[Senate Hearing 106-245]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-245
IRAN: LIMITS TO RAPPROCHEMENT
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 22, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
61-049 CC WASHINGTON : 1999
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Green, Dr. Jerrold D., director, Center for Middle East Public
Policy, RAND Corp., Santa Monica, CA........................... 12
Prepared statement of........................................ 15
Laingen, Hon. L. Bruce, president, American Academy of Diplomacy,
Washington, DC................................................. 3
Nafisi, Dr. Azar, visiting senior fellow, Johns Hopkins
University School of Advanced International Studies,
Washington, DC................................................. 6
(iii)
IRAN: LIMITS TO RAPPROCHEMENT
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THURSDAY, JULY 22, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Brownback and Torricelli.
Senator Brownback. The hearing will come to order. Thank
you all for joining us today.
I want to note before I go to my opening statement that we
have a memorial service going on for the two slain officers
that took place at the Capitol. So our thoughts and prayers are
with them and their families, and that may have some impact as
well on others, other members that attend this session perhaps
a little bit later.
I would like to welcome our panelists and everyone else
here today to discuss the recent events in Iran and the
implications for Iran's future and for the future of U.S.
policy toward Iran. This hearing was postponed twice. We were
originally planning to explore the progress President Khatemi
has made in moving Iran toward democracy and the rule of law.
In the meantime, Iranian students have answered this question
and sent a very clear signal that progress has been
disappointing, to say the least.
Yesterday commanders of the Revolutionary Guards reportedly
warned President Khatemi that they are running out of patience
at his moves toward political and social reform and blamed him
for encouraging the sentiments that exploded in last week's
pro-democracy demonstrations. The short-term outlook for more
democracy in Iran appears bleak at the moment.
The administration had originally agreed to testify at this
hearing, but since the events of the last 2 weeks the State
Department's position is that a policy of public silence is the
most prudent way to react. The fear is that any statement will
be read as confirmation of the hard-liners assertion that the
United States provoked the demonstrations.
We all know this is not the case. The recent uprisings were
the result of oppressive internal policies and dashed hopes for
more freedom which President Khatemi had promised. The
administration's decision to avoid this issue can only achieve
the very opposite of its weak intent. I cannot think of a
policy that is more likely to cause the Iranian public to
believe that the United States is a guilty partner in the
recent uprisings.
Rather than silence, the Iranian students need a
reaffirmation of the principles that this Nation believes in:
democracy, rule of law, and freedom of expression for all. The
United States should not be hesitant to speak up for the
principle of freedom of expression. It is very disappointing
that the administration could even hesitate on such an
important matter.
In fact, if one looks at the rhetoric of the hard-liners in
Iran, there is very little the United States is not accused of
doing repeatedly, even absent statements by the administration.
Hiding our heads in the sand and pretending that if we lay low
it will not happen is not keeping faith with those very ideals
that this Nation stands for. Timidity does not suit our ideals
well.
Also, even if one accepts the administration's argument,
which I do not, why are they suddenly worried about coming
forward to speak about Iran's foreign policy stance and U.S.
policy in response to that? The fact is that there is little
change in Iran's foreign policy and it is clear that Khatemi's
moderate agenda does not extend beyond Iran. Under Khatemi Iran
has continued its arms delivery to radical groups around the
world, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran continues to seek to
undermine the Middle East peace process, arrest innocent Jews
and charges them with spurious accusations of espionage, and
Iran has accelerated its missile program and will in a few
short years, at the latest, have an ICBM capable of carrying a
nuclear warhead.
Despite Mr. Khatemi's much-publicized message to the West
calling for a dialog between our two peoples, one cannot help
but note that the Iranian Government allows only a very small,
select group of Americans to visit Iran.
What with Khatemi's disappointing message to the students
that ``Deviations will be repressed with force and
determination'' and the ongoing arrest and threats of execution
on charges of which these students are clearly innocent, it
appears that the so-called moderation of Iran's policy is but
wishful thinking on the part of the West.
I look forward to hearing our panelists' views on this and
on U.S. policy toward Iran in general. Our witnesses today, we
have three witnesses and one panel: the Honorable Bruce
Laingen, president, American Academy of Diplomacy here in
Washington, DC; Dr. Azar Nafisi--and I think I probably
mispronounced that. Give me the correct pronunciation?
Dr. Nafisi. ``A-ZAR.''
Senator Brownback. ``A-ZAR''?
Dr. Nafisi. Yes, sir.
Senator Brownback. Is a visiting senior fellow at Johns
Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in
Washington, DC, and Dr. Jerrold Green, director, Center for
Middle East Public Policy at the RAND Corporation, Santa
Monica, CA.
I want to thank the panelists for being here with us today
on this very important and timely topic and one that we need to
have a good discussion about just what is taking place in Iran
and what the U.S. policy toward Iran should be in light of
these circumstances and what we have seen in recent history and
what we have seen of elections and failed promises from those
elections in Iran.
With that, I would like to turn to Mr. Laingen for his
statement to put forward to us in front of the committee. Thank
you for being here.
STATEMENT OF HON. L. BRUCE LAINGEN, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN ACADEMY
OF DIPLOMACY, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Laingen. Thank you, Senator. Thank you for
asking us. I applaud the fact that you are holding this
meeting.
For the record, let me state--and I want to make a general
statement and then I am quite prepared to respond to questions
later about the events most recently in Iran.
Senator Brownback. Good.
Ambassador Laingen. For the record, I served twice in Iran
in my 40-year career in the Foreign Service. I am not now in
government. I do not pretend to be that informed, if you will,
and I have not been back to Teheran since I left, now soon 18,
19 years ago. But I have not lost interest in the place.
I would make my position very clear up front about policy.
I favor the earliest possible dialog with that government in
Teheran. In fact, I deeply regret the fact that we have not had
contact, official contact, with that government, with that
people, for soon 20 years, a country of immense consequence for
us in that region.
Indeed, if it were possible I would favor immediate
resumption of diplomatic relations, granted the difficulty of
doing that. I have felt that way since January 20, 1981, from
the time I boarded that Algerian aircraft on the tarmac in
Teheran, not because I like that regime--I did not particularly
like it then, I did not, and I do not today--but because the
absence of contact in my view does not serve American
interests. I proceed from that point.
Indeed, it complicates our strategic interests throughout
the region, including those interests in the emerging central
Asian states and their oil future. Our current policy denies us
involvement with one of the largest emerging markets in the
Middle East. It simply postpones the time when we need to deal
directly with the Iranians about security issues in the Persian
Gulf. And our policy has left us with inadequate contacts over
these years with the future of Iran, that is its young people.
I simply cannot see that our sanctions-driven containment
policy has worked. A poor word in any event, ``containment.''
Iran is not easily contained. Our capacity to change its
behavior is limited. What may be beginning under Khatemi in my
view is a product of the internal contradictions of that regime
and not primarily or even largely because of outside effects.
To reiterate, I am no admirer of that regime. I do not like
it now, I did not then. I do not like theocracies. I have seen
them up close in Teheran. I returned, indeed, with a deep
appreciation, a profound appreciation, of my great good fortune
as an American to be living in a country with its traditions of
separation of church and state. But it is reality, what is
there today.
And I certainly do not appreciate its record in human
rights. You, sir, and others probably have read the recent
report of Amnesty International on the compilation of their
record in human rights in recent months and years, and it is
not attractive by any means.
But to reiterate, it is reality. I believe it is a
revolution here to stay in some fashion, although I am
convinced it must and will change with time into something more
compatible with Iran's own national traditions and Shi'a Islam.
I concede, Senator, I am a diplomat by training and
experience and an optimist by nature, so I am prejudiced for
those reasons toward dialog. But in all reality I see no other
way to deal with the concerns to which you referred, and they
are real, that we have vis-a-vis Iran except somehow finding a
way to sit down and talking to them directly, or indirectly if
necessary, through a third party if that were possible.
Their concerns are real, our concerns are real. I often in
my wilder moments wish that some Iranians and Americans could
go off somewhere like the Israelis and the Palestinians did, to
Oslo, and come up quietly with some way to begin, in the first
instance simply to begin talking about how we are going to talk
about these issues.
It is long since past time to be talking at each other--
that is what we have been doing--or past each other. But I am
also a realist. It is clear that we have got a problem in
talking when the other side is not open at the moment to
talking. The supreme leader, the Ayatollah Khamenei, is rigid
on that point. Khatemi is on record, as he was in the CNN
interview of now a year and a half ago, saying that Iran does
not need a relationship with the United States. I believe in
his mind he knows that they do.
Given that state of affairs, what to do? Well, to review
where we have been, we have lowered our rhetoric. Both sides to
some degree have done that, and in any effort to have a dialog
one has to at least begin with that. We have taken some steps,
as you know Senator, steps in the area of lifting sanctions
dealing with food imports and medical supplies.
There has been some easing on visas on our part, although I
think that is still very minimal, and certainly there has not
been much on their part. We have removed Iran from our list of
countries that facilitate the transit of illegal narcotics
across their borders. We have responded favorably, at least in
rhetoric, and I think the President has, to Khatemi's call for
people to people contact.
There was a time about 8 months ago, a year ago, I think,
when we got into a kind of pin-down diplomacy, reminiscent of
ping-pong diplomacy with China, when our wrestlers went to
Teheran and returned, and I was proud to have joined the
President in the Oval Office to welcome them back.
These things are a start. Beyond that, yes, we need to be
realistic. We are not likely to see much risk-taking there in
the period leading up to elections next February or March. I
concede full well that there is some danger in an embrace by
us, a publicly evident embrace by us of Khatemi or any other of
the reformers at this point. President Clinton expressed that
concern very eloquently, I thought, yesterday and very well
yesterday, and I think I would like to read into the record
what he went on to say:
I think that people everywhere, particularly younger
people, hope that they will be able to continue their
religious convictions and their personal opinions and
dreams in an atmosphere of greater freedom that will
allow them to be deeply loyal to their nation. I think
the Iranian people obviously love their country and are
proud of its history and have enormous potential.
The President has not failed to be on the record in recent
months in that sense.
