[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
IMPLEMENTING PLAN COLOMBIA: THE U.S. ROLE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 21, 2000
__________
Serial No. 106-188
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/
international--relations
______
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COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DANA ROHRABACHER, California CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California PAT DANNER, Missouri
PETER T. KING, New York EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
Carolina STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
MATT SALMON, Arizona JIM DAVIS, Florida
AMO HOUGHTON, New York EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
TOM CAMPBELL, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
KEVIN BRADY, Texas BARBARA LEE, California
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California [VACANCY]
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
------
Subcommittee on The Western Hemisphere
ELTON GALLEGLY, California, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
Carolina JIM DAVIS, Florida
KEVIN BRADY, Texas EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio
Vince Morelli, Subcommittee Staff Director
David Adams, Democratic Professional Staff Member
Kelly McDonald, Acting Professional Staff
Jessica Baumgarten, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable R. Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, U.S. Department of
State.......................................................... 12
The Honorable Brian Sheridan, Assistant Secretary, Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, U.S. Department of
Defense........................................................ 24
Carl Leonard, Assistant Administrator for Latin America, U.S.
Agency for International Development........................... 31
Jose Miguel Vivanco, Executive Director, Americas Division, Human
Rights Watch................................................... 42
Michael Shifter, Senior Fellow, Inter-American Dialogue.......... 62
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Elton Gallegly, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere: Prepared statement......................... 2
The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Indiana: Prepared statement........................... 7
The Honorable Cynthia A. McKinney, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Georgia: Prepared statement.................. 10
The Honorable Robert Menendez, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New Jersey: Prepared statement.................... 11
The Honorable R. Rand Beers: Prepared statement.................. 15
News Release from the International Relations Committee, dated
September 21, 2000............................................. 20
The Honorable Steven R. Rothman, a Representative in Congress
from the State of New Jersey: Prepared statement............... 22
The Honorable Brian Sheridan: Prepared statement................. 27
Carl Leonard: Prepared statement................................. 33
Jose Miguel Vivanco: Prepared statement.......................... 44
Michael Shifter: Prepared statement.............................. 65
APPENDIX
Additional material submitted for the record..................... 77
IMPLEMENTING PLAN COLOMBIA: THE U.S. ROLE
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2000
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:34 a.m. in
Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elton Gallegly
[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Mr. Gallegly. I call to order the Western Hemisphere
Subcommittee, and would like to start with an opening
statement. Good morning, Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. Ackerman. Morning, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gallegly. One month ago, the President signed into law
a $1.3 billion supplemental appropriation to carry out enhanced
counternarcotics activities throughout Latin America. Of that
amount, some $1.018 billion was designated as the U.S.
contribution to what has become known as the Plan Colombia.
Of all the issues we confront in our relations with our
southern neighbors, none is more critically important to the
stability of the hemisphere than the issue of illicit drug
trade. The illicit drug trade in the Americas is pervasive.
Drugs are eating away at the very fabric of American society
and they pose a significant threat to the political and
economic stability of the region. In short, I believe the drug
trade can be described as a serious regional security threat.
No one should doubt that there is a strong national resolve
to deal with the drug problem here in this country. Budgets for
demand reduction, education, treatment and law enforcement are
at record levels. And yes, those budgets could be increased.
But let there be no doubt, reducing demand and maximizing our
efforts in the international war on drugs are both necessary.
As I said during the floor consideration of the
supplemental, the question was not whether the U.S. should be
involved in providing assistance to the Colombia but how should
the U.S. be involved.
Today we are holding this hearing to find out just how the
Administration plans to administer this aid to Colombia. Who is
in charge? How are the roles and the responsibilities of each
agency involved organized and defined? What kinds of time
tables and benchmarks are we looking at and what are our
expectations, both short, midterm and long term? Colombia has a
plan. We have provided funding. We are now at the point as the
saying goes, where the rubber hits the road. And if my
colleagues will indulge me, we can only hope that this Plan
Colombia is not riding on Firestone tires.
To some of the Plan's critics, I say let us take a moment
and seriously consider the problems that are facing that
nation. Let us not get caught up in the emotional rhetoric. Let
us think about the alternatives.
Do you think assisting in the fight against drugs is the
wrong thing to do? Do people care little of the future of
Colombia's democracy? Do people believe we should not offer
alternative economic assistance to the people of Colombia? Do
critics not want us to help support judicial reform, human
rights or the peace process? I believe providing funding for
all these is more than appropriate.
And yes, despite the fact that military aid comprises only
25 percent of the entire Plan Colombia, the U.S. aid package is
weighted toward the military. But mobility is necessary and
helicopters are expensive. And unless and until the guerrillas
who do not now appear to be serious about ending the bloodshed
nor apparently care at all for the Colombian people get serious
about the peace agreement, why shouldn't the Colombian
government have the right to ask for help to prepare their
military?
I know many are worried about the past human rights abuses
involving Colombia's military. And while these are valid
concerns, I believe President Pastrana is working to crack down
on human rights abuses in the military as well as trying to
sever the connections between some of the military units and
the paramilitaries. I believe this aid provides us a good
starting point. We all support peace. We all wish the
guerrillas would get serious in those peace talks. We wish the
paramilitaries would stop killing civilians, but until those
wishes become reality, the Colombians need help and our
assistance to their Plan demonstrates to the Colombian people
and all America that we are committed to help solving these
enormous and dangerous problems of illicit drugs, violence and
human rights abuses in this beleaguered country.
The question today is can a plan be implemented and
implemented correctly, efficiently and effectively? I hope our
witnesses can provide some assurances that we can affect that
end.
Before we turn to the witnesses I would like to recognize
Members for an open statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gallegly follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Elton Gallegly, a Representative in
Congress from the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
the Western Hemisphere: Prepared statement
One month ago, the President signed into law, a $1.3 billion
supplemental appropriation to carry out enhanced counter-narcotics
activities throughout Latin America. Of that amount, some $1.018
billion was designated as the U.S. contribution to what has become
known as Plan Colombia.
Of all the issues we confront in our relations with our southern
neighbors, none is more critically important to the stability of the
hemisphere than the issue of the illicit drug trade. The illicit drug
trade in the Americas is pervasive. Drugs are eating away the very
fabric of American society. And they pose a significant threat to the
political and economic stability of the region. In short, I believe the
drug trade can be described as a serious regional security threat.
No one should doubt that there is a strong national resolve to deal
with the drug problem here in this country. Budgets for demand
reduction, education, treatment and law enforcement are at record
levels. And yes, those budgets could be increased. But let there be no
doubt--reducing demand and maximizing our efforts in the international
war on drugs are both necessary.
As I said during Floor consideration of the Supplemental, the
question was not whether the U.S. should be involved in providing
assistance to Colombia, but how the U.S. should be involved.
I believe United States policy toward Colombia should help Colombia
reduce the presence of illicit drug cultivation, production and
transit.
It should help protect Colombia's democracy which is under siege
from a large and violent guerrilla gang.
It should ensure the stability of Colombia and the Andean region as
a whole.
Today, we are holding this hearing to find out just how the
Administration plans to administer this aid to Colombia. Who is in
charge? How are the roles and responsibilities of each Agency involved
organized and defined? What kinds of timetables and benchmarks are we
looking at and what are our expectations, both short and mid-term?
Colombia has a Plan. We have provided funding. We are now at that
point, as the saying goes, ``where the rubber meets the road''. And if
my Colleagues will indulge me, we can only hope that this Plan Colombia
is not riding on Firestone tires!
To some of the Plan's critics I say let's take a moment and
seriously consider the problems that the nation is facing. Let's not
get caught up in emotional rhetoric. Let's think about the
alternatives.
Do people think assisting in the fight against drugs is the wrong
thing to do? Do people care little of the future of Colombia's
democracy? Do people believe we should not offer alternative economic
assistance to the people of Colombia? Do critics not want us to help
support judicial reform, human rights or the peace process?
I believe providing funding for all of these is appropriate.
I also believe providing funding for select, vetted, Colombian
military units who will work with the Police in the counter-drug effort
is crucial if our efforts to address the drug trade and Colombia's
stability are to be successful.
It is true that the Colombian police have a proven record in the
drug effort and should continue to be supported. And they are in our
aid package. But, the responsibility for protecting Colombia's
democracy from the drug supported violence of the guerrillas and the
paramilitaries is a legitimate job for the military. As Colombia's
national strategy to expand the counter-drug effort is likely to be met
by stronger resistence from the guerrillas, the police must have a
strong military to back them up. Additionally, if the military is to be
a successful backup to the police and a credible threat to the rebels
protecting the drug trade, then it needs modern weapons and
professional training.
And yes, despite the fact that military aid comprises only 25
percent of the entire Plan Colombia, the U.S. aid package is weighted
toward the military. But mobility is necessary and helicopters are
expensive. And, unless and until the guerrillas, who do not now appear
to be serious about ending the bloodshed, nor apparently care at all
for the Colombian people, get serious about a peace agreement, why
doesn't the Colombian government have the right to ask for help to
prepare their military?
The comprehensive strategy known as Plan Colombia was developed by
the government of President Pastrana for the good of Colombia. However,
there should be no doubt that providing additional aid to Colombia to
counter the drug trade, to help reform the judicial system, to provide
economic alternatives and to support the peace process is in our
national interest as well. Failing to help Colombia help itself will
have long-term adverse effects not only on our own country but on the
rest of the region, putting Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and
Panama under tremendous pressure and risk.
I know many are worried about past human rights abuses involving
Colombia's military. And while these are valid concerns, I believe
President Pastrana is working to crack down on human rights abuses in
the military as well as trying to sever the connections between some of
his military units and the paramilitaries.
I believe this aid package provides us a good starting point. We
all support peace. We all wish the guerrillas would get serious in
those peace talks. We wish the paramilitaries would stop killing
civilians. But until those wishes become a reality, the Colombians need
help. And our assistance to their Plan demonstrates to the Colombian
people and all Americans that we are committed to helping solve the
enormous and dangerous problems of illicit drugs, violence and human
rights abuses in that beleaguered country.
The question today is can such a plan be implemented and
implemented correctly, efficiently and effectively? I hope our
witnesses can provide some assurances that it can be.
Mr. Gallegly. At this time, I would yield to my good friend
from New York, the Ranking Member, Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
calling this timely hearing. Mr. Chairman, the United States
Government has embarked on a new course in the counternarcotics
effort in Colombia. In the broadest sense I support this effort
because I believe that we have an obligation to support
democracies when they are threatened.
Colombia is the oldest democracy in Latin America and it is
clearly under siege. But Colombia is not fighting a traditional
insurgency whose followers claim some ideological justification
for violence. It may have been that way once, but it isn't
anymore.
The guerilla movements in Colombia have largely abandoned
their ideology and instead provide protection to the narcotics
traffickers who poison our children. The guerrillas also resort
to kidnapping and extortion. From all these activities the
guerrillas generate substantial income making them the best
funded insurgency probably in the history of the world.
In addition to the guerrillas, the government must deal
with the paramilitary organizations who also receive a
significant amount of funding from narcotics traffickers and
who have continuing connections to the Colombian military.
So the first point that I would make to my colleagues is
that we should be clear about what our assistance is used for.
While it comforts us here to talk about this assistance as only
for counternarcotics, we must recognize, because of the current
situation on the ground in Colombia, counternarcotic strategy
is, by necessity, counterinsurgency strategy.
The push into southern Colombia is designed to punish the
drug traffickers and their guerrilla allies in order to stop
the flow of narcotics and arrest the traffickers and, with
luck, drive the guerrillas to the negotiating table. In this
scenario, I don't think we will be able to draw bright lines
around what is and what isn't narcotics related.
The second point we must consider is who we are providing
our assistance to. The Colombian National Police have an
outstanding human rights record. They are an organization we
should be proud to assist. The bulk of the Plan Colombia and
its assistance will go to the Colombian military, which has one
of the worst human rights records in the hemisphere. On top of
that there are critical allegations of ongoing cooperation
between elements of the Colombian military and the paramilitary
organizations. The good news is that the assistance will be
provided to battalions that have been vetted and trained by us.
In addition, it appears to me that the leadership of the
Colombian military genuinely wants to address human rights
issues. We should give General Tapias a chance to live up to
his rhetoric on human rights. We should also be clear with the
government of Colombia that the next waiver will not come so
easily.
And lastly, I am concerned about the direction of our
counternarcotics strategy and the heavy reliance on
interdiction and eradication. As we have seen in Bolivia and
Peru, when there is success with this strategy in one area, the
production and traffic merely moves to another area. I am
pleased that there is regional assistance in the overall
package, but I believe we must be vigilant in regarding changes
in production and trafficking patterns and be flexible in
response to those changes.
In a very real sense, much of the turmoil in Colombia is
our fault. Our citizens consume the drugs, grown and produced
in Colombia. Yet at the policy-making level, we don't spend
much time talking about demand reduction. For me, this is basic
economics, demand drives supply, and unless we intensify our
efforts to reduce demand here, a supply side strategy is doomed
to failure.
All of us would prefer not to become more deeply involved
in another civil conflict in Latin America. Yet doing nothing
imperils not only Colombia, but her immediate neighbors as
well. Today's hearing is the first in what should be many
hearings to ensure that the policy we have embarked upon is
working as we and the Colombians intend.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to hearing
from this morning's witnesses.
Mr. Gallegly. I thank the gentleman from New York.
At this time I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania,
for an opening statement--or I am sorry, Indiana.
Mr. Burton. Pennsylvania?
Mr. Gallegly. You both have a basketball team, right?
Mr. Burton. Now, wait a minute. Pennsylvania has a great
governor from my class of 1982, Tom Ridge. I just thought I
would mention that. And we used to have some pretty good
basketball teams and we will again.
Mr. Gallegly. The gentleman's time has expired.
I yield to the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton.
Mr. Ackerman. William Penn was a good governor, as I
recall.
Mr. Burton. Bobby Knight will be missed.
On a more serious note, Mr. Chairman, thanks for holding
this hearing. The situation in Colombia continues to
deteriorate by the day. Our allies in the Colombian National
Police are dying in droves. Over 5,000 CNP police officers have
been killed fighting the war on drugs in the last decade. Two
years ago, the Congress of the United States rightfully shut
down the Capitol for a week to mourn the loss of U.S. Capitol
Police Officers Chestnut and Gibson, who were killed protecting
all of us in the Capitol building.
Last year 49 police officers in the United States died in
the line of duty. Last year in Colombia, more than 500 CNP
police officers were murdered fighting our war on drugs.
Few in the U.S. even know or care about the lives of these
brave men and women, and I wish everybody did. In Colombia, the
FARC has made a sport out of planning and launching attacks on
remote CNP bases from the DMZ, which was granted to them in
exchange for peace. They were supposed to be peaceful if the
President gave them a peaceful area where they could be safe.
Yet they attack out of there and then go back to the DMZ, where
they are safe from counterattacks.
These attacks are always brutal and barbaric. The FARC
frequently cuts off the heads and mutilates CNP officers, even
executing their wives and children. We had one case where they
executed a CNP officer's wife and children in front of him, and
then very methodically tortured him before they beheaded him.
This is almost a daily scenario in Colombia. Yet no human
rights organizations ever condemn the FARC for their brutality
against these non combatant police officers. We ought to be
concerned about human rights in the army down there, and the
CNP, which has a great human rights record, incidently.
However, the human rights groups ought to also be talking about
the barbarism of the FARC and the ELN. I mean, they are doing
horrible things and nobody mentions a word about it.
Five years ago, when I was Chairman of this Subcommittee,
Chairman Gilman and I began pleading with an uninterested
Clinton-Gore Administration to do something about our national
security interests in Colombia. Unfortunately the
Administration had other priorities, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East
Timor, until now. We welcome them to this war on drugs in
Colombia because it is very important to our national security
as well.
It has been hard for Chairman Gilman and myself and others
on this Committee to fight this fight when every attempt we
have made to get equipment to our drug war allies has been
vigorously opposed by the Administration. We have repeatedly
reminded them that every year, nearly 17,000 Americans die from
drug overdoses, and that Colombia is the source of 90 percent
of the cocaine in this country and 70 percent of the heroin.
Our pleas have fallen on deaf ears. The Administration
chose to provide a lion's share of the Plan Colombia aid to the
Colombian Army. Many of us in Congress had hoped there would
have been a more balanced approach, distributing the assistance
in a more equitable manner between our proven allies in the
CNP, who have a great human rights record, and the Colombian
Army, which does not. The CNP has a long track record of
successfully combating the narco traffickers while the army is
new to this mission. The Colombian Army desperately needs
military assistance to combat the insurgency. It also needs
training to take on its new role of assisting the CNP in
enforcing the rule of law and attacking the narco-terrorists.
This untested plan needs some fine tuning before any CNP
officers or Colombia Army soldiers are sent on counternarcotics
missions together.
Fortunately in the past, the CNP has taken the meager
assistance we have been able to extract from a reluctant
Administration and has produced amazing results. This year the
CNP has already used the six Congressionally-funded Black Hawk
helicopters to eradicate over 10,000 hectares of opium poppy.
This is more than they did in 12 months last year and five
times as much in 1998, in only 5\1/2\ months. This equipment
protected by the GAU-19, defensive weapons that Congress
funded, has also permitted CNP to eradicate poppy without
taking a single casualty during hundreds of poppy eradication
missions.
In previous years many CNP officers were killed performing
this duty without the security that Black Hawks and defensive
GAU-19s provide.
It is my hope it is not too little too late in Colombia. It
is too bad it took negative polling numbers in an election year
to get the Clinton-Gore Administration engaged on this vital
national security issue. I don't like to be partisan about
something like this, but it is extremely important that we
realize that this is a war for America and not just Colombia.
It is a very short flight from the United States to Colombia.
And those people that are dying down there are fighting our war
for us. We ought to give them all the assistance we possibly
can.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Burton follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Indiana
The situation in Colombia continues to deteriorate by the day. Our
allies in the Colombian National Police (CNP) are dying in droves. Over
5,000 CNP officers have been killed fighting our war on drugs in the
last decade. In Colombia the FARC has made a sport out of planning and
launching attacks on remote CNP bases from the DMZ, which was granted
to them in exchange for ``peace.'' These attacks are always brutal and
barbaric. The FARC frequently beheads and mutilates CNP officers, and
even executes their wives and children. Tragically this is almost a
daily scenario in Colombia, yet no human rights organization ever
condemns the FARC for its brutality against these noncombatant police
officers.
Five years ago, when I was chairman of this subcommittee, Chairman
Gilman and I began pleading with an uninterested Clinton-Gore
Administration to do something about our national security interests in
Colombia. Unfortunately the Administration had other priorities--
Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor--until now. I want to welcome the
Administration to the war on drugs in Colombia.
It has been hard for Chairman Gilman and myself to fight this fight
when every attempt we've made to get equipment to our drug war allies
has been vigorously opposed by this Administration. We have repeatedly
reminded them that every year nearly 17,000 Americans die from drug
overdoses, and that Colombia was the source of 90% of the cocaine and
70% of the heroin on American streets and schoolyards. Our pleas have
always fallen on deaf ears with this Administration.
The Administration chose to provide a lion's share of the Plan
Colombia aid to the Colombian Army. Many of us in Congress had hoped
there would have been a more balanced approach, distributing the
assistance in a more equitable manner between our proven allies in the
CNP and the Colombian Army. The CNP has a long track record of success
in combating the narco-traffickers while the Army is new to this
mission. The Colombian Army desperately needs military assistance to
combat the insurgency. It also needs training to take on its new role
of assisting the CNP in enforcing the rule of law and attacking the
narco-terrorists. This untested plan needs some fine-tuning before any
CNP officers or Colombian Army soldiers are sent on counter-narcotics
missions together.
Fortunately, in the past, the CNP has taken the meager assistance
we've been able to extract from a reluctant Administration and has
produced amazing results. This year the CNP has already used the six
Congressionally-funded Black Hawk helicopters to eradicate over 10,000
hectares of opium poppy. This is more than they did in 12 months last
year, and five times as much as 1998--in only 5\1/2\ months! This
equipment, protected by GAU-19 defensive weapons that Congress funded,
has also permitted the CNP to eradicate poppy without taking a single
casualty during hundreds of poppy eradication missions. In previous
years, many CNP officers were killed performing this duty without the
security that Black Hawks and defensive GAU-19's provide.
It is my hope it is not too little too late in Colombia. It's too
bad it took negative polling numbers in an election year to get the
Clinton-Gore Administration engaged on this national security issue.
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you, Mr. Burton. The gentleman from
Nebraska, Mr. Bereuter, who is a Member of the Full Committee.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
coming here as vice-Chairman of the Full Committee, and at the
specific personal request of the Speaker that I attend this
meeting and raise some questions on behalf of the Speaker's
office. This marks a return to the Subcommittee where I began
my service on the then-House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Speaker Hastert came away from the trip to Colombia--by the
way, the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt, was one of
the 11 Members of the House and Senate to also go along with
this Member--firmly believing that we have less time, not more
time, than initially envisioned. He believes that delays are
deadly. The President went to Colombia talking about the need
to respond rapidly. And he had our support in that. An
emergency supplemental was approved. Now everything seems to be
slipping. And the question is why.
This is the information I want to relay from the Speaker's
office, and I am authorized to do that. It would appear that
critical components of Plan Colombia initiative are being
delayed by the Administration. I hope that the witnesses will
address some of these specifics that I am going to give you.
As of last week, Sikorsky notified House Intelligence
Committee staff that the 18 Black Hawks authorized in the
package would be reduced to 15 on the instructions of the State
Department. Further, the contracts, it was told, will not be
signed until April 2001, and delivery would be pushed back to
late 2002.
This is the Speaker's information. And the indications are
that it is not a Sikorsky problem. The company asserts that it
is prepared to stand by its original estimate of 16 Black Hawks
delivered in early 2000 through October 2001 for the $234
million provided by Plan Colombia. The Sikorsky package also
provided for training infrastructure and maintenance training.
Furthermore, the Speaker's office has discovered that the
Huey-II program seems to be stalled. In order to stay with the
anticipated delivery schedule, the State Department will have
to sign contracts, we are told, and perform inspections by the
end of September 2000. If they fail to meet the September
deadline, the kits that are now available in Fort Worth will be
sent elsewhere, and the Presidential certification which was
made in August will expire.
All of this information comes from the private sector. The
Speaker's staff had asked to be briefed on this issue, the
State Department acceded to that request for briefings, but OMB
and the White House stepped in and blocked those briefings.
You have some questions that I hope you can address or that
the Administration can address if you are not able to. I look
forward to the testimony, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gallegly. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.
Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very
brief. Clearly there are a lot of specific questions that my
colleagues have, particularly the gentleman from Nebraska. But
I would like to step back for a minute because we hear a lot
about helicopters, delivery dates, we hear about additional
assistance of a military nature, and military hardware to the
CNP, et cetera, et cetera. We shouldn't deceive ourselves. Plan
Colombia is more than simply about military assistance.
In fact, it is my opinion that Plan Colombia is really much
more fundamental. It goes to the transformation of Colombian
society. It speaks to the issue of judicial reform.
I would like to hear what has occurred in terms of
preliminary efforts in that regard. Let me also suggest it goes
to the issue of the transformation of the Colombian military.
As the gentleman from Indiana indicated, the military
historically in Colombia has had an abysmal human rights
record. I believe that at least at the senior command level and
particularly with General Tapias, we have an individual and a
leader who believes and embraces the concept of human rights in
terms of its military as we would hope.
I also believe that Plan Colombia deals with the issue of
economic and social justice in Colombia. Efforts that should be
undertaken in terms of bridging the gap or narrowing the gap,
if you will, between those that have and have not. If we are
going to have success in Colombia, it is going to require a
much more comprehensive effort than simply the delivery of
helicopters and military hardware. I think in the end, we
should acknowledge the fact that if there is to be a
substantial and significant reduction of the flow of cocaine
and heroin into this country, it only can be achieved by
stability in Colombia. And the linchpin to stability is peace,
and like every peace process all over the world, that is a
very, very, painfully slow faltering stumbling effort.
Clearly, that is the case currently in Colombia. So I would
like to hear from the panel their assessment and evaluation of
the peace process. Because it is my opinion in the end, if we
don't have peace, we will never do anything significant and
permanent about the export of cocaine and heroin into the
streets of this country. This isn't simply about drugs. It is
about having a different relationship with a society that needs
substantial change.
Mr. Bereuter. Would the gentleman yield? I agree with his
statement entirely. And in fact, I think that the four charts
prepared by the Subcommittee, with assistance from the State
Department, would be good to show the diversity of the aid that
the U.S. is giving, if we could have those put before the
audience as well as Members. It does provide for economic
development and does provide for judicial training and reform.
Perhaps the other point that should be made is that the overall
Plan Colombia current version calls for $7 billion of
expenditure, most of which comes from Colombian and other
international donors. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Delahunt. I thank the gentleman for the further
observation. I think it is very, very important that we
understand that the American assistance, while skewed in terms
of military hardware, the rest of the plan--and I would be very
interested to hear the commitments that have been made by other
nations as well as the Colombian government, where are we in
terms of those commitments, because as the gentleman from
Nebraska indicated, they are more attuned and focused in the
areas that I was referring to in my own remarks.
And I also want to echo--let me make a statement about an
observation or statement made by Mr. Bereuter in terms of
cooperation by the Department of State. And the intervention of
OMB in terms of providing a briefing to Members. I find it very
disturbing that information would be blocked by OMB, those
briefings would be stopped by OMB for any Member of Congress. I
think it is absolutely essential that there be an ongoing
working relationship between the Administration and interested
Members of Congress in regards to what is occurring as far as
our efforts in Colombia. And I would hope that if there has
been a block by OMB in terms of briefings by state and other
Federal agencies, that that block be removed quickly. I yield
back.
Mr. Gallegly. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts. We
will move on to our witnesses.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous
consent that the statements of Mr. Menendez and Ms. McKinney be
placed in the record.
Mr. Gallegly. They will be made part of the record.
[The prepared statement of Representative McKinney
follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Cynthia A. McKinney, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Georgia
Thank you for this opportunity to speak. And I would like to thank
the Chairman and the Ranking Member for calling this very important
hearing.
Our relationship with the people of Colombia is about to
fundamentally change and I hope we know that going into this massive
projection of US force into that country.
I am especially appreciative of the opportunity to put my thoughts
on the record because more than anything else, I care about the most
fundamental aspects of human rights and how Plan Colombia will affect
the human rights climate in Colombia today and the notions about the
United States that Colombians affected most will have about us after
implementation of Plan Colombia.
As citizens of the most powerful nation in the world, it's our duty
to ensure that this power is used responsibly and that we are not
confused when we use it. Bobby Kennedy once said that we used to be a
force for good in the world. I would like to hope that peoples around
the world still see us as a force for good. However, I fear that this
is far from the thoughts of the Colombian people from whom I have
heard.
Some 80% of the aid in Plan Colombia comes in the form of military
weapons.
This, more properly, should be called a military aid package and
this meeting must include the military component if we are to truly
grasp the full meaning of the US Role in Implementing Plan Colombia.
Congress actually voted to fund a counter attack against an army of
20,000 guerrillas in the Amazon jungle. We did this act alone without
the support of our European allies. The European Union does not support
our involvement of this nature in Colombia. And because we've voted to
give approximately one billion dollars to the Colombian military, not
very many other donors want to be associated with this kind of
contribution.
So, although Plan Colombia was originally intended by President
Pastrana to be a multinational aid package, it has now morphed into a
US military operation.
About two weeks ago, the Presidents of the twelve Latin American
countries met for the first time in a historic summit in Brasilia.
Although it was not the intended theme of the meeting, the leaders
resolved their opposition to the US aid package. Brazil's Fernando
Cardoso spoke against it, Venezuela's Hugo Chavez spoke against it. In
Ecuador they believe that tens of thousands of refugees are going to
spill across the border from the violence this plan is going to
generate. This is what Colombia's neighbors think of the plan.
Thirty-seven Colombian NGO's, including the Center for
Investigations and Popular Education and the Consortium for Human
Rights and the Displaced have signed a letter saying they would reject
any aid offered to them as part of Plan Colombia. They are completely
unwilling to be associated with this program in any way no matter how
much money they are offered.
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Washington
Office on Latin America all denounced President Clinton's decision to
waive the human rights conditions that had been placed on the aid by
Congress. The human rights groups had hoped that by placing such
conditions on the aid, Colombia would be forced to choose between the
modern weaponry and the dirty war of assassination they are currently
engaged in. I am extremely disappointed that the Clinton Administration
once again has taken human rights completely off the table for
discussion. Now there is no incentive whatsoever for Colombia to reform
its military and abandon its paramilitary strategy.
I will also note for the record that the push into southern
Colombia, which has been described today, violates the Geneva
Conventions, which prohibit the forced displacement of civilian
populations as a tactic of war.
In the whole world, only the Congo has more displaced people than
Colombia. At a forum recently sponsored by my office, I have quite
sadly learned that the vast majority of those displaced persons are
Afro-Latinos. Two-thirds are minors. Only one in eight has access to
education. One in three has access to health care. These poor children
suffer from the neglect of the Colombian State and the ignorance of
Washington policy makers.
My third and final point is that not only is this plan immoral,
it's impractical. Spraying chemicals on third world farmers is not an
effective way to discourage people in the United States from using
cocaine.
We are not immune to the lure of quick cocaine cash ourselves. As
has been made embarrassingly clear recently.
How can Colonel James Hiett, smuggling cocaine and laundering money
with his wife while overseeing anti-drug operations for the US Southern
Command in Bogota . . . how could this narco get off with five months
in jail while today there are more African Americans in prison than in
college?
So now, the US is about to implement a plan to spray chemicals on
third world subsistence farmers and attack them with helicopter
gunships while the Colombian government allows paramilitary groups to
massacre them.
