[House Hearing, 106 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] COMBATING TERRORISM: COORDINATION OF NON-MEDICAL R&D PROGRAMS ======================================================================= HEARING before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS of the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ MARCH 22, 2000 __________ Serial No. 106-168 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house http://www.house.gov/reform __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 67-312 WASHINGTON : 2000 ______ COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York STEPHEN HORN, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania JOHN L. MICA, Florida PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington, MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio Carolina ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois BOB BARR, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois DAN MILLER, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas LEE TERRY, Nebraska THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee GREG WALDEN, Oregon JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois DOUG OSE, California ------ PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho (Independent) DAVID VITTER, Louisiana Kevin Binger, Staff Director Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian Lisa Smith Arafune, Chief Clerk Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director ------ Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida TOM LANTOS, California JOHN M. McHUGH, New York ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia JOHN L. MICA, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York Carolina BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont LEE TERRY, Nebraska (Independent) JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho Ex Officio DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel Kristine McElroy, Professional Staff Member Jason Chung, Clerk David Rapallo, Minority Counsel C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on March 22, 2000................................... 1 Statement of: Chan, Kwai-Cheung, Director, Special Studies and Evaluations, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, accompanied by Sushil K. Sharma, Associate Director, Special Studies and Evaluations, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office; and Weihsueh Chiu, Evaluator, Special Studies and Evaluations, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office..................................................... 4 Spencer, Carmen, Director, Chemical-Biological Defense Directorate, Defense Threat Reduction Agency; Page Stoutland, Director, Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program, U.S. Department of Energy; Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Laboratory Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation; and Robert M. Burnham, Section Chief, Domestic Terrorism-Counterterrorism Planning Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation............................ 26 Letters, statements, et cetera, submitted for the record by: Chan, Kwai-Cheung, Director, Special Studies and Evaluations, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared statement of........... 7 Kerr, Donald M., Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Laboratory Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, prepared statement of....................... 60 Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 3 Spencer, Carmen, Director, Chemical-Biological Defense Directorate, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, prepared statement of............................................... 29 Stoutland, Page, Director, Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program, U.S. Department of Energy, prepared statement of...................................... 51 Watson, Dale, Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, prepared statement of..... 72 COMBATING TERRORISM: COORDINATION OF NON-MEDICAL R & D PROGRAMS ---------- WEDNESDAY, MARCH 22, 2000 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:10 a.m., in room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives Shays and Blagojevich. Staff present: Lawrence J. Halloran, staff director and counsel; J. Vincent Chase, chief investigator; R. Nicholas Palarino, senior policy advisor; Robert Newman, Kristine McElroy, and Thomas Costa, professional staff members; Jason M. Chung, clerk; David Rapallo, minority counsel; and Earley Green, minority staff assistant. Mr. Shays. I would like to call this committee meeting to order and to say that I have a great job being able to serve in this capacity, and I really appreciate the witnesses that are going to be participating today. It is a very important issue and we appreciate the good work of everyone involved. The purpose of this hearing is just to help us sort out where we are at and where we need to go and where we can improve, and that is ultimately the objective of everyone here. This Friday, in Connecticut, municipal, State and Federal emergency management officials will conduct a tabletop exercise to plan their response to a fictional but all too plausible incident of terrorism involving the use of chemical and biological weapons. Much of the technology they will discuss--detectors, protective gear, and decontamination equipment--is the producte of research and development [R&D], begun 10 to 15 years ago. Today, we ask how effectively today's Federal R&D efforts are focused on the needs of local first responders to meet tomorrow's terrorism threats. According to the General Accounting Office [GAO], research and development of non-medical technologies to meet chemical and biological threats is being conducted by several military and civilian agencies. In looking at four major R&D programs, GAO found all four are working on biological agent detectors, three are developing chemical detection and identification capability, and three are pursuing modeling and dispersal simulation. GAO found efforts to avoid duplication in these R&D programs informal and inconsistent. As we learned in our previous hearings, terrorism may know no boundaries, but bureaucratic barriers can be impervious to the need for interagency coordination and cooperation. The risk of overlap, waste, or missed opportunities to fill technological gaps is compounded by faulty or dated threat assessments. According to GAO, ``Several programs do not formally incorporate existing information on chemical and biological threats or needed capabilities in deciding what research and development projects to fund.'' If the threat doesn't drive R&D commitments, what does? Critical decisions are being made today that will determine whether local police, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel will have the technology they need to confront the next generation of terrorism. Our witnesses this morning make many of those decisions, or are in a position to influence those who do. We look to them for assurances that Federal research and development programs will be effectively coordinated and efficiently run. [The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.001 Mr. Shays. Our first panel is members of the GAO: Kwai- Cheung Chan, Director, National Security and International Affairs Division; Dr. Sushil K. Sharma, Associate Director, National Security and International Affairs Division; and Weihsueh Chiu, also from GAO. I believe we have just one testimony and that is from you, Mr. Chan. Mr. Chan. Yes, sir. Mr. Shays. We are happy to have you here, as always. Mr. Chan. Thank you, sir. Mr. Shays. Pardon me. I need to administer the oath. I wish I could just swear you in at the beginning of the year and just call it quits from then on. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Shays. Note for the record all three witnesses have responded in the affirmative. So we welcome your testimony. Thank you. STATEMENTS OF KWAI-CHEUNG CHAN, DIRECTOR, SPECIAL STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY SUSHIL K. SHARMA, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, SPECIAL STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; AND WEIHSUEH CHIU, EVALUATOR, SPECIAL STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE Mr. Chan. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss our report on the coordination of Federal non-medical research and development programs addressing chemical and biological threats. We examined four programs which conduct non-medical R&D. These programs focus on developing systems and technologies for detecting, identifying, protecting, and decontaminating against chemical and biological agents. These programs are, one, DOD's Chemical and Biological Defense Program which was established under the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1994; the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Biological Warfare Defense Program, established in 1996; three, the Department of Energy's Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program, established in 1997 in response to the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act passed by Congress in 1996; and, four, the Counterterror Technical Support Program conducted by an interagency Technical Support Working Group [TSWG]. I will discuss the following three issues. First, what processes are used to decide how to invest funds in R&D activities? Second, what similarities exist among Federal programs that conduct R&D in this area? Finally, I will present how these programs are coordinated in the activities. Before I discuss the results, let me briefly describe the context. Subsequent to the gulf war, concerns about the possible use of chemical and biological weapons in both military and civilian settings led Congress and Federal agencies to implement several new or expanded programs. Overall funding in this area has increased significantly in recent years. In addition, today several civilian and military agencies are conducting R&D designed to develop equipment to counter these threats. Total non-medical R&D funding in this area has increased from $76.5 million in fiscal year 1996 to a projected amount of nearly $190 million for fiscal year 2001, an increase of over 140 percent in 6 years. Let me turn to our findings. First, it is important to note that developing technology through R&D can be a lengthy process, sometimes extending to 10 years or more. Hence, it often does not offer a solution to immediate needs. To effectively plan and implement chemical and biological defense R&D, three key steps are to, one, identify, validate and prioritize chemical and biological threats; delineate the capabilities needed to address these threats; and allocate program resources to activities that develop those capabilities. Assessing threats may involve multiple dimensions, such as which particular chemical or biological agent might be used, how they may be delivered, and who might be the perpetrators. Delineating capability requires risk-based assessment of what specific capabilities are needed to address the threat. Before allocating program resources to R&D, one must evaluate the extent to which existing technology can address immediate needs and then identify gaps. R&D activities that are conducted outside this framework can carry the risk of developing a system that is technology-driven and not threat- driven, or one that users do not want or need. We have previously reported that civilian programs to combat terrorism do not follow these steps. Specifically, we recommended that a national level comprehensive threat and risk assessment to combat terrorism be done. Second, we found that these programs have several similarities. For instance, all of them conduct applied research and develop prototype equipment to demonstrate the practical utility of proposed technologies. Two of the programs focus on threats to the military, and the other two focus on threats to civilians. However, the military and civilian user communities are concerned about many of the same chemical and biological agents, such as nerve agents, and possible perpetrators, such as terrorists. In addition, we found that these programs are seeking to develop many of the same capabilities, such as detection and identification of biological agents. Furthermore, in some instances the technologies they are pursuing are similar. Examples of this include mass spectroscopy and flow cytometry for detecting bio agents. We also found that in some cases these programs contract with the same laboratories to perform the same research and development work. Finally, I will discuss the extent of coordination among these programs. Although the four programs we examined currently use both formal and informal mechanisms for coordination, we found several problems that may hamper their coordination efforts. First, participation in coordination meetings is inconsistent. For instance, sometimes they do not include representatives of the civilian user community. Second, program officials cite a lack of comprehensive information on which chemical and biological threats to the civilian population are most important and what capabilities for responding to these threats are most needed. Third, programs which are growing rapidly, such as the Department of Energy's program, do not formally incorporate existing information on chemical and biological threats or needed capabilities in deciding which R&D projects to fund. Without effective coordination among these agencies, R&D efforts might be duplicative, resulting in waste, and important capability gaps might not be addressed. In summary, basic information is needed to compare the goals and objectives of the various program activities to better assess whether overlaps, gaps, and opportunities for collaboration exist. Much of this basic information, beginning with a comprehensive assessment of the threat and the risk, does not yet exist. This concludes my formal statement, and we will be happy to answer any questions you have. [The prepared statement of Mr. Chan follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.002 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.003 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.004 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.005 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.006 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.007 