And in fact, the police chief announced that he was offered a bribe, and went public that he was turning down the bribe, and within 42 hours he was dead. That is how brazen it is. And so, as we confront our Mexican colleagues, we have also got to realize how sensitive it is. Our challenge is to make sure that we do not allow this to happen--this cult of corruption. There was a culture of corruption that was very small. And it was not that; it was like giving public officials tips, the ``mordida.'' The trouble is, that allowed the gap for this huge amount of money and violence to go into the Mexican culture and drive this hideous problem that is going on now. Our challenge is to make sure that culture of corruption does not transfer across the border. And it is, to some degree. It is a real challenge that we have to confront. I wish that we would look at all of the people that are dying on both sides of the border on this issue, and be as much outraged, and put the resources in along our ``frontiera'' to the south as we would in Europe. You know, we get all fired up about how the media cover that. It is really interesting how this has not been something that is covered in the U.S. media, and it has not been something we have discussed on our side. Remember, the bullets and the money that are used in this corruption are coming from our side of the border. Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman for his comments and questions. I want to thank each of the panelists for their participation today. Hopefully, through your testimony and your recommendations, we can do a better job in coordinating our Federal efforts, working both with the HIDTAs and local governments. Again, we thank you, and we will excuse you at this time. Mr. Rodriguez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Mica. I will call our third panel. Our third panel today consists of four different witnesses. The first one is Mr. Richard Fiano. He is the Chief of Operations of the Drug Enforcement Administration and with the Department of Justice. Next, we have Brigadier General Dorian Anderson, Commander of the Joint Task Force Six with the Department of Defense. We have also Mr. Michael Pearson, Executive Associate for Field Operations of INS. I believe Mr. Pearson is going to also be accompanied by Mr. Gus De La Vina, Director of the U.S. Border Patrol. We have Mr. Sam Banks, Deputy Commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service with the Department of the Treasury. As I indicated to our previous witnesses this morning, this is an investigations and oversight subcommittee of Congress. We do swear in our witnesses. We also ask, if you have any lengthy statements or documents you would like to be part of the record, that you do summarize your remarks and present 5 minutes of oral testimony. We will, by unanimous consent, submit those lengthy written statements or documents to the record. With that, I would like to ask each of those who are going to testify to stand and be sworn. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Mica. This is answered in the affirmative. I would like to welcome our panelists and participants. First, I will recognize Mr. Richard Fiano, Chief of Operations of DEA with the Department of Justice. Welcome, sir, and you are recognized. STATEMENTS OF RICHARD FIANO, CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; DORIAN ANDERSON, COMMANDER, JOINT TASK FORCE SIX, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; MICHAEL PEARSON, EXECUTIVE ASSOCIATE FOR FIELD OPERATIONS, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ACCOMPANIED BY GUS DE LA VINA, CHIEF, U.S. BORDER PATROL; AND SAMUEL BANKS, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY Mr. Fiano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Mica and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear today at this hearing regarding the drug threat along the Southwest border. I would first like to thank you and the subcommittee for your continued support of the DEA and your overall support of drug law enforcement. I have submitted and offer my complete statement for the record. Mr. Mica. Without objection, that will be made part of the record. Mr. Fiano. I think it is extremely appropriate to focus on the drug threat along the Southwest border. As you mentioned in your opening statement, this past Wednesday the DEA announced the conclusion of a 2-year international investigation which culminated in the arrest of 93 individuals linked to the Amado Carillo Fuentes organization headquartered in Cancun, Mexico. The investigation, known as ``Operation Impunity,'' was a multi-jurisdictional, multi-agency investigation conducted by DEA, the FBI, and the U.S. Customs Service, and a host of State and local law enforcement agencies throughout the United States. The investigation ultimately culminated in the dismantling of an entire criminal drug trafficking organization and the seizure of over 12,000 kilos of coke, a half a kilogram of heroin, 4,000 pounds of marijuana, and over $19 million in U.S. currency and assets. The operation demonstrates an extensive and coordinated and cooperative effort on the part of U.S. law enforcement, which exacted a devastating blow against one of the largest Mexican drug trafficking organizations operating along the Southwest border. As you are aware, DEA's primary mission is to target the highest levels of international trafficking organizations operating today. Due to the ever increasing legitimate cross- border traffic and commerce between the United States and Mexico, several international organized crime groups have established elaborate smuggling infrastructures on both sides of the Southwest border. Furthermore, it has long been established that in addition to drug trafficking these international criminal organizations spawn violence, corruption, and intimidation that threaten the safety and stability of surrounding border towns, cities, and States. The Southwest border remains your major point of entry for approximately 70 percent of all the illicit drugs smuggled into the United States. that are ultimately transported to and sold in our neighborhoods across the country. In response to this continued threat along the Southwest border, DEA has established several initiatives which employ a multi-prong strategy which utilizes and combines law enforcement