[Senate Hearing 107-388] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 107-388 UNITED STATES POLICY IN IRAQ: NEXT STEPS ======================================================================= HEARING before the INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION AND FEDERAL SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE of the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ MARCH 1, 2002 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs 78-624 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2002 ____________________________________________________________________________ For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpr.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800 Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman CARL LEVIN, Michigan FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio MAX CLELAND, Georgia PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah MARK DAYTON, Minnesota JIM BUNNING, Kentucky Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Staff Director and Counsel Richard A. Hertling, Minority Staff Director Darla D. Cassell, Chief Clerk ------ INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION AND FEDERAL SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman CARL LEVIN, Michigan THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey TED STEVENS, Alaska MAX CLELAND, Georgia SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico MARK DAYTON, Minnesota ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director Mitchel B. Kugler, Minority Staff Director Brian D. Rubens, Chief Clerk C O N T E N T S ------ Opening statements: Page Senator Akaka................................................ 1 Senator Thompson............................................. 3 Senator Domenici............................................. 10 Senator Cochran.............................................. 21 Prepared statement: Senator Carnahan............................................. 31 WITNESSES Friday, March 1, 2002 Robert J. Einhorn, Senior Adviser, International Studies Program, Center for Argument and International Studies.................. 4 David A. Kay, Vice President, Science Applications International Corporation.................................................... 7 Richard O. Spertzel, former head of UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) Biological Weapons Inspection, and former Deputy Commander, USAMRIID............................................ 12 Alphabetical List of Witnesses Einhorn, Robert J.: Testimony.................................................... 4 Prepared statement........................................... 33 Kay, David A.: Testimony.................................................... 7 Prepared statement........................................... 43 Spertzel, Richard O.: Testimony.................................................... 12 Prepared statement........................................... 48 Additional copy submitted for the Record Questions and answers submitted for the record for Mr. Kay from: Senator Domenici............................................. 57 Senator Carnahan............................................. 58 Questions and answers submitted for the record for Mr. Spertzel from: Senator Akaka................................................ 60 Senator Domenici............................................. 62 Senator Carnahan............................................. 63 Appendix: Background............................................. 65 UNITED STATES POLICY IN IRAQ: NEXT STEPS ---------- FRIDAY, MARCH 1, 2002 U.S. Senate, International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services Subcommittee, of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, Washington, DC. The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:29 a.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. Present: Senators Akaka, Carper, Thompson, Domenici, and Cochran. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA Senator Akaka. The Subcommittee will please come to order. This Subcommittee has held hearings over the past 5 months on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction around the globe and the threat they pose to the United States and our allies. We have discussed how non-proliferation programs, multilateral regimes, and export controls can prevent the spread of WMD to other countries and terrorist organizations. Today, we face the question of what to do once a nation--in this case, Iraq--has such weapons. The United Nations inspections between 1991 and 1998 were successful in uncovering and reducing much of Iraq's WMD capabilities. Economic sanctions have prevented Iraq from acquiring materials to restore its military-industrial base and have severely limited clandestine arms acquisition. However, Iraq continues to pose a significant national security threat to the United States. It continues to rebuild its weapons of mass destruction capabilities. If UN sanctions were completely lifted, its weapons program would accelerate. We may have hindered or prevented upgrades to Iraq's WMD capabilities, but what should we do about the capabilities they already possess? Even this may not be the case, as one of our witnesses today will state his assessment that Iraq's biological weapons program is stronger today than it was in 1990. These are the facts. Iraq had a sophisticated WMD program, including a nuclear weapons program. Iraq used chemical weapons against its own people and its neighbor Iran. Iraq had and has a missile program which can deliver WMD. We believe that Iraq continues to have and develop WMD warheads. Now, the questions are: How worried do we need to be? And what should we do about it? Should we become more aggressive militarily and more active in our support of Iraqi opposition groups? There has been considerable discussion about whether or not the United States should invade Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein. There has been less talk about invading Iran, although Iraq, Iran, and North Korea are described by President Bush as the ``axis of evil.'' Yet the WMD programs in Iran may be more advanced because they have been able to proceed without the restraint of UN sanctions. Iran is believed to be developing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles. We also know that our own Department of State lists Iran as an active state sponsor of terrorism and is systematically abusing its own people. We hope Iran can change from within, but there are no guarantees, and anti-American hard-liners appear to be still in charge. Can we attack one country and not the other? That question is among the many I hope we will address today. For example, another Gulf War will likely require many more troops than are now deployed in Afghanistan and may result in chemical and biological attacks against our forces. My view at this time is that we should continue to push to get UN inspectors back on the ground, both to constrain the Iraqi WMD program and to gain a better understanding of the scope of current Iraqi efforts. Keeping Saddam Hussein bottled up and forcing him to confront obstacles in every direction is not a bad outcome as we consider our long-term strategy while rebuilding our military arsenal. I have asked our witnesses to describe the current Iraqi WMD threat. They will also discuss the impact sanctions have had on the weapons programs and how international opinion of the Iraqi WMD threat has changed. I have also asked them to discuss policy options and their consequences. Our witnesses are the Hon. Robert Einhorn, Dr. David Kay, and Dr. Richard Spertzel. Robert Einhorn, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, was Assistant Secretary for Non- Proliferation in the State Department from November 1999 to August 2001. He was responsible for non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, missile delivery systems, and advanced conventional arms. His experience will serve us well in our discussion today. Our second witness, Dr. David Kay, of the Science Applications International Corporation, was the United Nations chief nuclear weapons inspector from 1991 to 1992 and led many inspections into Iraq to determine their nuclear weapons production capability. He will share with us his insight and expertise on the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. Our final witness, Dr. Richard Spertzel, is a retired Army colonel and former Deputy Commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease at Fort Detrick, and is an expert on biological weapons. He has served as the head of the United Nations Special Commission Biological Weapon Inspections Team in Iraq from 1994 to 1998. I look forward to hearing his views on Iraq's biological weapon prospects. I want to thank all of our witnesses for being with us today and helping us to make sense of the numerous reports and speculations about Iraq's WMD capabilities. I would like to yield to my colleague, Senator Thompson, for his statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THOMPSON Senator Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and while we often thank our Chairman for holding hearings as a matter of course, I really do thank you for having these hearings today. I can't think of anything more timely and more important. Although it is a Friday and some of our colleagues are beginning to think about greener pastures, I am glad we have this opportunity with such distinguished gentlemen here to help enlighten us. This is clearly a situation where the status quo is not satisfactory because while our policy might be status quo, what is happening in Iraq clearly is not. Iraq has used weapons of mass destruction. It has invaded its neighbors. It has violated international arms control obligations. It has lied and concealed at every step of the inspection process. It has defied the United Nations. It has continued to build up its weapons of mass destruction. It is headed by a person who is unpredictable and will not necessarily follow our notions of logic. Clearly, it all makes for an extremely dangerous situation. If Saddam obtains the weapons of mass destruction that he apparently is working on, it is not only a threat to Israel, it is not only a threat to oil supplies in the region, it is not only a cause for countries like Iran to build up their capabilities, but apparently all he lacks is sufficient fissile material and a little more delivery capability, and he will be able to hit the United States one of these days with nuclear weapons. So the threat is growing. The sanctions are a sham. We have lost our allies in the process with regard to this matter, and we are losing the PR battle. So, clearly, something has to be done. We have got a situation where Russia and France and other countries are vetoing any efforts to get any positive results out of what the United Nations has been trying to do. Dozens of countries fly in and out of there, violating the air ban. It is not only bad policy, it is disrespectful. And to me, I think the worst thing in the world that could happen is for Saddam to let inspectors back in. I know that is what the administration is calling for. I don't know whether they really want it or not, but I hope not, because if, in fact, we got back in there, it would be the same old song and dance. It would take months and months to gear up to get people back in there. Inspections are based on the notion that someone is not doing something and wants to be able to prove it. We clearly know that is not the case; therefore, it just means another cat-and-mouse game, at which point he would run to the United Nations and get his friends there to protect him with regard to whatever he is doing. And by that time, months, if not years, have passed and actually it puts off any chance for a regime change, which is the ultimate resolution, it seems to me. But, anyway, it is important that we understand, the American people understand the seriousness of the issue, and we need all of the help and wisdom we can get, and I am sure we are going to get some today. So thank you again for holding these hearings today. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Thompson, for your statement. We would like to proceed now with the testimony. I just want to apologize for the lateness. I think you know we had a vote call at 10 a.m., and for that reason we are slightly delayed. But we certainly welcome you and look forward to your statements. Mr. Einhorn, we would welcome any opening statement or comments you may have. We will include your full statement in our record of the hearing, and also ask you to try to summarize your statement for us. Thank you very much, Mr. Einhorn. TESTIMONY OF ROBERT J. EINHORN,\1\ SENIOR ADVISER, INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PROGRAM, CENTER FOR ARGUMENT AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Mr. Einhorn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Senators Thompson and Domenici, for this opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Einhorn appears in the Appendix on page 33. