[Senate Hearing 106-627]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-627
WEST NILE VIRUS
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FIELD HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
TO CONDUCT OVERSIGHT OF THE STATE AND FEDERAL RESPONSE TO THE 1999
OUTBREAK OF THE WEST NILE VIRUS IN CONNECTICUT AND NEW YORK
__________
DECEMBER 14, 1999--FAIRFIELD, CT
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
63-231 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
_______________________________________________________________________
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC
20402
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
one hundred sixth congress
JOHN H. CHAFEE, Rhode Island, Chairman
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia MAX BAUCUS, Montana
ROBERT SMITH, New Hampshire DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, New York
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming HARRY REID, Nevada
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri BOB GRAHAM, Florida
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
MICHAEL D. CRAPO, Idaho BARBARA BOXER, California
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah RON WYDEN, Oregon
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
Jimmie Powell, Staff Director
J. Thomas Sliter, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
DECEMBER 14, 1999--FAIRFIELD, CT
OPENING STATEMENT
Lieberman, Hon. Joseph I., U.S. Senator from the State of
Connecticut.................................................... 1
WITNESSES
Andreadis, Theadore, Department of Soil and Water, Connecticut
Agricultural Experiment Station................................ 8
Prepared statement........................................... 32
Fish, Durland, M.D., Associate Professor of Epidemiology, Yale
University School of Environment and Public Health............. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 31
McLean, Robert, Director, National Wildlife Health Center, U.S.
Geological Survey.............................................. 13
Prepared statement........................................... 45
Stahl, Jane, Deputy Commissioner, Connecticut Department of
Environmental Protection....................................... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 47
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL
Letters:
Benson, Krisann E., Fairfield, CT............................ 73
College of Agriculture and Natural Resources, University of
Connecticut,............................................... 52
Department of Public Health, State of Connecticut............ 51
Fairfield County Citizens Concerned About Pesticides (FCAP).. 61
Maranell, Donald R., First Selectman, Stonington, CT......... 53
New York Public Interest Research Group...................... 65
Prince, Stacy, Westport, CT.................................. 72
Report, Resmethrin, EXTOXNET..................................... 62
Resolution, Stamford, CT, City Council........................... 64
Statements:
Alderman, Nancy, President, Environment and Human Health, Inc 54
Baptist, Thomas R., National Audubon Society, Greenwich, CT.. 56
Boissevain, Andrea L., M.P.H., Health Risk Consultants,
Fairfield, CT.............................................. 55
Bolnick, Britt D. Pastor, Mohegan Lake, NY................... 76
Clark, Pamela, Fairfield County Citizens Concerned About
Pesticides (FCAP).......................................... 60
Diorio, Doreen, Staten Island, NY............................ 76
Eash, Connie, Cheshire, CT................................... 71
Epstein, Paul R., Center for Health and the Global
Environment................................................ 49
Fenley, Susan, New York, NY.................................. 75
James, E. Allen, Executive Director, RISE (Responsible
Industry for a Sound Environments, Washington, DC.......... 70
Kerr, Roger, Stamford, CT.................................... 70
Maranell, Donald R., First Selectman, Stonington, CT......... 53
New York Public Interest Research Group...................... 66
Ninivaggi, Dominick, Superintendent, Suffolk County Vector
Control, Yaphank, NY....................................... 69
Opp, William R., Director, Lee County Mosquito Control
District, Fort Myers, FL................................... 69
Pritchard, Lynn, Westport, CT................................ 74
Reidman, Sue, Ecological Health Organization (ECHO), Hebron,
CT......................................................... 59
Rupp, Henry R., North Brunswick, NJ.......................... 77
Santacroce, Lisa, Environmental Affairs Office, Connecticut
Audubon Society............................................ 57
Schulwolf, Marthe, Piermont, NY.............................. 75
Worden, Diane, The Nature Center for Environmental
Activities, Inc., Westport, CT............................. 58
WEST NILE VIRUS
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TUESDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Environment and Public Works,
Fairfield, Connecticut.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9 a.m. at the
Fairfield University School of Business, Fairfield,
Connecticut, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman [acting chairman of the
committee] presiding.
Present: Senator Lieberman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
Senator Lieberman. Thanks so much for joining us here today
at Fairfield University.
I particularly want to thank Father Kelly and the entire
Jesuit community here at Fairfield University and all our
friends here for welcoming us for this very--this great
institution, which is a great citizen of Fairfield and
Connecticut.
Let me now call to order this field hearing of the U.S.
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works on the subject
of the West Nile virus.
As all of us are aware, earlier this fall communities in
southwestern Connecticut and, in fact, throughout the New York
area, experienced an alarming outbreak of the West Nile virus,
a mosquito-borne virus never before found, as I understand it,
in the western hemisphere.
The emergency of the virus has had a major impact on nearby
communities, generating widespread concern about the immediate
health threat from the disease and also about the potential
health impacts of the pesticides that were used to respond to
the disease.
There was also, I know considerable frustration that
answers to some of the natural pressing questions that people
had about why the outbreak occurred and whether it was likely
to reemerge were lacking.
We know, as fact, that there were a group of people in New
York and its suburbs who were made ill, sickened by the
disease, and, in fact, I gather the number that is agreed on is
seven--seven people probably died as a result of the disease.
Connecticut did not experience, to the best of our
knowledge, and human cases of the virus this past fall;
however, the disease had a visible effect on wildlife in the
State, killing a number of crows and other birds.
It was found--that is, the virus--in mosquitos and dead
birds in the following towns in Connecticut: Darien, East
Haven, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, New Haven, Norwalk,
Orange, Reading, Stamford, Weston, Westport, and Woodbridge.
My purpose in convening today's hearing is to continue the
dialog and to try to engage some thoughtful responses from the
distinguished panel of experts that have been good enough to
come and be with us today.
Specifically, this morning the hearing is intended to
gather information and to help educate the public and the
Government about the West Nile virus, a kind of post-crisis
look at how we all performed, including the various
governmental agencies, and then to ask the natural question
that people have, including myself, which is: is the West Nile
virus likely to reoccur in the future? And what can we do to
prepare for and hopefully prevent, or at least limit, another
outbreak?
Now, to help us answer those questions, I am really pleased
to have these witnesses, who were closely involved in the State
and Federal response to the West Nile virus crisis.
Dr. Durland Fish of Yale University School of Environmental
and Public Health will provide us with some background about
the disease. He is also going to point out some areas, I think,
where more research and training is needed to better understand
and react to infectious diseases such as the West Nile virus.
Also, as I mentioned, with us is Dr. Ted Andreadis of the
Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Station, a great--if I may
say so--natural research for the State of Connecticut, let
alone the country. Dr. Andreadis was literally on the ground
this fall trapping mosquitos, testing them and the birds for
the presence of the virus. He is going to give us, I think, an
overview of the Experiment Station's efforts in response to the
West Nile virus outbreak.
Our third witness, Dr. Bob McLean, is director of the U.S.
Geological Survey's National Wildlife Health Center, and he
will describe the Center's research into the effects of the
virus on bird populations. Dr. McLean has previously held
positions with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, so he is really
uniquely positioned to address cooperative efforts among
experts in human health and animal health.
I want to particularly thank Dr. McLean for traveling from
Wisconsin to be with us today.
And, finally, Deputy Commissioner Jane Stahl of the
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection will, I
hope, describe the history of mosquito control in Connecticut,
give us an overview, and discuss the environmental impacts
associated with different approaches to mosquito control.
While I realize that we are unlikely to hear definitive
answers to some of the pressing questions that we have about
the source of the virus and the likelihood that it will
reappear in the spring, I am optimistic that this hearing can
provide an opportunity for all of us to learn what already has
been learned about the disease and to get an update on what
steps are being taken to gather more information about the
source of the virus and what we can do to avoid another
outbreak in the future.
As the witnesses present their testimony, of course, I am
also going to be interested in hearing at this distance,
although it is still close, but at least a couple of months
after the crisis, what they think worked well, particularly in
terms of the governmental response, and what did not, as local,
State, and Federal agencies coordinated their reaction to West
Nile virus.
To make the most efficient use of our time here this
morning, I am going to ask each of the witnesses to try to
limit his or her initial testimony to about 5 minutes. We have
brought from Washington one of these ominous time clocks with
lights. They are timed for 5 minutes. The yellow light will go
on when there is a minute left. If you feel you have really got
some important things to say after the red light goes on, you
know, I will not give you the hook, I assure you, but it is a
guide to the time.
The witnesses do have also, as I think you know, an
opportunity to submit broader written testimony, which is
included in the entirety of the printed record of this hearing
and will be reviewed by me and my staff, and I believe by
colleagues in the Senate. It is somewhat poignant for me to
point out that the previous chairman of the Senate Environment
and Public Works Committee, John Chafee, the late John Chafee
of Rhode Island, who was a great leader in environmental
protection and public health, passed away just several weeks
ago.
This was the last--his approving my holding this hearing
was the last contact that we had just prior to his death.
The record of this hearing will remain open, as is the
custom, for at least 1 week for written statements by the
witnesses and the public. Federal hearings generally are not--
we hear from expert witnesses, but if anybody in the public
does have a point of view, I really urge you to write it down,
submit it to us, and I will personally review it and I will
promise you that it will be part of the written record that the
Congress will review, as well.
Elise Campaign is my legislative assistant, and will sit
with me here at this table. You can see her or Cindy Lemick or
any of the others from my staff to submit testimony or find out
how you can do it in the next week or so.
With that, I am going to take a seat. I give the members of
the panel the choice of sitting or standing, as they wish, and
I will call first, with gratitude for your appearance here, on
Dr. Fish.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lieberman follows:]
Statement of Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, U.S. Senator from the State of
Connecticut
Ladies and gentlemen, welcome and thank you for joining us here
today at Fairfield University. I will now call to order this field
hearing of the United States Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works on the subject of the West Nile virus. All of us are aware that
earlier this fall the communities in southwestern Connecticut and
throughout the New York area experienced an alarming outbreak of the
West Nile virus, a mosquito-borne virus never before found in the
western hemisphere.
The emergence of the virus has had a major impact on nearby
communities, generating widespread concern over the immediate health
threat from the disease and about the health impacts of the pesticides
that were used to respond to the disease. There was also a frustration
that answers to the pressing questions of why the outbreak occurred and
whether reemergence is likely were lacking. We know that several dozen
people in New York City and its suburbs were sickened by the disease
and seven people died. Connecticut did not experience any human cases
of the virus; however, the disease had a visible impact on our
wildlife, killing a number of crows and other birds. The virus has been
found in mosquitoes and dead birds in the towns of Darien, East Haven,
Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, New Haven, Norwalk, Orange, Redding,
Stamford, Weston, Westport and Woodbridge.
My purpose in convening today's hearing is to continue the dialogue
and to provide thoughtful responses to these public concerns.
Specifically, the hearing is intended to: 1) to gather information and
to educate the public and the government about the West Nile virus; 2)
to take a look ``post-crisis'' and evaluate the performance of the
government in responding to the outbreak this fall; and 3) to ask
whether the West Nile virus is likely to reoccur in the future and what
we need to do to prepare for or to prevent another outbreak.
We're honored to have with us today a number of witnesses who were
closely involved in the state and Federal response to the West Nile
virus. Dr. Durland Fish of the Yale University School of Environment
and Public Health will provide us with some background about the
disease. He will also point out some areas where more research and
training is needed to better understand and react to infectious
diseases such as West Nile virus. Also with us is Dr. Ted Andreadis of
the Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Station, who was on the ground
this fall, trapping mosquitoes and testing mosquitoes and dead birds
for the presence of the virus. Dr. Andreadis will give us an overview
of the Experiment Station's efforts in response to the West Nile
outbreak.
Our third witness, Dr. Bob McLean, Director of the U.S. Geological
Survey's National Wildlife Health Center, will describe the Center's
research into the effects of the virus on bird populations. Dr. McLean
previously held positions with the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), so he
is uniquely positioned to address cooperative efforts among experts in
human health and animal health. I would like to thank Dr. McLean for
traveling from Wisconsin to be with us today.
And finally, Deputy Commissioner Jane Stahl of the Connecticut
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) will describe the history
of mosquito control in Connecticut and discuss the environmental
impacts associated with different approaches to mosquito control.
While I realize that we are unlikely to hear definitive answers to
our most pressing questions about the source of the virus and the
likelihood that it will reappear in the spring, I hope that this
hearing will provide an opportunity to hear what has been learned about
the disease and to get an update on what steps are being taken to learn
more about the source of the virus and to avoid another outbreak in the
future. As the witnesses present their testimony, I will also be
interested in hearing what worked well and what didn't as local, state,
and Federal agencies coordinated their response to the West Nile virus.
To make the most efficient use of our time here this morning, I
will ask each of the witnesses to limit his or her oral testimony to 5
minutes. The witnesses do have an opportunity to submit comprehensive
written testimony to be included in its entirety in the printed record
of this hearing. The record of this hearing will remain open for 1 week
for written statements by the witnesses and the public. Please see a
member of my staff if you are interested in submitting a statement. I
will personally review the submissions and see that they are included
appropriately.
STATEMENT OF DURLAND FISH, M.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF
EPIDEMIOLOGY, YALE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC
HEALTH
Dr. Fish. Since I have two microphones here, I think I will
sit here.
Good morning. I would like to thank Senator Lieberman and
Senator Smith for organizing this event, and, in particular,
for their foresight in recognizing that the threat of West Nile
virus and insect-borne diseases are as much of an environmental
issue as they are a public health issue.
The impact insect-borne diseases upon human health--which
in Connecticut includes eastern equine encephalitis, Lyme
disease, and now West Nile virus--have their origins in the
environment.
Mosquitoes, ticks, and other parasites that feed upon human
blood are products of the natural environment. The biologies
are inextricably linked to environmental conditions and
climatic events that regulate their abundance.
Viruses, bacteria, and other infectious agents are also
common elements of the natural environment and have an
important role in regulating populations in both plants and
animals. Such agents often play an essential role in the
balance of nature.
Humans become accidentally involved in the natural cycle of
environmental disease agents when they are exposed to pathogens
either directly, with contact with infectious wildlife, as with
rabies, or when they are bitten by a mosquito or tick that has
previously fed on an infected animal, as with West Nile virus
and Lyme disease.
Humans are innocent bystanders in these environmental
events, but the consequence of infection can be devastating,
and even fatal. Such is the situation we are now facing with
the threat of West Nile virus.
The West Nile virus has been known to cause epidemics
there, as well as in Europe, from migrating birds from Africa
who infect the local mosquito populations. Once established in
the local mosquitos, the virus can be transmitted.
We were woefully ill-prepared for this epidemic of West
Nile virus. We were not aware of an epidemic until some 40
suspected cases filled New York City hospitals. We did not even
know what virus was causing the epidemic until a month after
people had already become ill and some had died. We did not
know where the infected mosquitoes were and, consequently, 10
million people were exposed to pesticides in an attempt to
control the epidemic by indiscriminate aerial spray of the
entire New York City metropolitan area, not once but twice.
Our lack of preparedness was obvious and costly.
These events, as shocking as they may seem to the general
public, were actually predicted and warned by the scientific
community. Two reports from the National Academy of Sciences
warned of a decaying public health infrastructure, particularly
in reference to insect-borne diseases.
The first report, entitled, ``Manpower Needs and Career
Opportunities in the Field Aspects of Vector Biology,''
published in 1983, warned of a serious manpower shortage in the
field of vector biology, the science of studying insects that
transmit diseases.
This report was totally ignored by Congress and the
responsible Federal agencies. Consequently, there are now very
few professionals in Government or academic institutions with
the appropriate knowledge and training to address the threat of
insect-borne diseases.
The second report, entitled, ``Emerging Infections:
Microbial Threats to Health in the United States,'' published
in 1992, warned of the potential for the introduction of
foreign pathogens and the degradation of public health
infrastructure to combat such introductions. This report was
taken more seriously by Congress and some Federal agencies, but
the response has been neither adequate nor timely, as is
evidenced by the recent events with West Nile virus.
Well, what can we do to prevent a recurrence of last
summer's events and to prevent similar events from occurring in
the future?
In the short term, every conceivable effort must be made to
prevent West Nile virus from re-emerging next spring. It is
quite likely to survive the winter months, either in infected
wildlife or within the millions of mosquitoes hibernating in
buildings and tunnels in the New York City metropolitan area.
Immediate efforts should be made to find and destroy any
infected mosquitoes that may now be overwintering. Heroic
efforts must be made next spring to find the virus in
mosquitoes or wildlife and to focus mosquito control efforts on
containing the virus before humans become infected. A
preemptive strike on certain mosquito species known to be
capable of transmitting the virus should be initiated early in
the spring and directed at the larval stage, where
environmental impact of insecticide usage would be minimal.
Every conceivable effort must be made to control the virus
transmission early enough to prevent human infection and to
avoid the use of widespread aerial application to control an
epidemic in humans. A repeat of last summer's response must be
avoided at all costs.
In the long term, we must strengthen the public health
infrastructure to effectively and intelligently combat the
threat of new and reemerging diseases. If West Nile virus was a
test of our response capabilities, we have failed miserably.
Research is needed to better understand the human threat of
infectious diseases that originate from the environment. This
research should be interdisciplinary and include epidemiology,
microbiology, entomology, and, most importantly, ecology.
Government agencies responsible for the funding of peer-
reviewed research on vector-borne diseases must be given
increased resources to accomplish this goal. The training of a
new breed of scientists, blind to interdisciplinary boundaries
and comprehensively trained in both in medical and
environmental sciences, should begin immediately in order to
staff the increasing demand for expertise in government and
academic institutions. Academic research institutions and
government agencies at all levels should form working
partnerships to integrate resources focusing upon this specific
problem.
Epidemics of insect-borne diseases are preventable. We have
eliminated the threat of epidemic malaria, yellow fever, and
bubonic plague in this country years ago, but we have left our
guard down against the threat of new diseases, such as West
Nile virus.
Armed with new knowledge from academic research and the
will of responsible government agencies to refocus and
integrate prevention efforts, we can regain our capacity to
combat new disease threats from the environment and look
forward to an improved quality of life in the next millennium.
Thank you.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Dr. Fish. That was a very
provocative beginning, and I look forward to the response of
others on the panel.
You did put it in historic context, introduction of a
foreign insect-borne virus never before seen in the western
hemisphere is a public health threat unprecedented in modern
times.
Is there any evidence--you said in the two reports, which
were early warnings if we had seen them--I want to ask you two
questions and we will go on to the other witnesses and we will
come back and have a general discussion.
One is: was there any evidence of human infection prior to
this year? And then the second is: in the best of all worlds,
what would we all have done if we had responded to those two
reports you site?
Dr. Fish. Well, in response to your first question, in this
particular virus at this point we have no evidence that it has
occurred here before last summer.
Senator Lieberman. So this was the first appearance.
Dr. Fish. A new introduction.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Dr. Fish. But there are other similar viruses, mosquito-
borne viruses, that we know occur in this area. I mean, in the
beginning this epidemic was thought to have been St. Louis
encephalitis.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Dr. Fish. And it could very well have been St. Louis
encephalitis. I mean, these things are out there, and we know
they are out there, but they kind of surprise us. Every five or
10 years there is an epidemic. In the meantime, nobody seems to
care about them. It is those times that support for research
and support for surveillance just crumbles.
Senator Lieberman. Let me go to that second question I
asked, which is: what might we have done if we had heeded those
reports? Is it exactly what you believe we should be doing now?
Dr. Fish. Well, first of all, we need to keep the training
and the research going with these agents. We know they are out
there. We do not always know what they are up to or how much of
a public health threat they are going to be, but we need to
know about them.
Senator Lieberman. Finally, what is the source of support
for the kind of research and training that you're talking
about?
Dr. Fish. Primarily NIH at this point.
Senator Lieberman. Yes. And I presume you're saying that
there is not adequate support coming through NIH now for----
Dr. Fish. Well, there is kind of a problem. It's kind of a
turf war between NIH and NSF. I mean, NSF does not fund medical
research.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Dr. Fish. NIH generally does not fund ecological research.
These kinds of problems just----
Senator Lieberman. Fall in between.
Dr. Fish. They fall in between.
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
Dr. Fish. And not only is there not emphasis on them, there
is almost a prohibition against working in this area because of
the division of responsibilities by these two major funding
agencies.
Senator Lieberman. Well, that's an important point, and,
because of the obvious public interest and concern about this
virus and, you know, vector-borne diseases, generally, I'd like
to spend some time and see if there is a way in which, perhaps
in the coming session of Congress, we might be able to create a
visible and identifiable source of funding for that kind of
research and training so it doesn't fall between the
established categories.
Dr. Andreadis--just for the record, again, Dr. Andreadis is
the soil and water department head of the Congress Agricultural
Experiment Station.
Thanks for being here.
STATEMENT OF THEADORE ANDREADIS, DEPARTMENT HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF
SOIL AND WATER, CONNECTICUT AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION
Mr. Andreadis. Thank you.
I'd like to thank Dr. Lieberman for holding----
Senator Lieberman. That's a promotion I do not deserve. I
am a juris doctor, now that I think about it.
Mr. Andreadis. Thank you.
I am here today to report to you the research and
surveillance activities that occurred in the State of
Connecticut during the recent West Nile virus crisis.
I am going to focus my comments this morning on specific
work that was done to isolate, identify, and determine the
distribution of virus in birds and mosquitoes in the State.
Let me begin by stating that since 1997 the State of
Connecticut has had in effect a comprehensive mosquito
management program to monitor mosquito populations and
mosquito-borne diseases that are known to cause human disease,
most notably eastern equine encephalitis.
This program is a cooperative effort that involves three
State agencies: the Connecticut Agricultural Experiment
Station, which is responsible for trapping and testing
mosquitoes; the Department of Environmental Protection, which
is responsible for implementing all mosquito control measures;
and the Department of Public Health, which is responsible for
communicating health risks and protective measures to the
public.
Mosquito trapping in this program is conducted daily from
June through October at 37 permanent locations throughout the
State, and since 1997 we have trapped and tested over 150,000
mosquitoes and detected the eastern equine encephalitis virus
on nine occasions from six different locations. The map behind
me shows the locations of these 37 sites.
Now, because we had this surveillance program in place, we
were able to respond immediately to the West Nile crisis. On
September 4, the New York City Health Department and the
Centers for Disease Control announced the death of an elderly
resident of Queens from what was originally thought to be St.
Louis encephalitis, a mosquito-transmitted virus.
The following day, September 5, we placed mosquito traps in
the town of Greenwich and began a supplementary mosquito
trapping program that was eventually extended to 15 towns
throughout lower Fairfield and New Haven Counties. This was in
addition to our normal trapping in other areas of the State.
The purpose of our trapping was to determine the types of
mosquitoes in the region, to assess their relative abundance,
and to determine if these mosquitoes were carrying the
potentially deadly virus, and, if they were, did this represent
a public health threat.
Mosquito trapping was conducted over an 8-week period
through the end of October, during which 261 traps were placed
in 80 different locations throughout the region, and over 3,500
mosquitoes were trapped and tested in our laboratories.
The other map behind me shows the location of those
trapping sites.
Shortly after we initiated our mosquito surveillance
program, we began to receive reports of extraordinary numbers
of crow deaths throughout lower Fairfield County. Similar crow
die-offs were being observed in New York City, Long Island, and
New Jersey, as well, and suspicion was rising that perhaps
these crows were dying from the virus.
However, we knew this was highly unusual, since St. Louis
encephalitis does not typically kill birds. A plan was then put
into place to systematically collect and test dead crows. This
effort was coordinated by the Department of Public Health, with
assistance from local health departments and wildlife personnel
from the Department of Environmental Protection.
Birds were sent to the Department of Patho-Biology at the
University of Connecticut, where necropsies were performed by
veterinary pathologists. Brains and other tissues from crows
that had diagnostic symptoms consistent with viral encephalitis
were then submitted to us for virus testing. Over 300 birds
were assessed at the University of Connecticut from 38 towns
from October 12, and 40 were tested in our laboratories for the
virus.
Now, on September 21st, we obtained our first isolations of
this virus from two species of mosquitoes, aedes vexans, which
is a strong mammalian feeder, and culex pipiens. These
mosquitoes were trapped on the evening of September 14 at the
Innis-Arden Country Club in Old Greenwich, and we had an
additional isolation from the brain of a dead crow collected in
the town of Westport on September 13.
This announcement was made by Governor Rowland, who
subsequently directed the Department of Environmental
Protection to initiate limited ground spraying of insecticides
against adult mosquitoes in the affected regions, only.
The isolation of the virus from adult mosquitoes and the
brain of a domestic crow was a critical step in the eventual
identification of this virus. Despite the increasing number of
human cases that were being reported in New York City, the CDC
had yet to obtain an actual isolation of the living virus from
a human. We believe our isolations from mosquitoes and a
domestic crow were the first in the area.
Following our announcement, we were immediately contacted
by the Center for Disease Control, who requested that we submit
our isolations to them. We complied on September 23. The
following day, the CDC announced that the virus was not St.
Louis encephalitis, but was a West Nile-like. Two days later,
they informed us that the viruses that we had isolated from
mosquitoes and the brain of this crow were identical.
We then proceeded to obtain specific re-agents to test for
the West Nile virus an initiated molecular studies to sequence
a portion of the genome of the virus, with the intent of
definitively identifying this virus, determining its possible
origin, and assessing its virulence for birds and humans.
Early information, which appeared in the British journal,
``Lancet,'' on October 9, from studies conducted at the
University of California at Irvine, had indicated that this
virus was Kungin/West-Nile-like, which occurs in Australia;
however, their analysis was incomplete, and our genetic
analysis showed a much closer relationship to West Nile virus
that has been isolated from mosquitoes and humans during a
recent outbreak in 1996 in Romania, thus suggesting a common
origin.
The results of our investigations are due to be published
in the ``Journal of Science'' later this week.
Bird testing continued through mid-October, and, of the 40
birds that we tested, 29 were found to be positive for the West
Nile virus. This included 28 American crows and one Cooper's
Hawk that were collected from 18 towns in lower Fairfield and
New Haven Counties along a 62-mile corridor from Greenwich to
Madison. This is shown, again, on the map behind me. No virus
isolations were made from additional crows and a Canadian goose
that were collected from Hartford County.
Our isolations of the West Nile virus from birds and
mosquitoes conclusively documented the presence of this virus
in Connecticut during September and October 1999, and virus
activity appeared, based on crow die-offs, to be limited to
lower Fairfield and New Haven Counties.
All of the work that I have described to you this morning
was accomplished in State with no assistance from the Center
for Disease Control or any other Federal agency. Our timely,
coordinated response in trapping and testing mosquitoes and
birds provided indispensable data that was effectively used to
inform and protect the public. Fortunately, no human cases were
reported in this State.
The high mortality in crows and other bird species in the
region suggests a recent introduction of the West Nile virus
into a naive wildlife population that has never been exposed to
this virus. The isolation of West Nile virus from a variety of
native birds, which are likely capable of circulating this
virus at relatively high titers over a broad geographic region,
further suggests that this exotic virus is likely to become
established permanently in the avian fauna of the United
States.
