[Senate Hearing 107-410]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-410
HOMELAND SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SPECIAL HEARINGS
APRIL 10, 2002--WASHINGTON, DC
APRIL 11, 2002--WASHINGTON, DC
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
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senate
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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
TOM HARKIN, Iowa PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
HARRY REID, Nevada MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin CONRAD BURNS, Montana
PATTY MURRAY, Washington RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota LARRY CRAIG, Idaho
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
JACK REED, Rhode Island MIKE DeWINE, Ohio
Terry Sauvain, Staff Director
Charles Kieffer, Deputy Staff Director
Steven J. Cortese, Minority Staff Director
Lisa Sutherland, Minority Deputy Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Wednesday, April 10, 2002
Page
Opening statement of Chairman Robert C. Byrd..................... 1
Statement of Senator Ted Stevens................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Prepared statement of Senator Christopher S. Bond................ 6
Prepared statement of Senator Tim Johnson........................ 7
Statement of Senator Patty Murray................................ 8
Statement of Hon. Gary Locke, Governor, State of Washington...... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Biographical sketch.......................................... 15
Statement of Hon. John Engler, Governor, State of Michigan....... 16
Joint prepared statement of Governor John Engler, Governor Roy E.
Barnes, and Governor Gary Locke................................ 19
Biographical sketch of Governor Roy E. Barnes.................... 24
Biographical sketch of Governor John Engler...................... 24
Statement of Hon. Roy Barnes, Governor, State of Georgia......... 25
Statement of Dr. Ashton Carter, Ford Foundation Professor of
Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University................................. 28
Biographical sketch.......................................... 42
Statement of Stephen Gale, Associate Professor, Political Science
Department, University of Pennsylvania......................... 42
Prepared statement........................................... 47
Biographical sketch.......................................... 51
Questioning by:
Chairman Robert C. Byrd...................................... 51
Senator Ted Stevens.......................................... 55
Senator Patty Murray......................................... 57
Senator Byron L. Dorgan...................................... 60
Senator Herb Kohl............................................ 62
Statement of Senator Robert F. Bennett........................... 66
Questioning by:
Senator Richard J. Durbin.................................... 68
Senator Jack Reed............................................ 71
Statement of Senator Barbara A. Mikulski......................... 78
Statement of Hon. Martin O'Malley, Mayor of Baltimore, Maryland;
and Co-Chair, Federal-Local Law Enforcement Task Force, U.S.
Conference of Mayors........................................... 79
Prepared statement........................................... 82
Biographical sketch.......................................... 85
Statement of Hon. Michael Guido, Mayor of Dearborn, Michigan; and
Co-Chair, Working Group on Homeland Security, National League
of Cities...................................................... 88
Prepared statement........................................... 91
Biographical sketch.......................................... 93
Statement of Hon. Javier Gonzales, Commissioner, Santa Fe County,
New Mexico; and President, National Association of Counties.... 103
Prepared statement........................................... 106
Biographical sketch.......................................... 110
Questioning by:
Chairman Robert C. Byrd...................................... 116
Senator Ted Stevens.......................................... 118
Senator Barbara A. Mikulski.................................. 121
Senator Pete V. Domenici..................................... 123
Senator Mary L. Landrieu..................................... 126
Senator Byron L. Dorgan...................................... 129
Senator Daniel K. Inouye..................................... 133
Chairman Robert C. Byrd...................................... 134
Thursday, April 11, 2002
Opening statement of Chairman Robert C. Byrd..................... 139
Statement of Senator Ted Stevens................................. 140
Statement of Thomas Von Essen, former New York City Fire
Commissioner, representing the International Association of
Fire Chiefs.................................................... 141
Prepared statement........................................... 143
Biographical sketch.......................................... 146
Statement of Mike Crouse, Chief of Staff to the General
President, International Association of Fire Fighters.......... 146
Prepared statement........................................... 148
Biographical sketch.......................................... 152
Statement of Philip Stittleburg, Chairman, National Volunteer
Fire Council, and volunteer fire chief, LaFarge, Wisconsin..... 152
Prepared statement........................................... 153
Biographical sketch.......................................... 156
Statement of Colonel Lonnie Westphal, Chief, Colorado State
Patrol, representing the International Association of Chiefs of
Police......................................................... 156
Prepared statement........................................... 159
Biographical sketch.......................................... 162
Statement of General Richard Alexander, Director, National Guard
Association.................................................... 163
Prepared statement........................................... 166
Biographical sketch.......................................... 175
Statement of Gary Cox, Director, Tulsa, Oklahoma, City-County
Health Department, representing the National Association of
County and City Health Officials............................... 176
Prepared statement........................................... 177
Biographical................................................. 181
Questioning by:
Chairman Robert C. Byrd...................................... 181
Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell.............................. 183
Senator Herb Kohl............................................ 185
Senator Judd Gregg........................................... 187
Senator Ted Stevens.......................................... 189
Statement of Senator Ernest F. Hollings.......................... 191
Questioning by:
Senator Jack Reed............................................ 194
Senator Daniel K. Inouye..................................... 197
Senator Pete V. Domenici..................................... 198
Senator Barbara A. Mikulski.................................. 201
Senator Conrad Burns......................................... 206
Chairman Robert C. Byrd...................................... 209
Opening statement of Chairman Robert C. Byrd..................... 215
Statement of Senator Ted Stevens................................. 215
Statement of Hon. Warren Rudman, former United States Senator,
Co-Chair, U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century.... 216
Questioning by:
Chairman Robert C. Byrd...................................... 232
Senator Ted Stevens.......................................... 233
Senator Mary L. Landrieu..................................... 235
Senator Pete V. Domenici..................................... 237
Senator Daniel K. Inouye..................................... 239
Senator Ernest F. Hollings................................... 240
Senator Patty Murray......................................... 243
Senator Barbara A. Mikulski.................................. 245
Senator Arlen Specter........................................ 246
Senator Byron L. Dorgan...................................... 250
Senator Dianne Feinstein..................................... 251
Senator Robert F. Bennett.................................... 252
Statement of Stephen E. Flynn, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, National
Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations................. 255
Prepared statement........................................... 258
Biographical sketch.......................................... 262
Statement of Richard M. Larrabee, United States Coast Guard
(retired), Director, Port Commerce Department, Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey..................................... 262
Prepared statement........................................... 265
Biographical sketch.......................................... 270
Statement of P. Michael Errico, Deputy General Manager,
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, representing the
Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies..................... 271
Prepared statement of John R. Griffin, General Manager,
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission........................ 273
Biographical sketch.......................................... 279
Biographical sketch of P. Michael Errico......................... 280
Statement of David Lochbaum, Nuclear Safety Engineer, Union of
Concerned Scientists........................................... 280
Prepared statement........................................... 282
Statement of Jeff Benjamin, Vice President for Licensing, Exelon
Corporation, Chicago, Illinois, representing the Nuclear Energy
Institute...................................................... 294
Prepared statement........................................... 297
Biographical sketch.......................................... 303
Questioning by:
Senator Ernest F. Hollings................................... 303
Senator Patty Murray......................................... 304
Chairman Robert C. Byrd...................................... 308
Senator Patty Murray......................................... 314
Chairman Robert C. Byrd...................................... 317
Closing statement of Chairman Robert C. Byrd..................... 321
Prepared statement of Colleen M. Kelley, National President,
National Treasury Employees Union.............................. 325
Prepared statement of Victor L. Lechtenberg, Chair, National
Agricultural Research, Extension, Education, and Economics
Advisory Board................................................. 328
Prepared statement of the National Association of State
Universities and Land-Grant Colleges.....................329
(iii)
HOMELAND SECURITY
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 10, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 10 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate
Office Building, Hon. Robert C. Byrd (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Byrd, Inouye, Leahy, Harkin, Mikulski,
Kohl, Murray, Dorgan, Durbin, Johnson, Landrieu, Reed, Stevens,
Cochran, Domenici, Bond, Burns, Gregg, Bennett, Campbell, and
DeWine.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN ROBERT C. BYRD
Chairman Byrd. The committee will come to order. A scant
212 days ago, on September 11, our country was dealt a vicious
blow, the nature of which was inconceivable to most Americans
until that fateful day. In a space of a few hours our view of
ourselves, and of the world around us, changed. In the most
graphic and horrific way, Americans came face to face with the
fact that their country is extremely vulnerable to attacks of
unspeakable horror by madmen and terrorists.
How we as a Nation deal with that knowledge is the ultimate
test of our leadership and of our wisdom. The preamble of the
United States Constitution speaks to certain broad goals for
the Federal Government: ``to establish justice, ensure domestic
tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the
general welfare and to secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and to our posterity.'' In this new age, those words
have a special meaning. They go to the very survival of our
Nation and of our way of life, both of which may now depend on
our increased ability to respond to threats, understand the
complexities of our vulnerabilities, and still preserve the
individual freedoms that we cherish.
A comprehensive evaluation of every aspect of homeland
defense is essential. We must anticipate the soft spots and act
quickly to shore them up. If the United States is going to be
able to prevent future terrorist strikes, cooperation must
exist on all levels. Cooperation will be essential at all
levels in responding to the havoc of a successful attack.
The swift commitment of resources at the Federal, State,
and local levels is essential. Cooperation at every level will
be key to our success in this regard. Last September this
Congress acted very quickly to enact a $40 billion
appropriations bill within 3 days to respond to the awful
events of September 11--within 3 days of the attacks. I repeat,
that was done.
Of that money, $10 billion was made available to the
President upon enactment of the bill. The President could
allocate, after consultation with Congress, the next $10
billion. The last $20 billion required further Congressional
action which occurred as a part of the Defense Appropriations
bill last December. I might add that the Senate Appropriations
Committee reported the legislation on December 4, 2001, in 6
days--6 days after the House had acted on the bill.
The full Senate passed this legislation 3 days later. All
of this was accomplished despite the fact that this institution
was seriously crippled in October and November because of
heinous anthrax attacks in the country--and on the Congress,
which were delivered through the postal system. My office,
along with several other offices of Senators, was closed for
weeks--3 months. Congress was crippled and yet we acted in the
Senate. We were not slow to walk up to the plate, and we
appropriated that money within the 3 days.
The Federal Government has already committed substantial
emergency resources in the defense of our homeland. But
experience and knowledge are our best allies in the service of
maximum effectiveness. We've only just begun to digest the
scope of the challenges that face us. Senator Stevens and I
have called these hearings because this committee, the United
States Senate, and the American people are watching. We need to
understand these new challenges more fully.
Today and tomorrow the Senate Appropriations Committee will
hear from mayors and Governors about the real obstacles that
they face in preparing for a variety of security threats which
are particular to their circumstances. We also will hear from
men and women who will be on the front lines in responding to
any future terrorist attacks: National Guardsmen, police
officers, fire fighters, public health personnel. The committee
will listen to these so as to understand the security needs of
the Nation's communities in order to better prioritize our
funding decisions to best protect the safety of our citizens.
Everyone understands that the States will confront serious
budgetary problems. Hard budgetary choices will have to be made
at the Federal level as well. Senator Stevens and I and all the
members of this committee want to make sure that funding for
the homeland defense of our citizens is our top priority.
We talk about defense. This is defense of the homeland,
where you live and where I live, where my great grandchildren
live and those who will come after us. We also wish to
understand the threats to our domestic security well enough to
fund the right priorities in the most effective way.
It is essential that the American people have confidence
that their Government is acting swiftly and intelligently to
address their concerns. The President has sent us his budget
for the fiscal year 2003. In that document he makes requests
for substantial additional resources for homeland security.
This committee and the Congress will certainly give those
requests thorough and thoughtful consideration.
We'll be working at night, while some people in the country
are sleeping, confident that we will do our duty. There ought
to be bipartisanship in this endeavor, and there is
bipartisanship here. There is no partisanship on this
committee, there is no middle aisle on this committee. When
Senator Stevens was chairman I was his good right hand man, so
to speak. I worked with him with full cooperation, and I'm
receiving that same full cooperation now.
The coming fiscal year does not begin until October 1.
Assuming that the appropriations bills are signed into law by
that date, it would still take time for States and communities
to apply for the funding, and even more time for the agencies
and the departments to process the applications. As a result,
the homeland defense funds in the fiscal year 2003
appropriations bills may not actually be available for nearly 1
year from now. That delay represents valuable time wasted.
The committee is concerned about the needs here and now.
Lives may depend upon rapid response, here at the Federal level
as well as at the State and local levels. The President sent
Congress a supplemental request for the current fiscal year,
totalling $28.6 billion. Of that amount, $5.3 billion is for
homeland defense, with $4.39 billion aimed at airport security.
The holes in the Nation's airport security are well
documented. But airports are not our only concern. The litany
of potential security risks is long and it is daunting. It is
our hope that the witnesses we will hear throughout these
hearings will help us to sort out and sort through the
vulnerabilities and determine not only what we need to do, but
also what we need to do immediately.
I thank all of our witnesses for coming to Washington to
share with the Senate Appropriations Committee their insights
and their judgments about homeland security at the State and
local levels. We look forward to learning from all of you who
are testifying this afternoon and tomorrow in this room. I now
recognize my friend and colleague Senator Ted Stevens, the
ranking member of this committee, for any remarks that he may
wish to make.
Following Senator Stevens' remarks we will hear from our
first witnesses. And because of scheduling problems that have
arisen for some of our witnesses this morning, it is the
Chair's intention to call the witnesses for the morning session
to come to the witness table at this time. Is Governor Engler
in the room?
Governor Barnes. Mr. Chairman, I think Governor Engler is--
I think he is a little late. I'm told he is delayed.
Chairman Byrd. Alright.
Governor Barnes. Mr. Chairman, I think Governor Engler is
here. He is across the hall at the Senate Finance Committee.
Chairman Byrd. Okay. When he comes, someone will help him
to his chair at the table, please. After we hear from Senator
Stevens we will then hear from each of our five witnesses, and
then we will have a round of questions by members of this
committee. We will hear from our Nation's Governors this
morning, who present the views of the National Governor's
Association on homeland security issues.
Governor John Engler of Michigan is currently serving as
chairman of the National Governor's Association. Governor
Engler was first elected as Governor in 1990 and that makes him
now the Nation's most senior Governor. Governor Roy Barnes of
Georgia was elected Governor in 1998 and is now serving as
Georgia's 80th Governor. Georgia is one of the original 13. I
recall that William Few and Abraham Baldwin of Georgia signed
the Constitution of the United States.
Governor Barnes. Along with Burton Gwinnett.
Chairman Byrd. No, no, just two. Those two signed the--
there were others that attended, but only those two signed.
Governor Gary Locke of Washington was elected as Washington's
21st Governor in 1996. He was re-elected in 2000 to a second
term. These Governors are on the front lines in our Nation's
homeland security effort. We want to hear from them. We want to
hear about what is happening at the State level. We know the
homeland security initiative won't work unless all levels of
government are working together.
We also have Dr. Stephen Gale from the University of
Pennsylvania. Dr. Gale is an associate professor of political
science at the University and also the director of the
organizational dynamics program. He is an expert on the subject
of terrorism, having done extensive research on it. He also is
a consultant on security and terrorism issues.
We are also privileged to have Dr. Ashton Carter from
Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. Dr. Carter
is the Ford Foundation Professor of Science and International
Affairs at the Kennedy School. He serves as co-director, with
former Secretary of Defense William Perry, of the Harvard-
Stanford Preventive Defense Project. He served as Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy from
1993 to 1996.
We welcome all of you. We thank you all for coming. So, I
now turn to my colleague, the ranking member of the
Appropriations Committee, Mr. Stevens, for any comments he
wishes to make.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR TED STEVENS
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
welcome the opportunity to join you in convening these hearings
before our committee. And I'm going to ask that my full
statement appear in the record as so read, because I'm sure
that others have comments to make too, and I want to get along
with our hearing.
I want to re-emphasize that the Chairman has conferred with
me on all of the witnesses and we have attempted to respond to
the wishes of national organizations, such as the Governor's
Council and other organizations, to pick representatives of
national committees to show that we have the views of those who
are deeply concerned with homeland defense. I think the actions
that have been taken by our President and Congress reflect a
level of cooperation and mutual trust that has not been
witnessed since the Second World War. And we really have a deep
problem now to pursue the requests that have been made by the
President and to get the information we need to really
determine how the funds that are requested should be reflected
in the actions of this committee, and how they should be
treated, really.
We have a $27 billion request from the President to fight
terrorists abroad, and we also have a package of $38 billion in
homeland defense initiatives presented by the President. It is
a combination of $65 billion. It reflects the largest
commitment of Federal resources to any security threat since
the Vietnam War, and significantly exceeds the $15 billion
appropriated by the President during the Gulf War.
We have to reassure the public that the Congress and the
President are prepared to make available whatever resources are
needed to meet the threats. Mr. Chairman I look forward to not
only these hearings, but I am sure there will be follow-on
hearings where we will hear from various representatives of the
administration to attain their views on the testimony taken
here now. But again, I want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for
your approach to this.
It is a bipartisan hearing. It has been scheduled and the
witnesses represent--maybe not exactly the witnesses I would
have had the revolution not taken place last year--but they
certainly reflect our judgment on the balance that is necessary
to pursue this very complicated subject. So again, I thank you
very much and look forward to this hearing.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Ted Stevens
Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to join you in convening
these hearings before our committee.
In response to the horrific attacks against our nation on September
11th, we have all learned how vulnerable our nation was to the actions
of determined, suicidal murderers.
We have also witnessed the strength of the character of the
American people, who while mourning our dead, sought justice and
security for the living.
The actions taken by our President and Congress reflect a level of
cooperation and mutual trust not witnessed since the Second World War.
In a matter of days following the attacks against New York and
Washington, the Congress and the White House joined in a $40 billion
package to set the nation on the right course to respond to the
humanitarian crisis in New York, secure our borders and air space, and
go after the Al Queda and Taliban terrorists.
By any definition, that effort in the intervening seven months has
been an extraordinary success.
Our work in this regard is far from finished.
While we have made great progress in the war against terrorism, we
have taken only the initial steps in a comprehensive campaign to ensure
our nation is secure at home, as well as militarily powerful abroad.
This committee is uniquely charged with allocating resources among
federal agencies to address these threats.
The testimony by non-governmental witnesses over the next two days
will shed considerable light on the perceived threats and challenges at
every level of government in our nation, and by those who will be
called upon first to respond to any potential future attacks.
Before the committee now is a $27 billion request by the President
for these next steps in the fight against terrorism, at home and
abroad.
Later this year, the committee will consider a package of $38
billion in homeland defense initiatives presented by the President.
This combination of $65 billion reflects the largest commitment of
federal resources to any security threat since the Vietnam War, and
significantly exceeds the $15 billion appropriated by Congress for the
gulf war.
Our job is to consider these requests, and make sure the money goes
to meet the most pressing needs, and will deliver real security for the
taxpayers of this nation.
It is my hope the chairman will follow these hearings with sessions
where senior administration officials will testify, and explain the
priorities reflected in this package of $65 billion in counter-
terrorism and homeland defense priorities.
There is no question the Congress and the President are prepared to
make available whatever resources are need for this fight.
We must equally be vigilant that the federal resources provided
focus on the aspects of this war that the federal government should,
and must take responsibility for.
I look forward to the testimony by the witnesses scheduled for
today and tomorrow, and again thank the chairman for taking this
initiative.
ADDITIONAL SUBMITTED STATEMENTS
[Clerk's Note.--Several members have asked that their
submitted statements be made part of the record.]
Prepared Statement of Senator Christopher S. Bond
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling these two days of hearings on
homeland security with a primary focus on state and local capabilities
and needs with regard to acts of terrorism. The VA/HUD Appropriations
Subcommittee has held four hearings since September 11th on homeland
security issues which included testimony from mayors on local needs and
capacity, testimony by the EPA on anthrax and the clean-up of the
Senate Hart building, testimony on the needs of America's firefighters,
and testimony by FEMA on its role in terrorism response. Nevertheless,
there are many issues and concerns that need to be addressed as we move
forward on the President's budget request for fiscal year 2003 and the
fiscal year 2002 Supplemental and these hearings are critical to a
better and more complete understanding of the issues and costs.
While the President has advanced a plan since September 11th which
the Congress has begun to fund, there is still significant work to be
finished before we have in place the necessary protection and
capacities to respond to both the threat of acts of terrorism and the
consequences of such acts. In particular, we need a statutory structure
that will enable the various agencies of both the states and the
federal government to coordinate and build a federal, state and local
capacity to fully respond to acts of terrorism, including acts
involving weapons of mass destruction.
We must do more to ensure that states and localities have the
needed resources, training and equipment to respond to threats and acts
of terrorism and the consequences of such acts. In response, the
President is proposing to fund FEMA at an unprecedented $3.5 billion
for fiscal year 2003 to ensure that the Nation will not be caught
unaware again by a cowardly act of terrorism and is fully capable of
responding to both the threat and consequence of any act of terrorism.
More recently, the President has requested $327 million in the fiscal
year 2002 Supplemental appropriation as an additional downpayment this
year for FEMA to provide equipment and training grants to states and
localities to improve terrorism and chemical-biological response
capabilities. These funds include $50 million for the President's new
Citizen Corp initiative.
Despite the response to September 11th, the current capacity of our
communities and our First Responders vary widely across the United
States, with even the best prepared States and localities lacking
crucial resources and expertise. Many areas have little or no ability
to cope or respond to the consequences and aftermath of a terrorist
attack, especially ones that use weapons of mass destruction, including
biological or chemical toxins or nuclear radioactive weapons.
The recommended commitment of funding in the President's Budget for
fiscal years 2002 and 2003 is only the first step. There also needs to
be a comprehensive approach that identifies and meets state and local
First Responder needs, both rural and urban, pursuant to federal
leadership, benchmarks and guidelines.
As part of this approach, I introduced S. 2061, the National
Response to Terrorism and Consequence Management Act of 2002. This
legislation is intended to move the federal government forward in
developing that comprehensive approach with regard to the consequence
management of acts of terrorism. The bill establishes in FEMA an office
for coordinating the federal, state and local capacity to respond to
the aftermath and consequences of acts of terrorism. This essentially
represents a beginning statutory structure for the existing Office of
National Preparedness within FEMA as the responsibilities in this
legislation are consistent with many of the actions of that office
currently. This bill also provides FEMA with the authority to make
grants of technical assistance to states to develop the capacity and
coordination of resources to respond to acts of terrorism. In addition,
the bill authorizes $100 million for states to operate fire and safety
programs as a step to further build the capacity of fire departments to
respond to local emergencies as well as the often larger problems posed
by acts of terrorism. America's firefighters are, with the police and
emergency medical technicians, the backbone of our Nation and the first
line of defense in responding to the consequences of acts of terrorism.
The legislation also formally recognizes and funds the urban search
and rescue task force response system at $160 million in fiscal year
2002. The Nation currently is served by 28 urban search and rescue task
forces which proved to be a key resource in our Nation's ability to
quickly respond to the tragedy of September 11th. In addition, Missouri
is the proud home of one of these urban search and rescue task forces,
Missouri Task Force 1. Missouri Task Force 1 made a tremendous
difference in helping the victims of the horrific tragedy at the World
Trade Center as well as assisting to minimize the aftermath of this
tragedy. These task forces currently are underfunded and underequipped,
but, nonetheless, are committed to be the front-line solders for our
local governments in responding to the worst consequences of terrorism
at the local level. I believe we have an obligation to realize fully
the capacity of these 28 search and rescue task forces to meet First
Responder events and this legislation authorizes the needed funding.
Finally, the bill removes the risk of litigation that currently
discourages the donation of fire equipment to volunteer fire
departments. As we have discovered in the last several years, volunteer
fire departments are underfunded, leaving the firefighters with the
desire and will to assist their communities to fight fires and respond
to local emergencies but without the necessary equipment or training
that is so critical to the success of their profession. We have started
providing needed funding for these departments through the Fire Act
Grant program at FEMA. However, more needs to be done and this
legislation is intended to facilitate the donation of used, but useful,
equipment to these volunteer fire departments.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Prepared Statement of Senator Tim Johnson
I would like to thank Chairman Byrd and Senator Stevens for holding
this series of hearings on homeland security. There is no issue of more
importance to the long-term safety of the American people than our
ability to establish and coordinate an effective homeland security
policy. As we begin to consider our budgetary priorities for fiscal
year 2003, it is appropriate for the full Appropriations Committee to
conduct a detailed examination of the complex issues surrounding our
homeland security needs. By relying on the information and expertise of
a broad array of on-the-ground experts, I am hopeful these hearings
will highlight not only what we are doing right, but areas in which
Congress must better focus attention and resources.
Our country's reaction to the tragedies of September 11 was nothing
short of remarkable. Despite the devastating attacks and the fear of an
uncertain future, there was no panic in the streets. Instead, the
American people were somber and resolute in our commitment to honor
those who had died, to rebuild from the destruction, and to ensure that
we would decrease our vulnerability to future terrorist attacks.
In confronting the challenges presented by homeland security, we
face two major obstacles. First, the very idea of defending the entire
United States from future attacks is daunting because our nation is so
large and the threats are so diverse. From airport security to public
health, from food safety to improved border control, homeland security
requires a comprehensive strategy. The complexity of the problem and
the need to define the scope of the threats is one of the reasons why
these hearings are so important.
The second major challenge of homeland security is coordinating the
efforts of federal, state, and local agencies. This means ensuring
there is compatibility between the various agencies, and that local
entities have sufficient funding to fulfill their homeland security
missions. Work in this area has already begun, thanks in large part to
Senator Byrd's insistence that we make a down payment on homeland
security needs in last year's budget.
As a result of that money, the South Dakota Division of Emergency
Management is providing equipment acquisition grants to South Dakota
cities to identify, isolate, and clean-up hazardous materials. FEMA is
providing grants to local firefighters to make certain they have the
equipment necessary to respond to new threats. Federal dollars are
being used to upgrade ambulance services across the state with new
computers and software that will streamline data collection and improve
communications. These resources will allow the ambulance services to
communicate and share information in the event of a widespread bio-
terrorism attack. Over the last few years, I have worked to secure
federal funding to upgrade the NOAA weather radio system in South
Dakota. In addition to providing timely information about dangerous
weather, this system will also be used to distribute official notices
and instructions in the event of a bio-hazard or bio-terrorism attack.
Not only should we focus on providing resources to new efforts, we
should also utilize existing programs and activities to strengthen our
homeland security response initiatives. The Disaster Mental Health
Institute (DMHI) at the University of South Dakota provides mental
health services to communities following major tragedies. The DMHI is a
truly ``one-of-a kind'' Center of Excellence whose members have
literally served around the world in response to emergency situations,
including New York City in the wake of the September 11 attacks.
I would also like to note that the University of South Dakota
School of Medicine will be holding a 2-day symposium in May on the risk
and response to bio-terrorism. This symposium is designed to help
medical personnel, hospital administrators, law enforcement, first
responders, and elected officials discuss the importance of multi-
disciplinary disaster planning and to develop active steps for the next
level of disaster planning.
These are just a few examples of how state and local entities in
South Dakota are beginning to address the challenges of homeland
security. As we look to build upon the funding approved in fiscal year
2002, we must keep in mind the needs of rural America. Often faced with
geographic isolation, low population density, and poor economic
conditions, many rural areas confront the same risks as urban centers,
but lack the funds needed for proper equipment and training. As we
prepare to defend America, we cannot let rural America fall further
behind.
Let me also take a few moments to talk about one of the most
important federal-state partnerships that is already yielding benefits
in the effort to secure our nation. The National Guard is the oldest
component of our Armed Forces. Since its earliest days, the Guard has
served a dual, federal-state role. The National Guard provides states
with trained and equipped units available to protect life and property
during emergency situations. In addition, the Guard provides the
federal government with military units trained and available to be
called up to active duty to defend our nation. Since September 11, more
than 50,000 members of the National Guard have been called up by the
states and federal government to provide homeland security and to fight
the war on terrorism. As we speak, the National Guard can be found
protecting our nation's airports, assisting at critical U.S. border
checkpoints, flying protective missions over U.S. cities, and providing
disaster preparedness in the states. I am certainly proud of the men
and women serving in the South Dakota National Guard. Their
contributions to the security of the people of South Dakota and the
nation are greatly appreciated.
One of the most important lessons learned over the last few months
is that homeland security is not just an issue for the federal
government--the front lines are in our local communities, whether that
community is New York or Aberdeen, South Dakota. Almost immediately
after September 11, in small towns and big cities across the country,
communities began to come together to examine what they needed to do to
protect themselves and their families. The challenges are enormous.
Yet, I have no doubt about our ultimate ability to prevail against
terrorism both abroad and here at home. Once again, I thank Senators
Byrd and Stevens for holding these hearings and for their leadership on
this committee. I look forward to hearing the ideas of our witnesses
and to working with my colleagues to ensure Congress provides the
resources necessary to keep the American people safe.
Chairman Byrd. Governor Locke, would you proceed first?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATTY MURRAY
Senator Murray. Mr. Chairman, before the Governor speaks,
if I could just have a moment just to welcome the Governor from
my home State of Washington here. He has travelled a long way
to be here this morning and I really appreciate his coming and
joining us. He has a great deal of expertise to share with this
committee this morning. Washington State has an international
border. We have major seaports, major airports, critical
defense installations. As the members of this committee know,
we have had first hand experience with potential terrorists
when in December of 1999 an al Qaeda insider named Ahmed Ressam
came across our border and was apprehended. So I really
appreciate the Governor coming here today and sharing his
expertise with all of us, and I am pleased to be able to
introduce him to this committee today.
Chairman Byrd. The Chair thanks Senator Murray. Governor
Locke, would you----
Senator Stevens. Mr. Chairman, could I interrupt?
Chairman Byrd. Mr. Stevens.
Senator Stevens. I note that there's only cameras on this
side of the aisle--of our table. I wonder why the gallery on
the other side is not open for the press also?
Chairman Byrd. We don't do that.
Senator Stevens. Well I'd like to be informed later, thank
you. I thank you very much Senator.
Chairman Byrd. I had nothing to do with the placement of
the cameras, certainly. And I want my Republican friends to
have equal billing here. That has always been my position.
Senator Stevens. Thank you.
Chairman Byrd. Governor Locke.
STATEMENT OF HON. GARY LOCKE, GOVERNOR, STATE OF
WASHINGTON
Governor Locke. Thank you very much, Chairman Byrd, Senator
Stevens, Senator Murray and members of the Senate
Appropriations Committee. Thank you very much for the
opportunity to testify on homeland security on behalf of the
State of Washington and its citizens. I especially want to
thank you all for continuing to make homeland security a top
priority, a non-partisan priority, and especially as it
involves State and local governments.
September 11th dealt a very hard blow to Washington State's
economy and our State's budget situation. Because of our heavy
reliance on the aerospace industry, the nature of the September
11th attacks and their devastating impact on air transportation
across our country, plunged our State into recession. The
national recession, which was severely aggravated by the events
of September 11th, has cost Washington over 70,000 jobs, and
sent our unemployment rate soaring to a high 7.6 percent, the
second highest in the Nation.
At the same time, the national unemployment rate was around
6 percent. And while it appears that the national economy is
beginning to rebound, Boeing is not yet half way through its
announced lay offs of some 30,000 aerospace jobs in the State
of Washington. The economic recovery in our State will
significantly lag the rest of the Nation.
Washington State has also had to close a $1.6 billion
deficit. We accomplished this with over $700 million in painful
cuts in human services and education programs, layoffs of State
employees and other measures. Despite these challenges,
Washington State is strongly committed to partnering with the
Federal Government to ensure strong homeland security.
Our agencies and public health jurisdictions have already
spent an additional $8 million since September 11th on a wide
range of terrorism response measures, including increased
overtime pay for public health and law enforcement personnel,
new equipment, statewide vulnerability assessments and response
plans, protection of our ferrys and other transportation
facilities, and other prevention measures. But the national
recession and severe budget shortfalls experienced by some 40
States across our country place real limits on what the States
can do. We must have sustained Federal financial assistance,
since the Federal Government has the primary responsibility for
homeland security.
For our State that means an immediate and long term
financial commitment to bolster the security of our seaports
and other infrastructure, such as railroads, highways and
bridges. Washington State, with its extensive coastline, is
vulnerable and has already experienced the smuggling of human
cargo through its international ports. I urge the committee's
favorable consideration of the administration's request for
additional funding for the United States Coast Guard.
There's also an urgent need for sustained Federal support
for bioterrorism preparedness, including support to the States
and local communities to develop plans and hold terrorism
response exercises. Since these new threats are long term the
United States must adopt new approaches that ensure multi-year
Federal funding, much as the Congress has historically done for
the Department of Defense.
One of the issues of critical importance include the need
to share critical intelligence and security information with
key State and local officials who must partner with the Federal
Government to prevent terrorism. Governors need timely and
secure access to intelligence information from a number of
Federal agencies, and those agencies need to share information
with one another as well as with State officials. It is both
costly and grossly inefficient to require our officials to
obtain a separate security clearance from each separate Federal
agency or for one Federal agency to refuse to recognize the
security clearances granted by another Federal agency. And
that, Mr. Chairman, is the current situation.
For example, State agencies are trying to get security
clearances from FEMA. And should those be granted, the
clearances will not allow us to receive similar intelligence
information from the FBI. Federal security clearances should be
standardized and reciprocal between agencies and levels of
government.
Border security is absolutely critical for our State, which
has one of the busiest border crossings in the Nation. While
Washington State has not had a single credible terrorist threat
against it, its people or any installations within the State of
Washington, a documented terrorist was apprehended entering
Washington State from Canada just before the new millennium.
Ahmed Ressam was arrested getting off a car ferry at Port
Angeles on his way to commit a terrorist attack against LA
International Airport. His car was loaded with explosives.
I am therefore grateful for the authorization of increased
Federal staffing along the United States-Canadian border.
However, I and many other Governors along the United States-
Canadian border are still concerned about one, the length of
time it is taking to add trained border agents along our United
States-Canada border. And two, until additional border agents
are in place we are concerned about the decision to Federalize
the National Guard troops for border duty. And we also have
grave concerns about the decision to have these troops serve
unarmed. That decision results in the inefficient deployment of
our National Guard men and women, and adds an undue burden on
Federal agencies to provide force protection when they should
be focused on preventing suspicious materials and people from
entering the country.
Here is an example. Some of our border crossings are closed
at night, but they are still monitored by armed border agents.
But because our National Guardsmen are unarmed, under the terms
of their Federal deployment, they cannot be be the sole
security force at night. They cannot free up these Federal
agents for re-deployment to other, busier parts of our border,
thereby helping provide greater security and ease and speed up
the flow of people across our borders.
The National Guard troops should be activated under Title
32, or State control, in the same manner the States activated
the Guard for airport security. Under State authority the
Nation's Governors provided immediate assistance to the Federal
Government at the airports within days of the September 11th
attacks. Under the Federalization approach it has taken almost
6 months to get relief at our Nation's border crossings.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I emphasize the important role of
the States in managing and coordinating homeland security
funding. Although a large percentage of funds clearly must
support community-based emergency preparedness and first
responders, those funds should be channeled through the States
to ensure a calculated and collaborative statewide strategy. In
Washington State for example, we have an Emergency Management
Council that includes representatives of our cities, counties,
fire chiefs, police chiefs, sheriffs, Federal agencies,
National Guard, seismic safety experts, public health, search
and rescue personnel, and the private industry.
The Emergency Management Council, in turn, has a committee
on terrorism that has been meeting monthly for the past 2\1/2\
years. It includes 60 people including Federal agents. These
groups advise the adjutant general and me on emergency
preparedness strategies and policies. And our State is using
these groups to oversee the distribution and allocation of FEMA
and Department of Justice grant monies, and other Federal
funds, to ensure a coordinated and collaborative strategy for
using Federal funds to enhance our preparation and response to
any acts of terrorism.
Only in that manner can programs be implemented
consistently and comprehensively to raise capacity throughout
all regions of our Nation. And because of the severe deficits
faced by some 40 States, and most local governments within
those States, traditional Federal match requirements, including
so-called soft-matches, may be difficult if not impossible for
jurisdictions to achieve. We ask that you consider that as you
make any appropriations and provide any Federal assistance to
the States and local governments.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee I urge you to
develop a consistent, long term funding structure that helps
State and local governments prepare for this new era of global
terrorism. And, I thank you for your leadership to help our
States and our Nation respond to this new but very real threat
to our peace and freedoms. Thank you very much.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement Governor Gary Locke
Chairman Byrd, Senator Stevens, and members of the Committee, I
appreciate this opportunity to submit testimony to you regarding
homeland security impacts on the State of Washington and its citizens.
I want to thank you for your kind invitation to present this
testimony in person to the full committee. And I want to thank you all
for continuing to make support for state and local government homeland
security a top national priority.
SEPTEMBER 11 AND WASHINGTON'S ECONOMY
It is important to place the impact of the September 11 terrorist
attacks within the context of Washington's economy and the pressures
placed on it in recent months. Because our state is so heavily reliant
on the aerospace industry, the attacks had a particularly severe impact
on Washington. The nature of the attacks and their devastating effects
on air transportation dealt a more severe blow to our economy than to
the economies of most other states and the nation.
Prior to September 11, the state was already in the midst of an
aerospace downturn, which had resulted in the loss of 27,400 jobs
between 1998 and 2000. That downturn appeared to be over. But, in the
wake of the attacks, Boeing announced 20,000 to 30,000 additional lay-
offs. The majority of those were in Washington, home of the commercial
airline unit.
The events of September 11 exacerbated the national economic
downturn and, due mostly to cutbacks in aerospace, plunged Washington
into recession.
These impacts have been felt in our employment rates. Since
September 11, Washington has experienced deep declines in employment.
Payroll employment fell at a 3.2 percent rate in the fourth quarter of
2001. That followed a 2.4 percent drop in the third quarter and a 2.5
percent reduction in the second quarter. Only twice in the last 40
years has Washington seen such a precipitous decline in its employment
rates.
Altogether, the national recession, severely aggravated by the
events of September 11, has cost Washington over 70,000 jobs and sent
its unemployment rate soaring to a high of 7.6 percent, the second
highest in the nation. At the same time, the national unemployment rate
was six percent.
Washington, like other northern tier states, has an extensive and
largely unprotected border with Canada. For that reason, border
security is a critical priority for our state, which has one of the
busiest border crossings in the nation. While we have not had any
credible terrorist threats, Washington has had instances where known
terrorists, like Ahmed Ressam, have been apprehended while trying to
enter the United States from Canada.
In addition, our communities bordering Canada were severely
impacted by heavy traffic congestion and delays at border crossings in
the wake of September 11 events. Early estimates from border
communities showed that they experienced a 50 percent reduction in
retail sales attributable to Canadian shoppers immediately after
September 11. They have not yet recovered.
Washington and other northern tier states sincerely appreciate the
additional federal staffing that has been authorized at Canadian border
crossings as a result of actions taken by this Committee and the
special efforts of Senators Murray and Cantwell.
All of these devastating effects have caused severe budget problems
for the state. In December of 2001, our General Fund budget problem
stood at more that $1 billion. By mid-February of this year, the
projected problem had risen to $1.6 billion. The Legislature closed the
gap for this biennium with almost $700 million in painful budget cuts
and a mixture of other equally difficult measures. The aftermath of
September 11 will continue to present difficult fiscal challenges even
in the next biennium.
Coping with these budget problems has been a daunting task for our
state agencies, which are now faced with a hiring freeze and extensive
layoffs to erase the red ink.
STATE HOMELAND SECURITY EFFORTS AND NEEDS
In spite of these challenges, our agencies and local public health
jurisdictions responded to the call for increased homeland security.
They are facing unprecedented responsibilities in providing for
sustained security and protection of critical infrastructure. They have
expended an additional $8 million on terrorism response activities,
ranging from increased overtime pay for public health and emergency
personnel, purchasing new specialized equipment and gear, preparing
risk and vulnerability assessments and response plans, protecting
transportation facilities such as our state ferries, enhancing
electronic monitoring capacity, and other actions.
Faced with declining economies and severe budget shortfalls,
Washington, like other states, must receive sustained financial
assistance from the federal government, which has the primary
responsibility to provide for homeland security.
Security of our nation's seaports and related infrastructure must
receive immediate and long-term federal attention and funding.
Washington, with its extensive coastline, is particularly vulnerable
and has already experienced smuggling of human cargo through its ports.
I, therefore, urge the Committee to give favorable consideration to the
Administration's request for additional funding for the U.S. Coast
Guard.
PUBLIC HEALTH NEEDS AND THE BIOTERRORISM THREAT
Public health and homeland security are absolutely critical. In the
post-September 11 world, we must assume that a major bioterrorism
attack is a likely occurrence. It is our responsibility to prepare and
train accordingly. But states need a sustained financial commitment to
preparedness, so we can be ready to protect public health during a
bioterrorism incident, an infectious disease outbreak, and during other
health emergencies.
Preparedness is an expensive but essential investment. Every part
of our state must be ready. Our citizens live near unprotected borders,
major dams, nuclear sites, and military bases. We need the resources to
plan for emergencies, train the people who will be responding first,
and practice so we are prepared.
We have identified several immediate needs that must have a
continued source of funding if we are to successfully address
bioterrorism threats. These include increased local and state
communicable disease surveillance to detect bioterrorism events,
training of clinicians, hospital staff, and first responders, secure
statewide communication systems, and enhanced public health laboratory
capacity.
The National Pharmaceutical Stockpile is an integral part of
preparedness. However, states urgently need resources so they can be
ready to use it. States and local communities must develop and exercise
plans for receiving the stockpile and distributing the medication to
people quickly and efficiently.
We are grateful that Congress and your committee recognized the
importance of these needs and that we will be receiving funding for
many of them in fiscal 2002. But, it is critical these programs receive
continued funding in future years.
During our nation's civil war, President Abraham Lincoln cautioned,
``As our cause is new, we must think anew and act anew''. We now face
unprecedented threats to our homeland security. As these threats are
new, we must think anew and act anew. And as these threats are long
term, we must adopt a long-term operational and fiscal plan for
defending against and defeating those who would attack our citizens.
This new approach will require programmed, multi-year federal funding
for homeland security and bioterrorism protection, much as we have done
historically for the Department of Defense.
SHARING CRITICAL SECURITY INFORMATION
A second critical need involves sharing of sensitive information on
terrorist threats from all federal sources with Governors and other key
state officials and local public safety officials. The sharing of
intelligence is critical if we are to make informed decisions at all
levels of government regarding terrorist threats, and effectively
defend against them. Most of this information comes from federal
sources, and there must be a system that provides timely access to it
in order to prevent or mitigate terrorist attacks.
At the request of my office and the State Attorney General's
office, Washington's Legislature recently approved legislation that
modified our open public records law to expand restrictions on the
release of sensitive terrorism-related documents, including those
received from federal agencies. We now have much greater assurance that
these documents will be protected and not end up in the hands of those
who would harm our citizens.
CROSS RECOGNITION OF SECURITY CLEARANCES
A related and equally important issue is the need to ensure that
federal security clearances for key state and local officials are
standardized and reciprocal between agencies and levels of government.
It does not make sense for state and local officials who need access to
critical terrorism-related intelligence to be required to obtain a
separate security clearance from each separate federal agency or for
one federal agency to refuse to recognize security clearances granted
by another federal agency. That is what is currently happening and it
is costly and grossly inefficient.
As Governor, I need timely and secure access to intelligence
information from a number of federal agencies and those federal
agencies need to be able to share information with one another and with
me and other key state officials, such as Adjutants General, state
Secretaries of Health, and state police chiefs, as well as with key
local officials, such as mayors and county executives.
BORDER SECURITY AND THE FEDERALIZATION OF THE GUARD
With respect to border security, we are grateful for the increased
federal staffing that has been authorized and for the use of National
Guard troops to augment other federal resources on the borders.
However, we continue to have concerns about the decision to federalize
these troops under Title 10 of the United States Code, and have grave
concerns about the decision to allow these troops to serve unarmed.
That decision places these troops in unnecessary danger and adds undue
burden on federal agents to provide force protection when they should
be focused on preventing suspicious materials and people from entering
the country.
We believe these troops should be activated under Title 32 in the
service of the United States in the same manner as the Guard was
activated for airport security immediately following the September 11
attacks and as the Guard has been used to support law enforcement
agencies for more than a decade under the National Guard Counter-Drug
Program. Title 32 duty allows the Guard to be used in the service of
the federal government while retaining a meaningful role for the
governors and the states in overall mission execution. Title 32 duty
also assures equal pay and benefits for equal service regardless of a
Guard member's duty location. Title 32 facilitates use of the entire
National Guard, both Army and Air, as has been done for airport
security, as opposed to use of one service component only, as has been
done with federalization of the Army National Guard for border
security. Using the entire National Guard force, both Army and Air,
under the state's Title 32 force management authority significantly
enhances our ability to assist the federal government while assuring
our preparedness for state emergencies.
Finally, Title 32 duty is far more cost efficient, flexible, and
responsive in meeting federal needs than is Title 10 duty. The nation's
governors provided no-notice assistance to the federal government in
deploying Air and Army National Guard troops to 420 airports within
days of the September 11 attacks. This mission has been carried out in
direct support of the designated lead federal agency, the FAA, and has
been executed flawlessly and in a uniform manner at airports in every
state, territory, and the District of Columbia.
By contrast, in October and November 2001, border state governors
proffered, and federal agencies such as the Border Patrol, Customs and
the INS specifically asked for, Title 32 National Guard assistance for
enhancing security and speeding private and commercial vehicle passage
at our nation's land border crossings. Because of the Defense
Department's insistence on federalizing the Army National Guard for
this mission, a costly national command structure had to be created and
the mission has taken more than six (6) months to get off the ground.
Under Title 32, the federal government had critical National Guard
assistance at our airports in less than six days; under Title 10 it has
taken more than six months to get relief at our nation's border
crossings.
FEDERAL FUNDING AND THE STATE'S ROLE
Finally, I wish to address the important issues of how federal
funding is made available to state and local governments and what
restrictions or qualifications should be placed on eligibility for
homeland security assistance. It is critical that federal funding for
homeland security be allocated to the states for distribution to local
governments. Although a large percentage of homeland security funding
should be earmarked for enhancing the preparedness of our community-
based emergency management organizations and emergency responder
agencies, it must be channeled through the states in order to insure
enhancement of regional intra-state improvements in our domestic
security infrastructure.
In Washington, for example, we have a state Emergency Management
Council that includes representatives of our cities, counties, fire
chiefs, police chiefs, sheriffs, National Guard, seismic safety
experts, public health, building officials, search and rescue, and
private industry. The Emergency Management Council, in turn, has a
Committee on Terrorism that has been meeting monthly for the past two
and one half years. The Committee on Terrorism includes representatives
from more than 60 federal, state, local and private sector
organizations. These bodies function under state law to advise the
Adjutant General and me on emergency preparedness strategies and
policies.
We also use these bodies to oversee the distribution and allocation
of FEMA and Department of Justice grant monies and other federal funds
to assure a conscious, calculated, and collaborative strategy for using
federal funds to enhance our community and regional intra-state
preparation for natural and manmade disasters. Only in that manner can
programs be implemented consistently and comprehensively to raise
capacity throughout all regions of the nation.
I began my testimony by acknowledging the daunting financial
challenges the attacks of September 11 have thrust upon the state of
Washington. Governors, legislators, and local officials throughout the
nation are confronted with similar challenges and, like Washington, are
unable to generate revenues sufficient to meet the new demands of
homeland security while still satisfying the other mandates of state
and local governance.
As the threat to our national security is new, so we must think
anew and act anew. The federal government must take a new approach in
order to ``jump start'' national preparedness for further terrorist
attacks. It is imperative that homeland security funding for the next
two to three fiscal years (what I refer to as the critical
transformation period for assuring homeland security) not be tied to
traditional federal matching requirements. Under current economic
conditions, and in light of new national security demands, traditional
matching requirements are simply a bridge too far and will preclude
states and local governments from taking the steps necessary to enhance
our national security. As much as we recognize the need for enhancing
our emergency response infrastructure, many states and local
governments will not be able to take advantage of federal
transformation initiatives because of a lack of matching funds.
Given the sheer size of the national problem and the magnitude of
the funding that Congress has recognized is needed, so-called ``soft
matches'' may be equally difficult or impossible to achieve. I,
therefore, urge you to develop a transformation strategy for making
necessary funds available to the states, and through the states to
local governments, for enhancing state, local, regional and national
preparedness for this new era of global terrorism.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Biographical Sketch of Governor Gary Locke
MAKING WASHINGTON A BETTER PLACE TO LIVE, WORK, AND RAISE A FAMILY
Gary Locke was elected Washington's 21st governor on Nov. 5, 1996,
making him the first Chinese-American governor in U.S. history. As
governor, he has worked to make Washington public schools the best in
the nation, promote jobs and economic development in rural and urban
areas, and fight juvenile crime. On Nov. 7, 2000, the governor, a
Democrat, was re-elected to his second term.
Born into an immigrant family on Jan. 21, 1950, Gary spent his
first six years in Seattle's Yesler Terrace, a public housing project
for families of World War II veterans. His father, James Locke, served
in the 5th Armored Division of the U.S. Army under General George
Patton and landed on the beaches of Normandy shortly after D-Day.
Following the war, James Locke met his wife, Julie, in Hong Kong and
settled in Seattle, where they raised their five children.
Gary worked in his father's grocery store. He worked hard, became
an Eagle Scout, and graduated with honors from Seattle's Franklin High
School in 1968. Then, through a combination of part-time jobs,
financial aid and scholarships, Gary attended Yale University, where he
received his bachelor's degree in political science in 1972. After
earning a law degree from Boston University in 1975, he worked for
several years as a deputy prosecutor in King County, prosecuting people
for crimes such as robbery and murder.
In 1982, Gary was elected to the Washington State House of
Representatives, where he served on the House Judiciary and
Appropriations committees, with his final five years as chairman of the
House Appropriations Committee. As chairman, Gary negotiated bipartisan
budgets that increased college and university enrollments, improved
children's health-care services, and strengthened environmental
protections.
Gary was elected chief executive of King County in 1993 and took on
all of the challenges facing Washington's most complex urban area.
During his term, he cut the budget, expanded transit services,
established a program to reward county departments for saving money,
and developed a nationally acclaimed growth management plan.
As governor, Gary has worked to make Washington a better place to
live, work, and raise a family. Believing that education is the great
equalizer, he has made it his top priority. He created Washington's
Promise Scholarships for top high school students from working, middle-
class families. He has pushed to hire more teachers and to reduce class
size in the K-12 system. He appointed an Academic Achievement and
Accountability Commission to help identify and improve schools that are
struggling in the effort to raise test scores. He also created the
Washington Reading Corps to help students who are struggling as they
learn to read. And his Youth Safety Summit brought together educators,
community leaders, students, and law enforcement leaders to begin
addressing school violence.
In 1997, Gary signed into law a landmark welfare reform bill that
puts work first and has reduced the number of families on welfare by
almost a third. He helped roll back business and occupation taxes for
businesses, and in 1999 refunded $200 million in taxes from the injured
workers fund. He has also put forward a Rural Economic Development
proposal to help rural economies grow by making vital funds available
for infrastructure development and work force training. Gary proposed a
transportation plan in 1998 that provides strategic solutions for
congested traffic corridors in urban areas, focusing on basics such as
maintenance and highway improvements. His Offender Accountability Act
will increase the supervision of felons after they have served their
time.
Gary and his wife, Mona Locke, a former reporter for KING 5
television in Seattle, were married on Oct. 15, 1994. They are the
parents of Emily Nicole, born on March 9, 1997, and Dylan James, born
on March 13, 1999.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you. Governor Engler we are glad to
see you this morning. We thank you for your appearance. You've
already been introduced. Why do not you proceed please?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ENGLER, GOVERNOR, STATE OF
MICHIGAN
Governor Engler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Stevens,
members of the committee. I apologize for my late arrival. I
was in front of Senator Rockefeller and Senator Grassley, and
either their question or my answer was too long. But I am
honored to be here this morning and to join my colleagues,
Governor Locke from Washington and Governor Barnes of Georgia.
I'd also like to submit for the record more extensive testimony
that represents the position of the National Governors
Association.
Chairman Byrd. Your testimony will appear in the record as
though stated.
Governor Engler. Thank you. I want to thank this body for
its willingness to work in a bipartisan basis with the
administration and America's Governors as we develop a
comprehensive national strategy to protect our people from acts
of terror. When it comes to homeland security it is not about
Republican or Democrat priorities, simply American priorities.
And the National Governors Association is grateful to the
Congress for its focus on homeland security.
The National Governors Association also commends Governor
Ridge for his accessibility to Governors, his willingness to
work closely with State and homeland security officers as we
develop coordinated national security plans. And that is not a
trivial point. As we emphasize in the written testimony, for
our Nation's response to be comprehensive in both theory and
practice the 50 States must be the locus of interaction with
the Federal homeland security effort.
As a common clearinghouse for funding and program
implementation, as Governor Locke just testified very
eloquently, the States are willing to take on the
responsibility of making sure every community is covered. This
will not be the case, though, if homeland defense funding is
scattered to other levels of government that are more limited
in scope. There have been recent news stories on some of the
Justice Department funds, and I think those are unfortunately
maybe the tip of the iceberg on some of this. But, that was
before 9/11 and now it is a different day.
I think Governors recognize that the first responders are
often our local partners. There is no question about that.
Significant funding will need to be passed through to local
government to assure they are trained, equipped and ready to
go. However, without the statewide coordination, there will be
gaps in the emergency-based system. And our people, this
country, cannot risk those gaps.
So, if we are to prevent and to respond to another terror
attack, then the preparation must be comprehensive and across
the board, leaving no community or potential target
unprotected. I'd also like to stress the point that again is in
our submitted testimony, but it regards the interoperability of
communication systems. I think this is a special challenge that
we face.
In this regard, the committee may be interested to learn
just last month in Michigan we enacted a comprehensive strategy
to speed deployment of broadband, high speed Internet
connections. And we think, certainly, there are economic and
educational opportunities that result from broadband deployment
and high speed internet, but enhancing homeland security was
also a very key component of our initiative. The ability to
share data across government agencies, including law
enforcement, at every local level, the emergency management
hospitals, county health departments--absolutely critical. We
have invested in the recent years--we are just bringing online
the last aspect of a state of the art 800 megahertz radio
communications system, nearly $200 million of State money to
build this system out across the State, operated by our
Michigan State Police.
Now we have made it available for use by local law
enforcement and other State and local agencies, and many of
them have come on to this system. But, I guess the point I
would make is that the investment needed to have this kind of
communications capability, to have it done at the right speed
across all agencies, is a substantial cost. And then you add to
it, as we saw in--so important in New York--the need for
redundancy and back up systems, that adds more. And so, State
and local governments are going to struggle trying to bear
these costs alone. I don't think they can handle this all by
themselves.
But, the benefits of this interoperability will spill over
far beyond homeland security, and I think it will have a
positive effect in helping all these agencies be better
equipped to serve the public and carry out there respective
ongoing missions on a day to day basis. But, the Federal
investment is very important, and it is needed.
And I want to stress at the same time, there has been this
investment. But the State coordination is essential because we
can no longer afford or accept the Federal funding that results
in the creation of separate unconnected systems. We literally
have in the State of Michigan examples where different agencies
within the Justice Department in the past had funded different
local communities with systems which couldn't talk to each
other. And today, I think that is a luxury we can no longer
afford.
With regard to bioterrorism expenditures, within 3 months
of September 11th the Michigan experience, through our
Department of Public Health, some $2.6 million were spent
responding to anthrax threats crisis, to bolstering all of our
response capabilities. And we are budgeting now, on a statewide
basis, nearly $29 million in additional immediate investment at
local hospitals, at health departments, and again, in State
laboratories. And again, we are awfully grateful because it has
been the leadership and support from the Congress that formed
the Kennedy-Frist legislation. That makes a big difference,
that helps.
As with bioterrorism preparedness, there are a lot of other
homeland security initiatives too, and our testimony details
some of that and you will hear from each of us. We have spent,
our estimate is, something in the order of $31 million directly
responding to homeland security needs that have been put in
front of us, again, since 9/11. Recurring costs to support
necessary program initiatives are probably going to be in that
$30 million range on an annual basis.
I think, Governor Locke, you have two of us--I think we
both have busy border crossing points. If Governor Pataki were
here he'd be the third one on the Canadian northern border. But
we certainly appreciate the commitment that has been made by
the President and the Congress to add personnel to the borders.
We do need improvements in the staffing. We need a lot of
systems improvements as well. And frankly, this is a scenario
where the Canadians have done a better job, historically, on
the northern border.
Following September 11 the traffic at Michigan's border
crossing with Canada slowed to a crawl. We had delays that were
12 hours or more at border crossings. We operate in the auto
industry on something called just in time. Well, nothing was in
time and on time in those days. While it has gotten back to a
little bit of normalcy now, we still have far more delay than
we need.
Surprisingly, given the amount of trade between the United
States and Canada, it is about $1.3 billion a day, but 43
percent of the traffic flows through Detroit or Port Huron. And
we need that. We need that for the economy. We cannot have it
slowed at the border. We sent in Guard members. We were asked
to do that, and then later on additional Guard were Federalized
and brought in all to assist Customs.
It was amazing to me just adding Guard who were not trained
to be border agents, how much more contraband was being
discovered, what kind of stops were being made that maybe were
not in the past. So, we have got some issues, but we believe--
and I think Governor Locke would agree because he has had some
experience going out of Washington with technology--that
manpower alone is not enough. There has been a lot of
discussions about what would be a smart border approach. And
Mr. Chairman and members, we think that there are some smart
strategies, innovative strategies at the border where you use
new technology, you do a lot more information exchange and
resource sharing, the kind of things we need with Federal and
State agencies. But at the border, we can do a lot.
That is a Federal responsibility. The States do not
maintain the borders. I mean, I often hear let the States do
it. On the borders I am perfectly happy to say that is the
Federal Government's--that is your job. And we want to provide
whatever we can in the way of support to improve the way that
is done. And we recognize that it is going to cost some money.
It is going to take an investment, but we have got to make the
borders better.
And they do have a lot to do with security. In fact,
President McPherson, Peter McPherson at Michigan State who has
spent a lot of time on United States-Canada relations, suggests
that maybe what we really need to look at is the coordination
with the Canadians to the point that we look at the security in
the hemisphere where it really is the water that becomes the
natural boundary. And so, some of that coordination on an
international level to make sure than somebody who is coming to
this hemisphere is actually being appropriately admitted up in
Canada or in the United States. And that might even make our
northern border, at least those problems be a little bit less.
Mr. Chairman, that really is my testimony. I thank you for
the opportunity to be here on behalf of the Governors
Association.
[The statement follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Governor John Engler, Governor Roy E.
Barnes, and Governor Gary Locke
Mr. Chairman, Senator Stevens, and members of the Committee: The
nation's Governors appreciate this opportunity to discuss the issue of
homeland security. Since September 11, states have responded in every
possible way and at great expense without any certainty of
reimbursement despite the most significant budget shortfalls of at
least a decade--nearly ten percent of state operating funds, or $40
billion overall, with an expectation this will increase to $50 billion
this fiscal year.
Governors are grateful for the Administration's and this
committee's efforts to make support for state and local government
homeland security a top priority. The federal government should provide
adequate funding, support, and information sharing to ensure that
homeland security needs are met. In addition to significant initial
federal investment, ensuring homeland security cannot be a one- or two-
year effort, but rather requires a more permanent recognition of the
vastly changed responsibilities we all confront.
The Office of Homeland Security should have the ultimate authority
to coordinate policy and funding levels from which grants to states
could be provided for sustained state capacity. A well-developed
national strategy and work plan, reflecting the experiences and needs
of local, state, and federal policy officials, should guide the
development and approval of national programs and policies. Maximum
resources must be combined with state and local efforts to achieve a
truly effective national capability to prepare and manage the
consequences of terrorism.
We want to emphasize how critical it is that federal homeland
security funds be funneled through the Governor or a designated state
agency. The ability to coordinate through a single agency or office is
crucial if we are to address the complexity of directing and
coordinating resources towards protecting our citizens.
Before proceeding Mr. Chairman, America's Governors wish to thank
you for your leadership in providing additional funds as part of the
Defense Appropriations bill in the fiscal year 2002 budget directly to
states to immediately enhance the capacity and preparedness to the
state and local public health systems to respond to biological and
chemical attacks, and we appreciate the speed with which your committee
is moving to consider the President's supplemental request for homeland
security. While each Governor works diligently to address public health
threats, they all know that their best response is to develop and
maintain a strong public health infrastructure. Governors hope to
continue a partnership with you to accomplish this objective.
The September 11th terrorist attacks have moved the issue of
terrorism to the top of everyone's agenda. Dealing with the threat of
terrorism is a complex challenge that will not be accomplished
overnight; nor will it be inexpensive or easy to accomplish. It has and
will require significant costs--human and fiscal--at every level of
government. It will also require intergovernmental preparedness and
interagency cooperation at all levels of government to prevent loss of
life and major property damage.
The Governors are pleased that President Bush selected one of their
colleagues to be the Director of Homeland Security. Governor Ridge
recognizes and continues to emphasize the need for a comprehensive
homeland security strategy that is truly national in scope--a strategy
that takes into account the requirements of state and local response
entities, but recognizes that the central coordinating role must be at
the state level through the Governor's office. Many Governors have
appointed directors of homeland security and task forces to coordinate
state activities regarding securing the infrastructure. These
individuals have been consulted often by the Office of Homeland
Security. More importantly, Governor Ridge met with our Executive
Committee last December and with all Governors at their Winter meeting
in February to ensure the greatest possible mutual coordination and
cooperation. The Director has been directly accessible to Governors in
attempts to find answers to questions such as reimbursement for
National Guard security activities or specific questions concerning
infrastructure protection.
The magnitude and urgent nature of the September 11th terrorist
attacks and subsequent anthrax crisis and national alerts have led
Governors to initiate their own efforts to coordinate and implement a
comprehensive state-based strategy to detect, prepare for, prevent,
protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within
their borders. This great challenge comes at a time when Governors are
``tightening belts'' in order to balance their state budgets. But when
it comes to protecting the citizens of their states and the critical
infrastructure, Governors believe that as homeland defense priorities
are set, they must be accomplished. That is true whether the funds have
been made available yet or not and even though the circumstances were
not foreseen.
States have borne unprecedented costs to ensure that the nation's
critical infrastructure and citizens are protected from terrorist
attacks. These costs involve: building up the nation's public health
system to respond to and recover from a biological, chemical, or other
attack using weapons of mass destruction; developing an interoperable
communications system; securing the critical infrastructure, from
airports to border crossings, water supply to pharmaceutical labs,
bridges and tunnels; and securing and protecting crops and food
supplies vital to the health and safety of citizens.
Mr. Chairman, this is a tall order and as stated earlier, states
have and are paying a substantial price for homeland security. The
National Governors Association estimates that the first-year costs
alone could reach $5 billion to $7 billion nationwide, with $3 billion
of this cost devoted to bioterrorism preparedness and emergency
communication, and $1 billion devoted to guarding critical
infrastructure. These costs will vary from state-to-state because of
the different critical infrastructure and geographic location. But all
states, from Maine to California and from Iowa to Texas, have a story
to tell about the costs of beefing up security since September 11th.
Public Health System--Building a Capacity to Deal with Bioterrorism
The attacks of September 11th and subsequent anthrax scares
highlighted the importance of developing and maintaining a strong
public health infrastructure in every state and territory. In the
months following the attacks, states spent millions of dollars in
unbudgeted funds expanding the duties and work schedules of many public
health employees to prepare for and respond to public health
emergencies. In addition, Governors assessed and strengthened hospital
surge capacity and capability, as well as public health laboratory
capacity to analyze accurately and identify agents of chemical and
biological terrorism.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, our nation's public health system is
built and supported by state and local governments. State governments
conduct a range of disease surveillance and detection activities
necessary for identifying public health threats quickly. States also
coordinate, train, and deploy medical supplies and human resources
required for treating victims of public health emergencies. However,
most systems are currently tailored to respond to routine medical
situations, not bioterrorist attacks.
Mr. Chairman, as stated earlier in this testimony, late last year
this committee led the Congress to appropriate funding to improve
immediately our nation's capacity to respond to bioterrorist attacks.
The nation's Governors are especially encouraged that this committee
recognized the importance of state and local governments in building
public health emergency systems that can adequately protect our nation.
Indeed, states will receive more than $1 billion in fiscal year 2002 to
begin to develop comprehensive statewide and regional plans for
responding to public health threats. The nation's Governors applaud the
commitment of the Administration and Congress in providing this
immediate financial relief for states. States are currently developing
comprehensive, statewide plans in anticipation of funding for
laboratory build-up and other public health necessities. We all
understand there is no way to predict whether an attack will occur in a
metropolitan or isolated rural area--the need to coordinate an
unprecedented response on little notice is critical. The Administration
and Congress should build upon these current programs and recognize
that states need substantial additional resources to protect citizens
from bioterrorism, provide a mechanism for ensuring that funds are
fairly allocated across states and territories, and recognize that
Governors bear the ultimate responsibility and accountability for the
development, implementation, and coordination of state plans. During a
conversation with Governors at their 2002 winter meeting, Governor
Ridge emphasized the essential role of states in coordinating funding.
The most important step that Congress can take at this time to
protect our nation against public health threats is to commit to
continue funding for this important state-based initiative well into
the future. States are working to implement long-term comprehensive
plans to protect Americans from the threats of terrorism today and into
the future. These long-term goals will not be realized unless states
can reasonably expect that Congress will not eliminate or diminish
financial support in future years.
Developing a Communications System
The current focus on security has elevated the demand for public
safety communications and information sharing needs in emergency
situations. There must be interoperability of equipment between first
responders--fire, police, emergency medical workers, and lab teams--
with and between state and local police, across county and city
jurisdictions, and with federal enforcement officials. These
individuals must be able to communicate in a timely manner. There must
not be another incident as that described by New York City officials
when they warned about the imminent collapse of one of the World Trade
Towers on September 11th, but the individuals receiving the information
could not reach fire officials in the Tower with their radio equipment.
Instead they had to rely on the 19th century method of sending a
messenger across long distances only to arrive less than a minute
before the first tower fell. Mr. Chairman, this shouldn't happen in the
21st century with the availability of top notch equipment and technical
expertise.
Communication interoperability is the foundation for improving
communications among public safety and emergency service agencies and,
in turn, for reducing the lapsed time between receipt of, and response
to, calls for assistance from citizens. It is at the heart of efforts
to ensure rapid, clear, and secure voice and data communications. In an
interoperable environment, communications are seamless, coordinated,
and integrated. Also, security improvements are made to guard against
cyber attacks on essential government and other critical sector
operations.
Although interoperability is a national objective, it can only be
achieved on a state-by-state basis. Therefore, the state must play a
central role in designing and advancing the standards and objectives of
the system.
Building an interoperable communication system will not be an easy
task and will require a long-term commitment of federal and state
resources to accomplish. Furthermore, the Governors want to ensure that
funds are not squandered on the ``wrong'' equipment and that limited
personnel and resources are not wasted on incomplete or redundant
equipment and training. There should be no duplication of effort--
resources are too limited. Rather this must be a short- and long-term
sustainable effort to address the immediate and future public safety
needs of interoperable communications.
Action must be taken at the federal level to ensure that there are
adequate radio frequencies, known as spectrum, dedicated to public
safety needs. Under the existing law, allocations are governed by the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Currently, there is inadequate
available dedicated public safety spectrum. The situation will rapidly
become worse as states develop more comprehensive communications
systems designed to transmit voice and data targeted at incident
prevention and emergency response.
In 1996, Congress gave broadcasters a portion of valuable public
broadcast spectrum temporarily and at no cost for the auspicious
purpose of conversion from analog to digital signals in the move toward
high definition television (HDTV). At the same time the giveaway was
under consideration, state and local governments submitted comments to
the FCC urging prompt public safety action to allocate 24 megahertz of
spectrum exclusively for state and local public safety including
police, fire, and emergency medical services. On September 17, 2001, in
the shadow of the worst terrorist attack in this nation's history, the
FCC issued a decision that will allow 21 broadcast companies to resell
spectrum to the wireless industry. According to the FCC action, these
channels will not be available for public safety use until 2006, if
ever. In the meantime, state and local governments remain starved for
adequate broadcast spectrum for public safety.
Mr. Chairman, the resulting situation puts states and local
emergency responders in a serious situation with critical fiscal
implications: what equipment should states and local governments
purchase, lacking any certainty whether the public safety spectrum
promised by Congress will, in fact, ever be available? The federal
government must recognize that dedicated spectrum for state and local
government public safety use is a part of the nation's national defense
strategy and must make immediate plans for its accommodation.
Protecting the Critical Infrastructure
Since September 11th, states have spent millions of dollars to
ensure that the nation's public and critical infrastructure are
protected. These costs involve state and local law enforcement
personnel, including the National Guard, who provide security for
energy supplies, water resources, bridges, tunnels and inland
waterways, ports, nuclear plants, borders and chemical laboratories.
Governors believe that securing the infrastructure represents the first
line of defense in homeland security.
Subsequent to September 11th, the President asked Governors to use
the National Guard in augmenting security at the nation's commercial
airports. Although there has been reimbursement for some of these
expenses, Governors did not limit their use of the National Guard or
other security personnel to only that which was mandated at the
President's request, but also to meet federal requests for expanded
security to protect aircrafts in hangars and airfield perimeters.
In addition to augmenting airport security, Governors were asked to
provide assistance at several of the nation's ports of entry and border
crossings. This assistance was needed to expedite the trafficking of
goods and services. Some border states had commercial venders who were
experiencing slowdowns because they could not receive parts and other
materials needed for production in a timely manner.
Another critical security need is the energy infrastructure--power
plants, refineries, and transmission and distribution networks--that is
vulnerable to risks associated with threats from terrorist attacks and
weapons of mass destruction. Managing and securing the energy
infrastructure, including oil and gas pipelines, is an essential
element of the nation's economic well-being, environmental protection,
and community safety. States will need additional resources to work
closely with federal agencies and the private sector in taking the
necessary measures to protect our critical energy infrastructure.
Another infrastructure in need of protection is the public drinking
water and wastewater systems. Nationwide, there are approximately
168,000 public drinking water systems. The nation's wastewater
infrastructure consists of approximately 16,000 publicly-owned
wastewater treatment plants, 100,000 major pumping stations, 600,000
miles of sanitary sewers, and another 200,000 miles of storm sewers.
Significant damage to this infrastructure could result in loss of life,
catastrophic environmental damage to rivers, lakes, and wetlands,
contamination of drinking water supplies, long-term public health
impacts, destruction of fish and shellfish production, and extreme
disruption to commerce and the economy. The best protection for the
water sector lies in common sense actions to increase security and
reduce threats from terrorism, including conducting vulnerability
assessments, enhancing physical and electronic security, and
implementing emergency response and recovery procedures. Because these
actions often take place at the state level, it is imperative that
Congress and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provide the
states with increased funding to implement them.
Likewise, food safety is a major challenge to the nation's overall
security in dealing with bioterrorism and the infrastructure, given the
possible use by terrorists of crop dusters for spreading defoliants or
other chemicals or biological agents on crops, livestock, and the
overall population. The introduction of diseases such as hoof-and-
mouth, anthrax, and brucellosis through livestock or plants to the
population at large would create a loss of confidence in the integrity
of food production systems that could send economic and financial
shockwaves across the country. The impact would be devastating and take
industry years to recover.
In February 2001, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that
during 1999, state food safety programs alone provided more than $301
million in resources to food safety and accounted for approximately two
million inspections utilizing more than 5,700 staff years. This
represents a tremendous state role in the food safety/public health
protection system, especially since states account for more than 80
percent of the food safety enforcement actions that are accomplished.
In order to deal with an attack on the food supply, sufficient
funding for laboratory and scientific capacity is needed in states.
This capacity is essential to trace potential food borne illness
outbreaks and for detecting food contamination and infectious animal
diseases.
Finally, protecting the infrastructure will be costly for first
responders, and states must coordinate and assist in meeting these
costs. According to a survey of first responders conducted by the
National Emergency Management Association (this organization represents
state directors of emergency management) approximately $2.1 billion is
needed to assist local first responders in building overall capacity
and capability to respond to disasters. The first responder community
must develop their emergency operating centers (EOCs) and
communications and warning capabilities to complement the proposed
alert system from the Office of Homeland Security. Also, more local
emergency management personnel are needed to perform the functions of
administration, planning, public education and awareness, exercises,
and training. Additional fulltime local directors of emergency
management and appropriate support staff could cost more than $140
million annually. And the total cost for establishing primary and
alternate local EOCs needed to provide coordinating facilities for
local response operation could cost more than $1.5 billion according to
the survey.
Other Issues of Concern to Governors
Mr. Chairman, there are a number of issues we would like to raise
for your consideration, including identification security,
intergovernmental intelligence sharing, and the duration and
reimbursement of federal assistance. Each has importance fiscal impacts
for states.
The nation's Governors are aware of several proposals regarding
citizen identification security, including a national identification
card, or requiring certain biometric markers or other identifiers on
drivers' licenses. While the Governors applaud these efforts to
consider options for enhancing security, Congress and the
Administration should approach this issue with caution. Moving to such
a system would be very costly for states, especially the driver's
license issue, and should be discussed more with Governors and
Secretaries of States. The technology and enforcement of significant
new responsibilities would have significant fiscal impacts. In
approaching the issue, very careful consideration must be given either
to providing full funding to implement such a system or allowing
maximum flexibility to states.
Another area that Governors, Congress and the Administration must
work together on is intelligence sharing. A method must be developed to
get critical information into the hands of first responders who can and
must act on it in order to protect the nation. Governors understand and
appreciate that there is information critical to the nation's security
that must be guarded at the highest levels. But it should be understood
that state and local officials and responders can facilitate efforts at
apprehending potential terrorists or others who pose a threat to the
nation if they have the necessary information. Agencies such as the FBI
and/or Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) would be required
to share information and data bases with state and local officials.
There will be a cost to state and local governments for additional
personnel to assist federal authorities in carrying out the security
mission. But human and fiscal savings would be achieved through
preventing potential terrorists from reaching their targets.
As states near or have adopted our budgets for next year, they have
raised the issues of reimbursement and whether we have the authority to
stretch federal funds beyond October 1, 2003. Issues like building
public health care infrastructure will require a long-term commitment,
but currently there is little certainty about what the federal role
will be from the fiscal perspective after fiscal year 2002 and 2003. We
believe your committee could help on both fronts by clarifying federal
intent on these important issues.
Conclusion
In conclusion Mr. Chairman, states have made a major commitment to
homeland security since September 11th. A few examples are:
--The Commonwealth of Kentucky anticipates spending $3 million alone
in overtime costs to guard airports. Improvements in the
state's communications system start at $60 million, and the
state has spent $1.6 million on purchasing new equipment such
as vehicles, laboratory equipment, secure communications and
other specialized gear.
--Municipalities in the State of Maine have incurred an estimated
$1.6 million in overtime and other costs for security and for
responding to hundreds of anthrax scares.
--The State of Michigan has spent $2.6 million for epidemiologists,
microbiologists, and laboratory personnel to bolster the
state's response capabilities for anthrax and other potential
types of bioterrorism.
--In West Virginia, National Guard troops have been called up, and
state employees have been asked to patrol and protect highways,
bridges, waterways, refineries, and public buildings at a cost
of more than $4 million.
Mr. Chairman, these and other states have been spending funds at a
time when States are facing budget shortfalls of at least $40 billion
overall, with an expectation that--notwithstanding national economic
recovery--this shortfall will increase to $50 billion this fiscal year.
Therefore, the Governors urge Congress to make support for state
and local government efforts a top priority. The federal government
should provide adequate federal funding, support, and information
sharing to ensure that homeland security needs are met. In addition to
significant initial federal investment, ensuring homeland security
requires yearly maintenance-of-effort by the federal government.
Finally Mr. Chairman, we understand the difficult task of
developing a homeland security strategy for the nation. The Governors
stand ready to work in partnership with the federal government to meet
these challenges, but we need your assistance to ensure that we have
the authority and funding to succeed.
Biographical Sketch of Governor Roy E. Barnes
Birth Date: March 11, 1948
Family: Married; three children
Religion: Methodist
Spouse: Marie
Party: Democrat
Elected: November 1998
Term Expires: January 2003
Roy E. Barnes was born in Mableton, Georgia. He attended the
University of Georgia, earning a bachelor's degree in history in 1969
and a law degree in 1972. After serving in the Cobb District Attorney's
office for two years, he was elected to the first of eight terms in the
state senate. After two terms, he was named chairman of the Judiciary
Committee. Barnes served as administration floor leader from 1982
through 1989. He also served on the Governor's Growth Strategies
Commission and was senate chairman of the Constitutional Revision
Committee. Returning to the legislature in 1993 after a run for
governor in 1990, he represented the 33rd house district. He served as
vice chair of the House Judiciary Committee and as a member of the
Rules and Banks and Banking Committees. He also was a senior partner in
the law firm of Barnes, Browning, Tanksley, and Casurella in Marietta,
Georgia.
Biographical Sketch of Governor John Engler
``Gov. John Engler has had more impact on the lives of Michiganians
over the past decade than any other single person, and his deep imprint
will be evident well into the new century.''----The Detroit News, April
9, 2001.
First elected in 1990 as Michigan's 46th governor, Governor John
Engler is now America's most senior governor. Engler was elected
chairman of the National Governors Association in August 2001.
A common sense Midwestern conservative who believes strongly that
every child should have the chance to succeed, Engler has made
improving education Michigan's number one priority. With boldness and
vision for the future, Governor Engler also cut taxes, reformed
welfare, right-sized government and implemented the biggest road repair
and rebuilding plan in state history. Under his watch, the quality of
Michigan's water, land and air resources has steadily improved.
In 1994, Engler led the fight to enact Proposal A--a ballot
proposal overwhelmingly approved by voters to fund schools fairly and
cut property taxes. Now, all children have a foundation grant that
follows them to the public schools of their choice, including more than
180 charter public schools. With funding issues resolved, high
standards and rigorous assessments have helped improve student
performance. To encourage academic achievement, Governor Engler created
the Michigan Merit Award--a $2,500 scholarship for college or
training--that is awarded to high school students who pass their
proficiency tests in reading, writing, science and math.
Governor Engler has signed 31 tax cuts into law, saving taxpayers
more than $25 billion. The state inheritance tax and capital gains
taxes have been eliminated. Personal exemptions for children, seniors
and the disabled have been increased. The personal income tax rate is
being reduced to 3.9 percent--the lowest level in a quarter century--
and Michigan's main tax on business is being phased out completely.
Engler's economic policies have helped to create more than 900,000
jobs in Michigan, cutting the state's unemployment rate from over 9
percent the year he took office to 3.4 percent in 2000--the lowest
annual level ever recorded. For an unprecedented four years in a row,
Michigan has won the prestigious Governor's Cup for the most new
factories and expansion projects in the nation. As part of the nation's
most forward-looking economic development strategy, $1 billion is being
invested in a ``Life Sciences Corridor'' from Ann Arbor to Grand
Rapids, and a high-tech cybercourt to hear business disputes is also in
the works.
Governor Engler has strengthened Michigan's role as guardian of the
Great Lakes, fought water diversions and invested more in clean water
than any governor. Thanks to reforms of environmental laws, Michigan
leads the nation in reclaiming contaminated brownfield sites while
preserving green space and farmland.
Other highlights of the Engler administration include:
--passing the $675 million Clean Michigan Initiative to reduce
pollution, fix up state parks, improve water quality and clean
up contaminated sites;
--trimming state government personnel by more than 20 percent
(excluding state troopers, prison guards and other public
safety workers);
--transforming the $1.8 billion deficit he inherited to a $1.3
billion surplus;
--restoring Michigan's AAA credit rating;
--helping nearly 300,000 families achieve independence from cash
welfare and reducing welfare rolls by nearly 70 percent;
--restructuring the regulation of energy and telecommunications
industries to increase consumer choice and reduce rates;
--investing a record-high $1.54 billion to fix our roads in 2001
alone--more than four times the amount spent in 1990;
--reducing violent crime by more than 25 percent;
--serving an additional 45,000 patients annually with mental health
services;
--giving Detroit's mayor authority to appoint the local school board
and speed up the pace of reform;
--increasing K-12 education spending by 84 percent; and,
--dramatically improving student reading and math test scores.
Engler, 53, is a graduate of Michigan State University with a
degree in agricultural economics and earned a law degree from the
Thomas M. Cooley Law School. He was recently elected to the Board of
Trustees of the Gerald R. Ford Foundation and named a Public Official
of the Year by Governing Magazine. Michigan's First Lady, Michelle
Engler, is also an attorney. They are parents of seven-year-old triplet
daughters--Margaret, Hannah, and Madeleine.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you for your statement. Governor
Barnes.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROY BARNES, GOVERNOR, STATE OF
GEORGIA
Governor Barnes. Well thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Stevens and other members of the committee for giving me an
opportunity to come here this morning and talk about some of
the challenges we face and some of the things that we are doing
in Georgia--in the South--to protect the security of our
citizens. I also want to thank you for allowing us to share our
views on not only our problems, but something that has been
touched on by Governor Locke and Governor Engler, is how to
better coordinate the resources that exist between the State
government and the Federal Government.
We all know that the madmen who killed thousands of people
on September 11th, and those who contaminated our mail with
deadly anthrax, were not just targeting New York City or
Washington. They were attacking the United States of America.
The victims left loved ones in all 50 States, including the
State of Georgia. And now we realize everywhere that it could
happen anywhere.
And so as Americans, we are fighting side by side in this
war on terrorism. The fight, I suggest to you as you heard
earlier, will require planning for the possibility of future
attacks. And it will require, and if I can stress this even
more than what the other speakers have said to try to heighten
it, the sharing of information and the standardization of the
sharing of information.
And it also will require constant, real-time communication
between different agencies of the Federal Government, and also
different agencies of the State government. But most of all, it
will require a commitment of resources. Now we recognize there
is going to be some commitment of resources that have to come
from the States. And as Governor Engler talked about and
Governor Locke talked about, we are willing to do that.
But, we also need assistance from the Federal Government
because we also realize--and I think you do--State and local
governments are on the front lines of this war and we do not
have all the ammunition we need to fight it. And it will
require something else, and that is flexibility, because even
though we are all fighting the same war every State has unique
security priorities. I will just give you a couple of examples
in Georgia.
We have the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta,
Georgia. It is a major target from protesters to terrorists. I
mean, everybody is there that has a gripe with the United
States Government or particularly what they are doing. Or, and
during times of terrorism, of course they are the heartbeat for
the rest of the Nation. We have some specific and unique
circumstances to provide security there. We do that in the
State government for the CDC.
We also have two major seaports on the Atlantic coast. We
have 12 military bases, to which we are thankful, by the way.
And we also have the Nation's largest airport. In fact, on
September 11th when I was asked to evacuate the Atlanta Airport
we had over 20,000 people in the Atlanta Airport at that time.
Now like Governor Locke and Governor Engler, we also felt
particularly keenly the effects of the recession. Georgia will
take in less this fiscal year--$500 million less than what it
took in last year in taxes, which is the first time that has
occurred since 1953, because we have been a high-growth State.
But, we are willing to establish and have established the
priorities to make sure that we meet our responsibility in
providing the security for our people.
Let me give you a couple of things that we have done and
some of the problems that we see and how I think they can be
corrected. Shortly after September 11th we put together, as
most States did, a homeland security task force, which had
representatives of our law enforcement agencies, National Guard
and otherwise; and also a liaison to work hand in hand with our
Federal agencies. This task force includes the State agencies
responsible for public safety, emergency management, public
health, environmental protection, transportation and defense,
as well as local law enforcement officials and fire chiefs.
I asked them to come up with recommendations to us to
better provide the security for our people. And based upon
those recommendations we have included $6.3 million in this
year's budget. Now that is on top of the regular public safety
and public health increases, to try to put into some of the
specific suggestions that they had dealing with homeland
security.
Let me give you some of those that we are spending money
on. We have created the Georgia Information Sharing and
Analysis Center, which will gather intelligence on terrorism
threats and it will operate in tandem with the FBI's Joint
Terrorism Task Force in Georgia. In fact, this is a good
example of the Federal and State working together. The FBI
Joint Terrorism Task Force that is located in Atlanta will be
housed in a State facility--that houses this information
sharing facility and intelligence gathering.
But, also we are having the same problem about the
standardization of security clearances that Governor Locke
talked about. What clears security for one agency does not
clear security to another. In fact, on September 11th my
adjutant general came to me and he said I've got to get you to
fill out this security clearance so I can talk to you about
some of the threats that we may have. And since I hire and fire
him, I said that is an interesting thing, but I will fill it
out and I did so.
And I do not mind doing that, and I do not think anybody
else minds doing so, but there has to be among the agencies
that are cooperating so standardized way of clearing security
so that we can allow our State and our Federal agencies to work
together. Some of the other things we have done with the State
funds so far that we have appropriated, is to provide the
additional staff needed by existing agencies to handle
increased security responsibilities and to provide back up for
the CDC.
Our State lab, our Department of Human Resources
laboratory, public health laboratory, acts as the back up lab
for the CDC. When they are overburdened we undertake it. In the
anthrax scare we were covered up because CDC was covered up.
And we operated our public health lab 24 hours a day almost.
The FBI moved into our State laboratory, which was fine,
and we wanted them to do so. At one time we had over 2,000
pieces of mail in our State laboratory that we were doing for
the CDC to go through to test for anthrax. Now all of them
turned out to be negative, but you still have to go through
that process.
The reason I tell you that is we do not mind--the States--
do not mind providing the cooperative effort to keep our people
safe. And in exchange what we ask is a constancy of funding and
the flexibility to address some of those individual needs that
we have in our States. I will give you one more example in
Georgia. I am sure it is not unique, but it is of concern to
us.
We have 33 counties in Georgia out of 159--don't ask me why
we have so many counties--we have 33 counties out of 159 that
do not have a 9-1-1 emergency response system. And, of course,
9-1-1 is pretty well the very first level of emergency
response. We need the flexibility to be able to meet some of
those needs.
So, these are the things that we have done on a financial
basis. Most of us have also undertaken to introduce and pass
legislation to give our public health departments and directors
new comprehensive powers to deal with bioterrorism attacks,
something that Governors did not even consider less than 1 year
ago. This includes the ability to declare an immediate
quarantine and the power to require large scale vaccination and
compel medical examinations. And because the CDC is there, and
we are proud to have it there, it is also a concern to us to be
able to respond to any attack that may occur on the CDC and
anything that may come out of that.
We know, as President Bush has told us and that we all
realize, that this war against terror is not going to be won in
the immediate future. It is a long term fight and will require
a long term commitment, and that is what we are asking from
you. We are willing to commit long term because we are on the
front lines. We protect our people and we are going to protect
our people. We ask for Federal assistance and Federal
assistance on a long term basis rather than just one shot so
that we can do some planning around it.
We are doing our part and we ask the Federal Government to
do theirs. We need resources, yes, and the commitment to
resources over a multi-year period. But, we also need the
flexibility to do the things that are best suited for the
unique circumstances in each of our States. Georgia has
critical needs for equipment, supplies and technical support.
But the most critical need is for staff to establish and
maintain a bioterrorism preparedness and response program, for
the training to our counties and our cities and our State
officials that first respond.
We need to be able to hire staff, and in order to do that
we need an ongoing commitment of funds. And we need guidelines
that are consistent from one program to the next and as
standardized as possible to make sure that we are getting
results. We do not need micromanagement of our State agencies
and we are willing to be accountable for the results that are
required of us without micromanaging us.
In closing, I believe that a comprehensive State terrorism
strategy is the best and most appropriate framework for the
delivery of Federal programs and funding. All Federal
resources, programs and activities involving State and local
government should be coordinated through the Nation's Governors
and their appropriate State agencies so that we can make sure
that we do not duplicate our funding resources and that we do
not duplicate what is necessary and that we can coordinate into
one plan everything that is being done. I suggest to you that
bypassing the States would only lead to gaps or to wasteful
overlaps and redundancies, two things that we cannot afford in
this war that we are all fighting. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Governor Barnes. Dr. Carter, you
have already been introduced. Would you please proceed?
STATEMENT OF DR. ASHTON CARTER, FORD FOUNDATION
PROFESSOR OF SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT,
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator and members of the committee
for having me before this committee, but above all for holding
this hearing because it emphasizes the need to give some
coherence to the homeland security investment program over all,
and that in fact is the theme of the brief comments I would
like to make. My statement, Mr. Chairman, is drawn from an
article that I published in ``International Security'' in the
winter issue, which has attracted some attention. And that is
going to be the basis for what I have to say. If I may I would
like to enter that in the record as my written statement.
Chairman Byrd. That will be included, without any
objection.
Dr. Carter. Thank you. The main purpose of the article,
which was written in November, was to define the Governor Ridge
job. How can this new position add value, and make a
contribution and to protect the Nation against terrorism, which
is a struggle which is going to be with us as far into the
future as we can see? The conclusion of the article was that to
make a contribution Governor Ridge should not try to be a
coordinator; should not be a czar; should not be an agency
head; certainly should not be a spokesman; but instead an
architect, an architect of the capabilities we do not now have
but urgently need to build. The architect of what we need to
build.
I will not describe why these other job descriptions which
I named would fail, but I want to concentrate on the architect
role. The main thing an architect would do is to create a
multi-year, multi-agency program plan--and those of you from
defense backgrounds like me know what a program plan is--which
is an investment plan to build new capabilities. To see what I
mean, think of a single piece of paper in which on the left
hand side you have the various agencies of the Federal
Government that play a role in this process.
You have the States and the localities, their important
roles. You have the private sector, which owns and operates
critical infrastructures that need to be protected. And along
the top of the piece of paper you have the various tasks that
need to be accomplished in a competent national effort to
combat terrorism.
My favorite way of arraying them is to think of a timeline
that goes from before an incident to after an incident. And
before an incident you need to worry about detection and
surveillance and intelligence and prevention and protection.
And then when an incident is imminent, about interdiction. And
after an incident, about consequence management, attribution
and forensics and learning from what has happened to you.
So imagine those tasks arrayed across the top of the paper,
and it looks like a little matrix. And in every box the
architect would fill in what capabilities need to be built in
each of those boxes so that the Nation overall has the set of
capabilities it needs, prescribing for each box what new money
and new organizations are needed to get the job done.
