

**THE CRISIS IN MACEDONIA AND U.S.
ENGAGEMENT IN THE BALKANS**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

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JUNE 13, 2001
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 13, 2001

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 10:40 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Torricelli, Bill Nelson, Helms, and Lugar.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. I apologize to the witnesses. We had two votes. We are going to have, unfortunately, another vote in about a half an hour. Maybe the Senator and I can work out trading off getting there so we do not hold the witnesses.

It probably comes as no surprise to most of the people the subject of my first hearing as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

And I might add for the record it is evidence that it is better to be lucky than good. I am sitting here as chairman. I want to thank Senator Helms for the gracious way in which he has dealt with this change that neither one of us expected. If there is anything that should generate some degree of humility, it should be the way in which this change took place because it may be, in another 6 months, someone else is the chairman here. But at any rate, I want to thank Senator Helms. Oh, there he is. Mr. Chairman, how are you?

The first hearing relates to the Balkans. My long-held interest in this region is not unique on this committee. Under the able chairmanship of Senator Helms, the challenge of building a durable peace in southeastern Europe has received strong bipartisan support. This support stems, I believe, from the shared realization that stabilizing the Balkans is critical if we are ever going to attain the oft-stated, elusive goal of a Europe whole and free.

Conversely, my colleagues on this committee also recognize the grim fact that if we allow the Macedonian state to disintegrate, it could shatter the current peaceful relations in southeastern Europe among Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, and Turkey.

Today's hearing has a two-part focus. First, we will discuss the extremely volatile situation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, a country that just 1 year ago was considered a model of inter-ethnic cooperation, but now teeters on the brink of civil war.

Second, I would like our witnesses to take a broader look at the current scope of U.S. economic military and diplomatic engagement in the region and assess whether our effort until now is adequate to address the considerable challenges that include, among other things: helping to rebuild severely damaged economies of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia; fully implementing the Dayton Agreement so that Bosnia and Herzegovina becomes a genuine multi-ethnic democracy; peacefully resolving the final status of Montenegro and Kosovo; and most immediately, pacifying and helping to reform Macedonia so that all its citizens have equal rights and opportunities.

Although Macedonia is the clear and present danger in my view, I believe that a comprehensive examination of our entire Balkan policy is urgently needed.

I had the privilege of spending some time, Mr. Chairman, with the President of the United States on Monday at his invitation, and he indicated to me that part of what he was going to be doing in his European trip was reinforcing among our European allies and friends that we were committed with them in the Balkans and that was not going to change.

Most troubling to me is what is happening right now in Macedonia has an almost scripted familiarity to it. How many times now have we watched as a simmering crisis erupts into open conflict while we stand aside and wait for the Europeans to take the lead? In my humble opinion they never have and are not inclined to, not withstanding the fact that Secretary-General Robertson is going to be in Macedonia tomorrow.

In 1991, it was Croatia. In 1992, it was Bosnia. In 1998, Kosovo. And now in 2001 it is Macedonia. And make no mistake about it. If Macedonia fractures, it will have the most profound impact on the Balkans of any of the region's five wars in the last decade.

The administration, which initially responded to the crisis by augmenting U.S. emergency assistance to Macedonia and sending Secretary Powell to the region, now appears to be not quite sure where it is going to go next at this moment. I understand that and maybe they have made a decision. We may hear that today, but up to now, I am not certain where that is.

I am sure all of us are hopeful that the situation is still at a point where strong, resolute action can bring a quick end to the warfare that threatens the very existence of the Macedonian state.

In this regard, I consider the cease-fire and disarmament of Albanian rebels in the Presevo Valley, which was the result of negotiations among NATO, the Yugoslav Government, and the rebels as an encouraging example of what may be possible.

But the other side of the coin is, unfortunately, just as conceivable. The so-called National Liberation Army now is occupying a suburb of Skopje and threatening to shell a nearby oil refinery, the airport, and police stations in the capital.

If these attacks were to occur, widespread civilian casualties and further human rights abuses by frustrated Macedonian authorities would likely swing the country's ethnic Albanian population to active and full support of the rebels in my view. The fragile political coalition of Slavic and Albanian political parties would collapse, and Macedonia would descend in an all-out civil war, which could

easily draw in its neighboring countries, eager to annex parts of a disintegrating state.

Although the rebels claim otherwise, this chain of events may be the end game they have in mind. Whatever their goal, the worst-case scenario that we must prevent is the disintegration of that republic.

It is not my intention this morning to bash anyone, to denigrate the hard work of the European Union, which has dispatched two of its highest ranking diplomats to the region, Javier Solana and Chris Patten. I am simply concerned that we are falling into the time-worn tendency of doing too little too late. Both the U.S. Ambassador in Skopje and a Deputy Assistant Secretary are also dealing with the Macedonian Government and they are highly competent diplomats. But neither of them has the international image of a former NATO Secretary General or a former Governor of Hong Kong.

On the other hand, while I commend the efforts of Solana and Patten, I remain unconvinced that the EU alone has the credibility or the resources needed to forge a political solution in Macedonia.

It is clear to me that this country must increase its involvement. The stakes in Macedonia are simply too high for us to choose to play a secondary role.

Like it or not, the reality is that only the U.S. has the necessary military and political credibility with all ethnic groups to successfully manage and resolve the crisis in the Balkans. This unique American position is especially clear in Macedonia where the U.S. enjoys a store of goodwill among the Albanian population due to our leadership role in NATO's 1999 air campaign to end ethnic slaughter in Kosovo.

Mr. Chairman, I will put the rest of my statement in the record as if delivered now in the interest of time.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

It probably comes as no surprise to most people that the subject of my very first hearing as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee is the Balkans.

But my long-held interest in the region is not unique on this committee. Under the able chairmanship of Senator Helms the challenge of building a durable peace in Southeastern Europe has received strong bipartisan support.

This support stems, I believe, from the shared realization that stabilizing the Balkans is critical if we are ever to attain the oft-stated but elusive goal of a Europe that is "whole and free."

Conversely, my colleagues on this committee also recognize the grim fact that if we allow the Macedonian state to disintegrate, it could shatter the current peaceful relations in Southeastern Europe among Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, and Turkey.

Today's hearing has a two-part focus. First, we will discuss the extremely volatile situation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—a country that just one year ago, was considered a model of inter-ethnic cooperation, but now teeters on the brink of all-out civil war.

Second, I would like our witnesses to take a broader look at the current scope of U.S. economic, military, and diplomatic engagement in the region and assess whether our effort until now is sufficient to adequately address the considerable challenges that include:

- helping to rebuild severely damaged economies in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia;
- fully implementing the Dayton Agreement so that Bosnia and Herzegovina becomes a genuine multi-ethnic democracy;
- peacefully resolving the final status of Montenegro and Kosovo; and

- most immediately, pacifying and helping to reform Macedonia so that all its citizens have equal rights and opportunities.

Although Macedonia is the “clear and present danger,” I believe a comprehensive examination of our entire Balkan policy is urgently needed.

Most troubling to me is that what is happening right now in Macedonia has an almost scripted familiarity to it. How many times now have we watched as a simmering crisis erupts into open conflict while the U.S. stands aside and waits for Europe to take the lead?

In 1991, it was Croatia. In 1992, it was Bosnia. In 1998, it was Kosovo. And now, in 2001, it is Macedonia. And make no mistake about it—if Macedonia fractures, it will have the most profound impact on the Balkans of any of the region’s five wars in the last decade.

The administration, which initially responded to the crisis by augmenting U.S. emergency assistance to Macedonia and sending Secretary Powell to the region, now appears to be deciding on its policy.

I am sure all of us are hopeful that the situation is still at a point where strong, resolute action can bring a quick end to the warfare that threatens the very existence of the Macedonian state.

In this regard, I consider the cease fire and disarmament of Albanian rebels in Serbia’s Presevo Valley, which was the result of negotiations among NATO, the Yugoslav Government, and the rebels as an encouraging example of what is possible.

But the other side of the coin is, unfortunately, just as conceivable. The so-called National Liberation Army now is occupying a suburb of Skopje and is threatening to shell a nearby oil refinery, the Skopje Airport, and police stations in the capital.

If these attacks were to occur, widespread civilian casualties and further human rights abuses by frustrated Macedonian authorities would likely swing the country’s ethnic Albanian population to active, full support for the rebels.

The fragile political coalition of Slav and Albanian political parties would collapse, and Macedonia would descend into all-out civil war, which could easily draw in neighboring countries, eager to annex parts of the disintegrating state.

Although the rebels claim otherwise, this chain of events may be the end-game that they have in mind. Whatever their goals, it is a worst-case scenario we must prevent from coming to pass.

It is not my intention this morning to bash anyone.

I am simply concerned that we are falling into the time-worn tendency of doing too little, until it is too late. Both the U.S. Ambassador in Skopje and the Deputy Assistant Secretary who is also dealing with the Macedonian Government are highly competent diplomats.

But neither of them has the international image of a former NATO Secretary General, or a former Governor of Hong Kong.

On the other hand, while I commend the efforts of Solana and Patten, I remain unconvinced that the EU alone has the credibility or the resources needed to forge a political solution in Macedonia.

It is clear to me that the United States must increase its involvement. The stakes in Macedonia are too high for us to choose to play a secondary role.

Like it or not, the reality is that only the U.S. has the necessary military and political credibility with all ethnic groups to successfully manage and resolve crises in the Balkans. This unique American position is especially clear in Macedonia, where the U.S. enjoys a store of goodwill among the Albanian population due to our leadership role in NATO’s 1999 air campaign to end ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

A proactive Balkans policy also means doing more to support the regional success stories, such as the new, democratic, post-Tudjman government in Croatia and prosperous, stable Slovenia, a country about to demonstrate that South Slavs can earn inclusion in the community of Western democracies.

Furthermore, I am encouraged by the government of desperately poor Albania, in the southern Balkans, which has demonstrated admirable sophistication and restraint in pursuing a moderate foreign policy and disavowing any desire for a “Greater Albania.” We should continue to lend strong support to Albania’s arduous political and economic transformation.

We are very fortunate to have a stellar line-up of witnesses this morning. One would be hard pressed to assemble a more qualified group of experts on Macedonia, in particular, and on U.S. involvement in the Balkans as a whole.

Testifying for the administration will be Ambassador James Pardew, currently serving as the Senior Advisor on the Balkans for the Bureau of European Affairs at the State Department.

We also welcome two outstanding former soldiers who have served this country long and well.

General Wes Clark in 1995 headed the military negotiations for the U.S. delegation at the Bosnian peace talks in Dayton, and in 1999 as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe directed the successful air campaign to reverse Milosevic's ethnic-cleansing in Kosovo.

General William Nash, senior fellow and director of the Center for Preventive Action of the Council on Foreign Relations, commanded the multinational Task Force Eagle in northeastern Bosnia and later served as the United Nations civilian Regional Administrator for northern Kosovo.

Our third panel includes Richard Perle, a Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and Daniel Serwer, who directs the Balkans Initiative at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Both gentlemen have had distinguished careers in the U.S. Government—Mr. Perle here at the United States Senate and in the Department of Defense, Dr. Serwer in the Department of State.

I look forward to the testimonies of all five witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. But let me suggest that in our first panel that testifying for the administration will be Ambassador James Pardew, currently serving as the Senior Advisor on the Balkans for the Bureau of European Affairs of the State Department.

We also welcome two outstanding former soldiers who have served the country for a long time and served well.

General Wesley Clark in 1995 headed the military negotiations for the U.S. delegation at the Bosnian peace talks in Dayton, and in 1999 as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe directed the successful air campaign to reverse Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

General William Nash, senior fellow and director of the Center on Preventive Action of the Council on Foreign Relations, commanded the multinational Task Force Eagle in northeastern Bosnia and later served as the United Nations civilian Regional Administrator for northern Kosovo.

Our third panel includes familiar and well-known and well-respected faces, including Richard Perle, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and Daniel Serwer who directs the Balkans Initiative for the U.S. Institute of Peace. Both gentlemen have had distinguished careers in the U.S. Government: Mr. Perle here at the U.S. Senate and in the Department of Defense and Dr. Serwer in the Department of State.

I look forward to the testimony of all five of our witnesses, and I will now turn to my friend, Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

They gave me instructions when I came in to go through that door and turn left.

The CHAIRMAN. That is one of the few times you have ever turned left, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. If I may be indulged just a few personal comments. I want to offer my genuine congratulations and best wishes to the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Biden is a very special personal friend, and I have pledged to him my full cooperation as he has given me throughout my years as the chairman.

This committee, thanks to Senator Biden's cooperation, is in my judgment a genuinely bipartisan committee. It is for that reason that, while I enjoyed the previous arrangement, the gavel is in capable and responsible hands, and I congratulate you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator HELMS. The ongoing violence in Macedonia, which is the subject, well known by everybody here, of this morning's hearing, provides an important window into the broader question of U.S. engagement in the Balkans. Until recently Macedonia was a model, albeit an imperfect one, for inter-ethnic coexistence and democratic rule in Europe's most war-torn region.

Now, within the past few months, things have changed. Ethnic Albanian terrorists are today using violence in an effort to undermine Macedonia's stability. Indeed, I am impressed by the restraint with which the Government of Macedonia has responded to these vicious attacks. Now, I realize that there are legitimate Albanian grievances in Macedonia, but none warranting a turn to violence.

This point has been wisely underscored by the refusal of Macedonia's leading ethnic Albanian parties to side with the terrorists. Instead ethnic Albanian parties have condemned violence and are working with other Macedonian political parties as part of a national unity government, and the potential success of this unity government is a threat to all ethnic extremists in the Balkans.

Now, as Senator Biden has made clear, the United States has a vital interest in promoting peace and reconciliation in the Balkans, and that requires active American engagement in that region.

So, the issue now is how can the United States most effectively utilize its political, diplomatic, and military assets to achieve those objectives in cooperation with the democratically elected government of that region and of our European allies.

Now, President Bush and his administration have raised this specific question with me and with the chairman and others during their first months in office. I have been disappointed that there are some who are unwisely determined to misinterpret much needed policy reviews as American abandonment of the Balkans.

Now, what I have seen to date is a supportive, but firm relationship with the new government in Belgrade, as well as expanded assistance to the Macedonian Government. To me, these relationships underscore the Bush administration's repeatedly stated determination to facilitate peace in this region.

So, I welcome the administration's witness and the private sector panelists who have come this morning to offer their advice and counsel and their insights regarding the next steps that should be taken to define U.S. policy toward Macedonia and the rest of the Balkans.

[The prepared statement of Senator Helms follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JESSE HELMS

Before proceeding, I offer my genuine congratulations and best wishes to the new chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Biden is a very special, personal friend, and I have pledged to him my full cooperation, as he has given me throughout my years as chairman.

The Foreign Relations Committee, thanks to Senator Biden's cooperation, is in my judgement a genuinely bipartisan committee. It is for this reason, that while I enjoyed the previous arrangement, the gavel is in capable and responsible hands.

The ongoing violence in Macedonia, the subject of this morning's hearing, provides an important window into the broader question of U.S. engagement in the Balkans. Until recently, Macedonia was a model, albeit an imperfect one, for inter-ethnic coexistence and democratic rule in Europe's most war-torn region.

Within the past few months, however, things have changed. Ethnic Albanian terrorists are today using violence in an effort to undermine Macedonia's stability. In-

deed, I am impressed by the restraint with which the government of Macedonia has responded to these attacks. I realize that there are legitimate Albanian grievances in Macedonia, but none warranting a turn to violence.

This point has been wisely underscored by the refusal of Macedonia's leading ethnic Albanian parties to side with these terrorists. Instead, ethnic Albanian parties have condemned violence and are working with other Macedonian political parties as part of a national unity government. The potential success of the unity government is a threat to all ethnic extremists in the Balkans.

The United States has a vital interest in promoting peace and reconciliation in the Balkans. That requires active American engagement in the region. The issue now is how can the United States most effectively utilize its political, diplomatic, and military assets to achieve those objectives in cooperation with the democratically elected governments of that region and our European allies.

President Bush and his administration have raised this specific question during their first months in office. I have been disappointed that there are some who are unwisely determined to misinterpret much-needed policy reviews as American abandonment of the Balkans.

What I have seen to date is a supportive, but firm, relationship with the new government in Belgrade as well as expanded assistance to the Macedonian government. To me, these relationships underscore the Bush Administration's repeatedly stated determination to facilitate peace in this region.

I welcome the administration witness and the private sector panelists who have come this morning to offer their advice and counsel, and their insights, regarding the next steps that should define U.S. policy toward Macedonia and the rest of the Balkans.

Senator HELMS. I presume that the chairman wants you to proceed, but I better not tell you to do that.

I do not have the authority to do it anymore—yet.

[Pause.]

Senator HELMS. I have been given the word to invite you to go ahead, sir. You may be heard. Thank you, sir.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JAMES PARDEW, SENIOR ADVISOR ON THE BALKANS, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador PARDEW. Thank you, Senator. I am very pleased to be here today to discuss the situation in Macedonia as well as more generally the U.S. engagement in the Balkans. With the chairman's permission, I will submit a longer statement for the record, but I will briefly summarize that statement.

Macedonia remains critical for regional security and stability. The current conflict there must be resolved. However, no purely military approach can succeed here. Efforts to quell the armed insurgency must take place, therefore, within the framework of political measures that advance Macedonia along the path of necessary democratic, social, and economic reforms.

The situation today in Macedonia is precarious. The insurgent National Liberation Army [NLA] launched its first attacks in northwest Macedonia in February. Since then, the fighting has continued off and on largely in ethnic Albanian areas. Most recently the NLA occupation of the town of Aracinovo near Skopje and its airport poses a potential threat to NATO supply lines.

No one should mistake the position of the United States administration. We absolutely oppose the NLA's use of violence to undermine the democratically elected Macedonian Government and its leaders. We condemn the NLA's apparent effort to provoke an overreaction by the government against Albanian citizens in order to bolster their support from the ethnic Albanian community. NATO

and the United States are not taking the side of any ethnic group in this conflict. We are on the side of democracy.

The Government of Macedonia has a responsibility to protect its territory and citizens, but it must respond to extremist provocation in a measured and proportionate way that protects the lives of civilians. To do otherwise only falls into the trap, thus strengthening the extremists and accelerating the destructive ethnic polarization.

Thus far in the conflict, thankfully, confirmed reports of civilian casualties have been limited.

The ongoing military standoff makes all the more urgent the need for progress on the political front. We welcome President Trajkovski's plan for defusing the insurgency approved by their parliament yesterday. The plan contains confidence building measures aimed at reintegrating into Macedonian society the NLA fighters who disarm and give up violence in favor of a peaceful political process.

Our objectives are to quickly stabilize the security situation in Macedonia while at the same time laying a foundation for a political solution acceptable to all ethnic groups in Macedonia.

First, the political track. Advancing reforms that undercut the extremists' false appeal to the ethnic Albanian population is the key to Macedonian stability. Our diplomatic efforts have been active and are continuing at full throttle. Secretary Powell promoted progress toward a peaceful solution in meetings with President Trajkovski in Skopje in mid-April and in Washington in early May, along with President Bush. Then he met with their foreign minister in Budapest at the end of May. In addition, Secretary Powell and NATO ministers in Budapest on May 30 sent a strong joint NATO-EU message, reaffirming the international community's commitment and support for Macedonia.

The administration remains intensively engaged in efforts to find a solution by working side by side with our European partners and implementing an effective strategy. EU High Representative Javier Solana has taken a leading role for the international community in pursuing discussions with the parties on a frequent and continuing basis.

For our part, Deputy Assistant Secretary James Swigert is on the ground in the region and European capitals and is actively working with the Macedonian parties and with Solana.

On the security track, our efforts also have been vigorous. In Kosovo, NATO is in the process of further strengthening its control along the Kosovo-Macedonian border. The U.N. in Kosovo has recently promulgated tough, new regulations on weapons possession and illegal border crossing that enhance the U.N. and NATO's ability to deal with the insurgency and its supporters.