How the virus will behave is unknown, but if established in
North America, West Nile virus likely will continue to have
severe effects on human health, horses, and on avian
populations such as American crows and raptors. The
environmental, social, and economic implications of permanent
establishment of this exotic virus are considerable.
While many important questions need to be investigated,
among the most urgent include: will the virus persist in this
region? How widespread will it become? What impact will the
virus have on native bird and horse populations? How will the
virus affect humans? How will the virus overwinter? How will we
monitor virus activity to protect the public? What birds will
serve as natural reservoirs? And what mosquito species will
serve as competent vectors?
Additional resources and funding are urgently needed to
address these and other research questions. This will lead to a
better understanding of the natural ecology and epidemiology of
this new exotic virus in North America. This information will
provide critical fundamental knowledge that is presently
unknown. This will be an essential component for developing
effective virus surveillance, disease management, and mosquito
control strategies throughout the region.
The information obtained in these studies will further aid
in assessing the relative risk of the West Nile virus to human
health and help to determine its impact on wildlife and
domestic animals.
We would further anticipate that increasing our knowledge
in the aforementioned areas will reduce--I repeat, reduce--the
need for application of toxic chemical insecticides.
We are at a very critical juncture, and we stand ready to
act. We have the expertise and the laboratory facilities to
undertake these investigations. We have initiated studies on
overwintering mosquitoes and wild bird populations, and, with
additional funding, we can increase our mosquito surveillance
program, continue our basic research on bird populations, and
continue molecular studies to develop a rapid procedure for
identification of this virus.
Thank you.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Dr. Andreadis. Very interesting,
helpful testimony.
I congratulate you and your colleagues on the fact that
your work in this area is resulting in an article that will be
published in the very respected ``Journal of Science.''
I am fascinated by the conclusion you reached that this
West Nile virus is similar to a strain of virus found in
Romania, and I am just curious as to if you'd help us
understand what conclusions we might draw from that. Does this
mean that the virus that we saw here in the greater New York
area and southwestern Connecticut was somehow brought from
Romania, or is it just a coincidence that there are similar
strains of a virus?
Mr. Andreadis. We cannot conclude that this virus came from
Romania. In fact, the Center for Disease Control and
laboratories at Irvine, California, have also identified the
virus and found a very close match with an isolate that was
made from a dead goose in Israel.
Our two papers are consistent with one another and suggest
that the virus that we have here in the northeast United States
probably had its origin from the Mediterranean region.
Now, we do not know how the virus was introduced. I think
the highest likelihood that it was probably brought in with an
infected bird; however, we cannot rule out an infected mosquito
or an infected human. We simply do not know, and we may not
ever know.
But I think the evidence that has accumulated from various
laboratories that have worked on this would suggest a recent
origin of the virus.
This virus is very widespread, and there are over 40
different strains that have been identified. It occurs in Asia.
It occurs in Europe, as Dr. Fisher has indicated, and
throughout Africa. It is probably the most widespread of these
types of viruses anywhere in the world.
Senator Lieberman. And, of course, one of the things, just
to state for the record--and I'd invite a response if you
want--we are traveling so much, people are traveling so much,
goods are traveling so much that presumably it is not just
insects or birds that will carry viruses, but that people or
planes, for instance, will carry them. And so it is--I presume
you said that it might have been brought here, this virus might
have been brought here by a bird. Does that mean a bird really
flying on its own.
Mr. Andreadis. It could have been.
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Andreadis. Probably not a bird that flew on its own; a
bird that was accidentally brought in.
Senator Lieberman. Brought in. Right.
Mr. Andreadis. Right.
Senator Lieberman. Or that something brought in might have
had a mosquito, or a person might have----
Mr. Andreadis. That's also another possibility. Yes.
Senator Lieberman. Yes. I wonder, just to put it in
context, whether you want to react to Dr. Fisher's statement
that this is a public health threat unprecedented in modern
times and may be reminiscent of the introduction of Yellow
Fever, or even Bubonic Plague in past centuries.
Mr. Andreadis. Well, I would reiterate what I said before--
that we do not know how this virus is going to behave.
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Andreadis. Outbreaks that periodically occur in Europe
are introduced with migrating birds that come up from North
Africa. When a virus is then introduced into a region of
Europe, you can have human cases, an outbreak that may last a
couple of years, and then they disappear and then recur several
years later.
But we simply do not know how the virus is going to
respond.
Senator Lieberman. OK.
Mr. Andreadis. That's why it is so important to have a
really comprehensive surveillance program in effect to detect
the virus early on.
Senator Lieberman. Just take a moment, and then I want to
go on to Dr. McLean. What do you mean by a comprehensive
surveillance program?
Mr. Andreadis. We need a comprehensive surveillance program
that includes trapping and testing of mosquitoes----
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Andreadis.--and monitoring bird populations throughout
the region so that we can detect the virus in either mosquitoes
and/or birds early enough to provide warning.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Andreadis. And so appropriate measures can be taken to
protect the public.
Senator Lieberman. Now, you and your colleagues at the
Experiment Station do that. Who else might be involved in that?
Mr. Andreadis. Well, in the State of Connecticut, there are
three agencies involved--the Department of Environmental
Protection, the Department of Public Health, our agency, and
then the University of Connecticut is also assisting with the
bird work. In fact, we met yesterday in a 1-day session to
formulate plans for increasing our surveillance over the next
year.
Senator Lieberman. And do you have adequate funding for
that?
Mr. Andreadis. No, we do not, presently. We are putting
together a package that we would present, and hopefully that
would be approved.
Senator Lieberman. OK. I saw Representative Nopsham, and
there must be other members of the State Legislature, so you're
putting them on notice.
Are there Federal agencies involved, as well, in the
surveillance program?
Mr. Andreadis. Not in the State of Connecticut. No. We have
been pretty much doing all of this ourselves, in concert with
CDC. We're in communications with them. This is generally
through our Department of Public Health.
Senator Lieberman. Right. You made an interesting point,
just for the record, that there is an active kind of mosquito
surveillance monitoring program in the State that results from
an earlier outbreak, but not of the West Nile virus.
Mr. Andreadis. Right. The impetus for the development of
the program that we now have in place occurred in 1996.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Andreadis. We had a real scare, where we were finding
large numbers of mosquitoes carrying the eastern equine
encephalitis virus, which is far more virulent than the West
Nile virus.
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Andreadis. That was over in the southeastern corner of
the State. And, because of our finding, the Legislature and the
Governor did provide funding for us to develop this program.
Without this program in place, we could not have responded
in the manner that we did, so that----
Senator Lieberman. As quickly or as fully as you did.
Mr. Andreadis.--was really critical. Correct.
Senator Lieberman. OK. Great. Thanks.
Now we go to Dr. McLean. Again, thanks so much for coming
from Wisconsin, director of the U.S. Geological Survey's
National Wildlife Health Center.
Good morning.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT MC LEAN, DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL
SURVEY'S NATIONAL WILDLIFE HEALTH CENTER
Mr. McLean. Good morning.
Thank you, Senator Lieberman, for inviting me to
participate in this hearing.
I request permission to attach my written testimony with
some attachments, some background information on National
Wildlife health alerts we disseminated during the outbreak and
some information we provided to keep the public informed of
what we were doing.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you. That will be included in the
record without objection.
Mr. McLean. I will summarize my testimony to provide
information on the involvement of wildlife species and the
impact of wildlife populations related to the emergence of West
Nile virus in the United States.
As you mentioned, I am the director of the USGS National
Wildlife Health Center in Madison, Wisconsin, and our center
provides direct technical support, knowledgeable guidance, and
timely intervention to Federal and State wildlife managers who
are regularly faced with sick and dead wild animals, frequently
on a large scale.
Due to the mobility of wildlife and the potential spread of
disease, timely and accurate determination of the causes of
wildlife illness and death is a prerequisite to achieving the
effective disease control and prevention.
The expertise and resources of our disease diagnostic
laboratory are crucial in providing this rapid response to
wildlife mortality events, and it was due to this national
diagnostic wildlife system that we had in place that we became
early involved in this epidemic in receiving dead crows from
New York State during the first week in September.
Other people have mentioned the background information on
the virus. I will present a little bit of that, go over it very
briefly.
As mentioned, it is a mosquito-transmitted virus, very
closely related to St. Louis encephalitis that occurs regularly
in the United States. It was first isolated in Africa and
Uganda in 1937, so it is a long history of this virus, and
until recently it was only found in Africa, the Middle East,
Europe, and Western Asia. Human epidemics were first reported
in Israel in the 1950's, and later in Africa, Europe, and Asia.
The latest epidemic there occurred in southern Russia this
summer in 1999.
This virus infects a wide variety of vertebrate animals,
and birds are the primary host. Resident and migratory bird
species are involved in the natural transmission cycles.
West Nile virus seems to cause none or mild disease in
birds in Africa and Israel, and there was one exception, an
experimental infection study where there was high fatality in
crows and house sparrows.
The virus that occurs in the United States, St. Louis
encephalitis, causes little or no disease in animals;
therefore, the high mortality that was observed in crows with
this introduced virus was very unusual, and this suggests that
it was a higher virulence for our naive native species or this
was a much more virulent and deadly strain of virus for our
native birds.
To give a little bit of the current status of the virus as
we know it, obviously, human cases occurred only in New York
City area, with one exception of a case that was exported to
Canada. Infected mosquitoes were found in New York, New Jersey,
and Connecticut, and virus-infected birds were found in New
York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Maryland. All but a few of
these positive birds were found within about a 50-mile radius
of New York City.
Some exceptions of that were one bird found 100 miles north
in New York and a bird found positive in Baltimore, Maryland.
This was an American crow we found dead in Baltimore. This crow
certainly extends the infection area much farther south in
U.S., about 250 miles south to Baltimore.
Senator Lieberman. Doctor, can I interrupt you--just a
curiosity. What conclusions can we draw about the location of
that crow, infected crow in the Baltimore area? Can we assume
that it flew from the New York area, or that there is a
separate occurrence of the virus, or neither?
Mr. McLean. That's what we're trying to investigate. we are
doing surveillance in the Maryland area, intensive surveillance
with the State, and both possibilities exist. Certainly, crows
could fly south that far. There are migratory portions of the
crow population.
The other question is if it picked it up locally from
mosquitoes, and that's one of the surveillance questions that
is continuing at this time.
Senator Lieberman. OK. Thanks.
Mr. McLean. All the birds tested for West Nile virus coming
from at least three of the States--as Connecticut mentioned,
they tested their own. CDC tested 392 birds, and 192 of those
were positive for West Nile virus. There were at least 18
species of birds positive, including some exotic and native
birds in zoos, and there also was one mammal positive, a cat in
New Jersey.
The National Wildlife Health Center conducted extensive
field investigation for 3 weeks in New York and New Jersey
during October and sampled more than 1,000 birds of 70 species
at 21 sites, and their laboratory results of these are still
pending.
At the same time, we established surveillance of bird
mortality in a multi-State, mid-Atlantic region, and have and
continue to receive wildlife specimens for necropsy and testing
at our center.
We recently broadened this wildlife surveillance using crow
mortality as an indicator of virus presence by expanding
collaboration with Center for Disease Control and State
agencies in 20 eastern States. The Center also established
further surveillance efforts with USDA to sample bird
populations in Atlantic and Gulf Coast States for early
detection of any virus expansion farther south.
This combined, cooperative effort of three Federal agencies
I think was unique in this investigation and was facilitated by
USGS.
The question was addressed earlier: how, when, and where
was this virus introduced? Certainly, importation, either
legally or illegally, of infected animals, whether they were
birds or domestic animals, which is a possibility, as well;
humans or mosquitoes, which could hitch a ride on an airplane
or in cargo are some of the possibilities.
It has been mentioned that migratory birds could have
introduced it by flying to this country. That's very unlikely,
and I will mention the reason why.
The normal infectious period in an animal is very short--
four to 5 days at the most are they infectious for mosquitoes.
Because of that, the very rapid transport of this animal would
be necessary to be able to get the animal here within that
short period of time.
There is one exception to that--if there are latent
infections followed by a relapse in animals. If that occurs,
that could extend the time.
There are efforts underway using molecular techniques that
could also provide some clues as to where this virus came from
by comparing the isolate in New York to isolates obtained in
other countries, as previously mentioned.
CDC did report that the virus is very closely almost
identical to an isolate from Israel, and I would agree that
certainly the Middle East and that area is a likely source of
this virus.
Senator Lieberman. I assume it got its name for that
geographic region.
Mr. McLean. Yes. From West Nile region in Uganda.
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. McLean. It is part of the West Nile River system.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. McLean. There are also efforts underway to determine
when and where it was introduced. If we assume it was
introduced this year, you know, how do we know it wasn't here
previously?
Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much for your testimony,
Dr. McLean.
Now may we hear from Ms. Jane Stahl, Deputy Commissioner of
the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection.
Ms. Stahl?
STATEMENT OF JANE STAHL, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, CONNECTICUT
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Good morning. My name is Jane Stahl and I am the Deputy
Commissioner of Environmental Protection here in Connecticut.
I'd like to thank the committee for this opportunity to discuss
the State's mosquito management program wand its interest in
this issue.
Mosquitoes are not our enemies. We need to be protective of
both our insect population, our bird population, as well as our
human population, as we study this disease and similar diseases
and move forward in our approaches to preventing human disease
that is related to them.
The cycle is, as we heard, very complex. We have mosquitoes
biting birds, building up reservoirs of diseases, being fed on
by more mosquitoes, and maybe transmitting disease to a human.
My final theme, and then I will go to my written testimony,
is that, because that cycle is so complex, I believe it is
still fair to say that the risk of disease to humans is low.
That's not to say that we can ignore it. We cannot afford to
ignore it. We cannot afford to not be concerned and not go
forward with the specific kinds of study and protective
measures and programs that have been talked about here, but I
also do not want people leaving the room thinking that we are
in a crisis mode. A concern mode, absolutely. A better-informed
mode, absolutely. But I think that, you know, we need to keep
that in perspective, and that perspective also helps us guide
our response so that it can be measured and that we are not, my
final theme, responding to politics as opposed to scientific
information and expert measures.
I have gone way up to the yellow light already and haven't
even gotten to my testimony.
Let me just hit the highlights, then, which is to say that
mosquito management, when it began in Connecticut, began with
the ditching and the filling of our wetlands. What we now know
as some of our most-valuable ecological areas, the areas that
we protect as nurseries to the fish and wildlife that we seek
to maintain, were the areas that we sought to destroy in our
efforts to manage our mosquito populations.
Well into really modern days, when the Department of Health
here in Connecticut took over the mosquito management program--
and it was, even then, a response to disease threat--we were
destroying wetlands in order to prevent the spread of mosquito-
borne disease.
We have gotten way smarter. We have learned that wetlands
and wetlands restoration is, in fact, one of the greatest tools
that we have in managing mosquito populations. Some of the best
enemies of mosquitoes and larvae are those healthy fish
nurseries and bird populations that look to the wetlands for
their homes and their breeding grounds.
So we have learned a lot and we have changed our approach.
Senator Lieberman. I had the opportunity, as I think you
know, to visit a site at Hemanas, in which it is very
interesting, actually, that we are trying to turn around
something we did earlier with wetlands we filled in. We now
have a program--some of folks here are overseeing it--which is
basically liberating the wetlands by removing the fill that was
put in, and it is quite remarkable to see the natural process
of mosquito control being restored--and, of course, all the
other positive effects of those wetlands.
Ms. Stahl. Absolutely. And we will take you on as many site
visits as you like, because we have wonderful examples of it
throughout the State.
And it is, in fact, an interesting twist of fate that
allowed Connecticut to have the first dedicated wetlands
restoration program, and that was the demise of the mosquito
management program in the Department of Health. It was a
budgetary matter back in the early 1980's, but the mosquito
management program had evolved to the State where it was
employing what we now call ``integrated pest management'' and
wetland restoration techniques as our best vehicles for
mosquito control.
It was also the existence of that expertise that allowed
us, as Dr. Andreadis said, to respond forcefully in 1996 when
we had a--I will use little quotation marks here--a ``crisis''
in the realm of eastern equine encephalitis showing up in
human-biting mosquitoes and the need to react to those
findings. So we had a skeleton of a program in place. We had
Dr. Andreadis' expertise at the Connecticut Agricultural
Experiment Station. We had our experts in the Department of
Public Health helping us evaluate the risk. And we had the
formal mosquito management program, now the DEP wetland
restoration program, able to mobilize to go out and do some
local focused spraying for mosquito control, knocking the adult
mosquitoes down.
It was that emergency response that led to the development
of Connecticut's program, where we sat back and we said--my
folks have heard me use this term far too often recently. We
tried to design everything from the Volkswagen to the Cadillac
of mosquito management programs, and then light upon something
that would be, in fact, a functional vehicle--maybe a Chevy,
maybe a Ford.
But what we ended up with was this cooperative, statewide
approach, again, geared toward eastern equine encephalitis,
that gave us our comprehensive testing and trapping program,
our proactive placement of larvacide in the off season, and our
ability to respond with ground spraying should test results
prove positive.
We developed an emergency contingency plan for eastern
equine encephalitis that gave us levels of response, depending
on the results of the trapping and testing that we were
pursuing through the season.
It was because we had that program in place, as Dr.
Andreadis said, that we were able to respond quickly,
remobilize some traps, and conduct some very area-specific
testing when the word came to us that we had this new disease
or potentially a new disease emerging in this area of the State
and Fairfield County.
And it was also having that program in place that allowed
us to respond in a measured approach with very localized, focal
ground spraying of a low-toxicity pesticide, because, again, we
are very concerned about the collateral damage that could ensue
from broader, more widespread pesticide application.
Among the things that was very successful in this last
season was daily communication with all of our municipalities
involved. We had conference calls with the chief elected
officials and local health directors in all of the towns in
Fairfield, southwestern Connecticut, Fairfield County area,
that were involved in this situation.
Because we communicated with them, we were able to get the
word out through them to the public as to the personal
protective measures, the measures, the methodologies that they
could undertake on a municipal level, and to get the word out
as to what the State efforts were.
It helped us, as I mentioned earlier, guard against a more
political response, if you will. By staying together and
keeping our experts on the phone with municipal leaders, we
were able to guard against a more emotional reaction and to
undertake a more measured response.
Those are, in fact, the kinds of elements that we need to
continue to undertake as we look toward how to address West
Nile or West-Nile-like virus into these coming seasons. We
cannot treat this as if it were a fluke, that it's not going to
happen again. We have to go in assuming that we are going to be
confronting this same situation again.
We also cannot forget the fact that we do continue to have
an issue with eastern equine encephalitis in the other half of
our State--and, again, as was stated earlier, a much more
virulent virus and one that, when it occurs in humans, is
fatal.
We have a lot of plates to keep on those sticks revolving
in the air. I think we are well poised to do that. We begin--we
have already begun. We continue today, and we will continue
throughout the season.
One of the challenges that we need to address--and I state
it here--is that we are dealing with a type of mosquito
transmitting a disease that is less focal or localized than are
the mosquito species that we were dealing with with eastern
equine encephalitis, and that means that we need to change our
protocol a little bit. But, because the protocol has worked so
well, we are not going to disband it. We are not going to
broaden it so much that we lose the benefits of a responsive,
responsible program.
Why do not I stop here and allow the questions to take us
where we want to go.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Commissioner Stahl.
Ms. Stahl. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman. That was very helpful testimony. I
appreciate it very much.
Let me ask a few informational questions for me and others
here and for the record, and then talk again about what we can
now do as we go to the future.
I was interested in the assessment of how we should react
to this, and ask if any of the other members of the panel,
particularly Dr. Fish, want to--in other words, we do not want
to panic, obviously, but, in terms of the impact of this West
Nile virus on people, you have said that the eastern equine
virus actually is more virulent, by our experience. On the
other hand, we do know that apparently seven--the deaths of
seven people in the New York area were attributable to the
virus.
So how seriously should we take this? Dr. Fish, do you want
to start?
Dr. Fish. Well, being that we do not have any experience
with this virus in the western hemisphere before, it is really
hard to predict what the total range of possibilities might be.
I think we should be prepared for the worst. We cannot
afford not to be prepared for the worst. And I think many
people--most people, I think, believe that this virus is not
going to go away. We are going to have it in some form.
So I think it is important to take a preemptive strike----
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Dr. Fish.--to control this virus and do everything we can
this spring. In fact, there are things that we should be doing
now. I mean, if it is overwintering in the mosquitoes, someone
should be looking for them and doing something about it and
trying to control some of the overwintering mosquitoes.
Senator Lieberman. Hold that thought a minute, because I
definitely want to come back to that.
Anybody else want to add a perspective on--this is new, and
it was frightening to a lot of people. No one is saying, I
know, that we should not be concerned about it. The question is
the level of concern. Does anyone else want to respond to that?
Mr. McLean. Yes, I'd like to respond. I think, since we
are--not only wildlife but the human population is naive to
this, that if the virus does persist it could go to other
metropolitan areas where we could have similar experiences in
the future, and so I agree with Dr. Fish that we should be very
vigilant, at least from the public health standpoint.
Being from a wildlife center, we are very concerned because
it is killing a lot of our native birds, and so we want to be
vigilant, ourselves, to be on the alert to whether this could
be a significant impact on bird population.
Senator Lieberman. Sure. That's a good point.
Mr. McLean. And it could very well be.
Let me go to a different kind of question.
Many of us have been concerned about the impact of weather,
specifically, and the whole question of global climate change.
I am interested in knowing what effect you think weather
conditions might have had on the outbreak of West Nile virus.
Is there a need for better weather prediction, for instance, to
help monitor for conditions that are conducive to mosquito-
borne disease?
Just to throw into it before I give you a chance to
respond, I was struck, looking over--for another reason,
recently. The report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change issued a 1995--this is the international group of more
than 2,000 scientists who reached the critical conclusion that
the planet was warming and that it is probable that it is human
activity that is warming it.
There is a sentence that says, ``Indirect effects of
climate change include increases in the potential transmission
of vector-borne infectious diseases, for instance, malaria,
yellow fever, and some viral encephalitis, resulting from
extensions of the geographical range and season for vector
organisms.''
In other words, I read it to mean that as certain parts of
the planet and of this country get warmer, that diseases we
haven't known here will come into the area.
I do not want to ask you to sort of express your
conclusions, particularly, certainly not at length about
whether climate change is real, but to what extent are we in a
position now to say that weather had an effect on this outbreak
of West Nile virus?
Dr. Fish. It depends on whether you're talking about
weather short-term or long term.
Senator Lieberman. Take a stab at both.
Dr. Fish. Both. OK. Well, my specialty area of research is
in ecology of vectors, of disease vectors. I have done it for
about 30 years. And I have seen this report, and I have seen
many statements concerning the impact that global warming might
have upon insect-borne diseases.
I, myself, am of the opinion that we know so little about
how the environment influences these diseases and mosquito
populations or the vector populations that we really cannot
make those kinds of predictions.
Certainly, these disease systems, the vector populations
and the virus circulation, are dependent upon climatic events,
I mean, in the short term. Over the long term, you know, it is
anybody's guess.
It's a nice story, but I wish there were some fact behind
it.
I mean, global warming probably will be good for Lyme
disease, because these ticks are cold-adaptive ticks. They like
northern climates.
Senator Lieberman. Right. It will have different effects on
different species.
Dr. Fish. Sure.
Senator Lieberman. And in different places.
Dr. Fish. I think it is hard to make a global conclusion
from that.
On the short term, certainly there seems to be pretty good
evidence that this summer's drought had some influence on the
populations of this culex pipiens mosquito, which likes
polluted water, small containers of water that have high
organic material in them. They do well, they do best in that
kind of situation, and when you have a lot of rain that tends
to dilute the organic material and washes some of these
structures out.
So I think that might have been important, but, of course,
we do not really have good monitoring system in the New York
City area to go back and find out how many mosquitoes there
were in June and July and August.
But that's a reasonable scenario, so the weather may have
had an influence, and if we have steady rains next summer we
may have unnaturally low culex pipiens population and the virus
may have a harder time getting started in the birds. Those
things can happen.
Senator Lieberman. Any other responses to the question?
Mr. Andreadis. Well, I would agree with everything that Dr.
Fish has said. I think a more important issue is the global
movement of organisms, and I think this is a greater threat
than global warming to the introduction of an exotic virus or
new disease.
I think that is a major concern, and that perhaps we need
better quarantine facilities to examine the movement of animals
or other carriers of disease.
We have a global economy. We have global movement. You can
be in Europe today and in Asia tomorrow, and I think this is
more important.
Another example--we have a newly introduced mosquito called
ades japanicus that we have discovered is present throughout
Connecticut. Its origin is somewhere in Asia, probably Japan or
China, and it is not present throughout the State. Our best
guess is that it was introduced with used tires imported into
the region. It has also been detected in New Jersey, New York,
and in Ohio now.
So we have another mosquito here that is a human biter that
is a potential vector for disease. It's another instance of an
accidental introduction.
Senator Lieberman. We do not know that it is carrying a
disease yet.
Mr. Andreadis. No, we do not know.
Senator Lieberman. But it is a new species.
Mr. Andreadis. It is a new species here in the region.
Senator Lieberman. Dr. McLean, do you want to----
Mr. McLean. Yes. I agree with both of the previous
speakers. There is no question that weather in the short term
can affect the extent and breadth of an epidemic. For example,
if you have a warmer season or fall season that allowed virus
transmission by mosquitoes to continue longer, which increases
the risk--and that certainly occurred this past summer. The
drought, as Durland mentioned, contributed probably to it. But
then in this area you have a longer fall season, which allowed
it to amplify more in the bird and mosquito cycle, which then
had more spill-over to the human cycle.
Also, I think the introduction of exotic species is a very
important consideration. We're studying a parasite that is
killing thousands of birds in Wisconsin, and we're not sure how
this parasite was introduced from Europe somehow--either came
in a snail or some other way. And so there are introductions
that we do not think about--ticks being brought in on animals
and get established. So there are a lot of other methods of
introduction that we have to be more vigilant about, I believe.
Senator Lieberman. As you remember, when the outbreak
occurred there were some stories about the possibility that
this might be bioterrorism. I take it that the prevailing
expert opinion that I heard after those stories occurred is
shared by the panel, which is that there is no evidence to lead
you to conclude that this was bioterrorism. Am I correct?
[No response.]
Senator Lieberman. Let me ask, then, a question that's
somewhat related, which is that, once those fears were
eliminated, people began to ask: did the response to this
outbreak of West Nile virus reveal for us any vulnerabilities,
any weaknesses in our detection and response system in the case
of bioterrorism.
So I do not--I welcome some comment on it, but what I
really want to transition to now is your evaluation of--and you
have touched on this, each of you, as you have gone along with
your testimony--about how we responded, how the governmental
agencies responded, and particularly what better could be done.