One thing is for sure in this plan, it isn't about drug abuse
control and won't help my friends who are strung out on dope.
I would rather have from the CIA a truthful accounting of how crack
cocaine came to flood every black neighborhood in America and affect
every black family. Telling the truth about the relationships between
federal agencies, US multinational banks, and elites in this country
and abroad will do more to eradicate the scourge of drugs in America
than this proposed Plan Colombia.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Representative Robert Menendez
follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Robert Menendez, a Representative
in Congress from the State of New Jersey
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. And thank all of
you, our witnesses today, for coming here to testify on this important
and difficult subject. You all have tough jobs. Those on the first
panel, the Administration panel, have the difficult task of
implementing what is not the easiest, surest policy response to an
extremely tough situation, that of reducing the drug flows out of
Colombia and reducing the threat to democracy in that violence-racked
country. Those on the second panel have the almost equally tough task
of assessing the situation, trying to guide us as we make policy and
reminding us of the human rights concerns and reporting on the abuses.
We shouldn't rehash today the policy debates of the past few
months. Like it or not, we now have a plan for at least the next two
years. It is an expensive plan. Though I supported it, I would have
preferred to see less emphasis on helicopters and more emphasis on the
peace process, on development in Colombia and elsewhere in Latin
America, and on drug demand reduction through treatment programs in the
U.S. Again, though, this is not the moment to reopen those discussions.
Today, we talk about how to implement this big undertaking. How to
best make sure it will work--to slow the flow of drugs, reduce the
violence, restore stability and democracy, reform the judiciary, and
move towards peace--all the while adhering to protection of human
rights. It's a tall task.
Some warn that Colombia will be ``our next Vietnam.'' I think one
Vietnam was probably enough, and the awareness of that in and of itself
will prevent a similar quagmire. But finding the right balance for the
U.S. role in Colombia will not be easy. I hope that we will stand
closely behind our Colombian friends, supporting them in their efforts
to end the violence and the drugs; but at the same time leading by
example and insisting on integrity, on efforts to rid corruption, and
on adherence to human rights. I also hope that we will vigorously
support efforts towards achieving peace.
Though we're focusing on the U.S. role today, I hope you will give
us some indication of what the Colombians, and other donors, are doing
for their part. This will not be an inexpensive investment for us; and
we already find ourselves ``in for a dime, in for a dollar.'' But I'd
like to know what our money is leveraging in terms of others'
contributions,
I hope that we will not spend this time today--and our time is
limited in these closing days of the session--micro-managing the
Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Agency for
International Development. These witnesses and their many colleagues in
the Administration have spent a lot of time and energy with their
Colombian counterparts working out the details. We should oversee, we
should hold accountable. We should not micromanage.
Thank you. I look forward to your testimony.
Mr. Gallegly. Okay. At this time let us move to our
witnesses.
The first witness we have is Assistant Secretary Rand
Beers.
Mr. Beers.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE R. RAND BEERS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Beers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today
about the implementation of our assistance to Plan Colombia. I
have submitted a statement in advance of this, which I would
ask be submitted in the record, although there will be some
amendments to it based on information that was available after
the delivery of that statement to the Committee. We will do
that by the end of today.
Mr. Gallegly. Without objection it will be made a part of
the record.
Mr. Beers. Thank you. Since the emergency supplemental for
Colombia was passed and signed into law in July, U.S. and
Colombian planners have worked together to develop a
comprehensive plan to spend the $1.3 billion of assistance for
its integration into the broader efforts of the Government of
Colombia. The U.S. planning team included representatives from
U.S. SOUTHCOM, the State Department, USAID, the Defense
Department, Justice and Treasury, who returned from Colombia
last week, after nearly 2 months of daily consultations with
their Colombian counterparts. The result is a comprehensive
interagency action plan for the Government of Colombia that
defines the implementation of our support to Colombia's
counternarcotics effort and provides a mechanism to coordinate
the various elements of our aid, particularly regarding
eradication and alternative development.
With the Government of Colombia's planning document in
hand, U.S. agencies are now refining their own draft
implementation plans, which had been prepared earlier prior to
the development of the Colombian plan. In the interagency
action plan, the Government of Colombia has laid out an
organizational structure that will assist in coordinating the
counternarcotics program with the other elements of Plan
Colombia.
Representatives of the Colombian police, military and
PLANTE, the alternative development agency of Colombia, as well
as the Social Security agency, will coordinate with mayors and
governors at the local and regional level. They will work under
the supervision of a national technical committee consisting of
representative government ministers such as PLANTE, Social
Security and the security community. U.S. embassy
representatives will coordinate with this Committee and at the
local levels with the embassy's military group narcotics
affairs section and Drug Enforcement Administration personnel
addressing these counternarcotics matters specifically.
The Colombian technical committee will, in turn, report to
an interagency Colombian government body at the vice
ministerial level, and finally to the heads of the ministries
involved. Senior members of the embassy country team will be
handling bilateral issues at this level.
U.S. agency representatives will coordinate operational
issues within the embassy with the lead responsibility for
specific projects generally falling to those agencies
responsible for the project's funding. There will be exceptions
to this approach, however. Such as, for example, with regard to
the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. Although they were funded
through the Department of State's Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, they are being purchased
as requested by Congress through the Defense Security and
Cooperation Agency and will be managed by Department of Defense
personnel.
The initial 2-year phase of the interagency action plan
focuses on southern Colombia. It will start with a rapid
expansion of programs aimed at social action and institutional
strengthening. Interdiction operations will follow shortly
thereafter and eradication efforts will commence before the end
of the year. Alternative development and other programs to
strengthen legal communities will expand in neighboring regions
where counternarcotics programs will continue regionally.
During this first phase, these regional efforts will be
accompanied at the national level by public outreach and
programs meant to prepare for the eventual expansion of the
programs nationwide.
Eradication in Putumayo will be conducted in two ways: In
the areas dominated by small scale cultivation of three
hectares or less per farm, voluntary eradication agreements--
sometimes referred to as community pacts--will be concluded
between the government of Colombia and the individual
communities. Through this program, small farmers will be given
the opportunity to eradicate their illegal crops voluntarily as
part of their development projects. Aerial eradication will
continue to be important in the more remote areas of Putumayo,
where large agro business coca plantations dominate the
landscape.
After the first 12 months of the eradication campaign in
Putumayo, those communities in the alternative development area
that have opted not to participate in the voluntary eradication
program will be subject to possible aerial eradication. This
does not necessarily mean the spray operations will begin
immediately upon the expiration of the 12-month grace period.
It is merely intended to leave the aerial eradication as an
option for the Colombian authorities to use in combating the
coca cultivation.
While eradication is getting underway, a Putumayo-focused
interdiction effort will also be launched to disrupt the supply
of important precursor chemicals into the region, and the
shipments of cocaine base and processed cocaine into the
region. Another principal activity will be the dismantling of
processing laboratories. These actions should decrease the
revenue potential of coca in the target area. When combined
with the increased expense of time and money caused by
eradication, the resulting distortions in the Putumayo coca
market should encourage growers to abandon the crop as a source
of income.
As an essential element of the interdiction efforts in
southern Colombia, we will be focusing on the Colombian Army's
counternarcotics brigade. While funding for its training and
support was contained in the supplemental appropriation, our
greatest contribution to the brigade, both in terms of dollar
amount and operational need is helicopter lift.
And I would like now to begin a response to Congressman
Bereuter's questions in my oral statement. As all are aware the
helicopters themselves, the platforms that we are talking
about, are but one part of the helicopter equation. In addition
to the aircraft themselves, we also have to take into
consideration the training and provision of pilots, crew,
mechanics and a logistical infrastructure to support the
operations of those aircraft. So that it is necessary in order
to have functioning aircraft brought together to bring together
all of these elements in near simultaneity so that aircraft are
delivered for pilots who are available to actually fly them,
and mechanics who are actually available to repair them.
With respect to the delivery of those aircraft, and I
understand that this is an important issue, as I mentioned
earlier, Congress has asked that with respect to the Black
Hawks, DSCA Act as the U.S. executive agent for the management
of that program, and we are fully complying with that. Based on
United States Army guidance and estimates, which are, by the
Army's own admission, conservative, they estimate that prior to
the signing of the contract, the first--in other words, at this
time, the first aircraft would be scheduled to arrive in
approximately October 2002 with all scheduled to arrive in
country by May 2003.
I know that this seems of concern to Members of Congress.
It is equally of concern to us. But we are not in a position at
this particular time to go beyond the Army's contracting
estimate until we actually sign the contract. We will be in a
much better position in order to deliver that estimate
definitively to the Congress once the contract is signed. I
know that the Congressman has heard that there has been a
discussion of that being delivered, that that contract may not
be signed for another 6 months. That is the current Army
working estimate. We are not prepared to accept that estimate.
And the Army, I think, would not be either. They have simply
provided us with their most conservative estimate.
Similarly, with respect to the brigade's Huey-II
helicopters, we expect, based on conservative estimates in
conjunction with Bell helicopter, that we will be able to fully
field this force within 2 years, with the first contract
helicopters arriving in the second quarter of calendar year
2001, following in train immediately behind the currently
programmed aircraft that Bell will be delivering earlier in the
spring of that year.
With respect to the numbers of aircraft that are under
discussion, there have been some indications or rumors or
information that has flown around suggesting that the numbers
may be less than the numbers that Congress has appropriated
for. We have been looking at the pricing of those aircraft.
There are some widely differing estimates of price for those
aircraft. We are trying to get to the bottom of that. The
effort on the part of the State Department to provide Members
with that briefing was stopped by OMB when they realized that
those numbers required a more thorough scrubbing within the
Administration. It is our intent to brief Members of Congress
as quickly as we can give you definitive numbers. But we are
not, unfortunately, in a position to do that at this particular
time.
With respect to the 18 UH-1N helicopters that were
prepositioned in Colombia at the end of 1999 by the Department
of State to provide an interim air mobility for the
counternarcotics brigade, those 18 aircraft will be ready by
the beginning of November with an initial operating capability
in October in order to train with the counternarcotics brigade.
The remaining 15 that are part of the supplemental will be
available in Colombia in the first quarter of calendar year
2001, in time to be available to work and operate with the
fully trained second counternarcotics battalion. These
aircraft, the UH-1N's, have always been envisioned as the
interim aircraft, and they will be available for the
operational requirement that we have all understood for them
until we can make the other aircraft available.
The Government of Colombia has committed itself to make an
all-out effort to resolve the country's problems, and with our
assistance of the package of $1.3 billion, the U.S. has pledged
much needed support, while teams in both countries continue to
plan and adjust to operational modalities. The implementation
process is now underway. I am confident of the success of these
projects and of Plan Colombia, and I look forward to working
closely with Congress as we continue to address and discuss
these critical issues.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Beers follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable R. Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary,
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, U.S. Department
of State
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I want to thank you for this opportunity to speak to you today
about the situation in Colombia, the threat it poses to regional
security, and the implementation of our assistance to Plan Colombia.
Over the last year, the nature of the situation in Colombia has
been repeatedly discussed in hearings such as this one, in the media,
and in international fora. There is little doubt that the Colombian
people are suffering greatly from the violence produced by that
nation's guerrilla insurgents and paramilitary vigilantes: groups that
support themselves through a host of criminal activities, the most
important of which, the illegal narcotics industry, provides them with
untold millions of dollars every month. Colombia's historic neglect of
the nation's outlying areas has allowed this problem to fester, and it
has been exacerbated by an economic down-turn of a magnitude Colombia
has not seen for seventy years. In short, Colombia must overcome
critical challenges.
Why is Colombia's situation critical? It is critical because
Colombians are dying. It is critical because the guerrilla and
paramilitary groups that perpetuate the violence in Colombia are
financed by the proceeds of illegal drug trafficking and the thousands
of Americans that it kills in our streets every year. It is critical
because that drug industry is clear-cutting Amazonian rainforest in
order to expand cultivation and is polluting the Amazon basin with tons
of toxins used in drug processing. It is critical because, with
unemployment topping twenty percent and government resources strained,
the financial lure of the narcotics industry is powerful.
The leadership of Colombia recognizes the need for action.
President Pastrana is committed to resolving his nation's problems. He
was elected on a pledge to resolve peacefully 30 years of violence and,
since taking office two years ago, he has maneuvered through a
minefield of issues to bring the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) and, hopefully, the National Liberation Army (ELN) to the
negotiating table. His administration understands the complexities of
the issues confronting the country, laid them out in Plan Colombia,
and, even while negotiating with insurgents, took the courageous step
of admitting that they required the assistance of the international
community to address that country's multiple crises.
In consultation with the government of Colombia, an interagency
group, including representatives of State, Defense, Justice, USAID, and
Treasury, developed a proposed U.S. assistance package for Bogota's
Plan Colombia, with a particular emphasis on the Plan's
counternarcotics component. Funding for that package, with some
modifications, was passed with the support of this committee and was
signed by the President on July 13.
Since the package was passed in its final form, U.S. and Colombian
planners have worked together to develop a comprehensive plan for the
implementation of our $1.3 billion of assistance and for its
integration into the broader efforts of the Colombian government. The
U.S. planning team, which included representatives of State, USAID, and
DoD, returned from Colombia just last week after nearly two months of
daily consultations with their Colombian counterparts. The result is a
comprehensive Interagency Action Plan that defines the implementation
of our support to Colombia's robust counternarcotics efforts and
provides a mechanism to coordinate the various elements of our aid,
particularly regarding eradication and alternative development. With
the government of Colombia's planning document in hand, U.S. agencies
are now refining their draft implementation plans.
In their recently completed Interagency Action Plan, the government
of Colombia has laid out an organizational structure that will assist
in coordinating the counternarcotics programs with the other elements
of Plan Colombia. Representatives of the Colombian police, military,
PLANTE (the Colombian agency that administers alternative development
programs), and the social security agency will coordinate with mayors
and departmental governors at the local and regional level. They will
work under the supervision of a national technical committee consisting
of representative governmental ministries, such as PLANTE, social
security, and the security community. U.S. Embassy representatives will
interact with this committee and at the local levels, with the
Embassy's Military Group, Narcotics Affairs Section and Drug
Enforcement Administration personnel addressing counternarcotics
matters. The Colombian technical committee, in turn, will report to an
interagency Colombian government body at the vice-ministerial level and
finally to the heads of the ministries involved. Senior members of the
Embassy country team will handle bilateral issues at this level.
The U.S. agency representatives will coordinate operational issues
within the Embassy, with lead responsibility for specific projects
generally falling to those agencies responsible for the project's
funding. Exceptions to this approach can be found, particularly with
regard to the UH-60 BlackHawk helicopters which, although funded
through the Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs, are being purchased through the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency and will be managed by Defense Department
personnel.
The initial two-year phase of the Interagency Action Plan focuses
on southern Colombia. It will start with a rapid expansion of programs
aimed at social action and institutional strengthening. Interdiction
operations will follow shortly and eradication efforts will commence
before the end of the year. Alternative development and other programs
to strengthen local communities will expand into neighboring
departments where counternarcotics programs will continue regionally.
This will include the expansion of voluntary eradication to Caqueta.
During this first phase, these regional efforts will be accompanied at
the national level by public outreach and programs meant to prepare for
the eventual expansion of the programs nationwide.
Implementation of Plan Colombia's counternarcotics elements will
require a multiyear effort and a great deal of coordination between the
U.S. and Colombian agencies involved, as well as care in the
synchronization of equipment deliveries and the operations that the
equipment is intended to support.
In the first two years of Plan Colombia, the Action Plan calls for
a concerted effort to eradicate illegal crops from southern Colombia,
support for expanded interdiction efforts, continued support for the
Colombian National Police, alternative and economic development, and
additional funding for human rights and judicial reforms.
Although the counternarcotics elements of Plan Colombia are
national in scope, the specific objectives for the first two years call
for programs to strengthen the government of Colombia's presence in
southern Colombia while reducing the production, processing, and
trafficking of illegal drugs in the area. One initial objective will be
to establish the security conditions necessary to permit the
implementation of other, civilian-run, programs. During these first two
years, the Interagency Action Plan focuses its counternarcotics
energies on southern Colombia in an attempt to reverse the current
surging expansion of coca cultivation and, through the implementation
of sustainable alternative development and institution building, to
make dramatic inroads towards a coca-free Putumayo by achieving a fifty
percent reduction in that region's coca cultivation.
Eradication in Putumayo will start with identification of the coca
cultivation to be targeted. A coordination committee including
representatives of PLANTE and the Colombian National Police will make
these targeting decisions prior to the commencement of eradication
operations. The operations will include the aerial eradication of agro-
business, plantation scale crops and the establishment of voluntary
eradication agreements, sometimes referred to as ``Community Pacts,''
between the government of Colombia and communities within the area that
is dominated by small-scale cultivation of three hectares or less per
farm. Eight communities have been identified in this alternative
development area, including Villa Garzon, Puerto Guzman, Puerto Asis,
and Orito. Through this program, they will be given the opportunity to
eradicate their illegal crops voluntarily as part of their development
projects. The pace of implementation for these voluntary eradication
and alternative development projects will depend heavily on the local
farmers and their willingness to participate and comply with verifiable
compliance benchmarks. Aerial eradication, the cornerstone of current
eradication efforts in Colombia, will continue to be important in the
more remote areas of Putumayo, where large, agro-business coca
plantations dominate the landscape. The spray campaign aimed at those
targets is scheduled to begin in December. This timing coincides with
the beginning of the local dry season, when aerial eradication is most
effective, and with the anticipated completion of training by the
Colombian army's second counternarcotics battalion, as well as the
arrival of the UH-IN helicopters needed to provide transportation for
it and for the first counternarcotics battalion.
After the first twelve months of the eradication campaign in
Putumayo, those communities in the alternative development area that
have opted not to participate in the voluntary eradication program will
be subject to possible aerial eradication. This does not mean that
spray operations will begin immediately upon the expiration of the
twelve-month grace period. It is merely intended to leave aerial
eradication available as an option for the Colombian authorities to use
in combating coca cultivation, which, under Colombian law, is a
criminal act.
While funding for the training and support of these battalions was
contained in the supplemental appropriation, our greatest contribution
to the brigade, both in terms of dollar amount and operational need, is
helicopter lift. That said, the helicopter platforms themselves are
just one part of the helicopter equation. We must also take into
account the training needed to produce the pilots, mechanics and crews
and the logistical network necessary for the helicopters to be
functional aircraft. We are working, with the Colombians, to address
all these issues.
On the helicopters themselves, we are complying with Congress's
wish to purchase the UH-60 BlackHawks through DSCA, who has provided us
with delivery estimates. These delivery estimates, that by the Army's
own admission are conservative, indicate that the brigade's UH-60
BlackHawk utility helicopters should begin to arrive by October 2002,
and all are scheduled to be in Colombia by May 2003. These dates are
based upon the worst-case assumption that the aircraft will be
contracted in April, with the first aircraft being completed eighteen
months later. Clearly, it may be possible to complete the contract
sooner than April and it may be possible to deliver the aircraft in
less than eighteen months. We know that this matter is of concern to
Congress. It is of concern to us as well and we will make every effort
to pin down earlier dates, but we are not in a position to say anything
beyond the Army's estimates at this time. Similarly, we expect the
brigade's contingent of Huey II helicopters to be fully fielded within
two years, with the first aircraft arriving in mid-2001. These are
current contractor estimates. The exact delivery dates have not been
determined, but the aircraft will follow immediately behind the Huey
IIs currently being processed for the CNP. Moreover, we will sign a
contract with Bell for the first 12 Huey II kits before the end of
September.
There have also been a great number of indications and rumors that
the number of Black Hawk and other helicopters being provided through
the supplemental appropriation may be less than Congress authorized. We
believe that this is due to widely different cost figures circulating
among the parties involved. We are working to resolve this confusion so
that the programs can proceed and we will share those cost figures with
the Congress as soon as they are available.
Last year, eighteen UH-IN helicopters were sent to Colombia to
provide lift to the counternarcotics battalion. Those aircraft were
used to train pilots. Then, in the spring, because funding we expected
from the supplemental appropriation was not yet available, the program
was temporarily suspended, including training with the ground forces.
Those aircraft are now being brought back into service. The first will
be operational in October and the full complement of 18 complete in
November. These 18 helicopters will be available for training with the
first and second counternarcotics battalions. Additionally, all fifteen
UH-IN helicopters provided by the supplemental are expected to be
available the first quarter of 2001. These 33 helicopters were always
envisioned as providing interim air-mobility for the first two
battalions and eventually for the third battalion, when it becomes
operational.
Pilot and mechanic development and logistical training are also key
to implementing Plan Colombia's counternarcotics goals. We believe that
this training requirement can be successfully addressed. The delay
between the order and delivery of the Huey II and UH-60 aircraft, for
example, will allow pilots and others for those aircraft to be trained
at a sustainable rate. No other counternarcotics element of Plan
Colombia raises the question of absorptive capacity in so serious and
difficult a manner. While the supplemental provides important new
resources, those resources, with the exception of the helicopters, will
primarily serve to expand upon programs already underway in Colombia.
Past U.S. government assistance for those programs has been easily
absorbed.
Colombian preparations, however, must go beyond mere absorptive
capacity and the training of personnel. In order to undertake such an
ambitious counternarcotics strategy, Colombian governmental
institutions have conducted difficult but necessary reforms to improve
efficiency and interagency coordination. This includes the breaking
down of long-standing intra-service rivalries, which is key for the
success of the envisioned joint operations, and the improvement of
communication between the country's security forces and organizations
dedicated to humanitarian assistance, both within and outside of the
government. This essential public outreach has been insufficient so
far, but the Colombian government is now carrying out a campaign to
educate the population, especially in Putumayo, regarding the social
and developmental aspects of the counternarcotics efforts.
Colombia must also work to address the human rights and
counternarcotics certification criteria identified in the supplemental
legislation. The documentation that accompanied the August 23
certification and waiver decisions noted that President Pastrana had
provided the written directive regarding jurisdiction over military
personnel that was required for certification. The Colombian
legislature has recently also passed a package of military reforms that
gives the government the ability to dismiss military personnel with
less than 15 years of service who are credibly suspected of human
rights violations and/or collusion with the paramilitaries. We are
confident that the next certification process, expected in December,
will be able to document progress in the prosecution of alleged human
rights abusers in the military. The Department of State is also working
with the government of Colombia to develop a more aggressive plan for
the eradication of illegal crops. Already, the Colombian government has
revised its goals to include a fifty-percent reduction of coca
cultivation in Putumayo and a thirty-percent reduction over the rest of
the country within the next two years.
The government of Colombia has committed itself to making an all
out effort to resolve that country's problems. With our assistance
package of $1.3 billion, the United States has pledged much needed
support. While teams in both countries continue to plan and adjust
operational modalities, the implementation process is now underway. I
am confident of the success of these projects and of Plan Colombia, and
I look forward to working closely with the Congress as we continue to
address these critical issues.
Mr. Gallegly. At this point, it is my pleasure to recognize
the gentleman from New York, the Chairman of the Full
Committee, Mr. Gilman.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman for conducting this
very timely hearing. I regret I have to run to the Floor. I
appreciate your letting me interrupt the proceedings, and I
want to thank our witnesses for being here, particularly
Assistant Secretary Beers, who we have worked with over the
years.
It is a particularly important time since the
Administration was, we believed, about to sign contracts for
the drug fighting choppers for which we provided the monies in
Plan Colombia and which are sorely needed. The delays we are
hearing about today are abominable and alarming, to say the
least. How those choppers are configured and how the other
monies Congress provided under Plan Colombia are going to be
spent, will make a major difference in Colombia. It will
determine whether or not we accomplish our twin goals of
reducing drugs from abroad and helping save Colombian democracy
from the self-sufficient and well-armed narco-terrorist
insurgencies of the ELN and the FARC. If the Administration's
track record of failing to get the right aid to Colombia in a
timely fashion is any indication, I think we have to be very
much concerned.
By comparison, the Russian speaking mafia, in conjunction
with the drug traffickers, got the steel, the tools and manuals
down to Colombia to build a pressurized double hull submarine
to move drugs into our Nation, out of Colombia. Our State
Department ought to be able to deliver our counterdrug aid at
least that well. If not, I think we are in major trouble. In
July, the State Department Inspector General's Office released
an audit of the Colombian anti-drug program. That report was
requested by Chairman Burton and myself last March after we
observed that the Huey-II choppers were improperly configured
for the Colombian National Police. The IG's audit makes it
clear there was a lack of consultation by our State Department
with the Colombian police, the front line fighters against
drugs, and how their choppers were to be configured.
Even worse, the Inspector General's report revealed that
the Bell 212 choppers that were given to the Colombia drug
police could not fly because the INL Bureau failed to give the
police the spare parts that were needed to make them operable.
As we know, the Colombian police have the lead in drug
fighting in that troubled nation. The police have lost nearly
5,000 of their officers in the last decade fighting drugs. And
many of their elite anti drug units were lost or captured when
their choppers were shot down by the narco-terrorists. Congress
had to lead the way in providing both good choppers and
correctly configured Black Hawks for the police. We thank the
Speaker, Mr. Hastert, for helping us in that direction. We
helped to do it right. I am pleased to report today through mid
September of this year, the police, have record eradication
levels. Drug eradication has soared, all without the loss of
one policeman's life because we gave them Black Hawks with the
right defensive weapons, the GAU-19 gattling gun.
I would like to note that this is the very same defensive
weapon that was just chosen by our Marine Corps to protect
their new 21st century troop transports.
The police have done an amazing job with eradicating opium
production. They have managed to eradicate nearly five times
the amount of poppy that they eliminated in all of 1998. This
was done without any loss of life in the rugged high Andes. I
have long had a healthy skepticism of Plan Colombia, both in
its implementation by our State Department-based on State's
past performance, and the overemphasis on our aid to the
Colombian military, instead of to these excellent CNP anti-drug
units. As we approach a provision of nearly $1 billion in aid
to Colombia under Plan Colombia, we need to be convinced that
the mistakes of the past, are not going to be repeated. We look
forward to the further testimony today, and to the work of
assistant Secretary Beers, who is fully cognizant of the
problems involved. I hope that answers will be provided on
whether we can get it right this time. If not, I think the
future of Colombian democracy is in grave risk, along with the
lives of many of our American families and children in our
Nation, as Colombian exports of illicit drugs continue to flood
our shore lines.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you Mr. Gilman.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Gallegly. At this point we recognize the gentleman from
New Jersey who just joined us, the Member of the Committee, Mr.
Rothman.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by
thanking you and our distinguished Ranking Member, Mr.
Ackerman, for holding today's hearing. I am here today because
I am interested in helping craft a U.S. foreign policy that
will pave the path to peace in Colombia. I know in my district
in northern New Jersey, I have some constituents who have
emigrated from Colombia and whose greatest dream is to return
to visit relatives and friends in a Colombia that is free from
the chaos brought on by drug warlords. I share their dream. If
history is any guide, large infusions of cash from the United
States for counternarcotics operations in Colombia will not
alone end that nation's dreadful slide into anarchy.
While the 2-year, $1.3 billion aid package, and we recently
approved, increased assistance for economic development and
democracy building programs in Colombia, it also directs the
lion's share of the aid about 75 percent for counternarcotics
programs. Frankly, I wish the aid package was a little bit more
balanced with more aid targeted toward democratization and
economic development programs. I believe that the real path to
peace in Colombia resides in two places, in the hearts of the
Colombian people and the resolve of the United States to help
Colombia in its efforts to fight narco-traffickers and to
institute broad economic and civic reforms.
Ultimately, it is these reforms that will help defeat the
very drug traffickers who are now dragging this once proud
nation into a political and economic black hole. Today,
Colombia is in danger of losing its war against these drug
traffickers and guerrilla groups funded by income from the
narcotics industry. These groups now control or influence over
half of the Colombia's 1,000 municipalities. These groups have
escalated their attacks on military targets and innocent
civilians and have expanded their kidnapping and extortion
operations. Likewise, paramilitary groups in Colombia with
close ties to the military have committed gross human rights
violations, including the murder of guerrilla sympathizers and
alleged guerrilla sympathizers. On top of these troubling
facts, United States officials estimate that despite our
programs, cocaine production in Colombia is likely to increase
more than 50 percent in the next 2 years.
To make matters worse, Colombia is now also the largest
supplier of heroin to the eastern United States. No nation, no
people can long endure the status quo that now prevails in
Colombia. The murder of innocents, the assassination of honest
government officials, and the lawlessness of the guerrilla
groups and paramilitaries, have all taken an enormous toll on
civil society and democracy and in Colombia. Many good people
have been silenced in Colombia. Many more have been forced to
flee their home land, leaving the guerrilla groups stronger and
the government weaker. The good news is that the people of
Colombia do hunger for change as evidenced by the fact that
over 10 million Colombians, nearly one quarter of the
population, marched last year in support of peace and a final
end to violence.
Today a new path toward peace in Colombia does exist. It is
called Plan Colombia. I voted to help fund Plan Colombia,
because I am convinced that it offers fresh new and concrete
ways to bring hope and prosperity back to Colombia. It affirms
that all Colombians should enjoy fundamental human rights,
including freedom from fear. It offers real solutions to end
the vicious cycles of poverty, and Plan Colombia includes a
blueprint to provide full access to education and health care
to the Colombian people, the real keys to long-term stability
in that troubled country.
Finally, by enhancing social development and
democratization programs in Colombia, by addressing the need to
advance the peace process and by defining goals for economic
reforms, along with a very strong military response, Plan
Colombia represents a bold new chance for a secure, vibrant and
peaceful Colombia.
Mr. Chairman, again I commend you for holding this hearing
and I look forward to listening to the testimony of our
distinguished witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rothman follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Steven R. Rothman, a Representative
in Congress from the State of New Jersey
MR. CHAIRMAN, LET ME BEGIN BY THANKING YOU AND THE DISTINGUISHED
RANKING MEMBER OF THIS COMMITTEE, MR. ACKERMAN, FOR HOLDING TODAY'S
HEARING.
