[Senate Hearing 106-43]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-43
UNITED STATES-TAIWAN RELATIONS: THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE TAIWAN
RELATIONS ACT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 25, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
-----------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
55-823 cc WASHINGTON : 1999
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
James W. Nance, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Feldman, Hon. Harvey J., Senior Fellow, Asia Studies Center, The
Heritage Foundation, Arlington, VA............................. 28
Prepared statement of........................................ 30
Ford, Carl W., Jr., President, Ford and Associates, Washington,
DC............................................................. 33
Prepared statement of........................................ 36
Helms, Senator Jesse, U.S. Senator from North Carolina, prepared
statement of................................................... 3
Kramer, Hon. Franklin D., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs................................. 16
Prepared statement of........................................ 18
Lampton, Dr. David M., Director of China Studies, Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University,
Washington, DC................................................. 42
Prepared statement of........................................ 44
Murkowski, Hon. Frank H., U.S. Senator from Alaska............... 6
Roth, Hon. Stanley O., Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs...................................... 9
Prepared statement of........................................ 12
Appendix
Responses of Assistant Secretary Roth to Questions Submitted by
Senator Helms.................................................. 51
Responses of Assistant Secretary Kramer to Questions Submitted by
Senator Helms.................................................. 52
(iii)
UNITED STATES-TAIWAN RELATIONS: THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE TAIWAN
RELATIONS ACT
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THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:16 a.m. in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse A.
Helms (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Helms, Hagel, Kerry, and Torricelli.
The Chairman. Well, I say to my colleagues that we are
hitting the high water mark this morning. We have some
excellent witnesses, the first being Senator Murkowski,
Assistant Secretary Roth, and then Assistant Secretary Kramer,
who are our primary panelists, and I thank all of you, of
course, for coming.
As is so often the case, all of us belong to more than one
committee, and it is inevitable about half the time that the
other committee will be meeting with something that they need a
quorum, so Senator Biden will be here presently, and I know you
will be glad to see him.
Well, we are here this morning to examine the future of
U.S. policy toward Taiwan, and we are approaching the 20th
anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act, which was signed into
law on April 10, 1979, and I remember it well, as do other
Senators, those heady days when Congress moved to rewrite the
draft of the bill sent to us by the Carter administration after
abruptly breaking relations with the Republic of China on
Taiwan.
I had a lot of problems myself with the Carter policy, and
I still do, but in the end we in Congress managed to craft
legislation that has thus far withstood the test of time.
During the past 20 years the Taiwan Relations Act has served as
basis for the continued growth of our cultural and commercial
relations with our great friends on Taiwan. That growth, when
you stop to think about it, has been nothing short of amazing.
In 1978, our two-way trade with the Republic of China was $7
billion. Today it is more than $53 billion, not bad I would say
to Frank Murkowski for a customs territory, as the World Trade
Organization has defined Taiwan. I wish we had a few more
customs territories over in Asia right now.
We have also seen the impressive and instructive
transformation of the Republic of China from a country under
martial law to today's vibrant multiparty democracy with a
spirited opposition, a free press, and a flourishing civil
society.
Now, I use the word instructive because I am convinced that
in this transformation the Republic of China on Taiwan has
proved for the world to see that it is the model for the
future, the future of Chinese civilization, and I do not
exaggerate when I say that.
But most important in my view were the defense provisions
of the Taiwan Relations Act, and by enacting into law that the
United States would consider any effort to determine Taiwan's
future by other than peaceful means should be a matter of great
concern to our country, the United States of America, and that
we would maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force
against Taiwan, and that the United States would provide
defensive arms to Taiwan, the United States put Red China on
notice that we expect them to keep their hands off of our
friends.
Well, that formula has worked pretty well so far. I have no
doubt that the Taiwan Relations Act has been a major factor in
keeping the Republic of China on Taiwan secure and free and
autonomous in the face of persistent hostility and pressure
from Red China.
But there are areas of concern that dictate that we must at
least review our implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act.
For instance, Taiwan's democratic development and economic
stability have made it increasingly difficult to ignore
Taiwan's justified cause for greater participation in
international organizations. The Taiwan Relations Act
specifically stipulates that nothing in that act can be used as
a basis for denying membership, let alone participation in, for
Taiwan in international organizations.
In its 1994 policy review, the Clinton administration
committed itself to efforts to secure membership or greater
participation by Taiwan in these international organizations,
yet Taiwan this day remains something of an international
outcast. Its voice cannot even be heard in the World Health
Organization. Its membership in the WTO is being held hostage
to China's accession, so the 19th largest economy in the world
is barred from the World Bank and the IMF.
I think those things speak for themselves. I think we
learned in Latin that the definition of all of this is res ipsa
loquitur, the thing speaks for itself. In any event, more needs
to be done in these instances, and I invite comment on this
from our witnesses, and I expect we will get it.
Most disturbing, however, is the increasing threat to
Taiwan from Communist China. In recent years China has been
engaged in a major military buildup, much of it clearly aimed
at Taiwan. Last month we learned from the Pentagon in its
report to Congress that China has been and will continue to
deploy a large number of missiles directly across from the
strait, from Taiwan. Taiwan has little or no defense against
these missiles, and in 1995 and 1996 mainland China
demonstrated beyond doubt that it is willing to use these
missiles to intimidate Taiwan, if not the United States and
other countries.
Well, the Pentagon report makes it clear that China's vast
qualitative edge in naval and air assets, coupled with its
ongoing modernization, would today prove overwhelming vis-a-vis
Taiwan in any sort of military confrontation barring third
party, that is to say, American intervention. The report
concludes that the Taiwan's future success in deterring China's
aggression will be dependent on its contingent acquisition of
modern arms, technology and equipment and its ability to deal
with a number of systemic problems, such as logistics.
And I am going to ask unanimous consent, presuming that it
will be granted, that the balance of my statement be included
in the record as if read.
[The prepared statement of Senator Helms follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Helms
Welcome to our distinguished witnesses this morning. Senator
Murkowski, Assistant Secretary Roth, Assistant Secretary Kramer, our
private panelists--thank all of you for coming to discuss the important
topic of Taiwan.
We are here to examine the future of U.S. policy toward Taiwan--as
we approach the 20th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act, which was
signed into law on April 10, 1979.
I well recall, as do other Senators here, those heady days when
Congress moved to re-write the draft of the bill sent to us by the
Carter administration after abruptly breaking relations with the
Republic of China on Taiwan. I had a lot of problems with the Carter
policy at the time--I still do.
But in the end, we managed to craft legislation that has thus far
withstood the test of time. During the past twenty years, the Taiwan
Relations Act has served as a basis for the continued growth of our
commercial and cultural relations with our good friends there. That
growth has been amazing: in 1978, our two-way trade with the Republic
of China was $7 billion; today it is more than $53 billion. (Not bad
for a ``customs territory,'' as the World Trade Organization has
defined Taiwan.)
We have also seen the impressive and instructive transformation of
the Republic of China from a country under martial law to today's
vibrant, multi-party democracy, with a spirited opposition, a free
press and a flourishing civil society.
I used the word instructive because I am convinced that in this
transformation, the Republic of China on Taiwan has proved for the
world to see that it is the model for the future of Chinese
civilization.
But, most important, in my view, were the defense provisions of the
Taiwan Relations Act. By enacting into law that the United States would
consider any effort to determine Taiwan's future by other than peaceful
means to be a matter of grave concern to our country, and that we would
maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force against Taiwan, and
that the U.S. would provide defensive arms to Taiwan--the United States
put Red China on notice that we expect them to keep their hands off our
friends.
The formula has worked well so far. I have no doubt that the Taiwan
Relations Act has been a major factor in keeping the Republic of China
on Taiwan secure, free and autonomous in the face of persistent
hostility and pressure from Red China.
But, there are areas of concern that dictate that we must at least
review our implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act. For instance,
Taiwan's democratic development and economic stability have made it
increasingly difficult to ignore Taiwan's justified calls for greater
participation in international organizations.
The Taiwan Relations Act specifically stipulates that nothing in
that act can be used as a basis for denying membership, let alone
participation, to Taiwan in international organizations. In its 1994
policy review, the Clinton administration committed itself to efforts
to secure membership or greater participation by Taiwan in these
international organizations.
Yet Taiwan remains something of an international outcast. Its voice
cannot today even be heard in the World Health Organization. Its
membership in the WTO is being held hostage to China's accession. And
the 19th largest economy in the world is barred from the World Bank and
the IMF.
Clearly more needs to be done in these instances and I invite
comment on this from our witnesses.
Most disturbing, however, is the increasing threat to Taiwan from
Communist China. For years, China has been engaged in a major military
buildup, much of it clearly aimed at Taiwan. Last month, we learned
from the Pentagon in its report to Congress that China has been and
will continue to deploy a large number of missiles directly across the
strait from Taiwan. Taiwan has little or no defense against these
missiles, and in 1995 and 1996, Mainland China demonstrated beyond a
doubt that it is willing to use these missiles to intimidate Taiwan if
not more than that.
The Pentagon report makes it clear that China's vast quantitative
edge in naval and air assets, coupled with its ongoing modernization,
would today prove overwhelming vis-a-vis Taiwan in any sort of military
confrontation, barring third party, i.e., American, intervention. The
report concludes that Taiwan's future success in deterring Chinese
aggression will be dependent on its continued acquisition of modern
arms, technology and equipment and its ability to deal with a number of
systemic problems, such as logistics.
And that's where the U.S. needs to step in. The United States is
the only power in the world that can guarantee Taiwan's right to
acquire these weapons and deal with its systemic problems. The question
is, will we? Communist China has coupled its military buildup and
threats against Taiwan with increased pressure on the United States to
limit or cease its arms sales to Taiwan.
The situation is sadly reminiscent of 1982, when the Reagan
administration unwisely yielded to Chinese pressure and agreed to limit
and reduce our arms sales to Taiwan.
Will the Clinton administration do something similar--perhaps
deliver a gift to Premier Zhu next month? Or will the Clinton
administration implement sections 3(a) and 3(b) of the Taiwan Relations
Act, which oblige the U.S. to sell defensive arms to Taiwan based
solely upon our judgement of Taiwan's needs.
Many Senators and Members of Congress, myself included, are going
to need a lot of convincing that this administration will have the
fortitude to withstand China's assualt on our arms sales to Taiwan in
light of last summer's cave in on the so-called ``three-noes''
question. In any event, Taiwan's defense needs are going up, and I will
look forward to a discussion of whether our arms sales to Taiwan should
go up as well.
In any event, it is time to begin a discussion of whether the U.S.
should be doing more in terms of exchanges, training and planning with
Taiwan's military. The Taiwan military has operated in virtual
isolation for twenty years, which has contributed to some of the
systemic problems alluded to in the Pentagon report.
It boils down to an inevitable and unavoidable question. Why is it
that when the Secretary of Defense and other top officials of our
Government can rub elbows in Beijing, the State Department prevents any
U.S. officer above the rank of colonel from setting foot in Taiwan?
Now as you know, yesterday I introduced legislation that addresses
many of these issues and I would invite comment from our panelists on
the bill itself or these issues generally.
The Chairman. Would the distinguished Senator from
Massachusetts, representing the Democrat minority, have a
statement?
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, a very brief one, and I thank
the chair.
I want to commend you for holding this hearing. It is
obviously very timely, not just because it is the 20th
anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act, but also because we
are now engaged in a very important debate over whether the
policy that we have been pursuing, the broad policy of
engagement followed by every President since President Nixon,
is still the most effective approach to China. Over the past 20
years we have witnessed very dramatic changes in Taiwan. It has
transformed itself from an authoritarian system into a rough-
and-tumble multiparty democracy with a flourishing free market
economy, and it has become a symbol of what others in Asia,
including China, can achieve over time, and what we would hope
that they would achieve over time.
The past 20 years has also seen a dramatic transformation
of Taiwan's economic relationship with China itself. Taiwan has
followed a very deliberate strategy of engagement with China.
Notwithstanding fundamental political differences with Beijing
over the question of reunification, Taiwan has developed a
robust trading relationship particularly with the southern
provinces, which form a critical export market for Taiwanese
products. That trade relationship is now valued at about $30
billion, but that really tells only about half the story, Mr.
Chairman.
Taiwan's companies' investments in China have surged in
recent years, particularly in the area of high technology, with
more than 10,000 investments worth more than $6 billion just in
the past 2 years. Moreover, the pace of Taiwan's investment in
China has doubled since 1996. Taiwan companies now rely on
their factories in China to manufacture more than half of the
sophisticated electronic components for the personal computers
which are ultimately purchased by American, European, and Asian
consumers.
These investments have led to a growing network of informal
contacts between Taiwan and its neighbor across the strait.
Family visits, academic exchanges, and tourism are flourishing.
Many of those belonging to the new generation emerging on
Taiwan, young people for whom China's Communist revolution is
ancient history, are eager to rediscover their roots, or just
become better acquainted with the mainland.
Most importantly, Taiwan and China have opened a critical
cross-strait dialog, a beginning on the difficult road of
determining the relationship between these two entities over
time. After an ice-breaking visit by Taiwanese Representative
Koo to China last year, direct high-level political talks are
likely to resume this fall on Taiwan. This would obviously be a
very welcome and encouraging development.
Taiwan has engaged China for one basic reason. They
recognize that in the end Taiwan and China alone, only the two
of them, can really answer the question of how they are going
to be related to each other in the 21st century.
Now, obviously, the United States has played a vital role,
and I think it is a role we can and should be proud of. Our
explicit commitment to Taiwan's security and prosperity
reflected in the Taiwan Relations Act has strengthened Taiwan's
hand in dealing with a much larger, more powerful, and
sometimes provocative neighbor. It is essential that we
maintain that commitment, but in so doing we need to be careful
ourselves not to take actions which would discourage the recent
trend of improving cross-strait relations, or allow either
party to use the United States as a pawn in their political
dialog.
For example, we all know that China poses a potential
threat to Taiwan. In recent years, China has increased the
numbers of M-9 ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan, and we have
responded, appropriately in my judgment, by providing Taiwan
with Patriot missile batteries and advanced fighter aircraft to
enhance its deterrent capability.
Some have argued that we should more rapidly go further,
that we should now rush to develop and deploy a theater missile
defense system [TMD] which would cover Taiwan. I do not
necessarily deny the possibility of doing that, but before we
do it, we should be certain that it fits into the context of
the increasing cross-strait relationships that I referred to
and also that the unintended consequences have been answered,
that by deploying TMD we will not ultimately decrease, rather
than increase Taiwan's security, and shred rather than enhance
their engagement with China, and our own.
These are important questions, Mr. Chairman, and we clearly
need to have answers to them. Everyone understands, and we talk
in this country sometimes about the Chinese notion of yin and
yang, which is essentially a notion about balance. The Taiwan
Relations Act is a very important component of that balance,
balance between our relationship with Taiwan and the
inescapable ingredient of our engagement with China, but it is
not the only ingredient. Another ingredient is our commitment
to the one China policy we have pursued in the past, and our
determination to avoid provocative actions which undermine that
commitment and the possible peaceful resolution of the Taiwan
question.
So, Mr. Chairman, as we proceed with our own debate over
the merits of the policy of engagement with China, we need to
keep in mind the consequences of any change or an abandonment
of that policy and the impact it would have in terms of the
strategic and political consequences not only for us but for
Taiwan itself. I thank the chair.
The Chairman. I thank the Senator.
Before we proceed further, just one moment to suggest that
this record shows the sadness of this committee and expression
of friendship to our distinguished friend, Mr. Lugar, who lost
his mother last night. She must have been a great lady if she
raised Dick Lugar. Senator Murkowski, you are now front and
center.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Murkowski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate the opportunity to be with you this morning, and I
want to thank you for welcoming me back to the Foreign
Relations Committee, where I served as a member for 12 years.
Regretfully, I left for the Finance Committee, but sometimes we
have to do those things.
I also want to recognize Senator Hagel, who chaired with me
a hearing of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee this
morning on global climate change, which I might add is still
going on. I want to recognize my good friend Senator Kerry as
well.
I also want to thank Senator Biden and the other members of
the committee for approving on Tuesday two resolutions which I,
along with others, introduced regarding the Taiwan issue, first
was Senate Concurrent Resolution 17 commemorating the 20th
anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act, and Senate Resolution
26, regarding Taiwan's participation in the World Health
Organization. These are both timely and important measures that
I hope the full Senate will adopt in the next few days.
Mr. Chairman, looking back over 20 years, well, we have
come a long way since then. I think there was an ad to that
effect, we've come a long way, baby.
I was not a Member of the Senate in 1979 when the Congress
passed the Taiwan Relations Act, I came in 1980, but I have
great respect for the wisdom of those who preceded me and
played a role in the negotiations in passing this enduring
piece of legislation. It would be interesting to hear from some
of those folks now.
I recall reading a statement from former Senator Boren, who
is in the education business now at the University of Oklahoma,
during the debate over the adoption of the Taiwan Relations
Act: ``we are here setting precedent, not merely a matter of
legal precedents of the past. We are here setting policy. How
healthy it would be for us to state, as a matter of policy,
that while we are going to move ahead with a relationship with
800 million people on the mainland, that does not mean that we
have to turn our backs on the people of Taiwan, who have been
our friends.'' That statement was made March 12, 1979.
In talking to my colleagues and former administration
officials who were here for the creation of the Taiwan
Relations Act, you really get the sense that no one--I think
the chairman expressed this--no one really expected Taiwan to
be around for very long. But Taiwan has not only survived,
Taiwan has thrived. Taiwan has turned into one of the Asian
tigers, and has weathered the Asian flu far better than any
other Asian country. She is a full-fledged multiparty
democracy, a democracy that respects human rights and civil
liberties, and she serves as a model of successful democratic
reform. It is almost a case where she had no other choice but
to make it work, regardless of the adverse circumstances, and
she has. The positive changes in Taiwan are really a tribute to
the spirit and the perseverance of her people, who have
achieved an almost impossible dream in the view of many 20
years ago.
The United States cannot take credit for Taiwan's
achievement, but we can be proud of the role the Taiwan
Relations Act has played are that we in Congress and in the
administration have played in maintaining peace, security, and
stability throughout East Asia.
There have been many times, as the chairman knows, over the
past 20 years when tensions have gripped the Taiwan Strait.
Most recently, in 1996, China chose to launch missiles over
Taiwan on the eve of the first direct Presidential election on
the island.
We might interpret that the mainland was trying to
interfere in the election process, but if so, it seems to have
back-fired because President Lee was elected by a greater
majority than otherwise he might have been, but in any event,
that is conjecture.
The Clinton administration responded appropriately by
sending two aircraft carriers to the region. This action was
consistent with both the spirit and the letter of the Taiwan
Relations Act, and I believe demonstrates the resolve of the
United States to stand by our commitments to the people of
Taiwan.
All who have studied the Taiwan Relations Act recognize
that, at its heart, it is really about one thing, and that is
security. The most important commitment the United States made
is in section 3, and it reads as follows: ``the United States
will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense
services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan
to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.''
I want to emphasize that the act talks about sufficient
self-defense capability, not offensive capability. I think that
is what we have to keep in mind, and that has been our policy.
As we near the 20th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act
on April 10, it is important to reflect on this commitment and
others incorporated in the Taiwan Relations Act, and to
determine whether our policies indeed meet that commitment.
Back in 1978, when the United States broke off our
diplomatic relations with the Republic of China and recognized
the People's Republic of China, we lived in a very different
world. We had a wall dividing the two Germanies, the Soviet
Union was the Evil Empire, and the people of Taiwan lived under
martial law. This was the state of the world when the United
States passed the Taiwan Relations Act.
Although the world has changed dramatically since then, our
policies have not. The Clinton administration conducted a
review of our policies toward Taiwan in 1994. They made some
small corrective adjustments regarding what level of meetings
could take place, where they could occur, and so forth. I
welcomed those changes, but I believe that we can and should do
more.