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In his State of the Union speech, President Bush vowed to prevent regimes that seek chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world. He said that he would not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. Most experts believe that the peril of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction is very close, and, indeed, in some respects it already exists. Today, or, at most, within a few months, Iraq could launch missile attacks with chemical or biological weapons at its neighbors. Within 4 or 5 years, it could have the capability to threaten most of the Middle East and parts of Europe with missiles armed with nuclear weapons containing highly-enriched uranium produced indigenously. Within that same period, it could threaten U.S. territory with nuclear weapons delivered by non-conventional means. If Iraq managed to get its hands on sufficient quantities of already produced fissile material, these threats could arrive much earlier. We have an enormous stake in stopping Iraq's WMD programs. If we fail to stop them, we will have a much more difficult time heading off Iran's efforts to acquire comparable capabilities. And a nuclear arms competition north of the Gulf will certainly stimulate interests in such capabilities elsewhere. We must also be concerned about Iraq's links to terrorists and about the possibility that Iraq might share WMD-related materials and expertise with terrorist groups. But Iraq's illegal pursuit of weapons of mass destruction capabilities is a sufficient basis, independent of whatever role it may be playing in global terrorism, to treat it as a dangerous threat that must be neutralized. But one thing should be clear. After over a decade of effort trying to disarm Iraq, the current regime in Baghdad will not voluntarily come clean about its current programs or give up WMD and missile delivery capabilities for the future. The importance it attaches to those capabilities can be measured by the well-over $100 billion in national income that the leadership has chosen to forego rather than to meet its disarmament obligations and have the sanctions removed. No inducements or blandishments, not even the growing prospect of military action by the Bush Administration, are likely to produce a genuine change of heart and a decisive and credible change of behavior as far as weapons of mass destruction are concerned. Given these considerations, one must conclude that the only reliable and durable way of preventing Iraq from regenerating and enhancing its weapons of mass destruction and proscribed missile capabilities is to replace the current regime with one that is prepared to abide by its international obligations. A consensus seems to be developing in Washington in favor of regime change in Iraq. The debate is no longer over whether but over when and how. This hearing has not been convened to discuss the questions of when and how, but because a strategy for regime change is likely to take additional time to develop, to prepare for, and to execute, anywhere from several months to perhaps a year or even more, we should give consideration to the interim steps we should be taking now to address the Iraqi WMD threat. An important interim step is scheduled to be taken May 30. It is to revise the current UN sanctions regime so as to expedite the delivery of a wider range of civilian goods to the Iraqi population while focusing the trade restrictions more narrowly on dual-use items that could contribute significantly to proscribed weapons programs. By reducing the workload for U.S. reviewers, these smarter sanctions could enable them to give closer scrutiny to the most sensitive cases. And by reducing delays in the approval of goods for the Iraqi people, they could help shore up international support for the remaining more tightly focused restrictions on Iraqi imports. Another interim step would be to minimize Iraq's illegal oil sales. The proceeds from these sales go directly to Baghdad rather than to the UN escrow account. They give Iraq the income to purchase clandestine imports for its military programs. Because Iraq makes these illegal sales at heavily discounted prices, it will be hard to get the purchasers, including Syria and U.S. friends, Jordan and Turkey, to limit them or to put them under the Oil-for-Food Program. But it is important that we press them to do so. The United States should also seek to reduce Iraq's illicit imports. It should urge Iraq's neighbors to adopt a much more serious approach to monitoring border trade and should offer them technical and material assistance to help them screen cargos more effectively. The administration should also press key states that trade with Iraq, including Russia and China, to exercise much more rigorous scrutiny and control over exports to Iraq. And we should be working aggressively with other governments to interdict sensitive cargos headed to Iraq when we receive information about such shipments. Another possible interim step would be the return of UN inspectors to Iraq. In recent weeks, President Bush and his advisers have repeatedly called on Iraq to readmit the inspectors. But at times, including in Secretary Rumsfeld's recent appearance on ``Face the Nation,'' administration officials have expressed skepticism about the value of resuming UN-mandated verification in Iraq. Among the concerns expressed about UN inspections is that the inspectors wouldn't have the same intrusive inspection rights as the UN teams that operated before December 1998. Another concern is that they wouldn't find or learn much of value and that they would end up giving Iraq an unwarranted clean bill of health and actually facilitating the removal of sanctions. Much of this concern is exaggerated. The new UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission, or UNMOVIC, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, or the IAEA, would have the same inspection rights, at least on paper, as their predecessors. UN resolutions make clear that Iraq must cooperate in all respects and make progress in resolving key remaining disarmament tasks before the Security Council can even give consideration to suspending sanctions, and sanctions cannot be lifted altogether until all outstanding disarmament issues are resolved. Moreover, suspending or lifting sanctions would require an affirmative decision by the UN Security Council, and, of course, the United States will have a veto in any such decision. Now, it is true that inspectors would rarely, if ever, be able to find anything that Iraqis have taken pains to conceal. If they approach anything incriminating, we would expect the Iraqis to deny them access. But even if the inspection teams are unable to ferret out and expose hidden capabilities, they may nonetheless be of value in terms of understanding and constraining the Iraqi WMD threat. In particular, the installation of sophisticated monitoring equipment at hundreds of locations and the constant movement of inspection teams around the country would complicate Iraq's covert programs, making it somewhat harder and more expensive to keep those efforts hidden and probably slowing the pace and decreasing the scale of those programs. Monitors would give us a better appreciation of Iraq's missile programs and their breakout potential. They would also provide assurance, as long as they had access and their equipment was operating, that illicit production was not taking place at known dual-use and other suspect facilities. But this brings me to the most serious shortcoming of renewed UN verification. At their very best, the inspectors can complicate, constrain, and slow down Iraq's clandestine efforts and give us a better picture of what is going on in Iraq than we have today. But they cannot compel Iraqi compliance and, therefore, cannot put an end to the WMD threat posed by Iraq. In other words, they can contain the problem, but they cannot solve it. Moreover, having the inspectors in Iraq could complicate a strategy of regime change. It would give other countries, including the Europeans and states of the Middle East, an excuse for arguing that military action should be deferred while inspections are given a chance to resolve the WMD problem. All this said, the debate about whether the inspectors should return is probably moot. So far, Iraq has given no indication that it is willing to allow the inspectors to go back on terms that the United States could conceivably support. However, we can't rule out the possibility of a reversal by Iraq, especially if the Bush Administration's tough posture has made the Iraqis nervous. But we will see when the Iraqi Foreign Minister comes to New York and speaks to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan next week. If Iraq says the inspectors can return, the administration would be hard pressed to say they shouldn't, especially in light of the position it has been taking recently. But it would have to insist on a clear understanding on the part of the P-5 members that UN verification activities must be carried out in strict accordance with existing UN Security Council resolutions rather than on the basis of any new ground rules that Iraq could try to establish. And the P-5 should agree that there would be a firm unified response in the face of any Iraqi failure to give its full cooperation to the inspectors. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, as President Bush warned in discussing the growing WMD threat, time is not on our side. This is especially true in the case of Iraq. We should, therefore, take interim steps to contain the threat, but such steps, even if successful, would only buy us some additional time. We need to use that time to prepare an effective strategy for the only approach that can be expected to stop WMD programs and prevent them from regenerating, and that is to change the current regime in Baghdad. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Einhorn, for your insights. Dr. Kay, we invite you to give your statement. TESTIMONY OF DAVID A. KAY,\1\ VICE PRESIDENT, SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION Mr. Kay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will quickly summarize my statement and, with your permission, enter the full statement into the record. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Kay appears in the Appendix on page 43. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It has been more than a decade that the international community has confronted, and unsuccessfully, a long-term solution to an Iraq led by Saddam Hussein and armed with WMD. In fact, as I say that statement, I realize that it has been almost 11 years to the day since I first led an inspection team into Iraq and spent 2 weeks running through the country to finally identify a part of their nuclear weapons program. My appreciation for the movie ``Groundhog Day'' is much less, although my understanding of it is much greater as a result of those 11 years that I did not expect this problem to be around. I think in trying to understand where we are today with regard to Saddam's nuclear program, it is important to understand the assumptions that proved to be false that we based UNSCOM's inspections on and, indeed, I would say U.S. policy at the beginning. The first assumption was that Saddam's rule would not survive the disasters suffered by Iraq as a result of its invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War. It was hard to imagine, certainly for those of us coming from democratically ruled countries, that any regime could survive such a disastrous policy. Second was that Iraq's WMD capacities were not extensive nor really significantly indigenous. I still remember the intelligence briefs I received as we were ending up the nuclear side of the inspection about what Iraq had. It was a program that had spent a lot of money, had accomplished very little, and most of which had been taken care of anyway by the air campaign. Third, it was a post-Saddam Iraq--and that was the assumption of most people as we entered the inspection--that a post-Saddam Iraq would declare to UNSCOM all of its WMD capacities. And, fourth, that UNSCOM would be able to ``destroy, remove, or render harmless'' in terms of the UN resolution Iraq's WMD capacity, leaving an Iraq that did not have such a capacity. And the assumption going in was this was probably a 90-day effort or, at most, 6 to 9 months. How wrong assumptions can be. Let me just dwell on one of those assumptions that is still bedeviling us today. We did not understand the impact that the discovery of such a gigantic spread and indigenous