[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PRELUDE TO NEW DIRECTIONS IN UNITED STATES-VIETNAM RELATIONS: THE 2000
BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEES ON
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
and
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE
of the
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 19, 2000
__________
Serial No. 106-182
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/
international--relations
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
69-535 CC WASHINGTON : 2001
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DANA ROHRABACHER, California CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California PAT DANNER, Missouri
PETER T. KING, New York EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
Carolina STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
MATT SALMON, Arizona JIM DAVIS, Florida
AMO HOUGHTON, New York EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
TOM CAMPBELL, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
KEVIN BRADY, Texas BARBARA LEE, California
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California [VACANCY]
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
(ii)
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Chairman
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
PETER T. KING, New York ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South Samoa
Carolina SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
MATT SALMON, Arizona ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
PAUL GILLMOR, Ohio GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois ALCEE HASTINGS, Florida
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California [VACANCY]
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
Michael P. Ennis, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dr. Robert King, Democratic Professional Staff Member
Matt Reynolds, Counsel
Alicia A. O'Donnell, Staff Associate
______
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio PAT DANNER, Missouri
KEVIN BRADY, Texas EARL HILLIARD, Alabama
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
DANA ROHRABACHER, California JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
TOM CAMPBELL, California JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
Mauricio Tamargo, Subcommittee Staff Director
Sean Carroll, Democratic Professional Staff Member
Yleem Poblete, Professional Staff Member
Victor Maldonado, Staff Associate
(iii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
WITNESSES
Page
Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, U.S. Trade Representative........ 5
The Honorable Stanley O. Roth, Assistant Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State.................. 15
The Honorable Timothy J. Hauser, Deputy Under Secretary for
International Trade, U.S. Department of Commerce............... 17
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
Hon. Doug Bereuter, a Representative in Congress from Nebraska,
and Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific............. 30
Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from
Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy and Trade............................................... 33
The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from
California..................................................... 36
Hon. Charlene Barshefsky......................................... 39
Hon. Stanley O. Roth............................................. 47
Hon. Timothy J. Hauser........................................... 53
Additional material submitted for the record:
Answers to questions for the record by Hon. Doug Bereuter........ 57
Articles submitted for the record by Hon. Dana Rohrabacher....... 59
PRELUDE TO NEW DIRECTIONS IN UNITED STATES-VIETNAM RELATIONS: THE 2000
BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2000
House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Asia and
the Pacific, joint with the Subcommittee on
International Economic Policy and Trade,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 1:36 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Bereuter
(Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific)
presiding.
Mr. Bereuter. The joint Subcommittee hearing will come to
order. The Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific and the
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade meet
jointly today to examine the current and future state of United
States-Vietnam relations in the context of a new bilateral
trade agreement [BTA] signed by Washington and Hanoi on July
13, 2000.
After taking nearly 5 years of frustrating and difficult
negotiations--and the difficulties are on the other side--I
think the new bilateral trade agreement represents an important
milestone in the process of normalizing incrementally our
bilateral political, economic, humanitarian, and consular
relationships with Vietnam.
Focusing for a moment on the economic relationship, this
evolving process began in 1994 with the lifting of the Vietnam
War-era trade embargo and the establishment of Ambassadorial-
level diplomatic relations the following year. Further
incremental steps such as allowing for the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation [OPIC] and the U.S. Export-Import Bank
to support American businesses exporting to or operating in
Vietnam were taken as the President granted Vietnam a waiver
from the requirements of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. The
Congress, in general, has supported this waiver by increasingly
large margins each of the last 3 years.
The new BTA represents another step which will be followed
by President Clinton's trip to Vietnam following the APEC
summit in November. I believe that this incremental policy and
the new BTA is in America's own short-term and long-term
national interests. It is a flexible policy allowing us to take
advantage of new opportunities such as those in the trade arena
now available with the BTA, while at the same time preserving
our leverage to help influence change in the most problematic
facets of our relationship, such as human rights. Indeed, I
believe our incremental approach also builds on Vietnam's own
policy of political and economic reintegration into the world.
The Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific has held a number
of hearings on Vietnam in recent years, conducting both broad
reviews of the general direction of United States-Vietnam
bilateral relations and more defined examinations of specific
issues such as the fullest possible accounting of American POW-
MIAs, the plight of Vietnamese boat people and the failure of
Vietnam to meet its human rights obligations. Today's hearing
is the first that focuses primarily on bilateral economic
relations; however, it certainly does not do so at the
exclusion of these other important issues. Clearly United
States-Vietnamese trade relations cannot be viewed as if in a
vacuum.
At this time, the BTA has yet to be transmitted to
Congress. I certainly welcome any insights our U.S. Trade
Representative Ambassador Barshefsky may have on when we should
expect to see that transmittal. With adjournment hopefully just
a few weeks away, there is not time this year for Congress to
consider and approve the BTA, a prerequisite for the
agreement's actual implementation. Thus I envision today's
hearing as an early opportunity to begin the process of
congressional consideration of such a BTA.
Before Congress will approve the significant step forward
in relations, there will be many questions for the
Administration to answer satisfactorily. For example, is the
BTA a prelude to new directions in United States-Vietnam
relations? What actual benefits can the United States generally
and the American business interests specifically expect from
the BTA? Does approval of the BTA enhance or serve to postpone
needed progress in other noneconomic concerns such as POW-MIA
accounting, human rights, emigration, and political reforms?
To help our two Subcommittees answer these and many other
important questions, including those pertaining to the
President's Vietnam trip, we are very fortunate to have with us
today a truly outstanding panel of high-level and distinguished
Administration witnesses. The first panel will consist of
Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, the U.S. Trade Representative.
While the BTA is the result of hard work from many different
agencies, of course, it is the USTR that has provided the
yeoman's service in the negotiations with the Vietnamese as was
the case with the bilateral market access agreement for China's
accession to the WTO.
Ambassador Barshefsky, it certainly was a great pleasure to
work with you on the China PNTR issue, and I understand that in
a hour or 2, the Senate will be voting on final passage of H.R.
4444 as passed by the House, and, in my judgment, thankfully
unamended by the Senate. In that regard, I appreciate that you
have responsibilities associated with the vote and are limited
in the time that you can spend with us. That is why you
constitute the first panel. And I will introduce the other two
distinguished witnesses shortly after your testimony and
questions from the panel. But in order to conserve this time
before you must leave, I want to come back to that later.
And I would like now to turn to the Chairwoman of the
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, the
very distinguished gentlewoman from Florida, Representative
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, for any introductory comments that she may
have, and then I will turn to the distinguished Ranking Members
of the two Subcommittees. I turn to the gentlelady for such
time as she may consume.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bereuter appears in the
appendix.]
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I thank my colleague in Nebraska, my good
friend Mr. Bereuter, for the opportunity to co-chair this
hearing with him. I welcome the opportunity to listen to some
of our witnesses. And while the witnesses appearing before us
today may be of like mind in their approach to United States-
Vietnam relations, there are vast differences among the Chairs
of the two Subcommittees regarding the viability and wisdom of
trading with a Communist regime such as Vietnam.
In fact, some of us view Vietnam as a classic example of
what happens when economic engagement begins without first
requiring fundamental, concrete changes in government and civil
society. The result? A sprinkling of limited economic reforms
to mask the strengthening of Communist totalitarian regimes.
In Vietnam such entrenchment was clearly demonstrated in
1999 with the passage of a resolution which stated that,
``Party committees should strictly criticize and punish those
party members who, after being assisted by the party
organization, keep disseminating their own opinion or
distributing documents contrary to the platform, statutes or
resolutions of the party.''
In August of this year, a report for the Vietnamese
Communist Party's Congress was drafted making reference to the
so-called process of reform started 15 years ago. However, that
same document reiterated that, ``During the process of reform,
it is essential to persist with the goal of socialism based on
Marxist-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh ideology.'' This coincides
with the April 1992 Vietnamese Constitution reaffirming the
role of the Communist Party as the leading force of the state
and society.
Article 4 of the Vietnamese Constitution enables the
security apparatus to enforce an extralegal administrative
decree against any dissidents under the pretext of
``endangering national security.''
The Vietnamese Government continues to systematically
violate the human rights, civil liberties, and religious
freedom of its people. It utilizes a maze of laws, decrees, and
regulations to prohibit religious worship and to justify the
arbitrary arrest, detention, harassment, physical abuse, and
censorship of those seeking to exert their religious liberty
and the right to free association.
The Vietnamese regime is among the ``totalitarian or
authoritarian regimes'' specifically rebuked by the State
Department for its religious restrictions. The intense
governmental suppression and control came under scrutiny and
harsh criticism when the Annual Report on International
Religious Freedom was released earlier this month. However,
these denunciations fell on deaf ears as the Vietnamese
Government had already been rewarded in August with the signing
of the bilateral trade agreement.