Beyond all of that, I believe myself that the charges of
the risk of an embrace, granted that it is there, can be
overstated and we need to be not quite that reticent. We are
going to continue to hear the charges, no matter what we say or
do, from the hard-liners about involvement by the great satan.
But I believe that much, if not most, of informed public
opinion in Teheran and Iran is weary of that and has set it
aside.
Too much reticence in my view does not help us, because I
think it is a given, I view it as a given, that our interests
would be better served if the more moderate forces under
Khatemi were to continue to progress. So I believe we should
never fail to affirm our readiness for dialog. Secretary
Albright has made that clear. I would like to see us--again I
have to reiterate, I am not in government. I cannot be that
well informed, obviously.
I would like to see us take a little more seriously what
she said about looking for parallel steps that we can both take
leading to what she called a road map that might lead to a
better relationship. I think we need to keep in mind that the
President has authority, as I see it, to make further steps in
the area of sanctions that could be eased in that field and be
a signal.
There is the possibility, as I understand it, and I am not
that well informed, that in the area of spares for Boeing
aircraft in Iran, for example, there might be something that we
could do to move things along.
As all of us know, one of the places we do have official
contact with the Iranians and have had for 20 years is The
Hague Tribunal in the Netherlands, one of the more useful
products of the Algiers Accord that brought us hostages back to
freedom. There we have had official contact with Iranian legal
representatives dealing with past claims that have been very
large, but where progress has been made, and I would hope that
we might be able to find some way to expedite that continuing
process.
I do not underestimate the fact that your hearings today,
the fact that you are holding them, will make an important
statement back in Teheran. I would welcome more interest on the
part of the Congress. I think there has been much too little
expression of interest by the Congress, by representatives of
the American people, about Iran and our problems there, because
our interests are so large in that region and are so impacted
upon by the fact of Iran and our problems with that country.
The bottom line, Senator, on the public record should
always be clear--and we have Radio Free Europe, Radio Iran, to
help make that clear to the people of Iran--that the American
people look forward to the day when our two peoples can again
have a productive, reasonably cordial relationship with each
other, that we applaud President Khatemi's call for a dialog of
civilizations and are ready to respond; that as a Nation with
one and a half million roughly, more or less, Iranian-Americans
among us now who have chosen to make America their home, that
we welcome any and all movement toward greater freedoms in that
society under a rule of law and a civil society within that
Islamic revolution.
Thank you, Senator.
Senator Brownback. Thank you.
Dr. Nafisi, please. Thank you for joining us today.
STATEMENT OF AZAR NAFISI, PH.D., VISITING SENIOR FELLOW, JOHNS
HOPKINS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Nafisi. I would like to thank you for asking me to
testify today. It is a great privilege.
Senator Brownback. If you could, that microphone is pretty
directional, so you need to get----
Dr. Nafisi. Should I push it back or forward?
Senator Brownback. Pull it forward toward you.
Dr. Nafisi. Forward? Usually I have to push it back.
I would like to thank you for the privilege of being here
today to testify. I just also want to go on the record about my
own background. Sometimes I am mistakenly called an Iran
expert. I am an Iranian; I am not an Iran expert. Actually my
field of expertise, which I think my experiences in the past 18
years in Iran has shown to be one of the most subversive in
relation to an authoritarian regime, is English literature, and
that is what I do, not just for a living but for being alive.
I have been spending--after I finished my degree, I went
back to Iran in 1979 and in that capacity I have been teaching,
writing, and working as a woman for human rights of Iranian
women, as well as working very closely with the Iranian
students.
In 1980 when the government made the veil mandatory in
Iranian universities, I and three of my colleagues at the
faculty of English literature and languages--Persian literature
and languages, refused to wear the veil, refused to go to the
university, and were expelled, and this system of sort of
guerrilla warfare has continued until today, when I am sitting
here and have the privilege to testify about my people.
I would like to concentrate what I want to say today about
the situation in Iran today and what has happened during the
past 2 weeks. I would also like to take the student protests of
the past 2 weeks and the role various factions in Iran have
played in these protests as a microcosm of what is happening in
Iran.
So what I will do, I will pose certain questions and then
try to answer those questions, and at the end of the conclusion
then I will talk a little bit about what I think, at least, as
an Iranian, as a woman, and as an academic, but most important
as a person who does believe in certain universal values and in
democracy, what the United States could do which would be
helpful to the struggle of the Iranian people.
So the first question that I have been asked during the
past 2 weeks is: Who are these students? How representative are
they of the rest of the society? Sir, I would like to tell you
that these students are what the government a long time ago, 20
years ago, called children of revolution. It is now the
children of revolution that are questioning the basic tenets of
that revolution.
A few months ago one of the, Manoochehr Mohammadi, who
later on, actually about 2 or 3 days ago, was seen on the
Iranian TV--under torture he was brought to the Iranian TV to
testify that he came to the United States as a spy and that he
had meetings with different Zionists and imperialist agents in
order to work against his country.
Now, Manoochehr Mohammadi and another student rebel leader,
Tabarzadi, these are representative of what the student body in
Iran is today. Unlike what certain papers and op-eds have been
saying, they do not come from the more comfortable section of
the Iranian society. Seventy percent of the student body in
Iran is the government's share. They come from the families of
the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, the Islamic militia, and
families of the martyrs of the war with Iraq.
So the body of the students as represented by Mohammadi and
Tabarzadi, both of whom are in jail now, are people who either
come from families who belonged to the revolution, who were
faithful to the revolution--Tabarzadi's two brothers were
killed in the Iran-Iraq War--or they come from families who or
they themselves as young people, like Mohammadi when he was 13,
participated in the 1979 revolution against the Shah.
These students today have changed the name of their
organization from the Islamic Students Association to the
Democratic Students Association.
I will go into more detail into what they are all about.
These are the people who 20 years ago demonstrated so that I
would be wearing the veil, and now when they come to Washington
I would be one of the people they want to talk to. These are
the people who not only said ``Death to the Shah,'' but said
``Death to the nationalists,'' to the Prime Minister Mossadegh.
But now the Iranian Government is asking you to apologize for
the 1953 coup. In fact, the Iranian Government has always been
anti-Mossadegh, anti-nationalist, and one of the reasons for
the torture of these students in jails right now, as they said
to the radio here in Los Angeles, is the fact that they have
been using the slogans that are pro-nationalist and pro-
Mossadegh.
Now, what I want to say is that the change within the last
20 years has been very significant within the Iranian society,
and these changes come from within that society, because when
this revolution began my people went into the streets not
wanting to take away their rights, but wanting more rights.
They did not know what an Islamic republic meant, but their
main slogans were for more political participation and for more
social participation.
The contradictions we are confronted with now and the
contradictions that the students here represent today come from
using a religion and using it as an ideology and imposing it
upon a very vibrant and dynamic society. So this is the problem
that Iran is facing today.
Now, who are the allies of these students? How
representative are they? As I said, since they come from the
families of people who were supportive of the revolution and
since the demonstrations that started in Teheran spread to 17
other cities in Iran, you will see how all-embracing these
demonstrations were.
Not only that, but the way the Iranian citizens acted in
the streets in support of the students was very reminiscent of
the 1979 revolution. People were passing students ice water and
they were reprimanding the Revolutionary Guards and the
militia, telling them: Why are you killing your own brothers?
You should be ashamed of what you are doing.
Senator, if you know anything about a country like Iran you
would know that 25,000 people coming into the streets to oppose
the policies of the government are putting their lives on line,
so it is very difficult to bring those people into the streets.
But 100,000 people coming to the call of the government is
nothing. Even during the Shah's time, there would be bus loads
of people from government, from schools.
This time, Elaine Sholino in a report from Teheran also
talked about the fact that the militia were told to wear
civilian clothes and to participate in these demonstrations. So
100,000, when before they could bring a million people into the
streets, is nothing and it shows how disappointed and
disenchanted the Iranian people are with the state of their
affairs.
The students, their demands and their slogans, and I will
come to their slogans in a few minutes, reflect what the
majority of Iran's nascent civil society has been asking,
especially in the past 2 years. They were protesting very
peacefully against the banning of the moderate paper Salaam,
which by the way has been published for the past 10 years
without being banned.
They were also protesting against a very repressive press
law that was passed by the Iranian parliament. They were also
asking for the trial of the murderers of the nationalist and
secular leaders Daryush and Parvaneh Forouhar and three others
to be brought to justice. This is what their demands were.
In these demands, they were supported not just by secular
and nationalist forces. There was in fact support from people
filling the ranks of the clerics. The Grand Ayatollah
Montazeri, who is the highest ranking cleric in Iran, wrote a
two-page virulent attack on how the government acted in this
matter. Ayatollah Taheri of Esfahan did the same thing. There
is a great deal of unrest within the younger clerics.
During the past 2 years, those who have been victims of
this government, thanks to Mr. Khatemi, have been in fact
people who were from within the wombs of the Islamic
revolution. I will bring you two examples: Mohsen Kadivar, a
young, very popular cleric who is now in jail and on whose
behalf the students have also been protesting and
demonstrating, and Hojatoleslam Sayidzadeh, who protested
against the repressive laws against women.
You know that the laws against women--the rule of law that
Mr. Khatemi is talking about is no Magna Carta, sir. This is
the law which has changed the age of consent for girls from 18
to 8\1/2\ lunar years. So a girl of 8\1/2\ will be married, but
a woman who is 50 years old cannot be married for the first
time without the consent of her father.
This is the law that stones men and women for the crime of
adultery. This is the law that does not consider women as whole
human beings. Women are considered as half a man, so two women
witnesses will take the place of one man. So these are the laws
that we are talking about when we are talking about the rule of
law.
Above all, this is the law that has the supreme leader,
religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as the sole person
who can say yea or nay to anything that goes on in that country
today.
Now, what I want to say then is that the important thing is
not that people like me, who were never enchanted by the
revolution, are now today disenchanted. Today people who came
from the heart of the revolution, who were in fact the
instruments in creating this revolution, are now disenchanted,
and that is why the government feels such a threat.
What are the people who attacked the students? I would not
go into that, sir. You yourself in your statement talked about
the vigilantes who, with the aid of the police, ransacked and
threw the students from the rooftops of their dormitories.
