[Senate Hearing 107-379] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 107-379 S. 1867--A BILL TO ESTABLISH THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES ======================================================================= HEARING before the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION on S. 1867 TO ESTABLISH THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES __________ FEBRUARY 7, 2002 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs 78-617 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2002 ____________________________________________________________________________ For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpr.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800 Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman CARL LEVIN, Michigan FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio MAX CLELAND, Georgia PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah MARK DAYTON, Minnesota JIM BUNNING, Kentucky Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Staff Director and Counsel Kevin J. Landy, Counsel Hannah S. Sistare, Minority Staff Director and Counsel Jayson P. Roehl, Minority Professional Staff Member Morgan P. Muchnick, Minority Professional Staff Member Darla D. Cassell, Chief Clerk C O N T E N T S ------ Opening statement: Page Senator Lieberman............................................ 1 Senator Stevens.............................................. 2 Senator Torricelli........................................... 11 Prepared statement: Senator Bunning.............................................. 25 WITNESSES Thursday, February 7, 2002 Hon. Dave McCurdy, President, Electronic Industries Alliance, and Commissioner, Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction............................................... 3 Norman R. Augustine, Chairman of the Executive Committee, Lockheed Martin Corporation and Commissioner, U.S. Commission on National Security........................................... 5 Richard K. Betts, Director, Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University and Commissioner, National Commission on Terrorism...................................................... 7 Maurice Sonnenberg, Senior International Advisor, Bear, Stearns and Co., Inc. and Manatt, Phelps and Phillips, L.L.P. and former Vice Chair, National Commission on Terrorism............ 9 Alphabetical List of Witnesses Augustine, Norman R.: Testimony.................................................... 5 Prepared statement........................................... 32 Betts, Richard K.: Testimony.................................................... 7 Prepared statement........................................... 37 McCurdy, Hon. Dave: Testimony.................................................... 3 Prepared statement with an attachment........................ 26 Sonnenberg, Maurice: Testimony.................................................... 9 Prepared statement........................................... 43 Appendix James Schlesinger, prepared statement with attached article entitled ``A Test by Terrorism''............................... 46 Copy of bill of S. 1867.......................................... 56 S. 1867--A BILL TO ESTABLISH THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES ---------- THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2002 U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:45 a.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. Present: Senators Lieberman, Torricelli, and Stevens. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN Chairman Lieberman. The hearing will come to order. Today we are going to be considering legislation that Senator John McCain and I have introduced to establish an independent commission to examine and report on the facts and causes relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As you probably know, Senator McCain has minor surgery this week and that is why he is not here, because otherwise he would be here testifying. We introduced the legislation late last year because we felt that it was important to get the truth about how those attacks could have happened and whether there was anything the Federal Government might have done to prevent them. An independent and impartial commission, composed of knowledgeable citizens, we concluded was the best way to learn the lessons of September 11, so that we in Congress, together with the President and those serving with him in the Executive Branch have the information we need to make the best choices about protecting the future of the American people here at home. That is future security we are talking about. Our proposal would create a National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States that will be charged with constructing a full picture of the circumstances surrounding the attacks, including the Federal Government's preparedness and response. The commission would also be charged with formulating recommendations for ways to strengthen our defenses against future terrorist attacks. Rarely in our history have events left scars on our national psyche as deep as those left in the aftermath of September 11, when more than 3,000 Americans were killed. The attack on Pearl Harbor was clearly one of those events, and it was followed by an independent investigative commission and, in fact, Congressional investigations. There have been many more recent commissions for serious, though less cataclysmic national security crises. Our military, for example, has investigated major terrorist actions in the past, as it did after the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, in order to learn lessons that might prevent future tragedies. And that is exactly what we have in mind here, on a larger scale. The most obvious question we have, of course, is how the terrorist plot succeeded despite the vast intelligence capabilities of our Nation. But we also ought to look into possible systemic deficiencies in other areas of our national security structure, including our counterterrorism capabilities, for example, our immigration and border control systems, our diplomacy, and our diplomatic activities. The best way to achieve the unvarnished truth is to allow those who know the most about the array of subjects that must be explored to deliberate in an atmosphere free of politics. Senator McCain and I have tried to create those optimum conditions with this commission. The initial months after September 11 were understandably and appropriately preoccupied with mourning and healing and then the aggressive and, thankfully, successful prosecution of the war in Afghanistan. But now that the Taliban has been removed from power and the reconstruction of Afghanistan is underway, we can and should begin to pursue in earnest the process of finding answers to our questions. Determining the causes and circumstances of the terrorist attacks will ensure that those who lost their lives on this second American day of infamy will not have died in vain. The commission we propose would, in that sense, pay tribute to the victims of September 11 but also would convey to their survivors and all Americans the message that their government is doing everything within its power to protect their future. We are very fortunate to have with us this morning four witnesses who have served on commissions that assessed the growing threat of terrorism and who therefore have expertise particularly relevant to the work of a national commission looking into September 11. I look forward to their testimony. Senator Stevens. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR STEVENS Senator Stevens. Thank you very much. I am sorry to say I have another meeting in just about 20 minutes, but I am very interested in this. I support the concept, Mr. Chairman, but I am not sure it is timely yet. I think this event was just so staggering on our national psyche that we may want to wait a little while before we create a commission like this. But I will be pleased to hear some of these statements, and I thank you very much. Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Stevens, for your support of the concept and I look forward to working with you on the timing. I think this is all about beginning a process that will take at least several months to go forward. I am going to down the table of distinguished witnesses and start with the Hon. Dave McCurdy, who is before us today as President of the Electronic Industries Alliance, and has served as a Commissioner on the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Dave, thanks for being with us. TESTIMONY OF HON. DAVE McCURDY,\1\ PRESIDENT, ELECTRONIC INDUSTRIES ALLIANCE, COMMISSIONER AND COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO COMBAT THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Mr. McCurdy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is always a pleasure to be with you and Senator Stevens, as well. And always good to be with my friends and colleagues on this side of the table, as well. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. McCurdy with an attachment appears in the Appendix on page 26. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I assume you are starting on this side because I have more gray hair, but Dick and I may compete for the quality of the gray hair, but it is an honor to be here. Chairman Lieberman. You have become one of our gray eminences very early. Mr. McCurdy. It is amazing what will happen. The commission proposed in your bill is charged with one of the most serious and significant tasks in our Nation's history. