

HOMELAND SECURITY: KEEPING FIRST RESPONDERS FIRST

HEARING

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
VETERANS AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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HOMELAND SECURITY: KEEPING FIRST RESPONDERS FIRST

TUESDAY, JULY 30, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS
AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Norwalk, CT.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:15 p.m., at the Norwalk Community College, East Campus Auditorium, 188 Richards Avenue, Norwalk, CT, Hon. Christopher Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Shays and Tierney.

Also present: State Representatives Boucher, Duff, San Angelo, Stone, and State Senator McKinney.

Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and counsel; J. Vincent Chase, chief investigator; Dr. Nicholas Palarino, senior policy advisor; Kristine McElroy and Thomas Costa, professional staff members; Sherrill Gardner, detailee and fellow; and Jason M. Chung, clerk.

Mr. SHAYS. Good afternoon. I'd like to welcome our witnesses and our guests to this hearing of the National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations Subcommittee and Government Reform Committee.

Mr. Tierney, my colleague from Massachusetts, and I are conducting this hearing and invited Members from both sides of the— from the State House and State Senate. We will be going pretty much by the 5-minute rule. We're going to invite our witnesses to make statements. We will allow them to go over their 5-minute rule.

Ms. Farrell, you are right over there.

Ms. FARRELL. Oh, thank you, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. At least you made it. You know, you can sit right there. The other witnesses will move down and make space.

We will be going by the 5-minute rule and we're going to invite our colleagues from the State House to jump in as well if they have some questions.

In the course of thirty hearings on terrorism issues, our subcommittee has learned this hard lesson: We are fighting a war for which we are not yet fully prepared. Despite far greater awareness of the threats since September 11th and despite some progress toward improved readiness, the tragic fact remains many first responders to the site of a terrorist attack today would also be the second wave of victims.

Without access to sensitive intelligence reports, without rapid detection capabilities and without realistic training, local police, fire fighters and emergency medical personnel arrive at the front lines armed only with dedication and bravery, and a tremendous amount of expertise. Too often, they face the potential horrors of terrorism without the tools they need to survive and prevail.

We called this hearing “Keeping First Responders First” because the men and women sworn to uphold the law and protect our lives and property have to be first on the scene. They also have to be first when it comes to the planning, equipment purchases, communication upgrades, and training exercises they need to do their vital work.

A recent after-action report on September 11th rescue efforts at the Pentagon gleaned more than 200 lessons learned from the incident. Over 200 lessons. Many of those lessons involved communications lapses, dead cell phones, clogged frequencies and incompatible radios that made it difficult to coordinate response units. A media report yesterday indicated some New York fire fighters died on September 11th because they did not hear warnings to evacuate the collapsing tower. The alert was sent over the police radio. The fire department used a different channel.

As we move toward creation of a new Federal Department of Homeland Security, Congress, the administration, States and localities need to be talking on the same channel about meeting the needs of America’s first responders.

We have three panels of witnesses this afternoon. Appropriately, we will hear from our local officials first. State and Federal officials will then give their testimony. We appreciate the willingness of our State and Federal witnesses to waive normal protocol and proceed in that order. We are actually talking about first responders from State and Federal Governments and I thank them for that.

All our witnesses bring valuable experience and important perspective to these issues. We appreciate their willingness to join us today and we truly look forward to their testimony.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

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
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Statement of Rep. Christopher Shays
July 30, 2002

In the course of thirty hearings on terrorism issues, our Subcommittee has learned this hard lesson: we are fighting a war for which we are not yet fully prepared. Despite far greater awareness of the threat since September 11th, and despite some progress toward improved readiness, the tragic fact remains many first responders to the site of a terrorist attack today would also be the second wave of victims.

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We called this hearing "Keeping First Responders First" because the men and women sworn to uphold the law and protect our lives and property have to be first on the scene. They also have to be first when it comes to the planning, equipment purchases, communications upgrades, and training exercises they need to do their vital work.



*Statement of Rep. Christopher Shays
July 30, 2002
Page 2 of 2*

A recent after-action report on 9/11 rescue efforts at the Pentagon gleaned more than two hundred lessons learned from the incident. Many of those lessons involved communications lapses: dead cell phones, clogged frequencies, and incompatible radios that made it difficult to coordinate response units. A media report yesterday indicated some New York firefighters died on September 11th because they did not hear warnings to evacuate the collapsing tower. The alert was sent over the police radio. The fire department used a different channel.

As we move toward creation of a new federal Department of Homeland Security, Congress, the Administration, states and localities need to be talking on the same channel about meeting the needs of America's first responders.

We have three panels of witnesses this afternoon. Appropriately, we will hear from local officials first. State and federal officials will then give their testimony. We appreciate the willingness of our state and federal witnesses to waive normal protocol and proceed in that order.

All our witnesses bring valuable experience and important perspective to these issues. We appreciate their willingness to join us today and we look forward to their testimony.

Mr. SHAYS. And let me say I was asked by the media will what we do here today result in any legislation. My first response was to say it may result in how we allocate resources, but then my second response was clearly that it will because the hearing we had in Bridgeport with Mr. Tierney a few years ago resulted in legislation.

What we will learn today may surprise us. It may have us move in a direction we hadn't thought or it may reinforce what we already have spent a lot of time learning. But it will result in a change in how we operate in Congress, what we legislate, how we legislate it, and how we appropriate those funds.

I'd like to give a personal warm welcome to my colleague Mr. Tierney. He has been here before. He was in Bridgeport for that major meeting we had with over 200 first responders and we went through that trial and practice of imagining what we would do for first responders to a chemical attack on an Amtrak Train in Bridgeport. That was a fascinating experience to me, and I think that the State deserves credit for encouraging that kind of practice because I'm certain it's made us all better responders. It certainly helped us.

But Mr. Tierney was there and I appreciate him being here now and I appreciate his equal partnership in this effort.

Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the Mayor and all the other elected representatives for being here today and for again inviting me to this part of Connecticut. I look out and I see your first responders as well as all the other interested people and I know why Chris is so proud to represent this area.

Chairman Shays, I would thank you for holding this particular meeting, as you have so many others in the past.

Among the images that seared the Nation's memory of the horrific terrorist attacks of September 11th were those hundreds of first responders rushing into fiery buildings. They were heroically sacrificing their lives to save others.

Since that time, we have worked together on this subcommittee, and I was going to say in a bipartisan way, but you should all be proud of the fact that it is in a nonpartisan manner. That is a manner that Chris Shays brings to Congress in a unique way that few, if any, others do with the ability to pull his committee and the Members that he works with around an issue focusing them on the fact that this is for the betterment of the Nation and for our respective districts and setting aside ideology and other factors that may come in. His leadership does that in a great way.

The subcommittee has been marshaling ideas of the country's best resources and skills, how we coordinate efforts to fight terrorism or to streamline government or to make America safer. We need to do this for the families who watched loved ones on September 11th and in the October anthrax attacks. We need to do it for the American people who expect us to protect them, and we need to do it for our children so that future generations can grow up in a free and open society.

I've commended the chairman before for his work on this issue and I want to reiterate the fact that it was long before September

11th. For some 25 to 30 hearings prior to that, several years, this subcommittee on National Security has had a series of public hearings on the issue of Homeland Security. Now, whether or not legislation will come from this hearing, I think everybody should know that a lot of the Homeland Security legislation that Congress is currently considering has been formed by the work this committee did under the leadership of Chairman Shays.

A lot of time has been spent on making sure that the Federal Government and the State government and the local government communicate well, coordinate their resources, and work together to be ready to deal with any sort of a crisis, and that happens to fall upon the many hearings this subcommittee held and a lot of the lessons that we've learned, including that experience that we had a couple of years ago down here on the tabletop exercise from which we learned an incredible amount and hopefully have been keeping that in mind as we fashion legislation moving forward.

These committee hearings have not been fluff. They've not been full of grandstanding. That wouldn't be the chairman's way and it certainly wouldn't be appropriate. We've heard about medical facilities and first responder agencies and the challenges they face from sustaining hospital operations in a chemical or biological environment, providing radios, physicians and nurses to expanding surge capacity for public health systems to purchasing decontamination equipment. We've heard from State officials the words that public health has not been at the table in Federal planning. Since September 11th and the anthrax attacks of October 2001, Congress has taken steps to address those issues and I suspect that they may more as a result of this hearing and others to follow.

Two key areas we've heard mentioned, communication and resources. As we look to first responders for solutions to Homeland Security needs, all parties of Homeland Security from Federal agents to local first responders must communicate with one another in ways to save lives and protect civil liberties. Whether that's highways or ports, nuclear facilities, office buildings or landmarks, our local first responders need to know how they will receive intelligence and what resources they will have to help them act on this information in order to protect the American people.

By resources I include direct Federal assistance directly to local first responders. All acts of terrorism are local, so each of our communities must be fully prepared in crisis response and consequence management. This requires some national preparedness and a response plan that builds upon but does not undermine the integrity of existing Federal, State, local partnerships such as the Fire Act and the COPS programs. It means listening to local first responders, respecting community concerns, and finding innovative solutions to these challenges.

Mr. Chairman, these issues are not limited to this district. I know my district in Massachusetts has similar challenges as well as other areas throughout the country. My first responders tell me we appreciate your rhetoric, but we need your resources. I look forward to hearing an update from the officials here as to the progress

and I hope we can continue to ensure the attention in Washington is directed toward the urgent needs of State and local first responders.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:]

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
Opening Statement
Representative John F. Tierney
 July 30, 2002

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very important hearing on keeping first responders first. Among the images seared into our nation's memory from the horrific terrorist attacks of September 11th were those of hundreds of first responders rushing into fiery buildings, heroically sacrificing their lives to save others.

Since that time, we have worked together on your Subcommittee, in a bipartisan way, to keep the focus where it truly belongs — on marshaling our country's best ideas, resources, and skills to coordinate our fight against terrorism, streamline government, and make Americans safer. We need to do this for the families who lost loved ones on September 11th and in the October anthrax attacks; for the American people who expect us to protect them; and for our children, so future generations may grow up in a free and open society.

I commend Chris Shays for his work on the issue of homeland security — work that began years before September 11 — when, as Chairman of the National Security Subcommittee, you began a series of more than 25 public hearings on the issue of homeland security — more than any other single Member of Congress — examining nearly every facet of this extremely complicated issue. This work has helped all members of our committee and the public develop a broader knowledge and a deeper understanding of the way our government is organized to defend against, and respond to, a terrorist attack. For that, I would like to thank Chairman Shays, and I think the American people owe him a tremendous debt of gratitude.

Our Subcommittee hearings have not been fluff or grandstanding — they have focused, in intricate detail, on issues that really affect whether people will live or die in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. In fact, one was a field hearing here in Connecticut two years ago, when first responders from all over the area conducted a table-top exercise and then gathered together to discuss their best practices, lessons learned, and future plans.



Mr. SHAYS. Thank you for that. I always appreciate your gracious words.

I'd like to welcome Representative Ron San Angelo from Naugatuk, Senator John McKinney from Florida, as well as Representative Jack Stone from—I said Florida. Forgive me. [Laughter.]

Representative Jack Stone from Fairfield, as well as Representative Boucher from Milton. Sometimes I call John Stuart, so I guess he can have me call him from Florida.

We have Representative Bob Duff as well, and we welcome you to participate, Representative Duff. He's a new member and a very effective new member. Welcome.

Before we swear you in, I just want to get some—and announce our panel, I just would like to get some housekeeping out of the way. I'd ask for unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement on the record and that the record remain open for 3 days without purpose. Without objections, so ordered.

I ask for the unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted to include their written statements in the record. Without objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that the written statements of Natalie Ketchum, First Selectwoman; Ken Flate, First Selectman of Fairfield; Christopher Lynch, Chief of Police, New Canaan; Marge Smith, Eastern Volunteer Emergency Medical Services; Richard Climates—am I saying his name correctly?

Ms. FARRELL. Climates.

Mr. SHAYS [continuing]. Climates, Southwestern Region, submission statements be placed in the record, and without objection, so ordered.

I would also say that we will—I think Mr. Tierney has a plane back to Massachusetts—

Mr. TIERNEY. Sometime.

Mr. SHAYS [continuing]. Sometime today and I'm not going to ask him to miss his plane. But we have three fairly full panels. If, in fact, we—at the end I'm going to invite anyone here to stay who has a comment and make a comment for the record. So you'll be able to make a comment based on your observations and/or ask a question if you would like to do that, and so that will be available. I'm not sure that—I'm not sure when that will be, but if you're willing to wait, we'll stay.

We have as our first panel a very fine number of witnesses representing—basically they're elected officials in our local communities and also the University of Norwalk. So let me just announce in this order Mr. Knopp, the Honorable Alex Knopp, mayor of Norwalk, a former State representative for a number of years and a new mayor in Norwalk and doing an outstanding job. He's joined by first selectwoman from Westport, Diane Farrell, who also has kind of almost become the dean of this group and is just as well a superb elected official.

We are also joined by Mr. Baldwin, who is a newly elected member. I enjoyed working with him as well and all of your communities are in good hands. Mr. DeMartino, the director of emergency preparedness for New Canaan, is here, and we have Dr. William

Schwab, who is president of Norwalk Community College. And I consider this one of the most outstanding schools, universities, colleges. Clearly the best community college besides Housatonic. [Laughter.]

So what we do, I would have to as a disclaimer say we swear in all our witnesses and we'll investigate you and swear in all our witnesses except for one. My colleagues might have some sympathy. I chickened out when Senator Berg came to testify. I didn't swear him in, but everyone else has to.

If you would all rise and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Note for the record all of our witnesses have responded in the affirmative.

Mr. Knopp, I'm going to have you go first. And, Doctor, I'm going to have you go second. Mr. DeMartino, I'll have you go—I'd like you to—you need to go first?

Ms. FARRELL. I have a WSCC meeting.

Mr. SHAYS. (Indiscernible.).

Ms. FARRELL. (Indiscernible.).

Mr. SHAYS. You know what? A gentleman from Norwalk is a gentleman (indiscernible). So we'll let you go first.

Ms. FARRELL. Are you sure about that?

Mr. SHAYS. Do you have that same meeting?

Mayor KNOPP. No.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Then if you don't mind, we're going to have you give your testimony. You're nice. You come in before your meeting rather than afterwards.

Ms. FARRELL. I appreciate that.

Mr. SHAYS. Go for it.

Ms. FARRELL. OK. All right.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, let me understand something. Do we have an amplification of our witnesses? Is that an amplification?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER. Yeah.

Mr. SHAYS. All right. WSCC is important, but that's the one you got to speak to.

Ms. FARRELL. OK.

Mr. SHAYS. Sorry. We don't give you much room.

**STATEMENT OF DIANE FARRELL, FIRST SELECTWOMAN,
WESTPORT, CT**

Ms. FARRELL. That's all right. That's OK.

All right. Good afternoon to the panel and our very esteemed visitors. And I must say I'm delighted, Mr. Chairman, that you've included members of the State legislature because while we are here speaking to you as first responders, the State's involvement is critical. Its financial help, its point of perspective is critical to this entire issue. So I am delighted to be here and I do thank you.

Your letter was very specific and there was a paragraph that you basically articulated five questions and points that you asked us to address. So that's what I'm going to do this afternoon. I would also say that as part of the backup that I've provided, I do have written responses from our police and fire departments and our EMS from Westport addressing directly—

Mr. SHAYS. We'll make it a part of the record.

Ms. FARRELL. But I am delighted they have participated as well, at least in writing, and I encourage you to take a look at it.

The first point that you had in that critical paragraph had to do with changes in domestic preparedness. And in that regard I did want to begin by saying that Westport has maintained a very high level of emergency preparedness for decades. We are a New England coastal community and we're certainly used to natural disasters. We respond quickly to rescues, evacuations, and mitigation efforts. Our crews also routinely train for other types of disasters. Since we have both I-95 and Merritt Parkway going through Westport, we have had incidents in that regard, and we also have the Metro North Railroad system.

Since September 11th what's changed for us is there's clearly a greater need to prepare for weapons of mass destruction events. And that would mean biochemical. It would also mean nuclear.

I should also tell you that we have not waited for support coming from New Hartford or the Federal Government, but that upon the experience of September 11th we did go forward and appropriate funds through our own taxpayers to provide bio-hazard suits for police and EMS. Fire, of course, are covered as responders for bio-hazard emergencies.

What we learned though—in fact, it was a wonderful phrase that was given by a police captain in Stamford when we met regionally, and that was that she was tired of the police being canaries. And of course what she meant by that is if you're dealing with a weapons of mass destruction event, you have a criminal aspect to this that does require police response. You also of course just need police and EMS personnel there to respond to health emergencies, as well as any kind of other, you know, public—keeping the public away from the site kind of thing.

So we did make the purchase of suits. These suits, however, have a limited shelf life. They will need to be replaced. Whether they're ever used, and obviously we hope they're never used, but at some point they're going to have to be replaced one way or the other. So we are going to face that expense once again.

The second point was the effectiveness of Federal programs to equip and train first responders. I'm sorry to say that in Westport right now as plans are unfolding, there are no dollars that are directly going to come to our town to provide for equipment or training. In fact, if I'm correct, right now I'm not sure that there are dollars allocated for training at all. They seem to be mostly in the area of equipment.

This is a real problem. I understand that we're a midsize town. I understand that we don't happen to have an attractive target. However, given the fact that we're 50 miles from New York City and within the distance of two different nuclear power plants and we're in a very congested area, it would seem that these midsize towns, especially here in Fairfield County, ought to be given some consideration.

What's planned right now, as we understand it, is that the State intends to provide equipment to the two major cities in our region, Stamford and Bridgeport, and I certainly don't disagree with that plan. And we do have mutual aid agreements among ourselves. We've had it for many years and we've recently reaffirmed.

The concern is this though. When you are talking about a large-scale event or even just a mass evacuation from (indiscernible) or New York City, is it realistic to assume that the personnel they're going to have in either Stamford or Bridgeport are going to be able to respond to the Westports, to the New Canaans, to the Norwalks on a timely basis. And I think that's something you have to really begin to consider, again thinking about where we live with the two highways.

And I also remind you that while we are considered small to midsize towns, you know, with the two bookends of the State, but when you add Bridgeport and Stamford to all of our municipalities, the Miltons, the Fairfields, etc., we're actually 19.4 percent of the State of Connecticut. We would have a total population of 661,163 people. So not insignificant.

We have as the next point adequacy of emergency response plans as relates to nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological threats. Our responders have been well trained to a point, as I mentioned previously. However, the criminal nature of weapons of mass destruction events do add to their complexity. I think this is something we really have to look at from a law enforcement standpoint.

You know, previously we had experiences with anthrax. Right after the initial anthrax letters were received, every municipality was getting phone calls, you know, suspicious white powder, suspicious mail, etc. Well, where you would sit down in a biohazardous event and you would deploy the fire department because that is the response, that is their training, you can't do that. They have to be accompanied by police because you don't know the nature of what this particular incident may or may not be and it takes more personnel and it takes a different kind of acute awareness of a situation that you're not just necessarily dealing with a simple truck spill. There's nothing simple about a hazardous material truck spill, but it's even more complex than that. So I think you really have to add that critical component.

I will also say that Westport made a conscious decision on its own to purchase 50,000 doses of potassium iodide. Now, the State of Connecticut's current policy and I believe the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's current policy has been within a ten-mile radius of where the event would take place. There are two things I would say. No. 1, we're only then talking about an event at an established nuclear power plant. When you begin to talk about nuclear bombs and other things, you can't really predict where a nuclear event is going to take place. So to simply draw a ten-mile circle around an established nuclear facility is good, but it's inadequate.

I think the other thing you have to look at is if you study some of the events of Chernobyl a decade later, you will see that there are still higher incidences of certain forms of cancer that tend to relate back to radiation exposure that have exceeded the ten-mile limit.

So we felt probably the only thing we could do as a municipality in terms of dealing with a nuclear threat was to at least try to provide dosage amounts that would handle the population in the town, which is 50,000, and then also to anticipate or assume that others could be, you know, in our municipality at the time of exposure.

You also had the role of the Federal Department of Homeland Security in supporting first responders. And this I can't say clearly enough. We must, must have adequate funds for training and ongoing equipment replacement. And probably the single most important thing that we have to have and that we ought to be able to have on a fairly expedited basis is the creation of a seamless communication system that connects all emergency services on an inter-municipal basis. And, you know, from having read the most recent accounts of some of the analysis of the New York coordinations that a lack of communications, linkage in backbone led in part perhaps to some of the fatalities that were faced with the New York Fire Department, that is really, really crucial.

I'm going to say it again. We've got to have money to train. We've got to have money for equipment and its replacement down the road, and we've got to have adequate communications to talk to each other both between towns, as well as in town.

You also had quality and timeliness of threat information currently available to State and local officials. Back to communications, right now I don't think communications are as good as they could be. The word that I was trying to tactfully use is fractured.

We tried—I know our police chief and our fire chief worked very hard and very diligently cooperating recently, as well as the State police and the FBI. However, I don't think that's a perfect communication system. I don't think I'm surprising anybody up here. And I'm not going to put anybody on the spot because, frankly, I don't think it's individuals. I think it's the entire process of communications that really needs to be reconsidered, but it's crucial.

I will also add that our residents really don't find the color coded system to be all that helpful or adequate. I don't think I'm telling you anything new, but let's face it this color coding thing isn't going anywhere. And, frankly, since September 11th everyone has been on a bit of an edge and it's only a matter of whether the edge is a little sharper or a little duller depending on what we're hearing or what we're experiencing.

So the last thing I'm going to say is this. Please look at us not as Westport, Norwalk, Trumbull, Milton as one little community. Consider what we are strategically. We are within a 50-mile radius of New York City, which is clearly a target. We have a population that we know we cannot evacuate right now. We need to plan for what we can do for that population at any given moment. And we also have to recognize that tens of thousands of our population commute into New York City every day.

So please when you are thinking about your district and lower third to a county and this part of Connecticut, remember that we are as much a part of the New York Metro area as we are the State of Connecticut. And so while, you know, we may look like just a town of 24,000, I think when you go just below the surface, it's a lot more complex than that.

One final comment from your colleague, Representative—is it Tauscher?

Mr. TIERNEY. Tauscher.

Ms. FARRELL. Tauscher from the 10th District in California. She gave a wonderful analogy by saying the first responders are the tip of the spear. Right now I'm here to tell you that the tip of the spear

is fairly blunt, and I would hope that what you will do in the coming months and, you know, as soon as possible is work with us creatively and, you know, responsibly to get that tip of the spear as sharp as it possibly can be.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Farrell follows:]



WESTPORT, CONNECTICUT

DIANE GOSS FARRELL
First Selectwoman

July 30, 2002

The Honorable Christopher Shays
U.S. Representative
Chairman
Subcommittee On National Security,
Veterans Affairs, And International Relations
Congress of the United States
Room B-372 Rayburn Building
Washington, D.C. 20515


Dear Mr. Shays:

Thank you for the opportunity to address the Subcommittee On National Security, Veterans Affairs, And International Relations to discuss *Homeland Security: Keeping First Responders First*.

In an effort to be as comprehensive as possible, I requested written comments from the Westport Fire, Police, and Emergency Medical Services Departments. I have endeavored to summarize their view, as well as my own; however, I encourage you to read their individual comments as well.

In your July 10th letter, you requested the following:

“Witnesses are requested to describe changes in domestic preparedness and emergency management procedures since September 2001, and to discuss the effectiveness of federal programs to equip and train first responders. Please also discuss the adequacy of emergency response plans, particularly with regard to incidents involving release of nuclear, radiological, chemical or biological material, and the role you see for a federal Department of Homeland Security in supporting first responders. In addition, the Subcommittee would be interested in your views on the quality and timeliness of threat information currently available to state and local officials.”



- Changes in Domestic Preparedness

Westport has maintained a high level of emergency preparedness for decades. As a New England coastal community, we experience natural disasters that warrant an ability to respond quickly to rescues, evacuations, and mitigation efforts. Our crews routinely train for other types of disasters, including major incidents on I-95, the Merritt Parkway, as well as the Metro North Railroad.

What has changed since September 11th is a greater need to prepare for weapons of mass destruction events (WMD), such as biochemical or nuclear.

It should be noted that since September 11th, Westport has taken the initiative to protect our first responders by purchasing bio-hazard suits for our Police and Emergency Medical Service personnel at Town expense. The Fire Department, as part of its existing protocol, is already trained and equipped for bio-hazard incidents.

- Effectiveness of Federal Program to Equip and Train First Responders

Sadly, no outside funding will yield any direct support to Westport personnel. Federal funds distributed by the State of Connecticut are not planned for any of the mid-size to smaller towns in Connecticut. Instead, the State has determined that the cities, (in our case Bridgeport and Stamford), will receive equipment and be expected to provide mutual aid in the event of an incident.

We in the mid-size/smaller towns are deeply concerned that this system will be unrealistic if a large scale regional event occurs. There simply will not be enough trained and equipped personnel to adequately deploy to other communities. In addition, response time will be much less efficient than that which could be achieved by local Police, Fire, and Emergency Medical Services.

It is important to note that the cities and towns from Stamford to Bridgeport, represent a population of 661,163, or 19.4%, of the entire State.

- Adequacy of Emergency Response Plans as Relates to Nuclear, Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Threats

Our responders have been well trained to a point; however, the criminal nature of weapons of mass destruction events add to their complexity.

More training is required in this area. In addition, Westport is within fifty miles of two nuclear power plants. Not satisfied with the State's current policy that potassium iodide is unnecessary any further than ten miles from a plant, we have purchased 50,000 doses for our residents and any others within our catchment area. Given the region's population density

and chronic road congestion, evacuation is increasingly daunting. We need help planning in-place evacuations as an alternative to "heading for the hills".

- Role of the Federal Department of Homeland Security in Supporting First Responders

Adequate funds for training and on-going equipment replacement is critical. Support for the creation of a seamless communications system that connects all emergency services on an inter-municipal basis is essential.

- Quality and Timeliness of Threat Information Currently Available to State and Local Officials

To date, communication links between outside law enforcement and first responders is fractured.

On several occasions, threat information is learned initially from media sources. Anecdotally, our residents find the threat level color codes confusing and ineffective.

As a final comment, I urge the members of the Subcommittee to consider the *strategic* nature of lower Fairfield County. We are fifty miles from New York City. We send tens of thousands of our residents to New York every day as a key component of our nation's economic engine. Our rail system is the busiest in the world. Our highways provide the only reasonable gateway to New England.

It is vital that we be considered in the aggregate as an integral part of the New York Metropolitan Region when considering security.

On behalf of the citizens of Westport, I thank the committee for its thoughtful consideration of this critical issue. As we commemorate the first anniversary of the September 11 attacks, it is my fervent wish that United States citizens never face the tragedy we experienced nearly a year ago. Unfortunately, we know all too well that the threat continues. We must remain vigilant. This means prioritizing funds so that *all first responders have the equipment and training necessary for whatever is ahead.*

Sincerely,


Diane Goss Farrell
First Selectwoman

DGF:ps
Attachments



Memorandum

To: Diane G. Farrell, First Selectwoman
CC: Alan Yoder, EMS Coordinator
From: David Heinmiller, Captain *DH*
Date: July 20, 2002
Re: National Security Field Hearing on July 30, 2002

RECEIVED

JUL 32 2002

TOWN OF WESTPORT
 SELECTMAN'S OFFICE

In response to your July 18th memo on your testimony at the July 30th National Security Subcommittee's Field Hearing I have the following comments.

- 1) The original premise of awarding equipment funds to large population areas was fine as an easy first step in the process to prepare our nation for a possible terrorist attack. This has been accomplished in Connecticut through the use of Department of Justice grants administered by the Connecticut National Guard. However, I suspect that most major cities will not expend the funding necessary to train and certify their personnel to utilize the equipment and it will sit in storage rooms never to be distributed. If a terrorist's incident happens in a major city their emergency personnel and population will be equally effected. They will require mutual aid from the regional towns. This has already been proven by prior terrorist's incidents and natural disasters. Unfortunately we have no equipment or trained personnel and can not provide aid.
- 2) **Equipment Grants should now be made available on a regional basis.** This premise is similar to that used in the EMS system. Towns should be encouraged to organize regional response teams. These teams would be trained to a higher level than a First Responder and would be equipped for a basic terrorist incident response. Under this plan no community would be expected to bare the burden of funding their own team. A team's first responsibility would be to provide service to member towns, but could be activated elsewhere by the Governor.
- 2) **Finally, Equipment Grants should be made available to all communities for Personal Protective Equipment (Masks, suits, etc).** The local community would decide if they wished to invest in training and certification for their personnel in the use of the equipment and then they could apply for it. All equipment would be purchased and issued by the National Guard so that everyone in the state has similar equipment and GSA pricing is used for the best value. This would place basic protective equipment in the hands of most

July 20, 2002

First Responders. Most small communities and volunteer organizations would train their personnel and accept the equipment grants. Most major cities in Connecticut would require mutual aid from smaller regional cities if a terrorist's incident happened. We need to get some equipment into every town in the U.S.

- 3) **The Federal Government must plan for future replacement of aging or expired equipment.** Once equipment is issued it will be used in training initially, then could sit for years unused, but deteriorating. The Federal Government should project these program costs out for future replacement or else cities and towns will not replace equipment as necessary and the program will be obsolete. Prior government programs to distribute or stockpile drugs to major cities have become nightmares as cities refuse to budget funds to replace costly stockpiles due to budget constraints and a poor economy. Unfortunately most governmental programs are of short duration and one time only funding for initial issues. I believe we must plan at least twenty years into the future for these national programs to succeed. The national security of the U.S. should not be a two - five year plan.

EMS Coordinator Alan Yoder has also been asked to testify and will be presenting a section on EMS needs for Southwest Regional EMS. I will ask that he forward you a copy of his report/discussion.




DEPARTMENT OF FIRE SERVICES

Administration (203) 341-5000
Fire Marshal's Office (203) 341-5020
FAX (203) 341-5009
RICHARD S. GOUGH
Fire Chief - Fire Marshal

RECEIVED

JUL 25 2002

TOWN OF WESTPORT
SELECTMAN'S OFFICE

TO: Diane Farrell, First Selectwoman
FROM: Richard Gough, Fire Chief 
DATE: July 24, 2002
RE: NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING

Some points to cover in your testimony:

Local Emergency Management Issues

Westport has discussed modifying our plan for re-location and holding of people effected by WMD. This would not involve use of our primary shelter location. This concept provides for control of the incident scene. Effected persons taken from a scene are either a witness, suspect or possible victim of insidious exposure. This strategy will minimize cross contamination beyond the incident location, permit proper interviewing of witnesses and provide accountability of family members effected by the incident. Our existing transportation annex using school buses supports this new concept. Another benefit is relieving the incident commander of excessive non-emergency personnel at the incident site, which would be treated as a crime scene.

Potassium Iodine acquisition for downwind exposure to radiation. We felt that access to stockpiles available would not service the needs of Westport as effectively. Distribution plan currently in development by Health Director utilizing Emergency Management Team resources.

Federal and State

The DOJ (Department of Justice) equipment grant program is providing equipment for WMD incidents to the five largest municipalities by population, Bradley Airport, DEP, State Police, Tribal Nations (Casinos), and Fairfield County Haz Mat Team. The purchasing process is handled by DAS (Department of Administrative Services) and OEM/Domestic Preparedness.

To date, our regional Haz Mat Team (lower 13 towns in SW CT) has received very little of the designated equipment.

One issue to surface since equipment distribution begun is training for First Responders. **In particular, law enforcement personnel who have not previously had to wear respirators and haz mat suits are on a large learning curve. OSHA requirements that are common to Fire Departments impact the level of pre-incident preparation. Providing, equipment is a good concept, however the required training should be part of the grant program, with a method to deliver it statewide (see below).**

Fire Departments receiving equipment and expanding their capabilities for WMD also must shoulder the additional training as part of their operating budget. **The State Fire Academy should be provided with additional assets to expand their programs to deliver broad-based training through their existing network. This existing system if properly funded, can deliver the requisite training required for police officers as well.**

The next level of funding available to municipalities should consider smaller populations so that resources reach a greater number of citizens in suburban areas. **To date, receipt of federal assets has required that they be made available regionally. This concept is the single most important issue.**

Municipalities need to enhance regional cooperation beyond previous mutual aid experiences. Response plans that rely on the occurrence of a major event will not be utilized frequently enough to be effective. Lack of frequent regional training/coordination results in the best-laid plan not performing as expected because of lack of familiarity and use. **State OEM should become the point agency to promote regionalization of basic everyday public safety service delivery.** This transformation should be promoted at the federal level (Homeland Security). This will result in greater daily coordination and worst case incidents will be better managed as a result of more frequent interaction.

State OEM and the federal government should develop and promote municipalities to regionalize services by offering incentives like cost sharing or grants. One example of this in Connecticut is the regional dispatch cost incentives through OSET (Office of Statewide Telecommunications). Regrettably little interest has been shown in that area. Given the critical impact of communications interoperability at a regional emergency, this concept takes on added significance. **Financial incentives (State) should be improved, with federal assistance; regionalization should be made too hard to pass up from a fiscal perspective.**

Threat Information

This area needs improvement, previous law enforcement sensitive information (NCIC Bulletins) can be read in the newspaper the next day. How proprietary was the data if it is publicized? The need to inform the public is important, but unless there is specific location based intelligence on a specific target, the need to keep stating we are on alert results in a "Chicken Little syndrome".

Proprietary information should be sent directly to the agencies responsible within the jurisdictions potentially effected. Then a local confidential briefing can be held to develop an action plan. A perfect example of this system would be how the White House handles Presidential visits with an "advance team" who meets with all responders to discuss logistics and details.

Summary

Given the magnitude of change presently underway, there are many opportunities to change the traditional thought process of Public Safety services and Emergency Management. Truly all communities should develop an all hazards planning process or improve upon what they already have. The concept of each town or city trying to provide for its own individual needs during a WMD is unreasonable. Incident demands will overrun an entire region. The only way to make wholesale improvements that pays dividends every day is to regionalize, as may municipal services as possible.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. My understanding is that you need to get on your way.

Ms. FARRELL. I do. I apologize.

Mr. SHAYS. But I did just want to give you a compliment that is so deserved and that is that you have not waited for others to try to deal with this problem. And I know that we're going to have to work on a regional basis, but hats off to you for stepping in to it.

Ms. FARRELL. Well, I thank my colleagues because they've really shown a lot of regional cooperation on a variety of issues and this is no different than West Nile or transportation, and I'm just really honored to be working with the folks in the area, as well as yourself.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Thank you for making it to be here.

Now, Mr. Knopp, you can welcome us and then we can welcome you, and thank you for your graciousness. You'll be staying for questions, right?

Mr. KNOPP. Absolutely. (Indiscernible). [Laughter.]

Ms. FARRELL. He grew up in Westport.

Mr. SHAYS. Do you still live there or have parents that live there?

Mr. KNOPP. Sure.

STATEMENT OF ALEX KNOPP, MAYOR, NORWALK, CT

Mr. KNOPP. Before I begin my remarks, let me first, Congressman Shays, welcome you and Representative Tierney to Norwalk, and thank you very much for holding this support and oversight hearing. I appreciate your inviting me to testify along with the other distinguished public officials from our region. And I want to thank President Schwab for his hospitality here at Norwalk Community College, and I want to also welcome my former colleagues of the General Assembly (indiscernible) and in the witness chair for the first time.

I would also like to thank you, Congressman Shays, for your very humane efforts to secure appropriate support for many of the families in our communities who suffered personal losses on September 11th. It's very important to them and you did that in a very humane and appropriate fashion.

Before I begin my remarks, I'd also indicate I'm accompanied today by Chief Verda of the Norwalk Fire Department and Chief Rilling of the Norwalk Police Department, who are sitting behind me, and I'm very, very proud to serve with them.

Mr. SHAYS. They make you look good, sir.

Mr. KNOPP. Thank you.

The message I wish to communicate to Members of Congress today is that while the President's National Strategy for Homeland Security released on July 16th properly acknowledges that cities are on the front lines in our national effort to secure America's homeland from terrorism, the Federal Government has not yet provided cities with the direct resources we need to successfully carry out this new mission.

Therefore, I urge you to enact legislation to strengthen the partnership between America's mayors and the Federal Government by providing cities with the direct resources we need to improve emer-

gency telecommunications, to obtain new technology, public safety equipment and to expand first responder training that will ensure that our cities will be safe and our citizens will live free from fear.

Indeed the war has come to America's shores only 50 miles from Norwalk and made municipal first responders part of America's national security team. But as Mayor Menino of Boston, the President of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, said on July 16th, 10 months after the horrific attack of September 11th, we are still awaiting Federal assistance to support our efforts to ensure that cities are prepared for and can respond effectively to any emergency.

To date, Connecticut has received relatively little Federal funding for enhanced security. Last year we received just \$2.6 million from the Department of Justice Domestic Preparedness Equipment Grant Program. Those funds were distributed to the State's five largest municipalities, and of course the Groton-New London area because of their nuclear power plants.

If I may slightly correct Ms. Farrell's comments, this year the State's Office of Emergency Management anticipates receiving about \$4.6 million from the Department of Justice, and Norwalk will participate in this grant as the sixth largest municipality in the State.

Our share of this Preparedness Equipment Grant will include Level A, B and C suits for hazardous materials, hazardous detection equipment, \$100,000 for a mass decontamination trailer that can also be used as a local command center, and 3 portable and 1 mobile 800 megahertz radios to be used for command and control that will allow the chiefs behind me and the EMS director to have direct communications with the ITAC and ICAL frequencies, which are manned 24/7 by the State police.

I'd like to compliment the State's Office of Emergency Management and the Adjutant General of Connecticut, Major Cugno, for preparing a comprehensive domestic preparedness strategy for these grants and for consulting with municipalities on their needs.

But it's obvious that this equipment grant, as welcome as it will be, is by no means sufficient to meet our needs. Are four federally funded emergency telecommunications radios to be delivered more than 10 months after September 11th really an adequate response to the biggest emergency facing our country in the last 50 years?

Like other municipalities, Norwalk has not waited for Federal funding, but has moved on its own with neighboring communities to enhance its first responder capabilities. Let me mention eight of the initiatives we've taken since September 11th since I know that you're on a fact gathering mission here today.

First, Norwalk adopted an Emergency Medical Services Plan that establishes performance standards for each segment of the city's emergency medical services team, including police, fire and Norwalk Hospital.

Second, we've adopted an overall Emergency Medical Services Mass Casualty Response Plan to assist first responders.

Third, we've adopted a Southwest Regional Mutual Aid Agreement that strengthens intertown aid agreements for EMS ambulance service.

Fourth, we have worked to improve regional municipal cooperation. The chief elected officials, fire and police chiefs and others

meet to exchange information. And during these meetings the priorities were identified as compatible telecommunications, equipment and training. And we have another meeting next week on August 6th.

Fifth, we've worked to improve regional security coordination. The police and fire chiefs have followed up with the elected officials meeting and have formulated a comprehensive regional strategy. In particular, they've adapted a \$20,000 grant program from ConnDOT to purchase a number of the 800 megahertz radios to be stored in a central regional location for quick distribution in a time of crisis.

Sixth, the police chiefs have developed a regional plan to deploy as many as 24 officers to any location to augment the baseline staffing of any community.

Seventh, we're putting a lot of effort in Norwalk to enhance the school security plans. We have participated in the FEMA program to train school personnel to manage their facilities for up to 72 hours in the event of a disaster when first responders may not be able to succeed. And all of the costs for this training are paid by FEMA in Maryland, while Norwalk will pay the cost for training of education personnel in City Hall next month.

Eighth, we've also developed a school emergency response plan. That means quick visual access for each school to provide a layout for emergency personnel, including where a gym or cafeteria or library are located if they have to come in from the outside.

In terms of Federal legislation, I would just mention three priorities. First, we do need to connect the telecommunication systems used by police, fire and EMS, as all the articles after September 11th would indicate. Connecticut is far ahead of the game because unlike other States, we have designated an 800 megahertz system of shared frequencies for emergency communications, and now our challenge is to obtain the hardware to utilize it effectively during a crisis.

Second, provide direct funding for cities. First responder funding from the Federal Government should be provided directly to cities and towns. We're the first responders and we need the best training and equipment possible. The best approach would be to establish a Homeland Security Block Grant Program, which unfortunately the current first responder legislation in the Senate, Senate Bill 2664 does not authorize.

And third, and I would just mention this in closing, when funding for training is provided, we believe that first responder Federal legislation should include funding for overtime. All training, for example, in the Norwalk Police Department is done on an overtime basis. The new training to prepare for forces against biological, chemical and nuclear attacks may result in unavoidable overtime expenses. And I say this as a Mayor who has cracked down the hardest in our city's history of overtime and reduced overtime budgets in both police and fire departments significantly. But now the bill, Senate Bill 2664 specifically forbids overtime funding. I urge you to give that a second look and to give municipalities the flexibility to use funds for overtime where overtime arises out of training first responders for mass disasters.

In conclusion let me say that it is critically important to strengthen the partnership between mayors and the Federal Government on homeland security. This hearing is an important opportunity for you to hear local municipal officials, and by working together we can create the national effort we need to prevail.

Thank you again for holding this hearing, coming to Norwalk and asking for our views on homeland security.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Knopp follows:]



OFFICE OF THE MAYOR
ALEX A. KNOPP

TESTIMONY OF MAYOR ALEX KNOPP AT CONGRESSIONAL HEARING ON
"HOMELAND SECURITY: KEEPING FIRST RESPONDERS FIRST" BY THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM – JULY 30, 2002 – NORWALK COMMUNITY COLLEGE

Chairman Shays and other distinguished members of the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations, I would like to welcome you to Norwalk and thank you for holding this important oversight hearing on the status of First Responder preparedness in Connecticut after the tragic events of 9/11. I appreciate your inviting me to testify along with the many other distinguished public officials from the Southwestern Connecticut.


I would also like to thank Congressman Shays for his humane efforts to secure appropriate support for the families in our communities who suffered personal losses on 9/11.

The message I wish to communicate to Members of Congress today is that while the President's National Strategy for Homeland Security released on July 16 properly acknowledges that cities are on the frontlines in our national effort to secure America's homeland from terrorism, the federal government has not yet provided cities with the direct resources they need to successfully carry out this new mission.

Therefore, I urge you to support legislation to strengthen the partnership between America's mayors and the federal government by providing cities with the direct resources we need to improve emergency telecommunications, to obtain new technology public safety equipment and to expand First Responder training that will ensure that our cities will be safe and our citizens will live free from fear.

Here is how the President's National Strategy document accurately and appropriately describes the municipal role:

"State and local governments have critical roles to play in homeland security. Indeed, the closest relationship the average citizen has with government is at the local level. State and local levels of government have primary responsibility for funding, preparing, and operating the emergency services that would respond in the event of a terrorist attack. Local units are the first to respond, and the last to leave the scene. All disasters are ultimately local events." [The National Strategy for Homeland Security, p. viii.]



Indeed the war has come to America's shores—only 50 miles from Norwalk—and made municipal First Responders part of America's national security response team. Since September 11, Norwalk's police and fire forces have served on the nation's front line of defense against terrorism.

But as Mayor Menino of Boston, the President of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, said on July 16 after release of the National Strategy document, "[T]en months after the horrific attack of 9/11, we are still awaiting federal assistance to support our efforts to ensure that cities are prepared for and can respond effectively to any emergency."

FEDERAL SUPPORT TO DATE

According to a report this month by the General Assembly's non-partisan Office of Legislative Research ["Security Measures Since 9/11" OLR Report 2002-R-0608, July 1, enhanced security in the wake of the attacks 2002] "Connecticut and other states have received relatively little federal funding to date for enhanced security in the wake of the attacks."

The State received just \$2.6 million last year from the US DOJ Domestic Preparedness Equipment Grant program that predates 9/11 to equip First Responders. According to the State's own Executive Summary of Connecticut's Three-Year Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy, this grant funding "merely scratches the surface of the funds needed to equip Connecticut's first responders for a weapons of mass destruction incident." These funds were expended for the five largest municipalities, as well as the Groton-New London area because of their nuclear power plants.

The State's Office of Emergency Management anticipates receiving \$4.6 million in federal FY 2002-03 from the U.S. Dept. of Justice under this grant program and Norwalk will participate in this grant as the sixth largest municipality in Connecticut.

Norwalk's share of the FY 2002 DOJ Domestic Preparedness Equipment Grant will be allocated for the following equipment:

*\$125,000 towards protective equipment, Level A, B and C suits, for hazardous materials;

*\$40,000 towards hazard detection equipment;

*\$100,000 for a mass decontamination trailer that can also be used as a mobile command center—the State will ultimately purchase 22 of these, with 15 designated for individual cities and towns (Norwalk, Stamford and Bridgeport each will have one), 5 for the regional HazMat units and 2 to UConn and another higher education institution—the state's plan is to distribute trailers throughout the state so that two trailers can respond to any emergency incident within the state within 30 minutes; and

*3 portable and 1 mobile 800 MHz radios to be used for command and control. This will give Norwalk's fire chief, police chief and EMS director communications capability with ITAC and ICAL frequencies, which are manned 24/7 by the State Police.

I would like to compliment the state's Office of Emergency Management and the Adjutant General of Connecticut, Major General William Cugno, for preparing a comprehensive domestic preparedness strategy for these DOJ grants and for consulting with municipalities on their needs.

But it's obvious that this equipment grant, as welcome as it will be, is by no means sufficient to meet our needs. Are four federally funded emergency telecommunications radios to be delivered this summer really the best we can do after ten months to respond to the biggest emergency facing our country in the last 50 years?

NORWALK AND REGIONAL ACTIONS SINCE 9/11

Like other municipalities, Norwalk has not waited for federal funding but has moved forward on its own and with its neighboring communities to enhance its First Responder capabilities and to expand protection for its citizens. Since this is a key component of the Sub-Committee's oversight hearing today, here is a list of the major initiatives we've taken since 9/11:

*Norwalk adopted an Emergency Medical Services Plan that establishes performance standards for each segment of the city's emergency medical services system, including police, fire and Norwalk Hospital

*Norwalk adopted an overall Emergency Medical Services Mass Casualty Response Plan to assist First Responders in the event of a mass casualty crisis;

*Norwalk adopted a Southwest Regional Mutual Aid Agreement to strengthen the inter-town aid agreements for EMS ambulance service.

*We worked to improve regional municipal coordination. Immediately after the 9/11 tragedy, the chief elected officials, fire and police chiefs, and emergency medical personnel in the Southwestern region began meeting to exchange information and coordinate responses. During those meetings, the priorities were identified as compatible communications systems, equipment and training for first responders.

*We have worked to improve regional security coordination. Police and fire chiefs from the area municipalities followed up the elected leaders meetings to formulate a comprehensive regional emergency response strategy. In particular, they adapted a \$20,000 selective enforcement grant from Conn-DOT to purchase a number of 800 MHz radios that will be stored in a central location in the region for immediate distribution in the event of a crisis.

*As part of this comprehensive response strategy, the police chiefs in Southwestern Connecticut have developed a regional plan to deploy as many as 24 officers to any location to augment the baseline staffing of any community.

*We are enhancing school security plans. The goal of this FEMA-supported program is to train school personnel to manage their facilities for up to 72 hours in the event of a disaster or an emergency when first responders may not be readily available to respond. The Federal Emergency Management Agency sponsors the Multi Hazard Emergency Planning for Schools Program. All of the costs of the four day training classes in Maryland were covered by FEMA while Norwalk will pay for the training of Board of Education personnel's two-day training at City Hall on August 20-21.

*In addition, the City is developing a school emergency response plan customized for each school that includes a quick access flip chart of the school's layout to help first responders in a variety of emergencies gain quick digital access to the building's blueprints to locate such important sites as the library or cafeteria or gym.