But I would also like to bring to your attention that in
the reports from the demonstrations one person who was badly
wounded, and that is why he was discovered, belonged to the
Hezbollah in Lebanon. So it is not just the vigilantes in Iran
that are sort of participating in these demonstrations.
The last--the next point, and then I will try to come to my
conclusion that I would like to make, is what do these people
want? I would like to draw your attention to the slogans that
these students have used. At the beginning of the revolution
the slogans were ``Death to America,'' ``Death to Zionism.''
Now their slogans are ``Death to Despotism, Long Live
Liberty.''
They have specific targets as despots. Nobody in Iran in
their right or wrong mind would dare come into the streets and
say: We do not want the Islamic republic. They did not say
that, sir. But let us see what they did say. Their slogans were
mainly targeting Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as the supreme leader,
the judiciary system, the Iranian parliament, the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards, and the Iranian militia. So who is left?
You do away with these, you still want the Islamic republic,
fine.
Were there any specific Islamic slogans, the way there used
to be before? No, there was not. As far as I can tell--I cannot
be sure about that--there was not one mention of even Ayatollah
Khomeini.
Who were the main favorable targets of these slogans? The
nationalist leaders and Prime Minister Mossadegh, plus the
press. Did they ask just for the freedom of Islamic prisoners?
No, they asked for the freedom of all political prisoners, the
freedom of all expression.
Those who say that the Iranian people do not want
democracy, they only want Islamic democracy, should define for
us what does ``Islamic democracy'' mean? Do you have Christian
and Judaic and Zoroastrian democracy? Do you want democracy and
then stone men and women on charges of prostitution? The
slogans of the Iranian students today, which has been supported
by the various progressive forces within Iran, tells you
exactly what kind of democracy Iranian people want, and it is
neither Western nor Islamic. It is democracy.
The last part is the role of the regime. I think the
Khamenei group and what is now called the hard-liners, their
position is much simpler and actually I think it is much more
understandable. Mr. Khamenei knows that any radical reform in
Iran would lead to his ouster and he has nowhere to go. So he
will use violence and he will consistently call the Jewish
prisoners, the Bahais, the women, the progressive clerics, and
now the students as agent provocateurs of Zionists and American
agents.
Those who talk about a policy of silence should know that
if America, if international organizations, keep silent, that
would not mean that you would not now be implicated. What it
would mean is that you are now complicit in the guilt that
these people are trying to attach to the students.
I would like to bring your attention to the fact that each
point in the case of Faraj Sarkouhi, the Iranian journalist, in
the case of Sayidi Sirjani, in most cases in Iran where
somebody's life was under threat, only the international
organizations, only because of the pressure from abroad, did
the regime do anything about it.
The students today have a web site. They have e-mail. They
are asking for help from all strata and sectors of American or
any other democratic society. So this silence is not to
anybody's advantage.
Mr. Khatemi's position is more problematic. He is a
paradox. On the one hand, in order to be elected he has to
believe in the basic tenets of the Islamic regime and he has
shown it, especially in the recent events. On the other hand,
his agenda is an agenda that would be shaking the very
foundations of that regime.
He should be judged according to what he does. As one of my
students says, he has created an Islamic republic of words,
which are democratic in words, but in an Islamic republic of
action we have not seen any change. So we should--we should
support Khatemi whenever he is doing right by the Iranian
people and we should not support him and condemn him whenever
he does not do so. So the good guy-bad guy formula does not
apply.
The last point, and this is the last point that I would
like to make, what you can do. This is the best, the golden
opportunity for you to create a people to people dialog. Up to
now the people to people dialog has been mainly the Iranian
people, the Iranian members of the Iranian regime or members of
Iranian civil society come here under the monitorship of the
Iranian regime.
You should reach out your voice. After all, Mr. Khatemi
correctly reached out to the America people. Why do you not? If
you want stability in Iran, if you want the three conditions
fulfilled, then you have to create a base, and the base should
be democratic.
The Iranian people are in the streets today and telling you
what they want. I think you should support them. This dialog
with the government is fine. It is not the American Government
who does not want dialog. It is the Iranian Government who is
not in a position to have dialog.
So I would like to ask you--the lives of Mr. Mohammadi, Mr.
Tabarzadi, and 1,400 people who have been arrested are in
jeopardy. I would like to ask your support. I would like to end
this by a message that the Iranian students--and this is the
legitimate council that supports Mr. Khatemi--sent to Mr.
Khatemi. I am quoting them in their message. They told him:
``The courageous Iranian people will judge your actions and
will discover whether your declarations concerning civil
society and so on are merely political or sincere.''
I think this is the way the Iranian people will judge who
their friends and who their enemies are. Thank you, sir.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Dr. Nafisi. That was an
excellent and very passionate statement, and I hope we can get
from you the names of these freedom fighters that are
imprisoned and whose lives are in peril, so that we could put
their names forward for the rest of the world to see.
Dr. Nafisi. I have already given their web site and also
the names that I got from the web site this morning, sir. I
would appreciate that.
[The information referred to follows:]
(Press Realease: 7/18/1999)
List of Individuals Arrested--(partial and known to us)
Followings are list of some of the people arrested in Tehran on or
about Tuesday July 13, 1999 and thereafter. This does not reflect the
complete list of arrested individuals. We are concerned that they may
be tortured and executed.
Please publicise these names in order to put international pressure
on Iranian authorities not to harm them.
These names are given to us by responsible people we know in
Tehran. Please send us the names of any individual arrested with the
source of information.
Latest Information: Mrs. Elaheh Amir Entezam was arrested one hour
ago. Abbas Amir Entezam reported that as many as 2000 arrested people
were brought to Evin Prison and they are being tortured.
The Entire Leadership of Tabarzadi Group, including Seyed Javad
Emami and Salamati, except Parvlz Safari, were arrested.
Information issued by Shoraye Montakhabe Daneshjooyane Motahassen
in Tehran Saturday, July 17, 1999 (Representative Council of Sit In
Students)
One Female Student named Haami-Far was killed. Many more youths
have been killed.
Other reports by Mohammad Milani from Daftare Tahkeim (Office of
Strength) stated that:
City of Esfahan--20 students arrested among them 5 female and
Mohammad Majidi was beaten severly and was unconsious for many hours.
City of Tabriz--Vigilante groups armed with sticks and guns
attacked students, 16 people were injured and they were taken to the
hospital which was reporting they have been kidnaped from the hospital
beds and their whereabouts is unknown.
Over 1400 Students and other Activists have been arrested.
Hezbe Melate Iran (Iran Nations Party, founded by Martyr Darioush
Forouhar)
1. Khosrow Saif (One of the Leaders and Spokeperson, 70 years old).
2. Bahram Namazi (One of the Leaders).
3. Safarifar (Kermanshah Leader).
4. Mir Abdolbaghi Kashani (Kermanshah).
5. Mehran Gorkani.
6. Farzin Mokhber.
7. Esmaeil Moftizadeh.
Jonbesh Democratic e Melli e Iran
1. Maryam Shansi (Maloos Radnia) (See Amnesty International
Communique of 7/14/1999.)
2. Several other members have escaped the wave of arrests and are
in hiding.
Andjomane Daneshjooyan va Daneshammokhtegan e Melli
1. Manouchehr Mohamadi.
2. Gholam-Reza Modjerinejad
Anjomane Daneshjooyan va Daneshamookhtegane Islami, (Islamic Society of
Students and Graduates, Tabarzadi Group, Tabarzadi was jailed
before)
1. Mohammad Reza Kasraii (along with many more).
Hezbe Marze Porgohar, (Glorious Fronteirs Party)
1. Roozbeh Farahanipour (Chief Editor of Vahoumen Mag).
2. Hossein Ghadyani.
3. Davoud Ahmadi Mounes (Armin) (Caricaturist of Zan Magazine, 17
year old).
4. Afshin Tajian.
5. Hossein Zahmatkash (Fotographer of Neshat Daily News).
6. Maryam Danaii Broomand (Author of Forgotten Letters of Hedayat).
7. Maryam Taadi (Reporter of Khordad Mag).
8. Farima Kolahi.
9. Anahita Najafi.
10. Forough Bahmanpour (8,9,10 all Journalist of Free Trade Zone
Magazine).
11. Mrs. Nasiri (Mother of Roozbeh Farahanipour) was arrested 24
hours after her son.
Unknown affiliation
1. Ms. Doctor Behieh Jilaani.--Based on information provided by
Majame Islami Iranian, (Societies of Islamic Iranians). Announcement of
13 July 99.
The following individuals are either killed, injured, jailed or
disappeared without any trace
1. Abbas Karami.
2. Ghorbanali faraji.
3. Morteza Hadadi.
4. Hamid Aghajani.
5. Mohammad Salary.
6. Mehdi Bazazadeh.
7. Amrollah Mir Ghasemi.
8. Davood Movahedi.
9. Alirreza Zamani.
10. Ahmad Darvish.
11. Mohammad Ghandi.
12. Baig Baler Saneei.
13. Alireza Sohrabian.
14. Zakeri.
15. Obaidi.
16. Naeimi.
Some of these arrests were carried out with violence at peoples
residence such as shooting at windows and walls of Reouzbeh's house.
Please utilize these names in your activities and send them to
various, international organizations.
We are concerned about the safety and lives of these and many other
arrested people. We demand immediate release of the students and
activists arrested.
long live liberty and the struggle for democracy in iran
The Student Movement Coordination Committe for Democracy in Iran--
www.iran-daneshjoo.org
[email protected]
+1 (972) 504-6864
Senator Brownback. Thank you.
Dr. Green, thank you very much for joining us. The floor is
yours.
STATEMENT OF JERROLD D. GREEN, PH.D., DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
MIDDLE EAST PUBLIC POLICY, RAND CORP., SANTA MONICA, CA
Dr. Green. Let me begin by saying I have written a
statement which I hope will be entered into the record.
Senator Brownback. Yes, it will.
Dr. Green. I do not want to go over what is in there, but
instead to raise a few other issues.