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.008 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.009 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.010 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.011 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.012 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.013 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.014 Mr. Shays. I would like to just ask you if the solutions are administrative or legislative to improving the coordination? And my second followup question is have we legislatively kind of reinforced the lack of coordination? Mr. Chan. I think over the years, since 1993, beginning with the bottom-up review, Secretary Aspin had noted this as one of those four major threats that is to be recognized. And there are a number of laws that have been passed over the years to encourage such activities, not only to provide threat and risk assessment as in the case that is directed, I believe, as Public Law 105-261, that the FBI does go and demonstrate the methodology in assessing threats and risk assessment, as well as the formulation of a number of these programs, as I stated in my oral statement, that are encouraged by Congress over the years to really develop these programs and try to, in fact, encourage them to address this threat. Mr. Shays. But my sense is that you are not seeing the coordination you want to see, correct? Mr. Sharma. If I could just expand on to this, I think on paper the---- Mr. Shays. I just wanted to say, Mr. Chan, you sounded to me like Alan Greenspan then. I was trying to figure out what the answer was to my question there. Mr. Chan. I hope I am much younger. I believe that, in fact, legislatively there has been a lot of action taken. Congress had encouraged them to do that, but nevertheless I think we are still finding problems out there. Mr. Shays. OK, thank you. Yes? Mr. Sharma. I think the coordination mechanisms on pieces of paper do exist. However, one of the problems we are seeing here is that no one is specifically responsible for ensuring that duplication would not occur, or in cases where duplication has occurred, nobody has the responsibility for saying no, or nobody is in charge of ensuring that if there are some specific gaps that exist, they do get addressed through the R&D programs. Mr. Shays. Well, that is a pretty serious comment. It is helpful. I think we all experience this, but in my own office if three people are responsible for it, no one is responsible. So I always in the end say if this doesn't turn out the way it should, it is your fault, and I will point to one person. I might put it in the positive, but the bottom line is I always have one person ultimately responsible. Your point is we don't have one person ultimately responsible, which begs the next question. Is that because no one wants to have to choose who ultimately is responsible or it is difficult to decide who should be? Mr. Chan. Well, I think in the past they believed there is a demarcation between the military needs versus the civilian terrorism needs. Mr. Shays. Say that again. Mr. Chan. There seems to be in the past, I think, that each organization pursued their area according to their expertise. What I am trying to say is that the military traditionally had concentrated on the battlefield threat from nation states. However, over time, the concern about terrorism against the military are also increasing. So while the threat itself is similar and overlap, the priority in addressing them might be different. There are common threats now. Mr. Shays. Is this the concept of the stovepipe view of their mission? Mr. Chan. Well, that is a good way to put it, yes. Mr. Shays. But I still need an answer to that question, and then I am going to turn to staff to ask some questions and I would like to listen to your responses and then I may jump back in. But, ultimately, I am assuming, Mr. Chan, that you agree with Dr. Sharma's assessment. Given what Dr. Sharma said, do you think one person or one agency should be held accountable for the coordination of this effort? Mr. Chiu. The National Academy of Sciences in looking at coordination of R&D has recommended that in cases where multiple agencies are conducting R&D, there should be a lead agency who is responsible for leading that coordination effort. Mr. Shays. And have they suggested who it should be? Mr. Chiu. They haven't addressed it in this particular arena. They addressed it on a broader level. Mr. Shays. That is helpful. Thank you very much. I am going to have both Larry Halloran, the majority staff counsel, and David Rapallo, the minority staff counsel, as some questions. Larry. Mr. Halloran. In your statement, you mentioned an alternative to a threat-driven R&D system was a technology- driven one. Did you come across an example of a technology that was kind of driving its own development process that had no user at the other end, a gizmo nobody asked for? Mr. Chan. Well, I I can approach it from the view that in the Department of Energy, when the program was in place the approach that was taken was looking at ways to maximize the utility and capability of the scientists that are there, how best to use them. And so in defining what the threat is and then see what the needs are, it went in a different direction, which is to optimize the utility of the people and their expertise. Now, it may eventually converge to the same point, but nevertheless I think---- Mr. Halloran. With a lot of luck. Mr. Chan [continuing]. Our view is that it should start from a threat-driven approach, and then you assess the risk, then you prioritize the capability you need to achieve, and then ultimately decide where to go. It is a process issue that we are raising here. Mr. Halloran. Right, and let's stay with the process. I know you didn't make formal recommendations in the report, but here you can. What would you see as a mechanism that might be used to develop requirements on the civilian side? I know DOD has a fairly complex requirements iteration process, and the civilian R&D side doesn't seem to have that. Is there a paradigm out there for coordination and for the requirements development process that they might look to? Mr. Chan. Well, I think the first observation one would make is that in DOD such a process is pretty well in place over time. I mean, this is something that they are used to, not only in addressing threats, but also developing a strategy by which you set requirements and the mission needs, as well as examining near-term, mid-term and far-term capability that might be needed, and then ultimately come out with so-called science and technology objectives, and so on. So the process itself within DOD is pretty well established. With the civilian side, this is a very different demand to really try to figure out where to go. First of all, in the national response system under EPA in addressing chemical accidents both on the mobile and stationary side--that means transportation where you have accidents with chemicals--you do have the local emergency planning team there, and first responders, and so on. Now, there is sort of an infrastructure available organizationally. Whether they are well trained to address not only chemical accidents, but all the way to the chemical agents, which is like warfare, and biological agents, that is clearly something new. And it is done in such a way that has always been with multiple-agency involvement, from the Department of Justice, involving the FBI, to EPA, to the cleanup problems, to even national labs doing analysis to figure out to what degree the civilian population might be affected if this happens. But it is not a very top-down way to approach the issue. So I think, you know, they are beginning to try to figure out how to do that better. Mr. Halloran. One final question. You noted in your statement and in the report that you didn't see much success, maybe some effort in involving civil users in the coordination process. What was the reluctance or what, in your view, caused that to not work? They just didn't think of it, or they tried and failed? Mr. Sharma. One of the things that DOE officials told us the reason that, you know--I mean, they gave us two reasons, essentially, that nobody has done the threat assessment, and as far as the users are concerned they really don't know what they want, unlike DOD users. I think it is partially true, but not correct in the sense that when you think about the civilian and military threats, there are artificially created boundaries. You do need some common things, such as detectors to detect what agents individuals have been exposed to, collective and individual protection systems, and decontamination systems. So these are sort of generic kinds of things, and DOD has years of experience. Now, users, are very different. They are coming from different States, you know. They are first responders, police, firemen, and so on and so forth. But, basically, everybody has awareness within those three categories of what do they need. What DOE has not done is to make an effort to go beyond what their jurisdiction, which is, you know, they are supposed to do R&D and, you know, they are independent, instead of making an effort to try to reach them and try to do a systematic need assessment, as well as recognizing that R&D does not offer any immediate solution. So you must do an assessment of the available technology and say to the users, look, for specific threats for the time being you could use ``x,'' ``y'' and ``z,'' and here are some of the gaps that none of these currently available technologies could offer. Therefore, we are going to do the R&D. So what I am saying is that DOE has to do two things. They have to do an outreach to the users and do some education at the same time in terms of what is available and what is not available, what they can use and work on, and go from there. Mr. Halloran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Shays. Thank you. I will turn to Dave Rapallo. Mr. Rapallo. With the varied types of end users on the civilian side, what are some ways that agencies could solicit requirement information and other types of information from the end users? Mr. Sharma. I think one of the processes is followed by TSWG, and they have a process whereby they invite responders from each State and it is an open meeting. That is one such area where DOE can expand on. I mean, it is not that there are no mechanisms available or it is impossible to do. Mr. Chan. But I think before you do that, you need to provide what are the likely threats to those people so that they can understand what they are. And, second, what are the priorities which ones are the most important ones. And, three, what kind of capability gaps do they have now in addressing those possible threats, and the likelihood of these threats and the lethality of these threats, and ultimately how best to be informed. That way, they can say, hey, we don't have anything to do this, OK? So either you go out and say, OK, do we have current capability to address that or do we need to develop some kind of R&D program for a system or develop a technology by doing so. I think the reason why we keep raising the question about the threats assessment is that we are seeing a tremendous overlap between the military side and the civilian side. There is no way to distinguish pretty soon, particularly in the chemical and biological arena. So in that case, the only real difference you find is the selection of the agents that might be of concern to the domestic side, and the priorities might be quite different than the military use of such weapons of mass destruction. So they are different, except the threats are similar. And then I think with the knowledge the users have, that way at least they can sort of react to it, because if you go out there and ask them now, most likely they would just look at the current stuff based on the experience they have with chemical accidents. Mr. Rapallo. I just have one followup. Do you know the status of ongoing efforts for threat assessment at the civilian agencies, at FBI and other agencies? Mr. Chan. Yes. I think Public Law 105-261 which I commented on before directed the FBI to do a risk and threat assessment, and do some demonstrations. I think that is sort of the beginning of it. What we are looking for is ways to prioritize and then ultimately determine the capability and needs, and then develop future R&D programs out of that effort. Mr. Sharma. But we don't know whether or not they have actually done that. Mr. Shays. I am sorry. I am not hearing you. Could you speak a little more into the mic? Mr. Sharma. Although the public act requires them to do it, our understanding is that they have not done that, and perhaps you can ask the FBI when they come next what their road map is with regard to the threat assessment. Mr. Rapallo. Thank you. Mr. Shays. What will be the effect on chemical and biological defense projects if DOD and DOE merge their R&D road maps? What will be the effect? Mr. Sharma. I think if they do merge, one of the things will be that you will identify right away what are some of the projects that are duplicative, and you could then minimize or eliminate the duplication, especially if it is not planned duplication. And you could then curtail waste and use those resources to address more important questions that are not currently being addressed. Mr. Shays. Did any of you look at how civilians view the technology, versus the military, the users? Do the civilians, for instance, have a lower tolerance for equipment functioning a certain way versus the military? Mr. Chan. Well, we did a study about 4 years ago. You are taxing my memory now. What we found, of course, is that on the civilian side they are less aware of the possible agents that could be used. And, second, they really have to rely on expertise that is in EPA, such as to identify agents. And often they are not really trained to know what to do. I am talking about, given the incident occurs, what follows. That is where it is wanting often. Mr. Shays. What would be the most important question I could ask each of the next panelists? Mr. Chan. The most important question? Mr. Shays. Yes. I am trying to get to the bottom line. Mr. Chan. I think the most important one is really ask them not to look from the agency's perspective what they are doing, but rather