*After I convened a meeting of the city's emergency services, medical and public health personnel for an assessment of our emergency response planning, it became apparent that there was no one individual or department assigned the task of reviewing key components of the response systems or identifying the unfilled tasks. Therefore, one of the changes we are considering for the future—with the support of both Chief Verda and Chief Rilling—is to seek grant funds to hire on a temporary consultant basis an emergency services coordinator with responsibility for updating and implementing a citywide emergency services action plan that would better integrate the city's efforts with federal, state and regional authorities.

FEDERAL LEGISLATION NEEDED

A comprehensive homeland security agenda should place a high priority on federal support for local First Responders and their needs for improved communications, equipment and training.

Apparently the DOJ's Statewide Domestic Preparedness Equipment Grant Program is being incorporated into the First Responder Terrorism Preparedness Act of 2000 (S.2664), which was unanimously approved on June 27 by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, to provide \$3.5 billion for the Bush Administration's First Responder Initiative.

These funds are needed to give cities the tools they need to meet their new First Responder responsibilities. In particular, there is a need now for a coherent federal strategy to strengthen municipal First Responder forces in these areas:

*Connect the telecommunications systems used by police, fire, EMS. All of the articles since 9/11 point to non-interactive telecommunications equipment as the greatest preventable cause of firefighter deaths at the World Trade Center. Connecticut has

created the 800 MHz system of shared frequency for emergency communication and now our challenge is to obtain the hardware to effectively utilize it during a crisis.

*Provide high-technology equipment to safeguard against weapons of mass destruction or new bio-terrorism hazards, like Anthrax.

*Expand the number of firefighters and police. When President Clinton's COPS program put 100,000 police on the streets, crime went down in the 1990's. Congress should fund more firefighters now to deal with the new threats of terrorism and biohazards. There is a gap now. The Norwalk Fire Department operates at eight firefighters below its authorized strength because of budget constraints.

*Provide Direct Funding for Cities: First Responder funding from the federal government should be provided directly to cities and other local governments. We are the First Responders and our homeland defense forces need the best training and equipment possible. The best approach is to establish a Homeland Security Block Grant to provide direct funding to cities. Unfortunately, S. 2664 does not authorize direct funding.

*Funding for training should also be a priority and that's why First Responder federal support should include funding for overtime. All training in the Norwalk Police Department, for example, is done on an overtime basis. The new training to prepare our forces against biological, chemical and nuclear attacks may result in unavoidable overtime expenses. But apparently S. 2664 specifically forbids overtime funding. This should be changed to give municipalities more flexibility.

STRONGER PARTNERSHIP NEEDED

Our cities must remain safe and secure if America is to prosper. Therefore, it is critically important to strengthen the partnership between mayors and the federal government on homeland security. This Congressional hearing is an important opportunity for local municipal officials to give you our perspectives. By working together, we can create the national effort needed to prevail.

Thank you again for holding this hearing and soliciting the views of local officials on homeland security priorities.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.
 I'm just going to go down the list.
 Thank you, Alex.
 Dr. Schwab.

**STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM SCHWAB, PRESIDENT, NORWALK
 COMMUNITY COLLEGE**

Mr. SCHWAB. Congressman Shays, Congressman Tierney, members of the State legislature, invited speakers and guests, I'd like to welcome you to Norwalk Community College. We're honored to serve as a venue for a very important and essential meeting, and that is how do we protect our communities more—even more than what we've done thus far.

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Schwab, I'm going to just interrupt you to say that the nicest and most—

[Interruption by audience member.]

Mr. SHAYS. I'd like to thank you for the extraordinary job that you do as University President, and I do think this is truly the finest community college that I'm aware of, and I say that with the knowledge that I have another community college which I'll say is the second finest. But this is a superb place and you bring tremendous energy and I thank you for your welcome and I appreciate your kindness.

Mr. SCHWAB. Thank you, Congressman Shays.

NCC is one of 1,200 community colleges in the United States and I believe that we're always playing a major role in educating those who President Bush refers to as the first line of defense against domestic terrorism; police, fire, emergency medical, and health care personnel. I would like to add one other thing, and I don't think there's been a lot of attention given to this, but this is computer security. We've expanded our role since September 11th by launching three new initiatives. We've created a Public Safety Academy. We developed a computer security degree, and we're putting together a Computer Security Institute.

The Public Safety Academy would include law enforcement, fire and nursing and paramedics training. And I see First Selectwoman Farrell talked about the importance of training and I think that's a real role as a community college. We offer degrees and certificates in all those programs, but in addition, since September 11th we've offered emergency response team training for base fire and emergency medical personnel through a curriculum designed by the Connecticut Office of Emergency Management and through FEMA.

Through partnering—I see the police and fire chiefs here, and we're partnering with them in Southwestern Connecticut to deliver first responder training, and this fall we'll inaugurate that by offering in-service certification courses to the police in the area departments.

Our computer security degree. There's a dire need for professionals in computer security. We have a partnership with Western Connecticut State University and, in fact, (indiscernible) from Western Connecticut was here today. And it's one of the first undergraduate programs in the country in computer security.

We've also cooperated with three other community colleges in the State and we're talking to Central Connecticut State University.

We had a meeting with the University of New Haven, who has a renown program in forensic science and also in criminal justice. And we're also—the Director of Work Force Development and the Office of Work Force Competitiveness was down here last Friday along with representatives from Patel Institute that is doing great work for the State of Connecticut in making sure that the needs of the IT community are met. And so to reiterate, we need professionals in the field.

What NCC would do is provide the first 2 years hands on in the laboratories and things of this nature, and then they'd move on to Western Connecticut and pick up the theoretical knowledge they need. I have talked with people in the area and in the State about what we're doing and I've heard responses such as we'd like to make this a gemstone of IT in the State of Connecticut, that is the computer security.

We're well positioned. When you came in, if you looked at the big building across the street, that's our center for information technology. We want to be touted as the center for IT. And the reason we ended up building—or part of the reason we ended up building over there is through the work of Congressman Shays and his staff in securing a half a million dollars in Federal grants to equip it and to make sure it's done right.

Mr. SHAYS. Representative Tierney said if he was representing you, you would have gotten a million. [Laughter.]

Mr. TIERNEY. I noticed the building across the street is not that big. [Laughter.]

Mr. SCHWAB. Touche.

So we've really directed our efforts since September 11th. When you think about what's going on in computer security or the lack thereof, I remember a few years back Cornell students had hacked into—I think it was the Department of Defense computers. When you think about the advent of wireless and what that means for security, it's a huge issue.

So our program that we developed, we're asking the National Security Agency to bestow their alma mater on this particular program. We've also asked the National Science Foundation and the Federal Government for equipment, personnel and training.

And just to show how serious we are about computer security, we hosted a cyber security conference here in April and we had 120 people who attended that day, many of whom are probably in the audience today.

We also want to put in a Computer Security Institute and offer computer security workshops in conjunction with the National Institute for Standards and Technology. Our focus, and these are the people that are most vulnerable, are small businesses, non-profit agencies and municipalities, to help them.

So these are our initiatives, and we know we need to do more. And we've hosted today's event and what I'm saying today as well is that we're willing to host more of these events. We're willing to work with Mayor Knopp and with the First Selectman in Southwestern Connecticut, with SACIA and with SWRPA to bring local, State and Federal emergency response teams together for training and coordination. We'll make ourselves available. We have the facilities. They're yours because we know it's an important issue.

I'd like to thank the Subcommittee of National Security for bringing us all together today, and Congressman Shays and Congressman Tierney. I think I'll give preference if you don't mind, Congressman Tierney, to Congressman Shays since he's been such a great advocate for NCC. And we know that we must collaborate with one another in order to create a safe and secure environment, and we at Norwalk Community College are saying we're ready, willing and able to work with you toward that end.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schwab follows:]

Testimony to

Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs & International
Relations

Field hearing on *Homeland Security: Keeping First Responders First*

Tuesday, July 30, 2002
Norwalk Community College

Congressman Shays, members of the Subcommittee on National Security,
invited speakers and guests, welcome to Norwalk Community College.


We are honored to be the venue for this Congressional Field Hearing.

It is fitting that you chose NCC to host this event in light of the significant
role the nation's 1,200 community colleges play in educating the people who
protect our nation's security: those to whom President Bush refers to as our *first
line of defense against domestic terrorism* -- our police, fire, emergency medical
and health care personnel.

Community colleges touch more lives than any other segment of higher
education. When America goes back to college this fall, more than half of all
freshmen will be attending a community college.

Our students are the people who implement the local emergency
response plans. And, while those plans are important, the people who carry them
out are essential. Indeed, NCC students were among the rescue workers who
responded on 9/11.

Since September, we have recognized that our role in educating the
workforce and serving the community should be expanded. There is a need for
all institutions to raise the awareness of people to be vigilant and prepared. Our



sense of national security has been badly shaken. Our challenge is to restore that security while maintaining the freedom we sometimes take for granted as American citizens.

For many years NCC has offered degrees in Law Enforcement, Fire Technology, Nursing and Paramedic programs. However, the events of last September prompted us to expand our current programs and to create two new initiatives: the forming of a Public Safety Academy and a Computer Security Institute.

Through the Public Safety Academy we will offer Emergency Response Team Training to police, fire and emergency medical services personnel. The curriculum was designed by the Connecticut Office of Emergency Management and FEMA with whom we continue to meet to identify other courses and services for the College to offer.

We also have partnered with the police and fire chiefs in lower Fairfield County to identify and deliver programs for first responder training. This fall, for example, we will offer in-service certification courses for area police departments.

Responding to the dire need for professionals in computer security, NCC, in partnership with Western Connecticut State University, created a computer security degree program, one of the first such undergraduate programs in the country.

The curriculum will provide students with "hands-on" practical instruction in the first two years and theoretical course work in the latter two years, resulting in a well-rounded security professional. This program will be expanded to other community colleges, universities and the business sector.

Norwalk Community College is well positioned, (geographically and strategically) to serve as a focal point for planning and development of homeland security measures.

To our surrounding municipalities and towns, we offer to bring local, state and federal emergency response teams together for training and coordination among our distinct communities. To the Southwest Area Commerce and Industry Association (SACIA) and the Southwest Regional Planning Agency (SWRPA), we extend our expertise and facilities to support their efforts in bringing together business, government and non-profit organizations to discuss measures to prevent community disasters.

I would like to conclude by thanking the Subcommittee on National Security for your willingness to examine local preparedness and processes used to coordinate federal, state and local response capabilities.

We are committed to the creation of a safe and secure environment, and know that we must collaborate with one another in order to achieve that degree of security. We are ready, willing and able to work with you toward that end.

William Schwab, President
Norwalk Community College

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

We've enlisted First Selectman Baldwin. And we didn't give him warning that we were going to ask him to speak so we appreciate him coming to the dais like this, the desk, and we appreciate your work preceding your work as First Selectman as an officer on the police force.

STATEMENT OF MR. BALDWIN, FIRST SELECTMAN

Mr. BALDWIN. Thank you.

Good afternoon, Representative Shays, Representative Tierney, members of the committee. I represent a community of 35,000 people that houses NASDAQ, which is a very sensitive, and particularly in this day and age, a very important part of our national economy.

As Representative Shays stated before, I'm a retired police officer, but more importantly I was a former marine and served in Viet Nam. And there's two things we should have learned from that experience. One is to define our mission and the other is to provide resources to fulfill that mission. What you've done so far is define the mission. What you haven't done is supplied the resources for us to fulfill that mission.

I was fortunate enough to be preceded here by comments by Mayor Knopp and First Selectwoman Farrell, who did an excellent job of outlining a lot of the detail. In very broad terms I will say that I support wholeheartedly all of their proposals, but most importantly the direct funding for such things as communication equipment, an emergency management center and training for our first responders.

We have already endeavored to put together an emergency management team, that began probably 8 months ago, to coordinate the efforts of our EMS, fire and police departments. But as I said before, we're a small community. We don't have all the resources of a larger city or the Federal Government. We need your help and we need it right away.

Joining me here today are Chief Berry from our police department, our fire marshall, and Bob Pescatore, our emergency management coordinator. And they will probably go into more detail as to the specifics that are needed, but I will tell as a First Selectman in this community that it's important that we get funding right away or we will not be prepared to fulfill our mission.

Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much, Mr. Baldwin, First Selectman Baldwin.

You're on, sir. Thank you. Mr. DeMartino.

**STATEMENT OF THOMAS DE MARTINO, DIRECTOR OF
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS**

Mr. DE MARTINO. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members.

I am Thomas DeMartino, the director of Emergency Preparedness—

Mr. SHAYS. Just hit it.

Mr. DE MARTINO. I am Thomas DeMartino, director of Emergency Preparedness for the town of New Canaan, and I am representing the Honorable Richard P. Bond, first selectman.

The Office of Emergency Preparedness was—

Mr. SHAYS. I'm sorry, Mr. DeMartino. You moved the mic away and unfortunately I need to have you move the mic closer.

Mr. DE MARTINO. The Office of Emergency Preparedness was created in November 2001 as a result of the events of September 11th. It is staffed by myself, Ms. Judy Wisentaner, who's deputy director, and Mr. James Hardy, chief of plans and operations. I am accompanied today by Police Chief Chris Lynch, who is available to respond to questions concerning public safety.

Chief Lynch.

The written submissions were provided by the principal first responders, police and fire, as well as a response from our Health Department.

I had indicated that the Emergency Preparedness Office was created last year. Its function is to coordinate the interaction of emergency service assets from both within and outside of the town. Overall planning for the potential of terrorist or natural hazard events has been its predominant activity to date. Rewriting the town's emergency operating procedures to comply with current FEMA standards is near completion, as is the evaluation of the town's existing emergency operations center with regard to its location and suitability.

Interaction between first responders has been heightened. Regular communications between police, fire and EMS has resulted in defined responsibility and protocols for weapons of mass destruction incidents. They have conducted consolidated training and have organizational strengthening.

Each of the first responders has revised their SOP's or added special orders, as well as making equipment purchases to reflect today's threat environment, which may provide an appropriate segue since your letter of invitation made mention of significant challenges in terms of equipment purchases, communication interoperability, training, data sharing, and coordination.

New Canaan knows its place on the food chain for Federal grant requests and we recognize that requests for funding for first responders would be more quickly granted to a regional rather than a local request. I think this is a State issue, but Federal guidance would be helpful.

Purchases of equipment for individual protection and for communication interoperability are required at the local level. For example, we have seen devices in the New York City Office of Emergency Management which allow different radio bands and frequencies, as well as cellular and landline phones to communicate directly with each other. Equipment of this nature is absolutely essential to virtually every town and region in this State, and I believe that the Federal Government should ensure that this necessity is realized.

Your invitation asked specifically for a discussion of emergency response plans with regard to the release of nuclear, biological, radiological and chemical material. In short, I view current plans as inadequate to deal with all but the most minor weapons of mass

destruction incident. The role that we envision from the Federal Government of Homeland Security in this regard is one of an enabler; directing, protecting—facilitating the availability of requisite detecting, protecting and monitoring equipment and providing the appropriate guidance for education, training and evaluation.


The most critical challenge facing planners for a major weapons of mass destruction scenario are those related to mass evacuation. An incident prompting large numbers of evacuees into or out of the community with the related transportation, shelter and health issues is perhaps the single most realistic threat facing our town at the moment. We look to higher government to provide the guidance to facilitate an effective response plan.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to express our views, and as we sit here, we're available to respond to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. DeMartino follows:]

TOWN OF NEW CANAAN TESTIMONY TO THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS
AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE US
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM.
JULY 31, 2002

HOMELAND SECURITY: KEEPING FIRST RESPONDERS FIRST.



GOOD AFTERNOON _____.

I AM THOMAS DEMARTINO, DIRECTOR OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS FOR THE TOWN OF NEW CANAAN. I AM REPRESENTING THE HONORABLE RICHARD P. BOND, FIRST SELECTMAN.

THE OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS WAS CREATED IN NOVEMBER 2001 AS A RESULT OF THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11TH. IT IS STAFFED BY MYSELF, MS JUDY WISENTANER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND MR JAMES HARDY, CHIEF OF PLANS AND OPERATIONS. WE ARE VOLUNTEERS AND OUR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE IS LOCATED NEXT TO TOWN HALL AT 61 MAIN STREET.

THE SPECIFIC AREAS OF MY BACKGROUND WHICH ARE PERTINENT TO MY ROLE INCLUDE A FORMER RESPONSIBILITY FOR FIRST RESPONSE EMERGENCY SERVICE AT A MAJOR NATURAL GAS DISTRIBUTION CORPORATION AND A 26 YEAR CAREER IN THE ARMY AND ARMY RESERVE WHERE I EITHER SERVED IN OR COMMANDED UNITS IN THE INFANTRY, CIVIL AFFAIRS, QUARTERMASTER, CHEMICAL AND TRANSPORTATION BRANCHES.

I AM ACCOMPANIED TODAY BY CHIEF CHRIS LYNCH WHO IS AVAILABLE TO RESPOND TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING PUBLIC SAFETY.

THE WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS WERE PROVIDED BY THE TOWN'S PRINCIPAL FIRST RESPONDERS, POLICE AND FIRE.

I HAD PREVIOUSLY INDICATED THAT THE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OFFICE WAS CREATED LAST YEAR. ITS FUNCTION IS TO COORDINATE THE INTERACTION OF EMERGENCY SERVICE ASSETS FROM BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE OF THE TOWN. OVERALL PLANNING FOR THE POTENTIAL OF TERRORIST OR NATURAL HAZARD EVENTS HAS BEEN ITS PREDOMINANT ACTIVITY TO DATE. REWRITING THE TOWN'S EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES TO COMPLY WITH CURRENT FEMA STANDARDS IS NEAR COMPLETION, AS IS THE EVALUATION OF THE TOWN'S EXISTING EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER WITH REGARD TO LOCATION AND SUITABILITY.

INTERACTION BETWEEN FIRST RESPONDERS HAS BEEN HEIGHTENED. REGULAR COMMUNICATION BETWEEN POLICE, FIRE AND EMS HAS RESULTED IN DEFINED RESPONSIBILITY AND PROTOCOLS FOR WMD INCIDENTS, CONSOLIDATED TRAINING AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRENGTHENING. EACH OF THE FIRST RESPONDERS HAS REVISED THEIR SOP'S OR ADDED SPECIAL ORDERS AS WELL AS MAKING EQUIPMENT PURCHASES TO REFLECT TODAY'S THREAT ENVIRONMENT. ---- WHICH MAY PROVIDE AN APPROPRIATE SEGUE SINCE YOUR LETTER OF INVITATION MADE MENTION OF SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES IN TERMS OF EQUIPMENT PURCHASES, COMMUNICATION INTEROPERABILITY, TRAINING DATA SHARING AND COORDINATION.

WE KNOW OUR PLACE ON THE 'FOOD CHAIN' FOR FEDERAL GRANT DOLLARS AND WE RECOGNIZE THAT REQUESTS FOR THE FUNDING OF NECESSARY FIRST RESPONDER

EQUIPMENT WOULD BE MORE LIKELY BE GRANTED TO A REGIONAL RATHER THAN A LOCAL REQUEST. I THINK THIS IS A STATE ISSUE BUT FEDERAL GUIDANCE WOULD BE HELPFUL. HOWEVER, PURCHASES OF EQUIPMENT FOR INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION AND FOR COMMUNICATION INTEROPERABILITY ARE REQUIRED AT THE LOCAL LEVEL. FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE SEEN DEVICES IN THE NYC OEM WHICH ALLOW DIFFERENT RADIO BANDS AND FREQUENCIES AS WELL AS CELLULAR AND LANDLINE PHONES TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY. EQUIPMENT OF THIS NATURE IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO VIRTUALLY EVERY TOWN AND REGION IN THIS STATE AND I BELIEVE THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD INSURE THAT THIS NECESSITY IS REALIZED.

YOUR INVITATION ASKS SPECIFICALLY FOR A DISCUSSION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS WITH REGARD TO THE RELEASE OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL MATERIAL. IN SHORT, I VIEW CURRENT PLANS AS INADEQUATE TO DEAL WITH ALL BUT THE MOST MINOR INCIDENT OF NBRC EXPOSURE. THE ROLE THAT WE ENVISION FROM A FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY IN THIS REGARD IS ONE OF AN ENABLER, FACILITATING THE AVAILABILITY OF REQUISITE DETECTING, PROTECTING AND MONITORING EQUIPMENT AND PROVIDING THE APPROPRIATE GUIDANCE FOR EDUCATION, TRAINING AND EVALUATION.

THE MOST CRITICAL CHALLENGE FACING PLANNERS FOR A MAJOR ENBC SCENARIO ARE THOSE RELATING TO MASS

EVACUATION. AN INCIDENT PROMPTING A LARGE NUMBER OF EVACUEES INTO AND/OR OUT OF THE COMMUNITY WITH THE RELATED TRANSPORTATION, SHELTER AND HEALTH ISSUES IS, PERHAPS, THE SINGLE MOST REALISTIC THREAT FACING OUR TOWN. WE LOOK TO HIGHER GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE THE GUIDANCE TO FACILITATE AN EFFECTIVE RESPONSE PLAN.

WE THANK YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS OUR VIEWS ON THIS MOST IMPORTANT SUBJECT AND WE ARE PREPARED TO RESPOND TO YOUR QUESTIONS.

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

CHRISTOPHER J. LYNCH

CHIEF OF POLICE

NEW CANAAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

TO THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Thank you for your invitation to attend the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations hearing. The New Canaan Police Department has been working in conjunction with the New Canaan Office of Emergency Preparedness, established as a result of the terrorist attacks committed on September 11, 2001. We have also been working with the Governor's Domestic Preparedness Senior Steering Council, the Fairfield County Chiefs of Police, and the Southwestern Regional Planning Agency on homeland security issues.

Since the establishment of the Town Office of Emergency Preparedness, New Canaan has been redeveloping its Emergency Operations Plan to reflect current FEMA standards. The document is, to my understanding, ready to be forwarded for State Office of Emergency Management review. An internal Special Order has been written and added to the Police Department's General Orders, which addresses the department's response to suspicious packages or potential WMD incidents.

As you are aware, federally budgeted monies are structured to distribute monies for purchase of protective equipment to the larger municipalities, followed by a descending order of distribution of funds based on population levels. Last fall I attended a meeting in Westport where William A. Cugno, Adjutant General of the Connecticut National Guard, addressed Lower Fairfield County Emergency Services administrative staff and elected officials. At the meeting, General Cugno stressed that a regional response in the form of grant applications would be an effective means for the less populated municipalities of Fairfield County to obtain federal funding for WMD protective equipment. I concur with this approach; however, I am not aware that there has been a subsequent coordinated Fairfield County effort to insure that all the jurisdictions involved in this area are working towards FEMA approved emergency operations plans. This effort could possibly be managed by establishment of an oversight

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
Christopher J. Lynch, Chief of Police
New Canaan, CT

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committee impaneled by the Lower Fairfield County Council of Government. I would urge chief elected officials of these jurisdictions to pledge to work cooperatively on this issue. Emergency operations plans, approved by State OEMs and FEMA for all municipalities in this region, is the only avenue in which the Town of New Canaan could access federal funding as part of a regional grant application.

Radio interoperability is also a key component to enhance emergency services responses to terrorist attack anywhere in our region. Connecticut State Police has developed a report entitled *Connecticut Telecommunications System Interoperability Status Report*, dated June 1, 2002. This report has been distributed to the State of Connecticut Radio System Interoperability Committee. It has also been forwarded to Lower Fairfield County agencies by the Southwestern Regional Planning Agency. A review of this report leads to the conclusion that fast tracking enhancements to the Connecticut State Police radio system and Fairfield County Chiefs of Police frequencies is a practical and cost-effective strategy for making multi-jurisdictional radio interoperability a reality. I would encourage action be taken to research and implement the full capabilities of this system on a priority basis. With this system in place, additional radio equipment grant applications on a regional basis could be forwarded for consideration of monies distributed under federal legislation.

The Committee has also requested comments on the quality and timeliness of threat information distributed through federal and state agencies. Over the past six to eight weeks my office has noticed a marked increase in general information and intelligence information being issued by both the Department of Public Safety Division of Protective Services and the FBI. Although some may argue that a proliferation of general information memos which are not related to local threats might lead to a lack of scrutiny overall, I do not subscribe to this view. I understand that federal and state agencies would suffer criticism if information were available to them, but had not been disseminated. I do prefer to review all information forwarded which allows my office to determine what is relevant for dissemination to my agency employees.

Thank you for allowing me to submit a statement for the record. I offer my availability to the Committee as they move forward on their deliberations.

To: Director of Emergency Preparedness, Tom DeMartino
From: Fire Chief David Jonker
Re: Congressional Sub-Committee Hearing
Date: July 24, 2002

The following are my thoughts on the state of emergency preparedness for the Town of New Canaan in the post-September 11 environment. Much work has been done, however there is much more work to accomplish:

Support of Town Government

Support for the public safety agencies has improved substantially from Town Hall, particularly with the First Selectman who has taken a keen interest in the topic. Of particular note are:

1. Funding to support training specific to weapons of mass destruction and a multi-agency incident command system
2. Funding to support improved public safety communications
 - a. Purchase of a public safety information reporting system
 - b. Outsourcing of Fire Department and EMS dispatch to Southwest CMED
 - c. Purchase of cell phones for Chief and Assistant Chief
3. Creation of position of Director of Emergency Management
4. Participation in State of Connecticut conferences on terrorism

Improved Interaction Between Public Safety Agencies

The tragedy of September 11, 2001 highlighted the need for public safety agencies to work together in order to effectively deal with terrorist incidents at regional and local levels. Although turf wars do not exist in New Canaan, there was no regular communication between public safety agencies with the goal of improving joint operations. Police, Fire and EMS regularly communicate with the goal of improving operations. We defined which agency would be in command for WMD incidents, as well as creating protocols for first responders. We identified mutual aid resources and how they should be notified. We are continuing our investigation into the training and equipment needs. There is much more work to be done, but we are identifying areas where we need to focus on.

Additionally, the Fire Department does now include the Health Department in the command structure for certain hazardous materials and weapons of mass destruction incidents. In short, beginning to broaden the scope of in-town resources that we can bring to bear during these types of incidents.

Increased Volunteer Membership

The Fire Department has seen its volunteer ranks grow in the aftermath of September 11. While not all members have joined because of that tragedy, it has had a positive impact. Increased membership gives the Fire Department first responding resources in order to deal with what can be very manpower intensive incidents.

WMD Training

The State of Connecticut has included a module on WMD as part of its Hazardous Materials Operations training. This level of training is the departmental standard, although four members are trained to the higher Technician level. This has prepared us to deal with small-scale local incidents. In addition to the training that we receive as part of Hazardous Materials training, the department received additional WMD training. This training paid off when New Canaan had two Anthrax related incidents.

New Equipment

The Fire Department purchased some equipment in order to more effectively deal with WMD incidents. This equipment includes:

- Two incident command boards of the type utilized by the Police Department so that we can more effectively practice the use of a unified incident command system including all local public safety agencies.
- Tyvec suits for victims who may be exposed or contaminated with biological or chemical agents.
- New scanning radios with weather bands and more mutual aid frequencies are being purchased in this fiscal year.

Revised Standard Operating Procedures

The Fire Department revised its standard operating procedure for Hazardous Materials Incidents as it views most WMD incidents as being hazardous materials oriented. A specific section on WMD was created and distributed to other public safety agencies. Dispatch protocols were defined and it was determined that the Fire Department would assume command of these incidents.

Potential Areas for Federal Involvement

Command Center

The Town Hall houses a small area in the basement which can be used as a command center in the event of a WMD incident. This facility is lacking in both space and capability. After touring the New York Office of Emergency Management, members of the Department of Emergency Preparedness, Fire, Police and Selectman's Office got a much better idea of what a true unified command center should contain. Currently, the command center does not contain many of the systems needed to handle a true large-scale emergency. Perhaps the federal government can define some standards for what a command center should contain in order to deal with WMD incidents. There may also be a funding need.

Improved Communications

The New Canaan Fire Department radio frequency is the only frequency that Police, Fire and EMS can jointly communicate on. This is also the primary dispatch frequency for the Fire Department. On large-scale incidents, the Fire Department will need to operate on at least two channels. It does not have that capability if the main dispatch channel is going to be used as the common communications channel.

A separate joint frequency that would be available to local, regional and federal agencies to communicate on would be invaluable.

The New York City OEM recently procured a software that can create a common means of communication from radio, telephone and cell phone units. The town should explore the purchase of this system. Alternatively, the State Police, and the Fairfield County Hazardous Materials Unit could house the software and transport it to a field location upon request.

There is no present means to communicate with non-local agencies via the Internet. There should be a WMD portal where public safety agencies can log onto it to communicate with federal agencies such as the Center for Disease Control, the FBI, Chemtrec, FEMA, CT National Guard, etc. It provides an alternate means of communication, can open up databases for research on WMD, provide training updates, provide a source of information to help local leadership plan for WMD incidents, etc. As a volunteer, it is nearly impossible for me to attend conferences, but having access to that information via the Internet would be invaluable.

This web portal should be available via wireless technology so that it could be used in the field.

Improved Cell Phone Communications

Cell phone service in New Canaan and surrounding communities can be weak to non-existent. Cell phones play an important role in mass incidents as they provide a means for resources with no common radio channels to communicate. They also provide a

means of redundancy. Cell towers are prevented from being constructed as people have the "not in my backyard" attitude. Cell phone communication is a must. Although unsightly, strategically placed towers are in the interest of public safety. The federal government may have a role to play in ensuring that there is adequate cell phone coverage in major metropolitan areas.

Satellite Communication

Public safety agencies should have access to satellite phones. The federal government could provide grant money to every fire department to purchase satellite phones, much in the way the State of Connecticut provided a grant for every fire department to purchase a thermal imaging camera. Satellite phones may be a solution to the problem of poor cell phone communication.

Consultation on Planning for Large Scale Incidents

The Fire Department is well prepared for small scale WMD incidents such as localized Anthrax incidents. The department is not at all prepared to handle large-scale incidents such as Small Pox, radiological, and contamination of local water supplies. Helping us to plan for these needs is perhaps our greatest need. As New Canaan is a bedroom community to New York City, there is a real threat that a trainload of passengers exposed to Small Pox would stop in town. Additionally, New Canaan is in the blast zone for a nuclear attack on New York City. There has been absolutely no planning for that incident. Lastly there has been no planning for handling a major chemical cloud traveling towards New Canaan or planning for dealing with a contaminated water supply.

Joint WMD Incident Simulation Training

New Canaan would benefit from an annual joint training exercise held with regional departments. This could be overseen by either State or Federal officials who would design the incident, provide evaluators, etc. Simulations provide a very good way of testing our resources and identifying weaknesses, which will ultimately improve our ability to protect our citizens.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

We're going to start off with Mr. Tierney. You can have as much time as you'd like.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank all the witnesses for your testimony. It's extremely helpful. On that, I wish Ms. Farrell had stayed only to—if not, to have a brief discussion on the K-1 potassium iodide situation because we did put some language in there originally that we're extending the ten-mile radius out to twenty and would have made the Homeland Security Secretary responsible for developing plans and guiding the community to develop plans for that. If, however, it was taken out by the Select Committee, now we're hoping that it can be put back in somewhere in the process. It was actually Chairman Shays' committee that put in that provision and he and Ose from California and I worked hard on it. Hopefully that will come back in because I think that's a concern and one that could be easily remedied and addressed.

Let me ask anybody on the panel that has an answer to this to tell me, A, how the Fire Act and COPS programs have worked, or effectively if their funding mechanisms work with respect to your communities. And then because I'm an advocate and I know that Chairman Shays is an advocate of direct local funding, let's put on the record, if you would, for us why that is so much more important than any other mechanism of funding. We'll start left to right or right to left.

Mr. KNOPP. I would say just in Norwalk we haven't gotten anything from the COPS Program. We haven't gotten any COPS funding through them and we've not experienced much funding through the Fire Grants. I think generally in the State we've received those stipends successfully. My community has not participated in that.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK. Do you have an opinion on the direct funding programs coming out of Homeland Security down to the local first responders on the way we fund those, whether you favor something like the direct funding in the COPS Program or the Fire Act or—

Mr. KNOPP. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY [continuing]. Do you have a feeling otherwise?

Mr. KNOPP. Yes, very much. I think it's very important that the funding come, or at least a large part of the funding come directly to the municipalities.

Thus far in the Department of Justice Grant Program, what we've seen again is the State works it through General Cugno and the Office of Emergency Management. That's a very good statewide plan, but nonetheless all of the equipment that we're getting, for example, are primarily for regional responses and many of our municipal needs are not going to be met through that program. As I mentioned, our getting four radios is just about our entire municipal telecommunications element from that Department of Justice Grant Program. So we believe that direct funding is very important.

Ironically, as I understand it, the COPS Program is being cut back significantly while we're trying to increase funding in other places. I would urge you to try to retain as much as possible of that COPS Program and also to create a fire fighter parallel program

that you would be able to fund 75,000 or 100,000 fire fighters in the country.

In Norwalk, for example, we are eight fire fighters below our authorized level because of the high expense of maintaining such a full force, and we would welcome Federal support to increase the number of fire fighters on our force. It would be useful for things like training and mass casualty response.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, I have a request for all of you then because generally the feeling on this is that we definitely applied for that, and if I know both the chairman and I and others, it's not a party matter. It's not a party matter at all. We've worked very hard for the Fire Program, Fire Act and COPS Program for money coming down directly to the communities. It is not the President's intention to do that. It is—so far. But an indication that lumping these programs in in a general sense is they are going to take a cut, which you don't think is wise.

So to the extent that any of you feel it appropriate, if you want to write—obviously you don't have to write to Chairman Shays. He's on board fully on that. But to your U.S. Senators, to the President, to the administrators on this program. It's extremely helpful that they get the message from local communities to join in the argument that we're making down here because it's substantial and it makes a huge difference in whether these programs are successful or not. So I'd thank you if you're inclined to do that.

If anybody wants to add to that.

Let me just ask each of you right now—I'm sorry, Mr. President. I'm sort of skipping over you, but I will come back to you at some point.

Who would be the person or the entity with whom your community now contacts first in case of emergency? If you have a disaster, if you were to have a biological or chemical incident or a nuclear bombs incident, which present agency would you naturally contact first?

Mr. KNOPP. Well, what we would do is to contact both FEMA and we would contact the State Office of Emergency Management through General Cugno's office.

Mr. TIERNEY. Is that pretty much the same with you?

Mr. BALDWIN. That's right.

Mr. TIERNEY. So nobody goes directly to the FBI or—

Mr. KNOPP. [Shaking head.]

Mr. TIERNEY. And with respect to your hospitals, can you tell me what your impression is right now of your hospital preparedness in terms of dealing with a biological or chemical incident that might cause a large number of people to be affected by this?

Mr. DE MARTINO. You know, a minor incident perhaps could be handled well by our local hospitals, as I understand it, but a major incident I don't think they're equipped to handle that.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK. Not equipped in what sense? In personnel or in training or in equipment?

Mr. DE MARTINO. Well, in personnel and equipment and the ability to be able to accept large numbers of individuals who might be affected by a radiological or chemical incident.

Mr. BALDWIN. Mass casualties would be problematic in our area because we have a high concentration of people in Upper Fairfield

County and they're only serviced by two hospitals. So that's a problem.

Mr. KNOPP. There are 32 hospitals in Connecticut. They all operate on a regional basis, and by and large I think they've all learned a lot of lessons from September 11th. And this is where the drills come in. That's why it's so important that we be able to fund these live drills so that hospitals can interact with the police and fire.

One of the aspects of the role of hospitals I think that should be supported is they're public health roles and initiatives and emergency intervention role. It's the case that if, for example, somebody who has anthrax symptoms goes to one hospital and two other people with anthrax symptoms go to a second hospital and two others that might have been in touch go to a third hospital, it's very important for the State to be able to coordinate and see that there is a public health crisis, even though at any one hospital it's only one or two patients who might be affected.

And that's what I call the public health infrastructure. We're trying to involve the cities' health directors more in emergency planning, and I think the State has been very progressive in trying to help coordinate information among hospitals to alert us that there really is a public health emergency going on even though within our town it's not more than one or two people affected.

Mr. TIERNEY. Dr. Schwab, does your school deal with public health issues also? Do you have any programs that would underlie the beginnings of a career in public health or—

Mr. SCHWAB. Yes, it does. We have programs, a paramedic program. In fact, most of the rigs that are on the road now, the people in there were probably trained by us. A nursing program, a medical assistant program.

And just to sort of followup on what you had said before about the COPS Act, I'm not real familiar with that, but a good many years ago—

Mr. SHAYS. Just get a little closer to the mic.

Mr. SCHWAB. Oh, I'm sorry.

A good many years ago there was an act that was put through by Congress called the Law Enforcement Education Program in order to train police and correction officers and those going into criminal justice. I'm just wondering whether that's something that might be resurrected and used for first responders, whether it's medical personnel, because surely there's a shortage in that area, police officers. Mayor Knopp talked about the fire fighter shortage. I mean, could that act be resurrected, and then we could work more people into those critical areas.

Mr. TIERNEY. That's important. Thank you.

Back to you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

At the concurrence of Representative Tierney, we're going to invite our State legislators to ask some questions and then I'll follow-up and if Mr. Tierney wants to followup with any questions as well, we'll go from there.

I'm going to start off with Senator McKinney and then we'll just go—I'll just go to Jack Stone. I think he came second, and Representative San Angelo, and then we'll go to you, Madam, and then we'll end up with Representative Duff.

Mr. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Congressman Shays. I want to thank you for bringing this important hearing to Norwalk and tell you how exciting it is to call you Mr. Chairman as well. And welcome, Representative Tierney.

I actually wanted to followup on Congressman Tierney's question about direct payments to municipalities. You know, obviously I tend to believe that when the money is flowing, the less it stops along the way the better. But as a State official I guess I'm alarmed that our local municipalities here feel more comfortable that they're going to get money from the Federal Government than they do from the State level. And without hurting anyone's feelings because this is a very important issue, I wondered if you could sort of better describe what fears you have if the money were to go to the State first.

Mr. KNOPP. Well, as a former State legislator—[laughter]—you know, when I served on the legislature, we had a \$500 million surplus, and somehow in the last 10 months we have a \$400 million deficit. I don't know how it happened.

I think basically the problem is this, that one of our concerns is that the State's emergency infrastructure is also understaffed and needs funding. And the question really is how much does the State rely on Federal funding to help solve its budget crisis and, therefore, does it have the funds to pass on to municipalities.

There are a number of shortages of positions in the Office of Emergency Management at the State level. When you get these funds, do those get plugged in to help deal with the State budget crisis or do they get passed on to municipalities. I think one of our concerns is that Federal funds will replace State dollars and State programs and won't be used to supplement the municipalities. And I think that actually, in fact, did happen in this last budget crisis.

Fortunately the DOJ Grant on emergency equipment prohibits States from spending more than a minuscule amount on administrative costs and, therefore, there are limits on who you can hire to fill gaps in the Office of Emergency Management structure.

Again, they need more people. We need more help. We just want to make sure those funds get to the first responders and don't get used to plug the State budget problems.

Mr. MCKINNEY. Let me just followup on that. Would you also be equally uncomfortable that if the Federal grants were to go to States but directed at municipalities but it would be the States deciding which municipalities it goes to?

Mr. BALDWIN. We have gotten grants directly from the Federal Government. Quite honestly, the process is a whole lot less cumbersome than going through the State. I think Mayor Knopp hit the nail on the head when he said there's a need to stop gaps, something to help the State of Connecticut take care of its budget problems at the expense of the municipalities, and that's why we have a greater comfort level to deal directly with the Federal Government.

We've gotten bullet proof vests for our police. We've gotten our SRO officers. We've hired dispatchers and so forth directly on Federal grants without having to go through the State. That does become a problem we have because—

Mr. KNOPP. I just want to say one thing, Senator McKinney. You know, I've said I was a legislator for 15 years. I'm a new mayor, and all this is very new to me. I think the biggest surprise about being a mayor is that unlike many economies in Europe where, in fact, municipal security inquiries are either State or Federal responsibilities, the United States is almost the only country in the world in which local security is a municipal and mayoral responsibility. In Japan it's a Federal responsibility. In Germany it's a State responsibility. So, in fact, we are responsible for the first responders at the municipal level and that's why I think it makes sense to have the funds come directly to us.

Mr. MCKINNEY. And my last question is in terms of priorities. I know there's a lot of need for training, communications equipment, and other equipment, but if you had to prioritize which one is first right now, which would it be?

Mr. BALDWIN. Well, I'd have to say communications only because knowing the people that are in this room today, police, fire, EMS personnel that are represented, we are fortunate here in Fairfield County to have really true professionals. These people know what they have to do. They know again what the mission is, but they're waiting for the resources.

Mr. MCKINNEY. Right.

Mr. BALDWIN. Communications is the absolute need.

Mr. SHAYS. You know, I'm just going to use that as an opportunity because I did want to ask this question. And if the next panel would think of this, the answer to this question, I won't have to ask it again. But what are the most critical needs, and I have a list. Is it detection capability? Is it decontamination capability, communication equipment, personal protective gear and suits, emergency medical personnel, emergency medical training, hospital treatment surge capacity, training in general exercises? Where would you try to put this list from detection capability all the way down to exercises? I'm not going to ask this panel that question now, but if you could just try to focus in.

Mr. Stone.

Mr. DE MARTINO. I wanted to respond to Senator McKinney's—

Mr. SHAYS. Sure.

Mr. DE MARTINO. I concur. However, I would put personal protection equipment equal to communications interoperability as our priorities.

Mr. KNOPP. Can I just also respond?

I agree with Ray. I think that the telecommunications is the first need. They're all obviously important needs, but we now have to make sure that fire and police can talk to each other, that we can use our mutual aid pacts on a regional basis to call in a lot of personnel. If they can't talk to each other, it doesn't do any good. So I think you get the biggest bang for the buck by telecommunications.

The State, as I mentioned, is far ahead of other States because it set aside the 800 megahertz band width for communications to the State police, and, therefore, we really can have interoperability and very effective telecommunications on a very short-term implementation phase.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank you, gentlemen, for those questions and the answers.

Let me just take the opportunity to recognize two very capable staff of Congresswoman DeLauro, Stanley Welsh and Scott McDonald.

Would you both raise your hands, please.

They're right over here and I just would point out that their Member of Congress had the extraordinary privilege of being on the Select Committee on the New York (indiscernible) of Government.

I might say to all of you so you can picture what happened when the President presented his proposal. His bill came to our subcommittee. Our subcommittee was the first to deal with the legislation. We had a hearing on that, but the full Committee of Government Reform was the committee that voted it out. We were the only committee of Congress that had the 100 percent full piece of it, but other committees had jurisdiction to—the Judiciary Committee and others had jurisdiction in transportation. They took that little part out of it.

And so the base bill came to our committee through the Select Committee. They altered it. In some cases we didn't like the changes they made. They then merited some of the other parts of other committees and I think did a good attempt at it. I think Congresswoman DeLauro was very supportive of some of the things that they did in our Government Reform Committee that was taken out by the Select Committee.

But we appreciate both of you being here. Thank you. And we appreciate the fine work you're doing with your boss. Sometimes I think she works for you, but I know she's the boss.

Also I think—is there anyone from Nancy Johnson's office here?

[No response.]

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I'd been told she might be here as well. Mr. Stone.

Mr. STONE. Thank you, Congressman Shays. And I do want to thank you for putting on this hearing today and welcome Representative Tierney, who happens to be from my home State originally.

I want to go to Mayor Knopp for just a moment. Shortly after September 11th there was a very, very informative session held at Norwalk Hospital and I know you had a great part in putting it on there. And I have to say that the information that was imparted to us at that session was less than optimistic in our capability of handling any type of disaster.

In the face of the comments that you've made here in establishing a performance standard, etc., relating to the medical aspects of this, where would you say we stand today in terms of where we were a year ago?

Mr. KNOPP. Well, I think that's a good question, Jack. I think the—we can't forget that a large part of the response to terrorism has to involve public education and public health organization. So I feel that we are better off than we were on September 11th because there's a much greater I think awareness among the public in terms of public health officials about how to respond to these

kinds of disasters. You know, if a nuclear weapon were to go off tomorrow, obviously the question—the answer is no.

But in terms of dealing with, first, unfounded fears, developing procedures to verify what the problems are, I think that we are growing in our sophistication and recognizing that this is not just an equipment or telecommunications issue. It's also a matter of public health and social organization. And I feel that hospitals, Norwalk Hospital and others are doing a very good job of now involving public health directors in this kind of outreach education.

Mr. STONE. As a followup to that, and I'm sorry that we don't have medical people here on these panels today, but you mentioned, Mayor, that we have 32 hospitals in the State of Connecticut and unfortunately close to half of those are financially distressed. What type of burdens or what type of relief is going to be necessary to really bring us up to standard? I realize it's a hospital question—

Mr. KNOPP. No.

Mr. STONE [continuing]. But you're the closest to a hospital here.

Mr. KNOPP. Obviously having hospitals upgrade their emergency procedures is going to be a costly matter. These are issues that the State health organizations have to deal with in terms of setting their rate structures.

One of the issues that we're getting with Norwalk Hospital is how to set up certain treatment facilities so that in the event of an emergency, we make sure that the anthrax spores, or rather contaminants don't spread throughout the hospital. These are highly sophisticated, high-pressure rooms that prevent spreading of this kind of contamination. This is going to be an expensive operation.

Mr. SHAYS. I believe we have two EMS folks. Particularly not from a hospital directly, but staff health systems as well as the EMS coordinator. So we can get into that later.

Mr. KNOPP. Sure.

Mr. STONE. May I ask just one more question—

Mr. SHAYS. Sure.

Mr. STONE [continuing]. In the area of communications. We all know that there are all sorts of communication systems available. Obviously police car to police car, headquarters, etc. What do you envision as the need for the communication? Realizing you can't have everything necessarily, but what would be your priority? I mean, a capability directed to the State police or to the surrounding communities or to General Cugno's office? What is the priority to the communications aspect?

Mr. KNOPP. I think the priority now is to have us obtain equipment that allows us to utilize this 800 megahertz system, that allows us to talk to surrounding communities but is patched through the State police. I think that is where you get the biggest bang for the buck. Connecticut is one of the States that has set aside this band width. We ought to take advantage of it.

Mr. BALDWIN. I agree and I'd take it just one step further in getting even more basic. I think being able to communicate amongst the different emergency organizations, fire, police and EMS even within our own community. We most recently purchased a—I don't know if it's appropriate to name the name of the company, but a Nextel phone to allow us to have walkie talkie communication

with all our emergency management teams and not having to rely virtually on cell phones because it didn't work on September 11th.

So getting as basic as that, having that in place is important to getting in touch with our public works people, getting in touch with, again, the obvious ones, fire, police, EMS, your Health Department. Everybody that's involved has to be able to be communicated with. And, you know, money for that is not a lot of money, but it makes a tremendous impact I think.

Mr. DE MARTINO. There is equipment on the market that will let us have our cake and eat it, too. I'm not that familiar with it. I've seen it one time. They made reference to it at the Office of Emergency Management in New York City. They're testing it now. But you can select who you want to communicate with and it's on a separate frequency. And I also think that satellite phones are a consideration. I don't have the answers, but I do know what ought to be looked at and we can come up with solutions real quickly.

Mr. STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Representative San Angelo.

Mr. SAN ANGELO. Yeah, first let me thank Congressman Shays for holding this hearing and Representative Tierney for joining us here in Connecticut.

I guess I want to take a step back for just a minute. I understand the mission of Homeland Security for the Nation and the State of Connecticut. I think I understand the needs of the local service providers. I guess I'm wondering about the plans to get there. I'm wondering if you had any precise plans or at least a process to go through from Homeland Security down through our Office of Emergency Management to a municipal level. I'm hearing these different towns want to do different things and have different priorities. I guess I'm wondering what is the plan to get to overall State coverage and overall competitive coverage.

So I guess I would like to know has the State provided you with some kind of resource where you're directed, these are the priorities you should look at, these are the kinds of things you should study, here's the regional approach we're looking at? If you have that kind of communication, I think that's probably the most important thing that you need to understand what's happening.