The Department of State committed also to ``support more
actively,'' Taiwan's membership in international organizations
that accept non-States--non-States--as members and to ``look
for ways to have Taiwan's voice heard'' in international
organizations where Taiwan's membership is not possible.
We are all aware of Taiwan's responsiveness to world
causes, famines, significant contributions for the betterment
of mankind. They are always called upon, and they always give.
As a consequence, I would encourage consideration by the
administration more specifically to recognize that this is
indeed a need unfulfilled that can be met, and as a consequence
I submitted Senate Resolution 26 urging Taiwan's participation
in the World Health Organization.
There was an epidemic in Taiwan not so long ago, a rather
unusual type of flu, and the World Health Organization was
unable to be responsive. That is tragic and unneeded. After
all, we are all inter-tied with our health needs and exposures
as we travel internationally.
Another resolution that I introduced, Senate Concurrent
Resolution 17, expresses concern about several issues,
including the process for evaluating Taiwan's self-defense
needs and the lack of high-level dialog between Taiwan's senior
military officials and American defense officials on many
issues of mutual concern. The resolution also expresses the
Congress' grave concern over the possible threat to security in
the Taiwan Strait from China's defense mobilization and
modernization and procurement, as documented in the February 1,
1999 report to Congress by the Secretary of Defense on the
security situation in the Taiwan Strait. This includes, of
course, China's growing arsenal of nuclear and conventionally
armed ballistic missiles.
With Secretary Kramer here today I would like to commend
the Pentagon for producing what I found to be a very
informative report, and I hope that similar reports can be
produced for Congress on an annual basis.
I understand that our chairman, Chairman Helms, yesterday
introduced the U.S.-Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, which
would codify some of the policies suggested in my resolution,
and I welcome your initiative, Mr. Chairman, and I ask that I
might be added as a cosponsor.
Because the Congress and this committee in particular play
such a strategic and key role in the oversight and
implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act, I think it is very
fitting that we take special note of this important
anniversary, as the chairman has. I look forward to working
with my colleagues and with the administration in maintaining
our strong and special relationship with Taiwan.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today. I would be pleased to respond to any
questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator. You are a
distinguished alumnus of this committee, and any time you want
to come back we will see if we cannot find a place for you.
I have no questions for the Senator.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
The Chairman. You are welcome to come up here and sit with
us. I know you do not have anything else to do today.
Senator Murkowski. I have got another place to sit. Thank
you.
The Chairman. He is almost running out the door because he
has so much to do. Seriously, Frank, we are glad that you came.
The second panel, the Honorable Frank Kramer, who I
mentioned a while ago, who is Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs, and the Honorable Stanley
Roth, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, and if you gentlemen will enjoy where you have already
taken a seat, that will be great, and your entire prepared
remarks will be made a part of the record, and you can, if you
want to let us have time to discuss the subject with you, you
may want to summarize your statement, but I am going to leave
that up to you.
I appreciate your coming. Mr. Kramer, why don't you
proceed, or----
Mr. Roth. However you would like, Mr. Chairman. Initially I
would set the context----
The Chairman. Well, I see it says Kramer and Roth. Why
don't you go first, then.
STATEMENT OF HON. STANLEY O. ROTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
Mr. Roth. Let me set the context, and then I understand
that many of the specific questions relate more directly to
Assistant Secretary Kramer's portfolio on the defense side, but
I wanted to make a few remarks.
The Chairman. Good.
Mr. Roth. First, I wanted to start with a personal note,
Mr. Chairman, because I became a staffer on Capitol Hill 20
years ago this past February, and the very first issue I worked
on, despite the fact that I was a Middle East expert at the
time, was the Taiwan Relations Act, and I have had a personal
interest in it ever since.
And to tell you the truth I quite agree with the assessment
that you made and the assessment that Senator Murkowski made
that the legislation sent up by the administration at that time
was grossly inadequate, and if not for the work of the Congress
I think that we would have a radically different situation in
the region today, so I think that the accomplishments in the
TRA are very great, and that Congress deserves a very large
share of the credit.
I may also say for the sake of history my own role as a
very junior 25-year-old staffer to a junior Member on the House
side was not great, but it was the first issue I worked on. I
am not attempting to take credit personally for the success.
Having set that context, I do want to make just a few basic
points. First, I think that the combination of the
normalization of relations with the PRC in 1979 and the passage
of the enhanced Taiwan Relations Act with the Congress' input,
has worked. I think as a result of it the world is radically
different than it was in 1979, and three sets of bilateral
relationships have flourished. Obviously U.S.-China
relationships are radically different and improved from where
they were in 1979, despite all the problems, and that
relationship is not the focus of our hearing today.
But second, I think it is important to recognize that the
peace and stability that came upon the Asian region as a result
of normalization was enormously beneficial to Taiwan and to
U.S.-Taiwan relations. I will not dwell on this point, because
it has already been made by many of the speakers, but I can
remember as a staffer organizing hearings on human rights
violations and the Taiwan-Kaosiung incident, assassination of
opposition leaders in the United States, and all of that is
gone. This is a totally different world. Taiwan is a role model
on human rights. It is a role model on economic development,
and I think that this enormous, staggering progress that has
been made in Taiwan is largely attributable to the people of
Taiwan, but that could not have happened without the
environment that was created by normalization.
But the third point that I want to spend just a little more
time on is what has changed in the relationship between China
and Taiwan, because here is where the most dramatic change has
taken place, and I agree with Senator Kerry.
Who would have thought in 1979 that you would have had $30
billion worth of Taiwan investments on the mainland. Who would
have thought in 1979 that you would have millions of Taiwanese
visiting the mainland? Who would have thought in 1979 that you
would have high-level political talks between China and Taiwan,
and that Taiwan Representative Mr. Koo would be received by
Jiang Zemin and others at Diaouyutai, the State Guest House.
So this is a radical change in the relationship, and I
think ultimately stabilizing in terms of reducing tensions,
because the ties between the two parties on either side of the
strait are so great. So all this is my way of saying I think
there is a lot to feel good about. A lot has worked over the
past 20 years.
In my statement I give a lot of statistics and go into
great detail about the recent Wang-Koo meeting, but in the
interest of time that you have expressed I will just leave that
for the record, and get directly to the question of assessing
the effectiveness of the TRA.
I think that clearly we should consider the TRA to have
been a success. I think clearly that it has managed to provide
for Taiwan security. Taiwan has not withered and disappeared.
As Senator Murkowski said, you know, was the fear 20 years ago.
I think that in fact we look at recent assessments of the
security situation by the Pentagon.
The conclusion is that except in a few areas, and missiles
has been highlighted as just one, that essentially the dynamic
equilibrium of forces in the Taiwan Strait has not changed
dramatically over the last two decades. That is a very major
accomplishment, and it demonstrates that for 20 years the TRA
has been effective.
And consistent with our obligations under the TRA, we and
other administrations before us, in close consultation with the
Congress, have approved a long list of defensive weaponry which
I list in my testimony but will not do in the interests of
time.
But let me turn to the hot issue of the moment, which, of
course, is TMD. The question of Taiwan and a theoretical
theater missile defense strategy has, of course, been a topic
of much discussion recently.
First, let me set out some important technical points. TMD
is a defensive system for which no deployment decisions, other
than the protection of our own forces, has been made. This high
altitude system technology is in the early stages of
development, with potential deployment at least some years
away.
But that said, I would like to emphasize the critical point
that Secretary Albright made in Beijing to the Chinese, which
was, the issue of TMD is not solely, or even largely an
American decision. The issue of TMD is going to be influenced
by what China does. What China does matters, and the Secretary
laid out to the Chinese very clearly that you cannot expect
countries to ignore missile threats.
For example, China objected strenuously to the sale of TMD
to Japan, a treaty ally of the United States, which faces a
real, legitimate threat from missiles from North Korea, and you
cannot expect the leadership of Japan to just live with this
threat without seeking some results, so the Secretary said to
the Chinese, look, if you do not want Japan to acquire TMD, you
are going to have to help Japan deal with the threat. Talk to
the North Koreans about their missiles and tell them to
negotiate with us.
It is exactly the same point with Taiwan. It is
unreasonable to say that China can deploy unlimited numbers of
missiles that can reach Taiwan's territory, and that Taiwan's
leaders have no obligation to think of defenses.
So what China does matters, and we have told them that they
ought to be addressing Taiwan's concerns if they do not want to
see the possibility of TMD introduced into the region.
We have worked and urged the PRC to exercise restraints on
missiles, to work toward confidence-building measures with
Taiwan, and to press North Korea to forego its missile
ambition. These factors are under PRC's direct control or
considerable influence, and the PRC's actions affect the future
perceived need for TMD.
Put differently, we do not preclude the possibility of
Taiwan having access to TMD. Our decisions on this will be
guided by the same basic factors that have shaped our decisions
to date on the provision of defensive capabilities to Taiwan.
In my testimony I go on to describe the success of the
economic relationship, but you highlighted that in your
statement, so I will skip over that section.
I also then go on to describe Clinton administration policy
at great length. I go back to the review of 1994. I will skip a
lot of the details and instead go to the issue that you have
raised and several of your colleagues, membership in
international organizations.
In the policy review, it was decided that the United States
would support Taiwan's participation in international
organizations that do not require statehood as a basis for
membership, and would support opportunities for Taiwan's voice
to be heard where membership is not possible.
Since then, Taiwan has joined some tactical organizations
like the Global Government Forum on Semiconductors. Frankly,
however, and I know you like frankness, this is not a smashing
success. Movement on this front has not been nearly as rapid as
we had envisioned. We have found that there are simply not as
many opportunities as we had initially hoped to find
organizations which do not have membership of the State, and
the PRC has been actively and adamantly opposed to many of
Taiwan's attempts at membership or participation in
international organizations.
However, we view successful Taiwan participation in the
Olympics, the ASEAN Development Bank, and APEC as clear
examples of the contributions that Taiwan can make
internationally and should be able to make. These contributions
became possible because Beijing and Taipei found formulas to
resolve participation. In the future, we hope that improved
relations in the strait that may grow out of enhanced cross-
strait dialog and lead to similar creative solutions to the
issue of greater access for Taiwan to additional international
organizations.
Finally, for the record, even though you have heard this
from me many times, Mr. Chairman, let me emphasize one aspect
of the administration's policy that has not changed, and will
not change. The administration continues to insist that cross-
strait differences be resolved peacefully.
The depth and firmness of the administration's resolve on
this point was dramatically demonstrated in March 1996, when
President Clinton ordered two U.S. carrier battle groups to the
waters near Taiwan in response to provocative PRC missile
tests. The visible U.S. strength, and the obvious U.S. signal
of continued support for peaceful resolution of issues between
the PRC and Taiwan was effective in counteracting the
escalating tensions in the region at that time.
Let me conclude my statement at this time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Roth follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Stanley O. Roth
introduction
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to address this
committee on the twentieth anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act. I
look forward to exchanging ideas and points of view, and to affirming
that we are following the best possible path for an issue we all care a
great deal about.
As many of you may know, some twenty years ago I was a new foreign
policy specialist on Congressman Steve Solarz's staff. When President
Carter decided to recognize the People's Republic of China, I found
myself grappling with my first significant policy issue: the nature of
U.S.-Taiwan relations in a fundamentally changed world. It was, in
fact, the Taiwan question--how to preserve the long-standing friendship
and common interests between the U.S. and Taiwan in the absence of
diplomatic relations--that initiated my interest in Asia and shaped my
life's work.
I vividly remember the confused and anxious atmosphere of 1979, as
well as the sense of solemn urgency. Clearly, the challenge of what
ultimately became the Taiwan Relations Act--the TRA--was to ensure that
normalization of our relations with the People's Republic of China did
not result in the abandonment of Taiwan. This premise led to the
articulation of the fundamental goals of the TRA as laid out in Section
2(a):
``(1) to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the
Western Pacific; and
``(2) to promote the foreign policy of the United States by
authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other
relations between the people of the United States and the
people on Taiwan.''
I have no hesitation in declaring the TRA a resounding success.
Over the past twenty years, the TRA has not only helped to preserve the
substance of our relationship with Taiwan, it has also contributed to
the conditions which have enabled the U.S., the PRC, and Taiwan to
achieve a great deal more.
no zero sum game
In reviewing the past twenty years of these three intertwined
relationships--U.S.-PRC, U.S.-Taiwan, and Beijing-Taipei--what becomes
absolutely apparent is that gains in one relationship do not dictate a
loss in either of the other two. In fact, the reverse is true: gains in
one have contributed to gains in the others.
As I noted earlier, the TRA was born of the U.S. decision to
normalize relations with the PRC. The U.S.-PRC relationship that
followed that decision--for all of its ups and downs--has contributed
enormously to stability and peace in Asia.
In turn, this positive Asian environment, supplemented by the
specific assurances of the TRA, has been conducive to the people of
Taiwan developing and applying their great creativity and capabilities
to bettering their lives. The result has been Taiwan's extraordinary
economic and political development. The unofficial U.S.-Taiwan
relationship has prospered accordingly.
Arguably, however, while the gains in the U.S.-PRC and the
unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relationship have been formidable, the Beijing-
Taipei relationship has actually experienced the most dramatic
improvement. The trade, personal contacts, and dialogue now taking
place were unimaginable twenty years ago when propaganda-filled
artillery shells were still being traded across the strait. Today,
economic figures tell a much different story.
In the five years from 1993 to 1998, cross-strait trade has grown
on average by over 13 percent per year, and stood at $22.5 billion at
the end of 1998. In fact, trade with the PRC accounted for over 10
percent of Taiwan's trade with the rest of the world in 1998, making
the PRC Taiwan's third largest overall trade partner surpassed only by
the U.S. and Japan.
Imports from the PRC to Taiwan are growing even faster--by an
average of over 40 percent per year over the last five years--albeit
from a lower base. 3.9 percent of Taiwan's global imports came from the
PRC in 1998.
Contracted Taiwan investment in the PRC now exceeds $30 billion.
With 30,000 individual Taiwan firms having invested in the PRC, over
three million mainland Chinese are now employed with firms benefiting
from that commitment of funds.
Economic ties have led to increasing personal ties. Up to 200,000
Taiwan business people now live and work in the PRC. Since the opening
of cross-strait travel a decade ago, more than ten million Taiwan
residents have visited the mainland.
This greater economic interaction is positive. Taiwan's security
over the long term depends more on the two sides coming to terms with
each other than on the particular military balance. Much like Adam
Smith's invisible hand of the market place, myriad individual economic
and social ties across the strait will contribute to an aggregate self-
interest in maintaining the best possible cross-strait relations.
Politically, gains are also apparent. One of the most salutary
developments in East Asia during the early 1990s was the emergence of a
dialogue between Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation, or SEF,
responsible for Taiwan's unofficial relations with the mainland, and
the Mainland's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, or
ARATS. The dialogue, cut off by the PRC after the Lee Teng-hui visit in
1995, has begun to be revived this past year. As I am sure you are
aware Mr. Chairman, in late 1998, SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu led a
twelve-member delegation on a five-day ``ice-melting'' visit to the
mainland. In addition to meetings with ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan, the
visit also included a meeting with PRC President Jiang Zemin and other
ranking PRC officials. In a good will gesture, Chairman Koo was invited
to stay at the PRC's official Diaouyutai State Guest House; an offer he
accepted.
Koo's October visit was able to reach a four-point consensus which
includes:
a return visit to Taiwan by ARATS Chairman Wang, a visit now
scheduled for Fall;
further dialogue on political, economic, and other issues;
more exchanges between SEF and ARATS; and
greater assistance (on personal safety and property) for
people visiting the mainland, and vice versa.
Chairman Koo's meeting with President Jiang Zemin was the highest
level contact between Beijing and Taipei since 1949. As such, it
substantially improved the climate for cross-strait exchanges. The
consensus that was forged provides an excellent framework for
developing the approaches necessary to resolve the difficult issues
between the two sides.
assessing the effectiveness of the tra
We should frankly acknowledge that Taiwan would prefer official
diplomatic relations with the United States to unofficial relations.
However, that said, the fact that our relations are unofficial has not
harmed Taiwan's core interests in achieving security, prosperity, and
freedom.
Twenty years ago, Taiwan was under martial law and had significant
human rights violations. That Taiwan no longer exists. Today, to my
great pleasure, human rights violations are no longer necessary topics
of discussion. Politically, Taiwan has a vibrant democracy
characterized by free elections, a free press and dynamic political
campaigns. The 1996 direct election of the President and Vice President
stands out as a particular high point, and Taiwan's competitive
democratic system continues to mature.
Taiwan's political metamorphosis has been profound and serves as an
example of peaceful democratic change in the region and beyond. The
shelter of the TRA, made real by each successive administration's
commitment to its provisions, helped make this transformation possible.
Taiwan's immediate security was a major concern twenty years ago.
There were those who feared that absent formalized defense arrangements
with the U.S., Taiwan would be subject to military intimidation by the
PRC. Clearly, the provisions of the TRA have been critical in enhancing
Taiwan's ability to defend itself.
The Department of Defense's recent assessment of the security
situation in the Taiwan Strait concludes that, except in a few areas,
despite modest qualitative improvements in the military forces of both
China and Taiwan, the dynamic equilibrium of those forces in the Taiwan
Strait has not changed dramatically over the last two decades. This
assessment means that for twenty years the TRA has been effective.
Consistent with our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act to
provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character, and in close
consultation with Congress, U.S. administrations have provided Taiwan
with a range of defensive weaponry including F-16s, Knox class
frigates, helicopters, and tanks as well as a variety of air-to-air,
surface-to-air, and anti-ship defensive missiles. We continually
reevaluate Taiwan's posture to ensure we provide it with sufficient
self-defense capability while complying with the terms of the 1982
Communique.
The question of Taiwan and a theoretical theater missile defense--
TMD--strategy, has of course been a topic of much discussion recently.
First, let me set out some important technical points. TMD is a
defensive system for which no deployment decisions, other than for
protection of our own forces, have been made. This high-altitude system
technology is in the early stages of development with potential
deployment at least some years away.
But, that said, I think it is critical to emphasize that the PRC's
actions are a key factor in the region's, and Taiwan's, interest in
TMD. We have urged the PRC to exercise restraint on missiles, to work
toward confidence-building measures with Taiwan, and to press North
Korea to forgo its missile ambitions. These factors are under the PRC's
direct control or considerable influence, and the PRC's actions can
affect future perceived need for TMD. Put differently, we do not
preclude the possibility of Taiwan having access to TMD. Our decisions
on this will be guided by the same basic factors that have shaped our
decisions to date on the provision of defensive capabilities to Taiwan.
Political development and military security have contributed to
Taiwan's tremendous economic development over the past two decades. As
a result, the U.S. and Taiwan now share a vibrant, mutually beneficial
trade relationship. Taiwan is the 14th largest trading economy in the
world and the seventh largest market for U.S. exports. It constitutes
our fifth largest foreign agricultural market and a major market for
U.S. automobiles. For our part, the U.S. absorbs one fourth of all
Taiwan exports, and our annual bilateral trade exceeds $50 billion.
The economic partnership, moreover, continues to grow. Taiwan's
sophisticated economy is largely withstanding the Asian Financial
Crisis and acting as a support for the region. Taipei is now pursuing
an ambitious, multi-billion dollar series of infrastructure projects--
projects for which U.S. firms are helping to provide professional
services and equipment. Taiwan and the U.S. passed a milestone in their
economic relationship last year with the successful completion of
bilateral market access negotiations concerning Taiwan's application to
the World Trade Organization. All indications are that Taiwan will
continue to be an important export market for the United States.
clinton administration policy
The Clinton Administration has been faithful to both the letter and
the spirit of the TRA.