Despite the trade agreement, the Supreme Patriarch of the
Unified Church of Vietnam is still being detained without trial
under pagoda arrest. Members of the Hoa Hoa sect of Buddhism
have been subjected to police surveillance and remain in jail.
Members of the Cao Dai religion have had their church property
confiscated. Protestants are still being suppressed through
police raids, surveillance, and negative propaganda.
Even foreign investors in June of this year questioned the
``fanfare and hype'' of communist Vietnam's reform process and
issued complaints about overregulation, inconsistent
application of laws, discriminatory pricing, and government
bureaucracy. Timothy Reinhold, head of the legal working group
for the private sector forum at which these concerns were
raised, said, ``It prompts one to ask the question whether
those currently directing policy really want foreign
participation in the development of the country.'' Further,
newspaper reports cited Vietnam's Minister of Planning and
Investment as ``generally unsympathetic to investor
complaints.''
Vietnam is still one of the most repressive countries in
the world, which, in turn, keeps it as one of the poorest with
an average annual per capita income of $330.
The most recent Index of Economic Freedom published by
Heritage Foundation lists Vietnam 148, out of 161 nations, in
lack of economic freedom. This marks a decrease from the 1995
rating. That is, Vietnam's economy is considered to be less
open today than it was 5 years ago.
Despite these realities, the single most powerful reason
for demanding much more from Vietnam before affording it the
enviable position of United States trading partner and
preferential trade status, is the yet unresolved issue of
American POWs and MIAs.
During my investigation into the torture of American POWs
in Vietnam by Cuban agents at a camp known as ``The Zoo,'' I
asked Ambassador Pete Peterson and other U.S. Government
officials to secure specific information and materials from the
Vietnamese authorities. The response from the Vietnamese
clearly depicts the unreliable, duplicitous nature of Vietnam's
Communist regime. The statement read: ``The evading war of the
Americans in Vietnam had caused a great damage in human lives
and property to the people of Vietnam. However, with a policy
of clemency and humanity, Vietnam treated the American POWs in
due form. There were absolutely no cases in which American POWs
in Vietnam were tortured.''
Is this the type of regime the United States should reward?
Is this a reliable trading partner? An ally? I hope the
witnesses who will testify today will address these issues
along with the other concerns raised by my colleagues on the
Subcommittees, and I thank Mr. Bereuter for the opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ros-Lehtinen appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Bereuter. I thank the Chairwoman, and I turn to the
distinguished gentleman from California, the Ranking Member of
the Asia and Pacific Subcommittee, for such time as he may
consume in his opening statement.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am anxious
to hear Ambassador Barshefsky, so I will be extremely brief.
Vietnam represents an obviously unique case in our foreign
relations and in our trade relations. This is really an issue
where many of us have a great deal of ambivalence. On the one
hand, I fully share the views of my good friend from Florida,
who outlined in great detail the human rights violations which
are persisting in Vietnam and for which there is no excuse. Yet
I think it would be a mistake not to recognize that the United
States has a major responsibility in normalizing relations with
Vietnam.
I fully share the views of my two distinguished colleagues
in the other body, John Kerry and John McCain, who have
supported the normalization of relations, and who, I believe,
are in support of this legislation, as is our good friend and
former colleague with considerable Vietnam experience,
Ambassador Pete Peterson.
I commend President Clinton for his forthcoming plan to
visit Vietnam, and I look forward to Ambassador Barshefsky's
testimony.
Mr. Bereuter. In order to save time, we are going to move
directly to the statement by Ambassador Barshefsky. Your entire
written statement will be made a part of the record. You may
proceed as you wish. We look to at least a small opportunity to
have questions before you have to leave. But we will have your
full statement at this point.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to
insert my opening statement for the record as well as the
inserts of several publication articles that I had for the
opening statement.
Mr. Bereuter. Certainly, without objection, we will extend
that to all Members at this point.
[The prepared statement and articles of Mr. Rohrabacher
appear in the appendix.]
Ambassador Barshefsky.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. CHARLENE BARSHEFSKY, U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE
Ambassador Barshefsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Madam
Chairman, Members of the Subcommittees. Thank you very much for
inviting me here today to testify on our bilateral commercial
agreement with Vietnam.
The landmark trade agreement entered with Vietnam in July
of this year is most fundamentally an economic agreement which
opens markets to American goods, services and agriculture and
promotes economic reform and great opening to the world in
Vietnam.
It also represents a decisive stage in the process of
reconciliation with Vietnam. With the approval of this
agreement, we begin a fully normalized economic and trade
relationship, capping a series of decisions made over the past
decade which have been difficult and emotional at times in both
countries, but which have served Americans and Vietnamese
together.
Throughout this period, as the Clinton Administration has
approached America's relationship with Indochina, we have set
as our first priority a full accounting for American service
personnel listed as missing in action or who were POWs. As
Ambassador Pete Peterson has noted, this work is proceeding
with full cooperation with Vietnam through joint field
activities and review of material evidence. With this
continuing, we have also worked toward normalized trade between
the United States and the three nations of Indochina, beginning
with the end of the trade embargoes and continuing through the
conclusion of formal bilateral trade agreements with Cambodia,
Laos, and now Vietnam. This we believe serves America's broad
interests in the Pacific.
The integration of Indochina into ASEAN and the larger
Pacific economy contributes to the cohesion and economic health
of Southeast Asia, which is in turn of great importance to
peace and stability in Asia more generally. Our developing
trade relationship with Vietnam helps us achieve this basic
goal as it also creates substantial new opportunities for
American businesses, farmers, workers, and for Vietnamese as
well.
Our trade and investment relationship with Vietnam today,
however, remains hampered by two major features. First, as a
country covered by the Jackson-Vanik amendment, Vietnam remains
only one of six in the world that lacks NTR status. As a
result, Vietnamese products face tariffs approximately 10 times
higher than those of virtually all other trading partners.
Second, economic reform within Vietnam has progressed
slowly, particularly in recent years, owing to the Asian
financial crisis, weakening the economy's overall potential and
creating obstacles for American exporters.
The United States-Vietnam trade agreement addresses both of
these issues. It marks a major shift of economic policy
direction for Vietnam, setting a course for greater openness to
the outside world, promoting internal reform and market
principles, transparency in law and regulatory policy, and
helping Vietnam to integrate itself into the Pacific regional
economy and build a foundation for future entry into the World
Trade Organization.
The agreement itself includes six chapters: Goods,
including agricultural goods; intellectual property; services;
investment; business facilitation; and transparency. To
highlight a few specifics, in goods trade Vietnam will cut
tariffs by a third to a half across a wide range of high-tech
goods, farm products, and industrial goods. Vietnam will also
abolish nontariff restrictions such as quotas, eliminate
discretionary import licensing, and, for the first time,
guaranteed trading rights for both Americans and Vietnamese
over a phased-in schedule.
With respect to intellectual property, Vietnam will
implement WTO-level standards of protection within 1 year for
patents and trademarks and within 18 months for copyright and
trade secrets. Vietnam will also take certain additional steps
in newer areas such as the protection of satellite signals.
As to services, Vietnam will liberalize a broad range of
service sectors opening for the first time opportunity for
American firms to compete in basic telecommunications services,
value-added telecom such as Internet services, banking,
insurance, and other financial services; the professions
including legal services, architecture, engineering and others;
and a range of other sectors from audiovisual to health,
distribution to private education and more.
With respect to investment, Vietnam will make commitments
that include the phasing out of such measures as local content
and export performance requirements; the abolition of almost
all investment screening, discriminatory pricing; and
protection against expropriation.
As to business facilitation, Vietnam will guarantee the
right to conduct routine but essential practices such as
setting up offices, advertising, and so on.
Finally, Vietnam will make an extensive set of commitments
to transparency. In sharp contrast to past practice, Vietnam
will reform its administrative policies. It will now provide
advance notice of all laws, regulations and administrative
procedures relating to any matter covered by the agreement. It
will now publish all laws and regulations and inform the public
of the effective dates and government contact points, and
Vietnam will establish appeals processes.
All together, the agreement addresses many of the principal
concerns of Americans seeking to export to or invest in Vietnam
and spur a deepening acceleration of economic reform within the
Vietnamese economy. Over time that should help create
sustainable growth and greater opportunity for the Vietnamese
people.