I AM HERE TODAY BECAUSE I AM INTERESTED IN HELPING CRAFT A U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY THAT WILL PAVE THE PATH TO PEACE IN COLOMBIA. AND I KNOW
THAT IN MY DISTRICT IN NORTHERN NEW JERSEY, I HAVE MANY CONSTITUENTS
WHO EMIGRATED FROM COLOMBIA AND WHOSE GREATEST DREAM IS TO RETURN TO
VISIT RELATIVES AND FRIENDS IN A COLOMBIA THAT IS FREE FROM THE CHAOS
BROUGHT ON BY DRUG WARLORDS. I SHARE THEIR DREAM.
IF HISTORY IS ANY GUIDE, LARGE INFUSIONS OF CASH FROM THE U.S. FOR
COUNTER-NARCOTICS OPERATIONS IN COLOMBIA WILL NOT ALONE END THAT
NATION'S DREADFUL SLIDE INTO ANARCHY .
WHILE THE 2 YEAR, $1.3 BILLION AID PACKAGE WE RECENTLY APPROVED
INCREASES ASSISTANCE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY BUILDING
PROGRAMS IN COLOMBIA IT ALSO DIRECTS THE LION'S SHARE OF THE AID, ABOUT
75%, FOR COUNTER-NARCOTICS PROGRAMS. FRANKLY, I WISH THE AID PACKAGE
WAS MORE BALANCED, WITH MORE AID TARGETED TOWARDS DEMOCRATIZATION AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS.
I BELIEVE THAT THE REAL PATH TO PEACE IN COLOMBIA RESIDES IN TWO
PLACES; IN THE HEARTS OF THE COLOMBIAN PEOPLE AND IN THE RESOLVE OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO HELP COLOMBIA IN ITS EFFORTS TO FIGHT
NARCO-TRAFFICKERS AND INSTITUTE BROAD ECONOMIC AND CIVIC REFORMS.
ULTIMATELY, IT IS THESE REFORMS THAT WILL HELP DEFEAT THE VERY DRUG-
TRAFFICKERS WHO ARE DRAGGING THIS PROUD NATION INTO A POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC BLACK-HOLE.
TODAY, COLOMBIA IN DANGER OF LOSING ITS WAR AGAINST DRUG
TRAFFICKERS AND GUERILLA GROUPS. FUNDED BY INCOME FROM THE NARCOTICS
INDUSTRY, THESE GROUPS NOW CONTROL OR INFLUENCE OVER HALF OF COLOMBIA'S
1,000 MUNICIPALITIES. THESE GROUPS HAVE ESCALATED THEIR ATTACKS ON
MILITARY TARGETS AND INNOCENT CIVILIANS AND HAVE EXPANDED THEIR
KIDNAPING AND EXTORTION OPERATIONS. LIKEWISE, PARAMILITARY GROUPS IN
COLOMBIA, WITH CLOSE TIES TO THE MILITARY, HAVE COMMITTED GROSS HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, INCLUDING THE MURDER OF GUERILLA SYMPATHIZERS.
ON TOP OF THESE TROUBLING FACTS, U.S. OFFICIALS ESTIMATE THAT
DESPITE ON-GOING COUNTER-NARCOTICS PROGRAMS, COCAINE PRODUCTION IN
COLOMBIA IS LIKELY TO INCREASE MORE THAN 50% IN THE NEXT TWO YEARS. TO
MAKE MATTERS WORSE, COLOMBIA IS NOW ALSO THE LARGEST SUPPLIER OF HEROIN
TO THE EASTERN UNITED STATES.
NO NATION, NO PEOPLE, CAN LONG ENDURE THE STATUS QUO THAT PREVAILS
IN COLOMBIA. THE MURDER OF INNOCENTS, THE ASSASSINATION OF HONEST
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AND THE LAWLESSNESS OF THE GUERILLA GROUPS AND
PARAMILITARIES HAVE ALL TAKEN AN ENORMOUS TOLL ON CIVIL SOCIETY AND
DEMOCRACY IN COLOMBIA. MANY GOOD PEOPLE HAVE BEEN SILENCED IN COLOMBIA.
AND TOO MANY MORE HAVE BEEN FORCED TO FLEE THEIR HOMELAND--LEAVING
GUERILLA GROUPS STRONGER AND THE GOVERNMENT WEAKER.
THE GOOD NEWS IS THAT COLOMBIA IS HUNGERING FOR CHANGE, AS
EVIDENCED BY THE FACT THAT OVER 10 MILLION COLOMBIANS, NEARLY ONE
QUARTER OF THE POPULATION, MARCHED LAST YEAR IN SUPPORT OF PEACE AND A
FINAL END TO THE VIOLENCE.
TODAY, A NEW PATH TOWARDS PEACE IN COLOMBIA DOES EXIST--PLAN
COLOMBIA. I VOTED FOR HELPING FUND PLAN COLOMBIA BECAUSE I AM CONVINCED
IT OFFERS FRESH, NEW, AND CONCRETE WAYS TO BRING HOPE AND PROSPERITY
BACK TO COLOMBIA. IT AFFIRMS THAT ALL COLOMBIANS SHOULD ENJOY
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING FREEDOM FROM FEAR. IT OFFERS REAL
SOLUTIONS TO END VICIOUS CYCLES OF POVERTY. AND PLAN COLOMBIA INCLUDES
A BLUEPRINT TO PROVIDE FULL ACCESS TO EDUCATION AND HEALTH CARE TO THE
COLOMBIAN PEOPLE--THE REAL KEYS TO LONG TERM STABILITY IN THIS TROUBLED
COUNTRY.
BY ENHANCING SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRATIZATION PROGRAMS IN
COLOMBIA, BY ADDRESSING THE NEED TO ADVANCE THE PEACE PROCESS, AND BY
DEFINING GOALS FOR ECONOMIC REFORMS, PLAN COLOMBIA ALONG WITH STRONG
AND CONTINUING MILITARY TRAINING, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT REPRESENTS A
BOLD NEW CHANCE FOR A SECURE, VIBRANT AND PEACEFUL COLOMBIA.
MR. CHAIRMAN, AGAIN, I COMMEND YOU FOR HOLDING THIS HEARING AND I
LOOK FORWARD TO LISTENING TO THE TESTIMONY OF OUR DISTINGUISHED
WITNESSES.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Chairman, we have a mark up in about 5
minutes. Could I take 30 or 60 seconds to make a brief comment,
then I will depart.
Mr. Gallegly. Without objection.
Mr. Burton. Let me just say real quickly, we have a lot of
Black Hawks in our inventory. We have mechanics and pilots in
the Colombian National Police who can fly those and take care
of them today, not 3 years from now, today. It will be a
tragedy if we have to wait 2 or 3 years to get new Black Hawks
and train people when we already have trained--look at me, sir,
please. We already have trained pilots down there with the CNP
and mechanics who can today fly Black Hawks. We have Black
Hawks in our inventory, a lot of them. We could send them down
there now. To wait 2 or 3 years for new Black Hawks to come off
the line and train a whole bunch of people when we have them
already trained and ready to go down there is a ludicrous
argument. I mean, there is a war that is going to be lost if we
wait 2 or 3 years. They already have a DMZ. The President down
there is scared to death of these people. And you are going to
wait 3 years to get them the help they need? That is bologna.
Mr. Beers. Sir, may I submit for the record an answer to
that question.
Mr. Burton. Yes. I would like to read it.
Mr. Gallegly. Yes, Mr. Secretary you can submit a response
for the record and it will be made a part of the record.
[The response appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Gallegly. And with that, I would yield to the Assistant
Secretary, Brian Sheridan.
Mr. Sheridan.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BRIAN SHERIDAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE
Mr. Sheridan. Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for holding
this hearing this morning, giving us the opportunity to answer
your questions. We appreciate your bipartisan support for Plan
Colombia. Before we delve into a detailed discussion of
delivery dates and GAU-19's versus M-60's and other kinds of
machine guns, I wanted just to make four points quickly on
behalf of the Department of Defense in order to make clear what
our policy is.
First, the DOD policy in Colombia is focused on
counterdrugs, and counterdrugs only. As General McCaffrey
eloquently has testified on numerous occasions, we have
thousands of American killed every year because of illegal
drugs in our society. By his estimation over $110 billion in
damages to our economy, and we have exploding coca cultivation
in Colombia. That is the problem that the Department of
Defense, along with all the others, is trying to address. And
that is our only focus in Colombia. Secondly, DOD's programs
supporting the Colombians are designed to interdict, disrupt
and destroy drug production, in particular, in southern
Colombia. I would note that the Department of Defense has a
broad ranging $900 million a year counterdrug program with
programs throughout all South America, Central America, the
Caribbean and in the United States. These programs are
effective, they work. We help foreign and local law enforcement
seize over 100 metric tons of cocaine a year. The programs that
we are supporting in Colombia are very consistent with the
types of programs we have been working on there since 1989.
In particular, as we have seen the problems in southern
Colombia explode over the last couple of years, with the strong
support of the Congress, we have undertaken a wide variety of
air, ground and river interdiction programs designed to choke
off the flow of precursor chemicals into Putumayo and Caqueta,
and to disrupt the flow of cocaine products out of that area.
We have seen in interdiction programs before in Peru the
dramatic effects that interdiction programs can have and how
they can reinforce and help alternative development, crop
eradication and other programs.
My point is simply to say from a DOD perspective, the
programs that we are executing under Plan Colombia are not new.
They are not different. In fact, what we are really doing is
somewhat more of and faster programs that we had architected
several years ago, and were well on our way to implementing.
My third point, is there is a concern, and I think a valid
concern among many, that we may get dragged into some kind of a
counter-insurgency campaign. Let me assure you that we will
not. We have very clear guidance issued repeatedly from the
Secretary of Defense, well understood by General Pace,
understood by General Wilhelm before him, exactly what we are
doing in Colombia and what we are not doing. As I have said
before, we have been operating counterdrug programs in Colombia
since 1989. We know what the mine fields are. We know what we
are doing.
The bright red line which we hold to and the one that I
think will keep us out of trouble, simply says on every single
deployment order of U.S. forces into Colombia, you are not to
accompany host nation forces as they conduct operations. We can
train them, we can give them intelligence support, I can give
them engineering support, but at the end of the day, when it is
time to do an operation, they go out and they do it. We have
taken extraordinary protection measures in Colombia to ensure
that our soldiers are as safe as they can possibly be.
Having said that, it is fairly obvious, I think, to all of
us here, that Colombia is a very dangerous place. We
continuously review our force protection posture. We try to
train at the largest military bases we can. For example,
currently the second counterdrug battalion is being trained in
Larandia in southern Colombia. Larandia is home to several
thousand Colombia Army troops in any case, including of course
the hundreds that we are currently training.
As Congressman Burton I think eloquently pointed out at the
beginning of his opening statement, the FARC are not noted for
their profiles in courage. They prefer to attack in isolated
police posts, a couple of hundred guerrillas against 10
policemen and commit their atrocities. We are relatively
comfortable that at a large military base with several thousand
Colombian police and military housed there, that our handful of
soldiers are relatively safe there.
Lastly, let me say a word about human rights. Human rights,
from our perspective, is an area that we evaluate and work with
the Colombians in three distinct areas. One, how is the
Colombian military doing currently in their conduct of their
operations and in the human rights area; secondly, how are they
doing on bringing to justice military personnel for past
abuses; and third, what is the status of their relationship
with the paramilitaries.
Let me say on the first score, that of current abuses by
security forces they are down dramatically. And any NGO, in
fact, I think the severest critics of the Colombian military
will tell you that human rights abuses by the Colombian police
and military have plummeted over the last number of years as
President Pastrana and the Colombian military leadership and
the Minister of Defense have made it clear that this will
simply not be tolerated. There was a time 5 or 10 years ago
when the security forces may have committed over 50 percent of
political violence in Colombia, but that number is now less
than 2 percent. So we think they have made dramatic progress in
that area. We think that needs to be recognized. I also would
associate myself with Congressman Burton's statements on that
score, while the human rights community has plenty to say about
the conduct of the Colombian police and military, I don't hear
a whole lot about the conduct of the FARC and ELN which engage
in atrocities on a daily basis in Colombia.
On bringing to justice military personnel who may have
committed human rights abuses in the past, clearly this is a
very difficult area that they have done some work on but
clearly they need to do more. Over the last few years over 500
cases of military personnel accused of human rights abuses have
been submitted to the civilian courts. Within the military
system over 400 members have been convicted of human rights
abuses. The Prosecutor General has taken action and has been
proceeding with cases against over 300 members over the last
couple years. So there is vigorous action being taken on these
past abuses.
Lastly, on the links to the paramilitaries, let me just say
that President Pastrana, Minister Ramirez, General Tapias and
General Mora have made it abundantly clear they will not
tolerate links to the paramilitaries. That said, we have no
doubt that in isolated instances there may be some collusion.
Clearly I think there is some onus of responsibility on those
to accuse the military to show me such links, and usually they
fall short in that area. I think it is one of those cases where
it is very hard to disprove a negative. If there is significant
collusion with the paramilitaries, I would like to see some
proof of it. I have not seen it. I don't believe it is the
case. I know all of the individuals I just named personally and
have known them for years, they are men of integrity, and when
they say this won't be tolerated and they convey that to their
forces, I believe they mean it.
I would just close by noting that on September 14th,
President Pastrana announced a presidential decree with a broad
sweeping reform of the Colombian military. Again, this is
something that had been asked for by the NGOs repeatedly over
the years. I haven't seen much press coverage of it; haven't
seen too many NGO press releases. As a matter of fact, last
week President Pastrana announced broad sweeping powers to the
head of the Colombian military to dismiss those who he thinks
have performed poorly or for other reasons. In the past General
Serrano, of course, the head of the Colombian National Police
had used such powers very effectively to dismiss those alleged
to be corrupt or alleged to have committed human rights abuses.
The Colombian military now has that power. The Colombian
military will now institute the creation of a JAG Corps. Again,
something requested repeatedly over the years by the NGOs and
by the U.S. Government.
So we think the Colombian military, the Minister of
Defense, and President Pastrana have continued to make strong
efforts in these areas, and I think we need to recognize their
efforts in that regard.
Let me close by saying Plan Colombia is very complicated.
There are many moving parts. Along with Randy Beers and Carl,
we are the three talking dogs who have been up on the Hill more
hours than we can count since last summer as we put together
Plan Colombia and explained it. We have always said it is
difficult. We have always said it will take time to implement.
But we also think it is the right approach. It is a holistic
approach. It includes alternative development, includes social
development, it includes judicial reform, it includes all those
pieces that have to be there and it includes the security
component piece of it. So it is complicated, it will be
difficult to synchronize and execute, but we think it is the
right thing to do. And I am happy to answer any questions the
Members have this morning about our progress in that area.
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you Mr. Secretary.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sheridan follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Brian Sheridan, Assistant
Secretary, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, U.S.
Department of Defense
I am pleased to have the opportunity to testify before this
Committee to discuss the implementation of the Department of Defense's
portion of the Fiscal Year 2000 supplemental appropriation that
supports the Government of Colombia's execution of Plan Colombia.
Drug abuse is an undeniable threat to our national security; one
that is measured by the thousands of lives lost in our country every
year and that costs our country billions of dollars annually. Reducing
the supply of drugs on our streets is an integral component of our
National Drug Control Strategy and the Department of Defense (DoD)
plays a key supporting role in creating the opportunity for law
enforcement agencies, both our own and those of foreign nations, to
interdict the flow of drugs into our country. DoD is committed to this
counterdrug mission.
The demand for illegal drugs in the United States, specifically for
cocaine and heroin, is met primarily from the growing fields and
production laboratories in Colombia. The vast sums of money that this
illegal activity provides have served to exacerbate current domestic
issues facing the people of Colombia. The US and Colombian Governments,
and our citizens, share a common objective to reach our specific
national goals--to reduce drug abuse in our own country and to bring
peace and stability to Colombia. A significant reduction in the flow of
illegal drugs to the US, with the corresponding reduction in the supply
of ``easy money'' which supports both guerillas and illegal self-
defense forces operating in Colombia, serves the national interests of
both our countries. For these reasons, it is absolutely necessary that
the US continue to support Colombia in its effort to reduce the
production and transport of cocaine and heroin that is destined for the
US.
Over the past two years Colombia, specifically the area east of the
Andes, has become the center of the cocaine trade, largely as a result
of successful interdiction and eradication efforts in Peru and Bolivia.
The remoteness of southern Colombia and the lack of government control
in large areas of this region has precluded Colombian interdiction
operations to the point that the expansion of coca growing areas,
especially in the Putumayo Department, has progressed virtually
unchecked. Most of the world's coca is now grown in Colombia and over
ninety percent of the cocaine consumed in the US is manufactured or
passes through Colombia. The United States, the nation with the
greatest cocaine demand, currently consumes over 200 metric tons
annually from the Andean region.
DoD has been supporting Colombian counterdrug efforts for over ten
years. The additional funding provided by the FY00 Emergency
Supplemental will allow the Department to build on past programs, in
short, to accelerate the implementation of the efforts in Colombia that
ultimately proved to be successful in Peru and Bolivia. The
supplemental is a balanced and executable plan that will not require an
appreciable increase in the number of US military personnel present in
Colombia. This effort is responsive to Plan Colombia and consistent
with current US policy. Furthermore, these programs, in coordination
with other interagency efforts, form the core of a sound, responsive,
and timely assistance package that will significantly enhance
Colombia's ability to conduct effective counterdrug operations.
Let me briefly outline the Department's programs. Before I do so
however, let me raise a cautionary note regarding the timing of the
execution of the programs and delivery of equipment associated with
this increased support for Plan Colombia. While the funding was
appropriated in July of this year, several reporting requirements were
mandated which precluded immediately obligating the funding. As a
result, most of the supporting contracts are just now being submitted
for review by the Department and many of the dates reflect only our
best estimate of the expected delivery date.
support for the push into southern colombia
Counternarcotics Battalion Support
The Department has commenced training the second Colombian
counternarcotics battalion using members of the US 7th Special Forces
Group. This training is scheduled to be completed in the December 2000
time frame. The third battalion is currently scheduled to begin
training in early 2001. These battalions will give the Colombian Army a
complete counterdrug brigade in the Putumayo/Caqueta region to engage
what is the world's largest coca cultivation center. Plans include
positioning counternarcotics battalions at Tres Esquinas and Larandia.
Counternarcotics Brigade Headquarters
The establishment of a counterdrug brigade headquarters is
sequenced to support the strategic and tactical operation of the
counterdrug Brigade located in southern Colombia. Department support
for this program is scheduled to begin in the first quarter of fiscal
year 2001. Allocated funding will provide for training, communications
equipment, computer needs, facility modification, and similar
requirements. The counternarcotics brigade headquarters is scheduled to
be operational in February 2001.
Army Aviation Infrastructure Support
The Colombian Army does not have the infrastructure necessary to
support the number and mix of helicopters that will be provided by the
Department of State using emergency supplemental funding. DoD will fund
a variety of critical aviation infrastructure needs to support the UH-
1N, UH-1H Huey II and UH-60 helicopters that are required to provide
mobility for the counternarcotics battalions. This program will include
funding for electrical utilities and road infrastructure, aviation fuel
storage and fueling systems, security improvements, parking aprons and
helicopter pads, a maintenance hanger, an operations facility, and a
taxiway. DoD has conducted several site surveys and hosted conferences
to facilitate planning for this challenging requirement. Support
contracts are expected to be awarded in the first quarter of fiscal
year 2001 and continue through 2002.
Military Reform
For some time the Department has been managing a contractor led
endeavor to provide the necessary assistance to Colombia to support the
government's effort to restructure its military establishment so it can
successfully engage the drug threat throughout the country. The focus
of this effort is not tactical but organizational in nature, centered
at the Minister of Defense level and the uniformed services of
Colombia. The contractor's efforts have focused on restructuring and
improving military planning, logistics support for ground and air
operational assets, development of counternarcotics military doctrine,
development of counternarcotics military strategy, new concepts on
recruitment and conscription, development of an integrated intelligence
capability, improved computerization and command and control, and
similar initiatives. The program will also support efforts to promote
human rights and effect judicial reforms. This is an on-going effort
and is subject to periodic review. Supplemental funding will be
utilized to extend this program should it prove to be necessary.
Organic Intelligence Capability
The intelligence collection capability in the region will be
enhanced to support operations by the counternarcotic battalions. This
program will provide the counternarcotics battalions with a combination
of airborne and ground tactical intelligence capabilities to directly
assist in the planning and execution of counterdrug operations. It is
scheduled to begin in the third quarter of fiscal year 2001 and be
sustained for an extended period of time.
support for interdiction efforts
Tracker Aircraft Modification
In the first quarter of fiscal year 2001, DoD will provide for the
modification of two Colombia Air Force C-26 Merlin aircraft by
installing APG-66 air-to-air radars, Forward Looking Infrared Radars
(FLIRs), and communications equipment. The completed aircraft will give
Colombia an organic capability to terminally track and intercept
illegal smuggling aircraft that move the cocaine from the HCl labs in
southeastern Colombia to the Colombian coasts for transshipment to the
United States. These modified aircraft will replicate the terminal
radar interceptor that supported the Peruvians in their successful air
denial operation against the Peru-to-Colombia air bridge. The aircraft
modifications should be completed in the summer of 2001.
AC-47 Aircraft Modifications
Commencing in the first quarter of fiscal year 2001, the Department
will support the installation of a FLIR in one of the three operational
Colombian AC-47 aircraft. The FLIR will greatly enhance the aircraft's
ability to support night operations against drug smuggling activities.
Funding will also support modification of an additional Colombian
DC-3, converting it into an AC-47 aircraft with FLIR, night vision
cockpit, and fire control systems. This will be the 5th AC-47 in the
Colombian inventory. These planes have been used repeatedly by the
Colombian military to strafe drug trafficking aircraft. The aircraft
upgrades are scheduled to be completed in the third quarter of fiscal
year 2001.
Ground Based Radar
The contract for the installation of a ground-based radar at Tres
Equinas, Colombia that will provide positive air control for the
counternarcotics brigade helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft that
operate in the region is scheduled to be awarded in the first quarter
of fiscal year 2001. The Tres Equinas radar will provide improved
detection and monitoring of smuggling air activity in the Putumayo
region of Colombia, where over 70% of Colombia's coca cultivation
occurs. The program includes the upgrade of an existing TPS-70 owned by
DoD, and the installation costs for installing the radar at Tres
Esquinas. The radar site is scheduled to be operational in October of
2001.
Radar Command and Control
The DoD supported radar command and control program will provide
Colombia a modern and operationally effective system, located in
Bogota, which will be capable of monitoring multiple radar sites
throughout Colombia. It will support positive control of Colombian Air
Force air interdiction operations throughout Colombia. The current
system is outmoded and needs to be replaced. The contract will be
awarded in the first quarter of fiscal year 2001 with completion
expected in the first quarter of fiscal year 2002.
Andean Ridge Intelligence Collection
This ongoing program supports Colombia with critical intelligence
against drug smuggling activities. It provides for collection sites
located in critical areas throughout the drug cultivation and
trafficking regions.
Colombian Ground Interdiction
The Colombian ground interdiction program is still in the initial
planning stages. Supplemental funding will be used to initiate a
Colombian program to control drug smuggling on the major roads across
the Andes and those roads feeding the northern coast and western coast
cocaine transshipment regions. This funding will start the process of
Colombia regaining control of their major roads, which currently are
routinely utilized by the drug trafficking forces. Road control is
important since it can help control cocaine and precursor chemical
smuggling across the Andes and to/from major ports. As reference, there
are 4 or 5 major roads across the Andes and these highways feed the
road network located west of the Andes. Vehicle traffic on the highways
west of the Andes serves as the principal mode of moving chemicals and
cocaine to/from the northern coast and western coast cocaine ports and
transshipment regions.
All these programs that I just outlined build on our current
strategy--no change in DoD policy is required to execute the programs
funded by this supplemental. There is nothing new here for DoD.
However, there will be challenges to confront in the course of our
efforts to attack the center of the cocaine industry in southern
Colombia. It will not be easy, but it is worth the effort. Let me share
with you my concerns.
dod concerns
Colombian Military Organization
The Colombian military has limitations based on resources, training
practices, lack of joint planning and operations. They need to better
coordinate operations between the services and with the Colombian
National Police (CNP). The restructuring of the military is essential
if Colombia is to have continuing operational success against the drug
threat. The Colombian Congress has given President Pastrana authority
to implement a number of reform measures now under review by the
Ministry of Defense; those reforms will make the Colombian military a
more modern, professional and effective force. The Colombian military
needs help and, as was previously outlined, we plan to use a small
portion of supplemental funding towards this end.
Human Rights
I am also concerned, as are members of Congress, about human
rights. The human rights practices and procedures that the US
government has put in place, in response to legislative enactments, and
the example set by the small number of our troops training Colombian
forces has had an impact, as have President Pastrana's reforms. Human
rights violations imputed to the armed forces have dropped by 95% over
the last five years, to fewer than two percent of the total violations
in 1999. Armed forces cooperation with the civilian court system in
prosecuting human rights violations committed by military personnel has
improved. Some military officers accused of collaboration with or
tolerance of illegal self defense force activities have been dismissed,
while others face prosecution. The armed forces have demonstrated
greater aggressiveness recently in seeking out and attacking illegal
self-defense forces. Clearly, the Colombian Armed Forces have come a
long way, yet no one would dispute that more must be done. I am also
alarmed by the reported dramatic increase in human rights violations
attributed to both the illegal self-defense forces and insurgents--this
is symptomatic of Colombia's crisis in general and, as I see it, a call
for to action. The Colombian government needs the resources and
training to address this problem and the supplemental represents a
significant contribution on the part of the US.
Counterdrug vs. Counter Insurgency
Lastly, let me address the ``targets'' of this supplemental
package, and our source zone strategy as a whole. The targets are the
narco-traffickers, those individuals and organizations that are
involved in the cultivation of coca or opium poppy and the subsequent
production and transportation of cocaine and heroin to the US. Only
those armed elements that forcibly inhibit or confront counterdrug
operations will be engaged, be they narco-traffickers, insurgent
organizations, or illegal self-defense forces.
I know that some are concerned that we are being drawn into a
quagmire. Let me assure you, we are not. There are numerous
restrictions, constraints, and reviews that are involved in the
approval of the deployment of US military personnel on counterdrug
missions in Colombia. Suffice it to say, the process is comprehensive,
involving reviews by the Embassy in Bogota and US Southern Command in
Miami as well as the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. I personally look not only at who is deploying and what they
are doing, but at the specific locations to which they are going.
Furthermore, each and every deployment order states, in no uncertain
terms, that DoD personnel are not to accompany host nation personnel on
operational missions. This will not change. As I have said, the
execution of this increased support does not require a change in US
policy. Is there risk to US personnel providing counterdrug support?
Yes, there is. However, we are aggressively working to minimize that
risk.
In summary, the Department of Defense supports this additional
assistance for Colombia. US Southern Command and my office participated
extensively in its formulation. It integrates fully our source zone
strategy, affording the opportunity to enhance those counterdrug
programs that have proven successful in Peru and Bolivia. President
Pastrana has asked for international support to address an internal
problem that has international dimensions--fueled in part by our
country's demand for cocaine. It is time to move forward.
Mr. Gallegly. Mr. Leonard.
STATEMENT OF CARL LEONARD, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR LATIN
AMERICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Leonard. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am
pleased to be here to speak about the role that the U.S. Agency
for International Development will play in supporting Plan
Colombia. USAID has been helping Colombia and its neighbors
address a regional threat that knows no borders. We believe
that President Pastrana has taken bold significant steps in
beginning to address the challenges that today face his
country. USAID's programs are intended to provide help to the
people of Colombia who are caught in the middle of a national
nightmare. They are desperate for the restoration of normalcy
to their lives, free of violence and abuse and full of freedom
and prosperity.
We are well aware of the terrible scourge of drug abuse in
the United States and the continuing need to address this
problem at home. In Colombia, however, the effects are also
severe. Pervasive violence, increasing crime and murder thrive
under the flourishing drug economy. Urban drug consumption is
on the rise. And the country's precious and diverse ecosystems
are being decimated as cloud forest regions are destroyed for
poppy cultivation, and Amazon rain forests are cleared for coca
cultivation.
As part of the United States Government's support of Plan
Colombia, USAID will focus on the following three program
areas: alternative development programs, to help farmers secure
decent incomes and futures from the production and sale of
legal crops; second, democracy, rule of law and human rights
programs to help promote peace and support Colombian efforts to
strengthen democratic institutions, the judicial process, and
civil society; and third, support for Colombia's internally
displaced persons and families, to help Colombia's most
marginal population reenter the economy and social life of
their country. Through alternative development, USAID is
assisting Colombia to undermine the illegal narcotics economy
by providing farmers with legal income alternatives. Our
program fits into a multifaceted approach that includes
interdiction, eradication, and alternative development.
Our experience demonstrates that no single facet can be
successful without the other two also being effectively
applied. And Plan Colombia includes all three of these
approaches.
Today, more than 120,000 hectares of coca grow in Colombia.
Most of this coca is grown on large industrial plantations with
links to traffickers or insurgent groups. Our program will
concentrate on the 18,000 small family farms that cultivate
approximately 40,000 hectares of coca. USAID will focus on
helping this sector of small farmers get out of the coca
growing business.
Supplemental appropriation funds will allow USAID to
provide $52.5 million to help Colombians find viable and
sustainable alternatives to illicit crops. Farmers will be
introduced to more productive farming methods, provided with
high quality seeds and assisted in replacing their coca fields
with cash and food crops such as beans, rice, coffee, cacao and
hearts of palm. In addition, we will facilitate the marketing
of these products. We also finance critically needed social and
productive infrastructure.