have them address it from the people's perspective in terms of the community; given these kinds of threats, what kinds of concerns they may have and what kinds of things they might need. Instead of looking at it from the agency perspective, I think you have to sort of look at it from the user perspective because it is affecting the community and I think that needs to be represented in some form. But before they can respond to that, they need to understand what potential threat there might be. So you need to lay that out first and say, hey, this is what happens to you if this happens, then what would your needs be. I think you get a lot of statements about this is my agency and this is how we are addressing that issue rather than---- Mr. Shays. So, in one sense, it is asking each of them who their customer is? Mr. Chan. Exactly. Mr. Shays. And have them define to me who their customer is. Mr. Chan. That is the quick and short answer. Mr. Shays. That is helpful. Is there any comment that any of the three of you would like to make before we get on to the next panel? Mr. Sharma. One of the questions I would ask is how is the nature of the threat different between the military and civilian. An agent is an agent, and while the magnitude of the effect might be different in a battlefield scenario versus in a civilian exposure, basically you are dealing with the same category of agents. And how that threat would impact the R&D efforts--a second question is while DOD has been doing a lot of research over the years and has developed many technologies, and that expertise ought to be utilized and have some effect, positive contribution, on the civilian side. But maybe civilian agencies have done some assessment and they find what DOD has done is good for nothing. I don't know, but you could ask them. Mr. Shays. OK, thank you. Mr. Chiu. Following up on the customer issue, how they are going to ensure--once some of this threat assessment and risk assessment comes out, how will they ensure linkages between the various elements, between the threat and developing the capabilities and the R&D, because one of the things that we found was that there seemed to be some gaps in establishing those linkages. Mr. Shays. Thank you. We have been joined by the ranking member, Mr. Blagojevich, who serves on our Armed Services Committee as well. I think you wanted me to go on to the next panel. Mr. Blagojevich. Yes. Mr. Shays. OK, so I thank all of you. As always, you provide very helpful information to our committee and a nice introduction to the next panel, so I thank you very much. Mr. Chan. Thank you. Mr. Chiu. Thank you. Mr. Shays. Let me just call the next panel and then I am just going to take care of some housekeeping. We have Mr. Carmen J. Spencer, Director of Chemical and Biological Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency. I might just point out that I think Mr. Spencer is retiring, and I want the record to show he is not retiring because he came before this committee. Dr. Page Stoutland, Director, Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program, Department of Energy; Dr. Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Laboratory, Federal Bureau of Investigation; and Mr. Robert M. Burnham, Section Chief, Domestic Terrorism-Counterterrorism Planning Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Before I ask you to stand up--don't stand up quite yet--I will just ask unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be permitted to place any opening statement in the record, and that the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without objection, so ordered. I ask further unanimous consent that all Members be permitted to include their written statement in the record. Without objection, so ordered. If you gentlemen would stand, I will swear you in, and then we will get started here. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Shays. Note for the record that all four witnesses responded in the affirmative. I think you are seated the way I called you, and we will just go right down the line. We are going to turn the lock on for 5 minutes and then we will roll it over for another 5 minutes, so you have a sense of where we are at. But your testimony is very important, especially in areas that are pretty new to us and this is an area that is fairly new to us. Mr. Spencer. STATEMENTS OF CARMEN SPENCER, DIRECTOR, CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE DIRECTORATE, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY; PAGE STOUTLAND, DIRECTOR, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; DONALD M. KERR, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION LABORATORY DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; AND ROBERT M. BURNHAM, SECTION CHIEF, DOMESTIC TERRORISM-COUNTERTERRORISM PLANNING SECTION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Mr. Spencer. Mr. Chairman and distinguished committee members, I am honored to appear before your committee today to address your questions regarding the Defense Department's Chemical and Biological Defense Program. I am Mr. Carmen Spencer, the Director of the Chemical and Biological Defense Directorate within the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. In this capacity, I am responsible for managing, directing and executing the armed forces joint NBC defense, research, development, and acquisition programs to ensure all our armed forces can survive, fight and win on a battlefield contaminated with chemical or biological weapons. The Department's Chemical and Biological Defense Program is threat-driven; it is not technology-driven. The chemical and biological weapons threat is potentially increasing in diversity and frequency. Currently, there are over 20 countries with known or suspected chemical and biological weapons programs. Assessing the threat is complicated by several interrelated changes, including the proliferation of weapons, technological advances, unstable political regimes, shifting regional power balances, and the increasing threat of terrorism. The continued frequent deployment of U.S. forces worldwide makes assessing the threat more difficult. Further, because the countries which are of the greatest concern to the United States are also in regions in which the United States has well- defined national security interests, it is of paramount importance that we continue to maintain a credible, robust capability to protect our forces and provide them capabilities to operate effectively in a chemical or a biologically contaminated environment. The chemical and biological threat drives warfighting commanders and CINCs and services requirements. The CINCs and services identify the capabilities needed to survive, fight and win. These identified capabilities form the basis for all requirements for the research and acquisition community. The Defense Intelligence Agency provides us with continually updated reports and assessments. These reports assess the effect of adversaries' weapons systems on how we fight. The commanders-in-chief identify their priorities which are supported by our joint NBC defense program. Our joint user community evaluates materiel, training and doctrinal improvements to provide the necessary capabilities for our warfighters. If a materiel solution becomes necessary, the joint user community generates requirements in the form of mission needs statements and joint operational requirements documents. The result is that our programs and technologies are driven by validated threat assessments and user mission requirements, not by technologies. Our Chem-Bio Defense Program coordinates with several relates efforts, including the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency [DARPA]; the Department of Energy; the Department of Health and Human Services. And we have many international cooperative efforts. DARPA is charged with seeking breakthrough concepts and technologies. DARPA's biological warfare defense program is intended to complement the DOD Chem-Bio Defense Program by anticipating threats and developing novel defenses against them. The Chem-Bio Defense Program has programmed funding to facilitate the transition to acquisition of any demonstrated DARPA technologies that may meet warfighter needs. The Department of Energy initiated an effort to develop chemical and biological defensive capabilities for first responders and protection against terrorism attacks within the United States. The Department of Defense program has leveraged the Department of Energy program by funding specific DOE efforts that may have military applications. Additionally, coordination is achieved by the Department of Energy participation as a non-voting member of our Joint NBC Defense Board, DOE participation in the Chem-Bio Defense Program science and technology reviews, and regular meetings with the Department of Energy and visits to their national laboratories as well. The Department of Defense's Chemical and Biological Defense Program and DARPA and the Department of Energy's Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program have worked together to provide a report to Congress on our cooperative work in chemical and biological defense science and technology. It is prepared through an interagency coordination mechanism known as the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Focus Group, which involves the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the intelligence community. The Department of Defense also participates in the National Security Council-led Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness Group, which coordinates activity in the U.S. Government toward preventing, detecting and responding to terrorist release of weapons of mass destruction, and toward more effectively managing the health, environmental and law enforcement consequences of such an incident. This body does not address or oversee the DOD Chem-Bio Defense Program's mission of providing the warfighter with the capability to operate effectively in a chemical and biological- contaminated environment. However, technology development efforts within the Department of Defense, including the Chemical and Biological Defense Program, that can contribute directly to the domestic preparedness mission are coordinated with other agency programs through this R&D subgroup which is chaired by the White House of Science and Technology Policy. The Department's fiscal year budget request for the Department of Defense Chem-Bio Defense program is approximately $836 million. This is an increase of over $100 million from fiscal year 2000. $362 million is being applied for research, development, test and evaluation, and $474 million will go toward providing equipment to our warfighters. In summation, the Department of Defense Chem-Bio Defense Program responds to the threat-requirements-programs process. Programs are in place to respond to user needs and shortfalls. Oversight and management of the Department of Defense Chem-Bio Defense Program continues to improve and does comply with Public Law 103-160. The Department is on the right azimuth for fielding needed, improved chem-bio defense equipment to our armed forces to meet warfighter needs. The continued support of Congress and implementation of current plans will continue to improve joint force readiness. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Mr. Spencer follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.015 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.016 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.017 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.018 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.019 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.020 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.021 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.022 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.023 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.024 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.025 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.026 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.027 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.028 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.029 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.030 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.031 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.032 Mr. Shays. Thank you very much. We are going to have two votes, so we might as well go until we have to leave because then we have to wait for the next vote. So we are probably going to interrupt you, Dr. Stoutland, but why don't you start? Mr. Stoutland. I would like to thank the chairman and the members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to appear before you and describe our efforts to counter the use of weapons of mass destruction. My name is Page Stoutland and I am the Director of the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration's Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program. Today, I will concentrate on the important topic of equipment and operational requirements and coordination as they relate to chemical and biological research and development programs. The Department's Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program [CBNP] as we refer to it, was initiated in response to the fiscal year 1997 Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act. The mission of the program is to develop, demonstrate and deliver systems and the supporting technologies that will lead to major improvements in the U.S. capability to prepare for and respond to chemical or biological attacks. Technology plays a critical role in defending the U.S. population against attacks with chemical and biological weapons. These emerging threats, whether of domestic or foreign origin, are rooted in science and technology, and any effective response must draw on similar expertise. Our program has three principal elements: analytical studies, technology development, and domestic demonstration application programs. Analytical studies are used to help guide the overall program direction, as well as individual technical areas. One overarching study was initiated last year to examine alternative system concepts for defending cities against chemical or biological attack. This was done jointly with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Technology