WMD program would have on our future efforts to, in fact, contain that program. Iraq's nuclear program--and it is true of the BW, chemical, and missile program as well--spanned over a decade, spent over $20 billion, employed 40,000 Iraqis, and accomplished much--all of the technical steps on these programs are well understood, and most of the production steps where the real problems arose, in fact, had been overcome. Iraq is not like a Libya. Iraq that we face today is much more like Germany at the end of the First World War under a Versailles regime and inspectors. It is an indigenous capability. The capability to produce weapons of mass destruction that arises from a national program on this scale is one that to eliminate by inspection is, quite frankly, a fool's errand. We have underestimated entirely what inspections--we have overestimated at the beginning what inspections could accomplish. And let me hesitate--stop here to say inspectors accomplished a great deal. In the nuclear area, for example, UN inspections destroyed more nuclear facilities than were destroyed by the coalition air force during the Gulf War, simply because we were able to find facilities that were not known before. But to compress a lot of history, in December 1998, when the United States conducted military actions against Iraq, all inspections ended. It took a year later to bury UNSCOM, but, quite frankly, inspections had been net down to an almost insignificant point by 1996 and 1997. The ending of UNSCOM was almost a humanitarian effort. The regime that replaced UNSCOM, UNMOVIC, which it took a year to negotiate, was to be more acceptable to Iraq, led by a commissioner that Iraq and Iraq sympathizers on the Security Council would find acceptable. Indeed, the Secretary-General's first choice for that job was rejected by the Russians and the French. Even under these more favorable inspection regimes, Iraq has still refused to this day to allow inspections into Iraq. Mr. Chairman, you posed a series of what I think are critical questions about the Iraqi nuclear program, where it is today, what impact UN sanctions have had on it, and what are the options for dealing with this in the future. Let me try to just quickly give you my views on that, and I think the first and most serious point about this is to recognize that this program is an indigenous program. It is a program where the Iraqis understand the technology of producing nuclear weapons. It has engaged not only in the technical side, but Iraq really beginning in the mid-1980's engaged in a major effort of deception and denial, of hiding their facilities, of understanding them. They certainly studied our inspection techniques well enough to know how we proceed and to compensate for that. When we got close to penetrating their web of deceptions, they resorted to physical force and denial. I had the fortunate privilege, I guess one would say, of spending 4 days in an Iraqi parking lot as a guest of the state, not a hostage, because we got close to discovering and, in fact, did seize the basic documentation on the Iraqi nuclear program. It is a layered program of protection, and Iraq has learned much more about that. Let me try, based on the very sketchy insights we have in the more than 3 years since inspections ended and limited number of defectors, try to give you my view of where that program is today. Iraq's pre-Gulf War program ensured that if they had fissile material of a sufficient quantity and quality, they would today be able to fabricate a nuclear device. Certainly as Senator Domenici understands because of the state he represents, the hard nut for any nuclear wannabe to crack is the acquisition of fissile material. Once you have that, Iraq knows the rest of the fabrication steps. The German intelligence agency publicly--and it is always easier to cite a foreign intelligence service than your own, for those of us who continue to do professional work. The Germans last year cited that because of major Iraqi procurement efforts that were continuing at least through the end of last year, in the worst case, without external assistance or new fissile material, Iraq would have nuclear weapons in 3 to 6 years. Second, you can have great confidence that Iraq will, in the 3 years since inspectors were in, have carried out a major deception campaign of hiding and scattering key nuclear facilities. I am somewhat more fortunate than my colleagues. It is a little harder to shield nuclear and hide nuclear facilities, but not impossible, and we have real experience with the Iraqis on that. Third, Iraq understands the methods used by inspectors and how we operated, and they also understand the methods used by national intelligence services. These are very smart, determined adversaries. I had the great privilege, when I wasn't sleeping in the parking lot, of having a hotel room in Baghdad that had 24-hour video and audio monitoring. They looked at how we did--they use local Iraqis to penetrate it. They penetrated the inspection mechanism itself. The next is that Iraq has not abandoned its efforts to acquire WMD. Recent defectors stated that as recently as August 1998--that is while inspections were still going on--a formal order was issued to proceed with the nuclear program at full blast. Finally, economic sanctions no longer play any significant role in limiting Baghdad's nuclear ambitions. Oil prices have gone up. Smuggling methods have increased. And in any case, Saddam gives a priority to his WMD program. If the Iraqi population has to do without medicine, you can be quite sure the WMD program does not starve for material because of a lack of money. Let me turn to the attitude--and in many ways for me this is, I think, the most regrettable one because I think it shapes our possible actions and certainly shapes my negative prospects on inspection. And that is the attitude of states in the region and our European allies towards Iraq's WMD ambition. By 1996, the real aim of the inspections--that is, eliminating Iraq's WMD capacity and installing some long-term monitoring capability--had started to slide away in the face of absolute Iraqi determination but, more importantly, an attitude among regional and European allies of the United States that this was no longer as important as short-term economic and political gain. And I am particularly speaking of the attitude of the Russians and the French. We also have to credit--and it is a discredit on ourselves, I must say--a very successful Iraqi propaganda campaign which convinced most of the world's population, including many in the United States, that sanctions and UNSCOM inspections were responsible for the devastation, health- and welfare-wise, of the Iraqi population. That is simply not the case. The starving and lack of medicine of the Iraqi population was a result of Saddam's determination to use the money available for his weapons of mass destruction program. It was not the result of economic sanctions. And though, as you may tell, I believe this with vigor, I think it is largely irrelevant. They won the propaganda game, and Americans as well as Europeans and many in the Middle East believe we are responsible for that suffering. Senator Domenici. Mr. Chairman, might I ask Dr. Kay if I might have 1 minute to comment? I have to be at another meeting. Senator Akaka. Certainly. Senator Domenici. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would ask that my statement be made a part of the record as if read. Senator Akaka. Without objection, it will be included in the record. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DOMENICI Senator Domenici. I want to comment to you and Senator Thompson with reference to this hearing, I only wish that millions of Americans would get to hear the testimony we are hearing here today. There are so many that listen to our President talk about Iraq and what must happen sooner or later that have no idea what is being said here as the reality in Iraq with reference to weapons of mass destruction and what they are doing to make sure that they reach the right level to continue to be the very major nuisance that they are. I think the hearings are very worthwhile, and I thank you for them and thank the witnesses. Thank you, Dr. Kay. [The prepared statement of Senator Domenici follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR DOMENICI I would like to welcome each of the panelists and then make just a few brief remarks about today's subject matter. As we all know, we have been playing a game of cat and mouse with Iraq since the end of the Gulf War in which Saddam continually sacrifices the welfare of the Iraqi people for his own hunger to possess weapons of mass destruction. While the comprehensive containment approach we have taken with coalition partners has largely kept Saddam at bay, we remain uncertain of the state of Iraq's weapons programs as a result of his expelling UNSCOM inspectors in 1998. Since the terrorist attacks of last fall, we are more alert than ever as to the lack of any inhibitions certain factions have about using any means necessary to strike at the heart of United States security. Clearly, Iraq is such a faction. Saddam has used chemical weapons on his own people and, given the opportunity, he would use any weapon of mass destruction against us or our allies. The time has come for us to take this reality very seriously and formulate a policy that will unravel the mystery of the current status of Iraq's weapons programs. Simultaneously, we must implement concrete means for dealing with the answers we find. I look forward to hearing from each of you and I hope you can shed light on the various options we have for dealing with this real threat. Thank you. Senator Akaka. Thank you. You may proceed, Dr. Kay. Mr. Kay. We today face a situation where we are left with allies in the region that really lack sufficient military power to stand up to a rearmed Iraq and are increasingly unwilling to provide us with the political and operational support necessary to directly confront Iraq. The same splintering of the alliance has occurred among our European allies. The French are no longer willing partners. The Russians can no longer be bribed or coerced into cooperation. And, finally, it is a psychological war that we have lost. What choices do we have left? And I know that is what you, Mr. Chairman, challenged us all to think about. Let me say there are few choices. They are mostly bad. The easy solutions that we hear talked about--support the opposition, contain, as we did the Soviets, or the statement of the Secretary-General of the UN in 1998, ``I can do business with Saddam''--these are expensive, risky, and, at best, only partial answers. The reintroduction of inspectors into Iraq, now under the guise of UNMOVIC, I am afraid will result not in constraining the Iraq WMD program but, in fact, freeing them of all restraint. I think it is underestimated by people who have not served as inspectors in Iraq, the difficulty of re-baselining a program that has been free of inspection for more than 3 years. It is a significant technical challenge that can only be done if you have the unrestricted right to go anywhere, anytime, with anything, and the cooperation of the world's national intelligence establishments to help you. I do not think that is the situation that we will find if UNMOVIC inspectors were let in. I think the Iraqis have, in fact, convinced a sufficient number of the permanent members of the Security Council that the purpose of inspection is to quickly declare compliance and allow Iraq to be free of sanctions. I am absolutely convinced that if the inspectors indeed were to be given the support and were to probe Iraq, first of all, they would face this huge web of deception they would have to deal with; and if they got close to the truth, they again would meet physical restraint, just like all of their colleagues who for 10 years conducted inspections into Iraq. I am seriously worried, however, that we could be faced with a judgment: Iraq has allowed inspectors back in, let's get off their back. And that, let me remind you of the German estimate: 3 to 6 years, the worst case, Iraq rearmed with nuclear weapons. The opposition. The best hope of the opposition in Iraq was, quite frankly, in 1991 at the end of the Gulf War. We stood aside and we allowed many brave Iraqis to be slaughtered by Saddam's force. There may have been a chance in 1995, early 1996, when major coup attempts were attempted. There, again, the U.S. attitude was, at best, not supportive. Indeed, as I look at the history of U.S. support for democratic opposition around the world, I am reminded of nothing more than the dance of the black widow spider: Attractive, but ultimately fatal to the male. I don't think it is true that we are genetically incapable of helping oppositions effectively. It is just that we are so inept at it, the genetic pool of opposition is likely to be drained before we get the lesson right. I do not view the opposition as likely to play a major role in the goal of regime change. Containment I think has a nice ring. It worked in the case of the Soviet Union. It took 40 years, well over $20 billion, and reshaping European societies to do it. I don't think those conditions exist in the Middle East. I am afraid there are no alternatives but a U.S.