The agreement is an economic achievement that will have
shared and substantial benefits. It will also have beneficial
political consequences, contributing to the development of a
more unified and stable Southeast Asia as it integrates Vietnam
once again into the broader world of Asian-Pacific trade and
investment. And it is an agreement with historic meaning for
the United States. When Congress approves this agreement with a
granting of annual normal trade relations, we will take the
critical step in developing a relationship with Vietnam that
looks to the future rather than the past, and we will do so in
a fashion in which I believe everyone who remembers the era of
the Vietnam War can take pride, both cementing peace and
reconciliation between the two governments and advancing reform
and freedom for the Vietnamese people.
In that regard, I would point to a recent statement made by
Vietnam's leading independent--leading and most visible
dissenter Dr. Que, and he said, `` Opening the country
economically will increase the people's power to make their own
economic decisions. Integrating into the global economy and
increasing contact with developing countries will increase the
people's awareness of what it means to be modern. The sooner
the trade agreement is ratified and put into effect, the
better.''
We look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, Members
of the Subcommittees, to developing a consensus for the best
way to secure rapid approval of the agreement. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Barshefsky appears in
the appendix.]
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you very much.
We have only 15 minutes remaining, and I want to hear from
all Members. I would ask unanimous consent that the normal 5-
minute rule be changed to 3 minutes so that all Members may be
heard. Is there objection? Without objection, that will be the
order.
I have one question that relates to the difference between
the 1999 agreement in principle and the final agreement July
13, 2000, Ambassador. I will submit other questions in writing
in order to save time.
Ambassador Barshefsky. Fine, thank you.
[The additional questions appear in the appendix.]
Mr. Bereuter. The gentleman from California, Mr. Lantos, is
recognized under a 3-minute rule.
Mr. Lantos. I was listening very carefully to your usual
concise and impressive presentation, but I did not hear any
response on your part to Ms. Ros-Lehtinen's catalog of human
rights abuses. Now, we have had a long-standing dialogue of the
deaf ones, ``dialogue des sourdes'' as the French call it,
between the Administration and those of us who feel that human
rights criteria should receive a far more important level of
consideration than, in fact, they have.
Would you mind, Ambassador Barshefsky, dealing with the
issues raised by my friend from Florida? Because while some of
us are conscious of the fact that we have a very heavy
responsibility vis-a-vis Vietnam for obvious historic reasons,
we will not stand by as the human rights abuses are swept under
the rug and the truly outrageous persecution of religious
groups and others continues.
Ambassador Barshefsky. I think you will hear more about
this from the panel that follows me, but if I could make a few
points.
I do not disagree with the characterizations made by the
Chairwoman with respect to the Vietnamese regime or with
respect to substantial concerns about human rights, religious
freedom and the like in Vietnam. These are quite amply
documented in the State Department human rights report and in
other materials, including from the United Nations. And I
certainly have no basis to disagree with them, nor would I
attempt to do so.
The question presented is how do we best change the
mentality among the governing body in Vietnam as to the
expected conduct with respect to human rights as to
international norms and the vast importance of Vietnam meeting
those norms with respect to human rights, worker rights, and
with respect to issues surrounding human dignity.
The quote I read to you from Dr. Que speaks to one approach
to that question, and it is the approach generally that the
Administration has followed in the case of China and now wishes
to follow in the case of Vietnam.
Mr. Lantos. If I may stop you, since you raised China,
which I was trying hard to avoid----
Ambassador Barshefsky. I know.
Mr. Lantos. The Administration policy has been a total
failure with respect to China on the human rights issue. As a
matter of fact, the Administration's own documents, both the
religious document, the human rights document, underscores
quite accurately the deterioration of the human rights
situation in China.
So if what we can look forward to vis-a-vis Vietnam is a
repetition of the China pattern, that would raise very serious
questions in the minds of many of us with respect to our
ability to support this legislation.
Ambassador Barshefsky. If I may say in connection with both
countries, because I think it is probably hard to avoid the
comparisons, I would prefer to answer it straight on. The
question is how one builds internal momentum and a larger
internal dynamic for reform in a country. We know from
experience it is very difficult to change countries from the
outside if there is not inside the country a critical mass of
reformers in order to speed the process, indeed to generate the
process, of reform. Integration into the global community is
the way in which this Administration has decided to approach
that problem.
It comports in the case of China with the views of such
respected dissidents as Martin Lee and Bao Tung and Dai Ching
and any one of a number on the ground in China who believe that
integration into the global community will further the process
of internal reform, such as Dr. Que has indicated similar views
in Vietnam. We believe that this is really the best way to
approach the problem. Isolation, whether of China or Vietnam,
tends to increase repression, tends to decrease the
accountability----
Mr. Lantos. I know my time is up, but since you have used
the world ``isolationism,'' I have to respond to that. Those of
us who disagree with the Administration's policy are not
recommending either isolating China or isolating Vietnam, but
of using our enormous leverage to improve the human rights
condition.
Mr. Bereuter. I thank the gentleman. And I thank the
gentlewoman, the Ambassador, for her response. This is of major
interest to everyone of us, so if you wish to extend your
remarks in written form, it certainly would be most welcome.
Ambassador Barshefsky. Thank you very much.
Mr. Bereuter. I would like to call on the gentleman from
California, if he has questions under the 3-minute rule.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes. I associate myself with Mr. Lantos,
especially with his last observation, that with this
Administration every time that we insist that there be some
consideration of human rights given to various trade issues
with dictatorships and tyrants, we always are thrown back with
it is either isolation or, you know, some sort of engagement
that does not include human rights. I resent that, and I think
that Mr. Lantos put that very well..
Under the agreement that you are proposing today, or that
we have negotiated with Vietnam, will the tariffs be the same
on our products going in as their products coming here?
Ambassador Barshefsky. No. Our tariffs are among the
world's lowest, so our tariffs will be lower than their
tariffs.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Substantially lower than their tariffs?
Ambassador Barshefsky. Likely so, but that is the case with
respect to our relations with much of Europe as well.
Mr. Rohrabacher. OK. You are saying with this dictatorship,
we are going to really influence them to go in the right
direction by letting them ship in their goods to our country
with a dramatically lower tariff than they are permitting our
goods to flow into their country. I think people look at us as
being rather stupid for making such an agreement.
Ambassador Barshefsky. If I can make a comment on the
question of human rights, we have had a substantial human
rights dialogue with Vietnam for the past 8 years.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Ma'am, I can't let you go on with my time.
I only have 3 minutes. You want to put a statement about that
in the record, that is fine.
Let me ask a little bit about will it still be illegal
under the new agreement for anyone in the Vietnamese Government
to release economic information? That now is a criminal offense
in Vietnam.
Ambassador Barshefsky. That I would have to get back to you
on. I don't know the answer.
Answer: We are not aware of a statute in Vietnam that makes
it a criminal offense to release economic information.
Regardless, this agreement addresses this issue by obligating
Vietnam to ``provide nationals and companies of the other Party
(i.e., the United States) with access to data on the national
economy and individual sectors, including information on
foreign trade.'' (Chapter VI--Transparency Related Provisions
and Right of Appeal, Article 2)
Mr. Rohrabacher. Does this agreement include--will it
result in the fact--in some type of taxpayer subsidies in the
form of loan guarantees through Export-Import Bank or OPIC that
would be made available to this Communist dictatorship, to
businessmen who are building factories in Vietnam?
Ambassador Barshefsky. The President has waived Jackson-
Vanik, which entitles Vietnam to OPIC and Eximbank financing,
and the Congress has not overturned that decision.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right. And this agreement then sort of
puts that in cement? Make that law?
Ambassador Barshefsky. No, this agreement does not--well,
do anything until Congress approves it.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Correct. But it will make that a part of
the law permanently.
Ambassador Barshefsky. It will make sure that those remain
available.
Mr. Rohrabacher. OK. Let's see. We will end up with a
Communist dictatorship and give them the right to export into
our country at lower tariffs than they will permit our products
to go into their country, plus we are going to subsidize
American businessmen to set up factories in their country with
taxpayer money. I don't think that the Communist dictators are
going to miss the message about that at all. They are probably
going to think that we are a bunch of saps, and I do, too.
Mr. Bereuter. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Florida Mr. Davis is recognized.
Mr. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Ambassador
Barshefsky. Could you elaborate a little bit on what you see as
the condition of the rule of law today in Vietnam and how you
see that being influenced by this trade agreement once it is
ultimately approved by Congress?
Ambassador Barshefsky. The condition of the rule of law is
very weak; the arbitrary exercise of government power,
unfettered bureaucratic discretion, a nontransparent trade and
economic regime, an economic regime, indeed, which is in need
of substantial restructuring.
Under this agreement, Vietnam will have to make transparent
a number of things it has never made transparent before; for
example, laws and regulations, advance notice of laws, the
uniform application of the trade regime. These things are very
basic to us, but do not exist today in Vietnam.
