[Senate Hearing 106-298]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-298
CRISIS IN PAKISTAN
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 14, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
61-870 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Inderfurth, Hon. Karl Frederick, Assistant Secretary of State for
South Asian Affairs, Department of State....................... 3
Prepared statement of........................................ 7
(iii)
CRISIS IN PAKISTAN
----------
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 2:09 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senator Brownback.
Senator Brownback. The hearing will come to order. Thank
you all for joining us today. I anticipate we will be joined
soon by Senator Wellstone and possibly some other members, but
in the interest of time, the appointed hour has arrived and we
will go ahead with the hearing.
Thank you all for joining us. Secretary Inderfurth, welcome
again to the committee. As we talked previously ahead of time,
it seems like you always come up during difficult times. So, I
guess I should say I am not so happy to see you because that
usually harbingers a difficult time we are having.
It was a disappointment to see the news previously, 2 days
ago, of the military takeover in Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif was the
democratically elected Prime Minister of Pakistan, and he has
been a good friend of the United States.
The problems we are experiencing today precede Pakistan's
nuclear detonation. They precede Nawaz Sharif's current
government and his previous one as well. They are, I believe,
in large part the result of an inconsistent and I believe a
flawed policy toward what was once one of our best friends in
South Asia.
You will, I am sure, be pleased to hear that I am persuaded
that both the administration and the Congress share the blame:
Congress for sanctioning Pakistan and curtailing our ability to
influence Islamabad; the administration for, I believe pursuing
a one-issue policy since the nuclear test a year and a half
ago.
Do not mistake what I am saying. The U.S. rightly strived
to have influence in an important part of the world. One of the
ways we can do that is by not falling into the trap of zero sum
politics on the South Asian subcontinent. What is good for
India is not bad for Pakistan and what is bad for Pakistan is
not good for India. Each nation in its own right deserves a
separate foreign policy. However--and this is a vital caveat--
when the U.S. treats the same problem in India and Pakistan
differently, we create problems for ourselves.
Neither nation should be in the nuclear business. Neither
nation should have detonated a nuclear device. And when they
did, each deserved the sanctions imposed on them by the
President. Looking back, however, I believe we made a mistake
in threatening and then sanctioning only Pakistan for its
development of a nuclear weapon. While I understand some of the
motivations behind the Pressler amendment, I am persuaded that
ultimately it had the effect of driving Pakistan to a greater
reliance on a nuclear deterrent. It also had the effect of
lessening our influence over the Pakistani military which,
whether we like it or not, is where the real power resides, in
Pakistan.
The Pakistan army, once a bastion of U.S.-trained officers
with secular pro-Western views, now relies on soldiers trained
in Islamist institutions. It should hardly come as a surprise
to us that the result is adventures such as the ill-considered
incursion over the line of control in Kashmir earlier this
year. Had we remained consistent in our engagement with the
Pakistani military, we could possibly be in a better position
than we are today.
The Pressler amendment is not the only culprit in the ``who
lost Pakistan'' debate. Recent administration policy has also
led us to where we are today. And here again let us face facts.
What looks like a good South Asian policy in Washington is not
necessarily good politics in Pakistan. With both carrot and
stick, this administration has tried to force both India and
Pakistan into signing the CTBT. This kind of single-mindedness
on our part, I have said time and again, is dangerously short-
sighted. This summer this administration used all of its powers
of suasion to force a Pakistani withdrawal back to the line of
control in Kashmir. While I agree that Pakistan's actions in
Kashmir have been dangerous and ill-considered, I also believe
a negotiated withdrawal would have benefited both India and
Pakistan without making Nawaz Sharif look like a U.S. puppet to
his own people.
Another fact: The United States has pressured Pakistan not
to do any further missile testing, and this is an excellent
policy. But was it imperative to beat the Sharif Government
into submission on this matter in light of India's continued
testing? I ask myself and I intend to ask you as well, how have
we furthered our goals in South Asia policy by positioning and
putting a weakened democratically elected government in
Pakistan in an even more difficult and weaker position?
And now that we are faced with this extra-constitutional
event--I guess that is diplo speak for a coup--what are we
going to do? Are we going to cutoff aid? Did that. Give them a
cold shoulder? Did that too.
We are left without too many options. Though we are
providing the President with a waiver on the Glenn amendments,
sanctions should not be waived under the current circumstances,
I do not believe. Indeed, section 508 of the 1999 Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act mandates a cutoff of aid in view
of the military coup. Yet, if we let Pakistan go now without
any sanctions relief, the United States will be left with no
leverage at all. We will have no policy tool capable of
providing any incentive for a military regime to bring back a
democratically elected civilian government.
Democracy must be restored in Pakistan. If the duly elected
government has lost all credibility, then a caretaker
government should be appointed. Long-term military control is
unacceptable.
Finally, I want it absolutely clear that I support the
administration's desire to promote stability in South Asia.
However, by making demands which I believe destabilize a
fragile democracy in Pakistan, we may well have set back our
goals by many years.
I look forward to hearing your comments, Secretary
Inderfurth, as to where we go forward from here.
I would just like to note to those in attendance and those
listening, this subcommittee, myself, Secretary Inderfurth have
worked a great deal of time and put a lot of effort into
providing the President with waiver authority toward sanction
in Pakistan and in India. Those are in the defense
appropriation bill that will be voted on later today by the
Senate. I intend to vote for that bill, and I continue to
believe that is the right policy for us to pursue.
I would hope that we could move forward, once that is done,
press the government in Pakistan to return to a constitutional
government, and then fully reengage with Pakistan on a broad
basis, on a broad set of issues that the administration would
be willing to engage with them on, economic, on military
training, so that we can build these relationships and in 5 or
10 years not look back and find ourselves in the same
predicament that we find ourselves in today. These are
important times for us as a country and certainly for the
Indian subcontinent. I think we need to be very careful in our
review and see where we went wrong in the past and try to
project into the future and say, how can we correct and not
repeat the same mistakes again.