So that, in the simplest terms, producing that chart is the
job that would add value. That is the simplest description I
can give it. It is not rocket science or Werner von Braun, the
physicist. Werner von Braun said the job of the rocket
scientist--the goal of the rocket scientists at Pennemunde was
to make sure that it was more dangerous to be at the predicted
impact point than to be at the launch point. By that standard
of rocket science that is probably all we need to produce that
chart.
Now Governor Ridge, hypothetically if he took on this
definition of his job, would get the President to approve his
chart. The President would direct the agency heads at the
Federal level to reflect the contents of that chart in their
budget submission, and to provide the funding, the inducements
and the regulation which may be required so that State and
local levels and private entities do their part. And then send
that package up to the Hill where it would, of course, be your
job to make the final disposition.
The chart I have described and the process I described
stand in sharp contrast, I think, to the process that produced
the fiscal year 2003 budget, which process I think can be
described charitably as the result of agency, contractor and
Congressional initiative, many of them very good, but not a
plan. There is a lot of useful stuff in there, but it is the
result of a lot of people hammering and sawing without an
architectural blueprint.
Next, if Governor Ridge took on that definition of his job,
what does it take, what does he need to do a competent job of
creating an architectural plan? A small White House staff,
however capable, is in my judgment not enough to produce a good
plan in an area that is so large, so new, so complicated and so
vital. They will not have the knowledge across all the domains.
They will get outgunned by the agencies who have a more partial
view of the problem. We saw that in the skirmish over the
creation of a border agency, for example.
They will not be able to do the Red Team-Blue Team work
which, I describe in the article and again I draw from my
defense experience, is so crucial to figuring out, to be one
step ahead and smarter than the people who would do damage to
us. They will not be able to do the systems engineering, the
design of the cross-cutting things that are no agency's
individual responsibility, but that are necessary to make the
whole thing work together.
They will not be able to help the agencies that we are now
showering with money but that have no tradition of spending
large sums of money on engineering programs and large
technology programs and systems efforts to help those agencies
develop the capability capably to spend that money. And above
all, they will not be able to provide a framework for deciding
who pays for all this stuff. Who is going to pay for all this
protection? What mix? How are we going to apportion the cost
between the Federal level, the State and local level, and all
the private actors? Somebody has to design that architecture.
To do all this well, Governor Ridge, who decided he was
going to be an architect, would in my judgment need the kind of
capability that was represented in defense for many years by
institutions like Rand, the Mitre Corporation, the Mitretek
Systems Corporation, Aerospace Corporation, and so forth, not-
for-profit institutions that were not part of the Government,
but were not part of the for-profit sector either, and that
were capable of providing in-depth analysis program planning
and systems engineering to the Government when we had another
complex job, which was to win the cold war.
And I think that some kind of capability like that, perhaps
a consortium of the ones that exist, maybe a new founding, will
be necessary to make Governor Ridge all he can be.
Now I have some of my views, Mr. Chairman, and members,
about what that plan if it were well done would contain. I
won't say what they are except to, if I may, note two things,
and then I'll stop.
The first is that this is a pretty serious problem for the
country and we have to look to what our strengths are. We have
a lot of weaknesses as a society. We're open, we're complicated
and fragile. We're comfortable. So we have to ask, what are our
comparative advantages as a society in beating this thing.
And it seems to me that one key strength that no other
society on Earth has as much as ours does is the inventiveness
and the science and technology capabilities that this country
has. I just want to stress the importance of that for this
homeland security mission.
You know, when we were taking on the Warsaw Pact and my
boss, former boss and now collaborator and friend, former
Secretary of Defense Bill Perry used to make this point all the
time. When we went against the Warsaw Pact, we didn't try to
compete with them man for man, tank for tank. We knew we
couldn't do that. And instead, we decided to make a military
that was better than, not larger than theirs, and it was going
to be better through science and technology. And that was the
approach that played upon our national strengths and won the
cold war. And we need similarly to marshal science and
technology in this war.
In many cases, moreover, not only is it successful, but in
many cases the application of science and technology can
relieve us of the need to adapt in other ways that would be
detrimental, procedural ways that would be detrimental to our
way of life or to our civil liberties.
Though science and technology, applied right, can give us a
way out here, I understand the National Academy of Sciences is
working on a science and technology plan, I'm a member of that
committee, and that's just one contribution, but I commend
their work to your attention.
I'd like to close, Mr. Chairman, with a final idea which is
a big idea about the international coalition effort against
terrorism and where it meets the subject of this hearing,
especially the question of weapons of mass destruction
terrorism. This is an idea that for all I know might already
have occurred to Senator Domenici, who is an expert on this
subject; I've heard it sketched in a speech by Senator Lugar; I
saw it also in a speech by former Senator Nunn. It was a Senate
Foreign Relations testimony that curiously enough preceded
September 11 by a few days. But it goes like this.
There's a lot of talk about what's the next phase in the
international war against terrorism, is it Iraq, is it--who's
next? And that's an important discussion to have, but let me
ask you to imagine a different kind of next phase, not an
alternative to those others, but in addition to those others,
whose object is not root out cells of al Qaeda, but to root out
cells of unsecured wherewithal to do weapons of mass
destruction, be they fissile materials, germ cultures, the
scientific knowledge that goes with that.
Imagine such a coalition, a coalition of nations including
us, our European and Japanese allies, Russia, China, India,
maybe even Pakistan, who set standards for safe custodianship
of these materials and assist those who need help to meet those
standards the way the Nunn-Lugar program has assisted the
Soviet Union. Like a Nunn-Lugar, but which is global in scale,
in scope rather, and global in participation.
I think, Mr. Chairman, the United States needs to lead a
coalition of that kind also, because I know enough about
nuclear weapons in particular, to know that once they're here,
we're cooked. They're very difficult to find. And the only way
to stop those threats--by far the most desirable way, is at the
source, and I'd like to see that be another phase in the
international coalition as well. Thank you. Thank you all.
[The information follows:]
The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism
On September 11, 2001, the post-Cold War security bubble finally
burst. In the preceding ten years, the United States and its major
allies failed to identify and invest in the prevention of ``A-list''
security problems that could affect their way of life, position in the
world, and very survival. Instead they behaved as if gulled into a
belief that the key security problems of the post-Cold War era were
ethnic and other internal conflicts in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti,
East Timor, and Kosovo. Peacekeeping and peacemaking in these places,
although engaging important humanitarian concerns, never addressed the
vital security interests of the United States, and none of these
conflicts could begin to threaten its survival. As if to confirm this
point, the official military strategy of the United States during the
last decade centered not on peacekeeping but on the challenge of
fighting two Desert Storm reruns, one in Korea and one in the Persian
Gulf, at the same time. The two-major-theater-war doctrine at least had
the virtue of addressing threats to vital U.S. allies and interests.
But as the decade wore on, it was increasingly apparent that although
important interests were at stake in both major theaters, in neither
was U.S. survival in question. The A-list seemed empty, so policy and
strategy focused on B- and C-level problems instead.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This argument and the corresponding A-, B-, and C-lists are
derived from Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense:
A New Security Strategy for America (Washington, D.C.: Brookings,
1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-list threats, such as the threat posed by the Soviet Union for
the preceding half-century--were indeed absent, but only if threat is
understood as the imminent possibility of attack defined in traditional
military terms. If taken instead to denote looming problems that could
develop into Cold War-scale dangers, the A-list contained at least four
major underattended items in the Government 1990s: (1) the collapse of
Moscow's power, (2) the growth of Beijing's military and economic
might, (3) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and (4) the
prospect of catastrophic terrorism. Upon taking office, George W. Bush
and his administration claimed to be formulating their strategy around
the first two of these items, in a self-proclaimed return to big power
realism. But in the wake of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks
of September 11, the Bush administration is instead finding its agenda
dominated by catastrophic terrorism, for which it appears no more or
less prepared than its predecessor Bush, Sr., and Clinton
administrations.
The challenge of catastrophic terrorism is destined to be a
centerpiece of the field of international security studies, and thus of
the readers and writers of the pages of this journal, for the
foreseeable future. Today the focus is a particular nest of Islamic
extremists operating freely from the lawless failed state of
Afghanistan. But the last time that a building in the United States was
destroyed in a terrorist attack, the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building
in Oklahoma City in April 1995, the perpetrator was homegrown, an
embittered American nihilist operating in the vast anonymity of modern
society. One month earlier, an obscure cult in Japan put sarin nerve
gas in a Tokyo subway and attempted an airborne anthrax release. Indeed
the varieties of extremism that can spawn catastrophic terrorism seem
limitless, and they have not been studied as thoroughly by social
scientists as have the dynamics of great power rivalry. What is clear
is that war-scale destructive power is becoming increasingly available
as technology advances. The same advances heighten the complexity and
interconnectedness of civilization, making society more vulnerable at
the same time it delivers to small groups destructive powers that were
formerly the monopoly of states. Thus if security is understood to be
the avoidance and control of mass threat, catastrophic terrorism must
occupy a central place in security studies, a status that ``ordinary''
non-mass terrorism never achieved.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Studies dealing with catastrophic terrorism include: Richard A.
Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's
Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert
Attack (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998); ``A False Alarm (This
Time): Preventive Defense against Catastrophic Terrorism,'' in Carter
and Perry, Preventive Defense, pp. 143-174; Ashton B. Carter, John M.
Deutch, and Philip D. Zelikow, ``Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the
New Danger,'' Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 6 (November/December 1998),
pp. 80-94; Robert T. Marsh, John R. Powers, Merritt E. Adams, Richard
P. Case, Mary J. Culnan, Peter H. Daly, John C. Davis, Thomas J.
Falvey, Brenton C. Green, William J. Harris, David A. Jones, William B.
Joyce, David V. Keyes, Stevan D. Mitchell, Joseph J. Moorcones, Irwin
M. Pikus, William Paul Rodgers, Jr., Susan V. Simens, Frederick M.
Struble, and Nancy J. Wong, Critical Foundations: Protecting America's
Infrastructures: The Report of the President's Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection (Washington, D.C., October 1997); The Gilmore
Commission, James S. Gilmore III, James Clapper, Jr., L. Paul Bremer,
Raymond Downey, George Foresman, William Garrison, Ellen M. Gordon,
James Greenleaf, William Jenaway, William Dallas Jones, Paul M.
Maniscalco, Ronald S. Neubauer, Kathleen O'Brien, M. Patricia Quinlisk,
Patrick Ralston, William Reno, Kenneth Shine, and Ellen Embrey, First
Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel
to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities to Terrorism Involving Weapons
of Mass Destruction I: Assessing the Threat (Washington, D.C., December
15, 1999), http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror.pdf; The Gilmore
Commission, James S. Gilmore III, James Clapper, Jr., L. Paul Bremer,
Raymond Downey, Richard A. Falkenrath, George Foresman, William
Garrison, Ellen M. Gordon, James Greenleaf, William Jenaway, William
Dallas Jones, Paul M. Maniscalco, John O. Marsh, Jr., Kathleen O'Brien,
M. Patricia Quinlisk, Patrick Ralston, William Reno, Joseph Samuels,
Jr., Kenneth Shine, Hubert Williams, and Ellen Embrey, Second Annual
Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to
Assess Domestic Response Capabilities to Terrorism Involving Weapons of
Mass Destruction II: Toward a National Security for Combating Terrorism
(Washington, D.C., December 15, 2000), http://www.rand.org/nsrd/
terrpanel/terror2.pdf; and The National Commission on Terrorism,
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, Maurice Sonnenberg, Richard K. Betts,
Wayne A. Downing, Jane Harman, Fred C. Ikle, Juliette N. Kayyem, John
F. Lewis, Jr., Gardner Peckham, and R. James Woolsey, Countering the
Changing Threat of International Terrorism, report of the National
Commission on Terrorism (Washington, D.C., June 5, 2000), http://
www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The resulting agenda of analysis and policy development is wide.
First, the motivations and root causes of catastrophic terrorism--
inscrutable as they may now seem--must eventually yield at least in
part to careful study.\3\ Second, the potential of catastrophic
terrorism to transform traditional international relations should also
be studied and its policy consequences propounded, as the great
powers--the United States, Europe, Japan, Russia, and China--set aside
some of the lesser issues that divide them and acknowledge a great
common interest in protecting their homelands.\4\ This article concerns
a third dimension of policy: the need to reengineer the architecture of
governance--security institutions and their modes of operation--when
warscale damage results from terrorism.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1999); and Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism and
America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1998).
\4\ See Stephen M. Walt, ``Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign
Policy,'' in this issue.
\5\ Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry with David Aidekman,
``Countering Asymmetric Threats,'' in Carter and John P. White, eds.,
Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 2001), pp. 119-126; and The Hart-Rudman Commission, Gary
Hart, Warren B. Rudman, Anne Armstrong, Norman R. Augustine, John Dany,
John R. Galvin, Leslie H. Gelb, Newt Gingrich, Lee H. Hamilton, Lionel
H. Olmer, Donald B. Rice, James Schlesinger, Harry D. Train, and Andrew
Young, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change: The Phase
III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
(Washington, D.C., February 15, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE GOVERNANCE ISSUE
Post-Cold War complacency was only one reason that the United
States found itself so surprised by, and so unprepared for, the onset
of catastrophic terrorism and the mission of homeland security. A
deeper reason is that the security institutions of the U.S. federal
government are particularly ill-suited to deliver homeland security.
Greater awareness of the threat since September 11 alone will not
rectify this problem. There is a fundamental managerial inadequacy, as
basic as that of a corporation with no line manager to oversee the
making of its leading product.
Pundits have been debating whether the campaign to prevent
catastrophic terrorism is a ``war'' or not. If one sets aside semantics
and asks the practical managerial question, Can U.S. preparations for
war be easily adapted to preparation for catastrophic terrorism? the
answer is no. Preparations for war in the military, diplomatic, and
intelligence senses are the province of institutions--the Departments
of Defense and State, and the intelligence community--whose focus and
missions have been ``over there'' in the fields of Flanders, the
beaches of Normandy , the jungles of Vietnam, and the desert of Kuwait.
Their opponents have been foreign governments, and even against them
they have not been asked to defend the U.S. homeland in recent history
except through the abstraction of nuclear deterrence.
If catastrophic terrorism cannot really be treated as a war, then
perhaps it should be conceived as a crime. But the U.S. law enforcement
paradigm is also ill-suited to deal with catastrophic terrorism. This
paradigm centers on the post facto attribution of crimes to their
perpetrators and to prosecution under the law. So deeply entrenched is
this model that four weeks after the September 11 attacks, the attorney
general had to prod the Federal Bureau of investigation publicly to
shift its efforts from ``solving the case'' to preventing another
disaster.\6\ Additionally, if the focus of the war model is foreign
perpetrators, the focus of the law enforcement model is the American
citizen. Neither model encompasses the transnational drifter that is
characteristic of the al-Qaeda operative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Philip Shenon and David Johnston, ``F.B.I. Shifts Focus to Try
to Avert Any More Attacks,'' New York Times, October 9, 2001.
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Early in the Bush administration, the new director of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) asserted that catastrophic terrorism
was not a war or a crime, but a disaster, and thus the province of his
agency, even obtaining a presidential directive to that effect.\7\ In
so doing, he reversed the previous FEMA management, which regarded
catastrophic terrorism as a new mission with no funding and thus to be
avoided. But even armed with a presidential directive, FEMA seemed
unable to convince anyone that acts of God and acts of terror were
similar enough that a managerial solution was to be found in combining
them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Vernon Loeb, ``Cheney to Lead Anti-Terrorism Plan Team: New
FEMA Office Will Coordinate Response Efforts of More Than 40 Agencies,
Officials Say,'' Washington Post, May 9, 2001, p. A29.
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Thus the federal government lacked a managerial category for
catastrophic terrorism, which is neither war, crime, nor disaster, as
conventionally understood. Preparations for mass terrorism therefore
proceeded haltingly in the 1990s. Some progress was made when
preparedness was tied to specific events, such as the 1996 Atlanta
Olympics.\8\ But elsewhere the preparations were more the result of the
efforts of a few well-placed individuals--in the Departments of
Defense, Justice, and Health and Human Services--who had become
concerned about the problem, than of any overall managerial scheme. As
the decade wore on, money did begin to flow to such programs as
training state and local governments in weapons of mass destruction.\9\
But these efforts were largely the result of congressional initiative
and inevitably reflected constituent interests. They did not lead to
the development of a program to build a national capability for
combating catastrophic terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Kennedy School of Government case authored by John Buntin,
Parts A-C: ``Security Preparations for the 1996 Centennial Olympic
Games (Part A),'' Case No. C16-00-1582.0; ``Security Preparations for
the 1996 Centennial Olympic Games: Seeking a Structural Fix (Part B),''
Case No. C-16-00-1589.0; and ``Security Preparations for the 1996
Centennial Olympic Games: The Games Begin (Part C),'' Case No. C16-00-
1590.0.
\9\ Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act 1996 (Nunn-
Lugar-Domenici), Public Law 104-201 (H.R. 3230), September 23, 1996,
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, 104th Cong.,
2d sess., http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1996/pl104-201-
xiv.htm.
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Outside the federal bureaucracy, even less was done. State and
local governments, key to both prevention and response to this new
threat, generally lacked the resources and specialized knowledge to
combat catastrophic terrorism. The role of the private sector--for
example, in protecting critical infrastructures such as communications
and power networks from disruption or in funding protection through
insurance--remained undefined.
Before September 11, 2001, therefore, the U.S. government did not
have a managerial approach (i.e., a framework for bringing
responsibility, accountability, and resources together in sharp focus)
to deliver a key public good--security in the homeland against
catastrophic terrorism. This managerial deficiency was not unique to
catastrophic terrorism. The post-Cold War world spawned a host of novel
security missions for government: peacekeeping and post-peacekeeping
civil reconstruction, counterproliferation, threat reduction,
information warfare, and conflict prevention (or ``preventive
defense''). Although it is widely agreed that the United States needs
to be able to accomplish these missions (even if debate continues over
exactly when and where it should perform them), no fundamental changes
have been made in the security architecture to create better
institutions and capabilities for them.
Indeed, at least on paper the federal structure has changed little
since the first burst of innovation in the aftermath of World War II
and the onset of the Cold War. No comparable burst occurred in the
1990s. It is as though corporate America was managing the modern
economy with the structures of the Ford Motor Company, the Bell System,
and United Fruit. Company managements spend a great deal of thought and
energy on organizing their functions to align executive authority with
key products. The federal government disperses executive authority so
thoroughly that few individuals believe they are accountable for any of
the government's key security outputs. People rise to the top of the
Washington heap because of their policy expertise, not their managerial
expertise. Those senior executives who are managerially inclined find
their tenures so short and precarious that there seems to be little
reward in making changes in ``the system'' that will make it possible
for their successor's successor to be more effective.\10\
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\10\ Ashton B. Carter, ``Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the
Future,'' in Carter and White, Keeping the Edge, pp. 1-26.
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Above all, the federal government in the past few decades has
eschewed creating new institutions for new missions such as
preparedness for catastrophic terrorism. The political climate in the
United States has been hostile to ``big government,'' and existing
cabinet departments staunchly defend their heritages and authorities,
many of which are enshrined in two hundred years of statute. The sense
of departmental entrenchment is mirrored on Capitol Hill, where
separate authorization and oversight committees protect each
``stovepipe''--national security, law enforcement, disaster relief,
public health, and so on--as jealously as the executive agencies
themselves.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the specter of catastrophic
terrorism occasions deep reflections on the nature and structure of
governance in the United States. What needs to be done next cannot be
understood without reference to these problems, and to past attempts to
overcome them.
FOUR FAILED APPROACHES
In broad outline, four approaches to managing the mission of
homeland security have been proposed: the command and control approach
of the Clinton administration, the lead agency approach, the
establishment of a Department of Homeland Security, and the appointment
of a White House coordinator or ``czar.'' To date, the Bush
administration appears to be focusing on the last, which like the other
three has inherent deficiencies.
The Clinton administration defined its approach in command and
control terms: Which federal agency should be in charge of dealing with
catastrophic terrorism? Initially, the administration determined that
the Department of Justice would ``have the lead'' in domestic terrorist
incidents, while the Department of state would do so in incidents
abroad. This approach both reinforced the false distinction between
domestic and foreign terrorism and focused on acts in progress rather
than on advance detection, prevention, and protection. Later, the
Clinton administration promulgated two presidential directives, PDD-62
and PDD-63, which further apportioned the matter of ``who's in charge''
among the existing agencies according to their traditional
functions.\11\ Thus, for example, PDD-63 assigned protection of the
financial system to the Treasury Department. The fact that this
department had no funds, no technology, and little authority to
regulate in the field of cybersecurity did not deter the authors of
PDD-63. In fact, by focusing on the question of who is in charge, the
command and control approach presumed that the government possessed the
capabilities to combat catastrophic terrorism; all that was required
was to marshal them effectively under a clear command system. The
result was the creation of a host of unfunded mandates,
responsibilities assigned with no plan for providing the means to
fulfill them. The administration made no provision to build new
capability, which was--and remains--the crux of the matter.
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\11\ Address by President Bill Clinton at the U.S. Naval Academy,
May 22, 1998; White House fact sheet, Combating Terrorism, PDD/NSC-62,
Protection against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans
Overseas, May 22, 1998, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd-62.htm; and
White House fact sheet, PDD/NSC-63, Critical Infrastructure Protection,
May 22, 1998, http: //www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A second approach considered was to designate a single lead agency
as having the homeland defense mission. In this approach, the proposed
lead was usually the Department of Defense. DOD was presumed to have
already much relevant technology, an ample budget, and a reputation for
carrying out its mission more effectively than most other government
agencies.\12\ But this approach failed because too much of the relevant
capability--for example, for surveillance of potential terrorists on
U.S. territory--fell beyond DOD's traditional purview. The Pentagon
shared the disinclination to arrogate such sweeping new authorities to
itself and proclaimed itself willing to take a strong, but follower,
role if another agency would lead the effort.
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\12\ See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Philip D. Zelikow, and David S. King,
eds., Why People Don't Trust Government (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1996), p. 9 and references therein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A third approach called for the creation of a Department of
homeland Security.\13\ This approach sought to escape the problem of
interagency coordination by concentrating the catastrophic terrorism
mission in a single agency. It recognized that none of the existing
cabinet departments was a natural lead agency, and that their ingrained
cultures would not easily incline them to adopt the new mission. The
fallacy in this approach is that interagency coordination could be thus
avoided. Suppose, for example, that the Department of Homeland Security
sought to develop a more rapid means of determining whether someone was
exposed to anthrax. It would soon discover that this effort was
redundant with DOD's efforts to develop the same detector technology
for battle field exposure in accordance with its traditional mission.
The problem of interagency coordination would not have been eliminated,
but only complicated by the introduction of a new agency. Aggregating
functions such as customs, immigration, border patrol, and coast guard
into a new agency might be efficient, but it can hardly be said that
such an entity should have the lead in homeland defense, or that its
creation eliminates the inherently interagency nature of catastrophic
terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Hart-Rudman Commission, Road Map for National Security.
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A fourth approach to organizing the federal government for
catastrophic terrorism is to appoint a White House coordinator or
``czar.'' President Bush named Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge to such
a post within a month of September 11. This approach is the least
problematic, because it recognizes that the essence of the solution is
the coordination of a wide range of government functions behind a new
priority mission. White House czars, however, have usually been
ineffective. With no resources or agencies of their own, they are
easily reduced to cajoling cabinet departments into doing what the czar
prescribes. The czar's instructions inevitably compete with other needs
and tasks of the department, and the final outcome of the competition
is determined by the cabinet secretary (invoking legal authorities,
usually of long standing) and the relevant committees of Congress, not
the czar. After the czar is thus overridden a few times, lower-level
bureaucrats conclude that the czar's directives can be ignored. As the
Washington saying about czars goes, ``The barons ignore them, and
eventually the peasants kill them.''
THE CRUX OF THE MANAGERIAL CHALLENGE
A solution to the managerial challenge of catastrophic terrorism
should have two features that the approaches outlined above lack.
First, it should acknowledge the inherent and ineluctable interagency
nature of the problem and abandon any idea of creating a single lead
agency.\14\ Second, the approach should begin the long process of
providing the United States with a stock of essential capabilities--
tactics, technology, and institutions--that the federal departments,
state and local governments, and private sector currently lack.
Interagency coordination implies a White House focus. But this focus
should not be a ``czar'' who tries to assume or direct the daily
functions of all the agencies involved but an ``architect'' who designs
the capabilities that these agencies need to address the problem. This
approach gives the architect budgetary authority (the key to his
influence) and applies that influence where it is needed most: to
creating needed capabilities rather than stirring up empty command and
control disputes over who is in charge of capabilities that are
woefully inadequate or do not exist at all. In short, the important
function of the White House architect is program coordination, not
policy coordination or command and control. The program in question is
a multiyear, multiagency effort to develop tactics, technology, and
where required new institutions for the ongoing struggle against
catastrophic terrorism.
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\14\ This does not rule out the possibility of creating an agency
that combines the functions of such border-related agencies as the
Coast Guard, Border Patrol, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and
Customs. Accomplishing this bureaucratic feat, however useful, would
require the fulltime attention of a senior manager with presidential
and congressional support. If Governor Ridge were to assume this task,
he would have no time for anything else.
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Perhaps the most apt analogy for the job required of the White
House is provided not by any war that the United States has fought, but
rather by the Cold War. In 1949 Josef Stalin's Soviet Union exploded an
atomic bomb over the steppes of Kazakhstan. Although no U.S. citizens
died in that distant blast, Americans were suddenly gripped by the
prospect of warlike damage being visited upon their homeland by a
shadowy enemy with global tentacles. George Kennan warned of a long
twilight struggle that would test U.S. patience and resolve. The nation
mobilized over time a response that was multifaceted, multiagency, and
inventive. Nuclear bombers, missiles, and submarines were built for
deterrence and retaliation. Spy satellites were launched for warning.
Air defenses were deployed around the nation's periphery, and missile
defenses were attempted, to raise the price of attack. Civil defense
programs sought to minimize casualties if the worst happened. Special
relocation sites and procedures were instituted to ensure continuity of
constitutional government if Washington was destroyed. NATO and other
alliances were formed to get more friends on the U.S. side, and the
Marshall Plan sought to ensure that economic desperation did not become
an ally of Stalin. U.S. leaders further recognized that this new
reality was so dangerous that they needed a capacity to analyze,
reflect, and learn, not merely react. They founded such think tanks as
the RAND Corporation to devise innovative methods for coping with the
era's new danger. In time, ideas such as the theory of deterrence and
the theory of arms control were elaborated that were not obvious in
1949 but that helped navigate the world through fifty years of Cold
War. With difficulty and many mistakes, the nation also learned to deal
with fear of a threat at home without hunting ``reds'' in the State
Department and Hollywood. The Cold War effort was massive, extended
throughout most of the federal government, and was coordinated by the
White House.
Designing a similar long-range program to counter catastrophic
terrorism is the task of the Bush White House in the aftermath of
September 11, 2001. The National Security Council (NSC) cannot do the
job for two reasons. First, it does not normally convene the full range
of departments, especially Justice and Health and Human Services,
required for this effort. The NSC has largely focused on foreign
problems. More fundamental, since Dwight Eisenhower's day the NSC has
slowly lost the capacity for program coordination and become a policy
coordination body only.\15\ That is, it brings the national security
agencies together to decide upon a common policy but does not oversee
or influence their internal capabilities or budgets. Indeed the NSC's
staff is renowned for its diplomatic and policy expertise, but few have
experience managing programs or agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ John Deutch, Arnold Kanter, and Brent Scowcroft with Chris
Hornbarger, ``Strengthening the National Security Interagency
Process,'' in Carter and White, Keeping the Edge, pp. 265-284.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President Bush was therefore correct not to give the homeland
security job to the NSC, but instead to found the Office of Homeland
Security with a broader membership, chaired by Governor Ridge. It is up
to Governor Ridge to avoid the fate of White House czars who try to
``run things'' from the White House. Instead of taking a command and
control approach, Ridge should adopt the architect's programmatic
approach, designing a multiyear, multiagency plan that will materially
increase the capabilities of the existing departments and agencies so
that they can play their part in the campaign against catastrophic
terrorism. Such an approach would have the additional salutary effect
of overriding the tendency, prevalent as the fiscal year 2002 budget
was finalized in the aftermath of September 11, for individual agencies
and their oversight committees to craft their own response to the
counterterror challenge. In many cases, these responses amounted to
little more than long-standing budgetary requests to which the label
``counterterrorism'' was conveniently applied. Elsewhere, multiple
agencies vied to make redundant subscale investments where a single
large investment by only one of them is needed.
The homeland security program might be organized functionally
according to a time line extending from before a hypothetical incident
of catastrophic terrorism to its aftermath. In the first phase, the
United States needs better capabilities for detection of catastrophic
terrorism. This involves surveillance of persons and motives--a
delicate matter--but also surveillance of potential means of
destruction such as crop dusters, germ cultures, and pilot instruction.
Surveillance of means raises far fewer civil liberties issues than does
surveillance of persons, and it might be much more effective. A group
that evades surveillance becomes subject to prevention by efforts to
keep destructive means out of their hands. The Nunn-Lugar program to
safeguard Russian nuclear weapons and fissile materials is an example
of a prevention program. The next stage is protection, making borders,
buildings, airplanes, and critical infrastructures more difficult to
breach, disrupt, or destroy through technical design and procedures.
Protection might also mean making people more resilient to disease
through vaccination and other public health measures. Interdiction or
``crisis management'' seeks to disrupt and destroy potential
perpetrators of catastrophic terrorism and their base of support before
they can mount an attack, as in the current campaign in Afghanistan.
Containment or ``consequence management'' means limiting the level of
damage and the number of casualties by organizing emergency response,
public health measures, and restoration of critical functions in the
aftermath of a terrorist attack. Attribution refers to the capability
to find the perpetrators of an act (e.g., by typing an anthrax culture
or performing radiochemical analysis of nuclear bomb debris) and
choosing retaliation, prosecution, or other response. Finally, as with
the RAND Corporation in the Cold War, the nation will need a capacity
for analysis and invention: studying terrorist tactics and devising
countermeasures, understanding motivations and modes of deterrence,
drawing lessons from past attacks, creating new technologies, and
developing a systematic plan.
Schematically, the result of such an effort by the Office of
Homeland Security would resemble a simple matrix, in which functions
are arrayed in columns and the agencies involved in carrying them out
in rows (see Figure 1). In each box would appear the agency's
responsibility, if any, for possessing capability in that function,
with a plan to develop that capability over a period of years. The
president would approve such a matrix for each fiscal year extending
five years into the future, and would send it to the Congress with his
annual budget submission. Although Congress would of course have the
last word on the budget, experience shows that it makes only marginal
adjustments where there is a strong and clear presidential program on a
subject of great national importance.
KEY INGREDIENTS OF THE HOMELAND SECURITY PROGRAM
The homeland security program will have many key components. Below
are a few illustrative examples.
Red team, blue team
Most Americans were probably not shocked to learn on September 12
that the U.S. government did not have advance information about the
dozen or so individuals residing in the country who plotted and took
part in the airline suicide attacks of September 11. They probably were
deeply disturbed to learn, however, that the government was as heedless
of the tactic used as it was of the perpetrators. The airline security
system inspected for guns and bombs, not knives; aircrews were trained
to deal with hijackers who sought hostages or conveyance to Cuba, not
kamikaze attack. In retrospect, a huge gap existed in the U.S. air
safety system. Terrorists detected it before the security system did--
and exploited it.
To avoid tactical surprise of this kind, the homeland security
effort needs to adopt a standard mechanism of military organizations:
competing red and blue teams. The red team tries to devise attack
tactics, and the blue team tries to design countermeasures. When the
United States developed the first stealth aircraft, for example, the
air force created a red team to try to detect and shoot them down. When
the red team identified a weakness in the stealth design, the blue team
was charged to fix it, systematically balancing risk of detection
against the cost and inconvenience of countermeasures.
A comparable red/blue team mechanism should be the central feature
of the program for homeland security. To work, the mechanism must be
systematic and institutionalized, not ad hoc. It must be independent of
the interests--airlines, for example--that stand to be inconvenienced
by its findings. It must have the money to conduct experiments, tests,
and inspections, not just paper studies. It must be knowledgeable about
the technologies of terrorism and protection. Above all, it must be
inventive. These criteria all argue for a new institutional founding
outside of, but close to, government. Models include the National
Academies of Sciences, the RAND Corporation, the Mitre and Mitretek
Systems Corporations, the Institute for Defense Analyses, and other
nonprofit research organizations established during the Cold War.
Science and technology
American society has many weaknesses in the battle against
catastrophic terrorism. It is large and open. Its infrastructures are
complex and interconnected. It values free movement, free speech, and
privacy. Its commanding international position is a lightning rod for
many international grievances. The United States must therefore draw on
its key strengths in ensuring homeland security, among which
inventiveness, deriving from its huge science and technology base, is
probably most important. The U.S. military has long sought to use
superior technology to offset opponents' favorable geography, superior
numbers, and willingness to suffer casualties.\16\ The homeland
security effort requires a program of contract research and technology
development that should be conducted outside of government, in
universities and private companies. The contracting methods should
permit small and entrepreneurial commercial companies that are the
drivers of new technology, and not just large government contractors,
to participate in the effort. Biotechnology companies, which unlike the
aerospace and information technology industries have never had strong
ties to national security, should be induced to participate.\17\
Finally, ``centers of excellence'' in counterterrorism should be
established. These centers should set out to develop the same depth of
expertise represented by the Los Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia National
Laboratories in the field of nuclear weapons design during the Cold
War.
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\16\ William J. Perry, ``Desert Storm and Deterrence,'' Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 70, No 4. (Fall 1991), pp. 64-82; and Ashton B. Carter
with Marcel Lettre and Shane Smith, ``Keeping the Technological Edge,''
in Carter and White, Keeping the Edge, pp. 129-163.
\17\ Joshua Lederberg, ed., Biological Weapons: Limiting the Threat
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999), chap. 1.
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Transnational intelligence
A number of studies have called attention to the problem of
combining information derived from foreign intelligence collection with
information derived from domestic law enforcement.\18\ The rules
governing collection in the two categories differ for the important
reason that U.S. persons enjoy protections from surveillance that do
not apply to the overseas activities of the intelligence community.
There is no reason, however, why information of both types collected by
the U.S. government in accordance with the respective rules for each
cannot be combined and correlated. The barriers to doing so are largely
bureaucratic. These barriers need to be surmounted in an era when
individuals move easily across borders, and when groups fomenting
terrorism are likely to be transnational in their membership.\19\
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\18\ Gilmore Commission, First and Second Annual Reports to the
President and the Congress; Carter, Deutch, and Zelikow, ``Catastrophic
Terrorism''; Hart-Rudman Commission, Road Map for National Security;
and Heymann, Terrorism and America.
\19\ A specific proposal for combining CIA and FBI intelligence on
transnational terrorism is contained in ``A False Alarm (This Time),''
pp. 143-174; and Carter, Deutch, and Zelikow, ``Catastrophic
Terrorism.''
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Intelligence of means
Surveillance of the means that terrorists employ is potentially
more important than surveillance of persons, and raises far fewer civil
liberties issues. Placing all Middle Eastern male noncitizens resident
in the United States under surveillance, for example, is both
objectionable and impractical. But inquiring after all those persons,
of whatever nationality, who take flying lessons but are not interested
in learning to take off or land, who rent crop dusters, or who seek
information on the antibiotic resistance of anthrax strains or the
layout of a nuclear power plant is feasible and might be extremely
useful.
Likewise, it is undesirable to restrict access by citizens to the
Capitol building and congressional office buildings, but there is no
fundamental technical barrier to seeding these buildings with sensors
that would promptly, and with a low rate of false alarms, detect the
presence of anthrax on surfaces and in ventilation systems. Nuclear
weapons are much harder to detect, but the streets in the vicinity of
the White House could be laced with sensitive detectors that would
stand a good chance of finding a nuclear weapon or radiological weapon.
Although these detectors would individually have a high rate of false
alarms, when networked so that their outputs are correlated in space
and time, they could comprise an effective warning system. Such a
system is preferable to registering truck drivers or other methods of
surveilling persons in the White House vicinity. control of weapons and
materials
Ten years into the Nunn-Lugar program to safeguard nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons and materials in the former Soviet
Union, a job remains to be completed.\20\ In addition to continuing to
support and greatly expand this program, the effort must be extended to
Pakistan, where an arsenal of substantial size might fall prey to
growing extremism.
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\20\ See Matthew Bunn, The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to
Control Warheads and Fissile Material (Washington, D.C., and Cambridge,
Mass.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Harvard Project
on Managing the Atom, April 2000); and Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler,
cochairs, A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation
Programs with Russia (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy,
Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, January 10, 2001).
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The costs of protection
Protective measures for homeland security cover a wide spectrum of
possibilities: vaccines, air defenses around the White House and
nuclear power plants, electronic firewalls around information networks,
to name just a few examples. The investments required could be
enormous. Who will pay? Private investment could be mandated by
regulation. Government could bear or subsidize the costs. Or
apportionment of risk and blame could be left to the insurance
marketplace and tort courtrooms. The answer will vary from case to
case, but the federal government needs to devise a strategy. Crafting
the right regulation and legislation, as well as putting the right
subsidies in the federal budget, will be a key responsibility of the
homeland security architect. national information assurance institute
A major ingredient of the protection effort must be safeguarding
the information infrastructure that resides overwhelmingly in private
hands. Developing protective tools and techniques, sharing information
on threats between government and private network operators, and
establishing the proper balance between regulation and government
spending to strengthen networks will require a public-private
partnership. These objectives could be accomplished through a nonprofit
institution dedicated to this purpose and funded jointly by government
and participating private network operators. Several such institutions
have already been proposed.\21\
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\21\ ``A False Alarm (This Time),'' pp. 164-165.
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Iterdiction
Soon after September 11, President Bush enunciated a principle of
U.S. policy against catastrophic terrorism that, if pursued to its
logical conclusion, would establish interdiction as an ongoing effort
rather than an episodic response to actual attacks. In his first major
public pronouncement following the September attacks, the president
said, ``Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.'' \22\
This would seem to imply the need for a continuing program to preempt
attack from groups that profess an intention to carry out mass
terrorism and to apply pressure, including attack, against those who
actively support or harbor them. Taken literally, such a program of
interdiction would have profound consequences for U.S. foreign policy,
for alliances such as NATO, and for international organizations such as
the United Nations.
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\22\ President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of
Congress and the American People, U.S. Capitol, September 20, 2001.
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Public health surveillance and response
Containment of the damage from an incident of mass terrorism
requires that the public health and agricultural systems establish
capabilities that go well beyond their accustomed mission of protecting
against naturally occurring dangers. The powers of the public health
authorities to mandate disease surveillance and impose such remedies as
quarantine are broad, a holdover from the nineteenth century. These
authorities need to be updated to encompass man-made pandemics. The
private health care system overall, which under the doctrine of managed
care is designed to have the least possible excess capacity during
normal times, will need to provide such surge capability as extra
hospital beds and stockpiled medications carefully chosen and sized for
possible bioterrorism. state and local first response
The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation, passed in 1996, began
providing state and local first responders with the equipment and
training needed to enhance their vital role in consequence
management.\23\ Defining the ongoing federal role in supporting state
and local government is a major task of the counterterrorism program.
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\23\ Falkenrath, Newman, and Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel; and
Richard A. Falkenrath, ``The Problems of Preparedness: Challenges
Facing the U.S. Domestic Preparedness Program,'' BCSIA Discussion Paper
2000-28, ESDP Discussion Paper 2000-05 (Cambridge, Mass.: Belfer Center
for Science and International Affairs and Executive Session on Domestic
Preparedness, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,
December 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Forensics for attribution
Ever since the U.S. Air Force sampled the first residue from the
Soviet Union's nuclear weapons testing in the 1950s and deduced their
detailed design, radiochemical analysis of bomb materials and debris
has developed into a sophisticated science. A corresponding effort to
type bioterror agents and their chemical preparations is required to
attribute attacks to their perpetrators. At this time the FBI, DOD, and
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention all have forensic
programs, but none is adequate for counterterror purposes. The
counterterror program architect will need to decide which of these
programs will be funded to provide the greatly expanded capability the
nation needs.
Mobilization and sunset
Until the mid-twentieth century, successful prosecution of war
depended on the ability to mobilize nations and armies. A similar
concept is useful in the war on terrorism. In the face of reasonably
credible and specific information about actual or imminent mass
terrorism, extraordinary measures might be advisable that are
undesirable when there are no such warnings. In an emergency, the
government will assume special authorities, restrict movement and other
freedoms, and impose economic disruptions as the nation hunkers down.
It is important to the quality of civil society in the long run that
this mobilized state be clearly distinguished in statute and procedures
from ``normal'' times when catastrophic terrorism is an ever-present,
but not specifically anticipated, contingency. Experience in the United
Kingdom during its century long struggle against Irish terrorism
suggests that even in liberal democracies, powers granted to the
government in the name of imminent terrorism are seldom rescinded when
the threat recedes.\24\ It is therefore important to write into any
statute or regulation conferring extraordinary powers on the government
a sunset clause describing the time and method of demobilization,
placing the burden for extending the mobilization squarely on the
government's ability to produce credible and specific information of
imminent threat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\Laura K. Donohue, ``Civil Liberties, Terrorism, and Liberal
Democracy: Lessons from the United Kingdom,'' BCSIA Discussion Paper
2000-05, ESDP Discussion Paper 2000-01 (Cambridge, Mass.: Belfer Center
for Science and International Affairs and Executive Session on Domestic
Preparedness, John F. Kennedy School of government, Harvard University,
August 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONCLUSION
Merely coordinating the existing capabilities of the United States
to counter catastrophic terrorism is not adequate to protect the nation
or the international order from this major new challenge, because the
existing capabilities fall far short of what is needed. Nor is it
practical to imagine having someone in the federal government who is
truly in charge of a mission that inherently cuts across all agencies
of the federal government, state and local government, and the private
sector. What is required instead is a multiyear, multiagency program of
invention and investment devised in the White House, embedded in the
president's budget submissions and defended by him to Congress, and
supported by appropriate law and regulation. This program should cover
all phases in the war against catastrophic terrorism--detection,
prevention, protection, interdiction, containment, attribution, and
analysis and invention. If President Bush's director of homeland
security assumes the role of architect of such an effort, he will
provide future presidents with the tools they will need to cope with
this enduring problem.
Biographical Sketch of Hon. Ashton B. Carter
Ash Carter is Ford Foundation Professor of Science and
International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of
Government and Co-Director, with William J. Perry, of the Harvard-
Stanford Preventive Defense Project.
From 1993-1996 Carter served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy, where he was responsible for national
security policy concerning the states of the former Soviet Union
(including their nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction), arms control, countering proliferation worldwide, and
oversight of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and missile defense programs; he
also chaired NATO's High Level Group. He was twice awarded the
Department of Defense Distinguished Service medal, the highest award
given by the Pentagon. Carter continues to serve DoD as an adviser to
the Secretary of Defense and as a member of both DoD's Defense Policy
Board and Defense Science Board, and DOD's Threat Reduction Advisory
Committee. From 1998-2000, he served in an official capacity as Senior
Advisor to the North Korea Policy Review, chaired by William J. Perry.
Before his government service, Carter was director of the Center
for Science and International Affairs in the Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University and chairman of the editorial board of
International Security. Carter received bachelor's degrees in physics
and in medieval history from Yale University and a doctorate in
theoretical physics from Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes
Scholar.
In addition to authoring numerous scientific publications and
government studies, Carter is the author and editor of a number of
books, including Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for
America (with William J. Perry). Carter's current research focuses on
the Preventive Defense Project, which designs and promotes security
policies aimed at preventing the emergence of major new threats to the
United States.
Carter is a Senior Partner of Global Technology Partners, LLC, a
member of the Advisory Board of MIT Lincoln Laboratories, the Draper
Laboratory Corporation, and the Board of Directors of Mitretek Systems,
Inc. He is a consultant to Goldman Sachs and the MITRE Corporation on
international affairs and technology matters, a member of the Council
on Foreign Relations, the Aspen Strategy Group, and the National
Committee on U.S.-China Relations, and a fellow of the American Academy
of Arts and Sciences.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Dr. Carter. Dr. Gale.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN GALE, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR,
POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT, UNIVERSITY OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Dr. Gale. Mr. Chairman, Senator Stevens, members of the
committee, I really thank you for the opportunity to be here
today. A lot of what I have to say actually is an amplification
on some of the remarks made by Senator Byrd this morning, and I
was very impressed. I've been asked to present my views on the
status of homeland security since the events of September 11
and comment on the ways I believe we need to change that will
effectively lead to types of threats that should be expected in
the future.
As you know, many of the steps taken over the last several
months to enhance homeland security have been quite public, for
example, the creation of the Office of Homeland Security, and
the changes in airport screening. Others have been less
visible: modifications in the policies and operations of State
and local governments, Federal agencies, private sector firms.
To the extent that the military actions in Afghanistan and
various diplomatic initiatives throughout the world have been
directed at minimizing the probability of future acts of
terrorism in the United States, I suppose that those, too, can
be included under the rubric of homeland defense. As
potentially valuable as these steps may appear, it is my
opinion that they not only fall short of meeting their specific
immediate objectives, but also based on critical
misconceptions, about the kinds and sources of threats that the
United States faces from terrorist groups in the future.
In many ways, our current situation I see analogous to that
of a man whose only tool is a hammer, and therefore treats
everything as if it's a nail. We have misdirected many of our
efforts simply because we have not come to terms with the
objectives and methods of the attackers, and have assumed that
the strategies for prevention and mitigation that have served
us in the past are going to apply equally well to threats of
the type that we now face. Unless those misconceptions are
corrected and our policies revised, I believe that they will
ultimately result in a continued misallocation of resources
devoted to homeland security and will continue to leave us
highly vulnerable to acts of terrorism.
Having spent the past 25 years involved in research,
teaching and consulting about terrorism and security, the
sources of those misconceptions, at least to me, are clear as a
proverbial sore thumb. What's not as obvious are the steps that
we're going to need in order to correct the situation.
According to the Executive Order which established the
Office of Homeland Security, ``The Office shall work with the
executive departments and agencies, State and local governments
and private entities to ensure the adequacy of the national
strategy for detecting, preparing for, preventing, protecting
against, responding to and recovering from terrorist threats or
attacks within the United States.''
It seems to me that Congress has also got to play a role in
providing for the security of the United States by insuring
that our Nation's resources are effectively and efficiently
invested in homeland security. And what I hope is that my
remarks here can assist you in helping to refocus our efforts,
and that your deliberation process and decisions will be guided
by the very real possibility that these attacks can occur at
any time.
Whatever else we may think of the actions on September 11,
there is no doubt that they should be viewed as a clear
indication of the type and scale of the terrorist attacks that
I believe we will experience in the future. al Qaeda has not
only demonstrated the will to attack the U.S. homeland
directly, but with massive, well organized attacks designed to
directly support its goals. It's not a media event; they are
trying to reach their objectives directly.
What should also be understood is that the attacks on
September 11 required relatively modest efforts and resources,
at minimal cost--certainly no more than half a million
dollars--and with a very simple tactical plan. The United
States suffered and continues to suffer major personal,
financial, material and psychological damage; the financial
impact alone is capitalized by some in the trillion-dollar
range.
Notwithstanding the level of damage and disruption caused
by the events of September 11, I believe that we will not be as
quote, ``fortunate,'' unquote, in the future. Unlike many other
terrorist organizations, with its extensive global network of
operational and support cells, al Qaeda is not interested
simply in presenting its case to the media or using the fear of
terrorism as a source of leverage in negotiations to acquire,
say, land or the return of prisoners. Let me be clear: the
long-run goal of al Qaeda is the creation of an independent,
pan-Islamic society based on the commitment to Islamic faith
and Islamic law. Osama bin Laden has clearly described this
society as the reinstitution of a caliphate.
But regardless of what its institutional structure is, al
Qaeda's goals must be understood as the critical driving force
in its planning for future acts of terrorism. al Qaeda's
leadership believes that the key element of their plan for a
pan-Islamic society is to ensure that the West, and the United
States in particular, is defeated and unable to threaten any
Muslim.
By creating a situation wherein the United States and its
allies are in a state of mass disruption and chaos, not
necessarily death, chaos and destruction, and focused on
domestic control rather than on our relationships throughout
the world, al Qaeda believes that it will be able to proceed
with the next phases of its strategy, which is the polarization
of Islam to ensure that the new society is led only by the
faithful and local revolutions to eliminate those nation States
which they see as having been imposed on Islam by the West.
This is this comment about the past 80 years, referring I
suppose to the League of Nations.
It's important to recall here that the U.S. Department of
Defense's perspective on terrorism is framed in terms of
asymmetrical warfare, the attempt to ``circumvent or undermine
U.S. strengths while employing its weaknesses, exploiting its
weaknesses, using methods that differ from the usual mode of
U.S. operations.''
Whatever we may believe about its morality and legitimacy,
however, asymmetric warfare is simply warfare that employs
nontraditional operations and strategies. And just as the U.S.
position during the cold war was based on the strategy of
mutually assured destruction, what we called MAD, my colleagues
and I, perhaps in a moment of macabre humor, see al Qaeda's
strategy in terms of MUD, Multilateral Unconstrained Disruption
on a permanent basis.
Based on Osama bin Laden's statements, I fully expect that
the next round of attacks from al Qaeda will almost certainly
be directed at disrupting, and possibly disabling the U.S.
economy. And as far-fetched as this may sound on the surface, I
believe that this threat is not only real, but at least under
the current U.S. policies regarding homeland security,
disturbingly feasible, even in the near term.
Now, my colleagues and I have explored a number of
scenarios, of which I'm just going to make a few to make my
point. I'm not a movie director or movie writer, these are
serious considerations, I'm going to only omit a few of the
details because in the past people have accused me of giving
too much information out.
The potential of a physical or cyber attack directed at the
computing facility responsible for coordinating and balancing
the loads of the electrical grid in the eastern United States
can be readily accomplished. It's one building guarded by two
contract guards. And it would result in the total loss of
electrical service throughout the entire grid, save for Texas
because it's on a separate system, for the foreseeable future.
And should anyone doubt the reality of this threat, note that
the elements of this attack were outlined in materials found in
Afghanistan and published on the front page of the New York
Times about 1 month ago.
As my colleague to my right has said, special nuclear
materials are also important, but not necessarily nuclear
weapons. They can be used in attacks ranging from the
detonation of what are popularly referred to as ``dirty''
nuclear bombs to the contamination of water supplies of one or
more major metropolitan areas and potentially the disruption of
health care systems, transportation, food distribution and
other critical national functions.
Estimates of the amounts of nuclear materials available
vary, but based on materials found in Afghanistan and the al
Qaeda training manual, it's clear that al Qaeda has given
serious consideration to such attacks, and we believe they have
access to those materials. But note that even without the use
of special nuclear materials, by using conventional nonnuclear
explosives, many of the same objectives can be achieved,
particularly if a large number of facilities such as regional
shopping centers, major hospitals, or entertainment centers
were simultaneously targeted.
The idea is disruption. Not necessarily that--the use of
the largest number of surface to air missiles which are readily
available throughout the world, in a strategy of ongoing hits
at take off, and/or landing from about 1 mile away, can easily
be used to further disrupt and potentially end passenger and
other commercial air traffic in the United States. Even a
limited number of strikes coupled with the threat of continued
actions could easily lead to the discontinuation of both
passenger and package flights, and a major disruption of the
U.S. economy.
Attacks based on dispersing environmentally dangerous
materials in major cities can easily cause massive disruption
and financial damage, and in many cases without any loss of
life. And with it, massive destruction of our way of life as
Americans and a significant loss of Government credibility.
As is clear from the enormous Federal, State and local
investments in roads, ports, airports, public transportation
systems, the U.S. economy depends on transportation. Raw
materials and machinery, intermediate goods, services,
retailing are all fundamentally dependent on the continued
operation of the entire system, not just individual legs of a
journey. And even before the documentation was found in
Afghanistan, it was clear that terrorists fully appreciate that
attacks on special facilities, critical interchanges, choke
points such as bridges, tunnels, trestles, interchanges, port
facilities, would produce catastrophic impacts on the U.S.
economy.
Many of these attacks would require even more modest
resources than the events of September 11 to produce an even
greater disruption and damage. In a number of cases the result
would be a total collapse of one and more sectors of the
economy. For example, roughly 80 percent of the manufacturing
and distribution of health care products depends on the
operation of a highly integrated transportation system on the
east coast.
For virtually all the Fortune 2000, maintenance of the
efficiency of today's global supply chain depends on the
continued operation of what are called enterprise systems,
these are the software systems created by SAP and Oracle. The
dark side of technological improvements and economic
efficiency, however, is increased vulnerability.
Governor Engler pointed this out when he spoke of problems
of just in time inventory. Attacks aimed at enterprise systems
could result in not only in significant long-term disruptions
to our economy, but to severe disruption of military logistics
and operations, since they are on the same systems.
The list is obviously abbreviated. I could go on. And it
also omits a lot of details, but what I want you to recognize
is that none of these potential threats depends on the
technologies or weapons that are found in science fiction
novels. Nor do they depend on using classified information,
special techniques or financial resources that are not
generally available to terrorist groups such as al Qaeda.
Instead, as with the events of September 11, I believe that
future terrorist attacks will be based on the simple
application of the principle of leverage, that is to say,
terrorists will use very modest actions which are simple in
planning, resources, technology, and execution, to achieve
major highly disruptive consequences.
Equally important, either directly or through the loss of
credibility in Government, any of these actions could result in
precisely the kind of broad disruption and chaos al Qaeda
regards as critical in meeting its goals. In fact, given what
we now know of the training methods and operational plans, all
that al Qaeda needs at this point to implement any or all of
these actions is organization and coordination. There should be
little doubt that they have the will and the resources.
Given the very real threat of acts of terrorism in the
future, my colleagues and I have approached the problem of
enhancing homeland security in terms of the following
observations. First, the future actions of terrorist
organizations such as al Qaeda will be the continued use of
attacks that meet their goals. This is not a media event.
They're going to be constrained only by their available
resources and their perception of the vulnerabilities in the
United States and the West.
Planning for homeland security must in turn recognize that
our investments in security decisions needs to be based on the
analysis and understanding of the objectives and resources of
organizations such as al Qaeda and the variety of specific
actions that they're going to use to achieve their long-run
goals, not just what we imagine that they should be doing
because we know how to protect it.
Understanding terrorist actions through examining the
relationships among an organization's goals, strategies, and
tactics is the hallmark of an albeit nontraditional military,
not criminal, analysis. And as with the use of military actions
to promote international security, effective homeland security
depends on developing, coordinating, and implementing security
measures that meet realistic expected threats, rather than
assuming that the threats will be determined by the security
that we choose to employ.
Remember, just because we know how to use a hammer doesn't
mean that everything is a nail. If we had used marshals and
snipers to protect the World Trade Center and Pentagon because
of, say, a threat on September 8, it would not have done any
good. The success of policies and programs aimed at homeland
security for the United States depends directly on our ability
to make decisions based on the effective and efficient use of
national, State and local resources and the effective
coordination of those decisions as part of a consistent
national effort.
As explained by the President in his remarks on October 8,
2001 at Governor Ridge's swearing in ceremony, ``In the war on
terror, knowledge is power. We will strengthen and help protect
our transportation systems, our food and water systems and our
critical infrastructure by making them less vulnerable to
attack.''
Fortunately, the United States has actually taken steps in
this effort. In its reports to congressional requesters on
combating terrorism, the GAO recommends the use of a set of
procedures for threat and risk assessments that assist in
prioritizing and targeting program investments for homeland
security. Based on quantitative and qualitative threat risk
assessments, the procedures known as VAM views the application
of specific threat postures, and estimates the net present
value, the return on investment, resulting from investments in
security. Think of it as a kind of security impact statement.
However, in order to make direct use of risk and threat
assessments and estimate value added, there must also be a
commitment to structuring the Office of Homeland Security in a
manner capable of supporting comprehensive reviews of findings,
developing programs and plans, and effectively coordinating and
implementing the decisions through public and private sectors
across all branches of government.
And as with other wartime efforts and at least in this
regard, the war on terrorism wasn't misnamed, clear
institutional responsibility, authority and operational control
is critical to success. Governor Ridge actually said as much on
November 27, 2001. He told a gathering of aerospace executives,
``There's no question that American ingenuity, know-how and
technology will be a key to winning this new war on terrorism.
Our national strategy for homeland defense will identify our
objectives in precise and measurable terms. The first step in
developing a strategy is to identify your goals.''
This is as true of homeland security as it is in military
planning and military strategy. In short, I believe that at
least until all the elements of al Qaeda and all the similar
groups have been eliminated, and the United States is able to
support expanded homeland security through extensive
intelligence and the implementation of coordinated security
measures, the Nation must commit to ensuring homeland security
for a policy of effective and efficient investments, and those
security measures that are likely to mitigate the effects of
threats from al Qaeda.
Given the likelihood of continuing threats from terrorist
organizations, I believe that the United States must take steps
to ensure that substantial resources are invested in security
and the Nation has an authoritative organizational focus for
homeland security efforts. Thank you very much.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Stephen Gale
Mr. Chairman, Senator Stevens, members of the Committee on
Appropriations, thank you for this opportunity to testify today. It is
a pleasure to be here in the United States Senate.
I have been asked to present my views on the status of homeland
security since the events of September 11th and to comment on the ways
in which I believe it will need to change in order to effectively meet
the types of threats that should be expected in the future.
As you know, many of the steps taken over the past several months
to enhance homeland security have been quite public--for example, the
creation of the Office of Homeland Security and the changes in airport
screening. Others have been less visible modifications in the policies
and operations of state and local governments, federal agencies, and
private sector firms. To the extent that the military actions in
Afghanistan and the various diplomatic initiatives throughout the world
have been directed at minimizing the probability of future acts of
terrorism in the United States, I suppose that these, too, can be
included under the rubric of homeland defense.
As potentially valuable as these steps may appear, it is my opinion
that they not only fall short of meeting their specific, immediate
objectives, but also are based on critical misconceptions about the
kinds and sources of threats that the United States faces from
terrorist groups in the future. In many ways, the situation is
analogous to the case of the man with a hammer who treats everything as
a nail: we have misdirected many of our efforts simply because we have
not come to terms with the objectives and methods of the attackers and
have assumed that the strategies for prevention and mitigation that
have served us in the past will apply to the types of threats we now
face. Unless these misconceptions are corrected and our policies
revised, I believe that they will ultimately result in a continued
misallocation of the resources devoted to homeland security and will
leave us highly vulnerable to acts of terrorism.
As one who has spent the past twenty-five years involved in
research, teaching, and consulting about terrorism and security, the
sources of these misconceptions are as clear to me as the proverbial
``sore thumb.'' What is not as obvious are the steps that will be
needed to correct the situation.
According to the Executive Order which established the Office of
Homeland Security, ``The Office shall work with executive departments
and agencies, State and local governments, and private entities to
ensure the adequacy of the national strategy for detecting, preparing
for, preventing, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from
terrorist threats or attacks within the United States.'' (emphasis
added)
It seems clear to me that Congress should also have a role in
providing for the security of the United States by ensuring that our
nation's resources are effectively and efficiently invested in homeland
security. I hope that my remarks can assist you in helping to refocus
our efforts--and that your deliberation process and decisions will be
guided by the very real possibility that attacks could occur at any
time.
Whatever else we may think of the actions on September 11th, there
is no doubt that they should be viewed as a clear indication of the
type and scale of the terrorist attacks that I believe we will
experience in the future. Al Qaeda has not only demonstrated the will
to attack the U.S. homeland directly, but with massive, well organized
attacks designed to directly support its goals. What should also be
understood is that the attacks on September 11th were relatively modest
efforts. At minimal cost and with a very simple tactical plan, the
United States suffered--and continues to suffer--major personal,
financial, material, and psychological damage.
Notwithstanding the level of damage and disruption caused by the
events of September 11th, I believe that we will not be as
``fortunate'' in the future. With its extensive global network of
operational and support cells, Al Qaeda is not interested simply in
presenting its case in the media or using the fear of terrorism as a
source of leverage in negotiations. The long-run goal of Al Qaeda is
the creation of an independent, pan-Islamic society based on a
commitment to Islamic faith and Islamic law (the Shari'ah). Usama bin
Laden has described this new society as a reinstitution of a
``caliphate'' but, regardless of its specific institutional structure,
Al Qaeda's goals must be understood as the critical driving force in
its planning for future acts of terrorism.
Al Qaeda's leadership believes that the key element of their plan
for a pan-Islamic society is to ensure that the West--and the United
States in particular--is ``defeated and unable to threaten any
Muslim.'' With a sufficiently weakened United States, with a United
States and its allies in a state of mass disruption and chaos--focused
internally rather than on its relationships throughout the world--Al
Qaeda believes that it will then be able to proceed with the next
phases of its strategy: polarization of Islam to ensure that the new
society is led by the faithful and local revolutions to eliminate the
nation states imposed on Islam by the West.
It is important to recall here that the U.S. Department of
Defense's perspective on terrorism is framed in terms of ``asymmetrical
warfare''--the attempt ``to circumvent or undermine U.S. strengths
while exploiting its weaknesses, using methods that differ from the
usual mode of U.S. operations'' (DOD Annual Report, 1999). Whatever we
may believe about its morality and legitimacy, however, asymmetric
warfare is simply warfare that employs non-traditional operations and
strategies. And just as the U.S. position during the cold war was based
on a strategy of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), my colleagues and
I see Al Qaeda's strategy in terms of ``MUD,'' Multilateral
Unconstrained Disruption.
Based on bin Laden's statements, I fully expect that the next round
of attacks from Al Qaeda will almost certainly be directed at
disrupting--and possibly disabling--the U.S. economy. As far-fetched as
this may sound on the surface, I believe that this threat is not only
real but, at least under current U.S. policies concerning homeland
security, disturbingly feasible--even in the near-term. My colleagues
and I have explored many scenarios, of which I will use just a few to
make my point. (Please note that I have omitted the details in order to
limit the identification of specific areas of vulnerability.)
--A physical or cyber-attack directed at the computing facility
responsible for coordinating and balancing the loads of the
electrical grid in the Eastern United States can be readily
accomplished and result in the total loss of electrical service
throughout the entire grid (save for Texas) for the foreseeable
future. (Should anyone doubt the reality of this threat, note
that elements of this attack were outlined in materials found
in Afghanistan and published in the New York Times about a
month ago.)
--Special nuclear materials (not nuclear weapons) can be used in
attacks ranging from the detonation of what are popularly
referred to as ``dirty nuclear bombs,'' to the contamination of
the water supplies of one or more major metropolitan areas, to
the disruption of health care systems, transportation, food
distribution, and other critical national functions. Estimates
of the amounts of available material varies but, based on
materials found in Afghanistan and the ``Al Qaeda Training
Manual'' it is clear that Al Qaeda has given serious
consideration to such attacks and has access to such materials.
Note that even with the use of conventional explosives, many of
the same objectives could be achieved--particularly if a large
number of facilities such as regional shopping centers, major
hospitals, and entertainment centers were simultaneously
targeted.
--The use of a modest number of surface-to-air missiles in a strategy
of on-going ``hits at take-off and/or landing'' can easily be
used to further disrupt--and potentially end--passenger and
other commercial air traffic in the United States. Even a
limited number of strikes coupled with the threat of continued
actions, for example, could easily lead to the discontinuation
of both passenger and package flights and a major disruption of
the U.S. economy.
--Attacks based on dispersing environmentally dangerous materials in
major cities can easily cause massive disruption and financial
damage--in many cases, without any loss of life or even serious
health threat--and, with it, massive disruption of our way of
life and a significant loss of government credibility.
--As is clear from the enormous federal, state, and local investments
in roads, ports, airports, and public transportation systems,
the U.S. economy depends on transportation. Raw materials,
machinery, intermediate goods, services, and retailing are all
fundamentally dependent on the continued operation of the
entire system. As was clear even before the documentation was
found in Afghanistan, terrorists fully appreciate that attacks
on specific facilities, critical interchanges, and choke points
(e.g., bridges, tunnels, trestles, interchanges, port
facilities) would produce catastrophic impacts on the U.S.
economy. Many of these attacks would require even more modest
resources than the events of September 11th to produce even
greater disruption and damage. In a number of cases, the result
would be a total collapse of one or more sectors of the
economy. (For example, roughly 80 percent of the manufacturing
and distribution of health care products depends on the
continued operation of the highly integrated transportation
system on the East Coast.)
--For virtually all of the Fortune 2000, maintenance of the
efficiency of today's global supply chain depends on the
continued operation of what are called Enterprise Systems
(e.g., SAP, Oracle). The ``dark side'' of improvements in
economic efficiency, however, is increased vulnerability.
Attacks aimed at Enterprise Systems can result not only in
significant long-term distortions to our economy, but the
severe disruption of military logistics and operations. (To the
extent that we can assume that Al Qaeda is familiar with the
critical role of such systems in business processes, attacks on
Enterprise Systems probably constitute a true threat to the
stability of the United States and Western economies.)
This list is obviously abbreviated--and omits many details. What I
would like you to recognize, however, is that none of these potential
threats depends on technologies or weapons that are found only in
science fiction novels. Nor do they depend on using classified
information, special techniques, or financial resources that are not
generally available to terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. As with the
events of September 11th, I believe that future terrorist attacks will
be based on the application of the ``principle of leverage:'' the use
of modest actions--simple in planning, resources, and execution--to
realize significant, highly disruptive consequences.
Equally important, either directly or through the loss of
credibility in government, any of these actions would result in
precisely the kind of broad disruption and chaos Al Qaeda regards as
critical in meeting its goals. In fact, given what we now know of its
training methods and operational plans, all that Al Qaeda needs at this
point to implement any or all of these actions is organization and
coordination. There should be little doubt that they have the will and
the resources.
Given the very real threat of acts of terrorism directed at the
United States in the future, my colleagues and I have approached the
problem of enhancing homeland security in terms of the following
observations:
--The future actions of terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda will
be continue to be directed toward the use of attacks that meet
their goals, their resources, and their perceptions of the
vulnerabilities of the United States and our allies. Planning
for homeland security must, in turn, recognize that our
investments in security decisions need to be based on an
analysis of the objectives and resources of Al Qaeda and other
groups and the ways in which specific actions will assist them
in achieving their long-run goals.
--Understanding terrorist actions through examining the relationships
among a group's goals, strategy, and tactics is the hallmark of
(albeit non-traditional) military, not criminal, analysis. And,
as with the use of military actions to promote international
security, effective homeland security depends on developing,
coordinating, and implementing security measures that meet
expected threats rather than assuming that the threats will be
determined by the security we choose to employ.
--The success of policies and programs aimed at homeland security for
the United States depends directly on our ability to make
decisions based on the effective and efficient use of national,
state, and local resources--and the coordination of these
decisions as part of a consistent national effort.
As explained by the President in his remarks on October 8, 2001 at
Governor Ridge's swearing-in ceremony, ``In the war on terror,
knowledge is power. [We will] Strengthen and help protect our
transportation systems, our food and water systems and our critical
infrastructure by making them less vulnerable to attack.''
Fortunately, the United States has already taken steps to support
this effort. In its Report to Congressional Requesters on ``Combating
Terrorism'' (GAO/NSIAD-98-74), the GAO recommends the use of a set of
procedures for threat and risk assessments that assists in prioritizing
and targeting program investments for homeland security. (The process
was developed through a joint effort initiated over five years ago and
is currently used by at least one major oil company and the Department
of Energy.) Based on both quantitative and qualitative threat and risk
assessment procedures, this system (VAM) reviews the application of
alternative security strategies to specific threat postures and
estimates the net present value (net benefits) resulting from
investments in each of the alternative strategies.
In order to make direct use of risk and threat assessments and
estimate the value-added of alternative security measures, however,
there must also be a commitment to structuring the Office of Homeland
Security in a manner capable of supporting a comprehensive review of
findings, developing programs and plans, and coordinating the
implementation of its decisions throughout the public and private
sectors, and across all agencies and branches of government. As with
other wartime efforts--and, at least in this regard, the ``war on
terrorism'' has not been misnamed--clear institutional responsibility
and operational control is critical to success.
Governor Ridge has said as much. On November 27, 2001, he told a
gathering or aerospace executives, ``There is no question that American
ingenuity, know-how and technology will be a key to winning this new
war on terrorism. Our national strategy for homeland security will
identify our objectives in precise and measurable terms. . . . the
first step in developing a strategy is to identify your goals. This is
as true in homeland security as it is in military planning and military
strategy.''
In short, I believe that, at least until all of the elements of Al
Qaeda have been eliminated and the United States is able to support
homeland security through vastly improved intelligence and the
implementation of coordinated security measures, the nation must commit
to ensuring homeland security through a policy of effective and
efficient investments in those security measures that can mitigate the
likely types of threats from Al Qaeda. Given the likelihood of
continuing threats from terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda, I
believe that the United States must therefore take immediate steps to
ensure that its substantial resources are wisely invested in security
and that the nation has a visible, authoritative organizational focus
for its homeland security efforts.
Thank you.
Biographical Sketch of Dr. Stephen Gale
Dr. Gale is the Director for the Center for Organizational Dynamics
and a member of the faculties of the Regional Science and Political
Science Departments at the University of Pennsylvania. In these
capacities, he has responsibility for developing and directing
educational and research programs aimed at assessing the impacts of
changes in organizational structures, business development, financial
valuation, performance analysis, urban and regional development, and
locational evaluation.
During his career, Dr. Gale has been responsible for developing
graduate level programs related to new business development,
performance analysis and business process re-engineering,
transportation and logistics, the effects of information systems in
reorganization strategies, and the use of financial analysis to
transform cost centers into profit centers. His research and consulting
work have concentrated in these areas and have included: (a) studies
for the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health,
Sandia National Laboratories, the Office of Naval Research, the Ford
Foundation, the Departments of Housing and Urban Development,
Transportation, and Energy, and the Agency for International
Development; and (b) assignments on behalf of Gerald D. Hines
Interests, Control Data Corporation, IMS America, Johnson & Johnson,
Amtrak, Exxon Corporation International, Dupont, and a number of
Fortune 1000 corporations. The work included business plan development,
technology transfer, financial valuation, process re-engineering,
survey research, and logistical analysis.
Dr. Gale's current research and consulting has focused principally
on the development of effective and efficient procedures for valuing
cost centers. His recent work for the Department of Energy and Exxon
Company International has resulted in the development of software for
determining the value-added of security to organizations and its
application to the improvement of security management.
Dr. Gale is the author of over seventy books and articles as well
as a variety of reports associated with his consulting assignments. He
received his B.S., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees from the University of
Michigan. In addition to his current position, Dr. Gale has also served
on the faculties of the University of California, Berkeley;
Northwestern University; and Columbia University.
Questioning by Chairman Robert C. Byrd
Chairman Byrd. Thank you Dr. Gale. The chair thanks all the
witnesses for their excellent statements. The committee will
now proceed with questions. And Senators will be limited to 7
minutes. I shall begin.
Dr. Carter, this Nation is facing huge challenges
domestically and overseas. But our budget for addressing all of
these challenges including the new relatively undefined issue
of homeland security is very limited. Given the cost and the
long-term nature of homeland security efforts, some national
priorities will not be funded. Others will have to be cut. How
do you recommend to this committee that we prioritize among all
of our many and varied funding decisions?
Dr. Carter. That's a very good question. I can only give
you a partial answer to that. I do think that in the area of
homeland security, I can't speak to all the national priorities
as broadly as you can, Mr. Chairman, but within the homeland
security plan, that's one of the vital tasks of the architect.
We can't cover all of these contingencies. We can't be
everywhere all the time on top of all these things. We have to
put some order into this house and figure out what kinds of
scenarios we're going to invest in disproportionately and what
the best cost exchange ratio is for a given investment.
That's precisely the kind of thing which isn't going to
just bubble up by the agencies all by themselves which busy
people like you who have a much broader profile cannot do. And
that's what this architect needs to do. Otherwise, it isn't
going to happen and we will be making investments willy-nilly.
Not only will they cost more than we can afford, but they won't
protect us in the long run.
Chairman Byrd. Thus far, do you see this architect doing
that prioritizing?
Dr. Carter. I think it's been a slow start. I'm just making
inferences from the outside, but I believe that it is becoming
apparent to Governor Ridge's office that the architect's role
is in fact where he can leave a legacy and that trying to
coordinate that which we already have is something you can't do
from the White House and beside the point, because that which
we have is not sufficient. Trying to run your own agency is
okay, and we may need some new agencies here and there, but
even if we create a new agency or several new agencies, the
problem of coordination will remain. There will still remain a
need for an architect, even if we rejigger the agencies better.
So that role isn't going to go away.
It is now more than 6 months since the event. I think that
it would be easier to get a head of steam with this job
description were it November and not April, but we've got to
wish him well, because it's the only Government we've got, and
he will be occupying the role of Director of Homeland Security
even if he's not doing the function. So I certainly do wish him
well and I hope he takes the architect's role and not any of
these other roles as the way he can leave a legacy.
Chairman Byrd. Dr. Gale, would risk assessments, at the
Federal level, using intelligence capabilities not available to
State and local officials, be a logical way to begin to
prioritize our vulnerabilities?
Dr. Gale. The way in which this is phrased makes it a
little difficult to answer, largely because the coordination of
all the efforts is yet to be done, and we don't really
understand precisely how an Office of Homeland Security is
operating.
At this point, however, what we have is an opportunity to
use methods that have already been developed, for example by
the Department of Energy in its security efforts, to try and
prioritize precisely the efforts of the architect that Mr.
Carter is speaking about. The difficulty is to coordinate that
with the kind of intelligence that we believe we can actually
coordinate from all of the other agencies that are collecting
information and bringing it together within this very, very
complex Government.
I think the most surprising thing to me in the aftermath of
September 11 is that we've continued to use a lot of the kinds
of stove-pipe organizational mechanisms that have been so
successful for us in balancing the efforts and the needs of
this enormous Nation. At the same time during time of war I
expect that there will be tremendous amount of change in the
cross-cutting across those agencies, and at this point the
question of setting priorities is one that will necessarily
have to await the kind of coordination that goes into an agency
like the Office of Homeland Security at the outset.
Chairman Byrd. Let me ask either of you two gentlemen, is
any Federal entity as far as you know now doing risk
assessments?
Dr. Carter. Sure.
Dr. Gale. Sure. The Department of Defense does risk
assessments, but right now as far as I know, the Department of
Energy has an extensive program. They also have a mechanism for
determining not just priority, but the return on investment
from security.
Chairman Byrd. Do you know if that information is being
shared with State and local people?
Dr. Gale. As far as I know, the only agency that has been
extensively involved in it is the Department of Energy,
although I must say that in March of 1998 I did make a
presentation on that method to the director of FAA security,
and he told me that we could not protect ourselves from
meteorites.
Chairman Byrd. My time is limited. I would like to ask a
question of the Governors. The Department of Justice's Office
of the Inspector General recently released a report on the
Office of Justice programs, State and local domestic
preparedness grant programs. And one of the major conclusions
of the report is that the funds provided for equipment grants
are not being disbursed to the States in a timely manner.
One of the primary reasons for the delay is that States
have been required to submit a 3-year State plan prior to grant
funds being released. Although this requirement has been in
existence since fiscal year 2000, only four States submitted
their plans prior to September 11, 2001. Since that time, 46 of
the States have submitted their plans, of which 44 have been
approved.
Given that these funds have been available to your States
for 2 years, what took the States so long to submit the 3-year
plans? Were there any problems with the Federal rules? Any one
of you three or all three, if you please.
Governor Engler. I know that in our case--and I'm not sure
of the dates, so I don't have the dates, I wasn't aware that
that was the reason that funds had not been allocated out of
these programs. I know that we have been receiving allocations.
I saw the article as well, and I was concerned. I had focused
on the allocations that had been made of money to local units
where the equipment wasn't in inventory or the training hadn't
been done and I looked at that as one of those issues where
again the lack of coordination was the program.
I think one of the things that's happened since 9/11 is
there's been a significant change in bioterrorism. For example,
I understand that those are different threats. We had not felt
I think prior to 9/11 that we were short on funds. So I would
think that we would argue before 9/11 that some of the funds
being made available were not coordinated very well. In
response to, to elaborate just on one of the previous
questions, we have not had any sharing at the State level with
the Governors of any type of risk assessment from Federal
officials. There's been no security type briefing that would go
beyond what we would read in the papers. So we have no special
knowledge.
All of us individually I think have said to our State
police and our adjutant generals what do you think the risks
are in our State? But there's nothing that's been brought to us
on the basis of any information gathered internationally or
nationally.
Chairman Byrd. Governor Locke and Governor Barnes, let me
repeat the question. The Department of Justice's Office of the
Inspector General recently released a report on the Office of
Justice programs, State and local domestic preparedness and
grant programs. Given that these funds have been available to
the States for 2 years, what took the States so long to submit
the 3-year plans? Were there any problems with the Federal
rules? Governor Locke?
Governor Locke. Mr. Chairman, I would have to get back to
you to find out exactly what the status was with respect to our
State of Washington. I know that we did receive, many of our
local law enforcement agencies did in fact receive Department
of Justice funds for equipment. And whether or not our State or
the local government entities had fully complied with the
Federal rules and whether or not we were taking too much time,
I'd have to find out.
But I have to say that shortly after September 11 as we
looked at all of our response plans and as we looked at the
issue of bioterrorism, I would have to say that the State of
Washington felt pleased with respect to the response by the
Justice Department in terms of ensuring and making available
grant funds for equipment purchases by local law enforcement
personnel.
Our concern has been as we looked at some of these
purchases and the equipment that was made available to local
law enforcement, is again the lack of coordination in making
sure that there was in fact a comprehensive strategy among
local government entities. And that's one thing I'd like to
just stress if I could, Mr. Chairman.
With respect to bioterrorism, it's important that there be
a statewide strategy, because for instance, if there is to be
some sort of bioterrorism event in the city of Seattle or in
any other city, the hospitals within that particular community
will not be able to respond fully. We're going to have to use
the services and the availability of the medical facilities and
expertise from entire communities many miles away. So we need
to make sure that whatever grant monies are available are
blocked through the State for such a coordinated, comprehensive
strategy, knowing that there's no one city that can respond in
any of itself.
Chairman Byrd. Governor Barnes, would you respond to the
question, please, and then I'll call on Senator Stevens.
Governor Barnes. All right, sir. First, I don't think any
of us ever thought about coming up with a terrorism plan before
September 11. We had been receiving, just like Governor Locke
said, equipment funds from the Department of Justice and I
don't think it was ever marketed to us, you know, when you sent
out the information, that this should be to come up with some
statewide terrorism plan. And so the idea that you come up with
some 3-year terrorism plan before September 11, you know,
hindsight is 20/20, but it just wouldn't have been on your
radar screen.
Chairman Byrd. Well, if you're expecting grants from the
Federal Government and you're required to do certain things in
order to qualify for those grants, wouldn't you know something
about that?
Governor Barnes. Yes, sir, we would. And we have a whole
staff that does nothing but tries to see what the individual
requirements are for each of the grants. But we interpreted the
grant application to be more on issues, if you really want to
know the truth, that dealt with those that had international
borders. And we did not. Now that might have been a
misapprehension on our behalf, but that's what we looked at
that part of the grant program as being.
Chairman Byrd. Senator Stevens.
Questioning by Senator Ted Stevens
Senator Stevens. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the last
Congress, we had a joint hearing here in the Senate, a series
of hearings. We found that the terrorism subject, and I guess
that's what we're really talking about, a strategy against
terrorism, was fragmented--leadership was fragmented among 42
Federal agencies, 14 congressional committees, hundreds of
State and local first responder entities. We also found that on
the Federal front, the Department of Justice, the FBI had the
lead in prevention and preparedness and crisis management, and
FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, I believe had
the lead in consequence management--that, is disaster relief.
We didn't have a single national strategy. We now have two
Presidential decision directives, the Attorney General's 5-year
plan, two Federal response plans, one by FBI and the other by
FEMA.
So really what we're dealing with is how to set this up. I
hope eventually we'll get around to creating a basic system
whereby a President nominates somebody, we confirm them by the
Senate and give a firm direction to coordinate all of these
plans.
I have several concerns I would like to ask you gentlemen,
if I could. First with regard to your abilities as Governors,
do you think we should have some specific authority in the
terrorist area to authorize States to enter into compacts on a
regional basis?
Governor Barnes. Yes. I generally favor regional basis,
regional compacts on almost everything, but particularly, for
example, Georgia and Florida, because of the long coast line
that exists, would be very helpful for us to be able to do
that.
Senator Stevens. Governor Locke?
Governor Locke. Well, I very much believe that we should
have the authority to enter into regional compacts and also
perhaps some international compacts as well, given the
situation we have.
Senator Stevens. That was going to be my next question.
Governor Engler?
Governor Engler. Agreed, and we already do that in terms of
the response to the incident. What you're suggesting is how do
we prevent. Can we do more together, and I agree with that
strongly.
Senator Stevens. The strategy for prevention seems to me to
be more effective on a regional basis than it would be
national, but I don't know if you would agree. With regard to
the border, and you mentioned that, Governor Locke, it does
seem to me that we have some basic problems along the border.
We have about the same border with Canada as all the rest of
the whole United States. But when you get down to it, have you
all had--you're both border States with Canada. Have you had
talks with Canada? Can you tell us how we're progressing in
terms of aligning our national strategies with our northern
neighbor?
Governor Locke. Actually, the State of Washington and our
officials including Senator Patty Murray have had numerous
conversations with Canadian officials. There's use of
technology that will be available soon to help expedite the
movement of people and freight, people who have had background
checks and are already entered into computer systems using
technology. And so that's proceeding, but we're still waiting.
We're still waiting for the deployment of trained border agents
and Customs official to the United States-Canadian border. In
the meantime, we have the deployment of the National Guard.
Senator Stevens. Is it only going to be on our side,
Governor? What about Canada?
Governor Locke. No, no. Canada is also involved in that and
they're also involved in the partnership of the deployment of
that technology, so that its people, whether Canadians or U.S.
citizens, who routinely go back and forth across the border.
Senator Stevens. I know you have probably more cross-
boundary employment than anyone in Michigan, Governor.
Governor Engler. That's true.
Senator Stevens. How are you working with them?
Governor Engler. We've talked to the Ontario officials.
Recently I've had a conversation with Premier Harris on this.
We have not kept up with the Canadians. We are understaffed
compared to the Canadian side.
Senator Stevens. Senator Inouye and I have taken some
international trips this year to central Asia and not just
through the Pacific region, along the Asian coast. In Singapore
we found that because of the alertness of one local policeman,
a whole ring of people that were designing to use 100 tons of
explosives and destroy a considerable number of U.S.
installations in a three-nation basis there was discovered. It
brought home to us that in the final analysis, only an informed
and alert public really can make this system work, and we
should be more concentrating on prevention than upon, God
forbid we also need the help, but concentration ought to be on
prevention rather than the needs of the first responders.
Now I want to ask all of you if you have any ideas of what,
how we might work in the system the ability of all of the
entities, local, county, State and Federal, to analyze the
reports of concerned citizens to be sure that reports of
suspicious activity are seriously treated. In Singapore, they
were lucky. A cop made a report and someone reacted immediately
and that whole ring was broken up. I fear that we are really
not emphasizing the role of individual citizens in prevention,
and I would like to have your comments. What can we do, this
committee, to help make certain that reports of concerned
citizens are treated immediately so that we know, we have the
ability to react under the circumstances, if God forbid,
something like Singapore's situation is brought to the
attention of anyone in any one of our States.
Governor Engler. Senator, I think that most States would
welcome the opportunity to have our key law enforcement
agencies fully briefed by the Federal agencies. We still have,
while we have seen improvements and we have seen improvements
specifically since 9/11, we still do not have, I think, a level
of confidence that there is a full briefing that takes place.
And whether that's with a select number of law enforcement
officers, or some fashion that that's determined, somebody has
got to know. We could have the citizen file the report today
but the agency might not have any clue that that was what might
be linked to something, because you know, they may not know the
key information from the Federal agency. And that, in talking
to our law enforcement agencies, is still a problem because I
mean, you have territory among agencies at the Federal level,
but we certainly have it inter-governmentally, Federal to
State.
Dr. Gale. You're talking about a massive effort. Singapore
is a much smaller society where the communication from a
policeman even up to the chief of police takes a relatively
modest amount of time.
Senator Stevens. I agree, but we don't have any
coordination at all, do we?
Dr. Gale. That was the word that I have heard pretty much
interspersed through everyone's discussion: Where is the
coordination? And quite frankly, it is the kind of thing where
we imagine what happened right after Pearl Harbor, that
coordination sprang into place somehow whole cloth. I believe,
if I know my history at all, we worked real hard to put a
coordinated effort together, but by March of 1942, there was a
substantial amount of coordination and no longer the reliance
on a lot of the stovepipes that we have been talking about
today. A lot of the difficulty is that we have a bunch of
stovepipe agencies and we all are using exactly the same
procedures we have always used----
Senator Stevens. Thank you----
Dr. Gale [continuing]. Even though there's a gun to our
head.
Senator Stevens. Dr. Gale, sorry. The chairman and I lived
through that period. I want you to know there was a lot more
volunteerism after the events of Pearl Harbor than there is
now. We had people--I lived in California then and we had
people walking the beach every night, and up in Alaska we had
the territorial guard, a volunteer group, and we had all over
the country volunteers. I don't see many volunteers coming out
of the woodwork right now, and what we're looking at now is
demands, I've had demands from almost every small village and
city in my State to get a new fire truck or a new police car,
or new communications system.
What are we going to do to create a volunteer system to
assist law enforcement in detection and prevention?
Dr. Gale. The first thing the public has to understand is
what we're fighting here. As far as we're concerned, I mean at
least as I read the national spirit right now, it's over and
done with, we took care of them when we had victory in
Afghanistan, and as far as a good percentage of the people on
my campus at least, there are a lot of people who say we
deserved it.
Senator Stevens. My time is up. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator Stevens. Senator Murray.
Questioning by Senator Patty Murray
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you to all of our guests today.
Let me start with Governor Locke and Governor Engler. Both
of you have mentioned in your comments today about the need to
work within your own regions in terms of organizing any kind of
response and preventive action. When it comes to bioterrorism,
our regions include the northern border. Are you working with
Canada in any way in terms of bioterrorism, in any way of
coordinating plans with them if there were to be an anthrax,
smallpox or other kind of bioterrorism activity?
Governor Engler. Senator, before I answer the question I
would like to ask the chairman's permission to after I do
answer it, to be excused to see Secretary Thompson before I
catch my plane.
Chairman Byrd. Surely.
Governor Engler. Thank you.
Chairman Byrd. And we want to thank you too for your
appearance here today.
Governor Engler. Senator, thank you for holding this
hearing and your keen interest.
We are not walking with Ontario in any formal fashion yet.
I mean, there may be informal communications my health
officials or law enforcement agencies have had, but there is
nothing that's formalized with the provincial leaders in
Ontario relative to that threat. Nor frankly is there with
Ohio.
So I mean, this is a gap that's so new to us in one sense.
We're still struggling even within communities. We found in one
community, a mayor told me he found each of his hospitals
seeking to order enough doses of a vaccine that would cover
their whole area and he said, well, we don't need three times
the vaccine for the community, let's have you three hospitals
get together. That's the level of coordination that just
historically has not been there.
We've got a very big job to do and I think what you're
hearing today from all of us is, tell us which part you want us
to take charge of and then actually put us in charge, and we'll
do it. That's really where we are. It's a very good question,
Senator.
Chairman Byrd. Governor, before you leave, HHS sent out
their request for plans in January. Only 2 of the 50 States
have sent HHS--you're going to be talking with the Secretary of
HHS--their bioterrorism plans. I am sure that the committee
would urge the Governors across the country to move these plans
along, move them along.
Governor Engler. Thank you.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you.
Senator Murray. Governor Locke?
Governor Locke. Thank you, Senator Murray. In response to
the Federal allocation for bioterrorism we have, I believe,
submitted our plan to the Federal Government, to HHS. But that
regional approach understands and emphasizes the fact that we
are going to have to cross State borders as well as
international borders.
As I indicated in an earlier response, we know that when we
ask the States to be able to coordinate and insure a
comprehensive strategy so that cities are not going at this
alone in terms of response to bioterrorism, that there has to
be a coordinated regional approach. That also recognizes that
for instance, Vancouver, Washington is really part of the
Portland, Oregon metropolitan area, and that whatever happens
in Portland is also going to depend across the river with
Vancouver, Washington. The same thing with Bellingham,
Washington, which is right next to the Canadian border, that
we're going to have to rely on the systems and response by
hospitals and public health authorities with respect to the
authorities in British Columbia. Also, eastern Washington with
Idaho.
And so our response plan contemplates multistate as well as
multination coordination.
Senator Murray. So are we working with Canada on any kind
of formal contract or agreement in terms of bioterrorism?
Governor Locke. Not in terms of a government to government
contract, but in terms of response planning, my understanding
is that we are working with Canadian officials and Canadian
communities to respond in the event of any type of bioterrorism
threat.
Senator Murray. Governor Locke, I wanted to ask you because
as you know, the Federal Government has issued several alerts
following the September 11th attacks, and I would really
appreciate in front of this committee your very frank
assessment of the Federal Government's ability to keep you
informed about threats to Washington State and other relevant
information.
Governor Locke. Well, we have been able to have very good
access with Governor Ridge, and when we have had some problems
along the way, we have been able to immediately contact
Governor Ridge and he has been able to respond and iron out
those difficulties with some of the other Federal agencies. We
wish that we had not had to go to Governor Ridge, but you know,
to be very candid, there was a time when one of the major TV
networks report and broke a story that Seattle was the target
of some threats based on pictures that were discovered in the
caves of Afghanistan. And shortly after that, various Federal
agencies, unnamed people within Federal agencies gave
interviews to the press and kept saying that there were
pictures of specific buildings or companies or landmarks that
were found.
They were all contradictory, and we were having a hard time
getting to the bottom of it and wondering if certain Federal
agencies were withholding information and not sharing that
information with the State. And finally we were able to get
hold of Governor Ridge and we were--he immediately ordered that
the copies of those pictures be made available to the members
of the congressional delegation, to the State officials, to
sheriffs and police chiefs. And so we convened one big meeting,
had those copies of those photographs brought to us so that we
could all see them.