In 1994 the Administration carried out a lengthy interagency review
of U.S.-Taiwan policy--the first such review launched by any
administration of either political party since 1979--in order to
determine that all that could be done was being done. On the basis of
that review, the Administration has undertaken a number of specific
steps. While these steps were briefed extensively to the Congress at
the time the decisions were made, I think it would be helpful to review
some of the decisions.
First, high level U.S. officials from economic and technical
agencies up to cabinet level, are now authorized to travel to Taiwan
when appropriate. Last November, Energy Secretary Richardson traveled
to Taipei to attend the annual meeting of the U.S.-Taiwan Business
Council, following the precedents set in 1994 and 1996, when then
Secretary of Transportation Pena and then Small Business Administrator
Lader attended similar meetings. Cabinet-level officials have attended
the Council's meetings in the United States in the alternate years.
Second, the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement--TIFA--talks
and the Subcabinet-Level Economic Dialogue--SLED--were established to
promote bilateral economic ties. In 1998, under the auspices of AIT and
TECRO, they were hosted here in Washington and addressed a large
spectrum of economic issues. TIFA meetings have been led by the USTR
and the SLED talks by Treasury. Since 1994, then Under Secretary and
now Deputy Treasury Secretary Larry Summers headed SLED for Treasury.
Third, it was decided that the United States would support Taiwan's
participation in international organizations that do not require
statehood as a basis for membership, and would support opportunities
for Taiwan's voice to be heard where membership is not possible. Since
then, Taiwan has joined some technical organizations like the Global
Government Forum on Semiconductors. Frankly, however, movement on this
front has not been nearly as rapid as we had envisioned. We have found
that there simply are not as many opportunities as we initially
estimated, and the PRC has been actively and adamantly opposed to many
of Taiwan's attempts at membership or participation.
However, we view successful Taiwan participation in the Olympics,
the Asian Development Bank, and APEC as clear examples of the
contributions that Taiwan can make, and should be able to make, in
international settings. These contributions are possible because
Beijing and Taipei found formulas to resolve participation. In the
future, we hope that improved relations in the strait that may grow out
of enhanced cross-strait dialogue, can lead to similarly creative
solutions to the issue of greater access for Taiwan to additional
international organizations.
Finally, let me emphasize one aspect of the Administration's policy
that has not changed. The Administration continues to insist that cross
strait differences be resolved peacefully. The depth and firmness of
the Administration's resolve on this point was dramatically
demonstrated in March of 1996, when President Clinton ordered two U.S.
carriers to the waters near Taiwan in response to provocative PRC
missile tests. The visible U.S. strength, and the obvious U.S. signal
of continued support for peaceful resolution of issues between the PRC
and Taiwan, was effective in counteracting the escalating tensions in
the region.
conclusion
U.S. relations with the PRC and the people of Taiwan are likely to
be one of our most complex and important foreign policy challenges for
many years to come. This Administration, like the five Republican and
Democratic Administrations before it, firmly believes that the future
of cross-strait relations is a matter for Beijing and Taipei to
resolve. No Administration has taken a position on how or when they
should do so. What we have said, and what I repeat here today, is that
the United States has an abiding interest that any resolution be
peaceful.
Over the last twenty years the TRA has served our interests well. I
fully expect that it will continue to do so during the next twenty
years.
The Chairman. Very well. Mr. Kramer.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANKLIN D. KRAMER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
Mr. Kramer. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to
discuss these issues with you. As you said, I have a prepared
statement which is in the record, so let me just make five
short points and then we can go to questions.
The first point I would make in terms of our overall
policy, which as you said is one of ensuring peace and
stability in the Taiwan Strait, that that is part of our
overall security policy for the Asia Pacific as a whole. We do
that in three broad ways, through the maintenance of a forward
presence of 100,000 forces, through working with our allies and
friends, and through engaging China, and on the last I might
point out that certainly in the defense area all of our friends
and our allies ask us about our engagement and encourage us to
do it.
The second point I would make with respect to Taiwan is
that we fully implement the provisions of the Taiwan Relations
Act not only because it is the law, but also because it is good
policy to do so, as you said. Our focus is, by helping Taiwan
maintain a self defense capability, that creates the
circumstances in which one can create a peaceful security
situation in the Taiwan Strait.
We also engage with the PRC, and we do that likewise in the
defense area.
The third point I would like to discuss briefly is just how
we do this. We did send the report up that you have alluded to
already, so that has a great deal of detail, but let me make a
few points to you and then we can discuss them at greater
length.
We focus on the missions that Taiwan has to be able to
undertake successfully. There is an air mission, a sea mission,
and a land mission, if you will, and in each of these areas we
have substantial relationships both with respect to hardware
and also working on personnel and training kind of issues.
For example, in the air area we have sold early warning
airplanes, we have sold air defense planes like the F-16's, we
have provided air defense systems, most notably, for example,
the modified air defense system, which is a Patriot derivative,
we have provided Stinger missiles.
On the sea we talk about ensuring control of the sea lines
of communication dealing with antisubmarine warfare. We have
provided Knox frigates. We have provided the technical know-how
so that Taiwan can produce the Perry class frigates. We have
provided the Harpoon missile.
On land, we have provided M-60 tanks, helicopters, the
Hellfire missile, advanced communications systems.
This is a pretty formidable capability, and it is one that
we have worked with very closely in my office and the entire
Defense Department, as well as with the State Department to do
this.
One point I would make is that these are sometimes fairly
expensive systems, and Taiwan does not have an unlimited
budget, so we have to work very closely with them to be quite
cost-effective. We have regular consultations in which we do
that.
We also work with them a great deal on what we tend in
shorthand to call software, the kinds of things that makes
militaries really effective, personnel and training and
logistics. On the personnel side, for example, we have had
recent visits which have focused on the reserve system for
Taiwan which is necessary given their relatively small
population and their smaller, as compared to the PRC, smaller
armed forces.
We work with them on training, and we have had them work on
issues of how we do training so that they can do similar
effective training. We're dealing with logistics management,
focused on integrated logistics, computer-assistive logistics.
We work on C4I, command, control, communications and computers,
and intelligence. And in particular we are working on a data
link system, and we are going to undertake in the near future
an overall assessment of their C4I, and we also work with them
on modeling and simulation, and we will be helping them set up
a stand-alone simulation center.
General Tong, who as you know is the commander-in-chief of
their armed forces, was here in October, the Secretary of
Defense met with him, I met with him, he is very interested in
these issues, and I would say if I had to pick one set of
things that are more important than anything, it is these
software issues.
I work on these kinds of things for many countries around
the world, as does Secretary Cohen, and our focus always, first
and foremost, is on personnel and training. It does not mean
that hardware is not important, but I just want to underscore
for you, Mr. Chairman, how important these other issues are.
As already has been mentioned, sometimes a defense
relationship is not enough, and if necessary, we do view
threats to Taiwan as a matter of grave concern, and as I think
you have mentioned, some of the other Senators have mentioned,
Mr. Roth had mentioned in March 1996 in response to a
provocative threat we did, in fact, put the carriers off of
Taiwan for very deliberate reasons.
On the other side of the strait, my fourth point, we do
engage with China. We do this to pursue our mutual interests,
and also to deal with their areas of profound differences. We
have common interest, for example, for peace and stability on
the Korean peninsula. We have concerns about nuclear testing in
South Asia, and we have differences with respect to the U.S.-
Japanese military relationship. We obviously have differences
with respect to Taiwan.
When we go forward on areas of mutual interest, we do so in
a transparent way. We seek reciprocity, and we do this to avoid
the possibilities of miscalculation, misinformation on their
side. We want to gain insights into their thinking, and we want
to increase communications.
Some examples of what we have done, for example, include
the maritime military agreement which Secretary Cohen signed
last year. This reduces the possibility for incidents at sea.
We have functional exchanges. The Chinese Defense University is
here right now, the president, I should say, and we have
exchanges on humanitarian activities, disaster relief, for
example. We have lots of open communications. The Secretary of
Defense visited China, as you know, last year. This year the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I visited, for example.
We are clear--and this is my last point, really--as
Secretary Roth has said, that our activities with China are not
a zero sum game with respect to Taiwan. We insist on peaceful
resolution, and what we are trying to do is create security and
stability in the strait so that we can come and let the parties
come to a peaceful resolution.
Let me stop there, Mr. Chairman. I am sure you have got
lots of questions. I would be happy to answer them.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kramer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Franklin D. Kramer
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. Thank you
for this opportunity to speak to you about the security situation in
the Taiwan Strait. It is especially important to address these issues
on the eve of 20th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act. In the
interest of reserving time to answer any questions you may have, I
respectfully request that the following statement be entered into
record. I have prepared a brief statement that specifically addresses
your interest in the views of the Department of Defense toward the
security situation in the Taiwan Strait.
Let me first say that the overarching U.S. goal is to preserve
peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The policy of the
United States toward Taiwan and the PRC is integral to this goal. We
maintain our obligations toward Taiwan as stipulated in the Taiwan
Relations Act, but also because it is good policy to do so. We also
maintain a policy of comprehensive engagement with the PRC, also
because it is good policy to do so. These two approaches are
complementary to one another and support our often-stated interest that
the PRC and Taiwan work out their differences peacefully. To that end,
we are encouraged by the resumption of cross-strait talks. A
constructive and peaceful Taiwan-PRC dialogue serves the interest of
all the parties and is a major element in achieving long-term regional
peace and stability.
Our commitment to peace and stability is further bolstered by the
maintenance of approximately 100,000 U.S. troops in the region, a
policy most recently reaffirmed by Secretary Cohen in DoD's 1998 East
Asia Strategy Report. There have been times when more than simple
dialogue and presence have been necessary to maintain stability.
America's enduring commitment is well-known and widely appreciated
throughout the region, and contributes to our overall approach to the
cross-strait issue. Our commitment to take the necessary actions was
visibly demonstrated in March 1996 by our deployment of two carrier
battle groups to the region in response to provocative PRC missile
exercises.
u.s. policy toward taiwan
Now, let me specifically address our policy toward Taiwan. The
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 forms the legal basis of U.S. policy
regarding the security of Taiwan. Its premise is that an adequate
defense in Taiwan is conducive to maintaining peace and security while
differences remain between Taiwan and the PRC. Section 2(b) states:
It is the policy of the United States to consider any effort
to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means,
including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and
security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to
the United States; to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive
character; and to maintain the capacity of the United States to
resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that
would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic
system, of the people of Taiwan.
Section 3 of the TRA also provides that the ``United States will
make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in
such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
sufficient self-defense capability.''
We take our obligation to assist Taiwan in maintaining a self-
defense capability very seriously. We do so not only because it is
mandated by U.S. law in the TRA, but also because it is in our own
national interest. We understand that as long as one has a capable
defense, the security environment will be more conducive to peaceful
dialogue, and thus the whole region will be more stable.
Let me also call attention to an aspect of the August 17, 1982,
Joint Communique between the United States and the People's Republic of
China that is extremely important to Taiwan's security. In this
document, the PRC stated that its ``fundamental policy'' is ``to strive
for a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan question.'' Based on that PRC
assurance, the United States Government made reciprocal statements
concerning our arms sales to Taiwan--that we would not increase the
quantity or quality of arms and, in fact, intend gradually to reduce
these sales. At the time the Joint Communique was issued, we made it
clear that our intentions were premised upon the PRC's continued
adherence to a peaceful resolution of differences with Taiwan.
While the PRC adheres to the 1982 Communique, we also recognize
that the PRC has not renounced the option of overtaking Taiwan by
force. Accordingly, we carefully monitor the PRC's military
modernization program, especially as it relates to Taiwan, to determine
how best to provide Taiwan an appropriate ``sufficient self-defense
capability.''
U.S. Defense Assistance to Taiwan
We continually reevaluate Taiwan's defense posture and self-defense
capabilities and consult with Taiwan about its needs. In assessing
these needs, the Department of Defense has dedicated significant
intelligence resources over the past two decades to monitoring the
military balance in the strait. We also have an active dialogue with
Taiwan's defense establishment to keep current on their defense needs.
Consistent with our obligations under the TRA, we have helped
Taiwan achieve a formidable capacity to defend itself and to maintain a
strong defense posture. Taiwan has acquired several defensive systems
from the U.S. in recent years, including E-2T airborne early warning
aircraft, NIKE, HAWK and CHAPARRAL ground-based batteries, and 150 F-16
fighters to enhance its air-defense capability; Knox-class frigates for
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and to protect its sea lines of
communication (SLOCs); and M-60A tanks and armed helicopters to counter
an amphibious invasion. We have also provided support for Taiwan to
construct for itself the more advanced Perry-class frigates to assist
in ASW and protection of SLOCs; sold F-16-launched HARPOON missiles for
ASW; and provided the Modified Air Defense System, a Patriot system
derivative.
In addition to these hardware sales, we are increasingly focusing
on enhancing functional areas in Taiwan's defense system to enable
Taiwan to better apply the equipment at hand, and optimize and
integrate its capabilities for its key missions of air defense, anti-
amphibious invasion, anti-submarine warfare and protection of sea lines
of communication. We conduct functional exchanges and host programs
under FMS and IMET to address such areas as personnel, training,
logistics management, development of joint service doctrines, and C4I.
The contribution of such ``software'' assistance will add measurably to
Taiwan's overall defense posture.
The United States has abided by its commitments to Taiwan.
Similarly, Taiwan's security will also be enhanced as we work to
improve relations with the PRC.
u.s.-china engagement policy
The Administration remains firmly committed to our engagement
strategy with China. This strategy is consistent with and appropriate
for relations between two major countries with both vital mutual
interests and profound differences in outlook and beliefs.
Indeed, engagement and pursuit of a cooperative relationship are
not to gloss over the very critical differences we have with Beijing's
leaders on a wide range of issues. Our broader security dialogues with
China aim at narrowing differences on key foreign policy issues. Yet we
continue to have divergent perspectives on Taiwan, U.S.-Japan security
ties, and overall U.S. regional security strategy.
On the other hand, we are developing important common global and
regional security interests. Key among these is the maintenance of
peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. We also share concerns
about nuclear testing in India and Pakistan and a range of non-
conventional transnational security threats, including terrorism, drug
trafficking, environmental degradation, and the spread of infectious
diseases. China is also becoming increasingly committed to the
maintenance of global WMD non-proliferation regimes.
Ultimately, our policy is designed to pursue cooperation with China
where appropriate while opposing Chinese actions and policies with
which we disagree.
U.S. Military-to-Military Relationship with China
The relationship of the Department of Defense with the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) is an integral part of the overall Administration
strategy of comprehensive engagement with the PRC. Sustained senior-
level dialogue and interaction at all levels will enable us to develop
better mutual understanding of capabilities, commitments and
intentions; enhance confidence; and promote trust in order to avoid
miscalculations and misperceptions that can lead to conflict. The
principles of transparency, reciprocity and pursuit of mutual interests
inform our military engagement activities. Through this approach, DoD
has advanced several objectives in its relationship with the PLA:
Reduce the possibility for miscalculations and accidents
between operational forces through development of a variety of
confidence-building measures (e.g., 1997 Military Maritime
Agreement, ship visits, informational exchange on military
environmental security, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief
cooperation)
Gain operational insights into the PLA through bilateral
functional exchanges (e.g., military medicine, military law,
defense university exchanges, language programs)
Ensure open communications during times of tension through
routine senior-level defense dialogues (e.g., annual SecDef
meetings, vice-ministerial level discussions (Defense
Consultative Talks), service chief visits, CINC visits)
Monitor PLA influence in PRC internal politics and foreign
policy decision-making
Expand PLA participation in appropriate multinational and
multilateral military activities (e.g., conferences on military
law, management, medicine)
Enhance understanding of China's strategic doctrine through
continuing Sino-American security dialogue
We will continue our dialogue with the Chinese national security
community to articulate our vital interests, cooperate in those areas
where we share common security interests, and to minimize differences
in those areas where our interests differ. Such dialogues do not harm
Taiwan's interests.
Indeed, in all our dialogues, we make clear to the PRC that we will
continue to support Taiwan in its legitimate defense needs not only
because it is required by U.S. law, but also because it serves the
wider interests of peace and stability in the region. We also have made
clear that we support only a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue,
and regard any attempt to resolve the issue by other than peaceful
means, or any other action that threatens regional stability, to be
contrary to our security interests.
Finally, it is important to reiterate our belief that any
improvements in the U.S.-PRC bilateral relationship are not zero-sum:
they will not come at Taiwan's expense, but rather serve to dampen
possible PRC misperceptions, enhance mutual trust and transparency; and
promote restraint. Taiwan will be a primary beneficiary of the regional
peace and stability fostered by positive Washington-Beijing relations.
We believe the Taiwan people share this view.
Ultimately, however, the U.S. position is that the Taiwan issue is
for the Chinese on both sides of the strait to resolve. This remains
the best approach and our policy must remain consistent in this regard.
Indeed, this is the only long-term guarantee of a peaceful and durable
solution across the Taiwan Strait. It is also a necessary element in
guaranteeing long-term peace and stability in East Asia.
Mr. Chairman, it is particularly important to note that six
administrations of both parties have understood that comprehensive
engagement with Beijing represents the best way to promote our
interests and to encourage a positive and constructive PRC role with
the world. This policy has served the interests of the United States,
the PRC, Taiwan, and regional security and prosperity. It has enabled
us to pursue engagement with China and strong, unofficial ties with
Taiwan. It has enabled Taiwan's people and leaders to maintain their
security, produce one of the world's economic miracles, and consolidate
its democracy.
Our relations with Taiwan and the PRC are likely to be one of our
most complex and important foreign policy challenges for many years to
come. Indeed, the global political and regional environment is very
different today than at the time the three Communiques and Taiwan
Relations Act were formulated and implemented. Nonetheless, these
documents have served U.S. interests in maintaining peace and stability
in the Taiwan Strait for more than 20 years and remain the best
framework for guiding U.S. policies into the future. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Very well. We will have 5 minutes for
Senators, because we have another panel coming.
Mr. Roth, I am not being picky, picky, picky, but there is
a lot of talk about the three noes, no, no, no. Now, can you
tell me when and where, either in a document or in a public
statement, or whatever, any previous administration has ever
stated that the U.S. policy is, quote, we do not support
independence for Taiwan, as President Clinton did last summer?
Mr. Roth. Well, Mr. Chairman, we, the administration sent
up to you a letter which detailed in great length the entire
story of the three noes, or so-called three noes, as we refer
to them, and I did not bring it with me again today, but the
basic point, which I want to reiterate on the record, and which
I think has helped to calm the situation, has been no change in
the administration policy. Every point made there had been made
before by a previous administration and there was no change
whatsoever.
The Chairman. So you think that is what the President
meant? Do you think that is what the President meant when he
said that, flat out?
Mr. Roth. I think the President had absolutely no intent of
changing our policy toward Taiwan, that is correct.
The Chairman. Well, now, the closest I could find is that
Henry Kissinger told the Chinese in 1971 in private that, ``the
U.S. does not seek independence, does not seek independence for
Taiwan,'' and as far as we have been able to establish, this
President is the first to say that the U.S. does not support
independence.
If you have any documents on that in your file, would you
send me a----
Mr. Roth. Of course.
[The information appears in the appendix on page 51.]
The Chairman. Because I want to have a complete file.
Mr. Roth. Sure, and I hope we agree that we both do not
believe that there should have been any change of policy toward
Taiwan, and that in fact the administration has been consistent
in its one China policy all along, as well as in its robust
support for the unofficial relationship in Taiwan, and we spent
a lot of time trying to reassure the Taiwanese of that point.
The Chairman. Neither you nor I would blame the Taiwanese
for listening to every word, and I do not blame them. I would
have drawn the same conclusion that they have.