Secretary Inderfurth, again, delighted to have you here in
the committee, and the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. KARL FREDERICK INDERFURTH, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Inderfurth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I may, I would
like to start off in a slightly unorthodox way to respond to
the last point that you made about broader engagement. This is
an area that I think you and I have discussed before and I
think that we are very much in agreement on. I would like to
say a word about the need for broader engagement.
As I said, I could not agree more with your view that what
we need is greater not less involvement with Pakistan. It is a
country where our national interests are engaged. Clearly the
impact of almost a decade of sanctions has restricted our level
of engagement, including valuable contacts with the Pakistani
military. For some time, we have wanted to establish a broader
relationship with Pakistan, one that is more sustainable for
the future. That is still our objective and we will pursue it
as soon as circumstances permit.
I also want to say that we are very pleased in this regard
that it appears the Senate will pass the DOD appropriations
bill and send it along to the President for signature. That
bill contains the comprehensive waiver authority we were
seeking with respect to the sanctions that were put into place
after the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan. I want to thank
you, Senator Brownback, for your leadership in this regard. We
look forward to working with you and members of the committee
on determining how best to use that waiver authority and the
appropriate timing. I thought that while that subject was at
hand, that I would want to make that brief statement.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, and I look forward to working
with you on that as well.
Mr. Inderfurth. Mr. Chairman, I do appreciate, as I said to
you before the hearing began, this opportunity to appear today.
I do regret that once again I am bringing bad news to you and
the committee. We have many issues in South Asia that warrant
our full attention, but none is more important today than the
political crisis in Pakistan that you asked me to address. I
look forward to discussing with you how we can fashion a U.S.
response which promotes a prompt restoration of democracy in
that country.
I would like to begin by reading the statement issued last
night by the White House from President Clinton. The President
said--and I quote--``The events in Pakistan this week represent
another setback to Pakistani democracy. Pakistan's interests
would be served by a prompt return to civilian rule and
restoration of the democratic process. I urge that Pakistan
move quickly in that direction. I am sending my Ambassador back
to Islamabad to underscore my view directly to the military
authorities and to hear their intentions. I will also be
consulting closely with all concerned nations about maintaining
peace and stability in South Asia.''
Mr. Chairman, let me now outline the facts as we know them,
with a caveat, that the situation remains fluid.
On Tuesday of this week, October 12, the Government of
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced the retirement of Chief
of Army Staff Musharraf, who was out of the country at the
time. Musharraf arrived in Pakistan from a visit to Sri Lanka
shortly after the announcement was made. Simultaneously,
military personnel under Musharraf's control placed the Prime
Minister and other civilian and military leaders under house
arrest. The armed forces closed the airports to civilian
traffic, took over the state-controlled broadcast media, and
interrupted some communications systems.
We listened closely to what General Musharraf had to say
two nights ago when he addressed the nation about the decision
and rationale for why the armed forces moved in to reestablish
order--those were his words--in Pakistan, and why Prime
Minister Sharif was removed from office. We also noted that
General Musharraf promised that a further policy statement
would be forthcoming shortly. We are still awaiting that
statement. Apparently he has been consulting with
constitutional experts, corps commanders, and prospective
government appointees about his next steps. When his statement
is made, we hope that General Musharraf will set forth clear
plans for the restoration of civilian government in Pakistan.
Mr. Chairman, that the military has deposed a
democratically elected government is clear. It is, however,
unclear whether General Musharraf intends to remain in
political control, even in the short term. While the Pakistani
army did shut down the parliament building today and our
charge, Michele Sison, was informed that the federal government
and four provincial governments had been dissolved, martial law
has not been imposed.
We understand that Prime Minister Sharif, his brother, the
Chief Minister of Punjab, Sabbaz Sharif, some cabinet members,
and General Ziauddin, head of the intelligence services, remain
under house arrest. Our embassy in Islamabad has not been able
to contact any of these individuals. We call upon the current
Pakistani authorities to assure their safety and well-being.
The situation in Pakistan itself remains calm. Public
reaction has been muted. Airports have been reopened. State-run
radio and television have resumed normal programming. The
financial markets remain closed on a banker's holiday.
I should also note that we have seen no reports of
disruption or threats to Pakistan's nuclear facilities or any
other installations.
Now, while Indian forces have gone on alert, this appears
to be only a precautionary measure. There does not appear to be
a heightening of tensions between India and Pakistan. The
official Indian reaction, as expressed in statements of Prime
Minister Vajpayee and others, has been cautious and low key.
Finally, we still have no reports of problems for Americans
in Pakistan. The U.S. Embassy notified American citizens of the
crisis and urged them to exercise caution, recommending in
particular that they limit unnecessary movement outside their
residences.
Mr. Chairman, the developments in Pakistan this week
represent another setback in that country's long struggle to
establish accountable and viable democratic institutions. In
the 11 years since 1988 when Benazir Bhutto came to power, no
elected prime minister has served a full 5-year term. Up to
this week's action by the military, Prime Minister Sharif had
served just over 2\1/2\ years of his 5-year term. Pakistan's
unfortunate history of interrupted democracy continues.
Mr. Chairman, the political crisis in Pakistan which
culminated in this week's events is a product of Pakistan's
history and recent developments. I do not need to remind you of
the two long periods of martial law in Pakistan. These two
periods served both to instill in the Pakistani military and
civilian political class the habit of military involvement in
politics and to inhibit the development of a stable,
democratic, constitutional system. Pakistan has yet to develop
a consensus about how to share responsibility among civil
institutions, nor has it forged a clear and accepted divide
between civilian and military responsibilities.
Now, recent developments did not occur in a vacuum. Many
Pakistanis viewed the current political and economic
environment as alarming and getting worse. For the past year,
Pakistan's economy has required IMF assistance to avert
collapse. Pressing needs in education and health care went
unmet in a budget devoted largely to debt service and the
military. Terrorism and sectarian violence was spreading.