Our goal is the voluntary eradication of coca production on
roughly 30,000 hectares over the next 5 years. Similarly, USAID
is also helping with the voluntary eradication of opium poppy
production on 2,500 hectares. This will be accomplished by
replacing the income derived from poppies with income from such
cash crops as organic coffee, tropical fruits and berries. Our
experience in Bolivia and Peru has found that alternative
development works. In Bolivia where USAID has been the
principal donor supporting alternative development, coca
production has decreased by 55 percent. In neighboring Peru,
coca production has decreased by 67 percent. Our experience
demonstrates that alternative development is an essential
element of an integrated counternarcotics program and can be
pursued successfully in the context of security challenges.
USAID will provide $39.5 million to help strengthen
democracy, the rule of law and human rights in Colombia which
have been under assault by insurgents, paramilitary groups and
the drug trade. With these funds we will strengthen human
rights institutions and groups and increase their capacity to
operate within the country to document human rights abuses and
monitor individual cases. We will help the government of
Colombia and local non-governmental organizations to implement
an early warning system that will allow officials to react
swiftly to threats against the civilian population by illegal
armed groups.
We will help local organizations inform and educate
Colombians about their legal rights and responsibilities, and
options for taking preventative measures in the face of
violations. And we will reinforce the ability of the government
of Colombia to help protect human rights workers and their
organizations.
USAID will support efforts aimed at greater effectiveness
and fairness within the Colombian judicial system. An
independent and vigorous judicial system is vital to the
observance of human rights, the defeat of narcotics
trafficking, and the decrease of white collar and street crime.
Working with the U.S. Department of Justice, we will help
Colombia move from an inquisitorial to a more open and
accusatorial judicial process. We will strengthen court
administration and training of judges, institutionalize the
public defender system, and work with NGOs and other interested
groups to provide greater oversight and participation in
judicial reform.
With the funds from the supplemental, we will expand our
support to the highly successful Casa de Justicia program.
Casas are neighborhood judicial centers in underserved
communities. I had the opportunity recently to accompany
President Clinton, Speaker Hastert, Members of this Committee,
and our Administrator, Brady Anderson, on a visit to one of
these centers in Cartagena last month. These Casas bring
together a variety of services in one location, giving
residents one-stop access to legal services. There are
presently 11 Casas in existence, and we plan to have 29 by the
end of 2001. Over 300,000 cases have already been resolved by
the Casa de Justicia system since the program was launched. And
when all the Casas are operational, over a million cases will
be addressed each year.
USAID will help Colombians reduce public corruption which,
like narco-trafficking, undermines the very fabric of
democracy. As Colombians address issues of impunity and law
enforcement, USAID will contribute to President Pastrana's
anti-corruption strategy by helping to strengthen governmental
and non-governmental oversight organizations such as the
Controller General, the account general and interested citizens
groups.
Finally we intend to work with nearly 100 towns and
municipalities to strengthen citizen participation in local
government, improve budget and program transparency, and
enhance the delivery of public services. Municipal governments
play a key role in connecting citizens with effective,
transparent accountable government.
Assistance to displaced persons is the third major
component of USAID's work within Plan Colombia. USAID will
provide a total of $27.5 million to help displaced persons in
Colombia. Accounts vary of the number of displaced inside
Colombia. However, there is no doubt that hundreds of thousands
of Colombians have sought refuge away from violence, threats
and intimidation. Many, after receiving an initial support of
housing and food for 90 days, are left on the margins of urban
areas to fend for themselves. USAID, through U.S.-based NGOs
and international organizations, will help municipalities and
local governments promote employment for displaced persons and
help them to obtain basic health care, primary education and
decent shelter.
USAID is prepared to obligate $119.5 million of
supplemental appropriated funds by September 30th of this year.
We are prepared to move forward immediately on assistance to
displaced persons. Our activities in administration of justice
and human rights will be expanded next month, and we expect to
initiate the anti-corruption program. Our largest single
program, alternative development in coca-producing areas, will
be open for competitive bidding at a bidders' conference
scheduled for early next month in Bogota.
I should also note that funding in the supplemental
appropriation bill provides for alternative and economic
development in Ecuador and Bolivia. In Ecuador, USAID will
provide $8 million for local infrastructure and support to
civil society along the northern border with Colombia. In
Bolivia, USAID plans to use $85 million in the supplemental to
initiative alternative development in the Yungas region and
broaden and deepen our program in the Chapare.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, clearly we
have a long way to go and a difficult task. We are greatly
impressed by the work and commitment of President Pastrana and
his team and we are encouraged by the interest already shown by
citizen groups, farmer organizations, municipalities and others
participating in these very important programs. Thank you for
giving me the opportunity to talk today.
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you very much, Mr. Leonard.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Leonard follows:]
Prepared Statement of Carl Leonard, Assistant Administrator for Latin
America, U.S. Agency for International Development
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here to speak about the role that
the U.S. Agency for International Development will play in supporting
Plan Colombia.
USAID has been helping Colombia and its neighbors address a
regional threat that knows no borders. We believe that President
Pastrana has taken bold, significant steps in beginning to address the
challenges that today face his country.
USAID's programs are intended to provide hope to the people of
Colombia and the region who are caught in the middle of a national
nightmare. They are desperate for the restoration of normalcy to their
lives--free of violence and abuse and full of freedom and prosperity.
We are well aware of the terrible scourge of drug abuse in the
United States and the continuing need to address this problem at home.
In Colombia, however, the effects are also severe. Pervasive violence,
increasing crime and murder thrive under the flourishing drug economy.
Urban drug consumption is on the rise. And the country's precious and
diverse ecosystems are being decimated as cloud forest regions are
destroyed for poppy cultivation and Amazon rainforests are cleared for
coca cultivation.
As part of the United States government's support of Plan Colombia,
USAID will focus on the following three program areas:
1. LAlternative development programs--to help farmers secure
decent incomes and futures from the production and sale of
licit crops;
2. LDemocracy, rule of law, and human rights programs--to help
promote peace and support Colombian efforts to strengthen
democratic institutions, the judicial process, and civil
society; and
3. LSupport for Colombia's internally displaced persons and
families--to help Colombia's most marginal population reenter
the economy and social life of their country.
alternative development
Through alternative development, USAID is assisting Colombia to
undermine the illegal narcotics economy by providing farmers with legal
income alternatives. Our program fits into a multifaceted approach that
includes interdiction, eradication, and alternative development.
Our experience demonstrates that no single facet can be successful
without the other two also being effectively applied. And Plan Colombia
includes all three of these approaches.
Today, more than 120,000 hectares of coca grow in Colombia. Most of
this coca is grown on large, industrial plantations with links to
traffickers or insurgent groups.
Our program will concentrate on the 18,000 small family farms that
cultivate approximately 40,000 hectares of coca. USAID will focus on
helping this sector of small farmers get out of the coca growing
business.
Supplemental appropriation funds will allow USAID to provide $52.5
million to substantially enhance our ongoing $5 million core program to
help Colombians find viable and sustainable alternatives to illicit
crops. Farmers, who are in need of the proper skills to sustain
themselves with legal crops, will be introduced to more productive
farming methods, provided with high quality seeds, and assisted in
replacing their coca fields with cash and food crops such as beans,
rice, coffee, cacao, and heart of palm. In addition, we will facilitate
the marketing of and access to these legal products. We will also
finance critically needed social and productive infrastructure.
Our goal is the voluntary eradication of coca production on roughly
30,000 hectares (about 75,000 acres) over the next five years.
Similarly, USAID is also helping with the voluntary eradication of
opium poppy production on 2,500 hectares. This will be accomplished by
replacing the income derived from poppies with income from such cash
crops as organic coffee and tropical fruits and berries.
Our experience in Bolivia and Peru has found that alternative
development works, especially when it fits into a comprehensive program
that also includes interdiction, and eradication. In Bolivia, where
USAID has been the principal donor supporting alternative development,
coca production has decreased by 55 percent. In neighboring Peru, coca
production has decreased by 67 percent in just four years. Our
experiences in Bolivia and Peru demonstrate that alternative
development is an essential element of an integrated counternarcotics
program, and can be pursued successfully even in the context of
security challenges.
democracy and rule of law
USAID will provide $39.5 million, in addition to the $4 million
core program now in place, to help strengthen democracy, the rule of
law, and human rights in Colombia which have been under assault by
insurgents, paramilitary groups, and the drug trade.
With these funds, we will strengthen human rights institutions and
groups, and increase their capacity to operate within the country to
document human rights abuses and monitor individual cases. It is our
goal that more human rights abuses will be reported and that cases in
the system will be brought to justice in a timely manner, thereby
contributing to a reduction in the number of violations.
We will help the government of Colombia and local non-governmental
organizations to implement an early warning system that will allow
officials to react swiftly to threats against the civilian population
by illegal armed groups.
USAID will help local organizations inform and educate Colombians
about their legal rights and responsibilities, and options for taking
preventative measures in the face of violations. And, we will reinforce
the ability of the government of Colombia to help protect human rights
workers and their organizations.
USAID will support efforts aimed at greater effectiveness and
fairness within the Colombian judicial system. An independent and
vigorous judicial system is vital to the observance of human rights,
the defeat of narcotics trafficking, and the decrease of white collar
and street crime. Working with the U.S. Department of Justice, we will
help Colombia move from an inquisitorial to a more open, accusatorial
judicial process. We will strengthen court administration and training
of judges, institutionalize the public defender system, and work with
NGOs and other interested groups to provide greater oversight and
participation in judicial reform.
With the funds from the supplemental, we will expand our support to
the highly successful ``Casa de Justicia'' program. Casas are
neighborhood judicial centers in underserved communities. I had the
opportunity recently to accompany President Clinton, Speaker Hastert,
and Brady Anderson, USAID's Administrator, on a visit to one of these
centers in Cartagena last month. These Casas bring together a variety
of services in one location, giving residents ``one stop'' access to
legal services. There are presently eleven Casas in existence and we
plan to have 29 by the end of 2001. Over 300,000 cases have already
been resolved by the Casa de Justicia system since the program was
launched; when all the Casas are operational, over a million cases will
be addressed.
USAID will help Colombians reduce public corruption, which, like
narco trafficking, undermines the very fabric of democracy. As
Colombians address issues of impunity and law enforcement, USAID will
contribute to President Pastrana's anti-corruption strategy by helping
to strengthen governmental and nongovernmental oversight organizations
such as the Controller General, the Accountant General, and interested
citizens groups.
Finally, we intend to work with nearly 100 towns and municipalities
to strengthen citizen participation in local government, improve budget
and program transparency, and enhance the delivery of public services.
Municipal governments play a key role in connecting citizens with
effective, transparent, accountable government.
internally displaced persons
Assistance to displaced persons is the third major component of
USAID's work within Plan Colombia. USAID will provide a total of $27.5
million to help displaced persons in Colombia. Accounts vary of the
number of displaced persons inside Colombia. However, there is no doubt
that hundreds of thousands of Colombians have sought refuge away from
violence, threats and intimidation. Many, after receiving an initial
support of housing and food for 90 days, are left on the margins of
urban areas to fend for themselves. USAID, through U.S.-based NGOs and
international organizations, will help municipalities and local
governments promote employment for displaced persons and help them to
obtain basic health care, primary education, and decent shelter.
Through USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives in the Bureau of
Humanitarian Response, the Agency will apply our experience in El
Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and other parts of the world to the
problem of reintegrating child soldiers. Children as young as thirteen
years old, many forcibly recruited, currently serve in the illegal
armed groups. The OTI program will help remove them from armed conflict
and peacefully reintegrate them back into society, through education,
training, and community-based programs.
implementation
USAID is prepared to obligate the entire $119.5 million of
appropriated funds for the programs I outlined above under Plan
Colombia by September 30 of this year. We are prepared to move forward
immediately on assistance to displaced persons. Our activities in
administration of justice and human rights will be expanded next month,
and we expect to initiate activities in the prevention of corruption.
Our largest single program, alternative development in coca-producing
areas, will be open for competitive bidding at a bidders conference
scheduled for early next month in Bogota.
regional support
I should also note that funding in the supplemental appropriation
legislation provides for alternative and economic development in
Ecuador and Bolivia.
In Ecuador, USAID will provide $8 million for local infrastructure
and support to civil society along the northern border with Colombia.
U.S. funding complements other funds already in place.
In Bolivia, USAID plans to use $85 million in the supplemental
funds to initiate alternative development in the Yungas region; and
broaden and deepen alternative development in the Chapare.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, clearly, we have a
long way to go and a difficult task. We are greatly impressed by the
work and commitment of President Pastrana and his team, and we are
encouraged by the interest already shown by citizen groups, farmer
organizations, municipalities, and others participating in these very
important programs.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify, and I would be
pleased to respond to any questions.
Mr. Gallegly. Mr. Beers, I am a little confused, and maybe
you can help us out here, who exactly in the Administration has
the overall responsibility for Plan Colombia? More
specifically, if I had a question about the Plan, would I
address it to State, INL, NSC, you, Secretary Pickering? Where
would that best be directed?
Mr. Beers. You have in front of you the three principal
implementers of the various programs under Secretary Pickering
as the co-chair, and in fact, the Chair of our executive
committee within the Administration as the overall person in
charge of Plan Colombia at this point in time, the whole range
of activities, including the peace process, as well as the
delivery of the programs that are implemented under the
supplemental funding.
Mr. Gallegly. Can you give us the members of the executive
committee?
Mr. Beers. They are representatives of the State
Department, the Defense Department, the Joint Staff, the Agency
for International Development, the Department of Justice, the
Department of Treasury, and the Central Intelligence Agency as
well as members from the White House staff of both ONDCP and
the National Security Council staff.
Mr. Gallegly. Do you have some type of an organizational
chart?
Mr. Beers. I can give you an organizational chart.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Gallegly. If you could give that to the Committee, I
would appreciate it. On the issue of helicopters, the 18 UH-
1N's it is my understanding that we have this number in
Colombia now, is that correct?
Mr. Beers. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gallegly. And they are assigned to the counternarcotics
battalion?
Mr. Beers. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gallegly. Right now can you tell me specifically what
they are doing and has the first battalion begun training yet
or what are they doing?
Mr. Beers. Sir, I will let Mr. Sheridan talk about the
battalion itself, but with respect to the helicopters, we
provided those helicopters in Colombia during the last quarter
of calendar year 1999 with final helicopters arriving in early
December. Those helicopters, when they originally arrived in
Colombia, were involved in the training of the pilots that
would fly those helicopters. They did not actually begin
training with the counternarcotics brigade. We had hoped and
expected that the funding from Plan Colombia would be available
to allow us to conduct that particular training. It was not
available. We stood down those 18 helicopters temporarily. They
will be back online and available for training beginning in the
middle of October, and the full 18 will be available for
training at the beginning of November.
Mr. Gallegly. Do you have all the spare parts and
everything that you need to maintain them?
Mr. Beers. We have the money. We have the spare parts. We
are ready to operate. Yes, sir. I mean we will have to continue
to order spare parts in order to maintain the inventory but
they are available to fly.
Mr. Gallegly. But at this particular point in time, there
is no reason that all 18 are not ready and you have adequate
back-up parts to keep them running without having to wait for
something else?
Mr. Beers. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gallegly. Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, let me
express my concern, it seems that all too often some of our
colleagues seem to just buzz around and fly in here and do a
political hit on the Administration or try to terrorize
witnesses and then fly off into some jungle somewhere. I think
that is really totally unnecessary for serious policy makers
who want to discuss the issues with the witnesses instead of
scoring political points.
I want to thank the witnesses for their written and their
oral presentations as well.
If I can ask Secretary Beers, there has been some concern
expressed that since the President exercised the human rights
waiver, which was necessary to release the assistance, that the
Colombian government now believes that a waiver is going to be
issued every time one is required. In the wake of the waiver,
how do we ensure that the military will actually improve its
human rights performance?
Mr. Beers. Sir, with respect to the issue of human rights,
it has been a constant issue at every level of our dialogue
with the Government of Colombia. We made clear to the
Government of Colombia in association with the discussions that
led to the decision by the President to waive those provisions,
that we were going to work with them and talk with them and
encourage them to move forward on the remaining items that were
not able to be certified.
In my written statement, and Brian Sheridan indicated it
earlier, I suggested that the chief of the Armed Forces have
the authority to dismiss individuals who are believed to have
committed human rights abuses which is now an element of the
Colombian military's way of doing business.
Secondly, the provision which requires the Colombian
military to create an equivalent of what we would call the
Judge Advocate General Corps in the United States Army is
underway. Both of those provisions, we believe now, would allow
us to certify three of the six elements of that certification.
The other three elements of the certification require judgments
to be made over time with respect to the implementation of the
dismissal of officers, the bringing to trial and whatnot. We
will continue to monitor those, and we will work with the
Colombian government. But there is no intent to simply say once
and for all, because we have done it that we will continue to
do it. We will work with the government of Colombia. This will
be a key issue of our bilateral relationship.
Mr. Sheridan. Can I just add, I was a strap hanger on the
President's trip to Cartagena a couple weeks ago. And I thought
there was a very powerful presentation made by a number of
Members of Congress to President Pastrana and his team, which
included the military leadership, which were in the room, about
how important it is, and this was post waiver, by the way, how
important it is that they continue to make progress in this
area. And so, I think they heard it very clearly from the
executive branch, they heard it very eloquently from members of
the legislative branch, and I have no reason to doubt that they
heard the message and are going to continue to work on that.
Mr. Ackerman. I thank you for that.
I have some concerns over the assertions made by our
colleague, Mr. Bereuter, that he was denied a briefing by the
State Department prior to his trip because OMB refused to
accede. Is there a----
Mr. Bereuter. Would the gentlemen yield just for a
correction? It is not this Member that was denied; the
information which came to me was that the staff of the
Speaker's office was denied, that the State Department had not
acceded to the briefing, but not this gentlemen.
Mr. Ackerman. Is there some structural thing that the OMB
has authority to suggest to or order the State Department not
to cooperate with the legislative branch?
Mr. Beers. Sir, the issue in question was that some
information had inadvertently been provided to a contractor
which was not entirely correct, which had then been provided
further to the Hill. We, the State Department, had been asked
to come up and explain that information. We had acceded to that
request. We had informed the Administration broadly about
acceding to that request. And OMB had said that rather than
providing an explanation of the interim information which was
not thoroughly scrubbed, we should wait and get the entirely
accurate information and provide the briefing at that point. We
have been engaged within the Administration since that time, in
near constant meetings run by the State Department, the Defense
Department and OMB, in order to be able to give a fully
accurate account of that piece of information, which was not
accurate.
Mr. Ackerman. So that will be forthcoming.
Mr. Beers. It will be forthcoming. It is fully our
intention to be responsive. We apologize for the creation of a
sense that we didn't want to provide the information.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. That is greatly appreciated.
One final question. I haven't exceeded my time as yet. The
Chairman of the Full Committee asserted that we should be more
dependent on the CNP, which seems to have been more reliable in
the efforts that we address today. And I think that most of us
agree that they have been. However, is it--does the CNP have
the capability to do the things that the Chairman had
suggested? My understanding is that there are somewhere between
2- and 3,000 anti-narcotics police in the CNP. Can they
actually go in and take an area or hold territory, or is only
the military capable of doing that?
Mr. Beers. No, they cannot, and yes, only the military is
capable of doing that.
Mr. Ackerman. I appreciate it. Thank you.
Mr. Gallegly. Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
return to some questions that I raised and review my notes on
your responses, Secretary Beers. I would like to ask if there
is anyone from the White House congressional liaison who is
here in attendance today? I would have liked to have heard from
them directly. But I see that is not the case. My questions in
part are derived mostly from material from the Speaker's staff.
But also, Chairman Goss and I did meet with the head of the
National Police and with the head of the military to understand
their decision, their request, and the details directly when we
were in Cartagena. Other members were involved in another
meeting and/or with the presses at their press conference. In
part, I bring that information to bear.
Secretary Beers, perhaps you recall that I presented
information that Sikorsky has notified the House Intelligence
Committee staff that the 18 Black Hawks that were authorized
would be reduced to 15 on the instructions of the State
Department. But Sikorsky says, as I understand it--and I have
this in writing from a good source--that they are willing to
proceed with the delivery of 16 Black Hawks. I don't know the
reason for the discrepancy between 18 and 16, at $234 million
as provided by Plan Colombia.
In part, this may involve a response from you, Secretary
Sheridan, because, in fact, the DSCA is handling this on it, at
the direction of the Congress. It appears from what Secretary
Beers said that the Defense Department is using the U.S. Army
procurement guidance documents, and I believe he, Secretary
Beers, said that the Army estimates the Black Hawks can begin
the delivery only in 2002. And the information I have indicates
that will be late 2002 and conclude delivery in 2003. And
furthermore, the Army guidelines you indicated, if I have this
correct, would take 6 months to sign the contracts.
Now, I am wondering if the information that you have
conveyed to me or my understanding of it is correct, first of
all, and second, whether or not you would think that the
President, if he was knowledgeable about the use of these
procurement documents, would find this a satisfactory and
timely response given what seems to be his urgency, and
certainly that of the Speaker, to move ahead in a timely
fashion. And it seems to me a bipartisan effort here in the
House. I would call on you in any order that you wish to
respond.
Mr. Beers. Thank you, sir. Your rendition of my oral
statement is accurate. But I want to emphasize that those are
the Army's conservative figures with respect to delivery. And I
want to also emphasize that those delivery times are not
acceptable to us. And that we will do everything to reduce
them. And there is a commitment on the part of DSCA and the
Army to reduce them, but that is the number that they can give
you now.
Secondly, let me say that included in the context of the
Black Hawk helicopters, must be the pilots, the crew, the
mechanics and the logistical structure. So the provision of
those aircraft immediately out of, for example, the U.S. Army's
active inventory would not allow those helicopters to be used.
Because there are not, within the Colombian army, the pilots or
the mechanics to fly them, contrary to the statement of Mr.
Burton. There are not those pilots and mechanics in those
numbers within the Colombian National Police to do that either.
Mr. Bereuter. There seems to be an agreement within the
Colombian police as to whether or not there are additional
pilots that could fly Black Hawks that are trained based on
what they told us in Cartagena, perhaps not in that number but
additional pilots. I am not prepared with information to
address whether or not maintenance capacity is there or not.
Mr. Sheridan, Mr. Secretary, would you indicate what you
believe your orders and overall directions are about expediting
the delivery in contrast to the procurement documents of the
U.S. Army?
Mr. Sheridan. Congressman, I am glad you asked. I think we
would all agree in the executive branch and in the legislative
branch that we all want three things: We want to get the
helicopters as fast as we can, consistent with them being ready
to accept them, so we don't have helicopters sitting on the
ground that no one can fly. We want to get them as fast as we
can. We want to get as many as we can. And we need to get them
properly configured to do the mission that they are being asked
to perform.
What we are in the middle of right now, which I think Randy
alluded to, is, from my perspective, a very technical
discussion among budget analysts and acquisition people as to
which estimates were used last time, which assumptions were you
making about the configuration, did you include external
additional fuel tanks or did you not? Did you include the air
defense systems on the helos or did you not? So let us compare
the original numbers, what was the configuration, what
currently is required, what has been the agreed-upon
configuration with the Colombian army.
And we had a configuration meeting in southern command
between the Colombian army and our aviation experts in SOUTHCOM
a couple weeks ago. And you have to do two things: You have to
ask the real operators who are going to go out and perform the
mission, the counterdrug battalions, what do you need? Where do
you have to go? How far do have you to go? What bases do you
have? What are the operating parameters that you have? And then
you get the more technical guys to tell what you need on the
helo. It is a very technical discussion. We are trying to wrap
it up as quickly as we can, but rest assured, we want them as
fast as we can, as many as we can, and we need them properly
configured.
Mr. Bereuter. Let us see if we have an understanding among
Sikorsky and the U.S. Government on two things. One, the
Sikorsky offer still stands for $234 million for Black Hawks.
Is that an understanding? But second, is there an inadequate
understanding of the configuration of the helicopter to be
delivered on the offer made by Sikorsky?
Mr. Sheridan. I think that--I think at this moment we
cannot answer this question until we get Sikorsky back in the
room with the aviation people and go through this one more
time.
Mr. Bereuter. The second on configuration or the dollar
amount?
Mr. Sheridan. Both. One has implications for the other.
Depending on how you figure it, it has implications for the
dollar amount. That is why we have to get back together with
them again and understand what they are talking about when they
communicate directly to the Hill on what they can do: what are
they talking about for configuration versus what the Colombian
army is talking about as it works with SOUTHCOM.
Mr. Bereuter. How soon can that happen?
Mr. Sheridan. We are doing it as fast as we can.
Mr. Beers. I would add one additional point if I might.
Mr. Bereuter. That is a little vague. I would like a
commitment.
Mr. Sheridan. There is a meeting today. There was a meeting
that Randy and I were at at the end of last week. We are
urgently working this. The other thing I would convey is, and
Randy I think passed this on, when you talk to the DSCA and the
Army, they tend to give you the most conservative or, in some
sense, worst case time lines. When can you sign a contract?
April. Why do you say April, because it usually takes this
amount of time to sign a contract. Is it possible to sign a
contract earlier than that? Yes. If there are no problems. Is
it possible you could have it in a month or two. Yes. Okay.
Mr. Bereuter. If the President has an interest in this,
which I believe is sincere and if the Congress had a particular
interest in a very specific direction, I would hope that the
Defense Department and the Army would try to aim at the
earliest possible responsible decision. I assume you can convey
that. I want to go on to the Hueys.
Mr. Beers. Can I give you one factual point? The numbers
discrepancy, I believe, is explained in the following way:
Sikorsky has taken two separate line items, $208 million for 16
helicopters that the Black Hawk variety for the Army and $26
million for two Black Hawks for the CNP. They have added those
together and come up with $234 million, and they have gone back
and applied it against the 16 helicopters for the Army. Our
objective remains 18 helicopters for $234 million or a clear
explanation to you of why that doesn't work. We have not given
up on that objective. So Sikorsky is giving you a number for a
lower number of helicopters and that is not our objective.
Mr. Bereuter. We are about out of time to go vote. I do
have this question, and I request an answer as soon as you can
get it to us--is it contemplated that there will be, in effect,
temporary Hueys delivered, so that there won't be as long a
delay in delivering, which could be, you said the second
quarter of 2003, on the Hueys? And, in fact, are some of these
helicopters coming from Canada?
Mr. Beers. Yes, sir, that's absolutely correct. What I
referred to is the UN-1N Helicopter, 18 of which are in
Colombia, 15 of which will be delivered early in 2001. Those
were purchased from Canada. They are used, they are adequate
helicopters. They will be the interim lift for the
counternarcotics effort until we can make these new helicopters
available.
Mr. Sheridan. If I could add that has always been our plan.
Regardless of what month the Black Hawks show up, we have known
there has been a gap and the idea from the beginning was to
design a program so the 33 UH-1N's provide the air lift as an
interim solution until the Black Hawks arrive. As soon as they
become operational, the battalions will be air mobile and they
won't be sitting around.
Mr. Bereuter. I understand that part of it. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Gallegly. I thank the panel. I do have, without
objection, a couple questions I would like to submit to the
members of the panel today to have a written response back that
could be made a part of the record of the hearing.
Mr. Bereuter. Could I be included in that?
Mr. Gallegly. Yes, without objection. And we have about 5
minutes to get to the floor. I don't want to hold this panel up
any more. I want to thank this panel very much for appearing
for your testimony. And the Committee will be in recess until
the vote is completed then we will reconvene with the second
panel. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Ballenger. [Presiding.] Let me welcome Mr. Vivanco and
Mr. Shifter to the second panel of the day.
Then without further ado--I guess--do we have enough
people? Okay. Mr. Vivanco, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF JOSE MIGUEL VIVANCO, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AMERICAS
DIVISION, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Mr. Vivanco. Thank you very much.
Mr. Gallegly. Your full statement will be entered into the
record and make it as concise as you can. Go ahead.
Mr. Vivanco. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Members of this Committee, it is a pleasure to be
with you today. Thank you for inviting me to convey to this
Subcommittee our concerns about the human rights situation in
Colombia and the implications of the U.S. security assistance
to Colombia.
I know that the Subcommittee is most interested in an
exchange, so my remarks will be brief.
I would also like to submit for the record, Mr. Chairman, a
copy of my written testimony, which includes what we consider
to be the key benchmarks to evaluate the compliance of the
Colombian government with the human rights conditions included
in Public Law 106-246.
Mr. Gallegly. So ordered.
Mr. Vivanco. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. These benchmarks
represent a joint effort that included Amnesty International
and the Washington Office on Latin America.
To summarize, the human rights situation in Colombia
remains serious with abuses committed by all sides. The armed
forces, paramilitaries and guerrillas continue to ignore
international humanitarian law and fight this war by mainly
attacking civilians, not combatants. For every combatant killed
in this war, two civilians die, a situation that appears to be
worsening, not improving, in Colombia.
Unfortunately, we continue to receive credible and well-
documented information from multiple and credible sources that
indicated that the armed forces, in particular the military,
has yet to break long-standing ties to the paramilitary groups
that are responsible for most human rights violations,
including massacres and mutilations in Colombia.
In addition, the two major guerrilla groups have refused to
abide by international law or humanitarian law. Two of the
newest tactics merit special consideration, the use of gas
cylinder bombs in attacks on police barracks and paramilitary
bases, a weapon that is inherently inaccurate and responsible
for dozens of civilian casualties, and the practice of mass
kidnapping, the seizure of large groups of civilians to hold
for ransom or political concessions.
In our view, Mr. Chairman, there has been no progress on
the performance of the guerrillas, the ELN and the FARC, with
regard to basic principles of international humanitarian law.