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the United States is united in its resolve to take the war to the terrorist organizations, as well as the countries who harbor and support them. But not since World War II has the country rallied and come together to face a common enemy, albeit an amorphous and insidious variety. Mr. Chairman, the most fundamental role and responsibility of the government and Congress is to provide for our common defense. And I add my commendation to President Bush, the administration, and Congress for their remarkable leadership and crisis management we have witnessed since the September 11 attacks. And I share Senator Stevens note of caution that, even though we have completed the first phase of this war by eliminating the Taliban and al Qaeda hold on Afghanistan, there is still much to be done to successfully prosecute the campaign against terrorism. It is imperative that nothing interferes with or impedes the prosecution of the war or efforts to bolster the defense of our homeland. Nevertheless, the requirements of this ongoing war must be balanced with the right of Americans to know why our intelligence, defense and law enforcement agencies were unable to prevent the attacks. Without question, now is not the time to point fingers or to look for scapegoats, but we must understand the causes, identify the weaknesses, and correct the lapses that allowed this catastrophe to occur. The American people deserve a forthright and complete accounting of the circumstances of that day. Above all, we must do all we can to ensure that such attack never occurs again. I know that the Chairman and the Senator know that when the National Security Act of 1947 actually was written, it was to ensure that we never had or suffered another Pearl Harbor type of attack. And I think that is the principle that we need to keep in mind. There are five Senate and five House committees that have jurisdiction and authority to conduct investigations and to review what happened. Arguably, there are even more, including this one. I certainly have the highest confidence in the leadership of these respective committees, particularly my former colleagues and current chairman, of the Intelligence Committee and Armed Services Committee, who I worked with on a daily basis. However, in my opinion, a commission has the advantage of being independent, singularly focused, and able to work outside the glare of the media. For these reasons, I support forming the commission to investigate the terrorist attacks upon the United States. In my experience, commissions work because they are not constrained by arbitrary jurisdiction or turf wars and politics, and thus have the ability to step back and take a more holistic view. In this instance, a commission can objectively collect facts, evaluate the evidence, and review the mission and effectiveness of the Federal, State, local and private organizations charged with our safety. Commissions are valuable because they are generally non- partisan and when effectively chaired seek consensus based recommendations and solutions. Operating an effective commission on the September 11 attacks will not be an easy task, but there already has been much valuable forensic work performed by the intelligence community, law enforcement, and the media to build upon. Based upon my experience with Congressional committees, presidential and Congressional commissions, war games, as well as my private sector experience in the technology industry, I believe there are numerous questions that this commission must investigate. It is especially important not to have any preconceived notions. And in this case, there are still many more questions than answers. These questions include but are certainly not limited to the following: Is there a clear chain of command and authority? What are the organizational impediments to effective collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence and information? Is technology being used to its fullest potential to provide effective information management? What indications and warning mechanisms were in place? How effective are they? What is the role of government versus private organizations? The list can go on, and I detailed more in my written statement. A priority for this commission must be to complement rather than compete with the efforts of Congress. Similarly, cooperation with the relevant Executive Branch agencies will be essential. I am confident that these issues can be worked through. Indeed, both Congress and the administration deserve enormous credit for the actions already being taken, such as the establishment of the Homeland Security office to improve coordination, the Patriot Act, and the Airline Security legislation. In addition, the President's budget proposal clearly makes homeland security a top priority. Still, this commission could serve a valuable role in looking at these additional measures and identifying areas that may need greater attention. I am also confident that the failures that resulted in the terrorist strike will be revealed and addressed, but this outcome is not automatic. Bureaucracies have a natural tendency to fight the last war rather than the next one. A commission can be particularly helpful in taking a comprehensive view of the events of September 11 and fashioning recommendations that mitigate this tendency. Mr. Chairman, Charles Darwin observed that it is not the strongest nor the most intelligent that survive, but the ones most responsive to change. The September 11 attacks were brilliantly evil, they were entirely outside the box of what we thought likely, and now it is our turn to adapt. To win this war, government must change how it thinks and acts, and do a much better job of coordinating its assets. Thank you. Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, David, for that very thoughtful statement. Next is Norman Augustine, Chairman of the Executive Committee of Lockheed Martin Corporation, a leader in America's corporate and civic life for a good long time now, and also I will mention, as part of that, a Commissioner of the U.S. Commission on National Security known as the Hart-Rudman Commission. Thanks so much for being here. TESTIMONY OF NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE,\1\ CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION AND COMMISSIONER, U.S. COMMISSION ON NATIONAL SECURITY Mr. Augustine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee. I particularly appreciate the opportunity to share my views on the proposed commission. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Augustine appears in the Appendix on page 32. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- With the Committee's permission, I would like to submit for the record a long statement and I will just abstract it now. Chairman Lieberman. Fine, we will accept and print that longer statement in the record. Mr. Augustine. I also probably should emphasize for the record that my comments this morning will be entirely my own, and I am not representing any of the organizations that I happen to be affiliated with. It goes without saying that the issues that are addressed by S. 1867 are of great importance to the country. It was, as you said Mr. Chairman, my privilege to serve on the Hart-Rudman Commission for several years. Having done so, it unfortunately came as no great surprise to me or, I believe, my colleagues, that America was subjected to an attack of the general nature that we suffered on September 11. I say this not because of any specific evidence of impending tragedy, but rather from a derived conclusion, if you will, from three basic considerations. The first of these was that it has been long evident that there are individuals and groups on this planet that have utter contempt for all that America stands for and have been very vocal about doing us harm. The second consideration is that with the end of the Cold War, when one views America's military capability it would be seemingly futal for such enemies to attack America in a conventional fashion on the land, in the air, at sea, or even in space. That leads to the third consideration, and that is in recent decades, we have witnessed a very fundamental change that largely has been brought about by the unintended consequences of advancements in science and technology. For the first time in history, individuals or very small groups can very profoundly impact much larger groups in a very adverse manner. It is not possible for the former, smaller groups to exert control over the larger groups, but they can certainly disrupt the stability that is enjoyed by these larger groups. So in short, for individuals or groups that are seeking to extort or physically harm America, by far the most obvious avenue today, and presumably in the future, will be through terrorist actions. There are groups that, as we now all know, have such capabilities and are seeking further capabilities for such actions. Clearly, we do have a great deal to learn and we have a great deal more to do if we are going to thwart terrorism and its consequences. The proposal that has been made to establish a commission to learn from the events of September 11 would appear to me to be a very logical undertaking. In the final assessment, though, I believe that its usefulness will, to a very large degree, depend on the quality and the judgment of the commissioners and of their staff, those who are involved in the endeavor. It will depend greatly on the perspective they take as they embark on such an