Mr. BALDWIN. Well, shortly in my term and not too long after September 11th, we did have such a seminar up at Oakdale, and they provided us with a booklet that allowed us to work as an operating guide. And I can only speak for my town. We followed that guide very carefully and it's been a tremendous help to us. But apart from that seminar and some of the other seminars that were attended by Emergency Management Coordinator, Bob Pescatore, who's here today, and Chief Berry, there hasn't been much else.

Mr. SAN ANGELO. Representative Knopp, I guess what I need from you is in your city have you seen a direct response that you know what the priorities should be based upon a State or a Federal plan and is there a process in place that you feel comfortable with to address the needs?

Mr. KNOPP. Well, as Ray said, there was a very helpful meeting up at Wallingford, although that proceeding was primarily geared

toward helping municipalities gear up to apply for Federal funds and the Department of Justice Grant.

One thing to remember, Ron, is that the police and fire departments do have many protocols already established and there already are very many mutual aid agreements worked out between municipalities, between hospitals and between the emergency ambulance services, and General Cugno in the Office of Emergency Management has been very helpful in making plans generally available.

As far as I know there's not yet an official State of Connecticut emergency response plan in place. Otherwise, we (indiscernible).

Mr. DE MARTINO. I didn't mean to interrupt, but I wanted to add that I am also familiar with the document that was given out. I attended that session upstate, but everything is predicated on the FEMA plan, which is fine. A single plan in which to follow which is the basis (indiscernible) is very important. But the State plan really, in fact, is the FEMA plan. And we have received assistance from the State to (indiscernible) Regional Office of Emergency Preparedness, but it's still based on the FEMA plan.

Mr. SAN ANGELO. And my last comment was—my concern was when we talk about the Federal funds making it to the cities, my concern is the State having some coordinated plan. If we're only going to get those limited amount of resources from the Federal Government, we need to use those resources that best benefit all the systems of Connecticut in some coordinated way. And that's what concerns me about giving the money directly to local municipalities. Their need may not meet the needs of the area around them in a way that we can best utilize those resources. That's my concern about that local grant process. I understand it's easier for you to deal with issues. You get the money, you buy what you want. But I'm not sure the message—

Mr. BALDWIN. Well, there are already in place mutual aid pacts. I think the funds are necessary to enhance those mutual pacts as to allow them to, as we said before, to fulfill their mission. But there already is in place, as Mayor Knopp said, protocols within not only the local police, fire and EMS, but also within the surrounding towns.

So I think we need to give the local police, fire, and EMS a little more credit because I think they really have a plan in place. I think they're professionals and I think they're prepared to deal with it. But, again, resources. We haven't seen any money for 10 months.

Mr. SAN ANGELO. And let me just say that I do think the local police do a phenomenal job. My concern in that is that Norwalk will do a phenomenal job for Norwalk, and I want to make sure that the State has full coverage. I know even in Hartford each agency has their own priorities and sometimes those priorities together don't serve the State in the best possible way and that's my concern, is working with those services.

Mr. SHAYS. What I think is going to happen is that clearly if you are a very large city, you're going to get direct grants. The challenge we have in Connecticut is that given our largest city is between 140,000 and 150,000, to the Federal Government it doesn't register. You're kind of a small community.

So the successful grant applications in my judgment will be the regional ones in Connecticut. But then the question is could those regional applications go directly, and I think they can. That's kind of what we're hearing is the desire. But you're going to be more successful if you put a package together with those colleagues, and I know that's happening.

But the workplace, for instance, in Bridgeport that is working in collaboration with a lot of different groups and different government agencies, as well as non-profits has won a lot of grants by their success in partnering both geographically and in terms of common causes.

But we hear your message. We wanted to come to you. That's why we're here. This is great.

Representative Boucher.

Ms. BOUCHER. Thank you, Congressman Shays, and also, Congressman Tierney, for attending this important hearing.

I only have one question and I hope that the panel will consider it and also the other two panels that are going to come forward to be thinking about it.

Mr. DeMartino was the only person on the panel that mentioned the issue of mass evacuations. Have any of the other panelists thought about this eventuality in their discussions and in their meetings? Have you been in contact with the Department of Transportation, the State police and also the National Guard, or is this something that is being deferred to the State Office of Emergency Preparedness?

I would think that in a case such as mass evacuation there would be quite a bit of panic that could result in injury and even death, and it is a concern.

Mr. BALDWIN. I'll take a crack at that one. I mean, we can't deal with commuter traffic here in this area of the State on a rush hour basis. Imagine what it's going to be like in a mass casualty situation. So I think until we put in place some type of plan to deal with the simplest of problems, which is our rush hour traffic, then it's going to be difficult to deal with plans.

Mr. KNOPP. Maybe this is a new argument. (Indiscernible.) [Laughter.]

Ms. BOUCHER. Then maybe we should think about mass transit options to get most people in one fell swoop out of harm and into safety.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Representative Duff, again welcome.

Mr. Duff came to a committee meeting I had and I didn't recognize him and I've had this tremendous amount of guilt. So I'm going to probably give you a little bit more time than I should.

Mr. DUFF. Thank you. Thank you so much, Congressman, and I thank yourself and Congressman Tierney for being here today. It's truly an honor to be up here with you as well.

Just a couple of questions, but the first comment I'd just like to make is about my vivid memories of September 11th. As First Selectwoman Farrell has said, it certainly is a regional issue and I think we have to think of it that way.

I hold vivid memories. I was working in Greenwich at the time and so was my wife, and we happened to drive in to work together

and when we saw what was happening, we both—I picked her up. We drove home. And as we were on I-95, there were about 40 or 50 ambulances driving in the fast lane toward New York City. And that is something that will be etched in my mind forever, and truly it does bring home to you how regional this is because our people went down to New York and were the first people down there to help our comrades down in New York City. And so we really have to think of it that way.

The question I'd like to ask Mayor Knopp and the rest of the panelists is how are the communications that we get from say the Federal Government when there's different kinds of scenarios we need to watch out for, potential harm in our waterways or possible anthrax problems or different kinds of communications, how is that system working? Has it improved over the last few months and how do you think we can get it maybe a little better?

Mr. KNOPP. Congressman Shays, do you mind if I invite the chief really to answer that question?

Mr. SHAYS. Unfortunately you can't. I would have to swear him in.

Mr. KNOPP. All right. Well, based on what the chief has told me, one of the problems we're having with the Federal Government is a very inconsistent type of communication, especially with the FBI on threats. Just like First Selectwoman Farrell said, the color coded system just doesn't seem to be taken seriously at all.

We get both e-mails and other types of communications on threats. You know, some seem serious, some seem frivolous. We don't get a followup to the initial communication. I can say that's a part of the system that needs an awful lot of work. And the police are very anxious to get a higher quality of information from the FBI in particular, but so far that system has been unsatisfactory.

Mr. DE MARTINO. We feel we're receiving an awful lot of information that requires attention because you can get too much information sometimes. You're overworked sometimes, but we prefer to filter it in at our level—not filter it in, but examine it at our level and continue to receive the information provided to us.

Mr. DUFF. OK. So you'd rather have more than less?

Mr. DE MARTINO. We'd rather have anything you want to send us from either the State or the Federal Government.

Mr. DUFF. You had also I think also been in coordination with the (indiscernible) we had and it seemed like every time that the records of preparedness or whatever it was called, and it was kind of abandoned I guess by the early 1990's and maybe there's still something like that.

But kind of going through what we're really talking about, emergency communications network, training, equipment. We have to worry about our communities in New York City, school security, computer security, our transportation waterways, chemical attacks. Do we need or what kind of—what would make it easiest I guess on a regional basis on how to best deal with this as far as staffing levels go so that the communications go around and also making sure that we're all coordinated and on the same page and we're also thinking about school security and a plan for schools and somehow we can give Trumbull a head start with their plans

maybe or vice versa? What would help as far as I guess staffing to provide that?

Mr. DE MARTINO. I think you hit the nail right on the head. I don't know what the staffing level should be. I hadn't thought of that. But in our town we're a three-person volunteer group working with very professional and very effective first responders. It's hard for us to do it on a part-time basis with jobs and the like to keep abreast of things.

What I'm asking for is the guidance, whether it's either from the Department of Homeland Security or the State. I don't care where it comes from. We want guidance on how to address these very measures that you have brought up. Help us to devise a sensible and realistic plan and we'll apply it to the local need.

Mr. KNOPP. One thing we're looking to do, Representative Duff, is—I convened a meeting of the city's emergency services, medical and public health personnel to assess our emergency planning, and it became apparent that there's no one individual in the city who is assigned the responsibility of reviewing all the components of our response systems or identifying the unfilled plans and unfilled needs. Therefore, I expect to be hiring a consultant on a part-time basis, a retired individual from a law enforcement background to help the city really assess all of this.

Both Chief Berry and Chief (indiscernible) told me that they simply are not able with their heavy responsibilities to be contacting FEMA, to be contacting OEM to try to work out these communications. So it was very important for us to try to do that, and I hope we can find some grant funds or some other funding method for starting this on at least a temporary basis.

Mr. DUFF. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I'm going to just quickly ask a—not quickly. I'm going to ask a quick question and I'll get a long answer. I just want to make sure. I'd like to go to the next panel, but I want to know if any of you want to put on the record anything? Is there a question we should have asked you that you were prepared to answer that you would like to put on the record? Anything that you need to—

[No response.]

Mr. SHAYS. Well, let me thank all four of you. I am going to ask that you respond—we'll put it in writing. I read a list of things which potentially could be important to the issue of the detection equipment and the others, and we might try to have you rank them in terms of importance. I think it would make better sense if you consult your fire and police officers and the EMS folks, and so we'll go from there. So I thank this panel very much.

I would note that we have only one reporter today. So do you need a break, dear?

COURT REPORTER. [Nodding.]

Mr. SHAYS. So we're going to have a 4-minute break, 5-minute break and then we'll start the next one.

[Recess.]

Mr. SHAYS. The record will just note that we swore in the witnesses and they all responded in the affirmative. We had welcomed them and I read off the list of witnesses. They have been sworn in.

And I think we'll just go down the list and, Chief Berry, we'll start with you. I'm going to ask you if would try to be as close to the 5-minute rule as possible. I have a clock. If you run over, you run over, but if you can stay close to 5 minutes, that would be nice.
Chief Berry.

**STATEMENT OF POLICE CHIEF JAMES BERRY, TRUMBULL
POLICE DEPARTMENT**

Chief BERRY. Well, first of all, I would like to thank you, Congressman, Congressman Shays, I would like to thank you and Representative Tierney for coming out to our community and for allowing me to participate in this process. I think it's very, very important. And as I think about this whole process, I think about the fact that knowing the people that—the individuals that we're dealing with, the September 11th anniversary is coming up, and I don't want to sound like a sense of urgency, but I think it's very, very important that we facilitate this process and move it right along. So I'm very, very grateful to be here to speak on this situation.

The United States is probably engaged in one of the most difficult and dangerous situations they have ever been involved in. The gravity of these circumstances threatens the future of our culture and our way of life. I strongly concur that we must strengthen our Homeland Security and that there must be a collaboration of agencies on the Federal, State, and local levels to make this possible.

I believe that this is a war that will be fought on many fronts as well as our own soil. A strategic analysis of our defense mechanisms will dictate that we must have a strong defense at home to protect our soil.

Mr. SHAYS. Can I just interrupt for a second? Can you hear in the back? Is it OK?

Fine. Thank you. They can hear you.

Chief BERRY. In my opinion, this strength at home will be greatly enhanced by properly equipping the thousands of first responders that are already trained and dedicated to the preservation of life of the American people. If we increase the war effort abroad, the first responders at home will be on the front lines in this war effort. The urban terrorism that some local and State law enforcement officers confront on a daily basis in America probably has in many respects prepared these law enforcement officers to deal with this type of terrorist behavior that may be perpetrated on the streets of America.

Equipping us and sharing information with us is the most important strategy that I can think of relative to Homeland Security. We are in dire need of equipment such as PPE, personal protection equipment. The Trumbull Police Department does not have any personal protection equipment at this time. In the event of an incident in which the Trumbull Police Department needs the suits, we will call Bridgeport PD, who had 60 suits given to them by the Federal Government, or Westport PD, who has purchased 100 suits on their own. The suits range in size from medium to XXXL, but we do not know what size would be available to us.

The Federal Government should provide PPE suits and masks to each local police department and State police barrack. This would

help prepare us to deal with radiological, chemical or biological material. Our close proximity to New York City and cities such as New London and Groton makes it imperative that we be better equipped to deal with materials such as the ones listed above.

Communication is also very important when it comes to equipping us with Homeland Security defense. This communication should be broken down into a local, regional and State system of communication. From a local perspective, the Town of Trumbull, like most towns, has its own police, fire, EMS all on different frequencies on bands. The town needs interoperability for the different agencies and departments to be able to talk to with each other in an effective and efficient manner.


Training is another issue that should be addressed relative to first responders. We are the first line of defense. How we respond and how we handle an incident can determine how many lives are ultimately saved. Money for training is desperately needed. At the present time we are at Level 3 Yellow and are situated 55 miles from New York City, which is at Level 4 Orange. The training should encompass incident command, responses to biohazards, chemical, radiological and reacting to the utilization of weapons of mass destruction.

The information that we receive is pretty good information, but it is sometimes overwhelming because we're not prepared enough proactively to deal with the situation. I also firmly believe that the local, State and Federal agencies assigned to individual States should meet periodically to discuss information sent out and how to respond to these informational situations. On the subject of information, I also believe that Homeland Security should develop some type of early warning system for our citizens. At the present time, most towns and cities do not have any means of notifying citizens about disasters.

Emergency response plans are very important for providing some type of plan for responding to certain emergencies in a timely manner to minimize loss of life, turmoil and general chaotic situations. A plan is only as good as drills and training so everyone is aware as to how to respond to emergencies. To facilitate the adequacy of those plans, I think that they should start as local plans with the idea of regionalization along with collaboration with any State and Federal agents that would be assigned to the region.

In summation, I would like to reiterate that equipping and training first responders in conjunction with communicating and sharing intelligence from Federal agents assigned to each State could form a solid base for Homeland Security. The Federal intelligence base should consist of sharing information also about foreign students who live in our local communities and attend our colleges and universities, but who might have negative reasons for being in America.

I'd like to thank you for allowing me to present this information.
[The prepared statement of Chief Berry follows:]



Homeland Security: Keeping First Responders First

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I believe that this is a war that will be fought on many fronts as well as on our own soil. A strategic analysis of our defense mechanisms will dictate that we must have a strong defense at home to protect our soil. In my opinion, this strength at home will be greatly enhanced by properly equipping the thousands of First Responders that are already trained and dedicated to the preservation of life of the American people. If we increase the war effort abroad, the First Responders at home will be on the frontlines in this war effort. The urban terrorism that some local and State Law enforcement officers confront on a daily basis in America, probably has in many respects, prepared these law enforcement officers to deal with this type of terrorist behavior that may be perpetrated on the streets of America.

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In summation, I would like to reiterate that equipping and training First Responders in conjunction with communicating and sharing intelligence from Federal agents assigned to each State, could form a solid base for Homeland Security. The Federal intelligence base should consist of sharing information about foreign students who live in our local communities and attend our colleges and universities, but who might have negative reasons for being in America.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Chief.
Chief Maglione.

**STATEMENT OF FIRE CHIEF MAGLIONE, BRIDGEPORT FIRE
DEPARTMENT**

Chief MAGLIONE. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. I'm Michael Maglione. I'm the Fire Chief of the city of Bridgeport. I'm also here on behalf of the International Association of Fire Chiefs.

On July 16th, President Bush unveiled the National Strategy for Homeland Security. In it he notes "State and local governments have critical roles to play in Homeland Security. State and local levels of government have primary responsibility for funding, preparing and operating the emergency services that would respond in the event of a terrorist attack. Local units are the first on the scene and the last to leave. All disasters are ultimately local events."

I, along with fire chiefs across the country, agree with the President.

There are over 26,000 fire departments and 1.1 million fire fighters in the United States. In addition to our traditional jobs of fire prevention and fire suppression, we are the No. 1 primary provider of pre-hospital emergency medical care and response to hazardous material calls. Citizens look to us for help when any situation escalates beyond their ability to cope. In short, local fire departments are the first line of defense against any hazards.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to start by reiterating two components of a successful response plan that I discussed in my prior testimony before this committee. The first component is the need to train and equip responders at the local level. The second is implementing a standard incident management system to ensure smooth command at the scene of a response.

First, we must make sure that the local response plans do not rely too heavily on Federal assets. They will not arrive on the scene for hours and sometimes days. This is not an indictment of Federal capability. It is simply a consequence of business. We must have properly equipped and trained responders at the local level.

Also we must consider how to manage the various agencies, personnel and assets that have come to the scene of an incident. This means universal adoption of an incident management system. We have taken steps in this direction. The FBI is one of the first Federal agencies to begin training in IMS.

Ed Plaughter, Chief of the Arlington County, Virginia Fire Department and incident commander at the Pentagon on September 11th, previously testified before Congress that the FBI's understanding of and adherence to the standard of the IMS system was invaluable at the Pentagon. We must continue our work in this area.

With that said, I would like to take a moment to outline some of the specific actions taken by the Bridgeport Fire Department since September 11th.

Our department has increased training in hazardous material operations. We have been a member of the Fairfield County HazMat team, which is a regional team, for 18 years. This team is now being copied throughout the State. Additional communications equipment has been purchased to better communicate at the

command level with the surrounding communities. We have increased training for building collapse and for confined spaces, and we have improved communications with those who respond to our emergency operation centers, such as the Health Department, The Red Cross, hospitals and utilities. But there is still many proactive steps that we must take.

In communications separate command control channels need to be established so that all agencies can communicate at the command level. Connecticut is working on a USAR team, but no start-up funding has been granted. Realistic training programs need to be developed and implemented, and additional funding is required for public training. Specifically, we need money to pay for trainers and to cover overtime costs to local communities while this training takes place.

Mr. Chairman, I am speaking mainly from my experience as the Fire Chief of the city of Bridgeport, but I am sure that as resources have allowed, my fellow chiefs in Connecticut and throughout the United States are taking similar actions.

The final section of my testimony will discuss three specific actions that Congress can take to significantly enhance local preparedness.

First and most importantly, Congress must fully fund the Assistance to Fire Fighters Grant program for the fiscal year 2003. These grants, commonly referred to as Fire Act grants, assist fire fighters by funding training and equipment that is basic to fire fighters. Enhancing the ability of fire fighters to cope with a terrorist incident involving weapons of mass destruction can only begin after basic competency and capability have been achieved. Last week the Senate Appropriations Committee funded the Fire Act at \$900 million for fiscal year 2003. I strongly encourage the House of Representatives to appropriate the same level of funding.

Second, Congress must address the issues of communication interoperability, the ability of personnel from all responding agencies to communicate. This is vital to command and control for effective incident management. The only effective long-term solution to this problem is the allocation of additional radio spectrum for public safety.

In 1997 Congress did just that. Unfortunately, a loophole in the legislation has allowed the local television broadcasters to ignore the will of Congress. This situation must be reversed. Fortunately, a bill has been introduced, H.R. 3397, that will close this loophole. This bill has strong bipartisan support. Mr. Chairman, I encourage you and the members of your subcommittee to support this important piece of legislation.

Finally, the understaffing of fire departments is an issue that must be addressed. Limited apparatus and staffing reduces a fire department's ability to respond to major events, including a terrorist incident, where large amounts of resources are needed quickly.

Currently there is a bill before the House of Representatives, H.R. 3992, that would establish a grant program to aid local governments in hiring career fire fighters. Last week the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee adopted a bipartisan amendment that would include this program in the legislation creating the Department of Homeland Security. We expect that this provision will

be approved by the entire Senate. I hope that the House of Representatives would recognize the wisdom of the Senate's action and agree to this provision when the two chambers go to conference.

The fire service is delighted to know that our voice is being heard at the highest level of our Nation's leadership. America's fire chiefs through the IAFC have spent many years writing, testifying and lobbying about the issues of community safety and security long before September 11th.

Mr. Chairman, in my testimony I detailed concrete steps that have been taken at a local level to protect the citizens of Bridgeport. Now I throw down the gauntlet before you and your colleagues in Congress to pass the legislative initiatives I have discussed. These initiatives have strong support from both members of the political parties and they will further assist the Nation's fire service in its preparedness efforts. With your help we can further enhance our ability to protect our citizens.

Thank you for inviting me to testify. I'll be happy to answer any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Chief Maglione follows:]



Homeland Security: Keeping First Responders First

Statement by Chief Michael A. Maglione
Bridgeport Fire Department
Bridgeport, Connecticut

presented to

**Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs,
and International Relations**


of the

Committee on Government Reform

U.S. House of Representatives

July 30, 2002

International Association of Fire Chiefs
4025 Fair Ridge Drive • Fairfax, VA 22033-2868
(703) 273-0911 • FAX (703) 273-9363



Good Morning Mr. Chairman, I am Chief Michael Maglione of the Bridgeport, Connecticut, Fire Department. I also speak today on behalf of the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC).

Introduction

On July 16th, President Bush unveiled the “National Strategy for Homeland Security.” In this document, the president outlines his administration’s comprehensive strategy for mobilizing and organizing our nation to secure the United States from terrorist attacks. In it, he notes:

State and local governments have critical roles to play in homeland security.... State and local levels of government have primary responsibility for funding, preparing and operating the emergency services that would respond in the event of a terrorist attack. Local units are the first to respond, and the last to leave the scene. All disasters are ultimately local events.

I, along with fire chiefs across the country, agree with the president.

There are over 26,000 local fire departments staffed by 1.1 million fire fighters in the United States. We are responsible for mitigating all kinds of public emergencies in communities across America. In addition to our traditional mission of fire prevention and suppression, we are the primary provider of pre-hospital emergency medical care and hazardous materials response services in this country. We also provide urban search and rescue services in the event of structural collapse. Citizens look to us for help when any situation escalates beyond their ability to cope. In short, local fire departments are the first line of defense against nearly all risks, all hazards.

Facets of Successful Preparedness Effort

Mr. Chairman, there are two components of a successful response plan that I would like to reiterate from my prior testimony before this committee. The first component is the effective training and equipping of fire fighters to identify and mitigate a terrorist incident. Second, is clarifying the operational role of the three levels of government—local, state and federal—that will be involved in responding to a large-scale incident.

Training local emergency responders to identify a terrorist incident as quickly as possible is paramount. These incidents hold special risks for responders and civilians alike. Fire and police personnel who become victims themselves will only exacerbate an already dangerous situation. The possibility of exposure to chemical or biological agents has consequences that can be greatly reduced through training that will enable responders to identify their possible presence. It is also important to remember that the most common form of terrorist violence throughout the world is conventional bombing attacks. Often, in these attacks secondary explosive devices are employed for the very purpose of injuring or killing response personnel who arrive to render aid in the aftermath of the primary explosion. Training our responders to recognize these situations and the risks inherent in them will lead to a safer, more effective response.

The second facet of effective response is proper coordination of the local, state, and federal response assets. There are several concerns that arise from this issue. First, we must make sure that local response plans do not rely too heavily on federal assets that will not arrive on-scene for hours, or even days, after the attack. This is not an indictment of federal capabilities; it is simply a consequence of distance. Thus, we must properly equip and train responders at the local level.

Also, we must consider how to manage the various agencies, personnel, and assets that come to the scene of an incident. That means universal adoption of a standard Incident Management System (IMS). This system should be understood and mastered by all operational agencies at every level of government. We have taken steps in this direction—the FBI is one of the first federal agencies to begin training in IMS. Edward Plaughter, Chief of the Arlington County (VA) Fire Department and incident commander at the Pentagon on September 11th, previously testified before Congress that, “The FBI’s understanding of and adherence to the standard IMS was invaluable at the Pentagon on September 11.” We must continue our work in this area.

Local Actions

With that said, I would like to take a moment to outline some of the specific actions taken by the Bridgeport Fire Department since September 11th to improve our preparedness:

1. Our department has increased training for HazMat operations. Bridgeport belongs to a regional team comprised of 13 cities and towns (career & volunteer). The department now has seven members as part of the team up from two. In Connecticut, the regional approach is the way to go. The Fairfield county team has been in existence for 18 years. There is some movement to start two additional teams. At the local level the department is trained up to the operational level with an emphasis on decontamination.
2. Additional communications equipment has been purchased to better communicate on a command level with neighboring departments.
3. We have increased training for building collapse and confined space incidents. And,
4. While we have always had good communications with organizations who would respond to our emergency operations center, (such as hospitals, the Red Cross, utilities, social services, and the health department) these ties have been strengthened by additional emergency drills.

However, there are still several proactive steps which must be taken. These include:

1. In communications, separate command and control channels need to be established so all agencies can communicate at the command level. This is very expensive and not all communities can afford the expense of purchasing additional equipment. The state is working on a communications plan utilizing the ICAL, ITAC system. However, any additional funding specifically targeted to facilitate and expedite this effort is critical to addressing this weak link.

2. Connecticut is working on fielding a state USAR team, but again there is no startup money approved as of yet.
3. Realistic training programs need to be developed and implemented. Not tabletop classroom training, but in-the-field training for hands-on experience. And,
4. Additional funding is required to cover training. Specifically, we need money to pay for trainers and to cover overtime costs to the local communities who must call back personnel to cover the community while training takes place.

Mr. Chairman, I am speaking mainly from my experience as fire chief in Bridgeport, but I am sure that, as resources have allowed, my fellow chiefs in Connecticut, the Northeast region, and throughout the United States are taking similar actions. And certainly for the foreseeable future, I and other fire chiefs across the country will continue to take additional steps.

Additional Steps

Mr. Chairman, the final section of my testimony will discuss three specific actions that Congress can take to significantly enhance local preparedness efforts.

First, and most importantly, Congress must fully fund the Assistance to Firefighters grant program for fiscal year 2003. These grants, commonly referred to as FIRE Act grants, assist fire departments by funding training and equipment that is basic to fire fighting. Enhancing the ability of fire fighters to cope with a terrorist incident involving “weapons of mass destruction” can only begin after basic competency and capability has been achieved. Last week, the Senate Appropriations Committee funded the FIRE Act grant program at \$900 million for FY 2003. I strongly encourage the House of Representatives to appropriate the same level of funding.

Second, Congress must address the issue of communications interoperability—the ability of personnel from all responding agencies to communicate. This is vital to command and control for effective incident management. A short-term solution lies in the provision of patching systems that allow jury-rigged communication between agencies. However, the only effective, long-term solution to this problem is the allocation of additional radio spectrum for public safety. In 1997 Congress did just that by directing the FCC to allocate additional spectrum for public safety use. Unfortunately, a loophole in the legislation has allowed local television broadcasters to ignore the will of Congress and compromise public safety. This situation is untenable and must be reversed. Fortunately, a bill has been introduced, HR 3397, that would close this loophole. This bill has strong bipartisan support. Mr. Chairman, I encourage you and the members of your subcommittee to support this important piece of legislation.

Finally, the understaffing of fire departments is an issue that must be addressed. Whether a department is a career, volunteer or combination department, staffing is an immediate issue.

The primary objective of this legislation is to raise the staffing level of fire departments throughout the country to four fire fighters per fire company. Proper safety practice, codified in federal administrative law by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, requires fire fighters to operate in teams of at least two. Fire departments typically field three-person engine and ladder companies. However, fire apparatus staffing of four yields two working teams, thus doubling the capacity of three-person units which can only form one operational team. A four-person response unit will yield a 100 percent increase in operational capacity compared with three-person companies.

Limited apparatus staffing reduces a fire department's ability to respond to major events, including a terrorist incident, where large amounts of resources are needed quickly. Early intervention in the aftermath of a terrorist event will dramatically increase the number of lives saved.

Currently there is a bill before the House of Representatives—HR 3992—that would establish a grant program to aid local governments in hiring career fire fighters. Last week, the Senate Government Affairs Committee adopted a bipartisan amendment that would include this program in the legislation creating the Department of Homeland Security. We expect that this provision will be approved by the entire Senate. I hope that the House of Representatives will recognize the wisdom of the Senate's action and agree to this provision when the two chambers go to conference on this important legislation.

Conclusion

The fire service is delighted to know that our voice is being heard at the highest levels of our nation's leadership. America's fire chiefs, through the IAFC, have spent many years writing, testifying and lobbying on behalf of the fire service on issues of community safety and security, because unfortunately, this issue emerged long before September 11.

Mr. Chairman, I started my testimony by detailing the concrete steps that I have taken at the local level to protect the citizens of Bridgeport. Now, I throw down the gauntlet before you and your colleagues in Congress to pass the legislative initiatives I have discussed. These initiatives have strong support from members of both political parties and they will further assist the nation's fire service in its preparedness efforts and build upon our initial efforts at the local level. With your help we can further enhance our ability to protect our citizens.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify. I am happy to answer any questions you may have.

Attachments As Requested

Chief Michael A. Maglione's *Curriculum Vitae*
Written Disclosure of Federal Grants and Contracts

Additional Attachments

Protecting Our Nation: The American Fire Service Position Paper on the Department of Homeland Security

Michael A. Maglione

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 Bridgeport, CT 06606

Home (203) 372-3871
 Email: Maqlim0@ci.bridgeport.ct.us

PROFILE

Thirty-one years experience with the Bridgeport Fire Department

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

City of Bridgeport, Bridgeport, Connecticut

May 1971 - Present

Fire Chief

June 1997 - Present

- Administer municipal fire department that provides fire service protection to a diverse community population of 139,000 citizens
- Manage staff of 355 that includes 339 career uniformed personnel and 16 civilians
- Oversee department budget of \$24,000,000
- Implement Absence Control Policy that resulted in ongoing savings of \$400,000
- Work with management team to secure First Responder status for the Bridgeport Fire Department
- Work with management team to implement use of Automatic External Defibrillators (AEDs)
- Work with management team to implement use of Thermal Imaging Cameras
- Work with management team and firefighters' union to implement Random Drug Policy

Assistant Fire Chief

June 1995 - June 1997

- Responsible for overall command of personnel and equipment in half of the district during a scheduled shift
- Commanded and directed firefighting, rescue, and salvage operations on the fireground
- Enforced department rules, regulations, and orders
- Inspected fire companies for condition of quarters, property, apparatus, records, and personnel
- Responsible for routine administrative management in the district and for submitting required reports

Captain

January 1991 - June 1995

- Commanded personnel and equipment in a fire company
- Made duty assignments
- Conducted daily inspections of personnel and apparatus
- Enforced department rules, regulations, and orders

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (continued)

Lieutenant **November 1988 - January 1991**

- Served as officer in command of an engine, truck, or rescue company during an assigned tour of duty
- Assigned personnel to duty in quarters
- Supervised the care and upkeep of quarters and equipment
- Conducted and leads prescribed drills and training sessions
- Instructed personnel in firefighting and fire control methods, hose and ladder practices, ventilation, extinguishment, and salvage techniques
- Took command at the fireground until relieved by a senior officer
- Kept required records and makes shift reports

Pumper Engineer **April 1975 - November 1988**

- Performed all the duties of a firefighter
- Directly responsible for driving pumper engine to the scene of a fire
- Executed proper hydrant hookup and hose layout
- Operated pumping mechanism to supply required amount of water at prescribed pressure
- Directly responsible for daily inspection, care, and maintenance of the engine and its equipment to insure its constant readiness for service

Firefighter **May 1971 - April 1975**

- Responded to all alarms of fire during an assigned tour of duty
- Subject to call and duty to multiple alarms during off time
- Laid and connected hose
- Removed persons from danger
- Administered first aid to the injured
- As a member of the Rescue Squad, performed special rescue and first aid work as assigned
- Performed general maintenance work on quarters and equipment
- Participated in recurring company training sessions and drills

EDUCATION

Fairfield University, Fairfield, CT **1970**

- Bachelor of Arts in History

Norwalk State Technical College, Norwalk, CT **1975**

- Associate Degree in Fire Administration and Technology

National Fire Academy

- Fire and Arson Investigation Courses
- Management Overview Course

PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

International Association of Fire Chiefs	1996 - Present
National Fire Prevention Association	2000 - Present
City of Bridgeport Labor Management Steering Committee	1997 - Present
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Co-Chairman• Committee oversees Total Quality Management Teams	

REFERENCES

- Available Upon Request

IAFC 2002-2003
GOVERNMENT GRANT ANALYSIS
6/30/02

Grant #	Name	Agency	Duration	Total Grant	Direct Cost 2002	G&A 2002	Total Expenses	Balance Left
953	Fire Act II	FEMA	09/27/01-06/30/02	75,185	37,230	9,680	46,910	28,275
951	Hazmat Response	FEMA	03/29/01-03/28/02	110,000	34,023	8,846	42,869	67,131
952	Native American	FEMA	09/24/01-09/23/02	199,818	22,027	5,727	27,754	172,064
954	OJP Terrorism	DOJ	09/25/01-02/01/03	427,189	257,446	75,317	332,763	94,426
955	Wellness Fitness Initi.	FEMA	08/15/01-08/14/03	50,000	803	0	803	49,197
992	University of Fairbanks	FEMA	01/24/02-09/30/02	22,000	3,796	987	4,783	17,217
	Total Grant			884,192	355,325	100,557	455,882	428,310

V. Veerappan
6/30/02

**PROTECTING OUR NATION:
The American Fire Service Position
Paper on the Department of
Homeland Security**



Congressional Fire Services Institute


International Association of Arson Investigators



International Association of Fire Chiefs

International Association of Fire Fighters

International Fire Service Training Association



International Society of Fire Service Instructors

National Fire Protection Association



National Volunteer Fire Council

North American Fire Training Directors

**FIRE SERVICE POSITION PAPER ON THE
PROPOSED DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY**

Overview

The American fire and emergency service was very encouraged when the president proposed the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, especially since it has long advocated the need for a central point-of-contact for terrorism preparedness. Much has changed in the post-September 11th world, but one thing has remained constant: America's fire service must have the adequate personnel, training, and equipment to respond to future emergency incidents, including terrorist attacks, hazardous materials and emergency medical services incidents, technical rescues and fires. These, plus many other challenges, are what makes the fire service America's all-hazards first responders.

In developing a new department, Congress and the administration must consider a number of crucial issues or the department will fall short of meeting its desired intent:

1. The Federal Emergency Management Agency, which is tasked with emergency preparedness and response missions, must be at the core of the Department of Homeland Security. This guiding principle must manifest itself during the planning and development of a new department. To achieve this end, it is imperative that the fire and emergency service has significant representation at the table throughout the entire planning process.
2. The definition of a "first responder" must be clearly articulated from the onset, placing heavy emphasis on response times and exposure to risks. First responders are fire and rescue, emergency medical services and law enforcement personnel. This definition will determine to a large extent the distribution of federal funds to local, state and federal response agencies. To this end, it is imperative that funding for training and equipment reach the local level where it is needed most. Moreover, existing federal programs benefiting local first responders must be preserved. Of particular importance to the fire service is the Assistance to Firefighters grant program, authorized at \$900 million for FY 2003. Congress needs to fully fund this program to bring all fire departments up to a baseline level of readiness and keep them there. Furthermore, fire departments should be able to apply these funds to all uses contained in the enabling legislation, including initiatives to hire career firefighters and to recruit and retain volunteer firefighters. Any new grant programs addressing terrorism must be inclusive of all first responders and authorized to deliver at least 90% of all funds to local public safety agencies.
3. Local first responders are this nation's primary defense against terrorism. Without sufficient staffing and training, the risk of injury or death increases dramatically. This is why fire departments – both volunteer and career – must have adequate staffing levels and continuous training. Training must consist of existing national programs that utilize first responders to train first responders, and take full advantage of state and regional training centers. Moreover, training and equipment must conform to nationally-recognized voluntary consensus standards where such standards exist.
4. The tragic events of September 11th have again demonstrated the importance of communications to public safety. This issue, itself, is not limited to on-scene communications, but encompasses a wide variety of needs including: access to intelligence data on possible terrorist threats/attacks, additional spectrum for interoperability of radio systems, and new technologies that can track the positions of firefighters inside buildings.

These are some important components of the blueprint for a Department of Homeland Security. We ask for both Congress and the administration to give these concerns their every consideration as they lay the groundwork for a new federal agency. Firefighters have long recognized their role in protecting our nation against threats of all magnitude and will continue to serve on the front lines against future attacks. No matter what the final configuration of the complete national response plan to terrorism, the fire service and other first responders will always be first to arrive at the scene. They must be properly staffed, trained, and equipped in order to make a positive difference at the "moment of truth." It is imperative that they be given the recognition and support needed to enhance their level of readiness and decrease their exposure to risks.

*Priorities***Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program**

The Assistance to Firefighters grant program, commonly referred to as the FIRE Act program, is a model of efficiency. This can be attributed to the fact that it is a competitive grant program that provides direct support to local fire departments for basic fire fighting needs. Another important element of this grant program is that applications are peer-reviewed by fire service experts and grants are made on the basis of needs. Full community participation is assured by the matching grant requirement.

It is crucial that the Assistance to Firefighters grant program remains separate and distinct from any new funding programs for first responders and that it be fully funded to the amounts authorized by law. This is because local fire and emergency services departments are the only organizations deployed for the purpose of saving lives and mitigating property and environmental damage caused by natural or manmade disasters. They are strategically located throughout America and staffed, trained and equipped to arrive on the scene within four to six minutes of notification of an incident. It is only at the local government level that federal funds intended for first responders can be assured of being utilized for the purposes intended. Furthermore, fire departments should be able to apply these funds to all uses contained in the enabling legislation, including initiatives to hire career firefighters and to recruit and retain volunteer firefighters.

Providing support for the basics of fire fighting enhances all fire department responsibilities, including terrorism response. The history of the program to date:

- Authorized at \$900 million through FY 2004
- Funded at \$100 million for FY 2001 and \$360 million for FY 2002
- Almost 20,000 departments (of a total of 26,350) sought funding in each of the first two years in amounts approaching \$3 billion each year.

First Responder Grant Program

America's fire and emergency service stands strongly in support of the proposed \$3.5 billion first responder grant program. The program is uniquely positioned to promote desperately needed coordination between neighboring jurisdictions and various first response agencies. To ensure that the money is wisely spent, several principles should be included in the program.

First, at least 90% of the money must reach the local level. The funding should go through the states, but it should not stop there. While terrorism is an attack upon our nation, every terrorist attack is first an attack upon a local community. The ability of our nation to effectively combat terrorism is therefore inextricably intertwined with the ability of our local communities to respond to such attacks. Thus, a paramount job of the federal government is to provide adequate resources to local emergency response operations.

Secondly, the state agencies that distribute this funding must include all first responder interests in the decision making process. Too often the fire service is left out of discussions at the state level. This oversight must be corrected.

Thirdly, the states must expedite the funding to local governments. States are already undertaking needs assessments for terrorism preparedness, so within a limited amount of time the funding should be distributed to local governments.

Finally, if a match from state and local governments is part of the requirement for receiving federal funds, then state and local in-kind contributions should meet, in full, that requirement.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Training

The current WMD fire fighter training program operated by the Office for Domestic Preparedness in the U.S. Department of Justice must be retained and strengthened. The organizations that currently provide specialized WMD training under this program possess invaluable expertise and experience, which should be preserved under any plan to reorganize federal training programs. It is important to utilize existing and established programs to ensure the right training reaches the right people.

Standardization of Equipment

The InterAgency Board for Equipment Standardization and InterOperability (IAB) is designed to establish and coordinate local, state, and federal standardization, interoperability, and responder safety to prepare for, respond to, mitigate, and recover from any incident by identifying requirements for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosives incident response equipment. In addition to radio communication systems, interoperability applies to a firefighter's protective gear and rescue equipment. For instance, air cylinders of one manufacturer of self contained breathing apparatus cannot be interchanged with those from another. The purpose of the IAB is to ensure standardized and compatible equipment for use by emergency response personnel. The First Responder grant program should require that the Standardized Equipment List (SEL) prepared by the IAB be utilized for the purchase of equipment made possible by the federal grant.

SAFECOM

SAFECOM was formed as an e-government initiative with its purpose to improve wireless radio communications among and between federal agencies. Recently, the scope of SAFECOM was expanded to include state and local government and the lead agency was changed to FEMA. Since this is the primary federal initiative to improve wireless radio communications and interoperability for local fire and emergency medical services departments it is essential for the fire service to have representation on advisory committees to SAFECOM. Local public safety first responders must have appropriate input to federal SAFECOM decision makers.

Conclusion

Future events will require continuous review and evaluation of all federal programs designed to mitigate the potential impact of terrorist attacks and other major disasters. In highlighting the primary theme of this report, it is imperative that those agencies at the local level – specifically the fire and emergency services, emergency medical services and law enforcement – serve a primary role in the development of all federal initiatives dealing with national homeland security initiatives.

July 2002

Mr. SHAYS. Chief, thank you. We appreciate your testimony and we appreciate you being here today. Thank you very much.

Captain Newman, I would just say to you as a former resident of Stamford, it strikes me that your work comes out of the catastrophe that hit our fire fighters a number of years ago with the chemical plant and not knowing what was there. How many officers or fire fighters were injured in that?

Mr. NEWMAN. There were six severely injured in a chemical explosion. I believe it was around 1982.

Mr. SHAYS. Yeah, we didn't know that there were chemicals in the plant.

Mr. NEWMAN. Correct.

Mr. SHAYS. And that brought about tremendous reform, didn't it, in the city of Stamford and also around the country?

Mr. NEWMAN. Right. Recognizing the hazards in the community and having the appropriate personal protection equipment for first responders.

Mr. SHAYS. So we will take your testimony as testimony that has been—that comes from the experience of some real tragedy, but a lot of learning in the process.

Mr. NEWMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. You have the floor.

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN PAUL NEWMAN, STAMFORD FIRE HEADQUARTERS

Mr. NEWMAN. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee.

Again, my name is Paul Newman. I'm the captain and hazardous materials officer of the Stamford Fire and Rescue Department. On behalf of the officers and members of the Stamford Fire Fighters Local 786, and the 4,500 Uniformed Professional Fire Fighters in the State of Connecticut, I thank you for the opportunity to give this testimony today.

As tragically witnessed through the events of September 11th, our Nation's fire fighters are on the front line in the war against terrorism. In most jurisdictions across the country, the local fire service has been, and remains, the first response agency tasked with command and operations at disasters including building fires, structural collapses, explosions, hazardous materials releases, and transportation crashes. All can involve mass casualties.

The current terrorist threats we face include biological, nuclear, incendiary, chemical or explosive means to destruction and injury. Coupled with these conventional and unconventional methods is the realization that secondary means of destruction do exist and are often intended to kill or injure the first responders. Therefore, these would be rescuers need to have sufficient resources and adequate training to effectively accomplish their responsibilities as the first minutes and hours of an incident unfolds.

Often times my company is the first to arrive at an emergency scene. Depending upon how the scene and victims present, myself and the fire fighters I work with must first have the appropriate personal protective equipment, including the right clothing and respiratory protection to approach and affect rescues. Although signs and symptoms presented by victims will indicate hazards and help

to identify potential agents, metering and monitoring equipment is needed to aid in detection and identification of nuclear, chemical and biological presence.

Decontamination of victims and personnel at the scene is also a responsibility of responding fire fighters. The ability to communicate effectively over radio frequencies is another significant part of this command and control of functions. And the final part to this whole equation is the personnel resources to carry out the necessary tasks.

The State of Connecticut recently received approximately \$2.6 million in total for fiscal year 1999, 2000, and 2001 from DOJ to purchase domestic preparedness equipment and distribute it to first responders. This is being brought in in-state and coordinated with the Military Department. The State's objective in the initial distribution is to provide local first responders in the identified First Priority Jurisdictions with standardized equipment. The First Priority Jurisdictions include the five largest cities over 100,000, and eastern Connecticut as well as other site specific institutions and State agencies. The fire services in these jurisdictions are scheduled to receive approximately \$1.2 million of this equipment. DOJ approved the spending plans around January 1st. Although the programs are moving forward and more than \$3 million is expected in the next—in funding in the next fiscal year, 2002, only minimal amounts of the equipment have actually been delivered to the receiving agencies. However, I am pleased to announce that this morning we received our first shipment of PPE.

With that mentioned, I still believe that there are some flaws in the system. One problem is that a comprehensive program for the procurement, distribution and maintenance of the equipment has been left unfunded. Additionally, the equipment being purchased may not include maintenance contracts. There will be no quality assurance that once this equipment is distributed, it will be maintained and/or upgraded as needed.

But perhaps the most glaring deficiency in the program is the lack of associated training dollars. Our fire fighters are soon to be handed special chemical protective clothing, advanced electronic metering equipment, decontamination trailers and radio systems with many of them having no training other than the owner's manual. This is not only dangerous to our responding personnel, but to the public we are looking to protect. Support must be given to local municipalities in order to achieve this training initiative.

Although a major nationwide program to train personnel has been underway, no city in the State of Connecticut met the minimum population requirements to be included. The funding for these trainer-to-trainer courses had been established by Congress through the Nunn/Lugar/Domenici Amendment to the 1997 Defense Authorization Act. This is a program that had been run by DOD and DOJ, known initially as the 120 Cities Program.

Through the resourcefulness of one of our officers, the Stamford Fire and Rescue Department was able to send a few trainers to the program held at Yonkers, New York. We received this training in May 2000 and subsequently presented the Domestic Preparedness Training Program to our line fire fighting personnel in 2001.

Also in 2001, our department began to access the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium through FEMA, DOJ and DOE, which provides specialized training in WMD response at different sites throughout the country. Pre-September 11th and since September 11th, we have sent officers and fire fighters to the COBRA-WMD Hazardous Materials Technician and Incident Command courses at Fort McClellan in Anniston, Alabama, the Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings course at New Mexico Tech in Socorro, New Mexico, and the WMD Radiological Technician course at Bechtel in Mercury, Nevada. Having participated in all of these programs, I can say that it is some of the most well organized and presented training that I have attended in my fire service career.

After the October anthrax attacks, our city, region and the entire Nation was inundated with what I'll refer to as white powder calls. This truly tested the ability of fire, police, health and environmental services to work together on a local, State, and Federal level. I can honestly say that I have never worked closer with our local police department on any other effort. With written guidelines established on the spot, I believe we handled scores of incidents with the utmost of professionalism. We ran inter-agency training for awareness and operations and we improved upon recognized deficiencies. This was developed through our previous Domestic Preparedness templates and regularly updated recommendations from the CDC, FBI and DEP. The cost of these responses and training were borne by the local municipalities.

Here in Connecticut the current emergency response plans don't speak enough to regionalization of specialized services. This is a clear disadvantage to the lack of a county form of government. One positive example of a regionalized service is the Fairfield County Hazardous Materials Response Team. This is an effort of 13 communities in the southwestern part of the State that have pooled resources for response to hazardous materials emergencies. This team serves a population greater than 500,000 people and includes two of the State's largest cities, Bridgeport and Stamford.

The Department of Homeland Security should ensure that first responders are recognized as a focal point. Local, State and Federal politicians were eager to come to the fire fighter's side after September 11th and say we support you 100 percent, and whatever you need to accomplish your task will be provided. Those promises lasted until election day when suddenly fiscal constraints changed the tune of many at the State and local level. We soon found ourselves back to the same arguments, threats of reduction of personnel, closing of companies, lack of adequate training dollars, and contract negotiation impasses.

Words are not enough. What we need is action, long-term support, adequate staffing, maintained equipment, and continued training. We are being asked to put our lives on the line every day when we leave our families to work. We're asking for your support so that we can have a greater chance of returning to them at the end of that day.

I thank you for your time.