In Macedonia, NATO Secretary General Robertson has been actively engaged in resolving the conflict and will go there tomorrow with High Representative Solana and Mr. Swigert. He also has a personal representative, Ambassador Eiff, based in Skopje on a full-time basis. Further, the NATO Cooperation and Coordination Center has been established in Skopje to facilitate the exchange of NATO and Ministry of Defense operational information and to coordinate military assistance.

Despite the current crisis in Macedonia, we should not lose sight of the fact that overall the picture in southeast Europe has begun to brighten dramatically recently. There is democracy in Croatia, removal of Milosevic last fall and his later arrest, province-wide democratic elections in Kosovo this November, and progress in building democratic institutions and healing the wounds of war in Bosnia.

The administration's overall regional strategy is to bring southeastern Europe into the European mainstream. Where conflict or violence persists, our focus is on facilitating regional and European solutions, ones that are durable without continuing intervention. Bilaterally, as well as through multilateral mechanisms, such as NATO, the OSCE, the Stability Pact, and the Southeast Europe Cooperation Initiative, we are working to promote cooperation across borders rather than redrawing borders.

Some basic elements of the administration's strategy for the region are to: promote democratic governance based on the rule of law and civil society, assist with economic reform leading to sustainable growth, maintain NATO's role, and advance integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

To support the administration's strategy for fiscal year 2002, the President has requested \$711 million for U.S. assistance to the region, as well as \$169.6 million for U.N. assessed peacekeeping costs in the region. Based on historical data, we expect our European and other partners to more than double that contribution.

We are also working to ensure burden sharing in the military aspects of our engagement. Our troops in Bosnia are 18.6 percent of the total and in Kosovo 17.4 percent.

While we, of course, look for opportunities to conserve our resources whenever they are not necessary and to ensure that they are used efficiently, we are committed to doing our part within the overall context of the international community's support for building peace in the region. The administration has made clear that force structure decisions will be made in full consultation with allies and through the NATO process.

As Secretary Powell has said, regarding our continued commitment to NATO military deployments in the region, "We went into this together and we will come out together." He has also said that we are doing what we can to reduce the number of U.S. troops in Bosnia and Kosovo, but for now it is "clear we are the glue that is holding this fragile situation together."

So we will not let down our NATO allies, who provide the bulk of the forces to the region. The costs of U.S. engagement in the Balkans are significant and must always be considered carefully, but the cost of failing to invest in European stability and to stand in solidarity with our allies would be far greater.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my oral statement, but I will be pleased to respond to any questions the committee may have.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pardeu follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JAMES PARDEW

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here today to discuss with the Committee the situation in Macedonia, as well as, more generally, U.S. engagement in Southeast Europe. Beginning with Macedonia, I would like to lay out for you the Administra-

tion's efforts, together with our European Allies, to restore peace and stability to that country.

The violent conflict on-going in Macedonia is a threat not only to Macedonia's security and democracy, but also to the entire region. The conflict threatens the progress being made by the international community in Kosovo, and it undermines the positive, stabilizing impact of our success in bringing about a peaceful, negotiated settlement in Southern Serbia.

Macedonia remains a linchpin for regional security and stability, and the crisis there must be resolved. The roots of the problem in Macedonia, and thus the dimensions of a solution to the crisis, extend beyond the security sphere. No purely military approach can resolve this conflict. Efforts to quell the armed insurgency must take place, therefore, within a framework of political measures that advance Macedonia along the path of necessary democratic, social, and economic reforms. Working hand-in-hand with our European Allies, as well as with NATO, the European Union and the OSCE, the Administration is urging the Government of Macedonia to exercise restraint in its military response, while at the same time we are stressing the importance of taking concrete steps quickly to address legitimate minority grievances, ameliorate ethnic tensions, and strengthen Macedonia's multi-ethnic democratic institutions.

While in this time of crisis our engagement in Macedonia demands a large measure of attention, it is only a part of our overall engagement in Southeast Europe. Within the context of the broad international commitment to securing peace and political stability in the Balkans, the United States continues to play a significant role—quantitatively, in terms of our contribution of resources, and qualitatively, in terms of our leadership.

CURRENT SITUATION IN MACEDONIA

The situation in Macedonia is precarious. The insurgent National Liberation Army (NLA) launched its first attacks in northwest Macedonia in February. In April, the NLA renewed attacks and ambushes, killing Macedonian police and soldiers, occupying villages in northern Macedonia, taking hostages, and putting Albanian civilians in grave danger. OSCE and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) efforts to evacuate civilians in some NLA-occupied areas have been blocked by the NLA, raising serious concerns that the NLA is intentionally keeping villagers where they are as human shields. The NLA has been intransigent in setting unacceptable conditions for civilian evacuation in negotiations with the ICRC. Despite announcements of cease-fires, the NLA continues to carry out violent attacks, for example, wounding nine soldiers June 11 in violation of its own cease-fire declaration. Currently, they are threatening to attack the capital, Skopje, shut down the airport, and spread the conflict to other areas of the country.

The NLA dramatically escalated its attacks on June 8 by infiltrating and occupying a largely ethnic Albanian village—Aracinovo—just five miles from Skopje and its airport, the location of a large contingent of U.S. and other NATO soldiers serving with KFOR. The occupation of Aracinovo poses a potential threat to NATO supply lines.

No one should mistake the position of the United States: We absolutely oppose the NLA's use of violence to undermine the democratically elected, multi-ethnic Macedonian government and its leaders. We condemn the NLA's apparent effort to provoke an overreaction by the Government and the destruction of villages and killing of civilians in order to bolster their illegitimate claim to represent the ethnic Albanian community. NATO and the United States are not taking the side of any ethnic group in this conflict; we are on the side of democracy.

It is incumbent on the democratically-elected Macedonian government, however, to use military force cautiously. We understand that the Government has a responsibility to protect its territory and citizens, but it must respond to extremist provocations in a measured and proportionate way that protects the lives of civilians. To do otherwise only falls into a trap, thus strengthening the extremists and accelerating destructive ethnic polarization. We and our allies have counseled the Government repeatedly on restraint and are watching the situation very closely. We have raised with the Macedonian leadership our concerns over documented reports of heavy-handedness and abuses by security forces, making it clear that the international community expects the Government to investigate seriously any reports of abuses and punish those responsible. In equal measure, we have urged the Government to take decisive steps to check the sort of reprehensible, ethnically-driven mob violence and vigilantism that has occurred in reaction to NLA killings. Such violence is totally unacceptable.

Thus far in this conflict, thankfully, confirmed reports of civilian casualties have been limited. The Government has implemented, in cooperation with the ICRC, OSCE, and NGOs, a series of unilateral cease-fires, including most recently on June 11, seeking to minimize collateral damage and avoid civilian casualties. We applaud the Government's latest cease-fire as an important show of restraint in the face of provocations by the extremists, coming on the heels of the NLA occupation of Aracinovo. We will continue to impress upon Macedonia's political and military leadership the need for caution.

The ongoing military standoff makes all the more urgent the need for progress on the political front. The formation of the National Unity Government on April 13, encompassing all of the major parliamentary parties, including both major ethnic Albanian parties, was an important step. This move has the strong support of the United States and the international community, as it clearly demonstrates the national political consensus in Macedonia against violence and in support of the political process.

Progress in the political dialogue has been far too slow. Events on the ground have continually strained the functioning of the Government coalition and progress on the political track. The signatures of two Albanian parties on a political declaration May 22 with a spokesman for the NLA created a political crisis within the coalition. The international community, including the United States, rejected this declaration, which did not include even a rhetorical commitment by the NLA to renounce violence or lay down their arms. In meetings May 29 in Skopje with EU High Representative Solana and a senior U.S. diplomat, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Swigert, leaders of the four coalition parties and President Trajkovski agreed to resume the political dialogue and made clear that the status of the May 22 declaration was no longer relevant. The coalition parties agreed on a basic set of principles to move the political reform dialogue forward, ending the crisis in the coalition.

Even in these most difficult moments, the ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian political parties remain committed to advancing the political dialogue. Last week, Deputy Assistant Secretary Swigert visited Skopje with High Representative Solana and urged President Trajkovski and the party leaders to accelerate progress toward a package of reform measures. Defeating the insurgents requires that they overcome the issues that still divide them, and find consensus solutions that strengthen Macedonian civil society. High Representative Solana and Deputy Assistant Secretary Swigert met together with Trajkovski and the four coalition party leaders in their first joint meeting in over a month. All agreed to undertake an accelerated, comprehensive dialogue to seek a compromise solution on the political issues they had identified together, including the sensitive question of equal treatment of all citizens under the constitution. They are to report progress on June 25 to the meeting of the European Union General Affairs Council.

OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY FOR RESOLVING THE MACEDONIA CRISIS

Our objectives are to help quickly stabilize the security situation in Macedonia, while at the same time helping to lay a foundation for a sustainable political solution acceptable to all ethnic groups in Macedonia. On a political track, our strategy includes using all the diplomatic tools at our disposal to encourage serious progress on political reforms that address legitimate ethnic Albanian grievances. On a security track, our strategy includes steps to help counter the insurgency by disrupting NLA support from Kosovo, helping to improve Macedonia's counter-insurgency capabilities, and encouraging a more sophisticated, comprehensive approach by Skopje. To assist materially, we have expanded SEED assistance for Macedonia this year to \$38.4 million and have requested \$45 million for next year, and have accelerated our security assistance, which includes \$13.6 million in 2001 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and \$3.7 million in prior year FMF.

Political Track

Advancing reforms that undercut the extremists' false appeal to the ethnic Albanian population is the key to Macedonian stability. Only through consensus-based confidence-building and reform measures, paired with ongoing cautious restraint on the security front, can the extremists be prevented from exploiting the fears and concerns of the local Albanian population for their own illegitimate, anti-democratic ends. Both President Bush and Secretary Powell have reinforced this message to President Trajkovski, while reaffirming the United States' commitment to stand by Macedonia during this difficult time.

Our diplomatic efforts have been active and are continuing at full throttle. Secretary Powell advanced our efforts to encourage progress in meetings with President Trajkovski in Skopje in mid-April, and in Washington in early May, and when he

met with Foreign Minister Mitreva in Budapest at the end of May. In addition, Secretary Powell and NATO Ministers in Budapest on May 30 sent a strong joint NATO-EU message reaffirming international community support for Macedonia. They called for an immediate end to violence, demanding that the extremists lay down their weapons and withdraw, expressing strong support for the Government, and urging significant, concrete achievements from the interethnic dialogue.

We are working side-by-side with our European partners in implementing our strategy. EU High Representative Solana has taken a leading public role for the international community in pursuing discussions with the parties on a frequent, continuing basis, and as an indication of our close cooperation, he has welcomed U.S. participation on his team during missions to Skopje. Deputy Assistant Secretary Swigert is on the ground, and is actively working with the Macedonian parties and with Solana. Moreover, coordination among our diplomats based in Skopje and their European counterparts is intensive, as is their common engagement with the Macedonian leadership.

We and the Europeans have been discussing closely with the parties over recent days specific ways to achieve more rapid progress than they have been able to make to date on a significant package of political reforms that will strengthen Macedonia's democratic institutions and undermine support for the insurgency. The parties are in agreement on the need to accelerate the reform dialogue under President Trajkovski's auspices.

Security Track

Our efforts on the security side also have been vigorous. Through NATO and the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, we are supporting concrete efforts to deny insurgents safe-haven in Kosovo and to disrupt support networks. NATO is in the process of further strengthening its controls along the Kosovo-Macedonia border, as KFOR force requirements for the Ground Safety Zone diminish, freeing up assets for redeployment. The UN in Kosovo has recently promulgated tough new regulations on weapons possession and illegal border crossing that enhance the UN mission's and KFOR's ability to deter, investigate, arrest and prosecute those using Kosovo as a base for engaging in extremist activity, as well as insurgency supporters in and around Kosovo.

NATO Secretary General Robertson has been actively engaged in helping to develop solutions to the current crisis, including through visits to Macedonia and through a personal representative, Ambassador Eiff, based in Skopje. A NATO Cooperation and Coordination Center (NCCC) has been established in Skopje that facilitates the exchange between NATO and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) of operationally relevant information, and that handles coordination of military assistance. NATO mans a 24-hour post within the MoD to carry out information exchanges. In addition, we are coordinating our own security assistance to Macedonia with Allies, in order to ensure timely and efficient efforts to better equip Macedonian forces to counter the insurgency in an appropriate manner.

The OSCE, for its part, is playing a leading role in monitoring developments along the northern border area, and more broadly in offering advice and confidence-building measures to promote stability and inter-ethnic dialogue. We support the OSCE's work to help the people of Macedonia address concretely the issues on the inter-ethnic agenda, and we support giving the OSCE Mission appropriate resources to that end.

Furthermore, we have encouraged the Government to examine lessons from the negotiated re-entry of Yugoslav forces into the NATO-controlled Ground Safety Zone in Southern Serbia that might be applicable to the situation in Macedonia. That action in Serbia was achieved in a way that successfully and peacefully defused another ethnic Albanian insurgency.

President Trajkovski outlined his plan for defusing the insurgency in a politically courageous address to parliament and the country on June 8. The plan contains confidence-building measures aimed at reintegrating into Macedonian society NLA fighters who disarm and give up violence in favor of the peaceful political process. We are encouraged by President Trajkovski's initiative and will support a sound plan. NATO is prepared to assist the Government in the development of this plan.

While, at the end of the day, solutions must come from and be carried out by Macedonia's democratically elected leaders, we and others in the international community, including the EU, NATO, and OSCE, will do all we can to facilitate political solutions to the crisis.

Mr. Chairman, to summarize our approach to the Macedonia crisis, the Administration will continue to confront the threat of ethnic Albanian extremism in Macedonia in the following ways:

- Continued strong political support to the legitimate democratic Government of Macedonia, and support for the full development and rapid implementation of the Trajkovski plan, as the best and only effective strategy to restore peace to the country;
- Close engagement with Macedonia's Government and party leaders to advance the interethnic dialogue on necessary reforms;
- Continued material support through our SEED program to promote interethnic dialogue, reconciliation, and reform;
- Coordinated security assistance to enhance the capabilities of Macedonian security forces, while urging the GOM to counter the insurgent threat using only that force which is necessary and proportionate, take steps to avoid civilian casualties, and investigate security force abuses;
- Active diplomacy to ensure that ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, Kosovo, and in the diaspora understand the damage being done to Albanian interests by these extremists, who are using force to promote their political agenda; and
- Support for UNMIK, KFOR and regional governments' measures to deny extremists use of Kosovo or neighboring countries as safe-havens.

THE BROADER CONTEXT: U.S. ENGAGEMENT IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE

The Administration is committed to working actively to resolve the crisis in Macedonia because it remains committed to securing peace and self-sustaining political stability throughout the region. European stability is a vital interest of the United States, and the Balkans is part of Europe. Over the last decade, the countries of Europe, in partnership with the United States, have made breathtaking strides in creating a Europe truly whole and free. The glaring exception throughout much of that period has been Southeast Europe.

Despite the current crisis in Macedonia, we should not lose sight of the fact that, overall, the picture in Southeast Europe has begun to brighten dramatically. Democracy has taken hold in Croatia; the FRY turned an historic corner with the victory of the Democratic Opposition over Milosevic last fall and more recently with his arrest; Kosovo will have its first province-wide democratic elections in November; and progress in building democratic institutions and healing the wounds of war continues in Bosnia. Given the horrific violence of former Yugoslavia's break-up, and its several successors' much-delayed transition from Communist structures of governance, it is not surprising that challenges remain.

The diplomatic, economic, and military engagement of the United States has been central to the progress that has been achieved in the Balkans, and our engagement is continuing. U.S. engagement, however, is only part of a broader international, and especially European, engagement in the Balkans. European interests in stabilizing the region are understandably strong, as troubles in the Balkans send reverberations across the continent. As only one example, the wars in Yugoslavia sent hundreds of thousands of refugees streaming into western Europe. Consequently, the European investment in Balkan stability is strong. The European Union and its members are, for instance, the single largest group of donors to the Balkans. We support Europe assuming an increasing share of the leadership and responsibility for promoting regional stability as the region moves closer to Europe.

The Administration's goal is to bring Southeast Europe into the European mainstream. Where conflict or violence persists, our focus is on facilitating regional and European solutions—ones that are durable without continued intervention. Bilaterally as well as through multilateral mechanisms such as NATO, the OSCE, the Stability Pact, and the Southeast Europe Cooperation Initiative, we are working to promote cooperation across borders, rather than redrawing of borders. Some basic elements of the Administration's strategy for the region are to: promote democratic governance based on the rule of law and civil society; assist with economic reform leading to sustainable growth; maintain NATO's role; and advance integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

To support the Administration's strategy, for FY 2002, the President has requested \$711 million for U.S. assistance to the region, as well as \$169.6 million for UN assessed peacekeeping costs for the region. Based on historical data, we expect our European and other partners to more than double our contribution. We have worked hard to ensure appropriate burdensharing, and have had considerable success in ensuring that the Europeans carry the lion's share of the burden. For example, in Kosovo, for which we have the most precise data, our \$94.3 million pledge for FY 2001 is 14.5 percent of the total amount pledged. Europeans (the European Commission, EU Member States and Switzerland, and European members of NATO) have pledged 73.5 percent of the total.

We also work to ensure burdensharing in the military aspects of our engagement. We have 7,571 American troops serving with the Kosovo Force—17.4 percent of the total, and 3,872 troops serving with SFOR in Bosnia—18.6 percent of the total there. In addition, we supply 605 American civilian police for the UN mission in Kosovo—13.6 percent of the total deployed, and currently have about 145 serving with the UN mission in Bosnia—8 percent of the total. These are only a few of the quantitative indicators of our engagement.

While we of course look for opportunities to conserve our resources whenever they are not necessary, and to ensure that they are used efficiently, we are committed to doing our part within the overall context of the international community's support for building peace in the region. The Administration has made clear that force structure decisions will be made in full consultation with Allies and through the NATO process. As Secretary Powell has said regarding our continued commitment to NATO military deployments in the Balkans, "we went into this together, and we'll come out together." As he also has said, we are doing what we can to reduce the number of U.S. troops in Bosnia and Kosovo, but for now it is "clear we are the glue that is holding this fragile situation together." So we will not let down our NATO Allies, who provide the bulk of the forces in the Balkans. The costs of U.S. engagement in the Balkans are significant and must always be considered carefully—but the costs of failing to invest in European stability and stand in solidarity with our Allies would be far greater.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be pleased to respond to the Committee's questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

With the permission of my colleague, I would like to make, for this hearing, one amendment on the usual time. We usually do 7 minutes. I would like to suggest we do 10 minutes, if that is OK with you,

Senator HELMS. That is fine.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me begin, Mr. Ambassador, by asking you about something you indirectly referenced, but I would like to be more direct. What do you think is the proximate cause of the violence in Macedonia now?

Let me be more specific. In the Presevo Valley, when I was last there, which was about 4–5 months ago, our military analysis, KFOR's analysis was you were probably talking about three disparate groups, not coordinated, not part of a single operation, not funded and/or supplied exclusively by or predominantly by the KLA in Kosovo, but getting sympathy and some help from elements of the KLA, which is not a particularly unified organization now anyway in Kosovo.

Would you in a similar sense analyze for me what the administration's view is of what is going on in Macedonia now? In other words, where is the insurgency coming from? Is it indigenous? Is it part of a larger movement? How extensive are these, as you referred to them, terrorists?

Ambassador PARDEW. Senator, first of all, let me start with the situation back before February. The Macedonian Government was in a dialog with its Albanian minority community, which is substantial. The estimates range from 25 percent to 35 percent of the population is ethnic Albanian. They were in a dialog. They had brought them into the government in many areas, but that dialog continued because their record in dealing with the rights of their minority citizens was not perfect.