I know that CDC originally misidentified the West Nile
virus as St. Louis encephalitis. I also understand--I have
learned enough to know that these are not dramatically
different, so that it was understandable that that might
happen. And it went some period of weeks, I guess, before this
was correctly identified.
I am curious as to whether the initial misidentification
had any consequences, and, just generally, to give you an
opportunity now to reflect on how the agencies that you are
involved in work together and whether there is a need, for
instance, for the Federal Government, since I am here as a
member of the U.S. Senate, to assert a more active role in
coordinating response to a disease crisis of this kind.
Commissioner, why do not you start?
Ms. Stahl. Let me take a crack, because of course I am
going to tell you that we reacted appropriately, heroically,
brilliantly, much of which I do believe is true. Again, I think
that, you know, in answer to--the short answer to the question
was the misidentification or the later identification of what
we thought was St. Louis as West Nile, that did not make a
difference in Connecticut's case in our response. I think it
later allowed us to ask a different series of questions as we
went forward in our response, but as soon as we had a disease
in human-biting mosquitoes that was causing a health risk to
humans we established the process that we ensued, which was,
again, to relocate traps that we had and conduct additional
testing.
Then, when we had the--in kind of the evolution, both in
finding that it was, in fact, West Nile or West-Nile-like
virus, and in making the correlation with the crow deaths that
we were seeing, we began to broaden our response on terms of
the trapping, the testing, our collection of birds to better
evaluate the system or the situation that we were, in fact,
responding to. But, again, I think the protocol was basically
the same, regardless of the identification of the specific
virus.
Again, I need to emphasize the fact that a coordinated
response within the State was one of the keys to what I believe
was our success. Could we have done more, better? Of course. I
mean, these are always learning experiences. Is there a method
or a message for sister agencies in other States or for the
Federal Government? I think yes. I think it would have been
useful to have better coordinated information coming into the
State from the CDC. I think their focus initially was--and,
again, they, too, were evolving a response.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Ms. Stahl. But, you know, CDC responding to the New York
situation, trickling out to the other States, and then leaving
it for us to more actively get involved was something that I
think will change in future endeavors.
Senator Lieberman. How should it change?
Ms. Stahl. I think there needs to be a recognition of the
region of response, as opposed to the specific area of
response.
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
Ms. Stahl. I think we also need to be aware of the various
entities in any given State that are involved in mosquito
management, mosquito-borne disease, and the responses.
So, for example, in Connecticut it is a matter of talking
to and dealing with three or four different entities, all of
whom are very good at coordinating within and among ourselves,
but if CDC is only used to speaking to departments of health,
we lose a quick, on-time, on-point opportunity to communicate.
I think we resolved that as the situation wore on this
season, but, again, it is a lesson to have learned.
Senator Lieberman. Is CDC the right Federal agency to be
involved here? I mean, is there a--just keeping the
bioterrorism threat in the background, understanding that the
appearance of such--God forbid it ever happen--would have
somewhat similar signs, but potentially could spread more
rapidly and more virulently.
Did we learn anything from this experience with this virus
and other vector-borne diseases that suggest some more active--
was something going on that the public may not know about?
Dr. Andreadis, did you want to----
Mr. Andreadis. I was just going to comment that the
immediate needs--I mean, within the State we have the ability
to extend our surveillance trap, test mosquitoes, test birds. I
think what we're looking for from the Federal Government, in
addition to research dollars, would be the appropriate
agencies--and this may be the Center for Disease Control--
providing us with the technology and appropriate re-agents so
that we can do all of our own testing so that we can implement
our programs.
The great advantage that the Center for Disease Control has
and the Federal Government is they have a larger source of
resources available to them with all of these various reagents,
and we would look to them in the immediate year to provide us
with these re-agents so that we can do the work here within the
States, ourselves, and not burden them.
Senator Lieberman. Dr. Fish, did you have a thought on
that?
Dr. Fish. Yes. Connecticut is in pretty good shape. I mean,
they did a commendable job in combatting this threat because
they were prepared. My concern is New York City.
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
Dr. Fish. If this virus maintains itself through the winter
and it reappears next spring, it is going to happen in New York
City, just because of the nature of these mosquitoes, these
urban mosquitoes that transmit it. And New York City is the
least prepared to do anything about these kinds of situations.
Senator Lieberman. Focus on that. If you were the king,
what would you have New York City doing? Or just if you were
mayor of New York.
Dr. Fish. Well, at this point I am not aware of a plan, of
even a plan, a time-delineated plan of what is going to be done
between now and next summer.
Senator Lieberman. Because you'd say we have to all act on
the assumption that there will be a recurrence.
Dr. Fish. We have to.
Senator Lieberman. You have the expertise. I assume that
you all believe that this virus will stay alive through the
winter.
Dr. Fish. We cannot afford not to think that.
Senator Lieberman. It would be a great surprise if that did
not happen.
Dr. Fish. That would be great.
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
Dr. Fish. Everyone would be quite content.
Senator Lieberman. But it would be a surprise.
Dr. Fish. Yes.
Senator Lieberman. It is not what should be expected.
Dr. Fish. We need to be prepared, and there are things that
need to be done now. As I said before, if this virus is
overwintering, it is most likely overwintering in the mosquito
population. These mosquitoes overwinter in the adult stage.
They can be found in tunnels and basements in urban areas. And
every effort really must be made to find these mosquitoes, find
out where the infected ones are, and try to control them in
some way.
Senator Lieberman. Is that doable? It sounds like a massive
undertaking.
Dr. Fish. Well, we ought to try. We really ought to try and
then prepare in the spring. I mean, to go out and try to
control a mosquito population in the larval stage really is the
best way to control mosquitoes. If you have to kill them when
they are adults, you lost the battle. They can be controlled in
the larval stage, which means finding them, finding these water
containers. Sometimes it is catch basins, abandoned swimming
pools, and those kinds of structures. I mean, they need to be
mapped out and located, and we need to be ready in the spring.
When these adult mosquitoes come out and start laying eggs and
producing larvae, we have got to be able to go in there and try
to control the population before we have a lot of infected
adults flying around. And that all has to be planned. I mean,
it is going to be a big effort. You know, New York City is a
big place, and lots of places for mosquitoes. But I think we
ought to try.
Senator Lieberman. Is there something we should be doing in
this--go ahead, Dr. McLean.
Mr. McLean. I wanted to add, obviously, in the Federal
perspective, I might say the same thing occurred in New York
City. They responded. Their response to St. Louis encephalitis
was the same as if it was West Nile virus.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. McLean. So when they did respond, it was the
appropriate response that they were doing.
From the Federal perspective, like Durland, I have been
working for 30 years in these viruses, and 10 years ago we
would have said that everybody did a remarkable job in
identifying this virus so quickly. The technology is just
advanced so much we need a lot more now.
Senator Lieberman. It is important for us to have heard
that. I agree.
Mr. McLean. And the other thing, I think it was, at least
for me, a unique experience at the Federal level that--of
course, we are all resource limited. Everyone thinks Federal
agencies have a lot of money, and we are very resource limited,
but I think----
Senator Lieberman. I hear you.
Mr. McLean. What came out of this, I think, was a very
unique collaboration that occurred--and I think we need to
continue that and establish it--between three major agencies--
the Center for Disease Control, USDA, and our USGS National
Wildlife Health Center on wildlife diseases. Of course, this is
a unique virus in that wildlife became not only important,
because they were dying----
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. McLean.--but wildlife mortality was being used to make
public health decisions, which is the first time I know of any
disease like this where that has occurred.
As a matter of fact, it was occurring so rapidly, public
health officials wanted daily reports of positive crows to make
public health decisions, and that is unheard of in these
diseases.
So I think it has been a very good collaboration. We are
continuing the collaboration. All three agencies are working
together for surveillance, particularly in the Atlantic and
Gulf Coast States to see if the virus was introduced there and
if it has become established. That is going to be a second
critical question related to whether it is persisting in New
York. Did it go somewhere else? And will it be established
there?
That, in the long term, will be as important for the
persistence in the virus for the country, if there are some
transmissionsites established in the south for continuous
reintroduction to the north in the future.
We are doing surveillance. It is limited, obviously. We are
doing as much as we can. A lot of State agencies are
collaborating with us on that, so that is ongoing now. We are
getting in bird carcasses from all over the country, currently
testing. We do an active sampling of bird populations. I think
those are very important.
And I agree, too. I think the virus is probably mostly
likely going to persist in the New York City area. There was so
much intense virus activity that it probably filled the
mechanisms; however, the virus survives the winter, and this is
the area where it would most likely survive.
We have to be very vigilant in the spring in looking for
the virus as it first appears, and then be very proactive in
going after these spots where--it won't occur all at once in
the New York City area. There will be little, individual sites.
We need to identify as many of those as we can and react to
them quickly to prevent it from expanding further in the New
York City area, including Connecticut. I think, obviously,
mosquitoes were infected here, so it could persist here, as
well.
Senator Lieberman. That is good news about the
collaboration between the three Federal agencies, and I assume
that also would go over in this hopefully hypothetical case of
bioterrorism.
I want to pick up from what you said and ask the broader
question that I know was on a lot of people's minds here in
Connecticut, which is about how we respond and just state it in
a way that may be provocative.
I know some people felt that when the appearance of West
Nile--the occurrence of the West Nile virus happened this fall,
that in some sense we over-reacted, that perhaps it was a kind
of panic reaction, we over-sprayed, and that may have been done
to the detriment of both wildlife species and people.
So I would like to ask you to respond somewhat
retrospectively, but also prospectively about if we all agree,
as you do, and I think you make a very strong case that we have
to assume the re-emergence of this virus next year and in
future years, and that therefore we have to develop a plan and
a program to try to control it, control those mosquitoes,
particularly, that spread it, how do we do it? How do we do
that control in the safest way?
Commissioner, do you want to respond first about what
happened here with the use of insecticides, pesticides?
Ms. Stahl. Sure. And, again, I think that we were, in
large--we were well prepared, but we were also lucky. I do not
want to underplay that notion. We did not have a human case of
disease to which we were responding in Connecticut. We did
have, because of our eastern equine encephalitis protocol, a
hierarchy of responses when we made findings of disease in
different types of mosquitoes or in reports from sister States
or in other findings that would have been informative or
indicative of the level of threat to which we were responding.
So our first level of response is usually to get the word
out for people to take personal protective measures and to
avoid being in areas of mosquito concentration at times when
mosquitoes are known to be actively biting.
Now, that changes when you have different mosquitoes with
which you are dealing, and that is one of the things that we
needed to look at a little bit more carefully with the West
Nile virus, because we had a mosquito that was biting more
frequently through the day and in populated recreation areas.
We need to be vigilant, both proactively and at the time of
the occurrence in terms of larva siting and reducing the--I
hope I do not use the term incorrectly with all these experts
sitting here, but those nascent populations of mosquitoes and,
most dramatically, when we, in fact, have disease in human-
biting mosquitoes, we evaluate the need to conduct spraying of
pesticides.
What we did in this past instance was to do very localized
ground spraying of a low-toxicity pesticide to knock down the
adult mosquito population in the areas where we had the
positive test results. So we had very limited areas in which we
actually sprayed.
We were on call and are still paying the bills, actually,
for aerial spraying of pesticides should the test results have
increased significantly. I mean, if we had greater numbers of
positive test results in mosquitoes and in more widespread
areas, we would likely have done aerial spraying of pesticides.
If we went aerial, we would have used the same pesticide
that we used in the ground spraying, because it is a low
toxicity, which is not to say harmless----
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Ms. Stahl.--but low-toxicity pesticide.
Senator Lieberman. So you were evaluating constantly the
risks as against the danger of spraying.
Ms. Stahl. Absolutely.
Senator Lieberman. What about, as I recall, New York State,
I presume, did, in my recollection, wider aerial spraying. I
know there was some concern about that, and, of course, we are
just over the border and the winds move. So is that something
for people in Connecticut to be concerned about? And is there--
I hate to suggest this, but is there any sort of Federal role
in trying to regulate or at least to make more logical or
limited, sensible, the use of aerial sprays in a situation like
this?
Ms. Stahl. 20/20 hindsight?
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
Ms. Stahl. I think the role really is an educational and
communication role. New York City dealt with a more urgent
situation with a methodology that they had at hand and without
the benefit of having years of experience with similar
situations. It is not unlikely or unusual in States that have
longstanding mosquito control programs with mosquito-borne
disease to conduct continual aerial spraying of pesticides.
That is something that is very difficult for us to sit here in
Connecticut and second guess, because they, too, one would
hope, are constantly measuring and weighing the risks to their
population, the risks to their economy in States where the
tourist trade is----
Senator Lieberman. Sure.
Ms. Stahl.--important, and the risks to their ecological
systems.
So I think we are in a--were this to happen again next
year--and one of the points that I would like to make is that
there is a very active mosquito management coordination scheme
throughout the country. I mean, there is an organization of
experts in this field who do get together, and New York is, in
fact, participating in those organizations, and my hope, in
fact, my understanding, is that they have learned from this
experience and will deal differently with the situation.
Senator Lieberman. Good.
Let me ask Dr. Fish, as an epidemiologist, your reaction
briefly. Should the public not only be concerned about West
Nile virus but about the way in which we tried to prevent its
recurrence or limit it through the use of insecticides?
Dr. Fish. Again, Connecticut had a rational approach. I
mean, they were monitoring the mosquito populations, they were
monitoring for virus activity, and they had some information to
base a decision on as to whether to spray and where to spray
and how much to spray.
I know you represent Connecticut, but I keep going back to
New York.
Senator Lieberman. That is OK.
Dr. Fish. It is not that far away.
Senator Lieberman. No.
Dr. Fish. What happens in New York influences the people in
Connecticut.
Senator Lieberman. I grew up in Stamford. I used to think
that my Governor was Nelson Rockefeller. I think that has
changed now.
Dr. Fish. I do not think New York City had any alternative
other than to use aerial application of insecticides in
response to the human cases. By then it was too late to do
anything else. And they really did not have any idea where the
mosquitoes were or where the infection was. All they had was
human case data, and they had some cases in the Bronx and in
Manhattan of people who had never left and must have acquired
it there, so they were in a trap. I mean, they really did not
have any choice but to spray. I do not know if they needed to
spray twice. But they are not going to have that excuse next
year. They are not going to be able to do that, I do not think.
I mean, they have options. If they get a program in place and
get out there in the field and learn what is going on, they can
avert that kind of wholesale spray.
Senator Lieberman. You have all been very helpful. I think
we have--you certainly have helped me understand better how
this happened, some of the understandings about how different
groups work together fairly well in governmental agencies to
try to limit its outbreak.
We were fortunate here in the State that there was no human
effect. We have something to worry about about the reemergence.
Let me just, as we head toward the conclusion of the
hearing, just try to focus us on what we can do now and what
the Federal Government, particularly, can and should be doing
now.
You have made, I think, a very strong point that there is a
real public health concern here and there is not commensurate
or certainly not focused support for research in this area that
is adequate to the problem, and the same about monitoring of
surveillance. Some of the this money presumably you would ask
for from the State governments, but maybe there is some role
there for Federal agencies, as well.
Focus in now on what else, what are the practical next
steps? Again, repeating, it is clear from what you said that we
have to assume that this virus is going to reappear, and the
question is how can we--and probably spread, and the question
is: how can we inhibit that? How can we prevent that from
spreading further and deeper?
I will give you each a shot at that. What are the things we
could----
Mr. Andreadis. I think the immediate needs for the coming
year are to greatly increase our surveillance activities
throughout the region where we know we had virus activity last
year, at the very least. This would include trapping and
testing mosquitoes, monitoring bird populations, and, as Dr.
Fish had indicated, doing preemptive larval control,
identifying the sites where these mosquitoes are breeding, and
attempting to control them early on.
Senator Lieberman. Now, for instance?
Mr. Andreadis. Well, in the spring time.
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Andreadis. Identifying sites now, and then controlling
them in the spring before they have emerged as adults, because
it is only through obtaining this type of data that you are
going to be able to make the important decisions that may be
necessary here.
This, hopefully, would prevent a human case from occurring,
because we could detect the virus in either the mosquitoes or
birds early enough to get the warnings out.
So I see that as our immediate needs for the coming season.
Senator Lieberman. OK. Dr. McLean?
Mr. McLean. Yes. I agree with what he said.
I would like to emphasize--again, this is my experience
with St. Louis encephalitis--that the best surveillance method
of predicting human risk is monitoring bird populations.
Mosquitoes--it is more difficult to isolate virus in
mosquitoes, and that occurs very close to when humans are at
risk, where birds are involved much earlier in the
transmission.
With our experience with St. Louis encephalitis, monitoring
closely the bird populations in a number of species in urban
and suburban areas that we selected as several species, the
whole thing is driven by information. The more information you
have, particularly by location, and the earliest you have this
information, the better you are prepared and the more
preventive measures you can institute, so it is all information
driven.
Mosquito information is important to know where the risk
will be as far as what species are around and their density of
mosquitoes, so I think surveillance, early surveillance next
year, is very crucial, both within the area and broader
surveillance in a multi-State region.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you. Thanks, again, for coming up
for the hearing.
It strikes me what you are saying about the bird
population. It really brings to life the old metaphor about the
canary and the coal mine, doesn't it? We have an interest here
not only in preserving the birds for their inherent value, but
also they are a tremendous warning to us in terms of the
potential danger.
Mr. McLean. I would like to add to that. I would like to
commend, actually, the public in this whole New York area,
because they were so concerned about the birds, it really
helped.
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. McLean. They found dead birds and turned them in, and
there was a lot of concern.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. McLean. I guess New York City got 150,000 phone calls,
and more than half were about birds.
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. McLean. So the public was very concerned about birds.
And in this case, it was very helpful, from a public health
standpoint.
Senator Lieberman. Dr. Fish?
Dr. Fish. Senator Lieberman, yes, I think there is a really
crucial role for the Centers for Disease Control in this. They
are the lead Federal agency on these kinds of problems, and I
think we need more leadership and they need more resources.
We have kind of a patchwork of local jurisdiction and local
responsibility here of varying qualities, Connecticut having
probably the best program, New York City having the worst. It
is a mosaic of capabilities, and it is a regional problem. What
happens in one municipality is going to affect the next.
Mosquitoes do not respect political boundaries.
The CDC can show leadership, can put together a coordinated
regional program to combat this virus, but they have got to do
it now, immediately. I mean, we only have 5 months when we have
to have a plan, an operational plan in place. Five months. And
if you wrote a check out for CDC today, it would take them 4
months to figure out how to spend it.
Senator Lieberman. I want to respond to that but I am going
to give Commissioner Stahl--I would just really ask for a
quick--what are the one, two, three things we should be doing
now beyond what we have talked about in support for research
and surveillance?
Ms. Stahl. I do apologize, by the way. I do not generally
respond to those things, but we have--it was an issue that
needed response.
Senator Lieberman. Do not worry.
Ms. Stahl. I think we are really on target here. I think we
cannot stop. We need to better refine our approach to deal with
not only West Nile virus but other potential diseases that
might come our way, so I agree that we need to stay vigilant.
I am delighted to hear about the coordination at the
Federal level, because I think that is something that will
serve us will, not only in this instance but in other instances
as they may arise, and we need to always look toward the
future.
With regard to CDC's role, I think that it is imperative
that they continue to be a voice in this matter. Again, many of
our decisions, there is much that we can do in preparation, but
when push comes to shove and that first positive mosquito shows
up in a trap, the decision is what do we do. We need a voice
with credibility, integrity, and expertise to help us make
those hard decisions. How do we weigh and measure the balances
between application of pesticides, what kind of pesticides, how
broadly, what is the risk from the mosquitoes, what is the risk
from the pesticides. That, as well, is something that we have a
great deal of expertise and experience with here at the State
level.
It helps tremendously to have the voice of the CDC in
making those determinations and taking those actions.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks to all of you. For me this has
been a very helpful informational exchange. I walk away both
with a feeling that we ought not to panic, but that this is a
serious problem here, and it is the kind of problem, because of
the way in which we and goods and cargo are traveling, are
going to continue to have for a good long time to come.
I am, in one sense, reassured by the response of the
agencies here in the State this year and concerned and
heartened also by some of the collaboration that you talked
about going on at the Federal level, but there is clearly more
that has to be done, and I am going to think some about that,
both in terms of trying to develop legislation or coalitions
that will support additional resources from the Federal
Government for the research and surveillance that you have
talked about, and particularly to focus in on the Center for
Disease Control and see what we can do in the immediate future
to guarantee that the CDC is doing everything it can now in its
role of national leadership and coordination to be taking
preemptive steps to limit and impede the outbreak that we
presume will happen next year and the years afterward.
So you have been real helpful in giving me some guidance as
to what I can do to be helpful, as well.
I want to state again to people who are here, because I
know there is broad public interest in this, that Elise
Campaign--I have to run, but Elise Campaign, who is my chief
staff person on this, will stay around. She is available to
listen to you, but also to tell you exactly how you can file
testimony that I promise you I will read and it will be part of
the record as we go forward.
Again, thanks very much. If it seems appropriate, we will
come back and do this again next spring.
Now I have this authority with this gavel brought
specifically from Washington to officially adjourn the hearing.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 10:30 a.m., the committee was adjourned, to
reconvene at the call of the Chair.]
[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:]
Statement of Durland Fish, Ph.D., Department of Epidemiology and Public
Health, Yale School of Medicine
I would like to thank Senator Leiberman and Senator Smith for
organizing this event and for their foresight in recognizing that the
threat of West Nile virus and similar insect-borne diseases is as much
of an environmental issue as it is a public health issue. The impact of
insect- borne diseases upon human health, which in Connecticut includes
Eastern equine encephalitis, Lyme disease, and now West Nile virus,
have their origin in the environment. Mosquitoes, ticks and other
parasites that feed upon human blood are products of the natural
environment. Their biologies are inextricably linked to environmental
conditions and climatic events that regulate their abundance. Viruses,
bacteria and other infectious agents are also common elements of the
natural environment and have an important role in regulating
populations of both plants and animals. Such agents often play an
essential role in the balance of nature.
Humans become involved in the natural cycle of environmental
disease agents when they are exposed to pathogens either by direct
contact with infected wildlife, as with rabies, or when they are bitten
by a mosquito or tick that has previously fed upon an infected animal,
as with West Nile virus or Lyme disease. Humans are bystanders in these
environmental events, but the consequence of infection can be
devastating, and even fatal. Such is the situation we are now facing
with the threat of West Nile virus.
The introduction of a foreign insect-borne virus, never before seen
in the Western Hemisphere is a public health threat unprecedented in
modern times. It is reminiscent of the introduction of yellow fever and
bubonic plague in past centuries. This event has three possible
consequences: It could simply disappear and represent a kind warning
from Mother Nature that there is more to come. It could establish
itself and repeat the events of last summer. Or, it could explode into
a raging epidemic that spreads far beyond the confines of New York and
Connecticut. The preponderance of evidence suggests that West Nile
virus is not going to go away by itself and therefore we must be
prepared for the remaining alternatives.
We were woefully ill-prepared for this epidemic of West Nile virus.
We were not aware of an epidemic until some 40 suspected cases filled
New York City hospitals. We did not even know what virus was causing
the epidemic until a month after people had already become ill and some
had died. We did not know where the infected mosquitoes were and,
consequently, ten million people were exposed to pesticides in an
attempt to control the epidemic by indiscriminate aerial spraying of
the entire New York City metropolitan area, not just once, but twice.
Our lack of preparedness was obvious and costly.
These events, as shocking as they may seem to the general public,
were predicted and warned by the scientific community. Two reports from
National Academy of Sciences warned of a decaying public health
infrastructure, particularly in reference to insect-borne diseases. The
first report, ``Manpower Needs and Career Opportunities in the Field
Aspects of Vector Biology'' published in 1983, warned of a serious
manpower shortage in the field of vector biology, the study of insects
that transmit human diseases. This report was totally ignored by
Congress and the responsible Federal agencies. Consequently there are
now very few professionals in government or academic institutions with
the appropriate knowledge and training to address the threat of insect-
borne diseases. The second report, ``Emerging Infections: Microbial
Threats to Health in the United States'' published in 1992, warned of
the potential for the introduction of foreign pathogens and the
degradation of public health infrastructure to combat such
introductions. This report was taken more seriously by Congress and
some Federal agencies, but the response has been neither adequate nor
timely, as is evidenced by recent events with West Nile virus.
What must be done to prevent a recurrence of last summer's events
and to prevent similar events from occurring in the future? In the
short term, every conceivable effort must be made to prevent West Nile
virus from re-emerging next spring. It is quite likely to survive the
winter months, either in infected wildlife or within the millions of
mosquitoes hibernating in buildings and tunnels in the New York City
metropolitan area. Immediate efforts should be made to find and destroy
any infected mosquitoes that may be now overwintering. Heroic efforts
must be made next spring to find the virus in mosquitoes or wildlife
and to focus mosquito control efforts on containing the virus before
humans become infected. A preemptive strike on certain mosquito species
known to be capable of transmitting the virus should initiated early in
the spring and directed at larval stage where environmental impact of
insecticide usage would be minimal. Every conceivable effort must be
made to control virus transmission early enough to prevent human
infection and avoid the use of widespread aerial insecticide
application to control a epidemic in humans. A repeat of last season's
response must be avoided at all costs.
In the long term, we must strengthen the public health
infrastructure to effectively and intelligently combat the threat of
new and re-emerging diseases. If West Nile virus was a test of our
response capabilities, we have failed miserably. Research is needed to
better understand the human threat of infectious diseases that
originate from the environment. This research should be
interdisciplinary and include epidemiology, microbiology, entomology
and, most importantly ecology. Government agencies responsible for the
funding of peer-reviewed research on vector- borne diseases must be
given increased resources to accomplish this goal. The training of a
new breed of scientists, blind to interdisciplinary boundaries, and
comprehensively trained both in the medical and environmental sciences
should begin immediately in order to staff the increasing demand for
expertise in government and academic institutions. Academic research
institutions and government agencies at all levels should form working
partnerships to integrate resources focusing upon this specific
problem.
Epidemics of insect-borne disease are preventable. We have
eliminated the threat of epidemic malaria, yellow fever, and bubonic
plague in this country years ago, but we have left our guard down
against the threat of new diseases, such as West Nile virus. Armed with
new knowledge from academic research, and the will of responsible
government agencies to refocus and integrate prevention efforts, we can
regain our capacity to combat new disease threats from the environment
and look forward to an improved quality of life in the next millennium.
__________
Statement of Theodore G. Andreadis, Chief Medical Entomologist,
Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Station, New Haven, CT
I am here today to report you the research and surveillance
activities that occurred in the State of Connecticut during the recent
West Nile Virus (WNV) crisis. I will focus my comments on specific work
that was done to isolate, identify and determine the distribution of
the virus in birds and mosquitoes in the state. Let me begin by stating
that since 1997, the State of Connecticut has had a comprehensive
Mosquito Management Program to monitor mosquito populations and
mosquito-borne viruses known to cause human disease, most notably
eastern equine encephalitis (EEE). This program is a cooperative effort
that involves three state agencies. The Connecticut Agricultural
Experiment Station (CAES), which is responsible for trapping and
testing mosquitoes; the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)
which is responsible for implementing all mosquito control measures;
and the Department of Public Health (DPH) which is responsible for
communicating health risks and protective measures to the public.