Now, on April 8, I believe you are going to be here 2 or 3
days. The Chinese, mainland Chinese Premier Zhu will be here
for his summit with President Clinton. Now, what kind of signal
do you think that sends to Taiwan that the Communist Chinese
premier will be here on exactly the 20th anniversary of the
Taiwan Relations Act? Was that just an accident?
Mr. Roth. The scheduling had a lot to do with the
combination of the President's scheduling and their scheduling.
It certainly was not intended in any way to be symbolism with
respect to the 20th anniversary. That is not the purpose of it
at all.
The Chairman. You are confident of that? You are
conscious--that is a conscious statement you are making as a
known fact, is that correct?
Mr. Roth. Yes. Let me put it more categorically. The
administration is very proud of its track record with respect
to its relationship, albeit unofficial, with Taiwan. We believe
we have a very strong record of support for that relationship,
and are doing nothing to undermine it.
The Chairman. I am not trying to embarrass you. These
things happen. Now, I am sure that Mr. Clinton was involved
with other things and he did not sit down and tell the mainland
Chinese come over here because this will be the 20th
anniversary, et cetera, et cetera. I know that. But you do not
think the White House even thought about it being the 20th
anniversary?
Mr. Roth. I really do not, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Roth. I never heard that point raised once in any
administration meeting.
The Chairman. Well, it is clear that the reunification of
Taiwan, as mainland China calls it, is an increasingly high
priority for Beijing, and part of Beijing's strategy quite
obviously will be the ending of U.S. arms to Taiwan. What do
you think is going to be the topic of the agenda for Premier
Zhu's visit?
Mr. Roth. I think that while the entire range of issues in
U.S.-China relations will be on the agenda, as you know, he has
primary responsibility for economic issues. I think the
question of WTO accession and other economic issues will
probably be at the top of his agenda.
We will, of course, insist that a number of issues be on
the agenda, that we are going to raise all of our concerns on
issues ranging from human rights and nonproliferation to
country-specific issues as well and, of course, we will
reaffirm our positions on Taiwan.
The Chairman. What do you think the President is going to
say if the premier says, you have got to stop this arms
business with Taiwan? What is the President going to say about
that?
Mr. Roth. I think he will say what he has always said, that
we obey our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act, that is
the law of the land, to sell defensive equipment as well as our
obligations under the three communiques.
He will also reiterate the crucial point that, you know, we
believe that China should renounce the use of force with
respect to Taiwan, and that would change the situation in a
fundamental way that they have been unwilling to do.
The Chairman. That will be, if I heard you correctly, that
will be sort of like telling him to go fly a kite, we are going
to do what we think is right under the Taiwan Act, and that is
what you think the President is going to do?
Mr. Roth. Yes. He has said that to Chinese leaders on many
occasions, and he will say that again.
The Chairman. Well, my time is up and I will recognize the
distinguished Senator from Massachusetts.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Let me
sort of follow up on some of the questions of the chairman and
see if we can go a little further.
How do both of you assess the current Chinese deployments
and the current level of threat toward Taiwan with respect to
the strait.
Mr. Roth. Let me give a very general answer, and then I
will let Secretary Kramer give the detailed one.
To me, I look at this in the context of overall Chinese
military modernization as well as----
Senator Kerry. Can you both pull the mikes down and closer,
maybe?
Mr. Roth. I look at this first of all in the context of
overall Chinese military modernization, and more importantly,
overall context of Chinese economic development, that China is
in a situation as a result of its high levels of economic
growth where it is increasingly able to have spending on both
guns and butter, so that it can increase military expenditures
while increasing other expenditures.
As a result, there is a long-term military modernization
process, starting from a fairly modest base, but nevertheless
we have seen the Chinese makes strides in a number of different
areas not limited to missiles, with more strides expected in
the future.
As a result of that, obviously the military capability
increases vis-a-vis Taiwan, vis-a-vis others as well.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Kramer, what do you say to that?
Mr. Kramer. We sent up a very detailed answer in the
report, as you know. Let me try and summarize that. The
chairman alluded to it, of course.
I have said in my statement that we have helped Taiwan
modernize quite substantially, and we have, and I do not want
to repeat all those, but we have done so in each of the air,
land, sea areas.
As Secretary Roth has said, the Chinese themselves have
also modernized. They have done so with considerable Russian
assistance, for example, and they have done so also internally.
There are a large number of so-called short-range missiles, as
the report lays out, in the areas that are opposite Taiwan, and
that is an imbalance, if you will, because at the moment it is
very difficult for anyone, ourselves included, to defend
against those kinds of systems.
The Chinese have a very large force as compared to Taiwan.
In round figures, they have got about 2.5 million in the
military plus about a million-person auxiliary. In round
figures they have about 4,000 aircraft. They will probably get
down to about 2,000 because they are modernizing but also
decreasing.
Taiwan on the other hand has about 400,000 total, and its
military I think they have about 400 modern aircraft, so just
quantitatively there are differences.
Senator Kerry. Let me just stop you there for 1 minute. In
terms of threat perception and deterrence, is it not fair to
say that the balance is not judged by the numbers of troops in
uniform versus numbers of troops in China, because in fact the
specific ambivalence of the United States with respect to what
role we might play is also a component of that calculation.
Mr. Kramer. Yes, and where I was going was, I think that it
is fair to say that Taiwan nonetheless, despite those
differences, itself has a fairly formidable capability. That is
what I was saying in my statement.
Then if you factor in the United States, as I think the
Chinese in fact do, then the overall situation is quite
different, and we say, and we mean, both in law and in policy,
that we would consider any threat to Taiwan a matter of grave
concern, and I think this administration demonstrated that as a
matter of fact with the support of the Congress in March 1996.
Senator Kerry. Well, building on that, I mean, I think all
of us share a cross-party-line uniform commitment that we are
supportive of Taiwan's right to work through this process and
not to be threatened, and certainly we would all of us react, I
think swiftly, to any effort by China, as we have made clear in
the past, to do so in some forceful way.
I have suggested, during the last deployment, that we
should be less ambivalent about it, frankly. I mean, it has
sort of been a calculated ambivalence. I am prepared to be very
unambivalent about it.
Now, given that, it seems to me that China needs to clearly
calculate what the United States and world response would be,
and therefore, looking at that balance, we then have to make
judgments about what happens with deployment of weapons, and
where we proceed.
If you could both share with the committee, what weapons do
you think might be necessary now, if any, and what would the
impact be, in your judgment, on the perceived balance and
status quo that we have that has led to these talks, led to
this increased cultural exchange, that seems to be moving down
a road carefully? What would the result of a shift in weaponry
be to both of those calculations, in your mutual judgments?
Mr. Roth. I think the key point to make is that ultimately
Taiwan security is not going to be determined by military force
or by any specific discrete sales, that ultimately Taiwan
security is going to be determined by the state of the cross-
strait relationship between China and Taiwan and what they work
out between themselves and, of course, the policy of external
players, with us being the primary one.
But I think we cannot define this as a purely military
equation that can be influenced by one discrete sale solving
Taiwan's problems, which is clearly not the case.
In that context, I think one of the calculations for Taiwan
has to be, what is the diplomatic impact of steps it might take
on the military side, and could they end up worse off by virtue
of any specific acquisition, rather than better off in
fundamental security.
Mr. Kramer. In addition to that, Senator, obviously we will
continue our policy of providing sufficient quantities of
weaponry and also I really want to underscore again the
personnel work and the training work that we are doing with
Taiwan is extremely important. We do this across the board.
That is to say, you should not look at it as a single silver
bullet. That is not the way that militaries really operate, and
that is not what makes the difference in terms of an overall
capability.
We also are very clear with the Chinese, and I think you
should understand--you probably do, but let me underscore that
the Chinese themselves are very clear with respect to the U.S.
position. After March 1996 I think there was a fundamental
reassessment in their own thinking. I think that was good.
I think that the entire region was very appreciative of
what the United States did. We certainly spoke to all the
countries in the region about this. They were uniformly
positive on what we had done, and there you hear anecdotally
even from the Chinese things like, well, they look at Taiwan
and they sort of see a medium-sized person that is themselves,
and a smaller person that is Taiwan, but then there is a big
person behind Taiwan, and that is us.
So I think in the overall what we need to do is continue
broadly the kind of policy which requires us to evaluate on a
case-by-case basis as we do what kind of systems are necessary,
but I think you have to look at the military as a whole.
The Chairman. Senator Torricelli.
Senator Torricelli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I barely have
a voice, Mr. Chairman, so if the witnesses will bear with me.
Recently, Chairman Helms and I introduced the Taiwan
Security Enhancement Act. I would like to apply its provisions
against your interpretations of the Taiwan Relations Act in
three specific categories that we have included in our
legislation.
First, we provide that there be a continuation of the
necessary equipment to maintain defense, including specifically
satellite early warning data, advanced air-to-air missiles, and
diesel submarine technology. Are there any of those items which
in your judgment are, per se, inconsistent with the provisions
of the Taiwan Relations Act allowing the United States, indeed,
giving the United States the obligation in my judgment to
maintain defensive capabilities in Taiwan, since by my own
interpretation each of these items that we have enumerated in
our legislation are by definition defensive in design and
intention.
Mr. Kramer. Let me take the question first, and let me
answer it first directly and then a little more broadly about
the act.
Some of these items are actually discussed in the report,
and the overall issues I think are important for us to look at,
shared early warning, air-to-air missiles, submarines can all
fit into a modern military. We have some of these ourselves,
and in areas where we do not, like diesel submarines, we have
nuclear submarines.
On the other hand, as I mentioned before, Taiwan does not
have unlimited amounts of money, and it needs to focus very
clearly on what is the most cost-effective kinds of things to
purchase, and we have specific talks for those reasons. The way
I would ask you to look at it is by mission area, which was
what I was trying to suggest.
If we are thinking about a military confrontation,
obviously the best confrontation is the one that they can
avoid, so we want to give them as good a deterrent capability
as possible, and then we need to be involved appropriately. As
the act itself says, the Taiwan Relations Act, we would view
any problem along these lines with grave concern.
Shared early warning, air-to-air missiles, and diesel subs,
can be the right thing to do, but they would not necessarily
be, and we have to go through the whole activity.
Senator Torricelli. Let me interrupt you a moment, because
I am going to lose time, because I want to get specifically to
the point of whether or not you think they are the right
judgment. The chairman of the committee and I have drafted this
legislation and have identified specific items, in that it is
our belief that they are consistent with the Taiwan Relations
Act.
I do not know how you would interpret our opportunity and
obligation to provide defense assistance to Taiwan and come to
a different conclusion about satellite warning systems, advance
air-to-air missiles, missile defense systems. They are by
definition defensive. I am not asking you to endorse the sales.
I am asking you if you have a contrary view that these weapons
clearly could not be defensive, or subject it to an
interpretation which might--on no other basis could be
defensive.
Mr. Kramer. Frankly, first of all I think that we do sales
in a way that is designed to enhance Taiwan's self-defense
relationship.
Air-to-air missiles certainly can be used in a defensive
context, but they can be used offensively also. I do not mean
to say that the sale would be inconsistent with the Taiwan
Relations Act, but I do not think that you can necessarily say
that a system like an air-to-air missile could not be used
offensively.
Senator Torricelli. Well, anything can be used offensively.
I could take an iron shield and hit somebody over the head with
it and make it an offensive weapon.
Having given you the opportunity to say that these by
definition could not be offensive weapons, you have not done
so.
Mr. Kramer. Correct.
Senator Torricelli. Therefore, I assume that we are not
inconsistent with the provisions of the act.
The second provision in our legislation is to enhance the
staff of the American Institute in Taiwan, because we want it
to be effective. Clearly, the staffing at the institute cannot
be a violation of our obligation under the Taiwan Relations Act
if that staffing is necessary to carry out the mission in
Taipei.
Mr. Roth. Of course. It is not clear to me, however, what
the need is that you are trying to address.
Senator Torricelli. Simply that as the economy of Taiwan
expands, the relationship has grown dramatically in 20 years,
it is now our ninth largest trading partner, there may be a
need to have a greater staff presence to meet our obligations,
the point here again being that does not appear to me to per se
be any violation to the Taiwan Relations Act.
To conclude, Mr. Chairman, the third is participation in
our defense colleges to maintain the professionalism of their
military and understanding of each other's institutions. That,
again I would argue is not a violation of the Taiwan Relations
Act. It is simply maintaining qualitative capability, the
conclusion of this being that I think Chairman Helms and I have
identified items that simply meet our obligations under the
act, and I have not to my satisfaction heard an argument they
are not defensive sufficiently in nature that they are not
consistent with the act.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Thank you, gentlemen. We have another panel.
Senator Kerry. Could we--is it possible just to follow up
with one or two questions quickly on that subject, Mr.
Chairman?
The Chairman. Sure. Let's keep it as brief as we can,
because they have to go and we have another panel.
Senator Kerry. I will keep it brief. We are all under time
constraints and I do not want to press it, but just very
quickly, I thought I heard you say that air-to-air can be
offensive.
Mr. Kramer. Of course.
Senator Kerry. So that might not necessarily fit
automatically.
Mr. Kramer. Let me be clear. We sell air-to-air missiles to
Taiwan already. They have the M-9. I forget which version it
is. So of course I think that the sale of air-to-air missiles
in general terms is consistent with the act.
What I was saying, and let me be quite specific. I only had
a chance to quickly peruse the legislation. As I read it, it
was not a question of whether they were consistent with the
act, if that is the right way to look at it. It is a question
of whether we were required to sell or not, and what I was
trying to say to you is that what I would like to do is to
exercise the judgment with Taiwan to look at their militaries
overall and decide what ought to be sold.
I think that there are arguments to sell air-to-air
missiles. That is why we sell them, and you can make similar
arguments.
What I would not like, frankly, is to be required to do so
if that would not be the best overall use of Taiwan's funds.
Senator Kerry. One other question, Mr. Chairman, just 6
seconds. Maybe I will make a comment. It seems to me that the
judgment I am hearing, I mean, if the United States remains
steadfast, as you and I want it to, that the ultimate issue of
whether Taiwan is going to be safer or not has to be really
thought out in the context of any sale.
It is conceivable, is it not, that by selling certain
weapons deemed to be defensive, that you could invite a greater
deployment of offense or decoy or other kinds of things that
actually leads you into greater instability, as we have seen in
50 years of an arms race, so that ultimately it still becomes
the United States that is the equalizing factor, number 1, and
number 2, that you could in effect, even by fitting under a
pure definition of defense, not necessarily enhance security.
Mr. Roth. Absolutely. That was the point I was trying to
make in my previous response to your question.
Senator Kerry. So we need to measure that carefully.
Mr. Roth. Very much so.
The Chairman. Well, maybe--since we all extended it a
little bit, I hope that this Government's position will be in a
delicate, political way to say, they had better be safer, to
mainland China, because if we do not stand flat-footed for our
ally over there, we are going to be making a serious mistake.
Senator Torricelli. Mr. Chairman, you may want the record
to be corrected that our legislation only authorizes the sale.
The Chairman. That is correct.
Senator Torricelli. It does not require them. We are not
imposing weapons on Taiwan that it cannot afford or does not
want in its own judgment. We simply authorize them.
The Chairman. That is correct.
Gentlemen, thank you very much. I would appreciate to have
another hour with you. Maybe we can get you back one of these
days.
Mr. Kramer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Now for panel 3, three distinguished gentlemen, additional
gentlemen, Hon. Harvey Feldman, Senior Fellow for Asian Studies
at the Heritage Foundation, and Mr. Carl W. Ford, Jr.,
president of Ford & Associates in Washington, and Dr. David M.
Lampton, director of China studies at the Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins, when the house
clears just a little bit.
As I said, I would like to be here until 2:00 or 3:00 with
you gentlemen, but you would not like to be here with me till
2:00 or 3:00, and I have two or three other meetings, but if
you wish to summarize your statements with an understanding
that they will be included in the record in full, that would be
helpful, because I think we learn a lot more by being able to
have an exchange between the Senators. So Mr. Feldman, we will
be glad to hear from you first.
STATEMENT OF HON. HARVEY FELDMAN, SENIOR FELLOW, ASIA STUDIES
CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, ARLINGTON, VA
Ambassador Feldman. Thank you very much, Senator, and I
will just try to make a few points, but I thought I might begin
by giving a bit of my own background.
I was the Country Director for Republic of China Affairs in
the State Department through normalization. I cochaired the
drafting committee in the State Department that prepared the
first draft of the Taiwan Relations Act, and later I worked
with this committee as a representative of the Carter
administration in the revision that made it the great act that
it is today and, Mr. Chairman, you yourself were very kind and
complimented me on my work on that occasion.
The Chairman. I was going to say, welcome home.
Ambassador Feldman. Thank you, sir.
I wanted to point out that although the draft we prepared
in the State Department was inadequate in some respects,
nevertheless it accomplished a few things. Today, we take it
for granted that despite the absence of formal relations with
Taiwan we can trade, invest, sell arms, sell enriched uranium,
that the American Institute in Taiwan can provide just about
all the services that our former embassy provided.
And all of these things were contained in one magic
sentence that we came up with in that State Department draft
that said, whenever the laws of the United States refer to or
relate to foreign countries, nations, States, Governments, or
similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall
apply with respect to Taiwan, unquote.
I will come back to that later, because that becomes very
key on the question of Taiwan's membership in international
organizations.
But as we have seen and said, the State Department bill did
not go far enough, so there was a bipartisan effort, led in the
Senate by Frank Church, Jake Javits, Dick Stone, and you
yourself, Mr. Chairman. In the House we should remember and
applaud Lester Wolff, Dante Fascell, Clem Zablocki, and Ed
Derwinsky.
And so what we came up with--I am including myself. I guess
perhaps I should not. What the Congress came up with was a
treaty which the Congress drafted through legislative action,
and successive administrations have had to abide by that
treaty.
We are all familiar with the security assurances in that
treaty, but there are a couple of other points in there that
people may not be quite so familiar with. For example, the
language, threat to the peace and security of the Western
Pacific, which is in the TRA, intentionally replicated the
language of Article VII of the United Nations Charter about
threats to international peace and security and the obligation
of States to take up arms to meet those threats. That is in
there, a direct replica.
And the other thing it says in that same section is that
any attempt to use coercion against Taiwan would be an
international matter, and not a domestic matter, as the PRC
continually tries to tell us.
I want to talk a bit about international organizations. Mr.
Chairman, there is language that says nothing in this act may
be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or
expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any
international financial institution, or any other international
organization.
Now, that is phrased negatively, but the legislative
history makes it very, very plain that Congress intended the
administration, the Carter administration and those that have
followed, to support Taiwan's membership in those organizations
which it belonged to in 1979, and that included the Bank and
the Fund, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.
In fact, Taiwan's membership in those two international
financial institutions continued for 9 years after it was
expelled from the General Assembly, making the point that you
did not have to be a member of the General Assembly to belong
to the Bank and the Fund. Taiwan was expelled from the Bank and
the Fund only when the United States ceased supporting its
membership.
Now, there are a whole host of organizations that I believe
Taiwan could and should belong to today. There are humanitarian
organizations, there are technical bodies: the International
Civil Aviation Organization, the International
Telecommunications Union, the World Postal Union, all of these
bodies exclude Taiwan. By the way, there is even one body which
is open even to nonself-governing territories, and that is the
World Meteorological Organization.
Now, you heard Assistant Secretary Roth today, and I heard
Bob Suettinger, who used to be on the National Security Council
staff yesterday at a meeting at the Woodrow Wilson Center say,
well, we tried to do something about these organizations, but
it is just too tough because the PRC opposes.
Well, of course the PRC opposes, but I do not think that is
any reason why, if we believe that Taiwan should be in
humanitarian organizations, in technical bodies, in the World
Intellectual Property Organization, and of course the World
Meteorological Organization, I think we should stand up on our
hind legs and say so and not be intimidated.