[The prepared statement of Captain Newman follows:]

Testimony before the United States Congress
House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations

Field Hearing on *Homeland Security: Keeping First Responders First*
Norwalk Community College
Norwalk, Connecticut

Statement of Paul R. Newman

Fire Captain, Stamford Fire and Rescue Department

Stamford Firefighters Local 786, IAFF
Uniformed Professional Firefighters of Connecticut

July 30, 2002

Introduction

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. My name is Paul R. Newman and I am a Fire Captain and Hazardous Materials Officer with the Stamford Fire and Rescue Department. On behalf of the Officers and Members of Stamford Firefighters Local 786, the International Association of Firefighters, and the nearly 4,500 Uniformed Professional Firefighters in the State of Connecticut, I thank you for the opportunity to give testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations.

As tragically witnessed through the events of September 11, 2001, our nations Firefighters, Police Officers and Emergency Medical Service providers are on the front line in the war against terrorism. In most jurisdictions across the country, the local Fire Service has been, and remains, the first response agency tasked with command and operations of consequence management at natural or manmade disasters. These disasters include building fires, structural collapses, explosions, hazardous materials releases, and transportation crashes. Many involve mass casualties. The First Responders need to have sufficient resources and adequate training to effectively accomplish their responsibilities as the first minutes and hours of an incident unfolds.



The current terrorist threats we face include biological, nuclear, incendiary, chemical or explosive means to destruction and injury. Coupled with these conventional and unconventional methods, is the realization that secondary means of destruction do exist, and are often intended to kill or injure the First Responders. Therefore, it is a paramount concern that these would-be Rescuers, including local firefighters, are informed of, and adequately protected from, all potential hazards.

EFFECTIVENESS OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS TO EQUIP AND TRAIN FIRST RESPONDERS.

Equipment

As a line company officer, often times my unit is the first to arrive at an emergency scene. Depending upon how the scene and victims present, myself and the firefighters I work with must first have the appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) including the right clothing and respiratory protection to approach the scene and affect rescues. Without this clothing, we stand a chance of becoming part of the of the rescue problem. Although signs and symptoms presented by victims will indicate hazards and help to identify potential agents, metering and monitoring equipment is needed to aid in detection and identification of nuclear, chemical and biological presence. Most fire departments have metering equipment for flammable vapors and oxygen deficiencies, but more sophisticated instruments are needed to determine radioactivity and toxic products such as chemical warfare agents. Decontamination at the scene is also a responsibility of responding firefighting units. Having adequate equipment such as water heaters and shower facilities assist with this task. The ability to communicate effectively over radio frequencies is a significant part of command and control of these functions. And the fifth part to this equation is the personnel resources to carry out the necessary tasks. A hazardous materials call where personnel are required to make entry into a "hot zone" can require a minimum of 15 people with 7 of those people being trained to the technician level. This is just to put two people in to the hazardous area and decontaminate them upon exit. It does not factor in a mass casualty situation where personnel numbers increase exponentially.

As far as federal programs to equip first responders go, I wish to commend the members of Congress for their continued support of the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program through FEMA, also known as the Fire Act. This has enabled local fire services throughout the country to purchase up-to-date equipment and provide much needed training to their personnel. Such federal grant funding has long been afforded to local Police Services and I look forward to your continued support of your local Fire Services in this initiative.

The State of Connecticut received approximately \$2.6 million in total for FY99, FY00, and FY01 to purchase Domestic Preparedness Equipment and distribute it to First Responders. These Domestic Preparedness Equipment grants have been provided through the U.S. Department of Justice and coordinated in-state through the Connecticut Military Department. The State's objective in the initial distribution is to provide local first responders in the identified First Priority Jurisdictions with standardized personal protective, detection, decontamination and communications equipment. The First Priority Jurisdictions include the 5 cities over 100,000 population (Bridgeport, Hartford, New Haven, Stamford, Waterbury) and the eastern Connecticut region (Groton, New London), as well as other site specific institutions and State agencies. The Fire Services in these jurisdictions are scheduled to receive approximately \$1.2 million of this equipment. However, after DOJ approval of the spending plans around January 1, only minimal amounts of the equipment have actually been delivered to the receiving agencies. Most importantly, the minimal amount of equipment that has arrived does not include responder's personal protective equipment.

With all of these recipients in the first rounds of funding, it is difficult to completely outfit any one jurisdiction or agency with a full complement of equipment needed for potential scenarios. These organizations will, in no way, be receiving enough equipment to be fully ready for a large scale or long duration event. The intent behind the initial funding was to provide each on-duty first responder with the appropriate personal protective ensemble, provide each community with at least one detection equipment package for chemical and nuclear agents, provide each community with one scene based (mobile) decontamination unit and one hospital based decontamination unit, and begin to establish an interoperability communication system.

I believe that a good effort was made to begin this process of outfitting our first responders, but there remain some flaws in the system. A significant part of the problem has been that a comprehensive program for the procurement, distribution and maintenance of equipment has been left unfunded. Additionally, the equipment being purchased will not, in most cases, include maintenance contracts. Much of the detection equipment needs annual servicing to maintain accuracy. Will it be maintained and/or upgraded as needed? With cut-to-the bone local budgets, equipment maintenance may very well suffer. Much of the personal protective equipment being purchased will have shelf-lives. At the end of 5 years when a \$1,000.00 chemical protective suit has to be replaced, who will bear the cost? There will be no quality assurance that once the equipment is distributed. An ongoing program to maintain this equipment and keep stock levels up is needed. But, perhaps, the most glaring deficiency in the program is the lack of associated training dollars.

Training

Our Firefighters are soon to be handed special chemical protective clothing, advanced electronic metering equipment, decontamination trailers and radio systems with many of

them having no training other than the owner's manual. This is not only dangerous to our response personnel, but to the public that we are looking to protect. Support must be given to local municipalities in order to achieve this training initiative.

Prior to 9/11, work had begun on terrorism preparedness at the local level. The recognition of potential incidents, and some agency dependent training and equipment purchasing was taking place. Here in Connecticut, and specifically in Stamford, an effort was underway to improve our WMD response capability with limited State or Federal support.

Although programs were underway nationwide to train and equip local personnel, no city in the State of Connecticut met the minimum population requirements to be included. Funding for train-the-trainer courses had been established by Congress through the Nunn/Lugar/Domenici Amendment to the 1997 Defense Authorization Act. First the Department of Defense (DOD), then the Department of Justice (DOJ) ran what was known as the 120 cities program. Through the resourcefulness of one of our Officers, Captain John Conte, the Stamford Fire and Rescue Department was able to send a few trainers to the program held at Yonkers, NY. We received this training in May of 2000 and subsequently presented the Domestic Preparedness Training Program - Responder Awareness and Operations Course to our line firefighting personnel in 2001 prior to 9/11. The Stamford Fire and Rescue Department bore the training costs of implementing this program. I believe that we were the only Fire Department in the State to access the program up to that point.

Although total population was the criterion used to determine the initial training priorities of all these programs, specifically the 120 cities project, population density and proximity to major metropolitan areas was often overlooked. The fact that Connecticut does not have organized regional governments and relies on home-rule in 169 different jurisdictions also hampers the communities in this state from benefiting in some of this training. The "120 Cities" Domestic Preparedness Program has still not come to our state.

Also, in 2000, our department began to access the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium through FEMA, DOJ and DOE which provides specialized training in WMD response at different sites throughout the country. Pre-9/11 and since 9/11 we have sent Officers and Firefighters to the COBRA-WMD Hazardous Materials Technician and Incident Command Courses at Fort McClellan in Anniston, AL, the Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings Course at New Mexico Tech in Socorro, NM, and the WMD Radiological Technician Course at Bechtel in Mercury, NV. Having participated in all of these programs, I can say that it is some of the most well organized and presented training that I have attended in my fire service career.

Other Federal training dollars remain difficult for us to access at the local level in the State of Connecticut. Well prior to 9/11, the Fairfield County Hazardous Materials Response Team has been requesting State assistance in running a Hazardous Materials Technician Course for our personnel. The Fairfield County Hazardous Materials Technician Team is comprised of Hazmat Technician and Specialist level personnel from 13 communities in Southern Fairfield County. The population of the response area covered by this group is over 500,000 people and includes Bridgeport and Stamford, two of the 5 largest cities in the state. The team responds regionally to Hazardous Materials Incidents, which include WMD-Chemical, Nuclear, and Biological incidents in those communities. Training dollars for Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness filter through the State Emergency Response Commission (run by The State of Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection) to the Connecticut Fire Academy (run by the Office of Fire Prevention and Control). Local jurisdictions cannot access this money directly. Subsequent to 9/11 it became evident that the Director of Training at the Connecticut Fire Academy was not going to assist us in running this class to increase our response personnel. The team, through pooled resources of the 13 local communities developed its own 120-hour Technician Certification program and implemented it this spring without assistance from State or Federal funding.

ADEQUACY OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS WITH REGARD TO INCIDENTS INVOLVING RELEASE OF NUCLEAR, RADIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL MATERIAL

Response Plans

Here in Connecticut, current emergency response plans don't speak enough to regionalization of specialized services. This is a clear disadvantage to the lack of a county form of government. One example of a regionalized service is the Fairfield County Hazardous Materials Response Team. This is an effort of 13 communities in the southwestern part of the State that have pooled resources for response to hazardous materials emergencies. The team serves a population greater than 500,000 people and includes two of the State's largest cities, Bridgeport and Stamford. Apparently, efforts are now underway at the state level to regionalize response capabilities. This is a move that is long overdue. Without State and Federal support, such groups rely solely on the ability of member towns and cities to fund the costs. Any one municipality can decide not to participate and the necessary funding to run the organization could be jeopardized. A State/Federal funded regional system would be a more effective and secure approach.

Anthrax Responses

After the October anthrax attacks, our city, region and the entire nation was inundated with what I'll refer to as "White Powder Calls". This truly tested the ability of fire, police, health and environmental services to work together on the local, state, and federal level. I can honestly say that I have never worked closer with our local police department

on any other effort. With written guidelines established “on the spot”, I believe we handled scores of incidents with the utmost of professionalism. We ran inter-agency training for awareness and operations at such events and we improved upon recognized deficiencies. This was developed through our previous Domestic Preparedness templates and regularly updated recommendations from the CDC, FBI and DEP.

The train of thought on biological incidents was that emergency or first response personnel would have limited knowledge that an incident was taking place. With incubation periods of days to weeks, a “First Responder” emergency response to an acute outbreak was questionable. It would be incumbent upon the health care workers (doctors, hospitals and health departments) to recognize that outbreaks were taking place. In fact, that is how the actual cases presented, but the ensuing panic that swept the nation became our emergency response problem. Clear guidelines for response to such incidents delineating roles and responsibilities were created as the incidents happened. They need to be reviewed on a regular basis to establish effectiveness.

Department of Homeland Security

A Department of Homeland Security should ensure that first responders are recognized as a focal point. Politicians – local, state, and federal – were eager to come to the firefighters side after 9/11 and say we support you 100%, and whatever you need to accomplish your task will be provided. Those promises lasted until election-day when, suddenly, the reality of fiscal situations changed the tune of many at the state and local level. We soon found ourselves back to the same fights – threats of reduction of personnel, closing of companies, lack of adequate training dollars. In Stamford, for example, firefighters are at an impasse in Contract Negotiations for a contract that should have been settled over a year ago.

Words are not enough. What we need to be secured is long term support for adequate staffing, maintained equipment, and continued training. We are being asked to put our lives on the line every day that we leave our families for work. We are asking you for your support, so that we can have a greater chance of returning to them at the end of that day.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for inviting me to testify today. I am happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Mr. Docimo. Sorry. I pronounced it Docimo. I apologize. You've been to my office and I appreciate your visits. This is one of the reasons why we had this hearing.

**STATEMENT OF FRANK DOCIMO, SPECIAL OPERATIONS
OFFICER, TURN OF RIVER FIRE DEPARTMENT**

Mr. DOCIMO. Well, thank you. If you're looking on your schedule, I'm the speaker to be announced.

When you decide in your committee where you're going to put dollars, take a look at me. I am the first responder. I don't wear gold badges or slash marks. I come from a combination department in the city of Stamford that has 17 paid and the rest volunteers. So I'm going to address some of those issues.

I want to just go over a couple of my credentials because one of the issues I think you need to understand is who you're getting your information from.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just say we don't want to spend time on—you are well credentialed.

Mr. DOCIMO. OK.

Mr. SHAYS. So we'll pass that by.

Mr. DOCIMO. Very good.

The point to be made here is that I've been in hazardous materials since 1989 and have spoken in front of the Connecticut legislature in 1989 and now all of a sudden we've got people with 1 or 2 years of experience telling us where to spend our money and what's best for this country. I will tell you that we are messed up in some of our issues.

On the morning of September 11th it did not matter in our State whether we had any HazMat response teams, which we have none and I'll address that issue later. We have no USAR teams, nor do we have an awful lot of Federal funding. Well, that morning it didn't matter. What New York City needed was bodies. They needed us to support them, which has never happened in this country's history.

When it moved, which was very quickly, within an hour or two, my unit, which is a heavy-duty rescue unit, was the only rescue unit for 25 miles because big cities like Stamford, Bridgeport, Fairfield, and Westport jumped down to help the brothers in New York. Yet my little department had to kind of pick up the slack.

We had no air-monitoring equipment. Your committees talk about what equipment to buy. I can train you externally. One of my specialties is air-monitoring. I literally went home, took the gas detection devices out of my training cache and gave it to the downtown city fire department so we could operate. That is a tremendous issue.

Simple things like gloves and masks. And I'll tell you what, here's a little commercial, Home Depot right up the road was tremendous in giving us the things we needed that morning.

Over 1 million lines of communications were disrupted when the towers went down. When we talk about communications, I've got an issue that I'll bring back up. The bottom line is on September 11th they needed help.

Hours after the attack our hospitals were on full-time mode. The local water supplies were being paroled. The fire stations were

bare. These things we call terrorism task force groups, which are basically some paramedics and HazMat guys, and I was responsible for the north part of that district. I was involved in what the Department of Justice calls the terrorist task force or the tactical considerations. I was one of five expert—they're called expert trainers to develop that program.

About 3 weeks after the event we were called by the Department of Justice with a question, and this is a question that I'll have to live with the rest of my life. Did we fail as emergency responders to see the forest from the trees. What are some of the points? First response to Connecticut in emergencies such as chemical, biological and radiological events, we're as dysfunctional as the Osborne family, and I'm here to tell you that.

In 1989 I spoke in front of the Connecticut legislators on regional HazMat teams. Back then the career chiefs could not get together with the volunteer chiefs. So we still do not have regional HazMat teams in this county. Unionized fire department—which I am. I'm a union fire fighter. They call volunteer fire departments rival organizations. How do we accomplish this task of making sure the first responders can do their job if we won't even talk. Who is representing the 75 percent of the fire service that are volunteers?

Did we fail to train? You talk about training? In 1989 OSHA passed legislation that said police, fire fighters and EMS responders would be trained. Yet simply those people simply just didn't do it. The police departments in 1989 were dictating to have various training. Hospitals in 1992. There's actually an OSHA question that was asked and answered says that you have to train at the operation level.

Because of the dollars, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, MPA, National Fire Academy, everybody's fighting for the dollar. What we ought to do in a training initiative is get the best in the country to come together and write one program that everybody can use instead of everybody trying to do their own little gig. The 120 cities that were given the money, that was political. It had nothing to do with exposures or needs. It was political. That's where those cities got their dollars from.

Did we fail to equip? A few cities got an awful lot of dollars. They purchased a lot of equipment. You know what they didn't get? They bought hardware and they bought no software. They were given \$300,000. I will tell you that it's a \$299,999.99 question. You see, they bought equipment that would not help them one iota, but because they got the money to spend, they weren't giving you guys back a nickel.

There's an approved equipment list. The approved equipment list was put together in 1998, and yet we're still purchasing equipment off of that. Now, how would you like for your company to—if I said your company is finally getting a computer, but you got to buy computers with technology in 1998. We need to address that issue.

There's a device called a gastramastricostromy (ph). If you read the fine print, it says dumb firemen shouldn't buy this. Yet Montgomery Fire Department bought it because they have the money and 15 miles away Fairfax, Virginia bought one because if the Joneses got one, then the Smiths have got to have one. That kind of stuff needs to stop.

I was involved in Toledo, Ohio doing some training. They bought the equipment. Seven months later I went to train them. I had to cancel the class because nobody even took the stuff out of the boxes to charge the batteries or to see if they got what they paid for. The government is not supplying any money to maintain that equipment. So we're going to have an awful lot of equipment that is simply just going to sit there.

Communications? How can I talk to somebody on the moon, yet I can't talk to my brother or sister fire fighter behind me. We need to address the communication issue full on.

Radiological? The government used to sponsor a radiological program. They pulled that program off. The cold water's warm. A little fire department like Turn of River Fire Department had to spend \$1,700 of our own dollars to buy radiological equipment because of the threat of a germ bomb.

In closing I'll leave you with a couple of thoughts. There's an awful lot of issues on who's a first responder. You want to know who a first responder is? I'll tell you what I've been saying all over this country. You all saw the movie Top Gun. The last thing in Top Gun was the nips were coming in. They launched a couple of planes. The report was there's two of them, there's four of them, no, there's eight of them. The captain in that ship said launch me some more fighters. The report down on the flight deck was we can't do it. The catapult is jammed. The captain asks how long will it take to unjam? From the flight deck he was told 15 minutes. The captain said in 15 minutes it will be over. On September 11th it was over before we knew what hit us.

As you look at some of the things as far as first responder, what I really want to say is that we need to focus on where we're going to spend our dollars. I'll leave you with one last thought. Weapons of mass destruction has taken on a whole new meaning. It is called ways of making dollars. There are people trying to sell us the one suit, the one book, the one meter on technology as recently as yesterday's bioassays were canned because of their inaccuracy.

We have to really look at what our job function is, and we need to understand that on September 11th the new war is us, police, fire and EMS. We're the people that died that morning. And unless the emphasis is put on people like me and my 17-year-old son that's a volunteer in my fire department, we'll never win this war.

Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Clarke.

STATEMENT OF PAUL CLARKE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, EMS INSTITUTE, STAMFORD HEALTH SYSTEM

Mr. CLARKE. Congressman Shays, Congressman Tierney, members of the committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to speak before you today.

My name is Paul Clarke. I'm the executive director of organizational and clinical effectiveness at Stamford Health System. Hopefully I will be able to address some of those hospital questions that came up a little bit earlier. Additionally, just for your information, I'm a licensed paramedic in the State and practice as one. So I think that I can bring some perspective to this discussion.

The fact that a representative of a local community hospital and health system is included in a field hearing that seeks input on domestic security and first responder support is, I believe, a critical step in more completely defining the term first responder. Without a Homeland Security definition of first responder that includes hospitals and health systems, I think it is difficult to imagine and plan for an appropriate response to acts of domestic terrorism, especially with regard to those acts involving the potential use of weapons of mass destruction. Ensuring the readiness of our Nation's hospitals should be considered as important as training and equipping local police, fire, EMS, emergency management and public health organizations.

While there are a great many challenges that we must still face together, it seems most prudent to continue the process of strengthening our Nation's first and most important line of defense against domestic terrorism by identifying the critical components of the first response system that would be called upon to deal with an act of domestic terrorism and then aligning in a systematic, efficient and effective manner Federal financial, subject matter, and emergency planning expertise and resources. Anything less, I believe, will likely result in a fragmented and disintegrated response capability and a resultant increase in morbidity and mortality from an act of domestic terrorism.

Community hospitals and health systems, by virtue of their mission and function, must be considered an essential part of the first response system and be supported through the allocation of financial and other support. I don't think I need to tell the members of this group anything about the financial crisis that hospitals currently face.

This perhaps somewhat unconventional definition can easily translate into a mutually beneficial relationship given the unique attributes of and resources inherent to hospitals. As was evident in New York City on September 11th and during the days and weeks that followed, first responders from the police and fire departments, EMS, emergency management, the military and the public health community worked together first to establish a continuum of care in response to the attacks. That's a continuum of patient care.

The thought of removing any of these relatively unique but complementary aspects of the response would seemingly greatly reduce the effectiveness of the actual response. It therefore seems to reason that as we look forward and plan on strengthening this most important line of defense, the Nation's front line of first response, we act collaboratively and challenge ourselves to break down barriers that are often inherent in these types of initiatives. Only then will we be able to truly move forward to realistically address what is likely the greatest challenge in emergency management planning in our history.

I think it's fair to say that I believe one of the reasons I'm here today is because we recently held an emergency management demonstration in Stamford Health System, during which time we unveiled some equipment we recently purchased. I sit next to a couple of my colleagues here and I can tell you firsthand that we've been frustrated at Stamford Health System, and I imagine the same

holds true across the State, that more has not come our way in terms of financial or equipment support since September 11th.


We have spent somewhere in the neighborhood of 100 to \$125,000 of hospital funds to purchase decontamination equipment, to purchase training from local fire fighters and instructors, and to try and bolster our front line of defense so that we had some minimal level of preparedness to handle the worst case scenario incident. It disturbs me greatly that hospitals across the country are not more adequately prepared for a weapons of mass destruction incident.

In summary, I think that the focus of this group needs to be how to best coordinate the distribution of resources, how to define the term first responder, and how then to get the resources deployed and put in place where they'll do the most good.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Clarke follows:]

Congressman Shays and members of the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations,

My name is Paul Clarke, Executive Director of Organizational & Clinical Effectives at Stamford Health System. I am currently responsible for the direction of Stamford Health System's emergency management operations functions including the oversight of planning activities to help ensure our ability to respond to an act of domestic terrorism. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee at the July 30, 2002 field hearing on *Homeland Security: Keeping First Responders First* at Norwalk Community College. The fact that the representative of a local community hospital and health system is included in a field hearing that seeks input on domestic security and first responder support is, I believe, a critical step in more completely defining the term "first responder". Without a homeland security definition of first responder that includes hospitals and health systems it is difficult to imagine an effective response to acts of domestic terrorism especially with regard to those acts involving the potential use of weapons of mass destruction. Ensuring the readiness of our nation's hospitals should be considered as important as training and equipping local police, fire, EMS, emergency management and public health organizations. While there are a great many challenges that we must still face together it seems most prudent to continue the process of strengthening our nation's first and most important line of defense against domestic terrorism by identifying the critical components of the first response system that would be called upon to deal with an act of domestic terrorism and then aligning, in a systematic, efficient and effective manner, federal financial, subject matter, and



emergency management planning expertise and resources. Anything less, I believe, will likely result in a fragmented and disintegrated response capability and a resultant increase in morbidity and mortality from an act of domestic terrorism.

Community hospitals and health systems, by virtue of their mission and function, must be considered an essential part of the first response system and be supported through the allocation of financial and other support. This perhaps somewhat unconventional definition can easily translate into a mutually beneficial relationship given the unique attributes of and resources inherent to hospitals. As was evident in New York City on September 11, and during the days and weeks that followed, first responders from the police and fire departments, EMS, emergency management, the military and the public health community worked together *first* to establish a continuum of care in response to the attacks. The thought of removing any of these relatively unique but complimentary aspects of the response would seemingly greatly reduce the effectiveness of the actual response. It therefore seems to reason that as we look forward and plan on strengthening this most important line of defense, the nation's front-line of first response, we act collaboratively and challenge ourselves to break down barriers that are often inherent in these types of initiatives. Only then will we be able to truly move forward to realistically address what is likely the greatest challenge in emergency management planning in our history

Changes in Domestic Preparedness & Emergency Management Procedures

The tragic events of September 11, 2001 demonstrated all too clearly the critical importance of emergency management planning and gave first responders much to think about in terms of new potential threats. Stamford Health System's emergency management plan was exercised on that day like no other before it. In the days and weeks that followed the Health System critiqued, reviewed, and analyzed its response. An expanded hazard vulnerability assessment was developed to take into account, among other threats, weapons of mass destruction. An overall action plan was put together to identify critical access areas such as the emergency department that would benefit the most from targeted education and training. Some of the key highlights of steps taken at Stamford Health System to more adequately prepare for an act of domestic terrorism include:

- The development of an in-house hazardous materials response team. The team is intended to serve as a "back-up" to the Health System's designated primary HazMat Team from Stamford Fire/Rescue. The Health System purchased this training and conducted it in partnership with Stamford and Greenwich EMS and the Turn of River Fire Department
- The purchase of training materials (rapid reference for the identification of chemical, biological and radiologic agents) for key patient care departments likely to be confronted with signs and symptoms of an attack
- The purchase of personal protective equipment and decontamination equipment
- The enhancement of communications capabilities in order to better ensure the Health System's ability to communicate with all local police, fire, EMS and emergency management agencies

- Participation on local and CHA based emergency preparedness planning task forces

Effectiveness of Federal Programs to Train & Equip First Responders

Stamford Health System to date has received no funding for the purchase of equipment to help better prepare the organization to respond to an act of domestic terrorism.

Recognizing the enormous responsibility the Health System has to functioning as a critical component of the first response system led to a significant investment in HazMat decontamination, personal protective equipment and training materials.

Staff from the Health System's Office of Emergency Management and HazMat Team have taken advantage of training offered through the Connecticut Hospital Association and the Connecticut Office of Emergency Management. This training has been invaluable in helping start the process of becoming aware of and conversant in the new taxonomy of domestic terrorism response planning. We look forward to additional training opportunities and to expanding the offerings to other clinical providers at the health system. Of particular value are the "train-the-trainer" types of programs that allow staff to return and transfer knowledge to other members of the health system.

Adequacy of Emergency Response Plans

The adequacy of emergency response plans remains a critical concern. There is a great deal of work that is needed to develop realistic, workable plans of action to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction and many questions about how to

integrate local response efforts with federal resources that would likely be made available to assist. Hopefully this role would be fulfilled through the Department of Homeland Defense.

Role for federal Department of Homeland Security in Supporting First Responders

The notion that a single cabinet level department would be responsible for coordinating the activities that would support first responders is as encouraging as it is potentially overwhelming. Clearly one of the potential benefits of this department could be to house under one “roof” a structure and process for the timely direction of efforts that must be undertaken by entities designated as domestic preparedness first responders. Without clear guidance and support during the process of policy and procedure development, equipment procurement, terrorism response training, logistics management planning, and interagency communication and coordination the probability for a critical system failure during the response to an actual act of domestic terrorism increases greatly. If the Department of Homeland Security can advance, as part of its mission, these foundational concepts in support of developing first responder capability then our nation will be better prepared than we currently are.

I would like to again thank you for allowing me to share some of my thoughts and ideas and a brief description of some of the activities in progress at Stamford Health System to better prepare for an act of domestic terrorism. I encourage continued communication and dialogue and sincerely hope to have an opportunity to provide additional input as you might require it in the future.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much, Mr. Clarke.
Mr. Yoder.

**STATEMENT OF ALAN YODER, EMS COORDINATOR, WESTPORT
EMS**

Mr. YODER. Congressman Shays, Congressman Tierney, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. I am Alan Yoder, EMS coordinator for Westport EMS. I also serve as the secretary to Southwest EMS Regional Council.

Through the council, shortly after September 11th, we started surveying the EMS services in our region as to what they had available for personnel, equipment and communications. We looked at what they had done on their own to prepare for this. One of the things that helped us along is that all the towns in our region do have mass casualty plans that have been in existence since the early 1980's. These plans have also been updated, the standards, to conform with the State Department of Public Health and they all follow the New England Council Plan Mass Casualty Program.

We've done many drills with these programs. We've had a chance to look and see what works and what doesn't work and update some of the packages. And based on this, we have some basic equipment in place to deal with patients, but we found that it's not adequate for the potential number of injured patients we could have at this time.

We also now see that we have to incorporate patients with respiratory problems from chemical or biological attacks that we had not done before. Previously we always considered that was for people on bomb wards and when we're ready, we'll transport them off to the hospital, but we no longer can have these patients laying flat. You need to set them up because of their respiratory injuries.

One of the things that we did as a region was look at packages that we could put together through the Regional Council to supplement towns, and that's that we would put together a package for the service to have, provide them with the initial material they would need, and a package that would be placed in all the front line vehicles so that there was protection for the crews. Even as we teach EMS crews to stay back from an incident and wait for the HazMat teams to go in and take care of it and make it safe, we know our people are going to end up in the middle of things anyway. Even if they stopped at a safe distance, contaminated patients are going to come to us, and we need to protect our crews so that they don't become the next round of victims.

We also looked at putting together regional response teams, free trailers where we could have equipment to supplement both the EMS services in the towns and the hospitals, knowing that as we start to move the patients from the field to the hospitals, it's going to start to decrease their resources as well.

As we did this review, we also reviewed our communications system. Here in Southwestern Connecticut we have Southwest Regional Communications Center. It's commonly referred to as C-Med. C-Med is what we use to provide day-to-day communications between our ambulances and the hospitals. With this system all EMS units can talk to one another. We've had this ability for many years and it allows us to have the coordination of the units on the

scene with both command and control functions and it allows us to have centralized, accurate, reliable information to coordinate with the mobile units, and we can also get an assessment of available hospital beds statewide.

The C-Med system is designed for ambulance to hospital communications. We usually don't have the ability to coordinate once we get outside the vehicles. So we do need to upgrade the system and include with that portable-to-portable communications so that once we get outside of the unit we can continue to talk. We have limited frequencies, but if the system were to be upgraded, we would also have the ability to talk on a system to both the police and fire departments in their coordination where they're still lacking and trying to put together a system.

I also serve on the Mass Casualty Committee of the New England Council for EMS. One of the recommendations that group has made to the EMS directors of all six New England States is a comprehensive data collection system. That is a real-time system starting with pre-hospital and emergency room patients so that we can start to see patient trends throughout the entire New England area rather than individual hospitals, as was mentioned by Mayor Knopp earlier.

I've also served as a training officer for 15 years of my service. I've seen a lot of programs put together for training individuals that have been very narrowly focused. As programs come together and additional training is needed for dealing with these incidents, I suggest that they consider adding these to the components of the existing Federal DOT EMS curriculum so that responders can take additional training or do refresher training as part of the regular EMS programs, reducing the need to monitor certain patients at different levels for the 3,000 providers we have in this region. They also need to take a hazardous approach and focus on day-to-day operations and make it as concise as possible.

The Regional EMS Council is receiving \$6,000 over 2 years for administrative costs associated with conducting a survey of regional capabilities, which we've already done. We will continue to update with it and add to that what municipalities have added on their own and together report on pre-hospital preparedness.


Also when it is granted, we will work with other State agencies to develop disease scenario-specific response protocols for the State. I feel that we don't need disease scenario-specific responses. We need to have easy to follow response protocols that are similar to day-to-day responses and will work far better than something that's specific to a particular incident. EMS responders must approach all EMS calls with added trepidation and concern for their own safety, whether from terrorists or accidental cause. We don't need different programs, but ones that follow basic guidelines that are easily adapted to the local available resources.

I believe that the grants programs received for Federal funds need to be simplified. We're spending far too much money on administrative costs, thereby reducing the funds that are available to the local responders. With staff from both State and local agencies being shifted to complete applications, they're being taken away from their daily functions. This has also had an impact on the local responders because the routine business is falling between the

cracks and it can start to injure our patients the same as a terrorist attack. Whatever we do, we need to focus on the care of our personnel and the care that is provided to our patients.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yoder follows:]



What Do The Services Need?

Congressman Shays and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you this afternoon. My name is Alan Yoder. I serve as the Secretary to Southwest Connecticut EMS Council and I am the EMS Coordinator for Westport EMS.

In the months following September 11, members of the Southwest EMS Council met to review our state of readiness for terrorist threats. We prepared a survey of ambulance providers in our region which provided us with an updated inventory of mass casualty equipment,

personnel and communication abilities.

We did have an advantage when we started our review, as all towns in our region have had mass casualty plans since the early 1980's. All of these plans were updated in the mid 1990's to conform with State Department of Public Health approved guidelines. The plans also follow the New England Council for EMS Mass Casualty program.

Drills

As part of this planning we held mass casualty drills throughout the region. While most were planned on the local level, many grew into full regional exercises involving both local and state resources for incident management. Reviews were conducted following the drills, but unfortunately, little change took place. Many of the problems that have been published recently regarding the response in New York City are not surprising. The same problems would exist almost anywhere. Responders do best at what they do, day in and day out. When the game plan changes and it is necessary to work with other agencies, we do not play well. All of our services are built on strong leaders, and that's what we need. When an emergency occurs and there is a need to restore public order, we respond. That takes strong leaders. When there is a need for multiple agencies to work together, especially crossing local, state and federal lines, there are inevitable problems.


Other Events

The council looked at other events that have taken place, both actual and drills, to determine the need in our area. We know that with our proximity to New York, as well as the potential threat in our own area, we needed to update the mass casualty planning that had already taken place.

There are 169 towns in the State of Connecticut; fourteen constitute the Southwest Region. Our population base of 661,163 is 20% of the state. Our services are responsible for covering not only their cities and towns, but Interstate 95, the Merritt Parkway, Metro North, and Amtrak's northeast corridor. We also have shoreline communities, with both commercial shipping and fishing, as well as recreational boating. Bridgeport Airport, while not currently serviced by commercial airlines, does have a large number of private flights each day, and Westchester Airport, while not in our region, does border it. Southwestern Connecticut is also on the approach routes for both Kennedy and LaGuardia airports.

With all of this potential for incidents, and with what we have learned from actual events and drills, the Southwest region has recommended that the basic mass casualty equipment and supplies for each of its services be updated.

Testimony of Alan Yoder, SWEMS Council



Supplies & Equipment

EMS services in our region do have the most basic equipment needed for a mass casualty incident. This is based on a regional list that was created many years ago. In our work last fall, we updated this list and broke it down into several areas:

Service package – equipment each service should have available for use in its town or when responding to other towns.

Response unit package – personnel protective equipment on each responding unit for that crew, plus mass casualty triage supplies.

Regional units – 3 additional mass casualty units with equipment and supplies to supplement the local services and hospitals.

Additional Equipment Needs

Updated equipment package for each Town/Service cost \$ 13,413 per service.

The original equipment list was based on incidents creating large numbers of trauma patients. The updated list enhanced our ability to respond to this type of incident, and now includes the ability to treat medical patients with respiratory and other problems resulting from a potential biological or chemical terrorism incident. One of the major changes between a trauma patient and one with respiratory complaints is the need to sit them up. Until now the EMS standard was to place all patients who needed transport flat on long spine boards in order to stabilize neck and back injuries. Patients suffering from shortness of breath cannot and will not lie on their backs, therefore, we now need to have large numbers of folding cots that will allow patients to sit up.

Response Unit Equipment

Personnel Safety Equipment & Mass Casualty Equipment for each EMS unit, \$2,588 per unit

We instruct EMS personnel to stay back from an incident. But, most of the time, the first responding units will end up in the middle of things. Even if they stop at a safe distance, they are sure to be inundated by contaminated ambulatory patients. These first responding crews must have basic equipment to protect themselves.

Additionally, each responding EMS unit should have a basic mass casualty response kit and supplies identifying the responders in order to begin triaging patients.

Regional Response Units

Three Regional trailers can supplement all Towns and Hospitals in a mass casualty incident, for a total of \$510,513

With the diversity of potential incidents and the possibility of several thousand patients, we identified the need for three regional response trailers that can be shared by all the towns and hospitals in the region. These units would be located throughout the region and utilized either at the scene or at receiving hospitals, providing additional supplies and equipment.

Totals

Service package \$214,900
Response unit package \$237,259
Regional units \$510,513
Total \$962,672

As you can see, we have taken the approach of regional response, thereby reducing the duplication between responders and providing the appropriate initial response. This proposal was presented to the chief elected officials from our region on November 15, 2001, and a copy was also provided to the state EMS office. Limited funding from the first year Department of Justice funding provided the EMS services in Stamford and Bridgeport "Class 3" personnel protective equipment for a total of 59 responders. On a statewide basis only 3.1% of this money went to EMS services. To date, no other local EMS service in our region has received, or is in line to receive, any federal or state funding.

Emergency Communications Center

Included in our review was the regional communication system operated by the Southwestern Regional Communications Center, commonly referred to as C-Med. C-Med provides the day-to-day communications link between EMS personnel and the hospital emergency departments. C-Med's board of directors are appointed by the chief elected official from the 14 municipalities in our region. The C-Med system provides EMS services with a common regional communications frequency for mutual aid and mass casualty incidents. C-Med also provides scene management and patient resources. Its ability to support the incident command structure unites all field operations during incidents.

Mass Casualty Coordination

At mass casualty or other large incidents, C-Med allows all EMS units at a scene to communicate among themselves and with central command. Further, C-Med provides:

- Communication for response & for staging areas.
- Communication at scene for command, triage, and transport services.
- Centralized, accurate, reliable, timely information to all in need.
- Coordination with mobile communications units, etc.
- An inventory of available hospital beds statewide.

On Scene

The C-Med system is designed primarily to allow ambulances to communicate with the hospitals. It is made up of mobile radios mounted in vehicles. On-scene inter-agency communication capabilities for command, treatment, and transport services does not exist. Once we leave our vehicles we lose the ability to communicate with others outside our own services. We need to add portable-to-portable and portable-to-C-Med communications capabilities to the system for operations outside the ambulance. The existing C-Med system is over 15 years old and while it has been maintained, it does have limited frequencies. Other disciplines (police & fire) try to coordinate their systems to allow for a coordinated communications, but, EMS is the only emergency service that already has all of its units on a common communications system. With an upgrade to C-Med we can provide for communications to **ALL** responding agencies for any type of incident.

Data Collection

The Mass Casualty Committee of the New England EMS Council recommended to the EMS Directors in the six New England states that an EMS information system be created. This system should be comprehensive - covering data entries for pre-hospital, emergency department and relevant inpatient hospital patient encounters;

- It must be universal - including all six New England states.
- Real time - allowing information reports and displays of summary and specific data as events are progressing.
- The EMS information system should allow for data to be collected locally and immediately be referred to the state level for analysis and sharing between states.
- Such a system must be designed to allow for EMS system status analysis.
- Information available from the EMS data collection system must project future trends that can assist in crisis management and policy making.

Training

I have served as training officer for my service for 15 years and fully appreciate the need for comprehensive training programs for all emergency personnel. I have seen training programs that are too narrow in their approach, focusing only on single problems. Currently the EMT-Basic: National Standard Curriculum provides the student with overview information on hazardous materials, incident management systems, mass casualty situations, and basic triage. As new training programs evolve, they should follow an "All Hazards" approach and should be included in the Federal DOT curriculum. We should not create additional programs that EMS services must track. There are 3,000 providers in the region. For most EMS responders, mass casualty incidents will happen only once in a career, if at all. Requiring lengthy initial and refresher training serves only to drive both volunteers and career personnel out of the business, further reducing our ability to handle this type of event. The focus for EMS personnel should be to recognize and avoid hazardous incidents until cleared, thereby reducing their exposure.


Continued Coordination

The Southwest EMS Council and the Southwestern Regional Communications Center stand ready to continue to coordinate the EMS response in lower Fairfield County. The regional EMS Council is receiving \$ 6,000 over two years for administrative costs associated with conducting a survey of regional capabilities which, as you have heard, was done even before we were asked. With this new survey we will update what we have already done, adding to it what local communities have done to protect their responders and citizens. A report will be prepared to identify shortcomings in pre-hospital/EMS preparedness. With this information we will work with the State Department of Public Health, Office of Emergency Medical Service, Connecticut Hospital Association and the Hospital Centers of Excellence on the development of disease/scenario- specific response protocols for the State of Connecticut.

Statewide Policies/Procedures

We need standardized programs to provide universal direction that is easy to follow, not disease/scenario-specific response protocols. The more closely we align with day-to-day operations, the more likely they will be followed at mass casualty incidents. EMS responders must now approach all EMS calls with added trepidation and concern for their own safety, whether from terrorism or accidental causes. Patients who are injured or sick in Connecticut are the same as patients elsewhere. We do not need different programs, but ones that follow basic guidelines and are easily adapted to the local resources available.

I also believe the grants process for receiving federal funds needs to be simplified. We are spending far too much grant money on administrative costs, thereby reducing the funds available for local responders. With staff from both state and local agencies being shifted to complete applications, they are being taken away from their daily functions, which has an impact on local responders. Routine business is falling between the cracks and that can be just as damaging to our patients as an terrorist attack. **Whatever we do, it must protect our crews and improve the care for the patient.**



I hope I have been able to provide the information you are looking for.

THANK YOU!

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Yoder.

We're going to start out with Mr. Tierney. He can have as much time as he'd like and then I will invite my colleagues to ask some questions. We're going to try to have those questions collectively not take as long because we do want to get to our third panel before Mr. Tierney finds himself on an airplane.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you all for your testimony, and I don't have as many questions as you might imagine because I think you've been pretty precise and clear about what the priorities are, what the problems are, and what some of the solutions may be.

But, Mr. Yoder, I did want to ask you a little bit about—you were talking about the complexity of Federal applications for some of the first responder money. Are you sure that you're distinguishing between the Federal aspect of those and the State requirements and how would you size up—

Mr. YODER. My experience is limited. I know that actually the EMS director was finally included in this plan. It was done at the State level, and that we really lost him for about 2 months even with the EMS system at the State level because he and several of his staff people were working on applications I believe for a couple of human services. So that's where we're losing people that usually work with us as they're working on these other grants.

Mr. TIERNEY. For anybody that can answer this, I would be curious to know how Connecticut deals with this situation. What is the State plan right now in Connecticut in terms of dealing with a response that's necessary and aside from that, does Connecticut have a separate response system set up for biochemical matters or is it all done in one package of everybody responds to any kind of emergency?

Chief MAGLIONE. Right at this time there is now a formal process being signed off in the last couple of weeks—in the next couple of weeks. At present we have what's called Mutual Aid Plans with our neighbors, and in Fairfield County we have a regional HazMat team that responds to that type of incident backed up by Stamford, who has a significant number of personnel that are trained and/or other local teams in the State.

However, on a statewide disaster response, that plan is being put together and the State is being broken down into sections with a coordinator and if specific needs are requested, a task force will be assembled. The goal is to be able to move 1,000 fire fighters within 1 hour to where they're needed. That's the goal. I don't know if that's pie in the sky. I mean, considering we're a very small State and if we do not self-respond with the clogged highways, I think that is something we need to accomplish.

Mr. TIERNEY. How far are you from that plan?

Chief MAGLIONE. My understanding is that we're within 2 weeks, 3 weeks.

Mr. TIERNEY. Following up with you, Chief, and, Captain Newman, we talked a little bit during the break. Where do you currently get your training for fire fighter response?

Chief MAGLIONE. Well, in Bridgeport we train in-house. We also contract out with the State of Connecticut to supply us trainers in certain areas, and there may be other outside organizations that we contract with.

Mr. NEWMAN. In Stamford we do in-house training as well. We take people off the line—

Mr. SHAYS. Move a little closer.

Mr. NEWMAN. We take people off the line and put them in a training division for their areas of expertise that they might have and they get the information across to the fire fighters. Also attached to the Federal programs that I mentioned earlier, we had to go out and find those things. It didn't come to us.

Also in the State of Connecticut the Office of Fire Prevention Control and Fire Training Academy does have programs for us, but a lot of the Federal dollars that would come through directly to some of the communities for the specific training needs are all filtered through that organization. So unless they come down through that organization, we often don't get the money.

We recently ran a hazardous materials technician course that was funded pretty much by the 13 communities that belong to the Fairfield County HazMat group. We got no State money. We got no Federal money for that program, and that was a significant cost.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Docimo, where do you get training for your volunteers?

Mr. DOCIMO. We have in-house trainers. We'll also use some of the same resources. But like Captain Newman said, we got to hunt those down though. There's an awful lot of, you know, ceding programs out there, but you really got to almost be in that little inner circle to find out what agency has what you need in order to accomplish the task. And ours is a little more difficult because most of our staff is volunteer. We're talking about nights and weekends and holidays and those kinds of issues as opposed to, you know, moving somebody to a training division.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, let me ask all the panel on this. One of our colleagues just made a proposal that there be a Regional New England facility where first responders of all types could go. Can you roughly if I just go left to right starting with Chief Berry and right down the line and very quickly tell me what you see as the pros and cons to that type of a program.

Chief BERRY. Frankly, I think it's the way to go. And as far as Fairfield County, we work together very well. We've even looked at training involving U.S. (indiscernible) teams. So I think it's the way to go.

From the other side, the negative aspects of it, I really don't see many negative aspects of it as long as we sit down at the table and we decide what we are going to do and make proper plans, you know, to assist each other. I don't see any negative aspects of working together on a regional basis.

Mr. TIERNEY. Chief Maglione.

Chief MAGLIONE. As we spoke before, I guess we're going to go back and forth on this issue. You know, why reinvent the wheel. Most of the States in New England have their own regional training facilities, whether they be police or fire. If those places have to be updated, it's already there. Why have our members incurring costs of traveling to some distant location, thereby increasing the expense to the local communities.

Mr. SHAYS. So in other words, State by State is good enough?

Mr. MAGLIONE. As far as I'm concerned State by State (indiscernible).

Mr. TIERNEY. And I don't want to sound (indiscernible) but, Chief Berry, I'm just curious, would it be an impact to you if you had to send your people to another State within the New England region in order to get that training?

Chief BERRY. Yes, it would. We talked about overtime costs. Especially if you're talking about small communities. If I send someone out, you're definitely going to have to pay some overtime costs.

Mr. TIERNEY. So does that change your opinion about having one regional location versus a State region or—

Chief BERRY. I think it would definitely hurt us financially to have to do that. So that's—like I said, if the organizations effectively were broken down into the State and then broken down into a regional basis and then the State, I think it might be better.

Mr. TIERNEY. Maybe I wasn't clear. When I said regional, I didn't realize that you were responding to regions within the State, and I really wanted to know what your opinion was with respect to one within the region of New England. Maybe I'll get a clearer answer now that I'm making myself a little clearer. Captain?

Mr. NEWMAN. The region in New England for Stamford Fire Department I'd have to say as well as the Connecticut Fire Academy is concerned is a regional New England facility for us. It's all the way up at the top of the State. For daily type programs, a 1-day program or even 2-day programs it's a lot of trouble for us to get up there and back. You have to go up and stay there, be away from your family and things like that. I've traveled all over the country to these programs. It's tough to get away from your family. And it is a financial burden to the local communities to pay for these things as well. But as the Chief mentioned, the facilities exist in the various States. Having the instructors be able to go to those facilities might be a better way to go.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Docimo.

Mr. DOCIMO. Yeah, I think it's almost like a real estate question. Location, location, location. Like the captain even said, to go from Stamford to Hartford, we don't utilize that facility because of that. What you may want to look at if you're going to do that in the regional centers is to deliver the high level of training that we can't get in the localized areas, specialized training like the Tactics Considerations Program or advanced air monitoring or the hospital's role in the WMD event. Those types of issues.

But to effect the training issue you got to bring that down as a street beat cop, fire fighter, EMS provider. So rather than doing the nickel-dime stuff where you got to truck 3 hours away, do that with a more specialized group that can afford, A, some of the heavy-duty equipment and bring in the best instructors that we possibly can. That would probably give us the most bang for the buck.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. Mr. Clarke.

Mr. CLARKE. From a hospital perspective I think it's fair to say that we are constrained by financial difficulties that would make it even more difficult to expose adequate numbers of the staff covering three shifts to train. We find it much more effective to identify and bring in local instructors such as Captain Newman and

Fire Fighter Docimo. That has been very effective. And we found in Stamford anyway, given the great number of resources and the high degree of expertise, to be a worthwhile cause to sort of partner with the local first responders.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. Mr. Yoder.

Mr. YODER. Well, if your plan was to locate the center within Westport, CT, we would be more than happy to attend. [Laughter.]

Mr. TIERNEY. It was not my plan. It was my colleague's. If it was my plan, it would be (indiscernible), but it's not.

Mr. YODER. I have a feeling it would be very crowded. I have a service of 120 volunteers and I do not have the ability to send them out to a New England regional school. I need to bring the training in to them. I can get far greater training done. I don't have the associated personnel to cross train in the class like many departments do. So I'm limited to whatever it costs to bring instructors in.