Mosquito trapping is conducted daily from June through October at 37
permanent locations (principally in freshwater swamps) throughout the
state. Since 1997, we have trapped and tested over 150,000 mosquitoes
and detected the EEE virus on 9 occasions from 6 different locations.
Because we had this surveillance system in place we at the CAES
were able to respond immediately to the WNV crisis. On September 4, the
New York City Health Department and the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) announced the death of an elderly resident of Queens from what
was initially thought to be St. Louis Encephalitis, a mosquito
transmitted virus. The following day (September 5) we placed mosquito
traps in the town of Greenwich and began a supplementary mosquito-
trapping program that was eventually extended to 15 towns throughout
lower Fairfield and New Haven Counties. This was in addition to the
normal trapping in other areas of the state. The purpose of this
trapping was to determine the types of mosquitoes in the region, assess
their relative abundance and to determine if these mosquitoes were
carrying the potentially deadly virus and if they were did this
represent a public health threat. Mosquito trapping was conducted over
an 8 week period through the end of October during which 261 traps were
placed in 80 different locations throughout the region and over 3,500
mosquitoes were trapped and tested in our laboratories.
Shortly after we initiated our mosquito surveillance program, we
began to receive reports of an ``extraordinary'' number of crow deaths
throughout lower Fairfield County. Similar crow die-offs were being
observed in New York City, Long Island and New Jersey as well, and
suspicion was rising that perhaps these crows were dying from the
virus. However, this would be highly unusual, since St. Louis
encephalitis does not typically kill birds. A plan was put into place
to systematically collect and test dead crows. This was coordinated by
the DPH with assistance from local health departments and wildlife
personnel within the DEP. Birds were sent to the Department of
Pathobiology at the University of Connecticut where necropsies were
performed by veterinary pathologists. Brains and other tissues from
crows that had diagnostic symptoms consistent with a viral encephalitis
were them submitted to the CAES for testing. Over 300 birds were
assessed from 38 towns through October 12 and 40 were tested in our
laboratory for WNV.
On September 21 we obtained our first isolations of this virus from
2 different species of mosquitoes (Aedes vexans and Culex pipiens) that
were trapped on the evening of September 14 at the Innis-Arden County
Club in Old Greenwich, and from the brain of a dead crow collected in
the town of Westport on September 13. This announcement was made by
Governor Rowland who subsequently directed the DEP to initiate limited
ground spraying of insecticides against adult mosquitoes in the
affected areas.
The isolation of this virus from adult mosquitoes and the brain of
a wild domestic crow, was a critical step in the eventual
identification of the virus. Despite the increasing number of human
cases that were being reported in NYC, the CDC had yet to obtain an
actual isolation of the living virus from a human. We believe our
isolations were the first from mosquitoes and a wild domestic crow.
Following our announcement, we were immediately contacted by CDC who
requested that we submit our isolations to them. We complied on
September 23. The following day the CDC announced that the virus was
not St. Louis encephalitis but was a ``West Nile-like''. Two days later
they informed us that the viruses that we isolated from the mosquitoes
and crow were the same.
We then proceeded to obtain specific reagents to test for WNV and
initiated molecular studies to sequence a portion of the genome (RNA)
of the virus with the intent of definitively identifying the virus,
determining its possible origin and assessing its virulence for birds
and humans. Early information which appeared in the British journal
Lancet on October 9 from studies conducted at the University of
California at Irvine had indicated that this virus was Kungin/WN-like
virus which occurs in Australia. However, their analysis was incomplete
and our genetic analysis showed a much closer relationship to WNV that
had been isolated from mosquitoes and humans during a recent outbreak
in 1996 in Romania thus suggesting a common origin. The results of our
investigations are due to be published in the journal Science later
this week.
Bird testing continued through mid-October and of the 40 birds that
we tested, 29 were found to be positive for WNV. These included 28
American crows and one Cooper's Hawk that were collected from 18 towns
in lower Fairfield and New Haven Counties along a 62-mile corridor from
Greenwich to Madison, CT. No virus isolations were made from 3 crows
and a Canadian goose collected from Hartford County.
Our isolations of West Nile virus from birds and mosquitoes
conclusively documented the presence of this virus in Connecticut
during September and October 1999 and virus activity appeared to be
limited to lower Fairfield and New Haven Counties. All of the work that
I have described was accomplished in State with no assistance from the
CDC or any other Federal Agency. Our timely coordinated response in
trapping and testing mosquitoes and birds provided indispensable data
that was effectively used to inform and protect the public and
fortunately, no human cases were reported in Connecticut.
The high mortality in crows and other bird species in the region
suggest a recent introduction of WNV into a native wildlife population
that has never been exposed to the virus. The isolation of WNV from a
variety of native birds, which are likely capable of circulating this
virus at relatively high titers over a broad geographic region, further
suggests that this exotic virus is likely to become established in the
avian fauna of the United States. How the virus will behave is unknown
but if established in North America, WNV likely will continue to have
severe effects on human health, horses, and on avian populations, such
as American crows and raptors. The environmental, social and economic
implications of permanent establishment of this exotic virus are
considerable.
While many important questions need to be investigated, among the
most urgent include: Will the virus persist in the region? How
widespread will it become? What impact will the virus have on native
bird and horse populations? How will the virus affect humans? How will
the virus over winter? How will we monitor virus activity to protect
the public? What birds will serve as natural reservoir hosts? What
mosquito species will serve as competent vectors?
Additional resources and funding are urgently needed to address
these and other research questions. This will lead to a better
understanding of the natural ecology and epidemiology of this new
exotic virus in North America. This information will provide critical
fundamental knowledge that is presently unknown. This will be an
essential component for developing effective virus surveillance,
disease management and mosquito control strategies throughout the
region. The information obtained in these studies will further aid in
assessing the relative risk of WNV to human health and help to
determine its impact on wildlife and domestic animals. We would further
anticipate that increasing our knowledge in the aforementioned areas
will reduce the need for application of toxic chemical insecticides to
the environment.
We are at a very critical juncture and we stand ready to act. We
have the expertise and laboratory facilities to undertake these
investigations. We have initiated studies on overwintering mosquitoes
and wild bird populations and with additional funding we can increase
our mosquito surveillance program, continue our basic research on bird
populations and continue our molecular studies to develop a rapid
procedure for identification of the WNV.
Mosquito Arbovirus Surveillance in Connecticut, 1998
(By Theodore G. Andreadis and John F. Anderson)
introduction
In 1997, the State of Connecticut established its first
comprehensive arbovirus surveillance program as part of a state-wide
Mosquito Management Program (Andreadis, 1997; Capotosto, 1997). The
program relies on the trapping and testing of mosquitoes for eastern
equine encephalitis (EEE) and other arboviruses at 37 locations
throughout the State. Locations include fresh water swamp sites (mostly
red maple/white cedar) known or suspected to support mosquito
populations that have historically tested positive for EEE, are capable
of supporting such populations, or are proximate to locations where
EEE-related equine or emu deaths have occurred. The results of the
second full year of this program are presented herein.
materials and methods
Mosquito Collections. Thirty-six of the 37 permanent locations
identified in 1997 (Andreadis, 1997) were again selected to trap
mosquitoes for virus testing. Due to low trap catches in 1997, the
Stamford site was eliminated. One additional site in Waterford
(Waterford Country School), where 3 EEE-related emu deaths occurred in
1997, was added. Trapping was conducted from June 1 through October 23
with CO2-baited CDC miniature light traps. Traps were
routinely set once every 10 days at each location on a regular
rotation. One trap per site per night was used. Mosquitoes were
transported live to the laboratory where they were immediately frozen
on dry ice and then identified microscopically on a chill table using
the keys of Carpenter and LaCasse (1955), Darsie and Ward (1981) and
Means (1979, 1987). Specimens were pooled by species, site, and
collection date. The number of mosquitoes per pool was 50.
Specimens were stored at -80 degrees C.
Virus Assays. All of the virus isolation work was conducted in a
newly renovated laboratory at the Connecticut Agricultural Experiment
Station using the same protocols established at the Arbovirus Research
Laboratory at Yale University in 1997. In most cases, mosquitoes were
processed for virus the day after collection.
Each frozen mosquito pool was homogenized in phosphate buffered
saline containing 0.5 percent gelatin, 30 percent rabbit serum,
antibiotic, and antimycotic. The homogenate was centrifuged for 10 min
at 520 g to clear the mixture of mosquito debris. A 0.1-ml aliquot of
each supernatant then was inoculated into a 25-cm\2\ flask containing a
monolayer of Vero cells and incubated at 37 degrees C in 5 percent
CO2 for up to 7 d (Tesh et al., 1992). One uninoculated
flask was kept as a negative control. The remainder of the supernatant
was stored at -70 degrees C.
Flasks were examined daily for cytopathic effect. If cytopathic
effect was noted, the cells were scraped from the flask and a cell
lysate antigen was prepared (Ansari et al., 1993). Isolates were
identified by enzyme immunoassay using reference antibodies that were
prepared in mice and provided by the World Health Organization Center
for Arbovirus Research and Reference, Yale Arbovirus Research Unit,
Department of Epidemiology and Public Health, Yale University
School of Medicine. These included: Cache Valley (CV), EEE, Highlands J
(HJ), Jamestown Canyon (JC), La Crosse, and St. Louis encephalitis
virus antibodies. Positive and negative control cell lysates were
included in each test. Highlands J and eastern equine encephalitis
antibodies crossreact in the enzyme immunoassay, but were
distinguishable on the basis of titer.
results and discussion
Mosquito Collections. A total of 66,383 female mosquitoes,
representing 28 species and 8 genera were collected, identified and
tested for arboviruses. This represented over 20,000 more mosquitoes
than in 1997. The increased numbers were attributed to the excessive
amount of rainfall the region received in June that resulted in
increased numbers of flood-water Aedes, Anopheles and Culex spp. The
most abundant species were Coquillettidia perturbans, Aedes canadensis
and Culiseta melanura. Thirteen additional Aedes species were
collected, among which, Aedes trivittatus, Aedes cinereus, and Aedes
vexans were the most numerous. Aedes abserratus was the most frequently
caught univoltine ``snow pool'' Aedes. Culex pipiens and Culex restuans
were equally abundant, and relatively large numbers of Anopheles
punctipennis and Uranotoenia sapphirina were trapped.
Eastern Equine Encephalitis. Increased EEE virus activity was seen
in 1998. Eight isolations from four different mosquito species in five
locations were obtained. The first EEE isolations were made on
September 29 from two pools of Ae. vegans and Cs. melanura mosquitoes
trapped at Barn Island in Stonington (New London County). In response
to this, a Phase II: Public Health Alert of the State Contingency Plan
for Eastern Equine Encephalitis was implemented. Pesticide applications
(truck-mounted ULV) were ordered by the Governor and subsequently
implemented by the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) in the
affected region. Additional traps were set and no further EEE
isolations were made at that specific location.
Six more EEE isolations were obtained from mosquitoes collected on
October 6 and 7 from four widely scattered locations in Chester
(Middlesex County), Newtown, Ridgefield (Fairfield County) and
Voluntown (New London County). A Phase II Public Health Alert with
pesticide spraying by the DEP was similarly implemented at Cockaponset
State Forest in Chester due to the isolation of the virus from two
species of human-biting mosquitoes Be. canadensis and An. punctipennis.
However, because the virus was limited Cs. melanura in Newtown,
Ridgefield and Voluntown, a Phase I Public Health Notification (no
pesticide sprays) was implemented in those regions. No further EEE
isolations were made from mosquitoes that were collected in additional
traps that were set in any of the four locations.
Five equines with clinical symptoms consistent with EEE infection
were tested. Specimens were obtained from the Connecticut Diagnostic
Laboratory, Department of Pathobiology, University of Connecticut. EEE
virus was isolated from the brain of a donkey that had died on October
16 in Canterbury. The animal was housed in an open barn surrounded by a
wetland swamp. Previous history suggests the animal contracted the
infection at this location which was approximately 3.7 miles from the
trap site in Plainfield. No EEE isolations were made from any other the
other four animals.
Results obtained in 1998 once again reinforce the highly focal
nature of EEE which can be limited to mosquitoes and birds in a single
swamp. The isolation of EEE from mosquitoes collected in Newtown and
Ridgefield are particularly noteworthy as this area of the State has
historically been considered to be at low risk for EEE. However, our
findings now suggest that the EEE virus may be more widespread than had
been previously thought. The isolation of EEE from mosquitoes in
Stonington for three consecutive years (Andreadis, 1997; Andreadis et
al., 1998) suggests that this region of the State is a focal center for
the virus. The deaths of the donkey in 1998 and the 3 emus in 1997
clearly indicate that the present strain of EEE in Connecticut is a
potentially serious public health threat and further emphasize the need
for continued trapping and testing of mosquitoes in all areas of the
State.
Highlands J. Twenty-three isolations of HJ virus were obtained from
nine species of mosquitoes: Cs. melanura (10), Cs. morsitans (3), Ae.
canadensis (3), Ae. vegans (2), Ae. stimulans, Ae. triseriatus, An.
punctipennis, Cx. pipiens and Cx. restuans. These mosquitoes were
collected from nine different locations in five towns (Ledyard, Lyme,
North Stonington, Stonington and Voluntown) all of which were located
in the southeastern corner (New London County) of the State. Both the
number and geographic location of these isolates were similar to
results obtained in 1997. The first isolation was made on August 5 and
the last on October 15. Highlands J virus isolations were made in only
two (Stonington and Voluntown) of the five locations where EEE was
isolated, once again calling to question its usefulness as a reliable
predictor of pending EEE activity in Connecticut.
Cache Valley. Twenty-two isolations of CV virus were made from
seven species of mosquitoes (An. punctipennis, An. quadrimaculatus, An.
walker), Ae. canadensis, Ae. cinereus, Cq. perturbans and G. melanura)
collected in 13 towns throughout all regions of the State. from August
19 through September 17. More than half (14) of these isolations were
obtained from An punctipennis. This represents only the second
isolation of this virus from Connecticut mosquitoes. The first
isolation was made in 1979 from Ae. triseriatus (Calisher et al.,
1986). This virus has been isolated from at least six genera of
mosquitoes and is now recognized as the most widely spread Bunyamwera
serogroup virus in North America, occurring in much of North America
except the extreme southeastern States and southern Mexico (Calisher et
al., 1986). Cache Valley virus has been isolated from large wild and
domestic animals and has been associated with congenital malformations
in sheep. In 1995, CV virus was isolated from a 28-year old male
residing in North Carolina and presenting with severe encephalitis and
multiorgan failure that ultimately resulted in death (Sexton et al.,
1997). The broad distribution and relatively high prevalence of CV
virus in mosquitoes known to feed on humans in Connecticut suggest wide
spread exposure of humans to this virus which may be an etiology of
unknown disease.
Jamestown Canyon. Six isolations of JC virus were obtained from
four species of mosquitoes (Ae. canadensis, Ae. stimulans, Ae.
trivittatus and An. punctipennis) collected in four widely distributed
towns in four counties (Fairfield, Litchfield, Middlesex and New
London) from June 25 through August 3. Three of the six isolations were
made from Ae. trivittatus. These results were similar to those obtained
in 1997 where seven isolations from five mosquito species were made
from June 30-July 14 (Andreadis, 1997). Results obtained from this and
other studies on mosquitoes (Andreadis et al., 1994) and white-tailed
deer (Zamparo and Andreadis, 1997), indicate that JC virus is widely
distributed throughout the State and appears to be mostly vectored by
early summer Aedes mosquitoes.
acknowledgments
We wish to acknowledge the assistance of John Shepard, Jodi
Corriea, Bonnie Harnid, Colleen Scott, Susana Cantu, J.R. Dubicki,
Ronald Ferrucci Arwen Mohr, John Russo, Kristina Steiff (The
Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Station); Shirley Tirrell-Peck
(Yale University); and Lt. David Florin (U.S. Navy).
references
Andreadis, T. G. 1997. Mosquito arbovirus surveillance in
Connecticut, 1997. Proc. 43d Ann. Meet. Northeastern Mosq. Control
Assoc. pp. 10-12.
Andreadis, T. G., J. F. Anderson, and S.J. Tirrell-Peck. 1998.
Multiple isolations of Eastern equine encephalitis and Highlands J
viruses from mosquitoes (Diptera: Culicidae) during a 1996 epizootic in
southeastern Connecticut. J. Med. Entomol. 35:296-302.
Andreadis, T. G., P. M. Capotosto, R. E. Shope, and S. J. Tirrell.
1994. Mosquito and arbovirus surveillance in Connecticut, 1991-1992. J.
Am. Mosq. Control Assoc. 10: 556-564.
Ansari, M. Z., R. E. Shope, and S. Malik. 1993. Evaluation of Vero
cell lysate antigen for ELISA of flaviviruses. J. Clin. Lab. Anal. 7:
230-237.
Capotosto, P. 1997. Connecticut's new mosquito management unit--
first year. Proc. 43d Ann. Meet. Northeastern Mosq. Control Assoc. pp.
8-9.
Carpenter, S. J., and W. J. LaCasse. 1955. Mosquitoes of North
America (North of Mexico). University of California Press. Berkeley.
Calisher, C. H., D. B. Francy, G. C. Smith, D. J. Muth, J. S.
Lazuick, N. Karabatsos, W. L. Jakob and R. G. McLean. 1986.
Distribution of bunyamwera serogroup viruses in North America, 1956-
1984. Am. J. Trop. Med. Hyg. 35: 429-43.
Darsie, R. F., Jr., and R. A. Ward. 1981. Identification and
geographic distribution of mosquitoes of North America, north of
Mexico. Mosq. Syst. Suppl. 1: 1-313.
Means, R. G. 1979. Mosquitoes of New York. Part I. The genus Aedes
Meigen with identification keys to genera of Culicidae. N. Y. State
Mus. Bull. 430a.
Means, R. G. 1987. Mosquitos of New York. Part II. Genera of
Culicidae other than Aedes occurring in New York. New York State Mus.
Bull. 430b.
Sexton, D. J., P. E. Rollin, E. B. Breitschwerdt, G. R. Corey, S.
A. Myers, M.R. Dumais, M. D. Bowen, C. S. Goldsmith, S. R. Zaki, S. T.
Nichol, C. J. Peters and T. G. Ksiazek. 1997. Brief Report.: Life-
threatening Cache Valley virus infection. New Eng. J. Med. 336: 547-
549.
Tesb, R. B., J. Lubroth, and H. Guzman. 1992. Simulation of
arbovirus overwintering: survival of Toscana virus (Bunyaviridae:
Phlebovins) in its natural sand fly vector Phlebotomus perniciosus. Am.
J. Trop. Med. Hyg. 47: 574-581.
Zamparo, J. M., T. G. Andreadis, R. E., Shope, and S. J. Tirrell.
1997. Serological evidence of Jamestown Canyon virus infection in
white-tailed deer populations in Connecticut. J. Wildlife Dis. 33:623-
627.
__________
Statement of Robert G. McLean, Director and Supervisory Biologist,
National Wildlife Health Center, U.S. Geological Survey, Madison, WI
Thank you for inviting me to provide information on the involvement
of wildlife species and the impact on wildlife populations related to
the emergence of West Nile virus in the United States. I will also
provide information on the activities and efforts of the U.S.
Geological Survey National Wildlife Health Center to investigate the
wildlife aspects of this virus which has been recently identified in
the United States.
Background Information
I am the Director of the USGS National Wildlife Health Center in
Madison, Wisconsin, which provides Federal and state resource
management agencies across the nation with information, technical
assistance, and research on national and international wildlife disease
and health issues. Our Center monitors disease and assesses the impact
of disease on wildlife populations; defines ecological relationships
leading to the occurrence of disease in free ranging wildlife; provides
on site investigation and control for wildlife disease emergencies; and
provides guidance, training, and technical information for reducing
wildlife losses when outbreaks occur. Current investigations include
the causes of deformities and disease in amphibians; tumors in green
sea turtles; the mysterious eagle mortality in Arkansas and elsewhere;
and management strategies to control avian botulism and avian cholera
in migratory waterfowl. Major studies are underway at the Salton Sea in
California.
The staff provides technical support, knowledgeable guidance, and
timely intervention to wildlife managers who are regularly confronted
with sick and dead wild animals, frequently on a large scale. Due to
the mobility of wildlife and the potential for the spread of disease,
timely and accurate determination of the causes of wildlife illness and
death is a prerequisite to achieving effective disease control and
prevention. The expertise and resources of our disease diagnostic
laboratory are crucial in providing this rapid response to wildlife
mortality events.
West Nile Virus Background
The West Nile virus (WNV) is a mosquito-borne virus belonging to
the Flavivirus taxonomic group that also includes St. Louis
encephalitis virus, Kunjin virus, Murray Valley encephalitis virus, and
others. These viruses are structurally and genetically similar making
them difficult to separate by traditional virological and serological
procedures. West Nile virus was first isolated in the West Nile
district of Uganda in 1937 and subsequently isolated in Egypt in the
early 1950's. The normal distribution of West Nile virus is Africa, the
Middle East, western Asia, and Europe. In September, investigators
discovered West Nile virus in the New York City area. This is the first
known occurrence of this virus in the Western Hemisphere.
West Nile Virus can infect a wide variety of vertebrate animals,
but birds are the primary natural hosts for this virus. It can be
transmitted from birds to other birds and animals, including humans,
through the bite of mosquitoes. Human epidemics were first recorded in
Israel during 1950-1954 and later in parts of Africa and Europe. An
epidemic occurred in Volgograd, Russia, during the summer of 1999. The
virus usually produces either asymptomatic infection or mild fever in
humans, but WNV has not been documented to cause epizootics (epidemics)
in birds throughout its known geographic range. Natural antibody to WNV
was commonly found in crows and other birds in Africa and Israel
suggesting asymptomatic or mild infection usually occurs in those
regions. St. Louis encephalitis virus in the United States commonly
infects wild birds which can become reservoirs for the virus, but are
normally not harmed by it. Therefore, the disease in birds in the New
York area producing high mortality in crows and other bird species is
unusual for these viruses suggesting that this introduced West Nile
virus is more virulent to the native bird species or represents a new
virulent strain of the virus. Resident and migratory birds may play an
important role in natural transmission cycles of this virus and in
maintaining the virus in the United States. Migratory birds could also
disseminate the virus to new states outside of the New York City area.
Enhanced monitoring through surveillance for early and rapid detection
of WNV in those states outside of the affected area will be important
to guide prevention measures.
Current Status of West Nile Virus in the United States
West Nile virus infection has been detected in humans in the New
York City area only; in mosquitoes in New York, Connecticut, and New
Jersey; and in birds (mostly crows) in New York, Connecticut, New
Jersey, and one crow in Baltimore, Maryland. Birds testing positive for
the virus have been reported almost entirely from within about a 50-
mile radius of the initial affected area in New York City except for
one crow from upstate New York, one from southern New Jersey, and the
crow from Maryland. As of November 5, 1999, 392 birds have been tested
for WNV by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and 192
were positive. The virus has infected 18 species of birds, including
exotic and native birds at zoos, and about four species of mosquitoes.
Mortality from the virus has been predominantly in American and fish
crows. Bird mortality has been reported in multiple states in the
region and may represent thousands of birds. The finding of the
infected crow in Maryland extends the affected area a considerable
distance southward. It is unknown if this crow was infected in the New
York City area and moved to Baltimore before it died or if it was
infected locally in Maryland. USGS and CDC have increased sampling of
wildlife in that area in cooperation with the Maryland and Delaware
wildlife agencies to determine if local transmission has occurred.
Enhance wildlife surveillance for detection of West Nile virus by USGS,
CDC, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and other agencies is
continuing and will expand to other Atlantic and Gulf Coast states.
These agencies are continuing to collaborate on enhanced surveillance
and what specific surveillance methods are needed for each region.
Efforts are underway by CDC to determine the source of the virus by
conducting molecular comparisons with known strains from other
continents. Several Federal and state agencies and private groups,
including USGS are searching for stored human and animal specimens to
test for West Nile virus or antibody to determine if the virus was
present before 1999.
Results from these investigations should provide more insight into
how, where, and when the virus was introduced.
Additional Research Needed for Wildlife
Additional wildlife research is needed to determine the principal
wildlife host species of West Nile virus in the U.S., and to determine
if wildlife species can maintain the virus in New York and other states
and serve as an overwintering source for resurgence next summer. We
need to determine the best wildlife species to be used as sentinels for
detection of West Nile virus activity in surveillance programs. We need
to determine the current distribution of the virus in bird populations
in the eastern U.S., and if the virus distribution has been expanded by
migratory birds. We want to know the impact of West Nile virus on bird
populations, particularly for the American and fish crow species and to
determine the susceptibility of other native wildlife species to this
virus. Finally, we need to determine if threatened and endangered
species and zoo animals can be protected from exposure and infection.
USGS Collaboration and Interaction with Other Agencies
USGS regularly interacts with other Federal and state agencies in
providing diagnostic assistance and consultations on wildlife diseases
nationwide. That interaction brought our lab into the West Nile virus
investigation when we were asked to provide diagnostic assistance on
crow mortality to the New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation. I was personally contacted early in the outbreak for
information and advice because of my expertise in avian mosquito-borne
diseases, specifically St. Louis encephalitis. I also have experience
from working with three of the Federal agencies involved in the
investigation. USGS and CDC quickly established collaborative efforts
to investigate the avian aspects of West Nile virus in the New York
City area. This effort led to increased collaboration with CDC on
multi-state surveillance for detection of the virus in birds. USGS
later established further surveillance efforts with USDA's Wildlife
Services and Veterinary Services. We increased our cooperative
interactions with state agencies. We are using their staff to assist
with bird sample collections. We are providing increased diagnostic
support and an avian pathologist to assist at the New York state
laboratory.
USGS was successful in establishing and maintaining these
collaborations and cooperative efforts with the Federal and state
agencies and they are working well. The combined expertise and
resources of each agency are complementary to each other. This combined
investigation by three Federal agencies will far exceed any effort that
could have been accomplished alone by any one of the agencies. This
completes my statement. I will be pleased to answer any questions you
may have.
__________
Statement of Jane K. Stahl, Deputy Commissioner, Connecticut Department
of Environmental Protection
Good morning. My name is Jane Stahl and I am the Deputy
Commissioner of Environmental Protection here in Connecticut. I'd like
to thank the Committee for this opportunity to discuss the State's
mosquito management program and its interest in this issue.