I also want to point out that although in his three noes
statement President Clinton said that the United States would
not support Taiwan's membership in any international
organization that required Statehood for membership, in fact
the TRA says something very different.
What the TRA says is what I just read to you, that whenever
the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign
countries, nations, States, Governments or similar entities,
such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with respect
to Taiwan, because United States law requires that we can sell
enriched uranium only to friendly States, and we can sell arms
only to friendly Governments. So what this means is that as far
as the United States law is concerned, the Government of Taiwan
is a friendly Government, and Taiwan is a State.
The PRC objects. The PRC says it is a matter of domestic
jurisdiction, but the Taiwan Relations Act says something
different, says it is international. And if the Congress said
nothing should be construed as a basis for supporting exclusion
or expulsion from international organizations, why, it seems to
me the Congress must have meant the Congress believes Taiwan
has a right to belong to those organizations, i.e., it has the
qualifications for membership.
Mention has been made by Senator Murkowski of the World
Health Organization. The World Health Organization presents a
particular problem, because its charter says it is open only to
members of the General Assembly, States members of the United
Nations. But under the World Health Organization there is
another body, and it is called the World Health Assembly.
The Director General of WHO has the authority to invite to
the meetings of the World Health Assembly whoever the Director
wishes, and I think it is time for the United States to whisper
in the ear of the Director General of the World Health
Organization, ``We think you ought to invite some medical
associations from Taiwan to your next meeting of the World
Health Assembly.'' I see no reason why we cannot do that.
I want to conclude with just one final thought, and that is
that at the time, as has been said, at the time the Taiwan
Relations Act was drafted, signed into law, Taiwan was a one-
party authoritarian State under martial law. I think had it
been a democracy at the time, President Carter could not have
possibly accepted that third condition that the PRC imposed,
that we could not have any form of official relationship with
Taiwan. That was the third condition he accepted. I think had
Taiwan been a democracy,it politically would have been
impossible to accept that condition.
Well, Taiwan is a democracy today. Taiwan has a parliament
which is elected by the people. Taiwan has a president who is
elected by the people. Taiwan is a democracy today. So we have
locked ourselves into an artificial relationship that bears no
relation with reality, and I think perhaps we ought to consider
doing something about that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Feldman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Harvey J. Feldman
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I am
grateful for your invitation to testify at this hearing on the
twentieth anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act. A long-time
specialist in US relations with Taiwan, I co-chaired the Task Force at
the State Department which produced the initial draft of the Act, and
later represented the Carter administration in discussions with this
Committee on the revisions which resulted in the Act as we know it
today. Still later, I served as the American Ambassador to Papua New
Guinea, and after that the Alternate U.S. Representative to the United
Nations when Jeane Kirkpatrick was our principal representative there
in New York. Having retired from the State Department some years ago, I
am now Senior Fellow in the Heritage Foundation's Asia Studies Center.
Mr. Chairman, today we take it as a matter of course that despite
the absence of formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China
on Taiwan, nevertheless we can trade, invest, sell defensive weapons
and enriched uranium for nuclear power generation, and that our office
in the island republic, the American Institute in Taiwan, though
unofficial in name, nevertheless can represent the views of the United
States government and can provide ordinary consular services to our and
to Taiwan's citizens. But when we shifted diplomatic relations from
Taipei to Beijing, none of these things were possible for under
American law, arms can be sold only to friendly governments; sale of
enriched uranium fuel for nuclear power reactors, as well as Overseas
Private Investment Corporation guarantees and Export-Import Bank loans
are restricted to friendly states; and on January 1, 1979 we ceased
recognizing the Republic of China as a state and its government as a
government.
At the time we broke relations with Taiwan there were some 60
treaties and executive agreements covering everything from trade to
taxation to air travel. Some supposed authorities had written articles
claiming that after the switch in recognition all these treaties and
agreements would apply to the People's Republic of China. Others had
argued they simply would lapse. Was either view correct?
As it emerged from the TRA draft prepared at the State Department,
a totally novel instrument in international life, the American
Institute in Taiwan emerged. It is a private foundation incorporated in
the District of Columbia, but funded as a line item in the State
Department budget with a Board of Directors appointed by the Secretary
of State. It has a direct reporting relationship with both this
Committee and House Committee on International Relations. The Institute
is staffed with government employees, usually from State, Defense, the
CIA and the Commerce Department, who are nominally on leave from their
agencies, yet their service with AIT counts toward their pensions and
they even can receive promotions from their home agencies while serving
on Taiwan with AIT. By the way, I signed the incorporation papers for
AIT and paid the incorporation fee.
With regard to arms sales, OPIC guarantees, sale of enriched
uranium, Ex-Im loans and the like, we came up with a simple and elegant
fix: ``Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to
foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entitites,
such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to
Taiwan.'' Period. In similar fashion, the draft bill we sent up said
that unless specifically terminated, all treaties and agreements in
force on December 31, 1978, will continue in force.
I was very flattered, Mr. Chairman, when on the occasion of my
confirmation by this Committee as Ambassador to Papua New Guinea, you
congratulated me on the work we had done.
But the State Department bill in fact did not go far enough, for
given the commitments the Carter administration had made to Beijing,
the bill said nothing about the security of Taiwan and its people. So
here the Congress took over. Led by Republicans and Democrats working
together, in the Senate by Frank Church, Jake Javits, Dick Stone, and
of course you yourself Mr. Chairman; led in the House by Clem Zablocki,
Dante Fascell, Ed Derwinski and Lester Wolff, an entirely new kind of
relationship was created, something unique in international affairs,
and something that has stood the test of time over these past two
decades. As it finally emerged, the Taiwan Relations act in reality
became something like a treaty imposed by the Congress through
legislative action. Moreover, it is a treaty which has set the terms
and limitations by which successive administrations have had to abide
in conducting relations with both Beijing and Taiwan.
The security assurances written into law by the TRA are familiar of
course:
peace and stability in the area are in the political,
security and economic interests of the United States and are
matters of international concern (emphasis added).
the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations
with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation
that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;
the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense
articles and defense services in such quantity as may be
necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-
defense capability;
the President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of
any threat to the security of the social or economic system of
the people on Taiwan;
And most important of all, the United States would consider
any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than
peaceful means, including boycotts or embargoes, a threat to
the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of grave
concern to the United States.
The words ``threat to the peace and security of the Western
Pacific,'' echo the similar language used in Article VII of the United
Nations Charter, which deals with international resistance to acts of
aggression. Taken together with the statement that peace and stability
in the area are international concerns, it directly contests the PRC
assertion that whatever it does or does not do with respect to Taiwan
is purely an internal, domestic concern. Although we have learned quite
a bit recently about things whispered privately in Beijing by former
senior government officials, and never disclosed to the public or the
Congress, the Taiwan Relations Act and its formulations remain the law
of this land. And as far as I am aware, in official documents the
United States has never accepted Beijing's contention that Taiwan is
anything more than one of its provinces. All we have done is to
acknowledge that Beijing claims there is but one China of which Taiwan
is a part, while stating no position of our own on the matter.
Obviously there is a great deal of tension between the clear
language of the Taiwan Relations Act and the several communiques which
successive administrations have signed with Beijing, as well as with
obiter dicta such as President Clinton's three noes statements in
Shanghai last June. There is an obvious contradiction between the
section of the TRA dealing with arms sales and the August 17, 1982
communique language dealing with year-by-year reductions. And of course
there was a contradiction between that communique and President Bush's
decision to authorize the sale of F-16s to Taiwan.
But behind all of this lies an even more deep-seated contradiction,
stemming from the fact that President Carter not only accepted the PRC
conditions that in order to establish diplomatic relations we must
withdraw all U.S. Forces from Taiwan and terminate the Mutual Defense
Treaty, he also accepted Beijing's demand that we could not have any
form of official relationship with Taiwan. Had we refused to accept
that third PRC demand, we would have avoided the tortuous exercise we
now find ourselves in, having to operate a foreign policy which denies
that Taiwan is a nation and its government is a government, while both
American law and manifest reality make clear that it indeed is both.
This unreality takes its worst form in statements such as President
Clinton's three noes: the U.S. will not support Taiwan's entry into
international organizations that make statehood a requirement for
membership; will not support Taiwan's independence; will not pursue a
``two Chinas, or one China, one Taiwan policy.'' The administration
claimed there was nothing new here, but PRC official immediately
pointed out that Mr. Clinton's statements logically must mean that
Taiwan is only a province of China and not a state. After all, they
said, if your President says it lacks the qualifications necessary for
independence or statehood, and since the U.S. has recognized the PRC as
the sole legal government of China, the U.S. necessarily must agree
that Taiwan is a province of the PRC.
For contrast, let's look at what the TRA says about Taiwan's
status. Not only does it say that for all purposes of American law
Taiwan is a state and its government is the government of a friendly
state, it also says that any attempt to use coercive force against
Taiwan would be a matter of international as well as American concern.
Which means that despite Beijing's recent bluster and threat, as far as
the United States is concerned, using force against Taiwan cannot be
regarded as a domestic concern of the People's Republic of China.
But there is more. Section 4(d) of the TRA reads:
Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for
supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued
membership in any international financial institution or any
other international organization.
The language is phrased negatively, but the legislative history of
the Taiwan Relations Act makes very plain that Congress intended
affirmative U.S. support for Taiwan's continued membership in such
organizations as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
Which necessarily must mean that Congress considered Taiwan fully
qualified to belong to the Bank and Fund and other international
organizations, despite President Clinton's remarks in Shanghai. In
fact, let me point out that Taiwan remained a member of the Bank and
the Fund for nine years after being expelled from the General Assembly,
and probably would be a member to this day had the United States not
stopped supporting its membership. The only bar to its membership is
American and other passivity in the face of Beijing's opposition.
Ironically, the PRC is the number one borrower from the World Bank. Is
there another case in which the borrower gets to specify whose money
the lending bank can take?
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I believe that had Taiwan
been a democracy in 1978-79, no American president could have accepted
the PRC's three conditions and consigned Taiwan to its present weird
international limbo. But the Republic of China on Taiwan was not a
democracy at that time. It was a one-party, authoritarian state under
martial law. That was twenty years ago. In the decades since, Taiwan
has peacefully transformed itself into a multi-party democracy. Not
only is its parliament fully representative and directly elected, the
head of state is also elected directly by the people for the first time
in all the millennia of Chinese political practice. There are no
political prisoners. The press and other media are free and vigorous.
Fiercely contested elections take place almost every year. GDP per
capita exceeds $13,000--about 15 times what it is in mainland China.
Taiwan's existence as one of only three democracies in East Asia
requires a more realistic American policy.
Of course we want to have useful and cooperative relations with the
People's Republic of China. And of course we hope the PRC wants to have
useful and cooperative relations with us. Which is to say, these
matters should be reciprocal, avoiding the present situation in which
we are told that to have these useful and cooperative relations, we
must take account of and act in accordance with Beijing's sensitivities
and needs--including those relating to Taiwan--but somehow Beijing need
not take account of American sensitivities and needs--including those
relating to Taiwan.
In his excellent book, East and West, former Hong Kong Government
Christopher Patten points out the Chinese leadership in Beijing ``did
not require to be led in their negotiations by intellectual titans to
know that if they pushed hard enough, the British would give''. The
trouble was that because Britain's bottom line was so often abandoned,
the Chinese assumed it always would be abandoned.'' Unfortunately, all
too often in its dealings with the PRC, successive American
administrations have emulated the British pattern of negotiation.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, if we are to act in
accordance with the spirit as well as the letter of the Taiwan
Relations Act, I believe we should do the following:
Return to the former policy of saying we take no position on
what the final status of Taiwan should be, because this is a
matter for negotiation between the two sides. Reiterate that
the U.S. can accept any solution that is arrived at peacefully,
without coercion of any kind, so long as it is acceptable to
the people of Taiwan. In the absence of such an agreement, the
status quo must continue, and continue without threats.
Even though it is a neuralgic point for the PRC, we should
continue to press for a renunciation of the use of force
against Taiwan. As stated in the TRA, the U.S. decision ``to
establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of
China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will
be determined by peaceful means''; and ``any effort to
determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means,
including by boycotts and embargoes [would be considered] a
threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of
grave concern to the United States.''
Obey the implicit injunction of the TRA to support Taiwan's
membership in the international financial institutions, the
World Trade Organization, and other international
organizations. Beijing's continuing campaign to squeeze Taiwan
utterly out of international life, including the work of purely
humanitarian organizations as well as technical bodies in field
such as telecommunications, aviation, marine transport, and the
regulation of intellectual property, cannot be defended and
should not be accepted. The United States should cease its
passivity and support membership in such organizations as a
matter of law, as a matter of realism, and as a step which is
in the interest of the proper functioning of those
organizations themselves.
In short, it is time for the Executive branch to recognize, as the
Congress did in writing the TRA, and as it continues to do in
resolutions, that Taiwan's existence as a multi-party democracy, and a
free market economy--matters which were the fruit of so much work and
so many sacrifices by the people of Taiwan--respond to important U.S.
interests and must be protected. A policy which takes account only of
our interests vis-a-vis the PRC, and fails to take account of our
substantial interests in Taiwan's democracy and its future, cannot be
considered realistic.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ford.
STATEMENT OF CARL W. FORD, JR., PRESIDENT, FORD AND ASSOCIATES,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As a former member of
the committee staff, one who was here at the time of the Taiwan
Relations Act debate, I consider the opportunity to share my
views on Taiwan with you a great honor.
I serve as a consultant on East Asian security affairs for
a number of defense contractors and the Taiwan Research
Institute, but I especially look forward to my appearances
before this committee, as I did when I was still in Government
at CIA and later DOD.
The first time I sat in this room and observed the Foreign
Relations Committee at work was 20 years ago. President Carter
in December 1978, as you know, had announced normalization of
relations with the People's Republic of China. Despite
Beijing's occasional spasms of bellicosity, regional tensions
have not prevented Taiwan from building a flourishing economy
and moving from authoritarianism to genuine democracy.
Despite these notable successes, Taiwan's security is far
from assured. Indeed, I have grave concerns about China's
recent military buildup and what it could mean for the United
States. U.S. security interests in my view are more at risk in
East Asia today than at any time since the Congress passed the
TRA 20 years ago.
Consider these factors.
Fact 1. We are not dealing with the same China that we did
in 1979. China is economically stronger, and the PLA is
considerably more capable of using force against Taiwan than
when you first wrote the section 3 security guarantees into the
TRA.
Fact 2. Blatant appeals to nationalism in its most virulent
forms play an even greater role in motivating Chinese behavior
than in 1979. The Jiang regime has publicly committed to
retaking Taiwan on its watch.
Fact 3. Taiwan shows no sign of being intimidated by
Beijing's heavy-handed pressures and military provocation, but
Taiwan's military deterrent is at risk of obsolescence unless
the United States promptly provides the qualitative and
quantitative improvements.
Fact 4. U.S. policy toward China has never been more in
disarray, nor has public support for that policy been more in
question than it is today. The American people increasingly
reject a strategic partnership with a Communist Chinese regime
which repeatedly tries to bully Taiwan into submission.
Taken together, these factors should alert the committee
that Taiwan's security needs merit your attention. It should be
clear that Chinese leaders have changed how they think about
Taiwan militarily, something you will very much need to take
into account.
The Pentagon's new landmark report to Congress entitled,
The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait, reveals publicly
what many senior U.S. analysts have been saying privately for
months, that the PRC strategy is shifting toward a quick strike
threat to gain superiority over Taiwan. A special concern is
the incremental growth in Beijing's missile capabilities, most
notably the improved shorter-range models, the M-9 and the M-
11. Beijing will have an overwhelming advantage in offensive
missiles in 2005, the report predicted.
Taken together with recent training exercises, the
improvements convey an ominous message about the PLA's thinking
vis-a-vis Taiwan. One of the most revealing passages in the 27-
page report says, China views its growing conventionally armed
ballistic missiles as a potent weapon to influence Taiwan's
populace and their leaders. This development should concern us
all, as it threatens the fundamental U.S. interest in security
and stability for East Asia.
China knew even before Washington dispatched air carrier
groups in 1996 that the U.S. forces must be taken into account
militarily. Failing to do so endangered both China's power to
intimidate and its capability to use force. Consequently, the
PLA appears to have altered its contingency planning from the
large, slowly developing assault and blockade operations
against Taiwan, which by their very nature gave the United
States considerable time to respond, to more intense, quick-
hitting attacks featuring ballistic missiles.
This scenario is designed to achieve China's objectives
before the United States could become fully engaged in the
fighting. Chinese leaders probably believe that the more rapid
and complete the PLA's initial success, the less the prospect
that the United States could intervene. Indeed, they may
consider a quick, decisive action their only real option.
The evolving military balance, events in the Taiwan Strait,
such as the quick-strike exercises, and Taipei's reaction to
these developments, signal China's growing strategic
credibility. As Beijing military modernizes, and the number of
missiles targeted against Taiwan increases, so, too, will the
temptation to try to intimidate the people of democratic
Taiwan.
U.S. policy makers must now react. Chinese actions mean
that Taiwan will need more and better weapons, a distinct
qualitative edge, including theater missile defenses. The
alternative is for the United States to risk ceding to Beijing
a clear military advantage.
The U.S. also needs to review our own capabilities in the
region, and the speed with which our forces can respond to any
future PRC provocation. Time is no longer a luxury that the
United States can afford to take for granted.
The best way for the United States and Taiwan to cope with
these changing realities is to ensure Taiwan maintains an
effective military deterrent with the qualitative and
quantitative improvements in defensive weapons systems that are
urgently required from the United States.
Successive U.S. administrations have unwisely cramped the
effectiveness of Taiwan's weapons purchases. Limited
coordination and communications between senior Taiwanese
commanders and American counterparts have virtually eliminated
operational training opportunities for Taiwanese officers.
Even when a major transaction does go through, as in the
sale of the F-16 starting in 1992, the impact is muted. The
United States has refused to sell Taiwan the most potent
armaments and avionics available for the plane. Though last
month's Pentagon report noted the PRC's overwhelming advantage
in submarines, Washington has refused to sell Taiwan undersea
craft since 1973.
If this ill-advised policy continues, the PRC-ROC military
imbalance will grow increasingly dangerous to the security
interests of the American people. The last thing any U.S.
President wants is a Hobson's choice between allowing Beijing
to coerce Taiwan into submission, or sending American forces
into battle to defend democratic Taiwan and thwart the Chinese
Communists.
Twenty years ago, Congress offset the White House
inclination to short-change Taiwan's security interests.
Capitol Hill has frequently attempted to curb the same tendency
in all succeeding administrations. Now, a new vigorous
assertion of congressional authority is required to prevent the
security guarantees in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 from
being rendered meaningless.
Fortunately, simple changes in practice could make dramatic
improvements. With only slight modifications of the existing
rules, which would still be well within the terms and
conditions of unofficial relations, the United States can
relieve Taiwan's military isolation considerably, improve its
deterrent posture, and quite likely reduce the chances that
Americans will become entangled in a military confrontation
with the PRC.
To this end, there are three steps the United States should
take:
No. 1. Sell Taiwan the weapons and equipment it needs to
maintain an effective deterrent, a distinctive, qualitative
edge over the PRC, one that promotes peace and stability in the
region. The practice of putting Chinese interests ahead of our
own and Taiwan's security must stop.
No. 2. Establish an operations and training presence at the
AIT Office in Taipei. Since rules prohibit a U.S. command
element on Taiwan, we need a section at AIT that can handle
those responsibilities so that U.S. forces can effectively
communicate with Taiwan in a crisis.
No. 3. Allow more Taiwanese military personnel to visit
U.S. military schools and installations.