operations, intelligence operations, and provides for law enforcement assistance in order to achieve success in combating criminal drug trafficking organizations operating along the Southwest border. The objective of these initiatives is to disrupt and ultimately dismantle criminal organizations that smuggle illicit drugs into the United States, by linking Federal, State, and local investigations domestically and mobilizing multilateral enforcement efforts abroad. In order to combat drug production and trafficking networks operating along the United States-Mexican border DEA, in concert with other Federal agencies, established the Southwest Border Initiative, an integrated, coordinated law enforcement effort designed to attack the command and control structure of organized criminal enterprise operations associated with Mexican drug trafficking organizations. The strategy focuses on intelligence and enforcement efforts, targeting distribution systems within the United States, and directs resources toward the disruption of those principal drug trafficking organizations operating across the border. DEA, in cooperation with other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, is focusing increased intelligence, technical resources, and investigative expertise on the major Mexican drug trafficking organizations responsible for smuggling vast quantities of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamines across the border. Apart from this effort, DEA and the FBI also provide operational planning, intelligence, and training to the Government of Mexico law enforcement authorities, to strengthen their capacity to collect drug intelligence, attack production capabilities, conduct trans-shipment interdiction investigation and asset seizures, and prosecute key traffickers. The Southwest border strategy targets specific Mexican drug trafficking organizations operating across the border, and attacks their command and control infrastructures, wherever they operate. These organizations routinely utilize violence as well as sophisticated encrypted telecommunication methods in order to protect their organizations' illicit activity. The Southwest border strategy includes a joint DEA, FBI, U.S. Customs, and DOJ projects that resides within DEA's Special Operations Division. The Special Operations Division is a joint national coordinating and support entity comprised of agents, analysts, and prosecutors from DOJ, Customs, the FBI, and DEA. Its mission is to coordinate and support regional and national criminal investigations and prosecutions against trafficking organizations that most threaten the United States. As presently configured, we have sections in the Special Operations Division, two sections that target Southwest border major Mexican drug trafficking organizations, one that targets methamphetamines, one that targets Colombian trafficking organizations, and one that targets heroin investigations in Europe and the Middle East. The intelligence collection process is critical to the interdiction of drugs. In response to the DEA, the Department of State established a joint information collection center program managed and operated by the El Paso Intelligence Center. The program is a multilateral, multi-agency effort designed to collect and analyze data related to the trafficking of drugs with international origin and transshipment points. Domestically, highway interdiction programs are central to drug enforcement, especially on the Southwest border, since a vast number of seizures occur at checkpoint stops within 150 miles of the border in Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas. The highway interdiction program is promoted and monitored by the El Paso Intelligence Center, but carried out by State and local law enforcement officials. The operation is active along the highways and interstates most often used by drug organizations to move drugs north and east and illicit money south and west. Despite our many efforts and successes in identifying and apprehending the leadership and members of these international drug trafficking organizations, too often these drug lords are not apprehended by our international counterparts. Even if they are arrested, justice is seldom carried out which fits the magnitude of their crimes. The DEA, however, continues to work bilaterally with our law enforcement counterparts in Mexico, with the hope that our efforts will result in successfully diminishing these criminal organizations' ability to utilize the Southwest border. Mr. Mica. If you could, begin to conclude here. Mr. Fiano. I will, sir. Mr. Mica. We are going to have a series of votes. Mr. Fiano. Yes, sir. Perhaps the recent arrest of ``Operation Impunity'' defendant Jaime Aguillar Gastelum in Reynoso, Mexico by Mexican authorities is indicative of the GOM's future commitment to such joint ventures. However, continuing reports of corruption and the rapidly growing power and influence of the major organized criminal groups in Mexico cause great concern about the long-term prospects for success. DEA recognizes the drug threat along the Southwest border diminishes the quality of life of our citizens across the Nation. We are hopeful that new initiatives in our cooperative efforts with other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies will enhance our ability to combat these drug trafficking groups operating along the Southwest border, and have more successes such as ``Operation Impunity.'' Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Fiano follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.047 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.048 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.049 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.050 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.051 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.052 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.053 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.054 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.055 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.056 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.057 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.058 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.059 Mr. Mica. Thank you. I would like to recognize General Anderson. General Anderson. Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is a privilege to appear before you today. I have prepared a statement to be entered into the record. Mr. Mica. Without objection, your entire statement will be made part of the record. Proceed, please. General Anderson. Joint Task Force Six represents the Department of Defense Title 10 commitment to provide military capabilities in support of domestic law enforcement agencies' efforts against the flow of the illegal drugs into the United States. Joint Task Force Six does not initiate counterdrug operations. Instead, we support the operations of competent and professional law enforcement agencies. We take pride in providing that support. My official statement provided for the record details my mission. There are three words, however, in the mission statement that I would like to highlight: support, integrate, and synchronize. I emphasize the word ``support.'' With domestic law enforcement agencies in the lead, military units provide a capability that supports their efforts. Joint Task Force Six provides support in three categories: operational, engineering, and general support. Operational support includes ground reconnaissance and sensors, aviation reconnaissance, medical evacuation, and transportation. Engineering consists of assessments, roads, fences, barriers, border lights, shooting ranges, and facilities. General support includes intelligence analysts, mobile training teams, intelligence architectural assessments, maintenance and technology missions. In the fiscal year 1999, we will execute a total of 413 missions in support of law enforcement operations, such as ``White Shark,'' ``Rio Grande,'' ``Hold the Line,'' and ``Gulf Shield.'' Our priority of effort is the Southwest border. The majority of my operations directorate focuses its efforts on support to law enforcement agencies and High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas along the Southwest border. In conclusion, Joint Task Force Six provides Department of Defense capabilities from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, active duty, reserve, and National Guard, in support of law enforcement agencies throughout the United States. The multi-service, multi-agency nature of our support is challenging, complex, and necessary. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak before you today. I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of General Anderson follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.060 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.061 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.062 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.063 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.064 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.065 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.066 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.067 Mr. Mica. Thank you, and we will suspend questions until we have heard from all witnesses. Mr. Michael Pearson, with INS. Mr. Pearson. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss illegal immigration and drug smuggling on the Southwest border. I am accompanied by Gus De La Vina, Chief of the U.S. Border Patrol. I want to assure you that the Immigration and Naturalization Service shares your deep concern about the impact these increasingly intertwined criminal activities have on the quality of life not just along the frontier with Mexico, but in communities across the country. I have provided a written statement that details INS' role in drug interdiction, our strategic approach to border management, and how it strengthens our efforts to counter illegal immigration and drug trafficking, and how these efforts are fortified further through cooperation with other Federal, State, and local agencies. Let me summarize the major points. The primary enforcement mission of INS is to prevent the unlawful entry of migrants into the United States, remove those who are here illegally, and ensure that all those who enter the country at land, air, and sea ports are authorized to do so. Carrying out these responsibilities has put INS on the front line of our Nation's fight against drugs. INS' vital role in our national counterdrug effort is attributable to changing patterns in both narcotics smuggling and illegal migration. In response to the increased complexity of illegal immigration, INS developed an innovative multi-year strategy to strengthen enforcement of the Nation's immigration laws along the Southwest border. The strategy treats the entire 2,000-mile border as a single seamless entity integrating enforcement activities between the ports of entry with those taking place at the ports. Under the strategy, we deployed additional personnel to targeted areas, backing them with force-multiplying technology such as infrared scopes, and underground sensors, and infrastructure improvements. The strategy would not be as successful as it has been without one vital element: the cooperation and coordination with other Federal agencies, as well as State and local enforcement. Our comprehensive border control strategy has produced impressive results in both deterring illegal immigration and combatting drug smuggling. In fiscal year 1998, for example, apprehensions of undocumented migrants in the San Diego sector, which at one time accounted for nearly half of all apprehensions nationwide, fell to an 18-year low. Thus far this fiscal year, Border Patrol agents and immigration inspectors working along the Southwest border seized more than 1 million pounds of drugs destined for American streets. Simply seizing record amounts of drugs is not enough. We need to dismantle the criminal networks involved in drug trafficking. This is where our cooperation with other agencies is critical. Both at and between ports of entry, we work closely with the Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA], U.S. Customs, and others, to ensure that drug traffickers are prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. For example, in two separate incidents this week, Border Patrol agents in McAllen, TX discovered more than a ton of marijuana hidden in a compartment of a trailer they were inspecting, and 1,400 pounds of cocaine in a truckload of rotten watermelons. The drugs, valued at a total of more than $46 million, were turned over to DEA, which will develop the case against the drivers and others who may have been involved. I am proud of the role INS personnel play in combating the scourge of illegal drugs. It is a role they have embraced, even though, in carrying it out, they often place themselves at great personal risk. For example, last year alone, six Border Patrol agents were killed in the line of duty, three of whom were killed by drug smugglers or by individuals under the influence of drugs. We have made great strides in protecting our borders against illegal immigration and drug smuggling, but our efforts need to be strengthened. I look forward to working with Congress to achieve this. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the subcommittee. I will be pleased to answer any questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Pearson follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.068 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.069 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.070 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.071 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.072 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.073 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.074 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.075 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.076 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.077 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.078 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.079 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.080 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.081 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.082 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.083 Mr. Mica. Thank you. Mr. Banks, how long is your statement? Mr. Banks. Very brief, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Mica. OK. You are recognized. Mr. Banks. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you. Mr. Chairman, Commissioner Kelly asked me to personally thank you for your support, and to recognize your recent participation at the event we had for the B3 domed radar aircraft. U.S. Customs is responsible for enforcing the Nation's laws at our borders. We protect American industry from unfair competition, the public from unsafe foods. We even check for weapons of mass destruction. But our No. 1 enforcement priority is drugs and drug money. On a typical day, Customs officers seize 3,654 pounds of narcotics and $1.2 million in currency. Our primary focus on the narcotics effort is the southern tier of the United States and, specifically, the Southwest border. This job to ferret out drugs on our border with Mexico is huge: 278 million people, 86 million cars, 4 million trucks. Our work force has remained relatively stagnant in recent years, but narcotics seizures have continued to increase. This is because we have pursued a variety of initiatives. Two of the initiatives I would like to mention are the Border Coordination Initiative and our 5-year technology plan. The Border Coordination Initiative [BCI], was designed to improve coordination amongst the Federal law enforcement resources along our Southwest border; to give us a seamless process for moving these volumes of traffic through our ports, and to improve our interdiction efforts of narcotics, aliens, and other contraband. We in INS set out a very aggressive agenda to design how we would manage our ports, how we would link our tactical interdiction operations, how we would provide unified investigative and aviation support and enhance our integrity programs. BCI has been a force multiplier: Cocaine seizures are up 27 percent, marijuana by 23 percent, and heroin seizures by 33 percent; in part, we believe, attributable to better integration of our enforcement efforts. We have doubled our controlled deliveries, which is when we take a seizure up the narcotics organization food chain. The Border Patrol has joined our tactical intelligence units along the border, and they recently told General McCaffrey it was one of the best resource investments they have made. Our technology plan for the southern tier, which Congress supported with funding last year, has placed eight large truck X-rays at our major commercial crossings along that Southwest border. We are now in the process of acquiring mobile truck x rays and mobile gamma ray systems that produce images of the contents and even show false walls in the containers--even into double-walled propane tankers. We are testing a variety of new technologies, such as a pulse fast neutron analysis. We are installing gamma ray imagers for rail cars and high-energy x ray systems to examine sea containers. This is coupled with a whole series of other hand-held and information technology systems that we have designed. We can do the narcotics work and not have to seriously impact traffic. With the support of the National Guard, we have loaned mobile x rays to help Border Patrol with special operations at their checkpoints. Our systems are designed to be multi- purpose, so that they support more than one agency. They do not just look for narcotics, but they can also spot people that are hidden inside these rail cars that are coming in. They can even find radioactive materials inside these containers. Mr. Mica. Mr. Banks, I am going to cut you short, here. Mr. Banks. Yes, sir. Mr. Mica. There are four votes. We are going to recess the committee for 1 hour. We will come back at 1:40. If you have any comments at that point, we will finish at that juncture, and we will also have an opportunity for questions. The subcommittee is in recess. [Recess.] Mr. Mica. I would like to call the subcommittee back to order. When we concluded, Mr. Sam Banks, Deputy Commissioner of U.S. Customs, was testifying. Did you want to conclude, sir? Mr. Banks. Mr. Chairman, yes, I would like to very briefly. In addition to the Border Coordination Initiative, in addition to the technology piece that I talked about, the Commissioner of Customs chairs which is called the Interdiction Committee. It is the heads of all law enforcement agencies that are linked to drug interdiction. That committee is now engaged in developing a coordinated, fully integrated, multi-agency plan developed for what is called the ``arrival zone.'' It is really where the drugs first arrive into the United States, so it