And for the most part it's interesting because in working with this volunteer service, very rarely do we ever pay to bring an instructor in. We're able to get whatever training we need on a volunteer basis because of the reputation the services have.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Gentlemen, I'm struck by the fact that we all need each other, don't we? All of you are highly dependent on the other and it's a very humbling thing to see, and I know that you all go out of your way to work closely with each other.

I want to say, Mr. Docimo, you are a colorful figure and you keep me awake, but I'm not sure I agree with one part, and maybe you just were trying to emphasize it. Your testimony is you have no HazMat units within the State of Connecticut. Maybe you need to define that.

Mr. DOCIMO. Yes. After the event in Stamford when we burned the four fire fighters, and one of the fellows that was burned was a part of my wedding party, we tried to organize a HazMat group. I was—that's 1983. It took me 14 months—

Mr. SHAYS. Just give me more direct because—

Mr. DOCIMO. Yeah.

Mr. SHAYS [continuing]. I need an answer.

Mr. DOCIMO. OK.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just say something to you. You have so much knowledge and it's hard to—but just stay right to the point.

Mr. DOCIMO. In the State of Massachusetts they run seven regional response teams. That was after an event that occurred out on the eastern shore of Massachusetts. We have no State funded, State supported HazMat teams. Hartford, CT had a team. They lost it because of funding. New Haven had a team. Lost it because of funding.

Mr. SHAYS. So there's no locally funded HazMat team?

Mr. DOCIMO. Stamford maintains it because we had the event and we burned four fire fighters. They have—

Mr. SHAYS. And let me just ask you, Captain Newman, how many is that?

Mr. NEWMAN. In Stamford we have 45—currently 45 people that we consider to be technician level trained in HazMat—

Mr. SHAYS. But they're not totally devoted to HazMat?

Mr. NEWMAN. They are fire fighters that respond—a three-unit task force and they are fire fighters, but they do HazMat as well. And then we also do—you know, I have to differ with Mr. Docimo here. We do have a regional team. I'll agree it is not State supported. It is not federally supported, but it is supported by the 13 communities that do belong to it on a regional basis.

Mr. SHAYS. And those start from where? Don't tell me all 13 but—

Mr. NEWMAN. Stamford through Stratford. Every community on the coast and basically one town up in—

Mr. SHAYS. Chief, you want to jump in on this issue?

Chief MAGLIONE. Well, I'd agree with Captain Newman. We do have a regional team and it is not funded by the State, but is funded by the communities.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, is it your recommendation, Mr. Docimo, that we need to have a State funded regional HazMat organization?

Mr. DOCIMO. In other States the only HazMat teams that really survive are State funded regional teams. I am not knocking midcounty. I am not—they were formed out of a need, which if you go to Pennsylvania or Massachusetts, you have things like standardized SOP's all over the State. You have standardized equipment lists. These guys are street fire fighters trying to do a job by getting the funding support from 13 communities. We need to look at regionalization. The key to this thing is to be able to get that resource onsite in the shortest period of time. I firmly believe that regionalized HazMat teams are the answer to the problem.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. I just wanted to understand.

Chief MAGLIONE. Mr. Chairman, may I just add one little bit?

Mr. SHAYS. Sure.

Chief MAGLIONE. I completely agree on the State funding for regional HazMat. What exists in Massachusetts right now was a Connecticut plan that was never put into effect.

Mr. DOCIMO. Because they stole it from us. Absolutely.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Yoder, is it the testimony in Westport that they have 100 HazMat suits? Is that what I'm hearing?

Mr. YODER. Through our police chief, he went out and purchased suits and respirators for each EMS and the police department.

Mr. SHAYS. And they are different—do they have different gradations of effectiveness?

Mr. YODER. I don't know. They're still in the box.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. YODER. I believe actually they were doing the training programs this morning. So they're just getting into that aspect of it.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, Stamford has 60 not in the box?

Mr. NEWMAN. Stamford has a large amount of equipment. I don't know the exact numbers, but they're Level A, B and C protection as far as personal protection ensembles. A lot of stuff is coming down through the Federal DOJ program, and in Westport—the Westport Fire Department is the base of the county HazMat. They are getting a lot of this personal protective equipment as well to supply both the fire fighters and EMS and police also.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Docimo, your testimony would be if they're still in the box, that's kind of an illustration of your point that we're not really trained yet to use them?

Mr. DOCIMO. Actually you'll violate OSHA law if you put them on. The other thing is a lot of departments are buying carbon filter type respirators, which NIOSH, which is the approving agent, will not allow in a chemical emergency. There are police departments not only in our State, but nationwide that went the cheap way out with a couple hundred dollar gas masks that the minute they put it on they violate seven OSHA laws.

Mr. NEWMAN. I'd like to add that's where this DOJ funding for all this equipment came down, especially here in the State of Connecticut. No dollars were attached for training for it. It was almost—you asked earlier about what's the priority here. All of it together is a combined effort, but unless you have the training and the personnel resources to go along with that, none of it's going to work. Not one piece of that whole puzzle is going to solve the problem.

Mr. SHAYS. You know, this is very instructive and very helpful, and you're all giving us honest answers. We're all elected officials trying to deal with this issue.

I'm eager to know, Chief Maglione, would you add anything to this point here about getting equipment and clearly knowing how to use it and to be able to train all is one package?

Chief MAGLIONE. Yeah, you asked earlier about what the priorities were, and communications and training on an equal basis are the priorities in my view. The equipment is going to flow, whether we're going to purchase it ourselves or it's going to come from some other source, but you can have all the equipment in world, but unless you go out there and train—and I mean really train, have live drills. Not what we experienced 2 years ago at the Marriott up at Trumbull, but actually get out in the fields where we have backup companies where Stratford is going to come—and I'll use this as an example. Stratford and Milton are going to come to Bridgeport or Westport is going to move into Fairfield and Fairfield is going to come—we're hoping to do that in November. It's just going to take a lot of work. But that's the kind of training that has to take place.

Mr. SHAYS. I have just one last element with health care issues. Do you have the ability to tell me if I should feel confident and Mr. Tierney and the other Members up here that the hospitals are on a daily basis providing information to the State that there is the kind of coordination we have been told there is about particular outbreaks so that we can see if, in fact, there is chemical exposure and there is biological exposure and so on?

Mr. CLARKE. I can address the issue of biological exposure. We very strictly follow CDC protocol, Center for Disease Control, and report any unusual patterns and infectious disease identification there may be.

Mr. SHAYS. But it may not be unusual to the one hospital. It becomes unusual when you notice—

Mr. CLARKE. Right. That is reported on a very regular basis up to the State. So the infectious disease (indiscernible) is right on top of that. What you should feel uncomfortable about is being in a situation where you might be exposed to a chemical or other type of characteristic agent and have to seek care in a hospital. Hospitals are generally unprepared to deal with that.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me do this. I'm going to explain to my colleagues that I want Mr. Tierney to get to the next group. I then—when he has to leave, we can still ask, all of us, that next panel, and then we're going to have people from the audience who may make comments will be able to ask questions. But I do—if there's one or two questions from any of you, let's put it on the table.

Do you have some questions you would like to ask, Mr. Duff?

Mr. DUFF. Yes. Thank you.

I just want to ask Captain Newman about the point during his testimony that towns in Connecticut didn't meet the population numbers for some of the funding for the grants, correct?

Mr. NEWMAN. Correct. Home rule here in Connecticut is it has its advantages but it has its disadvantages as well. Some of the communities that did benefit by the 120 City—the largest population I believe is 180,000 people. Some of them included counties or regional districts. We have no regional districts here. So there's a difficulty in 13 communities deciding where that population number is coming in and who is the governmental authority overseeing those 13 communities.

Mr. SHAYS. Any other member? Mr. Stone.

Mr. STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just quickly to Captain Newman or whoever would like to respond, it's my understanding that Midcounty HazMat has a far more difficult time obtaining funds because they're kind of a combination of a bunch of communities. If you were an independent fire department, for example Bridgeport, independently asking for funds or if we had a county government, it would be in a much easier position to get funding, but by the fact that we have geographical county lines but not, in fact, county government, it makes it far more difficult. Is that a true statement?

Mr. NEWMAN. I would agree with that statement, yes.

Mr. STONE. Do you have any suggestions on how it might be easier?

Mr. NEWMAN. The State right now is—I see as the only realistic approach to being able to commit dollars to regional—

Mr. SHAYS. See, that's the challenge we have. We wanted to go directly to the local communities, but somehow the State has to get involved in this. It strikes me that's the challenge that we're facing.

Mr. NEWMAN. If for whatever reason one of these 13 communities decides to pull out of the pack, the system could fall apart. And if that one community was the community that received the Federal dollars or whatever dollars, then the rest of the group could suffer from that.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Thank you.

Ms. Boucher or Senator McKinney.

Ms. BOUCHER. I'll hold them for the last panel.

Mr. SHAYS. You'll hold them for the last.

We would have other questions to ask you gentlemen. You're on the firing line and a tremendous contribution to this dialog, and I thank you, and we're going to get right to our next panel, if that's OK. So I thank you, and I'll call our next panel.

We have Daniel Craig, Regional Director, Federal Emergency Management, accompanied by Gerald McCarty, Acting Director, Office of National Preparedness; Adjutant General William Cugno,

Connecticut Military Department; Captain John Buturla, executive officer, Division of Protective Services, Connecticut Department of Public Safety; Harry Harris, bureau chief of the Connecticut Department of Transportation, accompanied by William Stoeckert, director, Highway Operations.

Gentlemen, I need to swear you in, if you would stand and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. For the record, our witnesses have responded in the affirmative.

And I do want to say that you bring a smile to my face in part that you were willing to be the third panel and to listen to panel one and two. You broke protocol, but it really is important from my standpoint that you be able to hear what was said and now your testimony is that much more valuable to us.

So we're going to go with you first, Mr. Craig, Director Craig, and then we'll go to Acting Director McCarty. Pardon me?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER. (Indiscernible).

Mr. SHAYS. Oh, I'm sorry. We're going to have one person's testimony, but then you'll participate in the whole dialog.

And then we'll go to you, General Cugno. General, I'm going to be real strict on time because you love your job so much I have to watch you closely. [Laughter.]

Then, Captain Buturla, we'll go to you and then to Harry Harris. OK? Thank you. Mr. Craig.

**STATEMENT OF DANIEL CRAIG, REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY**

Mr. CRAIG. Thank you, Chairman Shays, and Congressman Tierney. Thank you for being here.

I'm Daniel Craig, Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Region I Office in Boston. I'm pleased to be here with you today to talk about the challenges facing emergency managers and first responders.

FEMA Region I includes the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the States of New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island and Maine. Region I is home to approximately 14 million people residing in urban and rural areas. We have significant disaster activity within the region, having administered to 25 Presidential Disaster Declarations within the last 5 years. While we are vulnerable to a broad range of natural and technological hazards, our greatest threats are a result of severe weather, especially floods, and the potential for terrorist attacks.

FEMA Region I has 81 full-time employees, including 320 part-time intermittent on-call employees. The on-call employees help regional staff respond to Presidentially Declared Disasters and emergencies. Presently we have employees working in Vermont, West Virginia, Texas, Arizona and Guam, responding to the effects of a typhoon.

The regional office is located in Boston, Massachusetts. The Federal Regional Center, which serves as our Regional Operations Center, is located in Maynard, Massachusetts. The agency also maintains five identical and geographically dispersed mobile emergency response units. Ours is located in Maynard, Massachusetts.

Region I is lucky enough now to have one of those five response units.

At the Region I office we coordinate also with other FEMA regional offices, especially Region II in New York, which covers New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island and (indiscernible). The directors of all ten regions meet monthly to ensure regional coordination and communication, and our staffs work together on all types of training, exercises, disaster response and recovery programs.

Immediately following the World Trade Center disaster, Region I was in direct support with FEMA Region II. The Regional Operations Center in Maynard, Massachusetts was operational within a couple of hours and Federal resources required at the disaster location were originally coordinated through our facility in Maynard. Not only do we coordinate with other FEMA regions, but we also coordinate with other Federal agencies involved in the Federal Response Plan.

Under the Federal Response Plan, FEMA coordinates a disaster response that involves up to 27 Federal agencies and 12 emergency support functions. Each of the 12 emergency support functions is led by a Federal agency both nationally and in the local regions. In the past 10 years the Federal Response Plan has been used to respond to the Northridge earthquake, Hurricane Floyd, the bombing of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City and the disaster of September 11th.

In order to maintain our readiness and coordination for large-scale disasters, including acts of terrorism, regional Federal agencies regulate and exercise a response plan. FEMA Region I meets quarterly with the Regional Inter-agency Steering Committee to share plan efforts, exercise preparedness and responsiveness. The risk is a group of Federal agencies in New England who work together during the emergency response to both natural and man-made disasters. At FEMA Region I we also work closely with New England States, especially here in Connecticut, for preparedness for all disasters man-made or natural.

One way we assist the States is the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program or the REP Program, which includes planning, exercises and training. This programs ensures offsite emergency plans and preparedness activities are in place and can be implemented to protect the health and safety of the public living in a city of commercial nuclear power plant. Staff review and evaluate offsite emergency response plans developed by State and local governments. These plans after implementation and determined to be adequate, are sent through special reports to the U.S. Regulatory Commission for their approval.

FEMA Region I currently has four operating commercial nuclear power plants; Seabrook Station in New Hampshire, Pilgrim Station in Massachusetts, Millstone here in Connecticut, and (indiscernible).

Through the years of working with other States we have developed a strong working partnership to strengthen our response to emergencies and disasters, especially here in Connecticut with Adjutant General Cugno, the State Emergency Management Director, and the new Office of Homeland Security for the State. Our region has participated in several training and planning meetings bring-

ing together selected officials and representatives of the first responder community throughout our States.

The exercises and planning meetings provide a forum for discussions relating to first responders, planning, training, equipment, exercises, border issues, mutual aid agreements and other Homeland Security issues. A showing of its cooperation will be held in a November exercise called Operation Yankee, which will happen at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, which will include emergency managers from the Federal, State and local level of our Federal and State partners.

The State government has spent millions of dollars directly responding to Homeland Security needs, including the anthrax crisis. While much has been done, we've identified many shortfalls in our Nation's ability to respond to weapons of mass destruction. These shortfalls must be addressed. Homeland Security measures must be sustainable and will require ongoing commitment of Federal, State and local resources. This is why the President's First Responder initiative is vitally important. And you all know that a first responder is (indiscernible).

In addition to the right equipment and planning capabilities, first responders have been telling us that they need a single point of contact with the Federal Government. They need a single entity to take a lead in coordinating programs, developing standards, providing resources and training to help them respond to terrorist events. This approach builds on a collaboratively developed national strategy and not just a Federal one.

We've heard from other sources too, including the Gilmore Commission, which has pointed out that Federal Government terrorist preparedness programs are fragmented, uncoordinated and unaccountable. It has also stressed a need for a single authority for State and local terrorist preparedness support. Other independent studies and commissions have also recognized the problems created by the current uncoordinated programs. In our view, it is absolutely essential that the responsibility for pulling together and coordinating the myriad of Federal programs designed to help local and State responders and emergency managers to respond to acts of terrorism be situated in a single agency. That is why we are excited about the President's creation of the Department of Homeland Security.

Last, 10 months ago several thousand people lost their lives in the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and United Airlines Flight 91, which crashed into a rural field in Pennsylvania. 450 of them were first responders who rushed to the World Trade Center in New York City, fire fighters, police officers, Port Authority officers. These events have transformed what was an ongoing dialog about terrorism preparedness and first responder support into action. Since September 11th, our responsibilities have greatly expanded in light of the new challenges and circumstances.

Our Nation's first responders are the front line defenders, and may be required to respond to a terrorist attack, a natural disaster or a technological disaster. We know that they must be better prepared to respond to threat of terrorism and we should ensure that they have training and equipment to do so. We must take the steps to unify a fragmented system of Federal assistance that has not

served them well at all. These investments will pay dividends by enhancing our Nation's ability to respond to any emergency.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today and I'll take questions after.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Craig follows:]

Statement of
Daniel A. Craig
Regional Director
Federal Emergency Management Agency Region I
House Committee on Government Reform's
Subcommittee on National Security Field Hearing
Norwalk, CT

July 30, 2002


Introduction

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I am Daniel Craig, Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Region I. I am pleased to be with you here today to talk about the challenges facing emergency managers and first responders.

FEMA Region I includes the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the states of New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island and Maine. Region I is home to approximately 14 million people residing in urban and rural areas. We have significant disaster activity within the Region, having administered 25 Presidential Disaster Declarations within the last five years and responded to many events impacting multiple states. While we are vulnerable to a broad range of natural and technological hazards, our greatest threats are a result of severe weather, especially floods, and the potential for terrorist attack.

FEMA Region I has 81 full-time employees and 320 part-time intermittent on-call employees. The on-call employees help regional staff respond to Presidentially declared disasters and emergencies. Presently, we have workers in Vermont, West Virginia and Texas responding to severe flooding. We also have personnel in Arizona, working in the fire-related disaster, and in Guam, responding to the effects of a typhoon.

The Regional Office is located in Boston, Mass. The Federal Regional Center (FRC), which serves as our Regional Operations Center, (ROC) is located in Maynard, Mass. The ROC operates during times of emergencies and disasters, with FEMA personnel along with our other federal partners staffing this facility. The Agency also maintains mobile assets consisting of five identical and geographically dispersed Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) Detachments. One such detachment is located in Maynard adjacent to FEMA's Region I Federal Regional Center. The MERS unit supports both FEMA Region I and FEMA Region II (NY, NJ, PR and the VI). We coordinate very closely with other FEMA regions, especially Region II.



Our staffs work together on all types of exercises and disaster response and recovery programs. We were in direct support of Region II immediately following the World Trade Center disaster. Our ROC was operational and federal resources required at the disaster location were coordinated out of our facility. We also assist each other in Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) exercises, training exercises and any other emergency situation that cross both our regions. All FEMA regions have back-up regions and Region VII (IA, KS, MO, NE) is the designated back up for FEMA Region I.

Through years of working with our states we have formed strong working partnerships that strengthen our response to emergencies and disasters.

FEMA works closely with state governments to enhance planning, preparedness and response for all types of peacetime radiological emergencies, and to ensure that adequate off-site emergency plans and preparedness activities are in place and can be implemented to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of commercial nuclear power plants.

Staff review and evaluate off-site radiological emergency response plans (RERP) developed by state and local governments, evaluate exercises conducted to determine whether these plans can be implemented, determine the adequacy of off-site planning and preparedness, and submit reports to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). We also respond to requests by the NRC and coordinate the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the REP planning process.

FEMA also chairs the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which includes representatives from the NRC, Department of Transportation (DOT), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Energy (DOE) and others. Regulatory oversight, rule making and guidance are provided as necessary.

Region I currently has four operating nuclear power plants: Seabrook Station, Pilgrim Station, Millstone Station, which has two reactors, and Vermont Yankee.

Biennial exercises are conducted for each plant and each plant has a FEMA Region I Project Officer responsible for working with the states within the ten-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and the 50 mile Ingestion Planning Zone (IPZ) of each plant.

To maintain their readiness for large-scale disasters, including acts of terrorism, regional federal agencies and the states turn to the Federal Response Plan. Under the Federal Response Plan, FEMA coordinates a disaster response system that involves up to 27 federal agencies and 12 Emergency Support Functions. In the past ten years the plan has been used to respond to the Northridge Earthquake, Hurricane Floyd, the bombing of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City and September 11. Each Emergency Support Function has a lead federal agency. Regionally these Emergency Support Function agencies have been called to support FEMA in the World

Trade Center Response. Our Regional Operations Center in Maynard was in operation by 10:30 a.m. on September 11th, staffed by FEMA personnel and representatives of other federal agencies responsible for several of the Emergency Support Functions.

FEMA Region I along with other regional federal agencies and our state partners meet at least quarterly to share planning efforts, exercise preparedness and response plans. We work together during the emergency response to natural and man-made disasters.

The Region takes an active role in preparing for a response to a terrorism event. FEMA's responsibility is to coordinate federal, regional, and state terrorism-related planning, training and exercise activities. This includes supporting the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program in which four Region I communities participate, including Boston, Providence, Worcester and Springfield. We are also working with states to build response capabilities and keep them informed of federal initiatives. We participate in state-sponsored conferences, training, exercises, task forces and workshops.

The Region has participated in several training exercises and planning meetings, bringing together selected officials and representatives of the first responder community throughout our states. The exercises and planning meetings provided a forum for discussions of issues relating to first responders, funding for planning, training, equipment and exercises, border issues, mutual aid agreements and other issues pertinent to homeland security.

Each state has an anti-terrorism task force consisting of representatives from emergency management, first responders, the Attorney Generals Office, FBI and other federal law enforcement agencies along with FEMA. In Connecticut, the task force is co-chaired by Major General William Cugno and Vincent DeRosa, commissioner of public safety and Connecticut's director of homeland security. An example of this cooperation will be Operation Yankee, a full scale Region I terrorism exercise. Participants will include first responders, state and local emergency managers and other federal agencies. The exercise will be conducted over three days in November at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I.

Terrorism alerts and notifications at the present time come from both Gov Ridge's Office of Homeland Security (HS) and the FBI through the homeland security directors in Region I states. All of the states in Region I have implemented proactive and aggressive actions in response to the terrorism threats that have emerged since September 11. Many states have committed substantial amounts of staff and their own financial resources towards preparing for weapons of mass destruction events. All states have designated homeland security directors. Groundwork has been laid or accelerated to develop inter-state and intra-state mutual aid agreements. Border crossing issues are being addressed. Specialized response teams are being formed. Legislation is being enacted. Training is being conducted and equipment is being purchased.

State governments have spent millions of dollars directly responding to homeland security needs and the anthrax crisis. While much has been done, we have identified many shortfalls in our nation's ability to respond to weapons of mass destruction events. These shortfalls must be addressed. Homeland security initiatives must be sustainable, and will require an ongoing commitment of Federal, state, and local resources. This is why the President's First Responder Initiative is vitally important.

Ten months ago, several thousand people lost their lives in the terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and when United Airlines Flight 93 crashed into a field in rural Pennsylvania. Four hundred and fifty of them were first responders who rushed to the World Trade Center in New York City - firefighters, police officers, and port authority officers. These events have transformed what was an ongoing dialogue about terrorism preparedness and first responder support into action. Since September 11, our responsibilities are greatly expanded in light of the new challenges and circumstances.

The creation of FEMA's Office of National Preparedness is intended to address a long-recognized problem - the critical need that exists in this country for a central coordination point for the wide range of federal programs dealing with terrorism preparedness.

The mission and overriding objective of the Office of National Preparedness at FEMA is to help this country be prepared to respond to the consequences of acts of terrorism. Our effort has three main focuses - the First Responder Initiative, providing a central coordination point for federal preparedness programs, and Citizen Corps.

First Responder Initiative

For many years now, emergency responders and state and local governments have been telling us that they need our help so they can be better prepared to respond to the consequences of acts of terrorism. One of the most important things the agency learned from its experience responding to September 11 is the value of a strong, effective local response capability. Local first responders are the first ones there when there is a fire, accident, chemical spill, earthquake or flood. They are first on the scene when terrorists strike. They need standardized, practical, compatible equipment that works in all possible circumstances. They need our assistance in developing response plans that take into account the new challenges this country is facing. They need to practice and refine those response plans with all possible partners at the local, state and federal level.

To support first responders, The President has requested \$3.5 billion in the 2003 budget. These funds would help them plan, train, acquire needed equipment, and conduct exercises in preparation for terrorist attacks and other emergencies. Right now, we are developing a streamlined and accountable procedure that would speed the flow of funds to the first responder community.

Specifically, the funds would be used:

- To support the development of comprehensive response plans for terrorist incidents.
- To purchase equipment needed to respond effectively, including better, more interoperable communications systems.
- To provide training for responding to terrorist incidents and operating in contaminated environments.
- For coordinated, regular exercise programs to improve response capabilities, practice mutual aid and to evaluate response operations.

At this time, the House-Senate Conference Report provides funds in the FY 2002 supplemental budget to support First Responder planning, a National Mutual Aid System, interoperable communications and Citizen Corps.

FEMA has held "listening sessions" throughout the country with first responders and emergency managers at every level to solicit their ideas on the design of the grant program and process. In addition, we are working to resolve other issues critical to the success of this initiative:

- National standards for compatible, interoperable equipment for first responders and other emergency workers.
- A national mutual aid system that allows the entire response network to work together smoothly and efficiently.
- Personal protective equipment for first responders that is designed for long-term response operations and incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.
- National standards for training and exercises for incidents involving weapons of mass destruction and other means of causing death and destruction.

Department of Homeland Security

In addition to the right equipment, planning capabilities and training, first responders have been telling us that they need a single point of contact in the federal government. They need a single entity to take the lead in coordinating programs, developing standards, and providing resources and training to help them respond to terrorist events. This approach builds on a collaboratively developed national strategy and not just a federal one.

We've heard this from other sources too, The Gilmore Commission, for example, has pointed out that the federal government's terrorism preparedness programs are "fragmented, uncoordinated" and "unaccountable." It also has stressed the need for a single authority for state and local terrorism preparedness support. Other independent studies and commissions also have

recognized the problems created by the current uncoordinated approach. In our view, it is absolutely essential that the responsibility for pulling together and coordinating the myriad of federal programs designed to help local and state responders and emergency managers to respond to terrorism be situated in a single agency. That's why we are so excited about the President's calling for the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.

The functions that FEMA performs will be a key part of the mission of the new Department of Homeland Security. The new Department will strengthen our ability to carry out important activities, such as building the capacity of state and local emergency response personnel to respond to emergencies and disasters of all kinds. The new Department will administer Federal grants under the First Responder Initiative, as well as grant programs managed by the Department of Justice, the Department of Health and Human Services and FEMA.

A core part of the Department's emergency preparedness and response function will be built directly on the foundation established by FEMA. It would continue FEMA's efforts to reduce the loss of life and property and to protect our nation's institutions from all types of hazards through a comprehensive, risk-based, all-hazards emergency management program of preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. And it will continue to change the emergency management culture from one that reacts to terrorism and other disasters, to one that proactively helps communities and citizens avoid becoming victims.

The new Department of Homeland Security would address head-on the problem of fragmentation and duplication in federal terrorism training programs. And FEMA's current efforts in developing and managing a national training and evaluation system would be absorbed into the new Department. The Department would make interoperable communications a top priority just as FEMA is doing.

The structure of this newly proposed Department recognizes that FEMA's mission and core competencies are essential components of homeland security. For this reason, Congress can continue to be assured that the nation will be prepared to respond to consequences of acts of terrorism and will coordinate its efforts with the entire first responder community. In fact, FEMA's mission to lead the federal government's emergency response to terrorist attacks and natural disasters will be greatly strengthened by the new Department of Homeland Security. By bringing other federal emergency response assets (such as the Nuclear Emergency Search Teams, Radiological Emergency Response Team, Radiological Assistance Program, the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, the National Disaster Medical System, and the Metropolitan Medical Response System) together with FEMA's response capabilities, the new Department will allow for better coordination than the current situation in which response assets are separated in several Departments. The new Department will have complete responsibility and accountability for providing the federal government's emergency response and for coordinating its support with other federal entities such as the Department of Defense and the FBI.

Citizen Corps

An important component of the preparedness effort is the ability to harness the good will and enthusiasm of the country's citizens. The Citizens Corps program is part of the President's new Freedom Corps initiative. It builds on existing crime prevention, natural disaster preparedness and public health response networks. It initially will consist of participants in Community Emergency Response Teams (FEMA), Volunteers in Police Service, an expanded Neighborhood Watch Program, Operation TIPS (DOJ) and the Medical Reserve Corps, (HHS).

The initiative brings together local government, law enforcement, educational institutions, the private sector, faith-based groups and volunteers into a cohesive community resource. Citizen Corps is coordinated nationally by FEMA, which also provides training standards, general information and materials. We also will identify additional volunteer programs and initiatives that support the goals of the Corps.

Broader Challenges

In addition to our First Responder and the Citizens Corps programs, we are implementing a number of other important, related initiatives. These include:

- **Training Course Review:** We have completed an accounting of all FEMA and federal emergency and terrorism preparedness training programs and activities for Congress. The National Domestic Preparedness Office's Compendium of Federal Terrorism Training served as a baseline for the FEMA Report to Congress on Terrorism and Emergency Preparedness and Training. Currently, the Office of National Preparedness is developing a Web-accessible searchable database that contains information about federal terrorism training courses and programs.
- **Mutual Aid:** In conjunction with the First Responder Initiative, we are working to facilitate mutual aid arrangements within and among States so the nationwide local, State, Tribal, Federal and volunteer response network can operate smoothly together in all possible circumstances. This idea is to leverage existing and new assets to the maximum extent possible; this involves resource typing for emergency teams, accreditation of individuals using standardized certifications and qualifications, and equipment and communications interoperability.
- **National Exercise Program:** This National Exercise Program involves the establishment of annual objectives, a multi-year strategic exercise program, an integrated exercise schedule and national corrective actions.
- **Assessments of FEMA Regional Office Capabilities:** We are reviewing the capabilities of our Regional Offices to respond to a terrorist attack.

Conclusion

Our nation's First Responders are our frontline defenders, and may be required to respond to a terrorist attack, natural disaster, or technological disaster. We know that they must be better prepared to respond to the threat of terrorism, and we should ensure that they have the training and equipment to do so. We must also take steps to unify the fragmented system of Federal assistance that has not served them well. These investments will pay dividends by enhancing our nation's ability to respond to any emergency.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today on the efforts of the emergency management community to be better prepared to respond to acts of terrorism and to build a better, stronger, and safer America. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I noticed that you summarized some of your statement and still ran over.

And, General Cugno, I have to for the record say that he was allowed 8 minutes. So you will be allowed up to that. [Laughter.]

**STATEMENT OF ADJUTANT GENERAL WILLIAM CUGNO,
CONNECTICUT MILITARY DEPARTMENT**

General CUGNO. Thank you very much, Congressman. I appreciate the opportunity to be here. On behalf of the 6,000 men—

Mr. SHAYS. Just turn that mic to face you.

General CUGNO [continuing]. We appreciate the opportunity.

I'm going to change a little bit of my testimony. I provided you a written document for the record—

Mr. SHAYS. It will be on the record.

General CUGNO [continuing]. And I'm going to give you the abbreviated version because I'm sure it will alleviate minutes. I would like to offer a number of comments on the previous panels that came up because they addressed some of the issues that were brought up, specifically my role and responsibility as the Chair of the—

Mr. SHAYS. I'm going to request that you not talk so fast. Even though I'm limiting your time, it will be better testimony if you speak more slowly.

General CUGNO. OK. I'm concerned that there's a clear understanding of the Domestic Preparedness Steering Committee that the government has established. In a sense with the—as it relates directly to the Federal Government's application process concerning Justice Department grants, I would like to be able to respond to questions that were brought up earlier.

The Connecticut Domestic Preparedness Steering Council that I chair brings together on a regular basis the various stakeholders representing those throughout our State that have a role specifically in domestic preparedness. As I mentioned, Governor Rowland commissioned this in May 2000, and it has a primary function to be an inclusive organization. Inclusive in that we have a number of organizations that are represented from the Connecticut Hospital Association, Fire Fighters Associations and the Chief of Police Organization. In doing so, the council collectively integrates Federal resources at a State and local level. To this end, much has been accomplished to facilitate the prioritization and flow of limited resources to best deal with today's threats.

In addition, the Steering Council recently, as you heard of this afternoon, conducted a leadership symposium directed toward municipalities here in the State. Of 169 towns and communities within the State, 160 of them participated. We invited executive leadership from the towns and encouraged them to bring their emergency management officials. I'm happy to say that more than 700 Connecticut professionals participated.

The purpose was to provide local leaders with information in a printed guide on how to assess, strategize and plan for emergencies that affect their community. Specifically the document incorporated guidelines explaining how to do a risk assessment within their community, how to develop local strategy, and a sample emergency

plan and updated emergency numbers should they have to contact officials within the chain up to the State headquarters.

In Connecticut, management of an emergency at the State level is a collective effort between the Department of Public Safety and the State Military Department through its Office of Emergency Management. Mr. Vin DeRosa, who is our Deputy Commissioner with the Department of Public Safety, the Division of Protective Services, is Connecticut's liaison to Governor Ridge at the White House on Homeland Security. In my role as the Adjutant General of both the National Guard and the Military Department, I oversee the Office of Emergency Management and also this program. I coordinate daily with Commissioner DeRosa. This is a program that we find working quite well.

Both the Department of Public Safety and the State Military Department work together to share actionable information and intelligence to place State and local governments in the best position possible to mitigate and respond to an act of terrorism, and we rely on the Federal Government to share the same. And to date I do believe that much more could be done or be improved upon.

Specifically, I know that there will be a question regarding whether or not we support the Office of Homeland Security and we do. I think it is a good idea and I think that following the model within the State, it can provide great benefits to the States throughout the country in expediting information and intelligence in a rapid State to the firm.

Individuals at the State and local level have asked do we need one in the State. It's an issue that I believe is being reviewed. Commissioner DeRosa and I are dealing with it to determine whether or not we would recommend that to the Governor or to the State legislative body.

The events of last September highlighted how important it is to arm our first responders to combat various threats posed to them. Not just for daily routine occurrences, but also for the possible eventuality of a rare catastrophic event such as that on September 11th.

The Connecticut Senior Steering Council through inter-agency cooperation established three priorities, three priorities that have been discussed a number of times today. Those priorities were interoperability for communications.

Mr. SHAYS. Hold on just a second. We're getting a funny noise. Why don't you pull that mic back. We're getting funny sounds.

OK. Thanks.

General CUGNO. The three priorities were personnel protection equipment, that we've heard much discussed about here today, communications interoperability, again discussed at length today, and finally training and exercises. Now, this I might add from 20 individuals, members of the domestic steering, professionals within the field. Not surprisingly, emergency management agencies at all levels of government across the country have also identified these same topics.

Prioritization and regionalization planning is essential because of the limited available resources. For example, it's estimated—and this was based on a survey that we did. It is estimated within the State of Connecticut just to provide personnel protection equipment

to all towns and communities, and I'm talking about a simple Level A suit, would be \$226 million. We at the State level realize funding of this amount is unrealistic, thus requiring thoughtful and inclusive prioritization. This is one of the reasons why Governor Rowland commissioned the Domestic Preparedness Steering Council.

As outlined in the President's National Strategy for Homeland Security, it's understood that Federal funding is no substitute for State and local monetary responsibilities in the emergency preparedness arena. Federal funding for State and local emergency preparedness is obviously limited.

To date, Federal funding has supported State and local governments in their efforts to best equip and train our front line responders. Moreover, as the President's strategy clearly states, the definition of first responders has broadened extensively since September 11th. It no longer just includes traditional fire fighters and policemen and emergency medical technicians. It now includes a wide variety of other disciplines which will require plans and resources and training to fully integrate into our communities' emergency plans.

To date, the State Military Department has received \$2.6 million for the fiscal year 1999, 2000, 2001. Much has been discussed about this today. I'll be happy to discuss distribution of that as dollars and materials have come in and how we have insisted on regionalized strength. We've also heard today that \$4.6 million will be forthcoming from the 2002 Justice Department grants. I'm happy to say that more than 70 percent of the moneys received has been spent on standardized equipment which are being shipped directly to first responders throughout our State in accordance with priorities developed by the committee that I chair that are representatives of the Domestic Preparedness Steering Committee.

One of the organizations that was not mentioned today is the Connecticut Hospital Association. They too provide invaluable information for decontamination and providing assistance to hospitals needs. I would be happy to talk to that on questions.

The Connecticut Department of Health—

Mr. SHAYS. I need to have you come to your conclusion.

General CUGNO. Yes, sir.

The Connecticut Department of Health received \$14 million, and we would be happy to talk during the question period on that.

I think you'll find that a number of the areas that were discussed today have been topics of consideration and concern with the Domestic Preparedness Committee. I would be happy to answer questions that you might have on this.

[The prepared statement of General Cugno follows:]

July 30, 2002

The Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations

Field Hearing
Norwalk Community College
"Homeland Security: Keeping First Responders First"


Major General William A. Cugno,
The Adjutant General, Connecticut Military Department

Background

The Military Department, mainly comprised of the Connecticut Army and Air National Guards, is a unique dual-status agency, having both federal and state missions. The National Guard's federal mission is to maintain properly trained and equipped units available for prompt federalization for war, domestic emergencies or other exigencies. Collectively, the Connecticut Army and Air National Guards (when not in a federal status), Office of Emergency Management (OEM) and the Organized Militia compose the Connecticut Military Department. The Military Department's mission is to protect life and property; preserve peace, order and public safety; conduct community service programs; and coordinate all resources to assist the state in recovering from any disaster, man-made or natural. The Military Department, through OEM, is designated the lead state coordinating agency to prepare for the consequences of a terrorist incident.

The Adjutant General, whom the Governor appoints, maintains twenty-six installations occupying 2,500 acres across the state, including armories, maneuver areas, a firing range, and airport-based facilities. The Military Department employs nearly 6,000 people, of which almost 1,000 are either full-time Active Guard Reserve (AGR) soldiers, federal technicians or state employees. OEM is designated the emergency-management coordinating organization for the state. OEM develops and implements the state's Emergency Preparedness Plan and its Nuclear Safety Emergency Preparedness Program. OEM plans for responding to a wide range of technological and natural hazards, including consequence management of terrorist incidents.

The Military Department manages Connecticut National Guard assets, which include engineering, aviation, infantry, medical, military police, maintenance, communications and transportation National Guard units. The force structure will soon include a chemical brigade with decontamination capabilities. Through interstate compacts the Military Department has the ability to access a wide array of resources located in sister states. The first three of eight Black Hawk helicopters were received this



year, further enhancing our ability to respond to emergencies from the sky. The Military Department is actively pursuing a Connecticut Civil Support Team (CST) a special unit designed to immediately respond to an incident site and detect the presence of chemical, radiological or biological agents.

Introduction

The purpose of this hearing is to examine progress in local emergency preparedness since September 11, 2001, and the processes used to coordinate federal, state and local emergency response capabilities. In doing so, the following areas will be addressed:

- (1) The changes in domestic preparedness and emergency management procedures since September 11, 2001;
- (2) The effectiveness of federal programs to equip and train first responders;
- (3) The adequacy of emergency response plans;
- (4) The role of a federal Department of Homeland Security in supporting first responders;
- (5) The quality and timeliness of threat information currently available to state and local officials.

Domestic Preparedness Since September 11, 2001

The events of September 11, 2001 have had little impact on the organizational structure of Connecticut's emergency response agencies. My testimony before the House Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations on July 23, 2001, which outlined Connecticut's organization to respond to a mass casualty incident, remains factual today as it was then. Connecticut uses the Federal Response Plan (FRP) and actively supports the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS).

The Federal Response Plan (FRP) is an agreement among 27 federal departments and agencies, including the American Red Cross, that provides the mechanism for coordinating delivery of federal assistance and resources to augment efforts of state and local governments overwhelmed by a disaster or emergency. The FRP supports implementation of the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (42 USC 5121, et seq.), as well as individual agency statutory authorities. Additionally, the FRP supplements other federal emergency operation plans developed to address specific hazards.

The FRP sets forth fundamental policies, planning assumptions, a concept of operations, response and recovery actions and federal agency responsibilities. The FRP describes the process and methodology for implementing and managing federal recovery and mitigation programs and support/technical services and focuses on interagency and intergovernmental emergency preparedness. The FRP also describes the array of federal response, recovery and mitigation resources available to augment state and local efforts

to save lives; protect public health, safety, property and aid individuals and communities in rebuilding after a disaster.

When implemented, the FRP avails delivery of immediate federal relief resources. The federal resources available include initial response resources, such as food, water and emergency generators; emergency service resources, including equipment and personnel to clear debris, open critical transportation routes, and provide for mass sheltering and feeding; resources to facilitate speedy recovery, such as loans and grants to repair or replace damaged housing, personal property, roads and public buildings; and other assistance, such as crisis counseling, tax relief, legal services and job placement.

Connecticut has planned for, practiced and participated in the FRP for a number of years. Connecticut's professional firefighters and law enforcement personnel are keenly aware of the FRP. Elected and appointed state officials are increasingly more familiar and comfortable with the FRP. It is the cornerstone of Connecticut's emergency response program. Emergency preparedness and response is not the sole responsibility of one level of government (federal, state, local). It takes all three pulling together and working cooperatively to maintain an effective program.

The key and most important aspect of the FRP is the recognition of and respect for the first responders and the requirement for a single line of Command and Control. Specifically, this hierarchy is referred to as the Incident Command System. The FRP establishes a process and structure for the systemic, coordinated, and effective delivery of Assistance, which is necessary to address the consequences of any major disaster or emergency.

The FRP is designed to supplement state and local efforts and capabilities. It is designed to assist us, the citizens of Connecticut, when necessary. When the response is beyond our means, the FRP channels federal resources to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human needs. The plan also addresses recovery, the restoration of the disaster-affected area to an acceptable level of normalcy.

In New York City many of the contracts for materials, supplies and construction services were part of FRP's application of a pre-planned recovery effort designed to minimize lead-time and routine bureaucratic procedures. The plan worked and resulted in a significant benefit to emergency responders. The FRP promotes an effective reduction of our risks by mitigating known hazards and likely problems. Thus, if we know our weaknesses, we should address them in our planning.

Within the FRP, a national disaster-response framework is comprised of the combined authorities of emergency management from local, state and federal agencies. Additionally, this framework may include Voluntary Disaster Relief Organizations and professionals within the private sector. This is applied often with representatives from utility, transportation and the communication industry. This matrix of talent is available to community leaders when the resulting consequences of a disaster are beyond our initial-response capability.

Connecticut actively promotes the integration and use of the FRP and NIIMS. Both lay the foundation for the coordination of response by all levels of government. But planned coordination alone is not enough. A comprehensive state terrorism response strategy is the best and most suitable framework to plan for the delivery of federal programs, equipment and funding.

Connecticut's Domestic Preparedness Senior Steering Council, which I chair, brings together, on a regular basis, the various stakeholders throughout our state that have a role in our Domestic Preparedness. Governor Rowland created this council in May of 2000 and stated one of its primary functions was to serve as an inclusive body to develop Connecticut's terrorism strategy. In doing so, the council collectively works to rationally integrate federal resources at the state and local levels. To this end, much has been accomplished to facilitate the prioritization and flow of limited resources to best plan for responses to terrorist threats.

The Senior Steering council brought local leaders from 160 municipalities, throughout the state, together for a Municipal CEO Domestic Preparedness Training Symposium this past January. We invited the executive leadership, from all towns, and encouraged them to bring their emergency management officials. The purpose was to educate local leaders on how to assess, strategize, plan, and resource their communities with the limited resources available.

The most noticeable change since September 11th is the American public's awareness of the terrorist threat and the need to be prepared to respond. Prior to September 11, 2001, many of us worked hard to make the public understand the potential threats and vulnerabilities. The future portends substantial change in, not necessarily how we respond to certain types of events, but how they are managed. Managing the various resources to best combat threat is what will need to change. Currently our policies regarding emergency response are being rethought and are fluid.

The recent release of the President's National Strategy for Homeland Security eliminates the "crisis management" and "consequence management" distinction. Implementation of this new policy will ultimately integrate separate federal response plans into a single all-discipline incident management plan. The result of this new strategy at the federal, state, and local levels has not yet been realized. It is certain that additional changes are inevitable.

Effectiveness of Federal Programs to Equip and Train First Responders

The tragic events of last September highlight how important it is to arm our first responders to combat the various threats posed to them, not just for the daily routine occurrence, but also for the possible eventuality of a rare catastrophic incident such as on September 11th. The Connecticut Senior Steering Council, through interagency cooperation, established three priorities to deploy limited federal resources. They are Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), Communications Interoperability, and Training/Exercises. Not surprisingly, emergency management agencies, at all levels of

government, across the country have also identified these as mission critical requirements.

Connecticut is uniquely positioned to distribute equipment to first responders in that no county or regional government between state and local government. All 169 municipalities, in most cases, look directly to the state for assistance once their resources are depleted. In addition, much of our state's municipal emergency management human resources are part-time and voluntary. The Senior Steering Council has recognized the issues that have surfaced as a result. The allocating of limited resources to best meet our state's needs is a priority. Inclusion, not exclusion, at the state level, was essential to the success of fielding inadequate federal resources where they can best be utilized. Strategic distribution of resources and equipment regionally provides reasonable and area specific coverage for localities unable to independently provide such services.

Federal programs designed to relieve the myriad of first response requirements at the state and local levels are supplemental initiatives. For example, it is estimated that Connecticut would require **226 million dollars** just for the acquisition of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). Most realize that expecting federal funding, of this amount and for this one aspect of emergency response, is unrealistic. Limited resources require strategic and inclusive prioritization in resource distribution, another charge of Governor Rowland to the Domestic Preparedness Senior Steering Council.

As outlined in the President's National Strategy for Homeland Security, federal funding is no substitute for state and local monetary responsibilities in the emergency preparedness arena. Federal funding for state and local emergency preparedness is obviously limited. To date, federal funding has supported state and local governments in their efforts to best equip and train our front-line responders. Moreover, as the President's strategy clearly states, the definition of "first responder" has broadened extensively since September 11th. It no longer just includes the traditional fire fighter, policeman, emergency medical technician – it now includes a wide variety of other disciplines, which are also competing for limited funds.

To date, the State Military Department has received \$2.6 million in Department of Justice grants for fiscal years 1999, 2000 and 2001. We expect to receive \$4.6 million for fiscal year 2002 from the Department of Justice. The grants are being used to obtain and distribute emergency responder equipment, which is shipped directly to first responders throughout our state in accordance with priorities developed by the Domestic Preparedness Senior Steering Council and detailed in the Connecticut Three-year Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy. The Connecticut Department of Health received \$14.4 million from the Health and Human Services/Center for Disease Control this spring which Doctor Garcia, the Commissioner of Department of Public Health, has programmed to strengthen our capabilities in combating the biological threats facing our state.

Equipping and training first responders remains our greatest need.

The Adequacy of Emergency Response Plans

Planning is a critical function for protecting ourselves from future attacks and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of emergency response. Overall, at the federal and state levels, effective base, all-hazards emergency plans, such as the FRP, State All-Hazards Plans, and State Radiological Plans that have been refined and advanced over many years, are in place. The plans remain our basis as we move forward to implement and develop new policies, especially as we work towards expanding and revising these plans to incorporate the new homeland security threat. However, it must be recognized that the threats of deliberate nuclear, biological, and chemical disaster do indeed pose different challenges and issues, which require new, specific and detailed planning.

Currently the State of Connecticut is engaged in two major planning processes. First, key state agencies are focusing on developing their portion, specific to their particular discipline, of our vision of a comprehensive state domestic preparedness plan. This vision, developed and endorsed by the council calls for three major portions or "legs" of the state plan - public safety and response, public health, and mental health/behavioral services - with common strategy, objectives, procedures and functions as the core or central component of the plan.

The public health portion will be the state's Bio-Terrorism Response Plan and is being prepared by the Department of Public Health as part of their HHS fiscal year 2002 grant. The Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services, utilizing lessons learned from September 11th, is developing a state community mental health response network and disaster plan to address the behavioral support needs of first responders, victims, survivors, and the public at large. The more traditional disaster and response sections will be developed and coordinated by the Military Department and Department of Public Safety. Although a challenging vision and model to bring to paper, we feel this comprehensive approach is essential to preparing the state for long-term recovery.

The second major planning effort underway is a strategic planning process being led by the Office of Policy and Management to develop a comprehensive state homeland security strategy, similar to the national model recently released by the Office of Homeland Security. With a draft expected this fall, it is the expectation that this document will help guide our state efforts in conjunction with our federal partners over the next year to 18 months. The demands on state and local planning resources are steep and continue to grow, almost quarterly.