Beginning in February, while most of everyone's attention was focused on southern Serbia and the insurgency that was ongoing there, a group of extremists—exactly whether they were from Macedonia or originated in Kosovo is not quite clear—began to form

and to take military action against the government forces in north-west Macedonia.

That insurgency grew. Our estimate now is that it is probably around 1,000 fighters. Its composition is complex and, as you indicated, decentralized in many ways, but perhaps more centralized than what we encountered in southern Serbia. About 1,000 fighters. It has support both in Macedonia from the population and some from Kosovo and some from Albania, largely from those people who believe in the concept of a Greater Albania, a more extreme element of the Albanian community. I do not think that it reflects the views of the majority of the Albanian people either in Macedonia or in Kosovo or in Albania.

Its strategy is the same strategy that we encountered in Serbia, that is, to provoke a repressive military response and to gain support from that response from the population. So, we are very concerned about these military operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any sense that there is a unified objective among these 1,000 or so fighters?

When I was recently there and as folks make their way through this country from the region, there are posited several scenarios. One is that there is an increasing desire on the part of some Slavs as well as Albanians in Macedonia to divide the country. Two, there is some sympathy in Serbia for such a division to take place. Three, the Albanian Government seems, from everything I can hear, unalterably opposed to any division and see it as their ruination.

What do you think, what do you all assess is the objective? The stated objective was more constitutionally recognized rights, greater participation, et cetera. That is what the negotiating parties are working for.

I met with the Macedonian leadership. I do not get the sense they understand or believe that they are prepared to make what I would think would be basic concessions needed to the Albanian minority. But the political parties have as an objective greater integration of Albanians fully into society and as full citizens, including taking the offending clause out of the constitution.

But can you tell me, with that broad background, about whether or not you have a sense of what are the objectives of the roughly 1,000 personnel who are engaged in military activity? What is their objective?

Ambassador PARDEW. Senator, at its most basic level, I think the objectives of these people who are running this insurgency are personal power for themselves, and they are pretty flexible on what they would accept. I think some of them would like to see this romantic notion of a Greater Albania, but that's probably a very small element. I think some of them would like to partition Macedonia. But at the end of the day, I think they are seeking greater political influence inside the Albanian community both in Macedonia and Kosovo.

Now, a lot of people jump to this idea of drawing lines somewhere in the Balkans as a solution to these kind of conflicts. We absolutely disagree with that. We have seen this before, and it has never worked out. We believe that concepts of individual rights and tolerance are the way to deal with these kinds of minority issues.

So, we agree with the Macedonian Government and with those who believe that Macedonia's sovereignty includes its current boundaries and we do not favor any concept of a division within Macedonia.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure it is, but I hope that is being communicated in the absolute sternest possible way that can be done by our Government to the present Macedonian leadership, the Slavic leadership. This is more a statement than a question. It seems to me that they have to understand that this is a lose-lose situation for them. There is no prospect of continued U.S. help or involvement and, I would argue, little from the European Union if they conclude that partition and annexation or a movement anywhere else seems to be in their interest.

The reason I pursue this is that one of the dilemmas is what do we do more than we are doing now, if we should do anything more. There are a number of things that theoretically can be done.

Theoretically we could be much more aggressive in Kosovo with the sympathizers in identifying those persons, whether former KLA or not, who are engaged with and supporting this insurgency.

There are others who suggest the possibility of having a version of a KFOR, an MFOR, in Macedonia while negotiations go on.

And there are those who further suggest that we should be able to step up considerably our physical presence and our physical efforts in terms of how porous the border is. Having flown over that area a number of times—and as General Clark knows better than I do—in the winter you can see the trails. In the summer it is a fundamentally different situation.

What I would like to know is what is the administration contemplating with our allies? Is it continued negotiations and no change in terms of the military operation that is being conducted by KFOR in the region? Are we going to step that up? Is there contemplation of moving forces into Macedonia? Could you talk to me a little bit about that for a moment?

Ambassador PARDEW. Yes, sir. First of all, in Kosovo there have been a number of changes taking place. The success that we had in southern Serbia has allowed KFOR to adjust some of its forces away from that border and to be more active along the border with Macedonia. They have had some success in interdicting the flow of arms and personnel in recent days.

In addition to that, we have pushed for tougher UNMIK regulations, which have the force of law in Kosovo, in order to give our military and police forces the legal basis for detaining and holding people because there was not sufficient legal structure there to do that. So, we have tried to strengthen the legal structure that would allow us to hold these people.

We are watching that situation inside of Kosovo very carefully because there is considerable support either originating from there or passing through there. We have emphasized that.

Inside Macedonia, we are working with the Macedonian security forces. I mentioned the coordination center that has been established. Admiral Ellis has been there a number of times, and a NATO team has been there. But we continue to believe that the solution for the situation inside of Macedonia is a Macedonian solution and not a NATO solution. So, right now any kind of change

to the NATO structure there is not on the table except for force protection for our troops who are there.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up. Let me just end by saying that I met with Generals Casey and Quinlan at Camp Bondsteel back when the Presevo Valley looked like it was about to explode. I was asked by them whether I would meet in Belgrade with Serbian officials, including the two people in charge of the area. The military guys had a very direct message, and the direct message was, not asking, but demanding that Belgrade integrate the Albanians in the Presevo Valley, make commitments of integration in the police force and other areas. It was not a request; it was a demand.

I respectfully suggest that such a demand has to be made now in Macedonia relating to the changes that need to be taking place in the constitution.

My time is up. I have gone beyond it. I yield to Senator Helms. Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I heard some speculation on the radio, a couple of fellows talking about this very situation. One of them expressed fear that this would result in the violent collapse of Macedonia. Does the administration have that fear?

Ambassador PARDEW. I do not think we are anywhere near that kind of situation, Senator. It is serious. It is dangerous. The government there is having a very difficult time in dealing with it, but I do not believe that the NLA has the forces to cause the collapse.

Senator HELMS. Well, I share that.

Maybe we ought to say for the record what is the value of Macedonia to our interest?

Ambassador PARDEW. We could tie it back to our interest in European security. It all stems from that. Fundamentally the whole issue of stability in the Balkans ties back to our commitment to Europe and our belief that European security is in our interest. So, to the degree that Macedonia is stable, southeastern Europe is stable, sir.

Senator HELMS. I have not had the pleasure of reading your full statement. I shall do that. But in there do you mention on June 11 the NATO peacekeepers operating along the border between Kosovo and Macedonia intercepted significant amounts of weapons and medicine and uniforms and other equipment? Do you mention that?

Ambassador PARDEW. It is not specified in the statement, but I just mentioned that there have been a number of successes along the border.

Senator HELMS. Well, that was intended for the National Liberation Army, was it not?

Ambassador PARDEW. It was, Senator.

Senator HELMS. That is a given.

Ambassador PARDEW. That is a given.

Senator HELMS. Well, my question is, do these seizures indicate that the supply of goods to the NLA is being cut off, or does it reflect an increase in the NLA's power? You could look at it either way.

Ambassador PARDEW. The NLA gets its support from a number of sources. Some things come out of Kosovo. Some come from Albania. All those borders are difficult, as the Senator mentioned. There

are not enough troops over there to 100 percent close that border. And some of it comes from inside of Macedonia and perhaps from areas on the other side of Macedonia. So, it has any number of places that it can get weapons. The weapons that are being used in this kind of conflict are not hard to obtain, and we have had some success inside of Kosovo, but if we close the door in Kosovo, there are other options for them.

Senator HELMS. What is the administration's opinion about who put together this shipment?

Ambassador PARDEW. We cannot trace back specifically that particular shipment. A lot of these weapons are coming from people who are simply in the arms market. We have to be lucky to catch them. But there are a lot of weapons for sale in this region. I cannot take this particular shipment back to a specific source.

Senator HELMS. I see.

Let me move on to another question that was discussed in this radio discussion, which I found very interesting, about the discrimination of the Albanian community that the Macedonian Government needs to address and address directly I think as part of a comprehensive strategy to end this conflict. What is the possibility of getting that straightened out and restoring a measure of comfort and peace to the area?

Ambassador PARDEW. The Macedonian Government was working in an ongoing dialog with the Albanian community at the time this fighting broke out. That process was not moving rapidly enough in either our view or in the view of the Albanian community. I think this conflict has heightened the awareness of the government that they do need to take actions here. There are any number of inequities in terms of Albanian participation in the institutions of government, the police force, the military, their access to resources, their cultural identity, language, and so forth. Those issues are on the table in the discussions that are ongoing now with the legitimate and accepted political parties that the Macedonian Government has been dealing with all along.

So, we are hopeful that this plan that President Trajkovski got through the parliament yesterday addresses all of these issues. It will be the topic of a major discussion beginning tomorrow at an offsite that the grand coalition parties will discuss outside of Skopje and try to move this political process forward. But there are recognized inequities and the Macedonian Government is trying to work rapidly to resolve them.

Senator HELMS. What role is our administration playing in trying to bring the parties together? What are you doing?

Ambassador PARDEW. We are facilitating those discussions.

Senator HELMS. Are you doing it by invitation?

Ambassador PARDEW. No. We are on the ground working extensively every day. We have a wonderful ambassador on the ground there. As I mentioned, a Deputy Assistant Secretary is working this full-time in the region right now and is traveling with the European parties who are working with the Macedonian Government to address these issues on an expedited basis. In fact, we are pushing them hard to deal with these issues. We pressed them to put together this plan, drawing from the successes that happened in southern Serbia. They have a plan and they will be dealing with

it over the next 48 hours. We are hopeful that that will produce results.

Senator HELMS. Let me confess again that I have not had a chance to read your manuscript. Did you discuss in there the peace plan put forward, I think it was this past Friday, by the President of Macedonia? Did you discuss that?

Ambassador PARDEW. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. Do you state an opinion as to whether this provides a reasonable path toward a just and enduring end to the conflict? Do you think it will?

Ambassador PARDEW. This is the plan that was passed by their parliament yesterday and will be addressed in this conference beginning tomorrow. We do believe that this plan has the basis for a solution here, a positive and peaceful solution, and we are hopeful that over the next few days that that plan can be agreed upon by all parties and that it will be the basis for an agreement.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Torricelli.

Senator TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador, looking at this historically from the perspective of 20 years forward, will people be harsh with the United States that our policies in Kosovo and Serbia generally participated in raising unrealistically Albanian expectations, which unwittingly and unfortunately may have further fueled the problems?

Ambassador PARDEW. I think we have been fairly consistent, Senator, in our position of opposing extremist political activities. In that sense the United States and our European allies went into Kosovo, as General Clark will testify, for a proper purpose. There was ethnic cleansing going on.

Senator TORRICELLI. I am not disputing that, nor is that my question, nor is my question our perception. My question is in the perceptions of Albanians, who have unfortunately now given themselves to violence and terrorist operations, could it be argued, out of the current context, that they have the unfortunate, misplaced perception that this was an opportunity for them, not on the scale of the Kurdish miscalculation, but nevertheless a miscalculation.

Ambassador PARDEW. There may be the misplaced view of some of them that we somehow support this, among some of them. But as I said in my statement, we want to make it crystal clear that the United States opposes the activities of the National Liberation Army in Macedonia. We do not support them.

Senator TORRICELLI. That is not at issue. I understand that.

Sometimes in this country, in deciding policies, the repercussions of them, the opportunities for the parties involved to misinterpret and miscalculate are enormous. It appears to me, while I do not quarrel with the intentions of the U.S. Government nor our announced policy in Kosovo, there are a series of echoes that come from this policy for a number of years from people who did not understand our actions or our intentions. This may be the first of them.

The chairman asked you to define if there was a unifying set of objectives in the KLA. To the extent that they exist and you were

to impose them on a map of the region, could you describe what that would look like?

Ambassador PARDEW. For those extremists in the Albanian community that believe in a Greater Albania, it includes all the territory where Albanians live and that includes southern Serbia, part of Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo and—

Senator TORRICELLI. I take it almost all of Kosovo and parts of southern Serbia. And define for me how much of Macedonia would be in that.

Ambassador PARDEW. Well, probably the northern at least third maybe more. But then you get very large pockets of Albanian citizens inside of Macedonia. For example, the capital of Skopje has probably 200,000 Albanians that live there. So, that is the problem with all these proposals to draw lines on maps. There is no clean line that—

Senator TORRICELLI. But if we were sitting in KLA headquarters—and every headquarters has a map on the wall to rally their forces—their map would include Kosovo, southern Serbia, at least the northwest of Macedonia and potentially some noncontiguous areas in Macedonia.

Ambassador PARDEW. Probably in the minds of some. I doubt that these guys have thought through it that far, and they certainly did not succeed in southern Serbia where we prevented a major insurgency from being successful.

Senator TORRICELLI. Are there any areas of Greek territory in question?

Ambassador PARDEW. I am not sure about the Albanian population in Greece. I know there are some, but I am not sure it is—

Senator TORRICELLI. Could you define for me the state of the problem of illegal Albanian refugees going into Italy and the posture of the U.S. Government on the question?

Ambassador PARDEW. Well, there have been refugees from the conflict. We are concerned about criminal activity from the region.

Senator TORRICELLI. Are the numbers still substantial of people entering Italy legally and illegally?

Ambassador PARDEW. I am sure the Italians consider them substantial, Senator. I cannot give you a number. I can give it to you for the record, if you would like for me to submit it later.

Senator TORRICELLI. Define for me the reaction and role of the Greek Government in the Macedonia issue and the support and whether they are lending diplomatically on behalf of the Macedonian Government.

Ambassador PARDEW. The Greek Government is trying to be helpful here. They have made a series of proposals. They are working inside the institutions that I mentioned, NATO, the OSCE, and others. They are working quietly and publicly to try to be helpful here. The Greek contribution here has been positive.

Senator TORRICELLI. You suggested to the chairman that you did not think that this had reached the—not to put words in your mouth—critical mass. If indeed we reached that posture, the options available, outside of Macedonia that might be available, would then you envision an international force on an ad hoc basis, a NATO force? Do you envision that there would be bilateral help

by any of the nations involved if indeed the Macedonian Government could not handle the situation?

Ambassador PARDEW. Well, Senator, as I said, I do not believe we are anywhere close to that. Before you would ever get to the kind of options that you are talking about, there are an awful lot of steps. There would be many alternatives in a kind of a meltdown scenario, and as to the issue of troops, as I said, that is not on the table now. We do not think we are anywhere close to requiring a consideration of that option.

Senator TORRICELLI. I was not suggesting troops. I was suggesting whether there is an ad hoc group of countries in Western Europe who might be making contingency plans in case this was required or even the profound question for the Greek Government, if they were prepared to have a full scale civil war and the possibility of the fall of the Macedonian Government with a larger Albanian state on their borders. I would think for Greece, aside from what the international community might do, this is a very real bilateral problem for them.

Ambassador PARDEW. When you get into scenarios in which the regional states are putting forces in there on an individual or bilateral basis, those are scenarios that we want to try to avoid because they are very, very volatile.

Senator TORRICELLI. Could you define for me, to the best we know, the sources of the weapons the KLA is using?

Ambassador PARDEW. Some of them are just local weapons. Some of them came from Albania. You recall several years ago the Albanian Government largely came apart, and the arsenals that were under the control of the military were looted. Some of them come from that. Some of them come from the international arms market, and some of them are bought in the region. So, there are a number of sources.

Senator TORRICELLI. You do not see any evidence of weapons being provided by other states. To the extent they are coming from outside of Albania, they are being purchased in the markets.

Ambassador PARDEW. No, we do not see any evidence that there is an outside governmental—

Senator TORRICELLI. And the funding sources to buy these weapons on the international market. Do you have some feel for what that might be?

Ambassador PARDEW. We are concerned about funding from the Diaspora for these activities.

Senator TORRICELLI. Is that including the United States?

Ambassador PARDEW. Possibly.

Senator TORRICELLI. Is this connected with the criminal activity in Italy?

Ambassador PARDEW. Well, anytime you get into these insurgencies and extremist activities, you usually get a close link with criminal activity, and I would suspect that that is true in this case as well.

Senator TORRICELLI. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I will yield.

I do hope, though, that the administration is sensitive to the enormous impact this problem is having internally in Italy in law enforcement, quality of life. One has only to visit any of the major cities of Italy. The Italians are living with this every day. This is

not a theoretical problem. I hope there is some sensitivity to that as they try to deal with this on a humanitarian basis and enforce their own immigration laws, the integrity of their own borders.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Ambassador Pardew, earlier today when the President had his press conference with Lord Robertson, he indicated, as you have this morning, that Lord Robertson would be going to the area and that the political apparatus ought to be allowed to move along. This was in response to questions much as we are asking of you today, about military force.

You and the distinguished witnesses that will follow you have been involved in this process for a long time. Without oversimplifying it, during the former President Bush's administration, with problems in Bosnia, the hope then, in testimony before this committee, was that Europeans would, by and large, take care of the situation. In due course, Europeans, in fact, said that they would but then recanted and said that they could not, that the historical problems were too great and the United States' intervention and participation would be required in a big way.

President Clinton, as he came in, tried to face up to this situation after, in the campaign as I recall, indicating that he was loath to do so. He was forced by circumstances to do so, and reluctantly we got into the Bosnia predicament and finally did so in a fairly large way. That is, with United States leadership, we determined a massive force was going to be required if that conflict was to be turned around because the ethnic violence had gone a long way, generated in many of the same ways as what we are describing today, namely an on-the-ground situation of diverse ethnic people, stirred up by those who sought political power, and used that for their ends.

Now, the reason I trace this today is that we have a new administration 8 years later, and the predicament now is Macedonia. In your testimony today you point out correctly that the United States, in the burden-sharing argument, which has been going on with NATO for a long time—we are down to 7,571 American troops in Kosovo, 17 percent, and 3,872 in Bosnia, at 18.6. That is satisfying to many of us in the Senate who have argued this all the time. In other words, our colleagues from time to time argue there should be zero U.S. forces. Those of us—I am one of them, the chairman is one of them—who feel that we have a very good reason to be there. We would say, of course, that we want our European allies to do their fair share and our European allies now say they are doing it. And they would cite these same relevant statistics.

The problem, though, is if those who are trying to foment the disaster in Macedonia have the same calculation as those who tried to do it in Bosnia in earlier times, they would simply note once again what might be conceived as temporizing; namely, hope good things will show up, that the President's plan announced last week will work, that those who are perpetrating the violence will cease and desist because they will be discouraged, and that they will not be successful.

But that never worked in Bosnia, unfortunately, and even to this day, there are good number of people, despite the long-time leadership we have tried to give with our European allies, who persist, despite all the discouragement and with a war intervening.

Is not another possible course of action that the NATO alliance indicate that this type of violence in Macedonia is unacceptable? That we, the NATO alliance, are prepared to land with as much force as necessary to eliminate all of the possibilities of there being a change to the border of Macedonia, to the character of the country at this point, both from the standpoint of European security, and that Macedonia is an integral part of this, as is the rest of the former Yugoslavia?

But to temporize in a way that gives a temptation to these forces to continue, to keep testing to see if somehow this government might unravel or whether we really do mean business or whether the debate back here says we are tired of it all, that we want out of there and let the Europeans handle it, and the Europeans come to us again after an intervening period of several months and say, we just cannot make it, then we are back to the situation of why is Macedonia important. Well, it is important. As Senator Torricelli was pointing out it could become important if it brought further problems with Greece or others in the neighborhood.

So, as you speculate maybe beyond your portfolio this morning, why is it not a better course simply to indicate that this type of violence, destined to unravel a nation state, is unacceptable? We have the forces to stop it. We will stop it, and the United States will take the leadership in doing that, even at the charge of being called unilateralist or hegemonistic, unless there is a preparation on the part of our NATO allies to step up with us shoulder to shoulder, indicating we are not withdrawing, that we intend to be part of this and we have assets that would be effective really in changing this.