-led--and U.S.-led means maybe the U.S. leading itself and hopefully our stalwart British allies--to use military force to end Saddam's rule in Iraq. And let me be clear: As long as Saddam is in power, the WMD aspirations and capabilities of Iraq will continue to develop. And while you referred to it, we largely have not today in our testimony referred to the issue of Iran. An Iraq that is continuing to seek WMD ensures that there will be an Iran seeking to acquire WMD. And that makes that territory the most dangerous spot in the world. Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying I think Iraq is unfortunately of that class of problems where all the easy answers seem to have been in the past and all we are left in near-term options that aren't really answers. Now, because I was there in the beginning, let me tell you, the answers that were there were not easy either, and we have forgotten how difficult they were. But there is no alternative to the replacement of Saddam and the regime if you want to deal with the WMD problem before, in fact, WMD weapons are used on the United States and our allies in the Gulf. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Senator Akaka. Thank you for your strong statement. Dr. Spertzel. TESTIMONY OF RICHARD O. SPERTZEL,\1\ FORMER HEAD OF UN SPECIAL COMMISSION (UNSCOM) BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS INSPECTION, AND FORMER DEPUTY COMMANDER, USAMRIID Mr. Spertzel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to start out by saying that I endorse 100 percent what Dr. Kay has just said. I have not addressed some of those particulars because of time constraints, but I could not have said it as well as he did. They are absolutely true when it comes to the whole issue of sanctions and inspections and dealing with Iraq. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Spertzel appears in the Appendix on page 48. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Iraq's biological weapons program was among the most secretive of the weapons of mass destruction programs. Its BW program began in the early 1970's under the auspices of Iraq's intelligence service and is probably presently under the special security organization. From its inception, Iraq's BW program included both military and terrorist application. The terrorist component of Iraq's program was not actively pursued by the Special Commission. In 1991, Iraq's BW program was in an accelerating expansion phase and was not obliterated, as has been stated, by Iraq, including a recent submission by Iraq to the UN Security Council. Its bacterial BW capabilities were well established, including its ability for production, concentration, spray drying, and delivery to produce a readily dispersable, small- particle aerosol. Iraq had demonstrated an anti-crop and a mycotoxin capability and was developing a viral capability. Iraq was developing both short-range and intermediate-range weapons delivery capability for biological agents, including, it would appear, a Supergun. Agents included lethal, incapacitating, and agricultural biological warfare agents. Iraq's interest in aflatoxin was in its long-term carcinogenic and liver toxicity effect rather than any short-term effects. One can only wonder what was the intended target population. Field tests encompassed point source releases, small-area contamination, and large-scale line source release and were evaluated both for tactical and strategic use. The weapons and range of agents considered provided Iraq with a variety of options for their use. During the inspection and monitoring regime, Iraq continued to expand its BW capabilities by acquiring supplies and equipment that would enhance its BW capability. This came about by the continued import of equipment and supplies, including a 5,000-liter fermentation plant that we have no idea where it is located in Iraq. Iraq also developed the capability to produce critical production equipment and supplies such as standardized growth media of direct importance to its BW program, as well as fermenters, spray dryers, and centrifuges. This is the indigenous capability that Dr. Kay talked about. Iraq's experienced senior BW personnel remained intact as a unit throughout the inspection period. Iraq still retains the necessary personnel, equipment, and supplies to have an expanded capability. We were only able to destroy the equipment that we could identify was definitely part of the past program. That allowed such things as a critical spray dryer and multiple large fermenters to still remain in Iraq. Iraq's program can be expected to be more advanced than in 1990, particularly its viral and genetic engineering capability, because the evidence suggests that those two efforts continued to grow in the 1990's. There is no doubt that Iraq has a much stronger BW program today than it had in 1990. And perhaps of most concern would be such agents as anthrax and tularemia bacteria and smallpox virus, as well as anti-animal and anti-crop agents. We cannot forget the economic devastation that could be wreaked upon the United States with the import of anti-crop and anti-animal agents. Iraq clearly places a very high priority on its BW program, not only the monetary cost but they considered it was vital to their national security and, perhaps more important, the security of the regime. A senior Iraqi official stated that BW was perceived as a power weapon and would influence its neighbors to see things Iraq's way. Senior Iraqi officials have repeatedly stated that BW was a vital armament step, at least until it had a fully developed nuclear capability. The continued Iraqi interest in BW terrorist research and development would undoubtedly evolve to meet changing situations and can be expected to be retained even after the development of its nuclear capability. The opinion by international experts after Iraq's program was disclosed has not significantly changed. But at the political-diplomatic level, some countries' experts' concerns were not reflected in the verbiage and actions by the respective leaders and diplomats that Dr. Kay touched upon. In spite of the lip service that is given to getting inspectors back into Iraq, there does not seem to be any material change in the disparity between the experts' concern and the diplomatic imperatives and, consequently, in the support that an inspection regime might expect from P-5 members. Most of the proposals for getting inspectors back into Iraq are based on the premise that any inspectors are better than none. To be blunt, that is pure garbage, just an illusion of inspections. Iraq's past behavior in restricting monitoring and inspectors' activities is likely to be repeated. Such limitations would make a monitoring regime a farce, which would be worse than no inspectors at all, because it would provide an inappropriate illusion of compliance to the world community. I was told by a senior diplomat in 1998 that it would not matter if a BW-laden Al Hussein warhead were placed on the Security Council table. It would not change opinions about lifting sanctions. He added further, if the CW and missile files are closed, the world will not care about biology. It appears to me that this may still be the viewpoint of several nations. This attitude does not address the terrorist threat posed by Iraq's WMD programs. One would think after September 11 a more realistic appraisal of Iraq's capability and willingness to use WMD as terrorist weapons would be forthcoming. The public rhetoric is not encouraging. Iraq's BW component from its inception, I would like to remind this panel, included a terrorist component. Sanctions had very little impact on the maintenance and expansion of Iraq's BW capability. New equipment and supplies were continuously being seen at sites under monitoring by both resident as well as non-resident BW inspection teams. Such items should have been declared to the Special Commission but were not. Items included bacterial growth medium, state-of-the-art general laboratory equipment, and genetic engineering equipment and supplies, including the appropriate restriction enzymes. Large-volume production and safety equipment were imported, but were never seen by the Special Commission. Critical BW supplies and equipment are not difficult to smuggle into a country where the country is an active participant. I would not expect sanctions, smart or otherwise, to have any significant deterrent to Iraq's continued development of its BW program. I do not expect much success from the return of inspectors to Iraq. The success or failure of inspections and monitoring depends too much on uncontrollable elements. What will be the conditions under which the inspectors return? What support will the inspection regime have given Iraq's recalcitrance and the likely lack of unanimous support in the UN Security Council? Will Iraq truly cooperate and reveal or destroy all its BW activity? Or will Iraq continue its established pattern of deception, denial, and concealment? And like Dr. Kay, I expect the latter to be the case. Implementation and monitoring was predicated on Iraq fully and willingly cooperating with UNSCOM--that did not happen; on Iraq providing full and complete disclosure of its proscribed BW program--that did not happen; and on Iraq making full and accurate disclosure of all facilities containing dual-use equipment and capability--that did not happen. It is most unlikely that Iraq will now be any more cooperative. A fundamental requirement for monitoring to be effective would be full support by the UN Security Council. Even under the best of circumstances, it would be almost impossible to detect small-scale research, development, and production of BW agents by a state determined to conduct such activities. Should Iraq use mobile production facilities, several additional magnitudes of difficulties would exist. Such laboratories were proposed by one of the senior Iraqi officials as having been considered in 1988. It has been recently reported by the German intelligence service that Iraq also possesses such mobile laboratories for their BW now. Without a sense of certainty by Iraq that there would be severe repercussions by a united Security Council, monitoring does not have a chance of true success. For any chance to succeed, there must be a harsh penalty for non-compliance that is supported in advance by all P-5 members of the Security Council. Should Iraq be allowed to retain its BW and other weapons of mass destruction programs, it will remain a menace not only to its neighbors but to the world at large because of the concomitant instability it would create in the region. The regime is unpredictable. The Gulf States would need to judge all their actions in light of the Iraqi threat. Iraq is already openly supporting the Palestinians. Would Iraq risk using WMD on Israel? If this happened, what would be the repercussions from such a foolhardy action? Iraq's bioterrorism potential poses an enormous risk to any of its perceived enemies. While much attention is focused on bioterrorism against people, the economic devastation that could be wreaked on the food animal or food crop industry may be far greater in the long-term effect. Should Iraq use its BW expertise in bioterrorist activities, it may be impossible to find a smoking gun that would implicate Iraq. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Akaka. I want to thank you for your statements and for the work you have done for our country to help stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction around the world. Thank you for that. We have some questions for you. My first question is to Dr. Einhorn. Both you and Dr. Kay state that the key obstacle to Iraq constructing a workable nuclear device is access to bomb- grade nuclear materials such as highly enriched uranium. The National Intelligence Council in its annual report to Congress gave a strong warning that, ``Weapons-grade and weapons-usable nuclear materials have been stolen from some Russian institutes.'' Is there any indication that Iraq might have been the destination for any stolen material from the former Soviet Union? Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, I think we just don't know the answer to that question. Is it possible that the Iraqis would be interested--well, it is certain that Iraqis would be interested in obtaining that material. Could they have? It is possible. I am not aware of any hard evidence that they have succeeded in obtaining fissile material. Senator Akaka. Dr. Kay, since 1997, the International Atomic Energy Agency has been reporting that Iraq no longer has a nuclear weapons program. How did the agency arrive at that assessment? And do you agree with it? Mr. Kay. Well, the reports I am familiar with are the result of routine safeguard inspections which go to known sites that were known before the war, and what they are very careful these days--they were not always before the war--to report is that, of what they observe, they do not see any signs. The IAEA, to the best of my knowledge, has made no general--has, in fact, been very careful not to make a general characterization of whether there is something there. The continuing inspections the IAEA conducts in Iraq today have nothing to do with the arms control inspections required under the ceasefire resolution that ended the Gulf War. Senator Akaka. Dr. Kay and Dr. Spertzel, Iraq and UN officials will meet next week to discuss inspections. In the past, Iraq declared certain facilities off limits to inspections. If inspections are restarted, how can we be sure that Iraq will not revert to past actions? Previously, some observers suggested the United States strike Iraqi facilities that Iraq refused to allow to be inspected. Would such a policy be effective in supplementing any new inspection policy? Mr. Kay. Let me just take a crack at the start of it. I absolutely believe if inspections were to begin, nothing is off the table--should be off the table. Am I confident that will be the ground rules? No, I am not. With regard to the use of military force as a means of striking facilities that they deny access, I confess at times in confrontations with Iraq I have raised that prospect. Do I believe that is the appropriate action now? Absolutely not. The only way to end the Iraq WMD program is to end the rule of Saddam Hussein. The appropriate application of military force is to achieve a regime change. You will never accomplish limiting a WMD program by striking facilities, deception, denial, and all. And I must say I do not think time is on our side in this regard. I am convinced that if Saddam believes we are going to end his rule, he will use WMD. I do not see any advantage to giving him additional time to prepare for that use of WMD against U.S. troops. Senator Akaka. Dr. Spertzel. Mr. Spertzel. I pretty much agree with what Dr. Kay said. I believe Iraq would actually set up a confrontation just to have the United States--if they thought the United States would do it, end up bombing a nursery school. They have been known to do that in the past. There is no reason to believe that they would do otherwise in the future. Furthermore, this requires, again, the UNMOVIC knowing that a site needs to be inspected. And I don't see that happening. Senator Akaka. Dr. Spertzel, UN Resolution 1284 states that the new UN inspection team will be staffed by mostly new and, therefore, inexperienced personnel. Under these conditions, how effective and how reliable do you think the new team's findings will be? Mr. Spertzel. The new team's--I should start out by saying that I helped to teach the first team, and it is a question mark how new that first group of trainees were, because I knew them all on a first-name basis. But having said that, they have received additional new ones, and they have gone through extensive training. The value of that training to the real situation in Iraq, I think, is pretty much of a moot point. New inspectors are going to fumble in the beginning. I think I can illustrate this best by stating what happened on one of our inspection teams, when we got out of Iraq and a new member who had been to Iraq for the first time said, ``Why were you so tough as a team on Iraq? They sounded perfectly plausible to me, the explanations they were giving.'' We had this same individual on another inspection about 2 months later, and about halfway into the second day, he turned to me and said, ``Now I know why you were so tough the first time.'' It takes that learning curve that is only gained by actually on-the-ground doing it. So the simple answer to your question is, in the beginning it is going to be a tough job for them. This comes back to a statement that Dr. Kay made about rebaselining. I don't think they can do it in 6 to 9 months' time. Senator Akaka. Mr. Einhorn, there have been reports about Iraq developing an unmanned aerial vehicle program. How concerned should we be at this time about this program, especially as it relates to biological or chemical weapon agent delivery? Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, I think we should be concerned. We are aware that the Iraqis have taken trainer aircraft and sought to adapt them for unmanned use. I believe they have had special modified spray tanks that they have tried to hook up to such a vehicle. And the assumption is that this was for delivery of chemical or biological weapons. I think we ought to be concerned about that program. Mr. Spertzel. Could I comment on that, sir? Senator Akaka. Dr. Spertzel. Mr. Spertzel. I would like to add that, of course, Iraq had such a program which they claim was for bio, but it appears it was actually for bio and chemical delivery both, and that was with converting a MiG to an unmanned vehicle. The continuation with the trainer aircraft that was mentioned just a few minutes ago involved the same Iraqi experts, engineering experts, as those involved in adapting both the drop tank as well as attempts to modify a MiG fighter to be an unmanned aircraft. So, absolutely, there are major reasons for being concerned about the development of such a weapons delivery system. Senator Akaka. At this time I would like to call on Senator Thompson for his questions. Senator Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, let me ask you to--after stating that Saddam is unpredictable and sometimes irrational, I am going to ask you to put yourself in his shoes, and even though there seems to be a rough sense of logic, Saddam logic, anyway, that pertains sometimes--and you all have watched him for a long time--and ask you what you think he is thinking about this situation right now. In light of the fact, if you agree, as I do--and I think with most all of you--that the worst thing that could happen is for us to get back in there under some idea that things are going to be different, yes, we can slow him down a little bit, but he knows us better, he is better at deception even than he was before. He has gone to school on us the first time. He knows that ultimately he can count on his friends in the UN Security Council if things get tough or when he decides to shut things down. Then the battle becomes over which building are you going to be able to go into and very narrow issues. Surely this is not worth going to war over, we will hear over and over again. I believe this is the case. If it is the case, why would not Saddam--and I hold my breath hoping he will not allow inspectors back in there. But why wouldn't he? Does he feel so secure that he does not feel any necessity to make any movement even to engage us in this charade and cat-and-mouse game, which you could have, it seems like, just like that and buy himself a year or more if he wanted to, and undergo a little aggravation, but almost guarantee, it would seem, and--well, hopefully not guarantee, but lead him to think that with all of the support he would get in the region, with the European support and all of that, he could be assured that there would be no strike against him. Is he so secure that he doesn't feel any necessity to engage us in what I believe would certainly inure to his benefit in the short term? Dr. Kay, can you comment on that? Mr. Kay. Senator Thompson, first of all, let me say I think the first reason he will not do this is he has some unsatisfactory experience with inspectors from his point of view. I remember--and I had the dubious pleasure of leading three of the more confrontational inspections with Iraq--that at the end I had an Iraqi Foreign Minister tell me that if we had understood that you were not going to behave like the IAEA did before the war and a UN diplomat, we would never have agreed to this. With all the troubles inspectors had, people like Dr. Spertzel and the other teams unmasked a program that was unknown to national intelligence officials in the scope, depth, and degree that the inspectors unmasked. So he has a positive hate relationship with regard to the idea. Second, inspectors were always a political threat to the regime. We represented a failure, a visible failure running around Baghdad in our white buses and our white Land Rovers that he--although he can torture and cow the rest of Iraq into submission, here are individuals who were behaving like they were immune to Saddam's threat. For a totalitarian dictatorship, that is a virus that you do not want to get started. It starts people inside your own regime thinking about changes. And, finally, I must say, I fear that he has lost his fear of the United States. The period in which one believed that six or seven Cruise missiles fired into an empty building at 3 a.m. in the morning was an appropriate response for an assassination attempt on a former President of the United States is not one that engenders great fear in a sadistic, fanatical dictator like Saddam. So those are my reasons. But I must say I have the same worry every morning as you. Senator Thompson. Dr. Spertzel, let me ask you to comment on that and, in addition, whether or not you think if Saddam was convinced that we were about to strike him in a significant way or invade him, then do you think his calculations would change? In other words, if he comes to the point of agreeing for an inspection regime of some kind, does that mean he is convinced that we are about to do that? Mr. Spertzel. Yes, you would have found that would have been part of my response, is that I don't think he is yet convinced that the United States will act unilaterally in opposition to the Europeans as well as the other Middle Eastern countries. And certainly those countries and the Europeans are giving ample reason to believe that he may be right. Now, further indications of that coming into his discussions with Kofi Annan is that the head of the Iraqi Ba'th Party in the last 4 days made a statement in a speech in Baghdad in which he commented something to the effect that the United States was the real terrorist Nation because it prevented Iraq from reclaiming its rightful territory integrity in 1990, i.e., the march on to Kuwait. Another senior official, an Iraq Foreign Minister, also stated that, yes, they are flexible, but inspections would have to include lifting of sanctions and inspections for weapons of mass destruction of all countries in the Middle Eastern region--clearly an indication that nothing has changed in Iraq over the last several months. Senator Thompson. Mr. Einhorn, would you care to comment on this? Mr. Einhorn. I don't think we can really predict what Saddam Hussein would do under extreme duress. I would tend to doubt that he is going to agree to admit the inspectors. He knows, because he knows his own behavior, that sooner or later if the inspectors are back, there will be a confrontation. Things may go smoothly for a few weeks or months, but sooner or later, I think the inspectors will be prying, will be demanding and so forth, and Iraq will not be cooperative, and there will be another confrontation. And Saddam recognizes that will be used by the administration as a very good reason to use military force to try to resolve the problem. So he can look down the road and see that this is not going to lead anywhere very---- Senator Thompson. Even if we can't get unanimity in the UN Security Council. Mr. Einhorn. I think he knows--he may be confident, as Dr. Spertzel says, that the Bush Administration will be dissuaded by some of the concerns of Europeans and so forth. He may feel that now. But I think as time goes on, he will recognize that this administration is committed to move forward, and that will put him eventually in a pretty tight spot. And I wouldn't rule out his making certain conditional offers to admit inspectors. I don't think he is there yet, but I think he will make those offers. Senator Thompson. That is very interesting. Could I ask the indulgence of my colleagues for one more quick question? This is the idea, Dr. Kay, that you alluded to or the point you made concerning the public relations battle that I believe we are losing, if not lost, in terms of the starving children. I have had people from Tennessee come up and say that they have talked to Iranian officials. Some of them have been down there and, you know, pointed out the effects of what we are doing are having on the poor people down there. Is there any objective thing that we can point to? Is the oil-for- food account set aside with money in it under the auspices of the United Nations that you can point to and say here is $1 billion he is not using? Obviously we know he is smuggling oil in and getting a lot of money from that. I mean, maybe that is a little bit more difficult for people to buy. But what do we do about that? That is the mantra that you hear all the time now in terms of our terrorist activities. Mr. Kay. Senator, it is a very sore point. There are factual things you can point to. The program was never--the limitation of imports never applied to food and medicine. In fact, sometimes I resort to pointing out what is actually imported--a liposuction machine. One would not think that a liposuction machine in Iraq would be a high-priority import, although if you look at some senior Iraqi officials, you can understand their desire for it. [Laughter.] Mr. Kay. But, look, I confess, Senator Thompson, this is a battle I think we didn't fight. We certainly at least didn't fight it well. It is a battle that is lost. I think we now need to focus on the main issue, that is, getting rid of the regime. The thing that will improve the health and well-being of Iraqis today more than anything else is the removal of Saddam Hussein and his family from power. Senator Thompson. Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Einhorn. Yes, Senator Thompson, there are some objective things you can point to. You are correct, the Oil- for-Food Program allows Iraq to export oil, but the proceeds must go into a UN escrow account, and those funds are to be used for the civilian, humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. The balances have remained very high. At the beginning, the Iraqis drew down those funds for civilian products. Now they have let those funds sit in the escrow account rather than use those funds for the needs of the Iraqi people. I don't have exactly the numbers in front of me, but we were impressed--when I was in government, I was quite impressed with the very cynical nature of the Iraqi approach to this problem where they continued to complain publicly about the effects of the sanctions on the Iraqi public, but they failed to use the funds that they could draw upon to meet those needs. But I agree with the other witnesses. We have lost this propaganda battle. It is very hard to change minds by showing them this data. Senator Thompson. Dr. Spertzel. Mr. Spertzel. Yes, I agree with what has been said. I have just two comments to make, because there are points of severe irritation with me, and that is the business of medicines and food to Iraq. At a time when Iraq was making a great deal of progress in winning this public relations battle, the issue was settling around medicines, vaccines for children. Well, the bio people, we monitored the central distribution point for biologicals to the medical community, and we were watching donated medicines and vaccines for children sitting on the shelves going out of date, intentionally not being distributed. As inspectors, we couldn't do anything about it. But it became a major sore point with us. The other one has to do with food. Our inspectors would buy food from the local market, and 1 day they went out to buy and there was nothing on the shelves. Everything was gone. And they asked why, and the person, the shop owner said, ``Tell me what you want. I'll get it for you. We were instructed to clear everything off our shelves because there were some foreign newsmen coming today.'' Senator Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Akaka. Thank you for your questions and the responses we received. Senator Cochran. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, we obviously are confronted with a very troubling situation in Iraq. I have made some notes for an opening statement which I will ask be printed in the record at this point, with your permission. Senator Akaka. Without objection, it will be printed in the record. [The prepared statement of Senator Cochran follows:] OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN Mr. Chairman, we obviously are confronted with a very troubling situation in Iraq. At the end of the Gulf War, UN Resolution 687 required Iraq to ``unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless'' of its weapons of mass destruction. But, here we are, 11 years later and we have no convincing evidence that these weapons have been destroyed, removed, or rendered harmless. Saddam Hussein has kept UN inspectors out of Iraq since December of 1998. Now, following pressure from the Bush Administration, Iraq's Foreign Minister and the United Nations Secretary General are going to meet next week to discuss the resumption of UN inspections in Iraq. I'm concerned that even if Saddam Hussein allows UN inspection, he will not cooperate with them. I'm also convinced sanctions have not achieved their goals. We may be running out of time and options; so we appreciate the opportunity to have the benefit of the thoughts and suggestions of these distinguished witnesses. Senator Cochran. If I could ask the witnesses about the UN inspection situation, the key to success, as I understand, for these UN inspections has always been the support of the international community. We can't just do this by ourselves and make it work. We especially need the cooperation of the countries that make up the United Nations Security Council. But there seems to have been considerable hesitancy among some of these members in creating this new inspection regime, the UNMOVIC regime. Several countries, including France and Russia, didn't vote, didn't actively support this initiative. Can we expect these UN inspections to have any chance of success without the cooperation of our allies and friends? Mr. Spertzel. At the risk of being undiplomatic, I will take that one on. Without the full support of the P-5 members-- France, Russia, China, United States, and U.K.--the inspection system doesn't have a chance, no matter what their authority might be in Iraq. And I have seen nothing that would suggest any change in the attitude and the expressions being stated publicly in the media right now by a couple of those countries that would indicate there is going to be any change in their support. Yes, France and Russia abstained in that vote because it did not meet Iraq's satisfaction. Iraq was actively encouraging them, requesting and pleading with them, to veto it, and they compromised by abstaining. I don't see anything that has changed. Senator Cochran. Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Einhorn. Let me go one better than that. Dr. Spertzel says that without their support the P-5 unified, the inspections can't succeed. If success means disarming Iraq and forcing compliance, even with the support, the unified support of the Security Council, they won't succeed, because it is very difficult to compel compliance, and especially with this regime. So if one sets that high standard--and we must--then as all the witnesses have said, the only way of compelling compliance is to change the regime and get a regime that is prepared to comply. I think that is the answer. But I would say with strong support by the Security Council, inspectors can do some useful things, perhaps only for a short period of time, before confrontation sets in again. I asked a number of my friends in the intelligence community what they know about Iraq now and what they feel about the inspectors not being there. And they are losing touch. They used to have a feel for what was going on in Iraq. They are losing that feel now. I asked them, would you like to see the inspectors back on the ground?, recognizing that the Iraqis are not going to give them access to anything incriminating. They said, ``We would still like them there. We could get some useful information. It would update us on a number of useful things, certain suspicious facilities we could at least get access to--that is, the UN inspectors could get access to those facilities, and resolve certain doubts.'' But they would have no illusions that the inspectors would ever be able to find what the Iraqis have worked hard to conceal. So there are limited things the inspectors can do, but if success is disarming Iraq, forcing compliance, they can't do that. Senator Cochran. Dr. Kay. Mr. Kay. Senator Cochran, could I give you a very practical answer? Because I failed Diplomacy 101. Talking about support from the Security Council in broad terms does not get you very far when you are talking about inspectors. The Iraqis will manage the individual confrontations at points where much of the world that is not focused on disarming Iraq--they are focused on getting rid of sanctions and getting on with business--will not understand. I led an inspection--because we had good intelligence that the Iraqis were hiding documents related to their nuclear centrifuge program--to a hospital for amputees. Now, can you imagine how many Security Council members I would have behind me if the Iraqis had chosen--fortunately this was on the first inspection, and they hadn't gotten very smart. But if they had chosen to say we can't have you traipsing through a hospital that has amputees from the war with Iran there, I probably wouldn't have gotten the support of my own government, quite frankly, at that stage. And that is how they manage the confrontations. It is not on the high ground. It is on individual cases, access to Saddam's palace, access to a Ba'th Party political headquarters. Well, you know, would we like UN inspectors traipsing through the RNC or DNC? I mean, they do it in ways that guarantee you will not keep--now, we managed to in the early days. In this current condition, I think it is absolutely assured that we would not keep the Council through really tough inspections. Senator Cochran. On another subject, I think Mr. Einhorn and Dr. Spertzel have testified that Iraq deployed Scud missiles with biological warheads. There are several reports that we have received, unclassified reports, that Saddam Hussein continues to retain interest in missiles of longer range than those permitted under UN Resolution 687. Do you think he is likely to try to equip long-range ballistic missiles that he may develop with weapons of mass destruction? Mr. Spertzel. I will start out by--yes. We found plans, design plans for a container to fit into a missile warhead--and I am not enough of a missile expert to tell you which one--the size of which could have only been for bio application. It was much too small for either chemical or nuclear devices. And certainly all the indications we had during the inspection period was their interest in acquiring a longer-range capability. The intent of at least one of the two Superguns, which was designed to hit much of Europe, or so the propaganda said, that the smaller of those two was clearly designed to carry a biological warhead, or missile, I guess in this case, being fired from the Supergun. So, yes, there was and undoubtedly is a continuing interest in developing longer-range missiles capable of delivering a small payload, which is easier for them to do. That would imply bio and perhaps later on a nuclear. Senator Cochran. Dr. Kay, could you respond? Mr. Kay. If he had the capacity to do it, I have no doubt that, in fact, he would do it. This is an individual who has sought it at every stage. For example, in the nuclear program, although they were starting with an early program, they were already carrying out research on how to use thermonuclear boosting to increase the size and yield of the weapon. The aspirations are unlimited. Given the time and the money and Saddam still in power, they will certainly proceed along that course. Senator Cochran. Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Einhorn. Just to add something, Senator Cochran, there is no question they would like longer-range missiles. One of the failings of Resolution 687, the ceasefire resolution, was that it allowed the Iraqis to have missiles up to 150 kilometers in range. I think that was very unfortunate because under the guise of permitted short-range systems, they could do a lot of work to help them get a leg up on future, more capable systems, and they are doing that right now. This Al-Samoud liquid-fueled missile is supposed to be below 150 kilometers. I have my doubts about that. They have a tactical short-range solid-fueled missile called the Ababil that I think is being used to develop a solid propellant infrastructure that can then be used in the future for more capable solid-fueled missiles. So I think they are laying the groundwork. But it is important to recognize the embargo, the current sanctions, as porous as they are, do have an impact on restricting what they can do. No doubt they are trying on the black market to acquire ingredients for their missile program. And they are succeeding to some extent. But, an important aspect of a missile program is to be able to flight test, and, sure, they are conducting short-range flight tests that they are permitted to do, but they can't fire a missile at long range. They know they would be detected. Look at Iran. Iran is flight-testing this medium-range ballistic missile, the Shahab-3, and they are making a lot of headway on acquiring a delivery capability that can go throughout the Middle East. Iraq is real constrained because of the inability to have an overt flight-test program at long range. That is an important constraint on what they can do. Senator Cochran. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Akaka. Thank you, Senator Cochran. Dr. Spertzel and Dr. Kay, on Sunday, Secretary Rumsfeld said that international inspectors were limited in what they could do, and that their ability to find out what was actually taking place was minimal. He noted, `` the real information that they were able to get--came from defectors who left the country, provided inspectors with information and in a few cases were able to discover some things and destroy some capabilities.'' The question is: Were all substantial discoveries made as a result of defectors? Mr. Kay. Senator, in my case, that is not the case. I hesitate to disagree with Secretary Rumsfeld, A, because I don't want to become the subject of his afternoon press briefing, but more importantly, I was actually flying back from Honolulu on Sunday and so didn't hear what he said on ``Meet the Press'' or ``Face the Nation.'' Inspectors--and Bob Einhorn referred to it. There is no substitute for people on the ground. We certainly used information from defectors. We used information, at least while I was there, from any source we could. But we made genuine discoveries. The Iraqis made stupid mistakes, and we unraveled them. They lied and we detected those lies and pulled them apart. It is not true that all the information was discovered as a result, at least in the nuclear area, as a result of defectors--although I welcome defectors, let me be clear. Mr. Spertzel. And with all due respect to Secretary Rumsfeld--and thank you for asking that question because I welcome the opportunity to reply to his statement. In bio, that absolutely is not the case. If I had to cite one single item that may be the most important, it would have been the import of supplies and equipment, the records that we were able to obtain from suppliers. That became the crucial item that forced Iraq to acknowledge their program, and the information that we had up until July 1, 1995 when Iraq first acknowledged their biological warfare program, none of it came from defectors. Now, as Dr. Kay said, certainly I would welcome defector information. Now, Hussein Kamel Hassan's defection did not add anything to the bio program other than perhaps stimulate Iraq to make further elaboration, but it wasn't information that we obtained from him. Now, there were later defectors and one very crucial one that would have led us to a site in January 1998 that the information received from that defector, as well as corroborating evidence from other sources, would have indicated an active bio research and development facility, except the whole system came to a screeching halt in challenge inspections in January 1998 and unfortunately got billed as a palace issue, which it had nothing to do with palaces. We had arranged to have three bio teams in-country at the same time, and we were going to join the inspection team of Scott Ritter to go to that site. But they got blocked the day before. So, yes, defector information is valuable, but I think it played a minor role, not a major role. Senator Akaka. Thank you. Mr. Einhorn, an Iraqi defector said he personally worked on renovations of secret facilities for biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in underground wells, private villas, and under a hospital in Baghdad as recently as a year ago. Do you believe that these sites are used primarily to hide activities or to discourage military action against the sites in the future? And what recourse does the United States have against such facilities? Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, I am not aware of the specific reports. They are certainly plausible to me, given past Iraqi behavior. They may feel that by hiding proscribed materials in places like that, it would be difficult to inspect without arousing public opinion, that they could have some degree of immunity from the effects of inspection. So it is entirely plausible to me that they would adopt that strategy. These gentlemen (the other witnesses) are probably familiar with many cases where they have adopted that strategy in the past. Senator Akaka. Dr. Kay and Dr. Spertzel, UN resolutions governing UNSCOM activities permitted on-site inspections with full access, including no-notice inspections and sample analysis. How frequently did you as an inspector implement these measures? Mr. Spertzel. In the case of bio, our resident inspection teams, to my knowledge, always functioned on a no-notice basis. That was the instructions to them. They also worked on a variable schedule that was devised-- and I would prefer not to say publicly what the basis was--so that it was sufficiently random that hopefully Iraq would not know. The limitation we had, however, was the minute a bio team headed beyond Samarra, they obviously were only going to three sites in the north, similarly in the south. And one of the proposals that has been made for a new inspection regime is that they have satellite inspection teams full-time in the north and the south and elsewhere in Iraq in addition to Baghdad, if necessary, because that essentially provided notification to Iraq. The non-resident teams always functioned on a no-notice basis, whether it was revisiting a declared site or an undeclared site. Mr. Kay. Mr. Chairman, I conducted actually the first no- notice inspection by any of the teams in Iraq. It was a result of having for a week tried to give the Iraqis under instructions notice of 24 to 12 hours. Not surprisingly, they moved everything. And so we resorted--and after that point, no notice became the standard. Now, it seems it is--no notice sounds easier in theory than it is. There are logistic opportunities, like Dr. Spertzel referred to. There is also the fact that all your meeting rooms were audio-bugged. I spent a number of hours jogging around Baghdad with some fit and some not-as-well-fit inspectors as we planned out how to conduct inspections because that was our only privacy. The Iraqis, we now know because of a defector, had penetrated a number of the inspection teams and actually gained notice. It was a constant struggle. Without no-notice inspections, there are absolutely no hopes of finding anything. Senator Akaka. Dr. Kay, why has the International Atomic Energy Agency been able to continue its inspections in Iraq? Is it due to their inspections being more narrowly defined? Or are they seen as less political and more independent than the UN teams? Mr. Kay. The Iraqis from the beginning have tried to drive a wedge between UNSCOM as the tough guys and the IAEA as the soft technical inspection. It was always a problem, one that was managed. The current inspections that have continued since 1998, though, are because they are more narrowly focused. They are focused on sites which were pre-Gulf War nuclear--permitted nuclear activity areas. They go only there. They don't go anyplace else. It is a narrow technical, and so it gives the Iraqis the appearance of maintaining compliance with the non- proliferation treaty, and yet it does not threaten their hidden program. So under those ground rules, you could conduct biological inspections or anything else. It is just not threatening to their program. Mr. Spertzel. If I could add, I believe those inspections are also aimed at essentially recertifying that a known quantity of nuclear material that Iraq had in 1990 is still there and that the IAEA teams can come in and still cite, oh, yes, there is X number of pounds of substance X, and it is aimed at that, not whether they have accumulated anything else. Mr. Kay. That is absolutely the case. Senator Akaka. Thank you. Senator Thompson. Senator Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Akaka. More questions? Senator Thompson. Yes, sir. Dr. Spertzel, you made reference to the fact that from the very beginning their WMD program--perhaps you were referring specifically to the biological program--had a terrorist component. What did you mean by that? Could you elaborate? Mr. Spertzel. Yes. I was referring to the bio, although at least initially it was true for the chemical as well. When the bio program was established by Iraq in 1973, perhaps late 1972, under the Al-Hazen Ibn Al Haithem Institute, the program was established totally by the intelligence organization with some technical input as well by the military, but all funding and guidance came through the intelligence. The nature of the studies that they were conducting, the types of organisms that they were evaluating and so on indicated two types of delivery: Those that would be of interest to the military for tactical and strategic reasons, and those that would be only of value used in a clandestine terrorist fashion. And, in fact, the initial efforts with the wheat smut, wheat cover bunt, anti-crop agent was developed to be delivered covertly and was the initial efforts in an unmanned, albeit in this case a very small drone as a delivery means. The initial efforts appear to have been aimed at Iran, but later the interest changed. There was also a variety of interesting other agents that are of only utility for terrorist application. Senator Thompson. Their biological program is still under the intelligence organization, isn't it? Mr. Spertzel. Yes, sir. There was a period perhaps from about 1979 to 1983--I am sorry, 1986 or 1987 when the military piece was under DOD--Ministry of Defense, and then brought--in 1987 it was brought back under the umbrella of the intelligence service. By that time the intelligence service had split into two different organizations. In this time, it was under the special security organization that is currently headed, I believe, by Saddam's oldest son. Senator Thompson. So you attach significance to that, the organizational structure, and looking at it from a terrorist or potential terrorist standpoint. That would be the main reason you think that it would be organized that way, because it would not strictly be military or defense usage. Mr. Spertzel. That is right. The program, as it appears to be designed, is for either the last-gasp, if you like, protection of the regime as well as the second side, which appears to be from the very beginning aimed at terrorist application, terrorist usage, wherever the regime felt necessary. Senator Thompson. Could you elaborate on that a little bit? I guess to me that issue would depend upon, of course, its usage. Developing the biological weapons themselves, I suppose, could be done under any structure. But is there anything that you see in terms of their usage or their preparation that would indicate an offensive intent? You mentioned maybe a last-gasp situation where it is a fallback to be used in case they are about to be overrun or something, which would be serious enough in and of itself. But is there anything in addition to that that would indicate to you some potential offensive usage? Mr. Spertzel. From the military standpoint or terrorist standpoint? The military---- Senator Thompson. From a terrorist standpoint. Mr. Spertzel. From the terrorist standpoint, because the Commission made almost an active effort not to delve into the terrorist side of it, we have very little information to go on. Senator Thompson. Why was that? Mr. Spertzel. It was deemed that it was not part of the mandate of Resolution 687. Senator Thompson. So we don't know as much about potential terrorist capability or intention as we perhaps could have. Mr. Spertzel. Absolutely. Senator Thompson. That leads me to something else. You mentioned--I think, Dr. Kay, it was you who indicated that in terms of what they were doing from a nuclear standpoint, that our intelligence estimates were off. Would you elaborate on that a bit, and Dr. Spertzel also, in terms of bio? How does what we found when we were in over there or anything that we may have determined later compare with our intelligence estimates that we had going in? We know from the Rumsfeld Commission, for example, that we were off quite a bit in terms of some countries, in terms of some capabilities. Dr. Kay, I assume that was the case that you alluded to. Could you elaborate on that a bit? Mr. Kay. Well, in the nuclear program, the prevailing intelligence estimate was that the Israeli action against Osiraq reactor, which occurred in June 1981, had substantially derailed the Iraqi nuclear