But it took a while for those photographs to reach us. And
it wasn't until Governor Ridge intervened that we were able to
have those almost instantaneously delivered to us, and we were
able to view all those pictures and get to the bottom of it, to
report that there were no credible threats against the State of
Washington, either facilities or installations or people.
So again, we need that better coordination among the
Federal agencies working with State agencies, and we should not
have to go up to Governor Ridge to have these things sorted
out.
Senator Murray. Thank you for that. I heard Dr. Gale talk
about the threat to the electrical system or the transmission
systems for energy sources, and I know in our area, Governor
Locke and I are hearing that the administration wants to move
towards what's called a regional transmission organization that
would be a centralized command over our entire electrical
system. And this has not been discussed in terms of
vulnerability to terrorist attack, and after hearing Dr.
Stephen Gale, I would just like to ask Governor Locke whether
he would share my concern that this is something we should
consider before moving to that kind of system.
Governor Locke. Well, I think we are all very concerned in
the Pacific Northwest, whether you're from Oregon, Washington
or Idaho, and even Montana, about the integrity of the BPA
system and the transmission facilities, and that it's a very
unique, very local system that's working well. It needs
improvements, and that's why BPA has asked for additional
borrowing authority, to make the upgrades to their transmission
facilities.
But it's a very unique system, far different from what
occurs in other parts of the country, and we need to make sure
that the unique features of the BPA transmission system are
protected and enhanced, and so we would be very very concerned
about some of the proposals from FERC and others to have a west
coast wide or a western United States wide regional
transmission organization.
Senator Murray. Dr. Gale, would you share that concern?
Dr. Gale. My concern here is that this attack may be coming
at pretty much any time, and the way in which we are discussing
it seems as if it's kind of theoretical at this time, and over
the long haul we are going to find some mechanism to try to
make the system work in a little bit more protective fashion.
Think of it this way. In a sense, these hearings are a way
of trying to figure out what we have to do to avoid martial law
if one of those attacks that I described actually occurs,
because any of those could seriously disable this entire
economy and with it, the entire Nation. And certainly BPA,
that's the entire west coast, and we could not afford to have a
2-month degradation or elimination of electrical service on the
west coast.
I mean, in a sense the question is, how do you actually put
together a security system that's going to react now and one
that will protect that entire structure. They are not going to
bomb large dams, can't do that very easily. But there are
coordinating facilities for all of these efforts, for all of
the energy systems, and those are easily targetable. And the
question is, where do we want to put our efforts right now to
insure that we can get the maximum leverage out of our
security, and certainly BPA is on the top of everybody's list.
Right now we're all still talking about the same problem of
coordination, how would you ever get it done, and given the
fact that it can happen tomorrow, how can we put it in place
and time.
Senator Murray. I see that my time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator Murray. Senator Dorgan, I
believe you were next.
Questioning by Senator Byron L. Dorgan
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, thank you. This panel has
been just an excellent panel. I really appreciate the testimony
you have offered, and I think it is a good start to these set
of hearings.
Dr. Gale, are you optimistic or pessimistic?
Dr. Gale. About what?
Senator Dorgan. Well, about the future, about our ability
to prevent the kinds of scenarios you described in your
testimony? Your testimony describes some pretty grim
opportunities for terrorists. Tell us your feeling about the
future.
Dr. Gale. I'm a realist.
Senator Dorgan. What does that mean?
Dr. Gale. I'm a pragmatist. Actually, I'm a fighter. I
believe that there are always threats to the United States and
to people and that our objective, national security and at
local security levels, is to insure that we can be optimistic
about talking to our kids. This kind of legacy for our children
is insane, and we could have prevented it, and at this time
there are real reasons to be optimistic if we invest in
security in the right ways and use the resources and the
volunteerism that Senator Stevens was talking about.
Where's the spirit behind all of this that motivates
anybody for defense? I haven't seen very much of that, and I've
heard a lot about overtime pay for people. This is a time of
serious national crisis and I really think we're talking about
it as if it's business as usual. And on September 11th, if
there was only one message that should have come through, it's
that there will be no business as usual until those people who
are capable of doing actions like that have been stopped and
eliminated, and that's not going to be any time soon.
So from my point of view, I'm really optimistic because I
love a good problem and I like fighting, but do I think there
aren't going to be problems? Absolutely not. I think there will
be lots of them.
Senator Dorgan. Governor Locke, before September 11th this
committee, through the subcommittee that I chair, had a
northern border security initiative that we funded, to begin
the long process of trying to provide some semblance of
security on the northern border. You know that we have a 4,000-
mile border between the United States and Canada. While we have
9,125 Border Patrol agents along the United States and Mexico
border, we only have 622 Border Patrol agents between the
United States and Canada, a 4,000-mile expanse.
You at Port Angelos, of course, have had the experience of
having an alert agent catch the millennium bomber coming
through, who would have caused substantial damage here in this
country, and undoubtedly loss of life. I think you and Governor
Engler certainly would know that we have much more to do all
across the northern border. Yet, we are not able to station
Border Patrol agents, INS or Customs Service people every
quarter mile on the northern border, so it is a long and porous
border.
Do you feel with what you have heard of our discussions in
Congress that we are moving in the right direction? We are
obviously now talking about substantial additional resources in
all of the agencies, Border Patrol, INS, and Customs. Is there
more we should do, and if so, what is it?
Governor Locke. Well first of all, I do want to
congratulate and compliment the Members of Congress and the
Senators along the United States-Canadian border for their
incredible interest and perseverance in making sure that
there's adequate funding to address the security issues along
our United States-Canadian border.
I did have a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Manley a
few weeks ago, who is the Canadian counterpart to Governor
Ridge, and we were talking about some of the improvements that
we can expect along the northern border.
Senator Patty Murray, I think took a tour of some of those
technologies and innovations, and reviewed the progress of
that.
Clearly there will be need for more technology, and there
have been a lot of news reports and explanations about how even
if you don't have a person at a particular place, the use of
technology alerts border guards and border agents and Customs
people to any movement along the border, and that enables them
to respond. We have to be smarter in the deployment of people
by using technology, and so I really applaud the commitment of
the Congress to adequately fund the deployment of that
technology.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Stevens talked about the
cooperation with Canada. You have two countries that have a
common interest in that border. It seems to me there's much
more capability with both countries to use technology and the
combination of manpower from both countries to achieve a common
objective.
Mr. Chairman, I must cut my questioning short because of
another commitment, but again, I think this panel has provided
some outstanding testimony. I deeply appreciate your
willingness to be here today to provide it. Mr. Chairman, thank
you very much.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator Dorgan. Senator Kohl, you
have been patient and you have been here a long time. Please
proceed.
Questioning by Senator Herb Kohl
Senator Kohl. I thank you, Senator Byrd.
Dr. Gale, you touched upon the topic of food distribution
in your remarks. Food safety has long been an area of interest
for this committee but the events of September 11th turned our
interest obviously to imperative. The Food and Drug
Administration has primary food safety responsibilities for
almost 100 percent of the food products in our country. And
yet, they have the capability to inspect only about 1 percent
of imported food items.
Furthermore, there is a great potential for tampering with
domestic food items that presents immediate threats to public
health and long-term harm to consumer confidence. Would you
comment on the adequacy of current Federal efforts to protect
our food supply? Do you think that these could be improved, for
example, by giving agencies a mandatory recall authority which
they do not have at this present time?
Dr. Gale. The complexity of our food supply is
extraordinary. In a previous life before I began college, I
spent 2 years as a dairy farmer. I know it from the bottom end
and I also obviously consume it, and I have watched Pioneer
Hybrid, I was doing work for them. You're talking about an
extraordinarily complex highly diverse system which right now
not only is regulated by the FDA, but an enormous number of
agricultural agencies and pricing structures.
In order to--we keep saying the word coordinate--in the
food distribution sector alone, we are talking about trucking
companies that are responsible, seed companies. We are talking
about all of the producers of chemical protection, or chemical
weed control and defoliants. If you are going to be looking at
this in terms of recall, that's after it appears. That's the
Tylenol problem.
What we have to be able to do is to insure that critical
food supply points, where there can be a massive disruption of
our food supply, are protected. Of course we ought to be able
to recall food that's been contaminated instantly, but that's
sort of after the fact. And I can describe to you, for example,
an attack that could be used with these enterprise systems in
which someone can identify precisely the containers that are
going, say, to the 7th Fleet, infect them with botulism, and
bring down the 7th Fleet with one person, who could be a
janitor.
Food supply is an extraordinarily complex effort, and
simply looking at it in terms of recalls from the FDA doesn't
span the issue that I think is in back of what Mr. Carter is
speaking about in terms of an architect. You've got to have a
different architecture for approaching terrorism, not the same
types of actions that we've taken in the past, FDA.
Senator Kohl. Would you then comment on our current
capability of inspecting only 1 percent of all imported food
items? Is that something that needs to be addressed?
Dr. Gale. Not only inspecting it in its entirety, but
inspecting it before it gets here. And I think this was the
point that was made by Governor Engler. There is no sense in
our trying to do all the inspections on U.S. territory. Quite
frankly, some of that stuff may be infectious when it gets
here. What we want is a system which protects and inspects
these commodities before they even get here.
But that's an extraordinary change. We would have to have a
very different approach to foreign policy. Our Customs
inspectors would have to be located internationally, and the
determination as to whether or not that can actually be done
and whether it's efficient and we have the resources for it is
again, we need some kind of coordination to even start this
process.
And to look at it as if we have our existing agencies and
our existing policies, and we only have to amend them a little
bit, is ignoring the fact that this is a major big shift in the
kinds of attacks that we've had in the past.
Senator Kohl. Dr. Gale, naturally we are mostly concerned
about international terrorism, but should that be the main
focus for every State? Should different States and regions be
focused on different threats, both domestic and international?
Are there current threat assessment investigations being done
to more clearly determine what States and what regions are the
most at risk for domestic and international terrorism?
Dr. Gale. Well, international terrorism, if we are talking
about al Qaeda, which is the big topic of conversation in the
terrorism world today, pretty much any State can be affected.
In fact, quite frankly, I would expect that the next round of
attacks would try to affect all of the States for that kind of
purpose of disruption.
On the domestic terrorism side, I've read some rather
unusual stuff recently. 1994. Terry Nichols and Ramsi Yusef
apparently had a meeting in Manila prior to the bombing in
Oklahoma City. Is there a tie-in between al Qaeda and domestic
terrorists in the United States? You would think that they
would be polar opposites in their approach to things.
They both have an approach of wanting to disrupt and
severely disable pieces of the United States, and my enemy may
be in fact my friend. And I see the domestic terrorism problem,
although it was the real focus of attention during the Clinton
administration, is coming back to be a major source of
difficulty for the United States simply because it could be
easily coordinated with international terrorism.
I fully expect that Osama bin Laden believes that domestic
terrorists will pick up some of the burden from him in causing
the massive disruption that he needs.
Senator Kohl. One last question for all of you to speculate
on, and I would be interested in your response. Many, many,
many Americans are hopeful, and maybe would suggest that what
happened on 9/11 is not going to be repeated, and that all of
these conversations that we're having, while useful, will
hopefully not have to be dealt with.
Are you in your own mind fairly certain? Are you Governors
fairly certain that we are going to have to deal with the
actuality of the things that we're talking about here in the
future, that this is not any sort of a theoretical discussion
but something that our country will be facing in terms of
things that do occur? Dr. Carter?
Dr. Carter. Well, it's not theoretical and we will see
incidents once again, and they will come from domestic sources.
Let me just remind you that as we all sit here today, we don't
know who did the anthrax attacks. It's entirely possible that
it was an American. It's entirely possible that it was a
cleared American. It's also entirely possible that it was a
cleared American acting alone, with motives so obscure to the
rest of us that he or she doesn't even seem fit to take credit
for the act up until now.
So what we're seeing is the increasing fragility of society
and also with the progress of technology, the ability of
destructive power to fall into the hands of smaller and smaller
groups of human beings, powers formerly reserved to nation
States. Now small groups and individuals exhibit a much wider
variety of motivations and behavior than do large groups of
people.
And so, you've got all kinds of people out here. Remember
the ones who put on sneakers and purple cloths a few years ago,
and decided to join the Comet's Tail? There are a lot of
motivations out there that are not just al Qaeda, that can be
rageful, Messianic and destructive, and destructive power falls
into the hands of groups that are deviant and bizarre from our
point of view.
Everything about technology says that that trend is going
forward and will be with us as long into the future as we can
see. That doesn't make me despair because there is a lot we can
do to fight back. Some of these examples we're talking about,
we can't change our foreign policy to protect our food supply.
We have a panel, the National Academy's effort, of which
I'm a member, that has looked in detail at the food supply. I
think there's a reasonable strategy towards that which does
look at choke points, as Dr. Gale said, does some random
sampling elsewhere, which is a reasonable deterrent. In other
words, there is a reasonable posture that provides a reasonable
level of protection and allows us to keep on keeping on.
And the electrical grid. We've looked at the electrical
grid in detail as well, and that also, most of the
interruptions that can be caused in the electrical grid are
transitory, disruptive but not massively destructive. The only
thing you need to worry about there, the principal thing to
worry about, is interruptions that result in the non-repairable
destruction of hardware, for example, high voltage
transformers. And so if you look at this--and for that purpose,
you buy some spare high voltage transformers and you would be
prepared to insert them if there's destruction.
So I think this is a matter where systematic looking in a
calm spirit, urgent but intelligent, infrastructure by
infrastructure, we can mount a defense which allows us to keep
on living our lives reasonably and makes these events not
never, but rare and manageable. We can do that. To that extent,
Senator Dorgan is gone now, but I'm an optimist.
Governor Barnes. Let me just reply to that----
Chairman Byrd. May we have shorter answers, please? We have
several other Senators here who have been waiting.
Governor Barnes. In 1996, as you know, at the Olympics in
Atlanta, we had an act of domestic terrorism. We never have
caught that guy. So it's real to us. And we know that we have
to be prepared.
Governor Locke. Senator Kohl, let me just say that even
before 9/11, our State of Washington put together a civil
support defense team, a full-time unit of the National Guard
that's able to respond within almost an hour anyplace in the
State of Washington to any biological, chemical or even
radioactive threat, and they have been called out several times
since September 11th. Thank goodness, false alarms even after
local law enforcement had raised it to a level that was beyond
their determination.
This civil support defense team was actually requested by
the Federal agencies to be deployed to the World Series game in
Arizona, and our civil support defense team, full-time National
Guard people with all the suits, all the mobile laboratories,
worldwide communications gear, this was up and running almost 1
year before September 11th.
So we take the threat of terrorist activities very real. We
hope it never occurs, but I'm not a person who's going to bank
the future safety of the people of the State of Washington and
take a gamble, and so we're responding whether it's the Federal
dollars, for bioterrorism we're taking this very real, we're
not going to use this money just to buy fire trucks for local
agencies. This is to make sure that we have prevention plans
and response plans in place that are coordinated throughout the
State and with neighboring States and other communities.
Senator Kohl. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Byrd. I think Dr. Gale has already stated that he
feels that we're dealing with situations that may happen
earlier rather than later, and that we should be prepared.
Senator Bennett.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT F. BENNETT
Senator Bennett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
holding these hearings and I appreciate the opportunity to
participate in them, and I intend to take the majority of my
time in a statement rather than questions, not because my ego
insists on that but because I feel there's one factor that has
been left out of this discussion. I say that without any
criticism whatsoever of the discussion so far. I have gone
through your testimony and your comments, and I think they have
been extremely useful.
But when we get to the issue, and I think it was you, Dr.
Carter, who was talking about going over this infrastructure by
infrastructure, if we talk about critical infrastructure in
this country, 90 percent of it is in private hands. It is not
in Federal hands, it is not in State hands, it is not in local
government hands, it's in private hands.
And I have not seen a discussion of the role of the private
sector in protecting its infrastructure. If the private sector
assumes that Government will do it, and they do not need to
focus on their own security activities, we will have enormous
problems. Osama bin Laden has made it clear post 9/11 that his
target is the U.S. economy, and anything he can do to damage
the U.S. economy he wants to do and is urging all of his people
to do.
Now perhaps it comes out of my parochial role as a member
of the Banking Committee, but if I wanted to do this country,
if I wished this country ill, I would not fool around with
kinetic weapons to blow up buildings. I would try to figure out
a way to get into the Fed wire and shut down the Fed wire
through the telecommunications system, all of which is in
private hands.
I have had this conversation with Chairman Greenspan and he
said yes, if you were able to shut down the Fed wire, you would
probably do more damage to the economy immediately, and if you
could keep it shut down for any period of time long-term, than
you would if you set off an explosive device in lower Manhattan
Island.
I know how, if somebody can get me in by hacking computers,
I know how to shut down the New York Stock Exchange, with a
very simple software fix, or unfix if you wish, that would
scramble all trading on the New York Stock Exchange for months,
if not longer, if you could keep it up.
The whole question of cyber attack through our computers
focused primarily on the private sector and those aspects of
the private sector that are critical to the function of the
economy is a question that hasn't been raised in these hearings
yet, and I want to raise the voice that it be raised and that
it be talked about.
We have been holding hearings in the Joint Economic
Committee, we have been holding hearings in the Banking
Committee, we have been holding hearings wherever we can to try
to focus on this problem, and the more we dig into it, the more
we find out how vulnerable we are.
Now, this brings me to one of your themes that you have
been talking about on the panel, or two actually, information
sharing and risk assessment. Senator Byrd has asked about risk
assessment and some of your testimony has been about
information sharing.
In this arena of cyber terrorism, there is a very great
reluctance to share information with the Federal Government,
because they are convinced it will be made public. I have
anecdotal evidence of public utilities that are very reluctant
to do any risk assessment for fear it will then be made public
and become a road map for terrorists.
I have a bill, if I can be shameless about shilling for my
own legislation here, I have a bill that would permit the
private sector to share information about cyber attacks with
the Federal Government without having that information be made
public. We have an example of an industry that shared
information about the extent of the industry with the Federal
Government that was then published on the web site of the
requesting agency until someone from Governor Ridge's office
called them up and said, will you please take that down off
your web site, because it tells the terrorists every single
check point in your industry that could be attacked that would
produce massive economic difficulty.
So, I simply want to inject into all of these discussions
the recognition that we are the most vulnerable wired Nation in
the world. It is one of the reasons we are the most productive
Nation in the world, because we have gone further than anybody
else in terms of technology and the technological advances that
come through computers. But with that advance has come a
vulnerability that at some point some terrorist is going to
exploit.
The attractiveness of it is that a terrorist can exploit it
sitting in his cave tapping on his laptop. He does not have to
go through customs, he does not have to come to the United
States physically. He can break into our network, cyber
network, and attack all of these critical infrastructures.
Again, 90 percent of which are in private hands.
So when we talk about risk assessments and we talk about
information sharing, I simply want to raise the flag on behalf
of more information sharing, more information security within
the Government, which means if my bill passes, a sharper
definition of what happens under FOIA, the Freedom of
Information Act, than is there today. I'm not repealing FOIA,
I'm not setting FOIA aside, I'm just trying to sharpen the
definition so that we can be protected from this kind of
attack.
And Mr. Chairman, I wanted to get that into the discussion
here because I think it is something without any impropriety on
anybody's part, simply has not been raised until now.
Chairman Byrd. Well, thank you, Senator Bennett, for
raising this flag to freedom's breeze unfurled. You may have
fired the shot heard round the world.
Senator Bennett. When the chairman starts quoting poetry,
you know you've made a point. I thank you.
Governor Locke. Mr. Chairman, if I could?
Chairman Byrd. Yes.
Governor Locke. To Senator Bennett, I just wanted to make
one comment. We in the State of Washington were very concerned
about the use of Freedom of Information Act or public
disclosure laws to get at those types of vulnerability
assessments and reports that might be collected by our State
agencies, or even source codes of computer programs and things
like that.
And so, I'm pleased to report that in our State of
Washington, I recently signed into law legislation that was
passed by the legislature, requested by the attorney general's
office and my office, that exempts that vulnerability
assessments and source codes, and a variety of very sensitive
information from any type of Freedom of Information Act.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you. Senator Durbin.
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
the panel.
Chairman Byrd. Before the Senator begins, do I understand
that Dr. Carter has to leave?
Dr. Carter. I apologize, Mr. Chairman and members. I do,
unless the airplanes can wait for me, or they'll let me through
faster than they're letting us through these days, I do need to
excuse myself.
Chairman Byrd. You have made a fine contribution here this
morning, and the committee thanks you very much for your
contribution. Thank you for your time, for your statement,
thank you very much.
Senator Durbin.
Questioning by Senator Richard J. Durbin
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, relative
to the statement just made by Dr. Carter, there are very few
common American experiences which everyone shares, rich or
poor, young or old. One of those experiences is voting in this
country, but another one since September 11th has been the
presentation of a photo ID. We are now in a society which
expects each of us to present on a regular basis a photo ID to
establish our identity. It has become the threshold piece of
evidence in a system designed for security.
And so while we have the Governors here and other
witnesses, I would like to explore what is the most common form
of identification, the driver's license, issued by 50 different
States. States also issue identification cards, but I would
think the most prevalent form of identification that I have
noticed is the driver's license.
We also know from experience that the driver's license has
been terribly abused when it comes to providing a source of
identification. Timothy McVeigh used a fake driver's license to
rent a Ryder truck for the Oklahoma City bombing. Of the 19
terrorists on September 11th, there was 1 who had neither a
driver's license nor an ID card; 11 had at least one driver's
license; there were 12 of them that had at least two different
driver's licenses; and there were 6 of them that only had State
IDs.
We have come to understand that leaving it to the States to
establish standards for issuing the most important piece of
identification, which we rely on as a threshold requirement in
our security system, is an invitation to disaster. What
happened in the State of Virginia and Florida with the
terrorists on September 11th tells us that there are ways to
defeat this system.
In the case of Virginia, it was $50 in a parking lot to get
a notarized statement from someone saying this is who this
person is and this is where they live, and that was good
enough. They were in the system, they had a Virginia ID card
and they were off to the races, in this case off to the
airports.
And so what I'm asking the Governors in particular, and Dr.
Gale as well, is to think with me about legislation that I'm
working on. If we are resistant to a national identification
card but we now have a card that is a nationwide identification
card--State driver's licenses--what is a reasonable thing to
ask of the States in terms of making certain that they have a
common standard for identification for the issuance of driver's
licenses? What is a reasonable thing to ask of Governors and
State governments when it comes to the verification of that
person's identity when they apply for a driver's license?
Is it reasonable for us to establish national standards or
a national model, provide some resources for not only creating
these verification procedures but also creating a more
counterfeit-proof driver's license and State ID card?
If you go to the city of Chicago, which I am honored to
represent, down Michigan Avenue every morning at about 8 a.m.
and you get to right about Wacker Drive, you are going to see
hundreds of people standing in all sorts of weather. They are
Mexicans who are trying to get into the Mexican Consulate to
get a ``matricula.'' Matricula is their national ID card, and
with it they can get into the banking system and a lot of
things. It is a card which, frankly, surpasses most of our
State driver's licenses in terms of how good it is, the
information it contains, and they have very strict standards on
issuance.
What do you think, as Governors, would be a reasonable
standard to work with the States to impose to make the driver's
license a better form of identification?
Governor Locke. Well, let me just say that I think that
first of all, I mean, if you're contemplating national
legislation, what you're really looking at is some sort of
common minimum procedures or thresholds that the States should
utilize so that we know that Joe Blow on a Virginia license
plate is really Joe Blow. And that if the State of Washington
has a higher standard, that you're not able to circumvent that
higher standard, higher verification process because a person
had to go to another State. So that's one issue, and what are
those common procedures, requirements that may be imposed upon
the States, and people might argue about that.
The second issue, obviously, is how do you address driver's
licenses for legal residents, whether students from abroad and
people who are here visiting or working, and what type of
documentation must those individuals have. And of course, I've
heard of people saying that we need to have verification of
their immigration status, but immigration is notorious in terms
of not getting us that information, and so we're asked to rely
on a status by Federal agency or verification by a Federal
agency that says that their information is years and years
behind. So that's a problem or a bottleneck that has to be
confronted.
The third issues might be, you know, if a police officer
from one State encounters a citizen with a driver's license
from another State, how do you determine that it's not been
altered or forged, how do you really understand, how can you
access the information about that individual that might be
encrypted? And so, do you have some sort of common encryption
of information on the back, magnetic cards or whatever, or bar
coded information on the back, that goes beyond or simply
verifies electronically what is on the face of the card,
because the information that's printed on the face of the card
may have been altered or forged, and so do you have a way of
determining or verifying that information.
So those are just some of the issues that are raised, and I
am not here to take a position on any of those issues or have
thoughts about it, but clearly I do know that with respect to
the issue, the dilemma of verifying immigration status, the
States are not able to do that because we have to rely on
Immigration and Naturalization, and their databases are so
woefully behind.
Senator Durbin. I agree with that completely.
Governor Barnes. There is one other thing. Of course,
Governor Ridge, we have all talked to, and when we met with him
this is one of the issues, as you probably know, that he is
considering.
Senator Durbin. We are anxious to meet with him too.
Governor Barnes. So I've read.
One of the other things in that same regard that you should
consider is some type of central national database. In other
words, all the States have information about their drivers that
are licensed, and they generally exchange information,
violation information between States, there are compacts
between States. But there is no really central database that
would allow information to be accessed, for example, someone
coming from Illinois to Georgia, on-line. It may come later,
but not on-line, and if you are going to create those
standards, you should seriously consider creating some type of
central on-line national database for all people that are
registered.
Senator Durbin. The most common reasons people seek fake
driver's licenses are fairly obvious. If they've had their
license suspended or revoked in some place----
Governor Barnes. That's correct.
Senator Durbin. If they're underage and want to buy tobacco
or alcohol. If they're trying to create a new identity for
deception and fraud, and certainly for terrorist and criminal
purposes. So we have to give Georgia and Illinois the ability
to communicate with one another. When I say I've just moved to
Georgia and I used to live in Illinois, well, I should be able
to establish in your State of Georgia whether I have a valid
driver's license or suspended or revoked. I'm sure you in the
State of Georgia would like to know that.
Governor Barnes. True. And it should be on-line. We get
that information now, but it's delayed.
Senator Durbin. It's later.
Governor Barnes. Yes.
Dr. Gale. Senator Durbin, at the risk of being
disagreeable, I think that the cost of doing it the way you are
describing it, which is a coordination of State efforts, would
probably be catastrophic compared to the institution of a
national level system. I think you're going to be duplicating
an enormous amount of energy and effort that's already been put
in, and the coordination of databases like this, with very
different procedures that are sort of built into the various
State systems, I don't think is going to have the kind of
protection that you want from the kind of terrorism that we're
talking about.
I imagine that at the local level, if you do it State by
State, you can probably do pretty well in preventing kids from
drinking underage, but we're talking about something that has a
much different function and if you're going to do it piecemeal,
probably the cost will be far far higher than doing it through
a national level system.
And I've got to tell you, going on an airplane recently,
several times, people are carrying their passports as often as
they are driver's licenses. If we're going to be carrying
passports, then we really do have a national ID card anyway;
the only difficulty is that a passport can't be read
electronically and doesn't have any other functions. Maybe we
just ought to fold those two things together; people are using
passports and maybe that's what we really have a need for at
this time.
Senator Durbin. I've noticed more and more passports too.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator Durbin. Senator Reed.
Senator Stevens. Pardon me. I want to correct you, Dr.
Gale. We do have readable passports now; the new ones are.
Dr. Gale. But it isn't swipable for all sorts of other
functions. Yes, we can read the code on it but we can't use it
for example, as a cash machine card. And a lot of these things
would be pretty much entre to any kind of facility, and that
was the reason those national cards were designed. I'm not
advocating it, but I know the costs that we're talking about on
a piecemeal effort would be phenomenal.
Chairman Byrd. Senator Reed.
Questioning by Senator Jack Reed
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
gentlemen for your testimony today.
I know you have thought hard about all of these issues
since September 11th and before September 11th, and there has
been lots of research and study and thought. It strikes me,
though, that until you actually try to operationalize these
ideas and see where the pieces fit or don't fit that you really
don't have a handle on the problem.
Up in Rhode Island about 2 weeks ago, my State had a
statewide emergency preparedness exercise at the Naval War
College on a bioterrorism attack, and it's the process of
drilling and exercising. And it seems to me that we can go
around and have hearings and discussions, and think tanks
operating, but until we actually try to figure out in a real
scenario what you have, then we really haven't engaged. And I
just wonder of the Governors, if you could comment about in
your States and in other States, whether this process of going
out and having full-blown exercises and seeing what you're
missing and what you have is taking place, and then, Mr. Gale,
you might comment also.
Governor Barnes. Yes, we have, and I think most States have
gone through that. But this kind of segues, I guess, into a
statement that Senator Stevens made earlier, and that is about
the prevention. There is a difference, as has been pointed out,
of reaction and preventing. That's what we have been trying to
concentrate on mostly. Yes, we have been going through training
and exercises.
One of the reasons that we created this central information
center that I talked about, and invited the FBI terrorism task
force in Georgia to be located there, is so that we could have
them close, and try to get over some of these issues that we
deal about stovepipe agencies, not exchanging information.
We figured if they were close, and they have been very
cooperative with us, and I want to be very complimentary, we
had them close and they were there, and they were talking to
our Georgia Bureau of Investigation and Law Enforcement, that
when a citizen, as Senator Stevens pointed out, sent some
information in, there would be one central point, a clearing
house, for that, and there would be State law enforcement folks
there and the Federal law enforcement folks there, and they
would be in one physical location, and they could make sure
that that citizen's suspicion was addressed.
I think that's much more important. I think the exercises
are important; yes, we are going through that, and yes, we are
trying, we have come up with all these scenarios about smallpox
quarantine. We have had exercises and everything else. But the
sharing of information is what leads to the prevention.
Senator Reed. Governor Locke?
Governor Locke. Yes, we've already had many communities
even prior to September 11th engage in exercises on
bioterrorism and especially after our WTO experience in Seattle
several years ago. And that's, again, why we also formed our
civil support team, a full-time unit of the National Guard
that's able to respond to any biological, chemical or
radioactive threat. That was up and running almost 1 year
before September 11th.
Nonetheless, we are planning on even more intensive drills
and exercises, but I'd like to repeat what Governor Barnes
indicated. We need to engage the citizens all across the
country in terms of being more vigilant, being more watchful,
being more observant, and reporting suspicious activities,
anything out of the usual or the ordinary to local law
enforcement, and we need that to prevent any type of activities
in the first place.
But that, again, that's what we at the State official level
can do, and it's up to the Members of Congress along with such
luminaries as Dr. Gale and Dr. Carter to talk about the
national strategy.
Senator Reed. I will now call on a luminary.
Dr. Gale. Clearly, training works. The problem is, training
in what? We don't know what standards we are trying to measure
up to right now in terms of training. The kinds of attacks that
we're used to training with reflect incidents that pretty much
are outdated at this time. I'm not sure that we have an idea of
how we would train people to respond to major electrical
outages over a long period of time and the reinstallation of
transformers; we've never done it.
So the training part of it has to start with some, call it
an imaginative approach, or view of what it is that we think we
can put in place, and what is effective and efficient to do. I
mean, in large part, a lot of those exercises that I've seen, A
Team, B Team, Red, Blue, all of these things are based on
archetypes of responses that really don't apply to the kinds of
attacks that we are going to face in the future. We are going
to be training on old issues rather than an expectation of what
we really anticipate in the future.
Senator Reed. It seems to me that based upon the Rhode
Island experience that one of the great learning lessons,
regardless of the reality of the scenario, is the difficulty of
communicating with different parts of the response team on a
tactical basis because of the lack of interoperability of
radios and computers, and on a procedural basis simply because
people don't know who to talk to at a given point. And that's
something I believe that the Federal level, certainly with
resources to not only encourage exercises but also to provide
hardware, software, and maybe even procedural advice could be
very useful.
And perhaps my final point, and Dr. Gale and the Governors,
you could comment on this interoperability issue.
Dr. Gale. I completely agree, but what you are talking
about is a very different form of coordination, control and
authority by the Federal Government at this time, and pretty
much everything I have heard today would require a very
different posture for the Federal Government rather than what
we have done on a piecemeal basis for purely important
Constitutional reasons in the past. You're talking about a very
different, very significantly different kind of coordination
effort.
On the other hand, if you imagine that a major attack like
this happens and that the alternative is martial law, I guess
it would be worthwhile to make some changes now before we
actually ran into that kind of dilemma.
Senator Reed. Governor Locke?
Governor Locke. Well, obviously we run into this problem
not just at a national level, from one State to another, one
computer system to another, but even just within local
governments. Different police agencies within our State have
different methods of communicating and they can't all talk to
each other. So we're talking about a huge paradigm shift in
terms of setting national standards, and you're talking about
setting national standards among the private sector as well as
the public agencies, and that would be a very contentious
debate as to who sets the standard and whose standard are we
going to use.
You know, I mean just think of the law enforcement, all the
different radio systems. Who gets to pick, and everybody will
be fighting and advocating for their particular system and
their viewpoint, and I can see this occurring, you know,
multiplied many many times and all across the Nation. But it's
a discussion that we have to have. It's a discussion that we
have to have.
Senator Reed. Thank you. Governor Barnes, did you have a
comment?
Governor Barnes. The only thing, I agree with Gary. It is a
discussion we need to have, and this is not just a Federal
problem, it's a State problem too. We have problems
coordinating between agencies, communicating between agencies,
and such, and there's a problem expending Federal funds.
I will just give you an example. Some Federal funds deal
with child welfare. The money that is given to the State,
appropriated to the States for technology, cannot be intermixed
with a State technology. In other words, it has to be kept
separate. Those kinds of things are things we fight all the
time.
And I guess what has happened by September 11th, and this
will be my final comment, is that September 11th has finally
told all of us, you'd better sit up and listen, because you
don't have the luxury of time to worry about whether folks can
communicate with each other and coordinate with each other.
You're either going to do it or you're going to have problems
in surviving.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Governor, and thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator.
The committee thanks each of you gentlemen for your fine
presentations. The committee is very much aware of the
responsibilities that you carry at the State level, Governors,
and that you Dr. Gale and Dr. Carter, carry in your
professorial work. You have given your time. You have made
interesting informative statements.
I was born during the administration of Woodrow Wilson. He
said, if I may paraphrase, that the informing function of the
legislature, the informing function of the legislative branch
is as important as the legislative function. And so you have
helped us, and you have helped to inform the American people.
After all, they are the people to whom we have to answer.
Thank you very very much. You have come at some sacrifices
to yourselves and you have spent your time, and we are very
grateful.
Now the committee----
Senator Stevens. Senator, could I just add one word?
Chairman Byrd. Yes.
Senator Stevens. I think we all have to look back and
realize what great freedom we had before September 11th and see
what we can do to get us back to that freedom. I'm reminded
just sitting here listening to the conversation of the fact
that came out, one of the terrorists that died on 9/11 had
rented a car in Florida and had some 6,000 miles on that car.
Yet, we go to great lengths to put up barriers to getting on
airplanes. I don't know of any barriers we put on highway
travel to track where people go. He had several different
credit cards, so we couldn't track where he went.
But I do hope we don't sacrifice the freedom of this
country in our rush to try and put up barriers to activities of
terrorists when we can't predict their actions. We have to find
some way, again, Dr. Gale, to resurrect the volunteerism of
this country, to report strange activities and the people
involved. For instance, as soon as I heard about the crashes, I
as a pilot said find out where they were trained. Who in the
world would believe that we would accept $20,000 from people
who wanted to get trained to fly jumbo jets, and only learn how
to make turns and fly straight and level?
Now somehow or another, the concept of awakening the public
of the need for information flowing into Government, I think is
much greater than our role of trying to take actions to try to
prevent these things happening by Government alone. I do hope
that we can focus on these things, and you all as Governors,
and Dr. Gale too, I think you have done us a service today by
raising a lot of flags, but let's not forget freedom as we do,
and I think that's got to be the watch word for all of us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator Stevens.
The Chair thanks all members of the committee for their
attendance and their attention, and for their contributions.
Thank you, Senator Stevens.
COMMITTEE RECESS
The committee will recess until 2 p.m.--2:15, because there
is a roll call vote scheduled for 2:00, at which time the
second panel on the subject of city and county homeland defense
needs will meet. Honorable Martin O'Malley, Mayor of Baltimore,
Maryland and Co-Chair of the Federal-Local Law Enforcement Task
Force, U.S. Conference of Mayors. He will be joined by the
Honorable Michael Guido, Mayor of Dearborn, Michigan, and Co-
Chair of the Working Group on Homeland Security, National
League of Cities. The third on the panel is the Honorable
Javier Gonzales, Commissioner, Santa Fe County, New Mexico, and
President of the National Association of Counties.
Thank you one and all.
[Whereupon, at 12:52 p.m., Wednesday, April 10, the
committee was recessed, to reconvene at 2:15 p.m., the same
day.]
(Afternoon Session, 2:23 p.m., Wednesday, April 10, 2002)
Chairman Byrd. The committee will come to order. This
afternoon we continue our full committee hearings on homeland
security. This is the second session of our hearings. This
morning we heard from three of our Nation's Governors about the
challenges they face at the State level in dealing with the
threat of domestic terror. We heard from Governors Engler of
Michigan, Barnes of Georgia, and Locke of Washington. We also
heard from Professor Stephen Gale, of the University of
Pennsylvania, an acknowledged expert on the whole matter of
terrorism. Professor Gale informed the committee about some of
the potential threats facing our country, and I think we all
agree that they are considerable.
We also heard from Dr. Ashton Carter of the Harvard Kennedy
School about some of the ways that the Federal Government
should organize itself to address these problems, very good
testimony. The Federal Government has already committed
substantial resources in the defense of our homeland, but much
more remains to be done, as we look ahead to a long-term
commitment, designed to protect our homeland. I have called
these hearings because this committee, the United States
Senate, and the people of this country need additional
information.
The committee will listen to those who best understand at
the local level these recurring needs in the Nation's
communities with one simple goal in mind, namely, to determine
how best to use the resources to protect and respond to future
terrorist attacks. I thank all our witnesses for coming to
Washington to share with the committee your insights concerning
the needs in homeland security at the local level.
Our panel this afternoon is made up of city and county
elected officials who are clearly on the front lines in the
battle against domestic terrorism in this country. The
committee has before it Mayor Martin O'Malley of Baltimore, the
co-chairman of the Federal-Local Law Enforcement Task Force of
the U.S. Conference of Mayors. He was elected mayor in 1999. We
have also Mayor Michael Guido, of Dearborn, Michigan, the co-
chairman of the Working Group on Homeland Security of the
National League of Cities. He was first elected in 1986. He is
now serving his fifth term in office.
We have Mr. Javier Gonzales--is that the way you pronounce
your name?
Mr. Gonzales. Perfect, Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Byrd. Would you pronounce it for me?
Mr. Gonzales. Javier.
Chairman Byrd. Javier?
Mr. Gonzales. Yes, sir.
Chairman Byrd. All right, thanks--Javier Gonzalez,
Commissioner of Santa Fe County, New Mexico. Santa Fe, that is
a community that has been around a long time.
Mr. Gonzales. Over 400 years, sir.
Chairman Byrd. Yes, almost as long as that city in Florida
that was founded in 1565, St. Augustine, and Santa Fe was
around before the pilgrims set foot on these shores.
Mr. Gonzales. Yes, sir.
Chairman Byrd. And you're still here.
And you're the Commissioner----
Mr. Gonzales. Thank the Lord.
Chairman Byrd [continuing]. Of Santa Fe County, New Mexico,
and president of the National Association of Counties. You've
served since 1994, and you are now serving your second term.
You were elected as the president of the National Association
of Counties in July 2000.
The committee welcomes all three of you. I now recognize my
friend and colleague, Senator Ted Stevens, the ranking member
of the committee for any remarks he may wish to make.
Senator Stevens. Senator, I made my remarks this morning. I
welcome the mayors and Mr. Gonzalez. It is a beautiful country
down there in New Mexico, Senator. Thank you very much. Nice to
have you all here.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator Stevens.
All right, let us begin with Mayor O'Malley.
Senator Mikulski. Mr. Chairman, may I have an opportunity--
--
Chairman Byrd. Oh, absolutely. Absolutely. Let me turn to
the distinguished Senator, or junior Senator--she is a front
line Senator, whatever it is, from Baltimore, Maryland. I used
to be a welder in a shipyard in Baltimore. We built Victory
ships and Liberty ships.
Now to my guide, philosopher, and friend, Senator Mikulski.
Statement of Senator Barbara A. Mikulski
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
once again thank you for holding these hearings on how we best
achieve the goal of homeland security. I am so pleased this
afternoon that you have invited the people who represent local
government, the National Association of Counties, and Mayors.
Mr. Chairman, I am so pleased that the National Conference
of Mayors has asked Mayor O'Malley to testify, because he comes
with first-hand experience, and he will share with you really
what it is like to represent a big city with a small wallet,
and at the same time face the contributions that are necessary
for homeland security. I come from local government. I am so
sympathetic to all three of the people who testify. I was on
the Baltimore City Council. The newspapers nicknamed us the
Pothole Parliament.
Now, why did they call us that? Because our job was to fix
potholes, but it was to educate our children, and keep school
libraries open and hope alive. Now with homeland security they
are asked to be the defenders against terrorism, and the stress
is on first responders, the public health infrastructure,
critical infrastructure like railroads and our port, putting
not only great stress on their personnel but indeed great
stress on their wallets. So I am looking forward to hearing
from both Mr. O'Malley, who will be unabashed in what he has to
tell us about what he considers the unfunded mandate, but also
from our local people, and from one pothole partner to another,
we can say a very cordial welcome.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator. Mayor, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARTIN O'MALLEY, MAYOR OF BALTIMORE,
MARYLAND; AND CO-CHAIR, FEDERAL-LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE, U.S. CONFERENCE OF
MAYORS
Mr. O'Malley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, Senator
Mikulski, my fellow refugee from the Baltimore City Council.
Mr. Chairman, my name is Martin O'Malley, mayor of
Baltimore City. I am here today on behalf of the U.S.
Conference of Mayors, as you have mentioned, where I am
delighted to be able to serve as co-chair of the Federal-Local
Law Enforcement Task Force during these challenging times for
our country.
I want to thank you and the other Senators for calling this
hearing, as well as all the members of the committee for giving
us the opportunity to discuss this very, very pressing and
urgent topic facing our republic. Today we are fighting a
different kind of war, and it is going to be fought on two
fronts, one on the forward front, where we have the best
technology, the best equipment, and no expense is spared, but
for the first time in nearly 200 years, that second front is
here at home, and it is in the streets of America's cities and
our population centers, and to date that is where it is at and
where we have seen the greatest loss of life, and yet we are
doing very little thus far to provide for counterdefense in
America's cities.
The fact is, local government is the front line of defense
on the home front, and we desperately need your help. There are
no Federal or State fire departments or paramedics, and while
there are about 11,000 FBI agents, that compares to 650,000
local law enforcement agents throughout this country, and as we
saw in New York, there is no time to bring in people and
equipment when a terrorist strikes. For those critical first
few hours, we are on our own, those critical first few hours
when there is also the greatest opportunity to save lives.
In Baltimore, we have chosen to make the investment to make
our city as safe as we possibly can. We are not waiting for
Annapolis, we are not waiting for Washington, and Mr. Chairman,
as a student of history, as a man who built the Liberty ships
in our city, you know that in Baltimore if we had waited for
the Federal Government back in 1812, we would all still be
singing God Save the Queen.
So we have started now on this. We have started facing up
to our responsibilities, even though we are facing some very,
very tight budget concerns, but we have faith that our Federal
and State governments will catch up to where our
responsibilities lie.
We calculate that the prudent steps we have taken since
September 11 improving our intelligence, improving our
security, and improving our emergency response capabilities,
have already cost us about $6.5 million in the city of
Baltimore. When we go on alert, our police department still has
to fight crime. The chemical attacks that have taken 6,000 of
our fellow citizens' lives over the last 10 years was not
anthrax, it was the chemical attacks of cocaine and heroin, so
rather than pulling officers away from their duties, we call
the officers back, or we ask them to work 12-hour shifts, and
through the end of the fiscal year we expect to spend an
additional $4.4 million largely on police overtime, guarding
critical areas of our infrastructure, guarding vulnerable
points.
As a tradeoff to help pay for these unbudgeted costs, we
have implemented tight spending controls across every other
agency and city government. We have frozen hundreds of
positions.
The fiscal year 2002 defense appropriations bill which the
President signed in December included $20 billion for homeland
security, and included in this bill was a total of $39 million
for the State of Maryland to in part protect our Nation's
capital. This money was provided solely to the State of
Maryland and the two jurisdictions adjacent to Washington,
D.C., yet not one dime of that has come to the largest city in
our State, the city of Baltimore.
The Conference of Mayors, Mr. Chairman, released a survey
finding that from September 11 through the end of 2002
America's cities will spend an additional $2.6 billion on new
homeland security priorities, including equipment, overtime,
and training. Mayors know the importance of public safety, and
we are 100 percent committed to doing our part in defending the
homeland in this war on terrorism, but we must forge a new
Federal-local partnership to make sure that our domestic
groups, our police, our fire-fighters, our paramedics, and
other city employees have the resources and support they need
to provide for our defense.
Mayors appreciate the administration proposing $3.5 billion
for first responders, and we want to work with Congress to make
sure dollars are provided in the most efficient and effective
manner. To that end, it is our firm belief that funding must be
provided directly to metropolitan areas, to cities' and
counties' first responders, rather than route it through the
States, with all the delay and all of the bureaucracy and
redtape that that entails.
A recent Department of Justice Inspector General's report
that the agency's domestic preparedness grant program has a 7-
to 29-month lifetime--7- to 29-month lifetime between when
funds are appropriated by Congress and when they're actually
awarded to the States, and that does not even include the
subsequent lag through the State and the local level. That is
no way to win a war.
This is largely the result of delays in almost every State
in developing a required comprehensive preparedness plan, plans
that most cities already provided. In Maryland, these funds
were delayed by nearly 3 years, with fiscal year 2000 funds
only recently being released. With our Nation at war, if
Congress wants to see its actions reflected in additional
security now for our constituents in a timely manner, direct
funding to large and medium sized cities and counties is the
only prudent course of action.
We also have to ensure that the funding can be used not
only to prepare for proximal attack, but also to prevent future
attacks. Our police departments have to have access to funding,
and officer deployments such as overtime should be specifically
authorized to coincide with times of heightened alert. For
example, Mayor's boards strongly supported the more detailed
terrorist alert system unveiled by Governor Ridge, but these
alerts will continue to require more officers on the streets,
in essence, national security being provided by local law
enforcement.
That is why the Conference of Mayors strongly supports
legislation sponsored by Senator Clinton, Senate bill 2038, and
several other Senators to create a highly flexible $3.5 billion
homeland security block grant. Homeland defense, currently, is
nothing but another unfunded mandate and, sadly, from our
perspective I do not believe we are a whole lot further along
in forging the new relationship the protection of our country
requires than we were on September 12.
You are asking cities to wage a new war against terrorism,
and oftentimes it is almost implicit that we are being asked to
pull bodies from fighting crime into homeland defense, and we
cannot do that. As of last year, violent crime was estimated to
be at a 20-year low, nationwide. Mayors strongly believe that
major factors in crime reduction were the additional officers
on the street, along with new technology, greatly assisted by
the COPS program and the local law enforcement block grant
program.
Over the past few years, Baltimore has achieved a 21-
percent reduction in crime, and I can assure all of you that we
would not have been able to do that without help from our
Federal Government, but now as crime is starting to rise in
many cities and States, we find it counterintuitive that OMB is
proposing to cut COPS by 80 percent and eliminate the block
grant by merging it into the State-funded Byrne grant program,
or the State-directed Byrne grant program. This comes on top of
the 25-percent reduction in the local block grant last year. We
simply cannot fund homeland defense by defunding local law
enforcement, and we strongly believe that one of the best ways
to prevent terrorism is to have more officers on the streets
armed with better technology.
We are already organized on the metropolitan level. We have
mutual aid agreements with our fire departments and officer
jurisdictions, mutual aid agreements when it comes to police
protection, we coordinate all the time with regard to our water
supplies and so many other things. We need the Federal
Government to join us there at the metropolitan level where
American citizens reside in greatest numbers.
I want to make one final point in conclusion. Although our
Air Force is fighting thousands of miles away, this war is not
primarily about Afghanistan or even Osama bin Laden or al
Qaeda. It is about how strong we are as a Nation, and whether
we can rise to this new challenge. We have to safeguard our
Nation, but we also have to continue to invest in our people's
protection and in our cities. This is not and cannot be an
either-or situation, and clearly there is no easy answer, and I
do not think that this Nation has ever faced a war in which we
did not call upon our people to make greater sacrifice.
But we are up to this challenge. We are as up to it now as
we were in the past, and we need your help. Now is the time for
all parties, cities, States, and Federal Government, along with
the private sector, to rise to this challenge. We have to think
differently, we have to form tighter partnerships, and we have
to do it down at the metropolitan level.
Thank you.
Chairman Byrd. Mayor, you also have some important points
that you make in your prepared statement with reference to
airport security, passenger and freight rail security, and
without objection the entire statement will be included in the
record.
Mr. O'Malley. Thank you, sir.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Martin O'Malley
Good afternoon. I am Martin O'Malley, Mayor of Baltimore, Maryland.
I am here today on behalf of The U.S. Conference of Mayors, for which I
am Co-Chair of the Federal-Local Law Enforcement Task Force.
I want to thank Chairman Byrd and Senator Stevens for calling
today's hearing, as well as the entire Committee.
Thank you for the opportunity to join you today to discuss a topic
critical to our nation's cities and to our nation: in protecting our
people in the wake of the tragic events of September 11th, how do
elected officials address unmet needs and how can the Federal
government work more effectively with cities to assist in meeting these
needs?
The New Paradigm For Homeland Security
Today, we are fighting a different kind of war--on two fronts. One
front is in Afghanistan, where we have the best technology, the best
equipment, the best intelligence being sent right to the front, and no
expense is spared.
But for the first time in nearly 200 years, the second front is
right here at home. And to date, it's where we've seen the greatest
loss of life. Yet, we have insufficient equipment, too little training,
and a lack of intelligence sharing with federal authorities--although,
on this last point, we're working with Homeland Security Director Ridge
and FBI Director Mueller to make it better. And currently, we have very
little in the way of national funding targeted for homeland defense
where it is truly needed--at the local government level.
Local government must be the first line of defense on the home
front. It can't be a federal or state function. There are no federal or
state Fire Departments or medics. There are about 11,000 FBI agents
compared to 650,000 local police officers. And as we saw in New York,
there is no time to bring people and equipment in from somewhere else
when terror strikes. For those critical first hours--when there is the
greatest opportunity to save lives--local governments are largely on
their own.
Today, in the new world in which we live, every mayor has a choice
to make: your city can be prepared or not; it can be a hard target or
it can be a soft target; you can make a huge unanticipated investment
now to keep your people safe, or you can cross your fingers, wait for
help from a higher level of government, and hope for the best.
In Baltimore, we have chosen to make the investment. We are not
waiting for Annapolis. We are not waiting for Washington. If our city
had waited for advice on self-defense from Washington in the war of
1812, all of us would be singing ``God Save the Queen.''
Baltimore's Interim Homeland Security Response
Baltimore is a fairly typical city in terms of our vulnerability--
but somewhat unique in terms of our greatness. I think what we are
doing today provides a good illustration of what cities are being asked
to do in our nation's defense. We are moving forward on three fronts:
On the Intelligence front:
--Recruited Richard Hunt, retired Chief of Criminal Intelligence for
the FBI.
--Created and formalized a statewide security intelligence network,
working with other law enforcement agencies.
--Engaged in ongoing dialogue with the FBI and Department of Justice
to improve intelligence sharing.
--Met daily with Federal authorities to obtain intelligence.
--Created a web-based surveillance system to provide real time
reporting from hospitals, ambulances, animal control, school
attendance and over-the-counter medicine to track common
symptoms in uncommon amounts--as well as hospital bed
availability.
--Tested reservoirs and the water system several times daily.
Second, on the Security front, we have:
--Completed a citywide assessment of infrastructure vulnerabilities.
--Completed a deployment plan to secure and protect City's
vulnerabilities, such as major buildings, water system,
stadiums, major rail and interstate highway bridges and
tunnels.
--Called daily security briefings with Police, Health, Fire, Public
Works, Transportation and IT Departments and State officials
almost every day.
--Bolstered police and security presence at City buildings.
--Arrested and charged people who make bomb threats.
Third, on the Emergency Response front:
--Recruited a civil preparedness expert, former NYPD Chief Louis
Anemone to update our emergency preparedness blueprint, with
four graduated levels of response.
--Recruited experts like the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological
Chemical Command (SBCCOM) in Aberdeen at Aberdeen and the
Center for Civilian Biodefense at Johns Hopkins University to
advise the Security Council.
--Implemented a bio-terrorism plans with hospital CEO's.
--Met with local news directors to discuss City's ongoing
preparedness and dissemination of information in the event of
an emergency.
--Completed an assessment of personal protective equipment
requirements for all emergency responders and submitted unified
request for said additional equipment to MEMA.
Local Homeland Security: Extraordinary Costs
We calculate that the prudent steps we've taken since September
11th already have cost the city approximately $6.5 million. When we go
on alert, our Police Department still has to fight crime. The chemical
attack that has taken the most lives in Baltimore still is heroin and
cocaine. So rather than pulling officers away from their duties, we
call other officers back, or they work 12-hour shifts.
Through the end of the fiscal year, we expect to have to spend an
additional $4.4 million--largely on police salaries. We consider it our
patriotic duty to step up to the plate. But when we approved our budget
for this fiscal year, we did not anticipate that our police, fire and
emergency responders would double as local militia in a war on
terrorism. We need to strengthen our supply lines from Washington.
In addition to the approximately $11 million I've mentioned, we
also have a $3.5 million request pending with the Maryland Emergency
Management Agency for personal protective equipment. Right now, our
first responders are not fully equipped. And our water utility plans to
spend an additional $24 million in capital funds to convert chlorine
gas to bleach at all of our water and waste water facilities. As a
tradeoff to help pay for these unbudgeted costs, we have implemented
tight spending controls in virtually every program area except for
public safety and criminal adjudication. We have frozen more than 250
vacant General Fund positions Citywide. This freeze affects everything
from our ability to fully staff our recreation centers to our efforts
at collecting mixed refuse and maintaining our roads and streetlights--
all very important quality-of-life issues for the people of Baltimore
and high priorities for me as Mayor. We have also put a hold on
approximately $6 million worth of non-personnel spending Citywide for
contractual services as well as the purchase of materials, supplies and
equipment.
Aid from the Federal Government
Back in November, the State along with the big seven jurisdictions
submitted a comprehensive funding request to Congress for such things
as equipment, overtime costs, renovation of the backup emergency
operations center and training.
As a result of this request, in the fiscal year 2002 Defense
Appropriations bill, which President Bush signed in December, $20
billion was appropriated for homeland security. Included in this bill
was a total of $39 million for the State of Maryland to in part,
protect the Capitol. As indicated, the funding was only provided to the
State of Maryland and the two jurisdictions adjacent to Washington, DC.
The funds were distributed as follows:
--$8.5 million to Montgomery County for police and fire vehicles,
bio-terrorism response, vaccines and reimbursement from 9/11,
--$7.9 million to Prince George's County for hazmat vehicles,
vaccines and fire and police operations and equipment,
--$10.5 million for State Department of Health and Mental Hygiene for
bio-terrorism response, vaccines, training and computer
upgrades,
--$7 million to the Maryland State Police for inoperability and IT
systems, computer upgrade and patchwork of crime watch list,
--$3.5 million for the Maryland State Police for bomb squad unit,
bomb squad robots and a helicopter,
--$986,000 to the Maryland State Police for Baltimore Washington
International Airport bomb and canine team,
--$508,000 to the Maryland State Police for field operation system,
--$9,000 to the Maryland State Police for crime lab equipment and
training.
The Conference of Mayors released a survey which found that from
September 11, 2001 through the end of 2002, cities will spend an
additional $2.6 billion on new homeland security priorities including
equipment, overtime and training.
Mayors know the importance of public safety and are 100 percent
committed to the homeland war against terrorism. But we must forge a
new federal-local partnership to make sure that our domestic troops--
police, fire, emergency workers and other city employees--have the
resources needed for this new challenge.
Let me touch on just a few points contained in our National Action
Plan on Safety and Security.
Supporting Our First Responders
Mayors appreciate the Administration proposing $3.5 billion for
first responders, and want to work with Congress to make sure that
those dollars are provided in the most efficient and effective manner.
To that end, it is our belief that funding must be provided
directly to city and county first responders, rather than all flowing
through the states.
I know that this Committee heard from governors this morning, so I
want to stress this point. I am very concerned that despite the best
intentions of the Administration in developing its plan, the needs of
the local first response community will not be met unless funding is
provided directly to medium and larger sized cities and counties.
We must also ensure that the funding can be used to not only
prepare for a possible attack, but to also help prevent future attacks.
Our police departments must have access to the funding, and officer
deployments such as overtime should be specifically authorized.
For example, mayors called for and support the more detailed
terrorism alert system unveiled by Governor Ridge, but these alerts
will continue to require more officers on the streets--in essence
national security being provided by local law enforcement.
This is why the Conference of Mayors strongly supports legislation
sponsored by Senator Clinton (S. 2038) and several other Senators to
create a highly flexible $3.5 billion Homeland Security Block Grant.
I also want to thank Congress and the Administration for the recent
infusion of new funding focused on building the nation's public health
infrastructure. But we must remain vigilant in understanding that most
of the capacity needs to respond to chemical and biological events are
at the local level.
The Ongoing Fight Against Crime
While we wage the new war against terrorism, we must not retreat
from the ongoing fight against crime.
As of last year, violent crime was estimated to be at a 20-year low
nationwide. Mayors strongly believe that major factors in this crime
reduction were additional officers on the streets, the deployment of
new technology, and a new focus on community policing--all of which
were greatly assisted by the COPS program and Local Law Enforcement
Block Grant (LLEBG).
Over the past two years, Baltimore has seen a 24 percent reduction
in crime which I can assure you would not have been possible without
the help of these federal resources.
But crime is still a major issue in cities, and key indicators,
such as the economy and return of more than 600,000 ex-convicts
annually to our cities, have led some experts to predict an upswing in
crime rates.
That is why we find it counterintuitive that OMB is proposing to
cut COPS by 80 percent and eliminate the block grant by merging it into
the state Byrne Grant program. This comes on top of a 25 percent
reduction in the local block grant last year.
We simply cannot fund homeland defense by de-funding local law
enforcement, and we strongly believe that one of the best ways to
prevent terrorism is to have more officers on the streets armed with
better technology.
Airport Security
We are pleased that many of our aviation security recommendations
are being implemented by Congress and the Administration, in particular
federalizing airport screeners, screening all checked baggage and the
year-end requirement to have explosive detection systems in place.
I cannot stress enough the importance of honoring the language and
timetables of the aviation security law. Installation of sophisticated
explosive detection systems at all 429 commercial airports by December
31 is a top priority of the nation's mayors.
And, I want to urge Congress to appropriate funding for the
reimbursement of security costs incurred by local government in meeting
federal security mandates at our airports.
Transit Security
Second, with more than nine billion trips logged on the nation's
public transit systems each year, securing these systems and protecting
riders from potential terrorist activities must be a high priority.
To increase security while not compromising our ability to meet
growing demand for public transit, we have called for new resources for
security personnel; the deployment of new technologies; and
infrastructure improvements including secure transit control
facilities, fencing and barriers.
Passenger and Freight Rail Security
Third, The U.S. Conference of Mayors strongly supports Amtrak's
fiscal year 2003 request of at least $1.2 billion. Eliminating long
distance routes would have a devastating impact on the nation in normal
times of travel; and much more so in the event of a national emergency
as we saw on September 11.
Funding should also be supported to improve Amtrak's security.
Now, more than ever, we must strengthen our nation's passenger rail
system, not dismantle it.
A New Federal Response is Needed
Fighting terrorism and safeguarding our citizens from terrorism
always has been a national challenge. But now the paradigm has
changed--our homeland is vulnerable. Without a dramatic shift in how we
finance a portion of our homeland security, protecting our homeland
will become an unfunded mandate on local governments.
Federal support today for local homeland security is a patchwork of
programs. They are largely uncoordinated and provide no common
standards for how states and localities should best use these funds.
Even the programs that have the highest potential impact--like FEMA's
FIRE Grant programs--meet only a fraction of local government needs.
FEMA provided just $100 million last year, and is providing $360
million this year, despite nearly $3 billion in applications from fire
departments in the first round of the program.
Local governments need stable funding for this effort. We also need
a one-stop shop to turn to for assistance in gearing up for this war.
Conclusion
Finally, I would like to make one more point in conclusion.
Although our armed forces are fighting thousands of miles from our
shores, this war is not primarily about Afghanistan or Osama Bin Laden.
It is about how strong we are as a nation--about what we are willing to
do to maintain our way of life--which is being threatened in very real
ways, as people have died going about their daily routines.
The people who flew airliners filled with innocent people into
buildings filled with innocent people were not uneducated--they were
not acting alone--and they were not unprepared to die trying to destroy
our way of life.
They will not relent. So the question remains: what are we willing
to do to protect our way of life? How will America rise to the
challenge, and how will we become even stronger?
We must safeguard our nation. But we also must continue to invest
in our people and our cities. This is not and cannot be an either or
situation.
Clearly, there is no easy answer to how we fund the war on the
homefront. Overcoming the overwhelming task can be accomplished. This
country has done it before and can do it again.
Now is the time for all parties--cities, states, the federal
government and our private sector partners--to rise to the challenge.
And, we must succeed.
Biographical Sketch of Martin O'Malley
On November 2, 1999, after an energetic, hard-fought campaign that
captured the hopes and imaginations of families throughout the city,
Martin O'Malley was elected as the youngest Mayor in Baltimore's
history with an overwhelming 91 percent of the vote. Two months
earlier, he garnered 53 percent of the vote in the Democratic primary,
winning all six of Baltimore's City Council Districts and besting a 17-
candidate field that included the sitting City Council President and a
former City Councilman and School Board member, who were the campaign's
early frontrunners.
Following through on his campaign themes of accountability, change
and reform, Mayor O'Malley has made improving public safety, education,
and economic development--downtown and in each of Baltimore's
celebrated neighborhoods--the cornerstones of his covenant with the
people of Baltimore. Within a week of taking office, he also kicked off
an ambitious drive to make Baltimore America's cleanest city.
Prior to his election as Mayor, Martin O'Malley served on the
Baltimore City Council from 1991 to 1999, and as an Assistant State's
Attorney for the City of Baltimore from 1988 to 1990.
After winning election to a 3rd District City Council seat in 1991,
the Mayor rapidly rose through the ranks to become Chairman of the
Legislative Investigations Committee and Chairman of the Taxation and
Finance Committee.
Mayor O'Malley, a graduate of Catholic University and the
University of Maryland School of Law, is a member of the Maryland Bar
Association.
Mayor Martin O'Malley and his wife Katie Curran O'Malley live in
Baltimore's Beverly Hills community with their two daughters, Grace and
Tara, and son William. They are members of St. Francis of Assisi
Church.
CITY OF BALTIMORE SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS COSTS FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2002
(ENDING JUNE 30, 2002)
TABLE 1.--SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS COSTS INCURRED BY CITY
AGENCIES FROM SEPTEMBER 2001 THROUGH MARCH 2002
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non- Subtotal
Agency Personnel Personnel All
Expenses Expenses Expenses
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Police Department................ $3,045,281 $51,306 $3,096,587
Fire Department.................. 432,415 203,079 635,494
Health Department................ 383,463 162,858 546,321
Office of Transportation......... 45,027 5,011 50,039
Public Works--General Services... 51,127 119,275 170,402
Bureau of Water and Waste Water.. 116,020 1,654,453 1,770,473
Circuit Court.................... ........... 58,000 58,000
Sheriff's Office................. 158,548 ........... 158,548
Mayor's Office of Information 2,963 ........... 2,963
Technology......................
--------------------------------------
TOTAL...................... 4,234,844 2,253,982 6,488,826
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: All figures presented here are preliminary and subject to change.
TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF ANTICIPATED REMAINING COSTS FOR EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS IN FISCAL YEAR 2002
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non- Subtotal
Agency Personnel Personnel All
Expenses Expenses Expenses
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Police Department................ $2,639,059 $379,234 $3,018,293
Fire Department.................. 32,139 1,920 34,059
Health Department................ 94,500 256,250 350,750
Office of Transportation......... ........... 61,100 61,100
Public Works--General Services... ........... 70,000 70,000
Bureau of Water and Waste Water.. 48,971 493,791 542,762
Circuit Court.................... ........... 215,000 215,000
Sheriff's Office................. 75,355 ........... 75,355
--------------------------------------
TOTAL...................... 2,890,024 1,477,195 4,367,219
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: All figures presented here are preliminary and subject to change.
CITY OF BALTIMORE AGENCY ACTIVITIES SINCE SEPTEMBER 11TH
(ENDING JUNE 30, 2002)
I. Police Department--General Fund
Actual expenses--$2,527,827.
Anticipated expenses--$2,815,393.
Activities/costs include:
--$2,527,827 spent in personnel costs--regular time, overtime and
benefits--and non-personnel costs including consultant
payments--$6,200 to Lou Anemone and $34,566 to Richard Hunt.
--$2,815,393 anticipated in personnel costs with an estimate that the
City will spend $235,000 per pay period for 2 pay periods and
another $1.77 million for one pay period, assuming there is
another attack. There is also $383,744 for non-personnel costs
such as plant traffic barriers and additional payments to the
consultants.
II. Police Department--Water and Waste Water Fund
Actual expenses--$568,760.
Anticipated expenses--$202,900.
Activities/costs include:
--$578,760 spent on regular time, overtime and benefits.
--$202,900 anticipated future costs based on $50,000 per pay period
times four pay periods.
III. Health Department
Actual expenses--$546,321.
Anticipated expenses--$350,750.
Activities/costs include:
--$546,321 spent consists of personnel costs--regular time, overtime
and benefits--diverted to bioterrorism activities, including
personnel sent to work at anthrax testing and clinic sites.
--$350,750 anticipated costs include minimal ongoing personnel
expenses for clinics and bioterrorism response as well as
funding to strengthen the bioterrorism surveillance network
(add staff, more training for hospitals, web based reporting
system).
IV. Fire Department
Actual expenses--$635,494.
Anticipated expenses--$34,059.
Activities/costs include:
--$635,494 spent for regular time, overtime and benefits for use of
the fire boat in the Port and response to hazmat calls. Non-
personnel costs relate to maintenance of the fire boat and
Battalion truck responding to hazmat calls with an additional
amount for equipment and supplies.
--$34,059 anticipated costs reflect decision to cease fireboat
patrol. Costs are estimated based on weekly level of hazmat
calls and maintenance.
V. Transportation Office
Actual expenses--$50,039.
Anticipated expenses--$61,000.
Activities/costs include:
--$50,039 spent consists of personnel--regular time, overtime and
benefit--costs.
--$61,000 anticipated cost is for camera modification at the
Emergency Operations Center and other City buildings (City
Hall, Benton).
VI. Bureau of Water and Waste Water
Actual expenses--$1,770,474.
Anticipated expenses--$542,762.
Activities/costs include:
--$1,770,474 spent represents costs for increased security and
monitoring, including sample testing of the water distribution
system, storm center coverage and labor and materials for
welding manholes closed.
--$542,762 anticipated costs consist of ongoing personnel based on
the average costs for four-week period for water sampling and
security and additional costs for fencing, cameras, barricades,
electronic door lock monitors, front entrance security, card
readers, traffic barriers, automated gates and security
contract costs.
VII. Department of Public Works--General Services
Actual expenses--$170,402.
Anticipated expenses--$70,000.
Activities/costs include:
--$170,402 spent in personnel functions--regular time, overtime and
benefits--for renovating the Emergency Operations Center as
well as $10,000 in overtime costs as the Central Garage in the
days following 9/11.
--$70,000 anticipated for installation of the ground source heat pump
at the Emergency Operations Center.
VIII. Sheriff's Office
Actual expenses--$158,548.
Anticipated expenses--$75,355.
Activities/costs include:
--$158,548 spent in overtime salaries and wages, along with benefits.
--$75,355 anticipated personnel costs based on a $10,000 per pay
period plus overtime and benefits.
IX. Circuit Court
Actual expenses--$58,000.
Anticipated expenses--$215,000.
Activities/costs include:
--$58,000 spent for video cameras in the judges chambers.
--$200,000 anticipated cost for new, more secure garage doors for
Courthouse East.
--$15,000 anticipated for video cameras in the Family Court division.
X. Mayor's Office of Information Technology
Actual expenses--$2,963.
Anticipated expenses--$0.
Activities/costs include:
--$2,963 spent for personnel overtime and benefits.
Chairman Byrd. Now, Mayor Michael Guido.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL GUIDO, MAYOR OF DEARBORN,
MICHIGAN; AND CO-CHAIR, WORKING GROUP ON
HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF
CITIES
Mr. Guido. Thank you very much, sir, Mr. Chairman,
distinguished members of the committee. My name is Michael
Guido. I am mayor of the city of Dearborn, and I co-chair the
Task Force on Homeland Security for the National League of
Cities.
The National League of Cities is the Nation's oldest and
largest association representing municipal governments in
Washington, D.C. NLC's membership includes more than 135,000
local elected officials in 18,000 big and small cities,
representing 225 million Americans. The National League of
Cities is pleased to have this opportunity to share its view on
the administration's budget proposal, as well as the fiscal
year 2003 appropriations process for homeland security
programs.
Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, cities across
America have heightened security for infrastructure, for
events, and for transportation. They have assumed
responsibility for counterterrorism in partnership with Federal
law enforcement agencies, and revamped emergency preparedness
plans. Cities have also responded to anthrax threats and
incidents. They have also purchased new equipment and have
shouldered significant costs in overtime pay.
According to a recent survey of NLC members, cities could
spend more than $2 billion this year to cover unbudgeted
homeland security needs. For the city of Dearborn, we have
spent more than $500,000 on overtime costs, training, and other
related expenses stemming from the terrorist attacks.
The lessons that we learned from September 11 indicate the
need for better coordination among all levels of government. In
Dearborn, we thought that it was in our community's best
interest to create a homeland security position, called the
community preparedness officer, within our police department.
Among his duties, this officer coordinates information along
with the State and Federal agencies.
The municipal governments have supported the creation of
the White House Office of Homeland Security, and the proposals
to increase FEMA's capacity to help State and local governments
prepare, plan, and train.
Mr. Chairman, we applaud your willingness to improve
funding, coordination, and information-sharing, actions which
hopefully will prevent such catastrophic acts of terrorism in
the future. In order to achieve this objective, however, we
realize that there must be significant improvements made at and
among all levels of government. In this regard, I would like to
discuss both long and short-term municipal priorities for
domestic preparedness that the National League of Cities
believes should be addressed.
Funding is needed now to assist in planning to cover
overtime expenses of our first responders and to improve
emergency communications systems. We strongly urge you to
appropriate funding for these immediate needs through
supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 2002. If local
governments have access to resources for these purposes, we
will be in a much better position to maximize the use of
proposed funding such as the Homeland Security Block Grant Act,
or first responder initiative, in fiscal year 2003.
Coordination is essential as States develop and submit
their emergency preparedness plans to FEMA, and as the
jurisdictions orchestrate mutual aid agreements, proper funding
for emergency management is critical.
It is also important to manage threats of bioterrorism. We
realize that States recently received the first round of grants
for bioterrorism preparedness, and we know that a House-Senate
conference committee is meeting to finalize the Bioterrorism
Preparedness Act. However, we have concerns about how much of
this funding will actually reach county and municipal levels.
More direct funding to local governments and certain
performance guidelines are needed. In most situations, cities
are the first responders, and they may be on the scene for at
least 6 hours before outside resources arrive.
In Dearborn, when we had an anthrax scare at our post
office, our hazmat team responded, our police department
responded, our fire department responded. We had no one from
the Postal Service respond at all. We secured the scene and
found out that it was a hoax. There was no help from the State
police, and no one of any other agency helped us in that
particular incident.
Having the proper training, the equipment, communications,
and planning place is extremely crucial for local governments.
As you know, all levels of government are experiencing
significant budget constraints. Homeland security is one of the
most serious factors affecting municipal budgets. Deficits at
the State level, coupled with the uncertainty of exactly how
much cities will receive through the proposed first responder
initiative, will certainly impact our budget. These
circumstances could be made worse with the severe budget cuts
and restructuring plans the administration is proposing for two
crucial programs, community-oriented policing services, the
COPS program, and the local law enforcement block grant.
Programs like these should not be jeopardized, because they
directly impact homeland security and local public safety.
The National League of Cities advocates direct block grants
file funding to cities for first responder preparedness. We
believe the administration's proposed 25 percent in-kind match
in the first responder initiative may discourage some cities
from requesting funds. NLC believes a Federal agency with the
capacity to administer a block grant for counterterrorism, such
as Senate bill 2038, the Homeland Security Block Grant Act, is
needed. This agency would ideally function as both a grants
management center and as an information clearinghouse on
counterterrorism resources.
Mr. Chairman, the National League of Cities strongly
advocates direct funding to cities, but it is our understanding
that the proposed first responder initiative would allocate 75
percent of the $3.5 billion program to local governments
through States based upon population. If this program is
funded, we urge you to waive the 25-percent matching funds
requirement. We also would like you to ensure, through
statutory language in the appropriations bill, that the States
forward the 75 percent to cities and counties within the 30-day
period after receiving the grants.
Another point we want to emphasize involves our grave
concerns about the lack of a coordinated emergency
communications system. Because emergency responders do not
share common broadcast frequencies, lives are at risk.
Different jurisdictions use different broadcast frequencies,
and incompatible equipment. Within my own city, the police and
the fire departments have very limited capacity to communicate
with each other because they use different frequencies.
We believe that this situation is unacceptable. Cities need
funding for the creation of a seamless energy communications
network linking all public safety entities.
Mr. Chairman, allow me to tell you about our interactions
with the new Office of Homeland Security as it has been
established. NLC's leadership, members, and staff, have met
with the Office of Homeland Security on multiple occasions to
discuss the priorities that I have outlined. We have expressed
our support for the office's monumental task of overseeing the
coordination of domestic security activities and, in return,
Director Tom Ridge and his staff have been accessible to NLC's
staff and members. NLC has supported the Homeland Security
Advisory System on March 12 and, additionally, the National
League of Cities has supported the Preparedness Against
Domestic Terrorism Act, which would provide congressional
oversight for a national council or agency for
counterterrorism.
We continue to support this goal to ensure accountability
as well as effective coordination among all levels of
government. We understand that this committee is not directly
responsible for sanctioning programs or operations. However,
the NLC urges Congress to authorize the Office of Homeland
Security as a Cabinet-level agency with its own budget
authority and congressional oversight. We want the agency to
have the authority to direct all Federal spending and
activities related to terrorism prevention and response.
In closing, I would like to reiterate that our
counterterrorism plan must provide a significant increase in
direct funding to local governments. Again, the National League
of Cities appreciates this opportunity to discuss its homeland
security priorities with you, and we look forward to working
with you to achieve these goals throughout the appropriations
process.
I am happy to answer any questions at the appropriate time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael A. Guido
Chairman Byrd and members of the Appropriations Committee. I am
Mayor Michael Guido of Dearborn, Michigan, co-chair of the National
League of Cities' (NLC) task force on homeland security and a member of
the League's Board of Directors.
The National League of Cities is the nation's oldest and largest
association representing municipal interests in Washington, DC. NLC's
membership includes more than 135,000 local elected officials and
18,000 cities and towns representing 225 million Americans throughout
the United States. Our member cities range in population from the
nation's largest cities of New York and Los Angeles to its smallest
towns and villages.
The National League of Cities is pleased to have this opportunity
to share its views on the Administration's budget proposal and the
fiscal year 2003 appropriations process for homeland security programs.
Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, cities and towns across
America have strengthened security for physical infrastructure, events
management and transportation. They have significantly increased
surveillance activities, assumed responsibilities for counterterrorism
in partnership with federal law enforcement agencies, revamped
emergency preparedness plans, responded to anthrax threats and
incidents, purchased new equipment and have shouldered significant
costs in overtime pay for first responders. According to a recent
survey of NLC member cities, could spend more than $2 billion this year
to cover unbudgeted homeland security needs.
The lessons we learned, from both the tragic bombing of the Murrah
Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 to the terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon, indicate the need for better
coordination among all levels of government in order to achieve an
effective state of national domestic preparedness. From the creation of
the White House Office of Homeland Security to the proposals to
increase FEMA's capacity to help state and local governments prepare,
plan and train, and the recently enacted PATRIOT Act--municipal
governments support these actions and applaud your willingness at the
federal level to improve funding, coordination and information sharing,
preparedness levels and training so that we can hopefully prevent such
catastrophic acts of terrorism in the future. Mr. Chairman, to achieve
this objective, however, we realize that there must be significant
improvements made at and among all levels of government. In this
regard, I would like to discuss both long- and short-term municipal
priorities for domestic preparedness that NLC believes should be
addressed.
Funding is needed now to assist in planning, to cover overtime
expenses of our first responders, and to improve emergency
communications systems. We strongly urge you to appropriate funding for
these immediate needs through supplemental appropriations for fiscal
year 2002. If local governments have access to resources for these
purposes, we will be in a much better position to maximize the use of
proposed funding such as the Homeland Security Block Grant Act or First
Responder Initiative in fiscal year 2003.
Planning and coordination are essential as states develop and
submit their emergency preparedness plans to FEMA. However, it is our
experience that many cities have not been engaged in developing these
state response plans in the past, and we hope this will not be the case
this time.
As jurisdictions orchestrate mutual aid agreements to facilitate
disaster response in an expedited and cost-effective manner, proper
funding for emergency management and planning is critical along with
resources to strengthen coordination between local first responders and
public health systems to manage threats of bioterrorism.
We realize that states recently received the first round of grants
for bioterrorism preparedness and that a House-Senate conference
committee is meeting to finalize the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act,
which would provide funds for drinking water vulnerability assessments
and emergency preparedness plans and upgrades. These measures are
indeed essential; however, we do have concerns about how much of this
funding will actually reach county and municipal levels. More direct
funding to local governments and certain performance guidelines are
needed.
For example, the Office of Management and Budget's Annual Report to
Congress on Combating Terrorism, submitted May 18, 2000, reported that
local governments received less than four percent of the total federal
budget of over $9 billion for counterterrorism in fiscal year 2000. We
hope that this will not be the case after September 11.
Cities need direct federal funding for preparedness and must be
recognized as the focal point for all disaster mitigation and recovery
activities in any strategic counterterrorism plan. In most situations
it is local first responders who are managing the emergency response
and recovery operations for a disaster for at least six hours before
outside resources arrive. Having the proper training, equipment,
communications, and planning in place for crisis and consequence
management is extremely crucial for local governments.
As you know, all levels of government are experiencing significant
budget constraints. Homeland security is undoubtedly one of the most
serious factors affecting uncertain municipal budgets with decreased
revenues and increased expenditures. Unlike the federal government,
cities cannot operate at a deficit. Deficits at the state level,
coupled with the uncertainly of exactly how much funding cities will
receive through the proposed First Responder Initiative for homeland
security and related programs, will certainly impact local revenue
shortages. These circumstances could be exacerbated even more with the
severe budget cuts and restructuring plans that the Administration has
proposed for existing programs in fiscal year 2003 such as Community
Oriented Policing Services (COPS) and the Local Law Enforcement Block
Grant--two programs that directly impact homeland security and local
public safety. These and other existing programs should not be
jeopardized.
Cities provide the most efficient means for building effective
homeland security. Each has unique security needs and emergency
response networks, and spending decisions must be controlled by local
governments rather than by states.
In this regard, NLC advocates direct block-grant style funding to
cities for homeland security, and is concerned that the
Administration's proposed 25 percent in-kind match in its First
Responder Initiative may discourage some cities from requesting funds
for first-responder preparedness.
NLC believes a federal agency with the capacity to administer a
block grant for counterterrorism, such as S. 2038, the Homeland
Security Block Grant Act, is needed. This agency would ideally function
as both a grants management center and as a clearinghouse in providing
a composite list of all federal grants, training programs, and
technical assistance available to local governments for
counterterrorism, which are located in more than 40 federal agencies.
The administering agency should have the capability to educate local
jurisdictions about successful examples of regional planning and mutual
aid agreements, vulnerability assessments, information sharing, model
procedures, terrorism consequence plans, and other relevant guidance.
It is our goal that better coordination at the federal level and
direct assistance to local governments will enable us to avoid
duplication of effort, gain greater clarification about the types of
federal counterterrorism programs available to assist local
governments, and ultimately improve early detection, warning, and
response capabilities against the use of weapons of mass destruction.
Mr. Chairman, although NLC strongly advocates direct funding to
cities and towns for domestic preparedness, it is our understanding
that the proposed First Responder Initiative would allocate 75 percent
of the $3.5 billion program to local governments through their
respective states, based upon population guidelines. If this program is
funded, we urge you to waive the 25 percent matching funds requirement
and include statutory language in the appropriations bill that would
ensure that the states forward the 75 percent to cities and counties
within 30 days of receiving the grant. This would be important to
reassure cities and towns that have failed to receive adequate funding
through state block grants in the past, and it would help ensure that
smaller jurisdictions are not overlooked and receive proper assistance.
Another point we want to emphasize involves our grave concerns
about the lack of interoperability capabilities among first responders
and emergency communications systems. In the wake of the Oklahoma City
bombing, first responders resorted to runners who relayed critical
information to various command centers throughout the city because they
could not communicate with federal, state, and local authorities using
the existing communications systems. These same problems were
experienced during the response activities for September 11. Because
emergency responders don't share common broadcast frequencies, lives
are at risk. Law enforcement, fire departments, and emergency medical
systems need to rely on instant radio communications. But different
jurisdictions use different broadcast frequencies and incompatible
equipment.
This is unacceptable. Cities need the immediate allocation of
proper spectrum channels for public safety and the necessary funding
for deployment of interoperable equipment to create a seamless
emergency communications network that would efficiently link all public
safety entities in times of emergency.
Mr. Chairman, I believe you have also inquired about the level of
contact that the new Office of Homeland Security has established with
cities. NLC's leadership, members, and staff have met with the Office
of Homeland Security on multiple occasions to discuss the priorities
outlined above and express support for its monumental task of
overseeing the coordination of domestic security activities. Director
Tom Ridge and his staff have been accessible to NLC and have offered
direct support to several cities regarding information and planning
requests. NLC has supported the recent Homeland Security Advisory
System announced on March 12. This is a welcome first step in helping
the federal and local levels communicate effectively on homeland
security, providing more clarification about what to prepare for during
a level of alert with guidelines for local officials and first
responders so they can best direct their resources and receive critical
information for preparedness that would otherwise remain classified. We
are reviewing the details of the announcement and corresponding
Presidential Decision Directive, and look forward to providing feedback
about the alert levels.
Additionally, NLC has supported the Preparedness Against Domestic
Terrorism Act, which would provide congressional oversight for a
national council or agency for counterterrorism. Our policy continues
to support this goal to ensure effective coordination among all levels
of government as well as accountability. We do understand that this
Committee is not directly responsible for sanctioning programs or
operations.
However, with the need for a federal agency with the capacity to
administer a block grant as mentioned earlier in my testimony, NLC
urges Congress to authorize the Office of Homeland Security as a
Cabinet-level agency with its own budget authority and congressional
oversight, and the authority to direct all federal spending and
activities related to terrorism prevention and response.
In closing I would like to reiterate that any strategic
counterterrorism plan must provide a significant increase in direct
funding to local governments for preparedness and response activities,
including training, threat and vulnerability assessments, effective
emergency communications systems and public health systems, and
critical infrastructure protection. Again, NLC appreciates this
opportunity to discuss its municipal priorities for homeland security,
and looks forward to working with you to achieve these goals throughout
the appropriations process. I am happy to answer any questions at the
appropriate time.
Thank you.
Addenda:
--NLC Resolution for a National Strategic Counter-Terrorism Plan; and
--NLC survey report on Homeland Security In America's Cities and
Towns: Critical Issues, Responses, and Costs.
Biographical Sketch of Michael A. Guido
Michael A. Guido has been the Mayor of his hometown since Jan. 1,
1986. He's now serving his fifth term in office after winning
reelection in the year 2001 with 80 percent of the vote.
The son of Italian immigrants to America who adopted the hometown
of automotive pioneer Henry Ford as their own, Mayor Guido is a
lifelong city resident and a product of Dearborn Public Schools
(Fordson High School, class of 1972).
Early on, the Mayor recognized and developed a deep appreciation
for Dearborn's enviable way of life. This appreciation fueled a passion
in him for serving the citizens of this special city and a deep
commitment to helping it prosper.
In 1977, at the age of 23, he became the youngest person ever
elected to the Dearborn City Council, serving two four-year terms until
becoming the youngest Mayor in the city's history. Today, more than 16
years later, he still claims that being the mayor of his hometown is
the greatest job and greatest honor anyone could have.
Since day one, Mayor Guido has based his administration on values
of public service, accountability and accessibility. He's remained true
to Dearborn's tradition of quality public services, while blending this
commitment with a focus on successfully implementing innovative new
programs, facilities and technologies that deliver those services more
effectively and efficiently. The Mayor's vision and leadership have
strengthened the city's neighborhoods, bolstered its downtown business
districts and catalyzed continued growth in Dearborn's industrial,
manufacturing and technology sectors.
And he's done it all with a track record of fiscal responsibility.
The city's operating tax rate has remained the same or been cut in each
of the last 12 years, and Mayor Guido has balanced every city budget
he's been responsible for.
Here are a few of Dearborn's many success stories that Mayor
Guido's helped to forge:
--The city's overall crime rate has dropped by 33 percent since 1990
alone. Some crimes have declined even more: burglary, for
example, is down by 44 percent since he took office.
--Advanced Life Support (ALS) technology has been installed in
emergency medical rescue vehicles, shortening the time it takes
to bring potentially lifesaving treatment to victims of car
accidents or medical emergencies. In the year 2001 alone,
emergency responders used ALS to extend the lives of almost
2,000 people in critical need.
--The total assessed value of all property in the city has increased
by two and one half times what it was when the Mayor took
office: from $1.84 billion to an all-time high of more than
$4.46 billion in the year 2001. New construction has averaged
more than $155 million a year for each of the last 16 years.
--New neighborhoods and retail centers have been built--two examples
are Georgetown Commons ($23 million) and West Village ($11
million)--thanks to Mayor's Guido's leadership in working with
private sector developers to make them happen.
--The year 2001 marked the grand opening of Dearborn's Ford Community
& Performing Arts Center, North America's largest municipally-
owned community recreation and cultural complex. The $43
million facility is five times the size of the city's former
Civic Center.
Throughout his life, a key priority for Mayor Guido has been
helping to make Dearborn an even greater place to live by serving as an
active member and supporter of the city's many community service
organizations. Many of these organizations have expressed their
appreciation for his decades of dedicated service. Some of the honors
he has received are: Optimist Club of Dearborn Key Award, Dearborn
Exchange Club Distinguished Service Award, Michigan Jaycee Outstanding
Young Man of Michigan Award, Outstanding Young Man of America Award,
Rotary International Paul Harris Fellowship, Henry Ford Community
College Community Service Award, Detroit College of Business
Outstanding Community Service Award and the University of Michigan-
Dearborn Distinguished Leadership Award.
The Mayor's leadership and track record of success have contributed
to his emergence as a national leader helping to shape the public
policies affecting America's urban centers.
Mayor Guido has served as a member of the Board of Directors of the
National League of Cities (NLC) since the year 2000. In the wake of the
attacks on America of September 11, 2001, he was asked to co-chair the
NLC's Homeland Security Committee with Acting Mayor Mary Poss of
Dallas, Texas.
Mayor Guido serves as a member of the governing executive committee
of the United States Conference of Mayors, and chairs one of the
Conference's 10 standing committees (Urban Economic Policy Committee),
and the Conference's telecommunications subcommittee.
He is a past president of the Michigan Association of Mayors, and a
past president and past member of the Board of Directors of the
Michigan Municipal League (MML). For his dedicated service, the League
in 2001 awarded Mayor Guido its highest distinction by naming him an
MML Honorary Life Member. He also serves as a member of Federal
Communications Commission's Local & State Government Advisory Committee
and as a member of the Amtrak Mayors' Advisory Council.
Mayor Guido earned his Bachelor of Arts degree from Wayne State
University, and is a graduate of the Mayor's Leadership Institute at
Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. Born on July 3,
1954, he and his wife, Kari, have two sons: Michael, Jr., and Anthony.
National League of Cities Resolution #2002-41
NATIONAL STRATEGIC COUNTER-TERRORISM PLAN
WHEREAS, the terrorist attacks in America on September 11, 2001,
caused massive casualties and major damage to infrastructure critical
to national defense and the economy; and
WHEREAS, the police, firefighters, and medical services personnel
in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania responded immediately to the
attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and in Pennsylvania,
risking their lives to rescue victims and perform recovery operations;
and
WHEREAS, many cities throughout the world sent public safety
personnel to assist local first responders in the aftermath of the
attacks; and
WHEREAS, Americans have a diminished sense of security and physical
safety because of the nature of the recent attacks and subsequent
potential threats that have been identified; and
WHEREAS, terrorist activities can involve both conventional devices
and weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical, nuclear, and
biological agents or cyber terrorism that could potentially affect
numerous communities; and
WHEREAS, local governments and states do not receive the federal
funding and resources needed for domestic terrorism preparedness and
are currently seeking significant federal guidance and resources for
training, equipment, and information to properly prepare for terrorist
attacks, including nontraditional methods of rescue; and
WHEREAS, many emergency medical response systems are ill-prepared
to respond to large-scale public health emergencies resulting from
terrorist use of biological and chemical agents because of the absence
of a clear strategic national plan; and
WHEREAS, EMS and other local emergency medical response teams and
procedures are in place, but not all response personnel are trained to
identify lethal toxins or to properly treat citizens exposed to
biological agents using appropriate isolation and decontamination
equipment, and appropriate medical treatment; and
WHEREAS, our nation's defense must be coordinated among all levels
of government with proper safeguards against threats to critical
infrastructure and institutions, such as telecommunications and
information networks, banking and financial systems, power grids,
energy systems, transportation networks, water distribution systems,
medical and health systems, schools and other educational facilities
and emergency response services; and
WHEREAS, the federal government has failed to provide adequate
security for the transport of hazardous materials and weapons.