We should also seek other ways to enhance military contacts
with Taiwan. Unofficial relations was never intended by the
Taiwan Relations Act to mean no contact. The United States
simply has not tried hard enough to make activities other than
arms sales fit under this rubric. Up to now, we have not done
the right thing. Not to change our essential way of doing
business with Taiwan in the future will prove extremely
dangerous to the security interests of the United States.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your patience.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]
Prepared Statement of Carl W. Ford, Jr.
congress must lean on the white house to maintain balance in the taiwan
strait
In this season 20 years ago, Congress responded to a unique Asian
security challenge with prescience and dispatch. President Carter in
December, 1978 had announced ``normalization'' of relations with the
People's Republic of China. Closing that deal required the U.S. to
sever formal ties with the Republic of China on Taiwan, abandon our
defense pact with this long-standing ally, and withdraw all U.S. forces
from the ROC.
The dilemma was how to preserve Taiwan's security while nurturing
the new relationship with Beijing. The Carter Administration fixated on
the latter concern. But a bipartisan Congressional majority served as a
brake on the Administration's rush to please the PRC at the expense of
Taiwan's security. With strong leadership by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Congress voted overwhelmingly to assure that the
U.S. would make available ``such defense articles and services'' as
necessary ``to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
capability.''
Faced with veto-proof majorities, a reluctant President Carter
signed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which became law on April 10,
1979. For two decades the TRA has served as the foundation for U.S.
policy, helping to ensure Taiwan maintains a credible military
deterrent which protects U.S. interests. Despite Beijing's occasional
spasms of bellicosity, regional tensions have not prevented Taiwan from
building a flourishing economy and moving from authoritarianism to
genuine democracy.
In military terms, however, that foundation was never as strong as
it seemed because successive Presidents have failed to implement the
TRA fully. Cracks in the foundation are now becoming dangerous. That
was confirmed in a Defense Department report to Congress last month.
The study acknowledged Taiwan's increasing vulnerability on a number of
fronts. Specifically, the report for the first time publicly detailed
the PRC's growing arsenal of ballistic missiles. These weapons will
give the PRC the ability to overwhelm key Taiwan defenses in a
devastating quick-strike operation.
At the same time, the Pentagon report perpetuates a misleading
construct in fashion since TRA's enactment. For reasons having to do
more with diplomacy than military realities, Washington worked from the
assumption that the opposing forces were roughly in balance. Taiwan's
presumed ``qualitative edge'' would offset the PRC's gargantuan
advantage in numbers. By this reasoning, occasional and selective
upgrades of Taiwan's defensive weapons would maintain equilibrium.
This formulation was, at best, misleading 20 years ago and today is
downright deceptive. Students of the subject knew it then. I joined the
Foreign Relations Committee staff as a specialist in East Asian affairs
in 1979, after serving as a China military analyst at the CIA. Insiders
knew that serious deficiencies existed in Taiwan's military
establishment. Long before 1979, the U.S. was determined to restrain
the island's capabilities. Not only were sales of weapons limited, but
contingency planning envisioned that Americans would direct any
significant combat operation.
The result was an array of weaknesses in defense capabilities,
particularly in Taiwan's air and naval forces, and a leadership with
little experience in planning its homeland's defense. When the U.S.
dismantled its Taiwan Defense Command, these deficiencies persisted.
However, the risks then did not seem acute in the 1980's, at least from
Washington's perspective. The People's Liberation Army, with its own
flaws, could not contemplate a major offensive without accepting huge
losses. Beijing had to assign significant assets to defend against a
hostile Soviet Union. Also, PRC leaders seemed to assume that an
isolated Taiwan, bereft of its U.S. military alliance, could be
manipulated over time into surrender on Beijing's terms.
These factors changed dramatically in the 1990's. With the Soviet
Union's collapse, the PRC no longer must allocate great resources to
that front. Second, the PRC has embarked on an ambitious military
modernization program that is grinding away whatever ``qualitative
edge'' Taiwan once enjoyed in critical areas. Third, the takeover of
Hong Kong and the imminent reversion of Macao leaves only Taiwan as a
target of the PRC's avid irredentism. Finally, the island's progress in
economic and political terms has made separation from the dictatorial
PRC more attractive than ever to the native Taiwanese who now run the
ROC's democratic government. Beijing has now chosen to concentrate on
its military card.
The best way for the U.S. and Taiwan to cope with these changing
realities is to maintain an effective military deterrent. Successive
U.S. administrations have cramped the effectiveness of Taiwan's weapons
purchases, limited coordination and communication between senior
Taiwanese commanders and American counterparts, and virtually
eliminated operational training opportunities for Taiwanese officers.
Even when a major transaction goes through, as in the sale of F-16's
starting in 1992, the impact is muted. The U.S. has refused to sell
Taiwan the most potent armaments and avionics available for the plane.
Though last month's Pentagon report noted the PRC's ``overwhelming
advantage'' in submarines (66 vessels versus four), Washington has
refused to sell Taiwan undersea craft since 1973.
If this ill-advised policy continues, the PRC-ROC military
imbalance will grow increasingly dangerous. The last thing any U.S.
President wants is a Hobson's choice between allowing Beijing to coerce
Taiwan into submission or sending American forces into battle to thwart
the communists. Twenty years ago Congress offset the White House's
inclination to shortchange Taiwan's security interests. Capitol Hill
has frequently attempted to curb the same tendency in succeeding
administrations. Now a new, vigorous assertion of Congressional
authority is needed to prevent the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 from
becoming meaningless.
the quick strike: prc's formula to regain strategic credibility
The unclassified version of the Pentagon's new landmark report to
Congress entitled ``The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait''
remained corked for nearly a month because some administration
officials feared that it would affront Beijing. When the document
surfaced last week, its factual content overwhelmed the attempt of
insiders to be circumspect. The study reveals what officials apparently
sought to play down. The PRC's strategy is shifting towards a quick-
strike threat to gain superiority over Taiwan. This change is virtually
certain to affect Congress' stance on security issues affecting the
region.
Of special concern is the incremental growth in Beijing's missile
capabilities, most notably the improved shorter range models, the M-9
and M-11. Beijing will have ``an overwhelming advantage in offensive
missiles . . . in 2005,'' the report predicted. Taken together with
recent training exercises, the improvements convey an ominous message
about the PLA's thinking vis-a-vis Taiwan. One of the most revealing
passages in the 27-page report says: ``. . . China views its growing
conventionally armed ballistic missiles as a potent weapon to influence
Taiwan's populace and their leaders.''
Through the early 1990's, the PLA's exercises suggested an interest
in the larger generic options, such as an all-out attack or a blockade.
Since each of these involved considerable risk and potentially heavy
casualties, many believed that China--except in the most extreme
circumstances--would not actually initiate hostilities. Rather Beijing
was thought to be interested in the intimidation value of its training
activities. Even when the character of these operations changed in the
mid-1990's, most observers viewed them in the same light, noting their
value in psychological warfare rather than warfighting terms.
Recent exercises have indeed had a psychological effect. Just the
knowledge that the PLA was training nearby caused Taiwan's stock market
to dip noticeably on several occasions and otherwise fueled popular
concerns about the island's security. Though there has been no panic,
such fears are bound to grow. The more credible the PLA's capabilities
become, the more impact its training activities will have on public
opinion. This is because intimidation and the use of force share an
important characteristic: To be effective, they must be backed by real
military capabilities. China's new exercises demonstrate obvious
improvement and growth in this area.
Clearly, the PLA understands that its past threats of an amphibious
invasion, or even a blockade, are no longer as credible as they once
were. Ten and 20 years ago, China's leaders may well have believed that
saber rattling could intimidate Taiwan into accepting Beijing's terms
for unification. To do otherwise risked a major attack, and even if
Taiwan should prevail in the battle, casualties could be unacceptably
high and the economy left in ruin.
But Taiwan's people proved much tougher and more resilient than
Beijing assumed. They never lost confidence in their ability to defend
the island, and as the years passed the idea of China initiating
hostilities lost credibility. This resulted in part from a better
appreciation among Taiwanese of the difficulties associated with
China's use of force. Another factor was Taiwan's acquisition of new
arms and equipment. Leaders in both Taipei and Beijing also believed
that the U.S. would not allow Taiwan to be coerced and would intervene
to tip the scales in Taipei's favor, much as it did in 1996.
That explains why the PLA changed the nature of its training
exercises. Its leaders knew even before Washington dispatched aircraft
carrier groups in 1996 that the U.S. must be taken into account
militarily. Failing to do so endangered both China's power to
intimidate and its capability to use force.
Consequently, the PLA appears to have altered its contingency
planning from the large, slowly developing assault and blockade
operations against Taiwan--which by their very nature gave the U.S.
considerable time to respond--to more intense, quick-hitting attacks
featuring ballistic missiles. These would be linked with rapid assault
forces and concentrated firepower. This scenario is designed to achieve
China's objectives before the U.S. could become fully engaged in the
fighting. Chinese leaders probably believe that the more rapid and
complete the PLA's initial success, the less the prospect that the U.S.
would intervene. Indeed, they may consider a quick, decisive action
their only real option.
The evolving military balance, events in the Taiwan Strait (such as
the quick strike exercises), and Taipei's reaction to these
developments signal China's growing strategic credibility. As Beijing's
military modernizes and the number of missiles targeted against Taiwan
increases, so too will the temptation to try to intimidate the people
of democratic Taiwan.
U.S. policy makers must now react. Chinese actions mean that Taiwan
will need more and better weapons, including theater missile defenses.
The alternative is for the U.S. to risk ceding to Beijing a clear
military advantage. The U.S. will also need to review its own
capabilities in the region, and the speed with which its forces can
respond to any future PRC provocations. Time is no longer a luxury that
the U.S. can take for granted.
america's illogical rules make for dangerous policy in the taiwan
strait
Like most nations, Taiwan faces its share of military challenges.
Indeed, the standard list--for any country--is almost endless.
Recruiting and retaining good people is an expensive and never ending
problem for every country, while weapon systems only grow more
complicated and expensive each year. Little wonder that defense budgets
remain high during these times of relative peace, and military
establishments of all sizes and shapes are constantly looking for ways
to cut corners. Usually this means that combat forces rarely stay at a
top level of proficiency absent an imminent threat. It costs too much.
More typically, limits on funding impact those activities most relevant
to combat capabilities--operations, training and maintenance--first and
hardest.
In the case of Taiwan, of course, the island also faces in China a
formidable potential adversary just across the Taiwan Strait; one so
large in size and population, that even the United States and Russia
view its current military power with concern. China's military
capabilities, which by any measure already dwarf those of its smaller
neighbors, will become even more modern and intimidating over time,
especially as its power projection capabilities grow. Taiwan will need
to run hard and fast just to keep from falling further behind.
As if these challenges were not enough, Taiwan, in attempting to
achieve a sufficient defense capability, must also contend with the
United States, its erstwhile best friend. Most times this has not been
easy. For despite the legal requirements of the Taiwan Relations Act
and a long list of defense items sold to Taipei over the past 20 years,
the United States has purposely saddled Taiwan with a web of silly
rules and limitations that not only harm the island's ability to defend
itself, but in the future could also put American military personnel in
jeopardy.
Military Hardware
Among these rules are restrictions on arms sales that are both a
financial burden and militarily unnecessary. For example, there is the
E-2T (the ``T'' signifies that it is the Taiwan version), a perfectly
good flying radar station used by many countries, including the U.S.
Navy, for controlling air defense assets. Apparently fearing China's
reaction when it learned of the sale and wanting to be able to claim
that we were not transferring the latest model, the E-2Ts were sold to
Taiwan on the condition that each contain parts salvaged from aircraft
no longer in service. No one was fooled by this silly requirement,
least of all Beijing's military, since it did not affect the aircraft's
performance. It only increased Taiwan's defense costs.
But the strange rules haven't just cost money. Most of the rules
impose restrictions on the level of capability we provided Taiwan as
well. For example, the first fighter aircraft sold to Taiwan after the
United States normalized relations with the PRC was the so-called IDF,
or indigenous fighter program. Worried about China's objections, the
United States decided against transferring a modern U.S. aircraft,
opting instead to provide Taiwan with the technology and know-how to
build its own fighter, though one less capable and not so provocative.
It was billed as a reasonable compromise between Taiwan's defense needs
and PRC sensitivities. Unfortunately, it did not turn out that way.
Costs skyrocketed almost immediately when U.S. government-mandated
limits and restrictions on performance proved unrealistic, resulting in
numerous design changes and other costly delays. The search for an
acceptable engine, given that all the existing U.S. military engines
had been deemed ``too capable,'' proved especially frustrating and
expensive. Even when Taiwan worked through these problems, and had
produced a good little fighter, U.S. rule makers still weren't
satisfied. They made certain that the aircraft could not adequately
defend Taiwan against air attacks by seriously limiting both its
armaments and its avionics. These limitations were so severe that only
a few years later President Bush, over the objections of the
bureaucracy, felt it necessary to transfer the F-16 to Taiwan. But U.S.
officials couldn't resist making the same mistake twice: Bureaucrats
insisted on selling Taiwan an older version of the aircraft, limiting
its armaments and avionics as it had with the IDF.
Military-To-Military Contacts And Information Exchange
Those wishing to minimize contact with Taiwan haven't confined
themselves just to arms sales. Far worse have been U.S. efforts to
constrain other military relations with Taiwan, such as training and
routine operational contacts. Such activities go to the heart of
maintaining a proficient military establishment. Without them, a
nation, even one armed to the teeth, can hardly hope to defend itself
well. A country like Taiwan, which does not yet possess the full range
of conventional military capabilities, finds itself even more seriously
hamstrung. The U.S. decision to keep working-level contacts between the
two militaries to a bare minimum and eliminate almost entirely
operational interactions of all sorts has seriously undermined Taiwan's
ability to maintain its combat readiness.
What's worse, it all seems so unnecessary. As the legislative
history of the Taiwan Relations Act anticipated 20 years ago:
The military advisory and training functions performed by the
U.S. Government prior to January 1, 1979, can in general
continue through other means if both parties show flexibility
and imagination. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Wolff, Lester L. and David L. Simon, eds., Legislative History
of the Taiwan Relations Act (Jamaica, N.Y.: American Association for
Chinese Studies, 1982), p. 19.
Had we followed that advice, both the United States and Taiwan
would have been better off. The sad fact is that we did not. Those in
charge apparently decided that, except for arms sales, it was easier to
ban almost everything military than to deal with China's criticisms. In
doing so, however, U.S. officials apparently did not worry too much
about what consequences there might be for the United States. Clearly,
such decisions have put the United States and its interests at risk.
The Taiwan Relations Act calls for the United States to help Taiwan
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability; something as much in our
interest as Taipei's. First, we hope that adequate defense preparations
by Taiwan will lessen the prospect for a war with China. Although
Taiwan's ability to fend for itself does not ensure that the PRC won't
make threats or launch an attack at some point in the future, it does
provide an important measure of deterrence. Unless Beijing can
calculate that its chances of success are high, it is not likely to
provoke a war. Second, should deterrence fail, we want Taiwan to be
able to defend itself with as little assistance from the United States
as possible. Ideally, few, if any, U.S. personnel would be directly
involved in the fighting. In most cases, the United States' primary
roles would be those of providing logistic support and acting as
peacemaker.
Unfortunately, U.S. decisions since 1979 have produced almost the
opposite result. The military balance in hardware terms strongly favors
the People's Republic of China and the proliferation of China's
missiles in recent years has only made matters worse. Equally
troubling, Taiwan's forces lack critical training experiences at all
levels and suffer from serious command control deficiencies--most of
the United States' doing. As the rest of the world experienced a
revolution in military thinking, the U.S. limitations imposed in the
case of Taiwan ensured that Taipei's military would become isolated and
out of touch with essential knowledge available only from military-to-
military contacts. Performance levels have suffered and commanders and
troops have lost confidence. The restrictions are so tight that the
U.S. military cannot communicate directly with Taiwan even for safety
precautions involved with air and naval transits through the region.
Consequently, even the slightest provocation, such as PRC training and
missile exercises, require a major U.S. response. Clearly, in the event
of a crisis, even more would be expected of Washington, including air
and sea control responsibilities.
Simple Changes Could Make Dramatic Improvements
Fortunately, simple changes in practice could make dramatic
improvements. With only slight modifications of the existing rules,
which would still be well within the terms and conditions of
``unofficial relations,'' the United States can relieve Taiwan's
military isolation considerably, improve its deterrent posture, and
quite likely reduce the chances that Americans will become entangled in
a military confrontation with the PRC.
To this end, there are three steps the United States should take:
1. Sell Taiwan the weapons and equipment it needs to maintain
an effective deterrent--a distinct qualitative edge over the
PRC--one that promotes peace and stability in the region. The
practice of putting Chinese interests ahead of our own and
Taiwan's security must stop.
2. Establish an operations and training presence at the AIT
office in Taipei. Presently, the main military business of the
American Institute in Taiwan (the quasi-embassy in Taipei) is
arms sales support and attache-type duties. Since rules
prohibit a U.S. command element on Taiwan, we need a section at
AIT that can handle those responsibilities so that U.S. forces
can effectively communicate with Taiwan in a crisis.
3. Allow more Taiwanese military personnel to visit U.S.
military schools and installations. Probably the easiest step,
and involves no more than changing the U.S. attitude toward
Taiwan's attendance at senior service schools. Instead of
constantly looking for ways to limit Taipei's participation, we
should bend over backwards to make this sort of training
available and ensure that there is robust, ongoing dialogue
between U.S. and ROC military officials regarding military
doctrine.
We should also seek other ways to enhance military-to-military
contacts with Taiwan. Over the longer term, the Pentagon should come up
with ways in which Taiwan's military can take better advantage of
training and other contacts that U.S. commands such as CINCPAC have to
offer. Unofficial relations was never intended by the Taiwan Relations
Act to mean no contact. The United States simply has not tried hard
enough to make activities other than arms sales fit under this rubric.
Obviously, these and other remedies will not solve Taiwan's
military problems. The potential military threat posed by the PRC is
much too great for that. This should in no way, however, relieve the
United States from its responsibility to provide as best it can for
Taiwan's self-defense capability. Nor should the United States lose
sight of its own interests in making Taiwan less dependent upon U.S.
forces during any future crisis. It is in everyone's interest that the
United States not continue to bury its head in the sand when it comes
to our military advisory and training responsibilities. Up to now, we
have not done the right thing. Not to change our essential way of doing
business with Taiwan in the future would be downright dangerous.
the pla gets down to business
It looks like Beijing's recent decision to take the PLA out of
commercial enterprises and other industrial activities in China comes
with several important quids. Not only will the Army be able to give
its full attention to its main business, military preparations, but the
government has agreed to increase the funding allocated for defense
spending by almost 13 percent next year. The implications of the
change, however, do not stop there. The PLA, in return for its reduced
role in the economy, will also it seems have a greater say in a number
of other critical international issues such as Taiwan and the Spratly
Islands in the South China Sea. Given the military's more hard-line
position on these sensitive problems the PLA's new focus should worry
us all.
Apologists both inside and outside of China quickly tried to
downplay the importance of the 12.7% boost in defense spending
announced March 4 by claiming that it would go mostly for ``living
standards.'' Such statements make for good sound bites, but are
purposefully misleading. Spokesmen know that personnel and other
related costs without exception take up the bulk of military budgets
both east and west. It is a given. What they don't tell you about are
China's large scale military modernization programs and stepped up
training activities detailed in the February DoD military balance
report to the Congress. Across the board the PLA is engaged in a major
spending effort to upgrade weapons and equipment and improve its
operational capabilities. According to the report these efforts already
make a real difference in China's ability to use force, for instance
the increase in ballistic missiles deployed opposite Taiwan capable of
a quick strike, and the PLA will only get better between now and 2005.
That's what this is all about.