Since September 11th, states have had to initiate several new significant planning processes to address specific issues or mandates from the federal level. These have included planning for the receipt and distribution of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile; the pre-distribution of potassium iodide (or "KI") to the public and special populations within the 10-mile radius of a nuclear power plant; planning for the design and use of a statewide Disaster Medical Assistance Team and a regional Metropolitan Medical Response Team; and a state plan to prepare and protect the state's medical and first responder systems for the unique threat of smallpox.

Most of the plan development and design for these new requirements falls upon the states. Except for the area of public health, there are few new, innovative and helpful planning guides and templates coming from key federal agencies, such as FEMA and the NRC. We are hopeful that the federal Department of Homeland Security will help centralize planning at the federal level and lead to a system of working with states to develop and share model plans and best practices. Currently, there are little to no economies of scale in the area of planning. Although one planning "shoe" will never fit all 50 states, there is great deal more our federal partners can do to help states and municipalities with emergency planning.

It is critical to note that there is an inherent danger that superficially deliberated mandates and requirements will overwhelm available planning resources. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the area of nuclear power plant emergency planning. KI distribution -- left to the states with almost no planning guidance or support -- is an apt example. Planning is a function of adequate staffing, time, and talent. The process of planning itself must be resourced adequately to achieve viable plans. The lack of planning resources for state and local planning organizations - primarily emergency management offices -- is one of the significant limitations that we face today.

Besides the substantial and relatively flexible funding from HHS and CDC into our public health community, there has been little other federal funding to support new planning functions. The \$175 million in state and local planning in the fiscal year 2002 Supplemental funding has not yet been released. And, although billions of dollars since September 11th have been authorized, there is no increase in FEMA funding for state and local emergency management planning. This limitation on and speed of delivery of resources for additional full-time planning must be resolved if we are to move quickly forward.

The Senior Steering Council recognized the need for uniform and revised plans and training, at the local level too, which resulted in the creation of the executive desktop guide entitled "Preparing for Terrorism: Municipal Chief Executive's Guide to Domestic Preparedness." The Guide was distributed at the Municipal CEO Domestic Preparedness Training Symposium and is a tool to assist local leaders in the mitigation and management of potential threats to their communities.

The Role of a Federal Department of Homeland Security in Supporting First Responders

In regards to supporting the first responder, the department's overall utility will be incumbent upon its ability to conduct, simply stated, "one-stop shopping" operations, to project unified leadership and policy in this multifaceted discipline. Coordination requirements, in the emergency management environment, to plan, equip, train, and resource first responders is cumbersome -- resulting today in the many initiatives for change from many sources in the way the emergency management community conducts business. It is important that this new department streamline the process, at all governmental levels, in four major staffing areas: administration, intelligence, operations, and logistics.

Additionally, one of the department's first priorities must be to address the communications infrastructure. Federal funding is necessary to provide full and comprehensive interagency communications through implementation of the Land Mobile Radio System (LMRS), or a comparable system, in each state. In order to take maximum advantage of the interoperability features of such a system, federal DOD, federal non-DOD, state government and local government must all be included in it. Interoperability of communications must be recognized as one of the major problems faced by first responders and emergency managers, regardless of the constraints of limited resources.

The foundation of this new organization should be based on the lessons we have learned and what works. The coordination of our efforts should be towards identified goals. To ensure uniformity and integration of effort, dedicated federal resources and programs should be coordinated through State government, in accordance with federally approved state domestic preparedness plans, which, by design, incorporate the unique local characteristics and needs and thereby eliminating potential gaps in area coverage.

The Quality and Timeliness of Threat Information Currently Available to State and Local Officials.

Protocols and an advisory system must be adopted to facilitate the timely flow of information up and down the governmental chain-of-command. Interagency dedicated secure communications must be developed in order to provide the capability for all agencies to collaborate effectively. Modification of Freedom of Information Acts (FOIA), at all levels of government, are being, or should be, revised to insure that sensitive information relating to the security, vulnerabilities, and resources at each level of government are exempt from FOIA.

Conclusion

The tragedies of September 11th and the biological attacks upon both government officials and ordinary citizens which followed have cause all Americans to assess how we may become better prepared to cope with disasters. In the wake of such tragedy, civic leaders have enhanced responsibility to assess and plan for our emergency preparedness. Assessment of the magnitude of the September 11th attacks leads reasonably to the realization that no one agency can be the sole response and planning agency. Such planning and response requires input and execution from numerous if not all levels (municipal, regional, state, federal) and agencies of government. Leadership, guidance, coordination and resource deployment, however, are necessary and proper to emanate from one federal agency charged with homeland security.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Captain.
Thank you, General.
General CUGNO. Yes, sir.

**STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN BUTURLA, EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
DIVISION OF PROTECTIVE SERVICES**

Captain BUTURLA. Thank you and good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Representative Tierney, distinguished members of the panel. On behalf of Deputy Commissioner Vin DeRosa, who extends his regrets for not being able to be here today, and all the dedicated men and women of the Department of Public Safety, thank you for providing an opportunity to testify before the subcommittee.

I come here not only as a first responder and captain of the State Police, but now as the executive officer of the Division of Protective Services, which is in essence the Homeland Security Office for this State. On a side note, I am an adjunct professor at Housatonic and I have to agree with you that it's a (indiscernible). [Laughter.]

That's another story. I just wanted to go on record saying that.

The State of Connecticut has changed after September 11th. The changes in domestic preparedness and emergency management procedures were necessary to meet the evolving world and threats to our great Nation. Deputy Commissioner Vin DeRosa was appointed to his position in the Department of Public Safety in August 2001 and on September 11th his mission and that of the Division of Protective Services has expanded. It is now the mission of the division to utilize all available resources within State government and to develop and implement unified safety and security measures to prevent, mitigate and manage incidents threatening the quality of life of the citizens of this State.

Governor Rowland has also designated Deputy Commissioner DeRosa as the Homeland Security Advisor for the State in liaison with Governor Tom Ridge in the Federal Office of Homeland Security. As such, our responsibilities include coordinating the State's response to terrorism incidents and to ensure that the statewide strategy is consistent with the National Homeland Security strategy.

The Division of Protective Services is presently organized into four major components that relate to Homeland Security. These components were created after September 11th to more effectively and efficiently deal with new responsibilities placed on first responders.

The first major component is the Office of Statewide Security, which consists of a critical infrastructure protection unit, an Urban Search and Rescue Task Force, and a Transportation Security Section. I would be happy to expound upon any of those after my testimony here.

The second section is the Domestic Terrorism Section, which includes participation in the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, the development of a Homeland Security advisory system for dissemination of information to all stakeholders, and an intelligence unit for the collection and analysis of the dissemination of information.

The third and fourth sections are the Training and Education Section, and our most recent responsibility is the development of the Citizens Corps for the State of Connecticut.

The Division of Protective Services is also coordinating the Governor's initiative on radio interoperability for first responders by our participation in the Communications Task Force. The task force is pursuing the possibility of very shortly offering State police 800 megahertz portable radios to local incident commanders, thereby to give them the ability to talk to each other and various State resources in a time of a crisis.

The effectiveness of the current Federal programs to equip and train first responders is tied primarily to Federal budgets and grant programs that were previously in existence. The funding streams to first responders can best be categorized as in a state of suspense. The only Federal funds available are those that had been obtained prior to September 11th. Everyone in the first responder community and various other affected agencies are all waiting to see the much discussed Federal Homeland Security funding.

Emergency response plans have always been subject to review and change. September 11th has mandated all communities and private concerns with ties to local, State and national critical infrastructures update their emergency plans. The development of an all-hazards approach to planning has been recommended. However, as with any plan, there must be exercises of the plan and resources needed to manage the incident.

We support the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and appreciate the support that Governor Ridge and his staff has given to our State. From defining terminology, eliminating seams in disjointed Federal agencies, providing fiscal services, and the development of clear accountability, the Department of Homeland Security is a required partner to the States in responding to new world threats. To have one agency with a central focus and a point of contact for Homeland Security is not only crucial to the national strategy, but for the development of the State strategy as well. The prevention and response to terrorism is a grass roots concern. The first to respond and the last to leave will always be the local and State first responders and our resources.

The United States of America has long been considered the most powerful nation in the world. Many factors, including our democracy, open borders, constitutional privileges and our role as defenders of freedom have contributed to this belief. This makes us a country that many wish to come to, as our parents and grandparents may have done, to begin a better life. It also makes us the target in the world of terrorism.

Our way of life was forever changed on September 11th. We must now build an organizational infrastructure on the national, State and local level primarily to protect because if we can't protect, we don't need a component of protection in being able to respond to terrorists. That is the mission of the Division of Protective Services. We will continue our commitment to lead the State's efforts in Homeland Security.

I appreciate this time. Thank you.


[The prepared statement of Captain Buturla follows:]

**TESTIMONY FOR THE
107TH CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**



**SUBCOMMITTEE ON
NATIONAL SECURITY,
VETERANS AFFAIRS
AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**CONGRESSMAN CHRISTOPHER SHAYS
CHAIRMAN**



**Captain John J. Buturla
Executive Officer
Department of Public Safety
Division of Protective Services**

**July 30, 2002
Norwalk, CT**

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY
CAPTAIN JOHN J. BUTURLA

INTRODUCTION

The United States of America has long been considered the most powerful nation in the world. Many factors, including our democracy, open borders, constitutional privileges and our role as defenders of freedom have contributed to this belief. This makes us a country many wish to come to, as our parents and grandparents may have done to begin a better life. It also has made us a target in the world of terrorism. Our way of life was forever changed on September 11, 2001. We must now respond to build an organizational infrastructure, both nationally and locally, to prevent, protect and respond to terrorism.

Prior to September 11th the State of Connecticut was actively engaged in efforts to combat terrorism. In April of 2000 the Department of Public Safety, Division of State Police; Military Department, Office of Emergency Management; Department of Public Health; Office of Policy and Management; Connecticut Chiefs of Police Association and the Connecticut Fire Chiefs Associations began working on the Department of Justice Statewide Domestic Preparedness Equipment Grant program. This process is on going and has evolved into a more diverse group of representatives, which form the Domestic Preparedness Senior Steering Council. This council has made recommendations for the distribution of equipment for first responders throughout the State of Connecticut. It has developed a strategy for the acquisition of equipment for the first responder, focusing initially on the largest population areas and specific state organizations.

After the first World Trade Center bombing the Connecticut State Police increased its' level of preparedness by training and equipping Bomb Squad and Tactical Team members to more effectively respond to a terrorist incident. Troopers also went out and spoke to community organizations that were at risk, such as schools and women's health clinics. Although these brief examples were prior to 9/11, they demonstrate that the State of Connecticut was working and continues to work to insure the safety of our citizens.

POST SEPTEMBER 11TH CHANGES IN DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS

The State of Connecticut has changed after September 11th. The changes in domestic preparedness and emergency management procedures were necessary to meet the evolving new world and threats to our great nation.

Deputy Commissioner Vincent J. DeRosa was appointed to his position in the Department of Public Safety in August of 2001. His mission was partially to integrate law enforcement functions throughout state government. On September 11th his mission and that of the Division of Protective Services changed. It is now the mission of the Division of Protective Services *"to utilize all available resources within state government to develop and implement unified safety and security measures to prevent, mitigate and manage incidents threatening the quality of life of the citizens of the State of Connecticut"*. Governor Rowland has also designated Deputy Commissioner DeRosa as the Homeland Security Advisor for the State and liaison with Governor Tom

Ridge and the Federal Office of Homeland Security. He is the only Commissioner with the ability to bring matters directly to the Governor in a time of crisis and coordinates the state's response to terrorism incidents.

The Division of Protective Services is presently organized into four major components that relate to Homeland Security. These components were created after 9/11 to more effectively and efficiently deal with the new responsibilities placed on first responders.

The *Office of Statewide Security* consists of:

- Critical Infrastructure Protection Unit – The Unit has the responsibility of conducting threat and vulnerability assessments of key or strategic assets throughout the State of Connecticut. The Unit has received specialized training in order to review and make recommendations to those public and private entities that would be part of the critical infrastructure of the state.
- Urban Search and Rescue Task Force – The Task Force is in the developmental stages. Shortly after 9/11 Governor Rowland tasked the Division with the development and implementation of a multi-disciplinary team that could respond to any large-scale structural collapse to assist the Incident Commander with the locating, extricating and preservation of life. The Task Force will soon begin soliciting members through an application process. This team will be modeled after the existing FEMA teams and will partially be funded through existing DOJ Equipment Grants.
- Transportation Security Section was recently formed to focus on the various issues relating to security of our transportation systems.

The Division of Protective Services will be working together with the Department of Transportation, Department of Environmental Protection, Coast Guard and local jurisdictions to ensure that all ports and transportation infrastructures are secured.

The *Domestic Terrorism Section* consists of:

- FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force is responsible for collecting, analyzing, disseminating and investigating intelligence information. The task force is comprised of local, state and federal law enforcement.
- Homeland Security Advisory System disseminates information regarding the risk of terrorist attacks to state and local authorities. Based on the national framework originating from DOJ.

The Unit is currently working with DOIT on a stand-alone encrypted email system that would allow the Division to send out advisories to local municipalities and key private companies.

- Intelligence Unit collects, analyzes, disseminates and investigates intelligence information concerning terrorist activity. This Unit would be comprised of State Troopers and local officers. This Unit's main responsibility would be to investigate incidents that occur within the state of Connecticut.

The *Training and Education Section* is responsible for the development of a program for America's front line, especially our law enforcement first responders. The Division is in the process of hiring a consultant to help with the curriculum development and to do a large portion of the training. The training will be coordinated with the available federal training and national training strategy for first responders. This area has been previously overlooked by many of the agencies that had the information, which would have helped those tasked with crisis management, primarily law enforcement personnel. The focus on this training will be to equip our law enforcement personnel with the knowledge to differentiate between forms of identification, such as visas or passports and to have the basic understanding of how a terrorist behaves. If we, the law enforcement officers entrusted to protect America can fulfill our mission, training, is a major factor in our success. The training and preparation of all first responders is crucial to the level of preparedness of the State of Connecticut. No state, county, city or town stands alone in this process. All first responders must be trained and equipped with the necessary information to protect, prevent and respond to terrorist attacks.

The *Citizen Corps* is a new component of the division. FEMA is hosting a coordination meeting this week to give states the background necessary to promote volunteerism. In keeping with the emphasis that President George W. Bush has asked the American citizens for, we will work to promote the concept of the corps and seek citizens to support our efforts in new areas, such as combating terrorism.

The Division of Protective Services is also coordinating the Governor's initiative on radio interoperability, for first responders, by participation in a Communications Task Force. The task force is pursuing the possibility of immediately providing State Police 800mhz portable radios for the local Incident Commanders so that local commanders will have the ability to talk on a common frequency to each other and state resources, so that constant communication is fulfilled in the time of crisis. The Office of Policy and Management are pursuing the funding source for these radios.

After September 11th the Connecticut State Police increased staffing levels at Bradley International Airport. The number of troopers assigned to the facility nearly tripled immediately after the terrorist attacks. The increases in personnel and responsibilities have not diminished. It became abundantly clear that airports were vulnerable and that personnel were needed to insure the safety of the American people.

Governor John G. Rowland held a domestic preparedness symposium for chief elected officials to encourage their role as a stakeholder in the state's security. They were provided a guidebook with some basic suggestions for developing plans and contact information. This guidebook was tested on May 16, 2002 in the town of Easton when three individuals were observed on the Easton Reservoir water tower. They had been observed videotaping and that had certainly raised suspicions of witnesses. The prompt notification by the Police Department resulted in a response of state and federal resources for the investigation of the incident. This is a brief example of the need for

intergovernmental cooperation and the building of the unified approach to the investigation and response to suspicious incidents.

In the past Legislative Session a bill was enacted to make terrorism a crime in Connecticut. This bill made enhancements to the criminal penalties and will provide state law enforcement officers the ability to act, when necessary under color of state law. It also creates a mechanism through which state law enforcement officers can develop a partnership for the investigation of terrorism. With the federal resources stretched thin and with the need for the public to be vigilant this legislation will aid in the state's first responders mission of prevention.

The Division of Protective Services authored and implemented a Long Island Sound Security Initiative during the July 4th holiday period. Due to the political and cultural significance of the holiday this Division developed this plan. The purpose was to provide security to the ferryboats between Connecticut and Long Island and to, in conjunction with local, state and federal resources, insure the state was as safe as possible. The Division also coordinated the receipt of local community event information for the period. This enabled us to have an overview of the location of significant segments of population during the holiday and to deploy resources to monitor activities and assist local agencies, when requested.

EFFECTIVENESS OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS

The effectiveness of current federal program to equip and train first responders is tied primarily to previous federal budget driven issues and grant programs. The current funding sources are weak from previous budgets for the basic personal protective equipment for first responders, communications equipment and funding for training and exercises. Those in the fire service when responding to incidents utilize the term "blue canary". If they see police personnel incapacitated they are certain that there is some form of chemical or biological attack and can now use the appropriate level of protection, if they have it. We are lacking significant funding sources to insure that our personnel are protected. A standardized federally approved equipment list for first responders would be beneficial for agencies throughout the country.

The funding streams to first responders can be best categorized is in a state of suspense. The only federal funds available are those that have been obtained from grants prior to 9/11. Everyone in the first responder community and the various other affected agencies are all waiting to see the much discussed federal homeland security funding. Equipment and training funds are those that were allocated in FY99 through FY01, with some supplemental funding from FY02. This funding has been primarily used for the personal protective equipment for first responders. Training, although vital to our mission, has not been adequately funded to date.

The existing proposal to keep law enforcement funding with the Department of Justice and move homeland security grants and funding to the Department of Homeland Security is one that we favor. The central point of contact on both the federal and state side will allow for a coordinated effort for funding distribution. This unified approach between the Department of Homeland Security and the Division of Protective services

will assist the first responders of Connecticut in having a singular point of contact for funding questions and solutions.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS

Emergency response plans have always been subject to review and change. September 11th has mandated that all communities and private concerns with ties to local, state, or national critical infrastructure update their emergency plan. The development of an all-hazards approach to planning has been recommended to insure that every eventuality is discussed, reviewed and planned for. Although the goal is the prevention of an incident involving the use of biological, chemical, nuclear or radiological substances plans have been reviewed and updated but must be continued, as new information is developed. However, as with any plan, there must be an exercise of the plan and resources needed to manage the incident. The exercises eliminate the stovepipe approaches to planning that may exist in some first responder organization. This approach validates the plan for the involved parties and the communities they serve. Funding for training and exercises is a fundamental component of the federal assistance. We know that the plans today are better than prior to September 11th and we must continue to build with all agencies a national and statewide strategy in the prevention, protection and response to terrorism.

ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

To have one agency with a central focus and point of contact for Homeland Security is not only crucial to the national strategy, but to the state strategy as well. The prevention and response to terrorism is a grassroots concern. The first to respond and the last to leave will be local and state resources. The federal authorities will come in and provide supplemental assistance, but the burden will be on the states. The Department of Homeland Security has a key role in the federal response to terrorism and support to the first responders.

From defining terminology, eliminating seams in disjointed federal agencies, providing fiscal services and development of clear accountability the Department of Homeland Security is a required partner to the states in responding to the new world threats. Its' role and that of the Division of Protective Services for the State of Connecticut is similar. We must work with both short-term solutions and long term plans to protect our citizens. The Department of Homeland Security is necessary and will be a vital partner to the State's first responders, if allowed to exist in the proposed fashion.

THREAT INFORMATION

Intelligence information is necessary for first responders. This Division is obtaining information from a variety of sources and disseminating the information to local agencies. Much of the information is from multiple sources and considered "raw" which requires only dissemination to law enforcement agencies. Where possible other forms of information are disseminated to interested parties. The timeliness and quality of the information from federal sources has been somewhat insufficient. Although we are

working to improve the information flow, through our own Homeland Security Advisory System, it can be substantially better. It will not be until the disjointed federal systems are linked and appropriate state points of contact are established that the flow of information will be improved. When this occurs we will have real time information pertaining to threats and intelligence to combat terrorism.

CONCLUSION

The crucial issue and central theme to a variety of issues is the lack of funding for personnel and appropriate resources. States do not have the ability to add personnel to their respective agencies without sacrificing at some other point in state government. Local communities are in the same situation. It is imperative that federal funding be inclusive to supplement the costs of building the state's Homeland Security offices. Time is of the essence to fund the state's role so that the infrastructure is in place to manage the cooperative mission of federal and state homeland security. Once in place the responsible state agency can work with local authorities on protective equipment, communication interoperability, training and intelligence information.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much, Captain.

Mr. Harris, I saw you this morning, and I'm familiar with your activities and I appreciate you being here this afternoon.

**STATEMENT OF HARRY HARRIS, BUREAU CHIEF,
CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you very much. Good afternoon, Chairman Shays—

Mr. SHAYS. Move that mic closer.

Mr. HARRIS. Good afternoon, Chairman Shays, Representative Tierney, and members of the State legislature. My name is Harry Harris. I'm the rail administrator and bureau chief of the Bureau of Public Transportation for the Connecticut Department of Transportation. I am joined today by Bill Stoeckert, who is the director of highway operations for the Bureau of Engineering and Highway Operations.

Since September 11th, the Connecticut Department of Transportation has instituted a variety of changes to address emergency management procedures and preparedness. Conn-DOT has developed emergency response plans which outline the Department's Homeland Security Advisory System. And attached to my testimony is a copy of all of the plans that have been developed by each of the various bureaus within Conn-DOT. In addition to those plans that I've submitted to you, I will attempt to summarize some of the more salient provisions relative to each of our operating bureaus.

First of all, with regard to the Bureau of Aviation and Ports at Bradley, the first responders there are the Connecticut State Police. Troop W, which is located at the airport, have taken specific first response steps in accordance with the Homeland Security Office as just outlined to you. As a result of September 11th, all of Bradley's fire fighters recently completed a 70 to 80-hour training program and now all are hazardous material technicians.

Furthermore, the State unit was also given the opportunity to participate in the program whereby Bradley will receive equipment and supplies that would be most useful in the event of a mass casualty incident specifically related to weapons of mass destruction. Bradley was one of the first airports in the country to experience implementation of the Federal Transportation Security Administration Federal Security Director program and now has that program up and operating onsite.

In terms of our ports, Conn-DOT controls and administers the Admiral Harold E. Shear State Pier in New London, and with coordination with Federal and local jurisdictions participates in the care and supervision of the State's waterways and harbors. The department continues to work closely with the U.S. Coast Guard on security of the ports. There has been a concerted effort to develop better communication links and the Coast Guard is reaching out to local and State entities. Under the new Coast Guard program, we're taking a look at various ports in the State in terms of security and what needs to be done there. We are currently requesting funding under that program.

The attached Bureau of Aviation and Ports Homeland Security Alert document has a provision for evacuating cargo vessels from

their berths in Connecticut harbors should the threat assessment warrant such actions. This evacuation would involve using Connecticut licensed marine pilots to get the vessels out of harm's way or to prevent the vessels from suffering a catastrophic catastrophe which would then in turn cause problems for other facilities and emergency responders.

In the Office of Rail Operations we were—several things have come out as a result of the incident on September 11th and how we have to respond to them. We have made major changes in the way we operate and personnel identification and so forth. But I think one of the key issues that came out of the September 11th issue was one that has been discussed fairly frequently so far this afternoon, and that is the issue of communications.

At the time of September 11th, most of our communications were limited to cell phones. Our personnel was divided between New Haven, Stamford, Newington and the command center in Grand Central in New York. So some of the things, as we have talked about, is the need to improve our ability to communicate between Conn-DOT and Metro North and Amtrak in a crisis situation and to communicate between ourselves, and we're looking at a second command center as being something needed to be set up in this part of the State.

We also have a lot of problems with our infrastructure that needs to be addressed in terms of bridges and other things that could cut-off the rail service in the event of a catastrophe type of situation.

Similarly, in our Office of Transit and Ridesharing, we have 14 different transit districts in the State of Connecticut. Most of them have old and antiquated communications equipment where it is difficult to communicate with their own buses. It is impossible to communicate within the transit district. So a transit function in lower Fairfield County that involves Connecticut Transit, the Bridgeport Transit District, the Norwalk Transit District and the Stamford, CT, Transit operation have no way of communicating except through cell phones and through ourselves, and that is another issue that we're looking at.

For the Bureau of Engineering and Highway Operations, the Office of Maintenance and Highway Operations have prepared a Homeland Security Advisory System Response Plan. This 11-page document outlines all of the responses. It's included in your program.

But prior to September 11th Conn-DOT had in place Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Procedures using a Traffic Management Plan for a Millstone Nuclear Power Station disaster event. Implementation plans for a 2, 5 or 10-mile impact have been coordinated and developed with the Connecticut State Police and the Office of Emergency Management. The purpose of the Traffic Management Plan is to assist State and local enforcement officials and other emergency responders to engage in traffic and access control. The concept of operations includes traffic control and access control.

Diversion plans for highway incidents on limited access highways along I-95, 395, 91 and 84 have been developed in cooperation with the local and State police, first elected officials and Conn-DOT field personnel. Guidelines for implementing the Traffic Diversion Plans

have been developed for use when a major closure occurs on the expressways. Coordination of field personnel and field resources using variable message signs, HAR radio and other means have also been developed.

Again, I tried to summarize the written document and I'll join the panel in responding to questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Harris follows:]

Testimony – Connecticut Department of Transportation

July 30, 2002

Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs & International Relations
 Committee on Government Reform
 U.S. House of Representatives
 Washington, D.C. 20515

Good afternoon Chairman Shays and members on the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations. My name is Harry Harris; I am the Rail Administrator and Bureau Chief, Bureau of Public Transportation, Connecticut Department of Transportation. I am joined today by Bill Stoeckert, Director of Highway Operations, Bureau of Engineering and Highway Operations.

Since September 11, 2001, the Connecticut Department of Transportation (CONNDOT) has instituted a variety of changes to address emergency management procedures and preparedness. CONNDOT has developed Emergency Response Plans which outline the Department's Homeland Security Advisory System. The Plans were established in accordance with the five threat levels of risk established under the Federal Homeland Security Advisory System. These Plans are based on each Bureau's mission and responsibilities and will continually be updated and modified. Only the Plans relevant to the Subcommittee's scope of testimony have been included.


Please find enclosed a copy of the Plans that were compiled by the various Bureaus within the CONNDOT:

- 1) Bureau of Aviation and Ports;
- 2) Bureau of Public Transportation, Office of Rail Operations;
- 3) Bureau of Public Transportation, Office of Transit and Ridesharing (Connecticut Transit Security Measures for Progressive Threat Levels);
- 4) Bureau of Engineering and Highway Operations, Office of Maintenance and Highway Operations.

In addition to the attached Plans, the testimony below summarizes some of the changes and concerns since September 11, 2001:

BUREAU OF AVIATION AND PORTS**Bradley International Airport**

There have been many changes at Bradley International Airport since September 11th. The "first responders" at Bradley are the Connecticut State Police. Troop W, which is located within the Bradley Airport terminal have taken specific first response steps in accordance with the



Homeland Security Office of the Connecticut Department of Public Safety. CONNDOT will continue to assist and coordinate with the Connecticut State Police.

Bradley's Airfield Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) personnel, which includes the fire and paramedic unit, has training in medical and firefighting techniques and specific areas such as "hazardous material identification" (example: anthrax). As a result of September 11th, all of Bradley's firefighters recently completed a seventy to eighty hour training program and are now all hazardous materials technicians. Further, the ARFF unit was also given the opportunity to participate in a program whereby Bradley will receive equipment and supplies that would be most useful in the event of a mass casualty incident, specifically related to weapons of mass destruction. This was in reply to state and federal initiatives for the Homeland Security effort. When it arrives, the equipment will be located at Bradley, but will also be available to others within the north central region of the state or elsewhere, if needed.

Bradley was among the first large group of airports in the U.S. to experience implementation of the Federal Transportation Security Administration's Federal Security Director (FSD) program. Bradley now has the FSD on site and anticipates a full federal employee passenger screener workforce up and running by today. This places Bradley at the forefront of the list of four hundred and twenty nine U.S. airports that must go through the process. While Bradley still has mandated responsibility for security in accordance with Federal Aviation Regulations, September 11th has brought many new resources to the airport, primarily in the sense of federal manpower (personnel), to perform many of the functions that previously belonged to Bradley and those of the airlines.

Office of Port Operations

CONNDOT controls and administers the Admiral Harold E. Shear State Pier in New London, and through coordination with federal and local jurisdiction, participates in the care and supervision of the state's waterways and harbors. The Department continues to work closely with the United States Coastguard (USCG) on the security of the Ports. There has been a concerted effort to develop better communication links and the USCG is reaching out to local and state entities. Under the Coast Guard's new program, defense contractor TRW will perform studies at fifty-five key ports over three years and the reports will be shared with ports. Most ports have delayed infrastructure investments until the Coast Guard conducts vulnerability studies of their facilities. There have been discussions about biometrics and new identification cards, however Ports are not taking any action on these measures until the TSA issues its credential policy for transportation workers.

Funding is needed for a Port Security study at the three Ports of Connecticut. CONNDOT filed a Port Security Grant Application with the TSA. The solicitation was for two categories; Category 1 was considered an assessment category, and the product would include recommendations from security experts for measures that should/could be taken in port locations; Category 2 was considered an implementation / construction category, and the funding would be used for actual items, i.e. fencing, cameras, security guards, security vehicles, lighting, etc. CONNDOT filed for Category 1 and Category 2 grant monies in three deepwater ports, including, New London, New Haven and Bridgeport. The Category 1 total was under \$ 500,000, so the balance of approximately \$73.5 million is needed for implementation / construction projects. To date,

CONNDOT was awarded \$200,000 of Category 1 funding (assessment category) for the New Haven harbor. This will be spent studying what is needed for port security in New Haven.

The attached Bureau of Aviation and Ports Homeland Security Alert document has a provision for evacuating cargo vessels from their berths in Connecticut harbors, should the threat assessment warrant such action. This evacuation would involve using Connecticut licensed marine pilots to get the vessels out of harms way, or to prevent the vessels from suffering a catastrophe which may in turn cause problems for shore side facilities and emergency responders.

The CONNDOT Office of Water Transportation maintains a radio watch on the commercial VHF channels, and would be able to participate in coordinating efforts in New London to advise vessel owners and masters via these frequencies of recommended actions based on disaster information to be provided through CONNDOT operations center. CONNDOT will continue to coordinate with the USCG on additional safety measures.

BUREAU OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION

Office of Rail Operations

As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, the CONNDOT's Office of Rail Operations has made several significant changes to enhance both customer as well as employee security.

While CONNDOT demonstrated fairly effectively on Sept. 11th the ability to make significant adjustments quickly, many concerns remain and are being addressed. Metro-North and Amtrak were both able to make adjustments, redirect their rolling assets and help facilitate large numbers of persons trying to leave Manhattan at the same time. It was fortunate that (a) much of the rolling stock was already in New York having been used to bring rush hour commuters to the City and (b) none of the rail infrastructure was damaged.

Amtrak, Metro North Railroad and CONNDOT have been excellent partners in exchanging information. All aspects of security issues as they relate to commuters as well as inter-city trains are being addressed. Periodic meetings are held with representatives from both the railroads and CONNDOT to review any unusual incidents, upcoming special train movements and potential security issues. CONNDOT has met with representatives of Metro North's Safety Department to specifically discuss issues that could best be described as having a profound effect on homeland security. The meetings, which are held at various locations in both New York and Connecticut, are of a high security nature and items are discussed face to face only. This prevents any information from being obtained surreptitiously.

Some concerns that have been identified and are being addressed:

One of the first items addressed was identification of personnel. All CONNDOT personnel as well as Amtrak, Metro North and consultants or contractors, working under contract to the State of Connecticut, now are required to wear photo identification cards while at work. This additional information provides law enforcement as well as potential rescue personnel with an additional sense of security. Additionally, all office locations have been secured with a key

lock/video terminal system. This allows individuals who have control of the door, with the ability to request identification prior to letting anyone into the offices.

The catenary or overhead power system causes a concern. If there was a problem with Connecticut's AC system or to the NY or Connecticut power grids that results in a shutdown of the AC system, the ability to handle large numbers of customers would be significantly reduced because (a) there are not many diesel trains available, and (b) the signal system would also be affected, that would greatly reduce the capacity per track.

The issue of a second "command center" within Connecticut should be explored. The Command Center would be comparable to the Situation Room at Grand Central Terminal in New York. Located somewhere in Connecticut the Command Center would be where information from NYC (both MNR and city) could be relayed, and necessary coordination between buses Connecticut Transit and the various state transit districts, SLE, local police, hospitals, etc. handled. This is especially important because sending someone from Connecticut to the Situation Room might not be possible (as on 9/11, when inbound service was shut off). This would not be a replacement for the state Command Center located in the Armory in Hartford but a regional center that could coordinate information. During the September 11th incident the Rail staff was divided between New Haven, Stamford, Newington and the Armory in Hartford. Communication and coordination was done via cell phones primarily

Better coordination of communication would be helpful. There were rumors following September 11th concerning evacuees from the city. Reports were circulating that trains loaded with injured were being sent to hospitals outside NYC and heavily injured persons were being air lifted to Connecticut hospitals. Medical personnel were sent to every train station -- far more than were ever needed. Currently Metro North has a rail radio system which does a good job in communicating between the command center at GCT and the trains in the field as well as with the working crews. But there is no back up for that system. If it fails or if it becomes overloaded, there is no alternative. Also, direct communication between Metro-North and CONNDOT is limited. Much of the communications during the Sept. 11th incident were done through the use of cell phones.

Another problem that has been identified is the lack of visual communication between GCT and New Haven and the field. Connecticut has cameras on the interstate highways that permit highway operations to visually look at a potential problem. On the rail side Connecticut has the radio communication with the conductors but for a more detailed assessment of problems personal must arrive on the scene and do a visual inspection. Connecticut DOT has no way of directly communicating with the trains.

Rail infrastructure is also an item of concern, since it could significantly limit the ability to respond. Points of vulnerability within New York are obvious -- the Park Avenue Tunnel and Grand Central Terminal are two key ones. However, in Connecticut there are three vulnerable targets that, if hit, would completely cut the Northeast Corridor. They are the Walk Bridge in Norwalk, Saugatuck bridge in Westport and the Cos Cob bridge in Greenwich. All of the bridges are moveable rail bridges over water that, if damaged, would shut down the system. All of the bridges are very old and in substantial need of repair.

As CONNDOT continues to monitor daily activities, both Amtrak and Metro North provide the Department with updated information as needed. This information allows the Connecticut Office of Rail Operations to be ready to react swiftly in the event of a major service disruption. Amtrak and Metro North have both been provided with contingency plans in the event that they must be implemented as well as the Department has been involved over the past several years with CTTransit to assist as needed.

Office of Transit and Ridesharing

The attached Connecticut Transit Plan was developed after September 11th for the state-owned bus operations and detail actions at various levels of Homeland Security alert. The Office of Transit and Ridesharing has plans in place in the event of rail strikes or in the event of an incident at a nuclear power plant. The Office is prepared to mobilize equipment to move smaller numbers of people on short notice. The Department has a small contingency fleet of fifteen buses in the reserve fleet in addition to the active rolling stock assets of over six hundred buses and three hundred rail cars. Using a pending grant from the Federal Transit Administration, the Department plans to do drills during the winter. The drills will include simulated "mysterious packages," chemical agents at a bus garage, hijacked buses, bomb exploding in the building, etc.

Connecticut Transit was the first transit system in the country to receive a FTA sponsored security review after September 11th. The results indicated that the system was generally well positioned to provide secure environments for employees, customers and assets. Some recommendations have already been implemented and others will require additional funding such as upgraded communications systems (including back up systems should the primary system be unavailable,) increased use of security cameras on buses and at facilities, and other site security improvements.

BUREAU OF ENGINEERING AND HIGHWAY OPERATIONS

The Office of Maintenance and Highway Operations has prepared a Homeland Security Advisory System Response Plan per Acting Commissioner James F. Byrnes Jr. The eleven page document implements appropriate protective measures and assets for which maintenance field and office staff is responsible for at each level. This plan is consistent with the Federal Homeland Security Advisory system.

Notification procedures to the Division of Protective Services (DPS), U.S. Coast Guard Joint Operations (OEM desk), CONNDOT Management staff and CONNDOT field support staff have also been developed if a potential terrorist threat is received by the CONNDOT Highway Operations Center in Newington. All operators are required to obtain information such as the date, time, caller, location of potential threat, brief description, time notified DPS and OEM Desk, time notified Deputy Commissioner Adams or another contact.

Prior to September 11, CONNDOT had in place Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Procedures using a Traffic Management Plan for a Millstone Nuclear Power Station disaster event. Implementation plans for 2,5, or 10-mile impact had been coordinated and developed with the Connecticut State Police, Office of Emergency Management and CONNDOT. The purpose

of the Traffic Management Plan is to assist State and Local Law enforcement and other emergency response personnel engaged in traffic and access control duties. The concept of Operations includes traffic control and access control. Traffic control is the efficient and safe management of vehicular traffic through the use of traffic control devices e.g. cones, barricades, emergency vehicles. These activities are designed to expedite the movement of evacuees from the affected areas of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) to host communities and reception centers. The access control is the discouragement of vehicles and pedestrians from entering or re-entering those areas within the EPZ from the Millstone Nuclear Power Station.

Diversion plans for highway incidents on limited access highways along I-95, I-395, I-91, I-84, Route 8 have been developed in cooperation with local police and state police, first elected officials and CONNDOT field personnel. Guidelines for implementing the Traffic Diversion Plans had been developed for use when a major closure occurs on the expressway. Coordination of field personnel and field resources such as variable message signs, highway advisory radio, and diversion route assurance signing along the route are implemented. The Plans could be implemented effectively and efficiently by all first responders including, state police, local police and CONNDOT.

Thank you. Bill or I would be happy to answer any questions.



**CONNECTICUT
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

**HOMELAND SECURITY
ADVISORY SYSTEM**

SEVERE
SEVERE RISK OF
TERRORIST ATTACKS

HIGH
HIGH RISK OF
TERRORIST ATTACKS

ELEVATED
SIGNIFICANT RISK OF
TERRORIST ATTACKS

GUARDED
GENERAL RISK OF
TERRORIST ATTACKS

LOW
LOW RISK OF
TERRORIST ATTACKS

The graphic displays the five risk levels of the Homeland Security Advisory System in a vertical stack. Each level is contained within a rectangular box with a dark background and light text. The levels, from top to bottom, are: SEVERE (Severe Risk of Terrorist Attacks), HIGH (High Risk of Terrorist Attacks), ELEVATED (Significant Risk of Terrorist Attacks), GUARDED (General Risk of Terrorist Attacks), and LOW (Low Risk of Terrorist Attacks). The top of the graphic includes the text "HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM" and a small circular icon.

RESPONSE PLAN

JUNE 1, 2002

REVISED _____

REVISION NO. _____

INTRODUCTION

The following Plan has been developed, which will automatically trigger prepared responses consistent with the five levels of risk developed under the Federal Homeland Security Advisory System. The five threat levels, based upon the various DOT Bureaus' missions, responsibilities, property and personnel appropriate protective measures, have been spelled out to safeguard the Department's assets.

The plan is considered a perishable product, which must be continually reviewed and updated as circumstances dictate.

It is the responsibility of each individual DOT employee to familiarize himself/herself with the Plan and participate in its implementation.

Each Bureau's individual response plan is outlined on the following pages.

RESPONSE PLAN

BUREAU OF AVIATION AND PORTS

HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM



HSAS CONDITION: GREEN – Low Condition. Low Risk of Terrorist Attacks

The following protective measures will be applied:

- Ensure personnel receive training on HSAS, departmental and agency-specific protective measures, including the reporting of suspicious activity.
- Periodic review of emergency procedures;
- Conduct regular assessments of security procedures; and
- Threat level signage to be displayed at facility access points

SITE-SPECIFIC ACTIONS

Airports and Port: Review tenant security; identify lapses, shortcomings, or discrepancies in security plans and systems.

Airports: Distribute security awareness brochures to tenants and users.

Port: Devise a plan to notify marine pilots, should the need arise to put all vessels to sea in a particular port or to re-position vessels to anchorage away from piers in the event of an emergency.

Ferries: Chain vessel to landing; lock pilothouse, engine room and gear boxes, issue cell phones to the ferries; park assigned State vehicle in enclosed fenced area.

HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM



HSAS CONDITION: BLUE – Guarded Condition. General Risk of Terrorist Attacks.

In addition to the previously outlined response, the following protective measures will be applied:

- Review and update security plans;
- Check all fence lines and gate access entry points; and
- Check communications networks with designated emergency responders.

SITE-SPECIFIC ACTIONS

Airports and Port: Review key distribution and/or I.D. card distribution lists; review and update tenant lists and phone numbers.

Marine Pilots: Conduct training meetings regarding emergency evacuation of vessels in port.

Ferries: Institute procedure to have captains check in twice daily via cell phone and radio. Radio check-ins to be accomplished by calling the East Haddam Highway Bridge and/or U.S. Coast Guard.

HOMELAND SECURITY
ADVISORY SYSTEM**HSAS CONDITION: YELLOW – Elevated Condition. Significant Risk of Terrorist Attacks.**

In addition to the previously outlined response, the following protective measures will be applied:

- Coordinate emergency plans with mutual aid parties and adjacent jurisdictions;
- Implement contingency/response plans; and
- Refine procedures within context of available threat information.

SITE-SPECIFIC ACTIONS

Airports: Check off-airport navigation aids on a weekly basis.

Airports and Port: Increase patrols of AOA airport and port perimeter fence line to a minimum of twice daily; normal status of all non-essential gates will be closed and locked; restrict the parking of vehicles in all operations areas; and remove keys from all fuel trucks and lock same.

Airports, Ports and Ferry Landings: Overnight lighting shall remain on in all areas.

Marine Pilots: Badge all Connecticut-licensed marine pilots.

Ferries: Disable vessel during off-hours; Captains to check in every four (4) hours via cell phone and radio.

HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM



HSAS CONDITION: ORANGE High Condition, High Risk of Terrorist Attacks

In addition to the previously outlined response, the following protective measures will be applied:

- Coordinate necessary security and law enforcement activities;
- Conduct on-site security review with state and local emergency responders (police, fire, EMS); and
- Restrict public events.

SITE-SPECIFIC ACTIONS

Airports: Check off-airport navigation aids every four (4) days.

Airports and Port: Restrict access permits, locking down all non-essential gates and placing tamper seals on them; restrict the use of personnel doors, limiting the number of access points to buildings; park essential airport/port equipment in high visibility areas, and lock said equipment when not in use.

Ferries: Request state and/or local police check vessel once per shift on off hours; Lead Captain at Glastonbury/Rocky Hill ferry to take state vehicle home; and leave all vessel lighting on overnight.

HOMELAND SECURITY
ADVISORY SYSTEM

HSAS CONDITION: RED – Severe Condition. Severe Risk of Terrorist Attacks.

In addition to the previously outlined response, the following protective measures will be applied:

- Close public areas;
- Review and restrict all construction activities that are not security related or deemed necessary; and
- Assign second and third shift personnel where possible.


SITE-SPECIFIC ACTIONS

Airports and Port: Log in and log out all personnel and vehicles entering operations areas, check identification and require a “need” to enter; request State Police or military personnel be stationed at the airports and port. A random security patrol will be conducted nightly, seven (7) days per week.

Airports: With FAA approval, restrict operating hours and/or areas; require all air traffic to give prior notification of arrivals and departures; request aircraft owners disable aircraft which will not be utilized within a 30-day period. Tenants or crewmembers must escort non-crewmembers on the air operations area. A list of flight trainees must be recorded with the airport manager, which must be updated immediately upon change. Check off-airport navigation aids daily.

Ferries: Captains to use cell phone to check in with DOT Operations Center every two (2) hours; record all license plates of vehicles carried; keep passengers in vehicles during crossings; and hire security guards to remain on site over night.

**CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT
OF
TRANSPORTATION
RAIL OPERATIONS
SAFETY SECURITY PLAN**



**CDOT Rail Operation
Anti Terrorism Policies and Procedures**

Purpose

To establish procedures for response to and recovery from terrorist acts. The key components of the procedure are:

- ◆ coordination of internal and external agency responses to the incident
- ◆ clear designation of responsibilities
- ◆ decision-making
- ◆ guidelines for execution of counter terrorist activities for recovery

The overall objective of CDOT Rail Operation responses to terrorist acts is to protect life, property and service.

General Responsibilities

Terrorist acts can lead to incidents and emergency conditions that require response from internal and external agencies simultaneously. It is important to have clear designations of responsibilities so that response efforts will be coordinated effectively. In general:

- ◆ Metro North and Amtrak Police have the responsibility for all criminal activities systemwide.
- ◆ CDOT Rail Operations key personnel in conjunction with NHPA, Amtrak/SLE and Metro North have the responsibility for all operational accidents and emergencies that are not criminal nature.
- ◆ External agencies may be responsible for coordinating response when the incident affects area beyond the Metro North and Amtrak/SLE system. Otherwise, external agencies provide operational and logistic support.
 - Immediate notification to appropriate federal, state, county, city agencies including:
 - State of Connecticut Bureau of Transportation
 - Amtrak/SLE and Metro North
 - NHPA
 - Local Police Department
 - Local Fire Department
 - Local EMS
- ◆ All operational incidents shall initially be responded to as criminal events. When it is determined to be an industrial/operational accident, it shall be considered a non-crime event, then major responsibilities rest with the CDOT Rail Operations, Amtrak/SLE and Metro North.

Scope

Terrorist acts are willful activities which present potential actual danger to life, property and service. Terrorist acts include (but are not limited to):

- ◆ Bomb/Explosive Devices
- ◆ Chemical Agents
- ◆ Biological Agents
- ◆ Hostage Situations
- ◆ Sabotage

The following table indicates the potential for these terrorist acts as designated locations throughout the Metro North and Amtrak/SLE system.

Amtrak/SLE Metro North	Bomb Explosive Devices	Chemical Agent	Biological Agent	Hostage	Sabotage
GCT	X	X	X	X	X
Outlying Stations	X	X	X	X	X
New Haven Station	X	X	X	X	X
Bridges & Movable Bridges	X				X
Right of Way	X				X
OCC-7 th flr GCT	X	X	X	X	X
RTC	X	X	X	X	X
Signal	X				X
Power	X				X
Interlockings	X				X
CETC-Boston	X	X	X	X	X
Trains	X	X	X	X	X
Yards & MOW Bases	X	X	X	X	X

Alert Status

CDOT Rail Operations Office will incorporate Metro North's alert status. The Metro North Police Department through Liaison with domestic and Foreign law enforcement agencies maintains current knowledge of terrorists acts and activities with particular interest to transportation incidents.

The President of Metro North and the Chief and Assistant Chief of Police have been granted secret Security Clearance by the U.S. Department of Defense that enables those officials to receive restricted information pertaining to terrorist activities and heightened degrees of counter terrorist alertness.

The Chief of Police in conferral with law enforcement and other governmental and Metro North officials shall activate levels of alertness for Metro North Police, managers and employees.

Alert Status		
Alert Status	Deployment	Actions
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		

Alert Status Color Codes

- Green** service is not currently disrupted, but has the potential to be so. The event is noted and the appropriate people are notified to respond as usual or to be alert for further developments.
- Yellow** the problem seems likely to last for more than a short period of time. Service on one line or a partial shutdown of GCT is threatened.
- Blue** the problem seems likely to last a long time and will affect a large number of customers. Service on one or more lines is affected and or a full or partial shutdown of GCT has occurred.
- Red** the problem is severe and potentially long lasting. Service is affected on all lines and/or GCT.

Definitions

Rail Operations Administrative Assistant maintains Operations log (record officer/historian)

Biological Incidents are characterized as the prolonged onset, days to weeks, of medical symptoms and typically there will be no characteristics signature because biological agents are usually odorless and colorless. Because of the delayed onset of medical symptoms in a biological incident, the area and people affected may be greater due to the travel of infected individuals.