NOW, THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the National League of Cities
salutes the heroism of the first responders to the attacks on September
11, and recognizes that local officials and first responders are on the
front line of defense against terrorism and must be prepared; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the National League of Cities calls on
Congress to authorize and oversee a Cabinet-level agency, with specific
appropriations, to fully implement, in consultation and partnership
with all levels of government, a coordinated national preparedness and
response plan, ensuring:
--that prevention and mitigation are the highest priorities of our
nation's defense;
--local government will be the focal point for all disaster
mitigation and recovery activities;
--a significant increase in funding to local governments for
preparedness and response including processes to resolve equity
issues in disaster relief efforts;
--the restructuring of airport security, as stated in the NLC
Resolution on National Aviation Security;
--special resources devoted to any facilities and densely populated
areas that have the potential to be terrorist targets;
--agricultural counterterrorism and food safety efforts are
sufficiently funded;
--strict standards and enforcement for the transport of hazardous
materials and weapons;
--procedures for sharing sensitive intelligence with local
governments, as needed, without jeopardizing national security;
--the development of a comprehensive evaluation of risk factors for
potential terrorist targets;
--specialized training and resources, including rapid test methods
for public safety, health officials, and hospital personnel to
properly identify and treat any threats to public health
resulting from terrorists' use of biological, chemical, and
nuclear weapons of mass destruction;
--local and regional coordination of emergency room readiness and
response, with special response devoted to biological threats
and access to antidotes; and
--the resolution of barriers to communication both technical and
practical.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the National League of Cities calls on
the telecommunications industry to fully develop and fund wireless
emergency locater services and tracking systems, and lead efforts to
resolve interoperability problems that affect emergency communications
systems throughout the nation.
Adopted on December 8, 2001, National League of Cities' Annual
Business Meeting, Atlanta, Georgia.
Homeland Security in America's Cities and Towns
CRITICAL ISSUES, RESPONSES, AND COSTS
``. . . Since Sept. 11, cities and counties have rapidly and
somewhat awkwardly adapted. Police departments are behaving like
intelligence agencies, interviewing foreigners and surveying the
infrastructure for weaknesses that might be exploited by the enemy.
Local governments are appointing liaisons to neighboring agencies--like
diplomats who negotiate regional treaties in the event of an attack.
Hazardous material teams have become front-line soldiers, responding to
the smallest hints of bioterrorism.
``The new security and public health costs--defense budgets in
practice if not in name--are expected to total as much as $4 billion
for state governments and $3 billion for localities by the end of this
year. These obligations have left city councils and county supervisors
facing a dilemma once reserved for those in Congress: If we spend more
money on defense, where do we cut? `If you're a city or a town, you
can't wait for the federal government, you can't wait for Tom Ridge,'
says University of Wisconsin professor Donald F. Kettl, referring to
Bush's recently appointed director of homeland security. `If you're the
mayor of Appleton, you're the real Tom Ridge anyway.'
``To interview 5,000 young Middle Eastern men about terrorism, the
Justice Department relied on police departments around the country.
Security updates on city halls, courthouses, water and electric plants
are taking place. Across the nation, the cost of vigilance is mounting.
``Localities can't expect direct help from states, either. Thirty-
six states face a combined shortfall of $40 billion; a figure that the
National Governors Assn. predicts could reach $50 billion, or 10
percent of all state revenues, by early next year. That picture is far
bleaker than during the 1990 recession . . .'' (Excerpt from the Los
Angeles Times, December 27, 2001, Home Edition)
1. Cities, particularly smaller cities, report an increased
emphasis on regional approaches to homeland security--by ``regional,''
we mean increased cooperation with other cities, towns, counties, etc.,
as well as with private sector groups, nonprofits, and civic
organizations.
Silsbee, TX (pop. 6,400)
The Emergency Management team is county wide and includes about 60
people from industry, police, fire, schools, EMT, and city
representatives. It meets about every 2 months and has thus far revised
the emergency awareness handbook to include more information on
terrorist preparedness.
Jupiter, FL (pop. 39,000)
After a post office in Jupiter received a suspicious package in
October, the city decided to step up its terrorist preparedness through
cooperation with other cities, levels of government, and agencies. Fire
Department Lt. Peter Allen said, ``The fire department has been
training and preparing for events such as these for some time now. We
are working closely with surrounding departments as well as county,
state and federal agencies to maintain the highest level of
preparation.'' In addition, the city takes part in a state effort.
Fire-Rescue Chief James Weinand is Palm Beach County's representative
to Gov. Jeb Bush's Domestic Terrorism Task Force, so the department
receives constant up-to-date information on threats and suspected
terrorist activities in the state.
Foley, AL (pop. 7,600)
The agreement between the city and the U.S. Navy base within the
city has been changed to create a joint jurisdiction over the base
between the Navy and the city's police department. In the past, the
arrangement was proprietary. There has been no specific resolution that
has designated funds, but the mayor estimates that a minimum of
$100,000 has been spent for police officer overtime.
Terrell, TX (pop. 14,000)
City department heads from the administration, finance, public
works, police, fire, utility, and municipal development meet with area
entities to discuss their emergency plans of action, to make sure they
are able to work with one another in case of an emergency. In addition,
this committee plans to meet with representatives from the following
entities: Public Schools, State Hospital, County, Public Hospital, Mark
Hardin (FBO), Red Cross, Department of Public Safety, Major Industries
(Madix, Vistawall), and shelter owners to ensure sustainable
cooperation. Also, department heads are working with local entities to
ensure that they will have an ample number of supplies, as well as a
number of locations to purchase supplies in case of an emergency.
Boston, MA (pop. 589,000)
The Boston Police Bomb Squad has done security training with
businesses, hospitals, and universities encouraging them to have a plan
in place to deal with emergency situations, and to contact 911 about
any threat or perceived threat.
Los Angeles, CA (pop. 3,700,000)
The City Attorney's Office will be partnering with the Building
Owners and Management Association, Staples Center, leading public
safety officials and private sector leaders to commission a study of
security and emergency measures that are currently in place in the
city. The study will also make recommendations on safety and security
procedures for potential private sector terrorist targets in Los
Angeles.
Minneapolis, MN (pop. 383,000)
Since Sept. 11, Minneapolis has and continues to collaborate and
cooperate with federal, state and county law enforcement. Minneapolis'
Chief of Police meets regularly to share and gather new information as
it becomes available concerning the City of Minneapolis. Federal
authorities assigned to this region have been providing continuous
updates about any new information.
Bismarck, ND (pop. 56,000)
Bismarck has been the leader for the western half of the state,
assisting with outreach, assuring businesses, citizens of domestic
preparedness resources, and working with state and county emergency
managers.
Various areas:
Five Pacific Northwest states and three Canadian provinces are
putting together a joint plan for how to respond to an attack. So are
the governors of North and South Carolina.
2. Cities and city officials are taking on roles they haven't
played before, such as appointing ``homeland security officers'' in
their city to coordinate security efforts. Some are assisting the
Justice Department in the interviewing of individuals who may pose a
risk, while others are increasing security at the U.S. borders with
Mexico and Canada.
Appleton, WI (pop. 70,000)
Before Sept. 11, Appleton's police Lt. Rudy Nyman had served as
``operations coordinator.'' He supervised traffic and towing, ran a
``crime prevention through environmental design'' initiative and
organized special events, including the Largest Flag Day Parade in
America. But in early October, he was told to form plans for defending
Appleton from terrorist attack. The mayor now introduces Nyman as
``chief of homeland security.'' Nyman's first task was defining
potential targets. He worked his way past the obvious targets, such as
large gathering places, and gradually added railroad facilities,
highways and most government buildings. So far the list has more than
100 sites.
Chula Vista, CA (pop. 174,000)
The city immediately heightened security at the Mexican border.
Jupiter, FL (pop. 39,000)
Plain-clothed officers have been ordered to wear their uniforms and
drive marked cars to increase visibility on the streets. The sheriff's
office is also restructuring the tactical and special weapons units to
deal with the increased terrorist threat, including the creation of two
10-member emergency response teams. The new teams will be on duty seven
days a week to respond to emergencies.
Arlington, TX (pop. 333,000)
In Fort Worth, police have conducted assessments of all department
buildings. Arlington's police and fire departments are in the process
of conducting inspections of some 150 city-owned structures and
buildings. Arlington Police Deputy Chief Michael Ikner, who is
overseeing the project, said patrol sergeants have been charged with
the task of assessing facilities in their beats. He said the project
will take several weeks to complete. A cost estimate is not yet
available.
3. There is a need for additional training for all cities. Larger
cities seem to have already had some form of anti-terrorism training,
usually through FEMA (see San Jose report below). However, the smaller
cities report that they have not had this type of training and it is
too costly for them to obtain on their own. For smaller cities, most of
the additional public safety costs are coming in the form of overtime
for police and fire personnel. This is true for larger cities, however
many of them are also reporting increases/improvements in
infrastructure and/or equipment.
San Jose, CA (pop. 895,000)
As one of the nation's 27 largest cities, San Jose was approached
in 1997 to take part in a federal preparedness program. Receiving
federal funds and classified intelligence information on credible
terrorist threat scenarios, the city was asked to devise a response
plan to everything from anthrax attacks on bridges and water systems.
Under the guidance of Frances Edwards-Winslow, Director, Office of
Emergency Services, San Jose was the first city to complete the
Pentagon's training program for terrorism preparedness in 1998 and
fully coordinate community emergency services. The federal government
has presented San Jose's terrorism response plan as a national model
for 120 other cities designing similar civil defense protocols. Listed
on several secure federal Web sites, the plan has inspired scores of
calls from areas that want to emulate San Jose. This program cost $1.4
million in federal funds and millions more from of its own funds.
Orlando, FL (pop. 186,000)
The City Council approved a $2.5 million installment on the city's
security plan that includes funding for its new Urban Search and Rescue
truck, equipment and team.
Tempe, AZ (pop. 159,000)
The city has concentrated on enhancing security measures such as
increasing security personnel, installing advanced security alarms,
improving communication strategies in the case of an emergency plan and
developing new mail handling procedures. The estimated cost of these
changes is approximately $200,000. Additionally, enhanced security
measures are taken at all public events at a cost of approximately
$50,000 per event.
Arlington, VA (pop. 190,000)
The county board has appropriated $280,000 to the Arlington Fire
and Police Departments for the purchase of chemical, biological and
radiological detection and decontamination equipment.
Foley, AL (pop. 7,600)
The agreement between the city and the U.S. Navy base within the
city has been changed to create a joint jurisdiction over the base
between the Navy and the city's police department. In the past, the
arrangement was proprietary. There has been no specific resolution that
has designated funds, but the mayor estimates that a minimum of
$100,000 has been spent for police officer overtime.
4. To the extent that the federal government steps in to help fund
increased security measures in cities, city officials are stressing
that this support needs to be an ongoing, dedicated stream of money--
not a 2-year or 3-year federal program that cities are later expected
support through their existing tax bases.
Silsbee, TX (pop. 6,400)
The small population of this city tax contributions do not allow an
adequate tax base for heavy expenditures on security preparedness.
Mayor Dean Robinson noted too that it is important to keep in mind that
even if federal programs were allocated to small cities, their tax base
would not allow for maintenance of these programs without continued
federal support.
5. Cities are heavily involved in increasing their hazardous
materials preparations, largely as a result of the anthrax scare.
Examples of cities dealing with drastically increased numbers of
``suspicious white powder'' threats are common, and the costs of
dealing with these threats can be large. Cities also report increases
costs of obtaining the protective suits for dealing with biohazards,
which can also be quite expensive.
Various cities
For years, about the only new expense on city and county public
safety budgets was for police cars and fire engines. Since the
terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, a new but necessary item has appeared:
biohazard suits. Local governments are expected to foot the bill for
their biohazard suits. The suits can range from as little as $60 to $70
for used suits, to top-of-the-line models ranging from $500, to more
than $2,000 each for high-tech suits with a special breathing
apparatus.
Los Angeles, CA (pop. 3,700,000)
City council adopted legislation suggested by its Threat
Preparedness Task Force to improve its' anti-terrorism readiness. Some
of the new developments include:
--Purchase of 1,700 emergency masks for the LAPD and 1,300 for the
LAFD and four additional bomb detection technicians and canines
for the LAPD's Bomb Squad at a cost of $1 million.
--The permanent assignment of LAPD and LAFD representatives to the
L.A. County Operational Area Terrorism Early Warning Group
(TEW).
--Additional 516 Hazmat suits and equipment for the LAPD, including
bio-detection equipment costing $351,000 to increase hazardous
materials detection capabilities by the LAPD and LAFD.
--Motion (not approved to date) for $2.3 million to expand the LAFD's
urban search and rescue unit by 12 people and hire 10 more
security officers.
--Motion (not approved to date) for $140,000 for four vehicles for
the LAPD's hazmat unit.
Appleton, WI (pop. 70,000)
With federal officials urging citizens to call 911 when anthrax
contamination is suspected, area police officers and sheriffs have
collected as many as 30 bags of suspicious powder a week and sent them
to a state lab for testing. Cost to taxpayers? $1,000 per bag.
Riverdale, GA (pop. 12,000)
In addition to the purchase of biohazard suits, city fire officials
said they faced an added cost of acquiring a storage trailer for them.
The two suits on order are $1,200 each, but an additional $7,000 was
part of the bill to securely and safely store the suits.
Fayette County, GA (part of Atlanta metro area)
A potential threat at a local post office resulted in the team's
spending about $3,000 to determine no threat existed. Afterward, the
team spent several weeks responding to an average of a half-dozen
similar calls a week. The county has some disposable biohazard suits
costing around $600 each.
Durham, NC (pop. 187,000)
In late October Durham voted to use federal grant money on new
police equipment, namely bioterrorism suits, as opposed to adding
additional police officers. The grant will provide almost $100,000 for
96 biohazard suits and 280 state-of-the-art gas masks. The grant will
also allow for over $150,000 in crime prevention equipment and $1
million to buy land for a substation and other police operations.
Columbus, OH (pop. 711,000)
The city has already spent $320,000 in overtime related to calls
for anthrax scares and reports of suspicious packages.
Jupiter, FL (pop. 39,000)
The Jupiter Town Council approved $12,500 to be spent on 98
helmets, gas masks and protective shields for officers who might have
to respond to the scene of an attack.
6. Some cities, particularly the larger cities, report that they
have conducted or are engaged in public education efforts about how to
deal with terrorist threats and emergencies. Examples include the use
of city websites to distribute information and campaigns to distribute
leaflets/pamphlets with directions for how to react in the case of an
emergency.
Arlington, VA (pop. 190,000)
Soon after the terrorist attacks, the county organized a community
forum on emergency preparedness and bioterrorism in which county
officials met with the public to answer questions about public safety,
health, schools and other topics. They also provided a twelve-page home
guide to emergency preparedness in seven languages which can be
accessed on their website.
Boston, MA (pop. 589,000), Denver, CO (pop. 555,000), and Minneapolis,
MN (pop. 383,000)
Cities that have made educational pamphlets, useful emergency
links, fact sheets, etc. available their website.
Olympia, WA (pop. 43,000)
The city website was restructured to allow people to gain easy
access to information pertaining to security and community
preparedness. In addition, a pamphlet about mail handling was
distributed to all homeowner associations (approx. 40) and all downtown
business associations (approx. 120) to then copy and distribute to
their clientele. The cost associated with this activity included
payment for staff time and mailing expenditures. People of the city
interested in further information could also attend a community
preparedness class. All city employees received a mail handling class.
7. Many cities mentioned stepping up security around airports,
water and electric supplies, and in some cases, nuclear power plants.
Various cities also mentioned stepped up security measures around port
facilities.
Manitowoc County, WI (city of Manitowoc pop. 34,000)
The sheriff's office is spending $2,000 a day in overtime to
provide 24-hour protection for the Point Beach nuclear power plant.
Watertown, SD (pop. 20,000)
The city immediately moved to protect its water facilities, which
include a water filtration plant and a 6,000-acre lake. In an effort to
prevent water contamination, the city will most likely will turn to a
regional approach of water testing, working with the state to
centralize the testing process and procedures, and coordinating this
effort among local governments.
Bismarck, ND (pop. 56,000) and Hickory, NC (pop. 37,000)
Insured and/or increased water supply security.
Carlisle Borough, PA (pop. 18,000)
Implemented a very detailed security plan for their water plant
which ultimately will cost the rate payers a substantial sum in order
to fully realize.
Fort Lauderdale, FL (pop. 152,000)
In addition to enhanced security at city buildings, the city
secured their water treatment plants, water tanks and well fields,
wastewater treatment facilities, and executive/general aviation
airport. The total estimate for the period of Sept. 11-Nov. 20,
including these measures and others was almost $327,000.
Worcester, MA (pop. 173,000)
City Manager Thomas Hoover stated that the cost of increased
security at Worcester Regional Airport since September 11 has been
averaging $30,000 to $35,000 per week. Police patrols were increased
around and near what were determined to be high-risk targets, such as
high-rise buildings, public utilities, the Worcester Centrum Centre and
other facilities that draw crowds, and religious institutions. Police
has watched the Muslim mosque on Laurel Street and businesses owned by
Arab-Americans closely, the city manager said. Total costs for new
security measures are not yet available.
Kodiak, AK (pop. 6,000), Fort Lauderdale, FL (pop. 152,000), Savannah,
GA (pop. 132,000) and Portland, ME (pop. 64,000)
Increased security at port facilities.
Terrell, TX (pop. 14,000)
The city has established a comprehensive plan of action since the
events of September 11. Included are provisions for increased
protection at water plants. At City Lake Pump Station at Elmo these
include: (1) Three locked gates along drive to plant; (2) Buildings
remain locked at all times; (3) Intruder alarm monitored by Water Plant
computer; (4) Radio telemetry used to operate pumps and to show pump
station status and; (5) Radio communication link continuously monitored
by Water Plant computer.
8. In addition to looking at overall safety concerns, many cities
have concentrated on the response of health specialists in the case of
an emergency, as well as the planning and coordination of medical
supplies and equipment.
Allentown, PA (pop. 107,000)
If Allentown is the site of a bioterrorism attack, city health
officials said, a small army will receive and distribute a shipment of
medical supplies that could protect and treat about 375,000 people. The
shipment, known as a ``push pack,'' is part of the National
Pharmaceutical Stockpile, which provides antibiotics, antidotes,
intravenous lines, ventilators and vaccines to disaster sites anywhere
in the nation within 12 hours.
Each push pack is more than 100 containers regularly restocked by
the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta.
Collectively, they weigh more than 50 tons, consume more than 5,000
square feet of floor space and hold supplies valued at more than $3
million. For security reasons, the eight stockpile locations and
designated receiving areas are not disclosed, he said, but the
emergency management people who need to respond know where they are. It
is estimated that the more than 200 sites within the county will be
sufficient to serve as mass casualty sites. These would include
schools, community halls and churches, in which to break down and
dispense medical supplies to those exposed but not sick.
9. Some cities are encountering new expenditures and pursuing new
ways of raising revenues.
Vancouver, WA (pop. 144,000)
The Vancouver city council met with representatives from the
Southwest Washington Health District, which resulted in a proposal of a
$127,000 program to improve detection, response and communication in
the event of a future terrorist attack involving anthrax, smallpox or
other infectious agent. The health district has asked Vancouver to
provide $50,879, or 40 percent of the cost. The Southwest Washington
Medical Center board of trustees voted to provide $127,000 to cover
first-year expenses, so Vancouver will consider providing dollars
beginning in 2003.
Columbus, OH (pop. 711,000)
The City Council is expected to approve a smaller budget than the
previous year for the first time in memory and will only be providing
an increase to the Department of Public Safety. All others will be cut,
says Mayor Michael Coleman. Coleman said Columbus plans to spend $1.5
million for additional security in city buildings, plus training people
in workplace safety, preparing for public-health emergencies, updating
response plans in city buildings and holding drills with schools and
hospitals and other communities. Also in the safety budget will be two
new police classes with 80 officers and a class of 25 firefighters.
The city also will buy a police helicopter for $1.1 million,
replacing an old one. It will spend $848,000 on a radio system to
ensure that Columbus police and firefighters are on the same frequency
and are able to communicate not only with each other, but with more
than 100 other emergency and government agencies, including suburban
communities and the Franklin County Sheriff's Office, said Assistant
Public Safety Director Barb Seckler. Health Commissioner William C.
Myers said the Metropolitan Medical Response System has stocked up on
antibiotics in case of a biological attack. That includes Cipro in case
anthrax is detected. He also said six trailers have been positioned
throughout the county to decontaminate people in a biological or
chemical attack.
Kansas City, MO (pop. 442,000)
Two ordinances were introduced that would ask Kansas City voters in
February for a quarter-cent sales tax increase for police and a 5-cent-
per-pack cigarette tax increase for bioterrorism response. If approved,
the proposal would raise about $276 million to upgrade police
facilities and hire 130 to 150 additional officers. However, the plan
wouldn't raise all the $110.8 million police were seeking for building;
it would generate $85 million to $90 million for capital improvements.
The cigarette tax ordinance, introduced by Councilman Ed Ford, would
raise about $1.5 million annually for the Fire Department's hazardous
materials team and for other emergency preparedness activities. The
quarter-cent sales tax increase would cost a family of four with an
annual income of $50,000 about $30 a year. The cigarette tax would rise
from 10 cents per pack to 15 cents per pack.
Seattle, WA (pop. 563,000)
Seattle police Chief Gil Kerlikowske said that since Sept. 11, his
department has identified several measures needed to beef up his
agency's domestic security preparedness, including the purchase of
bomb-sniffing dogs.
To cover such costs, King County Executive Ron Sims proposed a one-
time, 1.2 percent property tax increase as part of his 2002 budget
plan. The revenues would help to create a reserve fund to cover
countywide domestic-security costs, such as unexpected police, court,
jail and public-health costs arising from the international situation.
The monies would also help pay salaries of county employees in the
military reserves who are called to active duty. Property taxes would
increase between $3 and $4 per $100,000 of assessed value.
However, the proposal was blocked by a voter-approved initiative
barring governments from increasing base property-tax collections by
more than 1 percent a year unless voters approve more.
On the bright side, the county's council did agree to spend
$162,000 to hire a consultant and a one-year city employee who will
study the city's preparedness for emergencies and recommend changes.
Sims plans to revisit domestic-security funding issues early next
year, and will likely try to redirect money from other programs or win
federal grants. In the meantime, financing domestic security will mean
reprioritizing existing resources. About $450,000 for gas masks,
biohazard moon suits and other equipment and training was included in
the budget however with slipping tax revenues and a troubled economy,
difficult choices are being made.
Sources:
Allentown, PA: The Morning Call (Allentown), January 4, 2002,
Second Edition.
Appleton, WI: Los Angeles Times, December 27, 2001, Home Edition.
Arlington, TX: Fort Worth Star Telegram, October 23, 2001.
Arlington, VA: http://www.co.arlington.va.us.
Bismarck, ND: The Bismarck Tribune, December 23, 2001, METRO
EDITION.
Boston, MA: http://www.cityofboston.gov.
Brusly, LA: Mr. Joey Normand, Mayor.
Columbus, OH: The Columbus Dispatch, November 13, 2001.
Denver, CO: http://www.denvergov.org.
Durham, NC: The Herald Sun, October 30, 2001.
Foley, AL: Mr. Tim Russel, Mayor.
Fort Lauderdale, FL: Mr. Al Ortenzo, Assistant Chief of Police.
Jupiter, FL: The Jupiter Courier, October 28, 2001.
Kansas, MO: Kansas City Star, November 9, 2001.
Los Angeles, CA: Los Angeles Times, November 7, 2001.
Los Angeles, CA: http://www.lacity.org.
Minneapolis, MN: http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us.
Olympia, WA: Mr. Greg Wright, Emergency Management.
Orlando, FL: http://www.cityoforlando.net.
Riverdale, GA: The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, December 26,
2001, Home Edition.
San Jose, CA: Los Angeles Time, November 4, 2001.
Seattle, WA: The Seattle Post-Intelligencer, November 24, 2001,
Final Edition, The Seattle Times Company, November 21, 2000, Fourth
Edition, and November 14, 2001, Fourth Edition.
Silsbee, TX: Mr. Dean Robinson, Mayo.
Tempe, AZ: Mr. Patrick Flynn, Assistant City Manager.
Terrell, TX: Ms. Raylan Baker, Executive Secretary, Office of the
City Manager.
Vancouver, WA: The Columbian, October 23, 2001.
Worcester, MA: Telegram & Gazette, October 25, 2001.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Mayor Guido.
Commissioner Gonzalez.
Senator Domenici. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Byrd. The Senator from New Mexico.
Senator Domenici. Might I just introduce the speaker?
Chairman Byrd. Please do that, yes.
Senator Domenici. Mr. Chairman and fellow Senators, this is
Javier Gonzales from the City of Santa Fe. It would be enough
to have that behind his name. We would welcome him. But in
addition, the county commissioners of our country have elected
him as their chairman of all the county commissioners in the
United States.
That is a pretty robust group over the last 15 or 20 years.
They have had to do more and more work that looks and feels
like being a city, and we have a good county that works with
the city. We have a pretty good arrangement in these United
States, and I was just so pleased that he got a chance to get
up here that I wanted to introduce all of you to this very,
very successful young man in a city where it is very difficult
to be a successful politician. He seems to thrive in it, and I
am sure he will represent the county commissioners well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you. Commissioner, you are in the
front seat in the front row now, with that kind of an
introduction.
Senator Domenici. I noticed Mayor Guido did have the
agendas attached to his statement. Would you place those in the
record, too, please?
Chairman Byrd. Yes, indeed. They will be placed in the
record.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAVIER GONZALES, COMMISSIONER, SANTA
FE COUNTY, NEW MEXICO; AND PRESIDENT,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES
Mr. Gonzales. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your kind words
about our community. Member Stevens, I, too, had the privilege
of touring your State with my peers. We toured the Alaska
National Wildlife Refuge in Prudhoe Bay, and your State is
beautiful, and Senator Domenici, thank you for your enormous
contribution to our State as a citizen in New Mexico, I will
forever be grateful for what you have done and certainly what
you will do for us in the future, so thank you.
Thank you for inviting me, Mr. Chairman, to testify on an
issue of paramount importance to counties across the country,
securing our homeland against the threat of terrorism.
As you are aware, counties are first responders to
terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other major
emergencies. County public health, law enforcement, fire, and
emergency management personnel have major responsibilities for
planning preparedness, response and recovery actions. Counties
also own, operate, and security key aspects of the Nation's
infrastructure such as airports, transit systems, water
supplies, courts, schools, and hospitals. Elected county
officials like myself, along with our emergency managers,
provide the essential regional leadership, planning, and
coordination function in preventing, preparing for, and
managing our community's response to emergency events.
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 7
months ago today, I appointed a NACO Task Force on Homeland
Security. The task force, comprised of 45 top county officials
from across the country, was formed to provide a forum for
county officials to advise the Federal Government about the
roles and concerns and financial needs of counties regarding
homeland security as we increase prevention and security
measures in our communities. NACO's task force met three times,
and I would like to share the problem statements and policy
recommendations from those meetings with you as summarized in
an eight-page publication, First Responders Counties Secure
America, which, Mr. Chairman, I offer for the record.
Let us discuss public health. In the public health area,
there are two major problems, the need to rebuild critical
elements of our Nation's public health system, and the
restoration of the State-local infrastructure. County officials
are calling on the Congress to provide adequate funding for
bioterrorism preparedness, and to provide a modest down-payment
in restoring essential elements of the Nation's public health
system. NACO believes that an appropriation of a minimum of
$1.8 billion is needed to implement the law fully and
effectively, with at least $940 million dedicated to rebuilding
and maintaining local and State public health infrastructures,
including increasing the capacity of local public health
departments to respond to disease outbreaks, including
bioterrorism events.
State and local plans are due April 15, and Mr. Chairman, I
can report to date, based on information NACO has received from
our affiliate organization, the National Association of County
and City Health Officials, that the record of collaboration
between States and counties is mixed, adding to the need for a
strong local public health capacity. After we review the State
plans, we will have a much clearer sense of the extent States
will be addressing local needs, particularly sustainable
staffing and training at the local level.
Now, as regional governments, counties are in the unique
position to provide the leadership, planning, and coordination
function needed to prevent, prepare for, and manage the
response to bioterrorism events. NACO recently conducted a
survey of county health departments, and the results of that
survey show that less than 10 percent--less than 10 percent--of
the county health departments in the country are fully prepared
to respond to a bioterrorism crisis in their communities. Of
the counties with populations about 250,000, none said that
they are fully prepared, 21 percent of the counties say that
they are not prepared at all to handle a bioterrorism crisis at
all.
Most of the counties in this category are the small, rural
counties. For a chemical warfare crisis, only 5 percent say
they are fully prepared, and 43 percent say they are not
prepared at all. County public health departments have had
considerable experience in responding to infectious disease
outbreaks, but we have a long way to go in terms of developing
the capacities we need to detect and respond to acts of
bioterrorism accurately and quickly, yet every dollar we spend
on bioterrorism will yield huge dividends in terms of
strengthening the communities' public health system in such
critical areas of surveillance, communications, data
management, and in creating systems for mobilizing the
community.
I would now like to discuss a local antiterrorism block
grant. NACO's Task Force on Homeland Security called on the
Congress to enact a $3.5 billion local antiterrorism block
grant. Under the task force's recommendations, Mr. Chairman,
the funds should flow directly, as stated previously, from the
Federal Government to local governments, with funding and
priority decisions being made using a county-facilitated
collaborative effort within the existing all-hazards emergency
management planning process.
NACO's concept of the block grant would enable local
governments to enhance regional planning and coordination by
preventing, preparing for, and managing an area-wide response
to terrorism. The block grant should enable counties to greatly
expand the implementation of emergency management plans,
improve capacity to respond to a whole range of emergencies,
fight fires, increase law enforcement intelligence of terrorist
activities, and raise security levels for key local facilities.
Counties are, by their nature, regional governments, and
are often engaged in county-wide and multicounty solutions. In
fashioning highly specialized responses to terrorist
activities, multicounty plans, teams, and interagency
agreements need to be developed and implemented. Thousands of
municipalities already contract with their county for a variety
of regionalized services, and look to the county for leadership
in expanding emergency capacities.
In placing greater responsibility in FEMA, President Bush
has proposed to spend $3.5 billion in fiscal year 2003 to
dramatically enhance the homeland security response
capabilities of America's first responders. The
administration's plan will provide $2 billion to State and
local governments to pool resources and equipment to prevent a
terrorist attack.
In addition to committing $2 billion for equipment, the
White House plan would allocate approximately $1.1 billion to
train firefighters, police officers, and emergency medical
technicians to respond and operate in a chemical or biological
environment. It would also designate about $245 million to
support a coordinated, regular exercise program to improve
response capabilities, practice mutual aid, and assess
operational improvements and efficiencies.
The White House strategy is similar to NACO's approach in
that it places major emphasis on elevating the existing
emergency management system and in connecting comprehensive
planning to funding levels. We are pleased to see that the
supplemental appropriations bill has requested $327 million for
planning and management, and that Governor Ridge has requested
the plans before funding decisions are made. Without
sophisticated planning and management systems to provide the
foundation for the wise expenditure of block funds, how can we
intelligently purchase equipment or adequately train emergency
management personnel?
At the heart of this new system of regional collaboration
is the need for highly sophisticated planning and management
building upon the existing integrated emergency management
system. It has been conservatively estimated that it would take
an investment of $500 million at a minimum to staff and develop
the kind of advance planning and management systems that is
required. The supplemental request of $327 million is a good
first start, but more is needed.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, NACO believes that an
appropriation of a minimum of $1.8 billion is needed to improve
our public health system, with at least $940 million dedicated
to building and maintaining local and State public health
infrastructures, and it needs to be a continuing funding
priority in the out-years. We also need a local antiterrorism
block grant along the lines of the President's $3.5 billion
first responders initiative to meet the long-term needs of
local and State governments. This should be a priority.
Mr. Chairman, prevention must be a key objective. NACO's
Task Force on Homeland Security has called for the creation of
a new and highly sophisticated planning and management system
at the city, county, and multicounty level to strengthen the
existing IEMS system, which has been poorly funded for years.
This is why we call for an additional $500 million for this
effort.
Let me leave you with these important thoughts. Mr.
Chairman, we are pleased that local governments will be full
participants in supporting our homeland security, but I want to
draw your attention to some concerns local governments have
experienced in the past. It is critical that funding provided
by this committee get to intended recipients as soon as
possible. The Office of Homeland Security has suggested that 75
percent of the money proposed in the first responders
initiative go to local governments. This is appropriate, and we
believe that FEMA has the knowledge and expertise to give
funding to the local governments in a timely fashion so that it
can be used in the most flexible manner possible for the
purposes intended. That is, of course, if the States do not
intervene by delaying their decisionmaking responsibilities,
attempt to use the funding for purposes other than those
intended by appropriators, or attempt to leverage some of the
funds for their own purposes. It must be made clear through
this process that funds appropriated for homeland security at
the local level are not considered offsets for other existing
commitments from the States to local governments, such as
revenue-sharing.
I only mention this, Mr. Chairman, because of the dire
budget situations in many States, and I certainly am not
pointing the finger at any State in particular, but these types
of situations have occurred in the past.
I hope we have been able to offer the committee some
important information about local government needs for homeland
security. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Javier Gonzales
Chairman Byrd, Ranking Member Stevens and members of the committee,
thank you for inviting me to testify on an issue of paramount
importance to counties across the country--securing our homeland
against the threat of terrorism.
My name is Javier Gonzales, and I am an elected County Commissioner
from Santa Fe County, New Mexico. I currently serve as President of the
National Association of Counties.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ NACo is the only national organization representing county
government in the United States. Through its membership, urban,
suburban and rural counties join together to build effective,
responsive county government. The goals of the organization are to:
improve county government; serve as the national spokesman for county
government; serve as a liaison between the nation's counties and other
levels of government; achieve public understanding of the role of
counties in the federal system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As you are now surely aware, counties are the first responders to
terrorist attacks, natural disasters and other major emergencies.
County public health, law enforcement, fire, and emergency management
personnel are responsible for on-the-ground response and recovery
action.
Counties also own, operate and secure key aspects of the nation's
infrastructure, such as airports, transit systems, water supplies,
ports, schools and hospitals. Elected county officials, like myself,
along with our emergency managers, provide the essential regional
leadership, planning and coordination function in preventing, preparing
for and managing our communities' response to emergency events.
What are the problems?
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, seven months
ago today, I appointed a NACo Task Force on Homeland Security. The task
force, comprised of 45 top county officials from across the country,
was formed to provide a forum for county officials to advise the
federal government about the roles and concerns and financial needs of
counties regarding homeland security as we increase--prevention and
security measures in our communities.
NACo's task force met three times and I would like to share the
problem statements and policy recommendations from those meetings with
you as summarized in the 8-page publication--``First Responders:
Counties Secure America'', which I offer for the record.
Public Health
Let me highlight our major problems and recommendations. In the
public health area, there are two major problems: The need to rebuild
critical elements of our nation's public health system; and the
restoration of the state-local infrastructure.
County officials are calling on the Congress to provide adequate
funding for the bioterrorism preparedness and provide a modest down
payment in restoring essential elements of the nation's public health
system. NACo believes that an appropriation of a minimum of $1.8
billion is needed to implement the law fully and effectively, with at
least $940 million dedicated to building and maintaining local and
state public health infrastructures, including increasing the capacity
of local public health departments to respond to disease outbreaks,
including bio-terrorism events.
The second point relates to information dissemination via the
Health Alert Network. NACo believes that the Centers for Disease
Control-Public Health Practice Program--the CDC office that best
understands local dynamics, should continue to coordinate and
communicate with county health departments, and that there should be a
focus on improving the Health Alert Network and on assistance with
technological upgrades for county health departments.
The President's budget for fiscal year 2003 includes $940 million
to continue the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
program to improve state and local public health capacities to address
bio-terrorism and other public health threats. This program, which
builds on prior years' funding for the Health Alert Network and bio-
terrorism preparedness, was vastly increased when Congress added $865
million to it last December. Continuation funding is essential to allow
state and local public health agencies to establish permanently
improved public health systems and infrastructures, including new staff
and training.
Importantly, the funding levels established in fiscal year 2003 for
this program will weigh heavily on the potential for future funding.
Continued, sustained funding will help establish this program as a
permanent aspect of the federal budget, rather than a one-time quick
fix.
The $940 million is a very modest down payment on what needs to be
a sustained long-term effort. It will also enable us to carefully
assess long-term needs.
State and local plans are due April 15. Mr. Chairman, I can report
today based on information NACo has received from our affiliate
organization, the National Association of County and City Health
Officials, that the record of collaboration between states and counties
is mixed--adding to the need for a strong local public health capacity.
After we review the state plans we will have a much clearer sense of
the extent states will be addressing local needs, particularly
sustainable staffing and training at the local level.
As regional governments, counties are in the unique position to
provide the leadership, planning and coordination function needed to
prevent, prepare for and manage the response to bio-terrorism events.
NACo recently conducted a survey of county health departments. The
results of that survey show that less than 10 percent of the county
health departments in the country are fully prepared to respond to a
bio-terrorism crisis in their communities. Of the counties with
populations above 250,000, none said they are fully prepared.
Twenty-one percent of the counties say they are not prepared at all
to handle a bio-terrorism crisis. Most of the counties in this category
are the small, rural counties.
For a chemical warfare crisis, only 5 percent say they are fully
prepared and 43 percent say they are not prepared at all.
The greatest obstacle to becoming prepared is funding. Forty-two
percent listed funding as the greatest problem that would prevent an
appropriate and timely response. Insufficiently trained medical staff
and insufficiently trained administrative staff, both at 40 percent,
followed funding as other obstacles. A conversation with a county
health director in Iowa, who participated in the survey, reveals how
drastic the situation is. He has no staff. He has no funds. And he has
no supplies.
The health director was asked to come up with an emergency response
plan. If he were faced with a major public health incident, he said,
his three-point plan would go something like this. Call for help. Hope
someone comes. Stack the bodies in the gymnasium.
County public health departments have had considerable experience
in responding to infectious disease outbreaks but we have a long way to
go in terms of developing the capacities we need to detect and respond
to acts of bio-terrorism as quickly as possible.
Yet every dollar we spend on bio-terrorism will yield huge
dividends in terms of strengthening the community's public health
system in such critical areas as surveillance, communications, data
management and in creating systems for mobilizing the community.
Justice Appropriations
In the Justice Department budget proposal for fiscal year 2003, the
Administration has called for the elimination of the State Criminal
Alien Assistance Program ($565 million) proposed the consolidation of
the Byrne Memorial Block Grant with the Local Law Enforcement Block
Grant (for a cut of $195 million in funds) as well as the complete
elimination of the hiring section of the COPS program ($574 million).
Mr. Chairman, the merit and timing of these proposed eliminations
and funding cutbacks which total close to $1.5 billion is a concern to
NACo and its membership, given the sharp rise in county spending since
September 11. This increase in expenditures is the direct result of the
heightened state of readiness that local public safety agencies have
been required to maintain.
Mr. Chairman, as of December 18, 2001, California State Association
of Counties were projecting additional expenditures of $91.5 million
for anti-terrorism by the end of the current fiscal year. In addition,
the California survey projected additional funding needs of $310
million for one-time expenditures and an additional $209 million to
meet additional annual funding needs.
Unmet Needs
The Need for a Local Anti-Terrorism Block Grant
NACo's Task Force on Homeland Security called on Congress to enact
a $3.5 billion local anti-terrorism block grant. Under the task forces
recommendations the ``funds should flow directly from the federal
government to local governments, with funding and priority decisions
being made using a county facilitated collaborative effort within the
existing ``all hazards'' emergency management planning process.''
NACo's concept of the block grant would enable local governments to
enhance regional planning and coordination by preventing, preparing for
and managing an area-wide response to terrorism. The block grant should
enable counties to greatly expand the implementation of emergency
management plans, improve capacity to respond to a whole range of
emergencies, fight fires, increase law enforcement intelligence of
terrorist activities, and raise security levels for key local
facilities. A NACo survey conducted late last year showed that 94
percent of all counties have emergency plans to deal with disasters,
but that only 49 percent have plans in place to deal with terrorist
activities.
Counties are, by their nature, regional governments, and are often
engaged in countywide and multi-county solutions. In fashioning highly
specialized responses to terrorism activities, multi-county plans,
teams and interagency agreements need to be developed and implemented.
Thousands of municipalities already contract with their county for a
variety of regionalized services, and look to the county for leadership
in expanding emergency capacities.
In placing greater responsibility in FEMA, President Bush has
proposed to spend $3.5 billion in fiscal year 2003 to dramatically
enhance the Homeland Security response capabilities of America's first
responders. The Administration's plan would provide $2 billion to state
and local governments to pool resources and equipment to prevent a
terrorist attack.
In addition to committing $2 billion for equipment, the White House
plan would allocate approximately $1.1 billion to train firefighters,
police officers and emergency medical technicians to respond and
operate in a chemical or biological environment. It would also
designate about 245 million to support a coordinated, regular exercise
program to improve response capabilities, practice mutual aid, and
assess operational improvements and deficiencies.
The White House strategy is similar to NACo's approach in that it
places major emphasis on elevating the existing emergency management
system and in connecting comprehensive planning to funding levels. We
were pleased to see that the supplemental appropriations bill has
requested $327 million for planning and management and that Governor
Ridge has requested the plans before funding decisions are made.
Without sophisticated planning and management systems to provide
the foundation for the wise expenditure of block grant funds, how can
we intelligently purchase equipment or adequately train emergency
management personnel.
Transportation
The President's budget requested $4.8 billion for the new
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in fiscal year 2003. Of
this amount, $2.2 billion is estimated to be derived from the new
aviation security fees; $124 million is to be transferred from the FAA
for explosives detection systems; and $2.5 billion is to be
appropriated from the general fund. The Department of Transportation is
still developing detailed cost estimates for the TSA. However, it is
becoming clear that additional funds will likely be required in fiscal
year 2002 and the Department of Transportation at a hearing before
Congress recently requested the same.
NACo strongly supports TSA and we urge this agency to begin a
dialogue with county officials who are responsible for the various
transportation modes. In addition, we would continue to encourage that
all efforts are made to ensure that security needs are met and that
coordination is taking place with local transportation and law
enforcement officials.
Airports
Mr. Chairman, the Airport Improvement Program (AIP) must be fully
funded for fiscal year 2003. NACo supports increasing the AIP to its
authorized funding level of $3.4 billion as the first step in bridging
the investment gap confronting our nation's airports. The AIP Program
should continue to permit security related cost as an eligible
expenditure.
Also, NACo urges Congress to not just focus on our large
metropolitan airports when considering enhanced airport security. Many
of the smaller airports in our communities need to be reviewed in
regard to their capacity to effectively and safely operate as well.
Ports and Highways
Finally, many counties also have a direct role in managing our
nation's ports and highways. As a result, NACo would also urge the
federal government to assist us in our efforts to secure these modes of
transportation as well. With more than 25,000 miles of navigable
channels and over 350 ports, our Nation's maritime system presents one
of our greatest security challenges.
Additional Responsibilities
The critical job facing counties now is to prepare, prevent and
minimize. They must prepare emergency response plans, work with other
levels of government to prevent future attacks and develop methods for
minimizing the effects of new attacks.
Mr. Chairman, for many years, thousands of municipalities have
contracted with counties for specialized and regionalized services,
including such preventative purposes as DNA testing, regional
laboratories, advanced law enforcement training, record keeping,
communications, regional intelligence systems and the like. The events
of September 11 have demonstrated the importance of regional
collaboration in preventing terrorist attacks.
At the heart of this new system of regional collaboration is the
need for highly sophisticated planning and management building upon the
existing Integrated Emergency Management System.
It has been conservatively estimated that it would take an
investment of $500 million at a minimum to staff and develop the kind
of advanced planning and management systems that is required. The
Supplemental request of $327 is a good first start. But more is needed.
To quote the International Association of Emergency Managers,
``Principles of a National Homeland Security Program''
``Regrettably, while this system [IEMS] represents the single best
capability for implementation of a national homeland security strategy
at all levels of government, the state and local element of that system
has been significantly under-funded for decades.
``Funding programs such as FEMA's State and Local Assistance (SLA)
and Emergency Management Assistance (EMA) programs have consistently
only been available to a minority of the agencies needing support and
have only been funded at a fraction of the authorized amount. As a
result, local agencies are consistently understaffed (often part-time
or even volunteer positions). They are often buried deep in the
organizational structure of local governments, which make it difficult
for them to accomplish jurisdiction-wide coordination and planning.
Their function is often not understood by senior local officials and is
often confused with that of emergency response agencies, making it
virtually impossible to gain the support necessary to provide a full
service, integrated program.''
Summary
First, NACo believes that an appropriation of a minimum of $1.8
billion is needed to improve our public health system, with at least
$940 million dedicated to building and maintaining local and state
public health infrastructures, including increasing the capacity of
local public health departments to respond to disease outbreaks,
including bio-terrorism events.
Next, NACo's Task Force on Homeland Security called on Congress to
enact a $3.5 billion local anti-terrorism block grant. Under the task
forces recommendations the ``funds should flow directly from the
federal government to local governments, with funding and priority
decisions being made using a county facilitated collaborative effort
within the existing ``all hazards'' emergency management planning
process.''
The emergency management system in the United States is largely
organized at the county level under the ``all hazards'' Integrated
Emergency Management System.
Third, in the aftermath of 9-11, the weaknesses of IEMS system at
the local level have become apparent in terms of preventing acts of
terrorism from occurring and in responding to terrorist attacks when
they do occur.
Mr. Chairman, prevention must be our number one objective. NACo's
Task Force on Homeland Security has called for the creation of a new
and highly sophisticated planning and management system at the city-
county and multi-county level to strengthen the existing IEMS system,
which has been poorly funded for years.
It has been estimated that such a system may cost conservatively as
much as $500 million to put together. The creation of such a system
should be among our highest priorities for without this foundation we
are in a weak position to purchase equipment and/or to determine our
training needs.
This concludes my statement and I would be happy to respond to any
questions you or the committee may have.
Biographical Sketch of Javier Gonzales
Javier M. Gonzales was elected President-elect of the National
Association of Counties (NACo) at the organization's 65th Annual
Conference on July 18, 2000. His election to the position puts him in
line to become the youngest NACo President ever, as well as the first
Hispanic to serve in that position.
In the early 1990's, Gonzales co-founded La Voz Broadcasting, Inc.,
which is New Mexico's largest Spanish language radio station. He serves
as the corporation's Chief Financial Officer. Initially elected to
serve on the Santa Fe County Board of Commissioners in November 1994,
Santa Fe County voters re-elected Gonzales to serve a second
consecutive term in 1998.
His commitment and dedication to public service is a family
tradition. His father, George Gonzales, also served as a Santa Fe
County Commissioner and later was elected mayor of the City of Santa Fe
in the 1960's. As a public servant, Javier Gonzales continues the
tradition as a dedicated and committed county leader.
In 1999, Gonzales was appointed by Interior Secretary Bruce Babbit
to serve on the National Parks System Advisory Board which advises the
Secretary of the Interior on parks-related issues. Gonzales was
selected to the Board to bring his perspective as a locally elected
official and as a small businessman.
Gonzales is particularly interested in addressing management issues
in the parks and finding new methods to attract non-traditional users
to our national parks. He is a graduate of New Mexico State University,
and is a lifelong resident of Santa Fe County, New Mexico.
First Responders--Counties Secure America
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES'
HOMELAND SECURITY TASK FORCE
January 2002.
Counties have a significant role to play in our new national
strategy for homeland security--we are the public's first defense.
Counties are the first responders to terrorist attacks, natural
disasters and other major emergencies. It is county public health, law
enforcement, fire, emergency medical, and other public safety
personnel, who are responsible for on-the-ground response and recovery
action. Counties own, operate and secure key aspects of the nation's
infrastructure, such as airports, transit systems, water supplies,
schools and hospitals. And, elected county officials and county
emergency managers provide the essential regional leadership, planning
and coordination in preventing, preparing for and managing the response
to emergency events.
Recognizing the important roles and responsibilities of counties, I
appointed a Homeland Security Task Force of the National Association of
Counties (NACo) in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11.
This task force has brought together a wide range of county policy
leaders to explore our roles, and to work with the White House Office
of Homeland Security and other federal officials.
The Homeland Security Task Force has met twice, on October 26 and
November 28, and adopted a Policy Plan to Secure the People of
America's Counties. The policy plan addresses the key responsibilities
counties have in the areas of emergency planning, law enforcement,
public health and infrastructure security, and outlines how the federal
government can best assist and strengthen its partnership with first
responders in securing the homeland. It outlines four legislative
priorities of NACo for 2002:
--Authorization of a minimum $3 billion local anti-terrorism block
grant to fund comprehensive emergency planning and
preparedness;
--Assistance to counties to improve public health infrastructure and
bioterrorism preparedness;
--Assistance to improve the security of county-owned infrastructures,
such as buildings, airports, transit systems, and water
supplies; and
--Passage of legislation to improve communications interoperability
and release public safety spectrum.
Since the task force's formation in September, NACo also has:
October 2001.--Released a Survey of Emergency Preparedness of the
Nation's Counties, which found that 95 percent of counties have
emergency response plans.
November 2001.--Sponsored a Homeland Security Technology
Demonstration, bringing county officials together with major technology
companies to learn how technology can be utilized to achieve enhanced
security.
December 2001.--Testified before the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee on the local role in homeland security, calling for the
authorization of a minimum $3 billion local anti-terrorism block grant.
January 2002.--Met with the White House Office of Homeland Security
to urge the formation of a state and local advisory committee to
Governor Ridge.
As president of NACo, it has been my honor to serve as chairman of
our Homeland Security Task Force. While the task force will complete
its work early this year, I know that counties will continue to step up
to serve as the nation's first line of defense.
What follows in this document is the full text of NACo's 20-point
Policy Plan to Secure the People of America's Counties. I hope you find
it informative. For additional information, please feel free to contact
the NACo Legislative Affairs staff at (202) 393-6226 or visit our web
site at http://www.naco.org.
Sincerely,
Javier Gonzales,
President, National Association of Counties; Commissioner, Santa Fe
County, N.M.
Homeland Security Legislative Priorities
AUTHORIZE A LOCAL ANTI-TERRORISM BLOCK GRANT
Congress should enact a new local anti-terrorism block grant at a
minimum of $3 billion to comprehensively fund county and municipal law
enforcement and public safety agencies and programs.
Improve Public Health Infrastructure:
Improve public health infrastructure to increase counties' bio-
chemical terrorism preparedness and response capability.
Improve Security for Infrastructure:
Support legislation and funding aimed at improving security for
county-owned infrastructure, including buildings, airports, transit
systems, highways, ports and water resources and facilities.
Improve Public Safety and Emergency Management Communications:
Increase interoperability for both voice and data, release
additional spectrum in the 700 MHz band for public safety and emergency
management use, and eliminate interference problems in public safety
communications.
policy agenda to secure the people of america's counties
Counties are the first responders to terrorist attacks, natural
disasters and other major emergencies. County public health, law
enforcement, fire, emergency medical, and other public safety
personnel, are responsible for on-the-ground response and recovery
action. Counties also own, operate and secure key aspects of the
nation's infrastructure, such as airports, transit systems, water
supplies, schools and hospitals. Finally, elected county officials and
county emergency managers provide the essential regional planning and
coordination function in preventing, preparing for and managing the
response to emergency events.
County officials believe it is critically important that emergency
preparedness plans be coordinated and rehearsed among local, state, and
federal levels, as well as coordinated across the various federal
agencies and state agencies with a role in emergency response.
Similarly, counties have unique responsibilities for effectively
coordinating the plans and response actions of their law enforcement,
public safety, public health, and other departments that assist in
response action.
With regard to the federal response in the event of a public health
or other emergency, county officials strongly believe that the federal
government should quickly identify the controlling federal authority
and chain of command at the scene, and that all federal agencies
diligently follow the lead of the controlling federal authority. The
controlling federal agency must serve--to counties, the public, and
other parties participating in the response--as a single point of entry
and source of information.
With regard to coordination among levels of government, the
National Association of Counties has formally requested that Homeland
Security Director Tom Ridge create an official State and Local Advisory
Committee to the White House Office of Homeland Security. The
committee, comprised of elected officials from state, county and city
governments, would provide input and assistance to federal homeland
security activities and facilitate coordination among levels of
government.
Additionally, the 45-member NACo Homeland Security Task Force at
its first meeting Oct. 26 recommended a number of policy actions to
secure America's counties. These recommendations are outlined on the
following pages. Many of them are intended to assist President George
W. Bush and the Congress as they make investments in local programs to
improve homeland security. Already, counties across the country are
raising and redirecting local funds to secure their communities,
demonstrating commitment at the county level to this national goal.
Public Health
1. Fund the Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act
Congress should provide adequate funding for the Public Health
Threats and Emergencies Act. An appropriation of a minimum of $1.8
billion is needed to implement the law fully and effectively, with at
least $835 million dedicated to building and maintaining local and
state public health preparedness and infrastructure.
2. Improve the Health Alert Network
The Centers for Disease Control-Public Health Practice Program, the
CDC office that best understands local dynamics, should continue to
coordinate and communicate with county health departments, including a
focus on improving the Health Alert Network and on assistance with
technological upgrades for county health departments.
3. Ensure an Adequate Supply of Vaccines and Antibiotics
The federal government should ensure an adequate supply of
appropriate antibiotics, vaccines and other relevant medications and
medical supplies, to be made available to counties and other local
communities in a timely manner as part of the stockpiled push packages
administered by the CDC.
4. Develop a National Policy to Prioritize Medical
Treatment
The federal government should develop a national policy to
prioritize, in the case of a public health emergency, who gets treated
first under what circumstances when demand for treatment exceeds
supply.
5. Train Health Personnel
Public and private sector health personnel should receive adequate
training to manage public health emergencies, in cooperation with
federal, state and local governments. While specific training relative
to bioterrorism is needed, general competency building in public health
is also needed to assure that the workforce is fully prepared.
6. Ensure that Adequate Medical Surge Capacity Exists
The federal government, in cooperation with state and local
governments, should ensure that the medical surge capacity needs
associated with events of mass casualties can be met, particularly in
communities that serve as regional medical centers.
Local Law Enforcement & Intelligence
7. Authorize a Local Anti-Terrorism Block Grant
Congress should enact a new local anti-terrorism block grant at a
minimum of $3 billion to comprehensively fund county and municipal law
enforcement and public safety agencies and programs. Funds should flow
directly from the federal government to local governments, and funding
decisions under the block grant should be made countywide as an
outgrowth of the existing ``all hazards'' emergency management planning
process.
8. Include Counties in Anti-Terrorism Task Forces
The Justice Department should expand the composition of its newly-
created law enforcement Anti-Terrorism Task Forces to specifically
include elected representatives of county and other general purpose
local governments. Security clearance should be provided to county
officials for intelligence information commensurate with their
responsibilities.
9. Balance Heightened Border Security with Economic
Activity
Improve border security operations to enhance the nation's ability
to restrict the movement of weapons, weapons components or potential
terrorists into the country and eliminate their ability to operate
within our borders, in such a way that heightened security does not
impede with the ability to continue active crossborder commerce.
Infrastructure Security
10. Reimburse Counties for Airport Security Costs
Congress should enact an airline security bill immediately, to
provide county-owned and operated airports with federal reimbursement
for additional costs of security measures mandated by the federal
government. In addition, the federal government should assist airports
in financing security measures by allowing flexibility with the Airport
Improvement Program, Passenger Facility Charges, and tax exempt bonds.
11. Assist Ports and Transit Systems in Financing Security
Measures
The federal government and state governments should provide
assistance to counties for securing ports, transit systems, commuter
rail and freight rail systems.
12. Help Localities Secure Public Utilities and a Safe
Water Supply
Congress should authorize funds for drinking water systems and
other public utilities, large and small, to conduct physical
vulnerability assessments and emergency planning.
Additional research should be conducted into the threats to water
and sewer systems and other public utilities and the development of
methods and technologies to prevent and respond to attacks.
13. Include Security in Infrastructure Development
The federal government and state governments should evaluate
threats and consider security as a criterion in the funding and
development of new infrastructure, including physical infrastructure
(such as transportation, schools, flood control and water systems) and
cyber infrastructure. Security measures associated with the development
of infrastructure should be eligible for federal funds.
14. Reimburse Counties for Costs Incurred on Behalf of the
Federal Government
The federal government should reimburse counties for the local
public safety and law enforcement costs associated with requests to
provide security to federal installations and federally-owned
infrastructure within their jurisdictions, and for the federal use of
county facilities and other federally-mandated expenses incurred during
an emergency.
15. Assist Counties to Develop Evacuation Capacity
Support assistance to counties for the evaluation of transportation
and other infrastructure systems and evacuation planning, including
developing capacity at the local level to facilitate evacuations.
Emergency Planning and Public Safety
16. Train County Officials to Prepare for and Respond to
Acts of Terror
Federal, state and local governments should collaborate to train
first responders to respond to acts of terror, utilizing and expanding
upon existing training facilities and opportunities to their fullest
extent. Curricula also should be established for the specific purpose
of training elected county officials and other representatives of
general purpose local governments. A standard, core set of competencies
should be developed.
17. Assist Public Safety Communications Interoperability
and Interference Issues
The federal government should assist counties to provide the
broadest possible interoperability between public safety agencies
across voice, data and geo-data and wireless technologies. The federal
government also should assist counties in obtaining additional spectrum
as soon as possible to address interoperability and dead zone problems
created by congestion and interference with commercial services. In the
event of a disaster or terrorist attack, all first responders should
have access to a common set of frequencies that can be used to
communicate between agencies. To make this effective, particularly if
the federal government chooses to use the 700 MHz band and digital
communications, financial assistance should be provided to ensure that
counties can afford to use these new technologies.
18. Establish a Public Communication Network
A communication network capable of delivering information in a
timely manner between the federal government, state and local
governments, and the general public should be established.
19. Urge the Release of Federal Research to Assist Counties
The federal government should make its research and information
available to counties at the earliest possible time--including
declassifying such information as appropriate--to facilitate their use
by counties to prepare for and respond to acts of terrorism and other
emergencies.
20. Provide Immunity to Encourage Mutual Aid and Support
The federal government and state governments, where applicable,
should provide legal immunity from civil liability for counties and
other local governments responding collaboratively to emergencies
outside their primary jurisdiction.
For more information, contact the NACo Legislative Affairs staff at
202/393-6226.
Revised by Homeland Security Task Force 11/28/01.
Revised and approved by NACo Board of Directors 11/30/01.
A SURVEY OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OF THE NATIONS COUNTIES . . .
AN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
America's 3,066 counties vary in geographic shape, size, population
and in the services they provide, but the one thing that unites them is
that they are responsible for emergency management planning, and very
often are the ``first responders'' to disasters such as those on
September 11. Whether it is a fire, flood or horrific crash, counties
across the nation are prepared to respond to virtually any emergency
situation.
Ninety-four percent of all counties surveyed have disaster plans in
place that include all aspects of disaster mitigation and search and
rescue operations.
Counties have addressed the possibility of terrorist actions. Large
urban counties long considered possible targets for violence have
specific plans to deal with terrorist threats. The results show that
all of the counties with a population greater than 1 million had
terrorist response plans prior to September 11. Eighty percent of those
counties also have specific plans to deal with chemical warfare.
Counties with populations below 10,000, the mostly rural areas of
the country, reported the fewest number of terror response plans, with
22 percent having specific emergency plans to deal with terrorist
activities. Twenty-nine percent of counties with a population of 50,000
or less have plans for chemical warfare. As our nation comes to grips
with the threat of terrorism that not only spreads through bombs and
planes, but by letters and airborne germs, we need to work to prepare
all areas of our country.
Counties have a history of working together to protect the nation's
communities. Counties, through mutual aid agreements, can marshal
resources faster than state and federal deployments because of their
proximity to the events. One hundred percent of counties with
population of 500,000 to 1 million have mutual aid agreements for fire
and law enforcement back up. Eighty-seven percent of all counties
surveyed have mutual aid agreements for fire crews, 77 percent have
agreements for emergency medical services, and 75 percent have
agreements for law enforcement.
Counties are ``first responders.'' As we all witnessed, New York
City (which is also a county) firefighters and police were the first
emergency workers at the World Trade Center. At the Pentagon, Arlington
County (VA) police and fire search and rescue workers were the first at
the scene, joined by Fairfax County Fire and Search and Rescue among
others. Within a few hours, county fire, and search and rescue workers
from as far away as Santa Fe County, New Mexico, arrived at the scene.
In Pennsylvania, it was the Somerset County emergency services team
that dealt with the crash of United Flight 93.
Counties bear the burden of preparing emergency response plans with
limited help from state and federal governments. Only 38 percent of
counties surveyed reported receipt of federal funds for emergency
plans. Merely 550 counties received state funds for planning and more
than 85 percent have used local funds.
Counties are the first line of defense and recovery from terrorist
attacks and disasters. They have a proven track record of preparing for
and implementing, the necessary steps to keep the public safe and
secure. These are challenging times, where the unthinkable has been
witnessed on televisions in our homes, and the threat of further terror
looms large. Counties stand ready to meet the challenge.
homeland security task force members
Chair
Javier Gonzales, Commissioner, Santa Fe County, NM.
Members
Alfonso Amaro, County Supervisor, Yuba County, CA.
Alfred C. Anderson, County Treasurer, Roanoke County, VA.
Patrice Bataglia, Commissioner, Dakota County, MN.
Hank Blackwell, Fire Marshall, Santa Fe County, NM.
John Brackney, County Commissioner, Chair, Arapahoe County, CO.
James E. Cadue, Commissioner, Monroe County, IA.
Joe Chekouras, Communication Specialist, Lake County, IL.
Ronald Christensen, Supervisor, Gila County, AZ.
Wayne K. Curry, County Executive, Prince George's County, MD.
Dewey Desler, Deputy County Administrator, Whatcom County, WA.
Robert Eckels, County Judge, Harris County, TX.
John Foard, Commissioner, Boise County, ID.
Anthony Giancola, Executive Director, NACE, DC.
Robert G. Greer, Commissioner, New Hanover County, NC.
Jane Hague, Council Member, King County, WA.
Bill Hansell, Commission Chair, Umatilla County, OR.
Angela N. Harper, Deputy County Manager, Henrico County, VA.
Chris Hart, County Commissioner, Hillsborough County, FL.
Douglas Hill, Executive Director, County Commissioners Assn. of PA.
David Huffman, Sheriff, Catawba County, NC.
Randy Johnson, Commissioner, Hennepin County, MN.
Angelo Kyle, Board Member, Lake County, IL.
Patrick Libbey, Director, Public Health & Social Service, Thurston
County, WA.
Kenneth Mayfield, Commissioner, Dallas County, TX.
Peter McLaughlin, Commissioner, Hennepin County, MN.
Jean Michaels, Commissioner, Olmsted County, MN.
Karen M. Miller, Commissioner, Boone County, MO.
Carol Moehrle, North Central Health Department, Nez Perce County,
ID.
Ralph Ogden, County Sheriff, Yuma County, AZ.
Janet S. Porter, County Treasurer, Catron County, NM.
Marilyn J. Praisner, Council Member, Montgomery County, MD.
Joe Murray Rivers, Commissioner, Chatham County, GA.
Linda G. Robinson, Legislative Liaison, Henrico County, VA.
Patricia Rogers, Council Member, Los Alamos County, NM.
Michael Selves, Emergency Management Director, Johnson County, KS.
Barbara Sheen Todd, Commission Vice Chair, Pinellas County, FL.
Charles L. Short, Dir., Dept. Health & Human Svcs., Montgomery
County, MD.
Deborah Sims, Commissioner, Cook County, IL.
William H. Stanley, Commissioner, Buncombe County, NC.
Donald D. Stilwell, County Manager, Lee County, FL.
Steve Szalay, Executive Director, California State Association of
Counties, CA.
John Whetsel, County Sheriff, Oklahoma County, OK.
Darrel Williams, Commissioner, Mecklenburg County, NC.
Danny Wright, Commissioner, Vance County, NC.
NACo Staff
Larry Naake, Executive Director, National Association of Counties,
DC.
Stephanie Osborn, Associate Legislative Director, National
Association of Counties, DC.
Questioning by Chairman Robert C. Byrd
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Commissioner Gonzales. The
questioning will now begin, and Senators will have 7 minutes
each in which to present their questions and get their answers.
Mayor O'Malley, while the Federal Government is charged
with protecting U.S. ports, local governments and private
sector companies are responsible for protecting individual port
facilities. With my support, $93 million was included in the
fiscal year 2002 defense appropriations bill for grants to U.S.
seaports to protect those facilities. The President included
funds in his budget for U.S. Customs and the Coast Guard, I am
advised that not one dime for the grant program that was
established last year for U.S. seaports. Can you clarify the
role of local government and private sector business in
protecting port facilities, and explain the need of local
governments for such a grant program, and is there sufficient
coordination among the various Federal, State, and local
entities and the private sector?
Mr. O'Malley. That is a big question, Mr. Chairman. It is a
pressing need, and I applaud you for putting the dollars into
it. We have created a much better working relationship, a lot
better coordination with Coast Guard and Customs in the last
few months, and none of that necessarily involved money. It is
just a matter of tearing down the barriers of the past and
sharing information on a more timely basis. It is my
understanding we have applied for some of those dollars.
Port security is a real mixed bag. We found ourselves
spending a lot of police overtime, putting uniforms out there
in times of heightened alert, which is not the best way to
secure a big old chemical facility on a waterfront, or the
other sorts of things that are adjacent to ports and come in
and out of ports. We have made that application. I am not sure
what the time line is. I do not believe we have seen any money
for it as of yet.
We have been trying at the State level to get some
legislation passed to require, for example, the railroad
companies that often store chemicals right out in the open on
tracks for days at a time with absolutely no perimeter security
to create some better perimeter security and fencing and
surveillance. Everybody seems to be looking the other way,
though.
We are all trying to rush back to that warm place where we
were at September 10, and it doesn't seem to me that the
private sector is in any hurry to step up to their
responsibilities, or to tack on these costs to the cost of
doing business, but I thank you for pushing that through. When
a dime reaches Baltimore, I will let the committee know, and we
have made application.
Chairman Byrd. Now, you have led right into my next
question. Do you have concerns about the ways in which Federal
funding to address your city's new responsibilities for
homeland security will be funneled to Baltimore, and along with
that, how much difference does it make to you, or to cities
generally nationwide, if the funding comes first to the States,
or is made available directly to cities?
Mr. O'Malley. Mr. Chairman, I think this is a point that we
are all in unanimity on. I mean, the model that we had in the
past of trying to prepare FEMA to respond after there has been
a hurricane, or after a tornado, is fine for hurricanes and for
tornadoes. It is not fine when we are under attack, and when
everybody is waiting for another attack to come, and we have to
assume, in our responsibilities in Government, that a second
attack will be coming. It would be imprudent and irresponsible
not to act that way.
I really want to urge the committee to try to drive forward
a different way of looking at this. This is not responding to a
tornado or a hurricane. This is building up the security, the
intelligence-gathering capabilities of your metropolitan areas,
this is about doing the vulnerability assessments, and doing
those things on the front end that discourage an attack, or
maybe even alert us that an attack is coming, and for us to
follow that model where it goes to the States is really
antiquated, outdated, and is not serving our public well.
To answer your question, Mr. Chairman, if we can all be
sure that there is not another attack coming between now and
whenever the State or emergency management agencies and FEMA
figure it out, then it might not be as big a problem, except to
our budgets, but God help us all if there is a second attack
and we are all scratching our heads and wondering, you know,
golly, that Federal-to-State system worked really well back in
the twenties and thirties, but it is not getting the money
there.
I would submit to you that because of this threat we need
to forge a much closer relationship between the Federal funding
that goes directly to metropolitan areas. We can handle it. We
all meet as metropolitan areas already, and all of these
gentlemen will tell you that as well, whether it is on our
water systems, or our school systems--I mean, we have the lines
in place right now. Unfortunately, there is this intercept
called State government, and it acts much more as an intercept.
The reason why some of those appropriated dollars back in
2000 have not reached us yet is because there is not the
urgency felt throughout an entire State about turning those
plans in. You know, in other words, the Federal Government does
not want to release the funds to the State governments until
all of the counties cooperate and put forward an emergency
management emergency preparedness plan. Well, in Baltimore with
the port, with the rails, with the highways, with the airport,
with all of that infrastructure running through that huge
population, we turned ours around lickety-split, and we got it
right in there.
In more rural counties that really was not on the top of
their to-do list, so we need to join much more closely the
Federal Government directly to the metropolitan areas, and we
are not worried about--we think you should require certain
things, that all of us have vulnerability assessments done,
that we know where the critical infrastructure is, that we have
plans that respond to the heightened areas of alert.
It is not that we are afraid of the accountability. We will
tell you where every dime goes. But what concerns us all
greatly is that we are going to be 3 years before we see the
dollars that you all have been appropriating over these last
couple of months.
Chairman Byrd. Mayor Guido, the National League of Cities
has called for more Federal support for hometown security. What
are the priorities, and what needs to be done immediately, and
who will coordinate, if the States do not? Who will coordinate
statewide if the States do not?
Mr. Guido. Well, I understand that my Governor, John
Engler, was here this morning to talk about these issues and
how the State would interface with the Federal Government and
with the cities, but the National League of Cities' position
and the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the National Association
of Counties believe that the direct accountability and direct
funding to cities can work and has worked in programs such as
the community development block grant program for many years in
this Nation.
Also, we feel that in terms of priority, Mr. Chairman, that
the full funding for the First Responders Act is very key, that
the metropolitan medical strike team program, bioterrorism,
administered through HHS, is very important to us as well.
Community policing, the COPS program I mentioned during my
testimony is very important to us, the full funding for that in
the local law enforcement block grant. We believe that those
programs that have been developed over the years and, of
course, the new responder initiative are important to cities,
and cities have the capabilities to administer those dollars
and make sure they get to where they are needed.
Everyone has that mental image of September 11, when they
were watching television, when they saw the fire trucks pulling
off, and the police officers. They were the ones that were
responding, and the 9-1-1 calls come to city hall and the
police department. They do not go to our State capital, so we
ask you for your trust, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Byrd. Senator Stevens.
Questioning by Senator Ted Stevens
Senator Stevens. Gentlemen, this morning, it would not
surprise you, that the Governors asked for just the opposite of
what you have just requested, and it does seem to me that there
are some instances where there are overlapping local
governments, counties which have cities within them. How are we
going to assure that the moneys are distributed fairly within a
State, unless the State is involved?
Mr. O'Malley. That assumes that they are distributed,
Senator, fairly within the States with the States already
involved. In other words, sir, you look at what you all did
with TANF funding and the welfare-to-work, and those dollars
went to the States, they fell to their bottom lines, and
instead of reinvesting them and making the top-notch work force
that we could with this country, they were spread around like
so much suburban port for pet capital programs. That is what
happened with TANF, because it went to the States. It did not
go to the cities that had the incentive to make the dollars
count and to do what they need to do.
Senator Stevens. As I understand the proposal, 75 percent
must go to local governments, that it is up to the States to
make the distribution within each State. That is the proposal
that is in the budget, as I understand it.
Mr. O'Malley. And the eventually I think is the understood
there, Senator, and that is what worries us. Eventually it will
probably go to their local governments, and I would submit to
you that if Congress required that there be metropolitan
councils in the top most populated areas of the Nation, we
could put that together instantly with our partners. We could
come up with the plans. We could submit to you the detailed
vulnerability assessments and all of those things.
I think there is a role for the States to play as a
backstop, if you will, for the less-populated counties, to make
sure that they get the training that they need, and again
emphasis, that they need, but if we continue to go this route
where things go to the State first, you are going to see all of
the same supplanting issues that we saw with welfare-to-work,
you are going to see years and months of delay, and you are not
going to rush these dollars to the front to defend the American
people in our population centers.
Mr. Gonzales. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Byrd. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gonzales. I was just going to say, Senator Stevens,
that right now counties and cities through local hazardous
management plans, actually conduct a lot of the work that could
receive these Federal dollars. Our focus is always about making
sure that when that attack takes place, and we have been told
by the President and Director Ridge that it is going to happen,
that our fire officials, that police responders, that our
public health agencies are fully prepared and capable of
protecting the American public.
The best way of making sure that that protection takes
place is to directly fund those agencies and not let any of
that money get lost in State bureaucracies, as Mayor O'Malley
indicated, or the politics of a State, and I think from our
standpoint we are hearing from our fire chiefs and from our
police chiefs and our public health agency saying we are ready
to protect our communities, we are ready to do our part in
homeland security by gathering intelligence, interpreting it,
sharing it with the FBI and the appropriate authorities, but we
need to make sure we get these resources in hand so that we can
work collectively, and I assure you, oftentimes you may see the
cities and the counties are at odds.
When it comes to the issue of homeland security, you are
going to see enormous collaboration taking place, not only
between cities within counties, but multicounty jurisdictions,
but it is the old adage that we believe that at the local level
we can best determine how to fulfill the needs of our
communities, and that is the same issue with homeland security.
Senator Stevens. Well, do not shoot the questioner, but it
does seem to me that your proposal is that every city, every
county in the country should be prepared to have a terrorist
event sometime within the next year, and we should be prepared
to meet that. Now, that is not within the scope of the risk.
There is serious risk that we are going to have terrorist
events, and we do not know exactly where they are going to
happen, but I think we can get some risk assessments where
intelligent people think that will take place.
But why should we use Federal taxpayers' money to make
every city and every county in the country ready for a
terrorist event, when the number of terrorist events is going
to be very limited, if any?
Mr. Guido. Your point, Senator, is very well taken, and
believe it or not, Governor Engler and I get along famously,
and we do talk to each other and we do interact with each
other.
I think the point we are making is, we believe, as you are
saying, that there needs to be regional cooperation. Every city
cannot be fully equipped for every event that could happen. We
understand that. We know that.
Senator Stevens. But who is going to make that
determination, FEMA, or your Governor? I say I would rather
have it made in the State than have it made in Washington. Do
you disagree with that?
Mr. Guido. No, we agree that there is that element of local
control. We were just hoping that we would bypass the State
capital.
Senator Stevens. Well, I do not know how you make the
decision State-by-State unless it really funnels through the
State, unless you let FEMA make the decision for you.
Mr. O'Malley. Mr. Chairman, can I try? The CDBG dollars,
the community development block grant funds go directly to the
cities, Senator, and I think that as urgent as those dollars
are needed, these dollars are needed more urgently.
Senator Stevens. Well, I agree, in most instances CDBG
grants are analyzed here in the Congress, and we spread them
out, but as a practical matter, what you are saying to us is,
every city should be prepared to meet terrorism now, as though
that kind of event is going to happen in every one of the
80,000 cities.
Mr. O'Malley. I think that every Senator--Senator, I think
what we are saying is, every city needs to be as prepared as we
can possibly be, and I think our National Government, based
upon the population centers of this Nation, needs to urgently
drive those dollars to those population centers.
Senator Stevens. Let me just be another advocate, and that
is for that Federal taxpayer. We are going to expand the
Federal taxpayer's expense for homeland security and defense at
a fairly enormous rate in the next years.
Mr. O'Malley. Well, sir, we have already----
Senator Stevens. Just a second here.
Mr. O'Malley. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevens. Are you going to expand the contribution
to the cities and counties, or are we going to pick up that
expense that is going to take place.
Mr. O'Malley. Sir, we have already picked up that expense,
and frankly, sir, it is being borne by the people in this
country that have the least ability to pay for it. It is being
borne by taxpayers in America's cities, many of whom are poorer
than people who live in the suburban areas, and right now what
this country is doing is asking those who can least afford to
pay for it, to pay for it.
We are closing schools, we are closing libraries, we are
trying to keep after-school centers open, and we are doing it
because we are funding overtime costs for our police to protect
things that the Federal Government has not stepped up----
Senator Stevens. I do not buy that. We are not in that kind
of thing. We are not asking you to do it all. We are just
saying, why should the Federal taxpayer do it all?
Mr. O'Malley. I think we need to do it together, sir,
because we are Americans, and I think that is what is required
right now.
Mr. Guido. Mr. Chairman, I think that the proposal does
include a match, which we do not really agree with, but you
know, we understand that we have to come to the table with
something, and as Mayor O'Malley mentioned we have to date
borne 100 percent of the cost for this preparedness.
Senator Stevens. I have got some areas in my State that do
not have any tax base at all. The 25-percent match is just
impossible in many rural areas of the country, and that is why
it is unfortunate the way--we have got to look at that, too,
mayor.
Mr. Gonzales. I agree. Can I just say two points real
quick, Mr. Chairman, Member Stevens, that in this all-hazards
management plan, a part of the planning that we are calling
for, we would be doing assessments at the local and the
regional level to assess how vulnerable we are to a threat, so
that all that assessment, all that planning is going to be done
prior to spending any money, so we prudently spend any type of
block grant that is coming down.
You are correct, not every community is vulnerable as the
next. In New Mexico we have several Federal installations, the
Los Alamos Laboratory, the Sandia Laboratory, we are a border
State--I anticipate that our State could be potentially very
vulnerable. That may be different from another State, but what
we are calling on is for the use of these monies to be going
toward pre-planning activities, and during those planning
activities we will be able to identify the threats and the
assessments that are facing communities.
In addition, the 25-percent match is also a soft match so
that a lot of our rural counties who do not have the hard cash
to pay for this will be able to use in-kind services towards
meeting these block grant needs.
Senator Stevens. I agree with that approach.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Mikulski.
Questioning by Senator Barbara A. Mikulski
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much.
Mayors, I can see listening to you why your constituents
elect you. You are compelling advocates for them, and Mayor
Guido and Commissioner Gonzales, I know that both of you also
have a family heritage of community service. I noted that both
of your fathers also held elective office, so you come with a
lot of experience to the table, in addition to my own Mayor
O'Malley.
So I am learning a lot. Mayor O'Malley has been a great
teacher, but Mayor O'Malley, I want to go to a question to you
about funding, and then Mayor Guido to you and to Mayor
O'Malley about double value.
Mr. Mayor, when we talk about the city, about the Federal
Government helping cities, or communities, right now we are
doing individual programs, a type of fire grant program, which
is to help first responders have the right equipment, protect
the protector as well as the right equipment. Then we are
talking about the homeland security block grant program, which
would be 70-plus percent coming to the local governments, 30 to
the States.
From your perspective, what would be the best way to be
able to fund local communities, keep it at individual grants,
like first responders, the police grants, or do you think a
block grant, or do you think you need both?
Mr. O'Malley. We are playing stump the mayor here.
Senator, I think the notion of having specific programs as
far as the equipment goes and the preparedness things are not
bad ideas provided they can be done quickly.
With regard to block grants, the biggest cost we have
incurred is police overtime costs at these heightened states of
alert, and I know there is kind of a cultural aversion here to
ever getting involved in that thicket of funding police
overtime, but those are the homeland defense soldiers, you
know. It is our officers that are out there. I would defer to
my colleagues' thoughts on that issue.
I think some of these things with regard to equipment and
capital expenditures probably are best done on a programmatic
basis, but we do need direct block grant funding when it comes
to these overtime costs associated with large events. We have
several in every city. Whether it is Superbowls or whatever
they might be, every city has its own events, and we need that
flexibility on the policing front, because this is a huge
unbudgeted cost that we have not prepared for.
Senator Mikulski. But that is not a block grant. That is a
police overtime bill.
How about you, Mayor Guido, or Commissioner Gonzales, and
if you could--because I think Senator Stevens raises very
important issues. Number 1, those communities are the greatest
strength, but when we are talking about the bucks to be spent,
I am of the belief, and I wonder if you share it, that this
could be a double benefit.
In other words, when we provide the firefighter with better
equipment, whether it is a chemical fire in Baltimore by
accident, or by malevolent attack, that firefighter is ready to
deal with it. But he is also, or she is ready, to deal with all
the other fire incidents that come up in the Baltimore area,
the same way with public health and that rather tattered
infrastructure.
Mayor Guido, what about you? You are from Dearborn, you are
next to Detroit, you face a lot of the responsibilities.
Mr. Guido. Yes, and first let me congratulate you on giving
everybody the correct Italian pronunciation of my name. The
people in Dearborn say Guido. As long as they vote for me, I go
with the flow. I have been Mike Guido for a long time.
Senator Mikulski. Well, when I go to Richmond, Mayor
O'Malley is there and they call me McCloskey, but it is all
right.
Mr. Guido. Thank you very much. We understand that when we
are equipping fire and police officers it is not just standing
by the station waiting for that terrorist attack, and they have
regular work to do, and so the benefits, the residual benefits
of funding where we are buying this equipment can be
implemented for regular day-to-day tasks, and I think that your
point is well-taken, that on a broad scale when we are
preparing for homeland defense it could be a myriad of issues
and incidences that we would respond to, so when we talk about
the COPS program, it was a one-page application, very simple,
it worked, crime dropped substantially, the money went directly
to the city, it was something that we had worked on with
Members of the House and Senate, over the years it passed, and
it was implemented in the cities.
The same with the block grant program. We are responsible
for audits and for implementing those dollars, and when Senator
Levin or Senator Stabenow or Congressman Dingell or my
Congressman come back home, we can point to things that we have
done with those dollars directly for the cities, and we share
those issues with them and those successes with them, and we
are saying here that we can do the same thing with homeland
security dollars.
Mr. Gonzales. Senator, I just want to say on two things,
you bet it is a double benefit, but in particular on the public
health area, where we see enormous deficiencies that exist in
that area, if at a minimum we upgrade our public health systems
so we can treat our indigent and poor people and mid-level
income people with a good level of care, that is a good thing
that jointly the Federal Government and local governments can
do.
In New Mexico, Senator Domenici has been a huge champion in
fighting black tar heroin, and even with all the money he has
been able to bring home to New Mexico, we continue to have
those issues. With money like this, we will be able to enhance
those systems of treating people in Northern New Mexico just
because we have a better, stronger public health system that is
preparing for, potentially, if we have some type of terrorist
attack against Los Alamos Laboratories, where this issue
exists.
Senator Mikulski. Well, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator. Senator Domenici.
Questioning by Senator Pete V. Domenici
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
stayed this morning for quite a while, but I could not, under
the circumstances, wait my turn, and so I thank you for the
opportunity to speak for a moment this afternoon.
I would like to call to your attention and to your staff's
attention existing law that provides the framework and the
money for 120 first responder cities in America right now. We
may not even know that we have got that, and we have, your
city, Baltimore, has received a substantial amount of money,
and has had your officers trained as first responders.
You also might find it interesting that that same law,
called Nunn-Lugar-Domenici, adopted on the floor of the Senate
as an amendment, so you know we worked on it for a long time,
provided for a White House appointee of the President to become
the czar of the program, and President Clinton would never
appoint him.
As a consequence, this money floundered until one of these
subcommittees of appropriation, I believe Senator Gregg's
subcommittee, decided we had to get it done, and at this point
we spend half of it through the Department of Justice, who took
over a piece of it, and we spend another big portion of it
through the Department of Defense, but I think it would be
interesting for us to know as a committee how the 120 cities
got selected, and how the money got distributed to them under
this bill, because it totaled over $260 million. It is not
peanuts.
Also, it does not provide for follow-on, so there is an
issue right off that we ought to look at. The cities that have
been prepared cannot expect to be kept current, but if they
have done it right, they bring their law enforcement, their
communications, their hospitals, their doctors, their policemen
into a plan.
New York had one, so you see, it does not stop everything,
but it was there, and it was pretty effective, from what I
understand, to get people working on it.
So I think that some footprints have preceded us in terms
of how we would distribute the money.
I would also say to the distinguished mayor, and he wants
to speak, and I will recognize him, or you will, Mr. Chairman,
in a moment, but I just wanted to say he is wrong in his
definition of community development block grants.
Chairman Byrd. Which mayor are you talking about?
Senator Domenici. The mayor of Baltimore. That is a
combination program, where 25 percent of it is run by the
Federal Government, and 75 percent of it is doled out pursuant
to a formula, so it is a hybrid, and this is not something in
drafting legislation that we are neophytes at. We spent the
whole period of time--when Lyndon Johnson had his Great
Society, we spent billions of dollars and had figured out who
gets it. Some of it was formulated, some of it was competitive.
If you had an urban renewal grant, you did it by competition,
then the question was, how much politics was involved in that.
So I just recall that for your staff and ours, and
certainly Ted Stevens and his staff would be aware of what has
transpired.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Domenici. Then I would like to make a couple of
points about this first responder law. I think you have been
very concerned about who is going to run this program, and we
have been talking here, you know, are we going to run it
through a whole batch of United States agencies who just happen
to have the money, or are we going to run it all through FEMA,
or are we going to run it through a new grant program that we
set up? I assume these are tough issues for us to do in a 3- or
4-week period.
Some of it is not going to be done so well, because we are
not going to know enough, but I believe the President's
approach for starters is pretty good. We will have to look at
it carefully as a result of all the evidence we gather, but at
least they have gone through and taken a lot of evidence as to
what is going on out there, and even if you use our committee
for another seven or eight hearings, you know what we are going
to get, we are going to get a good 30 minutes of facts as the
rest of the meeting takes on its normal course.
I would like to ask that the mayor of Baltimore, first, for
all your talent which you display here in front of us, and what
I read about you, I do not think you know everything about
managing cities or States, or the relationship of cities to
States. I mean, I am not even going to ask you how long you
have been at it, because I do not want you to tell us how short
a time you have been at it, which might indicate that I know a
little bit about you.
I was a mayor of a city before I came here. We happened to
have the whole Great Society then, so our city became a huge,
successful grantmanship city, and we were so good at it that we
got lots of things, and we got them direct from the Federal
Government, but now I have a question, as we proceed with this,
who is going to tell us the best formula for distributing this?
Is it because a State has a certain population they are going
to get a bigger piece, or what about a State like--I will just
give you one, New Mexico.
It has 1,700,000 people, but it has two of America's
nuclear laboratories, both of which have 8,000 scientists and
engineers, and plenty of things that the enemy would like to
fool around with, plus the only underground disposal facility
for nuclear waste--although it is low-level transuranic, it is
there, it is the only one--plus a lot of other things.
I think there was a recent account that maybe half the
nuclear weapons that the United States has might be in the
mountain there. That is a newspaper story of a couple of weeks
ago.
So they deserve a little bit different attention, it seems
to me, than Nebraska--that just comes to my mind--with huge,
huge portions of it in agriculture with only a few communities.
So I think these are issues that I cannot answer today, and
I regret to say that I do not think these gentlemen can answer
them, either.
Chairman Byrd. They can help us, though.
Senator Domenici. They can help us, so now, you wanted to
speak, Mr. Mayor.
Mr. O'Malley. I wanted to thank you, Senator. The funding
that you got to us--we were 1 of the 120 that received it--that
was in the first round.
Now, in the first round funding, a lot of cities through
that bill, which might be the better prototype--and I do not
claim to know a whole lot about anything, which is why I am in
elective office--but that first round funding, sir, came
directly to cities, and you helped us a great deal, because our
fire department, because we were able to apply for it, we got
the training right away. That was one of the reasons we were
able to handle that chemical fire in the CSX tunnel as well as
we did, was because of that funding.
Now, after that first round, though, for some reason--I do
not know if it was--I think it was legislation sent it directly
to the States, and those were the dollars appropriated back in
fiscal year 2000 that still have yet to reach us now, so that
very example that you give I think is a good one. You all had
it right when you were doing it in those first round things
because it was getting directly to us. For some reason now it
has been kicking around in States for 3 years.
As of September 12, 46 of our Nation's 50 States had yet to
submit their comprehensive plans for accessing those dollars
that you all had appropriated a few years ago, so that might
very well be the best case study for how we go about skinning
this cat.
Senator Domenici. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator. Thank you, mayor.
Senator Landrieu.
Questioning by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me
commend you for calling this very important hearing. I was able
to be here this morning just for a brief time, and I had
another hearing that I was actually chairing that had been
scheduled for quite sometime, but I wanted to be here as much
of the day as possible to support our chairman and our ranking
member in this effort, because I just think it is critical.
Let me say, before Senator Domenici leaves, and I am sorry
Senator Stevens left, I do understand their frustration, and I
want to honor the work that they do in so many areas trying to
distribute resources to local, State, and Federal agencies. But
I would want to suggest for consideration that we may be in a
completely new world here, I was very moved by the testimony,
Mr. Chairman, of Ashton Carter this morning, the doctor from
Harvard. I do not know if you mayors were able to hear him, but
I want to support very much the positions that you all have
laid forward this afternoon. Based on the testimony that he
presented this morning, Mr. Chairman, which is that truly we
are in a totally different position.
Maybe not since the Civil War, since we fought on our own
territory, do we have to completely rethink our whole strategy
of national defense and national security. For over 100 or more
years we have always thought we just had to support these
efforts and fight a war somewhere else, but we are truly, Mr.
Chairman, fighting this war on our own territory. We have never
hesitated, as a Federal Government, not in any war we have ever
fought, to give people on the front line everything they need
to win. It is what America does. We do it better than anyone
else, and I do not know of one period, except maybe in Vietnam
where we were very confused and not clear about what we were
doing, did we hold back. But in World War I, and World War II,
we gave the front line everything we needed.
These cities are the front line. Afghanistan is not the
only front line. The Mideast is not the only front line. These
cities that, Mr. Chairman you know so well, are the front line,
and so we have to rethink. This is not just a new Government
program. This is not charity to local governments. This is
national defense writ anew, and I thought the testimony this
morning was compelling, and it was urgent, and when you couple
it with the new weapons that are available, when you couple it
with the mind-set of these terrorists, when you couple it with
the strength of these weapons, it is frightening to me what
local officials have to bear up under every day, knowing what
could happen in their city.
And I want to repeat for the record, when people dial 9-1-
1, they do not get a Governor, they do not get a Congressman.
They get a mayor. They get their local police and their local
firefighters, and I do not want this committee, I hope, to lose
sight of that, and to think about the fact that we have to
support the front line.