They also don't tell you that China never tells the truth about its
defense spending anyway. For years experts have considered the publicly
released figures to be only the tip of the iceberg. While no one can be
certain, since much of the funding is hidden, many estimate that the
unclassified budget probably understates real spending by at least a
third. Moreover, it is in the area of weapons acquisition and training
that the Chinese are most secretive, at least in part because these are
the areas the PLA finances with profits from its sale of missiles and
other weapons to upstanding international citizens such as Iraq, Iran,
Libya and Syria.
All in all, I suspect that the PLA General Staff is delighted with
the new order of things. Most are highly trained professionals glad to
be rid of the distractions associated with a few bad apples profiting
from the PLA's involvement in commerce. They can now give their full
attention to strengthening the PLA with government promises of
increased official funding. Improvements in military capability are
likely to follow.
The General Staff also appears to have gained a greater say in
other matters as well. China's stepped up military activity in the
South China Sea, especially in and around the Spratly Islands, has the
PLA's fingerprints all over it. Always a flash point for expressing
Chinese nationalism, this area has also been one in which the PLA has
historically played a special role. Only the military has the
capability to operate so far from the China mainland and by default is
in charge of day to day activities. Along with operational control has
come an apparent greater say in the strategic decision making about the
Spratlys. It also gives the PLA an opportunity to test out and
experiment with its new power projection capabilities; ones that are
especially useful when thinking about potential operations against
Taiwan.
It is also likely not a coincidence that these events parallel a
hardening of PLA attitudes about Taiwan and the military buildup in and
around the Strait area documented in the DoD report. Military officers
and other nationalists expressed considerable anger and frustration
after the U.S. dispatched aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait in
1996. Not only were they surprised by Washington's action, but they
were embarrassed at their inability to do anything about it. Soon
after, several vented their anger with American friends telling them
that it would never happen again and even threatening possible
retaliation against U.S. cities. Ridding the PLA of its commercial
entanglements, giving it more say in sensitive international matters,
and carving out a larger share of the government's budget for military
programs looks like part of China's response. In the process, Beijing's
long term intentions, if not its military budget, are become much more
transparent.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Ford. I have just been advised
that there are going to be three votes on the budget bill
beginning at noon. I do not want to miss any of those, but I
certainly want to have a little bit of conversation with each
of you. Dr. Lampton, if you will proceed please, sir.
STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID M. LAMPTON, DIRECTOR OF CHINA STUDIES,
NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Lampton. I will try and be very expeditious.
The Chairman. I do not want to cut you short, because it is
important that we hear for the record what you have to say.
Dr. Lampton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
In my written testimony I make four points:
No. 1. The Taiwan Relations Act and the three communiques
have served American interests well and have simultaneously
permitted the people of Taiwan to prosper in the last two
decades.
No. 2. There are tensions among the Taiwan Relations Act
and the three communiques, but tinkering with the structure
that exists is a very dangerous course, not the least for the
people of Taiwan, about whom I care, and I know you do, Mr.
Chairman, a great deal.
No. 3. There are worrisome developments in the Taiwan
Strait, as well as some hopeful signs.
No. 4. American policy should continue to be what it has
been since Secretary Shultz uttered the following words in
March 1987: ``Our steadfast policy seeks to foster an
environment in which such developments'' he meant cross-strait
exchange and cooperation ``can continue to take place.''
Mr. Chairman, in my written testimony I draw three
conclusions. First, we need to manage the Taiwan Strait
relationship with the utmost care, not only out of
consideration of U.S. interests, but the interests of the
people of Taiwan and the region, as well.
Second, the proper management of the Taiwan issue, so-
called, is key to broader peace and stability in East Asia, and
key to such management is the peaceful resolution of disputes
across the strait, maintenance of our one China policy, and
U.S. willingness to accept any outcome peacefully determined by
the parties themselves.
And third, because the PRC is a central player in many of
the world's potential flash points, and Korea and Taiwan are
simply two of those, productive relations with Beijing are not
a luxury, they are a necessity.
Rather than cover all the points in my prepared testimony,
I only want to concentrate these remarks on one key point.
Expanding cooperation in the Taiwan Strait is the only way to
avoid conflict in the long run. This is the policy challenge,
not tinkering with the structure of arrangements, the TRA and
the three communiques, that despite the problems have served
America and the region well for many years, and for which no
preferable alternative exists.
Any attempt to legislatively reduce the current ambiguity,
which I admit does exist, would prove inflammatory to one side
of the strait or the other, encourage risk-taking by one side
of the strait or the other, and almost certainly would increase
the prospect for conflict.
The United States ought not further complicate matters
because there already is a drift in the strait toward
increasing tension. Beijing seems more anxious than in the past
to move toward what it calls resolution of the cross-strait
situation. The people of Taiwan show progressively less
appetite for anything that looks like reunification, and
Beijing and Taipei are perched on what may be the beginning of
an arms race.
While the United States should not become a mediator or
insert itself into talks, that does not mean that we ought not
feel able to express positive ideas to both sides through both
public and private channels. Among such positive ideas might be
the following.
It would serve everyone's interest to reduce the chance of
military incidents and an arms race in the strait. Why don't
both sides initiate cross-strait discussions about how to avoid
such incidents? Why don't they consider negotiating an
agreement whereby missiles would be capped in exchange for
Taiwan not acquiring TMD and restraint in weapons purchases? Or
why doesn't Beijing simply declare unilaterally that it will
cease its strait-area missile buildup in exchange for restraint
on the other side?
A unilateral halt to a missile buildup might very well
reduce the need for Taiwan to acquire a very expensive TMD
system. Indeed, Taipei has already said as much.
Why don't both sides consider the ``three links'' in
exchange for more flexibility in providing a dignified global
role for Taiwan, whether it is in the World Health
Organization, the World Health Assembly, the World Trade
Organization, the World Bank, or the International Monetary
Fund?
Frankly, Beijing's strangulation policy is not winning the
hearts and minds of Taiwan's people. Keeping Taiwan out of
organizations like WTO that would serve the tangible interests
of people on Taiwan does not convince the Taiwanese that
Beijing cares about their welfare.
Similarly, direct civil air transport across the strait is
long overdue, and I would like to see Taipei consider this. Why
don't both sides consider a diplomatic cease-fire in which they
agree to leave the number of countries recognizing each other
at current levels? The guerrilla war to buy diplomatic
recognition of small countries demeans both capitals, is
expensive, and erodes trust on both sides of the strait.
The point of the above suggestions is not so much to push
them specifically as to make a broader point. Developments in
the Taiwan Strait have their dangers for both parties and for
the United States, and it is time for some new thinking in the
Taiwan Strait.
While the United States should not become a mediator, it
may well be that some good ideas can emanate from the American
public and private sectors. In the meantime, Washington ought
not tinker with the structure of the Taiwan Relations Act and
the three communiques, documents that, while they are complex
and difficult to implement, have served us better than any of
the alternatives.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Lampton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. David M. Lampton
Mr. Chairman and Committee Members, I am pleased to be able to
share my thoughts with you as we approach the Twentieth Anniversary of
the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). I wish to make four points: (1) The TRA
and the Three Communiques have served American interests well and
simultaneously permitted the people of Taiwan to prosper during the
last two decades. (2) There are tensions among the TRA and the Three
Communiques, but tinkering with the structure that exists is a very
dangerous course, not the least for the people of Taiwan. (3) There are
worrisome developments in the Taiwan Strait, as well as some hopeful
signs. And (4), American policy should continue to be what it has been
since Secretary of State Shultz uttered the following words in March
1987--``Our steadfast policy seeks to foster an environment in which
such developments [cross-Strait exchange and cooperation] continue to
take place.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Norman Kempster, ``Will China Continue Economic Reform Plan?''
Los Angeles Times, March 6, 1987, p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Chairman, if we ask ourselves where American forces could
become embroiled in a major conflict any time soon, the locations would
include the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula,
and the Taiwan Strait. From this fact, I draw three conclusions. First,
we need to manage the Taiwan Strait problem with the utmost care, not
only out of a consideration of U.S. interests, but the interests of the
people of Taiwan and the region as well. Second, proper management of
the Taiwan issue is key to broader peace and stability in East Asia. As
the TRA made clear twenty years ago when it was passed and signed into
law: ``Peace and stability in the area are in the political, security,
and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of
international concern;--'' [Section 2(b)(2)]. And third, because the
PRC is a central player in all four potential flash points mentioned
above (two directly and two by virtue of its role on the UN Security
Council), productive relations with Beijing are not a luxury, they are
a necessity.
Consequently, the current downturn in U.S.-China relations is
neither in American interests nor those of the people of Taiwan. It is
not in American interests because the general direction of change in
China and its international behavior conforms with American interests
(though there are important areas of friction) and because Beijing
generally has been minimally (though not always) cooperative as we have
sought to manage the most dangerous hot spots. Further, the current
deterioration is not in Taiwan's interests because the more U.S.-China
ties deteriorate the more hawkish Beijing becomes toward Taipei.
Therefore, we should be seeking to utilize the forthcoming visit of
Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji to resolve genuine problems.
The TRA and the Three Joint Communiques Have Together Served America
and Taiwan Well
The April 1979 TRA has been a critical component of what overall
has been a successful policy with respect to ``Greater China.'' By
``successful,'' I mean that:
Taiwan has undergone extraordinary economic growth over the last
twenty years (per capita GNP in 1978 was US$1,450 and in 1997 it was
US$13,467); \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 1978 per capita GNP $1,450 (in 1978 dollars) from: Central
Intelligence Agency, National Basic Intelligence Factbook, January
1980, p. 221; 1997 per capita GNP $13,467 from: Republic of China
Yearbook 1998 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1998, p. 178
(chart).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Taiwan political system has moved from its own brand of
authoritarianism to a multi-party competitive democracy;
Taiwan continues to have 30,855 students and scholars enrolled in
U.S. institutions of higher education; \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Institute for International Education, online ``fastfact''
(http://www.iie.ort/516img/od98/ffact--02.gif)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S.-Taiwan trade has gone up nearly 600 percent (not adjusted for
inflation) in the 1978-1998 period; \4\ and,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Total U.S. trade with Taiwan in 1998 was $51.28 billion and
total U.S. trade with Taiwan in 1978 was $7.512 billion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the security story is complicated, the extensive economic
connections that now link the two sides of the Strait together
represents a welcome incentive that works against conflict. In 1999,
there are about 40,000 Taiwan firms in the PRC with total investment
commitments in the US$40 billion range--President Lee Teng-hui has
referred to the PRC as Taiwan's economic ``hinterland.'' Of course,
there are worrisome signs in the security domain (which I will address
shortly), but we should not overlook the security gains that have been
made.
At the same time that the people of Taiwan, largely by stint of
their own admirable efforts, have made progress, the U.S.-PRC
relationship has made important strides forward over the last two
decades as well, current frictions, difficulties, and conflicts of
interest aside. In the last twenty years the changes and progress have
been impressive.
The number of Chinese students and scholars studying in America
have gone from nearly zero to nearly 47,000; \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Institute for International Education, online ``fastfact''
(http://www.iie.ort/516img/od98/ffact--02.gif)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two-way trade has gone from US$1.2 billion to $85.4 billion over
the 1978-1998 period, though I am mindful that the trade deficit with
China last January exceeded the deficit with Japan \6\ and this year we
may have a deficit in the vicinity of $60 billion. This, incidentally,
is why we need a good WTO accession agreement with Beijing in order to
be assured of improved market access for American farmers and service
providers, among others;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Gautam Malkani, ``U.S. sees trade deficit hit $17 bn,''
Financial Times, March 19, 1999, p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Americans now have existing investment in the PRC totaling over
US$20 billion; \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Tony Walker and Nancy Dunne ``Clinton acts to head off China
`feeding frenzy' gripping capital,'' Financial Times, March 19, 1999,
p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
China has joined a great number of international organizations and
arms control regimes and it has been a constructive member of many
while we acknowledge the lack of fidelity to some commitments in some
important human rights and proliferation areas;
Beijing and Washington have cooperated in various problem areas,
ranging from the Korean Peninsula to the Sinai desert and Cambodia. I
don't need to tell this Committee that there are many serious concerns
as well, in the human rights, proliferation, and trade areas, as well
as the Taiwan Strait.
And finally let's not forget the central fact of importance to
American interests. In the three decades prior to the 1979
normalization with the PRC, America fought one war directly with the
PRC in Korea; had two very dangerous crises in the Taiwan Strait (1954
and 1958); and the United States became involved in the Vietnam War (in
which there was limited Chinese involvement) in part because of concern
about Beijing's revolutionary ambitions. In contrast, in the last more
than two decades since the Shanghai Communique (followed by the
subsequent two communiques and the TRA) the United States has had one
limited crisis in the Taiwan Strait (1995-1996) where Washington
appropriately sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to clarify
American commitments.
In sum, the central point is that the existing structure of
relations has well served all three societies and we should not tinker
with that structure unless we have compelling evidence that such
tinkering will improve the situation. This brings me to the character
of that structure--the TRA and the Three Communiques.
The Current Structure of Peace (the TRA and the Three Communiques) and
the Danger of Tinkering
The TRA and the Three Communiques all reinforce the steadfast U.S.
position that issues dividing the two sides of the Taiwan Strait should
be resolved peacefully--that is the core of the U.S. commitment and the
heart of America's interest. To this end, in the TRA the United States
made it a matter of U.S. law that America ``will make available to
Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as
may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defense
capability'' [Sec. 3(a)] and that the United States will ``maintain the
capacity'' ``to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion
that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system,
of the people on Taiwan.'' [Sec. 2(b)(6)]
While the U.S. commitment to a peaceful resolution is consistent
throughout the Three Communiques and the TRA, it also is obvious that
there are certain tensions among these documents and between these
documents and changing reality. First, there is the tension that
derives from the adherence to a one China policy coexisting with the
TRA commitments mentioned above, and there are tensions that stem from
the separate and increasingly distinct identity of the people of
Taiwan. In this vein, there also is the problem of what specific U.S.
behavior constitutes ``unofficial'' ties to the people of Taiwan.
With respect to changing identity on Taiwan, whereas in 1972 the
Shanghai Communique could say, ``The U.S. acknowledges that all Chinese
on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and
that Taiwan is a part of China,'' given the changing identity among
Taiwan's people and the emergence of a competitive party system on the
island, it is far from clear that such a statement credibly could be
made in 1999. Polls conducted in September 1998 and subsequently
released by the Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council show that only 16.7
percent of people on Taiwan said ``I am Chinese.''
Another important area of tension is between the August 1982
Communique concerning weapon sales to Taiwan in which Washington said,
``its [U.S.] arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in
qualitative or in quantitative terms the level of those supplied in
recent years--,'' and the obsolescence of Taiwan's older weapon
systems, and the availability of new, more expensive and more capable,
follow-on systems.
These inherent tensions among the Three Communiques and the TRA, in
the context of changes in Taiwan and technology, create problems for
all three parties. Beijing asserts that certain interaction with Taipei
violates the one China principle, violates the concept of
``unofficial'' ties, or that weapon sales to Taiwan exceed the limits
of 1982. Taiwan, understandably chafes at the limits which current
policy places on it. And, for its part, the United States can view
increased PRC military power in the Strait (e.g. exercises like those
of 1995-1996 or the subsequent gradual increase in missiles in coastal
China) as creating an environment of tension that is inconsistent with
a ``peaceful resolution'' or Taiwan's security. Parenthetically, the
1982 Communique does not obligate the United States to reduce weapon
sales irrespective of the security situation in the Strait.
Given these tensions two observations are key: 1) If the risk of
conflict in the Strait were to decline, and cross-Strait cooperation
were to increase, then the difficulties in implementing both the TRA
and the Three Communiques would diminish. Conversely, if Beijing
employs coercion or Taiwan pursues de jure independence, the strains
within the policy would mount and the ability to maintain the existent
structure would erode, probably beyond repair. 2) In light of the
preceding considerations, all three sides should be seeking to lower
the temperature in the Strait and find means to increase confidence
there. Expanding cooperation in the Strait is the only way to avoid
conflict in the long run. This is the policy challenge-- not tinkering
with a structure of arrangements that, despite the problems, has served
America and the region well for twenty years and to which no preferable
alternative exists. Any attempt to legislatively reduce the current
ambiguity would prove inflammatory to one side of the Strait or the
other, encourage risk taking by one side or the other, and almost
certainly would increase the prospect for conflict.
Having said that the existent structure has served America and the
region well, there are some concerns I have concerning the current
drift of events.
A Possible Drift Toward Conflict in the Strait--Some Worrisome
Developments Along with Rays of Hope
There are some hopeful signs when we look at cross-Strait
relations:
Cross-Strait talks were resumed last October with Koo Chen-foo's
visit to the PRC for dialogue with Wang Daohan and conversation with
President Jiang Zemin and Vice Premier Qian Qichen. A four-point
consensus was reached at that time and it is encouraging that both
sides announced last week that the next round of the Wang-Koo talks
will occur in Taiwan this coming fall.
Cross-Strait economic and cultural ties continue to grow, as
mentioned above.
Acknowledging these positive developments, however, my recent visit
to both sides of the Strait for discussions with citizens and leaders
in both societies leaves me worried about the future. What are some of
the things that worry me?
First, there is some, though not conclusive, evidence that Chinese
policy concerning Taiwan has changed somewhat. Whereas Mao Zedong
talked about resolving the cross-Strait situation in a hundred years
and Deng Xiaoping in fifty, the formulation we hear now is ``The Taiwan
problem cannot remain unresolved indefinitely.'' In my view, there is
no basis of trust or mutual interest that will allow for anything
resembling early reunification between the mainland and Taiwan.
Consequently, any attempt at early resolution will cause more problems
than it will resolve.
Second, both sides of the Strait are acquiring military capability
to prevent what each sees as the worst outcome for itself--de jure
independence is the worst for Beijing and early reunification the worst
for Taipei. Consequently, we could see an arms race that leaves
everyone with less security, obtained at higher cost, subject to
catastrophic miscalculation. The United States would be caught in the
middle.
Third, as the identity of people in Taiwan is becoming more
separate over time, this leads Beijing to place more emphasis on
``deterring'' separatism (coercion). This, in turn, simply compounds
feelings of separation and alienation from the mainland on Taiwan.
And finally, all of the preceding is reflected in the different
strategies that Beijing and Taipei are pursuing and which, I believe,
make agreement in the near-term a very remote possibility. For its
part, Beijing's strategy is as follows:
Induce the United States and Japan (and Russia) to make ever
clearer and more binding commitments to the One China Policy. If this
can be accomplished, there will be a big power fence built around
Taiwan that realistically makes de jure independence aspirations
infeasible;
Try to drive a wedge between the United States and Japan,
particularly as it relates to the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, unless
Tokyo and Washington specifically exclude Taiwan from the region of
coverage;
Over time, unless there is some negotiated understanding with
Taipei, gradually reduce the number of states that recognize Taipei,
reaching single digit levels of recognition of Taipei within the next
few years--what people in Taiwan refer to as ``strangulation.'' In
1998, Taipei had a net loss of three recognitions (with South Africa,
Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, and Tonga as losses and the
Marshall Islands as a gain). Taipei picked up Macedonia earlier this
year, albeit this set off a reaction in Beijing that led to a veto of
the extension of authorization for UN peacekeeping forces in Macedonia;
Focus limited PLA modernization on creating the capabilities to
inflict heavy costs on Taiwan for pursuing an independence course--this
need not necessarily involve invasion. The destabilization of Taiwan's
economy is probably sufficient. As well, while it is not possible to
defeat the U.S. military, raising the costs of any possible U.S.
intervention may have a deterrent value on Washington, in Beijing's
view;
Work to discourage Japan (and certainly Taiwan) from coming under
TMD coverage (though the combination of North Korean missile
development and the steady expansion of PRC missiles in the Strait are
having the opposite effect);
Make the PRC a progressively more attractive economic partner to
Taiwan business and demonstrate that the PRC is a reliable engine of
regional economic growth that Taiwan people need to maintain and
increase their standard of living; and,
Promise Taipei preferential policies even when compared to those
applied to Hong Kong under the wide umbrella of ``One Country, Two
Systems.''