development is the core program element. The program targets not incremental improvements, but major capability enhancements that can be achieved in the 3 to 5-year timeframe. There are currently four areas of specific focus: detection, biological foundations, modeling, and decontamination. The third program element consists of domestic demonstration application programs which bring together individual technologies into more capable systems in the 2 to 3-year timeframe. This integration is important, since it is usually only at the system level that problems are solved. The goal of these programs is to integrate current technology into prototype operational systems directed at specific applications. I now turn to the issues central to this hearing: assessing the chemical and biological threats, defining non-medical R&D requirements, and more generally determining what we do within the CBNP. In a general sense, our R&D investments are guided by a process that considers the threat and related vulnerabilities, and the benefit that a particular technology or system would have were it to be developed. Within this context, we have undertaken a number of specific activities to identify the highest impact areas for R&D. First, characterizing the threat environment is important for guiding our R&D activities. DOE does not conduct threat assessments in the chemical and biological areas. Instead, we rely on the FBI, the defense and intelligence communities, and public health assessments as appropriate. These assessments which, for example, consider the agents most likely to be used, are then used to guide our R&D activities. Implicit in this process is the recognition of the uncertainties inherent in estimating the nature and magnitude of the threat, and that these uncertainties must be factored into our planning. Threat assessments as well as other factors are necessary for the formulation of equipment and operational needs. These needs will ultimately be the result of a complex process that involves policymakers, technologists, first responders, the medical community, and others. As discussed in the GAO report, today there are no formal requirements for countering the domestic chemical and biological threat. This is not because we or others haven't considered the issue, but it is rather representative of the challenges implicit in arriving at a set of needs or requirements that would serve a diverse set of users and act as meaningful targets for R&D programs. In this environment, one must consider new mechanisms to identify user needs and to guide R&D programs. Within the CBNP, we sponsor two sets of activities that, in our view, contribute to the overall U.S. chemical and biological defense strategy and identify the corresponding needs or requirements. These activities buildupon our extensive interactions with potential technology users, and participation in the numerous processes designed to more clearly understand their needs. For example, we participate in the NSC-led Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness Group. Within this group exists an R&D subgroup chaired by the White House Office of Science and Technology. We fully support these processes, but in our view more is required. Specifically, we use analytical studies to aid in the development of an overall U.S. strategy to counter the CB threat. Our Defense of Cities Study aims to develop an analytical framework by which we can compare the various chemical and biological defense options available to policymakers. This will help to identify at a high level which components--for example, technologies--would have the highest value in terms of a response system and where further R&D might be most valuable. The most important component of our program for understanding user needs is our demonstration programs, or DDAPs as we call them. These programs, as I mentioned earlier, are designed to field and demonstrate complete prototype systems that use technology developed within the CBNP or elsewhere. In doing this, we work closely with users who host the demonstration and in an iterative way determine their needs. It is important to emphasize here the important difference between a stated need for a particular piece of hardware and the requirement for a system with particular performance specifications. Mr. Shays. Dr. Stoutland, I am going to let you summarize when we get back. I am very sorry, but we are going to go vote. I am sorry that we have to wait for another vote, so if you want to get a Coke or something, you probably have 15 minutes to do it. So we will stand adjourned. [Recess.] Mr. Shays. In 20 minutes, we are going to have another vote, so we will see how that unfolds. Dr. Stoutland, please feel free to conclude. Mr. Stoutland. OK, I will continue and summarize. The most important component of our program, as I was saying, are our demonstration programs. These are designed to field and demonstrate complete prototype systems that use technology developed within our program or elsewhere. In doing so, we work closely with users who host a demonstration and in an iterative way understand their needs. In order to provide you with some more insight into one of these programs, I would like to briefly describe one of our demonstration programs, PROTECT. With PROTECT, we are working closely with the Department of Transportation and a number of major U.S. subway systems to examine systematically and rigorously the vulnerability of subway systems to chemical or biological attack. Using computer models, we can estimate not only what the effects from an attack might be, but how to most effectively respond by, for example, changing the air flow in a subway system. We are now aggressively moving forward both in testing chemical detectors and improving the computer models and information systems necessary to realize these goals. Next year, a demonstration of the complete system will take place involving one subway station, and the following year a network of five stations will be demonstrated. This demonstration will result in the transit authorities being able to assess in their subway the value of such a system, and provides important guidance to our R&D program about where further technology improvements are needed. Finally, let me address the issue of coordination. The DOE program is designed to complement other U.S. Government programs, while relying on the unique capabilities of the DOE laboratories. We either participate directly or follow the status of a number of interagency coordination mechanisms. In addition to these groups, we participate in a number of formal coordination mechanisms with the defense and intelligence communities, such as the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee. Within the last year, the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee has formed a chemical and biological defense focus group to specifically help coordination in the chemical and biological area. Informal coordination occurs routinely via information exchanges between our program and other agencies, and we sponsor an annual meeting typically attended by over 200 people to review the status of our program. Let me conclude by saying that the DOE program if focused on addressing the high-leverage areas, particularly detection, that have been identified as being central to an effective response to chemical and biological attacks. Our program builds upon existing capabilities of the DOE laboratories and has begun to reach out to the industrial and academic communities. The chemical and biological threat presents enormous challenges. We are committed to fully utilizing the capabilities of the DOE and its laboratories in order to meet these challenges. In carrying out this commitment, we will continue to work closely with others to understand the evolving threat, to better appreciate the needs of technology users, and to coordinate our program with those in other agencies. Thank you. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have. [The prepared statement of Mr. Stoutland follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.033 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.034 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.035 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.036 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.037 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.038 Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, Dr. Stoutland. Dr. Kerr. Mr. Kerr. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you on behalf of the FBI. I am Assistant Director in charge of the FBI Laboratory Division, and while we have the word ``laboratory'' in our name, we are a little different from what you might expect, in that while we do forensic examinations of evidence, we also provide a great deal of operational support, particularly in the counterterrorism area. We work for the FBI field offices, of whom there are 56, so they are a principal customer, if you will. We work for other law enforcement agencies in providing training and equipment, which I will come to, particularly again in the counterterrorism area. And we work with those who manage our investigative programs in the FBI, of whom Bob Burnham, to my left, is one. The kind of support that we provide and where our needs are made clear can be exemplified by what happened over the millennium weekend, where all eight of the sections of our division were involved, and some 1,100 people in those sections. Of our 43 units, 20 were directly involved, including those in electronic and physical surveillance, people doing chemistry, explosives examination and latent prints on Mr. Rassam's car and what came across the border in it. And we also deployed our explosives render safe teams here in the national capital area, the hazardous materials response capability, and our crisis communications people. So we are, if you will, a tactical technology organization. Most recently, we have been operating in Irvine, CA, where the mayor had to declare an emergency because of a biological threat. But the biological threat was overlain by explosives and weapons. You may have read about that case where, in fact, the doctor who had all those materials was killed. We ran the crime scenes at the embassy bombings in Africa two summers ago, and of particular moment for this committee the Larry Wayne Harris case with the anthrax samples in Las Vegas was one that we had to respond to. So we learn by our casework. The counterterrorism activities and the support today underlie the five rapid deployment teams that the FBI has stood up around the country. They are based on our largest field offices; two of them are here in Washington. And there is a technical component now to each of those teams, with the equipment to go with it. We also have the disaster squad responsibility that deals with aircraft crashes, investigations like TWA 800, more recently Egyptair and the Alaska Airlines crash. The kinds of capabilities we offer more broadly are things like the EXPRESS data base, which is the explosive Reference search system, and that is funded by the Technical Support Working Group in conjunction with the FBI, and it is to provide data to all that might confront an explosive device in order to deal with it properly. We operate the Hazardous Device School in Huntsville, AL. That is the school that trains all of the State and local bomb techs today across the country, as well as the FBI's own. Mr. Shays. That is a very popular school, I might add. Mr. Kerr. Thank you. Mr. Shays. I mean, there is a long waiting list, as I understand it. Mr. Kerr. Yes, sir, and we are hoping that, in fact, we are going to be able to increase the capacity of it in the next few years. That school now includes a module of training on weapons of mass destruction threats, and so all of the people going through that school or recertified by it are being exposed to the current generation of capability that there is. In terms of R&D highlights, I should point out that we don't have the resources or the ambition to replicate what other agencies of the Government have in place. So through memoranda of understanding with the Department of Energy, with the Army Fort Dietrick people, with Edgewood Arsenal and others across the country, we have the opportunity to use their specialized facilities and people in many of our programs. So, for example, in the Larry Wayne Harris case we brought the suspected anthrax samples back here to Fort Dietrick for analysis because they have the containment facilities and the expertise to do that quickly. SBCCOM at Edgewood has developed a fly away laboratory for us. It was deployed, for example, to the World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle. It will be here in Washington for the IMF meeting. But, in fact, it is a replica of the treaty lab that that command had developed for treaty monitoring purposes, with modifications to make it suitable for law enforcement. The Department of Energy interaction, starting in 1998, has led to 10 projects at the national labs and a number of other more specialized tasks that we fund out of counterterrorism budget. In 1999, we took advantage of expertise at MIT's Lincoln Lab, which is a Department of Defense laboratory where they are developing a simplified DNA extraction capability for field use. This current year, the large vehicle bomb disablement project is underway jointly with the Department of Defense and Department of Energy. The improvised explosive device data base is being put together this year, and the advanced render safe capabilities that we are doing jointly with the Department of Defense and DOE are well underway, including foreign participation from the United Kingdom. We, in fact, should point out, in the statement I have given you for the record there is a table that displays some of the specific projects we work on. And for those who serve on the Armed Service Committee or others like them, I should point out that the letter after the number is ``k,'' not ``m.'' It is a way of making a point to you. Law enforcement and the Justice Department have not had a history of sustained R&D programs. We have tended, to support our casework, to buy off the shelf when we can to support current needs. So these relationships with the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy are particularly valuable to us because they are, in fact, in a mode of