Ambassador PARDEW. Well, the administration has been clear that we are not going to deal with these problems unilaterally either in or out. So, Senator, I do not think there is any promise that we would somehow take some unilateral action.

As to NATO, NATO has made clear that these kinds of actions are unacceptable and that we object to the NLA and that we are taking actions in places where we have responsibility, that is, in Kosovo.

But I would go back to the situation that we had in southern Serbia as kind of a model. We had about 1,000 fighters. They were Albanian extremists. They were operating in the Ground Safety Zone. By working with the Serbian Government, the Europeans taking the lead incidentally, we did a lot of diplomatic work with them, but we were able to separate the insurgents from the population support base.

These insurgencies are mainly about the people that the insurgents want to gain support from. If you're going to be successful here, the Government of Macedonia has to convince the Albanian citizens of Macedonia that that government is acting in their interests and that these fighters are not. We were able to accomplish that in southern Serbia through a lot of the confidence building

measures and changes by the Serbian Government toward their Albanian population. The Macedonians need to do the same thing.

Whether or not the United States or NATO should assume responsibility for an insurgency that is in Macedonia, somewhat created by the Macedonian Government in its treatment of its citizens, is a very serious question, and at this point I certainly could not recommend that.

Senator LUGAR. Well, it is a very complex question. That is one reason why we have temporized, maybe properly so. But as you say, each of the governments in that area might be faulted for being less than fastidious with regard to civil rights and treatment of all of their people. This is a problem of ethnic conflict in most of these situations. So, it is relative I suppose.

In southern Serbia, as you are pointing out, were these NATO military forces that are there physically, or who was doing the dealing?

Ambassador PARDEW. No. The success in southern Serbia was brought about by convincing the Government in Belgrade that it had to change its policies toward the Albanian citizens in Serbia. They implemented or have begun to implement or committed to many of the confidence building measures that we are trying to get the Macedonian Government to do.

Senator LUGAR. So, that is our hope, that a parallel might exist from these reforms that came from Belgrade and that the reforms in Macedonia might measure up in the same way.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield on that point very briefly?

Senator LUGAR. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We had a very different situation. The Serbs wanted access to that zone. Under an agreement, KFOR had control of that zone, No. 1.

No. 2, we indirectly threatened that we would get ourselves involved within that zone.

No. 3, we, not the Europeans, were the ones that let Belgrade know that if they were not willing to make the concessions they needed to make to the Albanian population, we would make it very difficult for them to recover economically.

So, with all due respect, Mr. Ambassador, I do not think you have accurately stated the situation in the Presevo Valley. It does not exist in Macedonia now.

Ambassador PARDEW. It is not a complete parallel, Senator. But my point is that we do not see a military solution to this. We see a solution more on the order of the confidence building measures that were implemented in southern Serbia being implemented in Macedonia as a way to get at the fundamental problem, which is separating the insurgents from their population support base.

Senator LUGAR. Fair enough. But just following Senator Biden's intervention, which is very helpful, it seems to me that maybe this is already a part of your planning. Plan B or Plan C better be there as a contingency because I think if you were to rate our confidence that this is going to work on a scale of 1 to 10, it might be problematic at this point. Now, maybe we will have good luck, but we have not had much in that area over the course of time.

So I would hope, without your laying all those cards on the table prematurely, that there is within our Government—and, hopefully,

our Government in consultation with NATO—some very good contingency and one on which our administration is prepared to come to the Congress with the arguments to gain support.

The worst of all worlds would be that finally Plan B or Plan C is implemented, but you or others come to the Congress and say, surprise. Sadly enough, this just did not work out. So, as a result we will need more of this or that. And the nay-sayers over here will say, we have got you.

In essence, this underlines the weariness we have of this problem, constantly being misled up the Hill and down the Hill. I just have some fear about this working out unless you and others are able to outline a course down the trail. If the political option does not work, if we are not lucky, what are we prepared to do? What are we prepared to advise our European allies to do?

I thank you very much for your forthcoming answers.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Ambassador, have our troops been placed in greater danger as a result of this conflict?

Ambassador PARDEW. We have about 700 Americans as part of the KFOR rear located near Skopje in a base camp there. There is a total of about 3,000 KFOR rear troops. They are responsible for logistics support to our activities in Kosovo. Obviously with fighting nearby, they are more exposed than if there was not fighting nearby, but we are confident that they have the means to defend themselves.

Senator NELSON. How about our troops in Kosovo? Are they in greater danger?

Ambassador PARDEW. Most of the activity on the Macedonian border recently—there have been some exceptions. There has been an interdiction of some weapons, but a lot of this has not been in the U.S. sector. But clearly with some support coming out of Kosovo into Macedonia, they are more active in their patrolling and can encounter people who are carrying weapons or crossing into Macedonia.

Senator NELSON. How about our U.S. aid? Is it helping Macedonia deal with this crisis? Political and economic.

Ambassador PARDEW. We are upping our assistance program next year to \$45 million for Macedonia. I think it is \$38 million this year. We are asking for \$45 million. We have a very active assistance program going there. We see assistance to the communities as one of the keys to success here with the civil population, the Albanian population. So, we are focused on that and we hope to increase our contribution next year.

Senator NELSON. Tell me about what you envision for the future as the U.S. leadership role in trying to resolve this crisis.

Ambassador PARDEW. We intend to be fully engaged diplomatically. As I have mentioned, the President has been involved in this. The President is in Brussels today. This is a topic of discussion. Secretary Powell is there. Secretary Powell has been to Macedonia. President Trajkovski has been here to meet with President Bush and so forth. There has been a constant high level engagement in this particular situation, both with our European allies and with the Macedonian leadership. There have been exchanges of letters,

and I can go on and on and on about the engagement of the very highest levels of this Government in this particular problem.

Senator NELSON. Do you think that our leadership role is sufficient as it is now or does it need to come to a higher level such as the placing of a special envoy?

Ambassador PARDEW. Well, with the personal involvement of Secretary Powell and Secretary Rumsfeld has been there, in addition to having our Deputy Assistant Secretary on the road with Mr. Solana's team, we believe that we have adequate representation in the region.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Ambassador, I would like to just make a few quick parting questions here for you. I appreciate your time and I appreciate your candor.

I might note that in the statement I put in the record, I ask the administration consider a special envoy.

One of the great advantages of General Powell, beyond his obvious strengths, is he ran the biggest bureaucracy in America and in the world, and he negotiated it incredibly well. He now is in charge of one that is close to dysfunctional. I am confident he is going to make some very positive changes there.

But at the expense of running the risk of offending the general sitting behind you, I think generals think like generals, and they think a little bit in these organizational charts. I know he does not like this notion of special envoys. But I noticed that they concluded that they have got to essentially do that in the Middle East. Powell cannot be everywhere. And sending Tenet was not an accident.

I respectfully suggest that there is a need to explain our policy, especially in light of the way in which the administration has finally arrived at its decision to stay involved in the Balkans—there were some doubts about that, not only with our friends in the region, but even with our own military in the region. I have been there nine times. The last two times were, geez, what is going to happen? What is our mission? Are we going to leave? What is going on?

I think it made this decision relative to Macedonia a little more difficult because everybody is playing brinkmanship in that region, as you know better than I do, Mr. Ambassador. I really think that you may very well conclude that, notwithstanding your considerable prowess, there is going to have to be a higher profile showing that somebody has a direct ear of the President and this means we are there to stay.

I would just like to suggest to you and to my friend from New Jersey, who had to leave, that if Italy thinks it has a problem now with immigration, you watch what happens if this ends up in a full-blown civil war. They ain't seen nothing yet. That is one of the reasons why we should stay involved.

It will not surprise you I associate myself with the comments of my friend from Indiana. I think that temporizing has been a mistake. Every President from Bush through Clinton through this President, in my view, has engaged in it, hoping for the best and always having to do more.

But I will conclude by saying that it may be that in the Presevo Valley it was not a military solution, it was a political solution. Dr. Haltzel and I spent several meetings and long hours, in one case 4 or more hours, dealing with the plan that got put together, going through the detail of what they had to do. I am not suggesting we had anything to do with putting the plan together, but going through the detail.

But I would respectfully suggest the only reason it worked, it was backed up with military. It was backed up with the prospect on the part of those in Belgrade that they would lose more control of part of their country. In fact, their inability to move into this zone where they are not allowed to have forces was a very unattractive, continuing prospect for them, and KFOR was demonstrating some muscle at the time.

So I do not suggest that there is a military solution, but I would suggest there is no political solution without a military backup in Macedonia.

My concluding question to you is this. This hearing obviously so far has focused totally upon Macedonia, but it is about the Balkans generally. My one question is whether it is in the Republika Srpska or anywhere else in Bosnia, as well even in Kosovo, but particularly the Republika Srpska, our collective inability and unwillingness to arrest war criminals is the single most significant failure of the entire Western world? I think it is the single most significant reason why Dayton has not been able to be fulfilled. I think that it gives overwhelming sustenance to those who want to see it fall apart.

You had Karadzic actually masterminding the debacle that took place when the mosque was going to be rebuilt in Banja Luka in the Republika Srpska which did, in one fell swoop, more damage in my view to progress in the region than anything that has happened in the last 5 years.

You cannot answer this in all probability, but I sincerely hope the President, who is a strong fellow, is willing to take the political risk of pushing our allies to do the one thing that is within our power and the one thing many people, not just me, think could change the dynamics on the ground more than any other single thing we could do: arrest particularly two war criminals, Mladic and Karadzic. But there are others. I know we have made some progress, but none of it has been a consequence of our using force.

I will conclude by saying that I cannot think of a single incident—and maybe the distinguished witnesses that will follow you, along with you, may be able to, but I cannot think of one—where anything has moved positively in the Balkans without a show of force and resolve, absolute resolve and an absolute certainty on the part of the parties that failure to move would result in the use of force, overwhelming force. This has been the case since 1992 in my view when I tried to convince, in the first instance, President Clinton to change the policy that had been put in place by President Bush.

So, if you are willing, I would like you to respond now and, if not, for the record. What is the administration's position on the seeking of and the arrest of war criminals in the Balkans, particularly in the Republika Srpska and elsewhere in Bosnia?

Ambassador PARDEW. Senator, the administration agrees with you on the absolute need to get these, particularly the larger, more notorious war criminals, to The Hague to face justice.

You mentioned some success. We have had some success. There are 50 or so of them who have, in fact, been brought to justice, to The Hague, and we have pressed the Government of the FRY to take care of Milosevic and continue to do that.

I can only say that it is a high priority. We continue to work it publicly and privately, and we will continue to do so because, as you rightly point out, it is something that must be done if we are to have long-term progress in the region.

The CHAIRMAN. I realize, Mr. Ambassador, our allies, with one exception, have been less than enthusiastic about these prospects. I understand that. But I think if the word went forward that you either are in custody or dead, it would be a nice message to send. I think we should pursue it as hard as we can.

What amazes me the most—and I do not mean this as a criticism of this administration or any administration or any of my colleagues here—is the idea that we cannot look back over the last 11 years and see almost the exact replication of events in every instance from the situation in Croatia in 1991 and 1992 and 1993 straight through to today. It really baffles me.

I hope I am wrong. I doubt whether our European friends are ever going to take the initiative totally on their own. That is not to say that once we move, they do not share the burden. They are sharing the burden now. The question is are they willing to share the leadership? I respectfully suggest they are not. Without us moving, I think there is no movement.

I will conclude by saying I think Senator Lugar is correct. I am willing to bet you my seat in the U.S. Senate that if in fact the President of the United States tomorrow would announce to our European allies that we were moving force, if we concluded it would be useful, into Macedonia, notwithstanding their strenuous objections, they would all move with us. The French cannot afford to let us move. The Germans cannot afford to let us move alone.

This is one of those cases where I think it is going to require some real leadership. I hope this President is able to do what other Presidents did not do initially. Otherwise, I think 10 years of painful and basically successful intervention incrementally will go down the drain.

But I appreciate your listening to me, Mr. Ambassador.

Senator NELSON. Will the chairman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. I would be delighted to.

Senator NELSON. I would like for the chairman to state for the record, with this country's history of being concerned about human rights violations and with this country's vigorous leadership with regard to bringing to justice those who have perpetrated war crimes, going all the way back to the followup to World War II, what is the hesitancy in the chairman's mind on the part of this administration or the past administration for not absolutely insisting, as the chairman has proposed, that those be brought to justice for their war crimes, as was the insistence, for example, with regard to Milosevic.

The CHAIRMAN. I would refrain from answering that. I think it is a good question that we can ask unfairly General Clark.

I have my own views. I believe there are those who truly believe if we were to move that forcefully, we would cause more problems in the region. I think they are dead wrong. I also think you will find that there is a notion that Serbia continues to be the big enchilada. If Serbia is right, it is all going to be right with the world. Our willingness to lift the embargo on Serbia before Milosevic was delivered to The Hague I think was a mistake. But I think there are logical and very well-founded arguments why I may be incorrect about this.

But I think that question would be better directed to General Clark, and I am happy to privately tell you my views.

Mr. Ambassador, thank you very, very much for being here. I appreciate it. I am sure you will communicate our views and hopefully come back.

Ambassador PARDEW. Yes, sir, I will. It is an honor to be here on your first day as chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Now, our next panel is General Clark and Richard Perle, two men with vast experience in the region. General, when you get situated, why do we not begin with you, and then, Richard, I am eager to hear what you have to say as well.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. WESLEY K. CLARK (U.S. ARMY, RET.),
CORPORATE CONSULTANT, STEPHENS GROUP, INC., WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. CLARK. Well, thank you very much for the opportunity and the honor of appearing here before this distinguished committee, Mr. Chairman. I have an opening statement I have submitted for the record, and in the interest of time, I would just like to go through it very quickly. Just a couple of key points.

I do think we are at another critical point in our decades-long struggle to bring peace, stability, and democratization to southeastern Europe and specifically to the Balkans and former Yugoslavia. We have watched with great concern as the situation in Macedonia in recent months has disintegrated. Each time we hoped for a solution. We hoped that the Macedonian police and the military could contain it, that there could be some agreement worked out, that people would not respond as they have in the past ethnic crises there.

But there is a degree, to use your words from the earlier panel, of temporizing in this. One thing we should know after a decade is if decisive action is not taken soon in these situations, they become politically intractable. In the Balkans, once Humpty Dumpty falls off the wall, it is very difficult to put Humpty Dumpty together again. We are right on the edge of a precipice right now.

I am delighted to learn about the initiatives and the conference this weekend at Lake Ohrid and I hope that an agreement will emerge. But even if there is a political agreement, there is going to be a need to implement it, and it is going to take NATO backing, and that is going to take U.S. leadership and U.S. commitment and, no doubt, some NATO troops on the ground to help the Macedonian army get back into the areas in which there has been

fighting with a minimum of bloodshed and further disturbance of the civilian population.

So, I think the time is now to move ahead with a NATO mission supporting diplomacy in the region. There is no military solution, but we do need a diplomatic solution.

Beyond that, I think the United States and NATO have to continue to stay engaged.

In Bosnia, there are still hard-line radical elements controlling from behind the scenes. The NATO military mission there is absolutely essential to provide the backup and support needed for courageous international civil implementation. The pace of progress there is limited by the courage and the imagination of the civil side of this mission, and that is where U.S. leadership needs to be, as well as with our troops there.

In Kosovo, I think we made enormous headway in the last few weeks with the finalization of the elections in November, but I think we have to recognize that international community reluctance to move ahead with the process for final status determination has been an important factor leading to conflict and further uncertainties in that region.

Finally, just to address your point about U.S. leadership. I have always felt that we had very, very strong support from our allies in this region, but every nation has differing interests. We have a different interest than Europe, but they each have differing interests. It has been the United States' burden and opportunity to lead NATO. That leadership is required today, just as it has been in the past, and it is required to see NATO be effective in halting this latest outbreak of fighting.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Clark follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. WESLEY K. CLARK (U.S. ARMY, RET.)

MACEDONIA AND U.S. TROOPS IN THE BALKANS

Mr. Chairman, Senators, it is an honor to appear before this distinguished Committee to discuss the critical situation in southeastern Europe [the Balkans] today. In recent years, members of this committee have shown great sensitivity to U.S. policy toward Europe, NATO, and our continuing commitments in this volatile part of Europe [the Balkans]. Senator Biden, in particular, has for over a decade been seriously engaged in efforts to understand the region, prevent or end its conflicts, and provide sensible proposals to policymakers of several administrations and both parties. And let me say how grateful I have been personally for the strong support of so many members of this committee as our policies have developed from our initial negotiations at Dayton to end the war in Bosnia, through the many issues associated with NATO enlargement, our successful NATO military action to end Milosevic's campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, and finally to our continuing commitment of U.S. forces as part of KFOR.

However, the work in the Balkans is not done, nor has the need for U.S. participation and, indeed, U.S. leadership diminished. In fact, we are once again at a critical juncture in the further evolution of events there, as we witness the tragic escalation of fighting in Macedonia. And, once again, as the international community attempts to resolve an emerging conflict with limited diplomatic missions and exhortations to restraint, the lessons of recent history run square against the pressures of contemporary politics. NATO has resisted an additional military mission in the Balkans, but all the pleas and counsel of EU and NATO political leaders have not and cannot end the fighting there. And as the fighting continues, the familiar pattern of excessive use of force and needless harm to innocent civilians has reappeared, promising that the continuation of conflict will make any political solution increasingly difficult between increasingly alienated and hostile ethnic groups.

For most of a decade the United States has worked to protect and strengthen Macedonia's democracy. Beginning in 1993 we deployed U.S. troops along the border with Serbia as part of UNPREDEP, the UN Preventive Deployment Force. It was a mission held up as an example of a new U.S. and international strategy, Preventive Defense. In conjunction with the United Nations, we successfully used a small military mission, only some 500 U.S. troops and an equal number of Scandinavians, to signal to Milosevic our determination that conflict would not spread to Macedonia, and to reassure the fledgling democratic forces there that they could work together peacefully in promoting a new system of government in an historically troubled region.

During the anxious moments of NATO's military actions against Serb ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, NATO and the U.S. reassured the Macedonian government that we would stand with them. I recall President Gligorov, with whom I met many times, reflecting that 50 years hence, Serbia would still be a neighbor, and asking if NATO would also still be there to help his country if need be. But despite our reassurances, the Macedonians were troubled, and they were right to be. During the fighting, Milosevic targeted Macedonia, inciting pro-Serb elements to raid the United States, German and several other NATO members' embassies in Skopje. Three U.S. soldiers were kidnapped in northern Macedonia by the Serbs in an action that has never been satisfactorily explained but has all the ear-marks of a special forces kidnapping. And finally, Milosevic used the "refugee bomb" against Macedonia, deporting hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians to Macedonia in an effort to destabilize the government there.

With help from NATO, the UN, and a number of NGO humanitarian assistance organizations, Macedonia coped successfully with the refugees. And throughout the long ordeal of the NATO campaign Macedonia provided us the use of their airspace for our operations, their airport for reconnaissance flights, their road network, and many facilities for staging the NATO force which was to enter Kosovo when the fighting stopped. That force, staging in preparation of peace, also helped convey the threat of ground invasion and was critical in convincing Milosevic to give in to NATO's demands. Macedonia also hosted the base areas for many KLA elements, and served as a logistics base linked to quiet infiltration routes, even though they feared that eventually the radical Albanian elements would turn against them someday. Without the continued and active support of the Macedonian government the NATO action in Kosovo would likely have failed. The United States and its NATO allies truly are in debt to the courage and skill of the people and government of Macedonia. We owe them more than we have thus far repaid.

Now, as the democracy we fostered and upheld rapidly disintegrates in ethnic fighting, the United States faces another critical juncture in its Balkan journey; to take responsibility, with cooperation from the Allies, in preventing renewed conflict and preserving Macedonia's territorial integrity through a military and expanded diplomatic mission, or to continue to try to just scrape by, hoping against reality and the experience of the past ten years that the fighting will die out as a result of EU-led mediation, skillful Macedonian government diplomacy and military pressure exerted by Macedonian troops in their own country. I cite this as a United States decision, for surely it cannot be implemented successfully without U.S. encouragement and participation, if not U.S. leadership.