Pakistanis were increasingly dissatisfied with the Sharif
Government because of these economic trends and also criticized
the government for taking actions that weakened the
institutions of civil society, including the judiciary, the
press, and non-governmental organizations.
With respect to foreign policy, February's euphoria, the
good will, at ``bus diplomacy''--and the historic summit
meeting in Lahore between Prime Ministers Sharif and Vajpayee--
had dissipated by the summer. The reason was Kargil, something
you referred to in your statement, the incursion into territory
on the Indian side of the line of control by forces from
Pakistan. Serious and deadly fighting resulted, ending only
when Prime Minister Sharif, in a meeting with President Clinton
at Blair House, made the wise and courageous decision to take
steps to encourage the intruders to withdraw.
Prime Minister Sharif's decision engendered strong
opposition at home. Some argued that it was a mistake to
withdraw from Kargil. We could not disagree more. It was the
right thing to do. The mistake was to launch the incursion in
the first place. Civilian and military leaders alike at the
highest level of government share responsibility for that grave
error which set back the prospect of reconciliation with India
which had seemed so promising at Lahore and also raised the
prospect of a larger war between two nuclear capable
adversaries.
Now, in the weeks prior to the military takeover, a stream
of opposition politicians had visited Washington and warned
that the political situation was approaching crisis
proportions. They said that Prime Minister Sharif had lost the
confidence of much of the electorate and that tensions between
civilian and military authorities were high. We were hearing
similar reports from our embassy in Islamabad.
In private, we told the opposition and government alike
that we opposed any extra-constitutional action against the
elected government. At the same time, we encouraged the
government to permit the opposition to demonstrate peacefully
and to express its views without hindrance and to respect the
freedom of the press. We also conveyed our views in public.
Just 2 weeks ago, it seemed that the crisis had been
averted when General Musharraf was made simultaneously chief of
army staff and chairman of the joint staff committee, and his
term extended until October 2001. Unexpectedly and for reasons
we do not know, Prime Minister Sharif on Tuesday decided to
remove Musharraf from both positions, precipitating military
action. Let me emphasize that our understanding of the motives
of the parties involved is imperfect. What we can say is that
today the elected Prime Minister and many members of his
government are in military detection. General Musharraf and the
military are in control. President Clinton, Secretary Albright,
and other U.S. officials have expressed both our deep regret at
this severe setback to democracy and our hope that they will
see and do their duty to restore Pakistan to civilian,
democratic, constitutional government as soon as possible. The
best response to an imperfect democracy is not to replace it
with an unelected government. The remedy is to take concrete
steps to strengthen democratic institutions.
Mr. Chairman, until we see a restoration of a civilian
democratic government in Pakistan, we have made it clear we
would not be in a position to carry on business as usual with
Pakistani authorities. In fact, as you know, section 508 of the
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act contains a prohibition
against a broad range of assistance for any country whose
democratically elected head of government is deposed by
military coup or decree. We are now in the process of making
the legal determination that such sanctions should be applied.
As a practical matter, most forms of assistance were already
prohibited for Pakistan under the Glenn amendment and other
statutory restrictions.
Mr. Chairman, as President Clinton referred in his
statement last night, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Bill Milam,
who has just completed urgent consultations here in Washington,
will arrive tomorrow in Islamabad. He will carry a message from
the U.S. Government containing our publicly stated expectation
that democracy and civilian government will be restored as
early as possible. He will seek to deliver this message to
General Musharraf immediately upon his arrival. He will also
make clear that we expect that Prime Minister Sharif, Chief
Minister Sharif, and other detainees will be treated properly.
Our view is that the sooner civilian democratic rule is
restored, the better. Better for the Pakistani people. Better
for Pakistan as a nation. Better for Pakistan's relations with
the international community.
Mr. Chairman, we and other members of the international
community are watching closely as the situation in Pakistan
continues to evolve. We are consulting with key states
regarding the situation. We have a great many important issues
to address with Pakistan, issues which can best be addressed by
a democratic government. These include contributing to the
development of stable, peaceful relations between Pakistan and
India; averting a nuclear arms race in South Asia; and
stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan and addressing
questions of terrorism, human rights, and narcotics.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me underscore one very important
point. Pakistan is important. It is important because it can
serve as an example of a progressive Islamic democracy, because
it is a link, both economic and political, between the Indian
Ocean and Central Asia, because it has significant human and
economic resources, and because it has historically been a
friend of the United States. It is important, therefore, for
the United States and other longtime friends of Pakistan to
express their concern, exert their influence, and take those
steps necessary and appropriate so that Pakistan can resume its
course toward stable, constitutional democracy as soon as
possible.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Inderfurth follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Karl F. Inderfurth
political crisis in pakistan
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I appreciate this
opportunity to appear before you today. We have many issues in South
Asia that warrant our full attention. But none is more important today
than the political crisis in Pakistan you have asked me to address. I
look forward to discussing with you how we can fashion a U.S. response
which promotes a prompt restoration of democracy in that country.
I would like to begin by reading the statement issued last night by
the White House from President Clinton: ``The events in Pakistan this
week represent another setback to Pakistani democracy. Pakistan's
interests would be served by a prompt return to civilian rule and
restoration of the democratic process. I urge that Pakistan move
quickly in that direction. I am sending my ambassador back to Islamabad
to underscore my view directly to the military authorities, and to hear
their intentions. I will also be consulting closely with all concerned
nations about maintaining peace and stability in South Asia.''
The Current Situation
Mr. Chairman let me now outline the facts as we know them, with a
caveat that the situation remains fluid, our information is imperfect,
and our understanding of intentions uncertain.
On Tuesday, October 12, the Government of Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif announced the retirement of Chief of Army Staff Musharraf, who
was out of the country at the time. Musharraf arrived in Pakistan from
a visit to Sri Lanka shortly after the announcement was made.