We need to build legal institutions in Vietnam. This is a
very long-term prospect. And we need to expect Vietnam to
adhere to the kinds of commitments it has made with respect to
transparency and the initial rule of law issues to which it has
committed in the agreement.
This will require substantial technical assistance. We are
working now with USAID, which will assist Vietnam in technical
terms in implementing the commitments including with respect to
transparency and the rule of law-related issues. But the
creation of a rule of law in Vietnam is going to take a number
of years.
Mr. Davis. Could you talk about what you think will be the
major issues we need to be bird-dogging as we oversee
implementation of the trade agreement?
Ambassador Barshefsky. I think we will have to pay close
attention to the entirety of the agreement. Vietnam has never
entered into an agreement of this comprehensive nature before
with any country in the world, Communist or non-Communist. This
agreement will be new to them. Of course, the NTR that would be
granted by Congress when it approves the agreement is annual
only, and this will give the Congress the ability to review
Vietnam's implementation step by step. The agreement itself is
also subject to renewal after 3 years. That is to say, the
agreement expires in 3 years until it is affirmatively renewed.
That will also provide us very positive opportunities to assess
implementation.
Mr. Davis. OK. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Barshefsky. Thank you.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you very much, Ambassador. I appreciate
your remarks about the two latter points.
Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen is waiving temporarily her time for
questioning, and we will move to Mr. Royce, the gentleman from
California.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you,
Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank our witnesses for this
critical hearing.
Ambassador Barshefsky, before getting to the agreement with
Vietnam, I would like to briefly discuss the Africa trade bill,
because within the next few weeks there are some decisions to
be made. The bill is now law, and, of course, it means a great
deal to Africa. And, Ambassador, this legislation was written
in a way that gives trade benefits to those African countries
that are reforming their economies to be good trade investment
partners with us.
The Administration is charged, in consultation with
Congress, with determining which countries are making this
progress, and that is the same type of progress we are pushing
for in Vietnam. And I have written you expressing my concerns,
and now I would like to raise one country in particular, and
that is Zimbabwe.
Many of us have sadly followed Zimbabwe's implosion as the
government of President Mugabe has made war on its economy,
launching a systematic attack on the property rights of a wide
array of Zimbabweans. And today in the Washington Times there
is an account by a commercial farmer who is leaving her land,
having seen it looted and illegally taken over. And she writes,
``Commercial agriculture in Zimbabwe seems to be drawing to a
close.'' This is very true. The farms are all closing. ``And
this will be devastating to the country including its food
security.'' Maybe our influence is limited, but I know that
now, now is certainly not the time to be validating this
economic destruction by qualifying the country for the African
Growth and Opportunity Act. And that is more of a statement
than a question, but I welcome any response.
My other question concerns the trade agreement with Vietnam
that we are looking at, and I wanted to ask there, what areas
do you expect Hanoi to have the most difficulty with
politically and logistically in implementing? Do you expect to
see trouble from Hanoi in some of the implementation process?
Thank you, Ambassador.
Ambassador Barshefsky. Congressman, I do not have any
specific comment to make about Zimbabwe. The interagency team
on AGOA eligibility is meeting even as we speak. Final
decisions on countries have not yet been made. And, of course,
we merely provide the President with recommendations, and
ultimately he will make decisions as to eligibility.
Certainly I am pleased to directly look into the question
of Zimbabwe and get back to you on that.
Mr. Royce. I appreciate that, because my concern was that
it would be in consultation with Congress, and I very much
appreciate you doing so.
Ambassador Barshefsky. I understand that. Absolutely.
[The information was not provided.]
With respect to difficulties Hanoi may have, as I said to
Congressman Davis, I think we are going to have to watch
implementation overall very, very carefully. I think it is to
be expected, particularly in a Communist country, that
liberalization related to information technologies, for
example, telecom or the Internet, which this agreement also
covers, are areas of the agreement that will have to be very,
very carefully monitored and scrutinized. To be sure, Vietnam
has several, for example, cybercafes, but we are talking about
quite a bit broader liberalization than that in the agreement.
But in general I would say we are going to have to watch
implementation very, very closely. Annual congressional review
will be of great, great importance in that regard. The 3-year
review of the agreement will be of great importance in that
regard.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you. The time of the gentleman has
expired.
The gentleman from North Dakota Mr. Pomeroy is recognized.
Mr. Pomeroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
congratulate you for your legislative victory in the House this
morning passing the overseas cooperative bill, which encourages
the use of co-ops in expanding overseas development activities.
Mr. Bereuter. And I thank you for being an original
cosponsor.
Mr. Pomeroy. My pleasure. That is a good bill, and I am
hoping that is going to make it this session yet.
Ms. Barshefsky, it is go good to see you again. My brother
the summer before last participated in a U.S. Commerce
Department training session for insurance regulators in
Vietnam. He serves presently as the insurance commissioner in
North Dakota. He came back quite enthused about the potential
for the services market there when we get a fair shot at that
market. Would you have a comment on that?
Ambassador Barshefsky. I think he is absolutely right to be
enthused. The services markets in Vietnam are grossly
underdeveloped and underfunded. There is a lack not only of
capital, there is a lack of expertise. There is a lack of
information and know-how with respect, for example, to what a
modern financial instrument looks like or what modern insurance
looks like. So there is very substantial, substantial
opportunities.
Mr. Pomeroy. With this session winding down, this may be my
last chance to publicly commend you in a hearing setting for
the job you have done as our trade representative. You have
been a tenacious advocate, and the howls from some of our trade
competitors of the concessions you have wrought at the table I
think shows third-party validation of your effectiveness.
I would be remiss in this last exchange potentially with
you not to mention the North Dakota Wheat Commission 301
petition filed with you on September 8. Just a little
background. Congressman Nethercutt, myself, many others, both
parties, have urged that the petition be acted upon and an
investigation launched. Commission 301, as you know, was
designed to combat unjustifiable, unreasonable, and
discriminatory acts, and, in that petition, we outline to the
extent we can pull together anecdotal evidence that says
precisely what is occurring.
Of course, the backdrop of this is very severely depressed
markets and horrible grain prices, and we do not think as we go
up against the Canadian Wheat Board that the trade competition
has been fairly conducted.
We think that an investigation to the full extent of the
Canadian Wheat Board's discriminatory pricing activities is
required. I would remind you of their adamant refusal to allow
the full audit that you and I have urged over the last 2 years.
Like I always say, if they do not have anything to hide, why
are they so adamantly opposed to the audit? The investigation
would allow us to unilaterally proceed to give the Canadian
Wheat Board the look that it deserves. I hope with your help we
can take a strong stand against these unfair trade practices
and support our farmers and move forward to launch the
investigation.
Do you have a comment as to the status of the
Administration's review at this time?
Ambassador Barshefsky. Once a 301 case is filed, it goes to
an interagency group which looks at the allegations, and which
gives counsel and the petitioners an opportunity to appear
before the interagency group to discuss the case. The
interagency group will make a recommendation to me as to the
disposition of the case, that is whether we initiate it or not,
by mid-October, and I then need to make a decision by October
23.
Certainly we are very familiar with the activities of the
Canadian Wheat Board. You and I have discussed many, many times
our mutual frustration at the secrecy surrounding Wheat Board
transactions and the fact that state trading in this sector
produces extremely negative consequences for our producers.
I look forward to receiving the interagency recommendation
and am certainly delighted to speak with you about it as well.
Mr. Pomeroy. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Barshefsky. Thank you.
Mr. Bereuter. Mr. Pomeroy, I join you in your commendations
for the public service that Ambassador Barshefsky has rendered
and her tenaciousness as a negotiator, and, like you, I just
handed her a letter about nontariff barriers in the Philippines
about American meat exports. So I have your same concerns about
the Canadian Wheat Board.
The gentlewoman from Florida, the Chairlady of the IEPT
Subcommittee, is recognized.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. I will make it brief because I
know the Ambassador's time is limited. In your testimony you
refer to the commitments that Vietnam will undertake. What
commitments and steps has this country already taken and truly
adhered to that raises investor confidence in a country with a
Communist/Socialist economy? How can the U.S. investor really
feel secure about property rights, about deregulation, about
rule of law, avenues for redress?
Ambassador Barshefsky. I think U.S. investors need to
proceed with great caution and care. Vietnam was making some
important progress in the early 1990's to roughly 1995, 1996,
in terms of economic reform, at least passing some rudimentary
but important laws with respect to the operation of companies,
with respect to investment, with respect to what they call
equitization, which is privatization.
When the Asian financial crisis hit, Vietnam was severely
and negatively impacted because about two-thirds of all of its
trade and all of its investment is with the rest of Asia, and,
of course, the rest of Asia was not trading, and they were not
investing. So Vietnam experienced rapid outflow of funds and
very, very poor export performance, a slowed economy, and that
then slowed the reform effort, the passage of laws and so on.