is heavily tied to the borders. This is being done in full support of ONDCP. As a first step to boost this level of inter-agency coordination, we are taking the Border Coordination Initiative and looking to integrate the activities of the Coast Guard, to integrate DEA more into it, to bring the State and local law enforcement agencies closer, and to link it with the high- intensity drug trafficking centers. So this whole drug interdiction thing obviously is a difficult, complex job to do with the limited resources we have, but we believe we are continuing to make progress in having a united front to deal with it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Mr. Banks follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.084 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.085 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.086 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.087 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.088 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.089 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.090 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.091 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.092 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.093 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.094 Mr. Mica. Thank you. I think we have heard from everyone now. Mr. De La Vina is available for questions. You did not have an opening statement. General Anderson, when we were looking at the operation along the border, we were concerned about reports we have had about this organization, turf wars, lack of inter-agency cooperation. How would you describe the situation now, as far as improvement since January of this year, in September? General Anderson. Yes, sir. I would like to address that. Being in JTF-6 and primarily responsible for providing support, we are actually in a very good seat to have an objective view of the cooperation between the agencies, since we touch almost every one of those agencies in executing our missions. I will tell you, since I last talked to you and today, I have seen a great deal of cooperation through, as an example, the different HIDTAs. We have what I call the command presence program, where senior officials from my organization go out and visit the HIDTAs. We visit the intelligence analysts where they are. We visit every one of our missions. We talk to those that we are providing support for. What we are finding is that many of the law enforcement agencies, local, State, and Federal, are all on the same sheet of music for those types of operations. From my point of view, we have very good cooperation between the agencies. Mr. Mica. Well, the drug czar testified just a short time ago that he still felt that there was not a sufficient point of contact, or someone in charge, to help coordinate these activities. We have the HIDTA structure, we have the JTF structure, and 23 agencies in four departments. If you were to restructure or assign someone with full responsibility for coordinating, how would you structure that, with all of these folks in play and agencies and activities, General Anderson? General Anderson. First, I would like to respond that my mission is the same, and that would be to provide the support but not anticipate---- Mr. Mica. Right. But you see it from your own perspective, and it is hard. You work with these folks, I know, but we appreciate some candor in this and some recommendations. Maybe we can help structure this a little bit better. General Anderson. I think the idea of what you can actually gain, what you are really going to be able to gain, I believe it is going to be found in the head of a coordinator first. I do not believe that restructuring, a total restructure will answer the most impending problem that we have right now. I think the cooperative approach will in fact, and is answering the problem right now. Mr. Mica. The drug czar also seemed to think that the Border Patrol should take a more active part in leading this effort. Mr. Pearson, or Mr. De La Vina, did you want to comment? Mr. De La Vina. Yes, Mr. Chairman. You know, looking at it from a logical perspective, there are basically three ways to bring drugs in. That is through sea, through land ports, and we are looking at the land port entries. What we are looking at is Customs and INS pretty much have the control of the ports of entry. We have between the ports of entry. We have the largest personnel patrolling the border, which is the U.S. Border Patrol. We are seizing a tremendous amount of drugs. We are close to 1 million pounds of marijuana. We are participating with the Customs effort at the ports of entry, as well as with our own agency in the POEs with the inspections. Customs has much control of that. We are trying hard to make this work. We can control, or at least make a huge impact, on narcotics between the POEs. Our cooperation with the ports of entry is beginning to solidify, and that is beginning to work. So we will be participating more. We are looking at more intelligence. We are looking at more liaison. Hopefully, we will have a better control of ports of entry as well as between POEs. Mr. Mica. Now, before this hearing, the drug czar said he called folks together to prepare for this hearing, or at least to update the drug czar and his staff on what was going on. Prior to that occasion, how often have you been in contact with the drug czar's office, Mr. De La Vina? Mr. De La Vina. We work periodically with him. Mr. Mica. Do they call a meeting from time to time, a quarterly meeting, monthly meeting, weekly? Mr. De La Vina. At the field level, we do not have as much contact with the ONDCP, but at the national level, we do. Mr. Pearson participates with that, so I will pass that to him. Mr. Mica. Wait. Is it important that we have increased contact, participation, at the field level? It is nice for these people in Washington to meet, but the actual activity is out there at the border. Is this something that is lacking? Then we have the HIDTA structure and the JTF structure. Are there adequate integration and meetings and coordination? What is lacking? Just direction? Mr. De La Vina. I think, first of all, the HIDTA. That is much our local contacts working at the field levels. At the national level, that works for policy and direction. Mr. Mica. Everyone participates