Human Rights Watch remains convinced that the most important
way that the United States can contribute to improving human
rights protections in Colombia is to enforce the strict
conditions on all military aid. Enforcement of the conditions
contained in Public Law 106-246 would have contributed greatly
to improving human rights protection, in my opinion.
In essence, these conditions force Colombia's leaders to
enforce existing laws by ensuring that cases involving alleged
human rights abuses by members of the armed forces be
prosecuted in civilian court and not military courts, where
impunity has been the rule. The conditions also require
Colombia to combat illegal paramilitary groups, a goal that
would greatly fortify democracy and the rule of law in
Colombia.
Some Administration officials have claimed that the
Colombian government lacked sufficient time to implement these
human rights conditions. In our view, that is incorrect.
Indeed, these conditions reflect the literally hundreds of
recommendations made over several years to Colombia by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the
Organization of American States, and human rights organizations
including Human Rights Watch.
As I said, they essentially tell Colombia to enforce its
own laws, laws that have been on the books since at least 1997,
and in the case of paramilitaries, since 1989, time is not the
problem, Mr. Chairman, political will is. Regrettably by
waiving most of these conditions, the Administration has
converted the clear will of the U.S. Congress into empty
rhetoric. Without a clear enforcement, these conditions are
worse than meaningless. The waiver demonstrates to the worst
elements within the Colombian armed forces that atrocities will
continue to go unpunished if there is a single-minded
imperative to fight drugs. But the lawlessness of Colombia's
war is not divorced from drug trafficking. To the contrary, by
seeking that all laws be enforced, including the ones that
protect human rights, the United States would contribute
significantly to the strength of civilian society and its
ability to defend democracy against the rule of the gun or
machete in Colombia.
I call on the Subcommittee to reassert its commitment to
human rights by compelling the United States Government to
enforce these human rights conditions. Specifically, I urge you
to consider, Mr. Chairman, to eliminate the waiver authority
through legislation. Human rights should never be considered a
minor or secondary goal of U.S. foreign policy. Reflecting the
ideals of this great Nation, human rights should be the
centerpiece of foreign policy.
Secondly, I respectfully request that you adopt the
benchmarks that I have submitted to the Subcommittee as a way
to measure the Colombian government's compliance with the
conditions in Public Law 106-246. If these conditions remain
unmet when aid is ready to be obliged for fiscal year 2001, I
urge you to insist to the Administration that Congress will not
tolerate another waiver, a weak certification, and more
impunity for abusers in uniform in Colombia.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude my remarks by just
saying for the record that in my experience, human rights
organizations in Colombia and outside Colombia have
unequivocally condemned violations of international law, human
rights law committed by all sides in this internal armed
conflict in Colombia. Human Rights Watch certainly has
published several reports, long reports about the failure of
the guerrillas as well as paramilitary groups and the state
agency in Colombia to satisfy minimal standards of
international law that should be enforced in Colombia.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Vivanco follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jose Miguel Vivanco, Executive Director, Americas
Division, Human Rights Watch
Chairman Gallegly, Representative Ackerman, Members of the
Subcommittee:
It is a pleasure to be with you today. Thank you for inviting me to
convey to the Subcommittee our concerns about the human rights
situation in Colombia and the implications of U.S. security assistance.
I know the Subcommittee is most interested in an exchange, so my
remarks will be brief. I would also like to submit, for the record, a
copy of my written testimony, which includes what we consider to be the
key benchmarks to evaluate the compliance of the Colombian government
with the human rights conditions included in Public Law 106-246. These
benchmarks represent a joint effort that included Amnesty International
and the Washington Office on Latin America.
To summarize, the human rights situation in Colombia remains
serious, with abuses committed by all sides. The armed forces,
paramilitaries, and guerrillas continue to ignore international
humanitarian law and fight this war by mainly attacking civilians, not
combatants. For every combatant killed in this war, two civilians die,
a situation that appears to be worsening, not improving.
Unfortunately, we continue to receive credible and well documented
information from a variety of sources indicating that the Armed Forces,
in particular the military, has yet to break long standing ties to the
paramilitary groups that are responsible for most human rights
violations, including massacres and the mutilations of bodies. In
addition, the two major guerrilla groups have refused to abide by
international law. Two of the newest tactics merit special rebuke: the
use of gas cylinder bombs in attacks on police barracks and
paramilitary bases, a weapon that is inherently inaccurate and
responsible for dozens of civilian casualties; and the practice of mass
kidnaping, the seizure of large groups of civilians to hold for ransom
or political concessions.
Human Rights Watch remains convinced that the most important way
that the United States can contribute to improving human rights
protections in Colombia is to enforce strict conditions on all military
aid. Enforcement of the conditions contained in Public Law 106-246
would have contributed greatly to improving human rights protection, in
my opinion. In essence, these conditions obligate Colombia's leaders to
enforce existing laws by ensuring that cases involving alleged human
rights abuses by members of the armed forces be prosecuted in civilian,
not military courts, where impunity has been the rule. The conditions
also require Colombia to combat illegal paramilitary groups, a goal
that would greatly fortify democracy.
Some Administration officials have claimed that the Colombian
government lacked sufficient time to implement human rights conditions.
That is incorrect. Indeed, these conditions reflect the literally
hundreds of recommendations made over several years to Colombia by the
United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, the Organization of
American States, and human rights groups like Human Rights watch. As I
said, they essentially tell Colombia to enforce its own laws, laws that
have been on the books since at least 1997 and, in the case of
paramilitaries, since 1989. Time is not the problem; political will is.
Lamentably, by waiving most of these conditions, the Administration
has converted the clear will of the U.S. Congress into empty rhetoric.
Without enforcement, these conditions are worse than meaningless. The
waiver demonstrates to the worst elements within Colombia's armed
forces that atrocities will continue to go unpunished if there is a
single-minded imperative to fight drugs. But the lawlessness of
Colombia's war is not divorced from drug trafficking; to the contrary,
by seeking that all laws be enforced, including the ones that protect
human rights, the United States would contribute significantly to the
strength of civilian society and its ability to defend democracy
against the rule of the gun or machete.
I call on the Subcommittee to reassert its commitment to human
rights by compelling the United States government to enforce these
conditions. Specifically, I urge you eliminate the waiver authority
through legislation. Human rights should never be considered a minor or
secondary goal of U.S. foreign policy. Reflecting the ideals of this
nation, human rights should be the centerpiece. Secondly, I
respectfully request that you adopt the benchmarks that I have
submitted to the Subcommittee as a way to measure the Colombian
government's compliance with the conditions in Public Law 106-246. If
these conditions remain unmet when aid is ready to be obligated for FY
2001, I urge you to insist to the Administration that Congress will not
tolerate another waiver, a weak certification, and more impunity for
abusers in uniform.
Overview
So far this year, there has been little progress beyond rhetoric
supporting a negotiated end to Colombia's prolonged conflict this year.
Both the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) and the Camilist Union-National
Liberation Army (Union Camilista-Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional, UC-
ELN) sent delegations to Europe in government-approved efforts to
further talks. Yet in Colombia, individuals who spoke out in favor of
peace and protection for civilians were eliminated relentlessly by all
sides, advancing the turmoil of war.
Colombia's military continued to be implicated in serious human
rights violations as well as support for the paramilitary groups
considered responsible for almost 80 per cent of the human rights
violations recorded in the first nine months of 2000. Repeatedly,
troops attacked indiscriminately and killed civilians, among them six
elementary school children on a field trip near Pueblo Rico, Antioquia,
on August 15. According to witnesses, soldiers fired for forty minutes,
ignoring the screams of the adult chaperones.
Even as he lamented the deaths, Gen. Jorge Mora, commander of the
Colombian Army, seemed to justify them by telling journalists, ``these
are the risks of the war we are engaged in.'' The Army's claim that
guerrillas had used the children as human shields was dismissed by
witnesses, who said that there had been no guerrillas present.
There continued to be abundant, detailed, and continuing reports of
open collaboration between Colombia's military and paramilitary groups.
For example, government investigators believe that active duty and
reserve army officers attached to the Third Brigade in Cali set up and
actively supported the Calima Front, which continued to operate in
Valle del Cauca. In the twelve months since July 1999, when it began
operation, the Calima Front was considered responsible for at least 200
killings and the displacement of over 10,000 Colombians.
In a particularly shocking incident, on February 18, an estimated
300 armed men belonging to the Peasant Self-Defense Force of Cordoba
and Uraba (Autodefensas Campesinas de Cordoba y Uraba, ACCU) set up a
kangaroo court in the village of El Salado, Bolivar, and for the next
two days tortured, garrotted, stabbed, decapitated, and shot residents.
Witnesses told investigators that the men tied a six-year-old girl to a
pole and suffocated her with a plastic bag. One woman was reportedly
gang-raped. Authorities later confirmed thirty-six dead. Thirty remain
unaccounted for. ``To them, it was like a big party,'' a survivor told
the New York Times. ``They drank and danced and cheered as they
butchered us like hogs.''
Meanwhile, the Colombian Navy's First Brigade maintained roadblocks
around El Salado that prevented representatives of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and others from entering. At one
point, residents told investigators, a military helicopter evacuated a
wounded paramilitary, but did not stop the slaughter. Thirty minutes
after paramilitaries had safely withdrawn with looted goods and
animals, Navy soldiers entered the village.
Officers implicated in serious abuses remained on active duty, and
only in exceptional cases were they transferred after intense
international pressure. In numerous cases, military judges ignored a
1997 Constitutional Court decision mandating that cases involving
soldiers accused of human rights violations be prosecuted in civilian
courts.
The Superior Judicial Council (Consejo Superior de la Judicatura,
CSJ), charged with resolving these disputes, continued to demonstrate
clear bias in favor of the military. For that reason, on June 2, 2000,
the Association of Family Members of the Detained and Disappeared
(Asociacion de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos-Colombia,
ASFADDES), the Citizenry Alive Corporation (Corporacion Viva la
Ciudadania), and the Colombian Commission of Jurists (Comision
Colombiana de Juristas, CCJ) filed a petition calling on President
Pastrana to use his powers to order the Armed Forces to cease disputing
these cases.
Defense Minister Luis Ramirez responded by arguing that military
tribunals had already transferred 533 cases to civilian jurisdiction.,
demonstrating, he claimed, compliance. However, after review, Human
Rights Watch found that only thirty-nine related in some way to crimes
that could be construed as human rights violations, like murder. Most
involved low-ranking sergeants and lieutenants, and none were senior
officials who may have ordered or orchestrated gross violations.
In one notorious case, the two soldiers who murdered Colombian
senator Manuel Cepeda on August 9, 1994, remained on active duty until
human rights groups protested in 1999. Press reports indicated that as
late as July 1999, Sergeants Hernando Medina Camacho and Justo Gil
Zuniga Labrador moved freely about Colombia and continued to work in
military intelligence despite the fact that the Attorney General had
issued arrest warrants against them. A Colombian judge found them
guilty of murder in December, 1999. Others alleged human rights
violators have simply walked out of the military facilities where they
were reported to be detained.
The Colombian government claimed dramatic improvement in its record
against paramilitaries. Upon inspection, however, improvement was
illusory. Most arrest warrants issued by the Attorney General remained
unexecuted due to military inaction. The few arrests claimed were
mainly low-ranking fighters. Meanwhile, leaders remain at large and
collect warrants like badges of honor. As of this writing, there are
twenty-two outstanding arrest warrants against Carlos Castano, for
massacres, killings, and the kidnaping of human rights defenders and a
Colombian senator.
Although the government of Colombia has repeatedly claimed that it
has special search units (Bloques de Busqueda) to target paramilitary
groups, in fact these groups are little more than paper tigers that
vanish once the press conference is concluded. One such group, the
``Coordination Center for the Fight against Self-Defense Groups,''
formed with much fanfare on February 25, 2000, has never met.
Violence was particularly acute in northeastern Colombia, where the
UC-ELN tried to win government support for a territory to hold what
they called a National Convention on social change in the
municipalities of San Pablo, Cantagallo, and Yondo. Thousands of
civilians protested, fearful of guerrilla abuses, paramilitary
retaliation, and more war. At the same time, the area was increasingly
controlled by advancing paramilitaries apparently tolerated by the
Colombian military. A report by the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, government representatives, and human
rights groups found that over 3,700 people in the region had been
forcibly displaced over the first three months of the year and dozens
had been murdered.
Although Castano often announced plans for massacres publicly and
well in advance, military commanders established a clear pattern of
failing to deploy troops to protect civilians, even when local
authorities directly informed them about imminent threats. Authorities
also received reliable and detailed information about the location of
permanent paramilitary bases, yet failed to act against them,
contributing to an atmosphere of chaos and terror.
Castano, who claims 11,200 armed and trained fighters, continued to
maintain numerous and permanent bases and roadblocks and moved himself
and his troops with apparent ease, employing computers, the Internet,
radios, and satellite telephones to prepare death lists and coordinate
massacres. In an unprecedented hour-length television interview in
March, Castano described himself as the ``fighting arm of the middle
class.''
There was limited progress on human rights protection. On January
13, President Pastrana signed the Ottawa Convention and promised to rid
the country of an estimated 50,000 land mines. After languishing for
twelve years, a bill criminalizing forced disappearance, torture, and
forced displacement was passed by the Congress in May. A few cases that
had long languished in impunity were reopened.
Nevertheless, the Colombian Army continued to lash out at human
rights and defenders. Army chief Gen. Jorge Mora characterized an
government investigation into alleged army collusion in a massacre as a
``persecution that affects the morale of the troops. Hundreds of cases
that should have been transferred to civilian jurisdiction remained
shielded in military tribunals.
Guerrilla abuses
Even as the FARC entertained foreign dignitaries, journalists, U.N.
officials, and Wall Street billionaires in the five southern Colombia
municipalities ceded to them to promote peace talks, they murdered
civilians, executed armed force and rival guerrilla combatants after
surrender, threatened civilians who refused to provide them with
information used to extort money, took hostages, and forced thousands
of Colombians to flee. The group maintained an estimated seventy battle
fronts throughout Colombia estimated to include at least 17,000
trained, uniformed, and armed members.
In dozens of attacks, the FARC used methods that caused avoidable
civilian casualties, including the use of gas cannisters packed with
gunpowder and shrapnel and launched as bombs. In an attack on Vigia del
Fuerte, Antioquia, in March, FARC-launched cannisters left the town a
virtual ruin. Witnesses told journalists that some of the twenty-one
police agents who died were executed by the FARC, among them several
who had sought medical attention in the local hospital.
After a June mission, Human Rights Watch found evidence that the
FARC may have executed at least twenty-six residents since taking
control in 1998, more than double the official count taken by the
office of Colombia's Public Advocate. In addition, sixteen others were
reported missing. The FARC publicly acknowledged only eleven
executions, claiming their victims had been paramilitary supporters,
but observers believed the number was significantly higher. The Public
Advocate reported that at least twenty children had been recruited.
In an interview with Human Rights Watch in Los Pozos, Caqueta, FARC
commander Simon Trinidad dismissed international humanitarian law as
``a bourgeois concept.''
Rarely is there confirmation that FARC members who commit
violations are punished. To the contrary, the few cases the FARC admits
show that punishment amounts to little more than a slap on the hand and
rarely extends to the commanders who order or cover up killings. For
example, the two guerrillas who killed Americans Terence Freitas,
Lahe'ena'e Gay, and Ingrid Washinawatok on March 5, 1999, were
eventually sentenced to construct fifty meters of trench and clear
land.
The UC-ELN tried to generate parallel talks, and even negotiated
the temporary release of jailed leaders to take part in July talks in
Geneva, Switzerland. However, talks appeared to bring little hope of a
settlement and the group's estimated 1,500 fighters were increasingly
pressed in the field by offensives launched by the armed forces,
paramilitaries, and rival FARC units.
Far from respecting dissent, the UC-ELN threatened groups that
supported humanitarian accords meant to protect civilians, among them
Conciudadania and Children, Planters of Peace (Ninos, Sembrando
Semillas de Paz), both based in Antioquia. Guerrillas also targeted
civilian infrastructure to protest government peace and economic
policies, a violation of international humanitarian law. Since 1999,
guerrillas have blasted over 300 high-voltage power pylons, at one
point leaving a third of Colombia in the dark. The group continued
attacks on oil pipelines, and for prolonged periods prevented transit
on vital roads, converting thousands of detained travelers into de
facto human shields against army counterattack.
In areas where control was contested and around its camps, the UC-
ELN continued to use land mines.
Both the FARC and UC-ELN continued to kidnap civilians for ransom
or political concessions, a violation of international humanitarian
law. According to the Pais Libre, an independent group that tracks
kidnaping, guerrillas were responsible for an estimated 517 kidnapings
in the first three months of this year, up from 1999. Paramilitaries
also carried out 48 kidnapings, an increase of 45 per cent over the
previous year. Most kidnapings, however, were unreported, since
families fear risking the lives of their loved ones by going public.
In April, FARC commander Jorge Briceno announced that all
Colombians worth over $1 million should pay the FARC a ``peace tax'' or
risk being taken hostage. Some hostages, including a three-year-old and
a nine-year-old, were kept in the area reserved for government talks.
As of this writing, three passengers seized on an Avianca flight on
April 12, 1999, remained in UC-ELN custody, used as bargaining chips to
force the government into concessions. Families of civilians kidnapped
by the FARC confirmed that the group uses the area to hold at least
some of its ransom targets, among them a three-year-old and a nine-
year-old.
Forced displacement remained acute. In a report on a 1999 mission,
Francis Deng, representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on
internally displaced persons, called Colombia's situation ``among the
gravest in the world . . . displacement in Colombia is not merely
incidental to the armed conflict but is also a deliberate strategy of
war.''
According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees, there are at least
1.8 million forcibly displaced people in Colombia and between 80,000
and 105,000 Colombians living as unacknowledged refugees on Colombia's
borders with Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama. Colombia is now third
behind Sudan and Angola in terms of displaced population.
Although Law 387, passed in 1997, outlined a broad and
comprehensive plan to assist the forcibly displaced, it had yet to be
effectively implemented by the end of 2000. Indeed, Colombia's
Constitutional Court ruled in August that the state had failed to
enforce the law and was in violation of its duties. However, it
appeared unlikely that even this unusual decision could substitute for
the political will necessary to address the problem.
Defending Human Rights
Five defenders were killed in the first nine months of 2000.
Threats were particularly acute in the oil-refining city of
Barrancabermeja, long the home of a vibrant and broad-based human
rights movement. On July 11, ASFADES member Elizabeth Canas--whose son
and brother had been seized by paramilitaries in 1998 and have yet to
be found--was shot and killed in Barrancabermeja. By September, dozens
of human rights defenders and trade unionists had received death
threats. Almost all appeared to be the work of the paramilitary groups
who vowed to ``sip coffee'' in guerrilla-controlled neighborhoods by
December.
The Regional Corporation for the Defense of Human Rights
(Corporacion Regional para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, CREDHOS)
received eleven telephone death threats in less than a month. At the
same time, its members were featured on a death list circulated in the
city in September; a trade unionist on the list was murdered in July, a
lawyer remained in critical condition after an attack, and another
lawyer had fled Colombia.
Demetrio Playonero, a displaced person and human rights leader, was
murdered by presumed paramilitaries on March 31. After shooting him in
the head in front of his wife at his farm outside Yondo, Antioquia, the
gunmen breakfasted, then stole all of the cattle. In May, defender
Jesus Ramiro Zapata, the only remaining member of the Segovia Human
Rights Committee, was killed near Segovia..
Government prosecutor Margarita Maria Pulgarin Trujillo, part of a
team developing cases linking paramilitaries to the army and regional
drug traffickers, was murdered in Medellin on April 3, apparently
because of her work. Several of her colleagues had already fled
Colombia because of death threats from a gang of hired killers known as
``La Terraza,'' a close ally of Carlos Castano.
Journalists continued to be attacked and threatened for their work.
In one particularly brutal incident, El Espectador reporter Jineth
Bedoya was abducted on May 25 by paramilitaries from La Modelo prison,
where she had planned to interview a jailed paramilitary leader. After
the photographer and the editor she was with stepped away, Bedoya was
abducted from the prison lobby in full view of the guards, drugged,
bound and gagged, and driven to a city about three hours away. There
she was beaten, tortured and raped by four men who accused her of being
a guerrilla sympathizer. Before kicking her out of their car that night
at a local garbage dump, the men told her they had plans to kill three
other journalists.
Other journalists faced threats by the FARC for their work. In
January, FARC commander Manuel Marulanda Velez told reporters that they
had been unfair to his group and would have to pay. At the time, the
FARC was holding seventy-three year old journalist Guillermo ``La
Chiva'' Cortes hostage; Cortes was later rescued. Other journalists who
wrote frequently about the war, including Francisco Santos of El Tiempo
and Ignacio Gomez of El Espectador, left the country because of
threats.
Cases involving the killings of human rights defenders, among them
the 1996 killing of Josue Giraldo Cardona; the 1997 killings of Mario
Calderon, Elsa Alvarado, and Carlos Alvarado; the 1998 killings of
Jesus Valle Jaramillo and Eduardo Umana Mendoza; and the 1999 killing
of Julio Gonzalez and Everardo de Jesus Puerta remained either in
investigation or with only the material authors of the crimes
identified or under arrest. In all cases, the people who planned and
paid for the killings remain at large.
Members of the Colombian military continued to make public
statements accusing civilian institutions of having been infiltrated by
the guerrillas and questioning the legitimacy of their investigations.
The Colombian Armed Forces General Command maintained on its official
Web Site a text that directly accused Human Rights Watch and the U.S.
embassy's human rights officer of forming part of a ``strange and
shameful alliance'' with a criminal drug trafficking cartel.'' After
the release of ``The Ties That Bind: Colombia and Military-Paramilitary
Links,'' Gen. Fernando Tapias, Colombia's commander in chief, and Gen.
Jorge Mora, Army commander, echoed this rhetoric by suggesting that
Human Rights Watch was in the pay of drug traffickers.
Implications of U.S. security assistance
As required by law, the State Department held consultative meetings
with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in both Washington, D.C. and
Bogota, Colombia prior to making a determination on the conditions
included in Public Law 106-246. On August 17 and 18, various human
rights organizations, including the Washington Office on Latin America
(WOLA), Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International, met with
officials of the State Department and other US governmental departments
and agencies in Washington, D.C. to discuss Colombia's compliance with
these conditions.
It was our unanimous conclusion that there was overwhelming
evidence demonstrating that Colombia had not met these conditions.
Subsequently, the State Department issued one certification, of
Section 3201 1 (A) (i). On August 22, President Clinton invoked Section
4 of the law, waiving the remaining six conditions on the grounds of
U.S. national security interests even as American officials admitted
that Colombia's military maintained ties to paramilitary groups, had
failed to suspend or prosecute implicated officers, and refused to
enforce civilian jurisdiction over human rights crimes. ``You don' t
hold up the major objective to achieve the minor,'' said a spokesperson
for the office of White House adviser and drug czar Gen. (Ret.) Barry
McCaffrey.
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and WOLA protested both
the decision to certify Section 3201 (1) (A) (i) and to waive the
remaining human rights conditions.
The single certification issued by the State Department came after
President Pastrana signed a directive based on the entrance into law of
the new Military Penal Code. Human Rights Watch believes this directive
complied only partially with U.S. law, so should have resulted in a
denial of certification.
The Directive erroneously suggests that Colombia's Constitutional
Court ruled in 1997 that only crimes against humanity (lesa humanidad)
allegedly committed by members of the Armed Forces should go before
civilian courts, and that those crimes were limited to torture, forced
disappearance and forced displacement. In fact, the Court went much
further, and included crimes of ``unusual seriousness'' (inusitada
gravedad) that include gross violation of human rights. This would
include extrajudicial executions and the aiding and abetting of
paramilitary groups, the most common abuses linked to members of the
Armed Forces. Therefore, the directive fell well short of the law,
which called on the President of Colombia to direct in writing that
Colombian Armed Forces personnel who are credibly alleged to have
committed gross violations of human rights (emphasis added) will be
brought to justice in Colombia's civilian courts, in accordance with
the 1997 ruling of Colombia's Constitutional court regarding civilian
court jurisdiction in human rights cases.
In granting the waiver, Clinton not only makes the United States
complicit in on-going abuses but risks converting a failed drug war
into a disastrous human rights policy. It is the wrong decision at the
wrong time. The waiver demonstrates to the worst elements that remain
on active duty in Colombia's armed forces that reprehensible behavior
will continue to go unpunished.
benchmarks
CONDITION (A)(i): Civilian Court Jurisdiction
This condition requires:
(A) (i) the President of Colombia has directed in writing that
Colombian Armed Forces personnel who are credibly alleged to have
committed gross violations of human rights will be brought to justice
in Colombia's civilian courts, in accordance with the 1997 ruling of
Colombia's Constitutional court regarding civilian court jurisdiction
in human rights cases;
benchmarks:
The following benchmarks should be achieved before the U.S.
Secretary of State issues a certification of the Colombian government's
compliance with this condition:
A. A written directive should be sent by the President of Colombia
to the Commander General of the Armed Forces ordering members of the
armed forces to cease disputing jurisdiction of cases involving
military personnel who are credibly alleged to have ordered, committed
or acquiesced in gross violations of human rights, including by aiding
or abetting of paramilitary activities, whether directly or by
``omission.''
CONDITION (A)(ii): Suspension of Military Officers
This condition requires the Secretary of State to certify that:
``(A)(ii) the Commander General of the Colombian Armed Forces is
promptly suspending from duty any Colombian Armed Forces personnel who
are credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights
or to have aided or abetted paramilitary groups;''
benchmarks:
The following benchmarks should be achieved before the Secretary of
State issues a certification on the Colombian government's compliance
with this condition:
A. The United States should require the suspension of members of
the security forces within twenty four hours of the presentation of
credible evidence of gross violations of human rights or international
humanitarian law; the aiding and abetting of paramilitary groups; or
their being formally charged by the Attorney General (Fiscalia) as
suspects in alleged human rights crimes or the aiding and abetting of
paramilitary groups.
B. The United States should obtain a list of the names and ranks of
military personnel who have been suspended from duty since August 1997
as a result of credible allegations that they committed gross
violations of human rights or aided or abetted paramilitary groups,
together with the dates of their suspension. The U.S. Embassy should
update this list at three-month intervals and distribute it to the
appropriate congressional committees and the human rights groups
included in the consultation process required for certification.
C. The United States should obtain a list of names and ranks of
military personnel who have not been suspended from duty since August
1997 despite credible allegations that they committed gross violations
of human rights or aided or abetted paramilitary groups. The U.S.
Embassy should update this list at three-month intervals and distribute
it to the appropriate congressional committees and the human rights
groups included in the consultation process required for certification.
D. In particular, the United States should ensure that the
following individuals are or have been suspended, pending
investigations and, as appropriate, prosecution for their alleged
involvement in gross violations of human rights and paramilitary
activities:
1. LGeneral Rodrigo Quinones, Commander, Navy's 1st Brigade:
Colombian government investigators linked Quinones to at least
57 murders of trade unionists, human rights workers, and
community leaders in 1991 and 1992, when he was head of Navy
Intelligence and ran Network 3, based in Barrancabermeja. A
military tribunal decided that there was insufficient evidence
against him, but he has not been brought to trial in the
civilian justice system. The only people to be convicted for
these crimes were two civilian employees of Naval Intelligence
Network No. 7, one of whom was later murdered in prison. In his
ruling on the case, the civilian judge stated that he was
``perplexed'' by the military tribunal's acquittals of Quinones
and others, since he considered the evidence against them to be
``irrefutable.'' ``With [this acquittal] all that [the
military] does is justify crime, since the incidents and the
people responsible for committing them are more than clear.''
This judge also discounted the military's contention that
Quinones was the victim of a smear campaign by drug
traffickers, concluding that there was no evidence to support
this claim. To the contrary, he concluded that evidence linking
Quinones to the Barrancabermeja atrocities was clear and
compelling.
L The only punishment meted out to Quinones so far has been
a ``severe reprimand'' ordered by the Procuraduria General de
la Nacion, which concluded that he was responsible for the
deaths. In a disputable interpretation of existing norms, the
Procuraduria has determined that murder is not classified as an
administrative infraction in the existing regulations.
Therefore, the maximum punishment it can impose for murder is a
``severe reprimand,'' essentially a letter in an employment
file. It is important to note that the Procuraduria itself has
termed this absurd punishment ``embarrassingly insignificant,
both within the national sphere and before the international
community.'' Quinones is also the officer in charge of the
region at the time of the February 2000 massacre in El Salado
(Bolivar). Military and police units stationed nearby failed to
stop the killing and established roadblocks which prevented
human rights and relief groups from entering the town. Quinones
was promoted to General in June 2000.
2. LGeneral Carlos Ospina Ovalle, Commander, 4th Division:
Colombia's Attorney General's Office has documented extensive
ties between the 4th Brigade and paramilitary groups between
1997 and 1999, while General Ospina was in command. Among the
cases that implicate Ospina is the October 1997 El Aro
massacre. Government documents show that a joint army-
paramilitary force surrounded the village and maintained a
perimeter while about 25 paramilitaries entered the town,
rounded up residents, and executed four people.
3. LBrigadier General Jaime Ernesto Canal Alban, Commander, 3rd
Brigade: Colombian government investigators found evidence
that, in 1999, while Brig. Gen. Canal Alban was in command, the
3rd Brigade set up a paramilitary group and provided them with
weapons and intelligence.