Bombs/Explosive Devices are characterized as explosive, incendiaries that can be constructed to look like anything and may be detonated by a fuse or remotely. The only common denominator that exists among bombs is that they are designed to explode with the intent to cause public alarm, destroy property, cause serious injury and death.

Chemical Incidents are characterized as the rapid onset, minutes to hours, of acute adverse medical symptoms (vomiting, nausea, bleeding, coughing, sneezing, blisters, rashes...) Chemical Agents have generally easily observed signatures; colored vapors, residue, pungent odor, dead foliage and dead insects and animal life.

Civil Disorder is an action by any group that poses a threat to peace, life or property or any tumultuous or violent activity that creates a grave risk of causing public harm.

Emergency Equipment includes Emergency response and medical bags, portable lights, police line tape, bullhorns, cellular telephones, map of area, easel, rosters, mesh barrier nets.

Field Command Post Staff are personnel designated by the Incident Commander to serve as advisors with staff - responsibility for personnel and administration, intelligence, operations and logistics.

Incident Commander is the ranking CDOT Rail Operations personnel at the scene, responsible for command and control off all incident operations. He/she will establish and maintain a Field Command Post.

Logistics Officer provides services and support systems to all the organizational components involved in the incident.

CDOT Rail Operation Safety Representative acts as an on scene safety advisory to Incident Commander.

Amtrak/SLE/Metro North Risk Representative(s) record identities of injured and dead, and begins a property loss assessment.

Mobilization area/point is the area designated by the Incident Commander where personnel report, upon arrival for instruction and assignment. Mobilization area will be located at the field command post.

On-site coordinator is assigned by the Incident Commander and is responsible for coordinating activities of police with other agency personnel

Perimeter A border a designated by the Incident Commander utilizing a series of traffic and pedestrian checkpoints that defines the are.

Sabotage is a criminal activity resulting in an industrial/operational emergency incident, causing property damage, physical injury and/or death. Individuals engaging in the destruction of property or interference with operations characterize it.

Staging area is the designated area (inner or outer perimeters) of the incident.

Inner perimeter: area designated to prevent further injury at location of problem.
Outer perimeter: area designated to retain control of the area used for Command posts and staging areas.

Terrorist action is a politically motivated, hostile action taken by a person or group which has as its intent the commission of violent acts designed to instill fear, communicate a message and/or demand some governmental action.

Transportation/Operations Manager The ranking Transportation/Operations Division supervisor responsible for train operations.

CDOT Rail Operation response to actual and potential terrorist activities follows five stages. Dependant on the nature of severity of the actual incident, the specific steps with in these stages taken each time will vary. However, each incident will follow this basic framework.

Process Stages

1. Initial Identification and Notification of Incident

Identification of an incident will be made by CDOT personnel, NHPA, Metro North and Amtrak/SLE employees and/or Police, outside agencies or customers.

Notification of actual or potential terrorist activities will be made to the Local Police (911) then to the Assistant Rail Administrator, who will notify the other appropriate authorities, NHPA and Amtrak/Metro North Police.

If you receive notification of a forthcoming terrorist action get as much information as possible and note all information for subsequent dissemination to Assistant Rail Administrator.

2. Initial Response by CDOT Rail Operations Personnel

The primary goal of the first responder is human safety. However, first responders need to resist the desire to rush in, they cannot help others if they become affected or injured.

Perform a preliminary assessment of the situation before rushing in.

Notify CDOT Assistant Rail Administrator of the conditions as your assessment is made.

3. Establish a Field Command Post

The ranking CDOT Rail Operation Supervisor at the scene is the Incident Commander. If no supervisor is present, the next rank in line is the Incident Commander until he/she is relieved by a supervisor.

The Incident Commander designates a Field Command Post, to coordinate all response activities and direct the operation. A mobilization area is designated if different than the Field Command Post.

The Field Command Post operations and the Incident Command organization are the same for all incidents.

4. Implementation of Operation

The Incident Commander is responsible for directing the operations. The operation will be designed to respond most effectively to each incident.

The primary objectives of the operation are:

- ◆ protect life, human safety, minimize injuries
- ◆ protect property, preserve crime scene
- ◆ provide service, resume train operations

5. **Recovery**

Once the threat to safety has been averted, and/or the incident corrected train operations can resume. The Incident Commander will work with Amtrak/SLE and Metro North Transportation Manager to quickly clear and return the operation to normal.

Designated CDOT Rail Operation Personnel will continue to assist NHPA, Amtrak and Metro North Police with crowd control when necessary.

Establishment of a Field Command Post is standard for all incidents.

Establishing a Field Command Post

The Field Command Post is where the Incident Commander can safely command and control the incident on scene.


The Incident Commander identifies and sets up the Field Command Post.

Incident Location	Recommended Field Command Post
New Haven Station	To be determined at time of incident
Right of Way	To be determined at time of incident
CDOT Facilities	To be determined at time of incident
Amtrak/SLE Facilities	To be determined at time of incident
Metro North Facilities	To be determined at time of incident

Mobilization area for all responding personnel will be the same location as the field command post, unless otherwise specified. All personnel should respond to this location unless otherwise instructed.

The Following diagram depicts the general Incident Command organization.

FIELD COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION



Primary Functions and Responsibilities

The Incident Commander is the Assistant Rail Administrator. If he is unavailable supervising rail officer will take his place. His/Her responsibilities are:

- ◆ Assess the incident
- ◆ Assign Incident priorities
- ◆ Assign strategic goals of the incident
- ◆ Design a structure appropriate to the incident
- ◆ Implement corrective action and investigations appropriate to the incident.
- ◆ Establish the operational area (inner and outer perimeters)
- ◆ Designate a staging area from which the primary logistics functions are performed.

The on-site coordinator is appointed by the Incident Commander and is responsible for serving as liaison to external agencies.

The Rail Operations Administrative Assistant is appointed by the Incident Commander with primary responsibilities of communications and keeping logs of incidents.

Amtrak/SLE and Metro North Operations Manager are the ranking Transportation Department supervisors on the scene with primary responsibility for providing Operations information and coordinating requests for Operations personnel, CDOT Rail Operation personnel and determining service conditions.

CDOT Rail Operation Safety personnel are responsible for providing safety advice.

Amtrak/SLE and Metro North Risk personnel are responsible for recording injuries, casualties and property damage.

CDOT Assistant Rail Administrator is responsible to provide up to date information to the Communications Commissioner.

Amtrak/SLE and Metro North Information/Corporate Communications personnel are responsible for providing up to date information to the public and press regarding the incident.

Example of Specific Incident

Bombs/Explosive Devices

Bombs/Explosive Devices are characterized as explosive, incendiaries that can be constructed to look like anything and may be detonated by a fuse or remotely. The only common denominator that exists among bombs is that they are designed to explode with the intent to cause public alarm, destroy property, cause serious injury and death.

1. Initial Identification and Notification of Incident

Any employee noticing a suspicious package or receiving a telephone call warning of a suspicious package will call 911 immediately. Then make immediate notification to CDOT Assistant Rail Administrator.

The Assistant Rail Administrator will notify the proper/effectuated parties, including the incident description, location of Field Command Post and location of the mobilization area. The proper/effectuated parties are:

- ◆ New Haven Parking Authority
- ◆ Amtrak/Metro North Police
- ◆ Amtrak/SLE/Metro North Operations Departments
- ◆ Amtrak CETC - Power Director
- ◆ Metro North Chief Rail Traffic Controller
- ◆ Safety Department
- ◆ State of Connecticut Bureau of Transportation
- ◆ Local Police/State Police
- ◆ Local EMS
- ◆ Local Fire Dept.

Designate an on-site coordinator at the Field Command Post.

Direct all internal radio communications to be made over channel 7 emergency frequency. Do not use Amtrak/SLE/Metro North channels.

2. Initial Response by CDOT Rail Operation Personnel

Human safety is the primary objective of CDOT Rail Operation Office response to a bomb/explosive device.

The Incident Commander will assist Amtrak/Metro North Police with the evacuation of area, outward from suspicious package.

Direct Emergency equipment to be taken to the mobilization area.

3. Establish a Field Command Post

Follow direction from Page 8

4. Implementation of Operation

The Operation in the instance of a Bomb/Explosive device on the premises is to Evacuate, Contain the area, Dispose of Device and reopen facility.

Evacuation

Follow Emergency Evacuation Procedures and if necessary confer with the Field Command Post Coordinator to determine perimeter area to be evacuated.

Instruct Mobilization area patrol supervisor to make appropriate distribution of emergency equipment.

Direct evacuation of area to perimeter

Containment

Establish and maintain police lines at perimeter until emergency situation is terminated. Provide security and customer information and directions.

Remain at temporary headquarters to maintain control of the scene and make notification to:

- ◆ Bureau Chief
- ◆ Rail Administrator

Designated CDOT Rail Operation Personnel will ensure that only proper authorized personnel are permitted through police lines for access to Temporary Headquarters.

Designated CDOT Rail Operation Personnel will assist Emergency Medical Services in establishing emergency first aid station.

Designated CDOT Rail Operation Personnel will assist in establishing official parking area outside police lines to avoid congestion and interference with emergency operations.

Disposal

Decisions and actions regarding removal or detonation of the device are the responsibility of the Amtrak, Metro North, Local or State Police Special Units.

5. Recovery

Discontinue operational status when suspicious package is determined safe.

Procedure for Use, Removal and Disposal of Protective Gloves

If you are using protective gloves in a mail handling or other tasks, the following guidelines should be followed:

- + Wash and dry your hands and remove any jewelry, such as rings, watches, etc., before putting on the gloves. These items may have sharp edges or other defects that can puncture the gloves. Cleaning your hands will prevent any foreign material from being held close to your skin.
 - + Choose the correct size. Gloves too small or too large will not be comfortable/effective.
 - + Put the gloves on so your fingertips are all the way to the tips of the gloves, and pull the cuffs to their fullest extension.
 - + If working with liquids, turn the cuffs back toward your hands to form about a one-inch cuff. This will prevent liquids from running up your arms when you raise them.
 - + Remove and dispose of the gloves before leaving the area for breaks, lunch or other activities where you need to use your hands without protection particularly when eating, smoking, performing personal hygiene tasks, etc.
 - + Remove the gloves by rolling them from the inside out so the outer surfaces ends up inside the rolled glove when removed.
 - + Immediately wash your hands with soap and water.
 - + Dispose of the gloves in the waste receptacles in your area. Do not leave used gloves around your workplace. Do not re-use gloves that may be contaminated, unless they are designed to be cleaned and re-used.
-
- + **Any gloves used for protection against anthrax spores are NOT to be re-used.**
-
- + **If you have any questions contact:**

IF YOU ENCOUNTER A SUSPICIOUS ENVELOPE, PACKAGE, OR SUBSTANCE:

All of these encounters are considered Police matters.
The procedures below should be followed without exception.

Do not handle or move the item or substance.

- If you made physical contact with a suspicious substance, wash your hands thoroughly with soap and water, then wash your face thoroughly with soap and water.
 - If it is possible to do so without contacting the suspicious envelope, package, or substance, turn off the car/building ventilation system.
 - Leave and isolate the car/building by closing and locking all doors. Control the area to prevent others from entering.
 - Immediately notify your supervisor. He/she will need to make additional notifications. Provide your supervisor with a list of all people who were in the room or area when the suspicious item(s) was identified. This list may need to be provided to public health authorities and law enforcement officials for follow-up investigations and advice.
 - Your supervisor will contact the Local Police for further instructions. If your supervisor is not available, then you should contact the Local Police yourself.
 - Police and/or HAZMAT team will advise further actions as necessary.
-

- If you feel you have been exposed and have a need for medical testing, you must make contact with the Local Police as stated above. Once an investigation, including a threat credibility assessment is done, the following will happen:
 - If the threat is identified as credible, Health Services will authorize medical testing.
 - At that point you should go to the nearest emergency room or a location identified by Health Services.
 - Local Police will provide you with a copy of the police report and threat assessment to explain to the medical professional the nature of the concerns and why the testing is being requested.
 - It will be up to the medical professionals to determine the testing and follow-up medical activities to be done.

**CDOT Emergency Evacuation Procedures
Union Station - New Haven**

In case of an emergency such as a bomb threat, terrorist activity or other emergencies notify Local Police at 911. Pull the Fire Alarm Emergency Pull Box to activate the building's alarm system. Notify Bob Silva, New Haven Parking Authority (NHPA) that there is an emergency and the alarm system has been activated. Floor Monitors will evacuate their assigned floors. The Local Police, Metro North Police and/or Amtrak Police will determine whether or not to evacuate the Public area of the Station.

If the Station needs to be evacuated an audible and visual (strobe) alarm will be activated to signal evacuation. Pull Box activation will cause all building alarms to operate. The fire alarm system may also be activated for other emergencies requiring building evacuation. The New Haven Fire Department is automatically notified by this system. Employees will evacuate the building as follows:

- ▶ 4th Floor West to use North West stairwell to ground level, meeting at the North West corner outside of the station.
- ▶ 3rd Floor West to use North West stairwell to ground level, meeting at the North West corner outside the station.
- ▶ 2nd floor West to use North West stairwell to ground level, meeting at the North West corner outside the station.

****DO NOT USE ELEVATORS****

Floor monitors will confirm employee head count and will notify NHPA (New Haven Parking Authority) Operations and Security Personnel that their floor has been completely evacuated. NHPA Operations and Security Personnel will be located at the front of the Station Lobby. After reporting head count floor monitors will move their groups of employees 200 ft. from building to the corner of Union St. and South Church St.

The CDOT Floor Monitor will coordinate with Bob Silva of NHPA regarding re-entry to the station.

Special considerations regarding train and passenger movements are to be coordinated through the Incident Command System. The Metro North (MNCR) New Haven West Tower Operator will be the radio contact for train crews. The MNCR tower operator will be advised by the Incident Command System if trains are to be moved out of the station area, off-loaded at down-line stations or if protection from rail traffic is required in the terminal area. The New Haven Parking Authority (NHPA) will have primary responsibility for vendor and customer evacuation and building security.

This plan is to be incorporated into New Haven Station Emergency Evacuation Plan as maintained by the NHPA.

Attachments

Emergency telephone numbers, Evacuation Maps, Floor monitors

Attachments


<u>Floor Monitors</u>	<u>Primary</u>	<u>Secondary</u>
4 th floor monitor	Marci Petterson 789-7667	Ron Boremski 789-7569
3 rd floor monitor	Jon Foster 789-6926	Donna Gallo 789-7189
2 nd floor monitor	Mark Bedan 789-7789	Julie Turbert 789-7789

In the event that the primary floor monitor is not here the secondary floor monitor will ensure employee evacuation of assigned floor.

All primary and secondary assigned employees tasked as a Floor Monitor will be briefed as to the content and intent of the evacuation procedure.

If primary evacuation route is not accessible Floor monitors will be responsible to assign a secondary evacuation route.

The New Haven Parking Authority manages the New Haven Station building and has primary responsibility for maintaining the fire alarm and suppression systems, evacuation route maps and the evacuation plan. The CDOT evacuation plan is to be an attachment to the Parking Authority's evacuation plan.



**CDOT Fire Evacuation Procedures
Union Station - New Haven**

An audible and visual (strobe) alarm will be activated at the detection of a fire or smoke condition. Pull Box activation will cause all building alarms to operate. The fire alarm system may also be activated for other emergencies requiring building evacuation. The New Haven Fire Department is automatically notified by this system. Employees will evacuate the building as follows:

- ▶ 4th Floor West to use North West stairwell to ground level, meeting at the North West corner outside of the station.
- ▶ 3rd Floor West to use North West stairwell to ground level, meeting at the North West corner outside the station.
- ▶ 2nd floor West to use North West stairwell to ground level, meeting at the North West corner outside the station.

**** DO NOT USE ELEVATORS****

Floor monitors will confirm employee head count and will notify NHPA (New Haven Parking Authority) Operations and Security Personnel that their floor has been completely evacuated. NHPA Operations and Security Personnel will be located at the front of the Station Lobby. After reporting head count floor monitors will move their groups of employees 200 ft. from building to the corner of Union St. and South Church St.

The CDOT Floor Monitors will coordinate with Bob Silva of NHPA regarding re-entry to the station.

Special considerations regarding train and passenger movements are to be coordinated through the Incident Command System. The Metro North (MNCR) New Haven West Tower Operator will be the radio contact for train crews. The MNCR tower operator will be advised by the Incident Command System if trains are to be moved out of the station area, off-loaded at down-line stations or if protection from rail traffic is required in the terminal area. The New Haven Parking Authority (NHPA) will have primary responsibility for vendor and customer evacuation and building security.

Fire Drills

In cooperation with the NHPA, Metro North and Amtrak/SLE, fire drills are to be conducted at a minimum on a bi-annual basis.

This plan is to be incorporated into New Haven Station Emergency Evacuation Plan as maintained by the NHPA.

Attachments

Emergency telephone numbers, Evacuation Maps, Floor monitors

Attachments

<u>Floor Monitors</u>	<u>Primary</u>	<u>Secondary</u>
4 th floor monitor	Marci Petterson 789-7667	Ron Boremski 789-7569
3 rd floor monitor	Jon Foster 789-6926	Donna Gallo 789-7189
2 nd floor monitor	Mark Bedan 789-7789	Julie Turbert 789-7789

In the event that the primary floor monitor is not here the secondary floor monitor will ensure employee evacuation of assigned floor.

If primary evacuation route is not accessible Floor monitors will be responsible to assign a secondary evacuation route.

All regularly assigned employees tasked as a Floor Monitor will be briefed as to the content and intent of the evacuation procedure.

The New Haven Parking Authority manages the New Haven Station building and has primary responsibility for maintaining the fire alarm and suppression systems, evacuation route maps and the evacuation plan. The CDOT evacuation plan is to be an attachment to the Parking Authority's evacuation plan.

**CDOT Maintenance Facility
Fire Emergency Action Plan**

Alarm System: Emergency Evacuation for Fire:

An audible alarm will sound at the detection of fire and strobe lights on the walls will be activated. Employees will evacuate the building through Emergency Exit doors located at the following locations:

- ◆ East End of Track #7. Proceed to parking area 200 feet from building.
- ◆ South wall adjacent to foreman's office parking area. Proceed to parking area from building.
- ◆ West End of shop adjacent to Track #7. Proceed to parking area 200 feet from building.
- ◆ Any open bay door. Proceed to parking area 200 feet from building.

Immediately following egress from the facility, employees will meet in the parking lot on the south of the building. The general foreman (or foreman on duty in absence of general foreman) will conduct a head count to ensure all personnel are present and accounted for.

1. The foreman will designate an employee to call 911 to summon the appropriate emergency response services. The employee will then notify the foreman that emergency response services have been notified and are responding.
2. The facility manager and/or foreman will be responsible for the receipt and dissemination of information. Also to notify proper Amtrak/SLE and CDOT Rail Operation Personnel.
3. No one will be allowed to re-enter the CDOT Maintenance Facility until the proper authorities declare the facility to be safe and secure.

SLE Trainmaster is responsible for crews working in the CDOT Facility to be trained and knowledgeable on this procedure.

Housekeeping

All flammable and combustible material will be stored in a non-combustible area; labeled in compliance with Material Safety Data Sheets available from MSDS Book located outside foreman's office. Information contained in the MSDS Book governs the handling, storing, and use of these chemicals as well as appropriate measures for first aid.

Attachments:

Evacuation Map and Emergency Phone #'s

**CDOT Maintenance Facility
Emergency Action Plan**

This Emergency Action Plan will be implemented at the CDOT Maintenance Facility to ensure the effective evacuation of employees and shutdown and/or removal of rolling stock and other equipment in the event of any emergency. For the purpose of this plan, an emergency shall include, but not be limited to fire, dispersion of toxic chemicals, flooding, electrical hazards and terrorist attacks/bombings. All employees on both shifts will be apprised of this plan, trained to implement it, and appropriate personnel assigned to specific functions outlined below:

In the event of an emergency requiring evacuation of employees, the foreman on duty will sound an alarm with an air horn and announce over the P.A. of evacuation, indicating emergency procedures are in effect. Employees will evacuate the building through Emergency Exit doors located at the following locations:

- ◆ East End of Track #7. Proceed to parking area 200 feet from building.
- ◆ South wall adjacent to foreman's office parking area. Proceed to parking area from building.
- ◆ West End of shop adjacent to Track #7. Proceed to parking area 200 feet from building.
- ◆ Any open bay door. Proceed to parking area 200 feet from building.

Immediately following egress from the facility, employees will meet in the parking lot on the south of the building.

2. Foreman will designate and assign employee(s) the responsibility of :
 - ◆ Conducting a head count to ensure all personnel are present and accounted for following the evacuation.
 - ◆ Shutting down main electrical circuit breaker.
 - ◆ Shutting down or removing rolling stock and other equipment.
3. In the event of an emergency (medical, fire and/or terrorist attacks/bombings), an employee designated by the foreman, will call 911 to summon the appropriate emergency response services. The employee will then notify the foreman that emergency response services have been notified and are responding.
4. The facility manager and/or foreman will be responsible for the receipt and dissemination of information. Also to notify proper Amtrak/SLE and CDOT Rail Operation Personnel.
5. No one will be allowed to re-enter the CDOT Maintenance Facility until the proper authorities declare the facility to be safe and secure.

SLE Trainmaster is responsible for crews working in the CDOT Facility to be trained and knowledgeable on this procedure.

Information pertaining to chemical hazards can be obtained from Material Safety Data Sheets posted on the bulletin board outside the foreman's office. This information has and will continue to govern the handling, storing, and use of these chemicals as well as appropriate measures for first aid.

Attachments: Evacuation Maps and Emergency Phone #'s

The overall objective of CDOT Office of Rail response to terrorist acts is to protect life, property and service.

CDOT Office of Rail has oversight of Shore Line East (SLE) Commuter Rail Service from New Haven to New London, as well as Metro-North (MNR) Commuter Rail service on the New Haven Line (NHL), New Haven to Connecticut/New York stateline and the three branch lines - New Canaan, Danbury and Waterbury. Also, CDOT Office of Rail oversees the maintenance facilities at New Haven Yard, Stamford Yard and Springdale. This includes the railroad stations on both commuter lines.

CDOT Office of Rail has established procedures for response to and recovery from terrorist acts. The key components of the procedure are:

- ◆ coordination of internal and external agency responses to the incident
- ◆ clear designation of responsibilities
- ◆ decision-making
- ◆ guidelines for execution of counter terrorist activities for recovery

Terrorist acts can lead to incidents and emergency conditions that require response from internal and external agencies simultaneously. It is important to have clear designations of responsibilities so that response efforts will be coordinated effectively. In general:

- ◆ Metro North and Amtrak Police have the responsibility for all criminal activities systemwide.
- ◆ CDOT Rail Operations key personnel in conjunction with NHPA, Amtrak/SLE and Metro North have the responsibility for all operational accidents and emergencies that are not criminal nature.
- ◆ External agencies may be responsible for coordinating response when the incident affects area beyond the Metro North and Amtrak/SLE system. Otherwise, external agencies provide operational and logistic support.
 - Immediate notification to appropriate federal, state, county, city agencies including:
 - State of Connecticut Bureau of Transportation
 - Amtrak/SLE and Metro North
 - NHPA
 - Local Police Department
 - Local Fire Department
 - Local EMS
- ◆ All operational incidents shall initially be responded to as criminal events. When it is determined to be an industrial/operational accident, it

shall be considered a non-crime event, then major responsibilities rest with the CDOT Rail Operations, Amtrak/SLE and Metro North.

CDOT Office of Rail has implemented Rail Operations Safety Security Plan that encompasses MNR and Amtrak/SLE commuter rail services, as well as rail facilities. The Safety Security Plan includes: CDOT Maintenance Facility Fire Emergency Action Plan, CDOT Maintenance Facility Emergency Evacuation Plan, CDOT Fire Evacuation Procedures Union Station - New Haven, CDOT Emergency Evacuation Procedures Union Station - New Haven, CDOT Rail Operation Anti Terrorism Policies and Procedures and Emergency Procedures for Bridgeport and Stamford Railroad Stations. Also the following plans have been revised and implemented CDOT/MNR NHL Contingency Plan and CDOT/SLE Contingency Plan.

CDOT Rail Operations Unit, in conjunction with MNR and Amtrak/SLE, has identified the potential areas that terrorist acts, as well as severe storms or service disruptions, would impact Amtrak/SLE and/or MNR commuter rail service and will incorporate Metro North's alert status for these identified areas, if needed, when implementing any safety security procedure. The Metro North Police Department through Liaison with domestic and foreign law enforcement agencies maintains current knowledge of terrorist acts and activities with particular interest to transportation incidents. The President of Metro North and the Chief and Assistant Chief of Police have been granted secret Security Clearance by the U.S. Department of Defense that enables those officials to receive restricted information pertaining to terrorist activities and heightened degrees of counter terrorist alertness. The Chief of Police in conferral with law enforcement and other governmental and Metro North officials shall activate levels of alertness for Metro North Police, managers and employees.

Alert Status Color Codes

Green	service is not currently disrupted, but has the potential to be so. The event is noted and the appropriate people are notified to respond as usual or to be alert for further developments.
Yellow	the problem seems likely to last for more than a short period of time. Service on one line or a partial shutdown of GCT is threatened.
Blue	the problem seems likely to last a long time and will affect a large number of customers. Service on one or more lines is affected and or a full or partial shutdown of GCT has occurred.
Red	the problem is severe and potentially long lasting. Service is affected on all lines and/or GCT.

CDOT Office of Rail, in conjunction with MNR and Amtrak/SLE, has heightened security levels by implementing the following security improvements to help counter terrorist attacks:

Increased police patrols on trains, in railroad stations, at facilities, along the right of way and in public spaces.

All employees will wear employee ids

Securing access doors and improving locking/detection

Employee awareness training

Vehicle scrutiny/inspection at parking garages and delivery areas

Increased video surveillance

Security surveys

GCT

Public Places

- ▶ Increased MTA, PD patrol
- ▶ Blockwatch - GCT, MTAPD, MN employees will participate

Halls A, B, C & D/non-public areas

- ▶ MN employees will wear employee ID badges
- ▶ OCC Security Checkpoint
- ▶ Secure access doors
 - close/lock

Parking Garages

- ▶ Vehicle scrutiny/inspection by MTAPD and garage operators

Loading Docks/Deliveries

- ▶ Prohibit curbside deliveries - MTAPD, MTA Real Estate, GCT Tenants
- ▶ Vehicle scrutiny - MTAPD
- ▶ Tenant Identification - MTAPD, MTA Real Estate, GCT Tenants
- ▶ Delivery verification - Materials Management

Increased MTAPD Patrols of:

- ▶ Emergency Exits
- ▶ Right of way
- ▶ White Plains, Stamford, New Haven, Croton-Harmon Stations
- ▶ All Trains

Reinforce current procedures on all train pre-departure/turnaround inspections by the operations Division

AMTRAK

Amtrak is requiring positive id when purchasing a ticket. No tickets are being sold on trains; all tickets must be purchased in the stations.

- ▶ Amtrak Police greeting every train & walking each car before it leaves platform
- ▶ Increased Amtrak Police presence at New Station
- ▶ Employees must wear employee photo id badges.

CDOT

- ▶ All doors including those next to the elevators are to remain locked at all times
- ▶ Signage to be erected to inform CDOT, NHPA, MN and Amtrak employees to keep doors closed.
- ▶ All employees and consultants to display employee photo id badges

CDOT Diesel Shop

- ▶ Doors to be locked
- ▶ Swipe cards are to be utilized

Unicco evaluated Bridgeport and Stamford Stations and submitted recommendations to CDOT


CDOT Rail Operations Fire and Emergency Evacuation Procedures for CDOT Diesel Shop submitted for approval

CDOT Rail Operations Fire and Emergency Evacuation Procedures for New Haven Train Station submitted for approval

CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION
BUREAU OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF RAIL OPERATIONS

SECURITY MEASURES TAKEN AS A RESULT OF THE EVENTS OF 9/11/01

REVALUATION OF SAFETY & SECURITY IN
THE AREA OF COMMUTER RAIL



9/11/01

REACTING TO THE EVENTS OF TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

IMMEDIATE REACTION TO THE EVENTS

While the events of Tuesday, September 11, 2001 did not occur within the State of Connecticut, they had a profound effect in the area as a result of the thousands of commuters who ride both Amtrak and Metro North trains on a daily basis. The initial response of the New Haven Office of Rail Operations as well as the New Haven Construction unit was to assist both Amtrak and Metro North Railroad in providing contingency train and bus service. With the realization of the terrorist attacks in both New York City and Washington, D.C., Amtrak chose to stop all rail service nationwide and Metro North provided limited service to 125th Street and from Grand Central Terminal.

The Office of Rail Operations immediately contacted both operating passenger carriers and made necessary arrangements to have one dozen buses made available to provide substitute bus service to Shore Line East commuters in addition to those individuals who were left without transportation from both Greyhound and Peter Pan bus services. The initial response from CDOT employees was to meet with Amtrak and Metro North Operations managers to determine what course of action would be taken as a result of the attacks in New York City. Initial reports indicated that Metro North trains would be used to "ferry" injured parties to Stamford, Norwalk and New Haven for treatment. A medical staging area was established by the New Haven Fire Department with the assistance of the New Haven Parking Authority. In addition, with the cessation of nationwide Amtrak service, already thinned Amtrak personnel in New Haven face the issues associated with four (4) full trains of passengers who were located both in New Haven station as well as just east of New Haven station on the main line.

In an effort to assist Amtrak personnel, the Office of Rail Operations assumed control of the Shore Line East substitute bus service with assistance from the New Haven Construction unit. By doing so, this provided Amtrak with personnel who would normally be assigned to Shore Line East service only to effectively resolve their "trapped" train situation. Additional support was given to Metro North in the use of CDOT personnel to assist in securing and maintaining Union Station parking facilities as well as traffic flow on Union Avenue. The commuter and taxi drop off area, which usually is crowded with vehicles, was closed to normal traffic. A taxi staging area was established west of Union Station on Union Avenue and cabs were "flagged in" to pick up passengers. At no point in time, were there more than five (5) standing vehicles in the area.

Normal New Haven Line operations see nearly 250,000 commuters daily. With such chaotic events of that day, the anticipated reverse commute back into Connecticut never materialized. Numerous forms of transportation were used by individuals to leave New York City, which included bus, rail, taxi, car rental and even ferry boat services. The medical staging area was never put to use and the last substitute bus service was released at 10:30pm that evening.

IMMEDIATE SECURITY CHANGES

As a result of the breaches in security at our nation's airports, immediate changes were made in major Connecticut railroad stations including Bridgeport, New Haven and Stamford along with changes in internal operations of CDOT.

- 1) All Amtrak, Metro North and CDOT employees were immediately required to wear visible photo identification cards.
- 2) Access to Union Station interior stairways was eliminated by locking doors from the public areas of the building.
- 3) Parking in the rear lot of Union Station was controlled by a key card/gate system.
- 4) CDOT offices which had up until September 11, 2001, been open were now secured with employees only having keys.
- 5) On going sharing of information between Amtrak, Metro North and CDOT security and operational personnel occurs at weekly meetings.
- 6) Restrictions placed on delivery personnel and leaving of unattended packages in lobby, hallways and elevators.
- 7) All office doors re-keyed and key lists maintained to provide tighter security of office access.
- 8) Random security checks throughout the offices looking for suspicious persons/objects/packages.
- 9) Familiarization for CDOT employees with the Incident Command System used by Fire and Police personnel at major events.
- 10) Participation with Metro North's annual Mock Disaster in conjunction with the Fire Department of New York, New York Police Department and New York Emergency Management Services.

ADDITIONAL SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS

To complement some of the immediate changes, which were instituted in New Haven's Union Station, several other security measures were added to the facility.

- 1) Closed circuit television monitors and door locks have been installed at all CDOT offices located within Union Station, New Haven.
- 2) CDOT developed "Terrorist Training" class given to all CDOT New Haven employees as well as Amtrak and Metro North employees.
- 3) New Haven Police Department Bomb Squad instruction regarding suspicious and unattended packages.
- 4) Development of Security Plans for all active construction project sites.
- 5) Fire Drill Evacuation of Union Station in conjunction with the New Haven Parking Authority, New Haven Fire and Police Departments, Amtrak and Metro North.
- 6) Undertook risk assessment of stations, facilities and shops.
- 7) Preliminary stages of a "Sensitive Information" policy in regard to releasing copies of structural plans or diagrams and other potentially sensitive information.
- 8) Developed and implemented a Safety & Security Plan for New Haven Office of Rail employees.

EXISTING AREAS OF CONCERN

While numerous security enhancements have been implemented, there are still areas of concern which must be addressed. At a recent meeting regarding Homeland Security with Metro North representatives, the question of securing the New Haven Line's movable bridges was raised. Interruption of service or destruction of one or more of the movable bridges could conceivably eliminate train service between New Haven and Grand Central Terminal as well as severing the Northeast Corridor.

- 1) Devon Movable Bridge, Milepost 61, two bridge, four track structure with interlockings on both sides of bridge. Easily accessible from the Housatonic River, I-95 as well as local surface roads.

- 2) Peck Movable Bridge, Milepost 56, two bridge, four track structure with CP 255 interlocking located west of Bridgeport Station. Easily accessible from the Peckuabuck River, Bridgeport Harbor and surface roads.
- 3) Saga Movable Bridge, Milepost 44, two bridge, four track structure accessible from the Saugatuck River and surface roads. In addition, a pedestrian walkway exists on the Track #4 side of the bridge. This was established by an agreement between the New Haven Railroad and the town of Westport. This access would allow anyone the opportunity to "invade" the bridge tenders office and potentially take control of the bridge as well as providing unlimited access to the mechanisms which control movement of the bridge.
- 4) Walk Movable Bridge, Mile Post 41, two bridge, four track structure accessible from the Norwalk River, the Norwalk Aquarium property as well as local surface roads.
- 5) Cos Cob Movable Bridge, Mile Post 30, two bridge, four track structure accessible from the Mianus River and local surface roads.

Additional areas of concern relate to control of passengers on board moving trains. While Amtrak has instituted a policy of showing photo identification at the point of ticket purchase, Metro North has not initiated any such policy. Therefore, it would be very easy for an individual, or an organized group, to access a train for terrorist purposes. While the MTA is in the process of hiring additional police officers, current plans do not call for Connecticut to receive any additional MTA police personnel. In fact, the Union Station New Haven post has been eliminated in recent months. This provides New Haven with little or no coverage in the event of emergency situations.

Other areas of concern include shops and facilities. Although employees are to wear their identification badges, one can easily walk through any yard without being questioned by anyone. Again, this provides near unlimited access to equipment, facilities and personnel.

FUNDING FOR ADDITIONAL SECURITY

While the above mentioned items are critical in the continued operation of the New Haven Line, it must be noted that additional security measures, which are needed, do come with associated costs. While this document does not address the funding sources or estimated capital required, it does demonstrate a need for additional funding to be made available for providing

CTTRANSIT Security Measures for Progressive Threat Levels

Threat Level: Low

- All normal security measures and procedures in place, including:
 - Guard service at front gate in all divisions
 - CCTV surveillance operational in all divisions
 - Dispatchers in radio communication with all buses and supervisor vehicles

Threat Level: Guarded

- All supervisory personnel and guard services notified of increased threat level

Threat Level: Elevated

- All supervisory personnel and guard services notified by phone or e-mail of increased threat level
- All employees notified of increased threat level via posted notice, e-mail, or telephone
- No one admitted past security without using keycard or sign-in procedure
- Building maintenance performs physical inspection of facility perimeter

Threat Level: High

- All supervisory personnel and guard services notified directly by executive staff or department heads of increased threat level
- All employees notified of increased threat level by radio communication or personal contact from supervisor
- Supervisor will verify ID of employees entering the property
- Only essential deliveries to be accepted; delivery vehicles to be accompanied from guard station; meetings/training involving non-CTTRANSIT personnel canceled
- Non-essential office employees to be excused
- Security personnel perform physical inspection of facility perimeter
- All supervisory employees called in
- Available operators held pending direction from CDOT
- Operators directed to perform physical inspection of their bus at layover; all buses inspected at pull-in

Threat Level: Severe

- Perimeter sealed; guard to verify employee ID and inspect vehicle; no other vehicles allowed to enter
- CCTV to be continuously monitored by assigned supervisor
- Non-essential office employees excused
- Security personnel performs frequent physical inspection of facility perimeter using electric cart
- All available operators held or called in for possible use in an evacuation plan, subject to CDOT direction
- Downtown information and sales booths to be locked and vacated
- All available street supervisors dispatched to pre-assigned locations
- Operators perform physical inspection of bus at the end of each trip and pull-in; all packages left on bus to be considered suspicious.

Office of Maintenance
and
Highway Operations

Emergency Response Plan
Homeland Security
Advisory System

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1) Maintenance Emergency Response Plan - Homeland Security Advisory System	Pages 1-4
2) List of Movable Bridges/Phone Numbers/Bridge Locations	Exhibit 1
3) List of Maintenance Emergency Phone Numbers	Exhibit 2

Emergency Response Plan - Homeland Security Advisory System
Office of Maintenance and Highway Operations

Low Threat Level (Green)

Low risk of terrorist attacks:

The following protective measures may be applied by the Office of Maintenance:

- All maintenance personnel shall be made aware of the present state of security and will be updated as security levels change.
- Field personnel shall report any suspicious activities on roadways, in rest areas and around movable bridges. Field personnel include managers, general supervisors, supervisors, crew leaders, maintainers, rest area attendants, movable bridge operators, service patrol and permit inspectors.
- Periodic monitoring of limited-access highways for suspicious activities using close circuit television located in the Newington and Bridgeport Operations Centers. Any suspicious activities will be reported to supervisory staff and the State Police.
- Rest area attendants will be on the look out for suspicious activities especially vehicles left unattended for long periods of time.
- All maintenance garages' trucks and heavy equipment should be secured and locked up at the end of the workday. Field personnel will report any tampering or breaches of security gates and entrances to supervisors. Incident reports will be filled out for any security breaches and shall immediately be reported to Staff Maintenance, the District Radio Rooms and the Newington and Bridgeport Operations Centers.
- Perform daily checks of the Maintenance radio system.
- Any maintenance equipment such as mowers and tractors left on roadways will be checked daily by equipment operators for tampering with gas tanks, etc., before starting the equipment.
- The Office of Maintenance herbicide contractor's equipment will only be stored in a secured location.
- Any maintenance activity on the Baldwin and Goldstar Bridges will be reported to the State Police by Highway Operations.
- All acetylene tanks and other highly flammable materials are to be kept in a secure location.

Guarded Threat Level (Blue)

General risk of terrorist attacks:

In addition to the previously outlined protective measures, the following preventive measures may be applied by the Office of Maintenance:

- Continued monitoring and surveillance of limited-access highways for suspicious activities by the Newington Operations Center and Bridgeport Operations Center.
- Portable generators will be started up once a week to ensure they are in good working condition, adequately fueled and serviced.
- Movable bridge operators shall do a walk-around checking key areas of the bridges for suspicious activities.
- Amida light towers will be started up once a week to ensure they are in good working condition.

Elevated Threat Level (Yellow)

Significant risk of terrorist attacks:

In addition to the previously outlined protective measures, the following preventive measures may be applied by the Office of Maintenance:

- Elevated monitoring and surveillance of limited-access highways for suspicious activities by the Newington Operations Center and Bridgeport Operations Center.
- Security personnel located at the district offices will be notified that we are in elevated state of security.
- Perform weekly visual inspections of Maintenance's radio towers.
- All maintenance personnel shall visually display ID badges.
- Review emergency response plans with appropriate personnel for the manual operation of staffed movable bridges.
- Portable variable message signs shall be checked to ensure they are in good working condition at assigned garages.

High Threat Level (Orange)

High risk of terrorist attacks:

In addition to the previously outlined protective measures, the following preventive measures may be applied by the Office of Maintenance:

- Access further refinement of current protective measures within the context of the threat information.
- Monitoring of critical arteries and bridges by supervisors and crew leaders.
- Heightened monitoring and surveillance of critical highway locations for suspicious activities by the Newington Operations Center and Bridgeport Operations Center.
- No equipment will be left on limited-access highways overnight.
- Access to maintenance facilities will be restricted to authorized personnel only.
- The Office of Maintenance will be prepared to issue public service announcements via the highway advisory radio system, variable message signs and the Internet.
- Portable variable message signs will be available as needed to inform the travelling public should an incident occur.
- All gasoline, diesel fuel and oil tanks shall be topped off before securing maintenance garages at end of the workday.
- All equipment shall be fueled prior to leaving at the end of the workday.

Severe Threat Level (Red)

Severe risk of terrorist attacks:

In addition to the previously outlined protective measures, the following preventive measures may be applied by the Office of Maintenance:

- Management personnel will be on call and shall be activated if an incident occurs.
- Emergency call out procedures shall be in place and ready to activate.
- A select team of maintainers (crew leader, flatbed trailer operator, payload operator and a truck driver) will be ready to deploy and set up movable barrier as directed.
- The Department's mobile operations bus and driver will be available if needed.
- Constant monitoring and surveillance of critical highway interchanges for suspicious activities by the Newington Operations Center and Bridgeport Operations Center.
- The Department's Office of Emergency Management representative will be on call and shall be activated if an incident occurs.
- The Newington and Bridgeport Operations Centers' staff shall be placed on high alert. The Storm Center shall be activated if an incident occurs to communicate with the Office of Emergency Management located at the State Armory in Hartford.
- The Office of Maintenance radio control rooms located at each district shall be activated if an incident occurs to provide communications capabilities, should the state's phone system become inoperable.
- Assigned staff at the state's nine movable bridges shall be placed on high alert.
- Equipment will be removed from all roadways at the end of the workday.
- All unsecured equipment will be brought to and stored in a secured location.

EXHIBIT 1

MOVABLE BRIDGES & BRIDGE LOCATIONS

<u>Bridge No.</u>	<u>Bridge Name</u>	<u>Bridge Phone No.</u>
00327	Devon Bridge	203-579-6203
00337	Tomlinson Bridge	203-468-1625
01349	Saugatuck River Bridge	203-866-7691 (Unstaffed)
02295	Straffolino Bridge	203-866-7691
02475	Stratford Avenue Bridge	203-579-6204
03637	Yellow Mill Bridge	203-579-6972 (Unstaffed)
00362	Mystic River Bridge	860-536-7070
01138	East Haddam Bridge	860-873-8106
06026	Niantic Bridge	860-440-3455

EXHIBIT 2

MAINTENANCE EMERGENCY NUMBERS

INCIDENT MANAGEMENT: NEWINGTON OPERATIONS		BRIDGEPORT OPERATIONS		(860) 594-3447	(203) 696-2690		
NAME:	CELL PHONE	BEEPER	CALL LETTERS	HOME PHONE	WORK PHONE	NEXTEL PHONE	
L.R. MALERBA			MAINT. 1	(860) 349-1124	(860) 594-2604	883-6301	
M.D. TURANO	490-3261		MAINT. 2	(860) 546-9310	(860) 594-2606		
J.E.LEWIS Jr.	490-8630		MAINT. 3	(860) 434-5975	(860) 594-2638		
F.R. LIBERATORE	490-3262		MAINT. 5	(860) 721-6036	(860) 594-2624		
J.D. MICALI	604-4256	(800) 347-2574 81431	MAINT. 7	(860) 667-2977	(860) 594-2608		
P. MARCHAND	573-2754	82492	EQUIPT. 1	(860) 379-0943	(860) 594-2639		
W.W. STOECKERT			OPER. 1	(860) 482-0466	(860) 594-2630	883-6180	
W.T.McALLISTER	681-5106	(860) 590-0174	1 MIKE 1	(860) 301-3534	(860) 258-4501		
		(800) 347-2574					
J. WILSON	490-8629	86471	1 MIKE 2	(860) 663-3757	(860) 875-4993		
P. ZOPPI	559-1586	86452	1 MIKE 3	(203) 333-1606	(860) 513-5636		
G CANFIELD	490-3236	86490	1 MIKE 4	(860) 542-5315	(860) 258-4531		
R. MONGILLO	604-1858	86481	2 MIKE 1	(860) 747-4840	(860) 823-3222		
R. CORMIER	604-1855	83979	2 MIKE 2	(860) 546-9896	(860) 465-8074		
J. DURANTE	490-3269	88463	2 MIKE 3	(203) 933-7950	(860) 388-3220		
J.J. CZARNECKI	(203) 605-1944	87081	3 MIKE 1	(203) 723-2873	(203) 389-3020		
E. HANSON	(203) 530-2416	87209	3 MIKE 2	(203) 723-0551	(203) 269-8488		
J. HEMSTOCK	(203) 494-2722	87211	3 MIKE 3	(203) 734-0195	(203) 972-5098		
W. PAPP	(203) 209-3366	81734	3 MIKE 4	(203) 377-5447	(203) 878-6300		
S.T.COCHRAN	490-8628	63136	4 MIKE 1	(203) 888-4360	(860) 585-2796		
C. DRDA	859-7370	83601	4 MIKE 2	(860) 485-0362	(860) 379-4414		
J. YEOMANS	604-1859	87205	4 MIKE 3	(860) 349-0049	(203) 881-0529		

Mr. SHAYS. Harry, thank you very much or, Mr. Harris.

Representative Tierney needs to leave here in about 10 minutes. So he's got the floor and he's got a driver ready to take him.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much.

I thank all of you again for your testimony.

Captain Buturla, my understanding is that you're essentially the Safety Protective Services individually or personally involved in coordinating the State's Homeland Security, for lack of a better terminology, approach; is that right?

Captain BUTURLA. That is right.

Mr. TIERNEY. So let me ask you, have you then taken all of these different agencies within the State, whether it be the National Guard or Mr. Harris's Transportation Department or the State Public Health or State Police and so forth and sort of merged them together as one entity?

Captain BUTURLA. No, there hasn't been a merging of agencies, not like would be proposed on the Federal side.

Mr. TIERNEY. Instead you're sort of coordinating that effort, right?

Captain BUTURLA. It's more of a coordinating effort between our division and the general who chairs the Domestic Preparedness Steering Council and brings everybody to the table to work on things collectively.

Mr. TIERNEY. And is that working well?

Captain BUTURLA. It is.

Mr. TIERNEY. And do you work on memorandum agreements or any other formal basis or just how do you do it?

Captain BUTURLA. Well, much of what we do is if an incident—or if we are looking at a specific problem area, we would reach out to various experts. If we had an issue with transportation, we would contact the Department of Transportation, and whatever the issue may be, we will work to resolve it within State government. And usually by resolving it with the State government will reach out to the local agencies also.

Mr. TIERNEY. Are you then responsible for advising the government with respect to the allocation of resources, if you identify a situation, advising the Governor and the State legislature as to where you might—or what resources are best for a particular concern?

Captain BUTURLA. We may be depending on what the issue is.

Mr. TIERNEY. I raise it because I had a particular concern, as well as Chairman Shays on, you know, a number of matters with respect to this. I have great concern about the President's plan of putting 177,000 people from different agencies, lumping them together into a new organization. I think most of the Members of Congress agree that we ought to have a standard local position for Homeland Security. My preference would be that individual work more on a State model where that individual then has the authority to bring together all the parties and work out agreements as to how they will be addressed going forward. I am considerably concerned about putting FEMA in or putting the Coast Guard in and other Federal agencies in total.

We had testimony from the General Accounting Office that it would take no less than 5 and probably closer to 10 years to get

an organization like that together with some sort of operable form where we would actually be able to get some good coordinating results. I don't think we have that amount of time. I think we have to move a lot quicker than that. That's why I think in some sense the proposal is unmanageable and problematic for us. I would much rather see a model where we have the cabinet local position coordinating things with the authority to call people together.

The concept that these different cultures, the turf battles, the budget battles, all those things are going to create problems that we have a lot of cooperation diversions. I don't think it's a good idea to sort of put them together until they find out later on it just doesn't work, and I have that real concern here.