There is much to be done in Vietnam. It is a country in
which an American businessperson would be advised to proceed
slowly and very, very cautiously.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Thank you Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, and I thank all of the Members.
Ambassador Barshefsky, thank you very much for your testimony.
You will be pleased but not surprised to know that the wheels
of the Senate debate are grinding more slowly than projected,
so you will be in time.
Ambassador Barshefsky. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mr. Bereuter. I would like now to call the second panel of
distinguished witnesses from the Department of State and the
Department of Commerce. Representing the Department of State is
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Mr. Stanley Roth. Mr. Roth is a valued and frequent
witness before the Subcommittee and has focused on United
States-Vietnam relations in many years in many capacities in
the State Department, the Pentagon, the private sector, the NGO
community, and here on the Subcommittee itself.
Representing the Department of Commerce is Deputy Under
Secretary of Commerce for International Trade Timothy Hauser.
Mr. Hauser is a 21-year employee of the Department, who serves
as Chief Operating Officer of the International Trade
Administration [ITA]. He oversees the day-to-day operation of
the ITA and its trade promotion, trade policy, and trade law
enforcement activities. He is the right person to have here
today.
Gentlemen, as is consistent with our policy, your entire
written statements will be made a part of the record. You may
proceed as you wish. I would appreciate it if you could keep
your oral comments to 10 minutes apiece.
Secretary Roth, you are recognized first.
STATEMENT OF HON. STANLEY O. ROTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Roth. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the
introduction. At some risk, I think, Madam Chairperson, as
well, at some risk I am just going to submit my written
testimony for the record without reading it, because listening
to the statements and questions that were made, I don't think
the largely historical materials that I provide in my statement
focus on the key issues here of interest to the Members.
And so instead I would really to respond to some of the
themes that have already been said.
First, I think there is a bit of disconnect between what we
are saying and a lot of what we are hearing back in terms of
what is a bilateral trade agreement. The bilateral trade
agreement, if approved, does not make Vietnam an ally. It is
not an ally. No one in the Administration claims it is an ally.
A bilateral trade agreement is not a reward. A bilateral trade
agreement is a benefit to the United States and to our
exporters. It improves the terms with which we can do business
with Vietnam, access to the market. If they do not abide by it,
as Ambassador Barshefsky said, we will not renew it. There is
leverage for implementation, but it is not a gift.
In fact, it is not special, it is the basis for NTR or
normal trade relations. It is an agreement that is essential
with every country with whom we have normal trading relations,
and so it is a prelude if the Congress should decide to approve
NTR at some future point after this agreement is submitted. So
this not an unusual step or extraordinary step, it is a normal
commercial step. The significance comes from the fact that in
the Vietnamese context, given how far back they have been in
terms of their economic procedures and the access they have
provided us commercially, it will require an enormous amount of
change on their part, much more change, I should say, on theirs
than on ours. But this is not a gift or reward.
Second, it is not the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval. I
think, as Ambassador Barshefsky said, we have been very blunt
in criticizing Vietnam in those areas where we think Vietnam
should be criticized. I don't think anybody could read the
human rights report or the recent report on religious freedom
and say that we had coddled Vietnam or failed to call a spade a
spade. We did.
We do not see this vehicle as the only means of policy
toward Vietnam. We have many other tools with which we address
issues, including, for example, the human rights dialogue that
was referenced on the area of human rights.
Third, I think that we haven't really examined trends as
opposed to a snapshot. For all the concerns about Vietnam's
human rights record, and they are legitimate concerns that I
happen to share, I also strongly believe that the human rights
situation in Vietnam is considerably better than it was 10
years ago or 20 years ago, and that there have been positive
developments, even though they are not enough. If you ask me do
I agree with the characterizations that have been made, sure.
Is there freedom of speech, press assembly across the board? Of
course not. Severe problems with freedom of religion? We have
already said that.
But if you ask me to compare it with where it has been
before, if I look at dissident releases, for example, they
would not have happened in the past. If I look at the very
large religious rallies that were held over the past year,
200,000 at one, 500,000 at another, that would not have
happened in the past. As Ambassador Peterson has said,
attendance in churches is up. It is not enough. That does not
mean there is religious freedom. But there have been many
positive developments in some of these areas, and I don't think
we should have a hearing go by without acknowledging that there
has been progress in some areas. We have gotten some dissidents
out.
There now have been 60 strikes, even though the system in
Vietnam does not theoretically allow strikes, that were allowed
to take place last year. That is not enough. That is not my
idea of labor rights under international standards, but that is
a huge change from where we have been in the past.
I think you can go on and on, and I don't think I need to
belabor the point other than to say take a look at the trends.
I think I make exactly the same point with the POW-MIA
issue. I think we have made enormous progress toward obtaining
the fullest possible accounting. That does not mean that we
have gotten all of our questions answered, including the one
that you, Madam Chairwoman, have raised. We have not gotten the
answer yet. Ambassador Peterson personally put that question to
Vietnam and has not gotten a satisfactory answer, and we will
raise it again.
We are not claiming it is 100 percent every single thing
that we asked for is there, but there has been a consistent
pattern of cooperation on a wide variety of issues with
enormous progress having been made, and I think that has been
detailed at great length. I do not need to do that now.
I think, finally, we haven't taken into context what is
Vietnam's relationship with the rest of the world and how does
that relate to our issues? I think it is very important to note
that over the past few years, Vietnam has been admitted into
ASEAN. It is, in fact, the Chairperson, Chairman, this year of
ASEAN. Will be holding the annual ASEAN regional forum meeting
there. It is in APIC. It is a member, participating widely in
the Asia-Pacific area, quite different from where Vietnam
historically has been. All of our friends and allies in the
region are working with Vietnam. We partake in many
international meetings with them. I think that there is little
chance if the United States chose to try to isolate itself from
Vietnam that, in fact, any other country or any other major
country would support us, and that is where I think the
regional context plays as well.
So, overall, I guess what I am pleading for is not to say
to you that everything is terrific, that Vietnam is a model
whether of economic good governance or human rights practice.
Of course it isn't. But rather, look at how far Vietnam has
come, the successes we have had with the policy to date and
where we hope to get in the future, and that is where the BTA,
or bilateral trade agreement, fits in.
And that is the final point I want to emphasize. There is
frequently misunderstanding, whether we are talking about
China, Vietnam, or other places, when the Administration makes
the case that if this agreement goes into effect and is
enforced, that over time it will lead to an improvement in the
situation. I have many times been questioned how come the
situation in China is not better 1 year or 2 years later. I
want to be clear about what we are suggesting. We are not
suggesting that these agreements, particularly trade
agreements, are immediate mechanisms for improvements on human
rights, that it is any kind of a quid pro quo that will lead to
dramatic immediate changes.
What we are suggesting is that they set the stage for
systemic changes, that the kind of reforms that are called for
under this agreement, the kind of openness that has to take
place, the greater accountability, the greater stress on rule
of law, plus the greater exposure to the West as Vietnam trades
more, as it modernizes and sends more people to be educated, we
are suggesting that over time all of those factors will have an
impact on the political process in Vietnam.
That is not a commitment that I can codify for you and say
2 years from now there will be 20 percent less dissidents or
anything like that. What we are saying, it is a process that
should yield desired results over a period of time.
Why don't I stop there, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Roth appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Secretary Roth.
Secretary Hauser, we are pleased to hear from you now.
STATEMENT OF HON. TIMOTHY J. HAUSER, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Mr. Hauser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairperson,
Members of the Subcommittees. Thank you for the opportunity to
appear here today on behalf of the Department of Commerce.
Ambassador Barshefsky and Assistant Secretary Roth have
addressed many aspects of our evolving bilateral relationship
with Vietnam. Let me focus briefly, if I may, on three main
points about the economic and commercial aspects of this
relationship.
First point, Vietnam is changing in fundamental ways. U.S.
policy is providing both the catalyst and the framework for
this sea change. The catalyst is the promise of economic
success. The framework is the bilateral trade agreement.
I have been watching this process of change closely since
the spring of 1996 when I led the first U.S. Government trade
mission to Vietnam. More recently, just last month, Robert
Mallett, our Deputy Secretary at Commerce, experienced this
same palpable energy of change when he went to Vietnam.
Some of the changes going on are extremely visible. One
example is Vietnam's first security exchange. The Deputy
Secretary visited that exchange, which was some 8 years in the
making, just days into its operation.
Another example which I find fascinating was the fact that
he received a PowerPoint presentation from the Vice Chairman of
the People's Committee of Ho Chi Minh city of his vision of a
software city that he plans to create with the help of an
American company.