The mosquito issue in Connecticut has generally had two components:
one the nuisance factor and, two, the thankfully never realized human
health issues associated with mosquito-borne disease. Until this past
season, the disease of concern has been Eastern Equine Encephalitis
(EEE); and as we are here today to recognize, we now need to be
similarly concerned about West Nile or a West Nile-like Encephalitis
(WNV). Recent findings notwithstanding, it is still fair to say that
the risk of EEE or WNV transmission to humans is low. However, we need
to review our understanding of that risk, evaluate our approach to
comprehensive mosquito surveillance and control, and adjust our program
as necessary.
Organized mosquito control in Connecticut began in 1902 in response
to hundreds of malaria cases reported from many coastal communities.
The program was part of the Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Station
(CAES) in New Haven. Operational control of mosquitoes consisted of
hand ditching of tidal wetlands for drainage and application of
pesticides and oils to kill mosquito larvae. Systematic ``grid-
ditching'' climaxed in the early 1930's with the formation of the
Civilian Conservation Corps. Some 90 percent of original Atlantic coast
tidal wetlands from Maine to Virginia were altered in this fashion.
The virus that causes Eastern Equine Encephalitis (EEE) was first
identified in 1938 in Massachusetts, although horse and human deaths in
the region symptomatic of this disease had occurred prior to the
isolation of this virus. Outbreaks of EEE have occurred sporadically
among horses and domestic pheasants in Connecticut since 1938 but no
human cases nave ever been confirmed. In 1949, the mosquito control
responsibilities were transferred to the Department of Public Health
(DPH) primarily to maintain the tidal grid ditch network. With the
advent of environmental awareness in the 1970's and 1980's, mosquito
control evolved into a more natural resource oriented,
interdisciplinary program coordinated with wetland and watercourse
management. Because of this progressive approach to mosquito
management, when in 1993 the Mosquito and Vector Control Section was
eliminated from the DPH due to budgetary constraints, it was
transferred to the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) to
function as a wetlands restoration unit. In 1996,with the
identification of high incidence of EEE in human-biting mosquitoes in
southeastern Connecticut, the DEP along with the Connecticut
Agricultural Experiment Station (CAES) and DPH responded on an
emergency basis. The following legislative session under the leadership
of Governor Rowland and then Commissioner Holbrook, state funds were
appropriated to institute and support the current Mosquito Management
Program.
Connecticut's Approach to Mosquito Management
The state's Mosquito Management Plan is a public health-based
monitoring and management collaboration involving the DEP, the CAES,
and the DPH, which includes the systematic monitoring of mosquito
breeding populations; monitoring the prevalence of disease within those
populations; application of pesticides to control populations;
communication and provision of technical assistance to municipalities
regarding mosquito control. The program is coordinated by the DEP which
is responsible for the systematic identification and monitoring of
mosquito breeding sites, the provision of technical assistance to
municipalities and private property owners regarding mosquito control,
and the collection and communication of information and data. Long term
mosquito breeding site management occurs through DEP's wetland
restoration program.
The CAES, in consultation with DEP, identifies the locations for
traps, conducts the trapping, identifies mosquitoes by species and
conducts arbovirus testing. Trapping has been conducted in areas known
or suspected to support mosquito populations which have historically
tested positive for EEE, are capable of supporting such populations, or
are proximate to locations where EEE-related horse deaths have
occurred. Additional trap sites were established this past season in
response to the identification of WNV and will inform the
identification of additional trap sites this coming season.
The DPH reviews all mosquito test data and consults with the DEP
and CAES regarding the epidemiological significance of such results.
Based upon its evaluation of the potential human health risks, DPH
advises as to appropriate personal, municipal, and state actions to
reduce such risks. DPH also maintains direct communication with local
health directors and the state veterinarian as necessary to evaluate
and advise on mosquito borne disease issues. This season, DPH played an
active and invaluable role as the State's liaison with neighboring
state's health departments as well as the CDC.
Increased efforts in response to West Nile virus
This summer when human cases of West Nile virus were detected in
New York City, the Mosquito Management team immediately responded.
Working together and guided by our Eastern Equine Encephalitis
Contingency Plan, with ad hoc modifications based upon the breaking
revelations of the new virus, this team
identified and implemented the strategic deployment of
additional mosquito traps to augment existing traps and track the
existence of this mosquito borne virus in lower Fairfield County;
determined appropriate locations and methods of spraying
adulticide and applying larvicide to control mosquito populations while
minimizing any adverse impacts of pesticide application;
conducted the spraying of a low toxicity, narrow band
pesticide specifically targeted to mosquitoes and sprayed to maximize
reduction of potential reservoirs of virus;
established an effective communications system with all
local officials simultaneously to advise and consult on all actions
affecting their communities and to effectuate communication with the
public;
maintained continuous communication with the Federal
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and neighboring state officials;
established a protocol for the collection and sampling of
dead birds associated with the virus
It is important to note that because we had an existing monitoring
and surveillance program already in place, we were able to be
responsive rather than reactive. We relied on the data provided by the
additional population monitoring to guide our decision as to where to
conduct spray operations to provide the most control with the least
risk to human health. Moreover, because of the scientific data
available, we were able to make the decision to ground spray vs. aerial
spray, further reducing the potential exposure of humans to pesticides.
Looking towards the Future
Towns in lower Fairfield and New Haven counties have expressed deep
concern about West Nile virus and would like to see continued and
additional efforts made to prevent any public health threat.
Traditionally, the southwestern corner of Connecticut has had little
arbovirus activity because it is highly urbanized. However, West Nile
virus appears to be an urban disease; the primary vector (Culex
pipiens) is an urban mosquito and both have been found in the most
densely populated area of the state.
At a recent conference, the CDC indicated that an intensive
monitoring program for WNV should be undertaken in this upcoming year
and should include monitoring of the crow population (as a sentinel),
monitoring of the human population and increased monitoring of the
mosquito population. Also, monitoring of larval mosquito populations
and preventative control through education, source reduction and the
use of larvicides would reduce the adult mosquito vector population and
potentially reduce the need for and extent of adulticides.
Connecticut's team of experts is reviewing these recommendations and
evaluating the efficacy of their implementation. The DEP has and will
continue to provide technical assistance to towns and can increase
operational mosquito control efforts in southwest Fairfield County. We
are also aware of the concerns regarding increased pesticide use and
are committed to continue our practice of a reasoned, measured response
to the mosquito borne disease issue as well as a continued evaluation
of pesticide usage.
All this must be done while maintaining the program of mosquito
trapping and testing throughout the state. EEE remains a concern in our
region and we cannot forsake this effort.
There is the potential for Federal action in two areas. First, we
look for the continued support and encouragement of the CDC and the
National Wildlife Disease Center. The continued participation of the
CDC in evaluating the health risks associated with mosquito-borne
viruses and its assistance in public information and outreach regarding
those risks provides a voice of expertise and credibility beyond that
which individual states may be able to provide alone. Second, here in
Connecticut we rely on wetland and habitat management as a natural
mosquito management tool. Additional Federal resources and support of
our wetland restoration program would also be most welcome and could
provide direct benefits to coastal communities beyond those associated
solely with reduced mosquito populations.
__________
Statement of Paul R. Epstein, M.D., M.P.H., Center for Health and the
Global Environment, Harvard Medical School
Encephalitis: can we prevent the next outbreak?
The means by which the virus causing mosquito-borne encephalitis
entered the New York region in the fall of 1999 are not known. But the
climatic conditions favoring diseases that cycle among birds, urban
mosquitoes and humans are well understood, and there are important
lessons to be drawn from this emerging disease and its association with
climate variability and change.
Overall, we are in the midst of an emergence of new diseases and a
resurgence and redistribution of old diseases occurring on a global
scale. Since the mid-1970's the World Health Organization records the
emergence of over 30 infectious diseases, including Legionella, HIV/
AIDS, Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome, Ebola, toxic E. coli (0157:H7), a
new strain of cholera, and a host of antibiotic-resistant organisms. In
this decade malaria cases have quadrupled and local transmission has
reappeared in northern US States, Canada and Europe. The issue of
emerging infectious diseases is receiving serious attention from the
Institutes of Medicine, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
and the U.S. State Department.
In the New York area, the mosquito population explosion ushering in
West Nile-like viral encephalitis came as a ``surprise.'' But mild
winters and summer dry spells favor breeding of city-dwelling
mosquitoes (Culex pipiens), while extended droughts kill off their
predators. The prolonged July heat wave may have amplified the virus
maturation and circulation among mosquitoes and congregating birds,
while late August rains unleashed a new crop of Aedes mosquitoes, that
may have acted as an additional ``bridge'' vector to humans.
West Nile virus may have recently evolved in strength, as it has
not previously killed birds in such numbers. Meanwhile ``generalist''
urban birds--crows, Canada Geese and gulls--are out-competing the more
sensitive ``specialists,'' that are losing their more restricted
ecological niches. The generalists--with wide ranging diets--may, in
general, be more tolerant to disease agents, thus more apt to maintain
blood levels that favor disease transmission.
Warm winters are associated with climate change. A warming
atmosphere holds more moisture, and the increase in clouds blocks
nighttime and winter cooling. More precipitation in winter falling as
rain, rather than snow, reduces snowpack, spring runoff, exacerbating
spring droughts projected for the Northeast region of the United
States. Enhanced evaporation from warming seas also raises humidity and
heat indices, fuels hurricanes and reinforces greenhouse warming.
With an increase in the hydrological (water) cycle, protracted
droughts, heat waves and intense, tropical-like downpours are also
associated with warming of the atmosphere and the world's ocean.
This decade, the International Federation of Red Crosses reports
that extreme weather events have been especially punishing for poor
nations, often spawning ``clusters'' of mosquito-, water-, and rodent-
borne diseases in their wake. Severe weather has also been costly. The
Munich Reinsurance Company calculates that weather-related losses
(increasingly intense weather compounded by development patterns)
exceeded $90 billion in 1998, eclipsing the $55 billion for all of the
1980's.
This summer New York suffered acutely from extreme weather. The
July heat wave strained the distributive capacity of the energy grid,
and the loss of key medical research at Columbia highlighted the need
for reliable generators, such as fuel cells. On August 26 an intense
downpour carried farm waste into the underground aquifer supplying the
Washington County Fair, resulting in 1061 cases of toxic E. coli
infection and several deaths. Encephalitis, with its economic and
psychological sequelae, was the final assault.
There are important lessons to be gleaned from this outbreak:
Basic disease and sentinel species surveillance must be
strengthened.
Collaboration between wildlife ecologists and human
health investigators must be forged, for many emerging diseases are
transferred from animals.
Forests and wetlands must be preserved, for these
habitats maintain the biodiversity that provides primary prevention
against pest and pathogen proliferation, and buffer against climate
extremes.
Health early warning systems based upon knowledge and
projections of conditions conducive to disease outbreaks can help
target surveillance.
Early warnings can facilitate timely, environmentally friendly
public health interventions, such as selective treatment of mosquito
breeding sites, in lieu of wide-scale dissemination of pesticides.
This outbreak also serves warning that diseases emerging
and evolving elsewhere--chiefly from poverty and environmental
degradation (e.g., deforestation)--can come home to haunt us.
And finally we have learned that the US is also
vulnerable to extreme weather that can trigger epidemics. An
increasingly unstable climate, with wide swings from norms, provides
conditions favorable to disease emergence and spread.
While this epidemic has raised the necessity of strengthening
surveillance and laboratory capability in order to prepare for the
potential of biological terrorism, we must confront the enemy we know:
the growing ecological and climatic vulnerabilities encouraging the
reemergence of infectious disease. This resurgence, in the final
quarter of the 20th Century, may be viewed as a symptom of global
change--social, ecological and climatic. And sadly, we must prepare for
more surprises.
Environmental cleanup, ecological restoration, clean energy sources
and energy efficiency can become guiding principles. Clean energy
sources (fuel cells, solar, wind and hybrids) can power transport,
industry and housing, and can pump, purify and desalinate water. Such
enterprises can become the engine of economic growth in the coming
decades.
Ultimately we must shed inherited economic obstacles (perverse
subsidies and unpayable debts) and adopt new incentives and new funds
to create a ``win-win'' for the environment and the economy. Only then
we will reverse the environmental assaults on public health and achieve
clean, equitable and healthy development in the century before us.
__________
Department of Public Health, State of Connecticut,
December 23, 1999.
The Honorable Joseph Lieberman,
Senate Hart Office Building,
Washington, DC 20510.
Dear Senator Lieberman: I am writing to submit formal testimony from
the Connecticut Department of Public Health (DPH) to the United States
Subcommittee on Environment and Public Works Regarding the West Nile
Virus. This testimony is being submitted in conjunction with the
Committee hearing held at Fairfield University on December 14, 1999.
Two Connecticut State agencies with which the Department of Public
Health closely works on vector-borne illnesses presented oral and
written testimony at the hearing on December 14. They are the
Department of Environmental Protection and the Connecticut Agricultural
Experiment Station. I will not reiterate their testimony. Rather, I
will provide the Connecticut public health perspective on preparedness
for and resources used in the initial response to the threat to human
health posed by the presence of West Nile virus, and a perspective on
what will be necessary to monitor for and respond to its likely re-
emergence.
I am the Director of the Infectious Diseases Division at DPH and in
that capacity am the designated State Epidemiologist. Connecticut is
one of eight States that currently receives specie' Federal funding to
conduct surveillance for emerging infections and has received Federal
funding for bioterrorism preparedness. I am the project director for
Connecticut for both of these Federal cooperative agreements.
Preparedness for and Response to West Nile virus in Connecticut, 1999
As the Committee has already heard, Connecticut had a state-funded
surveillance system for mosquito-borne viruses and a capacity and plan
to respond to their presence that was already in place when it became
apparent that West Nile virus was in the greater New York area. In
fact, the Connecticut system contributed directly to the rapid
recognition that the crow die-offs and outbreak of what was thought to
be Saint Louis Encephalitis (SLE) were related and due not to SLE
virus, but to West Nile virus. Having this pre-existing system made it
possible to quickly direct some of those resources to the parts of
Connecticut likely to be initially affected, to rapidly determine the
potential risk to humans and to have an information-directed response.
Without this information, it is likely that our response would have
been filled with extreme anxiety and highly conducive to over-
reaction--and we would not have the kind of information that will help
with future assessment of risk from the presence of West Nile virus.
However, several additional critical capacities were also mobilized
and integral to the Connecticut ability to respond to West Nile virus:
capacities fostered by regional bioterrorism preparedness and by
federally supported emerging infections capacity. Functional regional
communication systems had already been established as part of
bioterrorism preparedness: e-mail networks between State
epidemiologists, mass conference call capacity and, in New York, a
confidential electronic health alert network. Connecticut was informed
immediately by New York City and New York State as soon as it became
clear that there was an outbreak of mosquito-borne disease in New York
City. Beginning in early September, New York organized daily regional
conference calls including affected States, counties and the Centers
for Disease Control to discuss the breaking situation. Everything that
was being learned about the situation was shared. Because of the
incredible communication, we were able to intelligently communicate
with hospitals, local health departments and the public and to rapidly
establish intensive surveillance for human illness. We were able to use
our own developing in-state systems to rapidly share information with
local health departments and hospitals. If we had not begun to
establish such communication systems, the mobilization would not have
been as quick, the response not as coordinated and we would still be
groping for unpublished information that was shared during this time.
The communications aspects of the response to West Nile virus in 1999
are a real success story. I think Congress can be proud that they have
recognized a need to support development of national and state-based
communications systems as part of the preparedness to respond to
bioterrorism--and that these communication systems can be used
effectively in a variety of situations.
Connecticut's Emerging Infections Program was also very involved in
the response to West Nile virus. Among other things, we used hospital-
based networks established for surveillance of unexplained deaths and
life threatening illness to conduct more active surveillance for people
admitted with possible encephalitis. In addition, the professional and
public demand for accurate information was insatiable. Because we had
emerging infections ``surge'' capacity, we were able to devote 5 full
time equivalent professional staff for 6 weeks to answering telephone
calls from hospitals, physicians and local health departments to
provide them with more detailed answers to questions they had. Emerging
infections surveillance and response capacity is invaluable and enables
us to respond in much more depth to such situations.
Monitoring for and Responding to West Nile Virus in 2000
There is a high probability of West Nile virus becoming established
in the Western Hemisphere. Dr. Robert McLean from the USGS National
Wildlife Health Center testified on December 14 as to the possible
scenarios for the emergence of West Nile virus in 2000. It is critical
that we monitor for the re-emergence of West Nile virus in a variety of
ways that anticipate each of these scenarios. If we have information
about West Nile virus (or any other mosquito-borne threat to human
health) early, before the virus cycle in birds and mosquitoes builds up
to levels that threaten human health, we can take action to prevent the
kind of outbreak that occurred in New York City this past fall.
Early detection of the re-emergence or re-introduction of West Nile
virus will require special surveillance efforts, even in States like
Connecticut that already have a significant capacity to conduct
surveillance for arboviruses. Surveillance for West Nile virus will
require an extra component that is different than that used for any
other kind of mosquito-borne disease surveillance system--namely,
surveillance for dead crows. Such a system will be resource intensive:
staffing is needed to monitor crow deaths, to collect crows and to test
them for West Nile virus. If West Nile virus is found, intensive local
mosquito trapping and surveillance for human and horse illness will
then be needed. At this stage, there will be a huge public demand for
information similar to what we had this past fall in Connecticut. Thus,
each State in the eastern half of the United States where West Nile
virus is most likely to re-emerge or be reintroduced, needs to have
resources dedicated to early detection of West Nile virus. For States
without arboviral surveillance programs and without significant
epidemiologic and laboratory surge capacity, this will be a formidable
challenge. Even for those with such capacity, it will be a challenge to
implement and maintain such a system for the 6-7 months during which
there is mosquito activity each year. Given that this is an emerging
challenge affecting a large number of States, Federal support may be
needed to enable a widespread surveillance network for this critical
next year.
Thank you for the providing an opportunity to comment on the West
Nile virus situation. If you have any questions, I can be reached at
the Department of Public Health at: 860-509-7995.
Sincerely,
James L. Hadler, M.D., State Epidemiologist,
Infectious Diseases Division, Connecticut Department of Public
Health.
__________
College of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
University of Connecticut,
Storrs, CT, December 27, 1999.
Senator Joseph Lieberman,
Hart Senate Office Building,
Washington, DC 20510.
Dear Senator Lieberman: I recently attended your December 14 hearing on
the occurrence of West Nile virus in Connecticut during the fall of
1999. I write today with additional information that you may find
meaningful.
During his testimony Dr. Andreadis of the Connecticut Agricultural
Experiment Station spoke of three State agencies that collaborated
during the surveillance. We, at the University of Connecticut,
represent the fourth agency, the pathologists who received over 300
birds for necropsy and diagnosis, and who selected brain tissues for
attempts at virus isolation. The now famous ``Westport crow'' was
collect at our request after an alert from a New York colleague, and
tissues were later forwarded to Ted Andreadis consistent with a pre-
arranged liaison within the mosquito surveillance program. During the
bird die-off, Drs. Wakem, French, Garmendia and I did the dissections
on the submitted birds, four fifths of them crows, but including hawks,
owls, and a great variety of backyard birds.
We continue to do microscopic, virologic and electron microscopic
studies in an attempt to wrap up this extensive case material. One of
the difficulties we have encountered is the lack of funds to
immediately and effectively deal with these great numbers of cases
within an epidemic. We have an immediate and continuing need to pay a
full-time technician to enter data into a spreadsheet, to process
tissues for microscopy and to aid with new accessions, that continue to
come to us even in December. Further, there is an immediate need for us
to upgrade an existing laboratory from biohazard level 2 to biohazard
level 3. At our present rate we will not complete our case studies for
another 10-12 months, meaning that the data fail to be timely, for
everyone's purposes.
I have been a member of the mosquito surveillance team for 3 years
and I have participated in USDA-sponsored symposia that plan
preparedness. At these sessions money is never set aside for rapid
response. During the 1999 episode three of us worked day and night to
deal with the birds. We had to come away from our other research, which
we didn't mind, however there was inadequate technical support to make
our chores easier, less time-consuming, and more efficient. We
repeatedly had to borrow graduate students to help, a half-day here, a
half-day there. I write not to say that we or they minded helping, but
rather to ask now for funds to finish the work and to be properly
prepared for the spring recurrence, in whatever form that might be. In
a general sense then, I write to suggest that moneys need to be placed
in escrow to deal with new and emerging diseases, and in a specific
sense to ask for immediate moneys for the winter 2000 effort--to finish
the epidemic of 1999. We have evidence that West Nile fever extended
beyond Fairfield and New Haven counties and certainly beyond the
artificial cutoff for submission of birds (Nov.S) initiated by the
Department of Public Health and the DEP.
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
H. J. Van Kruiningen, D.V.M., Ph.D., M.D.
Director, Northeastern Research Center for Wildlife Diseases.
__________
Donald R. Maranell, First Selectman,
Stonington, CT 06378-0352, December 22, 1999.
Senator Joseph Lieberman,
Subject: Public Clearing Comments for Encephalitis diseases borne by
Mosquitoes
Attached is my testimony of January 31, 1997 to the members of the
Connecticut Environmental Committee in support of bills that enacted
the State of Connecticut's Mosquito happing and testing program after
an outbreak of BEE in the mosquito population in Rhode island ``d
Connecticut in the summer and fall of 1996.
It is appropriate to educate the public and I support your efforts
but we also need to do more. If not for Rhode Island's in place program
in 1996, our first indication of trouble could have been tragic. This
year, we were able to identify the cause of a health emergency due to
the program enacted as a result of our 1996 experience. We, as
Americans, should not have to depend on the actions of others to make
us aware of health threats that are caused by insects and birds that
ignore town, county and State boundaries. This is a national issue and
interest. I support public awareness but urge you to investigate the
creation of a national standard and a program that monitors, informs
and controls diseases such as encephalitis in any of its deadly forms.
Thank you for your interest. The Town of Stonington and I stand by
to assist your efforts In any way we can.
__________
Statement of Donald R. Maranell, First Selectman, Stonington, CT
support of senate bills 175/179/583 and house bills 5192/5822
I stand here today in support of Senate Bills 175/179/583 and House
Bills 5192/5822. As I am sure you are all aware, the Town of Stonington
was the first Connecticut community to deal with the mosquito-borne
Eastern Equine Encephalitis situation in September 1996. During this
time, our residents were subject to restricted outdoor activity, the
wearing of long sleeves/pants, altered school schedules, sprays, the
onslaught of the press and the negative effects this type of news has
on children, families and tourism-type businesses.
On September 24, 1996 Governor Rowland announced his intention to
propose a $850,000 mosquito control program to the Southeastem
Connecticut Council of Governments at Stonington Town Hall. It is my
understanding this program was to include larvaecide and adulticide
mosquito control, monitoring and wetlands restoration. I hope today is
step one of fulfilling that promise to the residents of Connecticut.
These bills are not only a human health issue but, also an economic
health issue. Southeastern Connecticut is mayor tourist attraction In
fact, over 60 percent of all Connecticut tourists stop in Mystic (a
section of the Town of Stonington). We cannot afford to allow our
residents to tolerate this health-threatening problem and cannot allow
the economy to suffer from inaction.
We were lucky. Commissioners Sidney Holbrook (DEP), Steve Harriman
(DPH) and our talented and dedicated State employees were up to the
task. They should be commended for their efforts. I know I will always
be grateful for the support we received from them.
I hope the final program you support includes preventive measures
and monitoring, not just monitoring and reaction. As a society we have
chosen to preserve the environment. That comes with responsibilities.
Not only to society but, to the Earth. Wetlands restoration funding is
probably one of the key issue in this program. If Barn Island (a State
Preserve in Stonington) and other protected areas are allowed to become
or remain the ``mosquito farms'' they are when stagnate water is
allowed to exist, this program will be very expensive to maintain. We
must invest in our wetlands. Many of our older residents remember when
the State would dig trenches to encourage water flow in the Barn Island
and salt marsh areas. Please don't stop short, we must commit to a
comprehensive program that protects our residents, removes fear from
our population, protects the environment, and assists in the economic
health of our State.
__________
Statement of Nancy Alderman, President, Environment and Human Health,
Inc. \1\, North Haven, CT
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\1\ Environment and Human Health Inc. is a nonprofit organization
made up of doctors, public health professionals and policy experts,
committed to protecting the public from environmental harms through
research, education, and the promotion of sound public policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The presence of the West Nile Encephalitis virus this fall in the
tri-State area raised several concerns for the future. As winter
approaches and the health hazard subsides, it is important to take
advantage of this time to gain a broad-based understanding of the
disease, and find the safest way to prepare for a re-emergence of the
virus.
There are both serious health and ecological concerns to be
understood. The Senate hearing that was held in Connecticut this past
December showed clearly that preparation by the local communities as
well as the States is essential if we are to avoid a major public
health and environmental crisis next spring.
There are dangers from under- as well as over-reaction. Connecticut
was fortunate in that there already was an infrastructure in place to
deal with insect-borne diseases due to the past occurrences of Equine
Encephalitis that had occurred in both Connecticut and Rhode Island.
However, next spring we must be prepared for a more serious
outbreak of insect borne diseases, and therefore we need to plan now
with our neighboring States. We also need to encourage public health
officials to make their decisions in a transparent way. The
transparency of decisions is needed in order to promote public trust.
It is vitally important for those that are in charge of managing
the West Nile Virus be aware that State health agencies over the last
decade have been ``down-sized'' due to economic constraints, and this
``downsizing'' has left the environmental and public health agencies
with limited experienced staff and resources. These resources are
needed to address a crisis of this magnitude.
a: coordination and credibility
1. Co-ordination among neighboring States.
a. Co-ordination with NY, NJ, RI and CT is vital. All States should
use the least toxic pesticide possible and should disperse that
chemical in the least harmful way. Risk of disease and risk of
pesticide must be weighed carefully.
b. Precautions for pesticides are different for different
pesticides. There is potential for the public to become confused about
advice given if this advice is not coordinated.
c. Because the media often covers more than one State, it is
essential that information is coordinated, especially if different
management approaches are taken. It will be important to communicate
why and how the States' approaches are different.
2. Credibility needs to be ensured by the political and health
entities at the Local, State and Federal level. If there are
conflicting messages it will reduce the public's confidence and
support.
a. An infrastructure is needed to address problems such as the West
Nile Virus. Local experts from both the environmental fields and the
public health arenas can add perspective to the issue. Health care
providers need to be aware of potential health problems that can arise
from both the virus and also from the use of pesticides. Communities
and grassroots organizations can be important outreach mechanisms. With
proper funding and access to resources, they can help to get the word
out to the public.
b. A technically expert support group is needed at the regional
level to address the redundancy of effort at the local levels and to
enhance the distribution of information and interaction of local
staffs.
The regional EPA's relationships with State and local governments
is one model that can be looked to.
b: ecological
1. Pesticide applications.
a. Recordkeeping of pesticide use must be kept. The information of
how, where, and how much materials are applied is necessary in order to
address the ecological impacts.
b. Standards need to be set for selecting those companies and staff
who are hired to spray pesticides.
c. We must evaluate and document the effects on the ecology of the
region when widespread use of pesticides has been undertaken.
c: public health
1. Adequacy of information.
a. Information should be geared toward the most sensitive of
populations as opposed to the general population.
b. Because we are a multi-cultural population, information should
be prepared in additional languages.
c. The public needs to have an honest evaluation of the relative
health risks of decisions made, as well as complete advice on what
precautions to take for the protection of themselves and their
families.