in the HIDTA? Mr. De La Vina. Yes, correct, sir. Mr. Mica. Do they have a chair of the HIDTA that is elected among those? Mr. De La Vina. That is correct. Our chief patrol agents participate in that. Mr. Mica. Is everyone meeting and then going their own way? Is that part of the problem? Mr. De La Vina. I think part of the problem is the lack of coordination with the intelligence that could be forthcoming. Out of the million pounds of marijuana that we have seized, over 20,000 pounds of cocaine, most of the Border Patrol's interdictions are cold interdictions. They are not based on intelligence. We are out on the line. Mr. Mica. Did you say ``cold?'' Mr. De La Vina. ``Cold.'' Mr. Mica. OK. Mr. De La Vina. In other words, no---- Mr. Mica. Not based on intelligence. Mr. De La Vina. That is correct. So that would be extremely helpful for a coordinating element, if we could have a heads-up as to either what is coming through the checkpoints or what is coming through the line. But at the present time, all of our seizures--the majority of our seizures, and I am talking about close to 98 percent of our seizures--are cold; men and women that are out there in the U.S. Border Patrol are seizing the narcotics without any prior information, just based on location. Mr. Reyes. Mr. Chairman, if you will yield for a moment? Mr. Mica. Go ahead. Mr. Reyes. I think it would be beneficial for you to understand, if Mr. De La Vina would explain to you, the chain of command. Because although he is the chief of the Border Patrol, stationed at headquarters, he does not have any supervisory oversight over the chiefs. It would be beneficial, because I think that is where the chairman is trying to understand what your role is. Mr. De La Vina. The current structure of the U.S. Border Patrol works in this manner. We have the Commissioner, we have the Deputy Commissioner, and the Executive Associate Commissioner, would be Mr. Pearson, who I report to. And from that point, we have three regional Directors that are located in the field, in Dallas, in California, and in the eastern region in Burlington, VT. Our chiefs report up the chain through the regional Directors to Mr. Pearson. My role is much as a second-line supervisor, in a manner of speaking, to the chief patrol agents. structure. Mr. Mica. That is a little bit---- Mr. Reyes. See, that is why, when you are asking him questions, I wanted you to understand the way the system is, in my opinion, broken. That is why we are trying to restructure the INS. Because he does not have supervisory oversight over the chiefs, and you are asking him if there is enough coordination, at ground level if there is enough--well, ``coordination'' is about the only word I can use. Mr. Mica. Yes. Mr. Reyes. He does not have the ability to influence that. The regional commissioners and then Mr. Pearson. He is actually on a staff advisory level. So the ``Chief of the Border Patrol'' is kind of a misnomer. Mr. Mica. Is that established by agency rule, as opposed to law? Mr. Reyes. Right. Mr. Mica. It is? Mr. Reyes. It is within the agency. Mr. Mica. So we can call the agency in and ask for a restructuring on that. Mr. Reyes. Right. Mr. Mica. OK. It sounds like we have some organizational and structural problems that can be corrected without legislation. Mr. Reyes. Right. Mr. Mica. OK. Mr. Reyes, did you have questions? Mr. Reyes. Yes. I am interested in getting the perspective from both Mr. Banks and Mr. Pearson. Before I do that, I want to publicly thank Mr. Banks for the support he has given us. You and I were discussing the new post technology for the ports of entry, and he has been very supportive. As a result of his support, I think next March or April we are going to actually field test that new technology, which I think is going to really make a difference. In addition to that, he has been very helpful in working with the private sector. Because if that technology works, the private sector is very excited about participating in defraying some of the cost, because to them time is money, and money is being spent by the trucks waiting in long lines, waiting for Customs to inspect them. So I did want to thank you for that, Mr. Banks. Mr. Banks. Yes, sir. Mr. Reyes. My question is regarding the comments by General McCaffrey in terms of the port coordination. From what I am hearing--correct me if I am wrong--the INS is OK with having Customs take the lead at the ports of entry and the Border Patrol take the lead in between the ports of entry. I would like for each one of you to comment on that. Mr. Banks. I do not know if it is quite as clean as that, Congressman. But we really have, under the Border Coordination Initiative, one person that we jointly designate between us as the traffic manager. One person at the port will control those operations. Now, we each have our own missions to do. But part of this effort with this coordination initiative was to get a seamless process; one face of government to the traveling public and the commercial process, also a single point to work on the law enforcement arena. That is the reason we merged resources and joined forces in our intelligence centers, is to provide tactical intelligence. Mr. De La Vina is correct; intelligence is probably one of the things that we are missing the most. But we are starting to make some real progress in getting tactical intelligence that is good for the officers on the line. We have done it by merging resources; not trying to take over resources or worry about turf or anything like that, but simply getting together, one place, one unit, to work on a common issue. So I know that General McCaffrey is interested in having an overall coordinator for the Southwest border. Treasury's position is not necessary, that perhaps that is a redundancy, another level of bureaucracy. Can there be more done in terms of achieving effective coordination between the agencies? Yes. Are we on track to do that? Yes. Is it perfect? No. We still have a ways to go. But we have HIDTAs. We have built this effort at the ports, to have a single port management concept. We have merged intelligence areas. We have border liaison mechanisms. And adding another coordinating body in the midst of this, if anything, I am not sure if it is going to add what everyone is looking for. I think it is trying to somewhat impose a military approach on a law