Why should the burden of leadership fall on the United States once again? Because I am convinced that, absent America's moral and political commitment to broker a settlement, spreading ethnic violence will lead to Macedonia's collapse, releasing passions that will focus on partitions and redrawing of borders that will prove destabilizing for the region and require an international military presence to police it indefinitely. If Europe matters to the United States, the administration and Congress will need to act on the premise that the most urgent and challenging problems for the transatlantic community begins with southeastern Europe; preventing the revival of ethnic cleansing, ensuring democratic development that will generate self-sustaining regional stability, and sustaining the continued vitality and viability of NATO.

At this point it seems clear that the situation on the ground is going to continue to deteriorate unless NATO actively intervenes. The troops of the Macedonian Army lack the equipment, skills, and leadership to meet the challenge posed by the Albanian fighters. Their continuing efforts to resist rebel incursions appear to have done little more than destroy civilian property and convince thousands to flee their homes and villages. About 10,000 refugees streamed into Kosovo over the weekend alone as the insurgents moved into the suburbs of Skopje, adding to the over 20,000 that UNHCR reported had previously fled into Kosovo and the nearly 20,000 internally displaced within Macedonia. UNHCR has announced that it is planning for 150,000 Macedonian refugees in Kosovo this year. Every strike against Albanian civilians

further radicalizes the Albanian population and generates more recruits for the Albanian fighters. It is not realistic to expect KFOR to control the border from inside Kosovo. The difficult terrain and numerous trails and villages will combine to frustrate efforts at total control with anything like the number of KFOR troops currently available. And even if we could "seal" that border (which we cannot), other support and assistance would still reach the fighters through Albania, Bulgaria, or from within Macedonia itself.

It is not too late however, for NATO to act in conjunction with a U.S.-led peace initiative with the ethnic Macedonians and Albanians. This plan would involve sending a senior Bush administration official with the clout and personality to broker an agreement among the Macedonians and engage Washington and the EU in its implementation. It would balance preservation of the Macedonian state—the key aim of ethnic Macedonians—with a political and economic agenda for overcoming deep-seated discrimination against the ethnic Albanians—the aim of the moderate Albanian political leaders and declared objective of the insurgents. The EU would be asked to commit and disburse one hundred million dollars in economic assistance immediately for the next six months to buy time for the reforms to take hold. Crucially, it would also require a NATO monitoring force, including a U.S. contingent, to supervise the security components of the agreement, creating confidence among both ethnic groups and allowing passions to begin to subside.

NATO should move immediately to reinforce its forces along the Kosovo-Macedonian border, and should extend its operations into Macedonian territory itself, in an effort to displace the Slavic Macedonian troops who are now attempting to fight against the Albanian guerrillas. In conjunction with the Macedonian effort the purpose of the NATO action would be to provide joint patrols and help the government of Macedonia establish a presence in the northern areas of its own country. This will entail some risk to NATO troops, but if accompanied by the right rules of engagement and political efforts, the risk can be minimized. Simultaneously, the United States must create some ad hoc organization to develop a multifunctional team which can help the government of Macedonia meet the needs of its own citizens. This would include surveying Albanian and Macedonian areas, helping to provide local security, augmenting the Macedonian courts, educational system and public health measures while assisting in the development of new rights and guarantees to remove the actual and perceived ethnic injustices which lie at the root of this quarrel.

The urgency of action in Macedonia is accompanied by the need to continue active measures to promote peace and democratic standards elsewhere in the region. In Bosnia, U.S. and NATO troops remain vital elements in continuing implementation of the Dayton agreement. But the international community must also muster increased determination through the Peace Implementation Committee to insist that the provisions of Dayton be implemented and that those who obstruct implementation be removed from positions of authority, whether elected or not. This is a matter of the increased and effective use of the various authorities the High Representative has been granted, but is frequently reluctant to use. Without courageous civil implementation actions, the mission in Bosnia will not be successful. But courageous civil implementation also requires strong NATO presence. Continuing troop cuts at this time run the risk of further undercutting the mission in Bosnia.

In Kosovo, U.S. forces are an essential part of KFOR and must continue to remain active. International delays in undertaking the process leading to final status determination in Kosovo have contributed to instability and renewed fighting in the region. Hopefully the elections now scheduled for November will help channel Kosovar energies into constructive channels, but the international community must also recognize and prepare for the reality that after a decade of repression and a vicious ethnic cleansing campaign, most Albanians will not feel secure until they are independent. In the meantime, hard work remains building an effective system of laws, police and courts which can assure Western standards are met during and after the transition. The recently proposed return of Serb refugees is a necessary but difficult step along the way to final status. Unless accompanied by reciprocal measures of justice and compensation by the Serb government in Belgrade to redress the wrongs of the Milosevic era, and especially the detained or still unexplained missing persons, much trouble can be anticipated. This trouble may well be focused on the area around Kosovska Mitrovica, an ethnically mixed, but effectively partitioned town inside the French sector. France has maintained a stubborn refusal to countenance multi-ethnicity in the town and its institutions; in the short run, this avoided violence and Serb flight, but in the longer term it has created a tinderbox of resentments which can only be dealt with by adding some American units to the KFOR mix to dampen Albanian assertiveness and to assure even treatment of the ethnic groups.

And this brings us to the all-important problem of Belgrade. Here, our European allies have been less than helpful, too quickly willing to grant concessionary treatment to the Serb government and slow to insist that it fully meet its international obligations in dealing with the International Criminal Tribunal, the many missing or detained Albanians and the continuing undemocratic practices and standards of its security forces. In fact, at the current pace, there will be years of work before Serbia can meet Western standards. Delivering Mr. Milosevic and the other indicted war criminals to The Hague is a necessary first step, and should be required before the United States agrees to participate in the late-June donors conference on assistance to Yugoslavia. But a decade of crime and corruption will require a thorough-going effort directed at most public institutions in Yugoslavia. International assistance should be organized and provided. And in the process there should be no consideration that somehow the future of Bosnia is connected to the final status of Kosovo. Bosnia-Herzegovina must remain a whole and unified country. On this point the international community must be unrelenting: no change of boundaries by force.

In facing these current challenges, however, the international community must accurately see the progress that has been made. Yugoslavia was always an uneasy federation, welded together under iron rule by Tito, and broken apart as an unscrupulous Milosevic pursued Serb domination and his own personal political power. A vicious war in Croatia and Bosnia is over. The legal basis for a unified Bosnian state is largely present in the yet-to-be-fully-implemented Dayton Agreement. A cold-hearted campaign of ethnic cleansing was halted in Kosovo. A civil war was deterred in Montenegro, though the international community exceeded its bounds in telling the Montenegrin people that they should vote against independence from Yugoslavia. The failure of the United States to prevent the violent collapse of Macedonia, however, would threaten to undo some of these accomplishments. Western intervention has generally been late, consistently undermining moderates and foreclosing more democratic and stabilizing options. Many in the region have suffered and died while we debated . . . but eventually we have acted and have generally been effective. Much has been accomplished; our investment in European stability needs to be safeguarded.

Southeastern Europe is not a quagmire; our efforts here are no "Vietnam." Milosevic would still be in office today had we not stopped him finally in Bosnia and Kosovo. However, as President Bush begins his first trip to Europe since taking office, he finds new war clouds gathering over Macedonia. It is now time for NATO to act, again—this time to halt the fighting in Macedonia—and this will again require American leadership. We must also persevere and not leave behind friends such as Montenegro, whose support for us was severely tested by Belgrade's pressures. Surely, all of this is not asking too much of the world's remaining super-power.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary.

**STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD PERLE, RESIDENT FELLOW,
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. PERLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting me to participate in this hearing.

Let me just say at the outset that I do not think you said anything this morning with which I disagree, and you said a great many things with which I agree emphatically and am greatly encouraged to hear the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee say.

In particular, I think you are exactly right in reminding us that we have managed somehow to repeat the same mistake over and over again. Macedonia today looks very much like Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. If we should have learned anything from a mistake made three times, it is that delay and indecision do not produce solutions; they only make matters worse. And that is the situation we are in today.

I also agree emphatically that our European allies cannot and, in the end, will not solve the problem in Macedonia. It is only the United States that has the stature and the credibility to foster a solution. We cannot do everything, but there are some things we can do. In the current case in Macedonia, I believe that without very decisive American involvement, there will be no solution.

The pattern that has developed of handing responsibility or acquiescing in the assertion of responsibility by the Europeans, which persists until it becomes undeniable that the Europeans have failed, is a pattern we must not repeat because by the time we recognize the failure of the Europeans, the costs are much greater, the tasks much more difficult and, in some cases, even unsurmountable.

Last let me say that a delay, even by days or weeks, in coming to grips with the current situation in Macedonia could prove disastrous. It is not often that things move so rapidly that one feels compelled to say immediate action is necessary. But as I understand the situation in Macedonia today, there is a very great danger that the combination of guerrilla attacks and an unsophisticated response, politically and militarily, if I can put it that way, by the Macedonian Government will create the kind of polarization and radicalization that will turn Macedonia into a catastrophe like Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

I do not think it has reached that point yet, but every day that goes by makes matters worse. As the Macedonian army struggles to deal with the insurgency, it is not a particularly well-trained army, not particularly effective in dealing with this type of insurgency. As the victims of that military action include a great many Albanians who have not in my view decided—

The CHAIRMAN. Exactly.

Mr. PERLE [continuing]. To opt for a radical solution, the situation only gets worse.

Now, what can the United States do? I do not think there is any substitute for direct involvement at the highest levels of our Government. A tragic mistake, in my view, was made in the first Bush administration when the Secretary of State said in a memorable phrase, "We don't have a dog in that fight." We did have a dog in that fight. We just did not understand it at the time, and we must not make that mistake again. We have a dog in this fight and it is containing what otherwise is going to be tragic bloodshed and instability and a situation that could spread and ultimately will require our involvement. So, sooner rather than later, Mr. Chairman, and I would hope that the administration would move quickly and decisively.

The pattern that has developed of the European Union looking for a political solution, with the notion that NATO is somehow waiting in the wings, seems to me a formula for catastrophe. If you are in on the military solution, you better be in on the political solution as well. This division of responsibility in which the Europeans, who frequently lack the will to take decisive action, somehow depend on our coming to the rescue later, simply will not work. I think we need to be at the front and center of both the political, diplomatic activity and ultimately the implementation,

which may well require peacekeeping forces involving the United States.

The last thing I want to say is that I was greatly encouraged to hear what you had to say about the importance of taking the mission of bringing war criminals in Bosnia to justice. There is no excuse for the fact that we have failed to do so to date. It is fundamentally a failure of will. When we find the will to do it, we will find the means to do it, and there will not be, as you rightly observe, a resolution of that terrible tragedy in Bosnia until Karadzic and Mladic and others—but those principally—are brought to justice. Every day that goes by is a day wasted in that regard.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you both.

Let me make clear and see if you all agree with the rationale that lies behind my strongly held and long-held, as General Clark knows, conviction about arresting war criminals.

I think what we—not you fellows—fail generally to understand here is that there are an awful lot of people in the Balkans, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania, who are inclined to do the right thing, even with the ethnic divisions that exist, who have reached the rational conclusion that there is no such thing as capable of being a Greater Albania, that there is no Greater Serbia, that it is not in the cards, it does not work, and they do not want to be part of it, but who are unwilling and unable to move in the direction of, for lack of a better word, reconciliation because you have people like Karadzic and Mladic out there who are the force against which they have to move politically. So, even if you had an enlightened leadership in the Republika Srpska, which for a brief, shining moment we thought we might have, if you have to push off against Mladic or before that Milosevic to make your case with your own people, you are always going to be trumped. You are always going to be trumped.

I think what many of my colleagues, from my perspective, fail to understand, what many in the successive administrations fail to understand is that this ethnic hatred, although real, is not totally pervasive until engaged.

To be more precise, my last several trips to the region, meeting with ordinary Kosovar Albanians, ordinary Albanians within the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, I found that they do not want to be faced with the choice of a Macedonian Government that does not give them their full rights and all-out civil war because they know the end of civil war is a dead end for them. They are smart enough to know there is a dead end. There is no possibility of a Greater Serbia, a Greater Albania in the region. And they are smart enough to know that.

But when they are forced to choose between a Slavic government overreacting to an insurgency that comes from radicals among them, and the rebels, they choose their brother. At the end of the day, it is clans. They choose their brother.

So, what I have been trying to communicate, as best I can, which is obviously not very successful so far, to this President and this administration and the last President, is the time to get in is before they have to make that choice. I am willing to bet you anything that if there were, for lack of a better phrase, an MFOR, a

Macedonian force, in the very Albanian villages that are now being occupied, they would be welcomed now.

So, I would like you two to talk about those two items. What is the damage caused by these leaders who engaged in genocide who are still on the scene, still at large? And what is your attitude about how the larger Albanian population in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia would respond to any type of intervention against those rebels, if they are 1,000, whatever the number is? Try to educate me and my colleagues about the dynamic there, if you would.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Chairman, if I could begin. First of all, with respect to the war criminal issue in Bosnia, I think Mr. Karadzic has still got Republika Srpska tied up in his web of corruption, intrigue, murder, and general political violence. Information I have received over many years indicates that he and his family are quite wealthy as a result of control of cigarettes, liquor, and other illegal activities, and have been for some time. In addition, people who have supported him have engaged in all kinds of illegal intimidation and other physical threats to politicians. So, it is not only that he controls the politics, he controls the economics. He and his organization have a choke-hold on Republika Srpska. Much of that money at one point was going back to Milosevic. I have no idea where the money is going at this point, but it seems clear that he still has a grip there. Witness the mosque episode. So, the arrest of Karadzic, the taking down of that organization from top to bottom is a first order of business in my view for moving ahead to full implementation of the Dayton agreement. It has got to be done.

Now, it has not been done. It has not been done for lots of complicated excuses. The excuses vary from time to time depending on who is asked and who is in authority. Without going into specifics that are beyond what we can discuss here in this open session, let me just say that when the United States determines that it really is going to take action, it will find the appropriate means to do so. And there are many means available.

The risks of taking action are far less than what many in this Government and elsewhere have suggested, and our allies will come along with us in these risks to take down this organization. They may need a little military assistance, but they also need some political top cover from the alliance's leader. So, I think it is an appropriate time to go after this problem again with renewed dedication and determination that we are going to see this problem of the war criminal control in eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina broken and these people arrested.

Now, Mr. Kostunica was democratically elected, but there remain war criminals in Serbia. They need to be turned over to The Hague, not just Milosevic. Mladic is there. Ojdanic is there, the general who directed the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Mr. Sainovic, who was the Minister for Kosovo and controlled the secret police activities, is there, and there are a couple more who have already been indicted. The records need to be opened up and turned over to the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague. Mrs. Del Ponte needs to be invited in to help heal the terrible scars that hyper Serb nationalism and the criminal activity associated with it has afflicted on the region.

The United States needs to take the lead in insisting our European allies support this as a precondition for going forward with any additional assistance. It is time to stop the business as usual with Serbia. They have got an enormous internal political problem. They have got a tentative fledgling step toward democracy and Westernization. We have got to help those in Serbia who want to take a full step forward, not just deal with the sort of interregnum here which is currently struggling with what to do. So, we need to give them a decided push.

Now, what I found in all of my time is that the ethnic cleansing leads to ethnic fear. There is a political reaction, a reality in the Balkans that conflict brings extremes. It promotes the extremes for reasons of fear. So, people go to their own kind not because they like them better, but because they do not know who is on the other side who is going to come in in the middle of the night, take them out of their home, shoot them, and kill them, and so forth. It is a very normal human reaction. That is why this kind of violence cannot be permitted where we, the United States, and for all that we believe in in human rights can make a difference, we have got to do so. So, we have got to stop this before this polarization hits the Macedonian people as it has hit the others.

The CHAIRMAN. Richard.

Mr. PERLE. Mr. Chairman, I think your observations about ethnic hostility are quite right. You understand the dynamic very well.

There is plenty of potential for ethnic hostility, even hatred, but it does not appear by spontaneous combustion.

The CHAIRMAN. A good way of putting it.

Mr. PERLE. It is a policy and it has been a policy viciously implemented, first by Milosevic and then by others.

There is an extraordinary description a book written some years ago by David Reiff about Bosnia. He matter-of-factly recounts a conversation he had with a young Serb paramilitary, a man in his 20's. The fellow says to David Reiff, let me tell you how we did it. He said, we would go into a village. We would find the first Serb home. We would get the guy out of bed. We would hand him a gun, and we would take him to the nearest Muslim home and we would say, you shoot him or we will shoot you.

The CHAIRMAN. Exactly. No one believed that.

Mr. PERLE. That is how it got started and that is how it was perpetrated by paramilitary organizations. There was nothing nationalist or dignified or noble about the Serb forces operating in Bosnia. These were thugs. These were gangsters. These were killers. They were there to profit, and they exploited the fears that General Clark has just referred to for their own purposes.

The great danger now in Macedonia is that while an arrangement is conceivable, plausible in which a greater cultural freedom is extended to the Albanians—they want university education of a certain kind. They want their own language accepted as an official language. They have a list of reasonable proposals. While one can imagine an arrangement in which those proposals are acceded to and responsible ethnic Albanians who are already part of the government sustain their opposition to the insurgency, that may not be true a few weeks from now—

The CHAIRMAN. Exactly.

Mr. PERLE [continuing]. When the fighting has become even more intense.

I do not believe that there is significant support for a Greater Albania in Macedonia. If anything, there is rather more support for ideas about partition, which have begun to emerge recently, with specific partition proposals, which is part of the dynamic you are talking about, things deteriorating rapidly.

There is, I think, still sufficient interest on the part of all parties in Macedonia to achieve a reasonable solution, but it is not going to happen without our direct involvement and it may not be a possibility a month or 2 from now.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, what I have found in my trips—again, I do not pretend that because I have been there a number of times and because I have a son who is working there in Pristina now, I have any overwhelming insight. But I have observed a repetition of the following conversation no matter with whom I speak, literally regardless of their ethnic background, and it goes something like this. It says, we know the Europeans are not going to stay here. We have had 500 years of this. We know at the end of the day they really do not want us part of Europe. This is how the conversation goes. Whether this is true or not, this is what I get.

Any accommodation we make, whomever I am talking with, whether I am talking to Thaci or whether I am talking to Rugova or whether I am talking to Kostunica no matter who it is, it goes further and it says, although Kostunica says it a different way, that unless you are going to be here leading the Europeans, nothing is going to happen. So, basically why should I make any concession on anything when I know at the end of the day it is going to fall apart if you are not here and leave? And I am just left further back than I was before I would have been had I given up nothing that you have asked me to give up in order to make some accommodation.

I can remember coming back on my first trip. They could not get me out of the airfield in Sarajevo. So the French took me up to a place called Kiseljak. It was up, as the general knows, up through the mountains. A beautiful, beautiful ride up. We got halfway up the mountain and an old acquaintance of yours, John Ritch, was with me. And General Rose was in this armored vehicle with me, kind enough to get me to the French helicopter. We got halfway up the mountain to a beautiful little village with homes that looked like they were probably 3,500 square feet, absolutely manicured, washed windows, tiled roofs, homes that any American would be happy to live in. There were about 15 on each side of the road with what looked like a general store/gas station in the middle.

We got stopped by this very attractive woman. She had these beautiful blue eyes with a carbine stuck to my head. She literally walked up to the door. It was a Serb checkpoint. If it were not for the fact that she had a gun in her hands, I thought she would be introducing herself, like welcome to my village.

You could look down literally either side of the street and you would see three or four perfectly manicured homes and lawns. This was in the spring. And then a hole in the ground with a chimney sticking up. Another home, a hole in the ground. I mean, literally, not figuratively.