sustaining R&D programs over a number of years. They have stability in their technical staffing to provide it, and they don't have to go out and do casework everyday as we do, which takes people away from the R&D projects. To further support our relationships with the other agencies, one of my Deputies is presently seconded to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and heads the Advanced System Concepts Office there, providing us real glue in terms of joint planning and thinking about some of the BW and CW problems. One of my unit chiefs is stationed at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to tie very closely into the work they do in dealing with weapons of mass destruction detection, planning, and other things that Dr. Stoutland briefed you on. We have four or five people exchanged with counterparts in the intelligence community, not for liaison, but, in fact, to fill real responsible operating jobs. It is a way of cross- pollinating the tools and techniques that we have. Last, we think while the funding for it is small, the Technical Support Working Group plays a very significant role in bringing the agencies to the table to talk about their joint requirements. It is led, of course, at the executive level by State, Defense, Energy, and now the FBI. But it reaches across the entire law enforcement and national security communities, and it has been an excellent place to fund projects that deal, for example, with explosives detection, some of the biological detection programs. And I think it is a good model for Government cooperation. We are going to continue to expand these relationships with the other agencies, but the most important thing is that we exercise them almost every month. One of the ways we have had to exercise them is that anthrax threat letters have become, of course, a favorite thing for some people. They come to the Congress, they come to the hospitals, they are everywhere around the country. We couldn't put people in the position of saying we are going to fly out and pick it up and in 48 hours we will tell you whether you were exposed to a pathogen. That is not satisfactory for the public that we protect. So with the help of the Centers for Disease Control and the public health laboratories across the country, there is now a network in place. So if we get a call from Cincinnati about a threat letter, we can advise them, first of all, how to package it successfully for their own safety and those around them, and who to take it to so that they can get an answer in a few hours rather than wait for the time it takes to transport it back here to Washington and analyze it. So it is a notable success. I think it is the kind of thing that clearly we benefit from, and hence want to encourage. Congressional interest helps a great deal in that area as well. Last, with respect to the State and local first responders, I mentioned the HDS school. We also in the past year have been buying and equipping State and local responders with sort of first-level capability, and that has, I think, been a good program. It has not put the most sophisticated equipment in their hands, and there is a reason for that. One of the things that we have to do is not take the best laboratory equipment to the field; we have to worry about shelf life, maintenance, calibration. We don't want to inflict an added overhead burden on the first responders if we can design around it. Mr. Chairman, I will be happy to answer your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Kerr follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.039 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.040 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.041 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.042 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.043 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.044 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.045 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.046 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.047 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.048 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.049 Mr. Shays. Thank you very much. Mr. Burnham, my understanding is you are going to be coming up to Connecticut. Mr. Burnham. Sir, I will be coming up on Friday for the tabletop, as well as on Monday for the hearing. Mr. Shays. It will be great to have you there. Why don't you give us your testimony and we will try to get your testimony done before I go and vote. Mr. Burnham. OK, I think we can get it done, Mr. Chairman. Again, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a pleasure to be here. I will be brief because, in the first place, I am a last-minute replacement here. Mr. Watson, my boss, the Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism Division, was unable to make it. His written statement has been submitted. [The prepared statement of Mr. Watson follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.050 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.051 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.052 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.053 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.054 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.055 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.056 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.057 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.058 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.059 Mr. Burnham. I do work for Mr. Watson. I have got one of the section; I have got the Domestic Terrorism Section, which is part of the Counterterrorism Division. And most of what is in Mr. Watson's statement are areas that are under my responsibility. Mr. Shays. So feel free to talk about them. Mr. Burnham. OK, so I am going to talk about a couple of things. Again, he regrets he couldn't be here. I guess the overriding theme here is probably defining a threat and risk, and I am going to touch upon a couple of things on that, particularly because it was brought up in the first panel here. Mention was made of the FBI's--and this is also material that is in Mr. Watson's statement--mention was made by the first panel of a threat and risk assessment that is being done by the FBI. Specifically, that is being done now and it is being done as part of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1998. In that, the FBI was tasked with doing a threat and risk assessment for chem-bio or radiological, whatever the threat may be in the WMD area. After we started that, pursuant to the fiscal year 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Support Program, which is administered by OJP, that was rolled then into an overall grant package which is being administered by OJP. We finished the actual threat and risk package, gave that OJP, worked with to OJP. And by the way, the actual threat package itself, the threat and risk package, was also piloted in two cities. After completing that, we did give that to OJP. OJP has since rolled that into their entire grant package. And starting on March 28, next week, there are five particular locations, and I don't have the locations now, where they are actually going to start--five localities around the country where they will actually start to demonstrate that and get that working. Now, there are some limitations in that threat and risk package that we did with the locals, in that it was not your typical FBI crime survey; it was not like a lot of intelligence estimates we did. There were inherent limitations on that because of the fact that it was going to be going out to individuals who may not be in law enforcement or the intelligence community. So it did have certain limitations on it and I can discuss that more later. The other area that was mentioned by the first panel was the General Accounting Office last fall did a study in which they pointed out, and Mr. Spencer has also pointed out, that there are intelligence estimates done for State actors and possible overseas development in the area of WMD or chem-bio. What GAO's assessment or study pointed out was there is nothing really that is done domestically as far as what is out there in the area of chem-bio. One of the tasks that they did recommend, although we haven't been tasked with it yet, was that there should be a study or a threat and risk assessment done domestically as to what is specifically out there. The GAO report did note that over the last several years a lot of money has been spent in the area of R&D, and a lot of money in first responder training. But what were they training for? Are they training for any particular element? And that hasn't been done and we haven't been tasked with it yet, although on a daily basis we are dealing with what I would say would be the domestic threat. Now, we rely heavily, as Mr. Kerr has stated, on the laboratory. I have got an operational section, most of whom are not scientists, most of whom don't have the technical expertise. So we do have to rely heavily on our laboratory. And if I can give you just an example of how we work not only with our Laboratory Division but with our Federal partners, the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, CDC, typically what we would do on our threat assessment process--and Dr. Kerr had mentioned the fact of an anthrax threat. We could get an anthrax threat in from one of our field offices. Our weapons of mass destruction coordinator may call in and say a particular hospital or doctor's office had received an anthrax threat that day. Part of the threat assessment process on what we do is we analyze the threat from three viewpoints. We analyze it from a behavioral, a technical, and an operational standpoint. What we will do is we will contact first our National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, our behavioral science people, and get them involved. This is all on a conference call. We will also get possibly HMRU and NBDC involved. We will also get the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta and do a behavioral, a technical and an operational assessment for the local field office. In most instances, it is done for the first responder because for all intents and purposes, it is going to be the local police department or fire department that is going to receive the message. And if we have been doing our job over the last couple of years, they will contact us. We will do that, we will d a threat assessment, and we do this two to three times a week. So I think from all these threat assessments we are doing, get back to the field office. Dr. Kerr had mentioned we did just recently have a case out in California where we did exactly that. The call came in on Friday night, indicating possible biological agents. HMRU, the Hazardous Materials Response Unit, for Dr. Kerr, were dispatched out there. We worked with the Office of Emergency Management and the local public health officials out in California. That is typically how we respond. We have been doing it in the local community, and from these I think we have a sense of exactly what is out there now, at least domestically. I can go through figures and the actual number of cases that we have had in the last year. Predominantly, most of them have been anthrax and most of them have been hoaxes. Mr. Shays. Most or all? Mr. Burnham. I would say about 80 percent of our cases have been anthrax threats, hoaxes. Mr. Shays. Right, and of the 80 percent that are anthrax, have all of them been hoaxes? Mr. Burnham. Yes. We haven't actually--we have not had an actual case, right. Mr. Shays. I just didn't want to misread your statement. Mr. Burnham. No. Mr. Shays. Otherwise, you have got my attention. Mr. Burnham. No, no. I am sorry, no. Let me just spell out we have not had actual cases of anthrax. Mr. Shays. Yet. Mr. Burnham. But, again, that is part of the process and we are going through it on a daily basis, fully expecting that in the next couple of months the FBI, my section, will be tasked with doing an actual threat and risk assessment. Those are the highlights of Mr. Watson's statement. Again, I would entertain any questions that you may have. Mr. Shays. It is kind of embarrassing to have you gentlemen have to wait around. I apologize for that, but I only have one vote so I can vote and come right back and then we will do the questions. It is very important that we have this hearing, so I really appreciate you being here. So we will adjourn for a bit and I will be back. [Recess.] Mr. Shays. I would like to call this hearing to order. I have a number of questions I want to ask, but I think the first question is I just want to talk about what kinds of equipment we are talking about. I want each of you to describe one or two pieces of equipment that you would be dealing with. Let's start with you, Mr. Spencer. Mr. Spencer. OK, I will lead off. Of course, DOD is concentrating on warfighting, and our No. 1---- Mr. Shays. Concentrating on? Mr. Spencer. On warfighting requirements, meaning warfighting needs for the commanders-in-chief. Our No. 1 priority is in the area of detection, identification and early warning. So when we talk detection, we are talking a detection capability that provides us early warning. We need to be able to detect and identify chemical agents, toxic industrial materials, biological agents, prior to them having an impact on exposed personnel so that exposed personnel can then take adequate individual protective measures. And that leads us into the next area, which is individual protection--clothes, boots, gloves, masks. The detectors themselves range from everything from airborne platform systems, which are basically lidar technology in nature that can send out a beam and scan the horizon to determine if there is a cloud that is not naturally occurring in nature. We have biological detention devices, something like our portal shield device that is deployed in southwest Asia and the Korean peninsula. Those are point biological detection devices that are for fixed sites that, should they be exposed to a biological aerosol, they will alarm, they will provide an early detection capability. In collective protection, collective protection is required--and most of us speak the same language when it comes to equipment. For example, a mash unit, emergency medical procedures. You do not want surgeons wearing protective masks, suits and gloves. They need