Second of all, I would like to thank you for devoting so
much of your precious time to discussing Iran, which is
enormously important. I am privileged and delighted to be here
to share my limited insights with you.
I am a political scientist. I began my study of Iran in the
1970's, wrote my Ph.D. dissertation on the Iranian revolution,
and did field work in Teheran during the revolution. I have
been back to Teheran twice since then. I have been involved in
assorted track two meetings with various Iranian officials, who
are indeed officials, monitored by Teheran, and who are limited
in terms of their ability to influence change, both
domestically and internationally.
One thing in which I remain interested is U.S. policy
toward Iran. Having witnessed a rather shameful episode in our
own history in terms of our ability to deal effectively with
events in Iran in 1978-79, I am keenly committed to trying to
think as systematically as I can about U.S.-Iran policy, the
importance of which seems evident.
I think it can be synthesized to several points. The first
is, what do we want in Iran? There are three areas in which we
have had significant disagreements with the Government in
Teheran. The first is the use of terrorism; the second is
rejection of the Arab-Israeli peace process; and the third is
Iran's attempt to develop WMD capability and, in particular, a
nuclear capability, specifically with assistance from Moscow
and others.
Although there has been some progress on some of these
divisions, there has also been backsliding. It is quite clear
that progress has been insufficient, although we tend to be
somewhat charitable about this insufficiency. this is because
of President Khatemi, the speech he made to the American people
on CNN, and an inchoate sense that he is a good guy with good
values with whom we can deal. None of this has been articulated
or has been fleshed out to my satisfaction.
The other issues, which are more recent, include the arrest
of 13 Jews in Shiraz on charges of espionage for Israel, which
have not been documented and are in my view highly
unpersuasive, and subsequent events that are occurring not only
in Teheran, but in Tabriz and elsewhere throughout Iran, as
described by my colleague Dr. Nafisi.
It is within this context that the U.S. needs to figure out
what is its policy, what are our strategic interests, what is
it we would like to see happen in Iran, and what outcome would
we like to see occur. This has not been articulated to my
satisfaction.
The second question we have not talked about today involves
how our Iran policy affects our broader regional interests.
Significantly, one of the forces that led to a U.S.-Iranian
rapprochement, limited as it may be, was in fact a Saudi-
Iranian rapprochement.
It is interesting to look at Iranian diplomacy and at its
foreign relations. Foreign Minister Kharrazi recently visited
Amman in Jordan. There has been an improvement in ties between
Iran and Lebanon, not only Hezbollah, but the government of
Lebanon itself. There was a very successful state visit to
Italy, and a failed state visit to France because President
Khatemi was unwilling to have himself photographed at a dinner
table littered with wine bottles and the French, being as
devoted as they are to wine, were unwilling not to serve wine
and therefore the visit was canceled.
Germany also canceled a state visit, because of the arrest
of the Jewish prisoners in Shiraz.
Senator Brownback. I thought you were going to say there
were beer bottles on the table in Germany.
Dr. Green. When I was writing my statement I was feeling
very eloquent, talking about a conflict between Islamic
fundamentalism and French oenophilia!
In any case, it is quite clear that there is a lot of
uncertainty and for us to conceptualize Iran in isolation from
our other regional and global interests is a serious mistake.
Israel is frequently invoked in a way that portrays the
Israelis as being somewhat more monolithic on the Iran issue
than they are. In fact, in Israel now, there is an interesting
debate going on about what Israel's posture should be vis-a-vis
Iran. There was an important dissenting piece written in one of
the main Israeli newspapers, by a professor in Jerusalem.
The Israelis themselves are trying to grapple with the Iran
issue, and the forces that led to these hearings have been
outstripped in my view by the arrest of the people in Shiraz
and other recent events in Iran. The question of rapprochement,
dicey to begin with, may appear to be even more uncertain now
because of these recent events.
Other regional issues which I think are important to talk
about include Afghanistan, in which the United States and Iran
for different reasons have problems with the Taliban as well as
Pakistan, with its nuclear test. The foreign minister of Iran
was in Islamabad within a week of the test talking about the
Islamic bomb, which, put differently was, you have nuclear
devices, we do not, what are the implications for us in Iran.
Iraq is another area to which I think we need to be attentive.
I am not arguing for U.S. policy coordination with Iran on
all these issues. More sufficient attention is needed however,
about how our position and policies toward Iran affect our
regional interests and even our global ones. A lot of time has
been spent trying to persuade the Russians to halt their
provision of WMD components to Iran without a great deal of
success.
My next question is whether we can in fact have any impact
on Iran or on events in Iran either through engagement or
through containment? These are the two bookend positions. One
argues that we engage the Iranians in the way in which the
Europeans did. The other is that we contain them, as was the
case with what used to be called dual containment.
Do either one of these really make a difference? Can we
really have an impact on Iran, either domestically or
regionally? Again, we could have a vigorous debate about
precisely this issue. The reality is that I am not certain
about the degree to which we can have an affect on Iran. Second
of all, I am not certain the degree to which we want to have an
affect on Iran, given our important strategic relations with a
number of other partners including Saudi Arabia, our NATO
allies, and others. It is really difficult to talk about Iran
in isolation from all of these factors.
The next point involves whether we have partners in Iran
with whom we can work? In other words, let us assume that we
articulate a policy toward Iran. Our policy toward Iran needs
an Iranian component. We need people with whom we can
collaborate, people with whom we can talk, people with whom we
need to run past our ideas, our expectations, and so forth.
Again, I am not certain that there are people over the long
haul with whom we can collaborate in Iran, certainly not
President Khatemi by himself.
It is with these issues that I am deeply concerned, as we
cannot have an Iran policy without Iran in it. The question is,
with whom do we deal vis-a-vis this Iran policy? I have been in
countless track two meetings with Iranian Government officials.
I always find them beneficial although I always wonder why the
meetings happen in Europe, how representative are the people
with whom I am meeting. I find them fascinating, I find them
important, but at the end of the day I am not certain that
these people have the ability to forge the kind of deal that we
would like.
Let me conclude. I think that this issue needs to be linked
to the question of what is the U.S. interest in Iran, what are
our strategic objectives, and how do we hope to accomplish
them? As simple as this formulation sounds, it has been
bedeviling us for 20 years. I saw it on the streets of Teheran,
I saw it in the American Embassy in Teheran during and after
the revolution. I have seen it elsewhere in the Middle East,
and I think until we get that right, the rest of our discussion
is just that. Discussion is interesting and informative, but I
am not certain that the absence of focus is taking us down the
road that we wish to take.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Green follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Jerrold D. Green
introduction
In recent times we have begun to see a gradual but subtle decline
in the acrimony that has characterized mutual perceptions of the United
States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. From the Iranian perspective,
the most undeniable sign of improvement began with President Mohammad
Khatami's address to the American people via a CNN interview where he
advocated a ``dialogue of civilizations.'' Other indicators have
included an assortment of Track II type meetings between Iranians and
Americans, sporting competition between the two countries, a modest
increase in U.S. tourism to Iran, opportunities for American students
to study in Iran, and a variety of other extremely limited
improvements. Far more significant have been comments by senior
American officials such as a speech delivered by Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright to the Asia Society last spring, and more recently,
comments made by President Clinton at a Holocaust Day memorial ceremony
at the White House. Other factors which have contributed to an
improvement include public statements by such well known Americans as
James Baker and Lee Hamilton, as well as a Foreign Affairs article by
Zbignew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft. The common theme linking these
pronouncements is a generalized recognition of the importance of Iran,
and the utility to the United States of gradually re-establishing some
sort of relationship with this key country. These efforts have been
aided by the fact that most U.S. allies have improved their relations
with Iran. The United Kingdom and Iran have agreed to re-establish
diplomatic ties at the highest level, reflecting British satisfaction
that official Iranian government support for the assassination of
Salman Rushdie has come to an end. Having said this, the bounty on
Rushdie's life by an Iranian bonyad (foundation) remains in place and
was even increased in value. In this apparent paradox, we find intra-
Iranian disagreement about ties with the West which remains a primary
impediment to greater U.S.-Iranian rapprochement. Finally, other
actions which have generally been interpreted positively in Tehran
include the unwillingness of the White House to enforce the Iran-Libyan
Sanctions Act (ILSA) on foreign oil companies dealing with Iran (the
French company Total being the company in question), a recent
suspension of the use of food and medicine as an economic weapon by the
United States which could clear the way for an American grain sale to
Iran, and a general lessening of tensions on both sides whose
significance is important but should at all costs not be exaggerated.
lingering problems
Although it appears that most Americans, official and otherwise,
seem to be persuaded by President Khatami's overture to the American
people, it must also be recognized that the three issues that have
traditionally divided the two countries, from an American perspective,
remain significant, even though the magnitude of their significance may
have lessened over time. The first of these is reliance by the Islamic
Republic on terrorism which clearly has diminished in recent years. The
next gap results from Iran's opposition to the American brokered Arab-
Israeli peace effort. For various reasons, this too seems to have
diminished in significance. In part, this diminution is a reflection of
a reported discussion between the Iranian leadership and Yasir Arafat
at the OIC meeting in Tehran in which Arafat was told by his Iranian
interlocutors that although the Islamic Republic might not favor an
agreement made between Arafat and the Israelis, that whatever agreement
Arafat chose to make would be accepted by Tehran. The diminished pace
of the Arab-Israeli peace process has made Iran's aversion to it
somewhat less significant, although the salience of this problem will
continue until Iran is willing to publicly and unconditionally accept
any Arab-Israeli peace arrangement deemed acceptable by Israel and the
Arab world. Having said this, a debate about Iran, not unlike that
being held in the United States, is also emerging in Israel with
knowledgeable Israelis trying to reassess Iran's regional role and its
implications for Israel in much the same way that Americans have
conducted parallel assessments of their own of Iran.