undertaking. Specifically, it would seem that there would be little to be gained simply by revisiting history for history's sake. In fact, doing so might even be divisive. It is also important, I believe, that the commission not unduly burden those who already carry the heavy burden of responding to, preparing for, and hopefully avoiding future terrorist acts. On the other hand, I believe that if those involved in the commission's work are able to take a rather forward looking perspective, take a rather broad perspective of lessons learned, lessons that could impact our future security, I believe that the commission can make a very significant contribution. It is apparent, from the wording of the legislation and, Mr. Chairman, from the wording of your statement, that the drafting of this legislation recognizes those considerations that I have just cited. I would note one specific matter with regard to the proposed legislation. That is, it does not seem to make clear how much of the commission's work is to be conducted in full public view. Of course, America prides itself on conducting the affairs of its government under a spotlight, and that is to our credit in general. But at the same time, I can imagine many of the topics that the commissioners will be called upon to address will be topics to which we would just as soon our enemies not be privy. I particularly address here those issues that do not truly fall under the existing legislation for protecting national secrets, but are extremely sensitive in today's world and probably deserve some form of protection. It was not clear to me from the legislation how that would be dealt with. In summary, I would just say that I believe a commission of the type that has been proposed can indeed be very beneficial, but only if it is conducted in a very sensitive and a very responsible fashion. And I would close, as did my colleague, David, by noting that we do live in a new world and I would use a quote, as he did, Jefferson's reminder that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance. This seems to have never been more true than it is today. Thank you for this opportunity to share my views. Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Mr. Augustine, and I look forward to having some exchange with you on some of the questions that you raised, which are well taken. Next we have Professor Richard K. Betts, who is Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University and a Commissioner of the National Commission on Terrorism, which if I have got my commissions right was the Bremer Commission. Thanks for being here. TESTIMONY OF RICHARD K. BETTS,\1\ DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE OF WAR AND PEACE STUDIES, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY AND COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORISM Mr. Betts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interest of time, I will summarize my longer, prepared statement. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Betts appears in the Appendix on page 37. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- My main points are that a national commission would perform an important function in coming to grips with the disaster of September 11, and such a commission should work best in addition to other efforts, such as Congressional investigations, not as a substitute for them. The organization of the commission in the proposed bill seems to make good sense, with one exception. That is that there is a tension between the objectives in Section 3(c)(3) concerning balanced representation of different professional groups, and the procedures for appointment of members of the commission set out in Section 3(a). In the coming months and years, there will be many rumors and half-truths leaking out to explain why the warning process failed before September 11, how organizational structures were unprepared, and so forth. There is a great need for an official post-mortem that brings the full story out in a thorough, careful, balanced and non-partisan manner. The main benefit of a national commission, I think, would be political credibility, to provide a detailed and sober investigation that the public could have confidence is as objective as humanly possible. There will be many exercises attempting to lay blame and it is important to have one serious effort that has high credibility in terms of two important criteria: Access to all relevant information and disinterest in scoring political points. In this matter, something I did not address in my statement, I would though like to associate myself with the last witness' emphasis on the need to conduct the most sensitive aspects of such a commission's work in reliable secrecy. My view is influenced by my own experience as a member of the National Commission on Terrorism established by Congress 3 years ago. That commission operated in a thoroughly bipartisan way. I say that as one of the four members of the commission appointed by the Minority Democratic leadership. Although it was a commission created by a Republican controlled Congress, there was never a hint that our effort involved grinding axes to embarrass the Democratic administration. It would be unrealistic and undesirable to see a commission as the sole official solution to grappling with what happened on September 11. Neither presidential nor Congressional commissions ever completely settle the questions with which they are tasked. Other efforts, particularly Congressional investigations, can do things that a commission cannot. On a matter as crucial as September 11, some redundancy in investigation is not only unavoidable, it is useful. Consider the investigations of the intelligence community in the mid-1970's. The process began with the Rockefeller Commission and expanded to investigations by select committees of the House and Senate, and all of these were useful in different ways. S. 1867 does not have any truly serious deficiencies, in my view. My one reservation is about the process for appointing members of the commission. Section 3(c) of the bill sets out an excellent summary of the qualifications desirable for the commissioners to be selected. The current bill's Section 3(a) however, sets out a process that disperses appointment authority widely. That would seem, to me, to make it hard to carefully craft a group as a whole. The President would be able to design some balance with his four allotted appointees, but the other 10 appointments are parcelled out to 10 different committee chairs, or 20 people in all, if the consultation with their ranking members is to be genuine. To get a good distribution of people from the military, diplomacy, business, law enforcement and so forth, it seems that the 10 or 20 chairpersons and ranking members or their staffs would have to caucus and do some horse trading. Otherwise, it appears that we could get a random assortment that might not be ideally suited to conducting a full, thorough and competent investigation. Falling back on my experience with the Terrorism Commission, I would suggest considering some greater centralization of Congress' share of the appointments. One way to do this would be to give the final appointment authority to the majority and minority leaders of both houses. The committee chairpersons and ranking members could certainly make their preferences known and the leadership would be free to select many of them. To conclude, a national commission, however well it does its job, will not bring us to closure in understanding how we should best move to prevent another September 11 catastrophe. That should not be the test of such a commission. September 11 was a watershed in national security policy, and figuring out and adjusting to the lessons will be a long process. The right sort of commission can be a good start. It can clear away underbrush, answer some questions, even if not all, lay down a valuable set of markers to channel other efforts, and discredit fast and loose attempts at easy answers. That will leave much to be done, but it will have done a lot. Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Professor, again helpful testimony. It is a pleasure to welcome Maurice Sonnenberg, an old and dear friend who also happens to be Senior International Advisor to Bear, Stearns and Company, and was Vice Chair on the National Commission on Terrorism. Welcome. TESTIMONY OF MAURICE SONNENBERG,\1\ SENIOR INTERNATIONAL ADVISOR, BEAR, STEARNS AND COMPANY, INC. AND MANATT, PHELPS AND PHILLIPS, L.L.P. FORMER VICE CHAIR, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORISM Mr. Sonnenberg. Nice to be here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Torricelli. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Sonnenberg appears in the Appendix on page 43. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I have been asked to testify in the efficacy of the creation of a terrorist commission. Having served as Vice Chairman of the National Commission on Terrorism and having been on the Commission for the Roll and Capabilities of the Intelligence Community and the Commission for the Protection and Reduction of Government Secrecy, I do come with a point of view as to how these might be best structured. A panel of this sort is of immeasurable importance in helping to better understand what basically were the factors that led up to the catastrophe of September 11. It also places into context sound bites such as ``a failure of intelligence.'' While these are catchy phrases, they are gross generalizations designed to convey the impression that it must have been a systemic all-encompassing failure on the part of the Agency, the Bureau, and others in the intelligence community. There may have been weaknesses in the intelligence community, but a more comprehensive analysis should also focus on the role of several governmental institutions, among them the White House, Congress, and the Department of Justice. When looking at these matters, the commission must also address obviously such matters as impediments to law enforcement, immigration, border controls, financing of terrorist activities, intelligence sharing, and on and on. The commission must obviously be established in a manner that supplements but does not replace the need for continued Congressional oversight, nor can it be allowed to compromise security, both at the National Security Council level and at the intelligence community level. But what about the specifics of a commission. It must take some very talented people and a superior staff to assess information available both in open and classified sources. The individuals appointed to this commission should bring to the task a broad understanding of the subject as a whole, rather than overly detailed knowledge of a specific field. It goes without saying that everyone associated with this commission will require multiple clearances, especially in the instances where the investigation hinges on matters related to covert operations. The commission will require, as we had before, a specific location, frankly not known to the public. On all the commissions I served on, that was the case. Congressionally mandated, our members were appointed, in our commission, by the majority and the minority leadership. In the other two commissions, the White House participated in the appointments. As far as I know very few people knew the names of our commission members until the report was published. We had never had a leak. This I might add was true for the commission on the role and capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence community. And that comes up to the topic of the security of the commission and where they are housed. Another reason that I am concerned about is the security in terms of the commission and staff members. We have got to check with law enforcement and intelligence community. We are now at a period after September 11. Do not underestimate the possibility that these commissioners could be jeopardized or pressured. And therefore, when this commission is set up, the idea of some secrecy behind where they meet and who they are, to some degree, must be looked at. I would do that in consultation with the proper law enforcement authorities. Finally, let me say you may wonder why, after all of this, would I want this commission? First, I am certain that the White House, or some branch of the legislature, is going to set one up no matter what happens. Second, a commission of this sort will have substantial public consequences. The cynics say oh well, all these commission reports wind up on the shelf. Frankly, most do. There is, however, a great difference regarding this one. It is post-September 11. If well written and carefully conceived, it will carry the gravitas and influence a study of this nature should have. The National Commission on Terrorism and the Hart-Rudman Report had some influence in focusing many members of the Congress, the media, and the press on the subject. The prescience of these reports made them unique and totally relevant to the legislation that passed after September 11. A commission report on the so-called ``monumental failure of intelligence'' can help to inform and educate the public to better understand the complexity of these matters. That is not to say that a commission would be a fount of wisdom. But it might, by its very making, keep the public focused on this problem that is not about to end or, for that matter, in our lifetime. You can control terrorism but you can never totally eliminate it. The sooner the citizenry is fully cognizant of this, the less likely it will lose its sense of purpose and resolve. That being the case, it is imperative that the public continue to be supportive of measures necessary to face this ongoing threat. The commission can be a valuable tool in this effort. Thank you. Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much. It was excellent testimony, very constructive. I should indicate for the record that Senator Thompson is home in Tennessee because, as is known, of the death of his daughter last week. He and I spoke yesterday and he is very interested in this subject and will be re-engaged with us next week. I am delighted that Senator Torricelli is here. Senator Torricelli has introduced, along with Senator Grassley, legislation to create a commission on the same subject. For reasons known best to the Senate Parliamentarian, it has been referred to the Judiciary Committee, not here. But I wonder, my colleague, if you would like to deliver an opening statement at this time? OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TORRICELLI Senator Torricelli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. I enjoyed the testimony and appreciate each of the witnesses appearing today. It is very good to see my neighbor from New York, Maurice Sonnenberg, here, and my former colleague, Dave McCurdy, who by all rights in my personal judgment, should have been a member of this institution but that is the way life works. Chairman Lieberman. Probably did better. Mr. McCurdy. It is nice on this side of the table, Senator. Senator Torricelli. That is his gain and our loss. Mr. Betts, Mr. Augustine, thank you all for being with us today. This is a subject about which I have extremely strong feelings. While, for some Americans, September 11 will soon become part of history, a painful event, but something that will take its place along with other tragedies in our generation. For those of us who live in New York, New Jersey, and Northern Virginia, it is something that is still unfolding every day. You cannot visit a community in my State without someone knowing a widow or an orphan, a parent. They wake up with this tragedy every single day. A loss child, a mortgage that cannot get paid, a family whose future has been changed. I support this commission because if not for everyone else in the Nation, and if not for history, if not for assuring that it never happens again, if none of those reasons were valid, then we are left simply with this. Those people deserve an answer. It is my own belief that the American people have remarkably low expectations for their government. They live their lives, they want as little contact with the government, usually, as possible. But at a minimum, they expect the government to keep them safe. In their homes from crimes and in the world from adversaries. And they trust that is being done. It was not done. And there may be many reasons, there may be many excuses, there may be many legitimate problems, but it did not happen. And somebody has to provide an answer. The President has made some remarkable appropriations requests for law enforcement, intelligence, and the military, historic changes in our level of expenditures that will radically change the finances of the U.S. Government. It may be the right recommendation. And Democrats and Republicans have competed with each other to endorse them more quickly than the next. That may be the right decision. The simple truth is there is not a member of this Congress, and there is no one in the administration, who really knows. One cannot build structure of law enforcement or defense without understanding whether the foundation is sound. These institutions upon which we would now rest our security and invest these new funds are the same institutions that failed on September 11. I do not say that because the institutions should be abandoned or dismantled or discredited, simply that we need to understand what failed before we invest in them again. That is the purpose of this commission. It is regrettable that the commission was not already formed. I genuinely believed that President Bush, in the weeks after September 11, would form a commission by Executive Order. This exercise in the Congress of legislatively creating a commission really should not have been necessary. Faced with the same decision, Franklin Delano Roosevelt created the Commission on Pearl Harbor in 10 days. Faced with the national trauma of the Challenger accident, Ronald Reagan acted within weeks. Faced with the catastrophe of the assassination of President Kennedy and what it implied for the security of the Executive Branch and the international implications, Lyndon Johnson acted immediately with the Warren Commission. This has been our history. This should not be the exception. In many ways, this is not as large a tragedy as each of those. In some respect, it is larger, the death of thousands in our greatest city and the capital of our country. We are too close to the event and there has been too little investigation to know much of what failed on September 11. Let me quote from the Los Angeles Times, if I could, ``In the last decade, suspected terrorists have repeatedly slipped in and out of the United States. They have plotted against America while in Federal custody. Key evidence that pointed to operatives and their plans was ignored until well after the attacks. The mixed signals now haunt a generation of U.S. intelligence and law enforcement officials who realize that their efforts to track terrorists linked to Osama bin Laden were undermined at times by bungled investigations and bureaucratic