to be in a clean environment, so you have a filtered environmental system that is self-contained so that surgeons can perform those types of operations. And that is also a valuable tool for command and control facilities, maintenance facilities, anywhere you have long- duration facilities. A good example also is the Army. All of their Abrahms armored systems have collective protection. We have collective protection on citadels, on ships. Some aircraft have collective protection as well. Mr. Shays. Thank you. Mr. Spencer. The last thing was decontamination, and obviously those are chemical substances that will decontaminate all known chemical and biological agents. Mr. Shays. So you basically mentioned three: the detection and identification, the protective gear, and the decontamination. Mr. Spencer. Correct, and collective protection. Mr. Shays. And what? Mr. Spencer. Collective protection, which are the shelters for the mash units, for example. Mr. Shays. OK, so individual protection gear and collective protection gear? Mr. Spencer. Correct. Mr. Shays. And I am going to come back to you because of the emphasis on the military. I would love to know what the implications are for civilians of what you do. Mr. Spencer. Certainly. Mr. Shays. Dr. Stoutland. Mr. Stoutland. Let me give you two specific examples, one being equipment and the other being a capability. With respect to equipment, one of our detector projects is one that we call micro chem lab CB, short for chem-bio. This will be a handheld unit able to detect many chemical agents, as well as biological toxins, including industrial chemicals as well. Mr. Shays. Will it be a sophisticated, calibrated piece of equipment or is it going to be--we had the problem when we did the gulf war illnesses where we had the military people in the field hearing alarms going off all the time, and then finally they just discounted it because they were being told to discount it. And then the more sensitive equipment would come in and discount most of the readings. So my point, I guess, is that in the end the handheld stuff, the stuff on the trucks, the jeeps, and so on, were almost useless because if they detected something, we ignored it. Mr. Stoutland. Our goal is to overcome those shortfalls by using a variety of techniques. I can go into them if you want. Basically, what we are doing is we are putting the power of an analytical laboratory, for example, a gas chromatograph which is the size of a microwave oven, into a chip format. So we are moving things literally to micro chips. So something that used to be a meter in length can now be put into a 1-centimeter- squared chip. So you can then put the power on to a chip and you can do things in redundant fashion so that you can eliminate the false alarm problem. Our goal for this particular device is one false alarm in every 10,000 measurements. Obviously, it is an R&D program. This year, we have the first prototype that will be tested this summer with live agents to see how close we are to that performance goal. Mr. Shays. You wouldn't ignore an alarm like that then, would you? Mr. Stoutland. That is the hope. And, again, getting back to the domestic use, what we hear from the first response personnel and others is that false alarms really are not tolerated domestically. In the military, of course, you have got some flexibility. You can bring in other units, you can don masks while you are trying to figure out whether the alarm was real or not. Mr. Shays. So are you mostly focused on civilian use protection? Mr. Stoutland. Yes. Well, I will give you two examples. Our program targets civilian use. The first example is detection. The second example is a computer modeling capability. For example, we have developed extensively models to be able to predict the flow or the transport of chemical or biological agents within buildings and within subway structures. So, for example, it lets us predict what the impact would be of a release at a given subway station, how far away will it travel, how quickly will it get there, which then aids in determining what sorts of mitigative measures you might think of. Mr. Shays. So you are doing detection and identification. You are not doing protective gear. Mr. Stoutland. That is correct. Mr. Shays. You are not doing collective protection. Mr. Stoutland. That is correct. Mr. Shays. And decontamination? Mr. Stoutland. We do have a decontamination effort. Mr. Shays. So you are doing both of those, OK. Mr. Spencer. May I comment on that, please? Mr. Shays. Sure. Mr. Spencer. Dr. Stoutland used an excellent example of micro chem lab. That is a technology that we are following very, very closely. In fact, we have contributed a significant amount of money and are working collaboratively with the Department of Energy because we at the Department of Defense see that as very promising technology for warfighting application as well. In the area of modeling and simulation, although we are not first responders, we realize the Department of Defense will be called upon in the event of a national emergency involving chem-bio terrorism to provide assistance to State and local authorities. In that role, we are looking at modeling and simulation as well to ensure that the work the Department of Energy is doing in the domestic arena aligns with the work that we are doing, as well as we provide support. And we are working together on modeling and simulation as well. Mr. Shays. Dr. Kerr. Mr. Kerr. First of all, I think it is important to recognize there are three things that the FBI has to be concerned with in its management of a crisis. The first responsibility is public safety, which leads to the issue of where is the same perimeter, do you evacuate, do you not evacuate, and can you get information quickly to inform those who might take prophylactic action. The second thing that we are concerned with is the safety of our own investigators as they move into this crime scene or incident scene. So personal protective equipment is, in fact, a very important component of what we need for our people. And the third thing, of course, is once on the scene we are concerned with attribution; that is, the forensics of the situation, and so more sophisticated and specific identification capabilities that might lead you back to the perpetrator. That being said, we live on the results of the programs in the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy and what we can buy off the shelf. We are not, in fact, ourselves developing new techniques or new equipment. So it is very important for us that there is, in fact, this set of developments in the other agencies that we can work with. Mr. Shays. Mr. Burnham. Mr. Burnham. Yes, to follow one step further on what Dr. Kerr---- Mr. Shays. I am sorry. So you are not into detection and you are not into decontamination and you are not--of the three outlined by Mr. Spencer---- Mr. Kerr. We are very much into detection and identification, but the kits that we are now using in the field were developed, for example, by the Naval Medical Research Institute, in Bethesda. Mr. Shays. Are you DOD's customer? Mr. Kerr. What happens is that DOD will in many cases develop a capability and we will go to the same vendor either as part of their procurement or as a separate procurement. There may be a little bit of specialization for us, but in general we try to use the same capability. Mr. Shays. Thank you. Mr. Burnham. To carry one step further what Dr. Kerr was talking about as far as on the crime scene what they came across, what the element is, I think the most important thing that we can do, the FBI, through our WMD coordinators, is impart that information to State and local responders. I can give you several examples. In the last year, we had dispersions of some type of chemical in a number of movie theaters throughout the Midwest. Once we saw a pattern where there were three or four of them, we deemed it to be important enough to get out Bureau-wide through all of our field offices--to get that information out to the local responders. As it turned out, it was more of a labor relations matter, but I think it is important. We see this in nationwide cases. Be they anthrax threats, or other patterns, I think it is important that we get that information out, and we are. From that I think the local responders as well as the FBI can then gauge what kind of equipment they need. Again, we would have to rely on Dr. Kerr and HMRU, but I think the important thing is to get the information out, which I believe we have successfully through our WMD coordinators, as well as through the National Domestic Preparedness Office [NDPO]. Mr. Shays. I am just deciding which level to go. This is a digression, but I do want to ask now, Dr. Stoutland, I don't know if you made reference the Europeans or if it was you, Dr. Kerr. Mr. Kerr. I did, yes. Mr. Shays. Is Great Britain ahead of us, is France ahead of us? I will tell you why I ask this question. When we went to view how they respond to the whole issue of dealing with gulf war illnesses and protective gear, and so on, I had a sense that the Brits and the French believe this kind of attack is likely to happen, and I think they are more sensitive to it than I think our general population is. I mean, that is just my own view. I am just curious. Are they ahead of us, behind us, parallel to us? Mr. Spencer. Dr. Kerr, can I address that? I think Dr. Stoutland and I can probably do a better job of addressing that question. I have a requirement for the Department of Defense to monitor all the chem-bio science and technology development programs internationally as well. As part of that responsibility, we have over 50 data exchange agreements in science and technology for chem-bio defense throughout the world. We also have a number of cooperative R&D programs, and we watch very, very closely and work very, very closely especially with the Brits and especially with the French, and the Canadians as well, as part of a memorandum of understanding that is a formal agreement between us. I can give you my professional and my personal opinion on the status of their R&D programs. Generally speaking, the rest of the world is following the U.S. lead. They are looking at where we are going, they are looking at the technologies that we are developing in the basic sciences as well as in the advanced sciences. In the area of biological detection, identification and early warning, and addressing the entire biological threat, I personally feel we are 3 to 5 years ahead of them. In the chemical technology arenas and chemical protection arenas, they are pretty close in some areas. Mr. Shays. Well, in some ways they are ahead of us. I mean, the fact is our masks don't work as well as some of theirs. The fact is they have protective gear that is two-ply, and it doesn't have charcoal and can be worn as a general uniform. I am speaking of the French. Mr. Spencer. Correct. They are very, very proud of their technology developments. They have been very generous and have provided us much of their newly developed equipment and the equipment that they currently have in advanced development. We have performed similar tests as well. Mr. Shays. Dr. Stoutland. Mr. Stoutland. I have been personally both to the UK and to France over the last year to look at the exact issue that you have addressed. With respect to R&D in particular, I would not disagree with Carmen. I think there are some things that the British in particular do very well, and we are in the midst of signing a memorandum of understanding with them so that we can more closely share information and proceed jointly. With respect to public awareness, my observation has been that they are a bit behind us, in fact. Mr. Shays. On what? Mr. Stoutland. With respect to public awareness and concern over the threat, my personal observation has been that we are a couple of years ahead of them, if you will. For example, in France there is a new commission called the Haute Commission Francais de la Defense Civile, which is sort of the high French commission for civil defense, and they have just now stood up and are really starting to move forward. So I think they are a couple of years behind in terms of awareness of the threat, but they certainly have some capabilities that we are aware of and we will be making use of. Mr. Shays. But when you go through Paris and you see their police carrying assault weapons, it is not like they are going after the common criminal. Mr. Stoutland. Well, I will defer to the FBI for sort of broad terrorist awareness. But with respect to chemical and biological threats in particular, my observation has been that on a national level they are now taking it much more seriously than they did 2 or 3 years ago. Mr. Kerr. Let me speak briefly to the question you initially asked, which is areas---- Mr. Shays. And candidly. Mr. Kerr. Yes, right. With respect to the United Kingdom, we work very closely with them in bombing matters because they have more experience with terrorist bombings than anyone that we know of. We send U.S. bomb techs to their schools. We adopt some of their equipment and adapt it to our use. Similarly, in some of the detection areas they have had activity that for us has been quite useful. The partners that work most closely, of course, are the UK, Canada, Australia, and the United States. And there are, in fact, working agreements---- Mr. Shays. Say that again. You left out France? Mr. Kerr. Correct. France is not part of what I will call the inner close working group. Maybe it is an Anglo-Saxon bias, maybe it is a harmonization of the legal systems, but there is, by tradition and past agreements, more of an open interchange there than with the French. Mr. Shays. When I was in France talking with personnel who deal with both chemical and biological and the nuclear threat, one of their warnings to us was that we can win the traditional war, but then be exposed to the terrorist threat out of frustration by our success militarily and just getting us to have a perception that it only takes a few people. And so I just found it interesting how sensitive they were to the reality that there will be a nuclear, biological, or chemical attack on some Western country sometime. I am also struck by the fact that when I went to a base in Mississippi, I saw the finest firefighting equipment for our planes, and I saw a crew of just outstanding firemen at this airport. And I thought they may never, ever have to use their equipment, but they prepare everyday as if they do. I was thinking as you were talking that if there were such an attack, you all would be right up there on the firing line and then there would be people writing articles about who are these people and what have they been doing for the last so many years. I want a handle on what we are spending in this area. I mean, this isn't classified information, so give me a sense of what we are devoting in each of your units. Mr. Spencer. What I will share with you is the fiscal year 2001 President's budget submission for the Department of Defense in this area. Mr. Shays. OK. Mr. Spencer. For the joint NBC defense program, which is the program that I manage, in the area of very basic research-- this is laboratory-level research for chem-bio--about $33.2 million for fiscal year 2001; in the area of applied research, $73.6 million; for advanced development programs, $46.6 million; for what we call demonstration validation of the technologies, $83.8 million; for engineering management development, which is actually putting the technologies into the widgets and doing the final operational and developmental testing, $100.8 million; and for overall management of the program, publication of doctrine, training requirements and the training base for chem-bio defense, about $23.9 million, for a total of $361.9 million for research and development. But probably more importantly, we are going to be spending $473.9 million to physically procure new equipment and putting it into the hands of the warfighters in all of those areas I discussed--detection, identification, early warning. Mr. Shays. In next year's budget or this year's budget? Mr. Spencer. I am sorry. This is for fiscal year 2001. Mr. Shays. 