Secondly, I want to go strongly on record as discouraging
us from suggesting in any of our legislation any local funding
matches unless they are absolutely necessary. And Mr. Chairman,
you know, because you represent a relatively poor State of West
Virginia--I represent a relatively poor State of Louisiana,
some of my vulnerable target-rich areas are very poor. They
could not put up 5 percent of the match if you asked them, so
by requiring any match requirement, you have basically shut
them out of any protection. And what you end up having is what
the mayor of Baltimore is trying to say, the perverse program
where you have the poorer people of the country substituting
wealthier counties getting the money because the poor counties
and the poor cities cannot get it because they cannot put up
the match.
So first of all I suggest that we rethink the whole
paradigm, recognize them as the front line, which you have done
almost better than anyone here, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
commend you for that, and your valiant efforts that the
chairman has put forward on this effort. There is no one to his
measure in this Congress on this particular issue.
And to also really ask this committee to be very clear
about what happens when there is a 25-percent match, and let me
just say, because this is a pet peeve--my staff knows this, and
I want to just get another minute on this.
If we are going to have a match, then we should have a
differential match. The poorer counties should put up maybe 10
percent--the second highest, you know, the middle third should
put up maybe 10 percent, or zero for the poor, 10 for the next,
and 20 percent, so you have a differential match if we have one
at all, but to ask everyone to give 25 percent just gives the
richer counties and richer cities the ability to get the money,
and leaves the poorest people completely out. That is not fair.
My question would be, after all of that, to say I support
you in almost every aspect of what you testified for. Could you
both or all three explain, and just briefly, how you get your
best practices so we can be sure that the money that I am
hoping that we can get to you directly, quickly, ahead of time
so you can be ready, so that we do not melt-down, you know and
cause general panic, which would completely do what the
terrorists want us to do, and hold up under great attack. How
do you get your best practices, so you can be sure you are not
duplicating among counties and cities? What is going on now, if
each of you would just answer briefly for a minute.
Mr. Guido. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Landrieu for
your comments. Right now, amongst counties and cities across
the country we have an all-hazards management plan, and in that
planning process it requires that a level of coordination
amongst multiple cities and multiple counties take place. That
is what needs to happen at a bare minimum as we go forward.
Cities cannot do it individually, and counties cannot do this
individually, it has to be a collaborative effort.
I appreciate your focus on rural communities and poorer
communities. Two-thirds of the American population reside in
rural counties. Those counties need to make sure that they have
adequate protection as well. Those counties are committed to
working collaboratively and ensuring that they protect their
communities just as much as the urban communities that are
doing it, but counties and cities recognize that they are not
going to do it individually. They are going to do it from a
regional standpoint.
And in that regional standpoint, we will be able to address
some of the concerns that Senator Stevens is talking about,
threat assessment, how vulnerable are we, where do we put our
money, and we know at a minimum we need to be able to tie our
communications systems together, we need to tie our databases
together, we need to have a mechanism where we can evaluate
information and respond to it, and that is not going to take us
doing it individually, but collectively, so I can commit to you
today, at least what we know from our organization, those best
practices, our communities know that they need to work in a
collaborative nature to be able to respond effectively to any
type of homeland security threats.
Senator Landrieu. Mr. Mayor.
Mr. O'Malley. Senator, as briefly as I can, we are very
lucky in Baltimore that we have located in our city the Johns
Hopkins Center for the Study of Civilian Biodefense, so we
really followed their lead and advice when we set up our own
biosurveillance network. We had Johns Hopkins Hospital to step
up as a leader to help all the other hospitals with
bioterrorism plans, and that biosurveillance network goes on,
that surveillance system is up and running every day. Our
health commissioner gets those numbers and passes them on to
the State.
On the security front, we are lucky to have recruited a
police commissioner out of New York City, Commissioner Norris,
who had a lot of training up there with regard to this, and we
hired a couple of specialists, one a retired FBI intelligence
person to help us put together a metropolitan intelligence
network, if you will, that coordinates all of our partners in
that information-sharing process as well as INS, Customs, and
all those other folks.
We also recruited a gentleman named Lou Anamone, most
recently, I think, a deputy commissioner I think for operations
in New York, to do a professional vulnerability assessment of
the critical infrastructure of the chemical companies and those
things, and with regard to the response functions of the fire
department
Senator Landrieu. Let me just ask you on that, did you pay
for that yourself----
Mr. O'Malley. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Landrieu [continuing]. Or did you use some of our
money? So you used your own money to do your risk assessment.
Mr. O'Malley. Yes, we used our own money to do that.
The fire department, they are professional people there,
and as I mentioned earlier, thanks to help from the Federal
Government, they availed themselves of the chemical
preparedness, and also folks up the road from us at the
Aberdeen Proving Ground have worked very hard and helped us get
prepared on that score, so we just kind of gathered together
the best experts we could find, followed their advice, and I am
glad to say that whenever these news agencies do ratings among
cities, we always score high amongst the most prepared.
Senator Landrieu. I know my time is up, but I do not want
to take Senator Dorgan's time, so if you could just submit that
for the record in writing, the question, mayor, and let me just
close with this. I chair a subcommittee on Armed Services,
involving Special Operations, and one of the great things we
did, Mr. Chairman, on Special Ops, was to basically give them a
pool of money that Special Ops could just go to directly and
draw down when they had to make a battlefield, when they had to
win the battle.
We may need to think of the same sort of thing for cities
that are on the front line of these attacks. And I do not know
how it would exactly be set up, but again that is just an
example of out-of-the-box kind of thinking, and it is why we
are winning the war in Afghanistan, because of that funding
mechanism that has been very helpful that was developed over
several years here in the District of Columbia.
Thank you.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator, for good questions and
an excellent statement.
Senator Dorgan.
Questioning by Senator Byron L. Dorgan
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Let me ask the mayors and the commissioner, at what point
will you say, following substantial work, that we are prepared?
Is there a checklist? I mean, Mayor O'Malley, when will you
say, we are prepared?
Mr. O'Malley. When there is long-term sustained funding for
some of the health efforts in the biosurveillance networks as
well as the epidemiologists, and those folks that have to
respond, when there is some funding mechanism in place for us
to be able to fund the police overtime costs associated with
heightened states of alert without having to do it entirely,
100 percent with local funds, and you know, when our police,
when our fire department has the equipment that they need to
handle two simultaneous events, rather than just one accident,
which is what we have the capability to do now. Then I would
consider us pretty well prepared.
Mr. Guido. Mr. Chairman, Senator, I would say that along
those lines, I would just reiterate, we need to integrate our
databases, our methods of sharing information so that we can
integrate our communications systems, so when we respond to any
types of events we are doing it in a coordinated effort. We
need to be able to establish regional relationships just as we
saw on September 11. Thirteen counties responded to the
accident in Somerset County. Those counties had practiced, they
rehearsed, but they had the equipment in place, they were all
in the same level when they were responding, and while
unfortunately they could not save lives, they came pretty
close, as close as they could, considering what had occurred.
So I would say we need to get to the point where we have
these regional relationships, where we have the equipment in
place, where we are sharing methods of gathering intelligence,
analyzing it, and using it to minimize the risk and the threat
to our communities. I do not know if we will ever get fully
prepared, but there is a lot we can do.
Senator Dorgan. Well, commissioner, on that point I think
that even prior to September 11, one would have, for purposes
of dealing with other emergencies in cities and counties,
wanted to have a communications system that is seamless and
that works between a county and a city and some other
jurisdiction.
Senator Domenici was asking, I think, some pertinent
questions. How do you get to that point? Who coordinates the
requirement to get to that point, because you have a county
government over here, they like this communications system,
they go to this vendor and they create their communications
system based on their set of needs, and they have a city over
here, they have exactly the same needs, they have someone else
in charge, they like a different vendor, they create a
different communications system.
Who drives this to the conclusion that you ought to have
commonality--notwithstanding just September 11, but the normal
kinds of emergency functions for which you are required to be a
first responder?
Mr. Gonzales. I would submit to you, Senator, that we do it
at the local level, that we need to do that.
Senator Dorgan. But you are saying you need to. I
understand that.
Mr. Gonzales. Granted, I would say in the past we have not
done as well as we could have. In fact, when you consider Los
Angeles County, there is 80-plus cities that are within Los
Angeles, all the different communications systems and different
methods of gathering information. We need to move to a new way
of thinking about--as Senator Landrieu indicated, we are in a
new day. We are responding to potential threats that could
affect our communities, which means that this collaboration
needs to happen at the local level, and I believe at the local
level mayors, county officials, and public health officials
know that we all need to be on the same page.
Senator Dorgan. I accept that, but I am wondering how it is
going to be--how are you going to force the issue, because I am
guessing last July if you were a local government and deciding
on a communications system, you would have had the same need
with respect to emergencies. In Minot, North Dakota recently we
had a couple of cars on a train derail and release anhydrous
ammonia, a very serious problem. So all of these needs have
existed prior to September 11.
September 11 has clearly changed the circumstances. I
understand that, but I am just trying to see who is going to
force this? Who is the coordinating force that requires this to
happen?
Mr. Guido. Let me just mention about the communication
issue, because it is very important, and this Friday a task
force on interoperability will have its first session here in
Washington, and I will be one of the members of the task force,
but we will be developing policy at a Federal level for States
and local government to set aside spectrum for emergency
communications, and September 11 only just created the urgency,
I would say, for establishing that.
It has been something everybody has thought of and talked
about, but there has never really been this coordinated effort,
but this will be a Federal policy that will be implemented on a
national level, and certainly will need the support of the
Senate and the House and the FCC in taking that spectrum and
setting it aside for public safety.
Senator Dorgan. Well, you understand the import of my
question. I am just trying to understand how this happens. Does
it emerge, or is there some driving force that requires this to
happen? If so, what is that force?
Mr. O'Malley. I would submit to you, Senator, that I think
that the Federal Government, that the dollars that the Federal
Government could devote to this also have the requirement that
the States come up with plans that make it really work, so you
do not get into the issue of, well, this county commissioner
wants it to go to his brother-in-law, and somebody else wants
it to go to this contractor. I think you can set that up as
part of the prerequisite for that--your question is a good one.
I mean, without a Cabinet Secretary, Cabinet-level person for
homeland defense really driving this with authority, it is
difficult.
Senator Dorgan. So you are asking for strings.
Mr. O'Malley. Yes, sir. I think there needs to be. I mean,
when you talk about the issue of interoperability, I understand
Maryland has got some dollars for that. We already have it in
Baltimore where our fire and police invested a lot of money in
it a while back, because of precisely what you were saying. We
knew we needed that anyway, but expanding that to the whole
metropolitan area, I think yes, put the strings on and force us
to do what security demands.
Senator Dorgan. Let me ask about the Office of Homeland
Security. Can the three of you tell me of your connection with
it? What kind of communications have you had, where have those
communications taken place, and essentially, without disclosing
anything that would be confidential, what have the
communications been?
Mr. Guido. Mr. Chairman, we have been very pleased with our
interaction with the Office of Homeland Security. I would take
20 seconds just to go back real quick. We are responsible for
implementing it. We are responsible for driving the integration
of these issues. We need to do that, through the conduction of
emergency management plans be able to draw the road map where
we will be able to integrate our systems.
So back to the issue of the Homeland Security Office.
Governor Ridge has offered many invitations that we have
accepted to advise and to be a part of how they developed their
security threats and what ways they can best communicate with
local government officials so we can adequately prepare our
communities for any issue that may come their way and, in fact,
on April 25 we have been invited to come back to sit down with
the Governor and do a review of these threat assessments and
determine what we can do to establish a more coordinated effort
between his office and local governments in terms of
disseminating information, providing feedback to him so
hopefully he can do his job for the President.
Senator Dorgan. Yes, I guess I am asking in a more specific
way. Governor Ridge has been charged by the President to be the
head of Homeland Security. We are not quite clear whether this
is an operational role or an advisory role. It is not quite
clear to me exactly what that role is. He does not head an
agency, although he has requested, I believe, in the White
House budget request $24 million for his office.
I am trying to understand--and this is not an implied
criticism of anything or anybody--I am just trying to
understand where we are, what kind of coordination exists, how
that coordination relates to your role.
Mayor Guido, tell me about your city and your role with
respect to the Office of Homeland Security at this point. Is
there an operational role from that office to yours?
Mr. Guido. Well, we certainly had the opportunity to meet
with Governor Ridge and his staff, and they have been both open
and very cooperative.
I think what we are trying to do is establish policies and
procedures, protocols for responding to a terrorist event or
other emergencies that would be on a local level, and I think
that Governor Ridge has been very open to our suggestions for
how to prepare for those things, and I think that over the
course of the next several months we will probably have some
planning in place. That is the charge that I have for the
national League of Cities, is to develop some kind of template
that cities can apply for homeland security.
Senator Dorgan. Would Governor Ridge, for example, from the
national Office of Homeland Security, be developing a template
for communications that he would say to your city and your
county, here is the way you have to develop a communications
system that allows you to communicate with one another?
Mr. Guido. Well, I think overall that would be the optimum
goal, that every city in this country is prepared and has a
specific way to deal with these issues, and I think that
ultimately it would be incumbent on the Director of Homeland
Security, Governor Ridge, to provide the types of measures that
we need to implement.
Senator Dorgan. Mayor O'Malley.
Mr. O'Malley. Yes, the Conference of Mayors believes that
position should be an operational one rather than just an
advisory one. The Governor very kindly met with us back at the
White House a few months ago and included us on a conference
call when they came up months later with these heightened
states of alert, but I think, Senator, you hit the nail on the
head. I think as we struggle with this, I think Governor Ridge
is a very decent man who is trying as best he can to take an
advisory role and make it operational without having that
defined in a budget.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, I think my time has expired,
but I ask these questions only because I think the question of
how we do what we do is very important. At the end stage I
think you all have described what you think we need to have
done here, and I certainly agree with that, and you all are the
first responders, there is no question about that.
When something awful happens in this country, the men and
women in your fire departments, emergency response, police
forces are going to be the first responders, and we need to
help you prepare them for that, but also there needs to be, it
seems to me, some kind of operational role here for a national
homeland defense system that says to you in New Mexico, and you
in Maryland, and the counties and cities, you have got to have
compatible systems, and you have got to have plans and
approaches that allow all of us to work together in a seamless
way to respond to these issues, so I appreciate your answers. I
think they are very helpful as we think through these.
Mr. Chairman, once again, this is an excellent panel and I
think contributes to this discussion in a very significant way.
Thank you.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator Dorgan.
Senator Inouye.
Questioning by Senator Daniel K. Inouye
Senator Inouye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I had
to absent myself. I had some other emergencies.
The Director of Homeland Security has to coordinate
agencies and subagencies from 81 different groups, and I
suppose in that sense he is a very important Director. When you
have problems on homeland security, who do you think of
calling, the Defense Department, or FEMA, who do you call?
Mr. Guido. That is a good question, Senator. I mean, I
think right now, when the American people have concerns about
homeland security they are calling their fire and police
officials.
I think for local government, at least in our case, it is a
wait-and-see who is going to have authority in providing the
guidance. You know, is it going to be FEMA in the end that is
going to distribute the money and provide guidance on how it
can be spent, is it the Governors, is it the Office of Homeland
Security, and so I think from our standpoint we are hopeful
that it is a single agency, that the money that comes down will
come down as flexible as possible, and as quickly as possible,
but right now, it is at least on my part it is a wait-and-see
as to what the Federal Government, where this issue of
distribution of funds and criteria on how they are going to be
spent, where it is going to be coming out of.
Senator Inouye. So as long as you can get it from 81
different agencies----
Mr. Guido. Yes, and consider many of our rural communities,
who have to go to 840 different agencies just to ask for all
the funds that are available for them, so we are hoping that we
can get that consolidated for one point of distribution.
Senator Inouye. Mayor O'Malley.
Mr. O'Malley. I was hoping you would skip me. Right now, we
call the people who have proven themselves the experts in the
advice category. We really have nobody to call for money. I
mean, we can jump up and down to our local emergency management
people and maybe to--whether it is DOJ or Defense Department,
it always seems so confusing to remember who is in charge of
which program.
On September 12, the person I found that gave me the best
advice was your former colleague, U.S. Senator Gary Hart, who
with Senator Rudman chaired the Commission on Security Needs in
the 21st Century, and the advice he gave me was advice we have
continued to follow, which is to do the very best we can with
the experts around us, because it will take our Federal
Government a long time to catch up to this.
Senator Inouye. Are you satisfied with the work of the
Office of Homeland Security?
Mr. O'Malley. Senator, I think that Governor Ridge is
trying very hard. Shortly before you came in, Senator Dorgan's
question asked, you know, if that were an advisory role or an
operational role. I think it is an advisory role in search of
operational powers, and he does not have those operational
powers, and I think that it is difficult to ask a person to do
things without giving him or her the power to do it, and we
have not given him the power to do that yet, and nor has the
President, apparently.
Mr. Guido. This is a relatively new phenomenon, Senator, as
you know. I mean, we are reacting, and things are evolving on a
daily basis, but the point is that we are the first responders
if there were an emergency for any incident, and we are trying
to put together plans that would make cities prepared for such
an event, and who do we call if we need assistance? Obviously,
we rely on the Federal Government for help.
A lot of different agencies within the Federal Government
will have money within their budget for homeland security, if
you will, and I am assuming that cities will still have the
opportunity to apply directly to those agencies or departments
for grants for issues that may relate to homeland security or
biohazards or other things that different departments deal
with, but it is an evolving program, and there are really no
specific answers at this time.
Senator Inouye. Well, I thought it was very clear for
anyone who watched the events unfold on September 11 that the
forces you command were the front line troops, and as front
line troops I think you should have the funds go directly to
you instead of going up to the Supreme Commander and filter
down, so we will do our best. I will do my best, and we are
hoping some day the Director of Homeland Security will come and
testify. We would like to know what his office is doing. But I
am glad the mayors are here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator Inouye.
Questioning by Chairman Robert C. Byrd
Now, earlier, Commissioner Gonzales, my time of 7 minutes
did not allow me to ask you a question. One of the National
Association of Counties legislative priorities calls on the
Congress to enact a new local antiterrorism block grant at a
minimum of $3.5 billion, I believe, to comprehensively fund
county and municipal law enforcement and public safety agencies
and programs. Does the President's first responder initiative
address this need?
Mr. Gonzales. Mr. Chairman, I believe it does, but our
proposal is a little bit different from the President's, as it
was indicated today. The President is proposing that the money
go to the Governors, 25 percent will stay in the States, 75
percent move down to the local communities. Our proposal calls
on the Federal Government to make a direct allocation to local
communities. We feel at the local level we are best capable,
through existing infrastructure, to be able to determine how
the moneys will be spent.
We are extremely concerned that the Governors will use this
money to either supplement other revenues that are due to local
governments, or that they may use it to leverage other
resources, or who knows what might happen, and they may use it
for the right purposes, but I think for the people on the front
lines--and I am talking beyond the policymakers. I am talking
about the fire chiefs and the police officers, the public
health officials. To them, all they want to do is make sure
they have access to the funds so that they can develop the
coordinated effort to get access to the tools to properly care
for their communities.
It may happen to the route that the President is
proposing--I agree with Mayor O'Malley, our big concern is that
that may take 2 or 3 years by the time it makes it down to the
local communities, and it makes it very difficult to coordinate
responses when that funding is coming down at different levels
and at different times, and it is very sporadic, and so how do
you promote regionalization when one county gets the money at
one time of the year, another county gets it at a different
time, and it is very inconsistent, so we are wanting to see if
we can get past that and find a direct allocation in the most
simple manner that is the most flexible.
Chairman Byrd. In the event of a bioterrorist attack, do
county hospitals across the country have the capacity to treat
a sudden surge of patients?
Mr. Gonzales. No, sir. No, sir, county hospitals do not
have the capacity at this point to fully care for anyone who
might impact some type of bioterrorism incident. We know that
the majority of our county hospitals do not have the capacity,
they are underfunded, they are undertrained, they are
understaffed.
Senator, we heard from one emergency management official in
Iowa who said he had a three-point plan, and he is coming from
a rural county, and his three-point plan was to pick up the
phone and call for help, the second point, hope somebody comes,
and his third point was that he was going to stack the body
bags in the gym.
That is the reality that exists in many rural communities
and many county public health facilities. They do not have the
adequate capacity to deal with caring for their communities.
They certainly do not have the adequate capacity to deal with a
bioterrorism impact on their communities.
Chairman Byrd. Mayor O'Malley.
Mr. O'Malley. I would agree with the commissioner. It
depends on how sick people are. We certainly are better
prepared now than we were just in terms of coordination and
running scenarios and figuring out which hospital would be the
quarantine hospital and things of that nature, but as far as
having the thousands of respirators that one might need, no,
sir, we are not nearly ready for that. In fact, we have done a
very good job, for better or worse over the last 20 years, of
reducing bed capacity in a lot of hospitals, so we still have a
long way to go on that.
Also, there is more we could--one of your colleagues asked
a question, what is another thing on the checklist, whether or
not we are prepared. One of those things would be whether or
not we administered the--whether we are able to prophylax your
health responders, who in essence are just like your fire and
police in the event of a bioterrorism attack.
Chairman Byrd. Mayor Guido.
Mr. Guido. Well, Senator, I think that we certainly want to
coordinate our efforts with the local hospitals, and we have,
but it is a shame that part of our plan is using the municipal
ice arena as the temporary morgue. I mean, that is how it is
written up in our plan.
There are many choices to be made here, and many decisions
that have to be made that really rest on the shoulders of this
committee and Members of the House, and we know that you have
finite resources, and cities go through budget issues as well,
and we know there are finite resources, but I want you to know
that we are so grateful to be asked to the table to discuss
what our needs are and to have the opportunity to explain to
you our position, and that you would be so respectful to us in
asking what our needs would be.
Chairman Byrd. Well, mayor, you are the people, you are the
individuals who have the answers at the local level, the local
municipal level, the local county level, and I want to
personally thank you for your time here, and for the wisdom
that you have shared for us as you have attempted, and done
very well, to answer our questions, and your testimony will be
very helpful to us. You have performed a real service. We have
to have your help. We have to have your advice. We do not stand
in your shoes. So thank you very much for coming here today,
all of you.
Today represents the beginning of this committee's attempt
to better understand the aftermath of the horror of 9/11. This
Congress responded immediately to enact $40 billion within 3
days, $40 billion. That is a lot of money. That is $40 for
every minute since Jesus Christ was born. That is quick action
on the part of the People's Branch.
Congress responded immediately to enact $40 billion to
address immediate needs after September 11. Now it is time to
step back and take a more comprehensive look at how we deal
with the long-term specter of terrorism that has come to visit
our shores. This committee is trying to get a hold, just a
feel, a sense--a sense--of what has worked, what has not, what
will work at the different levels of Government. We are also
trying to discern how to best allocate scarce dollars in the
most intelligent way with an eye toward prevention and toward
determining our most obvious vulnerabilities.
Several things have already emerged, Senator Inouye, which
need to be addressed. The need for a coordinated response, with
a smooth flow of intelligence data from the Federal to the
State and local levels, appears to be essential. The need for
sustainable programs to help the States plan for these new
responsibilities seems to be critical.
The Office of Homeland Security, while doing its best to
coordinate the needs, may not be structured in the best way to
facilitate effective cooperation among the various Federal
agencies and State and local entities. We are talking about
people's lives here. We are talking about a nation's
vulnerabilities.
Analyses of our most vulnerable infrastructures--and there
are many different infrastructures in this country--are
lacking, and information-sharing has been difficult. There may
be a need for the Office of Homeland Security to evolve so that
the Nation can more effectively deal with the long-term problem
of homeland defense.
Our resources are finite. We cannot protect every highway
and every bridge, perhaps. Throwing money at the problem will
not afford our people the protection that they must have, that
they deserve. The needs are huge. That is a good British word.
They are huge, and we must not approach these needs without an
effective plan.
In my view, this committee is grappling with the most
important challenge that we face as a nation in the foreseeable
future. We have been confronted with foreign wars, wars on
foreign fronts. I was born during the First World War, and I
have seen several wars on foreign fronts, the Second World War,
the Korean War, and the Vietnam War, the war in the Persian
Gulf.
Now, the battlefield is not in some distant land, it is
here, here in Baltimore, Mayor O'Malley, here in Dearborn,
Mayor Guido, and here in Santa Fe, where the Spanish came more
than 400 years ago.
Knowledge is power. Hopefully what we learn here can help
us to make the most informed, most effective funding decisions
possible, and I look forward to our hearings tomorrow. Tomorrow
morning, we will hear from a panel of first responders. These
are men and women who would be on the front lines in responding
during future terrorist attacks, National Guardsmen and women,
police officers, firefighters, public health personnel. We have
already seen what these people are capable of doing to protect
their fellow citizens in the face of disaster.
Tomorrow afternoon we will continue our hearings with a
number of experts in the area of infrastructure security. We
will be concerned with such critical matters as port security,
nuclear plant security, the safety of our water supplies, all
of which are absolutely essential to the security of our
homeland.
I thank all of our witnesses for coming to Washington to
share with the committee their insights and judgments. I thank
the members of the committee who have attended the hearing, who
have asked questions. I thank all members for their attendance
and participation. I especially want to thank Senator Stevens
for his very valuable contribution to the hearings, and at this
point I want to thank the staffs on both sides of the aisle for
the help that they have given, the contributions that they have
made.
So now, hurrying to a close, tomorrow morning at 10 a.m. we
will hear Mr. Thomas Von Essen, former New York City Fire
Commissioner, representing the International Association of
Fire Chiefs; Mr. Mike Crouse, chief of staff to the general
president, the International Association of Firefighters; Mr.
Philip Stittleburg, chairman, National Volunteer Fire Council,
and volunteer fire chief for LaFarge, Wisconsin; Colonel Lonnie
Westphal, chief of the Colorado State Patrol, representing the
International Association of Chiefs of Police; General Richard
Alexander, Director, National Guard Association; and Mr. Gary
Cox, Director, Tulsa, Oklahoma City and County Health
Department, but here in his capacity representing the National
Association of County and City Health Officials.
At 2:00 tomorrow afternoon, former Senator Warren Rudman
will be before the committee. He is the co-chairman of the U.S.
Commission on National Security for the 21st Century.
Panel number 4, on infrastructure security, on port
security, Admiral Richard M. Larrabee, retired Admiral,
Director, Commerce Department, Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey, former Rear Admiral, United States Coast Guard, and
Dr. Stephen E. Flynn, senior fellow, national security studies,
Council on Foreign Relations, New York, New York.
On water infrastructure, Mr. John Griffin, general manager,
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, Laurel, Maryland,
representing the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies;
Mr. David Lochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge,
Massachusetts will testify concerning nuclear facilities
security; Mr. Jeff Benjamin, vice president for licensing,
Exelon Corporation, Chicago, Illinois, representing the Nuclear
Energy Institute.
COMMITTEE RECESS
The committee is recessed for today.
[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., Wednesday, April 10, the
committee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday,
April 11.]
HOMELAND SECURITY
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 11, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 10 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate
Office Building, Hon. Robert C. Byrd (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Byrd, Inouye, Hollings, Leahy, Mikulski,
Kohl, Murray, Dorgan, Feinstein, Johnson, Landrieu, Reed,
Stevens, Specter, Domenici, Burns, Gregg, Bennett, and
Campbell.
Opening statement of Chairman Robert C. Byrd
Chairman Byrd. The committee will come to order. The
committee resumes its hearings which began yesterday on the
Office of Home Security's budget, items that are in the
supplemental appropriations request, and today we hear from
people at the local level, the first responders, what they have
to say about their needs.
Among the witnesses for today are these, who will testify
this morning. Mr. Thomas Von Essen, former New York City Fire
Commissioner, representing the International Association of
Fire Chiefs. Mr. Mike Crouse, chief of staff to the general
president, International Association of Fire Fighters. Mr.
Philip Stittleburg, chairman, National Volunteer Fire Council,
and Volunteer Fire Chief, LaFarge, Wisconsin. Colonel Lonnie
Westphal, chief of the Colorado State Patrol, representing the
International Association of Chiefs of Police. General Richard
Alexander, Director, National Guard Association. Mr. Gary Cox,
director, Tulsa, Oklahoma, City-County Health Department,
representing the National Association of City and County Health
Officials.
Now, before I call on my colleague, Mr. Stevens, let me
suggest that your statements will be included in the record as
though stated in their entirety, so where you can reduce your
statements to your recommendation as to the committee's
appropriations on what your needs are, and how you see the
Office of Homeland Security, is it working with you, is it
advising you, some of the proposals that have been made by the
administration in its budget, how will these proposals affect
your effort, your work and the work of the people you
represent? These responses will be helpful.
We all know the good work that you do, the hard work that
the people at the local level do, we know that they are the
first people to arrive on the scene, and we want to hear from
you, so with the understanding that we are fully aware of the
services that you perform, the people at the local level
perform, get right to the point, if you can, with respect to
the needs of the people we represent, and how can we best meet
those needs?
If there are proposals in the President's budget that you
agree with, let us hear. If there are proposals that you do not
agree with, let us know. Let us know what you think are the
good points and the not-so-good points, if there be some, as
far as your observations of the Office of Homeland Security are
concerned, so that when Mr. Ridge comes before this committee,
and he has been invited to come by both my colleague, the
former chairman of this committee, Senator Ted Stevens, and
myself, he can respond to some of the concerns you have
expressed. With that now, I will turn to my good friend and
colleague, Senator Stevens, for whatever statement he wishes to
make, and then we will proceed.
Statement of Senator Ted Stevens
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Sorry
to be a tad late.
Chairman Byrd. Oh, that is all right.
Senator Stevens. I had another meeting. I do welcome all of
you gentlemen as witnesses. Our hearings yesterday gave us
important insights into the challenges faced by the Governors
and cities and counties as they prepare to prevent similar
attacks occurring in their area that have occurred in New York
and at the Pentagon.
We are now dealing with the front line people as far as I
am concerned. You will be there. You have the responsibility to
react first in such a crisis, and I hope you can give us a
better understanding of the level of Federal cooperation that
you will need to carry out the plans and provide the services
first responders must give in the event of crisis.
I particularly appreciate your being here, General
Alexander. I think the post 9/11 period has greatly increased
the pressure on the people in your program, and we have worked
very closely with you and your predecessors as a key partner in
the effort to keep the National Guard prepared to respond to
any crisis, and I am proud the way you did respond to the
crisis past 9/11, and you deserve great credit for that.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to this panel. I think it
should be very interesting and informative. I appreciate your
holding the hearings.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator Stevens. Throughout our
efforts to prepare for these hearings, Senator Stevens and I
worked shoulder-to-shoulder and all witnesses that have
appeared before this committee, and those who are appearing
today, have been discussed between the two of us and there has
been no disagreement whatsoever. We have all agreed on the
witnesses to be called, and I thank Senator Stevens for his
cooperation and for his leadership. As former chairman of this
committee, he is a leader, and I lean on him very heavily.
I want to thank the other members of the committee who are
here this morning, Senators Johnson and Kohl and Senator
Campbell, the Senator from Colorado----
Senator Stevens. Senator Gregg.
Chairman Byrd [continuing]. And Senator Gregg. Thank you
for being here already, early this morning, and there will be
others who will come.
Now, Mr. Von Essen, would you please proceed?
STATEMENT OF THOMAS VON ESSEN, FORMER NEW YORK CITY
FIRE COMMISSIONER, REPRESENTING THE
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE CHIEFS
Mr. Von Essen. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. My name is
Thomas Von Essen, and I have served in the New York City Fire
Department for over 30 years. I began my career as a
firefighter in the South Bronx and retired earlier this year as
commissioner of the FDNY. I also serve on the Terrorism
Committee of the International Association of Fire Chiefs, on
whose behalf I speak today.
First, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman and members
of the committee, for your continued concern for firefighters
and other first responders to terrorist incidents.
Mr. Chairman, many of my colleagues have testified before
the Congress on the role of the fire and emergency service in
responding to and mitigating acts of terrorism. Chief Fanning,
responsible for FDNY's hazardous materials operations,
testified before this committee 11 months ago. He said in part,
if lives are to be saved and suffering reduced, it will be up
to them to do it, that a terrorism incident, whatever the
scale, firefighters and other responders will be there within
minutes, some quite possibly becoming victims themselves. They
will do what they have always done, act to protect the public
they serve.
I would like to take this opportunity today to speak to the
need to focus on the national preparedness effort in a manner
that facilitates cooperation among and between all levels of
government, and above all the need to focus on preparing this
Nation's million-plus firefighters, who will be the first at
the scene of any future terrorist attack against our homeland.
Though we in New York City enjoyed tremendous support from
agencies at the State and Federal level last September, the
brunt of the work fell upon and will always fall to local
personnel. That is simply because, in a crisis, time is our
enemy. Personnel that are dispatched by our existing 9-1-1
emergency system arrive on scene in minutes. Fire department
personnel are strategically located in every community in this
country for precisely this reason. There can be no substitute
for a well-prepared fire department in a time of crisis.
Jack Fanning and 342 of our colleagues and friends at FDNY
became victims last September. They were joined by scores of
local police officers in a successful effort to evacuate over
25,000 people from the World Trade Center before its collapse
took their lives and those of more than 2,500 civilians.
I would like to speak to some of the programs developed by
Congress to assist the fire and emergency service. First, we
are pleased with the administration's commitment to the support
of firefighters, police officers, and other first responders as
demonstrated in the $3.5 billion fiscal year 2003 budget
request. Though the details of the administration's plan are
not complete, what we have seen so far is encouraging. Our
input has been sought by administration officials, including
Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge and Joe Allbaugh, Director
of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and I cannot say
enough about the help we received last fall from Joe Allbaugh
and all of FEMA. New York City needed help, and FEMA delivered.
Mr. Chairman, we want you to know that there was a great
deal of confusion and disappointment in the fire service when
the administration initially proposed eliminating in fiscal
year 2003 grants provided under FEMA's assistance to
firefighters program, commonly known as the Fire Act grants,
that were established in law openly 18 months ago. The program
has been funded by this committee at authorized levels for two
consecutive years, has been received as an unqualified success
by America's fire departments.
We want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and your committee, for
your support of the fire grant program. We also want you to
know of our very positive experience with this program, and
that we believe it should not be eliminated or folded into any
new untested program. The Fire Act program is designed to
assist us with training and equipment that is basic to fire
fighting and all-hazard responsibility of local fire
departments.
Enhancing the ability of firefighters to cope with a
terrorist incident involving weapons of mass destruction can
only begin after basic competency and capability has been
achieved. After the administration's formal fiscal 2003 budget
proposal eliminating the Fire Act grant program was submitted
to Congress, both Director Ridge and Director Allbaugh told us
they believe the Fire Act grant program should continue, and
remain separate and apart from the proposed new terrorism
preparedness block grant program. We agree, and hope you and
Congress do, too.
Chairman Byrd. We hope Governor Ridge will come before the
committee and tell us that.
Mr. Von Essen. I hope so too, Mr. Chairman. I have a whole
section here about fire department staffing. By your request to
shorten my presentation I will just say the primary objective
of adding 75,000 U.S. firefighters is to raise the staffing
level of fire departments throughout the country to four
firefighters per unit. That is an important section, but I go
into it in detail in my prepared testimony.
We have called for the development of a single
comprehensive national strategy that addresses several key
areas. There are a variety of Federal agencies that have lent
us considerable expertise. Many have actively sought ours. We
believe our national preparedness effort should be focused in a
way that provides measurable preparedness goals to which we can
all work. Without clearly defined goals, it is exceedingly
difficult to measure progress and to define the end product,
adequate preparedness.
We believe that a national strategy should be developed
that focuses on building a comprehensive response capability
that enhances where necessary existing assets of the local,
State, and Federal levels of government. All communities are
served by fire and police departments that will be dispatched
to mitigate any terrorist incidents within minutes. We propose
that whatever funding you and the committee deem appropriate
for terrorism preparedness be tied to performance capability
objectives that include interagency and interjurisdictional
planning.
We in New York some years ago developed a system that
allowed for joint planning by our local agencies. We included
representatives from the State and from Federal agencies with
appropriate responsibility. We also worked with outlying
suburbs to include them in our planning process. We need
measurable goals, and we need to adhere to them.
Terrorist incidents are primarily local events. The events
of last September bear that out. The block grant program that
the administration has proposed must address that reality.
Funding that is provided by Congress to help enhance the
abilities of local agencies must reach those very agencies and
not get lost in the bureaucracy. The ramifications of an ill-
prepared local community in the post September 11 world are too
large.
Mr. Chairman, I want you to know that the support we
received in New York last fall was profound, and we remain
grateful for the assistance garnered by so many Federal
agencies from Congress and, most of all, from the American
people. We knew that we were not alone in our struggle or in
our grief. However, I am compelled to end my testimony where I
began. It is my life's experience that firefighters and other
local first responders will act alone in the first critical
hours of any emergencies, no matter how large or small. It is
within that time frame that lives will be saved. I urge you not
to forget this simple fact in your deliberations.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me the honor to
testify. I am happy to answer any questions the committee might
have.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Von Essen, for your fine
statement. It will be included in the record in its entirety.
Thank you for cutting it down. I hope that all of us will
follow in the wake of your example.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas Von Essen
My name is Thomas Von Essen. I served the Fire Department of the
City of New York (FDNY) for over thirty years. I began my career as a
fire fighter in the South Bronx and retired earlier this year as
Commissioner of FDNY. I also serve on the Terrorism Committee of the
International Association of Fire Chiefs on whose behalf I speak today.
First, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
Committee, for your continued concern for fire fighters and other
``first responders'' to terrorist incidents.
Mr. Chairman, many of my colleagues have testified before the
Congress on the role of the fire and emergency service in responding
to, and mitigating, acts of terrorism. Indeed, Chief Jack Fanning,
responsible for FDNY's Hazardous Materials Operations, testified before
this Committee eleven months ago. He said, in part, ``If lives are to
be saved and suffering reduced, it will be up to them to do it. At a
terrorism incident, whatever the scale, fire fighters and other
responders will be there within minutes, some quite possibly becoming
victims themselves. They will do what they have always done--act to
protect the public they serve.''
I would like to take this opportunity today to speak to the need to
focus our national preparedness effort in a manner that facilitates
cooperation among and between all levels of government, and above all,
the need to focus on preparing this nation's million-plus fire
fighters, who will be first at the scene of any future terrorist attack
against our homeland. Though we in New York City enjoyed tremendous
support from agencies at the state and federal level last September,
the brunt of the work fell upon, and will always fall to, local
personnel. That is simply because, in a crisis, time is our enemy.
Personnel that are dispatched by our existing national 911 emergency
system arrive on-scene in minutes. Fire department personnel are
strategically located in every community in this country for precisely
this reason. There can be no substitute for a well-prepared fire
department in a time of crisis.
Jack Fanning and 342 of our colleagues and friends at FDNY became
victims last September. They were joined by scores of local police
officers in the successful effort to evacuate over 25,000 people from
the World Trade Center before its collapse took their lives and those
of more than 2,500 civilians.
I would like to speak to some of the programs developed by Congress
to assist the fire and emergency service. First, we are pleased with
the administration's commitment to the support of fire fighters, police
officers and other ``first responders'' as demonstrated in the $3.5
billion fiscal year 2003 budget request. Though the details of the
administration's plan are not complete, what we have seen so far is
encouraging. Our input has been sought by administration officials,
including Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge and Joe Allbaugh,
Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). I can not
say enough about the help we received last fall from Joe Allbaugh and
all of FEMA. New York City needed help and FEMA delivered.
Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program
Mr. Chairman, we want you to know that there was a great deal of
confusion and disappointment in the fire service when the
administration initially proposed eliminating, in fiscal year 2003,
grants provided under FEMA's Assistance to Firefighters program,
commonly known as FIRE Act grants, that were established in law only
eighteen months ago. The program has been funded by this Committee at
authorized levels for two consecutive years and has been received as an
unqualified success by America's fire departments. We want to thank
you, Mr. Chairman, and your Committee, for your support of the FIRE
grant program. We also want you to know of our very positive experience
with this program and that we believe it should not be eliminated or
folded into any new, untested program.
The FIRE Act grant program is designed to assist us with training
and equipment that is basic to fire fighting and the all hazard
responsibility of local fire departments. Enhancing the ability of fire
fighters to cope with a terrorist incident involving ``weapons of mass
destruction'' can only begin after basic competency and capability has
been achieved.
After the administration's formal fiscal year 2003 budget proposal,
eliminating the FIRE Act grant program, was submitted to Congress, both
Governor Ridge and Director Allbaugh told us they believe the FIRE Act
grant program should continue and remain separate and apart from the
proposed new terrorism preparedness block grant program. We agree and
hope that you and Congress do, too.
Fire Department Staffing
The understaffing of fire departments is an issue that must be
addressed. Whether a department is a career, volunteer or a
combination, staffing is an immediate issue, especially in light of
today's reality. Existing federal programs provide tools for equipment
and training. No program provides for additional human resources for
adequate response to terrorism. The IAFC requests that Congress
establish a program to increase the number of fire fighters in the
United States by 75,000.
The primary objective of adding 75,000 U.S. fire fighters is to
raise the staffing level of fire departments throughout the country to
four fire fighters per fire company. Proper safety practice, codified
in federal administrative law by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, requires fire fighters to operate in teams of at least
two. Fire departments typically field three-person engine and ladder
companies. Therefore, fire apparatus staffing of four yields two
working teams, doubling the capacity of three-person units which can
only form one operational team. A four-person response unit will yield
a 100 percent increase in operational capacity compared with three-
person companies. Raising staffing levels to four personnel is a large
undertaking, but it is necessary.
Limited apparatus staffing reduces a fire department's ability to
respond to major events, including a terrorist incident, where large
amounts of resources are needed quickly and in quantity. Early
intervention in the consequence of a terrorist event will increase the
number of lives saved. Fire departments respond within three to five
minutes and remain in place until an incident is resolved. No other
consequence management resource can respond this quickly.
Senators Christopher Dodd and John Warner last fall crafted
legislation, the Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response
(SAFER) Act, which authorizes a program to provide local communities
with assistance for additional fire department staffing. Their bill
would require a local contribution of twenty-five percent of the cost
of additional staffing for each of three years. It is designed as a
one-time, three-year assistance program that is structured to require
local financial support from the outset, thus avoiding the ``balloon
payment'' that has resulted in an unmanageable burden upon local
governments participating in other federally-supported public safety
staffing initiatives. It is our hope that the Senate consider carefully
this innovative approach to the staffing issue.
Strategic Considerations
Mr. Chairman, we in the fire service have been deeply involved in
the terrorism preparedness issue for many years. We have worked closely
with policy makers at all levels of government and we believe that
significant progress has been made. However, there is much work that
needs to be done.
We have called for the development of a single, comprehensive,
national strategy that addresses several key areas. There are a variety
of federal agencies that have lent us considerable expertise. Many have
actively sought ours. We believe our national preparedness effort
should be focused in a way that provides measurable preparedness goals
to which we can all work. Without clearly defined goals, it is
exceedingly difficult to measure progress and to define the end
product, adequate preparedness.
We believe that a national strategy should be developed that
focuses on building a comprehensive response capability that enhances,
where necessary, existing assets at the local, state and federal levels
of government. All communities are served by fire and police
departments that will be dispatched to mitigate any terrorist incident
within minutes. We propose that whatever funding you and the Committee
deem appropriate for terrorism preparedness be tied to ``performance
capability objectives'' that include interagency and inter-
jurisdictional planning. We in New York some years ago developed a
system that allowed for joint planning by our local agencies. We
included representatives from the state and from federal agencies with
appropriate responsibility. We also worked with outlying suburbs to
include them in our planning process.
I would suggest that our efforts coincide with a national strategy
that would facilitate and encourage both the interagency coordination I
have discussed and the development of ``performance objectives'' that
clearly define the tasks that first responding agencies need to perform
in order to mitigate a terrorist incident. Institutionalizing this
approach, in all fifty states, leaves plenty of room for
experimentation and innovation by state and local officials. It
provides for flexibility that would ensure better preparation among
local first responders by focusing on those areas in which a particular
community's level of preparedness is deficient when measured against
these performance objectives. The plan also would provide a framework
that avoids the one-size-fits-all approach that has to an extent been
employed in the past. Such a plan would consider existing local, state,
regional and federal response assets and require their inclusion in a
local planning effort.
It is worth noting that on September 11th, fire companies from
outside New York City were dispatched immediately to ``backfill'' many
of our neighborhood fire stations so that communities would continue to
receive fire protection, emergency medical and other services while
FDNY was engaged at the World Trade Center. This well-executed mutual
aid would not have been possible without extensive pre-planning. We
call upon you and Congress to take whatever steps necessary to ensure
this kind of cooperation between all communities before the next attack
occurs.
We have also on many occasions outlined for Congress those
categories of preparedness assistance that we believe are most
important. They include personal protective equipment for fire
fighters, equipment that facilitates the detection and monitoring of
chemical, biological and radiological agents and appropriate training.
We have also discussed critical communications needs.
Communications interoperability--the ability of responders from all
agencies to communicate effectively is vital to command and control for
effective incident management. The issue revolves around radio spectrum
availability for public safety. This is an issue that Congress dealt
with in 1997. What remains is for television stations to vacate
channels allocated to public safety by the Federal Communications
Commission.
Terrorist incidents are primarily local events. The events of last
September bear that out. The block grant program that the
administration has proposed must address that reality. Funding that is
provided by Congress to help enhance the abilities of local agencies
must reach those very agencies and not get lost in the bureaucracy. The
ramifications of an ill-prepared local community in the post-September
11th world are too large.
Every agency has a role to play in mitigating a terrorist incident.
It is imperative that agencies within a given community or region work
together so as not to duplicate their capabilities while leaving some
needs completely unaddressed. We believe that grant funding made
available should be contingent upon inter-jurisdictional planning that
carefully considers the preparedness goals I just spoke of.
Mr. Chairman, I want you to know that the support we received in
New York last fall was profound and we remain grateful for the
assistance garnered by so many federal agencies, from Congress and most
of all from the American people. We knew that we were not alone in our
struggle or in our grief.
However, I am compelled to end my testimony where I began: It is my
life's experience that fire fighters and other local ``first
responders'' will act alone in the first critical hours of any
emergency, no matter how large or small. It is within that timeframe
that lives will be saved. I urge you not to forget this simple fact in
your deliberations.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me the honor to testify. I am
happy to answer any questions the Committee may have.
Biographical Sketch of Thomas Von Essen
Thomas Von Essen joined the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) in
1970 and was assigned to Ladder 42 in the South Bronx. He remained and
served the South Bronx through the conflagrations of that decade.
Mr. Von Essen was elected president of the New York City Uniformed
Firefighters' Association in 1993, and represented FDNY's 8,600
uniformed firefighters in that position. He was appointed Commissioner
of FDNY on April 1, 1996. He is a member of the International
Association of Fire Chiefs and has served its terrorism committee since
1998.
Mr. Von Essen retired in January, 2002, after over 30 years of
service to FDNY. He currently resides in New York with his wife, Rita.
He continues to work with former Mayor Giuliani in a consulting
capacity.
Chairman Byrd. Mr. Crouse.
STATEMENT OF MIKE CROUSE, CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE GENERAL
PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
FIRE FIGHTERS
Mr. Crouse. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. Good morning. My name is Michael Crouse, and I am
the chief of staff of the International Association of Fire
Fighters, here today representing the interests of our general
president, Howard Schaitberger, and the 250,000 professional
firefighters who are members of the IAFF.
Senators, for our organization September 11 changed
everything. The 343 firefighters who made the ultimate
sacrifice rescuing tens of thousands were our brothers. It is
in tribute to them I come before you to ask your assistance in
protecting our homeland, enhancing the safety of our Nation's
firefighters, and ensuring that our Nation's fire service is
prepared to respond to any and all future emergencies.
The first and foremost need of the fire service is adequate
personnel. Across our Nation, two-thirds of our fire
departments operate with staffing that does not meet minimum
OSHA standards or safety fire ground operations. In order to
come into compliance with the accepted industry standards,
75,000 new firefighters are needed today.
The second need of the fire service is equipment. An IAFF
survey has found that a majority of the fire departments in our
Nation lack even basic protective equipment, a fact that was
underscored by the billions of dollars requested for equipment
under the Fire Act grant program last year.
The third leg of our triad is training. Throughout the
Nation, there are firefighters who essentially receive on-the-
job training, endangering lives of both firefighters and the
public. While basic fire fighting training is needed for many
firefighters, almost all firefighters need additional training
in hazmat and weapons of mass destruction response. September
11, Oklahoma City, and the anthrax mailings taught us that
firefighters must be trained to recognize and safely respond to
all threats.
As we evaluate the various number of homeland security
proposals, the IAFF asks that you be guided by two principles.
One, priority should be given to programs that have a proven
track record of success. Two, money targeted to assist first
responders must be used for first responders and not diverted
to other purposes. First and foremost, funding must be provided
to increase fire department staffing. The Safer Fire Fighters
Act, which was introduced by Senators Dodd and Warner, and a
new proposal from the Senate Commerce Committee, are designed
to address staffing shortages in our Nation's fire departments.
We urge this committee to provide adequate resources for these
initiatives.
To address the need for equipment and training, we urge the
committee to fully fund both the Fire Act and the
administration's first responder proposals. Last year, Congress
increased the authorized level for the Fire Act to $900 million
per year. There is clearly the need to justify this funding,
and we are confident that FEMA is capable of targeting the
money to meet the most pressing needs of the fire service.
We also ask that the administration's first responder
proposal be adequately funded. We fully endorse the program's
emphasis on mutual aid response and interjurisdictional,
interdiscipline training and exercises.
While we find much to laud in the first responder proposal,
we have also some concerns. We oppose merging the Fire Act into
the first responder program, and we are troubled by the
administration's recommendation to allow the States to pay 25
percent of the funding off the top. Funding for first
responders must be spent at the local level.
Finally we urge this committee to assure adequate funding
for several existing firefighter training programs. These
programs have successfully trained millions of firefighters,
but since September 11 the demand for this training far
outpaces the funding available to deliver it. We encourage this
committee to fully fund existing training programs operated and
administered by the Departments of Justice, Energy,
Transportation, Health and Human Services, EPA, and other
agencies.
Equally important as funding these diverse training
programs is retaining their current structure. While we support
designating FEMA as the lead terrorism response agency, we do
not believe that all existing programs need to be housed in a
single agency. The role of a lead agency should serve as an
information clearinghouse to help local governments get the
support they need when they need it.
Mr. Chairman, far too long our Nation's domestic defenders,
our firefighters, your firefighters have been neglected. The
firefighters of the IAFF will be ready when the next alarm
sounds, but our ranks are thin. We ask for your support so the
firefighters have adequate staffing, proper training, and the
right equipment to do the job.
I thank you for this time to present the views of the
Nation's professional firefighters, and I will be happy to
answer any questions that you may have.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael J. Crouse
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman. I thank you for the opportunity to appear before this
committee today. My name is Michael J. Crouse, and I am the Chief of
Staff for the General President of the International Association of
Fire Fighters (IAFF). I am here today representing the views of our
General President Harold Schaitberger and 252,000 professional
firefighters who are members of the IAFF. I spent 17 years as a
firefighter employed by the federal government protecting United States
military installations. For 10 years I was the IAFF District Vice
President representing all IAFF federal firefighters. In this capacity
I was intimately involved with emergency preparedness at military
facilities.
For the IAFF and its members, September 11th changed everything.
The 343 firefighters, who made the ultimate sacrifice that day and
rescued tens of thousands of civilians from the hellish carnage of the
World Trade Center tragedy, are our brothers, as are the thousands of
fire fighters who responded to the terrorist attacks in New York and at
the Pentagon.
Since that day, our organization has dedicated itself to a single
mission: building a living memorial to these fallen heroes. In tribute
to them, I come before you to day to ask your assistance in protecting
our homeland security, enhancing the safety of our nation's fire
fighters, and ensuring that our nation's fire service is prepared to
respond to any and all challenges we may face in the future.
For nearly 100 years, IAFF members have been protecting the
citizens of our nation from all hazards. We are the first on the scene
when there are incidents involving hazardous materials, we are the
nation's primary providers of emergency medical care, and we are the
ones who search for and rescue people who are trapped and in danger.
And now, in addition to these traditional responsibilities, we are
also on the frontlines in the war against terrorism. While we all pray
that the tragedies of last Fall will never be repeated, in a larger
sense every day is September 11th for our nation's fire fighters. Every
time the alarm goes off, we steel ourselves to the possibility that we
are responding to the latest act of terror. In this first war of the
21st Century, the battle lines are drawn in our own communities and
firefighters are, and will continue to be, our nation's first line of
defense.
THE NEEDS
If we are to be successful in protecting America, fire departments
must have adequate resources. Sadly, as of today, we do not. Far too
many departments across the nation lack even the most basic levels of
training, equipment and manpower. While the federal government has
broad responsibilities in defending our nation against acts of
terrorism, from the perspective of front line fire fighters, few roles
are more important than ensuring local emergency responders have the
staffing, equipment, and training they need to fulfill their mission.
Personnel
The first and foremost need of the fire service is adequate
personnel. Across our nation, two-thirds of all fire departments--large
and small--operate with inadequate staffing. In order to come into
compliance with accepted industry standards, the International
Association of Fire Chiefs has estimated that 75,000 new fire fighters
are needed.
Far too many fire departments attempt to respond to emergency
incidents with three or even two fire fighters on a piece of apparatus.
Not only is this response below industry norms as identified by the
National Fire Protection Association, but responding with two or three
fire fighters doesn't even meet OSHA standards for safe fireground
operations. Quite simply, attempting to respond to an emergency call
with less than four fire fighters endangers the lives of those fire
fighters, as well as the public they protect.
Congress would never allow our Army to engage in a war with two-
thirds of its divisions understaffed. Incredibly, this is exactly what
we are asking our local fire departments to do in this current war on
our home soil.
Inadequate staffing also endangers our military assets and
threatens national security. Few of the federal fire departments that
protect domestic military installations comply with DOD's directives
for minimum staffing levels. Base commanders are faced with an
untenable choice between mandating overtime for a group of fire
fighters who normally work 72 hours per week or ignoring DOD safety
directives.
Equipment
The second need of the fire service is equipment. Recently, the
IAFF, which represents more than 90 percent of all the professional
fire departments in the nation, conducted a survey of our State
Associations. Twenty-two states participated in the survey,
representing 1364 fire departments.
Among the survey findings were:
--43 percent of fire departments are in need of additional turnout
gear (i.e., coats, gloves, helmets, and boots).
--50 percent of fire departments are in need of additional
respirators.
--70 percent of fire departments do not have adequate maintenance
programs for their protective gear
--66 percent of fire departments are in need of better communications
equipment.
Our bleak survey results were validated by the analysis of last
year's FIRE Act data. Of the approximately 30,000 grant requests
submitted last year for the six eligible categories, 27,384 were for
the three categories of personal protective equipment, fire fighting
equipment, and vehicles. The 27,384 grant requests in these three areas
accounted for $2.71 billion. Less than 5 percent of those grant
requests were awarded.
One of our members who served as a grant evaluator told me that he
literally shed tears during the evaluation process when they were
forced to deny requests to replace 15-year-old threadbare turnout coats
that are shared by several fire fighters because there were many other
departments in worse circumstances. It is a deplorable situation when
fire fighters who possess barely functional equipment must consider
themselves the lucky ones.
And beyond the need for basic equipment, there is a tremendous need
for advanced hazmat equipment, in particular hazmat detecting
equipment. As the IAFF has become increasingly involved in WMD
emergency response, we have grown increasingly concerned that the
greatest threat to our safety comes not from sophisticated nuclear
devices launched by foreign nations, but from so-called ``dirty bombs''
that utilize a conventional explosion to release radioactive material.
With minimal technical expertise, anyone with access to agricultural
fertilizer could unleash an atomic nightmare on our soil.
In the event of such a dirty bomb detonation, calls to 9-1-1 will
only report an explosion and fire. Fire fighters responding to the
scene will be completely unaware of the radiological contamination
dispersed miles beyond ground zero. For years we have been told that it
is the job of the military, with their specialized training and
sophisticated monitoring devices, to respond to such incidents. But the
reality is that these military teams, as capable as they are, could be
hours away. Meanwhile, the fire fighters are on the scene within
minutes. It is vital that all first responders have monitoring devices
and training to use them. When fire fighters are made aware of the
radiological dangers, we can take the appropriate precautions to limit
our exposure so that we can begin to conduct rescue and decontamination
missions.
Training
The third leg of the triad is training. Far too many jurisdictions
lack the funds to hire training instructors, purchase training
equipment, or have access to training facilities. As a consequence,
fire departments in these jurisdictions do not provide new fire
fighters with the basic level of training identified by the National
Fire Protection Association as necessary to perform the job safely and
effectively. Throughout the nation, there are fire fighters who are
essentially receive on-the-job training. This is a situation that
endangers not only the lives of the new fire fighters, but their fellow
fire fighters and the public that they are sworn to protect.
While basic fire fighter training is a need for many fire fighters,
almost all fire fighters need additional training in hazmat and weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) response and mitigation. A terrorist attack
using biological, chemical or nuclear materials threatens our nation as
never before. September 11th, Oklahoma City, and other terrorist acts
have demonstrated that these madmen will employ appallingly unthinkable
measures to achieve their goals.
In fact, just a few short weeks after September 11th, our nation
experienced its first biological terrorism when anthrax was mailed
targeting elected officials and the media. During those frantic days in
October, thousands of frightened Americans called their local fire
department to report suspicious white powder, quickly overwhelming the
capability of all dedicated hazmat crews. As a result, it was left to
frontline fire fighters who have never had any sort of biological
response training to respond to these calls. It is now clear that all
fire fighters need operations level WMD/hazardous materials response
training.
SOLUTIONS
To address these critical needs of the fire service, the IAFF calls
on this committee to provide adequate resources to both existing
programs and proposed initiatives designed to provide funding to local
fire departments. The IAFF believes that two principles should guide
this committee as it decides the course of Homeland Security. One,
priority should be given to programs that have a proven track record of
success. Two, money targeted to assist first responders must be used
for first responders and not for any other purposes.
First and foremost, funding must be provided to increase fire
department staffing. Just as the federal government has provided
funding to hire police officers and teachers to meet pressing local
needs, it must now provide resources to assure adequate emergency
response capabilities. In addition, funding must be provided to the
Department of Defense earmarked for hiring additional fire fighters to
protect military installations.
Legislation modeled after the highly successful COPS program was
introduced last year by Senators Chris Dodd and John Warner to address
the severe staffing shortage in our nation's fire departments. The
SAFER Fire Fighters Act would provide funding directly to both paid and
volunteer fire departments to hire additional personnel. In addition,
we understand the Senate Commerce Committee is developing a
comprehensive fire service proposal that will include a staffing
component. Whichever vehicle is ultimately deemed most appropriate, we
urge this committee to provide adequate funding to ensure that these
programs are able to meet their objectives.
To address the need for equipment and training, we urge this
committee to fully fund both the FIRE Act and the Administration's
first responder proposal. The FIRE Act has proven especially
successful, and we join with other fire service organizations in
praising the Federal Emergency Management Agency in their
administration of the program. We are of course aware, Mr. Chairman, of
your leadership in securing the initial $100 million in fiscal year
2001, as well as the $360 million appropriated for fiscal year 2002.
For this we are indebted to you.
Today we ask that you fulfill the promise made by Congress last
year in reauthorizing the FIRE Act. Public Law 107-107 increased the
authorized level for the FIRE Act to $900 million per year. There is
clearly the need to justify fully funding the FIRE Act, and we are
confident that FEMA is capable of assuring the money will be used to
meet the most pressing Homeland Security needs.
We also ask that you provide adequate funding for a
counterterrorism program, along the lines of the Administration's First
Responder proposal. There is tremendous need for a program to provide
terrorism-specific training and equipment to local emergency response
agencies. Specifically, we fully endorse the program's emphasis on
mutual aid response, and inter-jurisdictional, inter-discipline
training and exercises. Far too often, emergency response operations
are hindered because various responding agencies have little means to
communicate and coordinate their efforts. Rather than resulting in
enhanced public safety, the convergence of numerous emergency response
agencies often results in chaos.
After the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, evaluations
conducted by emergency planning organizations identified lack of
communication between police helicopters and the incident commander as
a significant impediment to effective response. Tragically, this exact
same lack of communication hindered our response on September 11th.
While we find much to laud in the Administration's First Responder
proposal, we also have some concerns about the initiative as proposed.
First, we disagree with the OMB proposal to merge the FIRE Act into the
First Responder program. The FIRE Act and the First Responder proposal
serve different purposes and one should not subsume the other. The FIRE
Act funds the basic needs of fire departments, including basic personal
protective gear, firefighting equipment, training, and apparatus. The
President's First Responder proposal is for terrorism response, which
is a specialized and advanced mission of the fire service. As a result,
we urge this committee to retain the FIRE Act and the First Responder
proposal as separate and distinct programs.
Additionally, we are concerned about the Administration's
recommendation to designate 25 percent of the funding for use by state
agencies. We recognize that states have a role in terrorism
preparedness and response. However, we worry that without explicit
instructions directing states to use the money for terrorism
preparedness, states will divert a portion of the funds to offset their
budget shortfalls. We urge the committee to establish safeguards so
that funds intended for first responders are used for this purpose.
Finally, we urge this committee to assure adequate funding for
several existing fire fighter training programs. The federal government
currently provides funding to prepare first responders to meet a
variety of specific threats. The Department of Transportation maintains
a training program for emergency response to incidents involving
hazardous cargo on our nation's highways and railways; the Department
of Energy provides specialized training for fire fighters who protect
nuclear weapons installations; the Environmental Protection Agency
funds training for fire fighters who respond to incidents at Superfund
sites; and, perhaps most significantly, the Department of Justice
operates the nation's premier program to train emergency responders in
the unique threats posed by weapons of mass destruction.
The IAFF is involved in many of these training programs. It was
more than 15 years ago that IAFF recognized the need for a more
effective way to train fire fighters, and we decided to develop a
hazardous materials training program based on the simple premise that
the best people to train fire fighters are fire fighters and the best
place to train fire fighters is in their own communities. To make this
concept a reality, we recruited a highly dedicated cadre of certified
fire service instructors who are also front line fire fighters with
hazardous material expertise. And we developed a curriculum designed so
that it can be adapted to incorporate the unique challenges facing each
community.
Perhaps most importantly, our partnerships with federal agencies
enables us to provide this expert training at little cost to the local
community. We make this training available to all fire departments-
professional and volunteer alike-free of charge.
Since its inception, the IAFF training program has directly trained
over 35,000 fire fighters and reached over three-quarters of a million
fire fighters through its innovative train-the-trainer program. The
Department of Justice has designated the IAFF training program as the
prerequisite for all advance WMD fire fighter training, and the IAFF's
curriculum has been formally adopted by 40 states.
As you can tell, Mr. Chairman, I am quite proud of our training
program. But we face one significant problem: a lack of resources.
Since September 11, the demand for our training program far outpaces
the funding available to deliver it. We encourage this committee to
fully fund those existing training programs that have proven their
value to first responders.
Equally important as funding these diverse training programs is
retaining their current structure. We are concerned that the legitimate
goal of identifying a lead federal agency to coordinate
counterterrorism activities could lead to merging or dismantling
programs that make unique contributions to Homeland Security. For
example, the Administration's proposal to place the Department of
Justice WMD program under FEMA jeopardizes one of the nation's most
successful counterterrorism efforts.
We support the Administration's plan to designate FEMA as the lead
agency for terrorism response. We believe FEMA's role, however, should
be to function as an information and resources clearinghouse so that it
can assist local governments in getting the support they need from
various federal agencies. Attempting to consolidate all existing
terrorism training programs under a single agency would ultimately
prove counterproductive.
The Department of Justice WMD program and the other myriad
emergency response training programs should be encouraged to continue
their unique contributions to Homeland Security.
conclusion
For too long, the fire service has been neglected when it comes to
allocating resources to protect our Homeland. Yet, we are the ones who
too often make the ultimate sacrifice in defense of our nation. While
we continue to focus our attention on the events in Afghanistan and
other parts of the world, we must not forget that the fire service
stands guard, day-in and day-out, protecting our communities and our
nation.
The federal government, including Congress and the Administration,
has begun to recognize that firefighters are the lynchpin to an
effective and strong homeland security. The firefighters of the IAFF
will be ready when the next alarm rings or when terrorists strike
again. But our ranks are thin and reinforcements are needed quickly.
Congress must follow through and provide the resources to ensure
that fire fighters have adequate staffing, proper training, and the
right equipment to do their job. Our organization will never forget the
sacrifice of 343 members on September 11th. Hopefully their sacrifice
and heroism will be the catalyst for the federal government to embrace
its responsibility and provide the resources to allow our members to do
their job safely and effectively.
Thank you for this time to present the view of the IAFF. I will be
available for questions by the committee.
Biographical Sketch of Michael J. Crouse
Michael J. Crouse serves as the Chief of Staff of the International
Association of Fire Fighters, reporting to IAFF General President
Harold A. Schaitberger and managing the day-to-day operations of the
252,000-member union's headquarters and staff.
Mr. Crouse joined the IAFF staff in September 2000 after a long and
distinguished career as a federal fire fighter and union leader. Mr.
Crouse served on the IAFF's Executive Board as the 16th District Vice
President, representing all IAFF Federal Fire Fighters at federal
facilities across the United States and Canada. He was then appointed
by President Schaitberger to assume the union's top staff position.
Mr. Crouse spent 17 years as a federal fire fighter with Coltsneck,
NJ Local F-147 and Portsmouth Shipyard, ME Local F-123, where he served
as local union president for 10 years. Mr. Crouse also served as
President of the Federal Fire Fighters Joint Council.
Mr. Crouse was elected to International office as 16th District
Vice President 10 years ago and he held that position until his
appointment as IAFF Chief of Staff.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Crouse, for a very effective
and persuasive and informative statement. The firefighters can
be proud of your presentation.
Mr. Stittleburg.
STATEMENT OF PHILIP STITTLEBURG, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
VOLUNTEER FIRE COUNCIL, AND VOLUNTEER FIRE
CHIEF, LaFARGE, WISCONSIN
Mr. Stittleburg. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity
to be here today, and I shall heed your admonition.
I would like to tell you where the volunteer fire service
fits into the overall picture. There are about 800,000
volunteer firefighters in the United States. About 90 percent
of all fire departments in the United States are volunteer.
About 75 percent of all firefighters in the United States are
volunteers, and we protect about 38 percent of the U.S.
population.
I mention that to you because it fits into my emphasis of
the importance of the Fire Act. The two gentlemen who preceded
me have already spoken to the importance of that. I will simply
echo that by saying that is unquestionably the most effective
and efficient method of delivering money from the Federal
Government directly to the departments that are in need.
I would offer just as substantiation of that, back when
that act was being developed there was some question as to
whether the fire service really needed funds, whether the fire
service was really listening. Well, sir, I would suggest to you
that the fact that in its very first year there were 31,295
grant requests from 18,915 fire departments--that is about two-
thirds of the fire departments in the United States putting in
grants in its very first year--and those grants totalled nearly
$3 billion, the grant requests, and there was $100 million
disbursed, indicates the depth of the need.
I would also suggest to you, sir, that the importance of
the fact that 1,379 of those grants were to communities under
20,000 indicates the significance those grants have to the
volunteer fire service.
The President has proposed his first responder initiative,
and indicated a $3\1/2\ billion funding for that. we certainly
are encouraged by that, because we understand that the
President's commitment to encouraging people to volunteer is a
part of that, and we support that.
However, our understanding is that the proposal is that the
Fire Act would be eliminated and rolled into this first
responder initiative, and I would suggest to you that is the
worst possible mistake that could be made. The Government has
demonstrated that it has the ability to deliver the funds that
our people need quickly, directly, and with an absolute minimum
of administrative cost and time involved. We are greatly in
need of that.
The presumption, as I understand it, is that the Fire Act
pretty much took care of equipping the first responders to
their basic need level, and now the first responder initiative
will work on a more regional level. Regionalization makes sense
financially, it makes sense tactically, if the underlying
assumption that the first responders are already properly
outfitted and equipped and trained is valid. It is not, and it
is the Fire Act funds that will enable us to gain that level of
preparedness.
Thank you, sir.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Philip C. Stittleburg
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Phil
Stittleburg and I am Chairman of the National Volunteer Fire Council
(NVFC). The NVFC represents the interests of the nation's nearly
800,000 volunteer firefighters, who staff over 90 percent of America's
fire departments. I have served in the volunteer fire service for the
last 30 years and have been the Chief of the LaFarge Volunteer Fire
Department in Wisconsin for the last 25 years. I have had experiences
in all phases of the first responder community, including chemical and
hazardous materials incidents, information management, EMS, rescue and
fire.
In addition to serving as NVFC Chairman, I have represented the
NVFC on a variety of standards-making committees, including ones that
set industry standards on firefighter health and safety. I also serve
on the National Fire Protection Association's Board of Directors and I
am an adjunct instructor for the National Fire Academy. I earn my
livelihood as an attorney, which includes serving as an Assistant
District Attorney on a half-time basis for the last 28 years. These
positions give me an excellent opportunity to work in emergency
services in both the law enforcement and fire service professions. On
behalf of the volunteer fire service, I appreciate the opportunity to
comment on needs and challenges we face.
According to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA),
nearly 75 percent of all firefighters are volunteers. In most years
more than half of the firefighters that are killed in the line of duty
are volunteers. In addition to the obvious contribution that volunteer
firefighters lend to their communities as the first arriving domestic
defenders, these brave men and women represent a significant cost
saving to taxpayers, a savings sometimes estimated to be as much as $60
billion.
September 11, 2001 is a date that will be long remembered for the
horrible losses our nation suffered, including the loss of so many of
our brothers and sisters in the emergency services. September 11th will
also be remembered for the heroics of those brave men and women who ran
into the World Trade Center to render aid to their fellow New Yorkers,
those who valiantly fought the raging fire at the Pentagon in
Arlington, VA, and the fire companies who responded to the Somerset
County, PA plane crash. Volunteer fire, rescue, EMS, and technical
specialty teams answered and responded on that fateful day at Somerset
and the Pentagon incidents and provided backup support to many
departments who responded to the World Trade Center. Finally, September
11th will be remembered for ushering in America's new all out war
against terrorism at home and abroad.
The September 11th tragedies in New York, Arlington, Virginia and
Southwestern Pennsylvania made it clear to all Americans that the fire
service is the first responder to all terrorist attacks this country
may face. Administration officials and Members of Congress continue to
warn Americans of a ``clear and present danger'' of follow-up terrorist
attacks. The question now is when and where, not if, the next terrorist
attack will occur. As America's domestic first responders, the fire
service will be on the front lines of any incident and must be prepared
to respond to and defend our citizens from the ravages of terrorist
attacks using conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction. This
expands our normal services beyond the delivery of fire, EMS, rescue,
and technical specialty services to our citizens. These services
already have time and training demands that are escalating annually.
America's fire and emergency services are in need of your
assistance and you, as Members of the United States Senate, can make a
difference by partnering with the fire service to give America's
domestic defenders the tools they need to help fight this new war.
One of the largest problems faced by America's volunteer fire
service is funding. Many volunteer fire departments struggle to provide
their members with adequate protective clothing, safety devices and
training to protect their communities, as mandated by regulations and
standards. These fire companies, in towns across America, are being
asked to respond to emergency calls involving hazardous materials,
structural fire suppression, search and rescue, natural disasters,
wildland fires, emergency medical services, and terrorism.
Many of these emergencies occur at federal facilities and buildings
and on federal lands. In addition, these incidents can damage America's
critical infrastructure, including our interstate highways, railroads,
bridges, tunnels, financial centers, power plants, refineries, and
chemical manufacturing and storage facilities. We as a fire service are
sworn to protect these critical facilities and infrastructure.
In these difficult times, while volunteer fire departments are
already struggling to handle their own needs and finances, they are now
forced to provide more services. Often, local governments are unable to
afford the extensive training and specialized equipment that these
activities require.
The funding problems in America's volunteer fire service are not
just limited to rural areas. As suburbs continue to grow, so does the
burden on the local fire and EMS department. Even though many of these
departments have the essentials, they are unable to gain access to new
technologies. At no other time have advances been greater in equipment
to protect them and make their jobs safer. Yet because the newer
technology is so expensive, many volunteer fire departments are forced
to forgo the purchase of the new technology or use outdated equipment.
Long before the terrorist attacks of September 11th, the national
fire service organizations began working together to enhance readiness
and increase funding levels for programs related to America's fire
departments. Many Members of Congress have been with us since day one
and have fought hard for improvement in the fire service.
Unfortunately, it has taken a horrible tragedy for all of America to
fully appreciate the risks our firefighters and EMS personnel take on a
daily basis and the level to which they need to be prepared.
The following are the funding priorities of America's volunteer
fire service:
First and foremost, Congress needs to fully fund the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Assistance to Firefighters Grant
Program. Thanks to your leadership Mr. Chairman, and the leadership of
many of your colleagues in both Houses and on both sides of the aisle,
Congress took a giant step in addressing the needs of America's fire
service by creating this grant program and funding it at the $100
million level in fiscal year 2001. Every fire department across the
country was eligible for funding for safety and firefighting equipment,
apparatus, training, prevention, and wellness and fitness programs.
In the first year of the program, the U.S. Fire Administration
(USFA) and FEMA received 31,295 grant applications from 18,915 fire
departments totaling $2.99 billion in requests. In the end, USFA/FEMA
awarded 1,855 competitive grants to local fire departments, including
1,375 to volunteer and combination fire departments. In addition, 1,379
grants totaling $55,377,798 were awarded in communities with
populations below 20,000 people. Many of these were rural volunteer
fire departments that struggle the most to provide their members with
adequate protective gear, safety devices and training to protect their
communities.
Again, thanks to your leadership Chairman Byrd, the funding for the
program was increased to a total of $360 million in fiscal year 2002
and the application period for this year's grants closed on April 5.
This increase in funding has allowed FEMA to add fire department based
emergency medical services (EMS) as an eligible category this year. EMS
calls continue to be the fastest growing burden on local fire
departments and these new grants will help to ease that burden and
prepare local departments for a terrorist event. Late last year,
Congress also passed a reauthorization of the FEMA Assistance to
Firefighters Grant Program for $900 million for each of the fiscal
years 2002 through 2004.
This direct grant program has proved to be the most effective
program to date in providing local volunteer and career fire
departments not only with the tools they need to perform their day-to-
day duties, but it has also enhanced their ability to respond to large
disasters as well. As we move to prepare for terrorist incidents at
home, we must first make sure that local fire departments have the
basic tools they need to do their jobs on a daily basis, before we can
ask them to be fully prepared to respond to terrorist incidents. In
addition, this program has been successful because it is the only
federal program that provides funding directly to fire departments. Far
too often federal funds intended to aid fire departments are diverted
to other uses by state and local officials.
Although the fire service is very pleased that the President's
fiscal year 2003 budget request includes over $3.5 billion to assist
our nation's first responders, we are concerned that the budget
recommendation would negatively impact the Assistance to Firefighters
Grant Program. The administration has proposed to consolidate this
grant program into a completely new state-based block grant initiative
called the First Responder Initiative.
We wholeheartedly appreciate the Administration's commitment to
provide training, equipment, and planning to the nation's firefighters
through the First Responder Initiative. We look forward to working with
the Administration to assure that this new counter-terrorism initiative
is successful and positively impacts local fire departments in suburban
and rural communities. However, we believe that it would be
counterproductive for the new First Responder program to replace the
valuable and proven Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program.
Therefore, on behalf of America's volunteer fire service, I
strongly urge Congress to fully fund the vital Assistance to
Firefighters Grant Program at the full authorized level of $900 million
and keep it as a separate and distinct program under the Federal
Emergency Management Agency.
Terrorism and hazardous materials response training and equipment
are of vital importance to America's fire service. Even the best-
prepared localities lack adequate resources to respond to the full
range of terrorist threats this country faces. Many jurisdictions,
especially those in rural and suburban areas protected by volunteers,
have little or no capability to respond to terrorist attacks using
weapons of mass destruction.
As I mentioned, the Administration has proposed a program called
the First Responder Initiative, which will spend $3.5 billion in fiscal
year 2003 to dramatically enhance the homeland security response
capabilities of America's local fire, EMS, and police departments. This
program, which would be administered through FEMA's Office of National
Preparedness, will allocate approximately $105 million for planning, $2
billion for equipment, $1.1 billion for training, and $245 million for
exercises. The National Volunteer Fire Council fully supports the
financial commitment the Administration has made in its budget for
first responders and we ask Congress to do the same.
However, the NVFC is concerned about the possibility that a large
portion of this new funding for equipment and training will get bogged
down in state agencies and will not get down to the local fire
departments that need it most. In addition, although we understand the
special needs and concerns of America's large metropolitan areas,
Congress and FEMA cannot forget smaller communities, whose fire, rescue
and EMS personnel also need the basic training and equipment to
recognize and respond to these incidents. While these communities may
not seem to be prime terrorist targets, it is this very perception that
makes them especially vulnerable.
In a March 27 speech in Greenville, South Carolina, President Bush
said, ``homeland security in the heartland is just as important as
homeland security in the big cities.'' We fully agree with the
President and we look forward to working with the Congress and FEMA to
ensure that these concerns are addressed and that this program is a
success.
Our nation's forests and wildlands are a critical part of America's
infrastructure. The volunteer fire service, in cooperation with our
Federal and State partners, plays a key role in fire suppression in
communities adjacent to federal and state lands. The U.S. Forest
Service's Volunteer Fire Assistance Program and the Department of
Interior Rural Fire Assistance Program focus on building the
community's capacity to lessen local vulnerability to risks associated
with wildland fires and should be supported by Congress.
The Volunteer Fire Assistance Program provides assistance, through
the states, to volunteer fire departments to improve communication
capabilities, increase wildland fire management training, and purchase
protective fire clothing and firefighting equipment. The 50/50 matching
grants are for fire departments that protect populations fewer than
10,000 people. The administration has proposed $13.3 million for this
program in fiscal year 2003 and the NVFC fully supports funding at this
level.
The Department of Interior Rural Fire Assistance Program is aimed
at enhancing the fire protection capabilities of rural fire districts
in the wildland-urban interface and around Department of Interior
lands. The program assists with training, equipment purchase, and
prevention activities, on a 90/10 cost-share basis. The rural fire
department must serve a community with a population of 10,000 or less.
The Administration has proposed $10 million for this program in fiscal
year 2003 and the NVFC fully support this request.
Another critical need in America's volunteer fire service is the
recruitment and retention of volunteer personnel. Over the past 20
years the volunteer fire service has seen its ranks decrease by nearly
15 percent. Major factors contributing to the problem of recruiting and
retaining volunteers include but are not limited to constant
fundraising demands, increase in emergency calls, more rigorous
training standards, and people working further away from the
communities in which they live.
In the President's State of the Union address, he encouraged all
Americans to commit to service of their neighbors and their nation by
becoming volunteers. He also laid out a plan to create a new Citizen
Corps, as part of the First Responder Initiative, which would utilize
volunteers to identify threats and respond to emergencies, including
much-feared biological or chemical attacks. The Citizen Corps will
enable Americans to volunteer to participate directly in homeland
security efforts in their own communities. Community-based Citizen
Corps Councils will help drive local involvement in Citizen Corps,
developing community action plans, assessing possible threats,
identifying local resources and coordinating other Citizen Corps
programs. These Councils will include leaders from fire and emergency
medical services, law enforcement, businesses and other community-based
institutions.
The volunteer fire service and the NVFC look forward to playing a
large role in this program and we hope that the Citizen Corps will
serve as a strong recruitment tool for local volunteer fire
departments. The Bush Administration has proposed more than $230
million in funding in their fiscal year 2003 budget for this program
and the NVFC encourages Congress to support this funding.
When I began my testimony today, I stated that the fire service is
in need of your assistance and that you, as Members of the United
States Senate, could make a difference with the necessary funding. I
hope that I have painted a picture that illustrates that the need is
real and that the continued support of the fire service by Congress is
indeed a national concern.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your time and your attention to the
views of America's fire service, and I would be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
Biographical Sketch of Philip C. Stittleburg
Phil Stittleburg joined the volunteer fire service in 1972 and has
served as Chief of the LaFarge (WI) Fire Department for 25 years. Phil
is also legal counsel to the NVFC, the LaFarge Fire Department and the
Wisconsin State Firefighters Association. Phil has represented the NVFC
on numerous National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards
making committees, including ones that set industry standards on
firefighter health and safety. He served as the NVFC Foundation
President for twelve years and is a current member of the NFPA Board of
Directors. Phil is an adjunct instructor at the National Fire Academy
and a regular contributor to Fire Chief Magazine.
Phil earns his livelihood as an attorney, which includes serving as
an Assistant District Attorney on a half-time basis for the last 28
years. These positions give him an excellent opportunity to work in
emergency services in both the law enforcement and fire service
professions.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Stittleburg, for your good
statement.
Colonel Westphal.
STATEMENT OF COLONEL LONNIE WESTPHAL, CHIEF, COLORADO
STATE PATROL, REPRESENTING THE
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF
POLICE
Colonel Westphal. Good morning, Chairman Byrd, and thank
you very much, members of the committee. I am pleased to be
here today on behalf of the International Association of Chiefs
of Police. As you may know, the IACP is the world's oldest and
largest organization of law enforcement executives founded in
1894, with the current membership exceeding 19,000. Our mission
throughout the history of our association has been to address
urgent law enforcement issues and to develop policies,
programs, training, and technical assistance to help solve
these issues.
As I appear before you today, combatting terrorism looms as
the most urgent issue facing our members and the communities
that they serve. In my written statement I highlighted the need
for improvements in information-sharing among Federal, State,
and local law enforcement, and the needs of State and local law
enforcement agencies in areas such as antiterrorism training,
communications technology, emergency response equipment, and
manpower needs. However, in the interests of time, I would like
to focus on the administration's proposed budget for fiscal
year 2003, and the IACP's view of the impact on the ability of
State and local law enforcement to play an active role in the
war against terrorism.
Ensuring that State and local law enforcement agencies are
fully engaged in this effort is vital to our success. In our
society, an enormous degree of responsibility and authority for
public security is delegated to local government, particularly
to the police agencies. As the September 11 attacks
demonstrated, the local police and other public safety
personnel will often be the first responders to a terrorist
attack. However, the role of State and local law enforcement
agencies is not limited to responding to terrorist attacks.
These agencies can and must play a vital role in the
investigation and prevention of future terrorist attacks.
Across the United States, there are more than 16,000 State
and local law enforcement agencies. These agencies, and the
700,000 officers they employ, daily patrol the streets of our
cities and towns, and as a result, have an intimate knowledge
of the communities they serve, and have developed close
relationships with the citizens they protect.
These relationships provide State and local law enforcement
agencies with the ability to effectively track down information
related to terrorists. Often, State and local agencies can
accomplish this task in a more effective way and timely fashion
than their Federal counterparts, who may be unfamiliar with the
community and its citizens. In addition, police officers on
every-day patrol, making traffic stops, answering calls for
service, performing community policing activities, and
interacting with the citizens, can, if properly trained in what
to look for and what questions to ask, be a tremendous source
of intelligence for local, State, and Federal homeland security
forces.
However, the events of September 11 and its aftermath have
placed an increased demand on law enforcement agencies. As
State and local law enforcement agencies adjust to their new
duties and responsibilities, it has become apparent that the
need for additional law enforcement personnel, which in some
communities existed prior to September 11, is even more urgent.
Departments around the Nation are discovering that meeting the
increased security needs of their communities has forced them
to significantly increase the amount of overtime that their
officers are working. As a result of this increase in overtime,
budgets have been stretched to the limit, with the result that
departments do not have the resources to acquire vitally needed
training and equipment. As a result of the increased burden
placed on State and local law enforcement, and the need for new
equipment, training, and manpower assistance, the IACP is
concerned that President Bush's fiscal year 2003 budget for the
Department of Justice proposes significant reductions in three
major State and local law enforcement assistance programs, the
Byrne grant program, the local law enforcement block grant, and
the COPS program.
In the current budget year, fiscal year 2002, these
programs in total received $2.154 billion. According to our
review of the President's proposed fiscal year 2003 budget,
these programs face a reduction in total funding of $753
million, a 35.5 percent cut from the fiscal year 2002 budget.
It must be noted that the Department of Justice has stated the
rationale behind these cuts in Byrne and the local law
enforcement block grants is that the majority of the
discretionary funds in these programs were already obligated by
legislative provisions which directed these funds be provided
to the specific agencies for specific projects. As a result of
these provisions, the flexibility that is crucial to the
success of this assistance program was minimized, and the
overall effectiveness of the program was reduced. While the
IACP understands and shares these concerns of the
administration of the loss of this flexibility, we do not
believe that reducing the funds available for these programs is
the appropriate response.
The IACP is concerned with the reductions in these three
vital State and local law enforcement assistance programs.
These programs have played an integral role in ensuring that
State and local law enforcement agencies are well-equipped,
well-trained, and staffed at an appropriate level. At this
crucial time, when State and local law enforcement agencies are
faced with new responsibilities and challenges, it is the
AECP's belief that the funding levels for these crucial
assistance programs should not be reduced.
In sharp contrast to the reductions proposed in the Justice
Department, State and local law enforcement assistance
programs, the proposed budgets for the Federal Emergency
Management Agency include the nearly $3.5 billion grant program
to assist State and local public safety agencies. According to
the administration, the proposed program, the first responder
grant program, is designed to assist State and local government
in preparing their response to terrorist attacks. While the
IACP completely supports the FRG program, we do not want it to
be funded at the expense of law enforcement's efforts to
prevent terrorist attacks on American citizens. It should be in
addition to current law enforcement funding.
In conclusion, I would like to offer the following
observations. In total, the administration's fiscal year 2003
budget includes approximately $4.9 billion to assist State and
local public safety agencies. Of that total, however, only
$1.38 billion is designated solely for law enforcement
purposes. This is a reduction of more than $750 million from
the current budget.
The IACP believes that at this crucial time in our history
we cannot afford to reduce the effectiveness of our Nation's
State and local law enforcement agencies. Over the last decade,
the funds provided by the Byrne grant, the local law
enforcement block grants, and the COPS program, have
dramatically increased the capabilities and effectiveness of
State and local law enforcement agencies. It is imperative that
departments continue to receive this assistance.
We have entered a new era for law enforcement. We are faced
with new and daunting challenges. We are asking more of our
officers, and our communities are turning to us for protection.
Only with Federal assistance funds that are specifically
targeted for law enforcement in its unique role can we hope to
successfully meet this challenge.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for
this opportunity to appear before you today, and I will be
willing to answer any questions at the end. Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Col. Lonnie J. Westphal
Good Morning, Chairman Byrd, Senator Stevens and members of the
Committee. I am pleased to be here today on behalf of the International
Association of Chiefs of Police. As you may know, the IACP is the
world's oldest and largest organization of law enforcement executives,
founded in 1894, and with a current membership exceeding 19,000. Our
mission, throughout the history of our association, has been to address
urgent law enforcement issues and to develop policies, programs,
training and technical assistance to help solve those issues. And as I
appear before you today, combating terrorism looms as the most urgent
issue facing our members and the communities they serve.
The initial response of law enforcement and other public safety
agencies in New York, Virginia, Pennsylvania and throughout the United
States to the terrible events of September 11th was outstanding.
Individuals around the world watched in admiration and astonishment as
police officers, firefighters and EMS technicians raced to assist the
victims of these attacks with little apparent regard to the danger they
themselves faced. On a broader scale, federal, state and local law
enforcement agencies immediately began working together in a massive
effort to respond to the attack and to prevent additional attacks.
However, in the weeks and months that have followed, it has become
apparent that the crucial partnership between federal, state and local
law enforcement is being hindered by difficulties in cooperation,
coordination and information sharing. This is unacceptable. Now, at a
time when communities across the United States are turning to their law
enforcement agencies for guidance and protection, we must do all that
we can to ensure that all law enforcement agencies work together and
overcome the artificial walls that sometimes divide us.
The IACP is certainly not alone in this belief. The Office of
Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of
Investigation and other federal agencies also realize how crucial
collaboration with state and local law enforcement is to the success of
their efforts, and they have taken several positive actions to address
this situation. For example, the FBI has recently formed a state and
local law enforcement advisory committee that is designed to foster
cooperation between the bureau and their local counterparts. In
addition, the IACP applauds the Office of Homeland Security's creation
of the Homeland Security Threat Advisory System. The IACP believes that
this system will provide state and local law enforcement executives
with a clearer understanding of the threat level confronting their
communities and the actions required of their agencies in response.
These actions have encouraged the IACP, and we look forward to
working with the Office of Homeland Security, the FBI and other federal
agencies to ensure greater cooperation and coordination between law
enforcement agencies at all levels of government.
ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
Ensuring that we are successful in this effort is vital because
state and local enforcement agencies must be fully engaged in the war
against terrorism. In our society, an enormous degree of responsibility
and authority for public security is delegated to local government,
particularly to police agencies. As the September 11th attacks
demonstrated, the local police and other public safety personnel will
often be the first responders to a terrorist attack. However, the role
of state and local law enforcement agencies is not limited to
responding to terrorist attacks. These agencies can and must play a
vital role in the investigation and prevention of future terrorist
attacks.
Across the United States, there are more than 16,000 state and
local law enforcement agencies. These agencies, and the 700,000
officers they employ, daily patrol the streets of our cities and towns
and, as a result, have an intimate knowledge of the communities they
serve and have developed close relationships with the citizens they
protect. These relationships provide state and local law enforcement
agencies with the ability to effectively track down information related
to terrorists. Often, state and local agencies can accomplish these
tasks in a more effective and timely fashion than their federal
counterparts, who may be unfamiliar with the community and its
citizens. In addition, police officers on everyday patrol, making
traffic stops, answering calls for service, performing community
policing activities, and interacting with citizens can, if properly
trained in what to look for and what questions to ask, be a tremendous
source of intelligence for local, state and federal homeland security
forces.
INFORMATION SHARING
However, in order to make use of this intelligence gathering
capability, it is vital that federal, state and local law enforcement
agencies develop an efficient and comprehensive system for the timely
sharing, analysis and dissemination of important intelligence
information. The IACP believes that failure to develop such a system
and the absence of guidance to law enforcement agencies on how
intelligence data can be gathered, analyzed, shared and utilized is a
threat to public safety and must be addressed. To that end, the IACP
urges the Administration and Congress to take the necessary steps to
develop a process that will promote intelligence-led policing and the
information exchange between law enforcement agencies. For example,
providing the resources necessary to assist the development of state
and local information and intelligence networks would greatly enhance
the ability of state and local law enforcement agencies to communicate
and access vital intelligence information of local interest in a rapid
and effective manner.