4. LGeneral Jaime Humberto Cortes Parada, Inspector General of
the Army: The Attorney General collected compelling and
abundant evidence indicating that under his command at the 3rd
Division, the Army's 3rd Brigade set up a ``paramilitary''
group in the department of Valle del Cauca, in southern
Colombia. Investigators were able to link the group to active
duty, retired, and reserve military officers and the ACCU in
Barranquilla, Atlantico (See below); and
5. LGeneral Freddy Padilla Leon, Commander of the II Division,
and Colonel Gustavo Sanchez Gutierrez, Army Personnel Director:
In July 2000, the press widely reported that the Procuraduria
formally charged (pliego de cargos) General Jaime Humberto
Cortes Parada and these two officers with ``omission'' in
connection with the massacre in Puerto Alvira in June 1997. Two
other generals who also face disciplinary charges, for
``omission''--Generals Jaime Humberto Uscategui and Agustin
Ardila Uribe--are already retired.
E. If it is found after extensive review that the military lacks
the legal power to impose suspensions required by this condition, the
United States should require that the president of Colombia sign a
decree authorizing these suspensions and implement it fully and without
delay.
CONDITION (A)(iii): Compliance with Conditions by Armed Forces
This condition requires that:
``(A) (iii) the Colombian Armed Forces and its Commander General
are fully complying with (A) (i) and (ii);
benchmarks:
A. The U.S. government should obtain from the Colombian government
a list of all cases since August 1997 in which military judges have
challenged jurisdiction in cases being investigated by the Attorney
General's Office involving gross human rights violations or the aiding
and abetting of paramilitary activities, including the charges, the
rank of the individuals charged, and the decision of the Superior
Judicial Council. The U.S. Embassy should update this list at three-
month intervals, and distribute it promptly to the appropriate
congressional committees and the human rights groups included in the
consultation process required for certification.
B. The U.S. government should obtain a list of military personnel
brought to justice in Colombia's civilian courts since August 1997,
including the names and ranks of these personnel, details of the
charges brought, and the disposition of the cases. The U.S. Embassy
should update this list at three-month intervals, and distribute it
promptly to the appropriate congressional committees and the human
rights groups included in the consultation process required for
certification.
C. The Colombian military should transfer the cases involving the
officers named below to the appropriate civilian authorities for
investigation and prosecution:
1. LGeneral (ret.) Fernando Millan, former Commander, 5th
Brigade: The Attorney General opened an investigation against
General Millan based on evidence that he set up the Las
Colonias CONVIVIR in Lebrija, Santander, while he commanded the
Fifth Brigade. The Las Colonias CONVIVIR operated throughout
1997 without a license but with army support, according to the
testimony of former members. According to residents and
victims' families, the group committed at least fifteen
targeted killings before the director, ``Commander Canon,'' a
retired army officer, and the employees he hired were arrested
and prosecuted under Decree 1194, which prohibits the formation
of paramilitary groups. Among the cases currently under
investigation by the Attorney General's Office are those of two
Protestants, brothers Oscar and Armando Beltran Correa, who
were taken captive by the Las Colonias CONVIVIR as they went to
work on July 29, 1997 and killed on the road leading from
Lebrija to the hamlet of La Puente. Apparently, the CONVIVIR
accused them of passing information to the guerrillas. On
September 4, 1997, father and son Leonardo and Jose Manuel
Cadena were forced out of their home by CONVIVIR members and
killed, according to a family member's testimony to the
Attorney General's Office. The CONVIVIR apparently accused the
Cadenas of providing food to guerrillas. According to a former
CONVIVIR member who was also an army informant, during its
months of operation, the Las Colonias CONVIVIR frequently went
on operations with army units, setting up roadblocks and
detaining suspected guerrillas and criminals. When the Attorney
General's Office investigated this case, the army high command
prevented prosecutors from questioning Millan, then interposed
a jurisdictional dispute, claiming that since Millan was on
active service and carrying out his official duties, the case
should be tried before a military tribunal. Following a
decision by the CSJ, the case was transferred to the military
justice system in October 1998. A prosecutor assigned to
investigate the May 1998 massacre of 11 people in
Barrancabermeja fled the country after receiving threats from
General Millan, then-Commander of the 5th Brigade. Nine members
of the military and police were disciplined in connection with
the massacre, but there have been no prosecutions under
civilian jurisdiction. General Millan has not been brought to
justice in the civilian justice system.
2. LMajor Jesus Maria Clavijo, 4th Brigade: In March 2000,
Major Clavijo was relieved of his command pending the outcome
of his trial on charges of helping form and direct paramilitary
groups during his service with the 4th Brigade. Eyewitnesses
have linked Clavijo and other 4th Brigade officers to
paramilitaries through regular meetings held on military bases.
An investigation by the Procuraduria listed hundreds of
cellular telephone and beeper communications between known
paramilitaries and 4th Brigade officers, among them Clavijo. On
May 11, 2000, the Attorney General received a jurisdictional
dispute from the military judge handling the case. The case is
now pending before the CSJ.
3. LGeneral (ret.) Jaime Uscategui, 7th Brigade: Dozens of
civilians were killed by paramilitaries and hundreds were
forced to flee for their lives from Mapiripan, Meta, in July
1997. For five days, paramilitaries acting with the support of
the army detained residents and people arriving by boat, took
them to the local slaughterhouse, then bound, tortured, and
executed them by slitting their throats. Local army and police
units ignored repeated phone calls from a civilian judge in the
area seeking to stop the slayings. At least two bodies--those
of Sinai Blanco, a boatman, and Ronald Valencia, the airstrip
manager--were decapitated. Judge Leonardo Ivan Cortes reported
hearing the screams of people who had been taken to the
slaughterhouse to be interrogated, tortured, and killed. In one
message that he sent to various regional authorities while the
massacre was in progress, he wrote: ``Each night they kill
groups of five to six defenseless people, who are cruelly and
monstrously massacred after being tortured. The screams of
humble people are audible, begging for mercy and asking for
help.'' Hundreds of people fled the region. They included Judge
Cortes, who was forced to leave Colombia with his family
because of threats on his life.
L Subsequent investigations revealed that troops under the
command of Uscategui, then in charge of the 7th Brigade,
assisted the paramilitaries during their arrival at the nearest
airport, and made sure that troops with the capability to
combat paramilitaries were engaged elsewhere. In an attempt to
cover up his responsibility, Uscategui tried to falsify
documents reporting the massacre. As a result of their internal
investigation, the army moved Gen. Uscategui to administrative
duties for failing to act promptly to stop the massacre and
detain those responsible. However, the CSJ later ruled that the
case involved an ``act of omission'' and belonged before a
military court. Uscategui has since retired, and has yet to be
prosecuted before a civilian court. However, the military has
reopened the case and announced that Uscategui will be brought
before a Consejo de Guerra on charges of ``homicidio,''
``prevaricacion por omision,'' and ``falsedad en documento''
for the Mapiripan massacre. Uscategui has been re-arrested and
is being held in the 13th Brigade.
4. LGeneral (ret.) Alberto Bravo Silva, Commander, 5th Brigade:
According to Colombia's Public Advocate, on May 29, 1999,
paramilitaries killed at least 20 people and abducted up to
fifteen more in La Gabarra (Norte de Santander). General Bravo
was repeatedly informed of the subsequent threats and the
ensuing massacres, but did not act to prevent them or to pursue
the perpetrators effectively once the massacre had taken place.
He was relieved of duty, but has not been prosecuted in a
civilian court for his alleged role in aiding and abetting this
atrocity.
5. LGeneral (ret.) Rito Alejo del Rio, 17th Brigade: An
investigation was opened by Attorney General in 1998 into Del
Rio's support and tolerance for paramilitary activity in the
Uraba region in 1996 and 1997 while he was commander of the
17th Brigade. According to reports made by Colonel (ret.)
Carlos Velasquez, his chief of staff, to his superiors in 1996,
that Del Rio supported paramilitaries in Uraba, and maintained
a relationship with a retired army major who worked with
paramilitaries. Instead of prompting a serious investigation of
Del Rio, the reports prompted the army to investigate
Velasquez, in an apparent attempt to silence him. The army
concluded the inquiry by recommending not that Gen. del Rio,
who was later promoted, be punished, but that Colonel Velasquez
be disciplined for ``insubordination, [acts] against duty and
esprit de corps.'' Velasquez was forced to retire on January 1,
1997.
L Recent press reports indicate that an investigation was
opened by the Attorney General against Generals del Rio and
Fernando Millan in August 2000. According to these reports,
prosecutors charge that they attempted to present false
witnesses to the Attorney General to claim that a prominent
trade unionist and a human rights defender had paid witnesses
to denounce del Rio and Millan as having ties to
paramilitaries. These reports suggest that the Attorney General
suspects that, in fact, an army ``informant'' in league with
Del Rio and Millan paid the two false witnesses to lie to
authorities.
6. LGeneral (ret.) Farouk Yanine Diaz: Gen. Yanine was arrested
in October 1996 for alleged complicity in the massacre of 19
merchants in the Middle Magdalena region in 1987. Eyewitnesses,
including a military officer, testified that he supported
paramilitaries who carried out the massacre and had operated in
the area since 1984, when Yanine was commander of the 14th
Brigade in Puerto Berrio. The paramilitary leader also
testified that Gen. Yanine had paid him a large sum to carry
out the killing. Yanine also allegedly provided paramilitaries
with the intelligence necessary to intercept their victims.
Despite compelling evidence, General Manuel Jose Bonnet, then
the army commander, closed the case citing a lack of evidence.
The Procuraduria appealed the decision on the grounds that
``evidence presented against Yanine Diaz had not been taken
into account [the sentence] clearly deviates from the evidence
presented in this case.'' The U.S. State Department expressed
concern about the acquittal on July 1, 1997.
7. LGeneral Rodrigo Quinones, Commander, Navy's First Brigade:
(See benchmarks above, under Condition (A)(ii).
8. LGeneral Carlos Ospina Ovalle, Commander, 4th Division: (See
above).
9. LBrigadier General Jaime Ernesto Canal Alban, Commander, 3rd
Brigade: (See above).
The following cases should also be transferred to civilian
jurisdiction:
1. LMassacres at Trujillo (Valle del Cauca): Dozens of people
were killed in the municipality of Trujillo over a several year
period in the late 1980s and early 90s. On December 20, 1990,
the 3rd Brigade dropped charges that had been leveled against
Major Alirio Antonio Uruena Jaramillo. The sitting president
later cashiered him on human rights grounds. Further cases
arising from the Trujillo killings remain in military courts.
The paramilitary leader widely reported to have participated,
Henry Loaiza Ceballo, ``El Alacran,'' is not known to have been
convicted for his role in this case.
2. LMassacre at El Caloto (Cauca): This massacre, in which
twenty members of Paez indigenous community were killed, was
carried out on December 16, 1992 by the Judicial Police. The
case was transferred to military jurisdiction at the end of
1997 and charges against the implicated officials were dropped.
3. LMassacre at Riofrio (Valle del Cauca): Thirteen people were
killed in the village of El Bosque, in the Municipality of
Riofrio on October 5, 1993 by men in uniforms and ski masks.
The victims were presented as combat deaths by Battalion Palace
of the 3rd Brigade, based in Cali. The case was initially
transferred to the military court system by a 1994 CSJ
decision. A civilian judge then requested that the military
justice system transfer to him the portion of the case brought
against several military officials. The military justice system
refused to grant the transfer, and the matter returned to the
CSJ. In July 1998, the CSJ refused to decide the conflict on
the grounds that it had already decided the jurisdictional
question in 1994.
4. LBlanquicet: On September 22, 1993, in the rural district of
Blanquicet, municipality of Turbo, in Uraba, Antioquia
department, members of the Colombian army killed Carlos Manuel
Prada and Evelio Bolano, members of the armed opposition group
Socialist Renovation Current, (Corriente de Renovacion
Socialista, CRS) who had been acting as peace negotiators. The
CRS later demobilized. An army captain, sergeant, and several
soldiers, were acquitted by the military justice system. This
decision was appealed by the lawyers acting for the families
and by the CRS on jurisdictional grounds, and they requested
the transfer of the case to the Attorney General in compliance
with the Constitutional Court's ruling. The request was
rejected but the rejection was appealed, whereupon the Tribunal
Superior Militar confirmed the decision to deny the transfer.
The Human Rights unit of the Fiscalia then requested the
transfer of the case on jurisdictional grounds, and it is now
before the CSJ. The case is also before the Inter-American
Commission, which has agreed to a `friendly settlement' on
condition that the criminal investigation is transferred to the
civilian justice system.
5. LSan Jose de Apartado: On February 19 and July 8, 2000,
alleged paramilitaries killed a total of eleven civilians in
San Jose de Apartado. According to eyewitnesses, personnel of
the 17th Brigade were in the area at the time of both massacres
and failed to prevent or stop the killings. An army helicopter
allegedly belonging to the 17th Brigade hovered overhead at the
time of the July 8 massacre.
6. LEl Aro: Colombian prosecutors collected evidence linking
the 4th Brigade, under the command of General Carlos Ospina
Ovalle, to the October 25, 1997, massacre committed by
paramilitaries in El Aro. Government documents show that a
joint army-paramilitary force surrounded the village and
maintained a perimeter while about 25 paramilitaries entered
the town, rounded up residents, and executed four people.
CONDITION (B): Cooperation with Civilian Authorities
This condition requires the Secretary of State to certify that:
(B) the Colombian Armed Forces are cooperating fully with civilian
authorities in investigating, prosecuting, and punishing in the
civilian courts Colombian Armed Forces personnel who are credibly
alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights;''
benchmarks:
The following benchmarks should be achieved before the Secretary of
State issues a certification on the Colombian government's compliance
with this condition:
A. The United States should insist upon the capture and effective
detention of alleged material and intellectual authors of gross human
rights violations against whom there are arrest warrants, including
military officers.
B. The United States should obtain a list of outstanding arrest
warrants issued by the Fiscalia relating to human rights cases. The
U.S. Embassy should update it at three-month intervals, and distribute
it promptly to the appropriate congressional committees and the human
rights groups included in the consultation process required for
certification. New cases should be included as well as developments in
existing cases, in particular, whether the security forces are taking
concrete measures to execute these warrants. The execution of arrest
warrants should be sorted according to the security force units to
which they refer.
C. The United States should require that Colombia take effective
measures to protect civilian investigators and prosecutors from threats
that impede their work.
D. There should be significant and measurable progress, including
the execution of outstanding arrest warrants and the transfer to
civilian courts of the prosecutions of implicated security force
officers, of the following benchmark cases:
1. LAlirio de Jesus Pedraza Becerra: Pedraza, a lawyer with
the Committee of Solidarity with Political Prisoners (Comite de
Solidaridad con Presos Politicos, CSPP), was ``disappeared'' by
eight heavily armed men on July 4, 1990. His whereabouts have
never been determined. At the time, he was representing the
family members of scores of peasants killed when the Luciano
D'Eluyart Battalion opened fire on a protest march in 1988 in
Llano Caliente, Santander. We are not aware of any arrests in
this case.
2. LBlanca Cecilia Valero de Duran, CREDHOS: This human rights
defender belonging to the Regional Human Rights Committee for
the Defence of Human Rights (Comite Regional para la Defensa de
los Derechos Humanos, CREDHOS) was shot and killed on January
29, 1992 in Barrancabemeja, Santander. The then Colonel Rodrigo
Quinones Cardenas, director of intelligence for Colombian Navy
Intelligence Network 7, was believed responsible for her murder
and scores of other political killings by government
investigators. Nevertheless, Quinones was acquitted by a
military tribunal, although the Fiscalia named him as the
``unequivocal'' intellectual author. He remains on active duty.
Two people were convicted in the killing.
3. LOscar Elias Lopez, CRIC: This human rights lawyer had been
advising the Indigenous Regional Council of Cauca, (Consejo
Regional Indigena del Cauca, CRIC). He was killed in Santander
de Quilchao by heavily armed men on May 29, 1992.
4. LJulio Cesar Berrio, CREDHOS: He was a security guard
employed by CREDHOS, also involved in a CREDHOS investigation.
Shot dead on June 28, 1992, allegedly by men working for Navy
Intelligence Director Colonel Quinones.
5. LLigia Patricia Cortez Colmenares, CREDHOS: Cortez, an
investigator with CREDHOS, was killed on July 30,1992,
alongside several union members. We are not aware of any
arrests in this case.
6. LJairo Barahona Martinez, Curumani Human Rights Committee:
This activist was killed on September 29, 1994 in Curumani,
Cesar following his abduction and torture. According to members
of human rights organizations who collected information and
pressed for a proper judicial investigation into the killing,
members of the security forces were implicated in the
assassination. No one has been brought to justice.
7. LErnesto Emilio Fernandez, human rights defender: He was
shot while driving home with his children on February 20, 1995.
We are not aware of any arrests in this case.
8. LJavier Alberto Barriga Vergal, CSPP: This human rights
lawyer was killed in Cucuta on June 16, 1995. We are not aware
of any arrests in this case.
9. LJosue Giraldo Cardona, co-founder and president of the
Meta Civic Committee for Human Rights: Giraldo was killed on
October 13, 1996 after months of alleged harassment and threats
by paramilitaries and military intelligence officers working
for the 7th Brigade, then commanded by General Rodolfo Herrera
Luna.
10. LElsa Alvarado and Mario Calderon, CINEP: Alvarado and
Calderon were investigators with the Center for Research and
Popular Education (Centro de Investigacion y Educacion Popular,
CINEP). On May 19, 1997 a group of masked gunmen forced their
way into Alvarado and Calderon's apartment, killing Elsa,
Mario, and Elsa's father. Although some material authors of the
crime are under arrest, the intellectual authors remain at
large. Arrest warrants have been issued for Fidel and Carlos
Castano as the intellectual authors of the killings.
11. LJesus Maria Valle Jaramillo, ``Hector Abad Gomez''
Permanent Committee for the Defense of Human Rights: Valle was
assassinated on February 27, 1998 by unidentified gunmen, after
repeatedly denouncing military / paramilitary links. Formal
criminal charges were brought by the Attorney General's office
against paramilitary leader Carlos Castano and eight others.
Six paramilitaries are currently detained. Despite strong
indications of military involvement in the crime, no formal
investigation has been opened against military personnel.
12. LEduardo Umana, human rights lawyer: Umana was killed in
Bogota on April 18, 1998. Several alleged gunmen are either
under arrest or wanted for extradition. Shortly before his
murder he had denounced the role of a military intelligence
unit in paramilitary activity and human rights violations. The
intellectual authors remain at large.
13. LJorge Ortega, union leader: This union leader and human
rights defender was killed in Bogota on October 20, 1998. Two
former police officers have been implicated in the attack and
are in prison. However, the intellectual authors remain
unidentified.
14. LEverardo de Jesus Puertas and Julio Ernesto Gonzalez,
CSPP: Puertas and Gonzalez, lawyers with the CSPP, were shot
dead on January 30, 1999, as they traveled by bus from Medellin
to Bogota. We are not aware of any arrests in this case.
15. LDario Betancourt, academic: Betancourt, a professor at
Bogota's Universidad Pedagogica Nacional, was forcibly
disappeared on May 2, 1999, and his body was found on September
2, 1999. There have been no arrest warrants issued in this
case.
16. LHernan Henao, academic: Henao, the Director of the
University of Antioquia's Regional Studies Institute, was
killed on May 4, 1999. There have been no arrest warrants
issued in this case.
17. LGuzman Quintero Torres, journalist: Quintero, a journalist
who had investigated reports of corruption within the Armed
Forces, was killed on September 16, 1999, in Valledupar
(Cesar). The Attorney General's Office detained two
paramilitaries allegedly involved in the killing, but the
intellectual authors have not been identified.
18. LJesus Antonio Bejarano, academic: Bejarano, a former
government official involved in the peace talks with the FARC,
was killed on September 16, 1999. There have been no arrest
warrants issued in this case.
19. LAlberto Sanchez Tovar and Luis Alberto Rincon Solano,
journalists: Journalists Sanchez and Rincon were allegedly
detained and executed by paramilitaries on November 28, 1999,
in El Playon (Santander), while covering municipal elections.
Three paramilitary gunmen have been arrested, but the
intellectual authors remain unidentified.
20. LJairo Bedoya Hoyos, indigenous activist: Bedoya, a member
of the Indigenous Organization of Antioquia (Organizacion
Indigena de Antioquia, OIA), was abducted on March 2, 2000.
There have been no arrests in this case.
21. LMargarita Maria Pulgarin Trujillo, Fiscalia: Pulgarin, a
prosecutor specializing in investigating links between the
military and paramilitary groups, was killed in Medellin on
April 3, 2000. No arrest warrants have been issued in this
case.
22. LJesus Ramiro Zapata Hoyos, Segovia Human Rights Committee:
Zapata, the leader of an umbrella organization of human rights
groups, was abducted and killed on May 3, 2000 in Segovia,
Antioquia. The day he was abducted, Zapata had reported to
local authorities that paramilitaries had been seeking
information on his whereabouts. Paramilitaries had occupied the
area the month before.
23. LElizabeth Canas Cano, Association of Family Members of the
Detained and Disappeared, ASFADDES: Canas, an ASFADDES
(Asociacion de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos-Colombia)
member, was shot dead near her office on June 11, 2000. She had
lost relatives in the 1998 Barrancabermeja massacre. Witnesses
to the massacre and other ASFADDES members are currently in
grave danger of further attacks.
In addition, we call for progress on the following cases
involving kidnappings, attacks, and death threats:
24. LJairo Bedoya, Olga Rodas, Jorge Salazar, and Claudia
Tamayo, IPC: These four human rights workers belonging to the
Institute for Popular Training (Instituto Popular de
Capacitacion, IPC) based in Medellin, Antioquia were abducted
from their offices on January 28, 1999 by an armed gang.
Several days later paramilitary commander Carlos Castano
claimed responsibility for the kidnappings, claiming the four
as ``prisoners of war.'' He remains at large.
25. LPiedad Cordoba de Castro, Senator: On May 21, 1999
Cordoba, Liberal Party Senator and president of the Senate's
Human Rights Commission, was abducted in Medellin by a group of
fifteen armed men. The next day, paramilitary leader Carlos
Castano issued a public statement claiming responsibility for
the abduction. She was later released.
26. LDiana Salamanca Martinez, Justice and Peace: Salamanca, a
human rights worker, was abducted on November 10, 1999 by
paramilitary forces in Dabeiba, Antioquia. Three days later,
following a national and international outcry, Salamanca was
released to church workers in Necocli, Antioquia. She reports
having been transported overland in a truck, passing unhindered
through various military and police checkpoints. We are not
aware of any arrests.
27. LSan Jose de Apartado: On February 19 and July 8, 2000,
alleged paramilitaries killed 11 civilians in San Jose de
Apartado. According to eyewitnesses, personnel of the 17th
Brigade were in the area at the time of both massacres and
failed to prevent or stop the killings. An army helicopter
allegedly belonging to the 17th Brigade hovered overhead at the
time of the July 8 massacre.
28. LEl Aro: Colombian prosecutors collected evidence linking
the 4th Brigade, under the command of General Carlos Ospina
Ovalle, to the October 25, 1997, massacre committed by
paramilitaries in El Aro. Government documents show that a
joint Army-paramilitary force surrounded the village and
maintained a perimeter while about 25 paramilitaries entered
the town, rounded up residents, and executed four people.
CONDITION (C): Prosecution for Paramilitary Activities
This condition requires that the Secretary of State certify that:
``(C) The Government of Colombia is vigorously prosecuting in the
civilian courts the leaders and members of paramilitary groups and
Colombian Armed Forces personnel who are aiding or abetting these
groups.''
benchmarks:
The following benchmarks should be achieved before the Secretary of
State issues a certification of the Colombian government's compliance
with this condition:
A. The ``Coordination Center for the Fight against Self-Defense
Groups'' should present to the public a comprehensive plan that is
fully funded and includes a long-term and politically feasible strategy
to disband paramilitary groups and execute outstanding arrest warrants.
B. The United States should obtain a list of the names of
paramilitary leaders and members who have been indicted, arrested, and
prosecuted since August 1997; a description of the charges brought; and
the disposition of the cases. The US Embassy should update it at three-
month intervals, and distribute it promptly to the appropriate
congressional committees and the human rights groups included in the
consultation process required for certification. Included should be new
cases and developments in existing cases, with particular emphasis on
whether or not the security forces are taking concrete measures to
execute warrants. Information regarding the execution of arrest
warrants should be sorted according to the security force units to
which they refer
C. The United States should obtain a list of the names and ranks of
Colombian armed forces personnel who have been brought to justice in
civilian courts since August 1997 for aiding or abetting paramilitary
groups, including a description of the charges brought and the
disposition of the cases. The US Embassy should update it at three-
month intervals, and distribute it promptly to the appropriate
congressional committees and the human rights groups included in the
consultation process required for certification. Included should be new
cases and developments in existing cases, with particular emphasis on
whether or not the security forces are cooperating with the execution
of arrest warrants. The execution of arrest warrants should be sorted
according to the security force units to which they refer.
D. The United States should require the investigation and, as
appropriate, arrest and prosecution in civilian courts of the following
military personnel. They have yet to be investigated and brought to
trial under civilian jurisdiction despite credible allegations of their
participation in gross human rights violations and/or support for
paramilitary activity:
1. LGeneral (ret.) Fernando Millan, former Commander, 5th
Brigade: The Fiscalia opened an investigation of General Millan
based on evidence indicating that he set up the Las Colonias
CONVIVIR in Lebrija, Santander, while he commanded the Fifth
Brigade. The Las Colonias CONVIVIR operated throughout 1997
without a license but with army support according to the
testimony of former members. According to residents and
victims' families, the group committed at least fifteen
targeted killings before the director, ``Commander Canon,'' a
retired army officer, and the employees he hired were arrested
and prosecuted under Decree 1194, which prohibits the formation
of paramilitary groups. Among the cases currently under
investigation by the Attorney General's Office are the killings
of two Protestants, brothers Oscar and Armando Beltran Correa,
taken captive by the Las Colonias CONVIVIR as they headed to
work on July 29, 1997 and killed on the road leading from
Lebrija to the hamlet of La Puente. Apparently, the CONVIVIR
accused them of passing information to the guerrillas. On
September 4, 1997, father and son Leonardo and Jose Manuel
Cadena were forced out of their home by CONVIVIR members and
killed according to a family member's testimony to the Attorney
General's Office, apparently because the CONVIVIR accused the
Cadenas of bringing food to guerrillas. According to a former
CONVIVIR member who was also an army informant, during its
months of operation, the Las Colonias CONVIVIR went on frequent
operations with army units, setting up roadblocks and detaining
suspected guerrillas and criminals. When the Attorney General's
Office investigated the case, the army high command prevented
prosecutors from questioning Millan, then interposed a
jurisdictional dispute, claiming that since Millan was on
active service and carrying out his official duties, the case
should be tried before a military tribunal. Following a
decision by the CSJ, the case was transferred to the military
justice system in October 1998. A prosecutor assigned to
investigate the May 1998 massacre of 11 people in
Barrancabermeja fled the country after receiving threats from
General Millan, then-Commander of the 5th Brigade. Nine members
of the military and police were disciplined in connection with
the massacre, but there have been no civilian prosecutions.
General Millan has not been brought to justice in the civilian
justice system.
2. LMajor Jesus Maria Clavijo, 4th Brigade: In March 2000,
Major Clavijo was relieved of command pending the outcome of
his trial on charges of helping form and direct paramilitary
groups during his service with the 4th Brigade. Eyewitnesses
have linked Clavijo and other 4th Brigade officers to
paramilitaries through regular meetings held on military bases.
An investigation by the Internal Affairs agency (Procuraduria)
listed hundreds of cellular telephone and beeper communications
between known paramilitaries and 4th Brigade officers, among
them Clavijo. On May 11, 2000, the Attorney General received a
jurisdictional dispute from the military judge handling the
case. The case is now pending before the CSJ.
3. LGeneral (ret.) Jaime Uscategui, 7th Brigade: Dozens of
civilians were killed by paramilitaries and hundreds were
forced to flee for their lives from Mapiripan, Meta, in July
1997. For five days, paramilitaries acting with the support of
the army detained residents and people arriving by boat, took
them to the local slaughterhouse, then bound, tortured, and
executed them by slitting their throats. Local army and police
units ignored repeated phone calls from a civilian judge in the
area asking for help to stop the slayings. At least two
bodies--those of Sinai Blanco, a boatman, and Ronald Valencia,
the airstrip manager--were decapitated. Judge Leonardo Ivan
Cortes reported hearing the screams of the people they brought
to the Slaughterhouse to interrogate, torture, and kill. In one
of the missives he sent to various regional authorities during
the massacre, he wrote: ``Each night they kill groups of five
to six defenseless people, who are cruelly and monstrously
massacred after being tortured. The screams of humble people
are audible, begging for mercy and asking for help.'' Hundreds
of people fled the region, including Judge Cortes, who was
forced to leave Colombia with his family because of threats on
his life.
L Subsequent investigations revealed that troops under the
command of Uscategui, then in charge of the 7th Brigade,
assisted the paramilitaries during their arrival at the nearest
airport, and made sure that troops able to combat
paramilitaries were engaged elsewhere. In an attempt to cover
up his responsibility, Uscategui tried to falsify documents
reporting the massacre. As a result of their internal
investigation, the army put Gen. Uscategui on administrative
duty for failing to act promptly to stop the massacre and
detain those responsible. However, the CSJ later ruled that the
case involved an ``act of omission'' and belonged before a
military court. Uscategui later retired, and has yet to be
prosecuted in civilian courts for his alleged crimes.
Subsequently, the military reopened the case and announced that
Uscategui would be brought before a Consejo de Guerra on
charges of ``homicidio,'' ``prevaricacion por omision,'' and
``falsedad en documento'' for the Mapiripan massacre. Uscategui
has been re-arrested and is held in the 13th Brigade.
4. LGeneral (ret.) Alberto Bravo Silva, Commander, 5th
Brigade: According to Colombia's Public Advocate, on May 29,
1999, paramilitaries killed at least 20 people and abducted up
to fifteen more in La Gabarra (Norte de Santander). General
Bravo was repeatedly informed of the subsequent threats and the
ensuing massacres, but did not act to prevent them or to pursue
the perpetrators effectively once the massacre had taken place.