2001, OK. Mr. Spencer. This is the President's budget, and that total is $835.8 million. Mr. Shays. So a little more than half is for procurement? Mr. Spencer. Correct. Mr. Shays. And is any of that procurement for non-defense personnel or is it all for defense? Mr. Spencer. It is all for defense, but it does include, for example, procurement for our civil support teams, formerly known as raid teams, for the domestic mission. Mr. Shays. These are the National Guard units? Mr. Spencer. Correct. Mr. Shays. Yes. Mr. Spencer. It also includes some procurement for some of our specialty units like the Marine Corps CBIRF units, Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force. It includes procurement for the Army's technical escort unit which has worldwide deployment capability in the area of chem-bio defense, and also for USAMRIID, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, which responds around the world to biological incidents as well. Mr. Shays. Dr. Stoutland, can you talk about your budget at all? Mr. Stoutland. Our budget request for the area that I described, that being R&D and the demonstration programs, is $42 million in fiscal year 2001. Mr. Shays. And that is the extent of your budget? Mr. Stoutland. Right. Mr. Shays. Dr. Kerr, you have a little more amorphous area of activity. Mr. Kerr. It is more amorphous, but it also pales in comparison to the numbers that you just heard. The identified increment for counterterrorism R&D is about $5 million in the Bureau. That is not the extent of all that we put into the capabilities that we field because we use some of our base funding that is accounted for quite differently. But, you know, one way to think about the FBI is that about 65 percent of our budget pays for agent and support personnel. The consumables go for the rest, and so we are not an R&D organization and it is an apples and oranges comparison here. Mr. Burnham. Sir, I can get you the budget for the Counterterrorism Division. As Dr. Kerr indicated, some of that bleeds over from the laboratory. I am going through the process now for the 2002 budget and the cross-cutting. To give you an example, in the Counterterrorism Division I have had to meet with the Investigative Support Division, which is intelligence; with our Critical Incident Review Group, which is CIRG; with the laboratory, all of which would go into our counterterrorism efforts. But we do have that broken out. We are going through that now and I can get you 2001 budget and it is broken out by different divisions that contribute to the counterterrorism effort. Mr. Shays. We don't have the Technical Support Working Group here today, a representative from it. How do you all interface with that Group? Mr. Spencer. The Department of Defense interfaces with them. They have a chemical and biological, radiological and nuclear countermeasures subgroup. We are a member of that subgroup and work in this arena with them. That includes the Department of Energy, the FBI, the Department of State, the Department of Agriculture, EPA, Customs, the Postal Service, FDA, the Centers for Disease Control, and FEMA. Mr. Shays. Agriculture because of---- Mr. Spencer. Domestic biological terrorism. Mr. Shays. Right, OK. Mr. Stoutland. That is basically true for us as well. We have a representative. In fact, DOE is one of the co-chairs of the TSWG, at the working level we have representatives on the appropriate subgroups, including the chemical and biological, radiological subgroup. Mr. Shays. Dr. Kerr. Mr. Kerr. The FBI is also one of the four executive members of TSWG, and then our people have served as co-chairs of things like the chemical and biological, radiological subgroup. Mr. Burnham. From the Counterterrorism Division, our representative is the laboratory, Dr. Kerr. Mr. Shays. How is the nature of the threat, which gets me to your point--you focused primarily on defense. I am not clear yet, and maybe we don't have a panelist here that--maybe I don't have a complete panel to answer this question, but I want to know the difference between the civilian customer and the military customer. Mr. Spencer. My customer is obviously the military customer, and my threat is basically a compilation from the intelligence community. The intelligence community--DIA, CIA, NSA--postulate a threat. That threat then receives what we call a validated--becomes a validated threat list after review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That validated threat list is a prioritized threat list, and that is the master threat-based list that we use to develop our research and development programs to counter. And that is both for chemical threats as well as for biological threats. Mr. Shays. I guess what I am asking then would be, before I go on, the need of your customer, the military, is on the battlefield. Mr. Spencer. Correct. Mr. Shays. It is not in the basement of the World Trade Center. Mr. Spencer. That is correct. The Department of Defense does have some units that we know will be responding to a domestic emergency in the chemical and biological arena, if requested. We also look to provide them the capability to provide that desired response. Those are the units like the TEU, the Technical Escort Unit, the CBIRF, the USAMRIID, and we look for specialized equipment to enable them to do that. The basic threat, though, domestically, as well as for worldwide, although not regionally focused, is primarily the same. Mr. Shays. I am not sure I agree with that. I mean, it is the same because? Mr. Spencer. The same types of toxic chemical substances and biological pathogens. Mr. Shays. Right, OK. I just see them being delivered in different forms and I see them---- Mr. Spencer. Absolutely. Mr. Shays. I would think the exposure would be greater on the military. I have no way of knowing, but it would strike me that way. Dr. Stoutland. Mr. Stoutland. First of all, there are many obvious similarities, but I think there are some important differences and I will just describe those. Mr. Shays. First off, who is your customer? Mr. Stoutland. We perceive our customers to be the broad domestic preparedness community who would be involved in protecting a city, and within that it would include some Federal agencies. For example, we consider the FBI to be a customer, but also local entities, and that changes depending on what the city looks like. For example, in the city of Washington it would involve a mixture of people who own facilities that need to be prepared; for example, subway systems. It would involve first responders, be they firemen in some cities or policemen in other cities. So it is a mix, but broadly it is those type of people who would either be involved in preparing for, meaning continually monitoring because they have a building or a facility they consider to be at risk, or people who would rush to the scene should there be an incident. Mr. Shays. Well, before you go on, given that, you said your budget was basically 42? Mr. Stoutland. That is correct. Mr. Shays. But that is basically research and development? Mr. Stoutland. That is correct. Mr. Shays. OK. Someone else is procuring from you? This isn't procurement. You didn't give me any figure on procurement. Mr. Stoutland. Our budget does not have procurement. Mr. Shays. So is that kind of like with the anti-missile defense system? I mean, we are still in research and development, not into procurement? Mr. Stoutland. No. I think there are two issues here. There certainly is procurement going on, and within cities it goes on in a number of different ways. It goes on in local budgets, be they local fire departments having money to procure items. Mr. Shays. But they are not buying from you? Mr. Stoutland. They are not buying from us, no. Our model is to first of all do development until it gets to a stage where we think it is ready for use, and then to move these things into what we call the demonstration phase. So, for example, our demonstration program that I highlighted which looks at subways will put in place chemical detectors, computer models, and so on. Some of those things will be from our program, some of them will be whatever is required to fill out the entire system. Mr. Shays. But we haven't yet perfected those models, have we? Mr. Stoutland. Sorry? Mr. Shays. Have we perfected the equipment that you are researching yet? Are we in a stage to develop them? Mr. Stoutland. There are things in different stages. Let me give you two examples. Some things will never be fielded operationally with a first responder. For example, computer models will be run that will then result in guidance that they will use on a day-to-day basis. Those things are ready. In other cases we have built, for example, a handheld biological detector where we have built several units, and this year we will be giving those to responders and various people around the country as a beta test. If that beta test pans out and people perceive this to be a valuable piece of equipment, then it will be transferred to the commercial sector and they will produce them. DOE is not in the business of producing many copies. Mr. Shays. I am getting the sense, before I go to the FBI, that we are at a stage where DOD has developed some equipment and is starting to procure, obviously. So it is still going to be in the hands of DOD. You are in the process of researching and testing and getting out in the field some test. But it leads me to believe that right now the only groups that would really have this equipment at any level would be responders from the Federal Government, not necessarily from the local and State. That is kind of the sense I am getting. Mr. Stoutland. That is not entirely true. The examples I gave you, both the subway, where we are working not with the Federal Government but with transit agencies, which I would consider to be local people--our capabilities are getting into their hands, first, in the form of improving their preparedness plans. The second example, the handheld bio detector, will involve some Federal people, but the majority of people receiving that will be State or primarily local responders. Mr. Shays. But it is ``will be.'' Mr. Stoutland. Excuse me? Mr. Shays. It is a ``will be,'' it is not ``already have.'' Mr. Stoutland. That is correct. The bio detector, in particular, will be---- Mr. Shays. That is my point. Right now, I feel like we are kind of vulnerable, that we have not yet reached the point where we are out there yet. Dr. Kerr, is that accurate? Particularly with a $5 million budget, that is pretty pathetic. Mr. Kerr. Well, our model is a little different. As you know, we have 56 field offices around the country, and so the first thing we have been doing as we have gained new equipment and capability is push it into our field offices because that way it gets tested on the street. Mr. Shays. Yes, but you don't have that equipment yet. Mr. Kerr. Oh, yes, we have first-generation equipment. We have, in fact, trained up full HAZMAT teams at the 15 largest field offices. They have a first-generation biological detection capability that is what the Navy had developed some years ago. They have radiation detectors of two different types and they have personal protective gear. In turn, those people then are training their counterparts in the State and local agencies, and for them we have been procuring personal protective gear, a simpler form of radiation detection. We do not yet have a biological detection capability to share with them. Mr. Shays. Yes, and I would just emphasize it is first generation. Mr. Kerr. Correct. Mr. Shays. And you all are working on what generation? Mr. Spencer. We are in the process of fielding an improved first-generation bio detector now, and we will be fielding in about 2 years our next generation. Mr. Stoutland. Our program, I would say, is a combination of first and second generation. We are seeing some of the first-generation things now coming out. We have given a number of things to response personnel, first responders rules of thumb for what they should do based on extensive calculations, and so on. But really the bulk of our program is going to be delivering things in the next couple of years. The program is 3 years old. We have set our program targets for programs or projects that are 3 to 5 years out that will make major capability enhancements, and so things are now just beginning to get out of the R&D pipeline. Mr. Shays. So let me ask you and Dr. Kerr again, because I didn't really pursue it enough, how is the nature of the threat different to the civilian versus the military? Mr. Stoutland. I would divide it into three areas and maybe give