In addition, the IACP strongly urges the Administration and
Congress to provide the necessary resources to improve the integration
and compatibility of local, state, federal and international criminal
justice information systems. Coordination and integration of these
systems and the data they contain will greatly enhance the ability of
law enforcement agencies to quickly access the information necessary to
combat terrorism in our increasingly mobile society.
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
In addition to addressing this crucial information sharing issue,
there are other steps that the federal government can take to ensure
that state and local governments and their law enforcement agencies are
active and effective partners in homeland security efforts.
Although the primary mission of law enforcement agencies has always
been to ensure public safety, the events of September 11th have
dramatically and significantly changed the focus of law enforcement
operations. Suddenly, agencies and officers who have been trained and
equipped to deal with traditional crimes are now focused on
apprehending individuals operating with different motivations, who have
different objectives and who use much deadlier weapons than traditional
criminals. As a result, law enforcement agencies and officers will need
new training and new equipment to meet this new threat.
For example, state and local officers could greatly benefit from
training on topics such as:
1. Recognizing possible threats to public safety and terrorist
tactics;
2. Field interrogation techniques to better enable them to
recognize and respond to terrorist threats;
3. Federal immigration law, sources and documentation; and,
4. How to respond to biological, chemical and nuclear incidents.
As for equipment needs, it has become clear that law enforcement
agencies will need to obtain protective clothing and isolation
equipment for first responders. In addition, the increased demands
being placed on law enforcement agencies for investigations and
protective responsibilities means that they will also need to obtain
electronic surveillance equipment as well as security equipment for
guarding public buildings and critical infrastructure installations.
Finally, the events of September 11th and its aftermath have placed
an increased manpower demand on law enforcement agencies. As state and
local law enforcement agencies adjust to their new duties and
responsibilities, it has become apparent that the need for additional
law enforcement personnel, which in some communities existed prior to
September 11th, is even more urgent. Departments around the nation are
discovering that meeting the increased security needs of their
communities has forced them to significantly increase the amount of
overtime that their officers are working. As a result of this increase
in overtime, budgets have been stretched to the limit with the result
that departments do not have the resources to acquire vitally needed
training and equipment.
FISCAL YEAR 2003 PROPOSED BUDGET
As a result of the increased burden placed on state and local law
enforcement and the need for new equipment, training and manpower
assistance, the IACP is concerned that President Bush's fiscal year
2003 budget for the Department of Justice proposes significant
reductions in three major state and local law enforcement assistance
programs: the Byrne Grant program, the Local Law Enforcement Block
Grant, and, the COPS program. In the current budget year (fiscal year
2002), these programs, in total, received $2.154 billion. According to
our review of the President's proposed fiscal year 2003 budget, these
programs face a reduction in total funding of $753 million, a 35.5
percent cut from fiscal year 2002 budget. The proposed reductions are
achieved in the following fashion:
LLEBG & BYRNE
The Local Law Enforcement Block Grant (LLEBG) program and the Byrne
Grant program would be combined into a new initiative entitled the
Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program. In the current fiscal year 2002
budget, the combined funding level of the LLEBG program and the Byrne
Grant program was $994 million. The proposed funding level under the
JAG program is $800 million, a decrease of $194 million, or 20 percent
from the current combined funding level for the LLEBG and Byrne
Program.
It must be noted that the Department of Justice has stated that the
rationale behind these cuts is that the majority of the discretionary
funds in these programs were already obligated by legislative
provisions which directed that funds be provided to specific agencies
for specific projects. As a result of these provisions, the flexibility
that is crucial to the success of this assistance program was minimized
and the overall effectiveness of the program was reduced. While the
IACP understands and shares these concerns of the Administration over
the loss of this much needed flexibility, we do not believe that
reducing the funds available for these programs is the appropriate
response. Rather, the IACP believes that the solution lies in
addressing the proliferation of directed spending provisions and their
impact on the effectiveness of the program.
COPS OFFICE
In addition to the consolidation and reduction of the LLEBG and
Byrne Programs, the proposed budget for the Community Oriented Policing
Services (COPS) program will be significantly reduced. In the current
fiscal year 2002 Budget, the COPS office received $1.115 Billion. The
Administration's proposed budget reduces this amount by $533 million,
or approximately 48 percent. This reduction is achieved by eliminating
the law enforcement officer hiring grant program and by significantly
reducing the funds available for crime fighting technologies. It is
important to note that aside from $30 million that has been allocated
for the Police Corps program, no funds in the President's budget are
available to hire law enforcement officers. This is unfortunate since
the IACP believes that hiring and manpower related issues remain a top
priority for many state and local law enforcement agencies throughout
the nation. As a result, the IACP strongly believes that, at a minimum,
the Universal Hiring Program, administered by the COPS Office, should
be funded at a level consistent with the current budget.
The IACP is concerned with the reduction in these vital state and
local law enforcement assistance programs. These programs have played
an integral role in ensuring that state and local law enforcement
agencies are well equipped, well trained and staffed at an appropriate
level. At this crucial time when state and local law enforcement
agencies are faced with new responsibilities and challenges, it is the
IACP's belief that the funding levels for these crucial assistance
programs should not be reduced.
FEMA: FIRST RESPONDER GRANT PROGRAM
In sharp contrast to the reductions proposed to the Justice
Department's state and local law enforcement assistance programs, the
proposed budget for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
includes a new $3.5 billion grant program to assist state and local
public safety agencies. According to the Administration, this proposed
program, the First Responder Grant (FRG) program, is designed to assist
state and local government in preparing for terrorist attacks.
Under this proposal, the FRG program will receive $3.5 billion in
fiscal year 2003. These funds would be distributed among the states and
are intended to assist law enforcement, firefighting and emergency
medical service agencies in increasing their abilities to respond to
terrorist attacks. The funds would be distributed among the states on a
per capita basis, with each state receiving funds in proportion to the
size of its population. The funds received under this program could be
used to address costs in four main areas: training, planning,
equipment, and training exercises. However, like the DoJ JAG grants,
these funds could not be used to address personnel costs.
According to the Office of Homeland Security, all funds under the
FRG program would initially be provided to state governments. However,
within 30 days of the receipt of these funds, 75 percent of the total
funds received must be transferred from the state to regional/local
jurisdictions. The remaining 25 percent of funds received are
designated for use by the state government as the governor sees fit.
The governor of each state would be responsible for dividing the state
into regional/local jurisdictions that would be eligible to receive
grant funds. These regional and local units would be responsible for
assessing their needs and developing a plan to address them.
The IACP has several concerns with the FRG program. First and
foremost, FEMA has historically been a response agency, and the IACP is
very concerned that this grant program is more oriented towards
responding to terrorist attacks rather than preventing them from
happening in the first place. The IACP agrees that there is a vital
need to assist state and local public safety agencies in improving
their response capabilities, and we agree that FEMA should be closely
involved in that effort. However, unlike firefighters and emergency
medical technicians, law enforcement agencies are not concerned solely
with responding to terrorist attacks. IACP is concerned that by
proposing that the FRG be the primary assistance program to state and
local public safety agencies, the administration has overlooked the
unique role that law enforcement plays in anti-terrorist activities.
The IACP is also concerned about the role state and local law
enforcement executives will play in developing the regional/local
response plans and needs assessment. The IACP believes that it is
vitally important for law enforcement executives to be intimately
involved in this process.
Finally, the IACP is concerned that the decision to provide these
grant funds to state governments could lead to disparities among the
funds received by local communities. The IACP believes that small
communities, tribal nations, and other public safety agencies may be
overlooked in the planning and allocation process and as a result,
their capabilities would not be enhanced.
In conclusion, I would like to offer the following observations. In
total, the Administration's fiscal year 2003 budget included
approximately $4.9 billion to assist state and local public safety
agencies. Of that total, however, only $1.38 billion is designated
solely for law enforcement purposes. This is a reduction of more than
$750 million from the current budget. The IACP believes that at this
crucial time in our history, we cannot afford to reduce the
effectiveness of our nation's state and local law enforcement agencies.
Over the last decade, the funds provided by the Byrne Grant, the LLEBG
and the COPS program have dramatically increased the capabilities and
effectiveness of state and local law enforcement agencies. It is
imperative that departments continue to receive this assistance. We
have entered a new era for law enforcement, we are faced with new and
daunting challenges, we are asking more of our officers and our
communities are turning to us for protection. Only with a federal
assistance funds that are specifically targeted for law enforcement and
its unique role can we hope to successfully meet this challenge.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will be
glad to answer any questions you may have.
Biographical Sketch of Col. Lonnie J. Westphal
Lonnie J. Westphal, Fifth Vice President of the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, was appointed to the position of
Colonel, Chief of the Colorado State Patrol, in October of 1995. He has
served with the Colorado State Patrol since 1974.
Colonel Westphal holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Business
Administration from Colorado State University and a Masters degree in
Public Administration from the University of Denver. He served in the
U.S. Navy as Romanian Linguist at the National Security Agency from
1970-74.
Colonel Westphal is a graduate of the National Executive Institute
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (September 1988), as well as the
John F. Kennedy School of Government for Senior Executives at Harvard
University (July 1999).
Colonel Westphal has been a member of the board of the State Patrol
Protective Association as well as of the Colorado Council of Law
Enforcement Associations, and has also served as International Chair of
the Police Traffic Services Committee of the American Association of
Motor Vehicle Administrators. He is an active member of the
International Association of Chiefs of Police and a board member of the
National Commission Against Drunk Driving.
Originally from Cherokee, Iowa, Colonel Westphal currently resides
in Larkspur, Colorado, with his wife of 34 years. The Westphals have
two grown children.
The International Association of Chiefs of Police
The International Association of Chiefs of Police is the world's
oldest and largest nonprofit membership organization of police
executives, with over 19,000 members in over 100 different countries.
IACP's leadership consists of the operating chief executives of
international, federal, state and local agencies of all sizes.
Founded in 1893, the association's goals are to advance the science
and art of police services; to develop and disseminate improved
administrative, technical and operational practices and promote their
use in police work; to foster police cooperation and the exchange of
information and experience among police administrators throughout the
world; to bring about recruitment and training in the police profession
of qualified persons; and to encourage adherence of all police officers
to high professional standards of performance and conduct.
Since 1893, the International Association of Chiefs of Police has
been serving the needs of the law enforcement community. Throughout
those past 100-plus years, we have been launching historically
acclaimed programs, conducting ground-breaking research and providing
exemplary programs and services to our membership across the globe.
Professionally recognized programs such as the FBI Identification
Division and the Uniform Crime Records system can trace their origins
back to the IACP. In fact, the IACP has been instrumental in forwarding
breakthrough technologies and philosophies from the early years of our
establishment to now, as we approach the 21st century. From
spearheading national use of fingerprint identification to partnering
in a consortium on community policing to gathering top experts in
criminal justice, the government and education for summits on violence,
homicide, and youth violence, IACP has realized our responsibility to
positively effect the goals of law enforcement.
Even with such an esteemed history, we are continually initiating
programs to address the needs of today's law enforcement professionals.
Our members have let us know that they consider IACP to be a
progressive organization, successfully advancing the law enforcement
profession.
If you would like additional information about the IACP, please
contact IACP Headquarters at 1-800-THE-IACP (1-800-843-4227) or visit
our website at www.theiacp.org
Chairman Byrd. Thank you. Thank you very much. General
Alexander, representing the National Guard Association.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL RICHARD ALEXANDER, DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION
General Alexander. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Stevens, and distinguished committee members. On behalf of the
men and women of the National Guard, of the National Guard
Association of the United States, we sincerely thank you for
the opportunity to discuss the issues of homeland security and
the challenges facing the National Guard in this arena. I have
provided copies of my testimony for the record. However, with
your approval, I would like to submit an updated copy for the
record.
Chairman Byrd. That updated copy, without objection, will
be included in the record.
General Alexander. Thank you, sir.
Nearly 1,300 members of the National Guard were on duty in
support of the civilian first responders in New York by
September 13. State authorities in Virginia, Maryland, and the
District of Columbia mobilized roughly 1,200 guardsmen within
hours after the attack on the Pentagon. Since that time, more
than 14,000 members of the Army Guard and over 23,000 members
of the Air National Guard have been called to active duty in
service as a part of our Operation Enduring Freedom and Noble
Eagle.
In addition to that, many thousands have been called to
active duty under the command and control of their Governors.
More than 7,000 members of the National Guard provided airport
security across the country for the past 6 months. These
individuals required certain needs as a result of that, and I
would like to share that with the committee.
It is envisioned that significant portions of the National
Guard structure will be dual mission and apportioned to a soon-
to-be-appointed Commander in Chief of Northern Command. This
structure needs to be resourced dual-mission to accommodate the
requirements of other CINC's. It is anticipated that this
transformation within the National Guard will make available
additional high-demand units and, as a result, reduce the level
of operations tempo for those units being called upon time and
time again to perform missions at home and abroad. The National
Guard must be resourced to support activities in support of
local, State, and Federal homeland security vulnerability
assessments, funding implementation of defense countermeasures,
and participation in exercises designed to evaluate
preparedness.
The Governor's homeland security plan, based upon a decade-
long National Guard program model in which each State Governor
adopts and administers a program of full-time manning to
support law enforcement agencies would marshal broad resources
to best meet the needs of each State and territory. Within
prescribed national standards the guidelines enforced by the
National Guard and the Governor's plan for homeland security
should explicitly authorize the National Guard to engage in
interstate support consistent with the objective of sending and
receiving States' plans, thus encouraging regional and
interstate mutual aid agreements.
Further, the charter of the National Guard needs to be
amended to expand its unique role as a channel of communication
between the States and the national security authorities. This
expansion should provide for communications on homeland
security issues between several States and the support of CONUS
CINC, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary
of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security.
The homeland security missions of the National Guard must
be established as a multiyear funded program to ensure
continuity and sustain support for the CONUS CINC, local,
State, and Federal emergency responders. The National Guard
Bureau should be authorized to biannually submit a separate POM
for all missions falling within the National Guard's homeland
security responsibilities. We would hope the Congress should
appropriate these funds directly to the National Guard Bureau.
Currently, there is a shortfall of title 32 missions, a
funding of title 32 missions as a result of domestic homeland
security missions being performed across the country. This lack
of funding will have a direct impact on the ability of a
prolonged presence supporting homeland security. Many States
are paying for missions with funding dedicated for training,
thus impacting upon unit readiness.
Mr. Chairman, we ask the Congress to support our Governors
in meeting the challenges of securing and defending America's
homeland by establishing a policy of employing National Guard
units and personnel in title 32 status for missions that
involve augmenting non-Department of Defense Federal agencies
within a State's borders. The National Guard gratefully
acknowledges the actions taken by the committee to correct the
full-time manning challenges for the National Guard. However,
there is still a critical shortfall that needs to be addressed.
The Army has validated a plan to bring the National Guard
full-time manning personnel to an acceptable risk level of 71
percent of its required force by 2011. We ask this committee to
support a level of funding consistent with or greater than
fiscal year 2002 funding for full-time manning for the Army
National Guard. Since September 11 the civil support teams have
performed 333 operational missions at the request of civil
authorities. These responses range from sampling a known or
suspected hazard to providing technical expertise and advice to
local, State, and Federal agencies.
The civil support team is playing a crucial role for the
National Guard in homeland security. However, 23 States and
territories have yet been provided this valuable asset to
assist in bolstering the ability of the National Guard to
support civilian first responders. The National Guard
Association stands with the National Emergency Management
Association, the International Association of Emergency
Managers, and the Council of State Governors, in recommending
that the Congress complete the fielding with a minimum of one
civil support team in each State.
The need to provide a reliable, interoperable
communications system to allow first responders and National
Guardsmen the ability to effectively communicate is of utmost
importance. The hard lessons learned from September 11
demonstrates this need. Out-of-date FM communications systems
which utilize the line-of-sight capability were inoperable in
the urban canyons of New York City. The National Guard, along
with civilian authorities, was dependent upon donated
commercial systems provided by companies like Verizon and
Nextel. The lack of interoperable radios forced many
individuals to carry three different radios to communicate with
military and civilian authorities.
Combat air patrols conducted by the Air National Guard
taught some valuable lessons for communications. Equipping the
Air National Guard F-15's with VHF radios with a DHF radio
capability will allow communications with commercial airliners.
Upgrading and expanding the National Guard distributive
technology training project is necessary to ensure multiple
C\4\I operating sites necessary in our States. We badly need an
increased amount of UH-60 helicopters, high mobility combat
vehicles, to ensure the mobility of our force.
In closing, let me say, recently I had the pleasure of
talking with Major General George C. Garrett, the Commanding
General of the 42nd Infantry Division of the New York Army
National Guard. He and his soldiers have identified critical
areas where attention is needed to preempt future challenges
that relate to Army equipping, feeding and clothing, and
sheltering our soldiers and airmen. Their comments include the
need for manned portable power devices and tactical generators
to charge cell phones, light sets, and radios, alternative
fueled vehicles need to be given consideration as diesel and
gas vehicle supplies are targets.
Many soldiers purchased authorized enhanced inclement cold
weather equipment, and a great many were unable to pay out of
pocket for this same gear. A mechanism for an immediate fund
site for personnel needing clothing needs to be available. The
Guard needs to be provided with 9 millimeter service pistols,
adequate training, and ammunition to support homeland security
missions.
One little side note. Major General Garrett wanted me to
express his thanks and gratitude from the 42nd Infantry
Division to the first responders whom they worked with and
continue to work with.
Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the National Guard and our
soldiers and airmen, I thank the committee for allowing me the
opportunity to express their concerns in this area, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Major General Richard C. Alexander
The National Guard in Operations Enduring Freedom & Noble Eagle
On September 11th, 2001, the National Guard--already heavily
engaged with the 29th Infantry Division ready to rotate into Bosnia and
the 7th and 8th Air Expeditionary Force serving abroad--became more
decisively engaged in fulfilling its dual role as defenders of the
homeland.
The Air National Guard (ANG) was the ``first responders'' over
America's skies with the immediate launch of Air Defense Units and
general-purpose fighters from four separate sites. Within hours, 34
fighter and 18 tanker ``dual-missioned'' units were flying or
supporting Combat Air Patrols over the United States as part of a Total
Force effort--including Presidential Escort. Numerous alerted strategic
and tactical lift units (C-130, C-5, and C-141) began transportation of
blood, organs, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Federal
Bureau of Investigations (FBI), medical personnel, Civil Support Teams,
and heavy equipment.
Thousands of force protection and combat support requirements were
identified and generated in the first hours to include more than 70
security forces units, hundreds of civil engineers, 88 command and
control centers in all 54 states and territories, services support for
35 dining and alert facilities, Chaplains, communicators, and air
traffic controllers.
Nearly 3,800 members of the National Guard were on duty in New York
by September 13th. State authorities in Virginia, Maryland and the
District of Columbia mobilized roughly 1,200 Guardsmen were by within
hours after the attack on the Pentagon.
Today 170 New York and 150 New Jersey National Guardsmen are still
on state active duty at Ground Zero and providing security enhancements
on the Hudson River bridges.
Since that time, more than 10,000 members of the Army National
Guard (ARNG) and over 23,000 members of the Air National Guard have
joined their Army and Air Force Reserve (AFR) counterparts in being
called to active federal service as part of Operations Enduring Freedom
and Noble Eagle. For the Army National Guard this means providing
security at key facilities here in the United States and in Europe. For
the Air National Guard this has meant flying Combat Air Patrols over
American cities, and performing in-flight refueling, flying cargo and
countless other missions at home and abroad. And, it is particularly
important to note, both Army and Air National Guardsmen are also
participating in diverse operational aspects of the war on terrorism in
the Continental United States.
In addition to that, however, many thousands more have been called
to active duty under the command and control of their governors. There
are over 7,000 members of the National Guard providing airport
security. This Title 32 mission was created and authorized by the
President and is being properly carried out by the governors. In
addition, over 4,000 members of the National Guard from several states
bolstered security at the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City. Over 2,000
members of the National Guard are on duty providing security at
National Guard armories and other key facilities. And finally, an
additional 2,000 are on state duty, on orders and pay from state
governors to help meet the security or other requirements of the
states.
The National Guard took on its newest six-month mission in homeland
defense in early March providing 1,500 troops, from the Army Guard, to
assist U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and U.S. Customs
Service officials in eight states along the Canadian border and in the
four states along the Mexican border.
Maine, Vermont, New York, Michigan, North Dakota, and Washington
state Guard aviators also began conducting surveillance flights along
the Canadian border.
Transforming the National Guard
The National Guard, in accordance with its long-standing
integration with federal, state and local civil authorities, uniquely
connects every police station and firehouse to the Pentagon and every
state house with the White House. While there may be a need for
selected units and personnel to be dedicated primarily or even
exclusively for homeland security, that mission can be most effectively
and efficiently accomplished as a dual mission that complements,
enhances and draws its essential strength from the National Guard's
continued combat force structure, training and experience. To provide
for a common defense, we must reinforce the authority and increase the
homeland security response capability of the Governors of the several
states.
Current studies are ongoing within the Army to transform a portion
of the National Guard structure to accommodate emerging homeland
security missions. It is envisioned that significant portions of
National Guard structure will be dual-missioned and apportioned to a
soon to be appointed Commander in Chief (CINC) of Northern Command
(NORTHCOM). It is desirable that this structure be dual-missioned to
accommodate warfighting requirements of additional CINCs. This
transformation will require significant resourcing and the National
Guard Association looks forward to working with this committee in this
endeavor. It is anticipated that this transformation within the
National Guard will make available additional units of the type that
are being called upon continuously and, as a result, reduce the level
of operations tempo for the limited number of units being called upon
time and time again to perform missions at home and abroad.
The National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) request
the Congress where necessary, to authorize, support, equip and fund the
National Guard to assume significant homeland security
responsibilities. These responsibilities must be recognized as an
important mission but not the sole or primary mission of the National
Guard. Although there may be a need for selected units and personnel to
be specially missioned or resourced for these purposes, homeland
security can be most effectively and efficiently accomplished as a dual
mission that compliments, enhances and draws its essential strength
from the National Guard's continued combat force structure, training
and experience.
Specifically, the NGAUS urges implementation of the following key
tenets of a successful homeland security strategy:
The National Guard and its relationship with the states
Congress should authorize and fund a program for National Guard
execution of a Governor's Plan for Homeland Security.
Program oversight and resourcing would be provided by the National
Guard Bureau based on the decade-long National Guard counter-drug
program model in which each state's Governor adopts and administers a
program of full-time National Guard support (AGRs) for law enforcement
agencies. Within prescribed national standards and guidelines enforced
by the Bureau, the Governor's Plan for Homeland Security for each state
and territory would marshal Guard resources to best meet the unique
needs of each state and territory. The Army and Air National Guard must
be authorized to participate in activities in support of local, state
and federal homeland security vulnerability assessments, planning,
implementation of defensive counter-measures, and participation in
exercises designed to evaluate preparedness, as prescribed in the
approved Governor's Homeland Security Plan in each state. Army and Air
National Guard forces should explicitly be authorized to engage in
interstate support consistent with the objectives of the sending and
receiving states' Governor's Homeland Security Plan (this would
encourage regional and interstate mutual aid arrangements).
Congress should authorize and fund a program for organizing,
training and equipping National Guard units for dual mission Homeland
Security support for first responders.
Oversight of these homeland security missions should be provided by
the National Guard Bureau based on the long-standing Garden Plot model
in which National Guard units are trained and equipped to support civil
authorities in crowd control and civil disturbance missions. The
program should also authorize and fund National Guard training with
civil authorities, to include local first responders, to assure a
heightened state of collective preparedness for consequence management
of domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear or high yield
Events (CBRNE) events.
Congress should support the establishment of a joint state task
force in each state, territory and the District of Columbia that is
staffed appropriate to each mission and which is:
--Scalable in organizational structure and personnel in modular units
with a variable command structure dependent upon the size of
the task force; and
--Staffed by Army and Air National Guard soldiers and airmen and the
Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers from other federal
reserve components and the Coast Guard; and
--Commanded by a National Guard officer (in Title 10 ADSW status if
necessary to exercise command and control of Title 10 military
personnel who are added to the task force). The grade of the
National Guard task force commander should be determined by the
size and composition of the Task Force; and
--Under the tactical control (TACON) of the Adjutant General and, in
turn, the Governor in order to assure unity of command and
unity of purpose.
--Supportive of the state and federal response plans.
--The National Guard Plans, Operations & Military Support Officer
(POMSO) Office would provide the nucleus, planning and exercise
functions for the standing task force element.
The National Guard and its relationship with the federal
government
Make the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) a member of the
Federal Interagency Task Force. This group supports the integration of
the various federal agencies supporting homeland security. The CNGB,
serving as a conduit between the state adjutants general and the
Department of Defense, should included as member of the Federal
Interagency Task Force in order to best convey what assets are
available within the National Guard.
Congress should increase full-time support to the National Guard
military support offices of each state, territory and the District of
Columbia. Increase full-time National Guard homeland security staffing
at the National Guard Bureau and Joint Forces Command /CJTF-CS to
enable planning and execution of military support to the broad band of
civilian authorities that have a role in the homeland security mission
within the states.
WMD-CST is an important part of the homeland security mission,
however, the rapidly emerging missions require a full time staff to
address the strategic issues surrounding the Homeland Security and
Defense mission and the National Guard's role. Congressional funds and
increased authorizations for AGR positions to staff the National Guard
Bureau and a full time staff within each State and Territory is
absolutely essential to maintain a viable role in this important
mission.
Bridging the Relationships
The statutory charter of the National Guard Bureau should be
amended to reflect its unique role as a channel of communications
between the states and national security authorities. The Bureau is the
official channel of communications between the several states and the
Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force. (10 USC
10501(b)). The charter should be amended to also make the Bureau the
channel of communications for homeland security between the several
states and the supported CONUS CINC, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, the Secretary of Defense and the Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security.
Congress should authorize the National Guard to prioritize
standardized equipping of state contingency stocks with CBRNE
equipment, and the equipping of state task forces with modern National
Guard communications and transportation assets. Each state and
territory should have self-contained National Guard aviation assets
capable of airlifting civilian and military homeland security personnel
and equipment within and outside the state or territory.
Land Mobile Radio equipment should be fielded through the National
Guard Bureau to facilitate homeland security-related interagency
communications. The Chief, NGB should also be delegated authority to
approve National Guard telecommunications cooperative agreements to
serve as mechanisms for collecting local, state and federal agency
funds for the purpose of enabling such agencies to utilize Military
Interdepartmental Purchase Requests (MIPR) through the United States
Property and Fiscal Officer.
Dual missioned National Guard forces should be authorized to
acquire and maintain homeland security mission equipment from either
military or commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) sources, whichever is more
effective and interoperable with other emergency responders.
Support the development and funding of a program to increase and
sustain the duty MOSQ of the ARNG to the Army minimum standard
(currently 85 percent). Cost efficiencies can be realized when on the
job training, credit for civilian acquired skills and credit for skills
acquired from previous MOSs can be factored into the awarding of
Military Occupational Specialties for members of the National Guard.
The National Guard should be authorized to develop regional
training sites for integrated homeland security and domestic emergency
civil-military training and exercises. The ability for the National
Guard to expand its long established relationships with civil agencies
is greatly enhanced when training is integrated. Successes have already
been demonstrated in this concept with the National Guard's counter
drug program. The creation of regional training centers as a local
schoolhouse for innovative education and sustainment training will
benefit both the Guard and local authorities in their response
capabilities to a homeland security mission.
Fiduciary Responsibilities
The homeland security missions of the National Guard must be
established as multi-year funded programs to ensure continuity and
sustained support for the CONUS CINC and local, state and federal
emergency responders. Separate and distinct funding to support pure
homeland security missions should come from other non-DOD agencies when
appropriate. A program should be established for the National Guard and
NGB should be authorized to bi-annually submit a separate POM for all
missions falling within the National Guard's homeland security
responsibilities. Congress should appropriate funds for that purpose
directly to the National Guard Bureau rather than indirectly through
the Army or Air Force.
Currently there is a shortfall of funding of Title 32 missions as a
result of domestic homeland security missions being performed across
the country. The lack of funding will have a direct impact upon the
ability to have a prolonged presence supporting homeland security
missions. Many states are paying for missions with funding dedicated
for training, thus impacting unit readiness. A mechanism needs to be
emplaced to ensure funding is either available, or available for their
immediate acquisition for the National Guard.
Calling up the National Guard
Mobilization of the National Guard is dependent upon the mission
requirements. The three distinct legal authorities available to
mobilize the National Guard provide an important tool for the Governors
and the Department of Defense. United States Code (USC) Title 10, often
referred to as active duty, is federal active duty under command and
control of the President of the United States. USC Title 32 is
federally funded active duty ``in the service of the United States'',
but where command and control remains with the Governors and Adjutants
General. The third authority, state active duty, allows the Governor to
utilize the National Guard with state funding for state specific
events.
The events of September 11th caused a national re-affirmation of
the principle that the first responsibility of government is to defend
and secure the lives of its citizenry. While the conduct of national
defense outside our nation's borders has long been the exclusive
province of the federal government, the mission of defending the
homeland in the future will require the integration across the spectrum
of local, state and federal government. Critical to this integration is
the role of the Governors, who best know what resources are available,
within their respective states, to address homeland security.
Use of the National Guard as a primary fusion agent in executing a
balanced, integrated national domestic security strategy preserves the
constitutional role of the sovereign states and assures that governors
and other state and local civil authorities remain responsible and
accountable for the public safety and security of their state,
territory or local jurisdiction. Use of the National Guard in state
active duty status and in federal pay status under Title 32, USC
permits military forces under the control of the governor to assist
civil authorities in executing all laws, federal, state and local,
without violating the Posse Comitatus Act. Any attempt to repeal or
substantially amend the Posse Comitatus Act would be met by a firestorm
of resistance from the nation's governors and state and local civil
authorities.
The National Guard, with its unique dual mission, provides a
flexible link between the states and the federal government. This link
is best maintained when the National Guard is activated under U.S. Code
Title 32. This past December, Governor Gary Locke, in his testimony
before the subcommittee on Treasury and General Government, expressed
the advantages of calling up the National Guard under a Title 32
status.
``In asking the President to assign these missions to the National
Guard in Title 32 status, the Governors were also mindful that for more
than a decade thousands of National Guard soldiers and airmen have been
performing virtually indistinguishable duties in Title 32 status. I
refer, of course, to the National Guard Counter-Drug Program in which
Guard soldiers and airmen, with the consent of the Governors of the
several states, have been actively augmenting the operations of the
Border Patrol, Customs, and INS. The proposed missions at northern
border crossings and ports of entry, for the most part, are an
expansion of the same operational functions, albeit with a refined
focus on terrorism instead of the current drug interdiction focus.
``Using the National Guard in Title 32 status, instead of
federalizing individual Guard volunteers in Title 10 status, also
ensures significant Air Force as well as Army participation in border
security. Because of the joint nature of each state's National Guard
command structure, we have been able to execute airport security
missions with both Army and Air National Guard personnel, thus
minimizing the impact on the wartime operational readiness of both
federal military services. The Governors stand ready to execute
expanded border crossing and port of entry missions in the same Title
32 multi-service manner. Using current Title 10 forces or Guard members
in Title 10 status would diminish the contributions of the several
states in support of national security, disproportionately impact the
Army and the readiness of its units for overseas missions, and place
federal military personnel on a collision course with the proscriptions
of the Posse Comitatus Act--an Act, by the way, that is as relevant and
compelling today as when it was enacted.''
The National Guard Association urges the Congress to re-affirm the
vital role of the nation's governors in meeting the challenge of
securing and defending the American homeland by establishing a policy
of employing Army and Air National Guard units and personnel in a Title
32 status for missions that involve augmenting non-Department of
Defense federal agencies within a state's borders. Furthermore, we
request the Congress to support amending Title 32 U.S.C. 502(f) to
clarify the definitions of ``other duties'' as including, but not
limited to, homeland security duties, counter drug duties, military
support to civil authorities (MSCA), disaster assistance and other
missions identified in the approved Governor's Homeland Security Plan,
as well as any mission in which use of National Guard forces in Title
32 status ``in the service of the United States'' is authorized and
accepted by the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Air Force,
the Secretary of Defense or the President of the United States.
Statutes governing ARNG and ANG federal technicians and AGRs must
also be amended to permit full time National Guard personnel (1) to
perform duties in support of the federally approved Governor's Homeland
Security Plan, and (2) to perform duties in support of any emergency
directive by the Governor in preparation for or effectuation of a
National Guard activation for a state emergency. By prohibiting the use
of full time staff (AGR and/or federal technician), the Adjutant
General loses his continuity of day-to-day functional operations. The
potential for error is greatly increased and could possibility hamper
the overall mission. The full time staff has the daily working
knowledge of the coordination effort to ensure the other state,
federal, and law enforcement agencies do not duplicate efforts with the
``train-up'' period of using traditional Guardsmen.
Command & Control Relationships
There is a need to delineate the command and control structure of
military forces supporting state and local officials. Under current
Department of Defense policy, the Adjutant General is not authorized to
assume tactical control, to enable the tasking for missions, of Title
10 soldiers or airmen. This potentially creates command and control
challenges during events where timely and disciplined response is
necessary to restore normal civic functions and support the needs of
the state and local communities, as witnessed during the consequence
management of Ground Zero.
The NGAUS urges the Congress to support the modification of the
Code of Federal Regulations to authorize Guard tactical control of all
U.S. military forces that are assigned in the several States in support
of disaster recovery operations.
Full Time Manning
The men and women of the National Guard continue to be a ready and
able force. Their ability to contribute to state and federal missions
is heavily dependant upon the full-time force comprised of military
technicians and Active Guard /Reserve (AGR) personnel. They are
essential to unit readiness and the overall successful operation of the
National Guard. These full time members fill vital positions in areas
that support a unit's administrative, payroll, supply, training and
maintenance needs. Without them, unit readiness and soldiers' quality
of life suffers severely.
For years, the Army National Guard has been operating with an
unacceptable low percentage of its full-time force requirements as
validated by the U.S. Army. Significant increases in military
technicians and AGRs, provided by the Congress, are leveling off what
was a downward spiral for the Army National Guard and its overall
readiness.
The Army has validated a plan to bring Army National Guard full-
time personnel to an ``acceptable risk level'' of 71 percent of its
required force by 2011. This requirement, assessed against deployment
criteria, does not meet the operational needs of the National Guard.
The National Guard Association of the United States gratefully
acknowledges the actions taken by the Committee to correct the
shortfalls in full time manning for the National Guard. However, there
is still a critical shortfall that needs to be addressed. The National
Guard Association urges the Congress to support a level of funding
consistent with or greater than fiscal year 2002 funding for full time
manning for the Army National Guard in order to achieve the validated
high-risk level by 2007 and assure the zero risk level by 2012.
Civil Support Teams
In response to a state or national emergency, the National Guard's
Civil Support Teams (CSTs) provide a well-trained assessment team to
support the state response as a lead element for the National Guard in
the event of a CBRNE incident. Their knowledge of the emergency
management system, expertise in emergency response operations, and
technical capabilities may provide tremendous assistance to the local
Incident Commander. CBRNE terrorism requires rapid response to a
suspected or actual terrorist attack. The CSTs, available for rapid
deployment, provide assessment of the damage, consultation on
logistics, medical, chemical and biological defense, and transmission
of the situation to higher headquarters to facilitate follow-on
military forces.
As of 26 Mar 2002, 26 of the 27 two tier phased teams have been
certified by OSD. The five new CSTs, located in Alabama, Kansas,
Michigan, Tennessee and West Virginia, were established 15 Nov 2002,
and are currently in the process of hiring, equipping and training
members. The NGB, at the request of the Chief of Staff, Army, has
developed an accelerated plan to train, equip and prepare these teams
for certification by the end of the calendar year 2002.
Since September 11th, the CSTs have performed 333 operational
missions at the request of civil authorities. These responses can be
separated into three different operational categories: ``Response,''
``Standby'' and ``Liaison.'' A Response mission occurs anytime a CST
deploys to sample a known or suspected hazard. CSTs have performed 133
Response missions, most of which consisted of sampling an ``unknown
white powder,'' most often suspected to be anthrax. A few of the
response missions were to sample an unknown liquid or a suspicious
piece of mail. Two CSTs conducted sampling at the World Trade Center to
detect any hazard that resulted from the attack. A Standby mission
occurs when a CST deploys to provide CST expertise to a community event
or for the visit of a VIP. This includes National Security Special
Events (NSSE), other events identified by the state chain of command,
and VIP Protective Details (including presidential and gubernatorial
protective details). CSTs performed 51 Standby missions, supporting the
World Series, Super Bowl, Mardi Gras, 2002 Winter Olympics and the
Paralympics. To date CSTs have performed 149 Liaison missions providing
technical expertise and advice, and participating in conferences that
focus on the response to a CBRNE attack with the U.S. Secret Service,
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA),
U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, the American Red Cross, various state
emergency management agencies, state and local law enforcement
agencies, hospitals and health departments.
The National Guard Association of the United States joins the
National Emergency Managers Association (NEMA), the International
Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) and the Council of State
Governments in recommending that the Congress complete the fielding a
minimum of one National Guard Civil Support Team in each state and
territory.
Retention Incentives for Civil Support Team Members
The CSTs are being negatively impacted by the high OPTEMPO and the
high salaries offered by civilian companies seeking highly trained
hazardous material technicians, also trained in WMD. Within the CST
community is a Personnel Working Group (PWG), an open forum for all of
the CST's to discuss personnel issues. This issue is the number one
priority for the group.
Each member of the team undergoes a rigorous eighteen-month
training program, above the normal required military training; 600
hours are specialized training in chemical, biological and radiological
agents. When these members are fully trained, civilian companies are
seeking out these individuals by offering high salaries because they do
not have to send them to training.
The National Guard Association of the United States recommends that
National Guard Civil Support Teams members be provided Special Duty
Assignment Pay at a level of SD-5 as an incentive to remain on the
Civil Support Team and to compensate them for the rigorous OPTEMPO
required to maintain readiness and to help bridge the gap between the
civilian and military salaries.
Security Forces
There is a need to address the personnel shortages in the Air
National Guard Security Forces career field. ANG security forces are
responsible for defending the ground battle space for 72 ANG
installations. Due to the overall Air Force shortage in trained
security force personnel, we are defending our bases with over 1,100
security augmentees each day. This ability to effectively use
augmentees is currently being threatened by the Air Force Personnel
Directorate by their reluctance to allow these volunteers to serve for
more than 270 mandays in a fiscal year.
Mobility Issues
Army Aviation
Army National Guard aviation plays a critical role in Total Army
aviation and in response to state requirements related to domestic
emergencies. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have placed
the highest priority on the Army National Guard's need to stand ready
to fight our nation's wars, perform emerging missions for homeland
security, defend our nation against weapons of mass destruction and
provide disaster relief support. Performing these missions will require
increased reliance on Army National Guard MEDEVAC and utility
helicopter assets. Accordingly, we must modernize our helicopter fleet
sooner than the Army's current procurement plans.
The ARNG aviation force suffers from the lack of a consistent
modernization program, turbulence within the force and poor aircraft
reliability, availability and maintainability of older aircraft. This
neglect has gone on far too long. ARNG aviation is severely hindered
and requires immediate attention if it is to recover and support both
its state and federal missions.
ARNG utility aviation comprises roughly 50 percent of the Total
Army's aviation without the addition of homeland security
responsibilities. Currently, the National Guard's UH-1 fleet is
scheduled to be retired in 2004. If the bulk of the ARNG UH-1 fleet is
retired without sufficient replacements, it will be unable to respond
to operations within the individual states and around the globe.
The National Guard Association of the United States urges Congress
to authorize and appropriate additional monies to the Aircraft
Procurement, Army budget line of the fiscal year 2003 Defense Budget.
This funding would support the procurement of an additional H-60
helicopters and the modernization of the Theatre Airlift Aircraft for
the Army National Guard. Request that Congress direct language
requiring the Army to field these systems to the Army National Guard.
The procurement of significant equipment necessary to support the
homeland security mission such as the Life Support for Trauma and
Transport (LSTAT) and rescue hoist systems provide a valuable force
multiplier for the National Guard.
Ground Mobility Assets
The High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) provides
the backbone of the light transport vehicles. Used as troop carrier,
cargo carrier, armament carrier, shelter carrier, TOW Missile carrier,
ambulance, and Scout vehicle, the HMMWV can travel off-road where often
only tracked vehicles can go. The HMMWV's off-road and inclement
weather capabilities are unparalleled and provided a valuable resource
in the aftermath of September 11th.
In addition to the HMMWV assets, at both the Pentagon and Ground
Zero, the use of the M-Gator proved to be a vital mobility asset in
areas where the HMMWV could not operate. Currently in use by the 10th
Mountain Division, the 101st Airborne Division and the 26th Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) have used M-Gators in Afghanistan and the
supporting area of operations. The M-Gator provides a flexible tool for
mobility in homeland security and the warfight.
The National Guard Association of the United States urges the
Congress of the United States to authorize and appropriate an
additional funding to the Other Procurement, Army budget line of the
fiscal year 2003 Defense Budget. This funding would support the
procurement of HMMWVs and the M-Gator. We request that Congress direct
language requiring the Army to field these systems to the Army National
Guard.
Communications Issues
The hard lessons learned from September 11th demonstrate a vital
need to enhance the communications capability of the National Guard to
ensure interoperability with civilian authorities during a homeland
security mission and while supporting the active component. Out of date
FM communications systems, which utilize line of site capability, lost
significant capabilities in the urban canyons of New York City. The
National Guard, along with the civilian authorities, was dependant upon
donated commercial systems provided by companies like Verizion and
NEXTEL. The lack of interoperable radios forced many individuals to
carry three different devices to communicate with military and civilian
authorities.
The Combat Air Patrols conducted by the Air National Guard taught
some valuable lessons for communication. Equipping Air National Guard
F-15s and F-16s with VHF radio capability will allow communications
with commercial airliners. At present time, communications from
military to commercial planes have to be relayed down to the ground and
back up. The ability to communicate directly saves much needed time,
especially if a commercial plane is suspected of being under hostile
control.
The NGAUS urges Congress to support the enhancement of
communications equipment within the National Guard by providing: A
reliable interoperable communication system to allow first responders
and National Guardsmen the ability to effectively communicate; Combat
Net Radios including funds for Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio
Systems (SINCGARS); and VHF radios capabilities for Air National Guard
F-15 and F-16 fighter jets.
F-15 /F-16 Fighter Modernization
The operations tempo for Air National Guard (ANG) F-15 and F-16
fleet increased significantly following the attacks of September 11th.
Furthermore, the ANG continued to participate as equal partners in
sophisticated threat areas throughout the world as part of the
Expeditionary Air Force (EAF) employment concept. Lack of a capable and
robust electronic identification capability, in these aircraft,
severely degrades the combat capability and survivability of the
aircraft in both homeland defense and contingency operations. By fiscal
year 2004, the current Air-to-Air Interrogator/Identify Friend or Foe
(AAI/IFF) system will be unsupportable. Air defense of the United
States is an immediate and essential concern of the National Command
Authority (NCA). The ANG F-15 A/Bs and F-16s, along with other active
duty aircraft, are the primary air defense assets employed for combat
air patrols.
The ANG currently operates 100 percent of the F-15A/B fighter
aircraft in the Air Force inventory. The ANG will be required to remain
a viable, supportable, combat capable and ready force flying these
aircraft well into the 21st Century, even though it possesses 126 of
the earliest models of these fighters.
The Precision Attack Targeting System program fills a critical need
for precision strike capability for the ANG and the Air Force Reserve.
Adding targeting pod capability to the ANG F-16 fleet addresses the
immediate shortfall in the Block 25/30/32 aircraft, which account for
over 35 percent of the overall combat Air Force's F-16 fleet. The
Litening II targeting pod meets this requirement. The ANG joined
efforts with the USAF to procure the next generation Advanced Targeting
Pod (ATP) to finish out the remaining ANG shortfall. The ATP is ``plug
and play'' technology, with state-of-the-art capability, allowing full
weapons exploitation and comprehensive Air Reserve Components
participation in homeland security missions and contingency operations
worldwide.
The NGAUS urges the Congress to authorize and appropriate funding
to: Procure a new state-of-the-art IFF for the ANG F-15 fleet; upgrade
the F-15A/B with a new AAI system; and procure next generation Advanced
Targeting Pods.
Resourcing of Distance Learning & shared usage
With the major roles that the National Guard has taken on in
homeland security, weapons of mass destruction, civil support, counter
drug, and national missile defense, as well as the increased reliance
on the National Guard to augment the active component through
contingency operations mobilization, the National Guard has increased
its requirements for updated Information Technology.
There is an increased requirement for modern decision support
systems backed by real time, accessible, accurate information that will
provide improved command and control, training, and family and employer
support.
Congress has urged the National Guard to share the usage of their
facilities and infrastructure with other Federal Agencies, such as the
Veterans Administration and other agencies and response organizations
in our local communities. There is a shortage of time, money, and
classroom seats for National Guard members to receive required
training.
The Distance Technology Training Program (DTTP) has increased the
National Guard communications and training capability and has assisted
states with the development of synergistic higher education programs
designed to leverage the technology investment in DTTP for shared
community use at the state and local levels.
The DTTP allows training to be conducted via Internet, computers,
videocassette recordings, compact discs, and satellite video
teleconferencing. Such technology is highly cost effective, promotes
the knowledge, skills and abilities of National Guard members, and
ultimately contributes to a higher retention of qualified service
members.
This same technology provides a command and control capability, as
well as distributed training in support of the homeland defense,
weapons of mass destruction, counter drug operations, partnership for
peace initiatives, and information operations initiatives. For example,
the DTTP recently provided command and control capabilities for the
response to the World Trade Center tragedy.
Additionally, there is an urgent need to accelerate the Army's
capability to develop readiness-producing courseware to be distributed
to National Guard units.
The NGAUS urges the Congress of the United States to:
--Provide funding solely for the operation, maintenance, upgrade and
extension of the DTTP in order to provide electronic command,
control and coordination connectivity between National Guard
forces and emergency responders before, during and after
terrorist attacks and other domestic emergencies.
--Provide adequate funding for the information technology
infrastructure of the National Guard so that it may continue to
support the various missions of the National Guard and for the
expansion to all Guardsmen, access to information, training and
communications anytime, anywhere. This infrastructure should be
interoperable with state and federal agencies to the greatest
extent possible to assist with civil emergencies and WMD events
and serve as part of an integrated national domestic security
communications strategy.
--Ensure the National Guard network and the DTTP program remain as
National Guard programs and under the operational control of
the National Guard Bureau.
--Provide funding increases to the Army to expedite conversion of
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) courseware into
distributed training format.
Modernization of Regional/Sector Air Operations Centers
Hawaii, Alaska, Florida, New York and Washington have aging
Regional Air Operations Centers (RAOCs) whose command, control,
computer and communications centers support air sovereignty and air
defense of United States. The air sovereignty/defense mission continues
to be of importance today and in the future. Currently there is no
modernization program for any Regional/Sector Air Operations Centers
(R/SAOC).
The R/SAOC system was designed for approximately a 20-year life
span (1983-2003). These Command and Control C\2\ computers are 1970s-
vintage C\2\ computers and are maintenance intensive and lag in
technology (COTS replacement estimate unknown). The present R/SAOC
computer system also lacks the needed capabilities for Joint Tactical
Information Distribution System (JTIDS)/Link 16 technologies to
communicate with other C\2\ platforms and Link 16 capable Air National
G F-15s.
The NGAUS urges Congress to authorize and appropriate funding to
modernize regional/sector air operations R/SAOC for replacement and
upgrade of the C\2\ and Link 16 joint tactical information distribution
(JTIDS) systems; and procure an interim system to ensure mission
accomplishment.
Aircraft Rescue And Fire Fighting Vehicles For the Air
National Guard
The United States Air National Guard has more than 230 Aircraft
Rescue and Fire Fighting Vehicles (ARFF), which range in age from 1 to
11 years more than their expected life of 12 years. In order to begin
replacement of these overage trucks; additional funding is required in
the Department of Defense Budget. To further substantiate the need for
these vehicles, in all cases they are the primary support vehicles for
the civilian airports on which they are stationed.
The ANG must also have the latest ARFF vehicles in the Air Force
inventory for operational and maintenance training of the 1,814
Traditional Guard Fire Fighters to meet wartime readiness requirements.
Any loss of assets from the aging, outdated vehicle fleet by the ANG
could lead to serious reductions in critical fire fighting and rescue
capabilities for both the military air crews and civilian aircraft they
serve as well as significantly degrade the contingency and wartime
readiness of United States ANG fire fighters.
The NGAUS urges the Congress of the United States to authorize and
appropriate funding for replacement of Aircraft Rescue & Fire Fighting
Equipment (P-19 Fire Trucks) for the Air National Guard.
Views from the National Guard Commander, and his soldiers,
on the ground performing duties after the attack on
the World Trade Center
Recently I had the pleasure of talking with Major General George C.
Garrett, the Commanding General of the 42nd Infantry Division of the
New York ARNG. He and his soldiers have identified critical areas where
attention is needed to preempt future challenges that relate to arming,
equipping, feeding, clothing, and sheltering our soldiers and airmen.
Their comments included the need for:
--Man portable power devices and tactical generators to charge cell
phones, light sets and radios;
--Alternative fuel vehicles need to be given consideration as diesel
& gas are targets and can cripple mobility;
--Electronic tracking tags on issued equipment to maintain
accountability;
--Inclement weather gear--while many soldiers purchased inclement
cold weather gear not yet issued, a great many more were unable
pay out of pocket to procure this same necessary gear;
--A mechanism for immediate fund site for personal clothing needs to
be available;
--The National Guard needs to be provided with 9 mm service pistols,
adequate training and ammunition, to support homeland security
missions; and
--Many soldiers were forced to sleep in corners of the Lexington
Avenue armory. This armory was in use as a rallying point for
victims and their families, while it also serves as a shelter
for the homeless. Many soldiers were afforded quarters aboard
on of a Navy hospital ship.
On a side note, MG Garrett wanted me to express his thanks and
gratitude from the 42nd Infantry Division to the first responders with
whom they worked and continue to work.
Conclusion
On behalf of the National Guard and our soldiers and airmen, I
thank the committee for allowing me the opportunity to express those
areas that need to be addressed to improve our ability to support the
firefighters, EMS, police and other first responders. The National
Guard will continue to work side-by-side with state and local and
federal authorities in time of need. Our relationships are strong,
primarily because of our permanent community ties. However, there are
many enhancements that can be emplaced to better allow the National
Guard to remain dual missioned as the first military responder and as
the main combat reserve to the warfighting mission.
Biographical Sketch of Major General Richard C. Alexander
Major General Richard C. Alexander was appointed the Executive
Director of the National Guard Association of the United States in
January 1999.
Until his retirement on 31 December 1998, General Alexander served
as the Adjutant General of Ohio. His responsibility as the Adjutant
General was the military preparedness of the Ohio Militia. The
organized militia consists of the Ohio Army National Guard, Ohio Air
National Guard, Ohio Military Reserve, and Ohio Naval Militia, totaling
over 18,000 militia personnel. General Alexander supervised four flag
officer heads of these components and one deputy director in the day-
to-day operation and management of the fiscal, personnel, equipment,
and real property resources of these militia organizations and state
agencies.
General Alexander was born June 26, 1935, in Cleveland, Ohio. He
enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1954, and was honorably discharged in
the rank of Sergeant in December 1958, with a concurrent assignment to
the Marine Corps Reserve. He then enlisted in the Ohio Army National
Guard on June 30, 1960, in Battery C, 1st Missile Battalion (Nike-
Hercules), 137th Artillery. With an honorable discharge on May 5, 1965,
and he entered the National Guard State Officer Candidate School on May
6, 1965.
From May 1965 to July 1971, he served as a Platoon Leader and
Battery Commander, Battery C, 1st Missile Battalion, 137th Artillery.
In July 1971 to September 1973, he worked as the Program Analysis
Officer and Assistant Finance and Accounting Officer at Headquarters
Ohio ARNG.
In September 1973 to October 1977, General Alexander was the Race
Relations/Equal Employment Officer at Headquarters Ohio. Starting in
October 1977 through July 1979, he went to the Ohio Military Academy as
Operations and Training Officer and Director of Instruction. Leaving
the Military Academy, he became the Deputy Brigade Commander and
Topographic Engineer, 16th Engineer Brigade until July 1984.
General Alexander graduated from the U.S. Army War College,
Corresponding Studies Course in 1983. In 1986, he received his
Bachelor's degree in Business Administration from Franklin University,
Columbus, Ohio.
As Director of Personnel and Administration, at Headquarters, he
then became Chief of Staff, State Area Command, Ohio ARNG where he
stayed until he was promoted to Adjutant General in December 1987. He
served as Adjutant General until 31 December 1998.
General Alexander was elected President of NGAUS, in September
1996.
NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES HOMELAND SECURITY
REQUIREMENTS LIST
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Item Description Quantity Unit Cost Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army National Guard:
H-60L Blackhawks............. 5 $10.4M $52M
SINGARS...................... 8,800 11-18K 97.2M
HMMWVs....................... 500 33.0K 38.5M
ECWCS........................ 48,000 250 12M
M-Gator...................... 200 15.5K 3.1M
Tactical Quiet Generators.... 186 32.0K 6.0M
Air National Guard:
AIFF......................... 126 231K 29.2M
Targeting Pods (ATP)......... 96 1.5M 144M
VHF/UHF Radios............... 126 71K 9M
P-19 Fire Trucks............. 10 450K 4.5M
ECWCS........................ 16,000 250 4M
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, General Alexander.
Mr. Gary Cox, director of the Tulsa, Oklahoma, City-County
Health Department, representing today the National Association
of County and City Health Officials. Mr. Cox.
STATEMENT OF GARY COX, DIRECTOR, TULSA, OKLAHOMA, CITY-
COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT, REPRESENTING THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTY AND CITY
HEALTH OFFICIALS
Mr. Cox. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, members
of the committee. We have made much progress in preparing for
bioterrorism, as a Nation, and other public health emergencies,
but much work remains to be done. The Nation is not fully
prepared to respond to or detect an act of bioterrorism and has
a long way to go in becoming fully prepared.
Mr. Chairman, we do appreciate your leadership in
appropriating substantial new funds to build local and State
public health capacities. It is very much appreciated and
needed. Even though it has been 7 months since the tragic
events of September 11, bioterrorism preparedness funds have
not yet reached the local level. Most localities do not know
how much funding to expect, and the sooner that localities have
access to these funds, the sooner that we can begin making
progress towards protecting our Nation. Without new funds or
staff, we cannot expand our capacities to meet new threats.
Bioterrorism preparedness funding must be adequate and
sustained. 2002 funding was a down payment for a task that will
take many years. At a bare minimum, we need $940 million for
2003 and clear assurance that a large proportion will be used
at a local level, as you have intended. The Federal Government
must monitor funding carefully and insist that most of it
reaches the local level, otherwise we will not be improving our
ability to respond. The Office of Homeland Security has not yet
reached out to local public health agencies. That office we
hope will assure coordination at Federal, State, and local
levels for emergency preparedness.
Although we must coordinate our efforts with Federal and
State governments, most public health preparedness is local.
Bioterrorism is unlike any other form of terrorism. Unlike a
bomb, a plane crash, or a chemical release, we may not even
know anything bad has happened for a few days or weeks. That is
why we must update our public health systems to enable us to
detect and respond to an epidemic, whether it be intentionally
caused as a result of a bioterrorist act, or naturally
occurring. This is what we feel that we need to do:
We must expand our public health capacity to detect and
quickly respond, investigate, and contain communicable disease.
Time is of the essence in these instances.
We must hire and train epidemiologists, infectious disease
nurses, environmental first responders, information technology
specialists, and those who are trained to effectively
communicate and educate the public.
We must make, update, and exercise our preparedness plans,
emphasizing exercise.
We must develop and refine new and sophisticated disease
surveillance systems. This will give us a first indication that
something is going on in the community.
Mr. Chairman, we are in a new and exciting era for public
health, and we appreciate the work that you and your committee
have done, and we vow to work hand-in-hand with you and your
colleagues towards this end.
Thank you, and we would be happy to answer any questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gary Cox, JD
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I am Gary
Cox, JD, director of the Tulsa City-County Department of Health in
Oklahoma. I am honored to appear before you representing the National
Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO). NACCHO is the
organization representing the almost 3,000 local public health
departments in the country. I have been actively engaged in
bioterrorism and emergency preparedness planning in Tulsa and am highly
familiar with national work to develop guidance in bioterrorism
preparedness for local public health systems. I am here today to tell
you about some of the lessons we have learned in our work and how much
farther we need to go.
As a nation, are we prepared for bioterrorism? Not nearly enough.
Local public health departments have long experience in responding to
infectious disease outbreaks and other local emergencies with public
health implications. We have made progress and learned important
lessons about the challenges of bioterrorism preparedness in the last
few years. But we have a very long way to go to achieve nationally the
capacities we need to detect and respond to acts of bioterrorism as
quickly as possible, to prevent the spread of disease, and to save
lives.
The nation's public health system, and particularly its local
agencies, will be the first responders to a bioterrorism event. Every
community needs public health first responders who are well staffed,
well trained, and well equipped. Without them, a small outbreak of an
infectious disease could turn rapidly into a deadly epidemic. The
nation needs a vast sustained effort to enable localities to achieve
optimum readiness.
FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR LOCAL BIOTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS: WHAT LOCALITIES
NEED
Mr. Chairman, under your leadership Congress provided new fiscal
year 2002 funding for upgrading state and local public health
capacities. At this point in time, funds have not yet reached local
public health agencies and most do not know yet how much they will
receive from the state, and for what purposes. For that reason, they
have not yet been able to hire or train new staff for bioterrorism
preparedness. It has been seven months since the tragedies of September
11. The sooner that new funds reach the local level, the sooner local
public health agencies and their community partners can begin making
real, measurable progress.
NACCHO has two overriding concerns about federal bioterrorism
preparedness funding. The first is that funding must be adequate,
lasting and reliable to enable local public health agencies to build
and sustain permanent improvements in their ability to protect their
communities 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Most communities do not
now have this level of protection. This cannot be achieved in a matter
of months. It is a complex undertaking that requires building
cooperation and communication not just among traditional public
agencies that are accustomed to being first responders, such as local
fire, police and emergency management, but also with private health
care providers. Because of the complexity of the task, it will take
years to develop sophisticated disease surveillance and response
systems and staff them with well-trained people. The funding that is
available for this fiscal year represents a down payment on a process
of rebuilding that will take many years.
Continuation in fiscal year 2003 of this year's $940 million for
upgrading state and local public health capacities is a bare minimum
requirement for continuing this large, multi-year task. We have
estimated that localities need 10,000 to 15,000 new people to work in
public health preparedness. In many places it will take more than one
year to locate and train qualified people to achieve those staffing
levels. We need to start now. We need to provide assurances that
funding will be both sufficient and sustained, so that state and local
public health agencies, some of which are experiencing hiring freezes
due to funding shortfalls, can move forward swiftly. Some are already
borrowing from other operating funds or reserves, diverting public
health resources from other important ongoing work to prevent disease
and protect their communities.
Even when the nation's localities have achieved a satisfactory
level of preparedness, continued federal assistance will be essential.
Our response plans must be continually refined and exercised, people
must be continually trained and re-trained, and sophisticated disease
surveillance and information systems will require systematic updating.
Our second concern is that federal funds be used to develop
capacities where they are needed. In some areas of bioterrorism
preparedness, localities look to states to provide the facilities and
expertise. Public health laboratories are a good example of where
technical expertise should be centralized at the state level. In most
respects, however, bioterrorism preparedness is local and the funding
emphasis should be at the local level. NACCHO is monitoring
implementation of the fiscal year 2002 funding carefully to determine
whether states will in fact be using adequate portions of these funds
to build local public health capacity for responding to public health
emergencies.
Thus far, the experience of local public health agencies in the
states has been mixed. Many are involved to a greater degree than ever
before in their states' planning on how to use the funds. Some others,
however, are greatly concerned that their communities may benefit very
little because the states have not been including them in a meaningful
fashion. We believe it is critically important that the federal
government monitor carefully the uses of these funds, measure their
impact at the state and local levels over time, and insist that states
document that funds are being used to enable localities to build local
public health capacities.
Coordination of public health preparedness activities undertaken by
the Department of Health and Human Services and its state and local
partners with other federal emergency preparedness programs, such as
those administered by FEMA and the Department of Justice, remains
another critical need. We believe that the White House Office of
Homeland Security could play an important role in assuring that the
differing missions of these agencies are well-understood by all parties
at the state and local levels and that their funding streams enhance
each other. We have a particular concern about the potential
expenditure by states or localities of public health preparedness funds
on other emergency needs, such as field detection equipment or personal
protective equipment, that have been and should be covered by other
programs. We would discourage expenditure of the more limited public
health funds for such purposes, unless other funds are clearly not
available.
We believe it is essential to require states and localities to
coordinate activities for public health preparedness funded under the
guidance of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) with
the Metropolitan Medical Response System and with funds for hospital
preparedness. This is a critical ingredient for local preparedness.
Medical emergency response planning should never take place independent
of the broader public health approach, which incorporates a community-
wide view of a preparedness system. Likewise, hospital preparedness
planning is an integral aspect of community-wide bioterrorism
preparedness planning. For instance, all acute care hospitals should be
enabled to participate in disease surveillance activities in
collaboration with public health agencies. However, it is probably not
necessary for all hospitals to have the same highly specialized
facilities for isolation should an epidemic occur. Hospitals and public
health agencies must collaborate to make practical plans that will work
for their own communities.
LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCIES: FIRST RESPONDERS TO BIOTERRORISM
An event of bioterrorism will be fundamentally different from other
terrorist acts that we have witnessed and for which we are preparing.
The reason is that, unlike an airplane crash, a bomb or a chemical
release, we may not even know that anything bad has happened for many
days, until an outbreak of disease begins to build and becomes
apparent. Our first line of defense, therefore, is to build public
health systems that will provide early detection and diagnosis. Only
when we know that an event is occurring can we mobilize a response.
Local public health agencies are the first responders when an act
of bioterrorism occurs. We witnessed this firsthand in Palm Beach
County, Florida, where anthrax was first recognized in October 2001.
The case of anthrax was recognized only because there was a preexisting
relationship between an astute physician who noticed unusual symptoms
and the local public health director. The local public health director
knew when and how to call on specialized state and federal public
health resources to confirm a diagnosis and did all the on-site
investigation and organizing to contain the outbreak.
Bioterrorism preparedness is, therefore, a complex and challenging
task. It is not a matter of taking a plan or set of specifications off
the shelf. The act of planning itself brings together people from
public health, emergency response, law enforcement, local hospitals and
physicians, to work out a plan that suits their own circumstances and
needs. Many times these parties have never before worked together. The
act of planning establishes the lines of communication that we have
seen to be so critical since September 11, and it identifies what
capacities and resources are missing. We are just at the beginning.
The capacities that every community needs to be prepared include
many elements of public health infrastructure that the nation has
neglected for many years. Every community needs new staff, new
training, new kinds of community-wide planning that have never before
taken place, improved systems for disease surveillance, rapid access to
public health laboratories, and better systems for communication and
data management.
Mr. Chairman, we have appreciated your keen understanding that, as
we invest in public health infrastructure, we are not just preparing
for bioterrorism. Investment in public health for bioterrorism
preparedness will yield multiple benefits. It will improve our
abilities to address other public health problems and emergencies,
including floods, disasters, and naturally occurring outbreaks of
infectious disease more effectively. Every dollar we spend on
bioterrorism preparedness will pay off in countless other ways to
maintain and improve the nation's health and safety.
LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT LOCAL PREPAREDNESS
Since the events of September 11 and the subsequent anthrax
outbreak, we in local public health have learned some unexpected
lessons. For instance, Internet-based information systems became widely
unavailable on September 11 and many local health departments could not
access email for hours to receive health alerts from CDC or their
states. The lesson is that a wireless, handheld communication capacity
is one important emergency tool for public health. A lesson learned
during the anthrax outbreak is that an important first step for many
jurisdictions is to set up a 24-hour hotline to receive reports and
dispense accurate information. Unlike fire and police, few local health
departments have staff availability 24/7, nor do they have a pre-
arranged means to access a new telephone line immediately for a
hotline.
Responding to a new public health threat consumes all available
resources and then some. In Tulsa, we have borrowed over $200,000 from
our operating reserves to rebuild our fundamental capacity to detect
and respond to a bioterrorism threat. A third lesson, therefore, is
that unless emergency capacities and crossing-training of staff are
built in to the staffing structure of a department, the more routine,
non-emergent work of public health quickly becomes neglected when an
emergent threat occurs. Meeting these newly-recognized needs requires
more funds and more people. There is no getting around that.
Attached to this statement is a description of an innovative system
in Tulsa for early disease detection and an upcoming statewide exercise
to assist us in bioterrorism preparedness planning. These examples
illustrate concretely the capabilities and activities that all
communities deserve, but few can afford.
Mr. Chairman, NACCHO believes that we are on the cusp of a new era
for public health, as society has recognized its role in public safety.
We will do our best to work with you and your colleagues to make sure
that public health protection for every community becomes a sustainable
reality.
Appendix
LOCAL DISEASE SURVEILLANCE--THE FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE
Current, practical experience in Oklahoma illustrates the magnitude
of the task ahead in building local disease detection systems, an
integral aspect of bioterrorism preparedness in every community. At the
Tulsa Health Department, we have developed a syndromic surveillance
system to detect infectious disease caused by an intentional
bioterrorism attack as well as naturally occurring infectious disease.
We are working with hospitals, pharmacies, schools, private physicians
and others to get ``real time'' information about a biological event
that could be taking place in our community. Our system is called
TASSS, the Tulsa Area Syndromic Surveillance System. The goal of the
system is early detection of a population-wide increase in illness that
might be caused by the intentional release of a biologic agent.
Recognizing diseases occurring in individuals is the role of health
care professionals through clinical diagnosis of distinct medical
characteristics and laboratory diagnosis. However, recognition of
patterns of disease, of outbreaks that could become epidemics, is a
public health issue that requires a strong local public health system.
Syndromic surveillance at the Tulsa Health Department has been
implemented through a partnership with area hospitals to make early
observations of clinical symptoms from emergency room records. Each
patient presents to the emergency room (ER) with a chief complaint as
his or her reason for seeking medical care. The TASSS is an electronic
file transfer of these chief complaints, utilizing a computer program
model to sort them into categories (cough, fever, rash, vomit,
diarrhea, respiratory, asthma, other.) The first indication of a large-
scale biological attack could be detected in these non-specific
symptoms.
Importantly, the surveillance system is not designed to detect
advanced illness. It is expected that such cases would be identified
and reported via existing surveillance systems (including an astute
clinician). An increase in early signs of illness might occur 24-48
hours prior to presentation and diagnosis of the first severe cases.
The central objective of this type of disease surveillance, called
``prodromal surveillance,'' is to alert the medical and public health
community to the possibility that a significant outbreak is occurring
before large numbers of patients present with advanced disease.
Currently, the data transfer from the ER is completed when one of
our epidemiology staff downloads the ER data, archives it, and runs it
through a computer model. Reports are generated for each category of
syndrome, which are then evaluated for their statistical significance.
If there is an increase in a particular syndrome, the system sends a
mathematical alarm. This surveillance process requires one full-time
employee seven days a week. Whenever the data trigger an alarm, an
additional staff epidemiologist is required to assist in evaluating the
significance of the alarm.
We are proud to be in the forefront, but we could do more in Tulsa,
also. The potential exists for adding additional surveillance sites
such as schools and major employers. With additional resources, the
surveillance system could be tailored for addressing population changes
in the community. It could examine trends in clustering of syndromes
that may indicate emerging disease, flu, waterborne outbreaks, food
borne outbreaks, and asthma as related to air quality. Observing these
trends takes time and diligence. Additional resources would provide the
capacity to increase this type of community surveillance.
In Tulsa, we have already expanded our capacity to quickly detect,
track, investigate, and contain infectious disease. Very few
jurisdictions in the country have surveillance systems that are this
sophisticated. Every community should be protected by similar
capabilities, and this will take more resources, more trained staff,
and more time, even if we were able to start today.
SOONER SPRING--PREPARING FOR SMALLPOX IN OKLAHOMA
In Tulsa, we will have the opportunity on April 12th and 13th to
test and exercise our expanded capacities in a simulated bioterrorism
event called ``Sooner Spring''. This will build upon last year's
national ``Dark Winter'' exercise that taught the nation so many
lessons about its ill-preparedness for bioterrorism. On April 12 there
will be a tabletop exercise in Governor Frank Keating's office that
will simulate a smallpox bioterrorism attack in Tulsa. The 13th will be
a field exercise in Tulsa simulating a smallpox attack. Two other
Oklahoma cities will exercise simulated attacks by two other biological
agents. This bioterrorism exercise will give Oklahoma State and local
community leaders and public health officials an opportunity to review
key planning elements for dealing with bioterrorism within the state.
In Tulsa, the exercise will focus on an intentionally introduced
outbreak of smallpox and will focus on the organizational
collaborations necessary to coordinate basic public health and medical
responses to any disaster or act of terrorism. Our Emergency Operations
Center and Metropolitan Medical Response System will be activated.
Police, fire, emergency medical transport, public health personnel,
hospitals, private physician societies, military, sheriff, elected
officials, volunteers and others will participate.
Just as officials test storm sirens to make sure their community
can alert citizens during severe weather events, these bioterrorism
exercises will help make sure the community is prepared for a potential
bioterrorist attack. The federal Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention will send a team of advisors to Oklahoma to provide
assistance. In addition, the Tulsa Health Department will conduct a
mock vaccination clinic. These exercises will be of utmost benefit as
we determine what works and what can be improved. Identifying the key
players in the community and their functions in the event of a
terrorist attack, as well as learning how to collaborate with them to
perform effectively, will help officials determine how best to keep
diseases from spreading, ensure effective medical treatment and inform
the public.
The basic cost to the Tulsa Health Department for preparing for
this exercise will exceed $30,000. This does not include costs incurred
by other state and local governments or private agencies. This is
another example of the substantial new costs facing public health
agencies and communities to prepare for bioterrorism.
Biographical Sketch of Gary Cox
Gary Cox has directed the Tulsa City-County Health Department for
eight years. He has worked in that agency for 22 years, including 7
years serving as Legal Counsel. The Department serves a population of
570,000 in Tulsa, Oklahoma and the surrounding metropolitan area. He
serves as a member of the Board of the National Association of County
and City Health Officials (NACCHO). The Department has gained national
recognition for excellence under his leadership, developing innovative
programs with community partners and pioneering a syndromic
surveillance system for infectious diseases. Mr. Cox has been highly
engaged in bioterrorism preparedness planning in Oklahoma. He is a key
player in planning and training for an upcoming new bioterrorism
exercise that expands last year's well-publicized ``Dark Winter''
exercise, which examined the consequences of a smallpox outbreak.
Mr. Cox holds a B.A. degree from Northeastern State University in
Oklahoma and a J.D. degree from the University of Tulsa School of Law,
where he also served as an Adjunct Professor of Environmental Law for
six years.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Cox.
Questioning by Chairman Robert C. Byrd
The committee will now begin its questions under a 7-minute
time limitation. Senator Stevens has been here and will come
back, and when he returns he will be recognized for questions.
Let me begin.
The administration's budget for fiscal year 2003 is
proposing drastic cuts, on the order of 35 percent, in the
Byrne grant program, the local law enforcement block grant, and
the COPS program, from about $2.2 billion to $1.4 billion. In
its stead, the budget proposes two new block grant programs to
be funded by Justice and FEMA to deal with homeland security.
Now, this seems to be an attempt to rob Peter to pay Paul.
They are both good people, and we will not help both of them,
but I am not sure that the right hand knows what the left hand
is doing here. The needs of local law enforcement have not
declined. Does this administration's proposal cause problems
for local law enforcement, and what are the problems of the
administration's approach that requires a 25-percent local
match? Colonel Westphal.
Colonel Westphal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The answer to
your question is yes, it does create problems for local law
enforcement. As I said in my testimony, at a time when there
really are a lot more burdens on local law enforcement and
trying to respond to some of the issues as a result of the
terrorist attacks of September 11, our offices are working a
lot more overtime, they are having to provide security at a lot
more places than they did before, we see increased security at
State buildings, at local government buildings, at dams and
reservoirs, and so on and so forth, and at the same time this
proposed budget is reducing the assistance from the Federal
level by $750 million, and that is going to be a great burden
on law enforcement.
At a time when we should be increasing our assistance from
the Federal level, we are seeing a reduction, so the response
to your question is yes, it is very problematic for law
enforcement throughout the United States.
Chairman Byrd. Mr. Cox, a recent report released by Johns
Hopkins University stated that it was imperative for the
Federal Government to shut down the Nation's air travel within
an hour of a diagnosed smallpox case in order to contain the
outbreak. Do local health departments have the capacity to
identify a smallpox outbreak in time to isolate the public's
exposure?
Mr. Cox. I think that varies, Mr. Chairman, across the
country. I can share with you a local experience in Tulsa. We
have recently developed a disease surveillance system----
Chairman Byrd. Well, that will take quite a while, and we
have the appendix concerning your Tulsa experiences in the
record. Could you be more responsive to the question from the
standpoint of the national official capacity?
Mr. Cox. From a national capacity, that word would have to
come from the emergency rooms and the private physicians to the
local health departments, and that is going to be a varying
response across the country. Some are going to pick it up
quickly that it is a suspicious, or a suspected case, and
others it could take longer before that is laboratorily
confirmed, but time is of the essence, and I do think we need
to build the capacity to more quickly detect any sort of a
biological event that may be taking place in the community.
Chairman Byrd. Colonel Westphal, last December, Congress
approved a $212 million emergency supplemental for the
Department of Justice to make grants to State and local
governments for the purchase of the equipment that police
departments could use for homeland defense programs. We wanted
to make sure that local and State law enforcement personnel had
an immediate infusion of resources to develop the capacity to
respond to the events of September 11. Has any of that money
made it to the local police departments yet?
Colonel Westphal. Mr. Chairman, in the sense of brevity you
have asked for, the answer to that question is no.
Chairman Byrd. I understand that nearly 4 months after a
supplemental was approved by Congress, the Department of
Justice has not yet even put out a notice that States can apply
for these funds. Do you know whether or not that is the case?
Colonel Westphal. Mr. Chairman, as far as I am concerned,
for my agency, that is the case. I have not seen a notice.
Chairman Byrd. Senator Stevens.
Senator Stevens. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact I had a
constituent in the back room I had to confer with, I would
request you recognize the person on this side, my side who
would be eligible. I think it would be Senator Gregg--no,
Senator Campbell.
Chairman Byrd. Senator Campbell.
Questioning by Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell
Senator Campbell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just ask
one quick question to General Alexander. Maybe I was not
listening carefully, but did you say the Guard needed radio
capabilities for military planes to communicate to civilian
planes? I thought they could already do that.
General Alexander. No, they have certain restrictions in
their ability to talk to airliners as a result of not having
this VHF radio.
Senator Campbell. I see, so it is not a frequency they can
go to to have direct communication now?
General Alexander. Not to my knowledge. They have to talk
down to the ground and then back up again, which is time-
consuming.
Senator Campbell. All right, thanks.
Mr. Chairman, just recently during our break I did a series
of town meetings. I am sure my colleagues did, too, as we all
do during the congressional district periods. I was rather
surprised to find out there is sort of a disconnect in a lot of
our small towns, at least in the State of Colorado, and most of
those people who came to the town meetings still seem to have
not prioritized the war on terror above local priorities, and
what I got mostly was people concerned about road construction,
schools, jobs, and so on, and the only people that really
seemed to be aware of it and concerned about it and wanted a
dialogue about it were folks such as these at this table, law
enforcement people, fire people, trauma people, some hospital
people, but most of them were not, and I would like to ask the
panel, how do we raise the awareness of the real danger without
creating some kind of fear and panic?
Yesterday, some of us heard from--former Prime Minister
Netanyahu was here giving an update on the terrorism that
Israel faces, and he said--and it is kind of chilling,
actually. He said it is only a matter of time before American
communities face the same suicide bombers that there are in
Israel now, or related attacks, and I have to believe that he
is probably right. Sooner or later we are going to, and it
seems like the longer we get away from September 11, the more
many people in communities are sort of--their interest or their
excitement about it is subsiding, and it seems to me that when
we deal with what the folks here at this panel are going to
have to deal with, it is really not just a response to
something that has happened, because that already gets people
excited, but the prevention that they have to take to prevent
it from happening in the first place, which is almost
immeasurable.
It is difficult to measure what does not happen, and I
would just like, maybe a response from anybody who would like
to, about how we make sure there is that awareness without
creating any kind of undue fear.
Mr. Stittleburg. If I may, first of all, the National
Volunteer Fire Council just completed its spring meeting in
Colorado last week, and one of our speakers was Suzanne Menzer,
who I believe is with the Governor's Office of Public Safety
there, and she talked about precisely this, and the efforts
that are being made in Colorado to alert law enforcement and
the fire service and EMS to the challenges that are there.
How do we get the job done? I think you get it done exactly
as you are doing it now. That is, you are holding the hearings,
you are going to appropriate the money to get it to the people
at the local level who are in a position to accomplish
precisely what you need to be done. It is not going to happen
from Washington. It is going to happen from the grassroots, and
it is going to happen because you train us and equip us at the
local level to solicit the local input and alert the populace
as to what the risks are.
Senator Campbell. Well, should fire departments and police
departments do that in terms of, like, seminars to schools, or
things of that nature, as they did during the wartime?
Mr. Stittleburg. Sir, I think that is absolutely critical,
and I think that is part of the President's first responder
initiative program.
Senator Campbell. I am also interested in transportation,
because I am on the Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee,
as several of my colleagues are here, and we do not have
bridges, as you have in the States that have seaways, but we
certainly have some long tunnels, and it seems to me when I was
a boy of 9 or 10 years old during World War II--I refer to that
again--that there were guards literally at every bridge and
every tunnel in those days, and I was wondering what States are
doing now. Someone on the panel did mention that they are
taking some measures to guard facilities, but specifically, do
we have people, State patrol or guardsmen, or anybody else,
like in the Holland Tunnel in New York, or the Eisenhower
Tunnel in Colorado, or some of the bridges that go across our
major waterways?
Mr. Von Essen. In New York City, to answer your question,
there are guards and National Guard is still helping us, and
police officers on both ends of the tunnels, and they are in
the process of expanding the electronic surveillance inside the
tunnel.
Senator Campbell. Colonel Westphal.
Colonel Westphal. In Colorado, Senator, first of all I
would like to agree completely with your observation in your
town meetings, that it is very difficult to get the attention
of the general public about the particular problem of
terrorism, and immediately after September 11 there was a lot
of response in trying to guard the reservoirs and the dams and
the Eisenhower Tunnel in particular, and what we call targets
of opportunity, in trying to harden some of those targets,
including our State buildings, in the State capitol, but as
time has gone on, your observation is exactly correct, that the
people's perception of the danger of terrorism has waned
tremendously, even to the point where we are now being asked by
our own legislatures in Colorado to take the security out of
the State capitol and open it up again, because they somehow
feel that the threat is already over, and I am not exactly sure
what the approach is, without creating the general panic with
the public, in trying to educate them that this is an ongoing
problem, and that we need to be ever-alert, so I think town
meetings and things like that are certainly necessary, but as
you say, you do not want to alarm everyone, but it is a
problem. As time goes on, nobody believes that this is a
concern any longer.
Senator Campbell. Well, hopefully they will not have their
interest rekindled by a bomb in the capitol of Colorado.
One last question, too, Mr. Chairman. That is, whenever we
start the flow of money from Washington, there is always that
question about whether it should go to the States and be
filtered through to the local communities and the local hazmat
teams and departments, or should there be a direct funding?
Would it be more streamlined and more effective to tailor the
response to the communities, rather than have some kind of
filter-through program from the State? Does anybody have a
feeling on whether it should be through the State system of
funding, or directly to the Departments?
Mr. Crouse. Senator, Mike Crouse from the firefighters. We
have experienced problems with the programs going through the
State and when the funds get there, not getting to the local
level, and we would prefer to see some mechanisms of process in
place where the funds go directly to the local affiliate, so
that they can put those funds directly to their needs and uses.
Senator Campbell. Well, in our State we have 80 percent of
the population in just one central area around metropolitan
Denver, and I know in some cases I have heard from people in
the small communities that the large metro areas--that is where
the State capitol is, and they pretty much soak up all the
money, and some of it does not even get to the small
communities.
Thank you for your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Byrd. Mr. Kohl.
Questioning by Senator Herb Kohl
Senator Kohl. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and we
thank you all for being here today, gentlemen.
Mr. Stittleburg, we respect the work that you have done as
a volunteer firefighter for the past 30 years, as well as the
work that you do as chairman of the National Volunteer Fire
Council, are you concerned that the new first responder
initiative, instead of the assistance to firefighters grant
program, will not provide you with the type of support that you
need, and are you concerned that not all of the funding will
get to where it is most needed?
Mr. Stittleburg. Senator, I am most deeply concerned about
exactly that. As I mentioned earlier, the Fire Act grant was
absolutely the most efficient way to get the money from the
Federal level to the departments that need it, directly. It was
very efficient in terms of time, it was done quickly, it was
done with practically no administrative cost involved, the
analysis as to how the grants were awarded was performed by
members of the fire service who understand the needs of the
organization.
To eliminate that program under the assumption that somehow
the first responder initiative will supplant it, and replace it
with a block grant program, is going to do a couple of things.
One, it is going to add significant time and administrative
cost to getting this done, and two, it is going to eliminate a
lot of the money that went directly to local, rural fire
departments. I simply cannot overemphasize to you, sir, the
importance of funding that Fire Act at the $900 million level,
and continuing it.
The base, that minimum level of responsive ability we have
to have at the local level still has not been achieved, and the
best way to get there is the Fire Act.
Senator Kohl. Okay. Mr. Stittleburg, as a volunteer
firefighter from a rural area, would you comment on some of the
needs of rural small towns and how these needs differ from
major metropolitan areas?
Mr. Stittleburg. Well, sir, the volunteer fire service
nationwide struggles routinely with money. That is a primary
and paramount struggle we have that is ongoing, and it
continues to be more of a problem for us because it is a time
demand. It is not just a money demand.
Most volunteer fire departments are engaged in raising
their funds. We go out and we sell raffle tickets, we fry
pancakes, we do whatever it takes to raise the money to buy the
equipment that allows us to provide the service to the public
we protect. When the Government can provide us with the money
to buy that equipment it literally buys us time, and that is
what we need.
Senator Kohl. Mr. Stittleburg, as you noted here today, far
too many fire departments across our country lack even the most
basic levels of firefighter training, a situation that
potentially endangers the lives of firefighters and the people
they protect. What can we do to ensure that our firefighters
have the basic level of training they need, and where should we
be directing Federal funds in the area of training? How can we
best use Federal funds to meet the diverse training
requirements of rural, suburban, and urban firefighters?
Mr. Stittleburg. Senator, the training apparatus is in
place. Training is being delivered to volunteer fire
departments throughout the United States. I would not suggest
to you that training funds should be designated primarily from
the Federal Government to the local fire department, because
they in turn then have to go elsewhere to secure that training.
Every State has a State training program in place, and that
is where the Federal money that is designated toward training
is best spent.
Senator Kohl. This question is for anybody, or all of you
on the panel. The Justice Department's Inspector General
reported just this past Monday that they failed to distribute
more than $141 million in grants set aside for emergency
equipment in response to the threat of terrorism. In some
cases, even when the money was awarded, some States and local
governments failed to spend it in a timely way, or failed to
readily accept available equipment. The equipment was for
police, fire departments, and emergency response teams. Can you
comment on the problems that occur with these grants, and are
there ways to ensure that the money and equipment gets to the
people who need it in the most efficient manner?
Mr. Stittleburg. Senator, at least as far as I am
concerned--I am not familiar with the grant program you are
talking about. I am sure there are lots of grants out there,
and not all of us know about all of them, but I am not familiar
with the ones that are being referred to.
Colonel Westphal. Senator, if I might respond, there were a
couple of problems with that program. One was that it required
a plan be submitted, a complete plan be submitted prior to the
time funds were allocated, which certainly slowed down the
process, and part of the other problem was, when equipment was
provided, there was nothing provided for training or use of the
equipment, and sometimes the equipment, and sometimes the
equipment sits around and is not used because nobody is trained
how to use it, so those are a couple of the major problems with
that program.
Senator Kohl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator Kohl. Senator Gregg.
Senator Gregg. I believe Senator Stevens----
Chairman Byrd. He gave up his time.
Questioning by Senator Judd Gregg
Senator Gregg. I do not want to step in front of Senator
Stevens--I appreciate it.
First off, Mr. Von Essen, I appreciate your reminding us of
the sacrifice of Chief Fanning. I had the honor of chairing the
joint hearings that were held here when Chief Fanning
testified, and remember rather vividly his testimony, which was
superb. Of course his tragic death in the September 11 attacks
reflected his commitment to his fellow citizenry, and the
deaths, obviously, of so many of his colleagues is something we
all continue to deal with.
I am interested, however, to know how much of the funding
that we have appropriated in the first trenche of supplemental
funding, which I think was $20 billion, how much of it has
actually made its way to the streets, in your opinion, relative
to fire, police, and emergency managers?
Mr. Von Essen. We have gotten so much help from so much
equipment coming in from people that have produced it, sent it
to us without getting paid, I am not even sure of the
bookkeeping side of it, since I have been gone the last 3
months, exactly how much has been received. I know that it is
coming. I know that Mayor Bloomberg is I think reasonably happy
with the progress. He has not been screaming about it, so I am
sure he is okay with it.
The fire department itself has been getting all the
equipment and resources that it needs as far as counseling and
everything, and if it is not in cold cash that has been
received from the Government, it has been all on lay-away.
Senator Gregg. I am glad to hear that.
The administration's proposal included reorganizing the
manner in which we provide the funding for the first
responders. Obviously, they put a significant amount of money
in here, $3.5 billion. Up until 9/11 these funds had been
administered by the Office of Justice Programs' Office of
Domestic Preparedness. Now the administration is suggesting
that most of these dollars move over to FEMA and very little of
it stay with Justice. I guess I would be interested in knowing
how first responders feel about where they should be getting
their money.
I think Senator Mikulski defined this question. We want to
make sure the money gets there and is most effectively used,
and I would be interested in anyone's thoughts on which one of
these agencies should have this responsibility.
Mr. Crouse. Senator, if I may, Mike Crouse with the
International Association of Fire Fighters. We would like to
see FEMA be the lead agency for the terrorism part, and we
would like to retain the Office of Domestic Preparedness in
DOJ. Our experiences with them have demonstrated that it is a
good program--it is not broke, do not fix it, and it seems to
be working.
Chairman Byrd. Would you speak a little louder, please?
Mr. Crouse. I am sorry, sir.
Chairman Byrd. Speak a little louder.
Mr. Crouse. We would like to see FEMA be the lead agency
for the terrorism part, and have DOJ continue as the lead on
the Office of Domestic Preparedness. It has worked fine for us.
We have not seen any problems with it.
Senator Gregg. Does anybody else have any thoughts on this
area?
I am interested, General, in what your thoughts are
relative to who the new CINC commander should be. If there is
going to be a commander who is basically in charge of what is
basically in charge of a domestic event, should it naturally be
a National Guard person?
General Alexander. We feel that this should be an active
component four-star officer who has joint experiences. The role
of the National Guard Bureau, if expanded, can fill that void
in terms of communicating directly what is going on with the
Governor's plan and our public safety forces by the
mobilization and intervention of a CINC that would in fact
mobilize the entire Guard across this country for that.
However, there is a distinct advantage of having a deputy CINC
commander that is a National Guard officer, a three-star, with
joint experience.
Senator Gregg. What is the progress, in your opinion, that
the Guard is making in--now, there was a proposal at one point
to set up regional Guard centers of excellence. These would be,
basically, second responders, people who go in with a hazmat
capability after the first responders have already come on the
scene. Where do you see the Guard's role in that?
General Alexander. Regional areas of excellence, I question
their value. There is a high degree of cooperation that exists
between the States and all public safety forces without a
particular boundary. Regional areas of excellence are hard to
make compatible with all of the other regions that are out
there for interagency actions. No boundaries are the same. I
would submit that the States and local governments within that
State are extremely capable of creating levels of excellence
based upon the expertise that is there, to include the Guard.
Senator Gregg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator. Senator Stevens, do you
want to----
Questioning by Senator Ted Stevens
Senator Stevens. If I may, yes. I apologize for having to
leave during part of your testimony, gentlemen. We have got
some other things working here that take time, too.
General Alexander, tell me, have funds been made available
to pay for the State activation of National Guard forces for
homeland defense yet?
General Alexander. Those funds are yet in total to be
distributed. I understand there is a significant shortfall in
the title 32 funding as it relates to the 7,000 more people
that we had on active duty for airports. I know the result of
that, moneys have been taking from existing training and
operational accounts to pay that bill.
Senator Stevens. Well, would you let Senator Inouye and I
know about that? I think that is a Defense Subcommittee
problem, but we ought to look into that, and for all of you,
one of the problems we encountered right off was the problem of
the interoperability of communications in terms of times of
crisis. I am concerned about the amount of money that is
necessary to bring that about. I think that is the first thing
that ought to be done, to make sure that everyone can talk to
one another, and I know, Mr. Cox, we have got this problem with
airplanes. I am talking about the people on the ground who
really cannot talk to one another right now, not that they do
not have good equipment, and not that I think we ought to have
one monopolistic outfit that provides everybody their
equipment.
I just think we ought to make certain that it is
interoperable, and we can communicate between firemen from
different States, and National Guardsmen from different States.
As I understand it, much of this equipment is not
interoperable, and we need to know how much funding would be
necessary to meet this first goal for first responders. How
much would it cost to assure that we had systems that were
totally functional and interoperable? Can anybody tell me any
steps that have been taken so far to meet that need?