But perhaps the more significant changes are not quite as
visible as these. One example of this, and perhaps the most
telling, was our delegation's roundtable discussion last month
with young Vietnamese entrepreneurs in Ho Chi Minh City. The
participants were people who were confident in their ability to
compete in the global marketplace and who look forward to an
environment that would allow them to do so.
I would submit, Mr. Chairman, that these represent real
changes, none of which I saw 4 years ago during my initial trip
to Vietnam.
Second, I believe there is a renewed enthusiasm for
business in Vietnam. We at the Department of Commerce, as part
of our daily work, talk with a broad range of American business
executives. We have also talked extensively with Vietnamese
officials. To a person, they are extremely enthusiastic about
the signing of the bilateral trade agreement.
This renewed enthusiasm is reminiscent of some of the
initial euphoria over the lifting of the embargo and the
establishing of diplomatic relations in 1994 and 1995. I was
still seeing this enthusiasm when I was there in 1996, and we
are seeing it again today, but I think in a more grounded way.
As they were then, American companies are attracted to this new
frontier by the very attractive fundamentals of a young and
industrious population and a good base of natural resources.
Over the intervening 4 years, it is true that some of the
companies became disillusioned by the difficulty of doing
business in Vietnam. The cost of doing business there is
extremely high and government policies there at times have been
schizophrenic. The Asian financial crisis further compounded
the difficulties for all parties involved.
But I think the renewed enthusiasm we are seeing today is
fundamentally different from the high expectations of the first
wave. Our firms are taking a second, more realistic, look at
this challenging market. They have gained in-country experience
over the past 5 years which now gives them an optimistic but
realistic view of commercial opportunities in Vietnam, and the
bilateral trade agreement has addressed many of their
uncertainties.
My third point, this is not going to be an easy process,
and the Vietnamese will need our assistance. Vietnam is still
clearly a country in transition. Much work remains to be done
on the implementation of the bilateral trade agreement.
Progress will not be easy, fast, or necessarily even smooth,
but I believe it will be unstoppable.
Vietnam is now on the path toward integration into the
global economic community. Signing the BTA was a significant
step down that path, but implementation is the key to that
journey.
We at Commerce will work closely with USTR, the State
Department, and the other agencies of the executive branch and
the Congress to monitor implementation of the agreement. As
many in Congress have noted, it is important to do the hard
work of monitoring all of our trade agreements and determining
the degree to which foreign countries comply with them.
In addition to monitoring implementation, we at Commerce
will also help American companies take advantage of the
agreements's market opening opportunities through a variety of
initiatives. But we also need to help the Vietnamese make the
agreement work.
During the bilateral negotiations, our negotiators told the
Vietnamese that the United States would provide technical
assistance to help them implement the agreement. Deputy
Secretary Mallett reaffirmed this commitment during his visit
last month.
We at Commerce have already begun a range of technical
assistance initiatives in a number of disparate areas. For
example, as early as 4 years ago I signed a memorandum of
cooperation on commercial law development with the Vietnamese.
Since then, we at Commerce have provided assistance in other
areas as in insurance regulations, standards workshops,
intellectual property enforcement training, as well as
meteorological and fisheries cooperation.
To date, many of these efforts, though positive, have been
on an ad hoc basis. We need to do more. I think we need to work
together both in the Administration and with the Congress to
develop a comprehensive, targeted technical assistance program
which could be a major investment in the new relationship.
With that, Mr. Chairman, let me stop. I would be pleased to
take your questions and those of the Subcommittee Members.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hauser appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Bereuter. Under Secretary Hauser, thank you very much
for your testimony as well.
We will now proceed, of course, under the 5-minute rule as
usual.
The gentlewoman from Florida, chairwoman of the IEPT
Subcommittee, has left to meet with officials about a plane
crash involving her constituency, and we will submit questions
for her under general leave. I will start the questioning under
the 5-minute rule.
Secretary Roth, I wanted to ask your opinion or the State
Department's judgment, if there is such a judgment, whether you
think Vietnam's decision to sign the trade agreement is an
indicator that Vietnam's reformers have broken the policy
paralysis in the Politburo, or is it a sign that conservative
hard-liner efforts are simply trying to co-opt the reform
agenda?
Mr. Roth. I hope that it is the first. I view it more of an
ebb and flow, not that it is one, you know, final victory. I
think there is a struggle going on within the regime in Vietnam
between reformers and those opposed to reform and that it waxes
and wanes at various points.
We saw this in the negotiation of the agreement itself, the
fact that we thought we had the deal and then the fact that it
did not happen and then the fact that we got the deal with
concessions made that weren't available before suggest to me
that this is still being fought out within there. But now that
it is signed in writing and needs to be implemented I hope that
the impetus or the strength will go to the reformers.
Mr. Bereuter. Undoubtedly, it delayed or slowed down the
course of the negotiations.
Secretary Hauser, you have mentioned the kind of things
that you have had ongoing to try to ensure that we have better
record of implementation of the trade agreement once it is
signed, approved by Congress; and you mentioned many of these
things are really ad hoc as opposed to a comprehensive policy.
Can you tell me anything more about how you might move to a
more comprehensive policy? What the components of it would be?
Whether you need additional resources to do that? And if so--as
we did in the case of China, if so, are they available within
the Commerce Department or do they depend upon, in part, a
budget request for Department of Commerce for fiscal year 2002?
Mr. Hauser. Mr. Chairman, let me differentiate. What I
think I said was ad hoc was some of our efforts at technical
assistance, and I think we are taking positive steps across the
Administration in that regard. I know AID has made resources
available for two people to work with the Vietnamese Government
on implementation of the bilateral trade agreement. We have
ongoing efforts at technical assistance. In fact, as
Congressman Pomeroy had said, we had some of our experts from
the insurance industry over in Vietnam. In fact, we have
another team on insurance there this week. Our Commissioner of
Patents and Trademarks, Under Secretary Dickenson, I believe,
is going to be in Vietnam within another week or 10 days,
again, to bring some existing resources efforts to focus on how
we can help the Vietnamese live up to the agreement.
On the issue of implementation of the agreement, we have
asked the Congress for some assistance across the board in the
U.S. Government in the fiscal 2001 budget.
Mr. Bereuter. But not identified specifically for Vietnam?
Mr. Hauser. Vietnam, among a number of countries. We are
looking for increased resources, obviously, for key areas like
China, Japan, Europe. I think there is also a need to be
putting more resources on this particular issue as this
agreement comes forward.
Mr. Bereuter. Secretary Roth, in the past, Vietnam has
treated United States citizens of Vietnamese background
differently and more negatively than other United States
citizens. Given that increased economic and trade ties will
likely increase travel to and business dealings with Vietnam by
the part of United States citizens of Vietnamese origin, what
steps will our government take to end the kind of
discrimination that seems to exist against Vietnamese
Americans?
Mr. Roth. First, one would hope that Vietnam itself would
come to recognize and see that Vietnamese Americans are a
positive factor in terms of developing the relationship in
their own economic development.
Mr. Bereuter. They should. It is logical.
Mr. Roth. I think that over time that is likely to be the
trend.
Second, we need to continue what we are doing, which is to
press extremely hard on every single case when we find examples
of discrimination. I have spent hours in Ho Chi Mihn City, for
example, discussing consular access for Americans who have been
detained on criminal matters. I think we have to make it very
clear that there is no distinction in the minds of United
States officials between Vietnamese Americans and other
Americans. That just has to be a priority point when necessary.
We have to get our Cabinet officials to raise these cases until
they come to accept it.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
My time has expired. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Davis,
is recognized 5 minutes.
Mr. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Roth, how would you describe the current state of
affairs as far as the government's level of respect for
political and civil rights of its citizens in Vietnam?
Mr. Roth. Minimal, I guess I would have to put it. As I
mentioned before, one can't talk about a whole lot of freedom
of speech, press, assembly and the like.
At the same time, changing. That I think you see signs that
you did not see before. I have been traveling to Vietnam for
the past 20 years, and it is different in many ways. It is
inconceivable to me to see a demonstration not organized by the
government. Now you can see that there were demonstrations
outside their parliament when it meets on various issues. There
is occasional criticism, not systematic; and sometimes there is
retaliation in the press. It is usually oblique, but the press
is different than it had been before, even though it is not
nearly good enough.
There has been--in other words, it is episodic, but there
is some signs that there is a gradual loosening. But there has
been no conceptual breakthrough yet. I don't think we can say
yet that Vietnam is on the path to democracy.
Mr. Davis. How do you see the implementation of this
proposed trade agreement influencing trends in that regard?