2. Misuse of the mosquito repellent, DEET
a. There is a great potential for parents and care givers to misuse
DEET. DEET is a neuro-toxin and should be used carefully and never on
children under 2 years of age. Coordination and expansion of good
information about DEET is needed in order to reach a wider audience
that includes children and their care givers.
b. In a crisis such a vector-borne disease, there is the potential
for the public to misuse other pesticides as well as DEET. Sound advice
with pesticide use health implications needs to be made available.
While the Senate Committee focuses on the environmental impact of
the disease and spraying, those managing the problem cannot divorce
themselves from the public health implications associated with its
environmental management.
__________
Statement of Andrea L. Boissevain, M.P.H., Health Risk Consultants,
Fairfield, CT
Ecological and Public Health
This Fall's West Nile Encephalitis virus presence in the tri-State
area raises several concerns. As winter approaches and the health
hazard subsides, it is important that a broad-based understanding of
the issues be sought.
The health and environmental agencies of Connecticut, New York, and
New Jersey are to be commended in their response to the potential
health crises. However, this coming spring, when the mosquitoes and
other vectors again become active, the region should be prepared on
both the public health and the environment fronts.
Environmental and public health responses need to be coordinated.
There are both serious health and ecological concerns. We raise but a
few of them here today:
a. ecological
1) Pesticide application.
a) Is there record keeping in place of how, where, and how much
material was applied? This will be necessary in order to address
ecological impact.
b) What are the criteria in selecting those who spray?
c) We will need to evaluate the widespread use of pesticide and its
effect on the ecology of the region.
2) Coordination among three States (CT/NY/NJ).
a) Precautions are different if malathion is used versus
resmethrin. There is the potential for the public to become confused.
b) Because the media is tri-State, it is essential that information
is coordinated especially if different management approaches are taken.
It will be important to communicate why and how the approaches are
different.
3) Study Issues.
a) Recommend an ``expert'' panel to assess effect of outdoor
pesticide application (e.g. lawn grooming) and how that may affect
biological balance of mosquito growth cycles.
b. public health
1) Adequacy of information campaign--especially next spring.
a) Equity in information and in dissemination. Information should
be prepared in additional languages because we are a multi-cultural
population.
b) Clear warnings not just for the general population. Information
should be geared toward sensitive populations as well (e.g. potential
for anti-cholinergic drug interactions is of greatest concern such as
some medications used to treat glaucoma).
c) The public needs a perspective on health risks as well as what
precautions to take for their children and themselves.
2) Misuse of the mosquito repellent, DEET.
a) There is a great potential for parents and caregivers to misuse
DEET--another aspect of adequate information campaign. This is the most
immediate health hazard. There are health education programs in CT and
NY that are designed to inform regarding the use of DEET in the
prevention of ticks and tick-borne diseases. There needs to be
coordination and/or expansion of these programs with mosquito-focused
campaigns in order to reach the wider audience that includes children
and their caregivers.
While this committee focuses on the environmental impact of the
disease and spraying, those managing the problem cannot divorce
themselves from the public health implications associated with the
environmental management. Furthermore, it is imperative that health
information be provided by health agencies, not only the Department of
Environmental Protection.
An infrastructure needs to be created to address problems like this
one where we could benefit from hearing from local experts from both
environmental and public health perspectives. Communities and
grassroots organizations can be a great outreach mechanism. With proper
funding and access to resources, they could really help to get the word
out.
__________
Statement of Thomas R. Baptist, National Audubon Society, Greenwich, CT
Thank you for your interest and leadership regarding insecticide
spraying to control mosquito-borne illnesses, such as the West Nile
Virus that occurred in Connecticut and New York this summer and fall. I
appreciate the opportunity to provide comments relating to this
important matter.
As you are aware, this is a complicated issue, and one that goes
far beyond the short-term goal of eradicating the infected mosquitoes
and preventing the spread of a potentially fatal disease. On the one
hand, it seemed clear that pesticide spraying was the only known short-
term response to limit the spread of disease when it was discovered
this summer and fall. On the other hand, the widespread spraying raises
serious questions about the long-term implications of insecticides in
the environment.
The impact on our natural systems received little attention during
the course of the field hearing in Fairfield last week. It is critical
that ecological and environmental health issues be carefully
considered, in addition to the public health conccms, as we move
forward to establish a comprehensive mosquito management program.
Here in Connecticut, our State officials deserve praise for their
cautious approach in developing a response to the presence of the West
Nile Virus in mosquito and bird populations. State health and
environmental officials sought input from scientists, evaluated what
our neighbors to the west were doing in the face of similar threats,
and came up with a reasonable and effective approach. After careful
research and evaluation, Connecticut's response included ground
spraying of Scourge, with the principal ingredient of Resmethrin rather
than aerial spraying of Malathion--the approach used in New York.
Ground spraying allows better control, allowing the spray to be
more effectively targeted at problem areas. Resmethrin is known for its
low toxicity and short persistence in the environment. It is intended
to control adult mosquitoes, midges and black flies. In humans, it is
harmful if absorbed through the skin or if swallowed. However, for
humans and house pets, it is fairly simple to avoid exposure by staying
indoors while spraying is occurring, closing doors and windows, turning
off air conditioners and fans, and preventing children and pets from
playing in areas that are still wet from spraying. For all other fish
and wildlife, the answers are not so simple.
According to the manufacturer's information, Scourge is highly
toxic to fish. If large fish kills were to occur, the effects would be
felt all the way up the food chain, with possible implications for the
overall health of the environment in our communities.
Like the canary in the coal none, birds sounded the early warning
of the presence of the enchephalitis threat. The death of crows, which
apparently host the virus that causes the disease, early this summer
served as a biological indicator that something was amiss. This
underscores the important role that native bird populations and other
fish and wildlife species play as indicators of environmental and human
health, and provides a rationale for continued close monitoring of bird
populations.
With the advent of the cold weather, the mosquito populations have
diminished, and the immediate threat appears to be over. But, as Dr.
Fish pointed out, it is quite likely that the threat will resurface
next year and we will again find ourselves facing a crisis situation.
Whatever the actual level of risk, there will undoubtedly be huge
public demands for continued mosquito control next year.
What should we be doing between now and then to ensure long-term
public and environmental health protection?
Federal, State and local agencies should institute active
monitoring programs, similar to that which is in place here in
Connecticut, to assess the level of threat. The existing mosquito
control program in Connecticut should be enhanced to allow officials to
carefully focus insecticides on problem areas, rather than employing
more handful broadcast spraying. However, in all cases, spraying of
pesticides should be the method of last resort to control mosquito-
borne illnesses. Adequate resources should be provided for Federal,
State local agencies to identify and carefully examine mosquito problem
areas, and specific action plans should be developed to correct
hydrologic conditions that are causing infestations.
In many cases, mosquito problems are the result of human impacts on
our wetland systems, and restoring wetlands and waterways to a more
natural condition can help restore Nature's own mosquito control
processes. For example in a healthy tidal wetland system, fish eat
large numbers of mosquitoes and their larvae, helping to control insect
populations. Wherever tidal flow has been restricted or wetlands have
been dammed, ditched, filled or otherwise impacted, this natural
balance may be disrupted.
Over the past decade, the Connecticut Department of Environmental
Protection has been working to restore key wetlands. The agency has
restored approximately 1,800 acres of salt marsh along the Connecticut
coast, including wetlands at Barn Island in Stonington, the Last River
in Guilford and Madison and Sliver Sands State Park in Milford. This
common sense approach--which protects human health, our feathered
friends and all other fish and wildlife--should be expanded, and
consistently applied as the most effective long-term solution to our
mosquito ills. In addition, adequate funding is needed for research lo
help identify other means of preventing the threat of mosquito borne
illness in this country.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to provide comments in this
important matter. My staff and I stand ready to assist in any way we
can to prevent human illness from mosquito borne disease while
protecting the health of our environment and precious natural
resources.
__________
Statement of Lisa Santacroce, Environmental Affairs Office, Connecticut
Audubon Society
I attended your hearing last week in Connecticut on the West Nile
virus and I am very pleased to see your attention to this issue, and
particularly your foresight in trying to address this issue before it
escalates into a crisis next summer. From the testimony presented, this
is certainly an issue where being proactive can make a difference.
The hearing was very helpful in learning more about this virus and
the mosquitos that transmit it. Connecticut Audubon is concerned about
the potential impact in native bird populations, but it is clearly too
early to tell what those impacts might be. We are also concerned with
large scale pesticide applications in terms of their impact on human
health and the environment.
We were very pleased to see, based on DEP Commissioner Stahl's
testimony, that Connecticut exhibited a much more measured and
deliberate response to the West Nile virus outbreak than New York. New
York instituted broad aerial-spraying of malathion, which is a very
toxic pesticide, without any knowledge of where the infected mosquitos
were concentrated. Granted. they did have human fatalities due to this
outbreak while Connecticut did not have a human case at all. Our
response was ground spraying in the areas where infected mosquitos had
been located (due to trapping).
We are pleased that our State's experience with the EEE virus led
to the development of an action plan to deal with mosquito-borne
viruses and this plan will serve us well as these threats continue to
develop. However, we would like more information about the actual
pesticides being used and any toxic impacts they may have. We would
also like to know exactly what the DEP's response hierarchy is in terms
of how they make decisions about what pesticides to use and how and
where they are applied. We think this kind of information should be
readily available to the public and particularly elected officials. We
were aware of chief elected officials in southwestern Connecticut who
wanted aerial spraying and clearly did not feel that the DEP's efforts
were adequate. We need to educate these officials and the public about
exactly what the State's policies are and how they will be implemented.
We believe this will go a long way to reduce the inevitable fear and
anxiety that will surround this issue. Without this information we fear
that the public will demand more radical solutions than are necessary
and also detrimental to human health and the environment.
Connecticut Audubon would also like to offer their support for any
increase in funding for mosquito programs at the State and Federal
level. Clearly, we could use increased funding for more trapping and
testing of the mosquito population and to broadly disseminate
information to the public on ways they can protect themselves and
prevent the virus from spreading by controlling mosquito populations.
We are also very supportive of the CT DEP's Open Water Marsh Management
program as a natural method of mosquito control and would support
increased funding for these efforts.
We would also like to offer our services, and those of the birding
community at large in Connecticut, to help locate and report incidences
of dead crows or any other dead birds or animals. There is a large
network of active birders in the State who are out in the field on a
regular basis and we can educate them on what to look for and how to
report it (birders tend to keep very good field notes!). We also
participate in Federal bird banding activities in the spring and fall,
mostly, along the shoreline. We could certainly take blood samples from
the birds being banded and send them to the appropriate labs for
analysis Connecticut Audubon and National Audubon plan to arrange a
meeting with the DEP and Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Station to
discuss ways we might be able to help monitor and track the virus
through bird populations.
Again, thank you for hosting a very informative session and
providing a forum to learn more about this new health threat to
Connecticut citizens. We appreciate your foresight in trying to develop
a proactive solution before we see another crisis situation. We would
be interested in more information about pesticide usage and seeing that
information disseminated as widely as possible to the general public.
And we are certainly eager to help, as stated above, in any way we can.
__________
Statement of Diane Worden, The Nature Center for Environmental
Activities, Inc., Westport, CT
My concerns about the recent widespread application of pesticides
are directly related to the work I am involved in at The Nature Center
for Environmental Activities located Westport, Connecticut.
I am sure you are aware of the time, energy and money that has been
spent improving the water qaulity of the region's rivers and streams.
More recently, the focus of funding sources has turned to habitat
restoration projects for our local waterways.
As a participant in the Norwalk River Watershed Initiative, I have
seen the combined resources that the EPA, CT DEP, and local
municipalities have brought together in this model project. The
Initiative's Watershed Action Plan, being carried out in conjunction
with local environmental organizations, has accelerated habitat
restoration efforts in the Norwalk River basin, which includes 8 towns
in central Fairfield County.
As a monitor of migratory fish species in our local rivers, I am
aware of the variety of life forms in the waterways. My own prior
research into the downstream effects of pesticides on aquatic life
brought the recent mosquito spraying to my attention.
As you may know, the pesticide, Resmethrin, that was used in the
Fairfield County ground spraying, is in a classification considered
``Restricted Use'' by the EPA due to its toxic tendencies in the
aquatic environment. The chemical, known as a pyrethroid, has a
prolonged breakdown time in bodies of water, increasing its likelihood
of causing problems, especially if repeated applications are made, as
was done in Westchester County.
While ground spraying from trucks along roadways provides for more
controlled application of spray, it does not reach into the rear of
large residential lots in towns like Westport with large lot zoning. If
the point was to reach the majority of mosquitos, that did not happen.
If aerial spraying was initiated for broader coverage, the smaller
waterways and ponds could not have been avoided; and as the pesticide
product label clearly states--application into water bodies should be
avoided due to its toxicity. This was not a good scenario.
An expanded monitoring program based on the CT DEP's existing
mosquito management program for Eastern Equine Encephalitis with its
emphasis on larval treatment will help prevent a repeat of this past
season's situation.
__________
Statement of Sue Reidman, Ecological Health Organization (ECHO),
Hebron, CT
I am writing on behalf of the Ecological Health Organization, a
statewide support and advocacy group for people with Multiple Chemical
Sensitivity. Like many others in our slate, we are concerned about the
recent West Nile Encephalitis outbreak in nearby New York. We realize
this is a serious public health concern, but we also feel that it is
important to make sure the solution doesn't create a new set of health
problems. There is a growing number of the population who are severely
sensitive to chemicals, and an epidemic of asthma in this country,
especially among children. It is very important that the needs of these
individuals be considered when devoloping a mosquito abatement plan,
and that the public be informed or any possible health effects of
pesticide spraying. We were appalled at the massive aerial spraying of
Malathion that took place in New York, as were many New Yorkers, and we
feel it posed an unnecessary health risk to the citizens of New York
since there were less toxic options available that were not used.
We strongly urge that least toxic methods be used in the event of
another encephalitis outbreak and that nontoxic preventive methods be
used to reduce risk of future outbreaks. Connecticut has an IPM program
in place and has been using a nontoxic product to kill mosquitoes in
their larval state. We want to encourage more treatments of this kind
and we urge that the DEP be given the funds it needs to aggressively
fight mosquitos using least toxic methods. It makes much more sense to
utilize safe methods to kill the mosquitos at the larval stage, than to
spray an entire relation with a poison. While we know that the
Resmethrin used here in Connecticut is a safer choice of pesticide, we
still have many concerns about the handling of the mosquito control
program in our State.
We are upset by the misinformation about Resmethrin that was
broadcast over the news. While it is considered a safer pesticide,
Resmethrin can cause severe reactions in sensitive individuals. The
news stations were reporting that Resmethrin, according to the DEP, was
totally harmless to humans, while at the same time they were advising
people to shut windows, bring their children and pets indoors, and to
wash any vegetables they eat from their garden. This certainly was a
mixed message. People were also told that the pesticides would the gone
in 4 hours, and we have learned from an EPA approved resource, that the
half life of Resmethrin is 30 days.
We would like more information about the total formulation of the
pesticide that was used. We know that the so-called inert ingredients
in a pesticide can sometimes be more toxic then the active ingredient.
We feel the public should be informed about all the ingredients in the
pesticide that was used. We need to know if there have been EPA safety
studies done on the formulation as whole, or are all the safety studies
industry generated, and test only the active ingredient?
We would like to know if there is any medical treatment, recourse,
compensation, available to people who are injured by mosquito spraying?
What assistance is available for people who might have to vacate their
home for a period of time due to severe sensitivity to pesticides?
Pesticide health effects should be monitored and treated. It is
imperative that real experts with experience treating patients who have
been chemically injured, be involved. While we hope that the need for
future spraying can be averted by an aggressive IPM program, if any
spraying is done in the future, we feel that there should be a hotline
set up for people to report any health problems relating to the
mosquito spraying and medical treatment should be made available.
Resmethrin, for example, is known to trigger asthma attacks in
sensitive people. Malathion is an organophosphate insecticide that
functions by interfering with cholinesterase, an enzyme essential to
normal nervous system function. Most doctors are not trained to
recognize symptoms of chemical injury. It an injured individual calls
his/her personal physician, there is strong likelihood the illness will
not be properly diagnosed, and will go unreported.
How effective is massive spraying in eradicating the disease? Does
it even work? Resmethrin is toxic to fish. What happens to mosquito
populations the next year if natural predators have been killed by the
spraying? The spraying in our State took place a few days before we had
our first freeze. Considering the time of years was the spraying
warranted?
We encourage the State to continue to broaden its IPM program for
mosquito control that uses a nontoxic product to kill mosquitoes in the
larva usage. It makes a lot more sense to kill mosquitoes in their
larva (before they can spread disease) than it does to do a massive
spraying at a later date. The State should be carefully monitoring
mosquito populations, and if necessary least toxic pesticides should be
used only in target areas, as opposed to a blanket spraying over large
populated area. The State should also on educating the public on using
least toxic methods to control mosquitos on their property, such as
removal of breeding habitat by reducing standing water, and how to
safely kill mosquitoes in the larva stage.
__________
Statement of Pamela Clark, Fairfield County Citizens Concerned About
Pesticides (FCAP)
Fairfield County Citizens Concerned About Pesticides (FCAP) was
active during the West Nile Fever (WNF) ``crisis'' earlier this year by
providing an opportunity for public dialog. FCAP also took reports of
Scourge exposure symptoms through a telephone ``Action Line.''
The attached sheet outlines some of the problems associated with
the handling of the WNF ``crisis.'' These problems and their
recommended solutions were presented to representatives of the
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) and the Department of
Public Health (DPH) in Hartford on November 22, 1999 by FCAP Chairman
Pamela Clark.
We request that this information, as well as the attached letter to
Congressman Shays, be entered into testimony at the West Nile Fever
hearing on December 14 at Fairfield University.
______
FCAP's November 22, 1999 Meeting with the DEP and the DPH Regarding
1999 Pesticide Spraying for West Nile Fever (WNF)
Problem: Information given by local health departments was problematic,
i.e. not accurate, complete, or consistent.
Example: Questions regarding the concentration level of Scourge
(the pesticide compound used in Fairfield County), the full list of
possible pesticide exposure symptoms, the spraying locations, etc. were
often answered inaccurately and answers varied from town to town.
Solution: Set up an interactive hotline in a central location with
an 800# using trained staff to answer questions beyond press release
statements.
Problem: Press releases overstated the dangers of West Nile Fever (WNF)
and underplayed the dangers of widespread pesticide spraying.
Example Public officials stated that the concentration of Scourge
sprayed was so low that it was ``harmless.'' In fact, the concentration
of Resmethrin (the active pesticide in Scourge) vas sprayed at 0.00175
pounds per acre, a concentration consistent with label application
directions, label warnings, and EXTOXNET research data (see attached).
Solution: Give equal time in news releases to the dangers of
widespread pesticide spraying as is given to the dangers of WNF.
Provide a full list of pesticide exposure symptoms in every press
release. Identify at-risk groups for both pesticide exposure and WNF.
Set up an action line to receive reports of pesticide exposure symptoms
in humans and wildlife. Report all cases of pesticide exposure symptoms
in humans to the locational Pesticide Telecommunications Network.
Problem; Spray zones were not adequately described and the public was
not properly notified.
Example: Citizens did not know how to determine the spraying
locations and schedules, callers to hotline numbers were given
inaccurate or incomplete information, etc.
Solution: Place flyers in all homes on spray route 24 8 hours prior
to spraying.
Problem: Scourge was misapplied.
Example: Scourge was sprayed on streets not listed in planned spray
routes, Scourge was sprayed on river banks and near water sources
despite warning labels to the contrary.
Solution: Follow the DEP mosquito management plan. Place stricter
controls on application. Provide documentation of concentration levels,
application areas, etc.
__________
Fairfield County Citizens Concerned About Pesticides
(FCAP),
Westport, CT 06880, October 13, 1999.
The Honorable Christopher Shays,
Dear Congressman Shays: Thank you for your time last Friday at
Fairfield University. FCAP members ask that you bring our concerns
about the dangers of Scourge, the pesticide used in widespread ground
spraying in Fairfield County recently, to the attention of the
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) and the
Connecticut Department of Health.
DEP press releases and statements have misinformed the public by
overstating the dangers of a viral strain which poses a slight threat
to a small portion of the population and downplaying the dangers of
widespread pesticide spraying.
DEP assurances that pesticide spraying is completely safe have had
horrifying repercussions. A mother in Westport was observed by one FCAP
member spraying her child with ``Raid'' insecticide before soccer
practice for mosquito protection.
The truth about pesticide dangers must be admitted and pesticide
spraying must stop
Due to the human and environmental risks posed by Scourge and the
fact that as of this writing there are no human cases of the disease in
Connecticut, further spraying would be reckless.
Pesticide sensitive people are being ignored
One point that has been not been adequately addressed by public
officials is the negative health effects of pesticides on the very same
human population that is most susceptible to the virus--the sick, the
aged, the very young, and those with weak immune systems. Pesticide-
sensitive children and adults include those with asthma and other
respiratory diseases.
Despite DEP rhetoric, it is clear that the concentration of Scourge
used is not low enough to void all warnings regarding this
chemical poison
According to the DEP, Scourge was sprayed at a level which
delivered 0.00175 pounds of Resmethrin (the active insecticide in
Scourge) per acre. Because this concentration falls within the
recommended spraying levels on the Scourge label, ail warnings apply.
Scourge is not harmless to humans at the level being sprayed
The National Pesticide Telecommunications NetNork (NPTN) Pesticide
Information Sheets on Resmethrin indicate that Resmethrin may cause
adverse effects on the central nervous system. Symptoms of exposure to
Resmethrin listed by the NPTN include incoordination, twitching, loss
of bladder control, seizures, numbness, itching, burning, and tingling.
This list has not been announced to the public.
Residents have reported most of these symptoms to FCAP's Action
Line after recent sprayings.
Scourge contains Piperonyl Butoxide(PBO), which '`affects mammals
by depressing liver function, thus lowering their ability to detoxify
chemicals,'' according to the National Coalition Against the Misuse of
Pesticides (NCAMP). PRO is a synergist which, when added to Resmethrin,
increases Resmethrin's toxicity, according to the New York Coalition
for Alternative to Pesticides (NYCAP).
Scourge contains petroleum distillates which ``can cause allergic
reactions and even a dangerous chemical pneumonia when inhaled,''
according to NYCAP.
Scourge is toxic to fish at the level being sprayed
The Scourge label states, ``This pesticide is highly toxic to fish.
Do not apply directly to water, to areas where surface water is present
or to intertidal areas below the mean high water mark. Drip and runoff
from treated sites may be hazardous to fish in adjacent waters. . . Do
not contaminate waters by cleaning of equipment or disposal of
equipment wash waters. . . Application of this product to any body of
water is prohibited.''
``The spraying [of pesticides such as Scourge] kills off natural
predators of insects . . . and results in insect resistance, which in
turn leads to a larger problem in the future,'' according to NCAMP.
FCAP members report spraying on the banks of the Saugatuck River in
Westport! Pear Tree Point in Darien, and other Fairfield County
waterways and runoff areas.
Scourge is toxic to bees and other insects at the level being sprayed
According to NPTN, ``Resmethrin is highly toxic to bees'' and a
lethal dose (LD50) of Resmethrin is a mere 0.063 micrograms per bee.
Assuming uniform application, every square inch sprayed in Connecticut
received two tinges that amount.
Resmethrin is a poison. If not, it wouldn't be able to kill
mosquitoes, bees, and fish.
Resmethrin does not disperse as quickly as has been indicated
According to NCAMP, synthetic insecticides such as Resmethrin were
developed to be stable in light, ``yielding longer residence tamest
According to NPTN, it takes at least 1 month for just half of the
Resmethrin that gets into water or soil to break down. Unfortunately,
just because breakdown occurs, that does not mean toxic effects
vanish--Resmethrin breakdown products are chemicals which have health
and environmental risks of their own.
______
EXTOXNET, Extension Toxicology Network, Pesticide Information Profiles
Pesticide Information Project of Cooperative Extension Offices of
Cornell University, Oregon State University, the University of Idaho,
and the University of California at Davis and the Institute for
Environmental Toxicology, Michigan State University. Major support and
funding was provided by the USDA/Extension Service/National
Agricultural Pesticide Impact Assessment Program.
extoxnet primary files maintained and archived at oregon state
university
revised june 1996
Resmethrin
Trade and Other Names: Trade manes include Chryson, Crossfire,
Derringer, FMC 17370, Isathrine, N DC 104, Pynosect, Raid Flying Insect
Killer, Respond, Scourge, Sun-bugger #4, SPB-1382, Synthrin, Syntox,
Vectun, and Whitmire PT-l 10.
Regulatory Status: Resmethrin is a slightly toxic to practically
non-toxic compound in EPA toxicity class III. Products containing
resmethrin must bear the Signal Word CAUTION on the label. All products
containing resmethrin for pest control at or near aquatic sites are
classified as Restricted Use Pesticides (RUP) by the EPA because of
potential fish toxicity. RUPs may be purchased and used only by
certified applicators.
Chemical Class: pyrethroid
Introduction: Resmethrin is a synthetic pyrethroid used for control
of flying and crawling insects in homes, greenhouses, indoor
landscapes, mushroom houses, industrial sites, stored product insects
and for mosquito control. It is also used for fabric protection, pet
sprays and shampoos, and it is applied to horses or in horse stables.
Technical resmethrin is a mixture of its two main isomers (molecules
with the same chemical formula but slightly different configurations);
a typical blend is 20 to 30 percent of the (1RS)-cis-isomer and 70 to
80 percent of the (1RS)-trans-isomer.
Formulation
Technical resmethrin is a mixture of its two main isomers
(molecules with the same chemical formula but slightly different
configurations); a typical blend is 20 to 30 percent of the (1RS)-cis-
isomer and 70 to 80 percent of Me (1RS)-trans-isomer.
Toxicological Effects
Acute toxicity: Resmethrin is slightly to practically non-toxic by
ingestion. The oral LD50 for technical resmethrin in rats is variously
reported as greater than 2500 mg/kg or 1244 mg/kg [3,12]. Resmethrin is
only slightly toxic through the dermal route as well. The reported
dermal LD50's for technical resmethrin are: greater than 3000 mg/kg in
rats, greater than 2500 mg/kg in rabbits, and greater than 5000 mg/kg
in mice [3,12]. It is slightly toxic via inhalation, with a 4-hour
inhalation LC50 for resmethrin of greater than 9.49 mg/L [3]. Symptoms
of exposure by any route may include incoordination, twitching, loss of
bladder control, and seizures [12]. Dermal exposure may lead to local
numbness, itching, burning, and tingling sensations near the site of
exposure. Resmethrin is reported to be nonirritating to the skin and
eyes of test animals and not to cause skin sensitization in guinea pigs
[3].