Simultaneously, military personnel under Musharraf's control placed the
Prime Minister and other civilian and military leaders under house
arrest. The armed forces closed the airports to civilian traffic, took
over the state controlled broadcast media and interrupted some
communications systems.
We listened closely to what General Musharraf had to say two nights
ago when he addressed the nation about the decision and rationale for
why the Armed Forces ``moved in'' to ``reestablish order'' in Pakistan,
and why Prime Minister Sharif was removed from office. We also noted
that General Musharraf promised that a further policy statement would
be forthcoming shortly. We are still awaiting that statement.
Apparently he has been consulting with constitutional experts, corps
commanders and prospective government appointees about his next steps.
When his statement is made, we hope that General Mushanaf will set
forth clear plans for the restoration of civilian government in
Pakistan.
Mr. Chairman, that the military has deposed a democratically
elected government is clear. It is, however, unclear whether General
Musharraf intends to remain in political control, even in the short
term. While the Pakistani Army did shut down the parliament building
today, and our Charge Michele Sison was informed that the federal
government and four provincial governments had been dissolved, martial
law has not been imposed.
We understand that Prime Minister Sharif, his brother, the Chief
Minister of Punjab Shabhaz Sharif, some Cabinet members, and General
Ziauddin, head of the intelligence services, remain under house arrest.
Our embassy in Islamabad has not been able to contact any of these
individuals. We call upon the current Pakistani authorities to assure
their safety and well-being.
The situation in Pakistan itself remains calm. Public reaction has
been muted. Airports have been reopened. State run radio and television
have resumed normal programming. The financial markets remain closed on
a ``banker's holiday.''
I should also note that we have seen no reports of disruption or
threats to Pakistan's nuclear facilities or any other installations.
While Indian forces have gone on alert, this appears to be only a
precautionary measure. There does not appear to be a heightening of
tensions between India and Pakistan. The official Indian reaction--as
expressed in statements of Prime Minister Vajpayee and others--has been
cautious and low key.
We still have no reports of problems for Americans in Pakistan. The
U.S. Embassy notified American citizens of the crisis and urged them to
exercise caution, recommending in particular that they limit
unnecessary movement outside their residences.
The Larger Context
Mr. Chairman, the developments in Pakistan this week represent
another setback in that country's long struggle to establish
accountable and viable democratic institutions. In the 11 years since
the Pakistan People's Party victory in 1988 brought Benazir Bhutto to
power, no elected prime minister has served a full five-year term. She
served only two years of that term. Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim
League was victorious in 1990 but he resigned three years later.
Benazir Bhutto was re-elected in 1993 and dismissed in 1996. Prime
Minister Sharif won re-election in 1997 and, up to this week's action
by the military, had served just over 2 years and eight months.
Pakistan's unfortunate history of interrupted democracy continues.
Mr. Chairman, the political crisis in Pakistan which culminated in
this week's events is a product of Pakistan's history and recent
developments. I do not need to remind you of the two long periods of
martial law in Pakistan. These two periods served both to instill in
the Pakistan military and civilian political class the habit of
military participation in politics and to inhibit the development of a
stable, democratic, constitutional system. Pakistan has yet to develop
a consensus about how to share responsibility among civil institutions,
nor has it forged a clear and accepted divide between civilian and
military responsibilities.
Recent developments did not occur in a vacuum. Many Pakistanis
viewed the current political and economic environment as alarming and
getting worse For the past year, Pakistan's economy has required IMF
assistance to avert collapse. Pressing needs in education and health
care went unmet in a budget devoted largely to debt service and
defense. Terrorism and sectarian violence were spreading. Pakistanis
were increasingly dissatisfied with the Sharif Government because of
these economic trends, and also criticized it for taking actions that
weakened the institutions of civil society including the judiciary, the
press, and non-governmental organizations.
With respect to foreign policy front, February's euphoria at ``bus
diplomacy''--and the historic summit meeting in Lahore between Prime
Ministers Sharif and Vajpayee--had dissipated by summer. The reason was
Kargil, the incursion into territory on the Indian side of the Line of
Control by forces from Pakistan. Serious and deadly fighting resulted,
ending only when Prime Minister Sharif, in a meeting with President
Clinton at Blair House, made the wise and courageous decision to take
steps to encourage the intruders to withdrawal.
Prime Minister Sharif's decision engendered strong opposition at
home. Some argued that it was a mistake to withdraw from Kargil. We
could not disagree more. It was the right thing to do. The mistake was
to launch the incursion in the first place. Civilian and military
leaders alike--at the highest levels of government--share
responsibility for that grave error, which set back the prospect of
reconciliation with India which had seemed so promising, and also
raised the prospect of a larger war between two nuclear capable
adversaries.
In the weeks prior to the military takeover, a stream of opposition
politicians had visited Washington and warned that the political
situation was approaching crisis proportions. They said that Prime
Minister Sharif had lost the confidence of much of the electorate and
that tensions between civilian and military authorities were high.
In private, we told the opposition and government alike that we
opposed any extra-constitutional action against the elected government.
At the same time, we encouraged the government to permit the opposition
to demonstrate peacefully and to express its views without hindrance.
We also conveyed our views in public.
Just two weeks ago, it seemed that the crisis had been averted when
General Musharraf was made simultaneously Chief of Army Staff and
Chairman of the Joint Staff Committee, and his term extended until
October 2001. Unexpectedly, and for reasons we do not know, Prime
Minister Sharif on Tuesday then decided to remove Musharraf from both
positions, precipitating military action. Let me emphasize that our
understanding of the motives of the parties involved is imperfect. What
we can say is that today the elected prime minister and many members of
his government are in military detention.