He was relieved of duty, but was not prosecuted in civilian
courts for his alleged role in aiding and abetting this
atrocity.
5. LGeneral (ret.) Rito Alejo del Rio, 17th Brigade: An
investigation was opened by Fiscalia in 1998 into Del Rio's
support and tolerance for paramilitary activity in the Uraba
region in 1996 and 1997 while he was commander of the 17th
Brigade. According to reports made by Colonel (ret.) Carlos
Velasquez, his chief of staff, to his superiors in 1996, that
Del Rio supported paramilitaries in Uraba, and maintained a
relationship with a retired army major who worked with
paramilitaries. Instead of prompting a serious investigation of
Del Rio, the reports prompted the army to investigate
Velasquez, in an apparent attempt to silence him. The army
concluded the inquiry by recommending not that Gen. del Rio,
who was later promoted, be punished, but that Colonel Velasquez
be disciplined for ``insubordination, [acts] against duty and
esprit de corps.'' Velasquez was forced to retire on January 1,
1997.
L Very recent press reports indicate that an August 2000
investigation was opened by the Fiscalia against Generals del
Rio and Fernando Millan. According to these reports,
prosecutors charged that they had attempted to present false
witnesses to the Fiscalia to claim that a prominent trade
Unionist and a human rights defender had themselves paid
witnesses to denounce del Rio and Millan for ties to
paramilitaries. These reports indicate that the Fiscalia
believes that, in fact, an army ``informant'' in league with
Del Rio and Millan paid the two false witnesses to lie to
authorities.
6. LGeneral (ret.) Farouk Yanine Diaz: Gen. Yanine was
arrested in October 1996 for alleged complicity in the massacre
of 19 merchants in the Middle Magdalena region in 1987.
Eyewitnesses, including a military officer, testified that he
supported paramilitaries who carried out the massacre and had
operated in the area since 1984, when Yanine was commander of
the 14th Brigade in Puerto Berrio. The paramilitary leader also
testified that Gen. Yanine had paid him a large sum to carry
out the killing. Yanine also allegedly provided paramilitaries
with the intelligence necessary to intercept their victims.
Despite abUNdant evidence, General Manuel Jose Bonnet, at the
time commander of the Army, closed the case for alleged lack of
evidence. The Procuraduria appealed the decision on the grounds
that ``evidence presented against Yanine Diaz had not been
taken into account [the sentence] clearly deviates from the
evidence presented in this case.'' The Department of State
expressed concern about the acquittal on July 1, 1997.
7. LGeneral Rodrigo Quinones, Commander, Navy's 1st Brigade:
Colombian government investigators linked Quinones to at least
57 murders of trade unionists, human rights workers, and
community leaders in 1991 and 1992, when he was head of Navy
Intelligence and ran Network 3, based in Barrancabermeja. A
military tribunal decided that there was insufficient evidence
against him, but he has not been brought to trial in the
civilian justice system. The only people to be convicted for
these crimes were two civilian employees of Naval Intelligence
Network No. 7, one of whom was later murdered in prison. In his
ruling on the case, the civilian judge stated that he was
``perplexed'' by the military tribunal's acquittals of Quinones
and others, since he considered the evidence against them to be
``irrefutable.'' ``With [this acquittal] all that [the
military] does is justify crime, since the incidents and the
people responsible for committing them are more than clear.''
This judge also discounted the military's contention that
Quinones was the victim of a smear campaign by drug
traffickers, concluding that there was no evidence to support
this claim. To the contrary, he concluded that evidence linking
Quinones to the Barrancabermeja atrocities was clear and
compelling.
L The only punishment meted out to Quinones so far has been
a ``severe reprimand'' ordered by the Procuraduria General de
la Nacion, which concluded that he was responsible for the
deaths. In a disputable interpretation of existing norms, the
Procuraduria has determined that murder is not classified as an
administrative infraction in the existing regulations.
Therefore, the maximum punishment it can impose for murder is a
``severe reprimand,'' essentially a letter in an employment
file. It is important to note that the Procuraduria itself has
termed this absurd punishment ``embarrassingly insignificant,
both within the national sphere and before the international
community.'' Quinones is also the officer in charge of the
region at the time of the February 2000 massacre in El Salado
(Bolivar). Military and police units stationed nearby failed to
stop the killing and established roadblocks which prevented
human rights and relief groups from entering the town. Quinones
was promoted to General in June 2000.
8. LGeneral Carlos Ospina Ovalle, Commander, 4th Division:
Colombia's Attorney General's Office has documented extensive
ties between the 4th Brigade and paramilitary groups between
1997 and 1999, while General Ospina was in command. Among the
cases that implicate Ospina is the October 1997 El Aro
massacre. Government documents show that a joint army-
paramilitary force surrounded the village and maintained a
perimeter while about 25 paramilitaries entered the town,
rounded up residents, and executed four people.
9. LBrigadier General Jaime Ernesto Canal Alban, Commander,
3rd Brigade: Colombian government investigators found evidence
that, in 1999, while Brig. Gen. Canal Alban was in command, the
3rd Brigade set up a paramilitary group and provided them with
weapons and intelligence.
10. LGeneral Jaime Humberto Cortes Parada, Inspector General of
the Army: the Fiscalia collected compelling and abundant
evidence indicating that under his command at the 3rd Division,
the Army's 3rd Brigade set up a ``paramilitary'' group in the
department of Valle del Cauca, in southern Colombia.
Investigators were able to link the group to active duty,
retired, and reserve military officers and the ACCU (See
below);
11. LGeneral Freddy Padilla Leon, Commander of the II Division,
and Colonel Gustavo Sanchez Gutierrez, Army Personnel Director:
In July 2000, the press widely reported that the Procuraduria
formally charged (pliego de cargos) General Jaime Humberto
Cortes Parada and these two officers with ``omission'' in
connection with the massacre of Puerto Alvira in June 1997. Two
other generals who also face disciplinary charges, for
``omission''--Generals Jaime Humberto Uscategui and Agustin
Ardila Uribe--are already retired.
E. Investigation and, as appropriate, arrest and prosecution of the
following paramilitary leaders and members:
1. LCarlos Castano Gil, leader of the Peasant Self-Defense
Force of Cordoba and Uraba (ACCU): Castano has twenty-two
outstanding arrest warrants, including one relating to the
killings of human rights defenders. He has been implicated in
the death of political satirist Jaime Garzon, whom he allegedly
threatened and he claimed responsibility for the death of
University of Antioquia student Gustavo Marulanda. Castano has
repeatedly threatened to have his forces continue the May 2000
massacres in La Gabarra (Norte de Santander) until the area is
``cleansed'' of guerrillas. Despite Castano's public
appearances, including a television appearance in March 2000,
Colombian law enforcement agencies have not executed warrants
for his arrest.
2. LFidel Castano Gil, Los Tangueros: Although the Castano
family claims that Fidel is dead, there is no confirmation of
this. Meanwhile, the Fiscalia continues to bring charges and
sentences against him, and he should at the present be
considered a fugitive.
3. LAlexander ``El Zarco'' Londono, Las Terrazas: Londono is
the head of a group of professional killers that works with
Carlos Castano and is wanted in connection with a series of
killings and kidnappings, including the 1999 IPC kidnapping,
carried out on the orders of the ACCU. There are several
warrants for his arrest.
4. LJulian Duque, Bolivar: Duque is the paramilitary leader of
the Autodefensas del Sur de Bolivar and is wanted for
organizing paramilitary groups.
5. LGabriel Salvatore ``El Mono'' Mancuso Gomez, ACCU: Mancuso
has eight arrest warrants outstanding against him, including
one related to the 1997 El Aro massacre, carried out in
coordination with the 4th Brigade.
6. LRamon Isaza Arango, Middle Magdalena: A veteran
paramilitary leader, Isaza is wanted for paramilitary activity
in the region surrounding Barrancabermeja.
7. LLuis Eduardo ``El Aguila'' Cifuentes Galindo, Cundinamarca:
Cifuentes is the paramilitary leader of the Autodefensas de
Cundinamarca and is wanted for organizing paramilitary groups.
8. LDiego Fernando Murillo Bejerano: Murillo is not directly
associated with the military wing of the ``self-defense
forces,'' instead playing a white-collar financial role. He is
allegedly responsibly for a series of kidnappings in and around
Medellin, carried out in association with the AUC. The Attorney
General reportedly also suspects him of being the
``intellectual author'' of the murder of Mario Calderon and
Elsa Alvarado.
F. Investigation and, as appropriate, arrest and prosecution of
paramilitaries believed to be involved in the following human rights
cases:
1. LAlirio de Jesus Pedraza Becerra: Pedraza, a lawyer with
the Committee of Solidarity with Political Prisoners (Comite de
Solidaridad con Presos Politicos, CSPP), was ``disappeared'' by
eight heavily armed men on July 4, 1990. His whereabouts have
never been determined. At the time, he was representing the
family members of scores of peasants killed when the Luciano
D'Eluyart Battalion opened fire on a protest march in 1988 in
Llano Caliente, Santander. We are not aware of any arrests in
this case.
2. LBlanca Cecilia Valero de Duran, CREDHOS: This human rights
defender belonging to the Regional Human Rights Committee for
the Defence of Human Rights (Comite Regional para la Defensa de
los Derechos Humanos, CREDHOS) was shot and killed on January
29, 1992 in Barrancabemeja, Santander. The then Colonel Rodrigo
Quinones Cardenas, director of intelligence for Colombian Navy
Intelligence Network 7, was believed responsible for her murder
and scores of other political killings by government
investigators. Nevertheless, Quinones was acquitted by a
military tribunal, although the Fiscalia named him as the
``unequivocal'' intellectual author. He remains on active duty.
Two people were convicted in the killing.
3. LOscar Elias Lopez, CRIC: This human rights lawyer had been
advising the Indigenous Regional Council of Cauca, (Consejo
Regional Indigena del Cauca, CRIC). He was killed in Santander
de Quilchao by heavily armed men on May 29, 1992.
4. LJulio Cesar Berrio, CREDHOS: He was a security guard
employed by CREDHOS, also involved in a CREDHOS investigation.
He was shot dead on June 28, 1992, allegedly by men working for
Navy Intelligence Director Colonel Quinones.
5. LLigia Patricia Cortez Colmenares, CREDHOS: Cortez, an
investigator with CREDHOS, was killed on July 30,1992,
alongside several Union members. We are not aware of any
arrests in this case.
6. LJairo Barahona Martinez, Curumani Human Rights Committee:
This activist was killed on September 29, 1994 in Curumani,
Cesar following his abduction and torture. According to members
of human rights organizations who collected information and
pressed for a proper judicial investigation into the killing,
members of the security forces were implicated in the
assassination. No one has been brought to justice.
7. LErnesto Emilio Fernandez, human rights defender: He was
shot while driving home with his children on February 20, 1995.
We are not aware of any arrests in this case.
8. LJavier Alberto Barriga Vergal, CSPP: This human rights
lawyer was killed in Cucuta on June 16, 1995. We are not aware
of any arrests in this case.
9. LJosue Giraldo Cardona, co-founder and president of the
Meta Civic Committee for Human Rights: Giraldo was killed on
October 13, 1996 after months of alleged harassment and threats
by paramilitaries and military intelligence officers working
for the 7th Brigade, then commanded by General Rodolfo Herrera
Luna.
10. LElsa Alvarado and Mario Calderon, CINEP: Alvarado and
Calderon were investigators with the Center for Research and
Popular Education (Centro de Investigacion y Educacion Popular,
CINEP). On May 19, 1997 a group of masked gunmen forced their
way into Alvarado and Calderon's apartment, killing Elsa,
Mario, and Elsa's father. Although some material authors of the
crime are under arrest, the intellectual authors remain at
large. Arrest warrants have been issued for Fidel and Carlos
Castano as the intellectual authors of the killings.
11. LJesus Maria Valle Jaramillo, ``Hector Abad Gomez''
Permanent Committee for the Defense of Human Rights: Valle was
assassinated on February 27, 1998 by unidentified gunmen, after
repeatedly denouncing military / paramilitary links. Formal
criminal charges were brought by the Attorney General's office
against paramilitary leader Carlos Castano and eight others.
Six paramilitaries are currently detained. Despite strong
indications of military involvement in the crime, no formal
investigation has been opened against military personnel.
12. LEduardo Umana, human rights lawyer: Umana was killed in
Bogota on April 18, 1998. Several alleged gunmen are either
under arrest or wanted for extradition. Shortly before his
murder he had denounced the role of a military intelligence
unit in paramilitary activity and human rights violations. The
intellectual authors remain at large.
13. LJorge Ortega, union leader: This union leader and human
rights defender was killed in Bogota on October 20, 1998. Two
former police officers have been implicated in the attack and
are in prison. However, the intellectual authors remain
unidentified.
14. LEverardo de Jesus Puertas and Julio Ernesto Gonzalez,
CSPP: Puertas and Gonzalez, lawyers with the CSPP, were shot
dead on the January 30, 1999, as they traveled by bus from
Medellin to Bogota. We are not aware of any arrests in this
case.
15. LDario Betancourt, academic: Betancourt, a professor at
Bogota's Universidad Pedagogica Nacional, was forcibly
disappeared on May 2, 1999, and his body was found on September
2, 1999. There have been no arrest warrants issued in this
case.
16. LHernan Henao, academic: Henao, the Director of the
University of Antioquia's Regional Studies Institute, was
killed on May 4, 1999. There have been no arrest warrants
issued in this case.
17. LGuzman Quintero Torres, journalist: Quintero, a journalist
who had investigated reports of corruption within the armed
forces, was killed on September 16, 1999, in Valledupar
(Cesar). The Attorney General's Office detained two
paramilitaries allegedly involved in the killing, but the
intellectual authors have not been identified.
18. LJesus Antonio Bejarano, academic: Bejarano, a former
government official involved in the peace talks with the FARC,
was killed on September 16, 1999. There have been no arrest
warrants issued in this case.
19. LAlberto Sanchez Tovar and Luis Alberto Rincon Solano,
journalists: Journalists Sanchez and Rincon were allegedly
detained and executed by paramilitaries on November 28, 1999,
in El Playon (Santander), while covering municipal elections.
Three paramilitary gunmen have been arrested, but the
intellectual authors remain unidentified.
20. LJairo Bedoya Hoyos, indigenous activist: Bedoya, a member
of the Indigenous Organization of Antioquia (Organizacion
Indigena de Antioquia, OIA), was abducted on March 2, 2000.
There have been no arrests in this case.
21. LMargarita Maria Pulgarin Trujillo, Fiscalia: Pulgarin, a
prosecutor specializing in investigating links between the
military and paramilitary groups, was killed in Medellin on
April 3, 2000. No arrest warrants have been issued in this
case.
Mr. Ballenger. Thank you. We will now recognize Mr. Michael
Shifter, senior fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL SHIFTER, SENIOR FELLOW, INTER-AMERICAN
DIALOGUE
Mr. Ballenger. Now today, I understand you may be wearing
two hats. I understand you have also been serving as the
project director for the independent private task force on
Colombia cosponsored by both the Dialogue and the Council or
Foreign Relations. Is there a report coming out on your work?
Mr. Shifter. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We hope to have it in
several weeks.
Mr. Ballenger. Good. I look forward to hearing your report.
Mr. Shifter. I would like to submit my written testimony
for the record please.
Mr. Ballenger. Without objection.
Mr. Shifter. I very much appreciate the opportunity to
testify at this important hearing. The recently approved aid
package to Colombia is a first step for the United States to
begin to help Colombia turn around its deterioration. It offers
an opportunity to devise a broader, longer-term strategy toward
that country. That is what can best advance U.S. interests and
values. The United States has a lot at stake in Colombia.
The aid package, though, is not enough. It responds to a
desire to ``do something'' about drugs and drug-fueled violence
at home and in Colombia. But it does not adequately respond to
Colombia's many crises and does not reflect a clear strategy.
We should not be under any illusions that the package will make
a dent in the serious drug problem here.
What is needed, I believe, is a broader, longer term policy
that moves beyond the aid package and moves beyond fighting
drugs. A sound policy should deal with Colombia's underlying
problems. The country is experiencing rampant lawlessness and
insecurity. 70 percent of the world's kidnappings take place in
Colombia. U.S. policy should be designed fundamentally to help
Colombians address their urgent security crisis. The government
cannot now protect its citizens, and it is hard to imagine how
it can deal with any other problem without first performing
this essential government function. Colombia cannot make any
progress on any front in such a climate of chaos and
insecurity. Drugs are, to be sure, an important dimension of
Colombia's crisis, but the core problem is one of state
authority and governance.
As a central element of a longer term strategy, the United
States, I believe, should give priority attention to working
closely with the Colombians to help professionalize the Army
and the police. Professionalization means two things: One,
greater effectiveness, and two, strict adherence to human
rights standards. The focus should be on training security
forces against all actors who violate the law in Colombia. This
includes the FARC, the ELN, paramilitary forces and criminals;
all of them represent significant threats to Colombia's
democratic system and the rule of law.
In light of President Pastrana's commitment to a peace
process and to a political solution to the armed conflict, such
a strategy should be aimed an enhancing the likelihood of
achieving a negotiated settlement. We know that so far the
process has yielded few, if any, tangible results. But the
purpose behind our assistance should be to help level the
playing field which would change the calculations of the FARC,
make them more inclined to negotiate seriously in good faith.
The overarching aim should be a political solution. If this
purpose is kept in mind, there is no contradiction at all in my
judgment, Mr. Chairman, between a well-targeted security
assistance on the one hand, and active support for Colombia's
peace process on the other. On the contrary, if done well,
these tracks are mutually reinforcing.
Many critics have pointed out with some reason that U.S.
assistance carries many risks. The assistance could drag the
United States into a quagmire and could also associate the
United States with a military that has had a problematic human
rights record and has been tainted by links with paramilitary
forces. Such risks are real but can and should be faced
directly and held in check. What many critics fail to
acknowledge in my judgment is that the risks of not providing
security assistance to Colombia are even greater than the risks
of doing so. It is essential to deal with Colombia's security
crisis, otherwise, the dirty war that is already under way
could get dirtier still.
Professionalization is only, of course, one element, one
track of what must be a broader longer-term policy. The United
States must fashion a comprehensive strategy that addresses
Colombia's multiple problems on all fronts, including support
for institutional reforms (especially judicial reform),
humanitarian assistance, alternative development efforts, and
economic and trade benefits.
In short, U.S. policy toward Colombia must be multitrack.
The challenge today is to go beyond the aid package's emphasis
on military support aimed at fighting drugs. The United States
has the opportunity and the responsibility to engage in a
stronger multilateral approach in such areas as illegal
narcotics, on the political and diplomatic fronts and on
economic and financial matters.
Specifically, the United States should extend full support
to the promising initiative on illegal narcotics being
undertaken by the Organization of American States. The United
States should back the important role that the United Nations
is playing in pursuing peace and protecting human rights. We
need to mobilize more support from the financial institutions
for development efforts to help Colombia. And Congress should
do what it can to ensure that Colombian products have access to
U.S. markets. The benefits should be comparable to those
provided in the Caribbean Basin Initiative.
Such an approach would send a positive signal at a critical
moment. It would be favored by most Colombians and would also
have the advantage of being supported by other Latin American
and European governments. Their constructive participation in
what must be a collective effort to get behind Colombia is
absolutely essential.
To be sure, the United States is already working hard and
making progress in many of these areas. But it needs to do a
lot more and be consistent in carrying out a multitrack policy
that seeks to help the Colombians achieve peace and
reconciliation. Too often, efforts are too dispersed and show
little evidence of clear strategic thinking. There is a need
for greater political direction and political leadership.
Of course, the task of reversing Colombia's deterioration
lies primarily with the Colombians. No policy or strategy, no
matter how competent or how comprehensive, will produce results
unless the Colombian leadership is committed to serious
reforms. That is why the United States should exercise its
leverage and continue to insist on compliance with the
important human rights conditions spelled out in the
legislation concerning Colombia. Such sustained pressure is not
only critical to uphold and promote U.S. values, but is also
welcomed by the vast majority of Colombians committed to
democratic principles.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, the United States not only has a
history of engagement in Colombia, but it also bears some
responsibility for being part of the drug problem that affects
both countries. High level constructive bipartisan and
sustained U.S. involvement would go a long way toward helping
Colombia achieve the peace and security that is in the utmost
interest of us all. Thank you very much. I will be happy to
answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Shifter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Shifter, Senior Fellow, Inter-American
Dialogue
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the invitation to testify at such a
timely and important hearing. The recently approved $1.3 billion aid
package to Colombia is a first step for the United States to begin to
help Colombia turn around its dramatic deterioration. It offers an
opportunity to devise a broader strategy toward the country, a strategy
that can best advance US interests and values. The United States has a
great deal at stake in Colombia.
The aid package is not enough. It mainly responds to a desire to
``do something'' about drugs and drug-fueled violence at home and in
Colombia. It does not adequately respond to Colombia's many crises, and
does not reflect a clear purpose or strategy. We should not be under
any illusions that the package will make a dent in the serious drug
problem. For that, we need to seriously explore other options,
including greater attention to demand reduction, better law
enforcement, and most importantly, more emphasis on genuinely
multilateral approaches.
What is needed, rather, is a broader, longer-term policy that moves
beyond the aid package and fighting drugs. A sound and sensible policy
should deal with Colombia's underlying problems. The country is
experiencing rampant lawlessness and insecurity; about 70% of the
world's kidnappings take place in Colombia. U.S. policy should be
designed fundamentally to help Colombians address their urgent security
crisis. The government cannot now protect its citizens, and it is hard
to imagine it tackling other problems without first performing such an
essential function. Colombia cannot make progress on any front in a
climate of such insecurity and chaos. Drugs are, to be sure, an
important dimension of Colombia's crisis, but the core problem is one
of state authority and governance.
As a central element of a longer-term strategy, the United States
should give priority attention to working closely with Colombians to
help professionalize their security forces, the military and police.
Professionalization means two things: greater effectiveness and strict
adherence to human rights standards and behavior. The focus should be
on training to provide security against all actors who violate the law
in Colombia. This includes the insurgents, paramilitary forces, and
criminals--all pose significant threats to Colombia's democratic system
and the rule of law.
In light of President Pastrana's commitment to a peace process and
to a political solution to Colombia's internal conflict, such a
strategy should be aimed at enhancing the likelihood of achieving a
negotiated settlement. We should recognize of course that the process
so far has yielded few, if any, tangible gains. The purpose behind our
assistance would be to level the playing field, which would change the
calculations of the insurgents and make them more inclined to negotiate
seriously, in good faith. The overarching aim should be achieving a
political solution. For a variety of reasons, a military solution is
not viable.
If such a strategic purpose is kept clearly in mind, there is no
contradiction at all between providing well-targeted security
assistance on the one hand, and actively supporting Colombia's peace
process on the other. On the contrary, if done properly, these tracks
are mutually reinforcing.
Many have pointed out, with some reason, that U.S. assistance has
many risks. Such assistance could drag the United States into a
quagmire and could also associate the United States with a military
that has had a problematic human rights record and has been tainted by
links with paramilitary forces. Such risks are real, but can and should
be faced directly, and held in check. What many critics fail to
acknowledge is that the risks of not providing security assistance to
Colombia are even greater than the risks of doing so. It is essential
to deal directly with the country's security crisis. Otherwise, the
dirty war that is already underway could get dirtier still.
Professionalization is of course only one element, one track, of
what must be an integrated, long-term policy. The United States must
fashion a comprehensive strategy that addresses Colombia's multiple
problems on all fronts, including support for institutional reforms
(especially judicial reform), humanitarian assistance, alternative
development efforts, and economic and trade benefits.
In short, U.S. policy toward Colombia must be multitrack, including
military along with social, political, and economic components. The
challenge today is to go beyond the aid package's emphasis on military
support aimed at fighting drugs. The United States has the opportunity
and responsibility to engage in a strong multilateral approach in the
areas of illegal narcotics, on the political and diplomatic fronts, and
on economic and financial matters.
Specifically, the United States should extend full support to the
promising initiative on illegal narcotics being undertaken by the
Organization of American States. The United States should also back the
important role the United Nations is playing in pursuing peace and
protecting human rights. We need to mobilize more support from the
multilateral financial institutions for development efforts. And the
Congress should do what it can to ensure that Colombian products have
access to US markets; benefits should be comparable to those provided
in the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).
Such an approach would send a positive signal at a critical moment.
It would be favored by most Colombians, and would also have the
advantage of being supported by other Latin American and European
governments. Their constructive participation in what must be a
collective effort to get behind Colombia is essential.
To be sure, the United States is already working hard and making
progress in many of these critical areas. But it needs to do a lot
more, and be consistent in carrying out a multitrack policy that seeks
to help the Colombians achieve peace and reconciliation. Too often,
efforts are too dispersed and show little evidence of clear, strategic
thinking. There is a need for greater political direction and
leadership.
The task of reversing Colombia's deterioration lies, of course,
primarily with the Colombians. No policy or strategy, no matter how
competent or comprehensive, will produce positive results unless the
Colombian leadership is committed to serious reforms. That is why the
United States should exercise its leverage and continue to insist on
compliance with the important human rights conditions spelled out in
the legislation on Colombia. Such sustained pressure is not only
critical to uphold and promote US values, but is also heartily welcomed
by the vast majority of Colombians committed to democratic principles.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, the United States not only has a history of
engagement in Colombia, but it also bears great responsibility for the
worsening of one of the principal factors that has substantially
aggravated Colombia's conditions--illegal narcotics. High-level,
constructive, bipartisan and sustained U.S. involvement in Colombia
would go a long way toward helping Colombia achieve the peace and
security that it is in the utmost interest of us all.
Thank you very much. I'd be happy to answer any questions.
Mr. Ballenger. Mr. Vivanco, according to our calculations,
the battalions that are being trained are all vetted for human
rights and therefore should meet your standards. But of the
rest of the budget, according to our calculations, only $2.6
million of the entire U.S. contribution to Plan Colombia is
earmarked for the Colombian army outside of the
counternarcotics battalions which are vetted and so forth.
This money includes $1 million to start the Judge Advocate
General school and a million and a half dollars to train the
Colombian military trainers who will go into various units and
provide human rights training, and 1.1 million to provide
training with U.S. senior Colombian officers. If this is the
case, what is all the fuss about the U.S. money going to the
Colombian army?
Mr. Vivanco. Mr. Chairman, I think the main issue here is
if you are going to engage with the Colombian armed forces by
supporting the creation of new battalions or helping them in
logistical transportation, training, and developing their own
military justice system, basic human rights conditions need to
be fulfilled--I mean, satisfied.
Mr. Ballenger. These battalions are supposedly vetted for
human rights and trained in that.
Mr. Vivanco. I think within the Colombian package there is
and there was an excellent opportunity and a unique opportunity
to use this leverage to help the Colombian armed forces to
professionalize to improve its human rights standards and to
break ties with paramilitary groups. And I wouldn't focus the
attention on whether they are receiving 2\1/2\ million, or 50
million, but on what is exactly the purpose. I mean, the whole
point is that the package is essentially a military package.
And 80 percent of the resources are going to the military. And
the political message that you are sending to the Colombian
armed forces is that the U.S. is ready to do business with
them, but before they do business with them, they have to
comply with basic human rights standards.
Mr. Ballenger. Unless I am mistaken, though, this military
force that you are speaking of are meeting the criteria that
you would consider proper in human rights and so forth. In
other words, there is a mandate that these battalions, which
the majority of all this aid is going to, be vetted as far as
human rights are concerned, and the Colombian National Police,
where the rest of the money is going, obviously have been
meeting all your criteria. So in reality, it seems to me a
great deal is being done that would match what you are asking
for. But let me ask you another one.
Mr. Bereuter. Would the gentleman yield? I just wondered if
I might ask if the gentleman, Mr. Vivanco, is familiar with the
fact that the overall Plan Colombia is to be funded at $7
billion, whereas the U.S. is providing approximately one-sixth
to one-seventh. And we are providing most of the military aid,
but the other things that you emphasize in the balanced package
should be from international organizations and from Colombia,
according to the plan. Are you familiar with that? Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Vivanco. Right. Yes, I am fully familiarized with the
idea. The Plan Colombia is $7.5 billion. The hope of the
Colombian government is to persuade the European Union to
contribute substantively to this Plan Colombia.
But, Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to answer you,
first of all, I am not in a position to answer or to tell you
whether these three battalions are in compliance with the Leahy
amendment because there is no transparency on the application
of the Leahy amendment. The Leahy amendment is applied by the
embassy personnel essentially in Bogota and they are supposed
to be vetting those officers and that is true. That is the law,
which, you know, they have the obligation to enforce. But I
have no way to comment on that one because we don't have access
to that information.
Secondly, Mr. Chairman, there are six conditions in the
human rights plan. And we don't think that there is any single
one that is being satisfied. We disagree with the
Administration on the first condition. The Administration is
fully convinced that the first condition is being complied with
by President Pastrana issuance of a presidential directive to
remind the armed forces that human rights atrocities should be
investigated under civilian jurisdiction. We consider that
condition as being partially met because President Pastrana
relied mostly on the military Penal Code in his instructions to
the military. And the military Penal Code refers to genocide,
torture and disappearances but there are crimes like rape----
Mr. Ballenger. Don't use up all the time. I understand the
statements you are making, but let me ask you a question: You
mentioned the waivers, that we ought to remove those. If all
the aid to Colombia were held up until all of the benchmarks
that you picked out were achieved, it could take years. For
instance, even if all the people you mentioned in your
statement were arrested and tried, knowing the speed of the
trials in Central America and South America, it could take
years for due process to be served. Wouldn't this leave
Colombia even more vulnerable to the ongoing war that they have
got?