program, that the principal evidence seen in the period from 1981 to the Gulf War was a shop-until- you-drop mentality, that is, Iraq had a lot of money and they were buying a lot of things and that there wasn't substantial doubt that they were trying to pursue a nuclear program, but that it seemed to be chaotic and not very close and not focused. And there were less than a dozen facilities identified as target points during the course of the coalition air campaign as being decisively known to be nuclear facilities or thought to be nuclear facilities. When we got on the ground, we found that instead of that, what the Iraqis had done is they had pursued a systematic Iraqi Manhattan Project designed to procure high-enriched uranium using literally all the known methods, the Tarmiya, the central--the first place we found the centrifuge--or, pardon me, the calutron program, EMIS program, electromagnetic isotope separation program, was, Senator Thompson, you will be happy to know, an exact duplicate of a facility that exists in your State. What the Iraqis had done is come here, and quite openly because it was unclassified, buy the blueprints of where we produced high-enriched uranium at Oak Ridge using calutrons, and just built a plant. They had also had a centrifuge program that had produced a building, what is called Al Furat, that was not known to U.S. intelligence until inspectors discovered it. And let me make this point: This was not as a result of a defector. We discovered that in the course of an inspection because an Iraqi official made a mistake in how he described the program, and we went there. It was larger than any centrifuge plant that exists in Western Europe or the United States, that if the war had not intervened, right now we would be facing an Iraq, if they had overcome the production problems, that would be producing a very large amount of high- enriched uranium. They also produced a chemical enrichment program. They were trying laser enrichment, which probably would have only consumed a large amount of money and not produced nuclear material. That has been our experience with it. But it was an all-encompassing program. The scope, scale, and dimension was much larger than was known by anyone. Let me not throw stones at the U.S. intelligence community. I did not receive a briefing from any other country's intelligence community that indicated they knew that scope. Senator Thompson. This plan with regard to the Oak Ridge facility, was this a blueprint you discovered, or what was it, did you say? Mr. Kay. We actually discovered the plant, and---- Senator Thompson. They had duplicated the plant? Mr. Kay. They had duplicated the plan. They built it to the plan, and the way we discovered it is a testimony to actually the knowledge in the U.S. program, although the individual has since passed away. We brought the photos back, spread them out on the table, asked one of the Oak Ridge designers, who was still alive and still working there, 80 years old, in that plant, didn't tell him what it was except a facility in Iraq. He walked around, looked at the pictures, and said--and I will never forget the statement--``I know this plant. I work in this building every day of my life.'' And sure enough, as we took the plant apart and then we discovered the blueprints later, it had been built to a set of U.S. plans. Senator Thompson. How do you account for that? Mr. Kay. Well, the plans are openly available. You could go today and buy them. We declassified--the calutron program, the EMIS program, was one that the United States abandoned because gaseous diffusion came on line and was far more efficient. When we were doing calutrons during the course of the Second World War, it took approximately one-half of the available U.S. electric supply and all the silver that was stored by the Treasury to use to wrap magnets in. It was a very inefficient way. The Iraqis had improved on it. They pursued it because they correctly guessed that no one would think anyone would be so stupid as to use that means of enrichment. And, in fact, the first assessment that came back to the United States, two Nobel Prize winners were asked to evaluate it, and their exact comment was, ``It can't be that. No one would be so stupid to do that. There are better ways to produce.'' There is a lesson for us here. There were some very old ways and still are very old ways of producing weapons that are quite destructive. Senator Thompson. It was older but it was easier for them to do? Mr. Kay. It was easier to hide and disguise. They still struggled with that process as well. That is why they were developing centrifuges, which are genuinely easier for everyone once you produce centrifuges. Senator Thompson. So they have plenty of uranium, I take it. It is just a matter of enriching it and---- Mr. Kay. That is correct. There is abundant uranium in Iraq. It is not in the concentrations you would like to have or you would find in Canada or other places, in the former Soviet Union. But there is plenty of uranium. Money doesn't constrain their program. And this was the hard lesson everyone has learned. Just because it is expensive to do or not the best way doesn't mean the Iraqis won't pursue it. They will spend the money. Mr. Spertzel. In the bio program, clearly the intelligence was sufficient to know that Iraq was at least attempting to weaponize botulinum toxin and anthrax, which is what prompted the use of vaccines against those agents for the coalition forces. But the intelligence was not good enough to know where the production plants were because of the four sites that we could identify as actually being involved in the production of biological agents, not a single one of them was touched by even one bomb. So, yes, the intelligence---- Senator Thompson. Could that have been on purpose? Mr. Spertzel. No. They simply didn't know. Senator Thompson. There was no danger to the civilian population or anything like that that would have come into play? Mr. Spertzel. Certainly the major production plant, which was the Al Hakam facility out in the desert, that could have been blown up with absolutely no qualms whatsoever, particularly if it was a daylight strike. Senator Thompson. So is it fair to say we knew basically what they were doing, we just didn't know where they were doing it? Mr. Spertzel. We certainly had some indication that they were investigating both botulinum toxin as well as anthrax. My guess is a lot of that probably came from import information because there was a basis for--would have been a basis for questioning that. But it was believed that most of that effort was all taking place at the Salman Pak Peninsula. And it is true, Salman Pak was, in fact, the original site of the BW program back in the early 1970's and stayed there throughout the 1970's and 1980's. But it was a research site, research and development site, not a production site. And by July 1990, before the invasion of Kuwait, all of the bacterial piece of the bio program had been moved out of Salman Pak and only the terrorist application as well as the Ricin work remained at Salman Pak. So, actually, our information was not current in terms of what Salman Pak was being used for by the Iraqis. Senator Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Akaka. Thank you. Do you have anything further? Senator Thompson. I don't, unless Mr. Einhorn wants to comment on the last--I am finished. Thank you. Senator Akaka. Thank you, Senator Thompson. I would ask that the statement of Senator Carnahan be included into this hearing record. [The prepared statement of Senator Carnahan follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARNAHAN Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to welcome the distinguished panel we have before us today. You are top experts in your respective fields, and I am looking forward to hearing your views on the dangerous situation in Iraq. For too long now Saddam Hussein's Iraq has posed a threat to both its neighbors and the international community. He lost the war but his program to develop weapons of mass destruction has not been dismantled. He had the choice to comply with the United Nations resolutions and rejoin the community of nations. But he has made other choices, and those choices need to have consequences. While Iraq has been contained militarily in recent years, we have not had weapons inspectors on the ground since 1998. So for years, Iraq has been free to develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons with impunity. Saddam Hussein has raised an estimated $1 to $2 billion annually from smuggled, illegal oil sales revenues. This money has most likely been spent on his weapons of mass destruction programs. Yet he has blamed the United Nations and the United States for the suffering of the Iraqi people, when in reality he has chosen not to use available funds for humanitarian purposes. Today's hearing has two important purposes. First, it is critical that we begin the process of educating the American people about the threat that Saddam poses: --Labout the dangerous weapons that he is developing; and --Labout the possibility that he could provide them to terrorists that would use them against the United States. Second, we need to explore the risks and rewards of the various policy options available to the United States. We can continue to contain him through the no-fly zone and ``smart sanctions.'' But that would not have an appreciable impact on his weapons of mass destruction. We can try to topple him by supporting opposition group, but we need a realistic analysis of the likelihood that such an effort could succeed. Or we could take military action. But we need to understand the readiness of our armed forces for such an engagement, the difficulties of eliminating Saddam's regime, and the impact such action would have on the volatile Middle East region. Finally, we need to envision what a post-Saddam world would look like and anticipate how to manage difficulties that would arise if there were instability in the Gulf region. So this is a difficult subject worthy of discussion and study. I look forward to your testimony. Senator Akaka. I would like to thank my fellow Senators for their time and interest in this important issue. Mr. Einhorn, Dr. Kay, and Dr. Spertzel, I thank you for your thoughtful remarks. Your testimony has been very thorough. To summerize your comments: We have lost the propaganda and public relations battle with Iraq; and a solution to the threat posed by Iraq upon the United States and the world is to replace Saddam Hussein and his regime. You have done the American people a great service by providing such useful and candid statements and sharing your experience and knowledge with us. You have painted a dark picture. Our Nation and our allies have some difficult decisions to make about Iraq. The deterrence effect of weapons of mass destruction has been both a benefit and hazard to the United States and our allies. On the one hand, reports indicate that during the Gulf War, Iraq resisted using chemical weapon warheads against coalition troops and Israel out of fear of United States retaliation. On the other hand, Iraqi leaders are convinced that their possession of WMD was vital to their survival by keeping American and coalition forces from getting into Baghdad in 1991. I think we have to ask ourselves, with that mind-set, how realistic is it to expect the current regime in Iraq to ever give up WMD capabilities. As Mr. Einhorn has said, the current regime in Iraq is truly a class by itself. The United Nations credibility is being undermined by Iraq's well-documented and clear-cut violations of proliferation agreements. If we fail to stop Iraq's WMD programs, how will we be able to stop other nations with similar intentions such as Iran? The international community must work together. The implementation of any system to destroy Iraq's WMD capabilities will depend on firm and active support by the international community. We have heard a lot of very strong rhetoric about Iraq. Now we must put action behind the rhetoric. We must state clearly what our objectives are in Iraq. We must decide what policies are needed to meet these objectives, and we must state when we will use force to meet these objectives. This is the only way to maintain our credibility with our allies and adversaries. Gentlemen, we have no further questions at this time. However, Members of this Subcommittee may submit questions in writing for any of the witnesses. We would appreciate a timely response to any questions. The record will remain open for these questions or further statements from my colleagues, and, again, I would like to express my appreciation to our witnesses for your time and for sharing your insights with us. This has been valuable to this Subcommittee. This hearing is adjourned. 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