General Musharraf and the military are in control. President
Clinton, Secretary Albright and other U.S. officials have expressed
both our deep regret at this severe setback to democracy, and our hope
that they will see--and do--their duty to restore Pakistan to civilian,
democratic, constitutional government as soon as possible. The best
response to an imperfect democracy is not to replace it with an
unelected government. The remedy is to take concrete steps to
strengthen democratic institutions.
What We are Doing
Mr. Chairman, until we see a restoration of a civilian democratic
government in Pakistan, we have made it clear we would not be in a
position to carry on business as usual with Pakistani authorities. In
fact, as you know, Section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations
Act contains a prohibition against a broad range of assistance for a
country whose democratically elected head of government is deposed by
military coup or decree. We are now in the process of making the legal
determination that such sanctions should be applied. As a practical
matter, most forms of assistance were already prohibited for Pakistan
under the Glenn Amendment and other statutory restrictions.
As President Clinton referred to in his statement last night, U.S.
Ambassador to Pakistan, Bill Milam, who has just completed urgent
consultations in Washington, will arrive tomorrow in Islamabad. He will
carry a message from the United States Government containing our
publicly stated expectation that democracy and civilian government be
restored as early as possible. He will seek to deliver this message to
General Musharraf immediately upon his arrival. He will also make clear
that we expect that Prime Minister Sharif, Chief Minister Sharif, and
all other detainees will be treated properly.
Our view is that the sooner civilian democratic rule is restored,
the better. Better for the Pakistani people. Better for Pakistan as a
nation. Better for Pakistan's relations with the international
community.
Mr. Chairman, we and other members of the international community
are watching closely as the situation in Pakistan continues to evolve.
We are consulting with key states regarding the situation. We have a
great many important issues to address with Pakistan, issues which can
best be addressed by a democratic government. These include:
Contributing to the development of stable, peaceful
relations between Pakistan and India;
Averting a nuclear arms race in South Asia; and
Stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan and addressing the
questions of terrorism, human rights, and narcotics.
Pakistan is important. It is important because it can serve as an
example of a progressive Islamic democracy, because it is a link--both
economic and political--between the Indian Ocean and Central Asia,
because it has significant human and economic resources, and because it
has historically been a friend of the United States. It is important
therefore for the United States and other long-time friends of Pakistan
to express their concern, exert their influence, and take those steps
necessary and appropriate so that Pakistan can resume its course toward
stable, constitutional democracy as soon as possible.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Secretary
Inderfurth, for your comments.
I want to add my voice to yours and the administration that
we urge the military in Pakistan to keep safe Prime Minister
Sharif and the others that they have put under arrest, that
they must do that. I add my voice to yours with that.
Secretary Inderfurth, there is a legal term about a coup. I
believe under any normal definition, this is a coup that has
taken place in Pakistan.
Has this, under the legal determination of the State
Department, been declared a coup that has occurred in Pakistan?
Mr. Inderfurth. We agree with your assessment. Indeed, the
definition does meet that of section 508. As I said in my
testimony, we are preparing the formal legal determination of
that now.
Senator Brownback. As you stated as well, there is not a
whole lot left to throw at the situation as far as any sort of
sanctions or relationships, but the coup determination does
have a legal significance to that. And the State Department
will be filing that soon?
Mr. Inderfurth. Yes, we will.
Senator Brownback. Have you had any communications with
General Musharraf since the coup?
Mr. Inderfurth. We have not. Again, Ambassador Milam will
be arriving tomorrow in Islamabad, and a request has been made
for an appointment with General Musharraf so that he can
receive the message that we have prepared. But this will be the
first contact with him since the coup took place.
Senator Brownback. There have been assertions that the
administration knew the problems that were brewing between
General Musharraf and Nawaz Sharif, that these were taking
place. You had made a public statement not favoring a coup
attempt. What did the administration know ahead of this coup
that took place and when did you know it?
Mr. Inderfurth. Well, again, as my statement pointed out,
we had been hearing both in Islamabad, as well as when visitors
came to Washington, that for some time opposition was growing
to Prime Minister Sharif. In September, two visitors in
particular came to Washington, both Pakistani politicians,
former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, whom I met with, and
Imran Khan who ran for office, another noted Pakistani
politician. They had, along with other opposition parties,
formed the Grand Democratic Alliance, 19 parties. As Mr. Imran
Khan said to the Washington Post, when he was here, the
alliance has one agenda item, and that is the ouster of Nawaz
Sharif.
Now, when I spoke to former Prime Minister Bhutto, she made
it clear that this was a constitutional route that they were
traveling. They wanted to see the Prime Minister resign.
In Islamabad, he was also under increasing opposition from
Islamist groups that were opposed to the decision for the
withdrawal from Kargil. The military, we were told, was unhappy
with that decision. Some cited it as humiliation of the
military that they were very opposed to.
So, we were hearing all of these things. Because of that,
and indeed because of other visitors that came here, including
the Prime Minister's brother--Chief Minister Sabbaz Sharif--we
discussed the internal situation with him. It was very clear
that, if you will, corridor talk in Pakistan was how to get rid
of Prime Minister Sharif. And there were also demonstrations, I
might add, demonstrations in Karachi, in Lahore, Islamabad,
40,000 people, demonstrations on that order.
So, because we had heard and because of the history of
Pakistan of ousting constitutionally elected leaders, we both
privately and publicly made it clear that we would not support
and, indeed, would oppose extra-constitutional means to remove
the democratically elected head of state, but we also made it
clear that the government should allow peaceful protests,
legitimate dissent, freedom of the press. And there had been a
crackdown through detaining individuals before these
demonstrations took place. We were concerned about the
government not allowing peaceful protests and legitimate
protests. So, that was the message that we got out both
privately and publicly. So, there was a lot of discussion.
But again, it was the question of the civilian and the army
relationship which was the key to whether or not there would be
some move against the Prime Minister. On September 29, the
Chief of the Army Staff, General Musharraf, and Prime Minister
Sharif had seemed to patch up their differences. Indeed, some
of the newspaper accounts in Pakistan had headlines such as
this one saying, ``No Differences with Government, COAS,'' the
chief of the army staff. So, it did appear that there was a
move to reconcile differences, and then 2 weeks after that
appeared to be the case, we had the crisis.