Mr. Roth. Well, I tried to make the point before that I
think that over time--and I am not necessarily saying a very
short, immediate period of time. I think that as trade
increases, as there is more exposure with the United States and
the rest of the world, as different standards are used in terms
of commercial law, in terms of transparency, in terms of
accountability, I think all of that has to have an impact and
spillover effect into the political side of the equation in
Vietnam.
It is not a one-to-one correlation, which is why I am
trying not to be absolutely--trying to not overstate and say
that this guarantees, the BTA, that Vietnam will be a democracy
or our type of guys or our type of system in another 5 to 10
years. But I think the trends that it promotes have to be
helpful in terms of the kind of openness that we all want to
see.
Mr. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Hauser, Representative Rohrabacher raised a legitimate
point earlier and that was the net benefit strictly on the
economics to the United States of this proposed agreement. And
Ambassador Barshefsky made the point that in the case of some
exports to Vietnam currently there are no tariffs imposed by
the United States. I think that is the case with shrimp and
coffee, for example, two major export items.
Could you elaborate a little bit more on what the net
benefits are to the United States as far as the tariff
reductions both on imports and exports under the agreement?
Mr. Hauser. I think you would have to look, Congressman,
beyond just the tariff reductions. I would note that I believe
something like four-fifths of the some-250 line items that are
being reduced in the Vietnamese tariffs are for American
agricultural products, which we know are very competitive and
in search of world markets. So I think the prospects in those
sectors--and, again, I am the Department of Industry and
Services, but my colleagues at Agriculture tell me that
soybeans, soybean meal, bulk cotton, wheat, wheat flour,
livestock and a number of other agricultural products would
benefit from this market opening.
In addition to the tariff reductions in the agreement, the
provisions on service industries, for example, go a tremendous
way to meeting the concerns that we have heard from the
American business community over the years. In 1996, for
example, I met with a number of U.S. insurance companies,
American banks that at the time were able to have a branch
operating in Hanoi, and the big deal for them was to get
permission, which they were not getting, to open a branch in Ho
Chi Minh City. Those kind of restrictions on doing business in
Vietnam are eliminated in the process of the trade agreement.
There had also been very strict limitations in terms of
degree of foreign ownership of particular sectors, whether it
is issues in telecom, insurance or any of the other service
sectors. The agreement as negotiated, and if it is approved by
the Congress, will over time allow increasing American
ownership, increasing participation in these sectors.
Similarly, the business facilitation provisions, the
transparency provisions that are within the six major
categories Ambassador Barshefsky discussed are all to the
benefit of American firms seeking to do business in the market.
So it goes beyond the tariffs, Congressman.
Mr. Davis. One last question, Secretary Roth, a question
that would probably have been better directed to Ambassador
Barshefsky. As this Congress begins to more aggressively tackle
the human rights issues, the labor and environmental issues
that are invariably associated with trade, as evidenced by some
of the efforts of our Chairman here today and Congressman Levin
on the China bill, to what extent were those subjects brought
up on the discussions of the bilateral agreement here and to
what extent do you see that as being a part of Congress'
consideration when we take up Fast Track on bilateral next
year?
Mr. Roth. I really can't address the first part of the
question, since I was not part of the negotiations, did not sit
in on them and haven't read the transcripts, but I will get you
an answer for the record.
Answer: Concerned by Vietnam's poor human rights record,
this Administration has worked consistently to engage Vietnam
on these issues. For 8 years, we have pressed for improvements
through high level meetings, everyday activities by Embassy
personnel, and our annual human rights dialogue. We have
achieved some progress, although significant problems remain.
The Bilateral Trade Agreement with Vietnam should
facilitate additional progress on both human rights and labor
conditions. The Agreement grants Vietnam's citizens significant
rights to trade and distribute goods and services. Over time,
increased trade should allow Vietnamese citizens to determine
their economic destiny, leading to a broader expansion of
individual liberty. Furthermore, we are confident that
Vietnam's commitments to improve the rule of law in commercial
transactions will eventually lead to the extension of the rule
of law to other, non-commercial activities in Vietnam.
We have clearly not finished the job. We will continue to
press for progress until Vietnam meets internationally accepted
standards for human and labor rights.
Environmental issues did not figure prominently in our BTA
negotiations but they figure prominently in our bilateral
relations. The USG is working with Vietnam on revision of its
environmental law, improvements in air quality, coral reef
preservation and coral reef trade management, and watershed
management to mitigate floods. Vietnam has also agreed to
conduct joint scientific research on the epidemiological and
environmental effects of exposure to Agent Orange/dioxin. We
fully expect the BTA to bring to Vietnam the latest U.S.
technology and practices related to the environment.
On the second part of your question, I think it is quite
clear that the Administration has heard the message, not only
from the Hill but from segments of American society, that it
would like to see more attention being given, more emphasis in
some of our trade agreements on environment, human rights and
labor issues; and I think that has already surfaced as
something that the Administration would like to do in the
future as we look forward. So we know this is coming in terms
of congressional consideration.
At the same time, I think it is important, in terms of the
consideration of this particular agreement, that we not hold
Vietnam to a different standard than we have held many other
countries in their bilateral trade agreements and, in other
words, not change the rules retroactively on them. We did
negotiate an agreement, and I think we should go ahead and seek
to get it approved.
Mr. Davis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bereuter. I will advise we probably will have a second
round.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
Whereas this is likely to be Mr. Roth's last appearance
before this Subcommittee of this Congress, anyway----
Mr. Roth. No more hearings?
Mr. Rohrabacher. No more hearings--I would like to ask him
a little bit about some testimony that he gave prior to this. I
seem to remember that you had been downplaying at the last
hearing the last time we were together my warnings about the
military escalation in the South China Sea. I have submitted
for the record, Mr. Chairman, an article from a July 26 article
from the Chinese army newspaper characterizing their facilities
in the Spratly Islands as modern fortresses at sea. Mr. Roth,
would you say that your characterization of my warnings the
last time you testified before this Subcommittee are more
accurate than the Chinese characterization of their modern
fortresses at sea in the Spratly Islands?
Mr. Roth. Absolutely. I would stand by what I said. Common
sense suggests if you look at the pictures of the facilities
that they are hardly modern fortresses.
Mr. Rohrabacher. When was the last picture that you saw of
those facilities?
Mr. Roth. A couple of months. I should say----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Chairman, I would submit for the
record--do we have those pictures? We will submit for the
record those pictures, and they are modern fortresses with
helicopter landing pads and facilities for rocket launchers.
Go right ahead.
Mr. Bereuter. Without objection, they will be made a part
of the record.
[The information appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Roth. I think the interesting thing to note is, because
of the diplomatic pressure we have generated, China has now
engaged in what it said it would not do, negotiating with the
other claimants on a code of conduct; and that, I think, is
significant if we get it; and that the claimants are standing
tough and insisting on construct freeze, no new facilities,
denying Chinese fishing rights until----
Mr. Rohrabacher. As you know, up until now the Chinese have
not been willing to negotiate with the other ASEAN parties,
claiming that all of the Spratly Islands belong to them..
Mr. Roth. They are in negotiations, which is a major
accomplishment.
Mr. Rohrabacher. If indeed--we will wait and see if your
optimism is justified.
Now, in terms of Vietnam, again, for the record let me
point out that what we have heard today is that we have an
agreement that will permit the North Vietnamese or the
Vietnamese, I should say, government, that dictatorship, to
continue to have very high levels of tariffs against American
products, while our tariffs are going to be substantially
lower, perhaps very low in comparison.
Also, part of this agreement will be a subsidy to American
businessmen who want to perhaps close factories here and open
up factories in Vietnam, while our Ambassador, our trade
representative just stated that businessmen should be very
cautious, very, very cautious in doing business in Vietnam. Yet
our agreement permits Export-Import Bank, OPIC, and other U.S.
taxpayers to subsidize those businessmen in building those
factories.
That does not seem like a good deal for America to me. It
seems to me that we have a terrible trade balance with
Communist China. It seems that we are setting up the same sort
of incentives for people to build businesses over there but not
to sell U.S. products.
Mr. Roth. I am baffled by your linkage between the BTA and
these programs. It is Jackson-Vanik which gives these programs.
We have these programs already. We do not have a BTA yet, and
we have these programs already. So I think that this has
nothing to do with BTA.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right. This does not lay the foundation
for our trading relationship for Vietnam in the future. Which I
think it does, and that, I think, is what we have heard today.
One last thing about the POWs which you have characterized
as their ``cooperation.'' Ambassador Pete Peterson when he was
here a month ago changed his position, by the way, I might add,
when the floor debate was going on, said they had cooperated.
But afterwards, when he met with me, admitted that the
Vietnamese Government has not cooperated with us in providing
us the records from prisons in which our POWs were being held.