The final issue, and the one that remains of greatest significance,
is Iran's attempt to develop a weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
capability. Here, the particular concern of the U.S. is Iran's drive to
acquire nuclear weapons. From an Iranian perspective, acquisition of
these weapons can be understood as a reflection of Tehran's concern
about Iran's regional status and attempts by its neighbors to acquire
the same weapons. The recent nuclear test by Pakistan, efforts by
Saddam Hussein to acquire a nuclear capability which was slowed but
certainly not eliminated by an Israeli attack on its nuclear
facilities, the possibility of ``loose nukes'' floating around former
Soviet Central Asia, and Iran's inability to rearm itself due to a weak
economy and low oil prices, as well as the residual consequences of a
debilitating eight year war with Iraq, all conspire to make nuclear
weapons a comparatively cheap security alternative for the government
of the Islamic Republic. Despite this, the United States is unwilling
to sanction such acquisition and, indeed, Iran's nuclear program has
not only continued to divide the U.S. and Iran, but also has
contributed markedly to increased conflict between the United States
and Russia, which is clearly one of Iran's primary supporters. Thus, if
asked to choose the primary impediment to rapprochement with Iran from
a U.S. perspective, I would argue that the nuclear issue clearly reigns
supreme, although the peace process and terrorism issues could reassert
themselves depending upon conditions in Tehran.
Impediments to rapprochement exist not only in the United States,
but also in Iran as well. Despite modest improvements in mutual
perceptions, in Iran there remains significant distrust of the United
States, its methods, and its motives. This can be attributed to a
complex melange of factors including the Mossadeqh affair, U.S. support
for the Shah, the U.S. commitment to Israel, and a generalized belief
amongst many, certainly not all, Iranians, official and the man in the
street, that the United States government wishes Iran ill. Although
these negative perceptions have diminished among some in recent years,
amongst others they remain tremendously significant.
According to some Iranians, the United States can do no right. For
example, attempts by NATO to assist Kosovar Muslims are regarded as
laudable, except when such attempts have their origins in Washington.
In fact, some Iranians find themselves conflicted over this issue as
they believe that these beleaguered Muslims should be assisted, but not
by the United States. This contradiction is important and results from
systemic differences, cultural misunderstandings, and a legacy of
distrust which is difficult to erase. It is further exacerbated by the
fact that although President Khatami has shown himself to be a
sophisticated observer of the U.S. political scene, as well as of U.S.
intentions, he does not have unquestionable control of all components
of the Iranian political system. His opponents use his comparatively
moderate views of the West in general, and the United States in
particular, as a means to undermine him. Thus, periodic negative
comments by Khatami about the United States and its policies, although
they may or may not reflect his personal views, also should be
perceived as attempts to keep his critics at bay by his not appearing
to be overly pro-American. The culture of distrust towards the United
States in Iran is palpable and significant, yet at times contradictory
and ephemeral. It is difficult to pin it down with any specificity,
although it undoubtedly exists, and this distrust serves as a
significant road block to rapprochement between the two countries. This
culture is part of a broader uncertainty in Iran about the qualities
and character of the Islamic Republic itself, which asserts itself
periodically in peculiar and unanticipated ways. For example, it is
generally thought that President Khatami's recent trip to Italy, his
meeting with the Pope as part of his dialogue of civilizations effort,
and other activities related to this trip represent a diplomatic
triumph for Iran. At the same time however, a parallel trip to France
was canceled in large part because President Khatami could not allow
himself to be photographed at meetings or at dinner tables in which
wine bottles would be visible and spirits might be served by his
European hosts! France refused to relent and to abstain from serving
alcohol. Although this conflict between the Islamically mandated
abstemiousness of the Islamic Republic, and the oenophilia of France
seems almost comical, it is all too real and prevented an important
state visit from coming to pass. Such sensitivity, when applied to the
United States, is of even greater significance, and highlights an
insecurity and uncertainty amongst the stewards of the Islamic Republic
about what is desirable and acceptable for and in Iran, and what is
not.
conclusions
The challenge to both the U.S. and to Iran is for each to maintain
its core principles while, at the same time, enhancing its interests by
seeking further rapprochement with a country too important to be
ignored. The United States will not back down from its commitment to
Israel, to its democratic principles, and to other values held dear by
the American people. The Iranians for their part, will maintain their
commitment to the notion and the reality of an Islamic Republic,
despite their own uncertainty about what such a polity is meant to look
like or how it should comport itself internationally. Khatami's efforts
are serious and should be regarded as such. Excessive U.S. attraction
to Khatami will hurt him in the eyes of his competitors who eagerly
seek new pretexts for conflict with the U.S. and instruments to
undermine him. On the other hand, if we ignore Khatami's gestures, this
will make rapprochement from Tehran even more difficult. Thus, the
United States is presented with a significant challenge. Certainly,
whatever Washington does it will be criticized or misinterpreted by
some in Tehran. This is inevitable, yet nonetheless problematic, and,
thus makes the process of rapprochement even more difficult. One way to
transcend some of these divisions is to devote greater attention to
areas in which the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran
actually have issues in common. These range from the continuing threat
of Saddam Hussein, to concern over the excesses of the Taliban in
Afghanistan, in whom neither Washington nor Tehran has much confidence.
Other common issues exist, such as the problem of drug trafficking, on
which Iran has taken a hard line. Certainly the legacy of distrust
between these two countries cannot be erased. Nonetheless, it could be
muted somewhat in recognition of areas in which the two countries
actually share some interests and might even be attenuated by remote
collaboration, or at least, mutual understanding.
recent developments and new complications
Since this statement was initially written, two other factors have
emerged as potentially significant complications to any attempted
rapprochement between the United States and Iran. The first was the
arrest of 13 Jews in Shiraz on charges of espionage for Israel.
Although this arrest has been interpreted by many Khatami supporters as
an attempt by extremists to undermine President Khatami, the reality
remains that the 13 remain, at this writing, in custody. Without a
speedy and complete exoneration, there is a strong likelihood that many
in the U.S. will regard President Khatami as lacking the necessary
authority to promote any sort of rapprochement. This skepticism is not
restricted to the United States alone, but extends to a number of
Western European powers as well, many of whom have expressed in the
strongest possible terms their concern over the fate of the prisoners.
Even if these arrests are indeed an attempt by Khatami's opponents to
undermine him, their ability to do just this certainly injects a
significant note of uncertainty about his ability to rule. This
uncertainty has been heightened even further by another development
which is of extreme importance.
In recent days there have been significant clashes between students
at Tehran University, said to be supporters of President Khatami, and
those critical of the students and, of Khatami as well, who represent
key parts of the government beyond Khatami's control, most notably the
military and intelligence services. Although the conflict between the
groups appears to have been suppressed, at least for the moment, the
smoldering tensions between them remains. And facile explanations about
``pro-democratic forces'' in conflict with more authoritarian elements
fail, in my view, to capture the complexity of the political
factionalism within Iran. The United States is in a difficult
situation, as any official comments made by U.S. officials are likely
to be used by extremist elements against President Khatami. The recent
demonstration in Washington by emigre Iranian groups exacerbates this
problem further as these groups are attempting to exploit the conflict
in Tehran as a means to advance their own political agendas. In short,
there is no ideal position for the United States to adopt other than to
make it abundantly clear to all, that the evolution of domestic Iranian
politics is an area to which the United States is attentive, but in
which it has no actual involvement. Certainly there are those in Iran
who will not accept such a statement at face value even though, in my
view, it is accurate. But the current tensions in Iran, which are
unlikely to abate soon, further complicate possible rapprochement with
the United States and frustrate the efforts of those elements of the
Iranian state apparatus who may seek such an improvement.
______
[From the Washington Post, July 15, 1999]
Voices of Iran
(By Azar Nafisi)
To be taken by surprise by events in Iran has become almost
routine. The election victory of Mohammed Khatemi in May 1997 came as a
surprise. Now, with the student demonstrations during the past week,
Iran has once again surprised us with perhaps the biggest challenge to
the Islamic regime in the past 15 years.
The easiest way for us to explain the unexpected turn of events
would be to repeat the fashionable mantra that this is another instance
of the clash between the hard-liners and reformist President Khatemi.
A more apt description is that the events of the past few days
reflect the paradoxes and contradictions in Khatemi himself. He is on
the one hand part of the ruling elite and believes in the basic tenets
of the Islamic Republic. On the other hand, he is genuinely committed
to certain changes and reforms.
But it Seems impossible in the case of Iran to have ``virtual
theocracy.'' To the vast majority of Iranian citizens, ``reform'' means
something different from what it means to Irans rulers. This is clearly
understood by the hard-liners, who justifiably see true reform as their
own doom and the end for all practical purposes of the Islamic
Republic. The hard-liners have been harassing, arresting, torturing and
murdering for the past two years not just to oppose Khatemi. They have
committed these crimes mainly because they fear the growing forces
within Iranian civil society. The women, progressive clerics,
journalists and youths at the forefront of the struggles have demands
that are not identical with Khatemi's ideas of reform.
The past two years have witnessed an amazing flourishing of civil
society, an unprecedented critique of reactionary laws and the rule of
the supreme leader. At the same time, there have been continued human
rights violations, murders of secular and nationalist figures,
persecution of minorities, torture and detention of prominent clerics
and stonings and executions of ordinary citizens as well as activists.
No, it would be too simplistic to conclude that the hard-liners
have pursued these policies just to oppose the president. The main
target of the hard-liners has been the forces within Irans growing
civil society, forces that now act in the name of democracy rather than
that of Islam. These forces oppose reactionary laws against women and
religious minorities, and reject the idea of a Western ``cultural
invasion.'' When the protesting students chanted ``Long live liberty,
death to despotism'' and ``Liberty or death,''they were using the
voices and slogans that ushered in the 1906 Iranian Constitutional
Revolution.
The students' slogans for liberty and justice were not just general
terms. The students have given these words specific meaning through
their particular demands. The protests resounded against the main
organs of the Islamic regime: the supreme religious leader, the
judiciary, the security forces, the revolutionary guards and the
parliament. The students have demanded freedom for political prisoners
and freedom of the press. They have evoked as their heroes and ideals
not just Khatemi but also nationalist leaders Daryush and Parvaneh
Forouhar, murdered in 1998, and former prime minister Mohammed
Mossadegh, overthrown in 1953. These nationalists are no heroes of the
Islamic Republic; the Ayatollah Khomeini so hated Mossadegh that he
refused to tolerate having a street named after the prime minister
following the Islamic Revolution.