Colonel Westphal. Senator, I might respond from one
person's perspective. There are many States that have tried to
do statewide systems and do digital trunk systems so they would
tie together, so that everybody would be interoperable, be it
the fire service, or law enforcement, or anybody else. The
problem has been that usually at the State level they fund
these things, but for the local agencies, the smaller agencies,
they are unable to acquire the radios necessary to do the
interoperable operation, and I am sure that is probably true in
the fire service. Some of the smaller fire services really talk
about having to do fundraising just to do their training and
buy their equipment. It would be the same situation.
So from the IACP's point of view, we would certainly be
supportive of trying to help some of these smaller localities,
local law enforcement, local fire service and so on, buy some
of this equipment to be interoperable.
Senator Stevens. Senator Hollings here, he is chairman of
the committee that deals with spectrum management. As I
understand it, part of the problem is spectrum allocation, but
secondly, the problem is that you could have perfectly fine
intrastate communications in your State, but if your people
went across the border, three States east, west, north, and
south of you, you might not be able to communicate with them.
There is a regional problem here as well as statewide, regional
and then national. I would like to make that the number 1 goal,
to see that everybody can communicate on a total basis, and we
would appreciate it if somebody in the task force would attack
that and tell us what kind of funding would be required to meet
that goal.
The last subject that I want to raise and I raised it
yesterday, and I do not want to be offensive to anybody, but I
have talked to some of the National Guard people at the
airports up my way. There is no such thing as overtime. Some of
them worked at their normal jobs and are being National
Guardsmen on weekends and evenings, and there is no such thing
as overtime. We are running into an overtime situation, and I
do not know where to draw the line on what is an area which
really should call for volunteers, and where it is legitimate
that we say a person has been required to work and therefore
has to have overtime.
Have any of you addressed that problem, and is it
something--I am going back to the days I knew in World War II.
I do not remember anyone asking to be paid. The neighborhood
watch that we had, we had watch on the beach up and down
California, and as I said yesterday, the Alaska Eskimo Scouts
provided 100 percent coverage to half of the coastline in the
United States for 4 years and was never compensated at all, and
now we have an absolute demand for more money for people to
take action to protect themselves. Where is the volunteer side
of this operation that you all are involved in?
Is that too bad a question? I do not want to be negative,
but it seems to me that each of your agencies should have a
whole series of volunteers, people who will fill in when a
crisis comes. Is that fair?
Mr. Stittleburg. Senator, certainly the 800,000 volunteer
firefighters in the United States do precisely that, volunteer.
Your question about overtime is an interesting one, because one
would not expect that to arise with the volunteer fire service,
but indeed it does in many situations where volunteer
firefighters who are also employees of the municipality where
they live, and the Fair Labor Standards Act frequently
requires, if those volunteers are responding to fires while
they are on the municipal clock, that they also be paid
overtime if also they work 40 hours at their regular job
assignment.
So I would simply suggest to you, sir, that as far as the
volunteer fire service is concerned, our services are estimated
at saving the taxpayers in excess of $60 billion a year, yet
overtime is even a factor with us.
Senator Stevens. Mr. Cox.
Mr. Cox. Senator Stevens, in the public health arena there
are established linkages between public health and the private
medical community, particularly with planning and so on for a
public health emergency. Certainly these need to be stronger,
and the funding that you are talking about certainly could be
used to make those stronger, but the linkages are available
where the private medical community does volunteer in case of
an emergency.
Senator Stevens. I do not like to pursue it too much, Mr.
Chairman, but there is an inequity here, you know. On any one
of these jobs, take 9/11, there are people working out there
all working on the same task, some of them are paid full-time,
some of them are being paid overtime, some of them not being
paid at all, and I really think that there ought to be a
standard there.
Maybe we should provide per diem for the people who are
really volunteers but are involved in a real crisis, because
all the time the volunteers spend getting trained, people
working for an entity such as yours, when they are getting
trained, they are getting paid. Even if they have to work
overtime, they still get paid. It is overtime pay.
There is not a level standard there, and it is a new world,
those of us who came through World War II, because I just knew
an enormous number of people who worked 8, 10 hours a day, and
then came back at night, worked 3 or 4 hours, so they might
work 3 or 4 hours in the morning and work swing shift and work
all night.
I do not see that now. I do not see the public being aware
of the crisis that is ahead of us, and you are absolutely
right, it is just a matter of time until we face the suicide
bomber, and I do not care whether it is the subway, in a train
station, or in a crowd waiting to get into a mall. They are out
there, and I do not think we are prepared for it at all. I do
not know, Mr. Chairman, how to get that degree of awareness
that we need to assure that there will be volunteers to help,
that they are trained, and that they fit in with your people
who have the daily job of trying to protect the country.
Enough said, and thank you very much.
Chairman Byrd. Senator Stevens, you raise a good question
and made some good points. I heard one of the witnesses earlier
say that the interest of the general public is waning. If the
general public interest is waning, you are not going to get
volunteers. Getting volunteers depends upon the interest of the
public, the concerns and the perceptions of the public.
Senator Hollings, you are next.
Statement of Senator Ernest F. Hollings
Senator Hollings. Mr. Chairman, right to the point. It is
us up here who are waning, not the people. What happens is, on
9/11 we had the best of responses. We are lucky, the firemen
did a magnificent job, law enforcement, National Guard moved
in, the ports authority, we are very, very lucky.
Incidentally, on that morning I was briefing the leadership
on the Senate side about counterterrorism, and the program that
we had in the Department of Justice field. The reason I mention
that is because we have had for 4 years now an ongoing program,
and I wanted to commend Senator Gregg on his leadership, who
has been the chairman of our little subcommittee, because it
was under his leadership that we started the Office of Domestic
Preparedness (ODP)--for example, we have got five training
facilities who have already graduated 80,000 firefighters and
law enforcement officers on the counterterrorism threat.
We have programs for the equipment. I am a cosponsor of the
Fire Act and like you say, Mr. Stittleburg, it is working, and
let us not formalize it where it has got to go through certain
channels, like the Governor's Office, because now the grant
office at FEMA makes direct grants down to these little
communities, and that is what you are begging for, isn't that
right?
Mr. Stittleburg. Perfectly said, sir.
Senator Hollings. That is right, and if you give it to the
Governors, that is like delivering lettuce by way of a rabbit.
I mean, it is not going to get there. We have had this
experience up at this particular committee level on these
things. We had a Governor in Indiana that bought a beach craft
for his wife to go buy her spring clothes. We had down in
Hampton, Virginia, somebody buy a tank and put it out in front
of the courthouse, and all of that thing, so we have been there
and done that, and we do not want to disturb the good programs
that are already working, because that is what you all are
saying. We need more personnel, more money, more equipment,
more training, just more of what we have got.
For example, the Office of Domestic Preparedness is
working. So Mr. Chairman, I wanted Governor Ridge to come and
say what are we trying to fix. Why are we changing it? Where it
has been inadequate--inadequacy, like I say, is us, because we
gave the $20 billion, but the poor Attorney General and the
Department of Justice is scared to death to distribute the
money, because we have got an ongoing debate about FEMA.
We are not going to transfer the ODP program to FEMA. They
do not know anything about law enforcement, and we have got
this ongoing program that we know understands the hitches. With
respect to interoperability, Senator Stevens, we now have the
equipment, the technology has been developed.
That was one of the troubles in New York. They had
different frequencies, for one thing, for the law enforcement
and for the firefighters. We have got to get that
interoperability, otherwise we have got to get a uniform
frequency to respond to an emergency of this kind so that they
are not all jammed. You were trying to tell your firemen, get
out of the place up on the 32nd floor, and they could not get
the message because everything was jammed.
Another thing that was wrong, they did not fireproof the
steel structure. They eliminated a lot of the fireproofing on
that thing. It was not supposed to fall down and melt like it
did.
So we have got a lot of things that we know about, but
there was not anything wrong with the firemen. There was not
anything wrong with the law enforcement. It was just the
ongoing programs have not been properly funded.
Those five training facilities under ODP, like I say, are
ongoing right now. We have got the equipment, but we need to
get it out there now, and that $20 billion, Mr. Chairman, that
you appropriated has got to be distributed. The log jam and the
disinterest is up here.
Chairman Byrd. You got it. That is right.
Senator Hollings. They have got cloning. Who is worried
about cloning right now? I am worrying about domestic violence
and terrorism.
We had a hearing--Senator, we had a hearing for 3 days last
May, and the entire Cabinet came up over a 3-day period before
our little Appropriations subcommittee. This issue is not
moving because of us. The communities are interested, and I
want to commend you folks who have been working out there in
the vineyards and leading the way. You all have done an
absolutely magnificent job.
I have got a letter from the National Sheriffs Association
that I want to put into this particular record, because what
they want is to not mess it all up, and stop transferring and
studying and then putting in new kinds of training programs and
Governors and everything else. We asked for plans 4 years ago,
and on 9/11 we only had four States. Now we have got 46. Now we
have got 46.
And incidentally, you are talking about the Governors. I
know several of the Governors did not even know they had
submitted the plans. They have not even been on the loop, but
it is us up here that have got to get it moving.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator, and your correspondence
will be included in the record.
Senator Hollings. I appreciate it. Thank you.
[The information follows:]
National Sheriffs' Association,
Alexandria, VA, February 25, 2002.
Hon. Ernest Hollings,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Hollings: The National Sheriffs' Association (NSA) is
surprised and deeply concerned about the proposal by OMB to eliminate
the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) at the U.S. Department of
Justice, and shift these responsibilities to the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA). While we appreciate the efforts of OMB to
consolidate functions and enhance efficiency, NSA believes this
proposal would undermine the efforts of law enforcement to prevent
another terrorist attack on the United States.
ODP serves as the only significant source of Federal financial
assistance for Sheriffs to train for and to combat the threat of
terrorism. For this reason, we applaud the recent action by Congress to
increase the ODP budget from $250 to $650 million. As we now commence
this long-overdue strategy to coordinate the efforts of Federal, State,
and local agencies, OMB would now slash the ODP budget to ``0''.
Moreover, the OMB proposal seems to repeal provisions of the
Patriot Act that grant to the Department of Justice responsibility to
prevent and detect potential acts of terrorism. Under Sections 1005 and
1014 we note that Congress directed the Attorney General, not FEMA, to
make grants to Sheriffs for terrorism prevention and anti-terrorism
training.
For the Nation's Sheriffs, this proposal means more than
organization and funding. This shift of authority completely
contradicts the established authority of law enforcement to prevent
potential terrorists acts and to protect the public from such threats.
Local law enforcement will always be the first to respond to an
incident, and only law enforcement has authority to take arrest action
and use force during a terrorist attack. FEMA's response at the scene
is appropriate and welcome only after law enforcement has determined
that public safety has been secured. Law enforcement cannot subordinate
its command responsibility to FEMA. FEMA has historically been a
response agency, and NSA is concerned that this program could become
response oriented instead of focused on law enforcement's efforts to
prevent terrorist attacks from happening.
Presidential Decision Directives 39, 62 and 63 direct the Attorney
General, not FEMA, to assume lead responsibility for the Federal
Government. Through the FBI, the U.S. Department of Justice, not FEMA,
serves as the central agency in a crisis. The Nation's Sheriffs have
long established working relationships with ODP and the FBI at the
Department of Justice, and we should not be asked to scrap all of our
policies, plans, and agreements so that we can work under the authority
of an agency that has no law enforcement role.
The National Sheriffs' Association believes that Congress should
commend the Department of Justice for its ODP program, and continue the
funding level at a minimum of the current $650 million. We ask that
Congress reject this well-intentioned but misguided OMB proposal to
take a successful program away from the Department of Justice and give
it to an agency that has neither the experience nor the charter to get
the job done.
Thank you for your consideration on this important matter and we
look forward to working with you to enact sensible law enforcement
policy.
Sincerely,
John Cary Bittick,
President.
Questioning by Senator Jack Reed
Chairman Byrd. Mr. Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you, gentlemen, for your excellent testimony. I believe the
questions this morning have illustrated first that we depend
upon local initiative to deal with many of these issues, but
the nature of these problems are not at all local. They are
regional and national, and so at some point we have to also
develop some type of coordination mechanisms for
interoperability of radio equipment, or what data we collect in
doctor's offices, and how it is reported, and so I wondered if
you could, going down the line with the commissioner, just your
kind of insights, what you think is the most important thing we
can do to help foster these kinds of national standards but
maintain local initiatives, any problems you see, or advice you
can just give us.
Mr. Commissioner.
Mr. Von Essen. Well, I think we have to do a better job of
making people accountable for money that they get, so there is
less duplication and more measured performance, just like you
see in the private sector. You know, you give us money, we
should be accountable for it, it should be spent properly.
You talk about a national issue, it is the spectrum that we
need more availability for our emergency services to be able to
communicate, and that is a bigger issue than we can solve. That
is what you have to solve with the Federal Communications
Commission, and I was hoping Senator Leahy would stay, but that
is an issue that is really critical to us nationally for us to
get more spectrum. It has got to be taken away from television
stations, which we cannot do. You have to do.
Thank you.
Mr. Crouse. Yes, Senator, if I can. As Senator Hollings
pointed out, I think the systems are in place. FEMA has
demonstrated to us their abilities and desires to coordinate
the events such as 9/11. There are several agencies that come
into play, and if those systems can be enhanced and improved
upon, I think we can learn from the problems, the mistakes that
may have been made.
But I think what really needs to be focused on, and again
repeating what Senator Hollings pointed out, is listening to
what the local needs are, and from our perspective the fire
service today has spoken with one voice and one concern. We are
on the same page with the need, with respect to staffing the
fire departments, providing the appropriate equipment, and the
required training for not only the basic fire fighting
evolutions, but for the add-ons, the EMS hazardous material,
and weapons of mass destruction.
We have a system in place right now that I think is working
fairly well, and I think it just needs to be funded, and the
folks at the local level that we represent need to be heard.
Senator Reed. Without preempting the other witness, let me
interject. Is there some mechanism now presentable that your
colleagues in the fire service are comparing about
standardizing the acquisition of radios, for example? Is that
going on?
Mr. Crouse. To my knowledge, I am not aware of that, sir.
Maybe I will defer to the commissioner who now has a personal
interest in the radio issue, but I am not aware of any efforts
to standardize. Now, in the fire service in general we are
looking at ways of standardizing apparatus and protecting
clothing standards and those type of things.
Senator Reed. I guess my concern is that we give money and
it is accountable by the locals, they go buy equipment, they do
not use it for a raffle or for tickets to the Giants, that they
buy a system that someone sold them, and the fire department
next door buys a system that they think is great, but they are
not interoperable. Where do we put this together in a very
detailed, practical sense?
Mr. Crouse. I think again it is communications that has to
start up at the top level of the process that is put in place,
and if those funds are going to be made available through the
Federal Government, then I think we should force the local
communities, whether it is the city, State, county levels, to
communicate, so when they do procure those type of things they
are talking to one another and can purchase equipment that is
interchangeable, and can interact with each other.
Just by way of example, in my experience as a Federal
firefighter at the Department of Defense, we put in a
communications system in the State of California through the
San Diego Naval Facility down there, and working through the
various agencies, not just the military and the Air Force and
Army and Navy community that were there, but also to the
highway patrol and DEA and FBI. They were able to get Federal
funds from their various sources and put in a communication
program that was statewide, where our Federal firefighters
could actually communicate with the surrounding municipal
departments, or if they needed to get the Border Patrol or DEA
or something. So it is doable, but I just think we have to,
again, forge that process.
Senator Reed. Thank you. Gentlemen, please, and I think my
time is running, so if you can be brief.
Mr. Stittleburg. Senator, what you can do for the volunteer
fire service is assist us in promoting volunteering to the fire
service. There are 100,000 less volunteer firefighters in this
Nation than there were 20 years ago, yet we staff 90 percent of
the fire stations.
Mr. Crouse appropriately spoke about staffing. Recruitment
and retention is our staffing. That is what the Federal
Government can do for us. We have a 1-800 fire line to
encourage people to volunteer. That is something you could
promote for us. That is where it is at with us.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Chief. Colonel.
Colonel Westphal. Thank you, Senator. I will try to be real
quick. One quick comment about the communications issue. There
are standards, there are international standards. It is the
public communication officer standards, APCO 25. Not all
vendors are complying with those standards, but if we could get
everybody to adhere to those we could probably all communicate.
From our point of view, your original question was what can
be done at the local level, and how do we bring that into the
national level. From law enforcement's point of view, we do not
want to lose sight of the fact that if we did everything right,
the local fire service would not have to respond to any more
terrorist attacks because we would prevent them, and what we
would like to see, as I mentioned in my opening statements, we
had 16,000 agencies and 700,000 officers who gather a lot of
intelligence, and if we had a good system of gathering that
intelligence together at a Federal level and then do a good
analysis, we could do something real good about trying to stop
terrorist attacks.
You know, we are over in Afghanistan and other nations
trying to track down the terrorists, the President has tried to
put a stop to their funding sources, but unless we do something
here in the United States of America to try and find out who
these people are and what they are up to, we are not going to
stop terrorism, and I think that is a key role for law
enforcement, along with the Federal agencies.
Senator Reed. Thank you, colonel. General.
General Alexander. In the area of communications, the
National Guard would need to have contingency steps that
included off-the-shelf radios that would be interoperable with
first responders and periodically communications exercises to
facilitate that. I would assume that this would be of
significant value prior to and during mobilization, because
once the Guard is totally mobilized for weapons of mass
destruction they are still going to be following the lead and
being interoperable with our first responders, who know more
about it than we do.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General.
General Alexander. But we do need to be able to talk to
them.
Mr. Cox. Senator, I think from a local public health
standpoint the key thing would be to help us to expand our
capacity, to quickly detect and quickly control and effectively
control communicable disease, because this in turn is really
going to take a load off first responders, because it will be
controlled more quickly, as well as take a tremendous load off
of the medical care system, which could be quickly inundated
and overloaded.
Senator Reed. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator Reed. Senator Inouye.
Questioning by Senator Daniel K. Inouye
Senator Inouye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before proceeding,
Senator Stevens and I just came back from an extended journey
to Asia, and one of the countries we visited was Singapore,
usually looked upon as the Switzerland of Asia, gracious
living, high per capita income. Just before our arrival, the
security and intelligence of that country uncovered a plot to
use 100 tons of explosives to blow up the American Embassy.
When one considers that it took 3 tons for Oklahoma City, 100
tons is a lot of explosives, so I hope people in the United
States consider that terrorism is available everywhere on this
globe.
Gentlemen, whenever we discuss terrorism, the words,
targets of opportunity will pop up, and targets of opportunity
are not distributed equally throughout the 50 States. Some
States have more and some have less, some have none. You have
the Golden Gate Bridge, psychological, the arch at St. Louis,
we have military bases in many parts of our land, you have high
density population areas. Should these funds be allocated on
the basis of targets of opportunity?
Colonel Westphal. Well, I might respond by saying, targets
of opportunity really defines how easy a target is to attack,
and what we describe in law enforcement is trying to make it a
hardened target, and to make it a hardened target, you do what
you have done here at the Nation's Capital, and people have a
hard time accessing this building. Cars are searched, persons
are searched, and you make it a hard target, so even though
this certainly is a primary target of terrorists, it is not a
target of opportunity. It is a very difficult target.
So a terrorist will look around and find a target that
probably will have the most impact and get the most print, but
that is an unhardened target, so your question is, should money
be directed towards those hardened targets, and I believe that
might be difficult to do, because it is going to be kind of
like shooting ducks on a pond. It is sort of a moving target,
and it is going to shift all the time. If we direct money
toward one target and harden it, they are just going to shift
their efforts towards another one, so I think it is going to be
very difficult to identify particular targets that need to be
dealt with financially.
Mr. Stittleburg. Senator, if I may follow up on those
remarks, I think the Colonel is absolutely on point. I think
the way we address this is by having the local agencies
prepared and trained and able to identify those potential
targets in their own districts.
Senator Inouye. That was my only question. Any others?
Chairman Byrd. Anybody else want to respond to that
question?
General Alexander. I think it goes to the void we have in
the diffusion of intelligence that is in the hands of many
agencies, that do not allow responders on the ground to be
aware of a threat in the environment, and having some awareness
of that, a capability-based force that would be available to
deal with that environment would be something to consider,
based upon the diversity of the targets that are out there.
There is just so much we do not know and should know, that
other agencies know, that is not being shared, and that results
in our inability to prepare and respond.
Chairman Byrd. Mr. Cox.
Mr. Cox. Senator, I think it would be helpful to give a
great deal of thought in the bioterrorism area to the
unexpected. I mean, who would have ever thought that terrorists
would have taken a commercial airliner and turn it into a
terrorist weapon, and so in the area of bioterrorism it would
be good to give some thought to where a terrorist might strike
from an unexpected viewpoint or angle, such as a genetically
altered bioagent or other things that we need to give some
planning and thought to, because they are going to strike at
our weakness.
Senator Inouye. In other words, all of us are in the
action. Thank you.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Domenici.
Questioning by Senator Pete V. Domenici
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
apologize for being as late as I was this morning, but I could
not avoid it and as a result I get to listen to everybody else,
which has been very interesting.
Mr. Chairman, since we have 7 minutes, I would understand
if we could use that for opening remarks or assessing the
situation and it not all be questions, so I would like to just
open with a comment. First, I appreciate the panel's focusing
in on the first responder training programs that are supported
by the Federal Government, either your indication that you
support them, or your concern about whether they are working,
or whether they are all in the right places or not.
The history of first responders is very, very important,
because some people think nobody was concerned about mass
destruction conduct occurring in the United States until they
bombed the towers, but the truth of the matter is, in 1996 on
the floor of the Senate a major amendment--could have been a
bill--was adopted that created the first responders, for
certain New York, you were one of those first responder cities.
That created 120 cities, first responder cities, and a
rather substantial amount of money was spent, but it did not
get to all the cities, and so Senator Judd Gregg in an
appropriation bill created a National Domestic Preparedness
Consortium, and it is in the law because it is in the
appropriations bill for the Department of Justice.
As a result of the combination of the two, 120 cities prior
to 9/11 already had first responder training and first
responder designation, so I assume, Mr. Von Essen, that New
York City was a first responder city and they had for at least
2 years, maybe 3, put together the communication, the ability
to deliver the kinds of services in health and the like. You
had those all in some kind of a system when that vicious act
occurred, is that not correct?
Mr. Von Essen. In a limited capability, yes.
Senator Domenici. So it would seem to me that right off it
would be interesting to know--and of course I cannot get this
today, but maybe the chairman would consent to a detailed
question to New York City, but I would think the first thing we
ought to do with reference to first responders is to ask New
York City what the shortcomings of the first responder funding
that we already have and assumed was in place, because you are
the only one that has actually experienced how well it worked,
and what shortcomings you found.
The second one is to find out from the jurisdictions here,
near the Pentagon, how did the first responders fail them with
reference to their location, because I think we will find that
the first responder did not include the Pentagon at any time,
and consequently the Maryland and Virginia forces that were
pooled to assist in this serious episode did not have a similar
communication on many of the things that you all in New York
City would have assumed would have been available for a
disaster, so it would seem like we could learn from those and
do a better job with the first responder system.
Now, could I ask, as far as New York City, Mr. Von Essen, I
am not sure if you know enough about how it was obtained, how
you got trained, and what you did, or am I mistaken? Do you?
Mr. Von Essen. No, I was actually the president of the
union before it took place, and then the commissioner when it
was in place, and there was an awful lot of work together with
the International Association of Fire Fighters providing
training and providing additional volunteers to take on
additional responsibility within the New York City Fire
Department, spreading that out to maybe 30 or 40 engine
companies in New York City to begin that program, the
metropolitan program that we put in place.
When I said it was limited, I mean, we have 210 engine
companies in New York City, so it was the beginning of a
program, and I am not sure where you are actually going with
the comparison, because you can have a first responder program,
you can have this level of training, this level of preparation
and capability, and you can have two major airline planes crash
into two of the largest buildings in the world. Your first
responder program was not ready for that.
Senator Domenici. But I think what we have to eventually do
is, we have to know they are ready to direct their attention.
We do not have that done, either.
Mr. Von Essen. No. That is basically I think what everybody
is here today trying to get the Government to get us help with
some kind of a national standard for everybody to know what is
expected at the minimum level, at the next level, and at the
highest level, what level of training that you are going to
help us pay for, what level of equipment you are going to help
us pay for, or what level of preparation.
We all want to be as prepared as we possibly can, and you
talked before about targets. Of course, New York City, and San
Francisco, and L.A., and Chicago, and some of the other major
cities will provide more targets. That does not mean that the
first responder firefighter responding in the smallest city in
New Mexico should not also have a level of training somewhere
that we have to decide is at least adequate.
So this is major stuff, and a lot of us have been working
on it for a long time. Unfortunately, there has not been as
much interest, I do not think, at the Federal level since--you
know, except for this horrible incident that we had last
September, so we are getting help now that we have been asking
for for a long time in the fire service, trying to get the
levels of training and manning, equipment and everything else
that is needed, so we are relying on your continued support.
Senator Domenici. Mr. Chairman, I do want to lay before the
witnesses, not to ask them any questions about it, but just to
comment on a capacity that exists in the country that is just
becoming known. Believe it or not, last year, because of the
Appropriations Committee, the computerized system called NISAC,
N-I-S-A-C--and that stands for National Infrastructure
Simulation and Analysis Center, NISAC. It is now put together,
Mr. Chairman and fellow Americans.
It is put together because of the supercomputing capacity
of the defense laboratories on nuclear weapons. That is the
most sophisticated and powerful computer systems in mankind,
and in their spare time they have put together a system which
will permit you to determine what happens if a target, for
instance, Hoover Dam is hit. You just punch it in and you ask,
what is the result of Hoover Dam being demolished, and it will
tell you exactly the effect and where in the United States as a
result of that.
If you go to the New York area and you have tunnels, and
major waterworks, this simulation has literally thousands of
facilities with capacity that furnish something to the American
people, and it will tell you what will happen if one of these
is damaged or destroyed by those who are doing what they did to
New York City, or planning it.
I believe what we are finding out in this committee, Mr.
Chairman, thanks to you, is that there are some things that are
going to have to be done nationally. There are some centers for
getting out the information that are going to have to be at
least regional, and there is going to have to be some way of
determining the standard you have been talking about, and that
is going to have to be one versus another.
You cannot give the same protection for an area that has no
targets that this evaluator would tell you has a chance of
doing far more damage, and thus would be looked up on by
terrorists as an opportunity, better than another place where
the damage would be very little or none.
So I hope that we can find that magic balance between what
the Federal Government should be doing directly with States,
and what we ought to be doing by way of creating some of our
own centers. I also want to say to you, Mr. Chairman, it does
point up to me, just the 2 days of hearings, very, very
emphatically, that there must be a big, big coordination at the
national level.
I do not believe this program is going to work with six
Cabinet members all getting funded by the Appropriations
Committee and that they have pieces of the program. Unless
there is some national simulation or evaluation, I do not see
how we are going to know what we are doing, and to that end, I
think you have been referring to it in another way. You want to
hear a witness. I am not so interested in hearing the witness,
but I think what you were saying is, who is in charge?
Chairman Byrd. That is right.
Senator Domenici. That is what you have been asking, and I
think eventually we are going to have to ask who is in charge.
It is going to be very hard to fund something and know that we
are going to get what they are telling us we ought to get, that
will even be inventoried in 2 years and we will know where our
money went.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Byrd. I thank you, Senator, and I believe that
Governor Ridge would be the person to answer that question, to
pose that question to, and I hope he will come before the
committee and respond to that question. It is an important
question. We are talking about people's lives. We are talking
about the taxpayer's money, and I thank the Senator for his
perceptions and all of his contributions that he makes.
Senator Domenici. I thank you.
Chairman Byrd. He has started several programs through this
committee. I think of the human genome, and another thing, he
referred to another program just a minute ago.
Senator Domenici. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would say to you,
you know, as a result of the concern on first responders there
are five universities under one consortium, headed by the
University of Alabama that are teaching the fundamentals of
first responder needs through the cities' leaders across
America, and thousands have been educated as to what it means
to be a first responder and how you put the thing together, and
so it is not automatic. These are nice words, but it is not
just an accomplishment because you say, I have a first
responder. It is very, very difficult to set it up right.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Domenici. Thank you.
Chairman Byrd. Senator Mikulski.
Questioning by Senator Barbara A. Mikulski
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
again I want to thank you for holding these 2 days of hearings
on this very important issue.
I think it builds on the hearings that Senator Gregg and
Senator Hollings held last year, and I think it also points
out, Mr. Chairman, from our colleagues' questions, we are
already doing a lot, and we need to almost talk among ourselves
on what the initiatives are, but I really think it is
compelling that Governor Ridge come with the appropriate
Cabinet people, or Cabinet-level people like FEMA, so that we
can stop acting like technocrats and start acting like an
antiterrorist organization.
We cannot be technocrats, fooling around with little pieces
of paper and who should come and who has authority and who has
executive privilege. I am afraid if Bin Laden was watching this
he would say, as long as they keep bumping into each other over
what is the right organization chart, I have targets of
opportunity.
I do not want us to be technocrats. I want us to organize
ourselves like a fighting antiterrorist organization to protect
this Nation.
Chairman Byrd. Amen.
Senator Mikulski. And the money that we spend will make us
all-hazards. It will be double value to strengthen our police
and fire to be ready for all hazards, whether you are going to
fight a fire because it was caused by a malevolent attack or a
naturally--you are fit for duty, along with our police.
An outbreak could come from food, by accidental food
poisoning at a sports event, or a meningitis attack at a
college, or it could be another kind of attack, and God bless
our National Guard. My 29th Division, as you know, is one of
the best and bravest, and they are already doing the heavy
lifting for peacekeeping.
So this is what I want us to be, and I will say that while
we are working on our funding--and I am going to get to a few
of the questions--first of all, I do know that there is this
plan to combine the Office of National Preparedness under
Justice from the police department with the fire at FEMA. Until
we get real clarity, I am not going to move on that. I like our
fire grant program, and I know our fire fighting community
likes that fire grant program. The money comes to you, it is
peer-reviewed, it is not earmarked, and it meets a compelling
need, and last year we got $3 billion worth of requests. If we
funded that, we would be on the right track.
So we are absolutely on your side, and I support Hollings
and Gregg, but let us not move that Office of National
Preparedness to do that.
I am not going to talk about the funding mechanisms. I do
not think we should find new ways to rearrange the line items.
I think we have to help you who are on the front line, and that
means let us keep the programs organized the way we want, let
us put the money where it is, and let us start organizing
ourselves.
And to that point, let me go to you, Chief, because I am
concerned about the underfunding of our police, the
underfunding of our fire for protecting the protector and
getting the right equipment and the right training. Are you
aware that the President is also proposing a Citizens Corps to
be operated under FEMA to do, I am not sure.
I really want to support the President, but why do we need
a Citizens Corps if we have volunteer fire departments that are
already struggling for enough volunteers and enough funding to
support the volunteers. Are you aware of the Citizens Corps?
Mr. Stittleburg. Only in the most general terms, Senator. I
understand that the Citizens Corps has been proposed. I believe
there is a proposal of funding it to the level of $230 million,
I believe, in fiscal year 2003, at least as best I have heard
it. I am pretty fuzzy on what its ultimate goals are.
Senator Mikulski. I am pretty fuzzy, too.
Mr. Stittleburg. As to what the specifics are, I do not----
Senator Mikulski. And I do not think we can be warm and
fuzzy about it.
Mr. Stittleburg. And that, I guess, Senator, is indeed our
concern. It is a lot of money. Certainly, we support anything
that will contribute to the opportunity for the emergency
services to better serve the public, and as I understand, the
Citizens Corps that is structured, a lot of it, as a volunteer
sector, and certainly we support anything that will encourage
volunteerism. Beyond that, we do not have enough of a handle on
what is proposed to tell you what our position is.
Senator Mikulski. Well, let me just encourage you, because
I am concerned, too. Within the funding request for this year's
appropriation is $230 million to fund the Citizens Corps. That
would be $86 million I think for funds through organizations--
that was unclear--and $144 million to set up councils.
Now, just to put it in perspective, last year, we were
fighting just to add $360 million to the fire grant program,
the whole fire grant program. Do you remember that?
Mr. Stittleburg. How well I do, ma'am.
Senator Mikulski. You remember that. So I would really
encourage the fire fighting community, as well as the law
enforcement community, to meet with this Office of
Volunteerism, or Freedom Corps, that the President has. I
support the call for volunteerism, but I would like to see it
also go where there is an existing framework, like the
volunteer firefighters, where there would be a recruitment
energizing inspiration tool so that you would get the next
generation you need, and then we would help provide the
resources to train them and equip them so you are not doing
this through fish fries and bingos.
Mr. Stittleburg. That is precisely our sentiment. That is
just exactly our sentiment, Senator.
Senator Mikulski. Well, please--because I do not want to
fund this unless there is clarity, and I do not want to be in
opposition to the President until there is clarity.
I would like to go to the issue of bioterrorism, Mr. Cox.
Is it Mr. Cox, or Dr. Cox.
Mr. Cox. Mr.--just Gary.
Senator Mikulski. Mr. Cox, on the issue of bioterrorism, I
think you have made an excellent statement of what our public
health agencies need. Their infrastructure is quite tattered.
Let me raise another issue, as we are working on
legislation. When bioterrorism hits, like it hit Brentwood,
like it hit the Senate, et cetera, I was concerned about two
things, one, the management of the public health incident, but
the management of the communication around the incident. As all
of the people at the table know, the fear and panic results
from terrorism, even if it is an attack on a small population,
but if it is an attack on you it does not matter whether it is
10 or 10,000.
Could you give for us, number 1, your observations on how
the communication strategies were handled, and number 2, what
would be the recommendation of the public health community on
how we cannot only manage a public health incident, but how we
can have a better communication way so that we can manage the
fear, and ultimately fear leads to panic?
Mr. Cox. An excellent question, Senator.
I think first of all, on the incident itself, probably a
good way to get the communication information out to the public
is to have first of all a single voice, a voice of a person, if
it is a bioterrorism action, that has a public health
background, a medical background, to speak with a clear voice
of understanding and authority.
As far as getting information out to the public--and I say
a second part of that would be to establish, as is usually the
case, a joint information center so that public information
folks from several different agencies all group together and
come up with a common message that needs to be communicated to
the public.
Senator Mikulski. Does that exist now?
Mr. Cox. It does in some areas.
Senator Mikulski. But it is uneven, and it is unmandated?
Mr. Cox. Yes.
Senator Mikulski. Well then, that takes me to another set
of questions that really affect everyone at the table. When we
held our hearings under Gregg-Hollings on terrorism 1 year ago,
one of the questions we asked was, at an incident, the question
was, who was in charge? The FBI said, we are in charge, because
we are crisis management.
FEMA says, well, we are in charge in terms of the casualty
management, and their whole preparedness framework.
Then we had a local sheriff who said, really, I am the one
in charge, because I am the first one there, making sure that
the fire department and whatever is.
Do you think that there is a real clarity about, when there
is an incident, number 1, who is in charge of managing the
incident at the scene, number 2, calling in the appropriate
resources, and number 3, ensuring that there is more
communication out to the people so that there is not panic
around, or a management of people so that panic and fear do not
take over? Do you know? Can you tell me who in your own
community, who would be in charge? Colonel, would it be the
FBI?
Colonel Westphal. Well, the FBI would be in charge if it
was a terrorist attack, and for the investigation, but the
general answer to your question is that most communities have
adopted an incident management system which kind of defines who
is going to be in charge based on the incident, and I would
assume that most of the major agencies--certainly I know New
York City has adopted that, and there are very defined
guidelines about who is in charge of what, and how they do the
logistics and so on and so forth, so for the agencies that have
been trained in the incident management system and use that,
that is not necessarily a problem.
But what you are addressing is probably more in the arena
of sometimes when the Federal agencies show up, and then there
is a dispute about who is going to investigate the particular
crime.
Senator Mikulski. No, no, no, I am not talking about
investigation.
Colonel Westphal. Just the response itself?
Senator Mikulski. Yes.
Colonel Westphal. So my response would be that for those
agencies that have adopted this incident management system, we
have really eliminated that problem, but I know that that is
not the case all over the country.
Senator Mikulski. Would that really be under a mayor, or a
local county executive, whoever is the head of local
government, and their designee?
Colonel Westphal. Generally, yes, if it is in a locality,
yes, generally that would be the case.
Senator Mikulski. Do any of you want to comment?
Mr. Stittleburg. Senator, I agree with the Colonel that for
those that are using IMS, or incident management system, these
issues certainly are addressed. However, how broadly the IMS
system is being utilized around the country is a real mixed
bag, and I would suggest to you that one of the key factors
involved in development of IMS is training, which again I
believe leads us back to the Fire Act.
Senator Mikulski. IMS stands for the incident management
system?
Mr. Stittleburg. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Mikulski. And who is in charge of that?
Mr. Stittleburg. That is what the IMS defines. The incident
management system defines who the incident commanders are. It
may be a combined command, but that is a system that deals with
precisely what you are addressing, who is in charge, and who is
in charge of what.
Senator Mikulski. Who calls up what?
Mr. Stittleburg. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Mikulski. In other words, different levels would be
called in.
Mr. Stittleburg. And obviously it is also
interdisciplinary, in the sense that we are not just dealing
with fire. Fire has to interact with police, police has to
interact with the EMS, EMS has to interact with utility
companies and contractors, and you bring in heavy equipment and
various other things, depending upon the nature of the call.
Senator Mikulski. Do you think that in that area, though,
that there is enough training and exercises to make sure that
local communities who have high threat regions--we are in the
capital region, so it speaks for itself. I do not want to
outline why we would be a threat, not only the continuity of
Government, but major Federal installations. There are other
areas, and there are different threats and risks around the
Nation. Some communities are at greater risk than others.
Do you feel that there is enough training, and then in
actual exercises, and do you think that is important to do, and
pay for?
Mr. Stittleburg. As to the first question, no, ma'am, I do
not think we are anywhere near at that point yet. Second, yes,
there is certainly a need for it, and when we talk about
targets of opportunity--that term was used earlier--I would
suggest to you that targets may develop through an unintended
fashion.
For instance, one of the calls that is overlooked for
September 11 was the crash in Somerset, Pennsylvania, which was
responded to by volunteer fire departments. Certainly that area
was not something that someone would have defined as probably a
high likelihood of a terrorist event, yet that is exactly what
it became, so these can develop in a serendipitous fashion.
Senator Mikulski. Does anybody else want to comment?
Mr. Von Essen. Senator, the system works when people listen
to it. The incident management system is designed for
complicated situations that we run into, and it works, but you
cannot have enough training, you cannot have enough making
everybody aware of it, and a big issue, a big problem like we
had in New York City, everybody worked together, and we were
able to get everything done.
Senator Mikulski. Well, I know my time has expired. To each
and every one of you in the professional organizations that you
represent, I just want to say thank you. I know even before
September 11 you worked around the clock, standing sentry to
protect America from all hazards, and I know that September 11
and its consequences have placed additional stress on each and
every one of the ordinary people who work for you, the
policemen, the firemen, the National Guard guy or gal, as well
as our dedicated public health people, so I just want to say
thank you, and we have got to get our act together to help you
perform your acts of courage.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator Mikulski.
Senator Burns.
Senator Burns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I understand we
have got a vote that is going to start around noon, or sometime
around noon, and we have got three stacked votes, so things may
get a little discombobulated.
Chairman Byrd. On that, would the Senator yield to me?
Senator Burns. Yes, sir. I always yield to chairmen.
Chairman Byrd. I thank the Senator.
Let me ask the panelists, are you at liberty, and are you
free to stay for a little while? We do have three votes, and I
think it is important enough that some additional questions be
asked, and following Senator Burns' questions--and in the
meantime I will go to the floor and try to vote--I wonder if
the panelists could all remain. I will be back as soon as I can
come. I have some questions that I would like to ask. Does
anyone disagree with this?
Colonel Westphal. Senator, I will not be able to remain. I
have to leave.
Chairman Byrd. How soon would the Colonel have to leave?
Colonel Westphal. I need to be out of here by 12:15.
Chairman Byrd. All right. I had some good questions. You
gave some good testimony, Colonel, but if you have to go I will
certainly understand, but others of you can stay. Thank you.
Thank you, Senator.
Senator Burns. I will not take long, and it looks like the
vote just started.
Chairman Byrd. I will go now.
Questioning by Senator Conrad Burns
Senator Burns. All right. I want the panel to just maybe
enlighten us all a little bit on 9/11. As you know, a couple of
years ago, through the efforts of a lot of us here on the
Appropriations Committee, but most of us on the Commerce
Committee, we passed E-911, and that is that cell phones, as
you well know, before that time, you dial 9-1-1, you are liable
to end up anywhere. If you are out of your home district or you
are in roaming you may get the Six-Center Cafe in Miles City,
Montana, and that is not going to help you out much.
But E-911, clearly we have a task force operating in just
about every State that I know of, with the exception of a few,
that are implementing that technology. The vendors have the
telephones available, or they are going to be available to the
public, but nobody had any clue 5 years ago how many cell
phones we would be using at this time, 5 years later. I mean,
there was a lot of estimates, but we have gone way past that.
Cell phones now every kid in high school darned near has one.
But also in that, we have to look at the implementation of
that technology. When that call comes in to the nearest first
responder, we have got to take a look at communications
centers. As you know, in my town of Billings, Montana, we have
one communications center. That dispatches fire, it dispatches
the city police, and also it dispatches the sheriff's
department.
By the way, those people who ask who is in charge of these
counties, the sheriff is. I am going to tell you that right
now. There is no more powerful man in any county than the
sheriff. He has the last word, and so let's make no doubt about
that. I was a county commissioner, so I know all about that,
and so they have to be involved in this. We have got a lot of
people here, but you have got to remember, the sheriff of the
county is the most powerful official there in that county, or
it is in Montana, anyway. They even have hanging authority, so
we listen to those folks quite a lot.
I got to thinking about, Colonel, when we were talking
about targets of opportunity, it would have been nice if those
three airplanes could have hit Pikes Peak.
Colonel Westphal. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Burns. It would have sure saved the Trade Center,
and they would have been empty going in.
But I just wonder, how many of you all are satisfied, in
your own jurisdictions, with the progress that communications
centers have made, and I want to ask the folks in New York who
dealt with that up there. I assume that you have the same
situation up there. You have one single communications center
that dispatches everybody, is that correct?
Mr. Von Essen. In New York it is a little different, all 9-
1-1 calls from one police dispatching system, then we break it
down.
Senator Burns. You do it from there. Also--and is it the
same in those centers, in those five different regions are your
city police and your county sheriff's department, are they
dispatched from the same center?
Mr. Von Essen. No. All the 9-1-1 calls go to the police.
The fire calls then would be given to one of our five
dispatchers in the boroughs to be sent from the local district.
Senator Burns. Well, I would say, you know, we pass that
bill, and we are dealing with new spectrum reform, and we will
probably come up with a bill sometime this year. It will not
pass this year, so do not get all excited about ginning up your
lobbyists and people to talk about reform of spectrum, because
this will be as big an issue as the Telco Act of 1996, I will
tell you that, because it involves not only your--everything
from a garage door opener to your channel changer on your
television, to broadcasters, to first responders, and also
satellite and terrestrial, so this will be a big issue, and it
will be a big issue nationwide. I know Colonel Westphal has to
deal with a State that has got mountains between Denver and
Grand Junction, and the difficulty he has just communicating
from his headquarters in Denver to somebody in the Saylor
Valley, and to your people in cars, so it is going to deal with
a lot of different things.
We would invite your input when we start down that road,
and as we complete that, and I think we will finally go to
models that will include your health departments as far as
those communication centers being able to sort of do a reverse
9-1-1. In other words, when a call comes in and it is a
terrorist act, and we determine what it is, that an automatic
call goes out to Gary Cox and his group in Oklahoma City. I
think that is--where are you from?
Mr. Cox. Tulsa, sir.
Senator Burns. Tulsa. I spent a week there one night.
A lot of people have.
But in other words, a reverse 9-1-1 is to notify on that,
notify what the action was, and the disaster, or the crisis
identify, and so you will start making plans to do it.
The model that Senator Domenici talked about is something
that I think every city and every county ought to be working on
right now, using every scenario. What if they throw something
in this pumping station in Billings, Montana, in the water,
what happens, who is affected, and how do we deal with it, so
that we hit one key on the computer, and we have got a model in
front of us.
Now, that is going to take a few dollars. It is going to
take some people looking at it, but I am not real sure that
county commissioners and city councils would not be amenable in
doing those kinds of things to handle these kinds of disasters.
But Colonel, your and my job is a little bit different.
Your big problem is to try to prevent it. Now, if these people
are willing to die in the commitment of such a heinous act, I
would prefer that they died before they got it done, and I
think yours is a different challenge, maybe, because I think
your investment, you are the intelligence arm--and if we are
going to talk about volunteers, that is where we ought to be
talking about some volunteers, to pick up little bits of
information that can be put together, and I know that is what
happened in Singapore. I know that is what happened in Hamburg,
in foreign countries, where we pick up little bits of
information and all at once we have got analyst that is up
there that says, wait a minute, this leads to this, this leads
to this, we have got a problem out there, and a red light goes
up.
And so I know your challenge is a lot different than the
rest of these, because these are going to respond. They are
going to respond. Yours is a problem of preventing, and so your
challenge is a great thing.
So I am going to go through most of your testimony here,
and I think we know pretty well what our role is going to be,
and what your role is. We had a great hearing as far as
spectrum is concerned in New York City over at the Commerce
Committee just after September 11, so we kind of understand
what is going on there.
I do not know what the chairman has got left up there, but
I think I will go vote. A while ago they mentioned food. It is
lunchtime. I have never missed a meal.
Nor do I plan to, even though we have got this illustrious
group in front of us, and a very powerful chairman, so what I
am going to do is--I'm sure he is on his way back, but there
are three votes. How are we going to handle that? Okay, let us
do that, let us just recess this committee hearing until the
chairman gets back, or subject to the call of the Chair, and
Colonel, if you have got to catch an airplane, nice seeing you.
Glad you came from west of the 100th meridian. We need more
people who come from out there.
Colonel Westphal. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Burns. And watch those policemen when you cross
that Wyoming line headed south, boy, they will hit you.
Questioning by Chairman Robert C. Byrd
Chairman Byrd. Thank you all. The committee will resume its
hearing, and thank you for your courtesies and your kindnesses.
Mr. Cox, last December this committee proposed, and the
Congress appropriated, $1 billion in supplemental funds
designed to help public health departments and hospitals
prepare for a bioterrorism attack. We have begun to hear some
concerns that not enough of these funds are making it to the
local level. I am from a rural State, a rural State. I want to
make sure that rural areas get the training and infrastructure
they need to be prepared.
In addition, the Secretary of Health and Human Services has
only given States 20 percent of these funds as of now, with the
rest of it given out later, when States submit their plans. I
understand that only two States have submitted their plans.
That means that it will be a while before States get the full
amount of their bioterrorism money.
We have also heard that the hospital money that we
appropriated last year, $135 million, is only enough for
planning. While the President has asked for a quadrupling of
these funds in next year's budget, I am concerned that this may
not be soon enough. If a bioterrorism attack happens now, how
will a hospital deal with the flood of cases? Do you think that
local governments and hospitals could use more of the money
now, rather than later? Would you please comment?
Mr. Cox. Yes, sir. You are absolutely correct, Mr. Chair,
the money that I am aware of has not reached the local level,
and that needs to proceed as quickly as possible, because
without those funds we cannot be prepared to respond to a
bioterrorist event, and to control that event, and that goes
for hospitals as well as the public health community as well,
at the local level.
Chairman Byrd. During a speech before the Fletcher
Conference and Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in
Washington last November, Governor Ridge said, and I quote him,
``the Defense Department takes a long-range approach to its
budget needs. Homeland security will do likewise, with a
multiyear budget plan. We need to give our Nation's first
responders--the firefighters, the police, the medical
professionals and other emergency officials--the tools with
which to do their job better.
``Before September 11, many in our country never thought of
these men and women as first responders, as the first line of
defense in our Homeland Security Corps. Today, every American
understands their critical mission. We would never send
soldiers into harm's way without proper training and without
proper equipment. We owe the same commitment to our domestic
first responders,'' close quote.
Let me ask you, any or all of you, does the funding in the
President's budget adequately fund your needs, as America's
front line of defense?
Mr. Stittleburg. Senator, if I may, the issue with us is
not as much the amount as whether the money gets to us. That is
the critical issue with us. The question that you and your
committee have to answer is how best to fund the fire service
in the United States, and I can tell you that the Fire Act was
the best possible vehicle you have ever come up with to do
that, and I would strongly encourage you to look in that
direction, where you are talking about the funds.
So our thrust is not even as much, how much, as it is, get
it to us quickly.
Chairman Byrd. Well, our problem is both.
Mr. Stittleburg. I understand, sir.
Chairman Byrd. Does anyone else wish to comment?
Mr. Von Essen. Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment. I
think it is critical to concentrate additionally, rather than
just getting the money to us right away, a commitment for a
long-term plan for training and equipment that is going far
out. There is only so much that you can do in a 6-month period,
when you have--I will just use New York City as an example.
If you have 16,000 firefighters, officers, paramedics,
EMT's, there is only so much training and preparation that you
can do in a 6-month period, so you cannot handle more than that
in that period, so to plan and to allocate resources going out
over the next 10 years would be a better way to do it, I think,
than to try to concentrate so much money early on.
Chairman Byrd. But to make a commitment, don't we have to
know what the plan is?
Mr. Von Essen. Yes.
Chairman Byrd. Do we know what the long-term plan is?
Mr. Von Essen. Yes.
Chairman Byrd. We do?
Mr. Von Essen. Yes.
Chairman Byrd. Where is it?
Mr. Von Essen. You do not have it.
Chairman Byrd. We do not have it, okay. How can we get it?
Mr. Von Essen. You have got to ask us. You have got to ask
us what we need, and that is what we are trying to do here
today.
Chairman Byrd. We are doing our part, you are doing yours,
but what about the long-term plans?
Mr. Von Essen. Well, you said before, you and I think it
was Senator Domenici that had asked you, who is in charge?
Chairman Byrd. Right.
Mr. Von Essen. You will decide who is in charge, you will
tell us who is in charge, we will tell them what we need, and
you will get a plan.
Chairman Byrd. Well, the President decided who was in
charge when he named Mr. Ridge, didn't he?
Mr. Von Essen. Yes.
Chairman Byrd. Okay. Have you been asked by the Federal
agencies for an inventory of your existing equipment, or for an
analysis of what you may need as you adapt to the new realities
of the threat of catastrophic terrorism in America? We will
start with you.
Mr. Crouse. No, sir, we have not. We have not been asked
that question by the administration or by others. We have
generated that information, I believe, through the Fire Act
program, where our communities have attempted to communicate to
the Federal Government their needs based on their observations
of what is going on in their respective communities.
Chairman Byrd. Anyone else?
Mr. Stittleburg. Yes, sir. There was a survey distributed,
I believe, by FEMA last December, that went to all fire
departments in the United States, and I do not believe I have
yet seen the tabulation of the results of that, but that survey
did deal with such things as types of department, it had some
information in terms of what types of equipment was available,
and things of that nature.
Chairman Byrd. General.
General Alexander. Mr. Chairman, the Guard ability to
support homeland security is directly related to the readiness
of the units that it currently has in its inventory. Prior to
September 11, those units were not fully resourced to
accomplish their mission, and obviously with the additional
requirements post September 11, we are not resourced to provide
proper support to the civilian responders to the extent that we
feel we should be.
Chairman Byrd. Mr. Cox, do you know? What comment do you
have on that question, if any? Let me ask it again. Have you
been asked by the Federal agencies for an inventory of existing
equipment, or for an analysis of what you may need as you adapt
to the new realities of the threat of catastrophic terrorism in
America?
Mr. Cox. Not directly. Indirectly, there has been some
communication from some local health departments to the State
level about what the needs are.
Chairman Byrd. Has the Office of Homeland Security given
you any view, any goals or benchmarks by which to assess your
state of readiness to respond to acts of terrorism?
Mr. Stittleburg. Not to my knowledge, sir.
Chairman Byrd. Sir.
Mr. Stittleburg. Not to my knowledge.
Chairman Byrd. Mr. Crouse.
Mr. Crouse. No, sir.
Chairman Byrd. Mr. Von Essen.
Mr. Von Essen. No, sir.
Chairman Byrd. General Alexander.
General Alexander. Not to my knowledge, sir.
Chairman Byrd. Mr. Cox.
Mr. Cox. No, sir.
Chairman Byrd. This is a question for the firefighter
representatives. Last December, Congress approved a $210
million emergency supplemental for FEMA grants to local fire
departments. When combined with the $150 million contained in
the fiscal year 2002 VA-HUD act, we provided $360 million for
this vital program last year.
FEMA received over $2.2 billion and 19,500 applications--I
think I have heard references to that figure a number of
times--for the $360 million program. Instead of proposing a
supplemental for the program, the administration has proposed
to eliminate the program in fiscal year 2003.
Now, I have heard some comments already that have touched
upon this question, but let me ask you to describe the types of
equipment and training that the local fire departments would
purchase and undertake right away if more resources were
provided for the fire fighting program, and also your comments
with respect to the proposing of a supplemental for the
program. Instead of proposing such a supplemental, the
administration has proposed to eliminate the program.
Mr. Crouse.
Mr. Crouse. Mr. Chairman, if I may, the IAFF opposes the
administration's position. We believe the Fire Act program is
much more different than the first responders proposal in that
the Fire Act was designed to provide the fire departments
locally the basic needs of what I refer to as putting the wet
stuff on the red stuff, basic fire fighting techniques, fire
apparatus, protective clothing, breathing apparatus as such,
whereas the administration's current proposal is designed to
address the terrorism issues themselves, which is an additional
proficiency within the fire service that requires additional
knowledge, skills, and abilities, trainings, and equipment to
accomplish those tasks, and I think all three of the
organizations here today are on the same page, that those two
proposals should stand alone, be treated individually, and
funded appropriately.
We think the funding that was authorized last year for $900
million I believe is an appropriate way to fund a Fire Act, and
whatever it takes to fund the terrorism piece, then we could
support that as well.
And just by way of information, a survey that we have done
with respect to your question about what type of equipment our
locals are looking to have, 43 percent of our fire departments
surveyed were in need of basic turnout gear, coats, gloves,
helmets, boots, 50 percent of the fire departments were in need
of additional respirators, breathing apparatus, 70 percent of
the fire departments, believe it or not, did not have adequate
maintenance programs to maintain the protective gear that they
did have, and 66 percent of the fire departments were in need
of better communications equipment, which obviously you have
heard most people up here talk about today.
So basically, just in closing, we support those two
programs individually.
Chairman Byrd. Anybody else?
Mr. Von Essen. No, the Fire Chiefs Association concurs 100
percent.
Mr. Stittleburg. Likewise, the Volunteer Fire Council is
absolutely in total agreement with Mr. Crouse's remarks.
In terms of, what would we buy, and what do we buy when we
get that money, we buy things as basic as the clothes we put on
our backs when we respond to calls. This is not sophisticated
equipment, as Mr. Crouse correctly points out. We are talking
about equipping people with the most basic needs they have to
provide responses.
Chairman Byrd. Mr. Cox, yesterday, this committee heard
from city and county officials who talked about the ability of
local hospitals to respond to a biological or chemical weapon
attack, and one mayor said that his response plan involved
turning the local ice rink into a morgue. What is the capacity
of local health departments to treat an outbreak of smallpox,
or the plague, and what kind of investment is needed so that
city and county health departments are able to identify
pathogens? Just comment on those questions.
Mr. Cox. Yes, sir. Well, certainly we need to develop
nationwide surveillance systems to detect disease, and this is
going to require cooperation with hospitals, with pharmacies,
with schools, major places of employment, and with private
physician groups and laboratories. That is--now, as far as--the
second part of your question, sir, was?
Chairman Byrd. Well, I had two questions. What is the
capacity of local health departments to treat an outbreak of
smallpox or the plague, and the second question, what kind of
investment is needed so that city and county health departments
are able to identify pathogens?
Mr. Cox. Thank you, sir. Well, the capacity of local public
health departments will vary, because some have really been
underfunded for years. Most health departments would have the
capacity to really, in an emergency situation, a bioterrorist
event, to stop what they are doing routinely and shift those
resources to the emergency, and that is what many would do.
They would have the ability to give prophylaxis or medications.
Certainly there is a great need to rebuild the capacity in
public health to get new epidemiologists, to be able to track
the disease down, to trace the disease, to isolate it, and to
work with the private medical community, which is going to be,
in a large event would be beyond local public health's capacity
to actually treat, but certainly to work with hospitals and
private medical providers, and health departments would be on
hand with their clinics as well.
Chairman Byrd. You say in your statement--I am not sure you
read this part. You did streamline your remarks here. You say
in your statement, and I quote, ``under your leadership,
Congress provided new fiscal year 2002 funding for upgrading
State and local public health capacity. At this point in time,
funds have not yet reached local public health agencies. Most
do not know yet how much they will receive from the State, and
for what purposes. For that reason, they have not yet been able
to hire or train new staff for bioterrorism preparedness.''
It has been 7 months since the tragedies of September 11,
and you say, I heard you say earlier, the sooner that new funds
reach the local level, the sooner the local public health
agencies and their community partners can begin making real,
measurable progress. Can you elaborate on this? Where is the
bottleneck? What is wrong? What is the problem we have to
resolve here?
Mr. Cox. Well, I do not know exactly where the bottleneck
is. I can tell you where it is not, it is not at the local
level, but I do not know where the money is. I know the States
have received, it is my understanding, 20 percent of the
allocations so far. The plans are due on April 15.
I know that some--some--local health departments have been
so impressed with the need to begin gearing up that they
perhaps borrowed from their own funds, out of their own pocket,
but quite frankly, that pocket has a hole in it, and is going
to have to be mended pretty soon.
Chairman Byrd. You say also that the experience of local
public health agencies in the States have been mixed. Many are
involved to a greater degree than ever before in their State's
planning on how to use the funds. Some others you say, however,
are greatly concerned that their communities may benefit very
little because the States have not been including them in a
meaningful fashion. Would you care to elaborate on that
statement?
Mr. Cox. Yes, sir. NACCHO has selected several sentinel
local health departments to monitor the progress of this
system, and reports that we have gotten back have been exactly
as you say, Mr. Chair. It has been mixed. Some have been
included in the planning process, and some have not.
Some States, as you are aware, have a more centralized
health system where they control the local health departments,
and others do not, so there is a wide variance, but many have
not been included.
Chairman Byrd. Very well. I guess there will be a second
vote starting soon. Now, I want to thank you again for your
generosity with your time. I know you are busy people, very
busy, and yet you have been very, very liberal with your time,
and I want to thank you for all the work that you have done in
preparing for these hearings and the time that you have
consumed away from your other tasks to come here this morning
and help us in our desire to appropriate the people's moneys
meaningfully. Thank you for the information you have given to
the committee, and for the information that people have
received as a result of these hearings.
This afternoon, we will continue our efforts with a number
of experts on such critical matters as port security, nuclear
plant security, and the safety of our water supply, all of
which are absolutely essential to the security of our homeland.
We will also hear from our former colleague from New Hampshire,
Warren Rudman, who was a member of this committee when he
served in the Senate. Senator Rudman was the co-chairman of the
U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century. He
will testify on that commission's findings.
COMMITTEE RECESS
I thank all of our witnesses again for coming to Washington
to share with the committee your insights and judgments.
Continue in your good work. We will try to do our part here.
Thank you again for coming. The committee is in recess
until 2 p.m. this afternoon.
[Whereupon, at 12:34 p.m., Thursday, April 11, the
committee was recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day.]
(Afternoon Session, 2:06 p.m., Thursday, April 11, 2002)
Opening statement of Chairman Robert C. Byrd
Chairman Byrd. The committee will resume its hearings. This
afternoon we will hear testimony from our former very
distinguished colleague from New Hampshire, Warren Rudman. He
is a former member of this committee and performed great
service on this committee. He will testify with regard to the
report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st
Century. Senator Rudman was the co-chairman--I do not know
anything about co-chairs--co-chairman of that commission and he
will focus on the homeland security portion of the commission's
final report.
He will be followed by a number of experts who will discuss
the security of our infrastructure. Here we are concerned with
such critical matters as port security, nuclear plant security,
and the safety of our water supply. Such entities undergird the
functioning of our economy and our way of life, and their
destruction could devastate commerce, the economy, and could
potentially cost thousands, tens of thousands, of lives. These
particular vulnerabilities have to be at the top of any list of
targets to protect from potential attacks.
So I look forward to hearing the next round of testimony
and to the wisdom of our panel this afternoon. Again, I want to
thank all of our witnesses for coming to Washington, those who
have had to travel from far away parts or near here. I thank
all of them for sharing with the committee their insights and
judgments.
Now, my friend and colleague Senator Ted Stevens is
recognized for any comments he may wish to make.
Statement of Senator Ted Stevens
Senator Stevens. Mr. Chairman, I am looking forward to the
comments of Senator Rudman as the co-chairman of the commission
and I will have some questions later. Thank you.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Stevens.
Thank you, Senator Rudman, again. We have missed you. We
are glad to have you back this afternoon. Ah, how great it is
just to reminisce about the days gone by. Things have changed
somewhat since you were here. We want to hear what you have to
say on this great subject. We are talking about our homeland
security, homeland defense. That is as much a part of national
defense as it could be.
So we know that you have given considerable study to this
matter, you and former Senator Gary Hart, as has former Senator
Sam Nunn. So we are waiting with eagerness to hear you.
STATEMENT OF HON. WARREN RUDMAN, FORMER UNITED STATES
SENATOR, CO-CHAIR, U.S. COMMISSION ON
NATIONAL SECURITY/21ST CENTURY
Senator Rudman. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that gracious
welcome. Let me say that it is a special privilege to appear
before this committee, where I served, as you stated, Mr.
Chairman, for 12 years. In many ways Ted Stevens was my mentor
when I came into the Senate in 1980 and he gave me many
opportunities, as did you, Senator, as chairman of the
committee. So I am particularly pleased to appear before the
two of you here today.
The United States Commission on National Security was
conceived of by the Congress and the President back in 1996 to
decide what our structures for national security ought to look
like in the 21st century. As you will both recall, although not
serving in the body at the time--Senator Byrd came shortly
thereafter--President Truman in 1946, along with General
Marshall, decided that the entire structure of U.S. national
security ought to be looked at and a major commission was
undertaken which ended up creating the United States Department
of Defense, the CIA, the United States Air Force, and a total
reorganization of the State Department.
Since 1946 no one had taken a look at this entire matter.
We were asked to look at it. To our great surprise, at the end
of 3\1/2\ years of study, to mirror somewhat what the chairman
said in his opening, we came to the conclusion that the
greatest threat to the United States' security was an
asymmetrical threat. It was homeland security. We had great
armed forces, a great Department of Defense, but we were naked
to the acts of international terrorism that we unfortunately
predicted in 1999 and again in the year 2000 would occur.
Let me briefly, Mr. Chairman, I think for the overview that
I have watched develop by this committee--and I have looked at
your witness list for this series of hearings. I think an
overview would be better, and let me tell you why we reached
our conclusions and why we think they're persuasive.
We debated two fundamental approaches to homeland security.
As this committee is well aware, there are 43 different
agencies that have some piece of homeland security, and we
decided it was essential that there be some coordination. We
proposed either a White House coordinator whose mission would
be to persuade, or to integrate the mission into a National
Security Council process and establish a coherent function to
develop the strategy.
We believed that any solution had to be consistent with our
Cabinet form of Government, with accountability, and integrated
into a strengthened NSC process that incorporates homeland
security into the overall national security framework, rather
than separating it as a stand-alone mission.
We proposed creating a National Homeland Security Agency
whose director or secretary would represent this mission at the
NSC level. Parenthetically, we thought that that particular
agency--and I testified on that just this morning before
Senator Lieberman's committee--ought to take the border
protection function and integrate the Coast Guard, Customs,
INS, Border Patrol, and FEMA, with a Cabinet-level secretary
who would be directly accountable to the Congress.
We believed that the enduring nature of the problem
required new institutions that could deal with homeland
security effectively over time and not depend upon the fear of
the moment or any strong personal relationship between a
coordinator and a President at that time.
We wanted to propose an agency that created no additive
structure. We wanted to reduce the seams between many
malpositioned agencies and rearrange them into a logical
fashion along core homeland security functions. We were not
proposing a highly centralized and unresponsive Federal
bureaucracy. We did not propose the spending of vast new sums
of money. As a matter of fact, the consolidation of those
agencies that we proposed in our report would actually save
money on the baseline of the year 2000.
Lastly, we believed the Congress should have, obviously,
complete oversight over homeland security to ensure
accountability to the American people and to protect our
fundamental freedoms and our civil liberties.
What did we propose? We proposed that the President should
develop a comprehensive strategy to heighten America's ability
to prevent and protect against all forms of attack on the
homeland and to respond to such attacks if prevention and
protection fail. We thought the Congress should adopt and the
President should propose a National Homeland Security Agency
with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating
all U.S. Government functions involved in homeland security. We
believed that FEMA would be the building block of this agency,
with the other agencies that I previously mentioned being
transferred from their present assignments in various Cabinet
agencies.
One directorate would focus on border control, a second
would focus on direct response, and the third would consolidate
both the physical and the cyber aspects of critical
infrastructure protection. One thing that we came to a very
quick conclusion on is that one of the greatest threats is
cyber attacks on our transportation networks, our banking
systems, our financial networks, and all of the things that
cyber controls in this country.
A great way to paralyze our economy would be with a smart
cyber attack and we have no reason to believe there are not
those in the world who are thinking along those lines. In fact,
we know that they are.
We recommended that the international component of reducing
proliferation and terrorism overseas remain in the realm of
diplomacy and defense, but integrated into homeland security.
The purely military aspects of homeland defense should remain
with DOD, though we recognized the need to better integrate
DOD's support to civil authorities and to reorient the National
Guard on the additional mission of homeland security.
To better integrate homeland security into DOD, we
recommended the establishment of an assistant secretary of
defense for homeland security within the Office of Secretary of
Defense. We also recommended, I think you may recall, that
there be a, if you will, a USCOM, and I that Secretary Rumsfeld
is proposing establishing essentially a CINC for homeland
defense.
We recognized the need to better integrate homeland
security intelligence efforts. We did not envision the new
agency to be an intelligence agency, spying on Americans, but
we identified the clear need to create a single point to
contact, request, get, and distribute intelligence relating to
homeland security. We recommended that the National
Intelligence Council include homeland security as an area of
analysis, assign that portfolio to a national intelligence
officer, and produce a national intelligence estimate on that
threat.
We did not recommend that the National Homeland Security
Agency take over any law enforcement functions. We saw the need
to better exchange information and to get the Justice
Department out of crisis management. A fundamental conflict
exists between efforts to preserve evidence and efforts to save
lives.
We recommended that the Congress establish a special body
to deal with homeland security issues, as has been done
effectively with intelligence oversight.
Finally, we wanted the Congress to have a voice in creating
this entity. We wanted legislation to establish a charter and
felt it necessary for the Congress to provide a proper
oversight to ensure that civil liberties are guaranteed. The
absence of effective strategies and organizations threatens
civil liberties. The best way to ensure that we violate the
United States Constitution is not organize, plan, and train for
this mission.
Finally, the commission strongly believes that any lesser
or more tenuous solutions would merely perpetuate bureaucratic
confusion and diffusion of responsibility. No homeland czar can
possibly hope to coordinate the hopeless dispersal of authority
that currently characterizes the 40 or more agencies with some
piece of the action for protecting our homeland.
There are thoroughly debated reasons of constitutional
principles and practices that cause us to strike the balance
that we did. The national homeland security agency should not
have police or military authority. It should not be an
intelligence collection agency or have responsibility for
counterterrorism. It should not be a military agency. It should
be the central coordinating mechanism for anticipating,
preventing, and responding to attacks on the homeland.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me say that nothing that we
propose is to be taken as a criticism of what the President did
post September 11th. What he had to do could only be done by
Executive Order. We believe it is now time for the Congress,
working with the administration, to work its way through to
develop an effective structure.
[The information follows:]
Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change
THE PHASE III REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON NATIONAL SECURITY/21ST
CENTURY
I. SECURING THE NATIONAL HOMELAND
One of this Commission's most important conclusions in its Phase I
report was that attacks against American citizens on American soil,
possibly causing heavy casualties, are likely over the next quarter
century.\7\ This is because both the technical means for such attacks,
and the array of actors who might use such means, are proliferating
despite the best efforts of American diplomacy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See New World Coming, p. 4, and the Report of the National
Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st
Century (Washington, DC: December 1997), p. 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These attacks may involve weapons of mass destruction and weapons
of mass disruption. As porous as U.S. physical borders are in an age of
burgeoning trade and travel, its ``cyber borders'' are even more
porous--and the critical infrastructure upon which so much of the U.S.
economy depends can now be targeted by non-state and state actors
alike. America's present global predominance does not render it immune
from these dangers. To the contrary, U.S. preeminence makes the
American homeland more appealing as a target, while America's openness
and freedoms make it more vulnerable.
Notwithstanding a growing consensus on the seriousness of the
threat to the homeland posed by weapons of mass destruction and
disruption, the U.S. government has not adopted homeland security as a
primary national security mission. Its structures and strategies are
fragmented and inadequate. The President must therefore both develop a
comprehensive strategy and propose new organizational structures to
prevent and protect against attacks on the homeland, and to respond to
such attacks if prevention and protection should fail.
Any reorganization must be mindful of the scale of the scenarios we
envision and the enormity of their consequences. We need orders-of-
magnitude improvements in planning, coordination, and exercise. The
government must also be prepared to use effectively--albeit with all
proper safeguards--the extensive resources of the Department of
Defense. This will necessitate new priorities for the U.S. armed forces
and particularly, in our view, for the National Guard.
The United States is today very poorly organized to design and
implement any comprehensive strategy to protect the homeland. The
assets and organizations that now exist for homeland security are
scattered across more than two dozen departments and agencies, and all
fifty states. The Executive Branch, with the full participation of
Congress, needs to realign, refine, and rationalize these assets into a
coherent whole, or even the best strategy will lack an adequate vehicle
for implementation.
This Commission believes that the security of the American homeland
from the threats of the new century should be the primary national
security mission of the U.S. government. While the Executive Branch
must take the lead in dealing with the many policy and structural
issues involved, Congress is a partner of critical importance in this
effort. It must find ways to address homeland security issues that
bridge current gaps in organization, oversight, and authority, and that
resolve conflicting claims to jurisdiction within both the Senate and
the House of Representatives and also between them.
Congress is crucial, as well, for guaranteeing that homeland
security is achieved within a framework of law that protects the civil
liberties and privacy of American citizens. We are confident that the
U.S. government can enhance national security without compromising
established Constitutional principles. But in order to guarantee this,
we must plan ahead. In a major attack involving contagious biological
agents, for example, citizen cooperation with government authorities
will depend on public confidence that those authorities can manage the
emergency. If that confidence is lacking, panic and disorder could lead
to insistent demands for the temporary suspension of some civil
liberties. That is why preparing for the worst is essential to
protecting individual freedoms during a national crisis.
Legislative guidance for planning among federal agencies and state
and local authorities must take particular cognizance of the role of
the Defense Department. Its subordination to civil authority needs to
be clearly defined in advance.
In short, advances in technology have created new dimensions to our
nation's economic and physical security. While some new threats can be
met with traditional responses, others cannot. More needs to be done in
three areas to prevent the territory and infrastructure of the United
States from becoming easy and tempting targets: in strategy, in
organizational realignment, and in Executive-Legislative cooperation.
We take these areas in turn.
A. The strategic framework
A homeland security strategy to minimize the threat of intimidation
and loss of life is an essential support for an international
leadership role for the United States. Homeland security is not
peripheral to U.S. national security strategy but central to it. At
this point, national leaders have not agreed on a clear strategy for
homeland security, a condition this Commission finds dangerous and
intolerable. We therefore recommend the following:
1. The President should develop a comprehensive strategy to heighten
America's ability to prevent and protect against all forms of
attack on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks if
prevention and protection fail.
In our view, the President should:
--Give new priority in his overall national security strategy to
homeland security, and make it a central concern for incoming
officials in all Executive Branch departments, particularly the
intelligence and law enforcement communities;
--Calmly prepare the American people for prospective threats, and
increase their awareness of what federal and state governments
are doing to prevent attacks and to protect them if prevention
fails;
--Put in place new government organizations and processes,
eliminating where possible staff duplication and mission
overlap; and
--Encourage Congress to establish new mechanisms to facilitate closer
cooperation between the Executive and Legislative Branches of
government on this vital issue.
We believe that homeland security can best be assured through a
strategy of layered defense that focuses first on prevention, second on
protection, and third on response.
Prevention.--Preventing a potential attack comes first. Since the
occurrence of even one event that causes catastrophic loss of life
would represent an unacceptable failure of policy, U.S. strategy should
therefore act as far forward as possible to prevent attacks on the
homeland. This strategy has at its disposal three essential
instruments.
Most broadly, the first instrument is U.S. diplomacy.--U.S. foreign
policy should strive to shape an international system in which just
grievances can be addressed without violence. Diplomatic efforts to
develop friendly and trusting relations with foreign governments and
their people can significantly multiply America's chances of gaining
early warning of potential attack and of doing something about
impending threats. Intelligence-sharing with foreign governments is
crucial to help identify individuals and groups who might be
considering attacks on the United States or its allies. Cooperative
foreign law enforcement agencies can detain, arrest, and prosecute
terrorists on their own soil. Diplomatic success in resolving overseas
conflicts that spawn terrorist activities will help in the long run.
Meanwhile, verifiable arms control and nonproliferation efforts
must remain a top priority. These policies can help persuade states and
terrorists to abjure weapons of mass destruction and to prevent the
export of fissile materials and dangerous dual-use technologies. But
such measures cannot by themselves prevent proliferation. So other
measures are needed, including the possibility of punitive measures and
defenses. The United States should take a lead role in strengthening
multilateral organizations such as the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
In addition, increased vigilance against international crime
syndicates is also important because many terrorist organizations gain
resources and other assets through criminal activity that they then use
to mount terrorist operations. Dealing with international organized
crime requires not only better cooperation with other countries, but
also among agencies of the federal government. While progress has been
made on this front in recent years, more remains to be done.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See International Crime Threat Assessment (Washington, DC: The
White House, December 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second instrument of homeland security consists of the U.S.
diplomatic, intelligence, and military presence overseas.--Knowing the
who, where, and how of a potential physical or cyber attack is the key
to stopping a strike before it can be delivered. Diplomatic,
intelligence, and military agencies overseas, as well as law
enforcement agencies working abroad, are America's primary eyes and
ears on the ground. But increased public-private efforts to enhance
security processes within the international transportation and
logistics networks that bring people and goods to America are also of
critical and growing importance.
Vigilant systems of border security and surveillance are a third
instrument that can prevent those agents of attack who are not detected
and stopped overseas from actually entering the United States.--
Agencies such as the U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Coast Guard have a
critical prevention role to play. Terrorists and criminals are finding
that the difficulty of policing the rising daily volume and velocities
of people and goods that cross U.S. borders makes it easier for them to
smuggle weapons and contraband, and to move their operatives into and
out of the United States. Improving the capacity of border control
agencies to identify and intercept potential threats without creating
barriers to efficient trade and travel requires a sub-strategy also
with three elements.
First is the development of new transportation security procedures
and practices designed to reduce the risk that importers, exporters,
freight forwarders, and transportation carriers will serve as unwitting
conduits for criminal or terrorist activities. Second is bolstering the
intelligence gathering, data management, and information sharing
capabilities of border control agencies to improve their ability to
target high-risk goods and people for inspection. Third is
strengthening the capabilities of border control agencies to arrest
terrorists or interdict dangerous shipments before they arrive on U.S.
soil.
These three measures, which place a premium on public-private
partnerships, will pay for themselves in short order. They will allow
for the more efficient allocation of limited enforcement resources
along U.S. borders. There will be fewer disruptive inspections at ports
of entry for legitimate businesses and travelers. They will lead to
reduced theft and insurance costs, as well. Most important, the
underlying philosophy of this approach is one that balances prudence,
on the one hand, with American values of openness and free trade on the
other.\9\ To shield America from the world out of fear of terrorism is,
in large part, to do the terrorists' work for them. To continue
business as usual, however, is irresponsible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Note in this regard Stephen E. Flynn, ``Beyond Border
Control,'' Foreign Affairs (November/December 2000).
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The same may be said for our growing cyber problems. Protecting our
nation's critical infrastructure depends on greater public awareness
and improvements in our tools to detect and diagnose intrusions. This
will require better information sharing among all federal, state, and
local governments as well as with private sector owners and operators.
The federal government has these specific tasks:
--To serve as a model for the private sector by improving its own
security practices;
--To address known government security problems on a system-wide
basis;
--To identify and map network interdependencies so that harmful
cascading effects among systems can be prevented;
--To sponsor vulnerability assessments within both the federal
government and the private sector; and
--To design and carry out simulations and exercises that test
information system security across the nation's entire
infrastructure.
Preventing attacks on the American homeland also requires that the
United States maintain long-range strike capabilities. The United
States must bolster deterrence by making clear its determination to use
military force in a preemptive fashion if necessary. Even the most
hostile state sponsors of terrorism, or terrorists themselves, will
think twice about harming Americans and American allies and interests
if they fear direct and severe U.S. attack after--or before--the fact.
Such capabilities will strengthen deterrence even if they never have to
be used.
Protection.--The Defense Department undertakes many different
activities that serve to protect the American homeland, and these
should be integrated into an overall surveillance system, buttressed
with additional resources. A ballistic missile defense system would be
a useful addition and should be developed to the extent technically
feasible, fiscally prudent, and politically sustainable. Defenses
should also be pursued against cruise missiles and other sophisticated
atmospheric weapon technologies as they become more widely deployed.
While both active duty and reserve forces are involved in these
activities, the Commission believes that more can and should be done by
the National Guard, as is discussed in more detail below.
Protecting the nation's critical infrastructure and providing
cyber-security must also include:
--Advanced indication, warning, and attack assessments;
--A warning system that includes voluntary, immediate private-sector
reporting of potential attacks to enable other private-sector
targets (and the U.S. government) better to take protective
action; and
--Advanced systems for halting attacks, establishing backups, and
restoring service.
Response.--Managing the consequences of a catastrophic attack on
the U.S. homeland would be a complex and difficult process. The first
priority should be to build up and augment state and local response
capabilities. Adequate equipment must be available to first responders
in local communities. Procedures and guidelines need to be defined and
disseminated and then practiced through simulations and exercises.
Interoperable, robust, and redundant communications capabilities are a
must in recovering from any disaster. Continuity of government and
critical services must be ensured as well. Demonstrating effective
responses to natural and manmade disasters will also help to build
mutual confidence and relationships among those with roles in dealing
with a major terrorist attack.
All of this puts a premium on making sure that the disparate
organizations involved with homeland security--on various levels of
government and in the private sector--can work together effectively. We
are frankly skeptical that the U.S. government, as it exists today, can
respond effectively to the scale of danger and damage that may come
upon us during the next quarter century. This leads us, then, to our
second task: that of organizational realignment.
B. Organizational realignment
Responsibility for homeland security resides at all levels of the
U.S. government--local, state, and federal. Within the federal
government, almost every agency and department is involved in some
aspect of homeland security. None have been organized to focus on the
scale of the contemporary threat to the homeland, however. This
Commission urges an organizational realignment that:
--Designates a single person, accountable to the President, to be
responsible for coordinating and overseeing various U.S.
government activities related to homeland security;
--Consolidates certain homeland security activities to improve their
effectiveness and coherence;
--Establishes planning mechanisms to define clearly specific
responses to specific types of threats; and
--Ensures that the appropriate resources and capabilities are
available.
Therefore, this Commission strongly recommends the following:
2. The President should propose, and Congress should agree to create, a
National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility
for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S.
government activities involved in homeland security. The
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) should be a key
building block in this effort.
Given the multiplicity of agencies and activities involved in these
homeland security tasks, someone needs to be responsible and
accountable to the President not only to coordinate the making of
policy, but also to oversee its implementation. This argues against
assigning the role to a senior person on the National Security Council
(NSC) staff and for the creation of a separate agency. This agency
would give priority to overall planning while relying primarily on
others to carry out those plans. To give this agency sufficient stature
within the government, its director would be a member of the Cabinet
and a statutory advisor to the National Security Council. The position
would require Senate confirmation.
Notwithstanding NHSA's responsibilities, the National Security
Council would still play a strategic role in planning and coordinating
all homeland security activities. This would include those of NHSA as
well as those that remain separate, whether they involve other NSC
members or other agencies, such as the Centers for Disease Control
within the Department of Health and Human Services.
We propose building the National Homeland Security Agency upon the
capabilities of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), an
existing federal agency that has performed well in recent years,
especially in responding to natural disasters. NHSA would be
legislatively chartered to provide a focal point for all natural and
manmade crisis and emergency planning scenarios. It would retain and
strengthen FEMA's ten existing regional offices as a core element of
its organizational structure.
While FEMA is the necessary core of the National Homeland Security
Agency, it is not sufficient to do what NHSA needs to do. In
particular, patrolling U.S. borders, and policing the flows of peoples
and goods through the hundreds of ports of entry, must receive higher
priority. These activities need to be better integrated, but efforts
toward that end are hindered by the fact that the three organizations
on the front line of border security are spread across three different
U.S. Cabinet departments. The Coast Guard works under the Secretary of
Transportation, the Customs Service is located in the Department of the
Treasury, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service oversees the
Border Patrol in the Department of Justice. In each case, the border
defense agency is far from the mainstream of its parent department's
agenda and consequently receives limited attention from the
department's senior officials. We therefore recommend the following:
3. The President should propose to Congress the transfer of the Customs
Service, the Border Patrol, and Coast Guard to the National
Homeland Security Agency, while preserving them as distinct
entities.
Bringing these organizations together under one agency will create
important synergies. Their individual capabilities will be molded into
a stronger and more effective system, and this realignment will help
ensure that sufficient resources are devoted to tasks crucial to both
public safety and U.S. trade and economic interests. Consolidating
overhead, training programs, and maintenance of the aircraft, boats,
and helicopters that these three agencies employ will save money, and
further efficiencies could be realized with regard to other resources
such as information technology, communications equipment, and dedicated
sensors. Bringing these separate, but complementary, activities
together will also facilitate more effective Executive and Legislative
oversight, and help rationalize the process of budget preparation,
analysis, and presentation.
Steps must be also taken to strengthen these three individual
organizations themselves.--The Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and
the Coast Guard are all on the verge of being overwhelmed by the
mismatch between their growing duties and their mostly static
resources.
The Customs Service, for example, is charged with preventing
contraband from entering the United States. It is also responsible for
preventing terrorists from using the commercial or private
transportation venues of international trade for smuggling explosives
or weapons of mass destruction into or out of the United States. The
Customs Service, however, retains only a modest air, land, and marine
interdiction force, and its investigative component, supported by its
own intelligence branch, is similarly modest. The high volume of
conveyances, cargo, and passengers arriving in the United States each
year already overwhelms the Customs Service's capabilities. Over $8.8
billion worth of goods, over 1.3 million people, over 340,000 vehicles,
and over 58,000 shipments are processed daily at entry points. Of this
volume, Customs can inspect only one to two percent of all inbound
shipments. The volume of U.S. international trade, measured in terms of
dollars and containers, has doubled since 1995, and it may well double
again between now and 2005.
Therefore, this Commission believes that an improved computer
information capability and tracking system--as well as upgraded
equipment that can detect both conventional and nuclear explosives, and
chemical and biological agents--would be a wise short-term investment
with important long-term benefits. It would also raise the risk for
criminals seeking to target or exploit importers and cargo carriers for
illicit gains.\10\
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\10\ See the Report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and
Security in U.S. Seaports (Washington, DC: Fall 2000).
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The Border Patrol is the uniformed arm of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. Its mission is the detection and prevention of
illegal entry into the United States. It works primarily between ports
of entry and patrols the borders by various means. There has been a
debate for many years about whether the dual functions of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service border--control and enforcement
on the one side, and immigration facilitation on the other--should be
joined under the same roof. The U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform
concluded that they should not be joined.\11\ We agree: the Border
Patrol should become part of the NHSA.
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\11\ See the Report of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform
(Washington, DC: 1997).
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The U.S. Coast Guard is a highly disciplined force with multiple
missions and a natural role to play in homeland security. It performs
maritime search and rescue missions, manages vessel traffic, enforces
U.S. environmental and fishery laws, and interdicts and searches
vessels suspected of carrying illegal aliens, drugs, and other
contraband. In a time of war, it also works with the Navy to protect
U.S. ports from attack.
Indeed, in many respects, the Coast Guard is a model homeland
security agency given its unique blend of law enforcement, regulatory,
and military authorities that allow it to operate within, across, and
beyond U.S. borders. It accomplishes its many missions by routinely
working with numerous local, regional, national, and international
agencies, and by forging and maintaining constructive relationships
with a diverse group of private, non-governmental, and public marine-
related organizations. As the fifth armed service, in peace and war, it
has national defense missions that include port security, overseeing
the defense of coastal waters, and supporting and integrating its
forces with those of the Navy and the other services.
The case for preserving and enhancing the Coast Guard's multi-
mission capabilities is compelling. But its crucial role in protecting
national interests close to home has not been adequately appreciated,
and this has resulted in serious and growing readiness concerns. U.S.
Coast Guard ships and aircraft are aging and technologically obsolete;
indeed, the Coast Guard cutter fleet is older than 39 of the world's 41
major naval fleets. As a result, the Coast Guard fleet generates
excessive operating and maintenance costs, and lacks essential
capabilities in speed, sensors, and interoperability. To fulfill all of
its missions, the Coast Guard requires updated platforms with the
staying power, in hazardous weather, to remain offshore and fully
operational throughout U.S. maritime economic zones.\12\
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\12\ See Report of the Interagency Task Force on U.S. Coast Guard
Roles and Missions, A Coast Guard for the Twenty First-Century
(Washington, DC: December 1999).
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The Commission recommends strongly that Congress recapitalize the
Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and the Coast Guard so that they
can confidently perform key homeland security roles.
NHSA's planning, coordinating, and overseeing activities would be
undertaken through three staff Directorates. The Directorate of
Prevention would oversee and coordinate the various border security
activities, as discussed above. A Directorate of Critical
Infrastructure Protection (CIP) would handle the growing cyber threat.
FEMA's emergency preparedness and response activities would be
strengthened in a third directorate to cover both natural and manmade
disasters. A Science and Technology office would advise the NHSA
Director on research and development efforts and priorities for all
three directorates.
Relatively small permanent staffs would man the directorates. NHSA
will employ FEMA's principle of working effectively with state and
local governments, as well as with other federal organizations,
stressing interagency coordination. Much of NHSA's daily work will take
place directly supporting state officials in its regional offices
around the country. Its organizational infrastructure will not be
heavily centered in the Washington, DC area.
NHSA would also house a National Crisis Action Center (NCAC), which
would become the nation's focal point for monitoring emergencies and
for coordinating federal support in a crisis to state and local
governments, as well as to the private sector. We envision the center
to be an interagency operation, directed by a two-star National Guard
general, with full-time representation from the other federal agencies
involved in homeland security (See Figure 1).
NHSA will require a particularly close working relationship with
the Department of Defense. It will need also to create and maintain
strong mechanisms for the sharing of information and intelligence with
U.S. domestic and international intelligence entities. We suggest that
NHSA have liaison officers in the counter-terrorism centers of both the
FBI and the CIA. Additionally, the sharing of information with business
and industry on threats to critical infrastructures requires further
expansion.
NHSA will also assume responsibility for overseeing the protection
of the nation's critical infrastructure. Considerable progress has been
made in implementing the recommendations of the President's Commission
on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) and Presidential Decision
Directive 63 (PDD-63). But more needs to be done, for the United States
has real and growing problems in this area.
U.S. dependence on increasingly sophisticated and more concentrated
critical infrastructures has increased dramatically over the past
decade. Electrical utilities, water and sewage systems, transportation
networks, and communications and energy systems now depend on computers
to provide safe, efficient, and reliable service. The banking and
finance sector, too, keeps track of millions of transactions through
increasingly robust computer capabilities.
The overwhelming majority of these computer systems are privately
owned, and many operate at or very near capacity with little or no
provision for manual back-ups in an emergency. Moreover, the
computerized information networks that link systems together are
themselves vulnerable to unwanted intrusion and disruption. An attack
on any one of several highly interdependent networks can cause
collateral damage to other networks and the systems they connect. Some
forms of disruption will lead merely to nuisance and economic loss, but
other forms will jeopardize lives. One need only note the dependence of
hospitals, air-traffic control systems, and the food processing
industry on computer controls to appreciate the point.
The bulk of unclassified military communications, too, relies on
systems almost entirely owned and operated by the private sector. Yet
little has been done to assure the security and reliability of those
communications in crisis. Current efforts to prevent attacks, protect
against their most damaging effects, and prepare for prompt response
are uneven at best, and this is dangerous because a determined
adversary is most likely to employ a weapon of mass disruption during a
homeland security or foreign policy crisis.
As noted above, a Directorate for Critical Infrastructure
Protection would be an integral part of the National Homeland Security
Agency. This directorate would have two vital responsibilities. First
would be to oversee the physical assets and information networks that
make up the U.S. critical infrastructure. It should ensure the
maintenance of a nucleus of cyber security expertise within the
government, as well. There is now an alarming shortage of government
cyber security experts due in large part to the financial attraction of
private-sector employment that the government cannot match under
present personnel procedures.\13\ The director's second responsibility
would be as the Critical Information Technology, Assurance, and
Security Office (CITASO). This office would coordinate efforts to
address the nation's vulnerability to electronic or physical attacks on
critical infrastructure.
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\13\ We return to this problem below in Section IV.
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Several critical activities that are currently spread among various
government agencies and the private sector should be brought together
for this purpose. These include:
--Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), which are
government-sponsored committees of private-sector participants
who work to share information, plans, and procedures for
information security in their fields;
--The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO), currently
housed in the Commerce Department, which develops outreach and
awareness programs with the private sector;
--The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), currently
housed in the FBI, which gathers information and provides
warnings of cyber attacks; and
--The Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection (I\3\P),
also in the Commerce Department, which is designed to
coordinate and support research and development projects on
cyber security.