Chronic toxicity: In a chronic feeding study with rats, 25 mg/kg/
day (the lowest dose tested) caused liver enlargement. At 125 mg/kg/
day, there were pathological liver changes in addition to increased
liver weights. Doses of 250 mg/kg/day caused increased thyroid weight
and thyroid cysts [3]. In another study over 90 days, doses of 150 mg/
kg/day did not produce any adverse effects in exposed rats [12].
Increased liver weights occurred in dogs fed 30 mg/kg/day for 180 days.
No effects were observed in dogs in this study at dose rates of 10 mg/
kg/day [3]. In a 90-day inhalation study with rats, 0.1 mg/L, the
lowest dose tested, produced behavioral changes, decreased blood
glucose levels in males, and decreased body weights and increased serum
urea levels in females [3]. Resmethrin was not neurotoxic to rats at
doses of 62.5 mg/kg/day for 32 weeks, 250 mg/kg/day for 30 days, or 632
mg/kg/day for 7 days [4]. It is unlikely that chronic effects will be
seen in humans under normal circumstances.
Reproductive effects: A three-generation study with rats showed a
slight increase in premature stillbirths and a decrease in pup weight
at 25 mg/kg, the lowest dose tested [4]. Since these doses are much
higher than expected human exposures, it is unlikely such effects will
occur in humans.
Teratogenic effects: No birth defects were observed in the
offspring of rabbits given doses as high as 100 mg/kg/day [4]. Skeletal
aberrations were seen in the offspring of rats given doses higher than
40 mg/kg/day [3]. No teratogenic effects were observed in mice at dose
levels of 50 mg/kg/day over an unspecified period [12]. It is unlikely
that teratogenic effects will be seen in humans under normal
circumstances.
Mutagenic effects: Resmethrin was not mutagenic in a test performed
with the bacterium, Salmonella typhimurium [6].
Carcinogenic effects: No evidence of tumor formation was observed
in a 2-year rat feeding study with doses as high as 250 mg/kg/day, nor
in an 85-week study with mice given doses as high as 50 mg/kg/day
[3,4].
Organ toxicity: Pyrethroids may cause adverse effects on the
central nervous system. Long-term feeding studies have shown increased
liver and kidney weights and adverse changes in liver tissues in test
animals [12].
Fate in humans and animals: Resmethrin is quickly eliminated by
chickens. When oral doses of 10 mg/kg resmethrin were given to laying
hens, 90 percent of the dose was eliminated in urine and feces within
24 hours [46]. In another study with hens given the same treatment,
residues were low in hens sacrificed 12 hours after the treatment, with
the highest levels found in the liver and kidneys. Low levels were
found in the hens' eggs, with levels peaking 1 day after treatment in
the whites and 4 to 5 days after treatment in the yolks [47].
Ecological Effects
Effects on birds: Resmethrin is practically nontoxic to birds. Its
LD50 in California quail is greater than 2000 mg/kg [3]. In Japanese
quail, the 5-day dietary LC50 is greater than 500C ppm [48].
Effects on aquatic organisms: Resmethrin is very highly toxic to
fish with 96-hour LC50 values generally at or below 1 ug/L (0.001 mg/L)
for most species tested. The LC50 for resmethrin in mosquito fish is 7
ug/L [49]. The LC50 for resmethrin synergized with piperonyl butoxide
in red swamp crawfish, Procarnbarus clarkii, is 0.00082 ug/L [48]. The
LC50 in bluegill sunfish is 0.75 to 2.6 ug/L, and 0.28 to 2.4 ug/L in
rainbow trout [3]. Other reported 96-hour LC50's are 1.8 ug/L in coho
salmon, 1.7 ug/L in lake trout, 3.0 ug/L in fathead minnow, 16.6 ug/L
in channel catfish and 1.7 ug/L in bluegill sunfish [50]. Fish
sensitivity to the pyrethroids may be explained by their relatively
slow metabolism and elimination of these compounds. The half-lives for
elimination of several pyrethroids by trout are all greater than 48
hours, while elimination half-lives for birds and mammals range from 6
to 12 hours [20]. Effects on other organisms: Resmethrin is highly
toxic to bees, with an LD50 of 0.063 ug per bee [3].
Environmental Fate
Breakdown in soil and groundwater: Resmethrin is of low to moderate
persistence in the soil environment. Its half-life has been estimated
at 30 days [51]. Observed half-lives will depend on many site-specific
variables. In aerobic Kentucky loamy sand, the compound showed a half-
life of nearly 200 days. Degradation end-products reported for
resmethrin are chrysanthemic acid, benzaldehyde, benzyl alcohol,
benzoic acid, phenylacetic acid, and various esters [52]. Resmethrin is
tightly bound to soil and would not be expected to be mobile or to
contaminate groundwater, especially in light of its extremely low
solubility in water [51]. Breakdown in water: Resmethrin may enter
surface waters through particulate run-off or misapplication. In pond
waters and in laboratory degradation studies, pyrethroid concentrations
decrease rapidly due to sorption to sediment, suspended particles and
plants. Microbial and photodegradation also occur [22]. The half-life
in water is 36.5 days. . Breakdown in vegetation: No information was
found.
Physical Properties
Appearance: Resmethrin is a waxy, off-white to tan solid with an
odor characteristic of chrysanthemums [12].
Chemical Name: 5-benzyl-3-furylmethyl(1RS)-cis,trans-2,2-dimethyl-
3-(2-methylprop-1-enyl)cyclopropanecarboxylate [12].
CAS Number: 10453-86-8.
Molecular Weight: 338.45.
Water Solubility: <1 mg/L at 30 C [12], insoluble in water.
Solubility in Other Solvents: s. in hexane, kerosene, xylene,
methylene chloride, isopropyl alcohol, and aromatic petroleum
hydrocarbons; m.s. in methanol [12].
Melting Point: 43-48 C [12].
Vapor Pressure: 0.0015 mPa @ 30 C [12].
Partition Coefficient: Not Available.
Adsorption Coefficient: 100,000 [51].
Exposure Guidelines
ADI: Not Available.
MCL: Not Available.
RfD: 0.03 mg/kg/day [30].
PEL: Not Available.
HA: Not Available.
TLV: Not Available.
Basic Manufacturer: Roussel Uclaf Coup., 95 Chestnut Ridge Road,
Montvale, NJ 07645. Phone: 201-307-9700. Emergency: Not Available.
References: References for the information in this PIP can be found
in Reference List Number 2
__________
DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR STAMFORD BOARD of REPRESENTATIVES REGARDING THE
CITY SPRAYING OF PESTICIDES
WHEREAS in response to an outbreak of a mosquito-borne, rarely
life-threatening disease, called West Nile Fever, Mayor Malloy, in
conjunction with the CT Department of Environmental Protection, had
promoted and consequently undertaken a program of ground spraying south
of I-95 and along the coastal areas of Stamford with the pesticide
RESMETHRIN; but
WHEREAS there are now grave and widespread concerns being raised by
the scientific, medical and academic communities about the safety and
long term impact of RESMETHRIN and other synthetic pyrethroids. All
have side effects and all must be applied under the strictest and very
specific guidelines to prevent contact with human-, animal- and aquatic
habitats. These guidelines extend also to proper storage and
concentrations of the pesticides.
WHEREAS there has been mounting evidence about repeated and
irresponsible disregard of the mandatory storage and application
precautions by ground crews.
WHEREAS Officials insist that these neurotoxins are applied
properly and are completely harmless to the population and the
environment. The Community education has neither been comprehensive,
timely or accurate about the health hazards that adults and children
who have been exposed to these pesticide sprays and their residue, can
suffer.
WHEREAS in addition to the spraying, the program has not undertaken
to fully disclose extensive precautions necessary to prevent contact
with the pesticides, incl. thorough wash-down of playground equipment
after spraying, as well as the dangers from residue and extended
periods of some dangerous breakdown chemicals on all contaminated
surfaces. Scientific research clearly identifies the link of repeated
pesticide exposure to life threatening forms of cancer, sterility, and
immune deficiencies.
WHEREAS more experienced jurisdictions, incl. LA County, Southern
Florida, portions of Michigan, and Amherst, NY have come to rely on
implementing more effective and ``least toxic'' measures with
Integrated Pest Management (IPM). Integrated Pest Management being a
process by which the use of preventative, non-toxic and least toxic
alternatives with the latest technology and management techniques are
prioritized. I.e. statistically valid surveillance, big-control with
natural predators, source reduction of breeding sites, least toxic
larvicides, combined with thorough public education.
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that SAFE \1\ of Fairfield County
urges the City of Stamford to immediately undertake a high priority
study and educational process of all agencies involved about the full
spectrum such as the small affect on adult mosquitoes but of all
potentially harmful side effects and long term impact on the eco system
from the spraying of pesticides versa the implementation of Integrated
Pest Management.
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\1\ SAFE of Fairfield County is a supporting chapter of New York
SAFE which stands for ``Seeking Alternatives For the Environment. SAFE
is both a task force and a clearing house dedicated to working hand-in-
hand with government agencies to establish safe, non-toxic solutions to
public health and/or environmental problems.
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BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that SAFE of Fairfield County urges the
Mayor and City Council to provide adequate funding and authorization to
form a Review Panel comprised of government officials as well as of
independent scientists specializing in entomology, toxicology and
physicians to devise the most effective and least invasive alternative,
safe method of mosquito management to protect the population and the
environment responsibly. This approach must include adequate year round
surface and followup blood sampling.
AND BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the current emergency response
system be reviewed by the H & S Committee to assure that appropriate,
measured responses are triggered before declaring an emergency, and
make this available for public review with full disclosure before the
Spring of 2000.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the City of Stamford work with the
State of Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection, the
Department of Health (DEP & DOH). and Fairfield County SAFE, to
immediately adopt and implement IPM policies and programs.
BE IT FINALLY RESOLVED that this review be undertaken immediately
and be finally available by February 28. 2000, before the next
emergence of the vector.
__________
New York Public Interest Research Group,
Albany, NY, November 17, 1999.
The Honorable Joseph Lieberman,
U.S. Senate,
Hart Office Building,
Washington, DC 20510.
Dear Senator Lieberman: We understand you will be holding a public
forum November 18 on the West Nile Virus outbreak this fall. As two of
New York's leading nonprofit advocates for pesticide use reduction,
Environmental Advocates and the New York Public Interest Research Group
(NYPIRG) are very interested in helping ensure that our region's health
agencies design and implement preventative, least toxic mosquito
control programs as soon as possible in order to avoid future aerial
spraying of pesticides.
Enclosed is a copy of the testimony which our groups presented at a
hearing last month before the New York City Council which lays out some
of the key issues which need to be addressed. We are currently
developing more detailed recommendations on mosquito monitoring and
prevention programs to submit to State and local health departments.
Although many of our recommendations are specifically directed at New
York City, the questions we raise must also be evaluated at the Federal
level. We therefore urge you to request that the General Accounting Of
rice prepare an analysis of how State, local, and Federal authorities
responded to the public health threat posed by the West Nile virus. We
would be happy to discuss our recommendations further with you and your
staff. Thank you for your investigation into this matter.
Very truly yours,
Laura Haight, Senior Environmental Associate, NYPIRG
Audrey Thier, Pesticide Project Director, Environmental
Advocates.
______
Statement of NYPIRG Before the New York City Council, October 12, 1999
pesticide spraying for mosquito control
Introduction
The New York Public Interest Research Group and Environmental
Advocates want to thank the New York City Council for holding these
important hearings. In the midst of this crisis of competing health
risks, it is essential to take a step back and view the broader picture
of what this experience can teach and how to avoid a repeat of it. It
is also a good opportunity to look more broadly at the city's pest
problems, for there are many, and its routine pesticide use, which is
prodigious, in order to devise strategies that deal with these in a
comprehensive, preventative, and least-toxic manner.
There is no foolproof means of preventing infectious disease
outbreaks, and the risks of these will likely be exacerbated and entail
more exotic illnesses as global warming and global travel increase
microbe circulation. We will always be at risk. But, when faced with
similar hazards, other communities across the country have found that
it is possible to keep such hazards in check and preclude the need for
the kind of wholesale pesticide exposure spawned by this current
outbreak. In Houston, Los Angeles, St. Louis, and other areas where
mosquito-borne diseases erupt repeatedly, widespread aerial spraying of
mosquitoes with adulticides rarely if ever occurs. We have an example
of a comprehensive mosquito control program closer to home in Suffolk
County, but if the preventative measures it employs are not
consistently followed regionwide, everyone remains at risk.
It is essential to implement such preventative measures, not only
because, ideally, outbreaks should be prevented, not contained after
they have claimed lives, but also because the cure--pesticides--entails
risks of its own. The following briefly summarizes the risks of the
pesticides used in New York City.
Malathion
Malathion is an organophosphate insecticide that functions by
interfering with an enzyme, cholinesterase, essential to normal nervous
system function in insects and humans alike. Although it is one of the
less acutely poisonous of this family of pesticides, exposure to
malathion nonetheless entails real toxicity concerns, including
respiratory distress, headache, dizziness, and nausea. \1\ Like all
organophosphates, at high doses it can cause more serious symptoms. \2\
For example, malathion was the second leading cause of hospitalization
for occupational pesticide poisoning in the United States during the
period 1977-1982. \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Reigart, J.R. and J.R. Roberts. 1999. Recognition and
Management of Pesticide Poisonings. United States Environmental
Protection Agency. EPA 735-R-98-003.
\1\ Ibid.
\3\ Blondell, J. 1997. Epidemiology of Pesticide Poisonings in the
United States, With Special Reference to Occupational Cases.
Occupational Medicine: State of the Art Reviews. 12(2)209-221.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Infants and children, whose immature nervous systems are more
vulnerable to insult, and newborns, whose metabolisms are less capable
of detoxifying malathion, are more susceptible than adults to its toxic
effects. \4\ Organophosphate poisoning in children may also result in a
different set of symptoms than adults commonly experience, including
increased muscle tension and rigidity. \5\
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\4\ National Research Council. 1993. Pesticides in the Diets of
Infants and Children. National Academy Press. Washington D.C.
\5\ Lifshitz, M. et al. 1999. Carbamate and organophosphate
poisoning in young children. Pediatric Emergency Care. 15(2):102-103.
see also Wagner, S.L. and D.L. Orwick. 1994. Chronic Organophosphate
Exposure Associated with Transient Hypertonia in an Infant. Pediatrics.
94(1):94-97.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information on long-term, chronic effects is less abundant.
Currently, malathion has not yet been classified by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as to its carcinogenic potential,
although a decision on its classification is pending. \6\ Over the
years, reports in the epidemiological literature have indicated that
malathion may compromise the immune system, \7\ cause reproductive
harm, \8\ and cause genetic mutations or interfere with normal cell
replication. \9\ Being a broad spectrum insecticide, malathion kills
other insects as well as mosquitoes, including honeybees, to which it
is highly toxic. It is also highly toxic to many aquatic organisms and
the aquatic stages of amphibians. \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Burnam. W.L. August 25, 1999 Memorandum. Office of Pesticide
Programs List of Chemicals Evaluated for Carcinogenic Potential. United
States Environmental Protection Agency.
\7\ Fan, A. 1998. 1998 Malathion Literature Review. Memorandum from
Anna M. Fan PhD, Chief, Pesticide And Environmental Toxicology Section
to Richard Kreutzer, M.D. Chief Environmental Health Investigations
Branch, Department of Health Services, California Environmental
Protection Agency. June 26, 1998. see also State of California
Department of Health Services. 1991. Health Risk Assessment of Aerial
Application of Malathion-Bait. Berkeley, CA. Desi, I. et al. 1978.
Studies on the Immunosuppressive Effect of Organochlorine and
Organophosphoric Insecticides in Subacute Experiments. Journal of
Hygiene, Epidemiology, Microbiology, and Immunology. 1:115-122.
\8\ Contreras H.R. and E. Bustos-Obregon. 1999. Morphological
alterations in mouse testis by a single dose of malathion. Journal of
Experimental Zoology. 284(3):355-9. see also Balasubramanian, K. et al.
1987. Effect of malathion on the testis of male albino rats. Medical
Science Research. 15:229-230.
\9\ See State of California and Fan note 7 above. See also Rupa,
D.S. et al. 1991. Frequency of Sister-Chromatid Exchange in Peripheral
Lymphocytes of Male Pesticide Applicators. Environmental and Molecular
Mutagenesis. 18: 136-138. see also New Jersey Department of Health and
Senior Services. 1997. Hazardous Substances Fact Sheet: Malathion.
Trenton, New Jersey.
\10\ Extension Toxicology Network. 1996. Pesticide Information
Profile: Malathion. Oregon State University.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Resmethrin
Resmethrin is a synthetic pyrethroid insecticide. Pyrethroids, like
organophosphates, affect the nervous system, though they do not inhibit
cholinesterase. They are of relatively low acute toxicity, although
poisoning can occur and allergic responses have been reported. \11\
There are also reports of persistent symptoms when exposures occurred
indoors. \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ See Reigart and Roberts note 1 above. See also Extension
Toxicology Network note 10 above.
\12\ Muller-Mohnssen, H. 1999. Chronic sequelae and irreversible
injuries following acute pyrethroid intoxication. Toxicology Letters.
197:161-175.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information on chronic effects is spotty. Resmethrin has not been
classified with regard to carcinogenicity, although products that
contain resmethrin often include the synergist piperonyl butoxide
(PBO), which has been classified by the EPA as a possible human
carcinogen, as have several other pyrethroid compounds. \13\ There are
indications that pyrethroids may interfere with the immune \14\ and
endocrine systems. \15\ Other adverse chronic effects, including
effects on the liver and thyroid, have been reported in toxicology
testing. \16\ Resmethrin is highly toxic to bees and fish. \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See National Research Council note 4 above.
\14\ Diel, F. et al. 1999. Pyrethroids and piperonyl-butoxide
affect human T-lymphocytes in vitro. Toxicology Letters. 107:65-74. see
also Stiller-Winkler, R. et al. 1999. Immunological parameters in
humans exposed to pesticides in the agricultural environment.
Toxicology Letters. 107:219-224.
\15\ Eil, C. and B.C. Nisula. 1990. The Binding Properties of
Pyrethroids to Human Skin Fibroblast Androgen Receptors and to Sex
Hormone Binding Globulin. Journal of Steroid Biochemistry. 35(3/4):409-
414.
\16\ Extension Toxicology Network. 1996. Pesticide Information
Profile: Resmethrin. Oregon State University.
\17\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
How these reports of possible chronic health problems of malathion
and resmethrin may relate to the dose or frequency of exposure
encountered in the current New York City spraying campaign is unknown.
It is also impossible to say how they may interact with the other
pesticides to which city residents are exposed. Data on such chemical
interactions are virtually nonexistent.
Alternative mosquito control
Clearly, avoiding the need for adulticides should be item one on
the city s agenda. They are a strategy of last resort, when all other
control possibilities have been exhausted and a public health emergency
requires action. In addition to health concerns about pesticides,
repeated use of these chemicals breeds resistance and reduces their
effectiveness for times when they may be the only option.
Effective preventative mosquito control relies on a combination of
before-the-fact measures, including:
Removal of breeding habitat by reducing standing water
wherever possible. \18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Olkowski. W. et al. 1991. Common-Sense Pest Control. The
Taunton Press. Newtown, Connecticut.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The use of meteorologic data to identify weather patterns
known to exacerbate specific vector-borne diseases and followup with
enhanced monitoring when such conditions exist. \19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Moore, C.G. et al. 1993. Guidelines for Arbovirus Surveillance
Programs in the United States. Centers for Disease Control.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Control of mosquito populations when they are in the
larval and pupal stages. There are a variety of non-toxic and least
toxic methods of larval control, such as applying bacillus
thuringiensis israelensis (BTI) bacteria to stagnant waters, bacillus
sphaericus to storm sewers, and stocking isolated water bodies with
mosquito-eating fish. Some of these products have effects on non-target
species and thus each use should be evaluated from this perspective.
\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ See Olkowski et al. note 18 above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Trapping and monitoring mosquitoes to detect the presence
of mosquito-borne illnesses. Trapping not only indicates the presence
or absence of disease, but can localize the source of infectious agent
so that targeted responses with least-toxic insecticides can be
implemented, instead of blanket spraying of wide areas. In addition to
monitoring, new traps are on the market, using carbon dioxide as a
lure, which are designed to control mosquito populations for areas of
up to an acre.
The use of sentinel birds to detect the presence of
disease before it reaches humans. For instance, chickens are commonly
used bird hosts for monitoring whether St. Louis encephalitis is
present in the local bird population. Like trapping and monitoring of
mosquitoes, sentinels detect the presence of disease before it reaches
human populations and help to locate the areas where it must be
controlled. \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ See Moore et al. note 19 above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Educating the public about how they can eradicate
mosquito breeding habitat around their homes (such as removal of
standing water) and measures they can take to avoid being bitten (such
as installation of window and door screens).
The benefits of preventive control and monitoring are myriad. They
reduce the likelihood that a surprise outbreak will occur while
minimizing the use of hazardous pesticides. Harris County (Houston),
which has one of the most active St. Louis encephalitis programs in the
country, has not conducted aerial spraying for years. Through effective
monitoring, their program can identify infected areas a month before
any human comes down with the virus, and thereby address potential
outbreaks at the source. This approach not only saves human lives, but
also reduces pesticide use and saves the county approximately one
million dollars each year. \22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Interview with Dr. Ray Parsons. Harris County (Texas) Mosquito
Control Division. September 11, 1999
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendations
The city must now address a range of issues and report fully to the
public on each:
How the city handled advance warning of spray schedules
and the quality and accuracy of pesticide health effects information
dispensed to the public regarding the spraying. Reports of people
caught directly in the spray due to lack of warning, inadequate advice
from poison control centers and misrepresentations by public officials
that the pesticides sprayed are harmless must all be documented and
assessed.
The observed adverse effects of spraying (from surveys of
poison control centers, hotlines, citizen networks, emergency rooms and
clinics), and the potential size and virulence of the West Nile
epidemic had it not been checked (based on other epidemic sizes across
the globe, mosquito population data and infection rate now being
gathered by the CDC, local serological studies, and cataloguing of case
outcomes). A complete accounting of all adverse -effects associated
with this crisis, whether from the disease or the spraying, is
essential in order to evaluate their relative risks.
Develop a vector control plan to guide the city in
responding to future arboviral disease outbreaks. These response
guidelines should include different response recommendations for each
potential arbovirus keyed to threshold levels of disease in sentinel
birds and mosquitoes, mosquito activity, and human cases.
The immediate implementation of preventative mosquito
control strategies to fend off a similar outbreak next spring and in
future years. Surveillance, larvaciding and breeding site elimination
are still useful this season.
Development of a long-term mosquito monitoring and
controlplan, together with sufficient funding for implementation. When
spring arrives, a comprehensive mosquito control policy must be in
place--one which uses all of the various techniques outlined above and
also investigates newer, non-toxic adult mosquito trapping technology
for potential effectiveness. Regardless of whether the West Nile virus
reemerges this spring, the City must maintain a constant vigilance for
potential mosquito-borne disease outbreaks, including those of a far
more serious nature, such as eastern equine encephalitis. Early
detection and control is safer for humans and the environment, because
it minimizes the use of pesticides and uses animal sentinels, not
humans, as a surveillance tool. A preventive approach is far less
expensive and more effective than the after-the-fact spraying that the
City has resorted to this fall. Coordination among State and local
public health officials in the tri-State New York City metropolitan
region with regard to improved surveillance, control measures, and
emergency response planning The City should work with neighboring
counties, some of which have very effective mosquito control programs,
to develop a regional plan for monitoring and preventing disease
outbreaks, and to share information and resources in implementing such
a plan.
These actions will help evaluate the handling of the current crisis
and ideally ward off a repeat next spring. But mosquito-borne disease
is by no means the city's only pest problem. And aerial spraying, while
dramatic, is by no means the only pesticide exposure the city must deal
with. New York State's pesticide reporting data, the first year of
which was available for 1997, demonstrated that New York City tops the
State in the amount of pesticides used overall. Furthermore, the
majority of the pesticides used are neurotoxic organophosphate and
carbamate insecticides. The most heavily used pesticide in the city,
chlorpyrifos, is, like malathion, an organophosphate insecticide, but
substantially more acutely toxic and persistent, and with a host of
adverse chronic and developmental health effects associated with its
use. \23\
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\23\ Thier, A. et al. 1998. Plagued by Pesticides: An Analysis of
New York State and New York City's 1997 Pesticide Use and Sales Data.
Environmental Advocates and the New York Public Interest Research
Group. Albany, NY.
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The city should regard this current crisis as a wake-up call to
examine all of its pest problems and its pesticide use risks, and
devise preventative, less hazardous methods of dealing with them. We
recommend the establishment of a New York City Pest Management Board
(such as the City of Buffalo has had for approximately a decade), that
would include local residents, public health and environmental interest
groups, physicians, scientists, and municipal leaders.
We urge the City Council to establish the Board as a watchdog to
solve pesticide and pest issues in the city, instead of the cu rent
situation--lurching from crisis to crisis with incomplete information
and no long-range planning and solutions.
__________
Statement of William R. Opp, Director, Lee County Mosquito Control
District, Fort Myers, FL
Your public hearing on mosquito control is of concern to me as the
director of the Lee County Mosquito Control District in Ft. Myers,
Florida. This District uses many tools/materials to protect the public
health of its citizens, as well as visitors to the area (which includes
Sanibel/Captiva Islands). Without the proper tools and materials, the
public health and welfare could be placed into question.
Please support good mosquito control.
__________
Statement of Dominick Ninivaggi, Superintendent, Suffolk County Vector
Control, Yaphank, NY
I regret that I am unable to attend your hearing on West Nile Virus
(WNV), but as Superintendent for New York's largest mosquito control
program, I would like to comment. First, Connecticut is to be commended
for its outstanding laboratory operation under Dr. Ted Andreatis. The
excellent work done by this lab helped provide critical information
about WNV. This information allowed Connecticut to respond in a
measured and limited manner.
Jurisdictions that lacked this information base in New York were
forced to resort to ``broad-brush'' spraying, because they could not
determine nature and the extent of the threat. Connecticut also has
outstanding mosquito control professionals such as Paul Capotosto and
Roger Wolfe in its DEP, and I urge you to listen their counsel. Here in
Suffolk County, we have an integrated mosquito control program that
uses laboratory surveillance to guide a full spectrum of physical,
biological and, when necessary, chemical controls to prevent and limit
mosquito problems before an epidemic is threatened. We were also able
to limit the need for pesticide applications in residential areas.
During the WNV outbreak, chemical control of adult mosquitoes was
appropriate and necessary, and such measures may be needed again in the
future.