Everyone from the leader to the president has condemned the acts of
violence against the students and has promised justice and punishment
for the perpetrators of violence. But these pleas and promises have
been made before, in the aftermath of the murders of nationalist
leaders, the numerous cases of harassment of ordinary citizens at the
hands of vigilantes and, recently, the arrest of Jews as spies.
The unkept promises of the past are coming back to haunt Khatemi.
The students, disappointed that Khatemi has not been more active,
chanted, ``Khatemi, Khatemi, where are you?'' Surprisingly, it was
Khatemi who condemned the protesters' leaders as ``attacking the
foundations of the regime and of wanting to foment tensions and
disorders.'' He warned that ``deviations will be repressed with force
and determination.''
President Khatemi is not a cause but rather a symptom of change. He
represents the paradox of both belonging and remaining faithful to the
regime, and at the same time presenting an agenda that shakes its very
foundations. He is caught between two forces.
The standard by which we judge Khatemi, or any force in Iran,
should be the Iranian people's demands and aspirations, as articulated
by representatives of the growing civil society. Democratic forces
around the world cannot afford to be cynical about their own values:
They should support those values when they are being reasserted and
fought for in countries like Iran. When and if Khatemi encourages those
values through deeds as well as words, he should be wholeheartedly
supported. And when he attempts to block them or throw doubts upon
them, he should be criticized accordingly.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Dr. Green. I particularly
appreciate your comments about the importance of Iran relative
to the rest of the region, where we have such involvement in
strategic interests. You can look at Iraq and what is taking
place there. You can look at central Asia and Iran's impact and
influence that they are trying to build and grow in that
region. You can look at the Middle East peace process, where
the next 15 months may be a very critical time for it, and Iran
continues to fight with us in that area. And then the expansion
and support that Iran is expressing even in some places in
Africa. They are a key component of our foreign policy
concerns.
We welcome Senator Torricelli to the committee. Thank you
for joining us. I had had an opening statement earlier. If you
would care to make a statement now, or we can go to questions.
Senator Torricelli. I prefer to ask some questions, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Brownback. If we could, I would like to look at the
students and at the protesters first, because that is the item
that is first and foremost on the news. Are you in some regular
contact with students, Dr. Nafisi?
Dr. Nafisi. Yes, sir.
Senator Brownback. Again, you can get that microphone down,
if you will.
Dr. Nafisi. Yes, I am in regular contact with them, through
e-mail and faxes and phone calls. Actually, I had just a fax
from them last night.
Senator Brownback. What is the key plea that you get from
the students that you are in touch with during this process?
Dr. Nafisi. Right now, because of the extreme repression
and because the lives of so many are at stake, this is the main
thing, to create some sort of international support for them.
Senator Brownback. Of those who have been arrested and are
being threatened?
Dr. Nafisi. Yes, because a number of them have been
missing. Then the bodies of those who were killed have not been
given back to their families. So nobody knows exactly what is
happening.
In one report which I think I have given to you in my
statement, they said that the bodies of those who were wounded,
some of them were stolen from the hospitals and they do not
know where the missing are.
Senator Brownback. The students, do they give you any
estimate on the number that have been killed already?
Dr. Nafisi. They are not very sure because the government
has not given back any of the bodies. We know that one girl,
whose name is also on the list that I gave you, has been
definitely killed--they have been able to identify her--and one
member of the militia. These two they are sure of.
At the very beginning they gave the number as to 5, but
that was in the first 2 days when they entered the hostels. We
do not know as yet how many.
Senator Brownback. Do they talk to you about how many are
missing?
Dr. Nafisi. They said that----
Senator Brownback. Any estimate of that?
Dr. Nafisi. The last number was 1,400 who have been
arrested or missing. They also said that they have started
arresting members of their families. Mr. Amir Entezam, who was
the speaker for the Barzangon government, who has been in jail
now for 17 years, he was let out during the Khatemi era and
taken back again, his wife has also been arrested.
Four members of the Nationalist Party of Daryush Forouhar
and his wife--who were murdered--have also been arrested, and
their names are all given.
So they are trying to create this conspiracy theory where
the student leaders and the nationalists have contact with the
U.S. and Israel.
Senator Brownback. And the students seek for outside
international pressure to state these are students who are
being held for political reasons and their lives are in danger?
Dr. Nafisi. Yes. It is mainly a plea for--the pleas they
have made, of course, to the government has been for, first of
all, the resignation and punishment of the chief of police, who
is mainly responsible for these events, bringing to justice the
vigilantes who have been inciting these riots, release of those
arrested, release of the bodies of those murdered and
identification of the whereabouts of those who are missing,
plus the most urgent thing is the guy whom they brought to the
television and two of the student leaders because of their
lives being in danger.
Senator Brownback. Well, as you pointed out in your
testimony, these students are being heroic in putting their
lives on the line for simple principles of democracy, and we
should support them any way that we can. I would hope that as
you get us names or as we can put them forward that we can post
those names and write to, contact the government in Teheran,
and ask what is taking place to these students, and try to
build that international pressure for their liberation.
Dr. Nafisi. Sir, also, since then one other publication has
been shut down and the editor, Mr. Hajarian, has been arrested.
So there are a number of people. I will give you all the names.
The journalists--they gave out a communique saying the time
when the Iranian press could please the enemies of the Islamic
republic by publishing falsehoods has passed, that anyone who
publishes anything against the government will be treated
accordingly.
There is almost a martial law right now in Teheran.
Senator Brownback. And they fear that it will spread even
further?
Dr. Nafisi. I had a call from one of my students. I had
actually talked also to my family. They said that it is very
much--there are curfews in the streets. Of course, you know
that the government has given out orders to the Iranian people
to spy out, to tell them the whereabouts of anyone who has
participated in the riots. At nights there is curfew in the
streets of Teheran.
The phones are most probably bugged. But these students did
put a phone number to be contacted. They have also an e-mail.
This indicates that they feel the only way they can be safe
would be through international pressure. The government is also
concerned about its image and its relations with the West, so
it will hear your message definitely.
Senator Brownback. That is something that some of us here
maybe find a little bit of a stretch, is that the Iranian
Government is concerned about its international image. It has
not appeared to be.
Dr. Nafisi. At least a faction of the government, at least
Mr. Khatemi. You know, you would be damned if you do, you would
be damned if you do not.
One of the papers in Teheran, Neshat, recently said that
the government has accused those who were murdered by the
Iranian security as agents of Zionism and U.S. imperialism. It
has also accused the murderers of those people as agents of
U.S. imperialism and Zionism. This is the first case where both
the victims and the murderers are agents of the same forces.
You can tell how powerful you guys are, you know. It is a
shame you abdicated your title of the great satan.
Senator Brownback. Yes, I guess so.
But let us get those names out and published and pushed
for. You look back in hindsight on some of the great protests
that have taken place for freedom and liberty and, whether it
was in Tiananmen Square or here, clearly we as a Nation stand
for liberty and we will stand for it everywhere around the
world, and we want to stand for it as well with these students
and stand with them.
Dr. Green, there was an editorial yesterday in the Boston
Globe calling or asking, is President Khatemi Iran's Gorbachev?
I do not know if you had a chance to look at that editorial. I
guess this sort of notion has floated around in some circles.
Do you have a thought about that?
Dr. Green. Well, let us take the case of the Jews in
Shiraz, in which it is being argued by Khatemi's supporters
that the 13 in Shiraz were arrested by his opponents in order
to embarrass him. Even if this is the case, Khatemi's inability
to do anything about it raises significant questions about his
ability to rule, which is one of the concerns of the students
that Dr. Nafisi has been talking about, that in a sense his
good intentions are only as significant as his ability to
implement them.
I think that it is quite clear that being compared to
Gorbachev is a compliment and an insult simultaneously. There
are elements of both of those qualities which I think can be
attributed to Khatemi. He has not shown himself as forceful,
dynamic, or as effective as even those who are his most fervent
supporters. Khatemi is only as good as his authority, and his
authority is extremely limited.
Senator Brownback. Senator Torricellli.
Senator Torricelli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me ask these questions to anyone on the panel that
would like to respond. First off, the degree to which you
believe that these student actions are entirely of their own
volition? Is there any evidence that exile organizations are in
concert with them or provided any inspiration to them or worked
in concert with them?
Dr. Nafisi. Well, sir, definitely there will be different
exile organizations who would have claims. I would like to say
that especially Mujahedin-e-Khalq, who have been making claims,
are not a popular organization at the time being in Iran. They
do not have popular support, so that is one thing that I would
like to mention.
The ferment, what has been happening in Iran, basically
comes from within Iran. Now, obviously different groups outside
Iran will use it to their own advantage.
Senator Torricelli. That is a different question. But the
actual stimulation for this activity was from the students
themselves?
Dr. Nafisi. From within the students. This Mr. Mohammadi
who came abroad--he came when the dialog between people to
people was being talked about--he talked openly to all the
newspapers and he met with different groups. But it was not an
incitement. Already within Iran a lot of things were happening
before this.
Senator Torricelli. Do any of you believe that, if you were
to project out, which I recognize how difficult this is to do,
that this either leads to an increase in student activism and
larger demonstrations that are difficult to control or, given
the reaction of the government to this, forces an underground
political operation, either way threatening the regime?
Dr. Green. I think that this activity has not been
restricted exclusively to Teheran. It has been happening
elsewhere in the country. I certainly could see this growing in
a way that would, if not threatening the regime, would
certainly undermine its already extremely limited ability to
accomplish much of anything.
Senator Torricelli. I know I am asking you something that
is very difficult, to provide some fair amount of guesswork.
But more likely that this becomes in public demonstration and
open organization, despite the risks, or, given the regime's
reaction, forcing this underground, either an armed insurgency
or organization?
Dr. Green. I would say being driven underground, but it is
unclear what that is likely to bring.
Ambassador Laingen. Senator, may I comment on that point?
Senator Torricelli. Please.