enforcement issue. Mr. Reyes. So if an individual like Mr. Rodriguez in the previous panel goes to any port of entry, any of the 39 ports of entry, and asks, ``Who is in charge?'' everyone at that port of entry can tell him? Mr. Banks. At least for that traffic issue. Now, frequently, he is going to go for a migrant issue, or an undocumented crossing issue. If he does, for the most part, he is going to go to the head of the Immigration Service at that port. Mr. Reyes. So he will ask, ``Who is in charge?'' Mr. Banks. Yes, sir. Mr. Reyes. And somebody will say, ``Well, that depends''? Mr. Banks. Yes, sir--No. Mr. Reyes. You see, that is the problem. I have been at the ports of entry with General McCaffrey, where he has asked that question and we have gotten from 6 to 30 different answers, in terms of who has the lead. It depends on what issue. I think that is what feeds the frustration, and that is what we heard earlier in the previous panel. Because I think that if there had been an arrangement worked out by INS and Customs and Agriculture and whoever else is at the port of entry, we would not continue to hear the same issues that came up in the previous panel, that came up with General McCaffrey, and that, frankly, come up as you visit the border with the delegations. What we are trying to do is to decide what needs to be done. part of the frustration is the fact that we are being told at times it is being handled, but when we go back out there and ask the same question, we get the same answers. That tells us that it is not any better than it was, you know, 5 years ago. Let me hear from Mr. Pearson, and then you can comment. Mr. Pearson. Well, as you know, Congressman, I spent over 25 years in the Army, so I understand the issue of unity of command and unity of effort. What we are trying to do here is the unity of effort. To ask somebody to walk in and say, ``Who is in charge'' is for the most part immaterial. It is, ``What is the issue?'' In much the same way, somebody walks into a police station and says, ``Hey, this happened.'' Well, ``OK, you are in the city police, but it happened in the county, so we need to refer to them.'' Or it is county, city, or State or Federal. When somebody comes in and has an issue, it does not matter who they talk to. It gets put in the right channels right away. That is what the port authority, the Border Coordination Initiative, is all about. There is a team that runs that port, and that team focuses all the efforts together. So there is no duplication where it is not necessary, and there are no gaps in it. It really should not matter when somebody walks in and says, ``Who is in charge?'' It is, ``What is the issue? And we will make sure the right people are handling it.'' Mr. Reyes. Except when somebody like Lieutenant Rodriguez goes to a port of entry and says, ``I have a load--or a group or whatever the issue is--coming in. And I need to talk to an individual to get that authorized or OKed.'' And when they say, ``Well, it depends what the issue is,'' the issue is coming into the port of entry, he needs to get it addressed. If the issue is narcotics, it goes to the Customs, correct? Mr. Pearson. That is correct. Mr. Reyes. But then you also have to consider what kind of documents those snitches have, or those informants. So ultimately, what happens--and I am telling you this from what I have heard personally and what at times I have experienced--the issue becomes, ``Who has overriding authority?'' If you walk into a McDonald's today, and there is a dispute about an order, and there is a shift supervisor, there is only one manager of that McDonald's. There is only one person that can literally make the decision, ``Yes, we will give it to you free,'' or ``No, we are going to charge you,'' or ``You can take a hike,'' whatever that is. The frustration is that there is not one person at a port of entry today that has that kind of authority or that kind of flexibility. I have been with General McCaffrey when he has been told about issues just like that; that in varying degrees there is an issue of enforcement or an issue of inspection, an issue of narcotics. The best scenario is that they have a mini- conference of the three port directors: Agriculture, INS, and Customs. In some cases, there is disagreement, and they have to bump it up their chains of command; which means, ultimately, that it becomes a bureaucratic nightmare. I mention this so that you understand the frustration that we hear. I have an advantage over colleagues like the chairman, because I worked in that agency, and I understand exactly what Lieutenant Rodriguez means when he says he has to step in and referee from a local level a turf issue or a disagreement on that level. That is where I think we need to come to some kind of understanding, or some kind of an agreement. That is why I think it is important that we continue to pursue those kinds of things, both at the ports of entry and in between the ports of entry. I do not know if you have any comments on that. I just wanted to make sure that everybody understood what the issue is. Mr. Banks. I think we do have an idea on the issue. Go into any major city in the United States, in their law enforcement, and you have State police, city police, county police, and sheriffs' departments. It is similar type situations on this. Most of the work that gets done is through cooperation. One of the things that would be of concern from Justice or an Immigration perspective: If there is one person in charge of drugs, then what happens to those INS resources? Will they be committed to drugs, or are they going to be committed to the immigration issues? You do not have somebody trying to dictate that and diverting those resources. Instead, we work it out in a cooperative way. Many times, we support each other. In other words, if there are not enough resources to go around, we either put in additional resources, or the Immigration does, in order to solve a particular problem. So in some ways, the cooperation approach, this unity of effort, is a solution to a lot of the issues out there. Because a lot of these turf wars, what they are fighting for is not turf; they are fighting for resources. They are fighting for enough agents to be able to work an investigation. They are fighting for enough people to man those lines and to search those trucks. It is almost a turf