rivalries.'' We now know that the FBI has known for at least 3 years that two bin Laden operatives trained to be pilots in the United States. One of them, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Egypt purchased a used military aircraft in Arizona in 1993. After he purchased the Saber 40 twin engine passenger jet for bin Laden for $210,000, he flew to the Sudan. Federal authorities also knew that Ramzi Yousef, who planned and carried out the 1993 World Trade Center attacks later planned to blow up 12 U.S. jets over the Pacific. One of his co-conspirators in the Pacific plot told Philippine police that he hoped to hijack a passenger plane and crash it into CIA headquarters. He had attended U.S. flight schools. No one took this evidence, to contact U.S. flight schools or raise the possibility of such a conspiracy. I know it appears easy after the attacks for people in my position or others to make it look easy. It was not easy. I understand it is difficult. Gathering intelligence from thousands or hundreds of thousands of sources, collating it, analyzing it, understanding it is difficult. Of course it is difficult. That is why we have a professional intelligence community. Maybe analyzing it and coming to the right conclusion was difficult. Maybe it was impossible. I do not know. Nobody knows. That is why we need a commission. It may be that to fight the war on terrorism and also undertake this review is difficult. It will involve some of the same people and some of the same resources. I suspect that is exactly the situation Franklin Delano Roosevelt had after Pearl Harbor. And I suspect the admirals of the Pacific raised the same objections. He ignored them and rightfully so. How could America's mothers and fathers be asked to entrust the lives of their sons and daughters to fight a war if they did not have confidence in the military hierarchy. How could Americans be asked to sacrifice and trust the future of their country's security in a military establishment reeling from Pearl Harbor if we did not believe in their competence or their structure or their command? And so we fought the war and undertook the review at the same time. No doubt the same arguments about the need for classified information were heard after Pearl Harbor and after the Kennedy assassination and after the Challenger accident, during the war that was being fought in Central America. But in each of those instances, each president from Reagan to Roosevelt reached a different judgment. We can analyze the problem and protect information because we needed to reach a national judgment. It may be, as was testified, that all these commissions did not succeed. Some did. NASA was saved, the American space program redesigned, because a commission did an extraordinary job in a difficult moment in history of admitting where we were wrong, why lives were lost, because of failures of the government. It worked. The Pearl Harbor Commission did restore confidence. People believed in the military establishment again. And I believe, for all the divisiveness of Central America, questions of strategic weapons, those commissions also succeeded in answering questions of highly classified materials, at a point where the Nation was very divided. This commission not only makes sense, it makes overwhelming sense. It will be painful because it will involve truth that we do not want to face, failures of institutions we believe in, and of people and friends that we like. In the final analysis, there is no choice. We owe this to the country. We owe it to the victims. And it is impossible to design a national security system to ensure that this never happens again without this review. We could not begin to appoint officials, redesign our security apparatus, and commit billions of dollars of new resources for the future unless we understand this failure of the past. I am committed to making this happen. It is regrettable, for reasons I do not understand, that Senator Grassley and I have undertaken different legislation than Senator McCain and Senator Lieberman. I hope that is reconciled. The differences are narrow but they are real. As was testified here today, in our legislation we specifically give appointment authority to the majority and minority leaders and the President of the United States to assure that those six individuals, balancing their interests, can ensure that the commission accurately reflects the different parts of the intelligence, military and civilian authorities. But we also specifically mandate the commission to look at the intelligence and law enforcement authorities involved, because while this should be a broad look at the failures, obviously the responsibility most directly lies there and should be addressed. I hope by the time this process has run its course that we have one bipartisan piece of legislation, but what is most important is that this gets done, and done quickly. In a democratic government, to have the people of our country doubt the ability of those that they have chosen to lead to protect them is very troubling. Even to have our adversaries believe, when they have exhibited our vulnerability, and inflicted us with enormous pain, that we have not undertaken a review to fix the problems, continues to signal vulnerability. For all these reasons I am very grateful that my colleague, Senator Lieberman, has called this hearing today. I think he has done a great service to the Senate and the country by beginning this process. And I am grateful to each of you and your participation today. After the Chairman has begun his own inquiries, I look forward to a discussion with you. Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Torricelli, for an excellent statement. I, too, share your hope that we can combine both bills. I think there were two major points of difference. One is in the form of the selection of the members, as you indicated, of the commission. The other is in the statement of jurisdiction because the bill that Senator McCain and I have introduced does mention intelligence but goes beyond that to other functions of government. I hope we can do that. I want to pick up and hope we can get together on a broad bipartisan, single approach to this. I want to pick up in my first question on something my colleague said and begin it this way. Some of those, including the White House, who have opposed the creation of such a commission, to try to do it justice, have said that their main concern is that it would distract those who have responsibilities now, both military as Senator Torricelli indicated, also I presume in the intelligence community and other aspects of our government, from their daily responsibilities. I must say that I am not convinced by that, both because of the historic precedents that my colleague states, the Roberts Commission after Pearl Harbor, the Warren Commission after the Kennedy assassination, the commission after the Challenger, etc. And even more to the point of the experience of the witnesses, Mr. Augustine, if there had been a major problem of Lockheed Martin of some sort where things had not been going as you had wanted, and I am sure this never happens, or at one of the new economy industries that is part of your association, Mr. McCurdy, I am sure that though those people would continue to be working on the line, you would jump right in and find out what the heck went wrong here so you could stop it from happening. Anyway, I wanted to ask your reaction to the notion that to create a commission of this kind might, in some sense, be negative because it would be a distraction for those who are at work now in these areas. Mr. Sonnenberg. Mr. Sonnenberg. I understand the feeling of the White House on this, however a commission of this sort will impinge upon some of the time of some of the people who are called up. But then, if we look at the role of Congress here, I think it was Jim Woolsey who once told me, you know Maurice, I had to go up there 104 times. Now that is not going to happen with this commission. We have 6 months. There is no way in the world we are going to fit someone in those days. So my feeling is that, as Senator Torricelli rightfully points out, it is absolutely imperative in my mind to have this commission, but I do not think there will be an impingement of the type that I am hearing about now. Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Augustine. Mr. Augustine. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I have served on both sides of commissions and I think it gets to be a question of degree. I think there is no reason that it has to be disruptive. But I think it could be disruptive. And it is going to depend on the responsibility of the people who are involved. I think without question that if properly managed people can still do their jobs and respond to a commission of this type. In our own company the way we solve these things in a case of a major crisis, is we let one group of people worry about the ongoing activities and another worry about the crisis issues. That is not an ideal solution, but I think it is an approach that we have to consider. I don't think any of this is what, in the vernacular, you would call a show stopper. Chairman Lieberman. Either of the other two witnesses want to comment? Mr. McCurdy. Mr. Chairman, I concur with my colleagues' statements. First of all, I want to commend Senator Torricelli for his comments. I think they were superb. You can always make an argument to defer an investigation but quite frankly I concur with both of your sentiments that now is the time to at least initiate the study. As I said in my written statement, there is an incredible amount of forensic evidence that has already been accumulated, much of that in the public eye and through the media. So there's a lot to build on. As far as distraction, I think Mr. Sonnenberg said it well. There are such a large number of committees in both the House and Senate that have jurisdiction they could be truly distracted if they were called before all of those. If there is a deferral, I think the Congress should be focused on the actions of protecting from here forward, as they have been focusing, and allow a commission to take the time to reflect and look more holistically at a broader cross-section of jurisdiction. Part of the challenges, and I do not think any of us are prepared to make judgments, but from our experience the issue is there is a lot of questions. Was it seamless? Everyone talks about creation of fusion centers and this new cooperative effort. It is easier in a wartime environment to do that. It is in the non-wartime situation that you ask those questions whether jurisdictions did cooperate properly. And you want to know that there is not a gap in those seams. There are always going to be seams, but you try to reduce those as much as possible. So for those points, I think the commission is timely and appropriate. One other point is about the political credibility, and I think my friend, Mr. Augustine, raised that. I think there is a great deal to be gained by that credibility. We cannot, as a Nation, afford to have this degenerate into partisan finger pointing on one side or the other. And also, for those who argue that the internal reviews in the organizations themselves have taken place and therefore it is corrected, I would just point out there are a lot of accounting firms and other groups out there trying to do that to restore some credibility. But until it is raised to a higher level that has those kind of independent view, I am not sure the credibility is there. Chairman Lieberman. Yes, sir. Mr. Betts. The simple point is that the purpose of this commission is to learn something important about what went wrong. Presumably, that will help these busy people to do the jobs better that we do not want to distract them from unduly. Chairman Lieberman. Agreed. Congressman McCurdy, let me ask you this, as a former chair of the House Intelligence Committee, I am sure you can understand why the Intelligence Committees in both chambers are interested in investigating the role played by intelligence agencies leading up to September 11. Nevertheless, you have supported an independent commission as a way to complement rather than compete with Congressional efforts. I wonder if you would expand a bit on that, about the different roles that might be played by both here. Mr. McCurdy. Clearly, the Intelligence Committees, who are chaired by very capable and experienced individuals, have an important role to play. I think you saw the commencement of that yesterday on the Senate side. Again, these can be complimentary efforts. If you look at the intelligence definition of the community, that in itself implies jurisdictional boundaries. I believe that any commission of this nature needs to look beyond those, much broader than that. Plus, my experience on commissions, and I have been on some actually for the CIA looking at issues of weapons of mass destruction prior to the presidential commission I was appointed to, there we had complete access to highly classified data. And the individuals on those commissions not only respected that, were experienced hands in dealing with classified information. And in the long term made recommendations that I think were helpful to the community as a whole. So again, they can be supportive, complimentary, but also with the experience can stand back and make an objective judgment at the end with regard to causality and concerns about both organization and efforts to prevent it in the future. Chairman Lieberman. Let me ask a final question in the time I have left. Mr. Augustine, your written testimony and what you delivered orally today urges us to make clear in the law the extent to which the work of the commission must be conducted in public view and can be conducted privately. My understanding is that existing law would allow a commission of this kind to hold closed hearings whenever it is dealing with classified information or information from law enforcement groups. And I gather that law governed Hart-Rudman and the Bremer Commission. I wonder if you, and then others if you wish, could reflect a bit on that or whether you think that we need to do something additional and specific in this proposed legislation, to protect the confidentiality of classified information? Mr. Augustine. It is an important and broad topic. My belief is that there is a shortfall in the current system in this regard. In the case at hand, I can well imagine a commission like this would like to hypothesize future threats and discuss them, to discuss vulnerabilities that we have. Some of these are truly hypothetical. It is quite different from having information on a specific threat of designing a specific weapon. I am talking about purely conjectural discussions that generally would not be covered by our laws. I would cite another example from recent experience. I served on the commission that reviewed the V-22 program in which, you will recall, 22 Marines died the year before last. One of the questions was how much of the problem was due to pilot error? So you are talking about fragmentary evidence, incomplete evidence, but it is very important. You need to be able to discuss something that can be very damaging to an individual or to a group or an organization. You need to be able to talk about it, but there is not enough factual evidence that you can really have a public discussion. We found it very inhibiting to be able to talk about issues like that in public, just because of the consequences on people--it had nothing to do with national security. It was human decency and the like. Chairman Lieberman. How about the experience that you had on the Bremer Commission, with regard to the authority that current law gives commissions to hold closed sessions when they are classified or law enforcement topics? Mr. Sonnenberg. To be frank, in terms of the Bremer Commission, we never had a public hearing. Chairman Lieberman. That eliminated the problem. Mr. Sonnenberg. That is not to say I understand the conflict between the openness of government and the necessity for secret, as Mr. Augustine has pointed out. We did it, for example, on the Secrecy Commission, which was Senator Moynihan and Senator Helms. That commission, we had one public hearing and that involved the subject of FOIA, which you would expect to have an opening hearing on. Now you might look at this in a different way. I understand the legislation is talking about a preliminary report in 6 months and then another one to follow. You might think about having some public hearings at that other end, thereby eliminating the problem of free discussion, over and above classified---- Chairman Lieberman. You mean after the preliminary report? Mr. Sonnenberg. I would think you might be able to do that. But remember what I said before, I am a little bit concerned, and that is why I want you to go to law enforcement and the intelligence community about the protection, and I am not being wild about this, about the protection of commissions. We are in a totally different era now and you will have to balance that. Now the second half might be the area where you might want to think about public hearings on specific subjects. You have them laid out and say all right, we are going to hold a public hearing. Because by then, after the preliminary report, it is pretty well known what the commission is doing, who they are. So I think you have to work on it a little bit. Chairman Lieberman. Professor Betts. Mr. Betts. I do not think the issue is the authority to hold closed hearings or to keep information secret. The issue is the general impression that is conveyed or the expectations about how much this is expected to be an exercise in opening up to the public. If the latter dominates the expectations, I think that would seriously compromise the work of the commission. Chairman Lieberman. You would say that would be a mistake? Mr. Betts. Yes, I think perhaps, as Maurice has suggested, emphasizing the public aspects of the enterprise in the later phase would make more sense. You would avoid a chilling effect on the sharing of information with the commission. You would avoid any conceivable problems, as unfortunately has happened in some cases. I remember many years ago, when Richard Helms was testifying at open hearings about ITT and Chile, and was asked whether the CIA had any covert operations. On the spur of the moment he decided to lie in order to protect secrecy and wound up having to go to trial over it. For all those reasons, I think it would be good to establish the presumption that for the most sensitive and most important aspects of this investigation, many of which will involve very sensitive classified information, that it is all going to be very closely held until whatever time the resolution is reached and the public phase can be emphasized. Chairman Lieberman. David, and then we will finish up with Norm Augustine. Mr. McCurdy. Mr. Chairman and Senators, I concur. And I know, to many colleagues, this is somewhat of a surprise. But on the commissions that I have dealt with, we never had public hearings. Of course, in the Intelligence Committee we