I also have the concern that we're going to lose some of the other core functions, some of the agencies with respect to FEMA in particular by putting them together in a agency whose core responsibility is national security so it assumes and moves the others to the back on that.

So I wanted to share with you, and I don't want to put you on the spot because I know you're a company guy here and I don't want to do that. But we're building a record here and I wanted you to have some comfort. But I wanted to tell, you know, the former FEMA Director, James DeWitt, who I credit with doing great things for that department, it used to be people in my town, the citizens didn't want to see FEMA coming. When they said FEMA's coming to town, they'd try to throw up boards and just keep them out. But I think that's turned around. Now people look to FEMA. They look for them to assist.

Well, we had a comment over the last decade FEMA has responded to over 500 emergencies of major disaster events. Two of those, two of them were related to terrorists, Oklahoma City and New York City. His view, "entering FEMA into a Homeland of National Security agency seriously compromises an agency's previously affected response to natural hazards."

We all know the major FEMA responsibilities that are unrelated to Homeland Security include, among others, the following: Providing flood insurance and mitigation services, including free disaster mitigation, hazard mitigation and flood damage, conducting various programs and mitigating the affects of natural disasters such as programs to assist States in preparing for hurricane and natural earthquake hazardous reduction programs, providing temporary housing and food for homeless people, and operating the National Fire Data Center and National Fire Incident reporting system to reduce the loss of life in fire related incidents and much, much more.

It may give me some comfort to have you explain somehow why it is that we have to take the entire FEMA and put it into this 170,000 plus person group with all of the problems that I envision it's going to create as opposed to having FEMA work cooperatively with the Homeland Secretary and be responsive in the incidents of terrorist related events while leaving them free to deal with incidents other than terrorists.

Mr. CRAIG. Well, that's an easy question to answer. FEMA has a role of first and foremost preparedness, whether it's terrorism, whether it's natural disaster, whatever it may be. The Office of

Natural Preparedness within FEMA was organized in March of last year before the terrorist events of September 11th. FEMA will be going in the plan to the Department of Homeland Security as a whole. It's not being carved up. Pieces aren't being sent anywhere else.

Mr. TIERNEY. But there's people who are trying. That's actually not over yet.

Mr. SHAYS. Let's speak a little slower. I want to make sure you're on the record.

Mr. TIERNEY. The fact of the matter is that there are people who are trying to divide it up.

Mr. CRAIG. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. So we're not actually there yet.

Mr. CRAIG. The role of the presiding president is to move it as a whole to the Department of Homeland Security. Our functions, our role inside the Department of Homeland Security will not change. We will still be the lead agency for flood insurance mitigation, for preparedness. Whatever our functions are now, that will not change.

A couple of the reasons why it is necessary for us to go to the Department of Homeland Security, one is—it was talked about on this panel earlier and other panels over the day, is a single point of contact with the Federal Government. Not only just for terrorism grants or first responder grants. There's approximately \$35 billion of Federal grants for terrorism this year spread across numerous Federal agencies, which will all be part of this Department of Homeland Security. If there's that single place that first responders or local governments or State governments can go to get access to most of the grants, to the expertise, to the training, to the planning expertise, it is going to be better for the local communities and for the State communities.

The goals, the mission of FEMA will not change in the Department of Homeland Security. We will still complete our mission. Preparedness for terrorism is one part of that, yes, but our preparedness for all events is what FEMA works with the States on and the local governments, and that will not change in the Department of Homeland Security.

But to better coordinate with the other Federal agencies—we do have a tough time with some of the Federal agencies coordinating, and getting them into one department will help. There are numerous agencies involved, Federal agencies, pieces of the State department. It will help us coordinate better with them. We have numerous meetings with the other Federal agencies. Some do come. Some that don't come. And we will—it will help us having one department better coordinate with the States, with other Federal Government agencies.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, I hope you're right. I suspect that it will come out that way, but I think right now if we had a secretary, they'd be able to call those people together and get them to the table to have that kind of party. It wouldn't entail dropping everybody into the same pie. So I would suspect that you're being honest and, frankly, being wishful more so than (indiscernible).

I think FEMA, as I heard from the earlier testimony, already is the primary point of contact for most communities and I think it

does a good job on that. And knowing there's two out of 500 incidents that fall under terrorist attacks, it still gives me great concern. But knowing that you're one of the individuals working with FEMA, it does at least give me some comfort and I appreciate the services you give. I know that you took office I think the day before September 11th, which had you on (indiscernible).

Mr. CRAIG. One comment on the earlier statement that the local governments call FEMA first. We will not and do not do any response without the State requesting it from FEMA. We don't work directly with the Federal Governments, the local governments. They don't come directly to us. They will call the State Office of Emergency Management and they will contact us. But we don't work directly with them.

Mr. TIERNEY. So I thank you for your services, and again I hope your wish (indiscernible) with the President's merger goes into effect.

And before I leave, Mr. Chairman, I just want to thank all of the witnesses that testified today, all of the fellow panelists for their courtesies. I know that I probably had more questions to ask and I may have taken some of your time. I'm very good at that. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the community for being so gracious and I hope to be back sometime soon.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Tierney, again, I appreciate this. This is the second time you've come down to the district and I appreciate the fact that you spent your day with us, and travel safe.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I am going to recognize Senator McKinney and then I'll have questions after. Senator McKinney, we're going to go to you next.

Mr. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In looking at the purpose of the hearing, obviously we're here to hear about progress that's been made in local preparedness, and thankfully there has not been a tragic incident that has tested our preparedness. However, General, we did have, I guess for the lack of a better term, the false alarm with the reservoir in Easton where three individuals were apprehended on top of one of the water tanks. And I'm just wondering if you have sort of learned anything from that incident in terms of the task force, you know, operation manual that you were putting together in coordination between the State and local agencies and the different agencies of police and health departments that might be useful for Chairman Shays?

General CUGNO. The answer to your question is yes. Specifically, the incident that happened, Chief Solomon, who's the Chief Police in Easton, was quoted as saying that by following the guide that was provided and by the State's leadership, was able to come up with the answers and immediate response from the State with resources that he thought they otherwise would not have had. It was a cooperative effort between Protective Services, the commissioner of the department, Vin DeRosa, and I'm sure many of them were onsite with a number of resources from the State directed to that incident. Within 2 days the incident was over and finished.

And I might add that the Federal Office of Investigation also participated with law enforcement support. The State police participated. The Department of Health participated. Dr. Garcia's office

participated. There were a number of Federal and State agencies who supported the effort throughout the State. It was done following the guidelines that were provided them. And basically it started with a phone call to the region's representative and that is the Office of Emergency Management.

As Dan has mentioned, it's not directly to FEMA. It goes to the region. Connecticut follows the Federal response plan and we reach them, the municipalities, with the incident command system. The incident commander was Chief Solomon.

Mr. MCKINNEY. And my last question is for you, Mr. Harris, Harry, and it's probably a question that's already been answered, but obviously we've seen, you know, a great deal of emphasis on airport security obviously after the events of September 11th. Yet our trains and our ships can be used as weapons or transportation for weapons. Are we doing anything to protect those methods of transportation? I mean, obviously if you make sure that someone gets on a plane without a weapon, you don't have to check them when they get off, but that's not necessarily true with somebody on cargo ships. Where are we moving in that direction?

Mr. HARRIS. I'm afraid I cannot respond in too much detail on either trains or cargo. The ports—the Department of Aviation and Ports is taking a look at cargo and shipments and developing security procedures. They are participating in this pilot program and taking a look at that. I cannot—I would have to get back to you with more details, that which can be discussed, to answer that question.

On the rail side of it, there's been a lot of talk and a lot of discussion in terms of using the rails and how that could be a potential for terrorism. Again, there's some things that you just can't discuss with any more—you know, it's very close to, you know, in terms of what they do and such as Amtrak.

Amtrak is now requiring, you know, that all passengers provide additional, you know, photo ID's and so forth. That simply is not practical on a commuter rail line. There are police, you know, riding the trains. There are, you know, Metro North personnel riding the trains and so forth, but when you're moving 50, 60,000 people on a rail line in the morning, it's just not, you know, possible to do that level.

There's also been a—basically levels of threat assessment. How much damage could be done by an individual. An airplane became a moving bomb. A train can't be. It can't get off the tracks, you know, and kind of stuff. So there has been a lot of—we've looked at assessments of points of vulnerability. Obviously Grand Central is the highest target area and there's a lot to be done to protect Grand Central. Less so we've looked at the various stations along the line, but obviously they're not as high a target.

The infrastructure, the movable bridges. We have four movable bridges in the State of—three movable bridges on the Metro North line. If any one of them gets hit, then the North East Corridor ceases to exist. And we're looking at threat assessment and what can we do to protect those and to maintain those. But that's basically what's been done.

Mr. MCKINNEY. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Ms. Boucher.

Ms. BOUCHER. Thank you, Mr. Congressman.

What I've picked up this afternoon and in other meetings as well are these areas of concern, and I just want to touch on two of them and ask two questions.

What I'm hearing is that communications is an issue. It's huge. That we can't communicate between each other, and then this is—in our first responders as well as hearing you mention on trains and having employees be able to communicate with each other.

The other big issue is equipment, PPE's or detection devices, that there's got to be training because the equipment is so sophisticated that it isn't going to be used unless there's training. In addition, there has to be maintenance on that equipment to keep them. I heard that there needs to be a standard plan that's distributed—at least a standard plan that everyone can follow and that there should be drills, that there should be State funded HazMat teams, that we need to grant local funding. There should be a notification system, early warning single point of contact. Those seem to be the big prevailing issues.

Now, the question I have for the general is when you mentioned in your discussion that you have a model plan in your documentation that is distributed but not necessarily a single plan, it's just a recommended plan and that local communities then develop their own, I'd like for you to react on the fact that it sounds to me like the local individuals are looking for maybe something more directive.

And then the question for the captain as well as Harry was on my previous question on not necessarily incident driven, but an evacuation. If, in fact, you can't communicate amongst personnel, then how do we put into place a mass evacuation plan that would be safe? Those are my two questions.

General CUGNO. If I could respond. First I understand is the question of the plan. There has to be a basic fundamental understanding of the Federal response plan. We fully support the municipality or local official is completely in charge. The first responders, as we discussed today their needs and requirements, every day go to work and have an emergency plan to respond to an incident within their community. The needs and requirements that they have have been categorized into additional equipment and personal protection into communications and into training and exercises so that they know how to do that.

The problem—when the first Justice Department grants came for 1999, 2000 and 2001, states—in our case, we put together a plan on how we would distribute it on a priority basis because it was an insignificant amount of money. It was \$2.6 million. That's insignificant when the needs are almost \$300 million.

So we said where is the threat and what are the priorities for distribution and how do we get the professionals to recognize we have other requirements. We came up with a regionally supported regionalization program. It is not a State funded program. But is, however, funded from the Justice Department. The grants that we received this year from the 2002 budget, which is more than \$1 million, goes just to regionalization and providing those that sign on to provide regional support for specific types of equipment.

Another thing that wasn't addressed today on a regional basis is the 31 hospitals. Every hospital received regional type equipment from the Domestic Steering Committee as part of the Justice Department grant. Those are success stories to answer part of your question. The plan and integration of it is us providing resources because our State is small rapidly moving from one end of the State to the other. So we minimize duplication because we know it is not affordable to provide every community every specific item that they would like. I'm not saying that they don't need it. And we also know that Federal funds that we receive are not a substitute for the general fund applications that have been implemented. So that's basically it.

Ms. BOUCHER. Thank you.

Captain BUTURLA. I'll address the communications issue first. Probably today, not tomorrow, all 169 towns will receive a letter regarding the fact that the State is willing to provide two 800 megahertz radios to each community in an attempt for a relatively quick solution of the interoperability problem. This will allow for the incident commanders to at least have communication so that we won't end up in a situation like what occurred in New York City where police and fire don't have the ability to talk. Communications is certainly something that is crucial to whatever type of emergency response, whether it be a local or a statewide response or even some type of national incident where we're bringing in Federal resources.

Our division—and we're setting up a search and rescue task force that is a multi-disciplinary type of organization that would have police, fire, structural engineers, medical personnel, all different types of representatives on this. We're in the process of setting this up. That too has a communications component that we're dealing with and that we're trying to link all that into a Connecticut sub-communications system or a State police radio system. So we are working on communications. The Governor made it his initiative to do this and get some type of initial fix, if you will, for the communications interoperability situation.

Mr. HARRIS. Let me respond to the communication issue looking at what happened on September 11th. Metro North has its own radio system. It's separate from, you know, the railroad system. They are able to communicate with all of their trains and all of their field personnel, but Connecticut—because of our unique relationship here in Connecticut where they are the operator and we are the owner of the system and we're the contractee, if you will, we do not have the ability to patch right into that system. So we have to be—the Metro North people are to find out what they're saying to one another.

When the commissioner in Hartford wanted to know what was going on, he called me via cell phone to find out what was going on so that I could relay it to him after I called on the cell phone to either New York or to New Haven to find out what was going on because I was in Stamford. So there is communication, but with that kind of incident, that kind of major problem, you know, it just doesn't work.

The Metro North system is also a single system. If for some reason their communications get shut down, then there is no redun-

dant backup system for that, which is one of the things that we're looking at. If we had to involve Connecticut Transit and all the buses and all the other players in there, we have no system other than the telephone to contact the various transit districts.

So while it's in place for an emergency of that kind, it clearly left some holes that need to be looked at. If you're looking at a massive evacuation kind of scenario, it gets all that much more complicated. And, again, the reason why I think we need some kind of a command center that has that ability to communicate back and forth to all the various players is because of the fragmented nature of public transportation in the State of Connecticut and the different players that are involved in it.

Ms. BOUCHER. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Before calling Mr. Stone and Representative—Representative Stone and Representative Duff, I just want to kind of have both of you start to think of the question—the answer to this question. I am hard pressed as a representative from the Fourth Congressional District as to why we would be under the Boston FEMA instead of under New York. I think of ourselves from the New York Metropolitan area and I feel that FEMA did a dirty trick appointing someone from my own congressional district and sending them up to Boston. If you could both think about that response, and, Mr. McCarty, I'm going to ask you to respond first as to why we shouldn't be looking at the entire metropolitan region. So that's what you can look forward to because I'd love an answer to that.

And let's go to you, Representative Stone, and then Representative Duff.

Mr. STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There are to my knowledge three levels of protective clothing for first responders. It's my understanding that there are as many as 16 potential biochemical weapons that can be utilized. Is any one of those suits capable of protecting our first responders in each one of those situations, and if so, what's the practicality of providing that outfit to each one of our first responders?

General CUGNO. Well, when we did the analysis for the Domestic Preparedness Steering Committee, we decided to standardize the suits that the State would be procuring with the Department of Justice funds using Level A. Level A meaning an excellent suit, and that's what we went with. I heard testimony today that some of the communities have purchased on their own suits. Some bought A's and some bought B's and C's for lesser threats or lesser incidents.

The intent of the State was on a priority basis to procure Level A and to begin distribution. We've distributed to a number of towns within the last—in the last few months. As equipment becomes available, manufacturers will—we're not distributing it from our office. It's coming directly from the manufacturer to the communities here.

In Fairfield County about—of the total grant for 1999, 2000 and 2001 more than 22, 23 percent of the dollars were expended here in the three largest communities, and also in addition to that HazMat dollars. In the 2002 grant, as that money becomes avail-

able, that equipment will also come in as suits for that, too. I can give you a breakdown of the towns. I would be happy to.

Mr. STONE. OK. Thank you. Staying with you, General, we've heard a lot of talk today about communications and people keep referring to 800 megahertz. In some of the hearings that we've had in Hartford you talked a great deal about a 700 megahertz system. I'm just wondering what the distinct advantages would be for the State of Connecticut over what's currently in place?

General CUGNO. Well, one of our colleagues earlier on the panel, he touched on it. He got into it pretty—it's got to be (indiscernible). You got to get the 700 megahertz emergency operations channels out. There simply are not enough communication channels. It isn't the hardware. No would should leave here thinking it's the radio.

Commissioner DeRosa and Protective Services are immediately impacting and responding so that the police chiefs that are out there in all communities will be able to at least discuss or communicate with someone in the incident command system, nets as we referred to it, but the real problem is these first responders need additional frequencies so that we can set it up and establish proper communications and proper nets rapidly.

Mr. STONE. There's also been some talk that it would be very advantageous for us to have a centralized communications system, for example, one for Fairfield County, which would coordinate all police, fire and EMS activities.

General CUGNO. I think that's an absolute benefit to the chiefs of police for all Fairfield County if they're able to establish nets, if you will, when they have the additional frequencies. Those are benefits of the frequencies, and they are absolutely necessary. So yes, and then hardware should be provided to adapt to those, but they have to have the frequencies.

Mr. STONE. Does that become a duplication of the State effort or is that just—

General CUGNO. Absolutely not. No, that does not duplicate the State effort at all. The State police operate the 800 trunking service with some smaller communities (indiscernible) on. We did that during the licensing. One must remember that all the activities for communications are licensed through the FCC. Now, we compete for those frequencies. That's a little understood item. We compete with the business world to get those frequencies. It should be mandated for public safety.

Mr. STONE. And, Captain, just one last question.

Captain BUTURLA. Sure.

Mr. STONE. The USAR teams, we've heard about them for awhile. I know it's a lot of work to put it together. Where are we and when can we expect it to be up and running?

Captain BUTURLA. The USAR team—I'm very happy to say that we just received some DOJ funding to begin equipment purchases. It takes about a million and a half dollars to adequately equip initially a USAR team. We are modeling the Connecticut team after the FEMA model. We are at the point now where we are soon to be advertising the availability of the positions. We're having some applications reviewed by counsel and looking at the ramifications of different types of positions that we're going to select people from.

The team itself will be a statewide team, and you heard from previous testimony that it takes substantial time to get Federal resources here. It's our goal to have the Connecticut Urban Search and Rescue Task Force onsite within 60 to 90 minutes of any large-scale structural collapse, regardless of the cause, within the State of Connecticut. It is something that is necessary, and right after September 11th the Governor came out publicly and said we will have one in this State, and we are working to that end right now.

Mr. STONE. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Representative Duff.

Mr. DUFF. Thank you, Congressman. I'm going to have to go in a few minutes but, again, I wanted to thank you for having me up here today.

I think on all three panels there has been a tremendous amount of testimony about our needs and our wants, and I guess I would just say that we really need to get our act together and that some of these—we really need to work well with the municipalities and we have to have more than kind of a wish list. I think we have to have a needs list and I think it's something we need to do sooner than later.

Can everybody hear me?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER. Yes.

Mr. DUFF. Anyway, the question I had was for the General. You spoke of the Steering Committee, correct?

General CUGNO. Yes.

Mr. DUFF. And you're working—is there a way of working with agencies that may not be part of your task force in the sense that—I'm trying to think I guess a little outside the box or anticipate maybe where terrorists or somebody may strike such as postal services with anthrax. I don't think anybody really anticipated that may happen. But are there ways of saying, OK, we know we need to coordinate with the first responders, police, fire, emergency medical, but are we also thinking of say the postal service as well as say cargo companies or any other kind of places where there may be some weaknesses that may not be governmental agency contrived businesses but could have—potentially may have some terrorist implications because of that?

General CUGNO. Yes is the answer to your question. The Connecticut Conference of Municipalities is represented and that organization is small towns. The business representative is the emergency medical technicians (indiscernible). The guidance from the Governor was inclusive rather than exclusive. And really the reason is you're looking to get a consensus of approval on the distribution process of Federal resources as they come in and also in building a safe plan because they're so limited in terms of dollars. There's limited Federal funds. So absolutely, yeah.

Right now the funding strength is hung up in Congress now. With the supplementals soon to be, we'll be able to proceed again and continue on with the distribution of the priority PD and other (indiscernible).

Mr. DUFF. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Let me start off with that question. I have a number of questions I'd like to ask all of you.

Let me first thank you, General Cugno, for State sponsorship of a hearing we had on March 27th when you redid basically the workout of the disaster on the Amtrak train. And what we learned from that was just incredible. 200 people together not knowing how they would work with each other and seeing them walk through that was a tremendous—it was a tremendous thing to see the firemen, police, EMS and the Health Department and so on all getting together.

I want to ask Mr. Craig and Mr. McCarty the question of the organizational team. And I realize you work within a system and so this isn't your decision. This is the way it is. But I mean I can understand why you would have New England as it related to the Department of Education or some other government agency. I can understand that it deals with a lot of different departments and agencies and governments. I have a gigantic challenge understanding why we live in Greenwich or Stamford or Norwalk or Bridgeport, why we would want Mr. Craig's organization out of Boston responding to that crisis and not the Greater New York area FEMA. And maybe you do and maybe you just don't know it. So walk me through it.

Mr. MCCARTY. One thing I should make clear at the onset is that the lines that separate Region I from Region II is strictly administrative. It makes no physical or functional difference to the organization. Clearly during the events of the World Trade Center, there was no difference between Region I and Region II. As you well know, the regional office was very affected by the disaster. As a matter of fact we had to leave (indiscernible) Plaza, and Region I was actually Region II for at least 14 hours.

In the events after the World Trade Center, many citizens in the State of Connecticut were victims of the disaster, and that's why we felt that they should apply to our recovery office for whatever assistance they required or whatever assistance was necessary for them to continue on with their lives. Clearly those lines that separate the two regions are strictly administrative and for most purposes, to be very honest with you, they're transparent.

Getting back to your question, and it's a very valid question, one of our major concerns is Southern Westchester County. There's seven large cities in Westchester County and bordering them is Connecticut and Darien. We encourage those seven cities to work very closely in developing that HazMat plan, which again is similar to an all-hazards plan, which is traffic as well as technological for man-made disasters.

That part of Connecticut, they're working with us because we've encouraged them to do it and we see that as a very viable need and interdependency between Westchester County and the southern part of Connecticut. That's an initiative that's being done on the local level with the encouragement of both Region I and Region II.

So, again, it goes back to where administratively speaking, yes, the State of Connecticut is in Region I, but for all practical purposes it is transparent to us and the Federal—another point that I should clearly point out to you is that I'm also responsible for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the territory of the United States in the Virgin Islands. Distance is not a factor in our response capability. It's hardly even a challenge when I talk about

4,400 miles. So Mr. Craig's response to Connecticut at only 150 miles is minuscule to the amount of response that you get—clearly that you're going to receive from Region I.

Should an incident ever occur, naturally Region I and Region II will always support each other.

Mr. SHAYS. Excuse me. We have to stop. You need to move the mic a little closer. The transcriber missed the last thing you said. We're almost to the end and I appreciate all your good work today.

Mr. MCCARTY. I'm very sorry if I'm creating more problems.

Mr. SHAYS. You almost have a Boston accent.

Mr. MCCARTY. No, I don't, sir. That's probably the one reason why the Connecticut Region isn't in Region II. I have a Brooklyn accent, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. MCCARTY. But, again, as far as administrative functions, that's the only reason it separates.

Mr. SHAYS. Before I go to you, Mr. Craig, the bottom line is you're saying that if Mr. Craig needs a resource that Region II has, he's just going to call you up and you're going to get it there.

Mr. MCCARTY. Absolutely. We both—all Regions. Region II supports Region I and Region III always in these types of incidents.

Mr. SHAYS. And if there's paperwork to be filled out—

Mr. MCCARTY. We leave that with Region I.

Mr. SHAYS. Pardon me?

Mr. MCCARTY. We leave that to Region I.

Mr. SHAYS. Right, but I would make the assumption, and now I'm almost wondering if I should make that assumption, you would be sending people down to the area rather than having them have to come up to Boston to do that work.

Mr. MCCARTY. Well, are you talking in reference to the events of the World Trade Center?

Mr. SHAYS. No, I'm just talking about any filing of any paper in any action. There are forms to be filled out for FEMA and you're not going to direct that—and this goes to you also, Mr. Craig. I mean, if someone has a—see, I don't get in any big struggle. First off, Mr. Tierney and I have a slight disagreement on the issue of your intentions. He has doubts and I don't. But he understands why we're having this debate, and you gave a very nice answer. I think I was pleased with the answer and, you know, he hopes you're accurate about how it will turn out. I mean, so we have disagreements in Congress not just between Republicans and Democrats, but between Republicans and Republicans and Democrats and Democrats.

But in the case of filling out forms and so on, if it's easier for someone to do it in New York, would they do it or would you actually be sending people down from your office to Fairfield, CT or to Darien, CT?

Mr. CRAIG. In the case of filling out forms, almost every program we have that's federally funded goes through the State anyway. So those forms get sent to Hartford and Hartford sends them to us.

One exception to that is the Fire Grant program. I have a fire point contact employee that actually goes out to all the local fire houses and works with them in getting that paperwork filled out, and that would be sent to Boston and not to New York. But there

are very few grant programs that we go directly to the local governments and most of those go through Hartford.

Administratively if we split up the State, it would be an administrative measure for a State administrative program in that they would be working with two different regions, Boston and New York, filling out forms for two different States, having planned for two different regions. Administratively it would be a nightmare.

Mr. SHAYS. So you're saying administratively it would be handled, and you're basically saying the response to a disaster is going to be national indicating—

Mr. CRAIG. To a Presidentially declared disaster there will be a site that the locals could go to. We'd open up a disaster field office for them.

Mr. SHAYS. But if you opened up a field office, it's possible that Mr. McCarty's Region II is going to be assisting you?

Mr. CRAIG. There's quite a few of his disaster employees that may come under—

Mr. SHAYS. And the logic of this is clearly—I mean, you could have one region of the country that hardly ever has to deal with a disaster and you could have some that have many. And I would imagine that you have the ability to move resources wherever you need them.

Mr. CRAIG. That's correct. The one example that was used before was the Atlanta office has approximately 400 disaster employees. They do not have any Presidentially declared disaster right now. They have approximately 350 of those employees allocated to other disasters around the country. So those employees go anywhere.

It would be a nightmare to split up a State. We do have a lot of resources that we work together with in Region II. As I said earlier, the Federal Regional Center, which covers both Regions I and II, emergencies that are associated with that comes from both Regions I and II. So we do—as Mr. McCarty said, those lines are purely administrative for management, but any response to a disaster would be manageable (indiscernible).

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just add and speak to our translator because—transcriber because when we're finished with all of you, I am going to invite anyone who wants to put anything on the record, anyone who testified at any of the previous panels, if they want to come in based on what they've heard this panel say and add to it.

I am not clear, Mr. Harris, and others on whether we have an evacuation plan. Do we have an evacuation plan if we have a—whether it's in Millstone or whether it's a nuclear plant on the Hudson, do we have an evacuation plan in place that FEMA has worked on, the State has worked on? Is the answer yes or no?

Mr. CRAIG. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. The answer is?

Mr. CRAIG. Yes. That is tested every 2 years.

Mr. SHAYS. Pardon me?

Mr. CRAIG. That plan is tested every 2 years.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. For every—

Mr. CRAIG. Each and every department.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Now, let me go into it a bit. How comfortable are you that the various units know it? How comfortable are you that

we can implement it? And when I say various units, so that if I just spoke to someone working for the State, would they know this plan and would they be comfortable in articulating it? General Cugno.

General CUGNO. Yes, the tests we do, they're certified.

Mr. SHAYS. You do it and they certify it?

General CUGNO. They certify it. And it's an annual requirement every 2 years. It's a requirement. Our office has—

Mr. SHAYS. But you're not the FEMA director in the sense that—so help me out here.

General CUGNO. The Office of Emergency Management—

Mr. SHAYS. It's under you.

General CUGNO. Yes, sir. And we receive Federal dollars from FEMA offsetting their pay. We also provide municipalities several dollars from FEMA, pass-through dollars, and that's (indiscernible) into the cities and plans.

Mr. SHAYS. So, Captain, your responsibility is to look at Homeland Security from not a national disaster standpoint, but more from an act of terrorism and you don't have this dual response of securing the homeland whether it's natural or not natural?

Captain BUTURLA. We do to some extent. The Office of Emergency Management is under a (indiscernible) but we do look at consequence management in a variety of different manners.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask as to where you are under, what are you under?

Captain BUTURLA. The Department of Public Safety.

Mr. SHAYS. Right. So you're not under the emergency management.

Captain BUTURLA. No, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So you're saying—let me just focus on your part of that responsibility. It's your focus primarily in response to terrorist attacks both—and are you both detection and prevention as well as preparedness and consequence management?

Captain BUTURLA. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. All of the above?

Captain BUTURLA. All of the above. We work very closely with the General Office of Emergency Management and Commissioner DeRosa and we would be joined at the hip, and honestly would have to be in order for it to succeed.

Mr. SHAYS. Harry, are you familiar with an evacuation plan?

Mr. HARRIS. I know that the Highway Department has an evacuation plan for Millstone and so forth, but I'm not personally—

Mr. SHAYS. But someone in the department is familiar with it?

Mr. HARRIS. Yeah, in terms of Millstone and so forth. There is no mass evacuation plan for the rail system.

Mr. SHAYS. I mean, it's very impressive how quickly the State helped empty out the beds where they could in our hospitals in the Greater New York area or Connecticut. And so obviously there was a plan. A lot of people didn't know about it, but when it was implemented, it was pretty darn effective. So I think that we're going to want to take a look at that a little bit, this so-called evacuation because the bottom line is we have a hard time getting around this place when there's no traffic, you know.

General CUGNO. Mr. Chairman, can I add one thing? After September 11th when the Emergency Management Center opened, sitting at the head of the table was the Governor and every commissioner in the State was represented there. Commissioner DeRosa and I and all commissioners, health through transportation. Every issue in every incident in every agency's plan is then directed at that emergency operation center. That's how the hospitals scheduled—when the individuals were here meeting and greeting people as they got off the rail lines, it was directed from that office. When there were—parts of the public had no knowledge then because they were looking to see if there was another incident that was going to happen.

Mr. SHAYS. Any other comments? What I'd like to—

Mr. CRAIG. I have one comment and that's to remind you that FEMA has responsibility for those evacuation plans and any plans related for biological offsite from a nuclear power station. We don't have any responsibility for incidents or security plans onsite. That's the responsibility of the inner city and the owner of the power plant site.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, this just gives me a good opportunity to say to you two for the record, I happen to believe it's not a question of when, where and in what magnitude we're going to deal with chemical, biological, radioactive or heaven forbid even nuclear, and for me the real organization of government has to come in response to what was the threat, what's the strategy and then how do we organize it.

The genesis of this was bipartisan and the motivation clearly was bipartisan. There were as many Democrats as Republicans encouraging the White House to respond. In fact, to his credit Senator Lieberman was at the very forefront of this along with many of us, but clearly a much higher profile as the Senator and he made this committee to basically help us with this legislation. So Connecticut has been kind of invited to the forefront in this effort and it is without question needed. But we will have to work out the parts and work overtime to make it work.

I am interested to know by a show of hands who would like to address—I would like to keep you all here, if you don't mind, because there may be a response.

Who would like to address this committee? You won't be sworn in. We have one. We have two. We have three. We have four. And I have a feeling we'll hear from Mr. Docimo. I know you too well.

OK. Can you raise your hands again, please. One, two, three, four, five.

What we're going to ask you to do is we're going to give you a pad of paper and ask you to write in your full name and give it to the transcriber. We're going to have you come up. You can make a comment. You can ask a question of the panels. You can do almost anything you want to do. So we will want you to repeat your name, say your name, and then make your comment or address your question.

I'd like these names—can we put them on one pad? Just put them on one, each one to a separate page.

Who's ready to go? Does the mic work?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Talk right into it.

Mr. BROWNING. I'm David Browning. I'm a citizen from Stamford. First of all, I am very impressed and reassured by all the dedication and expertise that I've seen here. I thank you very much, Chairman Shays, for having the meeting here.

The comment is there's one word that I heard one time here and that was urgency, and I think Chief Berry said that. This is an urgent situation here. And I'd like to ask you, Mr. Chairman, and anyone else, do you think that all of us have an adequate feeling of urgency about this and that we can, in fact, get on with the business on a nonpartisan basis and get something done that will put us in a good position to handle this whole Homeland Security question?

Mr. SHAYS. Let me respond to that. This has been remarkably bipartisan in terms of the whole issue of reorganization of government, but that's just one part of it. But in dealing with the sense of urgency, I don't think that the American people have the same sense of urgency that those who have worked in this area have. If you've worked in this area, you have some sleepless nights.

I go sometimes to the Capitol. I look at the Capitol building and say enjoy the view. It's a precious view. It may not be there. I look at the Washington Monument and sometimes wonder will it be there. I think of my wife and brother who work in the city of Washington. I think of it in terms of the fact that we literally have a government in exile in anticipation of a potential attack on the city of Washington or any other city, but particularly the city of Washington. And that a government in exile—not in exile but in hiding in a protected area would be called to reconstruct our government. And when people were astounded that the President had done this and some Members of Congress, I was astounded that they didn't have the anticipation that would be done and it told me even within government there isn't this sense or recognition of the urgency of the issue.

But in terms of how is the government working? Night and day. On the local level, on the State level, but clearly on the Federal level night and day people are trying to catch up to this new threat. So the urgency I think is not underestimated by most in government. I think more so by the general public.

And one of the challenges you have is how honest are you with the American people. And my practice is tell the American people the truth about how you do the right thing, and that's why shortly after September 11th I was saying things in contradiction to certain things you heard from say the Secretary of Health and Human Services.

For instance, when he said if we have a biological attack on small pockets, do we have the ability to deal with it, and the answer was we don't have the ability to deal with it. When others said, you know, there won't be an attack or a potential attack, I was saying I think the honest answer is that there could be and more likely will be. It's a question of time, not a question of if, and so on. But I'm pretty impressed with the sense of urgency at least within our government.

Yes, ma'am, if you can state your—excuse me. Does anyone else want to make a comment or anything about that first question?

Mr. MCCARTY. No, I would just echo that if people were here when the General said about the task force of the Governor putting together a coordination between all the State agencies and departments, especially bringing in the Department of Public Health, which is usually not talked about a lot in this area and that is critical, it has been bipartisan. It's been nonpartisan by us all. We will have to figure out how to pay for all this, but I suspect that also will be nonpartisan.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, ma'am.

Jack, did you want to say something? I'm sorry. I apologize.

Mr. STONE. I just wanted to add to the comments of both the Congressman and Senator McKinney, but as the ranking member of the Public Safety Committee, I have been greatly involved in a lot of these things that have transpired since September 11th, and was greatly impressed by two factors. One was the level of preparedness that this State was at prior to September 11th, things that we didn't even know about, and then, second, the urgency of which they responded and put their plans into place. So I think they're doing a tremendous job and I respect every one of them.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, Representative Boucher.

Ms. BOUCHER. Just one comment because I agree with my representatives up in Hartford that this is definitely a nonpartisan issue and has been, but I am concerned on the part of the public's perception on what's going on at least with the media in Washington, that sometimes there might be the perception out there that a lot of plans are being held up because of possibly a November election, and I don't think the public has any patience for that any longer, and I would hope that no politician sets out to do that.

Mr. SHAYS. Of either party. Are there any other responses? Do you want to make a last point?

Mr. MCCARTY. There was one thing I forgot just as by way of example of where we are in the State of Connecticut and where we were prior to September 11th. Dr. Garcia, who is the Commissioner of Public Health, went down to Washington, DC, and he was the main speaker at a seminar showing the rest of the country the Connecticut model because it was far and away superior to what all of the other States are doing. So we are the (indiscernible).

Mr. SHAYS. You've been very patient ma'am. Thank you. Your name, please.

Ms. DOBSON. Thank you. My name is Laurie Dobson and I'm a candidate for the democratic 141st District team for the House of Representatives.

Mr. SHAYS. And what town is that in?

Ms. DOBSON. In Darien. First I'd like to just acknowledge Representative Shays. I think I've come away from this hearing with a great deal of substantive information. I didn't expect (indiscernible) efforts and it was very practical and informative as well.

Yesterday at the Veterans' Town Hall meeting in Norwalk, Representative Shays justified the possible upcoming U.S. ban to strike on Iran based on information he said was procured that three or four American cities were targeted for terrorist attack. And my question is are any of those cities in this area? Can you give us any more information?

Mr. SHAYS. In terms of Iraq?

Ms. DOBSON. No, in terms of you justified that there would be reason for a pre-emptive strike on Iraq based on the fact that we now have information that three or four of our American cities have been targeted for an attack, and I'm just very curious about that comment.

Mr. SHAYS. And, no, you should be. We did not know in 1995, believe it or not, that Iraq had a nuclear program. And when the person in charge of the program in Iraq tried to defect, we didn't know who he was and we said you don't exist. He had to prove to our intelligence community that he actually was who he said he was and there was actually a program. That will send I think a little bit of an alarm to you that there was just a tremendous amount of ignorance of what was happening in Iraq.

When we had the investigations later on as to the nuclear, chemical and biological programs, the investigative teams from the U.N. were about to certify that Iraq did not have a chemical, biological, nuclear program, that we were about to certify that they were OK. The two son-in-laws who defected from Iraq and went to Jordan were debriefed and they disclosed that one of them had actually set up a nuclear program. It was disclosed to the parties that this program was active, and the bottom line was that we then jumped in and forced Iraq to have to show us some sites, and, again, we were underestimating Iraq's ability.

The bottom line is we believe Iraq will have nuclear weapons between two to 5 years and we believe that they will place them strategically in some part of the United States. And that's a little off subject of the hearing today on first responders, but I'm happy to respond to you about it. But we believe that if the President of the United States and our country doesn't respond to Iraq, that you will be in a situation in the near future where Saddam Hussein will say we've had nuclear weapons placed strategically in certain areas in some cities someplace in the United States.

And so the whole issue of dealing with a terrorist threat, unlike the cold war, has an element of pre-emption, and so that was the basis for it.

Ms. DOBSON. Just this question. Has everything been done as far as preparedness if you do have any information that these targeted areas could be in our vicinity?

Mr. SHAYS. Yeah, we don't know where the targeted areas are.

Ms. DOBSON. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Go ahead.

Mr. CARNEGLIA. Yes, sir. My name is Walt Carneglia. I'm a resident of Norwalk.

I've had some firsthand experience having done 4 years in Viet Nam. One of the things that I heard today constantly was about training. For the past 3 years I've been getting mostly Internet training from FEMA, from the Department of Justice, from the U.S. Fire Academy. There's a tremendous amount of information out there. You just have to ask for it.

I've taken dozens of CDC courses. I'm currently in a FEMA Incident Command course, title course, which they called me for a few weeks ago, which is an interactive course that I'm doing on-line. So

there's a lot of training out there, but it's real fragmented and you have to work real hard to find it.

I'd like to hear some comments because I noticed there was no one here from the Department of Justice, and they have a tremendous amount of resources. I've taken courses at six different colleges on-line that are all from grants from the Department of Justice.

And my final question is for somebody on the board here. Just before I came here, I logged onto the Homeland site for the Citizen Corps and I had volunteered for the community emergency response team approximately 6 months ago. There has been nothing in the State of Connecticut. If you go to the site, we don't have a coordinator there. There is nobody to contact for volunteering. They're supposed to be contacting us. Nothing has happened. So that's my main question.

Mr. SHAYS. Can anyone respond to that? Thank you, sir.

Captain Buturla.

Captain BUTURLA. Mr. Chairman, the Citizen Corps is something that is relatively new in FEMA. Tomorrow (indiscernible) sitting right behind me is going to Boston—or I'm sorry, to Massachusetts for a regional meeting regarding Citizen Corps. Representatives from throughout the country are coming to that meeting, and the purpose of that would be to lay the framework upon which Citizen Corps can be built. There are some States that are ahead of us. It is our division that has the responsibility for Citizen Corps.

So the only thing that I would say to you is be patient. We will have a Citizen Corps up and running hopefully fairly soon. Mr. Craig has been very supportive in helping us in this matter and—

Mr. SHAYS. You know what, get this gentleman's name and then see if, in fact, you get information from the Federal Government as to who—if he's on that list, and I'd like to know the answer to that.

So you basically registered—

Mr. CARNEGLIA. Yes, I am registered with the—on the Homeland Security site.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. He's registered. I'd like to know and if you can let our committee know if in the course of this work—if not tomorrow, the next day, but as you start to then get these lists, was he on it, and it would be interesting for us to then backtrack and see if, in fact, others are getting lost.

I'm delighted with your question. You made another question earlier about—

Captain BUTURLA. Training?

Mr. SHAYS. Training, yes.

Captain BUTURLA. I can address some of that. We learned a lot. We've—this State was unfortunately the target of the anthrax case. We learned from that we had some people at a certain level of preparedness and certain level of training. We have also learned that the need for training for first responders is there. It's there more than ever. We are in the process of bringing a consultant in to help us develop a curriculum.

We have also been working with the law enforcement perspective, the Police Academy to set up a block of training for first responders in the law enforcement community. We then contacted

the Fire Academy and have some input into what programs they are running as long as they fall into the terrorism type of realm.

Mr. SHAYS. Do you have a comment?

Mr. CRAIG. First on training, one of the aspects as part of the Department of Homeland Security is to bring all the terrorism training that is spread across numerous Federal agencies under one Federal agency, one department. FEMA was responsible for giving a report to Congress on all the different agencies that have terrorism training and evaluating all these training programs. In that report it is shown that those training sessions are spread out across too many Federal agencies and that it would help to have it under one department. In evaluating that, if maybe the Department of Justice, FEMA or the Public Health Service had the same type of training, let's coordinate it and have that one class for three different Federal agencies so that people out in the general public have one place to go to find training sessions.

As far as Citizen Corps, Citizen Corps, as you know, was an initiative by the President started earlier this year. The groundwork for Citizen Corps has been started with the States, and starting out with identifying points of contact, which the State of Connecticut has done. But the funding for Citizen Corps and Community Emergency Response Teams was in the supplemental program, which we're waiting for the signing of that bill. So the funding for that hasn't come out yet.

Mr. SHAYS. That's very helpful. I'm really happy you made the point with your question because that's important.

Do you want to make a comment?

Ms. BOUCHER. Yes. And, Mr. Craig, I'm not talking about Citizen Corps, but about the actual training on-line with regards to terrorism. Do you screen the applicants to a course like that for security reasons?

Mr. CRAIG. They do have to fill out a form. Most of our training programs you have to be a U.S. citizen to take. I'm not sure exactly how that form works because I haven't done it on-line.

Mr. DOCIMO. Can I speak on that issue?

Mr. SHAYS. Sure. But go ahead and finish. He interrupted you. Please finish.

Mr. CRAIG. But I'm not part of that committee or department. That's done out of the U.S. Fire Administration. It's part of FEMA, and they control all of those programs.

Mr. SHAYS. Did you want to say something?

General CUGNO. On training again, in addition, the Justice Department provides to on-line subscribers—you can print the catalog of more than 100 courses that are available, the courses that you subscribe to and take the course on-line that are available. They're available to municipalities. That is handled by individuals from the Domestic Preparedness branch and it is likely to be in this reorganization because this division is going to be part of Homeland Security.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Did you want to make a comment, Frank?

Mr. DOCIMO. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Just state your name again for the record.

Mr. DOCIMO. It's Frank Docimo.

At the National Fire Academy there's actually programs that we do not let out on-line. There's self-study guides that FEMA participates in. The National Fire Academy participates in those. But on the tactical consideration level for EMS, HazMat and company officers, we do not let that out unless we physically have the person there. There is some sensitive materials that relates to not only tactical considerations, but to implementation that we kind of hold a little closer.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Sir.

Mr. MCNAMARA. My turn?

Mr. SHAYS. You were the first to raise your hand and—

Mr. MCNAMARA. Well, that's all right. I'll be patient. Do I sound all right?

Mr. SHAYS. What's your name?

Mr. MCNAMARA. My name is Edward McNamara. I just kind of represent myself, but there's a couple of things that occurred to me when I heard this forum.

A few years ago I worked for a company that had a northeast contract for remediation of military bases and I was on one of the teams with a bunch of other people for the emergency response team for the Environmental Protection Agency. We did a lot of remediation on Superfund sites. But I had to sign something that said I have a passport and I have a packed bag and I'll go anywhere in the world in 2½ hours. I don't know if that still exists.

At that time, and this was about, oh, gosh, maybe about 6, 7 years ago, we were also told that we were the first responders. I think this is what is changing. At that time we were told we had the authority to tell the police and/or fire and everyone else get out of the area, you know, let us—containment was the primary issue of a spill, primarily a spill.

But what that made me think of is you have to readdress this issue of PPE, personal protective equipment. If it's dealing with the Levels A, B and C and if they still are tie-back saran and the blue acid suits, we used to call them, which had a self-contained breathing apparatus, which you needed training in each and every one of those, those suits are so cumbersome, awkward, prone to rip, tear. They do not lead to manual labor of any sort or any quick or ready response. They're archaic. They're really sort of dangerous. If anyone here has tried them, this fellow over here may have, you know that they've gotta be modernized and redesigned with more modern technologically advanced fabrics that will, you know, allow people to be protected but also work effectively and not worry about punctures, rips, tears. I don't know if you would agree. But—

Mr. SHAYS. One last comment. Do you have another comment?

Mr. MCNAMARA. Yeah, I mean, it's just, you know, these things have gotta be done. And you do need a mobile CRZ, a contamination reductions zone. Everything should be ready and ready to go.

And also I do think—when I watch some things on TV, I was really kind of surprised. I think we gotta start thinking and get somebody in that has some technological advanced abilities. For a man-machine, heavy equipment interfaces that, you know, allows people to have like a two-armed excavator instead of fumbling with a one-steel girder. You should operate by arm and pick it up and

move it. And I think a lot of these things could be done rather quickly with a concentrated effort.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

Mr. MCNAMARA. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. We appreciate it.

Do we have any other comments? Sir, do you want to finish this up? Is this the last? OK.

And, again, I would like to thank Rosa DeLauro's office for being here. Would either one of you from her office like to make a comment? You're all set?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER. (Indiscernible.)

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. And I'm assuming—do we have their names? Yes.

Mr. MICHELSEN. My name is Lieutenant Mike Michelsen. I'm a member of the Wilton Fire Department and also the Fairfield County HazMat Unit.

Mr. SHAYS. A little louder.

Mr. MICHELSEN. I appreciate all the time that we spent today on these important issues. A lot of people have summarized, but from the fire service today and in their relationship with FEMA, I think it's very important to maintain a position that the Fire Act remain a separate item.

You also asked about priorities and you wanted an order. Communications and training have been spoken about endlessly and they are, in fact, the ultimate priorities. There are logistical considerations to getting the equipment to us, but without the training to become comfortable with the equipment and to be able to maintain it, the efforts would be in vain.

On the issue of communications, even though the State has home rule, there are two things in place in this State. There's enabling legislation under Public Act 01117 and there is also an inter-local agreement under State Statute 7339E, which enables municipalities to contain their interests to improve their operational effectiveness.

Now, with the issue of communications, right now all the jurisdictions are hard pressed with the desire to communicate, but limitations are a capital resource. What would be desired, and has been discussed by us in great detail, is the desire to have Federal money and/or State money utilized to create a coverage for the capital expenditure. It becomes an ongoing expense to maintain the facility, but right now we're not comfortable with the economic circumstances in the municipalities to successfully lobby for the communications.

It's nice to hear that we're going to get two 800 megahertz radios, but the realities are we know as professionals that this will give us the ability to have one line of communication. It will not allow us to operate. All of this requires additional frequencies, to say nothing of the dispatcher for the ITAC and ICAL.

Those issues are what I feel is most important and I appreciate the opportunity to leave them in the closing emphasis. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. We appreciate the opportunity to hear you, sir, and I'd like to end there. Unless we have anyone else, I would like to end with your fine service. Thank you very much. Your contribution.

I'm going to say again that I'm very grateful to this panel for staying the distance and listening to everyone else and appreciate deeply your contribution, all five of you. Thank you so much. This hearing—and I thank Bill, President Schwab, for—where is he?

Mr. President, thank you very much for the opportunity to use this—I like saying Mr. President. I think I'm in the president's presence. And I would like to thank the clerk, or the transcriber for her incredibly fine work and her patience with us and her diligence. Thank you very much.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