I was told at the time that exactly what Reiff cited was what happened. The Serbs came in and said, your neighbor you have been living next to for years and years, go put this plastique on the side of their house. If you do not, we are going to do it to you. So, in this little village of probably no more than—I do not know—maybe 50 homes, you had only Serbs left with, in that case, the Muslims being either blown up or the Croats who may have been there being blown up or given time to get out.

The reason I recite that is I do not think there is a full appreciation here for how this works because you listen to our colleagues, Richard, and they talk about this being spontaneous. As you said, one thing it is not is it is not spontaneous. It is not this thing that automatically you wake up one morning and decide this Croat, this Albanian, this Serb I have been living next to for 35 years I am going to go shoot.

So, it leads me to this question. Kostunica, whom I have met with, as you folks have, a number of times now, was not very happy with me when he was here last, nor were several of my colleagues. We met in Senator Lugar's office as the administration was making the decision whether to partially lift the embargo, notwithstanding the fact they had not met the third condition that we had set.

And Kostunica made a very compelling argument on its face, that at least convinced a number of my colleagues, which was if we did not come in and help them now, this fledgling democratic government, that we would radicalize the situation in Belgrade and Serbia generally. And the very people we did not want running Serbian affairs would take hold because we were imposing on them a condition they could not meet politically and survive. Ergo, in order to get where we wanted to go, we should lift the embargo, give them a bye on delivering Milosevic or, for that matter, anyone else right now to The Hague.

How would you gentlemen respond to that argument?

Mr. CLARK. Well, it is a variation of many of the same arguments given many times about political expediency in the Balkans. But the difference is that they have had another 2 to 3 months now to work these issues. So, we should be asking for progress on complying with the International Criminal Tribunal and standards. So, I would say that it is time for them to deliver Milosevic and to take actions against the rest of the war criminals that are there.

There is no doubt that in doing so, there are risks. There are risks in the security forces that people who are guilty of crimes who have not been charged, but should be charged will see this as the beginning of the end for them. They will no doubt oppose it. But there are other people who see this as the beginning of the beginning for Yugoslavia and will support it. It takes courage and it takes risk to move a society as Yugoslavia has to move, as Serbia has to move.

Those risks have to be taken on a continuing basis. It is time for another move forward. We accept the risks. We want them to accept the risks. We are there with our arms outstretched, welcoming them, but they have got to move.

Mr. PERLE. Senator, I expect your instinct was right, and if we had said we are not going to lift the embargo until Milosevic has

been delivered to The Hague, they would have delivered Milosevic to The Hague. I rather doubt that it was beyond their capacity to do it. If it was, then I think the appropriate answer was to say, we are not going to invest in a government that cannot deliver a war criminal on the scale of Milosevic to The Hague. But this argument for weakness is used frequently in many contexts.

I wish we had said, we will lift the embargo for 3 months and revisit this 3 months from now when we see whether you have been able to deliver Milosevic. But it is almost always a mistake to abandon a principle of the importance of that one on the grounds of some short-term expedient move. And what you do not do when you cut a deal like that is encourage the forces on the other side.

The CHAIRMAN. Exactly.

As you both know, I have an inordinately high regard for your opinions, whether you are in agreement or disagreement with my views, and I mean that sincerely. And I could keep you here all day because of my interest in your knowledge. But let me just ask you to comment on one last observation on my part, and I obviously may be very wrong.

I have argued with whomever would be willing to listen to me in Belgrade—and they are not anxious to listen to me, although I have been there a number of times—that the key to the salvation of Serbia or Yugoslavia is to allow their citizenry to come face to face with what they intentionally or unwittingly enabled to happen. Otherwise, they will never come to grips with this constant sort of self-flagellation about how they are the mistreated people in the region.

I would offer as an illustration that the vast majority of Serbs are prepared to deal with the truth the public reaction within Serbia when that truckload of bodies was pulled out of the Danube River. As it was pulled out, literally bodies came pouring out, some 35 or 40, and then they said it was 70-some bodies. The reaction in Belgrade, the reaction in Serbia was fairly overwhelming. They found abhorrent, the vast majority of Serbs, what had been done in their name. For the first time, there began to be discussion on the part of the Belgrade Government that maybe they were now going to try Milosevic for war crimes. Up to then, they had said they wanted no part of that.

Would you, in conclusion to my questions, talk to us a little bit about what you believe would be the response of the Serbian people to a fair and open trial of Mr. Milosevic and/or Mladic and/or Karadzic and/or any of the people you named in The Hague. Do you believe it would cause the kind of backlash and revulsion and the leadership would be thrown out for having sent them, or do you believe it would be viewed in Serbia as a whole as something that they had to get behind them? Do you have an opinion on that?

Mr. CLARK. I agree with the way you formulated the question, Mr. Chairman. I noticed one thing during the war, that Milosevic always tried to protect his military from the real knowledge of what was going on.

The CHAIRMAN. Even his military.

Mr. CLARK. Even his military, his units, his troops. They had special hardening programs for some of the ethnic cleansers.

The CHAIRMAN. Explain for the record what hardening programs means.

Mr. CLARK. They were trained to cut the throats of goats and other things so that they could hear screaming like this so they could then be hardened. These were not troops. These were those paramilitary thugs that went through these training camps that were supposedly toughened up.

Milosevic knew that what was going on was not acceptable to the Serb people. I think it needs to see the light of day. I think the best place to do that is in The Hague, and I think that it would be acceptable to the Serb people and soon recognized as not only acceptable but welcomed and essential as a way of moving Serbia into West where it belongs.

Mr. PERLE. I agree with that. I think the overwhelming majority of Serbs are decent people who would respond to a properly conducted trial with the same sense of outrage and shame that would be inspired in a non-Serb. A clear recounting of what went on, a great deal of which would come as a shock to most Serbs, would be therapeutic, beneficial for the future of that country and for the future of their society. I do not at all believe that this would turn out to be detrimental to the political leaders who permitted it to happen.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you both.

I yield to my colleague from Florida.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, you have convinced me by your eloquent words. So, I would like to discuss with you after the hearing what I could do to assist you as the chairman of this committee to articulate that it is clearly in the United States' interest and intention that we should bring these war criminals to trial.

Just for the record—and I thank both of you for your testimony—do you think that the strength of NATO will be undermined by the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region? You all have stated it. I want to just get it nailed down for the record.

Mr. CLARK. Senator, I would like to say for the record that I think NATO would be seriously undermined by the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region. It will not be NATO after that.

Mr. PERLE. I agree with that. There is no NATO without the United States.

I do not believe that that is in contemplation, and I think it is important to distinguish between the willingness of the United States not only to meet NATO commitments but to lead the NATO alliance. There is no other country capable of leading the NATO alliance and practical questions of exactly when and where we should have what type of military presence.

I think it is a mistake, as some in the press have done, to equate adjustments to a deployment with a political statement. There was an incident not long ago where we withdrew some Americans because the element of the force they supported had been, by agreement, withdrawn because we took out some tanks and helicopters I think. Therefore, we brought back the crews. This was misunderstood as an indication that the United States was somehow diminishing its role or shirking its responsibility. So, I think it is important that we look, with some precision, at what we are doing. There is lots of room for sensible adjustments in the nature of our deploy-

ments, but American leadership and a willingness to be there when it is necessary to be there is absolutely indispensable.

I half facetiously but half seriously argued with some of our European friends recently that the most convincing argument for the United States remaining in full force in Bosnia would be a willingness on the part of the NATO forces in Bosnia to arrest war criminals. That is, let us have a serious mission that we can get enthusiastic about, and the United States will be there and it will be there in force.

So, there is no NATO without the United States.

Senator NELSON. Right. And as you stated, you do not think that it is serious that there would be a withdrawal, but you would recognize that there is the perception that the possibility of withdrawal is being talked about.

Mr. PERLE. Yes, I think over-talked about, frankly.

Senator NELSON. That would say a lot about the importance of the Balkans to the United States were there to be any serious discussion about withdrawal.

Mr. PERLE. Indeed.

Senator NELSON. Do you believe that the proposed European rapid reaction force would be a credible peacekeeping force without U.S. participation?

Mr. CLARK. Well, I would be very concerned if—let's take a hypothetical example—we wanted a Macedonian force and we turned that over to the European Union without U.S. participation for a couple of reasons.

No. 1, the leading role of the United States in the alliance says that the things that are important to the alliance the United States is doing. So, this would automatically put the Macedonian mission as somehow less important than our other activities.

Second, it is simply a fact that the United States is viewed as the most trustworthy power, particularly by the Albanians in the region, but also by others, but particularly by the Albanians. So, our ability to work with the Albanians would be crucially dependent on the presence in that force of an American element.

Third, I would not like to see the complicated command arrangements which such a force would lead to where you would have one force reporting to NATO, through a NATO commander. The other force would have to have an ad hoc commander. It would report perhaps sideways to NATO, but ultimately to the European Union. We would have the U.S. Ambassador to NATO trying to sit in on European Union council meetings to find out what guidance that force was being given, and there would always be the opportunity for friction. It is an old principle of the military art, that anytime you draw a boundary between units, you create a weakness. Well, this is a boundary not between a unit, but between organizations, and it would be unnecessary and, in my view, most unwelcome.

Mr. PERLE. Senator, this is perhaps a subject for another occasion, but I have grave misgivings about the practical consequences of the European Union developing the conceit that it will have an independent military capability. The rapid reaction force is neither rapid nor forceful. It is at best 60,000 troops who already exist and who are already assigned to NATO, capable of operating after 60 days mobilization, which is a long time, and as a practical matter,

in most situations, dependent on support from NATO, which is to say from the United States.

I think it was a mistake for the United States to say that we would provide essentially guaranteed access to NATO assets because that made it easy for the European Union to go off in the direction that I think ultimately will prove unsuccessful. Had we said to them if you want the kind of independence you are talking about, you had better be prepared to acquire the logistics, the intelligence, and the other capabilities that they continue to look to the United States to provide, had they faced that reality, they might have chosen a different course and I think ultimately will wind up with a different course.

So, this is a matter that I would very much hope this committee would take a very close look at because the Europeans are groping for an identity, and they have gone off on what I think is a dangerous excursion. We are all saying to one another, everything is fine as long as NATO and the EU can cooperate effectively, but the practical problems that arise are enormous. If we are not careful, we will see two structures develop that in theory can work together, but in practice will find it enormously difficult to do so. The danger is that we will only discover the inadequacy of that arrangement when it is tested in a situation where we cannot afford to fail.

Senator NELSON. Thank you to both of you for very important testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I can say to you, Mr. Secretary, that if I am chairman for another couple months, I do plan on holding hearings on that subject. As General Clark has heard me say—he is a better diplomat than I am, though—at the Perm Rep meeting, I indicated that instead of calling it ESDI, which originally it was called, they should call it the 3P program. They looked at me. I can now say this publicly because it is long past. I said they should call it the 3P program. I remember Solana looking at me and saying, what do you mean? I said, it should be called pride, procrastination, and procurement. And one of the reasons why some of us maybe should be a little more upset than we have been is our feeling that they are unlikely to be able to produce what they say they are going to produce. But we will have hearings on that subject.

Let me conclude with three brief points because we have one other panel, and I have trespassed on your time too much already.

General, I could not agree with you more on a point that you made about the final status of Kosovo. In my meetings with Thaci and Haradinaj and others in Pristina, I came away with no illusions about how tough particularly Haradinaj was and how smart he was, by the way. You told me that, but he looks like a farm boy that could lift a tractor out of a ditch all by himself, and when you get talking to him, you find that he is a pretty damned sophisticated fellow.

I think they have figured out—my read—all of them competing, including Rugova who is sort of there—that their future does not lie now in a Greater Albania. Their future lies in getting institutional control with the help of the West setting up institutions within Kosovo where they can govern. I am surprised that

Haradinaj figured out he has to know how to govern. He seemed to me to understand the distinction between a guerrilla movement and a governing body.

I really think we should be dealing with our European allies about final status now and talk about the inevitable now, instead of continuing to talk about this horrible circumstance of a Muslim state in the middle of Europe which conjures up all these bogeymen among our allies. The reason I mention that is to get to this point.

This is one of the places where I think words matter, what we say matters and how we say it. Although I fully agree with Secretary Perle that there is a firm decision by the administration not to withdraw from the Balkans, I spent Monday with the President. I asked if I can repeat this, so I am not repeating a private Presidential conversation. He said, with Dr. Rice sitting there, he was going to make it clear to our European allies on this trip, as we speak, that there was no intention, period, of us drawing down our forces, meaning not reallocating, but drawing down, lessening our commitment physically and militarily in the Balkans.

So, I think the record should reflect that that is the final word as the President told me. He said emphatically in front of Dr. Rice, his National Security Advisor, that was the policy. So, I think that may be a very positive first step.

But it worries me that we seem to be yielding—the second point. I do not quibble with the notion that our European allies ultimately always share the burden. We can argue about the detail, but they seldom share the burden of leadership. I would make a distinction here. I do not think it is a false distinction between the burden of leading and the burden of sharing the responsibilities once a decision is made. I do not want to buildup a notion here among our colleagues, as some believe, that the reason we should get out is because the Europeans are not doing enough. I make a distinction among leading, deciding, and implementing.

Which leads me to my question. We have followed the European lead in the last 7 months on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We have looked to them and the EU to go in and negotiate. We have followed the European lead on Serbia in lifting sanctions. That has been a strong European initiative, and we have followed the European lead, in an area we have not discussed at all today, in terms of Montenegro and what appears to be this fixation on the part of the Europeans, that we seem to be bolstering, that the idea of a plebiscite, the idea of an vote on independence in Montenegro would be per se an absolute, total disaster. I think we have become, as we Catholics say, more Catholic than the Pope on Montenegro.

And I am hoping that on the other two matters it is merely an acquiescence borne out of initial indecision that every new administration goes through getting their act together. This is not a criticism. We have been here for a lot of administrations. I have been here since Nixon, as you have, Mr. Secretary, and you have, general. Every Governor who comes to office understandably comes without a sense of sure-footedness in the area of foreign policy, and they tend to pick one from category A and category B on their side of the political spectrum. Then there is a little bit of a battle that goes on, and then ultimately they resolve it. The President resolves

in coming down on one side or the other within the spectrum that he has chosen advisors from.

Can you respond to whether or not you think that there is a—how can I say this—whether this administration has, in fact, to the best of your knowledge, thought through our position on Montenegro or whether we are just merely acceding to our European allies, if you know or if you have a view, and whether or not our European allies would likely follow us more broadly if we were to lead, be assertive as it relates to everything from war criminals to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia? They are my two concluding questions, if you could comment.

Mr. CLARK. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the European allies will follow if we are assertive, but we have to speak and put the resources behind it to back it up. General Nash may have more to say about this when he talks to you about his experiences in Kosovo, but my experience was that when the United States went into Kosovo after the air campaign, we did so encouraging the Europeans to lead. When we tried to lead, we did not want to put the resources behind it, and therefore, nations pulled their own weight. Some of our allies had slightly different interpretations of the mission of KFOR and the degree of support they were willing to give to the U.N. leader, Bernard Kouchner, than others did. This caused us trouble in my view in Mitrovica.

So, I think they will follow us when we assert leadership, but when we assert it, we have got to back it up with resources. We cannot demand the leadership and then demand that they pay the full price. If we are going to lead, we have to lead.

With respect to Montenegro specifically, for a long time people have been very ambivalent about Montenegro, too small, not economically viable, difficult culture, a record of involvement in corruption and smuggling and other things there along the coastline, great tourist potential but not very well developed, the population split, and the population undecided. So, the international community as a whole has generally counseled caution.

The giveaway in this case is that the reasons for counseling caution vary. When Milosevic was there, it was do not start a civil war. We do not want to get involved in a civil war, and we could not imagine how to help you if you had one. Now Milosevic is gone. Now I hear other reasons.

I think the United States has to be true to its principles in this case. By that constitution, they are entitled to have a vote, and the decision to have that vote should be their decision. They should make a decision that is informed by all the facts. This is going to be a very tough slog and they cannot ignore Serbia. They are connected with it historically, geographically, economically, culturally in so many ways. So, whatever they do, they are going to do. But it has been done in the past with other states who were forged together at the end of World War I only to decide they wanted a velvet divorce later on. I do not think we can quite say to Montenegro they do not have the right to confront that decision themselves.

Mr. PERLE. Senator, I think the notion of European leadership is an oxymoron actually. And there are good reasons for that. There are 50 years of cold war history in which the Europeans expected the United States to lead and the United States did not disappoint

them. The habit and tradition of leadership in which we were the leader developed over a long period.

Second, very few of the European governments are unitary governments. They are almost all coalition governments, often very delicately balanced, a handful of Greens can sometimes determine the balance. I cannot tell you how many issues I went through when I chaired a NATO committee where the ability to get cohesion out of our allies depended sometimes on a single member of a party of three in forging a common position.

Third, relatively speaking none of these governments are large enough, weighty enough to lead the others. The larger European countries, four large countries, are of roughly equal size and none of them is in a particular position to lead the others.

So, for all of those reasons, the United States has to lead.

I think American Presidents have tended to think that perhaps Europe is now coming into its own. We certainly accepted the declaration of Jacques Poos when he spoke for the European community with respect to Bosnia and said, the hour of Europe has arrived. We will handle this, and we saw what happened.

If President Bush has gone to Europe thinking that the United States is in a position to cede leadership on these issues to the Europeans, I promise you he will come back with a very different idea. He will have enough meetings and enough discussion so that he will draw the right conclusion, which is that the Europeans cannot substitute for American leadership. I have a lot of confidence that, as he sits across the table, he will draw the appropriate conclusions, and we will see strong American leadership.

The CHAIRMAN. It may sound unexpected coming from me, but I have a similar confidence. I was impressed. It is presumptuous of me to say this. Far be it for me to comment on a President, but I was impressed that this was a man seeking answers. This is a man, who given the options and the facts underlying each of them, whose instincts are solid and good, not merely in a moral sense, but good, sound. But he will meet a lot of resistance within his administration, even some in my own party.

Gentlemen, as usual it has been genuinely a pleasure and educational having you here. I know you know I will continue to try to trespass on your time and your views. I cannot tell you how much we appreciate it. I thank you, general, for making the trip up, and I look forward to being able to continue to work with both of you on this.

You do have extensive contacts within this and previous administrations. To the extent that you are making your views known—knowing you both, you probably are—at the highest level, as well as the second levels, within this administration, I think that was very useful. You are listened to a lot more than I would be, and I urge you to make your views known.

But, again, thank you both very, very, very much. I genuinely appreciate it.

Our next and last and clearly not our least panel—I appreciate their forbearance—is Dr. Serwer—and I hope I am pronouncing it correctly, Doctor—and General Nash. I would invite both of them to approach the table and maybe, general, you could begin. In light of the fact we kept you waiting so long, I impose no restriction on

your time. I am here as long as you are willing and would like to make your views known. I thank you both for coming and I again apologize for taking so long to get to you. General, if you would proceed, unless it makes more sense for Dr. Serwer.

**STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM L. NASH (U.S. ARMY, RET.),
SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER ON PRE-
VENTIVE ACTION, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASH-
INGTON, DC**

Mr. NASH. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. This is my first appearance before this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. It is an honor to have you here, general.

Mr. NASH. Well, it is an honor to be here and I appreciate your comments.

I too have provided a statement and will not go into detail. Based on the morning's conversation, maybe I will make just a few comments.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, your entire statement will be placed in the record as if delivered.

Mr. NASH. First of all, I think the title of the hearing today is very important because, in fact, there is an intertwined nature between U.S. engagement and the crisis in Macedonia. I would submit to you that the questions about U.S. engagement precede this administration. There has been relative apprehension by a variety of players as to the degree of U.S. commitment to the region.

We all agree here that U.S. engagement and leadership is important. I would add two points to the discussion. Without strong United States participation and leadership, there is always a question in the minds of the players to include the allies that the United States will represent a court of appeals for anything decided upon without their active participation.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a good way of putting it.