Ambassador Laingen. Let me just say at the outset, Senator,
that I salute you as a former participant in A Presidential
Classroom for Young Americans. As a board member and former
chairman of the board, I take every opportunity that I have to
commend what you have done then and what you do today----
Senator Torricelli. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Laingen [continuing]. To support the work of A
Presidential Classroom for Young Americans.
I do not believe this affair is a threat to the regime. It
depends on what you mean by that. The regime can cope in the
short term, as you have seen on the streets, with the security
they have got and the help they have got from the vigilantes
and the Hazari Hezbollah and the Besijj. Yes, it can cope, so
in that sense I do not think it is a threat.
Others have pointed out that this is the beginning, the
beginning, as someone reported the other day, in the contest
leading up to the elections in February 2000, the parliamentary
elections, when both sides are going to be very active out
there.
I think, in response to another question either you or
Senator Brownback raised, whether there is evidence of outside
involvement in these demonstrations, no, not in their origin,
but when it went onto the streets briefly then I think there is
evidence that outside elements, from hooligans to possibly the
Mujahedin-e-Khalq, took advantage of that to stir things up a
little further.
Senator Torricelli. On the government side, does it appear
that the government has succeeded in infiltrating the
organizations, the student organizations, to compromise their
ability to continue to organize and operate?
Ambassador Laingen. I think the government has that
capacity. I cannot speak to whether it has or not.
Dr. Nafisi. Well, you know, the situation in Iran right now
is very different from before. The activities have been mainly
very open. I think the government does have an estimate of who
the leaders are. This is very different from the 1979
revolution in that underground activity the way the guerrilla
organizations could effectively do then is not effective now.
Almost the whole citizenry is involved.
You should remember that this is a government that has
made--my students were expelled because one of them was charged
with giggling, with laughter of the giggling kind. Another one
was charged with running up the stairs for her class because
she was late. Now, when you do that then you involve the whole
citizenry. The non-political people like myself become
involved.
So what the government is dealing with right now is these
people in the streets. The way the young people do, they do not
go into the streets and demonstrate. They let a little bit of
hair out. There are patrols in the streets with guns for me
showing my hair. So this is how the situation is.
I do not think--and the fact that they have the web site
right now and the fact that they are trying to appeal to the
government openly shows that as long as they can they will make
it open.
Senator Torricelli. Let me ask you a final thing before my
time expires. I had read that it actually had been acknowledged
that many of the 13 people of the Jewish faith who had been
arrested in Iran, acknowledged that they were not in fact
spies. Has that actually been said by people in authority?
Dr. Nafisi. By who?
Senator Torricelli. By people in authority.
Dr. Nafisi. No.
Senator Torricelli. There has been no--there has been no
presentment of charges and no acknowledgements of innocence or
guilt?
Dr. Green. Well, it is not clear what they are being
charged with, other than vague suggestions that they were
involved with the defense ministry and somehow were sending
information to Israel. But formal charges have not yet been
laid.
Senator Torricelli. Let me just say finally, too, my hope
would be that the administration would recognize that, given
events in the streets of Teheran, any easing of relations in my
judgment, any attempt at dialog at this point, would be greatly
misinterpreted and misunderstood. I know there are some in the
Congress who may be attempting to lift American trade sanctions
to allow the exportation and importation of different items. I
hope people recognize how damaging this would be, how it would
be misused and misinterpreted by the government in Teheran, and
how very much these students might feel abandoned if this
appeared to be an embrace of the regime at a time when they are
this repressive.
Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Laingen. Senator, I think I can speak for my
colleagues on the panel that we all recognize that danger and
that that is very clear in the context of the immediate events,
and not least given the sentiment that we have heard for so
long about the activity of the great satan behind the scenes.
Senator Torricelli. Yes, and I am not talking about the
long-term development of a relationship as the regime may
change or reform.
Ambassador Laingen. I know.
Senator Torricelli. But I am talking about at the moment I
would urge the administration and the Congress not to engage in
any miscalculation. The potential for being misunderstood and
abandoning these students is enormous.
Ambassador Laingen. I read into the record, Senator, before
you came in, the statement by the President yesterday.
President Clinton in his press conference had alluded to that
same point, but then went on to say that as an American
obviously, looking at those students, we share their concern
for freedom. To me, that is what we ought to be saying now,
carefully.
Senator Torricelli. Exactly.
Dr. Green. But I also think that we are analyzing events
which have only manifested themselves in the last 2 weeks, at
least in a vivid public fashion. I think to expect that the
government is going to fall, that the government is going to be
shaken----
Senator Torricelli. I understand that. It is always
difficult to reach any conclusions on potentially great moments
in history from the perspective of a few days. This could
become a footnote in the history of the Iranian revolution or
events could now be set in motion that are going to change the
course of Iranian history. It is impossible to know.
We simply have the responsibility not to interfere against
the possibility that this is a great event. It is not for us to
control, but we do have the responsibility not to become a
problem.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Laingen. I wanted to add to that, if I may,
Senator.
Senator Brownback. Please.
Ambassador Laingen. All of these events involving the last
few days are reminiscent to me, of course, of the events of
1979, 20 years ago, when students then in a new revolution took
to the streets, particularly with the seizure of the embassy in
November 1979, to redirect the course of that revolution into
the more radical direction that it has been on ever since.
As I write in an article in the Christian Science Monitor,
today, these students are again a kind of engine of change.
They are not challenging the revolution directly, but they do
want to redirect it, if you will, calling on Khatemi to be
responsive, to be showing that he means what he says about
greater freedoms within the rule of law.
I do not think that these students are a challenge to the
regime. I think they are a challenge to the hard-liners, yes.
But they are calling on Khatemi. They are, as I think Dr.
Khatemi said--excuse me, Dr. Nafisi said--these are children of
the revolution. They are indeed, and they are not challenging
it directly.
Dr. Nafisi. Sir, perhaps the safest--and I do not mean not
risk-taking, but the most principled--way to go about it would
be not to support individuals merely, but to support the
principles and ideas they stand for.
Senator Brownback. Indeed, they are our ideas and
principles, the slogans that you have put forward Dr. Nafisi.
Dr. Nafisi. Where Mr. Khatemi does act according to those,
he should be supported. Where not, he should not. It just
depends.
Senator Brownback. The slogans you putting forward, ``Death
to Despotism, Long Live Liberty,'' that is the lead slogan.
I am curious. What do you think led to the arrest of the 13
Jews that were arrested, and how would you assess the
administration's response?
Dr. Green. My impression is the fact that it was in Shiraz
outside, not in Teheran, is significant, in large part because
I do think it was an attempt by extremists to embarrass
Khatemi. Why they chose this particular cause celebre as
opposed to others is unclear to me, but there was a demonic
wisdom in making this particular selection, largely because it
really did paralyze certain foreign policy initiatives vis-a-
vis the Europeans and others, and particularly Germany.
But one thing I would also say, to go back to an issue we
were talking about about in relation to external involvement.
Everything that happens in Iran is a product of--I do not want
to say global forces. That sounds too dramatic. But it is not
self-contained. This is not Albania in the old days or North
Korea. Iran is an electronically wide open country, with
telephones and the Internet and so forth.
The Iranian revolution in 1978-79 was an information
revolution revolution. Khomeini was very effective in using the
tools of modern communication. This is magnified even further,
with tools that did not even exist then, like the fax machine
and the Internet and so forth. So that it is clear there is
some external involvement.
But the question is is it institutional or is it
individual. Do students at Stanford University with Iran
related web sites and home pages matter? Khatemi had a web site
in the U.S. during the election, even though Iranians in Iran
were not really able to access it. So there is clearly an
international dimension to this. It is not at all certain what
it means.
The second point is that although the regime's existence is
not threatened, but its already limited ability to do anything
is threatened. And if it is paralyzed, which in fact it may
well be, this could have dire consequences for Iran, because it
is just this paralysis that led the students out in the street
in the first place, also to broken promises, things that
Khatemi was sympathetic to, but that he could not deliver.
I think the issue is not is the government being toppled a
la 1978-79, but rather how efficacious is it going to be, given
its limited efficacy to date. There I think there really is a
risk of paralysis and inactivity.
Senator Brownback. Well, it seems as if Khatemi's words and
deeds just do not match up. I mean, he is able to put forth and
articulate a softer line, but we continue to see support for
Hezbollah, we continue to see a lack of freedoms for the people
within Iran, that there is just a mismatch.
I wonder if you would agree that, or if you think, that one
of the losers in this recent crisis in Iran is President
Khatemi?
Dr. Nafisi. Sir, and also in terms of the Jewish prisoners,
I just wanted to add to what Dr. Green and Ambassador Laingen
were saying. The Iranian Government in the past when it gets
into crisis, especially on the international level, does this
sort of thing. In response to the Germans, they arrested a
German businessman on the charge of adultery with an Iranian
woman and they charged him and they were going to execute him.
Then they negotiated behind the scenes with the German
Government for about a year and a half before they finally
retried him.
The best case in the case of the Jews, as in the case of
the Germans, is to be firm. Bahais would tell you about that,
that it was only international pressure on the regime which has
saved the lives of the few Bahais that have been saved.
Senator Brownback. Yes, Mr. Laingen.
Ambassador Laingen. Dr. Nafisi has referred to Khatemi as a
paradox. He is indeed that. She also referred to the way in
which he has constructed a democracy of words, alluding to what
you have said. It is not clear what he is saying, what he
means. I think it is very unclear, in terms of the context of
Iran, where he thinks he can take that.
Senator Brownback. You say he is very unclear?
Ambassador Laingen. I think it is unclear just what he is
talking about when he speaks of a rule of law and a civil
society. What does he mean by that? To read his speeches,
particularly those he has made in the West, that is in Italy in
that state visit he made, they are beautiful words. Read them:
pluralism, rule of law, democracy. But the rest of us should be
given the respect to ask, what do you mean by that? Is that
compatible within the kind of theocracy that he still
represents?
He is, after all, a member of the revolution, of Khomeini
origins. He is a cleric. He is of that regime. Khatemi in my
view is not the future, but he does symbolize a demand, a
sentiment, broadly in that society. That society is weary of
the revolution, at least weary of its strictures and its
limitations and its denials of what they seek. And this is a
complex, once Western-oriented society, and there are a lot of
them who are troubled by that kind of stricture.