For its part, Taipei's strategy appears to be:
Seek functional talks with Beijing that avoid issues that would
imply any political subordination to the PRC. Pursue functional talks
that make progressively clearer the separation of control and delineate
zones of responsibility;
Talk about eventual reunification, but fashion preconditions
(democracy and equalization of wealth) that are sufficiently remote
that they, in fact, nullify any possibility of ``reunification'' in any
meaningful time frame;
Continue to seek expanded breathing space internationally. Even
when achievements in this regard may be unlikely, proceed with the
effort because it meets popular expectations and makes it clear to the
people of Taiwan that Beijing is hostile to their aspirations;
Use the PRC's limited military modernization (and the steady growth
in the number of missiles) to justify more weapons purchases,
particularly those that get the United States progressively more
entangled in the island's security;
Keep a vigorous business relationship with the PRC so that Beijing
will be reticent to forego the benefits of Taiwan investment, but do
not permit economic dependence on the mainland to become so substantial
that one's own freedom to maneuver is greatly diminished; and,
Make it clear to the U.S. Executive Branch that if it goes too far
in accommodating Beijing's concerns, that Taipei can and will play the
``Congress Card.''
The problem for America, therefore, is to recognize the potentially
dangerous drift in events and to finds ways, consistent with past
policy, to enhance stability and cooperation across the Strait.
Fostering an Environment Conducive to Peace and Stability across the
Strait
We need to define an achievable, constructive goal. Such a goal is
to contribute to a dynamic and constructive status quo. Beyond the
United States maintaining its forward presence and military
capabilities in East Asia, each side of the Taiwan Strait needs to
reciprocally reassure the other that it will not seek its maximal goal
for a long period of time, perhaps twenty-five years. In the case of
Taiwan, such reassurance could take the form of a no-independence
pledge and in the case of the PRC it could take the form of a no-use-
of-force pledge. In the meantime, both sides would engage in a set of
activities to build confidence and increase contacts. In short, the
immediate goal should be to build a constructive, stable, and dynamic
status quo. Increased economic contact and interaction appears to be
the most positive force that is available. Further, the situation
requires confidence-building measures such as those suggested below.
While the United States should NOT become a mediator or insert
itself into talks, that does not mean that we ought to feel unable to
express positive ideas to both sides through both public and private
channels. Among such ideas might be the following:
It would serve everyone's interests to reduce the chance of
military incidents and an arms race in the Strait. Why don't both sides
initiate cross-Strait discussions about how to avoid such incidents?
Why don't they consider negotiating an agreement whereby missiles would
be capped in exchange for Taiwan not acquiring TMD and restrained
weapons purchases? Or, why doesn't Beijing simply declare unilaterally
that it will cease its Strait-area missile buildup in exchange for
restraint on the other side? A unilateral halt to a missile buildup
might very well reduce the need for a probably very expensive TMD
system in Taiwan. Indeed, Taipei has already said as much.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Associated Press, ``Taipei seeks military cutbacks in
mainland,'' Hong Kong Standard, March 21, 1999, p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Why don't both sides consider the ``Three Links'' in exchange for
more flexibility in providing a dignified global role for Taiwan
(whether it be the World Health Organization, the World Trade
Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, etc.)?
This is the kind of policy that would find support in the United
States. Frankly, Beijing's strangulation policy is not winning the
hearts and minds of the Taiwan people. Keeping Taiwan out of
organizations like WTO that would serve the tangible interests of
people in Taiwan does not convince the Taiwanese that Beijing cares
about their welfare. Similarly, direct, civil air transportation across
the Strait is long overdue and I would like to see Taipei seriously
consider this.
Why not propose a diplomatic cease-fire in which both sides agree
to leave the number of countries recognizing each at current levels?
The guerrilla war to buy the diplomatic recognition of small countries
demeans both capitals, costs money, and erodes trust on both sides of
the Strait.
The point of the above suggestions is not so much to push them
specifically as to make a broader point. Developments in the Taiwan
Strait have their dangers for the parties and for the United States and
it is time for some new thinking on both sides of the Strait. While the
United States should not become a mediator, it may well be that some
good ideas can emanate from the American public and private sectors. In
the meantime, Washington ought not to tinker with the structure of the
TRA and the Three Communiques, documents that while complex and
difficult to implement have served us better than any of the
alternatives.
The Chairman. Well, I thank you, sir. I thank all three of
you, and I made a judgment, and I am instructing the staff at
this moment. I want copies of the remarks of each of you to be
made available to each of the Senators prior to consideration
of the bill.
You have given me several ideas, even for possible
amendment on my own bill, but this morning has renewed my faith
in the fact that we have got to do something to make sure that
Taiwan continues to exist, and I think there are forces in this
world that do not want Taiwan to exist.
With that, we will conclude, and I was going to ask--well,
let me ask you one question. We talked about the three noes,
no, no, no. You know what I am talking about. Of course, when
the President said that it created quite a stir, and I believe
it drew a rebuke from officials of Taiwan.
What is your understanding--I would just like for you to be
brief in your response. What was your understanding of the
question which essentially concerns our policy on Taiwan's
ultimate status? Mr. Feldman.
Ambassador Feldman. Mr. Chairman, despite what people may
have whispered in Beijing, the official policy of the United
States as contained in the three communiques is that we
acknowledge the Chinese position that there is but one China,
of which Taiwan is a part, but we make no statement of our own.
The word acknowledge is fancy diplomatic speech for, we
hear what you are saying.
The Chairman. Yes.
Ambassador Feldman. And we are not going to contradict you.
But we have never said anything of our own officially on the
status of Taiwan. We have always said, the status of Taiwan is
something for the two sides to work out and we will settle for
whatever they can work out, as long as it is done by peaceful
means, as long as it is acceptable to the people on Taiwan.
Well, when President Clinton said that we will not support
independence for Taiwan, he was ruling out one option.
The Chairman. That is right.
Ambassador Feldman. When he said that we will not support
Taiwan's membership in any international organization that
requires Statehood for membership, in effect he is saying, we
do not regard Taiwan as a State.
Well, the PRC jumped on this immediately and said, well, if
they cannot be independent, and if they are not a State, they
obviously must be a province of China, and since you have
recognized PRC as the sole legal Government of China, why, they
are a province of the PRC.
The Chairman. Very well. Now, Mr. Ford.
Mr. Ford. Mr. Chairman, I agree, it broke new ground. In
fact, I think the best way to see that is, to go back to the
Shanghai communique and the normalization agreement. In those
two documents, there were usually two clear sections: What the
Chinese said, and what the United States said. The words of the
three noes come from the Chinese position in the Shanghai
communique and the normalization agreement, not the U.S.
position.
We have at this point accepted what the Chinese said all
along, but it was the first time we had said it publicly.
Dr. Lampton. Mr. Chairman, I heard Stanley Roth earlier say
there was nothing new, and I do not think that is my
understanding exactly.
On the other hand, I do not think we ought to exaggerate
what is new, either. The way I would describe what the
difference is, is first the difference you pointed to--it was
said publicly, that is an important difference, by the
President. It was not new in the sense that at least two-thirds
of those three noes had been articulated by Secretary Albright
and Mr. Berger before, and certainly Henry Kissinger in those
private conversations in the 1970's that we made reference to
earlier today.
I would just conclude by saying that I think the President
was not very artful, if that is the correct way to put it, in
his third point, the point relating to international
organizations.
I think a more fulsome explication of that would have been
that the United States indeed supports Taiwan's participation
in global organizations.
The Chairman. Exactly.
Dr. Lampton. That is the key point, and I think rather than
emphasizing what we do not support, I would have been much
happier with articulating what we did support.
So I do not think it is tenable to say nothing is new, but
I would not go and say it represents this entire new path-
breaking policy.
Mr. Ford. Mr. Chairman, if I could take just 1 minute, part
of this gets to one of my basic fundamental problems, and that
is as several people have talked about, Harvey and others
today, that there was the initial Taiwan legislation sent to
the committee by the executive branch. Particularly on the
security side they didn't have anything, so that the TRA was
enacted by the Congress because they could not accept the
original version.
My interpretation as a person who has been involved for the
last 20 years on the committee and in the executive branch, is
that consistently the executive branch has attempted to
implement policies toward Taiwan based on the original
legislation, and that they have always been much close to that
interpretation of what we should do for Taiwan than the TRA.
In fact, I have in all of these arms sales discussions the
single most important issue in denying Taiwan weapons systems
has been how the PRC would react.
Ambassador Feldman. I want to echo that.
Mr. Ford. A distant second was protecting American
technology. The issue of what Taiwan needs, its legitimate
requirements, was almost irrelevant to the process of deciding
weapons sales.
Ambassador Feldman. And I would take it beyond just weapons
sales, Mr. Chairman. The problem has been for years and years,
ever since my days as a Taiwan specialist in the State
Department, is the tendency to cut American policy on the basis
of what we think is acceptable to the PRC, so you get into this
preemptive capitulation. We do not even ask them if it is
acceptable or not. We form our own conclusion about whether
they are going to tolerate it or not, and if we conclude that
they are not going to tolerate it, why, we do not do it.
The Chairman. Great. Now--I am sorry. Go right ahead.
Mr. Ford. Another specific example of this is found in the
report that the Defense Department presented to the Congress a
few weeks ago. It indicated that the best airplane that Taiwan
has is a Mirage 2000.
The only place in the world that an F-16 would not be
considered the best aircraft is Taiwan, and why? Because we
sold them the aircraft, but none of the weapons systems that
make it distinctively the most capable aircraft of its type in
the world, and it is a clear indication of what our policy has
been and what it has done to Taiwan's deterrence.
The Chairman. Thank you. I want you to hear my instructions
to the staff. I want you to begin where I asked a question, and
put that all down, and perhaps we should let them look at the
transcript, because I want this to be read by every Senator.
And gentlemen, thank you very much. Thank you so much. It
has been an interesting morning for me, and I just appreciate
you coming so very much. We are in recess.
[Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Responses of Assistant Secretary Roth to Questions Submitted by Senator
Helms
Question. As per our discussion at the hearing, could you please
submit for the record a comprehensive compilation of official documents
or public statements from any previous administration in which it is
stated that ``we don't support independence for Taiwan,'' as President
Clinton stated last summer?
Answer. The position that the U.S. does not support Taiwan
independence dates back at least to then National Security Advisor
Henry Kissinger's 1971 visit to China. In support of this, I offer
three examples of statements that are in the public domain:
First, during a July 9, 1971, meeting with Premier Zhou Enlai,
Kissinger stated that there would be no U.S. support for the Taiwan
independence movement.\1\ Second, during President Nixon's 1972 trip to
China, he reiterated the same commitment--``We have not and will not
support any Taiwan independence movement''--during a February 22
meeting with Premier Zhou.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Solomon, Richard H., U.S.-PRC Political Negotiations 1967-1984:
An Annotated Chronology, December 1985, (Declassified version), p. 14.
\2\ Memorandum of Conversation, Tuesday, February 22, 1972, 2:10
p.m.-6:00 p.m. (Declassified version), p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher publicly stated this
position at 1979 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the
Taiwan Relations Act. The following is the exchange with Senator Glenn:
Senator Glenn. We have said that Taiwan is part of China and
that the People's Republic of China is the sole legal
Government of China. Would we not be locked in with our own
statements in this agreement, then, toward influencing against
an independent Taiwan, even though it may not be the present,
existing Government of Taiwan?
Mr. Christopher. Yes. We have said that the governments on
both sides of the Taiwan Straits believe that there is only one
China. So as a matter of logic, we would find it inconsistent
to have the Taiwanese authorities declare independence. But I
was explaining my comment with respect to the provocative
nature, and I think it would be particularly provocative with
respect to the People's Republic of China.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.
Senate, 96th Congress, First Session on S. 245, Washington, 1979, p.
46.
All of these statements establish the consistent U.S. Government
policy since 1971 on Taiwan independence. This also is reflected in the
1982 U.S.-China Joint Communique concluded during the Reagan
Administration, which explicitly states that the United States will not
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
pursue ``a policy of `two Chinas' or `one China, one Taiwan.' ''
Question. Section 3(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act states that
``The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and
quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their
judgement of the needs of Taiwan.'' How does the Department of State
interpret this section of law?
Answer. The relevant sentence from section 3(b) of the Taiwan
Relations Act (``TRA'' or ``Act'') provides in its entirety that ``The
President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of
such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of
the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with the procedures established by
law.''
Although the TRA itself specifies no procedures for joint action by
the Congress and the President, the Executive Branch has for the past
20 years consistently maintained that section 3(b) was intended to
ensure Taiwan's continued eligibility to participate in programs under
laws and procedures generally applicable to arms transactions, and to
emphasize the coordinate responsibilities of the Congress and the
Executive Branch regarding the provision of defense articles and
services to Taiwan.
In addition to section 3(b), section 14 of the Act provides for
continuing oversight by the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and other concerned committees of the
implementation of the Act and United States policies concerning
security and cooperation in East Asia. This provision contemplates
continuing consultations between the Executive Branch and the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. However, no particular procedure for such
consultation is set forth; the Act leaves the specific nature of
interaction between the two branches to be determined in light of
practical circumstances of particular transactions.
We believe that this interpretation, together with the flexibility
that such an approach permits, has well served the security interests
of the United States, Taiwan, and the entire East Asian region.
Question. What is the rationale for State Department regulations
prohibiting military officers above the rank of colonel from traveling
to Taiwan on official business?
Answer. The U.S. maintains strong, but unofficial, relations with
Taiwan.
This Administration has worked to expand visits to Taiwan while
keeping within the parameters of our unofficial relationship with
Taiwan.
For example, following the 1994 policy review, the Administration
authorized travel by high-level officials, including cabinet officers,
from economic and technical agencies.
However, restrictions remained at the same level for visitors from
military or national security agencies at or above the position of
Deputy Assistant Secretary and at the rank of one-star flag officer or
above. This policy is based on the determination that visits of such
officials would be inconsistent with maintaining an unofficial
relationship.
______
Responses of Assistant Secretary Kramer to Questions Submitted by
Senator Helms
Question. One thing that seems abundantly clear from the recent
cross-strait report is that Taiwan needs missile defenses. It is also
abundantly clear that the notion of Taiwan acquiring missile defenses
severely displeases Beijing. How are we going to confront this dilemma?
Answer. U.S. provision of defense articles and services to Taiwan
is consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and the 1982 U.S.-PRC Joint
Communique. Taiwan's interest in theater missile defenses is driven by
China's past actions and its theater missile build-up opposite Taiwan.
Future Chinese actions can have an influence on U.S. decisions with
regard to the provision of theater missile defenses to Taiwan. We do
not preclude the possibility of Taiwan having access to theater missile
defenses. Our decisions on this will be guided by the same basic
factors that have shaped our decisions to date on provision of
defensive capabilities to Taiwan.
Question. A passage on page 23 of the report asserts that exclusive
reliance by Taiwan on active missile defenses and associated BM/C31
will be insufficient to offset China's missile advantage. What are the
ramifications of this statement? Does this mean Taiwan may need to
acquire a missile retaliatory capability?
Answer. Theater missile defense is designed to counter limited
attacks. The PLA is expected to deploy substantial numbers of ballistic
missiles which could overcome a limited theater missile defense
architecture. Assuming two interceptors are dedicated against each
incoming missile and a 100 percent probability of kill, a PATRIOT-
derived Modified Air Defense System (MADS) battalion theoretically
could halt a near simultaneous barrage of 48 short range ballistic
missiles (SRBMs) directed against targets within the battalion's area
of coverage.\1\ A 100 percent probability of kill, however, is not
likely. Larger SRBM salvos could ensure at least some ballistic
missiles reach their targets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ A MADS battalion will consist of three fire units, each with
eight launchers and four missile tubes per launcher. With each fire
unit loaded with 32 interceptors, a battalion would have a total of 96
ready-to-launch missiles. PATRIOT-derived systems generally use a two
shot firing doctrine. A MADS battalion may have enough missiles for at
least one reload.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are other options for responding to a ballistic missile
threat other than obtaining a retaliatory missile capability. Passive
defense, for example, can be particularly effective in reducing
vulnerabilities and minimizing effects of missile attacks. By examining
various combinations of theater missiles, warhead accuracy/effects,
numbers of available missiles, and the targeting process, the
likelihood and timing of an attack may be predicted and passive
measures selected for employment before, during, and after a theater
missile attack. In addition, political steps taken to reduce cross-
strait tensions could decrease the salience of the ballistic missile
threat.
Question. The 1982 Communique was premised on China's adherence to
a peaceful resolution of differences with Taiwan. Mr. Kramer, on page 2
of your written testimony, you state that the PRC adheres to the 1982
Communique. Can we truly say that, given that China fired missiles just
off the coast of Taiwan, and is now, according to your report to
Congress, deploying huge numbers of new missiles just across from
Taiwan?
Answer. PRC policy, as stated in the 1982 Communique, is pursuit of
peaceful means to resolve the long standing dispute between Taiwan and
the mainland. The PRC continues to assert its peaceful approach. The
PRC conducted missile exercises off the coast of Taiwan in July 1995
and March 1996. In response, the United States dispatched two aircraft
carrier battle groups to the region to reinforce U.S. interests in a
peaceful resolution. For now, the PRC appears committed to a cross-
strait dialogue that we hope will lead to a mutually acceptable
resolution. The most recent round of cross-strait talks took plaze in
October 1998 in Beijing. A follow-on session is slated for Fall 1999 in
Taipei. In addition, Taiwan investment on the mainland, currently
estimated at more than 20 billion U.S. dollars, is rising. Taiwan may
also lift restrictions on imports from the PRC.
Question. Why are American military officers above the rank of
colonel prohibited from going to Taiwan on official business? Could the
Department of Defense make use of being allowed to have higher-level
military interaction with Taiwan?
Answer. The Department of Defense's relationship with Taiwan is
unofficial in nature. U.S. policy has been effective in ensuring Taiwan
security for the last 20 years. Senior DoD officials interact with
their Taiwan military counterparts on a regular basis during unofficial
visits to the United States. The fundamental policy regarding high
level visits to Taiwan is promulgated in State Department guidelines on
relations with Taiwan. We maintain under review higher-level military
interaction with Taiwan.
Question. In the Pentagon report, we learn that China has a 65 to 4
advantage in submarines over Taiwan, including new advanced Russian
Kilo subs. Yet for years, we have refused to sell submarines to Taiwan.
Wouldn't additional submarines be useful to Taiwan, at a minimum for
anti-submarine warfare training purposes?
Answer. There are various means of performing anti-submarine
warfare missions. We take very seriously our responsibility under the
Taiwan Relations Act to provide for Taiwan's adequate defense,
including an ability to defend against undersea threats. We have
greatly assisted Taiwan in developing a modern, extensive anti-
submarine warfare capability using the latest sea and air platforms.
The U.S. has provided to Taiwan through sale of S-70C helicopters, and
the modernized S-2T ASW aircraft. We are continuing to examine Taiwan's
ASW requirements, to include the potential role of submarines.
Question. Could you please tell us your views regarding alleged
espionage conducted by China at the Army Research Laboratory at
Aberdeen Proving Ground. Specifically. I am concerned with allegations
that were made in 1995 that computers at the lab were used to compute
``ballistic tables'' for Chinese guns and missiles that were ultimately
fired at Taiwan. I am also concerned with allegations that China may
have acquired the (Sandia National Laboratory, Hyper-Velocity Impact)
CTH bomb code. Are you aware of these allegations? What are your views
on this?
Answer. We are actively looking into this matter and we will convey
an answer as soon as we have been able to review the issue in light of
the Committee's concerns.
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