They haven't provided how much supplies or how many prisoners
were supposed to be there. They just have not.
Pete's position is, which I imagine--and I am asking you,
Mr. Roth--is that the position of the Administration is that we
do not expect the Vietnamese to provide us the records from
those prisons because it is unrealistic for us to expect them
to have those records? Or, after having demanded to see those
records for 10 years, that we still are asking for those
records?
Mr. Roth. Well, I think this is something that you may want
to pursue in more detail with DIPMIL than with me, since I
don't work on it day to day. But having seen your exchange and
heard about it from Pete, what I have been advised is that it
is the assessment of our experts that they do not have these
records, and after 25 to 30 years that they have long since
vanished.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Vanished?
Mr. Roth. It is, further, their assessment that they
probably would not contain useful information if they had them.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I think that the public will have to
determine whether we can characterize that position which you
just articulated as something less stringent than holding their
feet to the fire. You might say we are letting them off the
hook.
Mr. Roth. You can't demand production of documents that do
not exist, which is one of the problems we have had all along
is trying to figure out what does and does not exist. It is
easy to say you have to produce something, but if it isn't
there, and it is completely credible to me that it might not be
there----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, whenever something comes down to
giving them the benefit of the doubt whether those documents
exist, I guess it is better to give them the benefit of the
doubt rather than worry about some POWs that have been murdered
somewhere.
Mr. Roth. We have gotten an extraordinary amount of
documents from the Vietnamese.
Mr. Bereuter. The time of the gentleman has expired. We
will come back to the gentleman if he wishes.
I would like to return under the 5-minute rule for a second
round.
Secretary Hauser, if the BTA enters into force, which
sectors do you think will benefit the most? That is my first
general question.
And sort of subsets under it, one of the predictions of
analysts is that the first beneficiaries of the agreement, or
the larger beneficiaries, initially at least, might be American
investors versus American--and multilateral investors, as
compared to American exporters. I wonder if I could get your
reaction to that.
Second, you briefly discussed the areas, commodities
products and so on, where you think we might have the biggest
natural benefits in terms of exports and suggested you were not
an agricultural expert. I heard several things mentioned.
The quantitative restrictions, according to Chapter 1 of
the agreement, reduced a range of industrial and agricultural
products, but they specifically list auto parts, citrus and
beef over a period of 3 to 7 years as being areas where we
could expect substantial export increase.
Would you care to react in any kind of degree of
specificity to those questions and subquestions?
Mr. Hauser. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I say, I had gone through where we saw opportunities
largely arising from the tariff cuts on the agricultural
spectrum.
On the industrial side of the ledger, I think the best
prospects we have identified in Vietnam would be, one, aircraft
and aircraft parts; two, oil and gas exploration and production
services; three, power generation and transmission; four, food
processing and packaging. Let me do two more, computer hardware
software and services and telecom.
I think in most of these sectors there is the opportunity
for export sales. We have been talking to the Vietnamese about
an aviation agreement. They want to develop a world-class
airline. We know the American producers are in discussions with
them. I think there is a good opportunity there. Vietnam is a
resource-rich country. American technology in the areas of oil
and gas exploration are world class. I think there is good
opportunity for sales there.
Similarly, as the country industrializes, moves down the
development path, power generation, power project will be very
important. Again, I think these all create very real sales
opportunities for American business over the near to medium
term once the agreement takes place.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you.
We are having a vote a little earlier than I anticipated. I
was going to ask your opinions about what Deputy Under
Secretary of Labor for International Labor Affairs Andrew Samet
is likely to achieve, but I will ask him directly by letter and
will move to my colleagues so we can complete this round and
complete the hearing before we go vote.
The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Davis, is recognized.
Mr. Davis. Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions.
Mr. Bereuter. The gentleman has no questions. Perhaps I
will sneak in one then, if I may; and that is related to the
Generalized System of Preferences [GSP]. Secretary Hauser, the
signing of the BTA could bring Vietnam closer to receiving
United States trade benefits under the GSP. What are the
conditions we would think under which the United States would
proceed with granting Vietnam GSP?
Mr. Hauser. Well, I think as a threshold question--and I am
not a trade lawyer, Mr. Chairman, but I believe Vietnam first
needs to become a WTO member before it passes eligibility for
GSP. We then do have a set of criteria, including issues like
intellectual property protection, worker rights, etc., that we
would look at very carefully in making a decision on GSP.
Again, WTO accession, while we think our agreement tees up
a number of issues at a WTO world-class standard, is still an
issue that is some years down the road.
Mr. Bereuter. And obviously they will be expected still to
be meeting the economic criteria?
Mr. Hauser. Yes.
Mr. Bereuter. The gentleman from California, Mr.
Rohrabacher, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I will be submitting for the record an
article that came out in the last 2 days describing the end of
the ASEAN negotiations with the Chinese and describing them as
being total failures in negotiation, Mr. Chairman. I am
surprised that Mr. Roth characterized it as something else, but
we will find out.
Mr. Roth. I just met with the Philippine foreign minister
yesterday who has been intimately involved in the negotiations,
and they are ongoing. They are not over.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, we will take a look and see whether
we are just talking about round one being a failure or whether
the negotiations themselves are being labeled as failure.
Also, Mr. Roth, you mentioned that for the first time we
have seen strikes in Vietnam. Do you know, were any of those
strikes at other than foreign-owned companies?
Mr. Roth. I don't know the details of them.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So you are hailing strikes here, but you
do not really know whether or not they are permitted to have
strikes at companies that are owned by anybody else except
foreigners?
Mr. Roth. I was simply making the point that, despite the
fact that these are technically illegal acts, that they did not
arrest the people. They permitted them to go forward. It was
part of my point about the generality trend.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, at a hearing when we were trying to
determine the economic viability of people doing business
there, it would seem to me it would be very important for us to
know whether or not the Vietnamese Government was permitting
strikes at foreign-owned companies but the rest of the country
they were holding labor with an iron fist.
Mr. Roth. I will try to answer for the record then.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right.
Answer: According to our Embassy, 17 legal strikes occurred
during the first half of 2000. Of these, 11 were at foreign-
owned enterprises, and 3 at state-owned enterprises. As noted
in the 1999 Human Rights Report, an estimated 252 strikes were
reported from January 1995 through September 1999. Of these,
some 132 strikes were in enterprises with foreign investment,
about 40 in state-owned enterprises, and 80 in private
enterprises. Most of the strikes did not follow an authorized
conciliation an arbitration process, and thus were illegal;
however, the Government tolerated the strikes and did not take
action against the strikers. Neither the Vietnam General
Confederation of Labor (VGCL) not its affiliate unions
officially sanctioned these strikes, but they were supported
unofficially at the local and provincial levels of the VGCL on
an informal basis.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me say I disagree, obviously, with
your assessment about whether or not there has been cooperation
about POWs. I think--and I am very sorry to hear that it now
seems to be want official position of this Administration that
the Vietnamese should not be expected to have the records from
the prisons in which American POWs were held during the war.
Let me note that Communist regimes are infamous for their
recordkeeping. They are--this is something that they have
excelled in. They do not excel in economic growth in Communist
countries, but they excel in bureaucratic recordkeeping. And I
am just sorry to hear that we are willing to just give them the
benefit of the doubt that those records no longer exist,
because those are some records that could indicate how many
American POWs that they actually held.
Mr. Roth, are you aware that Pete Peterson was kept not as
a prisoner of war but as a ``missing in action'' during the
first 3 years of his captivity?
Mr. Roth. No, I wasn't.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Do you know what he was not in the
ordinary--in with the other prisoners during that time period?
Mr. Roth. He has told me some of his experiences.
Mr. Rohrabacher. That would indicate that perhaps there was
a--certain people that were being kept that no one knew were
being kept. These records would indicate that.
I don't believe that the Vietnamese are being honest with
us. I believe that they kept hundreds of Americans after the
war and perhaps murdered them since. But we need to know that
before we should be entering into an agreement that provides
U.S. taxpayer subsidies to businessmen who build factories
there, or permit that country to have a high level of tariffs
against American products while they can flood their products
that are being built with slave labor into our markets. It is
not good for America, and it is not being loyal to our own
people.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you very much, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your testimony today.
Obviously, we expect to come back to this subject in the next
Congress. As I mentioned, this was a way of us starting for
consideration of the BTA when it is officially brought before
us.
I was going to ask Ms. Barshefsky when we could expect a
letter of transmittal, but perhaps we will do that by letter.
And I would make an announcement that while I am never
convinced that anything is final in the Senate, I am told that
the vote on H.R. 4444 was 85 to 15. The Subcommittees are
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:04 p.m., the Subcommittees were
adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
September 19, 2000
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