Senator Brownback. Did you know during that 2-week time
period by intelligence sources or by other places that some
move was taking place, that Prime Minister Sharif was going to
be moving on the head of the military?
Mr. Inderfurth. No.
Senator Brownback. You did not know that?
Mr. Inderfurth. We did not.
Senator Brownback. He did not call or communicate that to
the administration.
Mr. Inderfurth. No. No, he did not.
Senator Brownback. And you did not have any warning about
that taking place through signs or the intelligence service
that that was coming?
Mr. Inderfurth. Actually we are going back through that now
to see if there were any telltale signs. There were certainly
not any indications as explicit as what you are suggesting. We
will look back and see whether or not there were any telltale
signs that, with hindsight, could have been more of an
indicator that the Prime Minister was about to make that move.
But again, the fact that the army chief of staff's tenure had
been reaffirmed through October 2001 and that he had been dual-
hatted as chairman of the joint chiefs, as well as chief of the
army staff, it appeared that, once again, things in this
difficult relationship had settled down. We did not expect it
to be permanently resolved, but we thought that at least for
the moment it had settled down.
Senator Brownback. Did you have any communications from the
military that if the Prime Minister moved on the military--and
let us move this back prior to the 2 weeks before it started to
settle down--that if the Prime Minister moved to remove the
head of the military, that they would respond with removing the
Prime Minister?
Mr. Inderfurth. I think that General Musharraf himself said
publicly that this would not be well received if there was an
attempt to see him removed. This was not an entirely ``behind
closed doors'' debate. Things were being said publicly,
appearing in the press. The Pakistani press is quite lively and
gets a lot of stories on this kind of thing. Again, there was
no indication that we had that a plan was in place to respond
in this fashion.
But again, it is the history that is repeating itself that
gives anyone dealing with Pakistan, as we do in the South Asia
Bureau, cause to look at that history and say, are we seeing
signs of its repeating itself? Again, there has been no
democratically elected head of state that has fulfilled his or
her term in office, and the army has been in control in
Pakistan for 25 of Pakistan's 52-year history.
Senator Brownback. For that very reason that you just
stated, Mr. Secretary, is one of the reasons why I think we
should be far more engaged with the Pakistani military. A
number of them used to be trained in the United States. The
figures I am told is that of the military leadership in
Pakistan, it used to be 50 percent of them were trained in the
United States, and a lot of those relationships then were built
back and forth, many of them in my State. Many of them were
trained in Leavenworth at the Command and General Staff College
and a number remembered well, good, bright students, military
people.
But after the Pressler amendment and the stopping of that
training and exchange back and forth, all of that dwindled off
to the point where I am told now that of the military
leadership, 10 percent or less has received training in the
United States. Again, those relationships are not there and
more of them have been trained in Islamic institutions.
I would ask your comments about that, but it is certainly
my view that in the future, as we look forward and try to learn
lessons from this past decade, that we would say we clearly
need to engage them in the United States and we need to have
them here and to talk about civilian control and to talk about
the proper role of the military and relationships and, as well,
have it such that our military leaders can easily contact them
on a personal basis and try to understand better what is going
on with a country that has been a key ally in a tough
situation. I would ask your response on that, whether we should
be building and getting more involved in building those
relationships with the Pakistani military.
Mr. Inderfurth. We could not agree more. The best vehicle
we have for that is the so-called IMET program, the
International Military Education and Training program. It had
been suspended since the Pressler amendment went into effect in
1990, as you said. We have lost touch with a generation of
Pakistani military leaders.
The predecessor to General Musharraf was General Karamat
who was a graduate of IMET. He is actually in the Leavenworth
Hall of Fame. He went through that program. He rose to the top
of the Pakistani military. He was removed by Prime Minister
Sharif prior to General Musharraf assuming that position, and
then Prime Minister Sharif tried to remove General Musharraf. I
think you see a pattern developing here that gave the military
some unease about its relations with the Sharif Government.
But we believe that IMET should be restored. Actually under
the authorities granted in your legislation last year, IMET was
restored for India and Pakistan following the nuclear tests.
Unfortunately, Pakistan was not able to take advantage of that
because of other provisions of law. They were behind in their
debt repayments, so they were not able to take advantage this
year of IMET.
But we would like to see that done. We believe that we need
to have relations with the Pakistani military, and for
precisely the reasons that you suggested, to have both a
personal rapport with and also to try to influence their
direction. It has in the past been a Western oriented military.
There is clearly now a greater degree of influence of some of
the Islamic parties and schooling, and to some degree Western
orientation may be coming into question. So, I think we do need
to resume, as much as we can, that kind of relationship.
Senator Brownback. My fear is we may have missed our
opportunity because of so much fomenting and turmoil that is
taking place in that region of the world. Whether or not they
will be willing to reengage with the United States--I hope they
will, and I am glad you share my view on this.
I want to take you to General Musharraf. Does the
administration expect that he will establish martial law? Do
you have any indication of what he may do in the near future?
Mr. Inderfurth. We do not have any indication. It is very
clear, though, that what he is hearing from us and, indeed,
other countries around the world is that martial law or a
military government would lead to certain consequences for
Pakistan, which I hope that he will not want to incur. Pakistan
is quite dependent upon international financial assistance
through the IMF. There is a tranche of IMF funding of $280
million that is now under consideration for Pakistan. The
Director of the IMF, Mr. Camdessus, said yesterday in Paris
that he was not certain whether the fund could offer assistance
to Pakistan after the military takeover.
That, combined with I would expect be a concern on his part
of international isolation for a military government for
martial law--I would hope these things would influence him to
move quickly to restore democracy, to see a civilian government
established, hopefully according to constitutional practices.