battle for resources on a particular issue, more than it is a battle amongst agencies for who controls what. There is so much work out there, none of us can control it. Mr. Reyes. True, but the bottom line is, we still keep hearing---- Mr. Banks. Yes, sir. Mr. Reyes [continuing]. People like General McCaffrey talking about getting one coordinator, one person, where the buck stops at that desk or at that office and who says either, ``Yes, you can come in, Lieutenant Rodriguez, with your case,'' or ``No, because of `X,' `Y,' `Z'.'' And that, I guess, takes it from a perspective of constructive criticism. Mr. Banks. Yes, sir. Mr. Reyes. Can I ask? Mr. Mica. Go ahead. Mr. Reyes. I want to just switch gears, and speak to General Anderson. Because every year here with the Department of Defense authorization we go through a yearly argument of ``Put military on the border.'' I would like to get your perspective on whether the military has the resources, the inclination, the interest, of replacing or supplementing the Customs and the Border Patrol and DEA and everybody else, by taking a first-line presence on our borders. General Anderson. I think that is a bad idea. We are trained to do other things, quite frankly. There are agencies already in place that can operate within our national laws. You will have to change our laws to allow us to operate to our fullest capacity. There is enough work around the world in the engagement strategy that ties up those military resources. The way we are organized now, and the capabilities we bring, the idea is those capabilities are temporary in nature. That would allow then the law enforcement agencies to not only use the resource, to learn how to use it, and then possibly budget for it in the outer years. I think we are doing that well. We do not meet all the support requirements that come in; nor have we over our 10 years. Mr. Reyes. Mr. Banks. Mr. Banks. Congressman Reyes, one thing I would suggest, however, is the National Guard, working under the auspices of the Governors, is invaluable. You will see a lot of military uniforms out there working in the cargo lots and working at the ports. Mr. Reyes. Right. Well, the issue is not---- Mr. Banks. Understood. Mr. Reyes. You know, and the issue is not whether the military can support enforcement agencies. Of course they can. The biggest issue is--and we have had proposals here from putting 10,000 soldiers on the border--the frustration of the narcotics that are coming in and the impact that it is having on our streets in the country. Having worked in that area, I wholeheartedly agree that the National Guard, JTF-6, do an incredible job in giving you the resources to unload trucks. I think you divided it into operations, engineering, and the third one was general support. Now, all of those things are things that are very beneficial. But my question was directed toward putting actually armed soldiers on our border. I think it is a very bad idea, and I wanted to make sure that I was not speaking just from experience, but from hearing it also from the perspective of somebody that actually--and in this case, General Anderson-- who is in charge of JTF-6 and in charge of the military resources. So I appreciate it. Mr. Mica. Mr. Fiano. Mr. Fiano. Congressman, may I respond to the issue on the coordination? As far as DEA is concerned, while on the surface a coordinator looks like a practical solution, as an investigative agency I would have some concerns about having either a Customs port director or a Border Patrol port director make a decision as, Congressman, you brought up, if Lieutenant Rodriguez had a controlled delivery. I would hope that Lieutenant Rodriguez could go to either the Customs office closest to him, the FBI office, the DEA office, regarding the controlled delivery. That way, it could be coordinated. Because those controlled deliveries and investigations like those usually target one of the larger drug distribution networks within the United States. It may affect, negatively impact, either a foreign investigation that DEA, Customs, the FBI might be working jointly at a special operations division, such as ``Operation Impunity.'' It may affect one of the domestic cases. I would like to see Lieutenant Rodriguez go to the DEA, the FBI, the Customs Office, tell the Customs agent or an FBI agent, ``I have this controlled delivery, it is targeting the Rich Fiano organization,'' and then it will ultimately get to the people who can coordinate that, who are sitting together, FBI, Customs, and DEA. That way, we can pursue a larger investigation, and not jeopardize anything that anybody is doing. Mr. Reyes. I think under ideal circumstances, that is really the way it works, and it should work. But as you know, sometimes these cases take a life of their own, and there is no way that you can channel it. That is where it becomes critical that there be one person, one contact point, that can make a very critical decision. Because in some cases, a whole case can turn on the ability of getting an individual cleared to go through those ports of entry. Mr. Mica. Well, unfortunately, we are running short on time here. I am going to ask unanimous consent that we keep the record open for at least 3 weeks. Without objection, so ordered. I will tell our witnesses we have a substantial number of additional questions we would like answered for the record, which we will be directing to each of the agencies and witnesses here. We do want to also thank you for your cooperation, whether it is the Joint Task Force, DEA, Customs, INS, the Department of Justice, and Border Patrol. As you can tell, there is a certain degree of frustration of Members of Congress. We want this to work. We need your cooperation. Some things that the agencies can do a better job on in working together, we think we can leave it to you. But we need your cooperation. We do have an oversight responsibility and function. We will continue to do that. We have poured incredible resources into this effort. I think the Members of Congress are willing to fund and support, but again, the results are important, and cooperation is important. So we solicit your continued efforts and cooperation to make this a success. There being no further business to come before this subcommittee this afternoon, this meeting is adjourned. 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