a couple of specific examples. One is ``what?'' I mean, I think the list of agents--particularly in the chemical area, one can imagine a much broader set of agents that could have very dramatic effects in confined urban spaces. Obviously included in those would be industrial chemicals, and so the detection capabilities, for example, need to not only do the conventional CW threat agents, but a broader set of agents. The other point would be where things are going to be used. If they are going to be used in confined urban areas, be they inside of buildings or inside of subways, that requires a different set of capabilities both in terms of detection, because false alarms is a problem inside of buildings with outgasing of materials, and so on, as well as with the various modeling calculations that would help you to characterize the threat. And, finally, the differences with who is going to use the capability. First responders and others have very different training in many cases than those in the military, and we must develop equipment that is suitable for their level of training and expertise. Mr. Shays. So one of your points would be that the civilians will not have the same capability of training? Mr. Stoutland. No, no. It could be better. My only point is that it is different. Mr. Shays. OK, fair enough. Mr. Kerr. Having participated in the Defense Science Board for a number of years before I came back to Government, I was involved with many studies of urban warfare and what the military has called operations other than war. And I would argue that their thinking about the role of chemical and biological threats in that environment is virtually identical to the civilian issue that you are asking about. The difference in detail is that they are thinking about it in terms of a conflict situation. In law enforcement, we have to think about it in terms of it being embedded within the larger civilian population whose safety we have to assure first. So there is some difference in the amount of equipment you would need for, if you will, the first crude detection in order to set up a perimeter for safe access. But the specific threats, the so-called threat list, whether it be biological or chemical, is virtually the same, augmented in the chemical area by some of the industrial chemicals like chlorine. With respect to radiological dispersal, the ability to detect radioactive materials on the battlefield or in a city is no different. The same laws of physics apply. And the other thing I should point out is that we also have to deal with some of these things in conjunction with one another. We have had threats where we have responded which have been a combination of explosives and suspected biological material. We do have some 2,500 bombings a year in the United States, which is part of our backdrop in the counterterrorism program. So one way we look at this problem of high consequence and so far low probability event is that we ought to be incrementally adding capability, but we should not be withdrawing capability from the threats that we are facing everyday. Mr. Shays. Thank you very much. Let me ask this question, and we are getting to a close here. Who in the U.S. Government is in charge of ensuring the coordination of R&D efforts for the military and the civilian requirements? We will start again with you, Mr. Spencer. Mr. Spencer. Under the National Security Council---- Mr. Shays. Let me just say the pregnant pause is very telling. It is, it is, and it is not a criticism of anyone; it is just telling. Mr. Spencer. If you are looking for one individual to be in charge to ensure that the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Justice are all working toward the same common goal, and that common goal is domestic preparedness, I believe that would come under the National Security Council. And they have established seven working groups that are looking at all aspects of this particular issue. But, again, that is one body. They have visibility. They do not have decisionmaking authority, nor do they probably have the resources to do what is actually required. Mr. Shays. It sounds to me like you are just saying the President has the responsibility. Mr. Spencer. No. There is an individual that has been designated, and that is Mr. Dick Clark. Mr. Shays. Right, but does Mr. Clark have this responsibility? Mr. Spencer. Yes. Mr. Shays. Do you think he knows he has the responsibility? Mr. Spencer. Yes, I do. I think if you take a good external look at the programs, I think at the scientific level when you talk about the science and technology, the scientists working for the Department of Defense are working very closely with the scientists in the Department of Energy, and the FBI is a customer for both of us. As you work your way up in the bureaucracies, there are bureaucratic mechanisms that are in place that physically look and attempt to assure that the proper coordination is taking place. But the bottom line to really the whole effort is--and a good example of this and probably the best example occurred in the last 30 days. In the last 30 days, we had what we call a technical area review and assessment, where I had my principal scientists for every one of our programs brief a scientific panel of non-DOD, non-Government personnel. And the panel also had a representative from the Department of Energy on it, from academia, as well as from industry. The scientists briefed, are we going in the right direction? They briefed their program and they looked for opportunities to improve leveraging what is going on in academia and industry and internationally. Also presenting at that week-long effort was the TSWG. The Department of Energy briefed their programs, and at the scientific level that exchange is taking place and it is a very positive exchange. Redundancy in all cases is not bad, especially when you look at high-risk technologies, and there are high-risk technologies involved in biological defense. That is an excellent example, but if you look above that level within the Federal Government, I think there is probably a void. Mr. Shays. Probably what? Mr. Spencer. Probably a void. Mr. Shays. And that void again is where? I know you used the word ``probably.'' Mr. Spencer. I am going to qualify my statement. Mr. Shays. Sure. Mr. Spencer. We have the Counterproliferation Review Committee with the senior executive levels of the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense that they participate on, and that coordination is working well. What is really lacking, and I think what you are really looking for is what we are all striving toward, and that is there is no national architecture. What is the national capability for domestic preparedness that is desired by this Nation for chemical and biological antiterrorism and counterterrorism activities? To what capability should the Department of Energy, under Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 63, be developing a defensive capability for the United States? That national architecture does not exist. Mr. Shays. Fair enough. That is very helpful. Dr. Stoutland, do you want to respond in any way? Mr. Stoutland. I will agree, first of all, with what Mr. Spencer said and maybe add just a couple of things. My observation is that at the working level coordination is working very well. People are not duplicating projects. Scientists talk regularly, whether they be from Justice, Energy, or Defense-sponsored programs. What we are lacking, as was pointed out, is a high-level architecture for where we are going so that we know what the targets are, and that is exactly the purpose of the study that is now being jointly funded within my program and within the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, a study that call the Defense of Cities Study, to try to develop a framework so that we can compare in a rigorous analytical manner various high-level policy options to present to policymakers to then make decisions as to what our level of preparedness should be, which then feeds back into my R&D program and others so that we know where we are going. In addition to that, the Counterproliferation Review Committee group was mentioned. This year, at the urging of my Under Secretary Moniz and Under Secretary Gansler, of the Department of Defense, we formed a chemical and biological defense focus group. The purpose of this group is really to focus specifically on chemical and biological areas, with the goal over the next year of developing integrated R&D road maps in a number of areas where we both have programs going on with different missions, different technologies, but to look, in fact, at where there are intersection points where we can benefit to a greater extent from the other agency's programs. So I think that is a very positive step that has now been approved at the highest levels of Defense and Energy. And, of course, we will be vetting that with the NSC-led Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness Group, including the Office of Science and Technology Policy which chairs the R&D subgroup. Mr. Shays. Dr. Kerr or Mr. Burnham, either one of you? Mr. Kerr. I think I will take it and I will do it on a slightly different tack, not to disagree with those who preceded me, but there are a couple of people who have made a difference in this area. One is the present Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre. Another, working with him, has been the Attorney General, and they have had now two Saturdays this past month a major WMD exercise bringing Justice and Defense and other agencies together, thinking about not just technology and R&D, but thinking perhaps beyond that, how will it be used, what are the operational and policy implications of what is being discussed. They have been meeting regularly about every 6 weeks for the past year in order to try to harmonize the needs of the law enforcement community and the tremendous capabilities resident in the Department of Defense. Mr. Shays. Yes. I read that, though, differently. I read that as a very sensible thing to do because there is somewhat of a void. Mr. Kerr. Right, and what I was trying to do was point out that some individuals, by name, have tried to fill that void. Mr. Shays. I have got you, I have got you. Mr. Kerr. Yes, sir. Mr. Shays. Then let me ask you who should do it. That will probably be my last question, but the issue is who should be doing that? It is not going to be the Technical Support Working Group. It is not going to be that. Who should it be, in your judgment? Mr. Kerr. I think the voice that has been missing in the discussions that have gone on between the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense has been, in fact, the voice of those charged with the crisis management responsibility. We have to find a way to bring the Department of Justice into that discussion, recognizing that unlike the other two, it is not an acquisition agency, it is not an R&D agency. Yet it is, in fact, desperately dependent on what can be produced by those who do it so well. And we have to get that coupling not just at the working level, which is the TSWG, but at the policy level where people like the DOE and DOD Under Secretaries have an effective relationship today. Mr. Shays. Dr. Stoutland, who do you think it should be? Mr. Stoutland. I am sorry. Who should coordinate this? Mr. Shays. Yes. Mr. Stoutland. I think it needs to be led at the level that it is being led at, that is the President's coordinator for counterterrorism, Richard Clark. Mr. Shays. And let me just say I realize that Mr. Clark is working hard, but chooses to have a low profile. He is not looking to be called the terrorist czar, but it may make sense for our committee to ask him this same question and really get a sense of how he weighs in on this. This is a question that I would love answered ultimately, and it is too serious a question and too important a question not to feel certain about it. But I just think this is a very telling conversation, in a way, because you are all kind of wrestling with it, but nothing comes quickly to mind. Mr. Stoutland. Well, that is right, and what I won't do is suggest maybe a particular mechanism that would solve all of our problems because if we knew that, obviously we would be more than willing to put it forward. Mr. Shays. And I realize that you all work for bosses who may have a different opinion. Mr. Stoutland. I think what this is more telling of is the complexity of this problem. We have presently got a number of coordinating groups, some of which are quite effective. I think the Counterproliferation Review Committee is an effective group, but focused not on the domestic problem. I think the Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness R&D Subgroup is also an effective group which builds upon the CPRC. But I think ultimately the fundamental challenge and one that we have not grappled with as well as we could have is trying to figure out how to make the lash-up between those organizations with scientific and technical capabilities, represented to the most extent here by DOE and DOD, with those organizations with operational responsibility, which would include the FBI as well as State and local responders. That is hard thing to do. I think we are working toward it and we are making progress, but we are going to continue to struggle with that. Mr. Shays. This is a nice lead-in to what I will see on Friday and Monday when we have our hearing. We are going to be seeing how the fire departments and the police departments all interact in this effort to deal with a terrorist threat. What is helpful for me is to know that if I were on the outside looking in and saying, well, the Technical Support Working Group, there is someone in charge and they should be doing that, I think there is consensus that it is not that organization that I should be looking at. So this is something the committee will do, and I think we will have further dialog. I am prepared to close the hearing, but as is my practice, I am very happy to have you make any closing comments, if there is any question that we should have asked that you were primed to answer or just feel you need to answer. Is there anything? [No response.] Mr. Shays. Well, I thank you very much. I think we are all hungry, and you were a wonderful panel. Thank you for your patience. [Whereupon, at 1:42 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]