Mr. NASH. In that case, it is almost a self-fulfilling prophecy of the inability of others to lead. So, I think we need to understand that.

Last, I would distinguish between leading and dictating as we engage in the Balkans. Wherever possible, we should build rather than demand a consensus in the pursuit of our interests.

Sir, I think the next thing I would comment on is the necessity for consistency in U.S. positions. You can talk about the consistency of the American voice speaking on the Balkans. I think our friends in Europe and in the region understand that you will not get one voice from the Congress of the United States, and that is perfectly understandable. They are less understanding of different voices coming from the executive branch, and I think that is one thing that we should be very mindful of.

But I would tell you that I think we require a comprehensive and consistent policy with respect to the Balkans. If refugee returns are important in Bosnia, refugee returns are important in Kosovo. If minority rights are to be protected in Banja Luka, minority rights must be protected in Pristina. And I also think, sir, that if we must set a deadline for the turning over of Milosevic to The Hague, then we might also set a deadline for ourselves for the capturing of

other war criminals. I think it is very easy for those in the region to see a lack of consistency.

The CHAIRMAN. Good point.

Mr. NASH. Sir, if we fought an air campaign because of principles, we need to build the peace on principles, and the failure to do so or rationalization to the contrary is quickly seen as hypocrisy.

Sir, the last point I would cover that has not been talked about today—well, you mentioned earlier the Special Representative. I do think we need to organize for success better in the civilian implementation aspects of our work in the Balkans.

I will not comment on the Special Representative aspects, but I would say to you that—I just would like to share with you the difference in being a general on a peacekeeping mission and being a U.N. civil administrator on a peacekeeping mission. I would not distinguish between NATO and the U.N. as much as I would distinguish between the military and the civilian implementer because the problems with civilian implementation in the United States is just as great. That is an area for probably another discussion, but it is one that, as we try to do our work in the Balkans, needs attention.

The CHAIRMAN. I could not agree with you more.

Mr. NASH. Sir, again, thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nash follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM L. NASH (U.S. ARMY, RET.)

Thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today. That this committee would be interested in my views on "The Crisis in Macedonia and U.S. Engagement in the Balkans" is a great honor.

I first went to Macedonia in June 1995; it was my first trip to the Balkans. I was visiting the soldiers of the 1st Armored Division who were serving as part of the UN Preventive Deployment Force. I had recently taken command of the division. I was very impressed with both the soldiers and their mission. It seemed we had gotten it right—deployment before fighting broke out and our presence in Macedonia was a clear signal that the turmoil to the north was not going to be allowed to spread south. The international community had drawn a line of peace.

My next trip to the Balkans was a result of the Dayton negotiations and the resulting Peace Accord for Bosnia-Herzegovina. On this occasion, I had the privilege of commanding both the 1st Armored Division and Task Force Eagle, what was then a multinational division of 25,000 soldiers from 12 nations. We were charged to ensure the implementation of the military provisions of the Dayton Peace Accord, but our tasks were much more broadly defined by our very presence if not by the written word of our instructions. I commanded TF Eagle from December 1995 to November 1996.

My last or maybe I should say latest tour in the Balkans was as a civilian working for the United Nations in Kosovo. I was the Regional Administrator for northern Kosovo with headquarters in Mitrovica, the small city that is the change over point between Albanian and Serb majorities in Kosovo. I served with the UN in Kosovo from March to November of last year.

Despite these experiences, I am not a Balkans expert, and my thoughts are far more intuitive than they are founded in any rigorous academic study or diplomatic training. But I have spent some time in the region, and have worked the issues from a number of viewpoints. I would offer the following considerations:

Importance: I believe that the United States has valid (even if they are not vital) interests in Southeastern Europe. I also believe that what is important to our European allies is of some importance to the United States—that's the way friends behave. Furthermore, I do not believe it to be acceptable to ignore the human consequences of disinterest or disengagement in the region.

I do not know how long it will take to build a self-sustaining, stable environment in Southeastern Europe. Hard problems, like the ones in this region, take a long time to fix. The problems have more to do with political, economic, and social factors than military ones. So even while our troop levels have been and will continue to

be reduced, our commitment to the security and stability of the region cannot be pared down in the same way.

Engagement and Leadership: In the six years I have been actively involved in the Balkan situation, I have heard only one thing that all parties agree upon: for any chance of a positive outcome to the years of tragedy and turmoil in the Balkans, the United States must remain engaged and provide active leadership to both the local players and the international community. While determining “how much engagement is enough” is more art than science, I believe that our efforts must take two basic forms.

First, we must act as part of the international community through the United Nations Security Council, NATO political and military agencies, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The process of our serious participation and consultation with the fellow members of these organizations will serve to not only benefit the situation in the Balkans, but to establish the consultative and cooperative habits for further success in different regions and conditions.

I remember well that in the early days of NATO’s Bosnian intervention, all the commanders understood that cohesion within the allied force was our center of gravity . . . a condition to be preserved at all costs. Furthermore, both the Russian and American military chains of command knew that we were establishing relationships in Bosnia that were not only unprecedented, but inconceivable as well just a few years prior.

It is my judgment that American good faith and cooperation in the Balkans can and should have a positive effect on the overall views others take towards the United States on other important defense issues.

The second form of engagement is in the strong bilateral relationships we must have with all the local and regional leaders in the Balkans. Serbia and Macedonia require the most attention. Also, I would recommend the United States be more comprehensive in our approach to ensure we are talking with and listening to all parties with legitimate interests in the outcome of the events in the region. I would caution against continued demonizing of the Serb minority in Kosovo, which has been our tendency in the past.

In both cases, i.e., bilateral and multilateral, the United States must listen as much as we talk, and actively seek opportunities to build rather than demand consensus.

Consistency: The United States requires a comprehensive and consistent policy with respect to the Balkans. If refugee returns are important in Bosnia, then refugee returns must be as important in Kosovo. If minority rights are important in Banja Luka, then minority rights must be important in Pristina as well. If we must set a deadline for the transfer of Milosevic to The Hague, then might we not also set a deadline for ourselves for the capture of other outstanding indictees such as Karadzic and Mladic.

Now, I fully understand the difficult nature of the three “hot button” issues I just raised—refugees, minority rights, war criminals—they are very hard. I have lived and worked those issues on the ground for an extended period of time. And I would admit that my thoughts have changed, I hope matured, about how to address them. I am convinced that we must insist on the accomplishment of these tasks simultaneously. Insisting on the capture of war criminals helps temper emotions against returning refugees and ensuring that minorities are able to live and work with the majority. We have to make clear that we favor no side or party or people—that we are on the side of principle.

Sir, if we fought an air campaign because of principles, then we must build a peace on those same principles. Rationalization to the contrary is too easy and is too quickly revealed as hypocrisy.

Firmness: Of greatest importance is that in all our actions, we must be seen as firm in our beliefs, principles and actions. Any sign of hesitancy or lack of conviction will be exploited. The escalation of violence along the southern borders of Kosovo in recent months is a direct result, I believe, of U.S. and NATO hesitancy to act with firmness when the initial indicators gave every reason for us to anticipate trouble.

In general terms, our words have been right, but our actions have not matched the rhetoric; there has been insufficient military response to the provocation and we are now faced with the embarrassing situation that NATO occupies and is responsible for the security of the area being used by the guerrillas as a staging base for operations well inside Macedonia. Additional resources should have been employed, and a greater effort made to seal the border areas.

Likewise in Kosovo itself, we have not been able to establish the rule of law and protection of human rights as well as we might have. My biggest single frustration in Mitrovica was my inability to establish a viable refugee return plan. While we

were able to resettle over one thousand Kosovar Albanians north of the Ibar River to include the mayor of Mitrovica, we were unable to move any Serbs south—it was too dangerous because the majority population refused to cooperate. This failure, in turn, had a profound impact on the cooperation of the Kosovo Serbs in the political process.

Additionally, neither the UN mission nor NATO was willing to take on the security measures to establish law and order throughout Kosovo, especially in the northern municipalities. Nor did either group provide sufficient protection to the minorities, especially in the southern municipalities. This gap in security is the principal reason why building peace has been so slow.

Civilian implementation: Having worked this “peace building” effort from both the military and civilian sides, I would like to conclude with a few comments about what I believe is necessary to better serve American interests. Until the civilian component of these efforts receives the same relative priority in personnel and resource allocation, as does the military component, we will never achieve our goals. It’s my judgment we spend far too much time talking about the military issues and insufficient effort spent analyzing the political, economic, social and the broader security problems.

Further, it is hard to exaggerate the lop-sided professional advantage the military has over civilians in peacekeeping missions. As an American general, I led soldiers fully trained and equipped who worked with other professional soldiers that were equally trained. Everything was planned and executed with thorough coordination.

As a civilian administrator for the UN mission in Kosovo, I led a group of talented and dedicated people—I cannot over-emphasize this: they were as dedicated and as talented as any soldiers, and they responded extremely well to both hardships and leadership. But, they had little else in common and had been recruited in a rather haphazard manner. They had neither standard training nor a common sense of the mission.

In these circumstances, the military component will often fill these mission voids, and then we hear the complaint of “mission creep.” It is a matter of organization and leadership. While I found overall civilian implementation better in Kosovo than in Bosnia, much remains to be done. My view is that the United States must develop a civilian peacekeeping capacity led by the Department of State but including many other governmental agencies. This is a matter of importance.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity and will be happy to answer your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Doctor?

STATEMENT OF DR. DANIEL P. SERWER, DIRECTOR, BALKANS INITIATIVE, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. SERWER. Mr. Chairman, I hope you will permit me to deliver a short part of my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Please, take your time.

Dr. SERWER. I will submit the rest for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. You were kind to wait on us.

Dr. SERWER. I want to underline that this is a moment of great peril: the crisis in Macedonia threatens to destabilize not only that country, but also the Balkans region. We are again faced with a fundamental policy decision: do we engage to protect democracy and multi-ethnicity or do we abandoned the Balkans to partition and war? Let there be no doubt. Bosnia and Kosovo are also at risk. If the extremists in Macedonia are successful, it will inspire Serb and Croat extremists in Bosnia and Serb and Albanian extremists in Kosovo, setting back hopes for U.S. troop reductions.

More generally, U.S. interests in a peaceful and democratic Europe, whole and free, cannot be fulfilled if extremists are permitted to attack legitimate and democratic, even if imperfect, states. The administration needs to commit itself to a vision for the Balkans,

one that includes support to democratic institutions, accountability for war crimes, rejection of extreme nationalism, and maintenance of a secure environment.

What can and should NATO do in this situation?

People in the Balkans believe that those opposed to NATO involvement are prevailing in Washington. This creates the misimpression that the United States does not oppose the guerrillas and gives the guerrillas confidence that NATO will not act against them. Distancing NATO from this crisis now makes things worse, and increases the likelihood that the alliance will be called upon at a later and more disastrous stage.

Jacques Chirac is quoted this morning in the papers as saying that "NATO should rule out nothing." That sounds like a good policy to me, but I would add NATO should rule out nothing and prepare for everything.

NATO's main focus today, however, should be on achieving a negotiated settlement in Macedonia. Once the guerrilla war is halted and there is a peace to keep, NATO will have to decide whether commitment of its forces is vital.

So, what are the ingredients of a negotiated settlement? There are three: weakening the extremists, helping the Macedonian Government turn toward a political settlement, and unifying international efforts.

It is crucial, first of all, to weaken the extremists. If the fighting continues, the government may win the war but lose the loyalty of the 87 percent of Albanians who said 2 months ago in a poll that they want to continue to live in a unified Macedonia.

The international community could be doing more to weaken the insurgency. In particular, it should end fund raising and recruitment by the extremists abroad, especially important in the United States, Switzerland, and Germany.

We should use KFOR to crack down on the extremists' supply lines and supporters inside Kosovo not only by guarding the border, but also by arresting the kingpins. I understand that yesterday there were a number of arrests.

We should continue to pressure Kosovo's political leaders to try to stop the insurgency, which casts a dark shadow over Kosovo's future.

We should offer, as in southern Serbia, an escape route into Kosovo for those not accused of serious crimes, provided the guerrillas are prepared to demobilize and disarm under NATO supervision.

And we should continue to provide military intelligence assistance appropriate to counterinsurgency warfare.

Let me add a word about foreign support to the guerrillas. Fund raising and recruitment in the U.S. poses a threat not only to Macedonian sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also to U.S. troops. The administration could block fund raising if the insurgents are declared terrorists. If this is the only way, so be it. We need not only to limit the money flow, but also to send urgently a strong political signal crucial to the protection of U.S. forces.

In addition to weakening the extremists, we should help the Macedonian Government turn from its increasing reliance on the military instrument to a more political strategy. What counts is not

obliterating the guerrillas but regaining control over Macedonian territory and integrating Albanian citizens more fully into the life of the country. Legitimate grievances need to find serious responses and the polarization of Macedonian citizens needs to be overcome quickly if the country is to be saved. This is not the time for business as usual but for decisive political action.

To these ends, let me suggest that the international community should, first of all, urge the Macedonian Government to exploit its military victories for political purposes and end the shelling of Albanian villages.

Second, we should agree to recognize the Republic of Macedonia by that name, which is a name both Albanians and Macedonians have wanted.

Third, we should insist on serious and continuous political negotiations to produce an early harvest of parliamentary action, including a new non-ethnic constitutional preamble, passage of the law on local governance, and use of the Albanian language in parliament.

We should provide a quick package of assistance and investment aimed at overcoming ethnic division and revitalizing the economy.

And we should support a broad dialog throughout Macedonian society on group and individual rights and responsibilities. I would add that on this last point the Institute is looking for opportunities to do just that.

Mr. Chairman, the EU, NATO, and the OSCE have undertaken noble efforts in Macedonia, but a more unified approach is required. Experience in southern Serbia suggests that NATO, wielding as it does both military and political clout, must be engaged. Whoever leads the international effort in Macedonia should therefore be named not only by the EU but also by NATO and he should be prepared to devote full time to the effort.

The United States also needs a full-time, high-level Balkans envoy, one who can speak authoritatively for the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense on a daily basis. The region is rife with rumors about changes in U.S. policy, partition plans, withdrawal of U.S. troops, disinterest in capturing war criminals, and U.S. support for this or that side in ongoing conflicts. The administration needs a consistent and authoritative approach to counter the cacophony of proposals and leaks that undermine efforts to achieve our objectives in the region.

Mr. Chairman, the United States has invested \$20 billion in Balkans peace efforts. The Europeans have invested much more. We have never been closer to dividends. Now is not the time to give up or to compete with each other. A strong American voice is required. Macedonia is the last in a long line of Balkans problems. Get it right and you will get the troops back sooner rather than later.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Serwer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. DANIEL SERWER

My name is Daniel Serwer. I am director of the Balkans Initiative at the United States Institute of Peace, but the views I am about to offer are my own. The Institute does not take positions on policy issues, and I do not represent the U.S. government.

Mr. Chairman, I come before you today at a moment of peril: the crisis in Macedonia threatens to destabilize not only that country, but also the Balkans region. We are again faced with a fundamental policy decision: do we engage to protect democracy and multiethnicity, or do we abandon the Balkans to partition and war? Let there be no doubt: Bosnia and Kosovo are also at risk. If the extremists in Macedonia are successful, it will inspire Serb and Croat extremists in Bosnia and Serb and Albanian extremists in Kosovo, setting back hopes for U.S. troop reductions.

More generally, U.S. interests in a peaceful and democratic Europe—whole and free—cannot be fulfilled if extremists are permitted to attack legitimate and democratic—even if imperfect—states. The Administration needs to commit itself to a vision for the Balkans that includes support to democratic institutions, accountability for war crimes, rejection of extreme nationalism and maintenance of a secure environment.

THE SITUATION IN THE BALKANS HAS IMPROVED

The insurgency in Macedonia is occurring at a moment that might otherwise have been the best the Balkans have seen for ten years. The democratic regime in Croatia has been correcting the nationalist excesses of the Tudjman regime. The new governments in Yugoslavia and Serbia are beginning to make amends for the disasters of the Milosevic era. Bosnia has, for the first time since the 1995 Dayton accords, non-nationalist governments, except in Republika Srpska. In Kosovo, moderates triumphed in municipal elections last October, as they likely will again in November's Kosovo-wide elections.

Ten years ago, Balkans leaders were bent on war, with popular support. Today, most people in the region are tired of war, ready to live in peace and anxious to become full partners with Europe and NATO. Only a few people are committed to violence. Marginalized politically and threatened with the loss of economic advantages from trafficking in arms, drugs and people, extreme nationalists are trying to polarize ethnic groups and revive the atmosphere of hatred and strife in which they thrived for a decade.

THERE ARE PROBLEMS IN MACEDONIA, BUT INSURGENCY IS NOT JUSTIFIED

This they do in Macedonia under the banner of fighting for Albanian rights. Let me be clear: many Albanian grievances are justified. Albanians feel like second-class citizens in Macedonia, not only because the constitution favors ethnic Macedonians but also because of their under-representation in the police and civil service and limited use of the Albanian language. Ethnic Macedonians experienced independence as a source of pride and affirmation of their identity. Albanians in Macedonia, who found themselves suddenly separated by an international border from cousins and compatriots in Kosovo, experienced independence as a loss that reduced their freedom of movement, commercial ties and cultural contacts.

Armed insurgency in Macedonia is not however justified. Nor would it have occurred there if Macedonia had been isolated from Kosovo and southern Serbia. The leadership of the guerrillas had fought for years in Kosovo, though some had been born in Macedonia. They failed to find jobs and political roles in Kosovo after the war. With limited skills, they returned to fighting and smuggling. In Macedonia they found a weak state and political space on the nationalist extreme, because of the moderation of Albanian politicians who have participated in government since independence.

Neither the United States nor Europe can afford to allow extremists with strong criminal ties to dominate politics and economics in the Balkans. We need to learn how to strengthen moderates and weaken extremists, if only because of our interest in lessening troop commitments and combating the organized crime and trafficking in which the extremists have become expert.

BOTH POLITICS AND SECURITY REQUIRE ATTENTION

What can be done? There are two fronts in Macedonia: a political front and a security front. On the political front, Europe has the lead. The broad coalition government formed with the assistance of Javier Solana is a step in the right direction. But the guerrillas will not stop fighting because a new government has been formed; they will challenge it and try to prevent a negotiated solution without their participation in the process. It is crucial that the political strategy be combined with a security strategy that gets the guerrillas to withdraw and channels Albanian grievances into proper political channels.

We have a model for this approach just a few miles away in southern Serbia, where NATO has successfully mediated an agreement that allows for enhanced Albanian participation in local governance and the police, partial amnesty for the

guerrillas and an infusion of investment funds while the Serbian government regains control over its territory and the guerrillas withdraw and disarm. This is the kind of agreement Milosevic would never have countenanced but Belgrade's new democratic government has boldly undertaken. Macedonia's beleaguered leadership should be looking for such an agreement.

A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION SHOULD BE THE PRIORITY

What can and should NATO do in this situation? If you believe that the U.S. has an interest in Balkans stability, that interest is at risk. Some of my colleagues claim that only a NATO deployment into Macedonia will prevent the crisis from worsening. They argue that the earlier such a deployment takes place, the better. If we wait until disaster occurs, the troop requirements will be greater.

Others would argue that U.S. interests in the Balkans are secondary and that troops should be deployed only to protect vital interests. They would like to avoid deeper engagement in the Balkans. Our forces are stretched thin, so from this perspective any further Balkans obligations should be avoided and the Europeans asked to take on the burden in Macedonia.

People in the Balkans believe that those opposed to NATO involvement are prevailing in Washington. This creates the misimpression that the U.S. does not oppose the guerrillas and gives the guerrillas confidence that NATO will not act against them. Distancing NATO now thus worsens the crisis and increases the likelihood that the Alliance will be called upon at a later and more disastrous stage.