He has been in consultation apparently with constitutional
experts there.
So, we do not have any indication which direction he is
moving. He has taken longer than expected to make his
announcement. General Musharraf led us to believe with his
first announcement 2 nights ago that his next announcement
would be about what his plans were--that his intentions would
be known very soon. We hope that the fact that he has not
spoken is an indication that he is getting good advice and that
he is looking at ways to restore a civilian government very
quickly.
Senator Brownback. What are his options if he does not
establish martial law? What do you see as his options?
Mr. Inderfurth. If he does not establish?
Senator Brownback. Yes.
Mr. Inderfurth. There are a variety of ways that he could
see a civilian government established. I think in terms of
speculation, the one that is probably at the top of the list
right now is for him to turn power over to a civilian
government headed by technocrats, in other words, non-political
Pakistani leaders that could head a caretaker government for a
period of time, 6 months to a year, and then elections being
held. Now, we would want to see elections held much sooner than
that if that is the direction that he is going. We want to see,
as I said, elections held soon. We want to see a civilian
government. We want to see constitutional practices restored.
But again, all of this is speculation right now. We have
not been approached by anyone affiliated with General Musharraf
to sound out any ideas. We hope again that Ambassador Milam
will be able to meet with him and, as the President said, find
out his intentions.
Senator Brownback. I was just handed a note here that the
International Monetary Fund, which last year negotiated a $1.6
billion loan to Pakistan, announced an immediate cutoff of that
loan until democracy is restored.
Mr. Inderfurth. Well, again, that is what I was referring
to in terms of the statements made yesterday in Paris by the
Managing Director, Mr. Camdessus. What is up next in terms of
that $1.6 billion package is this $280 million third tranche
that has been held up since July, and it has been held up since
July because of Pakistan's lack of compliance with agreed
economic conditions. Now, that lack of compliance, combined
with events this week--I would expect that that third tranche
would be held up longer while they, and indeed while we, look
at our support for that.
Senator Brownback. How do you evaluate current threats of
broader violence, sectarian violence, in Pakistan? Do you think
these latest developments in Pakistan will affect this threat?
Mr. Inderfurth. Well, as I mentioned in my statement, there
has been an increase in sectarian violence. With respect to the
events this week, again the situation does appear to be calm.
This has not been an occasion where people have taken to the
streets in opposition to what has taken place or indeed in
celebration. It has been calm.
I think our reading at this stage is that there is no
reason to believe that during this waiting period that there
should be any further increase or outbreak of sectarian
violence or indeed, and perhaps more importantly, in terms of
our look at foreign relations, any increase in tension between
India and Pakistan. The new government of Prime Minister
Vajpayee, which has just been sworn in, as you know, has
adopted a very cautious, low-key approach to the situation. It
is watching it closely. It is taking certain precautionary
steps, but that would be normal under these circumstances.
Prime Minister Vajpayee has made it clear that he is ready,
willing, and able to return to a dialog with Pakistan on their
outstanding differences. We hope that there will be a
government in Islamabad that can respond to that offer as soon
as possible.
Senator Brownback. I want to take you to the relationship
with India, where we have a new leadership in Pakistan. General
Musharraf appears to have been responsible for the actions in
Kargil earlier this year. Do you draw anything out of that? Do
you have any intelligence to tell us whether or not he would,
because of that background and history, renew hostilities
toward India?
Mr. Inderfurth. I would certainly hope not. We agree with
your assessment that the Pakistani military, headed by General
Musharraf, was an active proponent of the Kargil incursion that
took place. It was approved, we also believe, at the highest
level of the civilian authorities, including Prime Minister
Sharif, and we do believe that it was a mistake.
A brief digression. You had asked whether or not you
thought it might be possible to have seen a negotiated
settlement for Kargil as opposed to the meeting that took place
at Blair House with President Clinton and Prime Minister
Sharif. We think that what was done on July 4 was the right
approach. Prime Minister Sharif, I think, realized that the
situation had grown quite dangerous with India. The Indian
military was, indeed, progressively retaking those positions
across the line of control, and the fighting did have the
potential for escalating either by calculation or
miscalculation.
Prime Minister Sharif got in touch with President Clinton
and said, I would like to see you. I would like to talk to you
about this. And the President made it clear that he would
expect the Pakistani Government to take steps immediately to
restore the line of control, to restore the sanctity of the
line of control, which would mean those forces withdrawing.
Prime Minister Sharif came here. They did meet throughout
the day on the 4th of July, and he did return and he saw that
decision taken. That brought this crisis to a close, which in
our view was very important. It saved lives and it also meant
that the possibility of it escalating was not there.
So, a negotiated settlement would have required the Indians
to sit down with the Pakistanis. That would have been the
negotiation. They were in no mood to negotiate what they saw as
not only an incursion by Pakistani supported forces, but also a
betrayal, in their words, of the spirit of the Lahore summit
where the two sides, two Prime Ministers, had agreed to resolve
all outstanding issues, including Kashmir, peacefully. And just
a few weeks later, Kargil occurred.
So, I do not believe that there was any room there for
negotiation. We had hoped there would be a decision to rectify
what we believe was a mistake and then get the two parties back
together. That is why the President said that with that
restoration of the line of control, he would work very hard and
he would have a personal interest in an intensification and
acceleration of their bilateral efforts to resolve their
outstanding differences. Unfortunately, now with these events
this week in Islamabad, we are unclear about when that
bilateral effort by the two countries can resume.
Senator Brownback. Let me ask you if the international
community presses hard again on Pakistan with what has taken
place in the military coup and our law kicks in, the section
508, with this, will we be forcing Pakistan into a closer
relationship with countries like Afghanistan, other ones that
have taken a lot of international condemnation, yet
domestically appear to be willing to take that? I wonder about
the effects of some of this, just as we look down the road. I
am not advocating one way or the other, but I would like to
hear your informed view of the likely effects of what that
would do to General Musharraf in his efforts in leading his
nation.