In the long term, however, an integrated program that includes
surveillance and emphasizes prevention is the most effective and
environmentally sound approach. I urge you to support and strengthen
these programs in Connecticut and elsewhere. Please bear in mind that
WNV is unlikely to be the last exotic mosquito-borne pathogen that we
will have to deal with. Having good laboratory and mosquito control
programs in place and running is the best means to insure that will be
ready when (not if) that happens again. Please feel free to contact me
if you would like further information on Suffolk's program.
__________
Statement by E. Allen James, Executive Director, RISE (Responsible
Industry for a Sound Environments, Washington, DC
RISE appreciates the opportunity to file the following statement
for insertion in the Field Hearing Record held in Fairfield, CT, as
noted above. RISE is the national association representing the
manufacturers, formulators, distributors and other industry leaders
involved with pesticide products used for public health protection as
well as in turf, ornamental, pest control, aquatic and terrestrial
vegetation management and other non-food/fiber applications.
West Nile encephalitis, a deadly mosquito-borne virus, killed seven
people and infected dozens of others in the New York metropolitan area
this year. This situation is just one example of the grave consequences
of reliance on emergency or ``catch-up'' pest control . . . or no pest
management at all. Effective public health protection from disease-
carrying pests, such as mosquitoes and other insects and vermin, is
dependent on a continuous pest management program.
Regrettably, more and more communities are being pressured by anti-
pesticide groups to restrict use of pesticides in schools, homes and
public buildings in the absence of any proven health or safety hazard.
Successful efforts to reduce or eliminate pesticide use allow insect-
borne health threats, such as encephalitis, to continue to emerge as
significant public health problems. Systematic, well-managed Integrated
Pest Management (IPM) programs are the solution.
As pointed out by expert witnesses during the Committee's field
hearing December 14, 1999, a variety of measures is safe and
effective--in combination--for control of such disease carriers as
mosquitoes. Insect traps and identification, elimination of breeding
sites, use of larvacides to kill larvae, ground and aerial applications
of pesticides were mentioned. These methods are all part of IPM
programs established in most States, many schools and communities.
Integrated Pest Management (IPM), as defined by Federal law in the
Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 (P.L. Law 104--August 3, 1996), is
a ``sustainable approach to managing pests by combining biological,
cultural, physical, and chemical tools in a way that minimizes
economic, health and environmental risks.'' Federal agencies have been
directed to use IPM techniques in carrying out pest management
activities. RISE and its members not only support IPM, but actively
promote development and implementation of such programs for pest
control and public health protection.
Children and adults deserve an environment free of carriers of
filth and disease. Such carriers include cockroaches that contribute to
asthma among inner-city children, ticks that carry Lyme and other
diseases, rats that bear numerous dreaded diseases and mosquitoes that
transmit encephalitis, dengue fever, malaria, and other human maladies.
In reference to the current West Nile virus concern when testifying
during this Committee's field hearing, Ms. Jane Stahl, deputy
commissioner, Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection,
warned ``We can't treat this [outbreak] as a fluke, like it's not going
to happen again.'' Effective IPM programs provide the answer.
Anti-pesticide activists are extremely vocal in their advocacy of
``chemical-free'' pest control. Real-world evidence, however, shows
that pests are the problem; pests cause public health threats, not the
safe and responsible use of pesticides.
Thank you for this opportunity to provide this statement for
insertion into the record.
__________
Statement of Roger Kerr, Stamford, CT
I understand you are cosponsoring hearings on the events
surrounding the recent West Nile Virus outbreak in the New York area.
I hope that you will fully explore the use of alternatives to
pesticides, as from my research I am convinced that the pesticides used
in both New York City and in Westchester County, NY and Fairfield
County, CT (my home) are significantly more dangerous than the threat
of the virus itself. There are more natural methods that can be used to
control the mosquito population, and I believe they should be the
foundation of a national (or regional, for that matter) program.
I believe that if we continue the spraying of pesticides we will
find other health problems emerging in future years. To me this risk is
much greater than the risk from the virus itself.
I hope during your hearings you require the various parties
testifying to use real numbers from this year's experience and not some
hypothetical or estimated set of numbers. We certainly had enough
experience this year to use it as the base for decisionmaking. In
addition please make sure they fully outline the real situation both
before spraying began and after it started. If that is done I believe
it will be obvious that the spraying not the prime factor in the
reduction of the incidence of this disease as it was already decreasing
before spraying began.
Thank you for exploring this topic for us.
__________
Statement of Connie Eash, Cheshire, CT
I understand that you will be holding a Senate hearing next week on
the West Nile Virus Outbreak. I hope that several things are made clear
during this hearing. I understand that the public is not invited, so I
would like to give information that I have researched during the last
few months. As a pharmacologist and a mother of a boy who was diagnosed
with pesticide poisoning in 1993 and now is sensitive to pesticide
exposures, I know that the effects of pesticides are not widely
recognized, even by the ``experts'' and that often such knowledge is
vehemently attacked by pro-chemical people who have certain interests
in protecting the reputation of chemicals.
During the coming hearing, I hope you will be sure the following
things are done: 1) Real experts in pesticide poisoning are used in
equal balance with the virologist experts. Pesticide health effects
should be recognized, monitored and treated. 2) Real numbers should be
used to compare the threat of WNV to other diseases. My source is CDC
numbers. 3) Real information benefits of pesticide spraying. The lack
of benefit is illustrated in the CDC report quoted below. Pesticide
effects can be obtained from EXTOXNET, through the EPA. 4) Any National
Policy should mandate that safer methods of mosquito control be used
prior to spraying. Safer methods exist and were not employed during the
New York incident.
First, a sign that an ``expert'' is NOT an expert is when he says
``pesticide spraying creates no or minimal risks to humans or the
environment,'' or that he calls reactions to pesticides ``allergic''.
Medical professionals who deal with pesticide poisonings should be
used as experts. These are hard to find, however the American Academy
of Environmental Medicine does have a list of medical experts in most
States. William Rea, MD, of Texas is one of the foremost experts in
actually treating pesticide and chemical poisoning. Risks of pesticide
use should be considered, publicized and recognized. Just as there are
efforts at monitoring and treatment of encephalitis, there should be
monitoring and treatment available to those poisoned with the
pesticides. Presently, the doctors involved are not trained in the
recognition of pesticide poisoning or performing tests for pesticide
poisoning. Health departments are not required to document cases of
pesticide poisoning.
Secondly, the Senators should be made aware of the low risk of West
Nile virus. Presently, the opinions of DEP and CDC officials are that
the West Nile strain is less virulent than than the St. Louis strain of
virus. The CDC keeps records of deaths across the country from certain
diseases, including four strains of encephalitis: Eastern equine,
California, St. Louis and Western equine. According to the CDC
``records of deaths from selected diseases, 1986-1995'' deaths from all
four of the encephalitis strains during those years were 48. Please
compare this to 948 deaths from chicken pox and 1006 deaths from acute
rheumatic fever during the same time period. Outbreaks of chicken pox,
in spite of it being highly contagious, are rarely a cause for panic.
These facts, coupled with the lack of human evidence, lead us to
believe that the panic occurring here is mostly due to an exaggerated
sense of danger created by an imbalance in the information, which must
be addressed in the coming hearing.
Next, ask the question, ``have mosquito control methods had any
effect on the progress of WNV?'' CDC's MMWR Weekly, October 22, 1999,
shows a graph illustrating a decline in new cases of WN before the
spraying even started. New cases in New York peaked the week of August
22-28 at 17, then declined to 7 the following week of August 29-
September 4. The malathion spraying started September 5.
Finally, they should have experts in alternative methods of
mosquito control which may become necessary should a more virulent
mosquito-borne virus ever appear. Such alternatives should strive to
maintain the natural predators of mosquitos so that the mosquito
population does not explode when its aquatic and other predators are
killed due to pesticide spraying. Indeed, we should call for an
investigation into the deaths of the lobsters and fish during the
spraying. Were they tested for pesticide poisoning? Were their deaths
consistent and fish kills due to pesticide poisoning? If less toxic
mosquito control are not being utilized, why not?
I am glad that the hearings will be held. I'm concerned because of
the handling of the whole issue in the past few months, that
information will again be twisted and suppressed.
Thank you for your time and interest.
__________
Westport, CT 06880, November 16, 1999
Senator Joseph Lieberman,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D C. 20510.
Dear Senator Lieberman: I was upset to find that the public hearing on
the PESTICIDE ISSUE would not include time for public comments. I am a
Connecticut resident who was dumbfounded by the way the mosquito issue
was handled in the tri-State area this fall.
It is imperative that local and national government officials
consider the drawbacks as well as the benefits of pesticide use. I do
not feel virologists should be the only health professionals consulted
when the decision to spray is made. The possible short- and long-term
effects of these chemicals on humans need to be weighed carefully. So
do the effects on wildlife--including the natural predators of the
targeted organism.
In the case of the West Nile-like virus, new cases in New York City
had peaked and begun to decline approximately 2 weeks before the city
even began spraying. They sprayed us here in Connecticut when there
were NO human cases. Worse still, they sprayed around dead crows,
despite their known 50-1OO-mile vector. The decision to spray was not
based on good science. Compare the death toll from West Nile to that of
say, chicken pox. This was the classic mountain-out-of-a-molehill.
Though the CDC got everyone riled up about the virus, even before
they were sure which virus it was, the DEP downplayed the very real
health effects of the pesticides. I have a letter from the Connecticut
Governor's office telling me that Resmethrin comes from chrysanthemums.
I have a memo from our local Board of Education saying that Resmethrin
is safe for bees (which the label says it is not). Repeated calls to
local and State officials to find out the truth about Resmethrin got me
nowhere--I finally got what I needed (including the product label) off
the Internet.
Furthermore, the pesticides were sometimes misapplied. It says
right there on the label that Resmethrin should not be sprayed on or
around water. In Fairfield County they paid that caveat no heed. It was
also applied on windy nights, and under cold conditions, conditions
contrary to what is stated on the label.
When people reported immediate effects of pesticide poisoning
(including shortness of breath and numbness in the extremities), many
were told they were just ``sensitive''. No agency kept track of
poisonings as far as I know no one is monitoring the long-term effects
on the area either. Since we've already been made unwitting guinea
pigs, someone should pick a similar, nonsprayed community and do a
statistical analysis over time for increased cancer and central nervous
system problems.
When it comes to insect-borne illness, education is the best
defense. People need to be told that persona] prevention is the first
and most effective line of defense--dressing appropriately, for
example, and avoiding buggy times/areas. It's important that people
know the symptoms of the disease in question so they can get treatment,
especially since no amount of spraying will kill all the bugs. And most
important, people need to know that a strong immune system is the best
defense against disease, and that--pesticides depress the immune
system.
I would respectfully ask that, when considering the recent West
Nile spraying fiasco and in making plans for the future:
1) REAL experts in pesticide poisoning balance the virology
experts. (Anyone who say ``pesticide spraying creates no or minimal
risks to humans or the environment,'' or who maintains that a reaction
to pesticide poisioning is ``allergic'' is NO expert.)
2) REAL numbers are used in comparing the threat of an insect-borne
pathogen, comparing it to that of other diseases.
3) REAL numbers are used in analyzing the risks of pesticide
spraying.
4) Health effects of pesticide use be recognized, monitored, and
treated.
It is not the job of Government to pander to people's ignorance or
convenience. Pesticide use to ``protect'' people in the short run
cannot be justified if it comes without a full, public explanation of
the potential immediate and long term problems it may cause.
Sincerely,
Stacy Prince.
__________
Fairfield, CT 06430, December 1, 1999.
Senator Joseph I. Lieberman,
Hart Senate Office Building,
Washington, DC 20510.
Dear Senator Lieberman: I am writing in regard to the upcoming meeting
on the West Nile virus on December 14, 1999 at Fairfield University in
Fairfield, CT. I would like to ask this committee to help promote and
educate the public in successful non-pesticide methods of mosquito
control that have been used elsewhere in the country.
The use of pesticides should be a control method of last resort.
Many of the natural predators of mosquitoes may be killed or negatively
affected by the use of pesticides. Mosquitoes have also been reported
to develop resistance to the pesticides.
This fall, in Connecticut, pesticides became the method of first
resort. Mosquitoes carrying the virus revere reported in only one town
(Greenwich) which was on the New York State border. However, many towns
chose to spray as a precaution with some calling for aerial spraying.
Even the State elected to do ground spraying in the Sherwood Island
State Park located in Westport!
Concerns
My first concern involves the negative impact on human health and
the environment from the use of pesticides to control mosquitoes. My
second concern is with the overall lack of knowledge of non-pesticide
methods and the lack of understanding of the importance of these
methods by local officials and the media.
Most of the spraying that was done in Connecticut occurred south of
Interstate I-95. Many of the beaches, marshlands and rivers adjacent to
Long Island Sound were subjected to pesticide drift and runoff. Scourge
was the pesticide that was selected. The AgrEvo Material Safety Data
Sheet, which I received from the Connecticut Department of
Environmental Protection, states that this pesticide is toxic to fish
and birds. Others reported that the pesticide was also toxic to bees,
butterflies and other beneficial insects.
While Connecticut may have selected the least toxic pesticide
available, there were questions that this chemical does negatively
impact human health. Special concerns were noted for those with upper
respiratory illness such as asthma and emphysema. Also, some of the
information suggested that the same two groups (the elderly and
children) are susceptible to both the virus and the negative effects of
the pesticides. Choosing not to spray to spray has been a very
difficult decision for our local officials.
Another problem has been the local media pressure ``to spray or
else you're not taking any action to protect the public.'' This
approach by the media only made a difficult decision more difficult. I
saw only one article on Fairfield's restored salt marsh as well as a
brief mention that town officials had been using BTI. The press did not
seem to understand the importance of these non-chemical steps.
With this in mind, I would like to ask your committee the following
questions:
1) Would this committee arrange to educate the media and State/
local officials about non-pesticide methods that have been used
successfully in other parts of the country?
2) Could you develop a team of individuals that specialize in non-
pesticide control methods that could go to any area and help design
programs for towns suddenly faced with this type of an emergency?
3) Can you provide funding for this training?
4) Can you provide emergency funding for the State to set up
additional mosquito trapping sites and testing? Faster turnaround time
on test results is also needed.
The State mosquito hotline reported only one permanent test site
for Fairfield. Just before the Fairfield decision to spray was made,
only few 1-day test sites were established. No mosquitoes had been
found with the virus, however the decision was then made to go ahead
and spray. Luckily, the temperature dropped and no spraying was done.
Faster turnaround times on testing would have confirmed that there were
no virus detections, which would have reduced the pressure to spray.
5) The USGS website provides a link to the EPA's ``Pesticide
Mosquito Control (10/6/99)'' report. Can your committee request that
the EPA create a report on non-pesticide methods of control?
I would like to thank you for having this hearing in Fairfield.
Even though the public will not be allowed to speak at this hearing, I
hope you will enter my letter into the record and look forward to any
information the speakers can provide on non-pesticide methods of
mosquito control.
Sincerely,
Krisann E. Benson.
__________
Statement of Lynn Pritchard, Westport, CT
On the evening of Tuesday, 28 September, at 10 p.m., family fed and
baby in bed, my nice safe world was breached by a nightmare.
I'm educated, I'm conscious and my decisions are based in careful
consideration of information sought, gathered and sifted. I feed my
family organic foods; I breast feed and stay at home with my son. I use
cloth diapers and environmentally safe cleaning products. I raise my
own organic herbs and vegetables and I preserve the surplus. I compost
and I recycle. Basically I care.
While watching the news on Wednesday, September 22, I saw there was
to be spraying for the mosquitoes carrying the encephalitis virus. I
felt uneasy, but I thought that if I couldn't stop it, I could prepare.
I made a point to find out where and when they would spray our
neighborhood and with no easy effort I gleaned the information
piecemeal.
The night I knew they were to spray, I covered my gardens, I taped
my leaky windows, I covered the sandbox, locked in the cat, covered the
neighbor's sandbox and toys (they were away), closed their windows and
locked in their cat and then left town for 2 days (my husband returning
the next morning for the cats). Basically, I played ball.
A week later, with the local newspaper this time reporting there
was to be spraying and where, I was able to calculate the risk of the
spraying which was to be a half mile away. I thought that we'd stay
home, close the windows and watch a movie. I made a point to tell the
neighbors not to drive or walk in those areas. Again, I played ball;
the town of Westport didn't.
At 10 p.m. we heard the muffled, unintelligible sound of a
bullhorn. We rushed to the window. It was the advance car with lights
flashing. Five car lengths behind came the spray truck. Our home,
situated on a corner close to the road, was coated. We saw the spray.
The fog was everywhere I called my pregnant neighbor. She had just
closed her windows because, her husband had arrived moments before. He
had jogged through it. The advance car telling him, ``Oh, it can't hurt
you.'' We went back to what we were doing. Fifteen minutes passed. I
tasted metal in my mouth. My husband did as well. We doubted
ourselves--but both of us? Our son coughed in his sleep. We moved him
from his corner room into our bedroom with a more modern window. We
stuffed towels under the door and sat there. My throat and sinuses
became increasingly irritated. I could smell it. . . I could taste it.
. . I could feel it. . . I couldn't do anything about it! It was a gas
seeping into my body. . . into my child's body. . . but to leave was to
walk into it. We waited an hour. A very long hour. We wrapped a towel
around our sleeping son's head. We breathed into cloths. We fled our
home in the middle of the night to my mother's home, a town away.
I awoke the next morning completely hoarse. I called the Westport
Health Department. I got an apology--that felt a little better. I felt
sorry for the Health Department lady--she was under a lot of pressure.
The day went on. . . By midday, I had lost feeling in the upper half of
my face and the tips of my fingers. My vision and reactions were
``fogged'' I watched my son play. I tried to calm myself. His eyes were
ringed with red, as were mine. I called the family doctor. I left a
message with the nurse around 2 p.m. I thought about how the Health
Department lady had told me that it was ``the public crying out for
spraying''. . . I called the newspaper so this couldn't happen again! I
was dropping things. My hands, mostly my left, just weren't getting the
information from my brain as fast as I was thinking it. How the hell
could this happen? I called the doctor again. . . Again I spoke to the
nurse. He wasn't in today. He'd call in the morning, OK? No. . . Not
OK. I was poisoned, my family was poisoned. I had to say something. My
Mama always said, ``Don't make a spectacle of yourself.'' But my God, I
couldn't hold a cup! The tremors began around 6 p.m. There I was. I'd
found a group holding a press conference about the spraying. . . but, I
couldn't drive. My mother had to, so there she was, helping me make an
spectacle of myself.
How did I come from a place of being quietly conscious to being
loudly poisoned? How was it that in the United States of America, I
came to be gassed in my own home? Well, they were just clearing the
spray from the trucks. You see, they park the trucks down the street.
We were exposed to an untold concentration of the toxin--as were at
least 20 small children, at least 2 pregnant woman, at least 10 elderly
people, among 100 or so others. On a warm night, windows open, without
our knowledge, against our will and if you ask me. . . against our
constitutional rights.
The lack of notification mixed with misinformation; the symptoms
way beyond the bounds of the pesticide's application label; the fact
that my family and the food we eat were exposed to a toxin against our
will and without warning! Mad, yup I'm mad. I'm jaded and I want to
move, but the fact is that there are people here: friends, relatives
and neighbors that I care about and love. If I let them be poisoned
without saying anything, it would be just as bad as doing it myself and
I can't, in all good conscience, allow that to happen. But, I guess the
question at hand is, ``Can you?''
__________
Statement of Susan Fenley, New York, NY
I understand you are holding a hearing on the W. Nile virus and
spraying. First, I urge you to recommend safer ways to handle the
mosquito population rather than spraying malathion randomly on people
and their surroundings. There are safe ways to do this. If you like,
I'll send them to you .
Malathion is not safe, and few people believe it is. Just look on
the label. It's not a mystery as to the lethalness of the pesticide.
Second, the encephalitis outbreak was certainly not at epidemic
proportion to warrant spraying to such a degree as was done last
summer. I am afraid what will happen next year when they rematch. Are
you going to spray randomly again? More and more people will protest
and your constituency, in order to protect itself, may turn against
those who support the spraying. Worse, they may suffer physical
consequences from malathion exposure. Please take safe measures now to
curb the mosquito population--but not lethal chemicals that will not
only ineffectively destroy mosquitos, but kill their natural predators,
harm people and that may bring about other, unforeseen future harmful
effects. Please stop the malathion and dangerous chemical exposure to
people.
Thank you.
__________
Statement of Marthe Schulwolf, Piermont, NY
I am not a Connecticut resident, but am nonetheless taking the
liberty of writing to you, as you are about to hold Senate hearings on
an issue of vital importance to all of the residents of the tri-State
region. I refer to the planned hearing on the handling of the West Nile
virus. I am concerned that the dangers and side-effects of broadcast
spraying of have received short shrift, in comparison to the dangers of
the West Nile virus. I would not like to minimize the latter, but I
feel that former have been largely ignored. It is crucial that true
experts on the dangers of pesticides, the symptoms of pesticide
poisoning, be involved in any cost/benefit analysis of pesticide use.
Any national policy on mosquito-borne illness should mandate a true
Integrated Pest Management approach, i.e., one that relies on accurate
scientific monitoring of the pest species in question and on safer
methods of mosquito control, specifically habitat control, water
management, mosquito fish and other predators of mosquitoes, public
education, and especially use of larvicides rather than the
``adulticides'' (the types of insecticides that were sprayed last few
months were ``adulticides,'' designed to kill adult mosquitoes and
carry considerable risk to humans and other species. Larvicides, on the
other hand, are far more biologically specific and are also generally
applied in a more targeted fashion.
I am aware of the fact that many ``experts'' minimize these
dangers, and also refer to reactions to pesticide exposure as
``allergic.'' In fact, such reactions are not allergic, but rather
neurotoxic. Organophosphates such as malathion were originally
developed as nerve poisons for purposes of warfare. They act upon the
nervous system of humans and insects alike. Of course, some people are
more sensitive to their effects than others. But the fact that some can
easily tolerate exposure hardly justifies risking the health of those
who are not able to tolerate it. Furthermore, long-term effects are far
more difficult to assess than short-term effects, as are possible
synergies with other products and medications. Furthermore, as most
mosquito control experts will tell you, adulticide is not the most
effective method of mosquito control, as mosquitoes develop tolerance
and resistance to insecticides. This is a vicouis cycle which must be
stopped. It is essential that our governmental bodies devote the funds
necessary to proper forms for mosquito control, utilizing the newest
and safest methods.
__________
Statement of Britt D. Pastor Bolnick, Mohegan Lake, NY
First and foremost, I would like to thank Senator Lieberman for
holding this forum. As a resident of Westchester County, I feel that
all the counties in this area must work together to ensure the safety
of our human residents, our non-human residents, and the natural
environment that supports us all. Decisions are being made which will
have both known and unknown repercussions on all forms of life.
Although I feel we are making great strides simply in holding and
attending these forums, I was concerned with two main issues after
hearing the panel speak.
The first concerns the definition of a ``public health crisis''. I
have heard this term used twice now, once in justifying Rockland
County's $390,000 single application of aerial pesticides and then
again today, especially in Dr. Fish's testimony. His use of phrases
such as a ``public health threat unprecedented in modern times'' and
comparison of the West Nile Virus to the introduction of yellow fever
and bubonic plague I found to be extreme. Considering the fact that
neither Fairfield County nor Rockland County saw a single human
confirmed case of question whether or not this warrants such strong
language.
I also noticed that Dr. McLean omitted a sentence from his written
testimony, one the important in terms of our reaction to this
situation. The sentence that he omitted reads as follows: ``The virus
usually produces either asymptomatic infection or mild fever in humans.
. . '' Then he goes on to talk about the effect on the bird population.
Now, given that in two counties that found it necessary to spray,
not one person was affected, and given the information that for
normally healthy humans this virus usually produces symptoms that are
less severe than the common flu, my question is: What was the public
health ``crisis'' that warranted the dumping of toxic chemicals over
us? Who gets to define this? My issue is that I no longer trust local
government, State government or the CDC to define a ``public health
crisis'', since my concept and theirs obviously differ so extremely.
The CDC even gives statistics that cite from the years 1986-1995, the
total U.S. deaths from all four strains of encephalitis were 48. The
total deaths from chicken pox were 948, and the total deaths from acute
rheumatic fever were 1006.
Another point that was not addressed sufficiently for me in this
forum was the extreme danger of the chemicals used. If no one had this
virus in Fairfield County, and people are so worried about all the bird
deaths, why would spraying be a solution, even temporarily? Rachel
Carson wrote about the dangers of pesticides and other chemicals on
wildlife and the natural world back in the early 1960's (she even wrote
on Malathion, which is still being used today). Have we learned
nothing? I believe it was Dr. Andreadis with whom I was speaking
briefly after the meeting, and I mentioned Carson's book, Silent
Spring, and he thought that it was not Malathion that she wrote about,
and that there isn't really conclusive evidence that all these
pesticides are harmful. I urge you, Senator, to please pick up a copy
of Silent Spring and find out for yourself what people knew almost 40
years ago, because I am worried that some of the people on this panel
weren't working with all the information they could have.
In closing, I feel that the risks to human life do not warrant such
extreme and irreversible reactions as the aerial spraying of
pesticides. Please reconsider using this as a solution, even if you
only plan minimal use. There is evidence that these chemicals can harm
people with compromised immune systems (which I believe most of the
people who died from the WNV had) so you can only expect more deaths
and ill health by using aerial pesticide application as a solution.
Thank you so much for hearing us.
__________
Statement of Doreen Diorio, Staten Island, NY
This is to support any efforts to protect our public health from
the toxic use of Malathion (and other toxic spraying) and to urge your
further efforts to promote safe alternatives in dealing with
occurrences of West Nile disease.
Where non-toxic sprays are available and where this disease has
been, as is widely felt, overreacted to, I'm sure you'll agree that
safer and saner alternatives must be endorsed. In addition, a program
should be instituted which would prohibit such future hazardous
spraying in cases such as these.
Particularly where children and pregnant women are especially
affected (not to mention the detrimental toll on our wildlife and
overall ecology), our future health lies in the hands of responsible
politicians like yourself.
Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.
__________
Statement of Henry R. Rupp, North Brunswick, NJ
We in New Jersey are delighted that a person of your caliber is
holding a hearing on the West Nile virus outbreak and the means whereby
the possibility of such a future event can be reduced. Those of us in
New Jersey who have managed mosquito control agencies stand willing to
offer you the benefit of our experiences in conducting surveillance,
habitat management, the use of biological controls and larviciding. We
would have hoped that your panel would have had someone with
operational experience to address this very important part of mosquito
control. Although we do not oppose the use of adulticides, we believe
their use should be as a last resort when environmental conditions
overwhelm us or when disease becomes apparent. Connecticut has a good
mosquito man in the person of Paul Capotosto and we would welcome the
opportunity to be of assistance to him. The West Nile virus outbreak
might not have happened with surveillance, inspection and a larval
control program, but if it did happen it would have been in spite of
the efforts made not because of the lack of them. Best wishes in your
search for information and in finding a reasonable approach to the
resolution of this problem.
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