The main focus today should be on achieving a negotiated settlement in Macedonia. Once the guerrilla war is halted and there is a peace to keep, NATO will have to decide whether commitment of its forces is vital.

What then are the ingredients of a negotiated settlement? There are three: weakening the extremists, helping the Macedonian government turn towards a political settlement, and unifying international efforts.

WEAKEN THE EXTREMISTS

It is crucial first to weaken the extremists. The Macedonian army and police have had some military success, forcing guerrillas from a few villages. But they have destroyed homes, displaced thousands and alienated many Albanians. If the fighting continues, the government may win the war but lose the loyalty of the 87 percent of Albanians who said two months ago in a poll that they want to continue to live in a unified Macedonia. The international community could do more to weaken the insurgency. It should:

- End fundraising and recruitment by the extremists abroad—this is especially important in the United States, Switzerland and Germany.
- Use KFOR to crack down on the extremists' supply lines and supporters inside Kosovo, not only by guarding the border but also by arresting the kingpins.
- Continue pressure on Kosovo political leaders to try to stop the insurgency, which casts a dark shadow over Kosovo's future.
- Offer, as in southern Serbia, an escape route into Kosovo for those not accused of serious crimes, provided the guerrillas are prepared to demobilize and disarm under NATO supervision.
- Continue to provide military and intelligence assistance appropriate to counterinsurgency warfare.

Let me add a word about foreign support to the guerrillas. Fundraising and recruitment in the U.S. poses a threat not only to Macedonian sovereignty and territorial integrity but also to U.S. troops. The Administration could block fundraising if the insurgents are declared "terrorists." If this is the only way, so be it. We need not only to limit the money flow but also to send urgently a strong political signal crucial to the protection of U.S. forces.

HELP THE MACEDONIAN GOVERNMENT

In addition to weakening the extremists, we should help the Macedonian government turn from its increasing reliance on the military instrument to a more political strategy. What counts is not obliterating the guerrillas but regaining control over Macedonian territory and integrating Albanian citizens more fully into the life of the country. Legitimate grievances need to find serious responses and the polarization of Macedonia's citizens needs to be overcome quickly if the country is to be saved. This is not the time for business as usual but for decisive political action. To these ends, the international community should:

- Urge the Macedonian government to exploit its military victories for political purposes and end the shelling of Albanian villages.
- Agree to recognize the Republic of Macedonia by that name, which is a name both Albanians and Macedonians have wanted.
- Insist on serious and continuous political negotiations to produce an “early harvest” of Parliamentary action, including a new non-ethnic Constitutional preamble, passage of the law on local governance, and use of Albanian in Parliament.
- Provide a quick package of assistance and investment aimed at overcoming ethnic division and revitalizing the economy.
- Support a broad dialogue throughout Macedonian society on group and individual rights and responsibilities.

UNIFY INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS

The EU, NATO and the OSCE have undertaken noble efforts in Macedonia. But a more unified approach is required. Experience in southern Serbia suggests that NATO, wielding as it does both military and political clout, must be engaged, at least politically. Whoever leads the international effort in Macedonia should therefore be named not only by the EU but also by NATO, and he should be prepared to devote full time to the effort.

The U.S. also needs a full-time, high-level Balkans envoy, one who can speak authoritatively for the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense on a daily basis. The region is rife with rumors about changes in U.S. policy, partition plans, withdrawal of U.S. troops, disinterest in capturing war criminals and U.S. support for this or that side in ongoing conflicts. The Administration needs a consistent and authoritative approach to counter the cacophony of proposals and leaks that undermine efforts to achieve our objectives in the region.

The United States has invested \$20 billion in Balkans peace efforts. The Europeans have invested much more. We have never been closer to dividends. Now is not the time to give up or to compete with each other. A strong American voice is required. Macedonia is the last in a long line of Balkans problems. Get it right and you'll be able to get the troops out sooner rather than later.

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, thank you, and thank you, general, very much. I do not want to hurt your reputations, but I agree with everything both of you said.

But I mean that sincerely. I think the prescription and the practical suggestions that you have made, Doctor, are right on. I quite frankly think the only one that may be politically not doable is the renaming of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to Macedonia because of domestic and regional sensitivity. But I truly believe what you have laid out is the plan. I do not think, if the President asked me, I would alter it at all. If he had a wish list, what do you want me to do, I think you have got it right.

General, I would like to go to you, though, because I agree with three points you have made that I do not think people fully understand. I am going to ask you to elucidate the points because I want it for the record. I want my colleagues to fully understand, if I correctly understand, what you are saying. That is, that it is not a matter of dictating to our allies, but a matter of genuine consultation and a genuine push within those consultations.

I will never forget when I was credited or blamed with convincing President Clinton that we should change our policy on the embargo in the Balkans back in the early 1990's in the beginning of his administration. He said he was going to do that. He said he did not want to do it unilaterally. He said he was going to send Christopher over to our NATO allies and make the case. Everything I got back, maybe unfairly—I may not be accurate, but I got back from many of our allies—after 28 years you get to know the individual personalities—was that Christopher basically went over

and said, look, we want to lift the embargo but you do not really want to do that, do you? And there was not much of a hard sell.

The point I want to make is this. The question I have is you are not suggesting that a very hard sell within the internal councils of NATO and Europe generally is inconsistent with consultation as opposed to just unilaterally deciding on this side of the Atlantic this is our policy. Would you speak to that just for a second so I do not have my colleagues misunderstanding what you said?

Mr. NASH. You have to have your views in order to have the conversation, and they expect us to come with a viewpoint. They expect us to have an opinion. They expect us to live up to our values and our precepts. So, it is OK to believe in what you talk about, but it is also important to listen and look for ways to build a consensus based on values, based on principles.

As we talk about issues of war criminals, we talk about issues of refugee returns, we talk about issues of protection of minority rights, the fact of the matter is on those three subjects the United States and our European allies have a variety of views. But as you address them together, you can look for ways to accomplish them all.

For example, there are some in Europe that think the refugee return issue is of greater importance than the war criminal issue. The fact of the matter is, to the people in the region, they go together.

The CHAIRMAN. That is exactly right.

Mr. NASH. Also, as I said in my comments, refugee returns in Bosnia and refugee returns in Kosovo are also seen as equally important to the refugees that have been displaced.

I understand you are good, sir, at putting deals together and developing legislative packages where you build consensus. It is the same process that you need to use as you negotiate and build consensus when working with our European friends.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate your saying that because I think that one of the things that you and the Doctor both said is that the region is rife with rumors. It is amazing to me, including our own intelligence people when I was there last, general, pulling me aside and saying, tell me, Senator, what is the deal here? When I walk through such and such a town, village, enclave, I get approached saying, are you leaving? What are you doing? Are you agreeing to partition, and so on and so forth?

So, I just think it is so important what you both said, that there be one voice here and that there be a clear voice and the President ordain that person, if you will, as being able to speak for him. I hope that is a realization the President comes to.

Yes, please.

Mr. NASH. Just one comment on that. I agree with Dan's comment about a Balkan envoy that could speak for the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. I would just submit that we have not had one previously that could do that and to find one in the future will be very difficult.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it will be difficult. I think the most important point though—I do not want to put words in the Doctor's mouth—is that it at least increases exponentially the possibility that there is a person, when he or she speaks, who is not likely

to be contradicted the next day, the next week, the next month. I am not being facetious.

Again, the President authorized me to be able to say this. I said, Mr. President, when I leave this meeting and the press asks me, what do you want me to say, and he said, tell them that I called you in ask for your advice. I am sure I am not the only one he asked for advice for his European trip. He asked me what was the one message I would want to have. I said, you know, Mr. President, we sit down in my end of the business, on a small scale, and say what do we want the major press in my state saying at the end of the following year about Biden. Biden did what? I said, I would, if I were you, look at it that way, Mr. President. He said, well, what would you want it to say? I said, when you come back, I hope two headlines are agreed upon by everyone in Europe and the United States. One, America Reasserts its European Engagement, European Power. And the second is, Bush Engaged. And he understood it. He understood the spirit in which I suggested that.

I think that the first step is going to have to be, before naming an envoy, the President clearly stating what our objective is. One of the legitimate criticisms of the opposition in the last 8 years was occasionally they would argue that the last administration did not clearly state what its objectives were, what the end game was. I think it would serve us all well if the President were willing to do that.

But it takes me to your second point, general, and I would like you to comment on it after the general does, Doctor, and that is that, if you excuse, as they say, a point of personal privilege. I have a son—he gets very upset when I do this, but my son is a Federal prosecutor who volunteered to go to your old territory to Pristina to be one of two representatives from the Justice Department with the U.N. delegation setting up a criminal justice system. As you know better than I do, general, they do not have a history of judges. They do not know how to judge. They do not have a history of a criminal system, that is, one that is based upon any Western principles, and so on and so forth. And it is kind of going from scratch.

When I was last there, Dr. Haltzel and I and others sat around with the civilian leadership not just on the criminal justice system or their courts, but the whole of civilian leadership in Kosovo. It is a much larger animal to get your arms around, much more difficult to make work, much less certainty because of the political dynamics and to whom the High Representative answers.

I found every place I went—I would like you to comment on this, general—it is the only time in the last 7 years, my only experience in 30 years in politics, where civilian leadership privately will pull you aside and say we need the military more here. We need the military to make more decisions. The willingness to look to you guys to do everything from construct a code of civilian conduct all the way through to pacify—bad term from my generation, but to bring order to a region.

I met with Veton Surroi, whom you know, when I first got there the first time after the bombing had stopped. I posited the following proposition expecting some resistance, which was that I thought that before it got turned over to civilian control, the mili-

tary, KFOR, should do what we did in Japan, impose a constitution. It was interesting to me that Surroi fully, totally concurred with that.

We always go in with this notion that somehow, once the military gets their job done, there somehow can be an electoral process or a political process that will take root, that will produce these orderly benchmarks that are needed in a society as it comes out of 50 years of Communist rule and a dozen years of ethnic conflict.

What would you do, general, if the Doctor were President and you were his National Security Advisor and he said, OK, general, tell me what do I do about the civilian rule in, for example, Kosovo, the international civilian apparatus. What are some of the practical things that you would suggest? I know you have an opinion. It may be unfair to ask you to state it.

Mr. NASH. A couple of comments. First of all, your son is doing the Lord's work as he addresses the issues of rule of law in Kosovo. As you talked about earlier, the perception of the people of justice rather than of revenge is one that is very important.

The CHAIRMAN. If I can interrupt you. One of our ambassadors got very upset when I met with the Kosovar leadership separately, and one made a comment about their independence. I said, well, I want to make it clear to you. If I were in charge—and at that time I was able to speak with more assurance about what the administration would do—if you step out of line, I am going to urge we come after you personally—you personally—arrest you, and if we cannot arrest you, take you out. I think that is the only language anybody understood because I think you are correct. I think there is this overwhelming perception that we have a selective imposition of principles throughout the Balkans, and I think it leads to great confusion.

Mr. NASH. I agree with you, sir.

Sir, since I came back from Bosnia at the end of 1996, I have looked at Japan and I have looked at Germany following World War II quite a bit. I was a dependent in Japan during that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you really?

Mr. NASH. Yes. My father was part of the occupation forces.

I would make a couple of comments. We need to be careful about analogies. First of all, that was a citizen army we had in 1945 that occupied Germany and occupied Japan, and there were an awful lot of civilian skills embedded in the United States Army that led that effort.

The CHAIRMAN. Interesting point.

Mr. NASH. Yes. One of the things that we need to understand.

The larger point I would say to the President is that we need to look at the long-range development of democracy. I have a little bit of time, since I retired from the army, in working on democracy development. So, I would come into this from the military viewpoint with the size and the capabilities of the military force today, a much, much smaller force than at the end of World War II, and for looking at the aspects of developing democracy in the long term, I would like to see more emphasis by the United States on developing civilian peace builders.

This is less a compliment to me than it is a problem with the system, but we could not find anybody that would take the job in

Mitrovica when I left in November, and I gave them 90 days notice for when I was going to leave. Here we are 5 months later and there is no replacement. When I left the 1st Armored Division, there was not a blip. There were plenty of people to replace me.

So, I think we need folks that understand the process—and dare I use the word—of peace building or nation building in this hallowed hall, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Use it with me.

Mr. NASH. Yes, sir.

Frankly, I think we talk too much about the military. We talk too much about the military issues and not enough about the political, economic, social, and overall security issues. Your son is working portions of that security issue.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to exaggerate. My son is embarrassed when I say it. The only point I am raising is that even talking to him firsthand the confusion that exists, the bureaucracy, the inefficiencies.

Mr. NASH. Yes, sir. It is hard.

So, I think we need much more work on that, and I think the Department of State should take the lead but all of the Government needs to play and there is a great capacity in the military to assist.

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, and then I will let you fellows go.

Dr. SERWER. Senator, you have opened up a lot of issues. Let me just say briefly that the split between civilian and military implementation in these situations is a mistake. It is a mistake that is pushed on the international community by the United States because we will not accept a civilian administrator over our military and we will not let our military do the civilian tasks.

I think there are solutions to this. I underline these are personal views. I believe that in the first 6 to 9 months, even a year, after an intervention of this sort the military is the only law on the ground and it has to take on the whole responsibility and only gradually turn over responsibility to civilian implementers, who must focus on the rule of law. We have focused on building schools. We focused on building houses. We focused on getting refugees back. I think all of those things are terribly important, but I think in the absence of the rule of law, none of them will stick.

Quite frankly, few went into Bosnia in 1995–1996 thinking about the rule of law. ABA CEELI were the only ones and they did a noble job. But this is a very small part of our assistance program. It should be a major part of our assistance program.

I might add a personal word about Mitrovica. I was among the people who were approached to replace Bill in Mitrovica, and I would say a simple word. People were uninterested not just because there was no one capable, but because of the split between military and civilian authority. If you took on that civilian job, you did not have any force with which to do what you thought was necessary because there was such a clear difference of vision between the—

The CHAIRMAN. That is a clear important point to make.

Dr. SERWER [continuing]. Forces on the ground and the civilians.

Let me just add a final word about discussion of a U.S. envoy. You are absolutely correct, Mr. Chairman, that you cannot have an

envoy who does not have a policy behind him. That is why I emphasized the administration needs a vision, and when it has that vision, it can then have an envoy who represents all of the power centers. I agree it has been difficult for us to have that kind of envoy, but one of our advantages over the Europeans is that we are able to combine all the instruments of power—diplomatic, economic, and military—and exert them at the same time, when we think something is important enough to do it.

Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand by the look on your face your skepticism. I must tell you share it a little bit. I do not want to oversell what I think an envoy can do. But I think right now the most urgent need in the region is for there to be a voice that all the parties are convinced speaks for the United States. He will probably shoot me for saying this but I think, for example, Secretary Armitage could do that job incredibly well. If he hears this, he will probably be damning me not with faint praise, just damning me. He is close to Bush, to Powell. He has a relationship with Rumsfeld.

The main thing, though, is to settle events on the ground so that everybody says, OK, this administration has come to its milk, it has made its decision. This is where it is. Again, I hope this is not translated by the press or anyone else as a backhanded criticism of this administration. I said it takes every new administration, unfortunately, time to work through where they are, but we are running out of time.

General, I want to hear your comments, but I might say I want to personally compliment you. I mean this sincerely not only in your military, but even more importantly in your civilian capacity, taking on the job you took on. I want to remind everybody where Mitrovica was before you arrived and where that could have gone in terms of really totally unraveling things.

But I would argue—and I may be dead wrong—that part of the reason why you were able to do what you did is because on the ground everyone knew you were a former general. I think that had something to do with it, notwithstanding the fact you were a civilian. The only thing I have ever observed that is respected in the region in the last 12 years has been the U.S. military.

I want to tell you something. I know this sounds chauvinistic. I have been truly impressed by the skill of our young women and men over there. One example. We were up in Brcko. There was about to be a very serious confrontation. This is how many years ago? Four years ago. There was this whole area which had been completely devastated. It looked like a giant Levittown with bigger homes. In terms of the right of return, you had people—you know the story, Doctor, of people moving into other people's homes and so on and so forth.

We had some very strong civilian leadership, a couple of whom were Americans, but none of it worked until a young captain literally set up a trailer in the middle of this "neighborhood," hoisted an American flag, and negotiated one-on-one personally. He was the only one anybody trusted. This was a young guy who was not trained. This guy was not trained as a diplomat. He was not trained as an arbitrator. I was blown away by the skill, the ingenuity, and the incredible patience. Some of these young troops of

yours that are walking through these towns are the only people anybody trusts.

Now, I realize that is an unfair burden to thrust upon them, and I am not suggesting we institutionalize that burden. But I just want to say for the record I have been so incredibly proud of the U.S. military. I am not suggesting other military are not good. But up personal and close, whether it was Camp McGovern or Bondsteel, or wherever we were watching these young kids, and the authority you give them, you are talking about 22-year-old kids out there doing more good in 5 minutes than anybody else does in a week.

Anyway, can you respond? And I will close this out because, as you know, obviously I have a passion for this subject. I could keep you here forever. But, general, if you do not want to do it now, maybe you would be willing to meet with me privately. Tell me about some of the practical distinctions between your civilian role and your military role in terms of trying to work out what you mean by needing the strength in the civilian component.

Mr. NASH. Sir, I would enjoy very much having that discussion with you if you would like to do it more completely at another time.

The comment that I would make to what Dr. Serwer said, first of all, I agree on the priority of rule of law, and that is a priority issue that I have only come to appreciate over the time.

But I want to discuss, if I could, very quickly the issues of civilian implementation and the frustrations about the forces that were mentioned earlier. The fact of the matter is there was not a consensus of political views in Mitrovica and there was a variance of perception of priorities. It is largely the basis for which I talk about the fact that law and order, refugee returns, and minority rights protection are intertwined, a confluence of issues that have to be dealt with. Some of the perceived obstructionism on the part of some folks in Mitrovica was national policy based on disagreements on those issues under the guise of other reasons.

Having said that, I think that some of the disagreements would have been the same regardless of which military force was there because the issues at hand were largely police, and there is a natural hesitancy, for good or bad, to address those issues in that environment. That is why Dr. Serwer is entirely right, that the rule of law and all the components thereof is a priority effort.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to make a concluding comment, Doctor?

Dr. SERWER. I would just comment, Senator, that the U.S. Institute of Peace has worked very closely with U.S. soldiers stationed at Camp Monteith, the other U.S. base in Kosovo. We have worked very closely with them in developing local dialogs between Serbs and Albanians. I share completely your view that these guys have done some fantastic things, that they do it every day on the ground, and we are very proud to have been able to help them out in the effort to reknit those communities.

The CHAIRMAN. I have also been amazed at the morale. This stuff about somehow this is sapping our military and drawing down—I was with General Casey and others, your former colleagues, and they say, look, give me a kid over here for 6 months

and I will forego 2 years of training stateside. Give me a kid for 6 months here.

By the way, I would state for the record the reenlistment rate of those who served in the Balkans is higher by—I forget what the factor is—than any other part of the world. It is amazing. They know what they are doing. They care about it.

I would just conclude my statement here with I could not agree with you more about the rule of law being the single most important priority. That is why with the last administration I was so outspoken about training police forces, movement quickly of gendarmerie into position—once you have a court system established and a code, because all the rest fails if it is not there.

Again, I am sorry to take so much of your time and keep you waiting, but I truly appreciate your input. With your permission, I will be back to you, if I may, because as the good old saying goes, the devil is in the details here. This is one house at a time when we talk about restoration. We are talking about a block at a time. We are not talking about you wave a wand and you have an agreement where everybody moves. I just hope that we understand that there is a need to be declarative, forceful, and resolved as it comes to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia right now, because I think you are right, Doctor. If that unravels—talk about putting our troops in harm's way, that is the way to do it.

Anyway, thank you, gentlemen, very much. I thank the audience for having stuck with this, and we are now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:42 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