Mr. Inderfurth. Well, it is not our hope or intention to
see Pakistan further isolated. We want to, as I believe you do,
work with them to address these issues. We certainly do not
want to push them any closer to Afghanistan and the Taliban,
and indeed we want to work with them on Afghanistan to try to
address--and I mentioned that in my testimony. We have many
concerns in Afghanistan today, some that we have talked about
with you in this committee, including terrorism, including
human rights, including narcotics trafficking. All of these are
the spill-over effects of Afghanistan. We need Pakistan's help
on that. We do not need to see Pakistan walled off and
unreachable in terms of their engagement.
I think that it is very clear from what we are saying
here--and I am sure what will be reported in Islamabad--that
General Musharraf and his colleagues will recognize that
certain fundamental choices will need to be made about whether
or not there will be a return to democracy, whether or not
there will be a restoration of a civilian government, how that
will be accomplished.
I would rather hope that that will take place than start to
discuss all the dire consequences if it does not. They have
heard enough about U.S. sanctions. We have sanctioned them with
so many different pieces of legislation. Section 508 will
barely add to that, if at all. They proved in their pursuit of
a nuclear capability that that was more important to them than
getting out from under the Pressler sanctions in 1990. Let us
hope that we do not have to go down that road. We should know
that, I think, fairly soon.
Senator Brownback. I would hope too that we do not have to
go down that road. I am sitting here. I am very troubled as I
try to look two or three steps ahead in the chess game and
speculate what takes place or try to anticipate then how
somebody else then moves. There has been a lot of discussion
amongst people that I have met with and experts and others
talking about the blow-back effect from Afghanistan into
Pakistan. If that is truly happening and if the military has
grown more Islamist in its orientation and thinking, I truly
worry about the sort of consequences that could be set up by
further isolation. I know we share that concern. I want to give
voice to it.
I also want to say really to Pakistan we want to be rightly
related with them. We do not want to have a full set of
sanctions against this nation. We want to work closely with
them. It is not any of our desire whatsoever to press them into
a deeper dependency or working relationship, however, you might
put it, with a nation like Afghanistan and the Taliban. It
would have dire consequences on us, I would think, as well. You
would agree that it would have significant repercussions right
next door to its neighbor on India if that happened as well.
Would you agree with that?
Mr. Inderfurth. I would.
Senator Brownback. They are difficult things to
contemplate, and yet you can almost see the setup of various of
the pieces there, the potential, for those sort of things which
we had not thought even really much in the potential category.
The seeds actually exist for the possibility of those to happen
if we do not handle these types of situations with one of an
open hand and not so much a closed fist. So, while our own
rules and laws put into place a certain set of sanctions, I
hope our communications are one of encouragement in trying to
work with them to get back to a constitutionally established
government quickly and that we would be willing to engage with
them broadly in ways that would be very positive if we can get
through that period of time.
Mr. Inderfurth. Well, I think that that will be very much
our approach, and I think Ambassador Milam in his message will
approach it in that fashion. We are not going there with a
dictat. Pakistan has never, nor will it ever, respond to
dictats from the United States or any other country. We are
also not going there for the purpose of interfering in
Pakistan's internal affairs. That is something that we have
been charged with at various times, and that is not something
that we intend to do. We do believe that these issues are ones
that the Pakistanis themselves must address and resolve, but at
the same time, we do believe that issues of civil liberties, of
constitutional practices, of democracy are ones that we need to
speak out about and to urge that these things be followed.
There is no question that the direction of Pakistan in
recent years, despite the interruptions, has been toward
greater democracy, toward trying to find a way to express
itself through the ballot box, through elections, through civil
society, through the growth of non-governmental organizations.
But it is still a difficult process and there are still
setbacks, some of which, as I said earlier, have occurred not
just from opposition to government but by government itself.
So, we will certainly approach our task in the way that you
have suggested and we hope that we will have a favorable
response.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Secretary, one last question I would
like to ask you. One point that I had raised in my statement
was that by our disengagement with Pakistan, we have actually
made them more dependent on the nuclear capacity. I would like
your thoughts as to whether or not the U.S. could have been in
contribution actually to Pakistan's dependence on the nuclear
option by our failure to work with them, as we have in the
past, on conventional military forces, as we had previously but
that has been cutoff in recent years. Have we contributed to
their dependence on nuclear options?
Mr. Inderfurth. Well, the Pakistani officials that we meet
with, both those in government and those out of government,
have made the point for a very long time that the imposition of
the Pressler amendment, by cutting off our military supply
relationship, forced them to have a greater reliance on
pursuing the nuclear option. They say that the conventional
balance was so disrupted with India that it directed their
energies, even to a higher degree, to attaining and acquiring a
nuclear capability. This is very, very unfortunate.
And it is for that reason that we have been trying, as you
well know, over the past number of months with Deputy Secretary
Talbott in the lead, to have very in-depth discussions with
Pakistani as well as Indian officials on security and
nonproliferation concerns and what those concerns are from
their point of view and what can be done about them.
But it seems that every time we start getting closer to an
appreciation of their views, or closer to being granted new
authorities to waive sanctions--through the legislation that we
have discussed--or closer to some breakthrough in relations
between India and Pakistan, like the Lahore summit--every time
we get closer to some kind of better understanding and perhaps
better relationship, something like this occurs. So, we keep
going back to square one.
We recognize the views of Pakistani officials on this
issue, and we hope at some point that we will be able to find
some way to see these concerns addressed.
Senator Brownback. I hope we shall, and if nothing else, we
can learn from our mistakes in the past and not repeat them in
the future.
Secretary Inderfurth, again, thank you very much for coming
up, particularly on such notice and on a very important matter.
The record will remain open for 3 days if there are other
additions you would like to put into the record of if other
members want to put additions into the record.
With that, thank you. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]