Mr. Vivanco. Mr. Chairman, I realize that it is a complex
and very delicate decision. And I don't think there is a simple
answer. But I believe that if you, for political reasons,
suspend the applications of these conditions, what will be the
message? The military forces will clearly understand that human
rights are subordinated to other more important business.
Mr. Ballenger. But didn't we do that already with the
previous President? And it had a disastrous affect as far as
the growth of Colombia's war. In the case of President Samper,
you know, we did not issue the waiver, in other words. And we--
unless I am mistaken, rather compounded the situation that was
already very bad.
Let me switch to Mr. Shifter. Having worked in Central
America about 35 years, it always appeared to me, and that was
the side of this that I was on, when we had a war going on in
El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, until it appears to be a
situation where both sides could recognize that neither one
could win, it takes that before you can have peace.
And at the present time, the way I read what is going on
down there right now in Colombia, it appears to me that the
FARC and ELN consider themselves in a rather strong situation.
They don't have much to worry about since they are better
financed than the Colombian government, even with our
assistance. Could you play around that one a little bit?
Mr. Shifter. Thank you. I agree wholeheartedly. I think
that there is not going to be any optimistic outcome in
Colombia unless the state and the government get stronger in
relation not only to the FARC and the ELN, but also to the
paramilitary groups. The paramilitary groups exist because of
the weakness of the security forces of the state. That has to
be turned around.
I would just ask for your consideration, whether the way
the aid package is currently designed is the best way in terms
of use of resources to achieve that purpose, to put the
government into better position to negotiate as was done in the
cases of Central America. At some point, there may be a
contradiction or a problem between the emphasis on improving
the professionalization of the security forces and making them
better and going after the drugs. I think going after drugs is
part of it, but I am not sure that is the whole thing. But I
agree with you. That has to be the emphasis and that requires
full engagement and support.
Mr. Ballenger. Mr. Delahunt. It is all yours.
Mr. Delahunt. You need more time, Mr. Chairman? I will
address my first question to Mr. Shifter. And I concur with
your observations in your opening statement. I think you are on
the mark. And I think you are aware of my own feelings in terms
of the need to advance the peace process because stability is
absolutely essential in terms of our narrow, discreet but
significant national interest regarding the flow of drugs into
this country. But I think that far beyond that we should take
what is a tragedy and try to make it into an opportunity in
terms of reassessing and rethinking our relationship at
multiple levels with Colombia, and, in fact, all of Latin
America for that matter, because the issue with drugs is just
not restricted to Colombia. And we are all aware of what has
occurred in the past in terms of Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador, et
cetera.
Your analysis of the peace process, we currently have a
position by the Administration that they won't talk. They will
have no contacts whatsoever, at least with the FARC, because of
the murders of three Americans several years ago. And yet I
hear when I travel to Colombia that there is a desire on the
part of some of the members of the various insurgency groups to
have contact with the United States. In fact, there was a
published report about a year ago, I think it was Mr. Reyes
that indicated he wanted to come to the United States. Is it
time for us to reassess our position in terms of if invited by
the Pastrana government, to become engaged in the peace process
itself? Are we accomplishing anything with the current policy
of no contact?
Mr. Shifter. Congressman, let me answer this way: I think
that that is an option that should be seriously explored. I am
not at all sure, given my understanding of the peace process
right now, that somehow the United States getting involved in
that way would really produce results right away. I don't think
the conditions are there for that. But I think if the
circumstances reach that point, I think if the Colombian
Government requested that support and felt that it could
achieve a positive result in terms of advancing peace, I think
the United States should reconsider that position. I think that
is an important thing. But I am just not sure right now if that
would happen.
Mr. Delahunt. I don't disagree with that statement in terms
of conditions and timing. I understand that is essential. But
you know, in the end, I think it is clear that the role of the
United States, at least the perception of the United States in
terms of the internal dynamic right now in Colombia, is of
great consequence, is of great consequence. And we are aware,
obviously, that there is some history there in terms of what
occurred in the mid 1980's when the FARC, you know, through the
union patriarch, became engaged in the electoral process. In my
conversations with some of the guerrillas, that was raised
during the course of those discussions. They came in, they
participated, and some--when they were meeting with political
success, there commenced a period of political assassinations.
I think it numbered in excess of 3,000 of their candidates.
So while sitting here in Washington, we might describe that
as paranoia, it is understandable paranoia I would suggest. But
I think maybe it is time to reconsider that position.
Reconsider it again upon the invitation of the Colombian
government, and given the conditions and the time, I am not
saying we should involve ourselves now.
What is your current analysis of the peace process?
Mr. Shifter. I think it really is struggling. It is having
a hard time. I think that the interest on both sides is keeping
something going, but I think you are likely to see a lot of war
and a lot of bloodletting, and some continuing low-level
discussions going on simultaneously. But I don't see any really
significant progress, at least in the short term. I wish I
could be more optimistic, but that is my reading of the
situation. I just don't see that really producing results in
the short term.
If I could just comment on the other point, Congressman, I
agree with you wholeheartedly that the position of the United
States should be reconsidered in terms of direct talk. I also
think the United States can do more to work with the Colombian
government to get them to try to get a consensus in the country
about the peace process and to try to work with them to try to
overcome the mistrust that is so profound that you properly
identified. Because in the long term, that is what really needs
to happen is to establish the confidence and trust between the
Colombian elite and the political class and the insurgents.
There is a long way to go. I think we can play a role in that
process. But I think it is their responsibility and I think we
can work with them to achieve that purpose.
Mr. Delahunt. Well, I think, you know, I agree with that.
Mr. Vivanco, I think you are aware that I agree with you that
the Colombian government should be in full compliance with the
1997 Constitutional court decision relative to the trial of
military in civilian courts. But I have a problem. I don't have
a significant amount of confidence in the civilian courts.
There has been historically a history of impunity within the
civilian courts, in terms of the administration of justice. How
do we deal with that issue? Is it any better? Can we expect a
different outcome than what has occurred in terms of the
adjudication of allegations surrounding the human rights abuses
within the military justice system? Do you have more hope than
I or optimism than I?
Mr. Vivanco. Congressman Delahunt, I am not extremely
optimistic about the civilian criminal justice system in
Colombia. But if you look at the record of the human rights
unit of the chief prosecutor of Colombia, the Fiscalia, it is
pretty positive. In other words, 25, close to 30 prosecutors
who have the jurisdiction to deal with abuses by guerrillas,
paramilitaries and agents----
Mr. Delahunt. Let me just interrupt for a moment. I want it
very clear and on the record I have great respect and
confidence in the Fiscalia. I think Jaime Bernal has done
extraordinary work. I think that is recognized in the human
rights community. But I am talking about the adjudication of
these cases as they go through the legal process in the
nonmilitary courts in Colombia. I mean, it has been those
courts that have been rife with problems and serious
allegations regarding corruption. I am willing to make the
effort, but I think we have got to be honest in terms of
expectations. Because we could become very disappointed, even
if we hopefully, at some point in time, achieve full compliance
with the 1997 Constitutional court decision.
Mr. Vivanco. Congressman, right. I think it is important to
strengthen the role of the judiciary. By the way, I was
referring to the Fiscalia, not the Procurduria.
Jaime Bernal Cuellar is the head of the Procurduria which
deals with disciplinary actions. Fiscalia is criminal
investigation in Colombia and the head is Alfonso Gomez Mendez.
These 30 ``fiscalias'' or prosecutors with authority to
deal with human rights problems in Colombia, they have made
terrific progress in several cases. Unfortunately, there has
been no cooperation from the armed forces in Colombia. And
normally what defendants from the army do when they have cases
against them----
Mr. Delahunt. I am going do have to interrupt because I
think we have a point of disagreement. Because I share that
concern, I had conversations with both Mr. Gomez and Mr.
Bernal. And again, this was prompted by a statement by a
General Ramirez, regarding a statement he made about both the
Fiscalia, and I don't know how to say it in Spanish, the
prosecutor. I went specifically to visit with Jaime Bernal, who
indicated that at least at the senior command level with
General Tapias, he felt that a change had occurred. I think it
is important at some point in time that we here in this
institution invite both Mr. Gomez and Mr. Bernal to come and
testify and give us their understanding and their perception. I
think you know that I agree that there is a long, long road to
go, but I couldn't let that comment pass that there is no
cooperation because that is not what they say to me. That is
not what they tell me directly. This is myself talking with
them.
Mr. Vivanco. But Congressman Delahunt, you are referring to
an incident there which the number two of the Army went to
Miami in a conference and accused the Fiscalia and the
Procurduria to be infiltrated by guerrillas. So if we are
talking about the leadership of the armed forces of Colombia, I
am not prepared to say that the--. If the number two of the
Army is accusing the Fiscalia and the chief prosecutor of
involvement with guerrilla members, I don't see this one as a
sign of change.
Mr. Delahunt. Agree. I totally agree. But I am just
relating to you what was said to me by the individuals directly
involved. And again, I think just simply the fact that it
occurred indicates that there is a very long road to go. But I
think we are at the beginning of that process. It was just
recently we had an indictment of four generals. This occurred
within the past several months. I am not trying to in any way
put a gloss on it or suggest to you no substantial progress has
been made, because that would just be simply inaccurate.
Let me ask you just one other question. I think a lot of
what is going on has to deal with the issue of the credibility
of the military in terms of its public pronouncements regarding
human rights which sound good to us. In conversations that I
have had with senior officials and, in fact, I sent a letter--I
will be happy to provide it to you--to President Pastrana back
in July. In the aftermath of the incident that occurred on July
7th, I sat down with the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Ramirez and
General Tapias and discussed that. They gave me an explanation.
Obviously, I don't have the resources or the wherewithal to
corroborate it, but it's one that is satisfactory. I have said
this to them and I said this to the President, that is
incorporated in this letter that I will be happy to provide
you, I think it is important in these particular incidents that
there be an independent group, a commission, comprised of both
military and other representatives of the government, as well
as representatives of the various NGOs, and in particular,
human rights organizations within Colombia to examine these
particular allegations and these particular concerns. Because
until the Colombian military in my judgment has some
credibility, they are going to find themselves, whether it be
true or not, continually on the defense. What do you think of
that particular concept, that particular mechanism? And do you
think that human rights groups within Colombia would
participate in that particular effort? Protection would be
provided them, assurances for their personal safety would be
guaranteed, and let them be the arbiters, if you will, of the
facts, of the reality of what occurred.
Mr. Vivanco. I do believe that the Colombia military has a
credibility problem on human rights. Whether that mechanism
that includes participation of members of the NGO community,
human rights organizations could help, is a matter of
discussing the details of what will entitle that kind of
participation.
Mr. Delahunt. Understand the details, the details are
important. But I am just talking in terms of a conceptual
position. Because I think it is absolutely essential that there
be a mechanism that has integrity, that has credibility, that
either issues its findings either condemning individuals in the
military responsible for human rights violation or exonerates
them. Because I believe no matter what the military says at
this point in time, it is going to be difficult for them to
regain credibility in terms of the human rights issues.
Mr. Vivanco. Congressman Delahunt, the military sometimes,
especially General Tapias, issue the right statements. You
know, his public positions are normally the right ones on human
rights issues. But you refer to the recent indictment of some
generals in Colombia on disciplinary grounds by Jaime Bernal
Cuellar, the head of the Procurduria. The reaction of the head
of the Army, General Mora, was to accuse the Procurador General
de la Republica Jaime Bernal Cuellar, of being part of a
campaign to demoralize the members of the armed forces. So that
was his reaction. It was not, you know, a receptive one that
shows commitment to collaborate with the civilians.
I really prefer to handle these matters, these human rights
investigations in the hands of the human rights unit of the
Fiscalia. Fortunately, the good news is that this Plan Colombia
includes important resources that hopefully will end up in the
hands of the human rights unit to reinforce their work,
especially in terms of increasing the ability of the CTI, the
technical support that helps them to investigate their human
rights cases.
Mr. Delahunt. I have one more question. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. Mr. Shifter, you alluded to the issue of the
consequences of the CBI enhancement policy. And what is the law
of unintended consequences. Do you have any recommendations?
Have you had a conversation with Senator Graham, I guess?
Mr. Shifter. I just think that the trade issue is of utmost
concern to the Colombians. And I just think this is a country
that has suffered lots of crises at the same time. The economic
one is the one that they are probably least accustomed to,
because historically they have been a very good economic
performer. I just think, given the fact that Colombia is a
priority as reflected in its aid package, not to make every
effort to extend the benefits of CBI really sends the wrong
signal.
I know that the politics are complicated, and I understand
the reasons why. But I just think if this is going to be taken
seriously as a priority, I think that every effort has to be
made to ensure the Colombians access to our market. I think you
have to be concerned about employment, immigration. I think it
makes lots of consequences that need to be very carefully
considered. I would hope the Congress would----
Mr. Delahunt. Do you have any time frames in mind, time
lines? Mr. Ballenger and I discussed it and to be engaged in
Colombia and providing this package of assistance and then
simultaneously not addressing the trade issue with what I
understand to be the potential loss of a couple of hundred
thousands of jobs, is just totally self defeating and makes no
common sense. But do you have an assessment as to how timely
action by Congress, our time frames in which action by Congress
would be necessary before jobs in Colombia are lost to
Caribbean nations.
Mr. Shifter. Congressman I don't have a precise sense of
that. All I can say is obviously the situation is critical, so
time is very, very important. But I don't know how much time
goes by and what the costs are in terms of job lost. But I know
that the numbers are very high and it is extremely troubling as
I think we agreed. So I think it should be taken very, very
seriously. But I don't know, I haven't seen any analysis to
that effect. I can try to see if I can come up with some
analysts or economists to see whether I can come up with that
for you.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one more
observation. I wanted to pick up on, I think, the opening
statement by Mr. Vivanco regarding the reporting by various
human rights organizations as to human rights violations by the
FARC and the ELN. I think earlier the gentleman from Indiana
indicated that hardly ever is there any comment regarding the
human rights abuses by both the FARC and the ELN. I have to
disagree vehemently with his statement and acknowledge that all
of the human rights organizations, including our own State
Department, have been very clear regarding the egregious
conduct of the insurgents in materials of human rights
violations. So I wanted to make that a matter of record.
Mr. Ballenger. Well, one thing I would like from Mr.
Vivanco, in our financial assistance, is a, I think little over
a million to build a Judge Advocate Generals--those of us that
watch TV, JAG operation and recognizing that that may be an
important way of going about developing some sort of judicial
operation there. I don't know how rapidly such a thing can
occur, but I have been involved in El Salvador since the peace
process started there, and we started redoing their judicial
system 5, 6, 7 years ago, and we are not there yet. Do you see
any positive way to develop any judicial system that is
trustworthy and so forth as far as your human rights are
concerned in any short period of time?
Mr. Vivanco. You mean within the military?
Mr. Ballenger. Wherever.
Mr. Vivanco. Within the military, I am thinking about
condition E of the package, I think it is a good initiative and
hopefully it will be in place soon in Colombia, this Judge
Advocate General. Only under one condition that in accordance
to the language of the condition of the package, it says that
the jurisdiction for this entity should be to investigate
military personnel for misconduct, and that is extremely
important. Because otherwise, we will continue with this
tension between civilian authorities and military authorities
regarding atrocities in Colombia.
Mr. Ballenger. What I was trying to bring up is when the
effort was made in El Salvador, it took 5 or 6 years and it is
still not there yet. So a Judge Advocate Generals operation is
not something you create overnight. So in my considered
opinion, it is going to take quite some time to be able to
develop that.
Mr. Shifter, you said that the U.S. policy should be
targeted toward addressing the Colombian security crisis and
that the creation of the three counternarcotics battalions
would not seem to answer that challenge. Only a small portion
of the U.S. aid is directed to the rest of the military. Are
you advocating that the U.S. assistance should be broadened to
include all the military?
Mr. Shifter. I am suggesting, Mr. Chairman, that the
purpose should be improving the performance and
professionalization of the military. That may mean less money,
that may mean more money. The purpose, the way it is framed now
doesn't help the Colombians as much as it could to protect
citizens. Some of that is related--a lot of it is related to
drugs, but not all of it. So it may include instead of three
battalions, yes, doing a much more wider institutional kind of
effort, professionalization and reform, I am not sure if that
would be more expensive or less expensive. One would have to do
the analysis. But I think the focus and the purpose should be
different. I would like to see it changed. I think it could
help Colombia begin to get more control over its country. The
state would be a better partner with us in fighting drugs and
dealing with all other issues if it were in more control. And I
think we should do everything we can to help Colombia get in
that position.
Mr. Ballenger. I would like to thank you two gentlemen for
being here. Obviously this is a big problem for our whole
Congress and country. The two of us have been kind of heavily
involved in this thing, as you can tell. He invited me to meet
with the FARC. I told him my right wing friends would kill me
if I did something like that. But in truth, we do sincerely
want to do something positive as far as the developments in
Colombia.
Mr. Delahunt. I think that is a very good question you
asked Mr. Shifter. Because the military, in terms of Colombian
society, is a different institution than the military in our
democracy. And currently, if I am misinterpreting your words, I
think what you are saying in terms of professionalization, is
to change the culture of the Colombian military so that it is
more reflective of a military that is in compliance with
democratic principles clearly in terms of the area of human
rights; is that a fair statement?
Mr. Shifter. That is correct. I think compliance with human
rights, and effectiveness and capacity are related.
Mr. Delahunt. Like much of Colombian society, it is a
question of who does the dirty work and who reaps the wealth. I
guess that is true in other societies. We shouldn't be too
quick to castigate. But I agree with that position.
I heard earlier today that there were concessions made by
the Pastrana government in terms of the distension zone.
Let us be really honest. There was never any governmental
presence of real consequence in that entire area, including
most of rural Colombia. The state abdicated its responsibility
a long time ago. This is a civil war that has been going on for
years before the 1980's when they discovered they could earn
monies from the sale of marijuana and coca and poppy. So these
are really fundamental issues that have to be dealt with. And
until we deal with those, with all due respect to others, you
can talk about guns and helicopters and it ain't going to do
anything.
Mr. Ballenger. He is speaking with a southern accent.
Again, let me thank you for participating today. It has been
very educational on our part. And I would like to say that some
of your suggestions implanted in our minds can maybe get
something constructive out of us. So thank you again for
appearing. The Subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:22 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Questions for the Record Submitted to Assistant Secretary of State Rand
Beers by Chairman Elton Gallegly
Question 1:
Critics of the overall Plan Colombia say that the new infusion of
U.S. military support, weapons and training only serves to further
militarize the current conflict and could weaken the peace process by
escalating the violence and encouraging hard-liners on both sides who
want to keep fighting. How do you respond to these comments?
Answer:
We believe such criticism is derived from too great a focus on
specific components of our assistance rather than on the entire
program. There will only be peace in Colombia when there is a strong
state capable of defending the rights and interests of the Colombian
citizens. To the extent that our assistance under President Pastrana's
Plan Colombia reinvigorates the Colombian economy, enhances Colombian
governing capability, encourages respect for and protection of human
rights, strengthens democratic institutions, and reduces the money
available to guerrillas and paramilitaries from involvement in the drug
trafficking, it will encourage the peace process.
Our package will provide support to the peace process by training
Colombian government negotiators and advisors on managing conflict
negotiations. The training will draw on the lessons learned in Northern
Ireland, the Middle East, and Central America. The training will also
examine the techniques for reintegrating ex-combatants into civil
society and seek their support for all aspects of Plan Colombia. This
is an extremely complex, difficult process, but it can be done.
Importantly, the package will also send a strong message to
Colombia's armed actors that meaningful negotiations offer the best
hope for peace and social justice. The guerrillas have demonstrated
that, under the present status quo, they feel little incentive to
negotiate in good faith, despite the remarkable out-reach efforts of
the Government of Colombia. The strengthening of the Colombian state,
institutionally and militarily, should convey to those groups that they
cannot win political advantage through violence.
Question 2:
Some have suggested that even if the ``push'' were wildly
successful, putting an end to a significant amount of coca cultivation
in that region, the net flow of cocaine from Colombia will not be
seriously affected because demand will just force it to relocate
elsewhere in Colombia. How do you respond?
Answer:
This is precisely the process that the effort is meant to combat.
Cultivation exploded in southern Colombia after concentrated efforts
were made in Colombia's Guaviare Department (and in Peru and Bolivia
before that). One of the aims of this package is to provide sufficient
resources needed to make concerted, simultaneous efforts in multiple
locations so that cultivation is localized and eliminated rather than
simply pushing it from one region to another.
Question 3:
A recent IG Audit of INL-Administered programs in Colombia
suggested that neither the CIA nor the INL could agree on the
effectiveness of coca reduction in Colombia. If you cannot determine
what the level of coca production currently is in Colombia, how can the
Colombians know how much they have to eradicate by 2005 and how could
President Clinton ever certify that the goal was being met by the
Colombians?
Answer:
The cultivation estimates made by the CIA are the official
estimates and are used to make determinations, including the
presidential certifications that President Clinton's successor will
need to make in coming years. INL does not disagree with those
estimates. With regard to those certifications, the Government of
Colombia has adopted a strategy for a fifty percent reduction of
illegal crops. Any results that approached that goal would be clear.
The differences reported between INL and CIA have occurred at a
tactical level. As verification of the results of Plan Colombia become
a priority, such differences should be resolved.
Question 4:
President Pastrana has again hinted that he thinks it would be a
good idea if the U.S. itself found a way to engage the FARC in some
type of dialogue to allow both to better understand each other's goals
in Colombia. What is the Department's position on opening a dialogue
with the FARC or the ELN?
Answer:
The United States Government strongly supports President Pastrana's
efforts to broker a negotiated settlement to end Colombia's internal
conflict. We remain convinced that the peace process is integral to
long-term prospects for fighting drug trafficking, reducing
kidnappings, and restoring respect for human rights.
However, until the FARC takes steps to ensure that those involved
in the killing of the three U.S. citizen NGO workers in March 1999 are
turned over to the appropriate judicial authorities, the USG will have
no contact with the FARC. We also continue to call upon the FARC to
provide information regarding the welfare and whereabouts of the three
New Tribes Missionaries they seized in Panama in 1993.
Question 5:
It has been my understanding that the currently configured CNP
Black Hawk with GUA-19s (sic) has never been done before. Sikorsky and
General Dynamics have agreed to the configuration of this helicopter.
Secretary Beers, do you have confidence that the agreement of these
companies is sufficient proof of flight worthiness?
Answer:
The Department has not relied on either Sikorsky or General
Dynamics for the determination of the air worthiness of the CNP Black
Hawks as configured. That determination has been made by a Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) Quality Assurance Board which has issued
a ``Certificate of Compliance'' for the aircraft.
Question 6:
There seems to be some rivalry between the Colombian military and
the police over who will ultimately be in charge of the ``push into the
South'' effort. I am told that neither side is willing to cede
leadership to the other and that the police have already said they will
not participate in the ``push'' if the army is in charge. If this is
the case, is the program doomed before it even beings?
Answer:
If that were the situation, it would be a serious obstacle, but we
do not believe the situation to be that dire. Yes, there are intra-
service rivalries, as there are here in the United States. Coordination
across those lines is difficult and, in the case of Colombia,
unprecedented. The Colombian leadership, particularly Minister of
Defense Ramirez, to whom both the army and police report, understands
the challenges facing Colombia. They came to us with this concept and
the process is continuing to develop and improve. Army-police
coordination efforts witnessed since the December initiation of coca-
spraying in Putumayo Department demonstrate heightened inter-service
cooperation--and unprecedented results in aerial eradication efforts.
Question 7:
In your statement you say that spraying in Putumayo will begin in
December which corresponds to the arrival of the UH-1N helicopters and
the completion of the training for the 2nd battalion. Does this mean
the 1st and 2nd counter-narcotic battalions will begin operations in
December?
Answer:
First let me clarify that the first counternarcotics battalion has
been operating since its training was completed in December 1999,
although past operations were limited by the unavailability of air
mobility. With regard to the question, the two battalions, having
completed their coordination and training with the UH-1Ns, are now
since mid-December conducting air-mobile operations in southern
Colombia.
Question 8:
Do you have some type of organizational chart (of the
Administration's Executive Committee for Colombia)?
Answer:
Questions for the Record Submitted to Assistant Secretary of State Rand
Beers by Hon. Gary Ackerman
Question 1:
It is our understanding that the Administration is sole-source
contracting for the purchase of Ayers S2R T-65 sprayer aircraft for the
Colombian National Police. However, it has come to our attention that
there may be better aircraft available such as the Air Tractor Thrush,
which has a larger payload capacity, bigger wingspan for fewer passes
to kill an airfield (sic), and better landing gear to allow planes to
land safely while loaded without jettisoning chemicals over water or
non-targeted land.
What is the cost per airplane for the Ayers S2R T-65?
Has the Department ever done a comparison of the Ayers S2R T-65
with the Air Tractor Thrust to determine which is the most effective
spray plane?
Answer:
The Ayers S2R T-65 costs approximately $1.5M per aircraft. The
Department has not done a comparison of the Ayers S2R T-65 with the Air
Tractor Thrush, and does not intend to do so for two reasons: the
Colombian National Police have requested that we provide them with
additional T-65s; and the conference report for the FY2000 emergency
supplemental bill recommended that the Department provide to the CNP
``Ayres S2R T-65 agricultural spray aircraft.'' In our Congressional
Notification of a spending plan for the appropriate funds, we notified
the Congress that ``The Department plans to use $20 million to procure
additional commercial agricultural spray aircraft, and of those funds,
not less than $12 million will be allocated for procurement, training,
and operations of Ayers S2R T-65 agricultural spray aircraft. We are
using the notwithstanding authorities contained in Section 481 (a)(4)
of the FAA of 1961 (P.L. 87-195) for such procurement.''
Question 2:
Now that U.S. assistance under Plan Colombia has begun to flow,
what benchmarks for success is the Administration looking for? What
should we expect to see, in the way of policy accomplishments, by this
time next year?
Answer:
Benchmarks specifically for Plan Colombia are currently being
discussed. These discussions have been dependent on delivery schedules
for equipment and training which are still being determined as well as
initial operational results to make sure our joint expectations are
realistic.
Question 3:
If one of the helicopters provided by the U.S. is proved to have
been used to aid or abet a paramilitary unit, what will be the process
of repossessing it, as required by law?
Answer:
As we have done in the past, the U.S. Government will provide
aircraft to Colombia under a no-cost lease. The U.S. Government will
retain title to the aircraft and no legal repossession will be
necessary in the event of misuse. That said, we will not hesitate to
remove from Colombia any equipment--helicopters or any other type of
assistance--that has been used inappropriately.
Questions for the Record Submitted to Assistant Secretary of State Rand
Beers by Chairman Ben Gilman
Question 1:
Mr. Beers stated the CNP cannot go in and hold hostile areas. That
has never been their mission, it is to enforce the ``rule of law'' and
eliminate drugs.
Can the Colombian Army hold the FARC controlled areas today in
Putumayo and Caqueta that you say the police cannot?
Answer:
The purpose of the assistance being given to the military is to
give them the equipment and training to do just that.
My earlier statement was in no way meant to impugn the ability or
dedication of the CNP. They are an outstanding organization and I hold
them in the highest esteem. I was simply pointing out that there are
military missions just as there are law enforcement missions and that
democracy is best served when those distinctions are respected. For the
Colombian state to defend the interests of its citizens, particularly
in southern Colombia, both the Army and the police need to fulfill
their respective missions.
Question 2:
Did INL ever consult the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), as it
relates to security needs and personnel, for Plan Colombia? If not, why
not? Obviously there will be more personnel in the Embassy and some
reports indicate there are close to 500 temporary duty personnel
currently in Bogota. I would suspect that the threat to Embassy
personnel will rise.
Answer:
INL is working closely with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to
ensure that additional personnel needed for the implementation of Plan
Colombia will receive adequate and secure office space and that their
security needs are met.
Question 3:
Where will the additional Embassy personnel be physically located?
If they will be in the trailers, will they be safe and secure from
attack? Will the trailers be blast proof? If not, why not?
Answer:
The Department has examined several options for the additional
office space needed in Bogota. The preferred choice is the use of pre-
fabricated structures, or ``modules,'' that have been certified for
blast and forced entry standards. A location that meets security
setback guidelines has been identified for the modules within the
Embassy compound.
Question 4:
It was reported that recently the State Department turned down the
Colombian National Police (CNP) request for night vision goggles
training on one of their Black Hawks by the Colombian army at no cost
to the U.S. Government. Please explain why we would not want the CNP to
be able to use the Black Hawks at night and increase their
effectiveness?
Answer:
The issue was not over night vision goggle (NVG) training, but over
the ad hoc nature of the proposal to train one crewman. We are working
with the CNP to organize a comprehensive NVG training program that will
benefit their entire UH-60 fleet.
Questions for the Record Submitted to Assistant Secretary of State Rand
Beers by Chairman Dan Burton
Question 1:
Let me just say quickly, we have a lot of Black Hawks in our
inventory. We have mechanics and pilots in the Colombian National
Police who can fly those and take care of them today, not 3 years from
now, today. It will be a tragedy if we have to wait 2 or 3 years to get
new Black Hawks and train people when we already have trained--look at
me, sir, please. We already have trained pilots down there with the CNP
and mechanics who can today fly Black Hawks. We have Black Hawks in our
inventory, a lot of them. We could send them down there now. To wait 2
or 3 years for new Black Hawks to come off the line and train a whole
bunch of people when we have them already trained and ready to go down
there is a ludicrous argument. I mean, there is a war that is going to
be lost if we wait 2 or 3 years. They already have a DMZ. The president
down there is scared to death of these people. And you are going to
wait 3 years to get them the help they need? That is bologna.
Answer:
The delivery timeline you refer to represented a conservative
estimate provided by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA),
through which we are purchasing the aircraft at the explicit
instruction of Congress. Since the hearing we have signed a contract
with Sikorsky and the first Black Hawk will be in Colombia on July 1.
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