only had one public hearing in all the time I was involved there over 9 years. So I think it would be very helpful for a commission of this nature that would be enduring a lot of scrutiny to be able to work together in not only a secure environment, but also a less public environment. Because there is going to be a lot of information that needs to be shared among commissioners and the staff. And I think the presumption should be that it would not be held in the open. Chairman Lieberman. Interesting. Mr. Augustine. Mr. Augustine. I was just going to add that I think how you handle this depends very much on the specific circumstances. Years ago I chaired a commission that reviewed NASA as a whole during the period after the Challenger accident. We held all our meetings on television and it worked fine. I think one has to view three categories of information. One, that is clearly covered by national security legislation, and you can discuss in private with no problem. Everything else that you possibly can should be discussed in public. But I say there is one exception, a third group that is not sensitive by the definition of today's law but is certainly sensitive by the definition of today's world. Perhaps there should be a provision given to the members of the commission, which hopefully they will use only very selectively, by majority vote or by the chairman's decision, to deal with certain topics in private. Chairman Lieberman. That is very helpful. I appreciate, as I listen to the four of you, from your experience, that to get at the truth, which is what this is all about, of what might have been done to prevent the attacks of September 11, a lot of this is going to have to be in private. There are categories where you may want to do some things in public, as you just said. But the report will then stand on its merits. I thank you. Senator Torricelli. Senator Torricelli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I tell you, myself, while I think it is probably helpful to have one or two public sessions to give the country a view of what is expected and some insight into the discussions, because this is obviously a source of national anxiety while the report is being written and conducted. It certainly does not trouble me that most of this would be done privately. It is the final product in which we are interested in. I think we simply need to have enough of a public face to assure the public it is being done and being done properly because of the current state of unease in the Nation. I only had several questions really. First, in each of your experiences, the kind of people who should serve and where they should come from, this is obviously an enormous time commitment. It involves people who will have some expertise and background. It should also involve people who are not co-opted by their relationships with any of these institutions. But I wonder if you would talk about the mix. Specifically, some of these that involve members of Congress. It is always difficult for me to believe that a member of Congress, on something this intense, with a short time frame, has enough time do this while meeting other responsibilities. I would appreciate it if you would address that. And whether we should look for commissioners who can do this on a 6-month basis or a 1-year basis exclusively or almost exclusively. And then your experiences on the mix of personalities or experiences that these people should bring to a commission. I think that helps us answer how, indeed, we reconcile our legislation to get membership. I'll leave that to anybody. Mr. Augustine. I will be happy to start. The first suggestion is no zealots. No people who have made up their mind in advance or have taken a position---- Chairman Lieberman. That is a tough one to write in a law, but it is a good idea. Mr. Augustine. But it is important. People who are willing to take an open mind, to learn, to change their mind, that is absolutely critical. The second is people who are willing to work together as a team and try to arrive at a reasonable consensus. Avoid people who have a single issue that they are fascinated by. And finally, with regard to your question, Senator, I think that to get people of the stature this commission would deserve and would require, it will be very hard to get people who could devote full time to it. And success is dependent on putting together an extremely good full-time staff. It does not have to be large, but it has to be very good. That means it has to have a good staff leader, chief of staff if you will. I think one has to call on the commissioners on a part-time basis. It is, frankly, hopeless to get people of the kind you want who are available full time. Senator Torricelli. I agree with that. How about, as we go forward now, please also address this question about how you do the balance between having people who have experience with these institutions or issues but are not people so identified with the institutions that are being examined that the commission loses credibility. Mr. Sonnenberg. First, I would add to Mr. Augustine's comment about the type of people. If full-time/part-time is the issue of getting the quality and the type of people you need, I doubt seriously you are going to find what you want full-time. You want these people who have had a depth of experience, knowledge of this material, and you are going to find them, unfortunately, on a part-time basis. Now about the stature, I believe that someone who has what I would call a rather deep general view of the subject becomes important. That is what you have staff for. You get all those experts in house--who have the abilities to examine specific issues. Your question again, Senator was, specifically you asked something just now? Senator Torricelli. I asked a variety of them, but I tend to do that. Mr. Sonnenberg. The last one. Senator Torricelli. The last one was this issue of how you balance that you want people with expertise that know these institutions, but you do not lose credibility of them being so identified with the institutions. Whether or not you have seen that as a problem before. Then I want people to come back to this issue of members of Congress as well, whether this has worked, who may have been members in the past. Mr. Sonnenberg. With regard to that, that is a double-edged sword. Obviously, people who are identified with a community, let's say, retirees maybe or people who have been out in the business or the legal world or wherever, they have something valuable to contribute. You are going to have to do that on a very selective basis. There are people, for example, who have been former agency and FBI personnel who are going to be extremely valuable on our commission. For example, on the Terrorism Commission, we had Jim Woolsey, and frankly he was quite good. In fact, he was excellent. We also had a fellow named John Lewis who had been at one time head of counterterrorism for the FBI. Exceedingly good. Now were they experts in a specific field? One could say so. Were they attached to an agency or bureau? Sure, by history. But I do not think that precludes them. As is pointed out, what you need really is an ability for all these people to get together. Now with regard to members of Congress, I served on the Commission for the Roll and Capabilities of the Intelligence Community. We had a Senator and a Congressman. Frankly, we had a Senator who never showed up until the day the report came out. On the other hand, we had a very involved Congressman by the name of Porter Goss, who is now Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. He showed up to most meetings. But he had some expertise, in addition, to contribute to that particular committee. Now what I am saying is it all depends which member of Congress, or former member depending what they are doing, you put on. Mr. McCurdy. Mr. Chairman, I think the first criteria is that they need to be independent. They not only need to be independent thinkers, as I think Norm stated, they should also be independent of organization and somewhat--he said zealots, independent of ideology. There are some, and I think we have all had experience with this, there are some who lobby to get on commissions. And maybe one of the best criteria is someone who does not want to be on the commission. There are those who lobby to get on the commission because they have a single interest. It is their business to be involved in non-proliferation or whatever. Sometimes they are not as prone to work to develop consensus positions either. And so I think that is a judgment that has to be exercised by those making the appointments. With regard to time, it would be a very time-consuming activity. I do agree that the staff is the key there. With regard to Senators or members of the House, I also served on both types of commissions. And with all due respect to this institution, you are on a moment's notice and you have that beeper and it is a leash and it goes off constantly. There is always some interruption or someone trying to get a piece of your time. I think in some of these it is disruptive in a commission. I think it should be a private group as much as possible. And last, with regard to the issue of experience, I think you do not need--it is helpful to have the right mix. I think that one of the suggestions was maybe working with the leadership in a more consensus fashion. It is like the old baseball trading. You make sure that you have a shortstop and a third baseman, that you have someone who has experience in the intelligence community or law enforcement. Because we