He is not the future, but he does symbolize a different
direction that that revolution must take if it is to continue,
if it is to maintain--not to maintain, to gain the support of
the emerging young people of that society, evident in these
students. The young people in Iran are no different really;
they hear a lot and they see a lot and they want to be part of
the world out there.
And Khatemi I think recognizes more, certainly more than
Khamenei does, that somehow that revolution has got to change
in the direction of ensuring that it wins the allegiance, keeps
the allegiance, of young people. It risks failing that, I think
it risks failing that under Khatemi, although he may be much
more of a ``democrat'' than I conclude now. He sounds good, but
he remains--as Dr. Nafisi said, he speaks of a democracy of
words, and I do not know where that is going, and I am not sure
he does.
Senator Brownback. Let me ask you, Dr. Green, how would you
interpret Iran's efforts to build better relationships
externally? Egypt, Saudi Arabia, some of the Gulf States, and
some other places have been noted. How do you interpret that?
Dr. Green. I am much impressed by Iranian diplomacy. I
think Iran realized that it could not remain isolated. It was
being contained by the United States and it needed to find
strategic alternatives. I think that the opening up to Saudi
Arabia was a brilliant piece of diplomacy on their part. I was
very impressed by their ability to ignore a lot of their own
ideological concerns, which they do regularly, and to make a
deal with Saudi Arabia. Indeed the Saudi's and the UAE have
been in disagreement over Saudi's Iran policy, which the UAE
feels is a little bit too tolerant of Iran.
Khatemi's visit to Italy was a brilliant triumph. To have a
dialog of civilizations with the Pope, it does not get much
better than that. But the failure of the trip to France was
unbelievably foolish and difficult to understand, showing in
fact the limitations on Khatemi, just as my colleagues are
saying. That that trip did not happen really is something which
shows with great eloquence how limited he is.
But the establishing of a relationship with Lebanon, as
opposed to groups in Lebanon, Egypt, after a poisonous
relationship between Egypt and Iran--the Iranians have been
very effective in their international diplomacy and very
successful, and at times at our expense, given that U.S. policy
to Iran has been unlike the policy of any other state toward
Iran. We have been very, very isolated in our views of Iran,
which has made our international diplomatic situation somewhat
more difficult.
When the United Kingdom re-established diplomatic ties with
Iran at the highest level, despite Rushdie--the Iranians were
able to have it both ways with Rushdie, which is on the one
hand the bounty was increased, on the other hand the Government
in Teheran saying, we are not going to act on this because it
is not really us. When Britain agreed to this, in a sense that
was the last straw for the United States because we were the
last state to seek Iranian containment, and we were left very
much by ourselves.
Senator Brownback. Dr. Green, would you agree, though, that
even though they have had some excellent diplomatic triumphs,
that their actions internationally have not changed appreciably
over the last 5 years?
Dr. Green. I think that, again, they would like to have it
both ways so that one could argue both sides of it. They told
Yasser Arafat at the OIC meetings in Teheran, any deal you make
with Israel is fine with us, while at the same time issuing
exactly the kind of rhetoric that my colleagues have been
referring to. They would like to have it both ways. Khatemi is
trying to appeal to multiple constituencies simultaneously.
What we may see happening now is his failure to attract any of
them to a significant degree.
The WMD issue is the one that I am most concerned about.
That is the most important issue.
Senator Brownback. And they continue to pursue that----
Dr. Green. Absolutely.
Senator Brownback [continuing]. With aggressiveness?
Dr. Green. Oh, I think so.
Senator Brownback. That is all the reports that I see.
Dr. Green. They do.
Senator Brownback. They continue to support Hezbollah.
Dr. Green. Hezbollah I regard as a less significant issue,
in part because they have been trying to diversify their
relationship with the Lebanese Government and ultimately I
think Hezbollah in Lebanon is only as good as its ability to
make mischief. I am hoping that the Barak election and a lot of
the movement that you referred to earlier is going to give
Hezbollah fewer opportunities to exert itself.
Interestingly, Iranians are to Hezbollah what a lot of
other foreign forces have been to other groups in Lebanon. The
Iranian experience in Lebanon has been as frustrating for them
as our experience has been to us, the Israelis' has been to the
Israelis, and the French experience has been to the French. At
the end of the day, the Hezbollah will not play. They do not
want to turn Lebanon into the Islamic republic of Lebanon. They
are not all out studying Persian. They are Lebanese trying to
forge a Lebanese solution, and Hezbollah within Lebanon has
dual qualities as well. The way the Lebanese regard it is
somewhat different than the way in which we regard it.
So I think it is less of an issue. I believe the terrorism
and Israel issues could change tomorrow. The Iranians have
taken significant steps to clean up their act on those two
issues, not to complete satisfaction but there has been
improvement. It may not be enough, but it is better.
But I also think that the improvement could be ephemeral,
depending upon other contextual political conditions. Iran
could return to the terrorism game if it wanted, or to aversion
to the peace process if it wished.
The WMD issue, however, that has not abated. The problem
here is that this is not only a bilateral U.S.-Iran issue. It
is a bilateral U.S.-Russia issue, and that brings in NATO and a
whole variety of other factors, so that it makes it a
particularly contentious and difficult issue.
Senator Brownback. It strikes me that Iran's objectives
have not particularly changed, their sophistication has. Their
external objectives have not changed, but their sophistication
at moving so, and perhaps they take some of the edges off of
some places in their foreign policy efforts or in their efforts
to spread the revolution, but it has merely grown much more
sophisticated.
Dr. Green. I think I would disagree with you, only in that
I think that they have become more realistic about their
ability to export the revolution and they have become more
accustomed to failure. No where have they succeeded in creating
significant long-term mini-Iran type revolutionary scenarios.
In Bahrain, they failed. No one has really emulated the
Iranian revolution. So what you are hypothesizing, and I think
it is worth considering, is that although their tactics have
failed, their goals remain the same; they may be trying
different tactics, which is what you are suggesting, which is
possible.
Senator Brownback. And on a slower road, that it may not
happen in 5 years, but we will get there in 15.
Dr. Green. The revolution is now 20 years old. A lot of the
enthusiasm, a lot of the naivete, a lot of the excitement, a
lot of the freshness has paled. Indeed, when Iran got out of
the exporting revolution business and diminished its support
for terrorism--they did not completely eliminate it, but they
diminished it.
What you are suggesting--and it is quite possibly
accurate--is they are using different techniques to accomplish
the same things. I think that the revolution fatigue has also
limited their expectations about their ability to transplant
what was in fact a uniquely Iranian event, despite the Islamic
character of it, elsewhere; and that the Islamic world is as
diverse as is other portions of the world.
Lebanese Muslims are not simply Shi'a Muslims. They are
also Lebanese. And it is the Iranian part of it that does not
travel well, simply because there are differences. But you may
well be right. It is an important issue.
Senator Brownback. Anything else? Yes, Mr. Laingen?
Ambassador Laingen. It is a question, I think as you say,
of appreciation----
Senator Brownback. Could you get up close to that mike? I
am having a little trouble hearing you.
Ambassador Laingen. It is a question of appreciable change
or something else. There is no question today in my view that
Iran, Iran's leadership, particularly Khatemi, are concerned
about their image for a variety of reasons, including economic
problems of their economy--we have not talked about that--which
underlie much, undergird or underlie and affect much of the
actions of the government today.
Their change of image, their concern about image, is not
least in the context of Saudi Arabia. Khomeini on his deathbed
issued a last will and testament in which he warned his
revolutionary colleagues and the people of Iran about the
evils, the dangers of dealing with Saudi Arabia, that nation to
the south. Today what Iran is doing in terms of reaching out,
changing its image, is exemplified particularly vis-a-vis Saudi
Arabia, and of course there is an economic factor there with
the oil pricing issue. The low cost, low price on oil, recently
has been buoyed, not least by the degree to which Iran and
Saudi Arabia have been able to cooperate in that context.
In the area of perception, I think it is clear that the
Iranians have cleaned up their act a little bit in the field of
terrorism broadly. On the Arab-Israeli peace process, that very
critical factor I think in the degree to which the American
public sees any change in that regime, there has not been that
much change. Dr. Green has referred to what was supposedly the
assurance that Arafat got at one point. Since then, of course,
Khatemi himself, that symbol of supposed change, when he was in
Damascus recently received and talked with some of the most
hard-line leaders of the anti-Israeli position in the Middle
East there.
On weapons of mass destruction, there I think we should not
forget that the Iranians regard themselves as a major power in
that region, that the regime there today looks around and sees
its neighbors engaged in what we call weapons of mass
destruction or the pursuit of some of them--Pakistan and India
and the former Soviet Union, Russia, to the north, Iraq and its
activities in the past, Israel of course.
The view of the regime there today in terms of weapons of
mass destruction, in terms of military prowess, is no different
essentially from the viewpoint of the Shah of Iran, who wanted
to see Iran respected and recognized in time as the dominant
regional power, and that that should be accompanied by the kind
of military prowess that in his view, and in the view of some
of the leaders of the revolution today, feel must accompany
that claim.
Senator Brownback. Well, thank you all very much. It has
been a wonderful panel and a good discussion on an important
topic that we have not discussed near enough and will continue
to be with us as the U.S. Government.
The record will remain open for 3 days if you would care to
add additional comments or writings that you have had into that
record. I appreciate greatly your traveling and coming here and
sharing of your expertise.
Ambassador Laingen. Senator, I want to put on the record
before we disperse, the concern that Dr. Nafisi has registered
about the arrest of the wife of Amir Entezam in Teheran. That
is apparently happening in this context. Amir Entezam has
suffered for almost 20 years because of his involvement with
the United States in the past. He was the deputy prime minister
when I was there after the revolution, a man whom I continue to
respect enormously, who has suffered for now 20 years in and
out of prison, and I regret deeply, and I hope it is not true,
that his wife has now been arrested as well.
Senator Brownback. Well, I think we have to do much to
publicize these people who are in prison there, and advocate
for their freedom internationally and push for that. So that is
why I hope we can continue to get these names in and pursue
those and pursue that publicly.
Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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