all spend time shaking our heads at acronyms and the language of specific areas. You do not have time for complete tutorials. So there has to be some knowledge there. And you often assign, in the commissions I have been involved in, Senator Specter and former Director Deutsch and others, they would actually assign two commissioners to go focus on specific issues. I focused on technology with regard to WMD. Someone else focused on the bioterrorism portion of it and biology. So again, it is nice to have that mix, aviation mix, and law enforcement mix. So you have to do an initial assessment of the scope of the commission and try to fill those as much as possible. And then you supplement it with the staff. You fill the holes with the staff. Having a good staff director is absolutely critical. Senator Torricelli. Given the desire of many institutions to protect themselves and their people, their reputations and their budget, it would be my belief that to do this without the ability to compel testimony and subpoena power with the force of law would be to make this a rather hollow exercise. We are not interested in simply providing cover for institutions, to provide comfort to the American people, but get genuine answers. Does anyone disagree with this notion that you have to have subpoena power put in this to make this a meaningful exercise? Mr. Betts. I think the ideal is to have the power but never have to use it, to have it in your pocket. Senator Torricelli. But nevertheless, it has to be given. Just for the historic basis of this, as we are going forward to argue with this, there are arguments about the sensitivity of sharing classified information with such a commission, given the sensitivity of the situation. I do not ever remember that being a problem when we were going through the debates about the MX missile on the commission, or the wars in Central America, or even our missile technology and the redesign of the Challenger. It is extraordinary to me that it is arising now. Do any of you remember there being problems of losses of classified information during those exercises that would give us pause now? Mr. Augustine. Mr. Augustine. No, I do not ever remember a problem of a loss of sensitive information from a commission of which I am aware. But that really was not the point that I, at least, was trying to make. I think the commission has to have full access to all information and I think they will protect it if we pick commissioners properly. Senator Torricelli. Actually, I was not responding to your point. I was responding to people down the street here. Mr. Augustine. My concern is that there is information that is not covered by existing laws that we still do not want people living in caves to hear. That is the part I am talking about. I do not worry about the commissioners. They should have access to everything that is available. Senator Torricelli. But I did not want, rhetorically, if Senator Lieberman and I take this to the Floor, people are going to rise and say well, to have this commission means sharing this classified information with commissioners and this involves certain risk. In my experience of watching this on everything from the defense of our Nation with strategic weapons to actual policy issues in combat with people on the ground, I never remember that this was ever a problem with a commission. Which raises whether that is an excuse or a reason not to have a commission. Mr. McCurdy. Again, the mix of the commissioners is vital there. My experience is, both in the Intelligence Committees in the Congress, where we dealt with highly compartmented--and there were times, quite frankly, and it may be a model even in commissions. There were times that only the chair and the ranking member were alerted to certain things with regard to source and methods. But if there is proper attention paid to the appointment of people, such as my colleagues here who I have the utmost respect for, most have held tickets before, classification and access, and probably maintained them. It would be helpful to have someone who is current in some of those, so you do not have to go through lengthy background checks. I am on the advisory board for the Department of Energy in Nuclear Matters, with regard to the former Soviet Union. Those are areas, and again, people do not go out and advertise those. But I think the commissioners and the experience again, there is a wealth of resource out there in the private sector you can draw upon, people who are willing to spend the time, sacrifice the time to do this appropriately. Mr. Sonnenberg. In all the commissions I have served on, three in the intelligence, and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board for 8 years, we never had a leak. What was interesting is once I had the National Security Advisor to the President come in and say you know, this is the only place around here where we have never had a leak. Now, having said that, I would not consider that important. However, we did do one thing which would be of interest. In the National Commission on Terrorism, we looked at findings. That was relegated, the permission to look at those findings was with the chairman and the vice chairman. So even in a situation where you have this top priority classified material, higher than top secret, you can then divide that up with the chairman, vice chairman, whoever. That is how you prevent leaks. In that case, I do not think there would have been a leak if the member had seen it because we all knew who the members were, but there is a way of handling that. Senator Torricelli. So the panel, in any case, is confident that we can argue with some certainty that the history of these commissions is that indeed classified information has been protected and it has never previously been raised as a problem in Democratic or Republican administrations regarding any of these issues. And I think that is important for us. I want to thank the panel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. This has been a very useful exercise. Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Torricelli, for your substantial contribution to the discussion. Thanks to the four witnesses for your time and for the help that you have given and some of the details of how this might work. I must say, hearing your testimony reinforces my belief that the Nation would benefit from such a commission. Certainly the Nation's future security would benefit from such a commission. This is not going to be an easy road ahead for this legislatively, both because though we talk about complementing some of the committees of Congress, there is a natural sensitivity about turf here. And because, at least for now, the administration appears to be opposed to this. But I do think there is no substitute for the most aggressive pursuit of the truth here. And I know that Senator McCain feels this way. I look forward to working with Senator Torricelli, Senator Grassley and others to advance this idea and, in the first instance, to move as quickly as seems appropriate when we are ready to mark this bill up before our Governmental Affairs Committee. Mr. Sonnenberg. May I make one last comment? The irony of this is the administration, if they participate in this commission, might find out that it is more helpful than not. Chairman Lieberman. Exactly my feeling, that this is a commission, as others, that I see working quite closely with the administration, not in an adversarial or confrontational relationship. And of course, going to the members, that is exactly the tone that you would hope, or I would hope, that the chair or the members of the commission would create right at the outset in their relations with the administration, even while they are involved in a very aggressive pursuit of the truth. I thank all of you for your continuing public service, whether in or outside of the public service directly. I am going to leave the record of the hearing open for 2 weeks, in case my colleagues want to either submit statements or perhaps even submit questions to all of you. But for now, thank you. The hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, subject to the call of the chair.] A P P E N D I X ---------- PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BUNNING Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The attacks on September 11 painfully illustrated weaknesses in American national security. The fact that terrorists were able to hijack four American planes with box cutters, and then turn those planes into weapons is almost incomprehensible. I am confident that America will recover from these cowardly acts. However, never again should we be caught off guard. Major changes need to be made, including tightening security at our borders and ports, improving our intelligence gathering operations and strengthening our military. We are moving in the right direction. The President has established the Office of Homeland Security, which is responsible for coordinating domestic security among the Federal agencies. The administration has also requested additional money for our military in 2003, and Congress has held numerous hearings concerning the September attacks. While we will never be able to completely insulate ourselves from another terrorist attack, we can and will take the necessary steps to increase our readiness, fortify our military and protect our citizens. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about their experiences on past commissions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 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