In partnership with the private sector where most cyber assets are
developed and owned, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Directorate
would be responsible for enhancing information sharing on cyber and
physical security, tracking vulnerabilities and proposing improved risk
management policies, and delineating the roles of various government
agencies in preventing, defending, and recovering from attacks. To do
this, the government needs to institutionalize better its private-
sector liaison across the board--with the owners and operators of
critical infrastructures, hardware and software developers, server/
service providers, manufacturers/producers, and applied technology
developers.
The Critical Infrastructure Protection Directorate's work with the
private sector must include a strong advocacy of greater government and
corporate investment in information assurance and security. The CITASO
would be the focal point for coordinating with the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) in helping to establish cyber policy,
standards, and enforcement mechanisms. Working closely with the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) and its Chief Information Officer
Council (CIO Council), the CITASO needs to speak for those interests in
government councils.\14\ The CITASO must also provide incentives for
private-sector participation in Information Sharing and Analysis
Centers to share information on threats, vulnerabilities, and
individual incidents, to identify interdependencies, and to map the
potential cascading effects of outages in various sectors.
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\14\ The Chief Information Officer Council is a government
organization consisting of all the statutory Chief Information Officers
in the government. It is located within OMB under the Deputy Director
for Management.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The directorate also needs to help coordinate cyber security issues
internationally. At present, the FCC handles international cyber issues
for the U.S. government through the International Telecommunications
Union. As this is one of many related international issues, it would be
unwise to remove this responsibility from the FCC. Nevertheless, the
CIP Directorate should work closely with the FCC on cyber issues in
international bodies.
The mission of the NHSA must include specific planning and
operational tasks to be staffed through the Directorate for Emergency
Preparedness and Response. These include:
--Setting training and equipment standards, providing resource
grants, and encouraging intelligence and information sharing
among state emergency management officials, local first
responders, the Defense Department, and the FBI;
--Integrating the various activities of the Defense Department, the
National Guard, and other federal agencies into the Federal
Response Plan; and
--Pulling together private sector activities, including those of the
medical community, on recovery, consequence management, and
planning for continuity of services.
Working with state officials, the emergency management community,
and the law enforcement community, the job of NHSA's third directorate
will be to rationalize and refine the nation's incident response
system. The current distinction between crisis management and
consequence management is neither sustainable nor wise. The duplicative
command arrangements that have been fostered by this division are prone
to confusion and delay. NHSA should develop and manage a single
response system for national incidents, in close coordination with the
Department of Justice (DoJ) and the FBI. This would require that the
current policy, which specifies initial DoJ control in terrorist
incidents on U.S. territory, be amended once Congress creates NHSA. We
believe that this arrangement would in no way contradict or diminish
the FBI's traditional role with respect to law enforcement.
The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate should also
assume a major resource and budget role. With the help of the Office of
Management and Budget, the directorate's first task will be to figure
out what is being spent on homeland security in the various departments
and agencies. Only with such an overview can the nation identify the
shortfalls between capabilities and requirements. Such a mission budget
should be included in the President's overall budget submission to
Congress. The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate will also
maintain federal asset databases and encourage and support up-to-date
state and local databases.
FEMA has adapted well to new circumstances over the past few years
and has gained a well-deserved reputation for responsiveness to both
natural and manmade disasters. While taking on homeland security
responsibilities, the proposed NHSA would strengthen FEMA's ability to
respond to such disasters. It would streamline the federal apparatus
and provide greater support to the state and local officials who, as
the nation's first responders, possess enormous expertise. To the
greatest extent possible, federal programs should build upon the
expertise and existing programs of state emergency preparedness systems
and help promote regional compacts to share resources and capabilities.
To help simplify federal support mechanisms, we recommend
transferring the National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO),
currently housed at the FBI, to the National Homeland Security Agency.
The Commission believes that this transfer to FEMA should be done at
first opportunity, even before NHSA is up and running.
The NDPO would be tasked with organizing the training of local
responders and providing local and state authorities with equipment for
detection, protection, and decontamination in a WMD emergency. NHSA
would develop the policies, requirements, and priorities as part of its
planning tasks as well as oversee the various federal, state, and local
training and exercise programs. In this way, a single staff would
provide federal assistance for any emergency, whether it is caused by
flood, earthquake, hurricane, disease, or terrorist bomb.
A WMD incident on American soil is likely to overwhelm local fire
and rescue squads, medical facilities, and government services. Attacks
may contaminate water, food, and air; largescale evacuations may be
necessary and casualties could be extensive. Since getting prompt help
to those who need it would be a complex and massive operation requiring
federal support, such operations must be extensively planned in
advance. Responsibilities need to be assigned and procedures put in
place for these responsibilities to evolve if the situation worsens.
As we envision it, state officials will take the initial lead in
responding to a crisis. NHSA will normally use its Regional Directors
to coordinate federal assistance, while the National Crisis Action
Center will monitor ongoing operations and requirements. Should a
crisis overwhelm local assets, state officials will turn to NHSA for
additional federal assistance. In major crises, upon the recommendation
of the civilian Director of NHSA, the President will designate a senior
figure--a Federal Coordinating Officer--to assume direction of all
federal activities on the scene. If the situation warrants, a state
governor can ask that active military forces reinforce National Guard
units already on the scene. Once the President federalizes National
Guard forces, or if he decides to use Reserve forces, the Joint Forces
Command will assume responsibility for all military operations, acting
through designated task force commanders. At the same time, the
Secretary of Defense would appoint a Defense Coordinating Officer to
provide civilian oversight and ensure prompt civil support. This person
would work for the Federal Coordinating Officer. This response
mechanism is displayed in Figure 2.
To be capable of carrying out its responsibilities under extreme
circumstances, NHSA will need to undertake robust exercise programs and
regular training to gain experience and to establish effective command
and control procedures. It will be essential to update regularly the
Federal Response Plan. It will be especially critical for NHSA
officials to undertake detailed planning and exercises for the full
range of potential contingencies, including ones that require the
substantial involvement of military assets in support.
NHSA will provide the overarching structure for homeland security,
but other government agencies will retain specific homeland security
tasks. We take the necessary obligations of the major ones in turn.
Intelligence Community.--Good intelligence is the key to preventing
attacks on the homeland and homeland security should become one of the
intelligence community's most important missions.\15\ Better human
intelligence must supplement technical intelligence, especially on
terrorist groups covertly supported by states. As noted above, fuller
cooperation and more extensive information-sharing with friendly
governments will also improve the chances that would-be perpetrators
will be detained, arrested, and prosecuted before they ever reach U.S.
borders.
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\15\ We return to this issue in our discussion of the Intelligence
Community in Section III.F., particularly in recommendation 37.
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The intelligence community also needs to embrace cyber threats as a
legitimate mission and to incorporate intelligence gathering on
potential strategic threats from abroad into its activities.
To advance these ends, we offer the following recommendation:
4. The President should ensure that the National Intelligence Council:
include homeland security and asymmetric threats as an area of
analysis; assign that portfolio to a National Intelligence
Officer; and produce National Intelligence Estimates on these
threats.
Department of State.--U.S. embassies overseas are the American
people's first line of defense. U.S. Ambassadors must make homeland
security a top priority for all embassy staff, and Ambassadors need the
requisite authority to ensure that information is shared in a way that
maximizes advance warning overseas of direct threats to the United
States.
Ambassadors should also ensure that the gathering of information,
and particularly from open sources, takes full advantage of all U.S.
government resources abroad, including diplomats, consular officers,
military officers, and representatives of the various other departments
and agencies. The State Department should also strengthen its efforts
to acquire information from Americans living or travelling abroad in
private capacities.
The State Department has made good progress in its overseas efforts
to reduce terrorism, but we now need to extend this effort into the
Information Age. Working with NHSA's CIP Directorate, the State
Department should expand cooperation on critical infrastructure
protection with other states and international organizations. Private
sector initiatives, particularly in the banking community, provide
examples of international cooperation on legal issues, standards, and
practices. Working with the CIP Directorate and the FCC, the State
Department should also encourage other governments to criminalize
hacking and electronic intrusions and to help track hackers, computer
virus proliferators, and cyber terrorists.
Department of Defense.--The Defense Department, which has placed
its highest priority on preparing for major theater war, should pay far
more attention to the homeland security mission. Organizationally, DOD
responses are widely dispersed. An Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Civil Support has responsibility for WMD incidents, while
the Department of the Army's Director of Military Support is
responsible for non-WMD contingencies. Such an arrangement does not
provide clear lines of authority and responsibility or ensure political
accountability. The Commission therefore recommends the following:
5. The President should propose to Congress the establishment of an
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, reporting directly to the
Secretary.
A new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security would
provide policy oversight for the various DOD activities within the
homeland security mission and ensure that mechanisms are in place for
coordinating military support in major emergencies. He or she would
work to integrate homeland security into Defense Department planning,
and ensure that adequate 24 resources are forthcoming. This Assistant
Secretary would also represent the Secretary in the NSC interagency
process on homeland security issues.
Along similar lines and for similar reasons, we also recommend that
the Defense Department broaden and strengthen the existing Joint Forces
Command/Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) to coordinate military
planning, doctrine, and command and control for military support for
all hazards and disasters.
This task force should be directed by a senior National Guard
general with additional headquarters personnel. JTF-CS should contain
several rapid reaction task forces, composed largely of rapidly
mobilizable National Guard units. The task force should have command
and control capabilities for multiple incidents. Joint Forces Command
should work with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Security to ensure the provision of adequate resources and appropriate
force allocations, training, and equipment for civil support.
On the prevention side, maintaining strong nuclear and conventional
forces is as high a priority for homeland security as it is for other
missions. Shaping a peaceful international environment and deterring
hostile military actors remain sound military goals. But deterrent
forces may have little effect on non-state groups secretly supported by
states, or on individuals with grievances real or imagined. In cases of
clear and imminent danger, the military must be able to take preemptive
action overseas in circumstances where local authorities are unable or
unwilling to act. For this purpose, as noted above, the United States
needs to be prepared to use its rapid, long-range precision strike
capabilities. A decision to act would obviously rest in civilian hands,
and would depend on intelligence information and assessments of
diplomatic consequences. But even if a decision to strike preemptively
is never taken or needed, the capability should be available
nonetheless, for knowledge of it can contribute to deterrence.
We also suggest that the Defense Department broaden its mission of
protecting air, sea, and land approaches to the United States,
consistent with emerging threats such as the potential proliferation of
cruise missiles. The department should examine alternative means of
monitoring approaches to the territorial United States. Modern
information technology and sophisticated sensors can help monitor the
high volumes of traffic to and from the United States. Given the volume
of legitimate activities near and on the border, even modern
information technology and remote sensors cannot filter the good from
the bad as a matter of routine. It is neither wise nor possible to
create a surveillance umbrella over the United States. But Defense
Department assets can be used to support detection, monitoring, and
even interception operations when intelligence indicates a specific
threat.
Finally, a better division of labor and understanding of
responsibilities is essential in dealing with the connectivity and
interdependence of U.S. critical infrastructure systems. This includes
addressing the nature of a national transportation network or cyber
emergency and the Defense Department's role in prevention, detection,
or protection of the national critical infrastructure. The department's
sealift and airlift plans are premised on largely unquestioned
assumptions that domestic transportation systems will be fully
available to support mobilization requirements. The department also is
paying insufficient attention to the vulnerability of its information
networks. Currently, the department's computer network defense task
force (JTF-Computer Network Defense) is underfunded and understaffed
for the task of managing an actual strategic information warfare
attack. It should be given the resources to carry out its current
mission and is a logical source of advice to the proposed NHSA Critical
Information Technology, Assurance, and Security Office.
National Guard.--The National Guard, whose origins are to be found
in the state militias authorized by the U.S. Constitution, should play
a central role in the response component of a layered defense strategy
for homeland security. We therefore recommend the following:
6. The Secretary of Defense, at the President's direction, should make
homeland security a primary mission of the National Guard, and
the Guard should be organized, properly trained, and adequately
equipped to undertake that mission.
At present, the Army National Guard is primarily organized and
equipped to conduct sustained combat overseas. In this the Guard
fulfills a strategic reserve role, augmenting the active military
during overseas contingencies. At the same time, the Guard carries out
many statelevel missions for disaster and humanitarian relief, as well
as consequence management. For these, it relies upon the discipline,
equipment, and leadership of its combat forces. The National Guard
should redistribute resources currently allocated predominantly to
preparing for conventional wars overseas to provide greater support to
civil authorities in preparing for and responding to disasters,
especially emergencies involving weapons of mass destruction.
Such a redistribution should flow from a detailed assessment of
force requirements for both theater war and homeland security
contingencies. The Department of Defense should conduct such an
assessment, with the participation of the state governors and the NHSA
Director. In setting requirements, the department should minimize
forces with dual missions or reliance on active forces detailed for
major theater war. This is because the United States will need to
maintain a heightened deterrent and defensive posture against homeland
attacks during regional contingencies abroad. The most likely timing of
a major terrorist incident will be while the United States is involved
in a conflict overseas.\16\
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\16\ See the Report of the National Defense University Quadrennial
Defense Review 2001 Working Group (Washington, DC: Institute for
National Strategic Studies, November 2000), p. 60.
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The National Guard is designated as the primary Department of
Defense agency for disaster relief. In many cases, the National Guard
will respond as a state asset under the control of state governors.
While it is appropriate for the National Guard to play the lead
military role in managing the consequences of a WMD attack, its
capabilities to do so are uneven and in some cases its forces are not
adequately structured or equipped. Twenty-two WMD Civil Support Teams,
made up of trained and equipped full-time National Guard personnel,
will be ready to deploy rapidly, assist local first responders, provide
technical advice, and pave the way for additional military help. These
teams fill a vital need, but more effort is required.
This Commission recommends that the National Guard be directed to
fulfill its historic and Constitutional mission of homeland security.--
It should provide a mobilization base with strong local ties and
support. It is already ``forward deployed'' to achieve this mission and
should:
--Participate in and initiate, where necessary, state, local, and
regional planning for responding to a WMD incident;
--Train and help organize local first responders;
--Maintain up-to-date inventories of military resources and equipment
available in the area on short notice;
--Plan for rapid inter-state support and reinforcement; and
--Develop an overseas capability for international humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief.
In this way, the National Guard will become a critical asset for
homeland security.
Medical Community.--The medical community has critical roles to
play in homeland security. Catastrophic acts of terrorism or violence
could cause casualties far beyond any imagined heretofore. Most of the
American medical system is privately owned and now operates at close to
capacity. An incident involving WMD will quickly overwhelm the
capacities of local hospitals and emergency management professionals.
In response, the National Security Council, FEMA, and the
Department of Health and Human Services have already begun a
reassessment of their programs. Research to develop better diagnostic
equipment and immune-enhancing drugs is underway, and resources to
reinvigorate U.S. epidemiological surveillance capacity have been
allocated. Programs to amass and regionally distribute inventories of
antibiotics and vaccines have started, and arrangements for mass
production of selected pharmaceuticals have been made. The Centers for
Disease Control has rapid-response investigative units prepared to
deploy and respond to incidents.
These programs will enhance the capacities of the medical
community, but the momentum and resources for this effort must be
extended. We recommend that the NHSA Directorate for Emergency
Preparedness and Response assess local and federal medical resources to
deal with a WMD emergency. It should then specify those medical
programs needed to deal with a major national emergency beyond the
means of the private sector, and Congress should fund those needs.
C. Executive-legislative cooperation
Solving the homeland security challenge is not just an Executive
Branch problem. Congress should be an active participant in the
development of homeland security programs, as well. Its hearings can
help develop the best ideas and solutions. Individual members should
develop expertise in homeland security policy and its implementation so
that they can fill in policy gaps and provide needed oversight and
advice in times of crisis. Most important, using its power of the
purse, Congress should ensure that government agencies have sufficient
resources and that their programs are coordinated, efficient, and
effective.
Congress has already taken important steps. A bipartisan
Congressional initiative produced the U.S. effort to deal with the
possibility that weapons of mass destruction could ``leak'' out of a
disintegrating Soviet Union.\17\ It was also a Congressional initiative
that established the Domestic Preparedness Program and launched a 120-
city program to enhance the capability of federal, state, and local
first responders to react effectively in a WMD emergency.\18\ Members
of Congress from both parties have pushed the Executive Branch to
identify and manage the problem more effectively. Congress has also
proposed and funded studies and commissions on various aspects of the
homeland security problem.\19\ But it must do more.
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\17\ Sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar.
\18\ Public Law 104-201, National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1997: Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction. This
legislation, known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Amendment, was passed in
July 1996.
\19\ We note: the Rumsfeld Commission [Report of the Commission to
Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (Washington,
DC: July 15, 1998)]; the Deutch Commission [Combating Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: July 14, 1999)]; Judge
William Webster's Commission [Report on the Advancement of Federal Law
Enforcement (Washington, DC: January 2000)]; the Bremer Commission
[Report of the National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the
Changing Threat of International Terrorism (Washington, DC: June
2000)]; and an advisory panel led Virginia Governor James Gilmore
[First Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory
Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: December 15, 1999)].
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A sound homeland security strategy requires the overhaul of much of
the legislative framework for preparedness, response, and national
defense programs. Congress designed many of the authorities that
support national security and emergency preparedness programs
principally for a Cold War environment. The new threat environment--
from biological and terrorist attacks to cyber attacks on critical
systems--poses vastly different challenges. We therefore recommend that
Congress refurbish the legal foundation for homeland security in
response to the new threat environment.
In particular, Congress should amend, as necessary, key legislative
authorities such as the Defense Production Act of 1950 and the
Communications Act of 1934, which facilitate homeland security
functions and activities.\20\ Congress should also encourage the
sharing of threat, vulnerability, and incident data between the public
and private sectors--including federal agencies, state governments,
first responders, and industry.\21\ In addition, Congress should
monitor and support current efforts to update the international legal
framework for communications security issues.\22\
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\20\ The Defense Production Act was developed during the Korean War
when shortages of critical natural resources such as coal, oil, and gas
were prioritized for national defense purposes. [See Defense Production
Act of 1950, codified at 50 USC App. Sec. 2061 et seq. Title I
includes delegations to prioritize and allocate goods and services
based on national defense needs.] Executive Order 12919, National
Defense Industrial Resources Preparedness, June 6, 1994, implements
Title I of the Defense Production Act. Congressional review should
focus on the applicability of the Defense Production Act to homeland
security needs, ranging from prevention to restoration activities.
Section 706 of the Communications Act of 1934 also needs revision so
that it includes the electronic media that have developed in the past
two decades. [See 48 Stat. 1104, 47 USC Sec. 606, as amended.]
Executive Order 12472, Assignment of National Security and Emergency
Preparedness Telecommunications Functions, April 3, 1984, followed the
breakup of AT&T and attempted to specify anew the prerogatives of the
Executive Branch in accordance with the 1934 Act in directing national
communications media during a national security emergency. It came
before the Internet, however, and does not clearly apply to it.
\21\ For more than four years, multiple institutions have called on
national leadership to support laws and policies promoting security
cooperation through public-private partnerships. See, for example, the
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical
Foundations, Protecting America's Infrastructures (Washington, DC:
October 1997), pp. 86-88 and Report of the Defense Science Board Task
Force on Information Warfare (Washington, DC: November 1996).
\22\ This includes substantial efforts in multiple forums, such as
the Council of Europe and the G8, to fight transnational organized
crime. See Communique on principles to fight transnational organized
crime, Meeting of the Justice and Interior Ministers of the Eight,
December 9-10, 1997.
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Beyond that, Congress has some organizational work of its own to
do. As things stand today, so many federal agencies are involved with
homeland security that it is exceedingly difficult to present federal
programs and their resource requirements to the Congress in a coherent
way. It is largely because the budget is broken up into so many pieces,
for example, that counterterrorism and information security issues
involve nearly two dozen Congressional committees and subcommittees.
The creation of the National Security Homeland Agency will redress this
problem to some extent, but because of its growing urgency and
complexity, homeland security will still require a stronger working
relationship between the Executive and Legislative Branches. Congress
should therefore find ways to address homeland security issues that
bridge current jurisdictional boundaries and that create more
innovative oversight mechanisms.
There are several ways of achieving this. The Senate's Arms Control
Observer Group and its more recent NATO Enlargement Group were two
successful examples of more informal Executive-Legislative cooperation
on key multi-dimensional issues. Specifically, in the near term, this
Commission recommends the following:
7. Congress should establish a special body to deal with homeland
security issues, as has been done effectively with intelligence
oversight. Members should be chosen for their expertise in
foreign policy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and
appropriations. This body should also include members of all
relevant Congressional committees as well as ex-officio members
from the leadership of both Houses of Congress.
This body should develop a comprehensive understanding of the
problem of homeland security, exchange information and viewpoints with
the Executive Branch on effective policies and plans, and work with
standing committees to develop integrated legislative responses and
guidance. Meetings would often be held in closed session so that
Members could have access to interagency deliberations and diverging
viewpoints, as well as to classified assessments. Such a body would
have neither a legislative nor an oversight mandate, and it would not
eclipse the authority of any standing committee.
At the same time, Congress needs to systematically review and
restructure its committee system, as will be proposed in recommendation
48. A single, select committee in each house of Congress should be
given authorization, appropriations, and oversight responsibility for
all homeland security activities. When established, these committees
would replace the function of the oversight body described in
recommendation 7.
In sum, the federal government must address the challenge of
homeland security with greater urgency. The United States is not immune
to threats posed by weapons of mass destruction or disruption, but
neither is it entirely defenseless against them. Much has been done to
prevent and defend against such attacks, but these efforts must be
incorporated into the nation's overall security strategy, and clear
direction must be provided to all departments and agencies. Non-
traditional national security agencies that now have greater relevance
than they did in the past must be reinvigorated. Accountability,
authority, and responsibility must be more closely aligned within
government agencies. An Executive-Legislative consensus is required, as
well, to convert strategy and resources into programs and capabilities,
and to do so in a way that preserves fundamental freedoms and
individual rights.
Most of all, however, the government must reorganize itself for the
challenges of this new era, and make the necessary investments to allow
an improved organizational structure to work. Through the Commission's
proposal for a National Homeland Security Agency, the U.S. government
will be able to improve the planning and coordination of federal
support to state and local agencies, to rationalize the allocation of
resources, to enhance readiness in order to prevent attacks, and to
facilitate recovery if prevention fails. Most important, this proposal
integrates the problem of homeland security within the broader
framework of U.S. national security strategy. In this respect, it
differs significantly from issue-specific approaches to the problem,
which tend to isolate homeland security away from the larger strategic
perspective of which it must be a part.
We are mindful that erecting the operational side of this strategy
will take time to achieve. Meanwhile, the threat grows ever more
serious. That is all the more reason to start right away on
implementing the recommendations put forth here.
Questioning by Chairman Robert C. Byrd
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator Rudman. In light of what
has happened since your report was issued, how would you change
your recommendations, or what additional recommendations would
you have, number 1? Number 2, what are the shortcomings of the
Office of Homeland Security? Perhaps the word ``shortcomings''
is the wrong word. How do you see the Office of Homeland
Security as it has been established and as it is presently
operating with broad responsibilities under the Executive
Order? How do you see that as against what you had in mind when
you wrote your report?
Senator Rudman. Let me take them in order. Mr. Chairman,
the only major change that we would make has in fact been
incorporated into legislation offered by Senator Lieberman,
Congressman Thornberry in the House, and I believe Senator
Specter. We believe that the homeland security agency, in
addition to Border Patrol and FEMA and Coast Guard and INS and
so forth, there are several other parts of certain agencies
which ought to be transferred in there. That would be the major
change from that recommendation.
As to your second question, we of course in our
recommendation did not anticipate the President appointing, if
you will, a National Security Council for Homeland Security,
which is essentially what has been done here. I mean, in many
ways Governor Ridge is Condoleeza Rice's counterpart, with
national security and national homeland security being handled
quite separately.
We had recommended the integration of a coordinating agency
within the NSC. The President has chosen to set it up
separately, which probably is every bit as good.
For the long term, however, we believe there has to be some
statutory oversight for any coordination of what's going to be
$35 or $40 billion worth of funds. Let me simply explain in a
minute why. Right now, as we all know--and I see my friends
Senator Hollings, Senator Inouye, and Senator Domenici have
joined us--we have all served on committees that had to do with
national defense. We know that the National Security Adviser is
a junction, if you will, for all of those issues.
But when it comes to the Congress having oversight,
although the National Security Adviser traditionally will not
testify, we get our testimony from the Secretary of Defense,
from the Secretary of State, from the Director of Central
Intelligence. Obviously, the secretary of homeland security
would be able to fill a large part of that, and for the
strategic end of it I suppose you would call for the Director
of OMB to come and testify as to what the coherent approach was
of the administration to any particular issue. So that is how I
would answer your second question.
Chairman Byrd. Well, as you say, Condoleeza Rice, the
National Security Adviser, has someone above her who does
testify before the Congress. There is the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of Defense. So we indeed do not have to have her.
But in the case of Mr. Ridge, there is nobody above him. He is
the point man for the administration. The President is the man
who is above Mr. Ridge.
Senator Rudman. And that is why there has to be major
reorganization in my view. You could not continue and I do not
think the White House would seriously--I do not speak for them,
obviously, but I cannot imagine that the administration would
believe that the Congress would allow $35 billion to $40
billion of money to be appropriated every year that was
uncoordinated in a strategic way.
But I would say in their defense, it has only been 6 months
and I hope that between the Congress and the administration
this can be worked out. That was the subject of our testimony
this morning before the Government Affairs Committee.
Chairman Byrd. Senator Stevens.
Questioning by Senator Ted Stevens
Senator Stevens. Senator, we do not see any plan yet. The
real problem is where the plan is, and that is one of the
reasons that I joined Senator Byrd in trying to get Governor
Ridge to come before our committee to give us a plan. Our
alternative right now is to call those 43, we think it is 44,
agencies that are all going to get a piece of this money. And
we would not do it. It would be the subcommittees that would do
that, and there would be no real coordination even here with
the overall subject of homeland defense unless we have some
sort of an entity.
Has your organization backed the bill that is introduced? I
think it is Senators Lieberman and Thompson, is it not?
Senator Rudman. I believe Senator Thompson did join the
bill. I did not want to mention his name. I was not sure of
that. But if it was, it is the Lieberman-Thompson bill. I think
Senator Thompson may take exception to title 2 of that bill. I
am not sure.
Senator Stevens. I am on that committee, but I do not know
whether he co-sponsored it or not.
Senator Rudman. Basically, there is a lot of agreement on
much of the bill. The first part of the bill does the
reorganization. The second part deals with what you and Senator
Byrd have been talking about and that is what goes on in the
White House. They kind of set it up a bit like the drug czar,
who is confirmed by the Congress, I believe, and reports to the
Congress.
Senator Stevens. I do not want to offend my chairman. I
think there is a little bit of politics going on in that bill
and I am not sure where it is going to go. I would like to see
some solution to this matter and I really believe we need a
coordinating committee, such as an entity like NHSA that you,
and your group, have suggested. But I sort of shy back because
you want the Coast Guard to be in that. The Coast Guard's
mission is far in excess of homeland security.
Senator Rudman. Absolutely.
Senator Stevens. The Coast Guard has been operating
overseas since the days of the Persian Gulf War. Now, you want
to put even more of it in the Department of Defense?
Senator Rudman. No, we do not, and if I can respond, we
talked to the Coast Guard people rather at length about this.
The Coast Guard would not change. It would not change its
mission, it would not change its equipment, it would not change
its organization. It, however, would reside in a department
which we believe is a more likely place for it to reside than
residing with the Department of Transportation. Its function
would not change.
Senator Stevens. But it has been residing in the Department
of Transportation, but most of its modernization money has been
coming from the money that Senator Inouye and I have urged the
Department of Defense to provide the Coast Guard.
Senator Rudman. Exactly. But we think it is better off in
the department of homeland security, which is a more sensible
place for it to be than in Transportation.
Senator Stevens. But you do admit in your report that the
problem with it is capitalization.
Senator Rudman. Absolutely, and we at length discuss that
and we applaud what the committee has done. The Coast Guard is
hurting. It has a myriad of missions and not the resources to
discharge them. When you consider what has been added on, now
homeland security, the war on drugs--15 years ago, those were
not missions of the United States Coast Guard. So I could not
agree with you more.
Senator Stevens. My real problem with that, Senator, is
that we have had this array of witnesses, we have got more
coming, and they are all talking about a need for money for
capitalization. Every entity that has been here so far wanted
more money, and to put the Coast Guard into an entity that is
going to be having--it is like an enormous nest of chicks,
little baby birds with open mouths. This one is already a grown
bird, and I think it will be starved if it is part of that
entity.
I have some real reservations about it, I have got to tell
you, real reservations about putting the Coast Guard into the
national entity you all have recommended.
Senator Rudman. Let me just respond in this way, and I
certainly respect your view and understand it. I think, coming
from Alaska, you have a great deal of interface----
Senator Stevens. We have half the coast line of the United
States.
Senator Rudman [continuing]. With the Coast Guard. Let me
just make an observation. You know, we have 50,000 containers
coming into this country every day, 50,000. Less than 1 percent
are inspected. If you want to see an act of terrorism waiting
to happen, that is where I would look. I would not look much at
airports right now.
The Coast Guard is doing yeoman work in trying to do
inspection on incoming ships, as you well know. We believe that
that is going to be such an incredibly important function that
it ought to be in the homeland security agency. But I
understand your objection, and I simply tell you that after
looking at all of the objections, we found this was probably
the best place to put it.
Although I am not sure how many will testify publicly, many
of the Coast Guard people who were ranking told us they would
love to be in a different agency. So we will leave it there.
Chairman Byrd. Senator Landrieu.
Questioning by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Senator.
Thank you very much, Senator, for appearing and helping us
sort through these great challenges. If I could just
acknowledge for all the members, who are very familiar with
your work and your career, how much we have appreciated the
Hart-Rudman report and that you were working on this excellent
piece of work prior to September 11th and at least it gave us
quickly something we could reach to on that day. Some of our
committees had already begun looking at some of the
recommendations of that report, and of course the events of
September 11th propelled us to move forward rather quickly on
that.
But let me ask, since we are on the governance issue, just
a question about a very excellent witness that was part of the
panel that the chairman and the ranking member had invited
yesterday, Ashton Carter, about his suggestion that I thought
was very insightful and very encouraging about the role of the
Office of Homeland Security, not so much as a czar but as an
architect.
Because of the complicated nature of so many of our
agencies having pieces of this great challenge, he suggested
that having this new role evolve more towards the framework of
an architect, laying out, if you will, a blueprint and then
allowing the standing committees of Congress, mostly through
this Appropriations Committee, to force those fundings down to
that architecture.
Have you read his work? Are you familiar with his work?
Could you comment about it? Do you think his work is----
Senator Rudman. Very familiar with Ashton Carter's work. We
have consulted with Ashton Carter. He has read all of our work,
we have read all of his work. I know him personally. He is one
of the most outstanding people up at Harvard at the Kennedy
School, so we certainly are familiar.
I do not think there is anything particularly mutually
exclusive about Ashton Carter's proposal versus ours. We
certainly agree. He wants to call it architecture; I would
prefer to call it a strategy for homeland security. It means to
me the same thing.
As to how you organize it, I am convinced of two things.
There has to be some consolidation of a number of agencies out
of these 43 or 44 that we currently are looking at into a lot
fewer, organized along structural and operational lines.
Secondly, there has to be a central place for defining the
strategy, if you will, or the architecture, if you will, as to
how you, A, are going to organize it and, B, how are you going
to spend the funds or, more particularly, how are you going to
convince the Congress that you need the funds. So I do not
disagree with Ashton Carter at all.
Senator Landrieu. Well, just to comment, though, what I
thought I heard him say--and I listened as carefully as I
could--was that he thought that any attempt at too much
consolidation would fail under the general weight of trying to
move agencies that are very geared and anchored into their
traditional ways; that he would argue for a clear strategy at
the top and then forcing it down through the agencies, with
maybe less consolidation than you will have.
I do not want to harp on this, but I think that is an
important point to drive a consensus about what is the best
way, because we could spend a lot of time getting agencies
fighting and then leaving our flanks open to the next attack,
and what I am interested in is trying to move forward in the
most effective way so that when the next attack comes--and I am
convinced, as your report suggests, that--you predicted, not
the specifics of the attack, but in your report you said there
will be an attack on American soil, and you were right in your
report. So I am assuming, because you were right in that
prediction, that there is some urgency about getting this right
before the next attack comes.
Senator Rudman. Let me respond that, as far as what Ashton
Carter has said generally, we do not disagree with it. But I
will tell you where we feel very strongly. We spent 3\1/2\
years looking at it. Maybe we are wrong; I do not think so. If
you look at the list of the people who served on this
commission, we had a lot of weight on this commission. It was
totally divided down the middle, Democrats, Republicans. There
was no partisanship whatsoever on this.
We were absolutely convinced that we have a dysfunction and
a disconnect in terms of border security. If you cannot protect
the borders of the United States, you better give up on almost
everything else you are doing--nuclear security and this
security and airport security. If you get enough people into
this country who should not be here, then we are going to have
a lot of trouble.
We believe that that consolidation is absolutely essential.
If you spent the time talking to the people from the Border
Patrol, the INS, Customs, Coast Guard, and many others, you
would come to the same conclusion we did. So to the extent that
Ashton Carter does not think that it is necessary, we disagree
with that.
Senator Landrieu. Well, I do not want to put those words in
his mouth. He might not think it was that strong. I just
thought that having one centralized agency might be too much to
reach to, so this was an alternative.
Let me ask a second question. There is a lot of uneasiness,
is the way I would describe it--different committees have
looked at it; the Armed Services Committee has looked at it--
about the new expanding role of the military, given this new
threat. The military has been structured to keep us safe by
fighting wars off of our shores. Now we find ourselves in some
ways under attack, not knowing when the next attack will come,
but it surely will come. We do not know what form.
Can you comment about the way that you see, with your
experiences, having been on the Armed Services, what we could
be suggesting to our military that they need to be looking at
differently? And not maybe shying away from this, but engaging
more, because they have the expertise, they do this very well.
They could be very, very helpful to our local civilians and
agencies that are very new to this protection, national
security. The military has been doing it well for hundreds of
years.
Could you comment about the role of the military, and are
they right to be this reluctant? Is it understandable, or
should we press them into a more direct role?
Senator Rudman. The military and its role is very well
covered in the report, not only in this report but, as you
know, there were three. There was a 1999, a 2000, and a final
report. The one thing we made it very clear is that there ought
to be strong civilian control over homeland security, that the
primary mission should be a civilian mission; but in the event
of a major emergency, such as a nuclear, chemical, or
biological attack, it is only the military that could respond
with the communications, transportation, hospitals, and so
forth.
So that is why we recommended a strong role for the
Department of Defense in planning to help local communities in
times of great stress. We also, as I am sure you know, made a
strong recommendation that the National Guard ought to be dual-
trained in homeland security.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you Senator.
Senator Domenici, then Senator Inouye.
Questioning by Senator Pete V. Domenici
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Very good to see you, Senator Rudman. One of the things we
do not do enough is see each other. It is a big void in our
lives.
Frankly, I do not have enough time in 7 minutes to engage
you on this subject. But I am a little worried about when we
are going to find out how we should allocate resources to put
our Nation on a path of responding to what happened. I think
the President and his people for a short period of time, the
little bit of time they have had, have done a pretty good job.
But I myself am concerned that we are a Nation of great
diversity, we are a Nation of great diversity both as to assets
that should be mobilized to be used in this new sense of
homeland security, and I do not quite understand how we are
going to get to an inventory of this with a conclusion as to
what we use that is out there, and how we continue to keep
ourselves modern in terms of what we should be doing.
I think you are reading my mind as I talk about this,
because we have some national laboratories, not only the three
nuclear laboratories but a few others that are part of the
Defense Department and civilian research. They have a great
capacity to organize and tell us where and what we have got as
a Nation, what is cutting edge, and what is ready. I do not
quite understand under the structure suggested by the President
how we are going to take heed of those and use them.
As you looked at this in your studies--I will just give you
another one: What will happen to instrumentalities that have
been developed for one purpose but are very good for another
purpose. I cited for the committee here this morning and maybe
you have heard of a process that two laboratories, the nuclear
labs in New Mexico, developed called NISAC. I think, being as
interested as you are, you would have heard of it.
I think the general that used to be the chairman of the
Coal Caucus, Senator Byrd, has just been assigned to
investigate the potential for this NISAC and where it should be
lodged. It is a process whereby the supercomputers at the
national laboratories have already been used to inventory all
the infrastructure of America, all the dams, all the tunnels,
all the power plants, all the electric generating plants, et
cetera.
That system, when operated appropriately by the right kind
of talent, tells you the impact on society of destroying or
harming any of the infrastructure you would like to ask it
about. You would ask it about a power plant way up there in New
York, if somebody was going to do it. You ask it, say that was
done what is the impact, and it will tell you whose lights will
go out, et cetera.
I think it is a good tool for the terrorists, but it is not
secret. At least it is not now.
But I am kind of wondering. Can you talk about how we
should go about putting these in a place where they would be
used properly and would the organization and the utility of
that be in the hands, at the discretion of the Governor, the
Governor that our President has put in charge? He is not a
line--he has no line operation, from what I understand. What
would you do about it?
Senator Rudman. That would not be--in fact, we covered in
the report--in the main body, I believe, and in the indices,
one of the things we talked about was, interestingly, long
before September 11th, was that science and technology exists
and the potential exists in both the private and the public
sector--you are referring to the public sector, some of those
laboratories, and some are private--that have science and
technology that is suitable for one thing which well could add
in homeland security.
Let me give you a very good example. One of the serious
problems facing us that is being looked at today is how do you
handle these containers coming into the country. Every one
ought to be examined for nuclear, chemical, or biological
contents. How do you do that? What kind of equipment is
available?
I am sure that residing in some of our laboratories around
the country there are some answers. The fact is that those of
us who worked in the defense area know all about DARPA and the
remarkable work DARPA has done over, what, a 40 or a 50-year
period. We believe there has to be a science and technology arm
of the department of homeland security to exploit the very
things that the Senator from New Mexico is talking about.
Senator Domenici. Well, I am not going to ask any other
questions. Mr. Chairman, that is exactly what I have been
thinking about in terms of presenting to the committee, that
there is a huge amount of money that the President has set
aside in his request for appropriations, it is called research
and development, that would impact on the positive side on our
ability to cope with this kind of war.
I am hopeful that we will be ingenious enough to make sure
that we set up within our Government a way to capture the dual
purpose science that is going on because of the Defense
Department and the private sector dual-use potential. There are
many, many things in our laboratories that are directed at
nuclear weapons that have a use to protect us in this war we
now have on terrorists.
I cited one for you that clearly is going to make a
dramatic impact. It is going to be somewhere in our Government,
and I am concerned how we are going to address it as
appropriators. Are we going to give them no money because we do
not know where it is or are we going to give it loose money and
say somebody is going to take care of it even if they are not
quite the appropriate place to have it? We will work on some of
those and present something to the committee long before we
start appropriating.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Byrd. All right.
Senator Inouye, then Senator Hollings.
Questioning by Senator Daniel K. Inouye
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
Senator Rudman, I wanted to be here earlier this afternoon
to greet you, but the problems and emergencies of Hawaii
usually erupt between 7:00 and 8:00 in the morning in Hawaii,
which is 1 p.m. and 2 p.m. here. So I was delayed a little.
Warren, if I may call you that, sir, since September 11th I
have had occasion to do much reading and much traveling--
Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, China, Indonesia,
Philippines, Singapore. There are certain conclusions I have
reached. This terrorism is global, as the President has
indicated; that terrorists do not necessarily wear beards. In
fact, the one who struck Oklahoma had no beard and he was a
Christian. Some of the most vicious terrorists were from Japan,
the Red Army.
I am also convinced that we can never look upon this as a
short-term matter, that it is going to be with us, as it has
been with us, for many, many decades, if not centuries.
Therefore, I agree with you completely when you recommend that
this should be a position of the highest level, at the least a
Cabinet position.
That is why we are hoping that, even if that designee is
not a Cabinet member at this time, he comes to us and helps us
in organizing what we hope to be the most effective system or
agency that can cope with this global problem. You are
definitely agreed upon that it should be a Cabinet position?
Senator Rudman. Oh, absolutely. We believe that the
department of homeland security, which would be the focal point
in any administration for all of these functions, although they
would not perform them all--obviously, the FBI, CIA, HHS has
functions--but they would be the focal point and they would be
the coordinators, they would set the budgets as to what they
ought to be, and they would be the ones who would be primarily
accountable to the Congress.
Senator Inouye. And the Director of Homeland Security today
is the man who is supposed to be doing that?
Senator Rudman. It is a superhuman effort that he has been
assigned. I looked at the numbers in the proposals of the
administration. We are talking $35 billion in homeland security
functions for this year and I think $38 billion for next. That
is four times the size of many of what we call independent
agencies. It is a lot of money.
Senator Inouye. Do you consider this a long-term problem?
Senator Rudman. Oh, our report says that this will be with
us for many, many years and into the indefinite future, and we
also sadly believe there will be other terrorist attacks on
this country, and we unfortunately believe that the greatest
threat is nuclear, chemical, and biological over the next 5 to
15 years, which is why we think it is urgent.
Senator Inouye. Does your commission also recommend that
the Congress should have a special committee for this?
Senator Rudman. We do, and we think you should take the
expertise of Defense, Judiciary, Foreign Relations, HHS, make
sure the committee draws broadly from the expertise of the
members, and establish, if you will, a special committee that
could deal.
One of the problems, I must say, and I knew it when I was
here and I think I still know it, is that sometimes, no ill
intention of anyone, some of these Cabinet secretaries spend
more time up here than probably is beneficial for their
departments, with all of the various committees they have to
testify before. It is necessary for certainly some of them, but
in this area we would hope it could be at least pulled down a
bit.
Senator Inouye. It is good to see you, sir.
Senator Rudman. Great to see you.
Senator Stevens. Would you yield for just one thing?
What is wrong with this committee, Senator?
Senator Rudman. Nothing at all. I always thought this was
the greatest committee on the Hill, Senator Stevens.
Senator Stevens. It has 13 subcommittees to cover all 44 of
those agencies.
Senator Rudman. You might decide to do it that way, but I
dare say you have got about, what, 82 people that might not
agree with that.
Senator Stevens. The buck stops here.
Senator Rudman. I always thought so.
Chairman Byrd. Senator Hollings, then Senator Murray.
Questioning by Senator Ernest F. Hollings
Senator Hollings. Senator Rudman, you know my high regard
and affection for you. It has been a wonderful privilege to
work with you and everything else. But getting right to the
point, darned if you do not sound like you belong on a campus.
Senator Rudman. That I belong on a campus?
Senator Hollings. On a campus rather than in politics. I
mean, yes, I could make the same study and sign the books, but
we live in the real world. Seemingly, nobody came up here and
talked to us who has been dealing directly with this. We have
the Border Patrol and it is on course, it is doing a good job.
Customs is doing a good job--both of them need way more money
and way more agents.
Now, that immigration department, like I told Ziglar when
he took it over, and I fussed at the previous President to get
us somebody who was hard-nosed, get a Warren Rudman who could
run the thing, it is the worst department in Government. They
have got computers all over everywhere that cannot talk to each
other. I can give you 50 different problems. We have been
giving them the money and it is like quicksilver. Every time
you think you have got the agency in the palm of your hand, it
jumps out, they have got another problem.
I do not want to visit the immigration department's problem
with the Border Patrol or the Customs Service or the Coast
Guard. I know what the Coast Guard is doing. You are right. We
increased the size of the United States by one-third when we
passed the Magnuson Act and everything else of that kind. Then
we promptly cut the budget, so Senator Stevens and Senator
Inouye here and Senator Byrd have to rob 050, the defense
function, to supplement the Coast Guard.
Now we have superimposed port security. We have been
working with them. Interestingly, where we know you had the
Coast Guard, the Immigration, Border Patrol, and the Customs
Service, you did not have the FAA. We know what planes come in
because we track them. We have not known what ships are coming
in, until recently. Now I have got a weather satellite from
NOAA that is looking down in the oceans and is beginning to
track ships, by putting transponders on them. We have got a
requirement that they send their manifests 3 days ahead of
time, like an airplane coming in, passengers and so forth like
that.
So we are working on all those things. The only reason I
say this is that we live in the real world and everybody
regrets that Governor Ridge--everybody knows he is an
outstanding individual, but I am glad he is not even coming
because, I hate to disappoint him, because none of this is
going to happen, and I have got a good excuse. I got to say,
well, the fellow would not come and testify to take the Border
Patrol or put the Customs into the Border Patrol.
They have got different duties. They are working closely.
We have got to give them more money and more agents and
everything else. I have been down to the border. We produced
4,000 agents last year down there in my own back yard. We are
doubling the class this year and everything of that kind. We
need more.
Another incident was to take cops on the beat. You were up
here when we were debating that back and forth. Now we have got
cops on the beat, we have got community policing. The system is
working. High crime rates are down. Just Monday they had the
Hispanic population, their crime rates are down and everything
else. So it is working, but the administration wants to get rid
of it. They also want to take the Office of Domestic
Preparedness and put it over in FEMA. Heavens above, they do
not know anything about law enforcement. They do not have the
schools, they do not have the training, they do not have the
FBI and the coordination that we do have.
In other words, my good friend, I just do not see any of
this happening. We are going to do our best by way of the
administration. We know they are sincere. But actually, this
homeland defense security agency--to put it all together and
have a military international security and then a homeland
security like the Pentagon. You and I remember Pete Kassada,
who commanded the 8th Air Force in World War II, and when Pete
came back he had never seen the Pentagon, the largest office
building in the entire world. He turned to the taxi driver and
said: My heavens, he said, how many people work in a building
like that? The taxi driver without hesitation said: About half.
Look here. I can get reelected on a toilet seat that costs,
you know, over in the Defense Department it costs $1,500 and
that kind of stuff. When you get the economies of size, they
are not economies. You see what I am trying to say?
Senator Rudman. I do, but I do not agree.
Senator Hollings. You and I do not have to agree, but I am
in and you are out.
And I want you to know, you do not have a closer friend
than me and it is not going to happen and I do not want you to
be disappointed.
Senator Rudman. Senator Hollings, let me respond. First, we
spent 3\1/2\ years on this because we were asked to. Obviously,
we are not the policymakers. We have made recommendations we
think are sound and we respect that the Congress and the
President will decide what to do.
But I have got to take issue with one thing you said. If
you look at the report carefully, we are not putting the
Customs Service into the Border Patrol or the Border Patrol
into the Coast Guard or the Customs Department into the Border
Patrol or the INS into the Customs Service. What we are saying
is if you look at where each of these reside now, it makes
little sense for them to be where they are. They do not get the
attention from the top of those departments because there are
other major parts of those departments that people really do
care about.
We say the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, yes, we say
the Coast Guard and the INS, staying identically as they are,
but less a lot of overhead, should be in a small Cabinet-level
agency that makes it possible when you give them all that money
for information technology that it gets spent correctly.
We believe they are lost in the departments they are in
now, and that is exactly what they told us behind closed doors.
I suggest you talk to some of them yourself.
Senator Hollings. Well, I understand. Of course, we work
with them. We do not have to talk behind closed doors. We do
both. We had the public hearings and everything else.
To your counterpart's credit, Senator Judd Gregg of New
Hampshire, he started ODP in our little subcommittee. He was
the chairman. Last May we had a full Cabinet hearing, over 3
days, on counterterrorism, and we had a budget all set.
So we had thought about the problem; in fact, we have been
providing funding for it. We have already got five training
facilities in the five States and we have graduated 80,000
police and firemen and those kind of things. We have got the
technology now need to get the interoperability of the radios
and everything else. That has just been brought on line so
everybody is talking with each other. We got with FBI Director
Mueller, who is about the best FBI Director we have had in a
long time.
He came to us last October and he said: You give me about
$250 million and I will have the FBI systems interoperable. He
started off and the contractor who told him he could do it is
not doing it, and we have already wasted $70 million. So to his
credit, he was watching it closely and everything else of that
kind.
These things are not easily done, and I do not want you to
work all this period of time, come up here and make this
wonderful presentation, and then, my friend Warren, go away and
say, they totally ignored me. It is not that we ignore you. It
is just we live in the real world and we are going to continue
the operations that are working.
They might say Coast Guard would like to get out from under
Transportation or Customs does not like Treasury, but it is
working and they are doing a good job, and they have been cut.
The Customs has been cut. Everybody has come to Government, you
know, and said downsize, downsize, get rid of the revenues. Now
we have got $216 billion already in the red this fiscal year
and it is not half over.
So I just wanted you to know that we are paying attention
and we like Governor Ridge, but he has done this subcommittee
chairman a favor because he has not justified it.
I had the Attorney General before the subcommittee. He is
not for this. He has got to say he is for it. I know how to
read the body language. When General Ashcroft came and we had
our hearing on the same thing, about ODP and everything else
like that: Well, yes, I support the President's initiative.
That is what they have got to say. But you can tell. That has
not been vetted.
I do not know any of these people who came up here or who
they talked to--these Senators have been working here for 30
years on these problems and working out the kinks. And to come
with this proposal--like I say, academically, that looks
pretty, to have it all under one agency and one border and one
authority and everything else like that, however it is just not
going to happen.
Senator Rudman. Well, Senator Hollings, let me just say to
you that I respect you very much. I totally disagree with
everything you have just said.
Chairman Byrd. Senator Murray, then Senator Mikulski.
Questioning by Senator Patty Murray
Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Senator Rudman, for your tremendous amount of
work and time on this issue. We all really do appreciate your
doing that and coming before our committee today.
Let me just say to Senator Hollings as well that I had a
hearing on port security last week on my Transportation
Subcommittee and it revealed that the Coast Guard requirement
for the 96-hour advance notice is of very little value because
the Coast Guard cannot actually verify the names of the crew
men against the watch list. So we have work to do on the
coordination, and I am sure Senator Rudman understands that
issue as well.
I did want to pick up on the issue you raised, Senator, or
that actually Ted Stevens raised with you. I really agree with
you completely that we have got to take measures to deal with
the 6 million containers that enter our ports every year. I
have the third largest container port in my home State of
Washington and we are going to be talking more about this on
the next panel. There are a lot of challenges there.
The Commandant of the Coast Guard already testified before
my subcommittee that his increased effort in port security next
year is going to come at the expense of fisheries enforcement,
marine environmental protection, and search and rescue efforts.
The public already has expressed their real deep concerns about
search and rescue in particular and the declining ability to do
that.
What do you expect would come of missions like fisheries
enforcement, marine environmental protection, search and rescue
if we were to put the Coast Guard under some kind of homeland
security agency?
Senator Rudman. You know, I must tell you, Senator Murray,
that I have not looked at that issue, but these are all
important functions you speak of. Certainly from a commerce
point of view, the fisheries issues are very important. They
are important to the east coast and the west coast.
Senator Murray. Economic issues, correct.
Senator Rudman. They are very important. In terms of
security issues, there is nothing any more important, no matter
who does it, Customs or Coast Guard, than to make sure that we
know what is in those containers coming to this country. I do
not know if you were aware--you must be aware that when they
come into, let us say, Seattle----
Senator Murray. I am extremely aware of the challenges.
Senator Rudman. I know you know what happens when they come
in there. They get offloaded, uninspected, and may go to St.
Louis, and never opened for 6 weeks. Who knows what is in them?
So I do not know how you allocate. I do not know how you
prioritize. But I will tell you this. From our commission's
point of view, that is a gaping problem in U.S. security.
Senator Murray. I think there is a gaping problem at port
security and I think we have some real challenges. Like I say,
we will talk about it on the next panel, I know. And I know
that very few of those containers are inspected. I am on the
ports a lot. I am very, very familiar with them. Senator
Hollings has dealt with this issue as well.
But I am not certain that combining the Coast Guard with
all the other agencies will not create another problem, and
that would be that they would no longer be paying attention to
their other really critical issues. We cannot lose sight of
those. Those are also very important.
I would just say, search and rescue saves lives, too, and
that is already decreasing in the Coast Guard's priority
because of the things we have put on them. If we put them in
another agency and tell them that their primary mission is
homeland security and we start losing people on ships because
there are not folks out there to take care of that, then we
have created another problem as well.
All I am asking you is have you thought about the other
missions the Coast Guard has besides homeland security if we
were to put them into an agency defined as homeland defense?
Senator Rudman. We certainly have, and we have talked to
people from the Coast Guard at high levels during the 3\1/2\
years. It is not our intention to change their mission at all,
to change its ratio, to change its funding, but to simply say
that they have a lot of functions that just fit with the border
security agencies because they are, in addition to everything
else, a border security agency.
But we do not change their function. We do not change their
name, their uniform, their equipment, their system. We simply
put them in a different place.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you.
Senator Mikulski.
Questioning by Senator Barbara A. Mikulski
Senator Mikulski. Senator Rudman, it is really great to see
you again. First of all, it is just good to hear you again. I
mean, your many years of experience in Government and the
Yankee common sense and so on.
As you know, I chair the subcommittee that funds FEMA. If I
could ask, under your conceptual framework for the national
homeland security agency, where do you see FEMA, and what do
you see FEMA doing? Do you see FEMA dissolving? How does this
work?
Senator Rudman. No, none of these agencies dissolve. FEMA
is an independent agency right now.
Senator Mikulski. Yes.
Senator Rudman. We believe it would be the building block
of the new department of homeland security. It is a responder.
The others tend to be preventers.
Senator Mikulski. So I do not know what a building block
is. Is under your idea the homeland security agency going to be
like a federation of agencies, each acting the way they do now,
but under kind of like a federation chairman?
Senator Rudman. The secretary of the homeland security
agency would essentially be the one that the head of each of
those agencies reported to.
Senator Mikulski. I see.
Senator Rudman. They would be able to consolidate some of
their financial functions, some of their human resource
functions, probably some substantial savings in terms of that
consolidation. They would stay precisely as they are in terms
of organization, unless that Cabinet officer, with the consent
of the Congress, decided over the years to change some of that
organization.
The difference would be they would have a shared
information technology system and they would have a much better
link to the intelligence communities and the law enforcement
community. That is how this proposal was concocted.
Senator Mikulski. All of which they need. So FEMA would be
part of this. And so FEMA would keep on doing what it is doing.
Senator Rudman. Exactly.
Senator Mikulski. Now, in terms of the Coast Guard, would
you see that the functions related to search and rescue, drug
interdiction, which I know you have been so supportive of,
environmental protection out on the waterways, do you see them
continuing to do those same functions under homeland security
or would those functions have to move someplace else?
Senator Rudman. No, they would be precisely the same
functions. No one else can do them as well or, frankly, for as
little money as the Coast Guard has been doing them for--a very
efficient organization. We leave them exactly like that. But
our witnesses and our experts--and we had many over the 3\1/2\
year period--made a strong case to us that Transportation was
not the right place for them, and particularly in view of our
homeland security argument.
By the way, when we did this September 11th had not
happened. This was 1 year before the 11th of September.
Senator Mikulski. I read this.
Senator Rudman. This is 1 year before, the 1999 report. So
we were not looking at trying to fix something right away. We
were looking at it deliberately, and we came to the conclusion
that the first and most important thing in the area of homeland
security was to secure the borders. So we took those agencies
which had major border security functions.
But the Coast Guard, as Senator Murray pointed out, has its
overwhelming function doing other things, 70, 80 percent. It
would stay the same.
Senator Mikulski. Well, I am glad I understand the
framework----
Senator Rudman. As would FEMA.
Senator Mikulski. Yes.
Senator Rudman. As would FEMA.
Senator Mikulski. I also agree with you, Senator, on what I
call the double benefit. Senator Domenici used the term ``dual
use,'' which is often a military term. I think if we strengthen
FEMA to be an all-hazards agency, we then protect our local
communities even far more effectively than we do now. We have
several chemical factories in Baltimore. If there is an
explosion at one, either because of a malevolent attack or an
accident, our firefighters have to respond the same way, or the
fire in the Baltimore Tunnel last summer.
The better prepared our first responders are, we are
literally making all of our communities better prepared, not
only against terrorist attacks, but against accidents or any
other natural disaster and so on. That is the way I envision
it. Is that the way you----
Senator Rudman. That is the way we viewed it.
Senator Mikulski. So it is double value for the dollar.
Senator Rudman. Not only that, but FEMA has proven to be a
very good agency, very efficient. You get some complaints, but
lately in the disasters that have happened they have done a
pretty first rate job. They did a good job up in New York. So I
must say that FEMA becomes essentially central to this
proposal.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator.
Questioning by Senator Arlen Specter
Senator Specter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rudman, on your brief departure over the past
decade, it seems that you have been doing more Senator's work
on the outside than----
Senator Rudman. Senator Hollings reminded me of that before
you got here, actually.
Senator Specter [continuing]. Than most of us do on the
inside.
I heard your exchange with Senator Hollings. My
recollection is pretty firm about Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.
Senator Rudman. For a while.
Senator Specter. You were the middle name for a time.
Senator Rudman. Right.
Senator Specter. That was quite a landmark piece of
legislation. I enjoyed the exchange you had, and you are still
indefinite and tentative and not decisive in your responses,
which is prototype Senator Warren Rudman.
Senator Rudman, on the specifics, where you have Governor
Ridge, a man of enormous ability, we all agree, saying that no
one will say no to the President, a proposition with which we
all agree, but adding that he can go down the hall and get
matters resolved, theoretically it is not possible to run down
the hall all the time. However, you have been on the scene.
Would you have anything to offer and, if you have something,
care to state as to how that really has not worked as Governor
Ridge has tried to wrestle with so many agencies to bring them
around to his way of thinking, but not having the authority to
do so?
Senator Rudman. Senator Specter, after you left the
Government Affairs Committee this morning we had a thorough
discussion about that on Senator Lieberman's, and I believe
Senator Thompson sponsors at least some part of that bill. I
made it very clear--and let me say parenthetically, the
President had no choice but to do exactly what he did. You
could not get organized without an Executive Order and start
doing the things that had to be done. No one can fault that.
But now we are looking ahead. We are looking at this
committee looking at $35 to $38 billion worth of
appropriations, $35 to $38 billion out of a total budget that
are assigned under OMB and CBO assignments, which I got so I
could prepare myself for this hearing to look at where it was
all assigned. They are assigned essentially to each of these
subcommittees here, every one of this $38 billion.
There is no way that a coordinator without statutory
authority will ever be able to get their arms about that. In
addition to that, you have got to have someplace, somewhere,
where the national strategy is formulated. I dare say Congress
has to play some role in that. So the various proposals that
are pending before Congress right now are to find some way to
make a statutory position, as the drug czar is, of that
position and other proposals.
That was not our proposal. That does not mean that ours is
the best proposal. We had a proposal which is formulated in a
different way. But you have got this big debate about whether
Governor Ridge is going to come up here and testify. I
understand all the legal arguments, you know. I could argue
either side of it from a constitutional point of view. But the
bottom line is that this is no longer a legal argument; this is
a very important argument about national strategy on homeland
security, and you have got to find a way to make it work that
everybody is comfortable with.
I say you do it in a traditional way, with somebody who is
confirmed by the United States Senate, who is then accountable
to the Congress. I do not see any other way to get there. With
a secretary of a homeland defense agency, at least you have got
someone who had the primary say on the budget as it would be
related in that area to the other agencies that are outside his
or her agency.
Senator Specter. So do you think it would be preferable to
have Governor Ridge come testify before all 13 of our
subcommittees or perhaps just come before Senator Byrd's full
committee?
Chairman Byrd. Both. Let him appear before the
subcommittees and the full committee.
Senator Specter. Well, now we have 14 invitations out.
Senator Rudman. Mr. Chairman, do I really have to get
involved in this fight?
Chairman Byrd. That is what other secretaries do. That is
what other secretaries do.
Senator Rudman. I believe----
Senator Specter. We have just raised the ante considerably,
Senator Rudman, Senator Byrd.
Senator Rudman. I believe the way it will work is the
secretary of homeland security will probably, if there is one,
will appear before this committee and whatever appropriate
subcommittees of the parts of his department, but as far as the
other parts of the budget that are outside of it, they will
still come before other committees, such as Defense, HHS, and
others. That is my view.
Senator Specter. Senator Rudman, on the aspect of
specifics, where we could make a case, as we lawyers like to do
with evidence, that it just does not work for somebody in
Governor Ridge's position through the Executive Order without
statutory authority over specific agencies, do you have
anything to enlighten us about that would be hard evidence in
that regard?
Senator Rudman. Hard evidence of?
Senator Specter. Well, where Governor Ridge has tried to
deal with an agency, for example, and they have in effect,
politely or not, told him they are not going to go along.
Senator Rudman. I am not personally familiar of that
happening. That is not to say it has not happened. I just do
not know that it has happened.
Senator Specter. On the mild disagreement between Senator
Rudman and Senator Hollings as to----
Senator Rudman. Oh, it was mild. You should have heard some
of the other disagreements.
Senator Specter. Well, I have heard some of your
disagreements, Senator Rudman. That is why I said it was mild.
The question is how we do it. You are a pretty practical
man from a lot of experience and a lot of lions. What would you
suggest in trying to tame all these lions inside the cage and
bringing them into line so we can get some of this legislation
done? How do we just get real tough about it, starting with
this committee?
Senator Rudman. Well, I only know what I read in the press
about this, because I have not talked to any of the principals.
But it seems to me that the administration is pretty hard over
on the separation of powers doctrine, that they do not want
someone who is not confirmed to come up here and testify. If
that is the case, I think you have one place you can go and you
have every right to go there and get a total explanation of the
strategy and that is from the Director of OMB. I assume that is
the one place you could go.
Senator Specter. My yellow light is on. Senator Rudman, I
conclude by thanking you for your continuing public service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Byrd. Before I call on Senator Dorgan: I do not
see the separation of powers doctrine. I do not see that at
all. I think that the administration is trying to claim
executive privilege. There is no separation of powers there. I
think the President has a point when he says that Governor
Ridge is a staff person or an adviser, he has a point. But it
goes far beyond that. This is a staff person that has powers,
responsibilities, that are light-years ahead of the average
Presidential staff person.
We have got the power of the purse here. That is the
greatest power in Government. The administration I think made a
mistake. I think the President was ill-advised by somebody when
they drew that line.
Now, they have drawn the line and I think they are trying
desperately to hold that line, even though it is becoming more
and more obvious that the people's interests out there are not
being served. The people need to hear Governor Ridge, not just
the members of this committee. The people need to hear him in a
formal hearing. We have done it this way since 1816. The
committee system was established in 1816, the standing
committees. So for 186 years now that is the way it has been
done.
If we are going to start down this road of having
Presidents appoint staff persons or ``advisers'' and then say
that they cannot come up before the Appropriations Committee
when it comes to hearing their budgets, then the committee
structure is doomed and every committee person in this Senate,
and I suppose everybody is on a committee, ought to be
concerned about that. It is not just the Appropriations
Committee.
It is not just the Senate, it is not just the Congress. It
is the American people out there who are entitled to hear what
Mr. Ridge has to say. We have indicated to Mr. Ridge and to the
President that Mr. Ridge will not have to testify before this
committee concerning any private discussions he may have had
with the President. This is not an investigation that we are
talking about.
If he does not have anything to hide, why does he not come
on up here before this committee? He goes around and talks with
everybody else, has his little private discussions. He has
offered to come up here for a briefing. Well, we can get
briefings any time. We need testimony on the record. This is
the taxpayers' money. It ought to be on the record. The
taxpayers ought to hear it in a formal meeting, such as the
Appropriations Committee has always had.
I have been in this Senate and House 50 years now this
year, and it is laughable. When I first came to the House,
Senator Rudman, Joe Martin of Massachusetts, Republican, was
the Speaker, John Tabor of New York, Republican, was chairman
of the House Appropriations Committee. They would turn over in
their graves today if they heard such a proposal. It is
laughable.
I am just sorry that the administration has drawn this
line. I think they made a terrible mistake. I think it ought to
find a way to get out from behind that line, because it is in
the interests of the American people. It is not my interests. I
like Governor Ridge. I think he is a fine man, I think he is a
fine public servant, I think he has an excellent record of
service. I personally believe that, if it was left up to
Governor Ridge, he would come. He has been in the House, he has
been a Governor. He understands these things.
But the President said when he came to Washington he was
going to change the tone. He has not done it. This has worsened
the tone. I have never heard anything like this in my 50 years
here, Mr. Rudman, Senator Rudman, and I think the American
people ought to understand it is their money and they ought to
know what is being done with it here.
I am sorry. I thank you, Senator Dorgan, for letting me say
these things before you begin. Thank you.
Questioning by Senator Byron L. Dorgan
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, you say them with great
passion. I might observe that the funding request for Mr. Ridge
comes to the subcommittee that I chair and they are proposing
that he has a staff of 135 people. They are asking for some $24
million plus detailees. So we are talking about a very
significant function in the White House. 135 people is not one
adviser. That seems to me to be a significant role and perhaps
an operational role. But that is a subject perhaps for a
different time.
I did want to say, Senator Rudman, that you left just
before I came 10 years ago, but I have long admired the work
you have done in a range of areas. I regret to tell you that I
probably side more with Senator Hollings on this question.
Homeland security is a very important issue and I worry about
some who think that we might solve problems by making or
creating larger Federal agencies. I seldom think creating a
larger agency has ever solved many problems.
I do think, though, and I am sure you agree, that we need
to define clearly the roles of all of these agencies and the
relationship of agencies to one another, and then hold people
accountable for performing. It is a profound embarrassment to
hear that an agency dealing with immigration 6 months later
sends a visa to Mohammed Atta after September 11th. Those are
the kinds of things that demonstrate a much broader point about
accountability and about what is actually happening inside the
agency.
But your contribution is significant here. I think this is
a great discussion to have. I was chairing a committee and I
was not able to be here to hear your testimony. I regret that.
But I do just to say I certainly do not want to visit the
immigration, the INS problems, or any other agencies. I think
we have got to do a much better job in all of these agencies,
including the coordination between agencies, in order to
address what is a very serious problem, homeland security.
Senator Rudman. Senator Dorgan, let me just comment on
that. I would argue that our recommendation says that we have
got Federal agencies that are too big and that is one of the
reasons you have got the problems. I submit to you--and you
have got certainly the resources to do it--take a good look at
the way some of these small agencies operate within giant
agencies--I am talking about Justice or Treasury or State or
anywhere else--and look at how effective some of them are.
The bigger these agencies get, the less attention the
smaller components of them receive. We in our proposal try to
address that by essentially creating one very effective, much
smaller Federal agency to take care of these homeland security
functions. So it was a matter of size, but we looked at it from
probably the other side.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you.
Senator Feinstein.
Questioning by Senator Dianne Feinstein
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
As Mr. Rudman knows, we had the pleasure of hearing his
testimony in the Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology and
Terrorism. I wanted to ask you about a different subject than
we talked about before and that is port security. One of our
Judiciary Committee hearings looked at improving seaport
security by ``pushing the borders out'' and this past week I
was in Hong Kong and I met with the Secretary of Commerce as
well as the head of the port there. That is a huge port, a huge
port. I think they employ 300,000 people. It runs 24 hours a
day. They have got very advanced mechanized cranes and
sophisticated X-ray machines.
In talking with the chief executive of the port, who used
to be a shipping person, he thought that it might well be
possible to push the border out and to be able to develop a
system whereby you could essentially X-ray overseas containers
going to the United States. And I looked at some of the X-rays
machines they use. So we should X-ray, certify, and seal U.S.-
bound containers overseas.
Did your committee, the Hart-Rudman Committee, look at that
aspect of terrorism policy and which ports might take the lead?
Hong Kong is so big in terms of what it sends into the west
coast that my suggestion to them was that they take the lead in
the International Port Association.
Senator Rudman. Senator Feinstein, we did in fact and I
believe, if I am not mistaken, that we did recommend to your
subcommittee that Commander Stephen Flynn of the United States
Coast Guard come up and help your staff to work on the issue
you were talking about. Commander Flynn is currently, I
believe, still a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations, a brilliant young Coast Guard officer who has done a
lot of work for our commission on the entire issue of port
security, containers, Coast Guard issues, and so forth.
That in fact is exactly one of the things that will make it
work. If you try to handle 50,000 containers a day in U.S.
ports, you get kind of bottlenecked, but you can at least push
some of it out to get them inspected, tested, and sealed. Some
of the technology which Senator Domenici talked about earlier
is precisely the kind of technology that is needed for certain
kinds of emissions, and I will leave it at that.
It seems to me that that is a sound proposal and one that
the Customs Service ought to look at. We currently have Customs
Service employees overseas, as you know, and we need more and
we need more equipment, we need better liaison relationships
with some of the agencies of foreign governments that are
exporters to the United States.
Senator Feinstein. You will be pleased to know that we have
followed up on your suggestion. Senator Kyl, who is the ranking
member, and I have a working group on seaport security and Mr.
Flynn has been helping us on that working group try to come up
with some specific legislation in this area.
Senator Rudman. We were very fortunate to have not only his
services, but the services of several hundred of some of the
best people in and out of Government on all of these issues.
This report was an effort of hundreds of people over almost a
4-year period.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate it.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator Feinstein.
Well, Senator Rudman, thank you for this opportunity to
hear you again. It has been a real treat for me. We miss you on
this committee. Senator Gregg has been doing a very fine job on
the committee. If you will come back, we will see if we cannot
have two Senators from the same State.
Senator Bennett, just in time. Senator Bennett.
Questioning by Senator Robert F. Bennett
Senator Bennett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had expected to
catch the flow of the questioning and get into it. But the
chairman will not be surprised, Senator Rudman, with what my
concern is. I have something of an obsession with cyber
terrorism, the hackers coming in and destroying the critical
infrastructure. I made my speech on that subject yesterday.
The thing I want to expand on a little today and get your
response to is the way that cyber terrorism is connected or
attacks, cyber attacks rather, would be connected to what we
would consider a more pedestrian part of the infrastructure. A
lot of people think that the hackers come in and shut down the
computers and that is where it stops, and they say, yes, it
would be devastating if the computers shut down. They do not
make the mental connection between, say, ports, chemical
factories, water systems, and other parts of the
infrastructure, and the computers.
For example, if someone were to attack the computers that
control the traffic pattern at a port they could bring the port
to a standstill. It is the connectedness between private and
public entities that I want to focus on. We found out during
the Olympics that a private-public partnership was essential to
get the kind of security that we wanted. It was not entirely a
governmental function, but that private entities had to share
information with public entities, and vice versa, the public
entities had to keep the private entities informed of what
their security patterns were in order to get the result that we
ultimately got at the Olympics.
The best summary of the Olympics was when the head of
security said to me as I stood in a room about half the size of
this one, which was the command center where everything was
going on for security, and he said: Senator, this is boring and
in the security business boring is good.
Of course, we had an extraordinary result in the Olympics.
By comparison, in the Atlanta Olympics they had something like
200 bomb scares a day that they had to check out. We had less
than 100 for the entire 17 days of the Salt Lake Olympics.
Again, as the head of the Olympics said to me: People scoped
these Olympics out, knew where we were, and decided it is not
worth it, and they stayed away.
But there were many things that were communicated between
the public-private organizations in that partnership that were
kept secret, and that is the focus that I want to talk about.
What information for security reasons does the Government need
to know from the private sector and, just as importantly, the
private sector needs to know from the Government that should
nonetheless be kept confidential so that the bad guys do not
know it and exploit it? Could you comment on that whole
dynamic?
Senator Rudman. I certainly can. Earlier in my testimony I
talked about cyber security and made some of the very points
that, Senator, you just made. There is no question that you
could disrupt this country in an enormous way and cause
enormous havoc by shutting down a number of systems that we
depend on for our daily lives.
In terms of how you protect information both private and
public which can be used to disrupt, as I am sure you are
aware, there is now a council or an Office of Cyber Security
and Infrastructure Protection.
Senator Bennett. Yes, Dick Clark's office.
Senator Rudman. Correct. They are working on the very issue
that you raise. It is a very important issue because, although
we are an open society and most of us kind of want to be
careful about putting a cloak of privacy over any information
for the reason that people might use it for the wrong reason,
the fact is there is some of that information which absolutely
would be devastating to be known in public. I that it is,
probably along with developing the infrastructure to protect
our cyberspace, I think it is important that the intelligence
agencies as well as financial institutions, the National
Security Council, intelligence committees of the Congress,
should come to some conclusion as to the nature of information
that has to be protected, because it has to be protected or
else it becomes vulnerable.
Senator Bennett. I just happen to have a piece of
legislation that deals with that.
Senator Rudman. Do you now?
Senator Bennett. I am looking for co-sponsors.
But I can give you an example in my office. A particular
industry had an attack and they were afraid to share the
information. The attack had come directly at the industry and
there was no governmental agency involved. They were afraid to
share that information with the Government for fear that a FOIA
request would be filed and the Government would make that
information public and their attacker would then have an
analysis of how well they had done.
Of course, my legislation would say we will--FOIA provides,
let me say it this way, FOIA provides for keeping certain
information confidential now. The definition of that
information is not as finely focused as I think it needs to be
in the cyber age. So my legislation would more tightly focus
that definition so that Government agencies will know what they
have to disclose under FOIA and what they do not.
But I am glad you addressed that. I had noticed it in your
testimony, which is why I raise it with you now, because I
think as we go through this and we talk about protection of
ports and we talk about protection of other public areas we
have to say, well, what would happen if the lights did not go
on because the hackers had broken into the power grid, what
would happen if the phones did not work because the hackers had
broken into the telecommunications system and produced that
kind of devastation in the areas that we are trying to
physically protect.
Senator Rudman. In fact, one of the directorates that we
definitely recommend within a new homeland security agency
which is in the Government Affairs bill that Senator Lieberman
has introduced is a directorate on cyber security.
Senator Bennett. My bill is before the Government Affairs
Committee to try to become a companion to that particular
effort.
I see my time has expired. Thank you again, Senator, for
your help and your leadership on all of these issues.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator Bennett.
Thank you, Senator Rudman. It is good to have you back. I
hope you will come back.
Senator Rudman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee. I just want to make it clear, the commission took no
position on the argument that you are having with the White
House and Governor Ridge. The commission takes no position. I
will take one personally some day, but the commission takes no
position.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you.
Senator Rudman. Thank you very much.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you for that postscript. We hope to
see you again one day. Thank you.
Now, panel number four, infrastructure security: Admiral
Richard M. Larrabee, Director of the Port Commerce Department,
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and former Rear
Admiral in the United States Coast Guard; Dr. Stephen E. Flynn,
Senior Fellow, National Security Studies, Council on Foreign
Relations, New York, New York.
Then, concerning water infrastructure, Mr. Michael Errico,
Deputy General Manager, Washington Suburban Sanitary
Commission, Laurel, Maryland, representing the Association of
Metropolitan Water Agencies; and nuclear facility security, Mr.
David Lochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge,
Massachusetts; and Mr. Jeff Benjamin, Vice President for
Licensing, Exelon Corporation, Chicago, Illinois, representing
the Nuclear Energy Institute.
Gentlemen, we thank you for your patience and for waiting
while the committee heard the excellent testimony of our former
colleague Senator Warren Rudman. I believe that first we will
hear from Dr. Stephen E. Flynn, Senior Fellow, National
Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, New
York. Dr. Flynn.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN E. FLYNN, Ph.D., SENIOR FELLOW,
NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS
Dr. Flynn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is an
honor to be here today, to be back. I had the privilege of,
just 1 month ago, being with Senator Hollings down in
Charleston at a field hearing, and I know well of Senator
Feinstein's excellent work that she is trying to assemble on an
issue that has been near and dear to my heart, the issue of
containerization. One of the privileges of my career,
highlights of my career, has been to work with Senator Rudman
on the Hart-Rudman Commission. I guess I should have given him
a publicist's fee for his endorsement here.
But I have just retired from the Coast Guard after 20 years
of service on March 15th and have assumed a position as the
Jeane Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security with the
Council on Foreign Relations.
I have my written comments, which I hope can be put in the
record. In real succinct form, because I know time is of the
essence here, I would like to maybe say just a few words to
frame hopefully the questions that will follow.
Chairman Byrd. Your written statement will be included in
the record.
Dr. Flynn. Thank you, sir.
I believe what we saw on September 11th is how warfare will
be conducted in the 21st century. It is one of the sad ironies
of the fact of our complete dominance as a military power
across all elements of the conventional warfighting spectrum
that the only way to take on this great Nation--and there are
people, adversaries, out there that want to take us on--is to
do it asymmetrically.
The greatest vulnerability is our very openness as a
society and our greatest vulnerability is our strength. It is
its openness and the integrated, sophisticated, complicated
systems that essentially support our way of life, and also are
global in their scope and therefore support much of the way in
which the international community can prosper.
As I survey--I would argue that there is reason for this.
Why I make this case that this is how warfare will be conducted
in the 21st century is because there is military value in
engaging in catastrophic terrorism, and it is not about killing
people in large numbers or toppling buildings. What it is about
is getting the collateral economic and societal disruption that
weakens the power of this great Nation. They think, our
adversaries do, that that would compel us to reconsider the
policies that we pursue.
Given that fact, that the goal is disruption, as I survey
the landscapes of possibilities--and we are truly a target-rich
society--I see no greater vulnerability than the area of our
seaports, our maritime transportation, that is essentially the
conveyor belt that makes global commerce work.
We can send ones and zeros around, we can enter contractual
arrangements, we can pass free trade agreements and so forth,
but at the end of the day goods and people must move, and the
overwhelming majority of those people and goods move by sea, or
the overwhelming majority of goods.
What makes me so concerned when I look at this area is,
one, it is so open to be attacked. That is quite simply because
security--it is almost not even a case of benign neglect. It is
almost malign neglect. In order to make the system efficient as
possible, cheap as possible--the fact of the matter is we can
move 15 tons of material from virtually any port in the world
for about $1,500. That makes the postage stamp look pretty darn
expensive.
But that makes possible our ability to trade with the
world, to outsource, to be able to run very complicated
manufacturing cycles with very thin inventories. It has been a
big part of our prosperity.
But our seaports who have provided that backbone have been
underfunded. They are indeed probably the only part of our
national transportation infrastructure where the Federal
Government is not only not supportive, but is parasitic. That
is, every other part of the sector, moneys that come into it
reinvest into it, but most of the moneys that come into the
maritime sector in fact go into the General Treasury, so we put
less in than we take from.
Now, in this area as ports have struggled with the growth
of volume they have at the same time had to deal with the
threat issue and, push comes to shove, the security has been
set aside. So we start, one, that they are open and they are
extremely vulnerable.
Second, we are so dependent on them. It is 25 percent of
our GDP that moves by sea. When we talk about the container
trade, those boxes, last year over 7 million that came into the
United States, represent 90 percent of all the imports of
general cargo moving transoceanically and 90 percent of our
exports.
There is no substitute for the box. The experience we had
in this very building with an anthrax attack using the mail
system is not a useful analogue. There we went to faxes, we
went to FedEx, we went to e-mails. If we compromise the box
system and we have not developed security to deal with it and
we have to turn it off, global trade stops. If I am an
adversary thinking about how to mess with this great land, I am
thinking about not just the opportunity a box presents, a
container presents, to introduce a weapon of mass destruction
into the United States and hurt people or disrupt our
infrastructure, I am also thinking about the ripple effect it
has across the entire sector.
The fact of the matter is we will do a post mortem and in
that post mortem we will want to know if all the other boxes
are safe, the other 7 million that come by maritime, the other
11.5 million that come by trucks across our borders with Mexico
and Canada, and we will want to know if the other 2.2 million
by rail. Right now the best we could say is maybe. That is not
going to be good enough in the wake of a catastrophic terrorism
event.
This is an issue of the very first order. It is not an
issue of gates, guards, and guns that we are going to station
at ports across the way, though some of that we need to do. It
is about how do we sustain a global network that underpins our
economy. We need to do that with some of the things that were
discussed earlier here with Senator Rudman. It is by pushing
the borders out. It is by engaging our trading partners. It is
by working with the port authorities like in Hong Kong. It is
beginning the process of thinking how we can put the controls
up front in the system and make good use of technologies so
that we can validate legitimate as legitimate and keep it
moving even in a heightened terrorist environment.
Three things I guess I would put on the radar here. One is
for this committee's consideration particularly. One is the
agencies who have the most important role to play in this
issue, the Coast Guard and the Customs Service, are simply not
staffed, equipped, manned to do the job. These agencies did
virtually nothing in seaport security prior to September 11th
and they were very busy agencies indeed, and the idea that we
can step up 10, 12 percent on top of these budgets and that is
going to be sufficient--I am not just calling for throwing
money at things, but these are agencies that have demonstrated
capability, have done heroic work, I think, against incredible
odds, have vital missions to do, and they need to be given the
resources to play the vital role of making this work.
A second area that I might suggest to you, low cost, as to
how we approach this is to pilot programs, basically to develop
prototypes of how this can be done. One of our challenges right
now is developing standards because we do not even know what we
are dealing with in part with this problem. It is a very
complicated one.
There is an initiative that I have been involved with and
Admiral Larrabee may talk a little bit about as well, Operation
Safe Commerce. It is something that has almost percolated up.
It has been championed by the good Senator--the Governor of New
Hampshire Jeane Shaheen and has been embraced by the New
England Governors Association. There are Canadian interests in
this as well. The Port of New York and New Jersey is indicating
interest as well as on the west coast.
This is an attempt to bring all the private and public
bodies together and prove that we can go to the starting source
of trade and bring security throughout the system. It needs
resources. A small amount, I think $2.5 million, will get it
going, and that is a worthwhile investment.
The last piece I would put on the radar screen that would
be helpful is a case--in terms of vulnerability, let me just
illustrate just what we are talking about here. The ports of
Long Beach and L.A. account for 44 percent of all the
containers that come into the United States. There is no
inspection facility to examine those containers in the port.
You have to go 15 miles inland through the congested Los
Angeles County to open up the box to discern whether or not you
have a problem.
Now, why is that the case? Because the real estate was
deemed too valuable to provide for an inspection station in the
port. Now, we are talking about weapons of mass destruction
transitting through a congested area.
Now, happily there is a proposal, which is that there is a
Naval Reserve station there that has been just left, that could
be put together as an inter-agency inspection facility, that I
would argue could be a multinational inter-agency inspection
facility. Let us turn this place into a model of how it can be
done, invite our Hong Kong customs, our Japanese customs
counterparts to get together and demonstrate how prescreening
could be done with Customs, Coast Guard, the Los Angeles Fire
Department, all the players of an inspection. Put them all
under one roof, and that would be something that would give us
a tangible way to move in the direction we want to go.
Let me just conclude by saying that this is a problem of
the very first order. This is not a low politics issue. This is
a problem that should not just be keeping me awake at night; it
should be one that the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary
of Commerce, the U.S. Trade Representative, certainly the
President of the United States, should be deeply concerned
about, because what we are talking about is the sustainability
of global commerce and those on-ramps and off-ramps are our
ports and they do not have security right now, sufficient
security.
We are talking $93 million that are available for 360-odd
ports, while we are spending $200 million a month at our
airports looking at luggage. When I look at the comparison of
the vulnerability and our dependency as a society with that
allocation of resources, it makes me wonder who is in charge.
Thank you very much, sir.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen E. Flynn
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. My name is Stephen Flynn. I am the
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the
Council on Foreign Relations where I am directing a multi-year project
on ``Safeguarding the Homeland: Rethinking the Role of Border
Controls.'' I have also just recently retired as a Commander in the
U.S. Coast Guard after 20 years of active duty service.
Since 1999, the aim of my research has been to both highlight and
help avert an oncoming policy train wreck taking place at our nation's
borders; that is, the clash between policies that promote facilitation
of trade and travel to support greater levels of global economic
integration on the one hand, and stepped-up efforts to protect
Americans from a growing array of transnational threats, including
terrorism, on the other. Based on a number of field visits to our major
seaports, my judgment prior to September 11 was that the facilitation
imperative was completely overwhelming traditional border control
measures. This despite the fact that a wide range of compelling public
interests were under assault in seaports throughout the decade of the
1990s. These included threats to our ecosystem arising from invasive
species found within ships' ballast water; the mounting costs to U.S.
consumers associated with billions of dollars in cargo theft; heroin
and cocaine smuggled among the millions of tons of goods washing across
America's shores each day; and the trafficking in human beings in
maritime containers, some of whom did not survive to relay the horrors
of their passage.
The mounting evidence that America's seaports increasingly have
become conduits for globalization's dark side received the sporadic
attention of the mass media and the more-focused attention of the
recent Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Ports.
Still, to a large extent port authorities and elected officials saw
these challenges in much the same way that most retailers view
shoplifting--as a cost of doing business. But, while major retailers
often invest in store detectives, cameras, and other devises to at
least deter amateur thieves, U.S. seaports have barely been going
through the security motions. A graphic illustration of this fact is
the case of Los Angeles and Long Beach where 44 percent of all the over
6 million containers entered the United States last year. The city of
Long Beach provides no sworn police force to patrol the waters or the
terminals within what is arguably the nation's most vital seaport--a
situation that has not changed in the 7 months since September 11. And
if the U.S. Customs service wants to examine a suspicious container
arriving at that busy port, they have to move it 15 miles inland
through congested neighborhoods of Los Angeles county. This is because
there is no inspection facility in the port--the real estate has been
viewed as too precious to justify that kind of a public investment.
The abysmal state of seaport security was not just a result of
local neglect. Washington has been complicit as well. Cash-strapped
agencies like the U.S. Coast Guard had been downsized to pre-1964
manning levels during the decade of the 1990s. One consequence of this
was that it was dedicating less than 2 percent of its operating budget
to the port security mission on September 10th. Faced with a rising
workload at the land border crossing with Mexico and our increasingly
busy international airports, the U.S. Customs Service and INS ``robbed
Peter to pay Paul'' and left the seaport with fewer inspectors than
they had in the 1980s, even though the volume of trade passing through
those ports had quadrupled over that time period. In addition the tools
and protocols for conducting inspections, collecting and mining data,
and sharing information among the border enforcement agencies simply
had not kept pace with the size, speed, and complexity of the
international networks that transport people and goods. This wasn't for
a want of asking. Repeated agency requests for new inspection
technologies and information age tools to support the work of
increasingly overwhelmed front-line agents fell on the deaf-ears of
government appropriators.
Like Rip van Whipple, the nation is waking from a decades-long
slumber and discovering a transformed port security landscape. While we
have been asleep, the United States has become increasingly dependent
on access to the seas for our national prosperity. Ocean shipping lines
are the conveyor belts for goods that account for 25 percent of the
Gross Domestic Product. The ports are the on-ramps and off-ramps to
those conveyor belts. In order to support the growing volume of trade,
particularly against the backdrop of parsimonious state and federal
budgets for seaport infrastrcuture, port authorities have had to work
hard to eliminate any source of friction that might slow throughput.
Security was one of the casualties of stepped-up efforts to improve
port efficiency.
Let me be clear about this. We are starting virtually from scratch
in developing a secure maritime transportation system to underpin
America's ability to trade with the world. For instance, U.S. Customs
inspectors rely on targeting systems to help identify the 1-2 percent
of the maritime containers they are able to physically examine.
Unfortunately, when trying to identify the high risk as opposed to the
low risk, customs analysts are currently poorly positioned to ascertain
three things: First, was the container loaded at a secure loading dock
that presents little opportunity for the shipment to be compromised by
a criminal or terrorist? Second, can the movement and condition of the
container from the point of origin to its arriving destination be
accounted for with sufficient detail so as to support a conclusion that
it is unlikely the box was intercepted and tampered enroute? Third, was
there sufficient timely and detailed information about inbound
containerized shipments to allow authorities to conduct a ``virtual
inspection'' in advance of arrival, using existing databases? Right
now, the answer to each of these three questions is, at best,
``maybe.'' ``Maybe'' is clearly unacceptable when the lives of
thousands of Americans are potentially threatened by a container that
has been transformed into a poor man's missile.
Given the dependency of most U.S. manufactures on global supply
chains, the ability of our ports to stay open for business is central
not just for our continued economic prosperity, but for our national
economic survival. The absence of a robust capacity to filter the
illicit from the licit in the face of: (a) a heightened terrorist
threat environment, and (b) the growing volume of people and goods
moving through international trade corridors, places U.S. and global
commerce at frequent risk of disruption. Absent alternatives, when
confronted with credible intelligence of a terrorist attack or an
attack itself, authorities will find themselves compelled to order a
shut down of our transportation systems as one of their first
preventative or responsive measures. Executing this order will have the
net effect of creating a self-imposed blockade on the U.S. economy. The
ripple effect throughout the international trade corridors will be
immediate and painful because there is no alternative to a container
for moving over 90 percent of general cargo between North America and
Europe, Asia, Africa and Australia. Working towards building a secure
maritime transportation system is intended to provide a counter-
terrorism alternative to such a draconian and disruptive response.
In short, the stakes associated with trade and seaport security are
enormous. But the state of investment in public resources to address
the longstanding vulnerabilities on the waterfront and within the
maritime transportation system by no means reflects that fact. At a
minimum, we should be seriously contemplating doubling the budgets of
the Coast Guard and Customs Service. We also should be raising the
ceiling on the port security grant program to fund the $2.2 billion the
American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) estimates U.S. ports
need to meet the terrorism and crime measures the Interagency Seaport
Security Commission has called for. I recognize that these are sizable
demands on the existing budget resources. But, when this investment is
contrasted with the resources we are now investing to improve airport
security and to combat terrorism overseas, these outlays appear quite
modest by comparison.
While providing sufficient resources for front-line agencies to do
their jobs and for port authorities to attend to their most pressing
security needs is essential, it will not be sufficient. The port
security agenda must be pursued with the following three points in
mind:
(1) Seaports cannot be separated from the international transport
system to which they belong. Ports are in essence nodes in a network
where cargo is loaded on or unloaded from one mode--a ship--to or from
other modes--trucks, trains, and, on occasion, planes. Therefore,
seaport security must always be pursued against the context of
transportation security. In other words, efforts to improve security
within the port requires that parallel security efforts be undertaken
in the rest of the transportation and logistics network. If security
improvements are limited to the ports, the result will be to generate
the ``balloon effect''; i.e., pushing illicit activities horizontally
or vertically into the transportation and logistics systems where there
is a reduced chance of detection or interdiction.
(2) Port security initiatives must be harmonized within a regional
and international context. Unilateral efforts to tighten security
within U.S. ports without commensurate efforts to improve security in
the ports of our neighbors will lead shipping companies and importers
to ``port-shop''; i.e., to move their business to other market-entry
points where their goods are cleared more quickly. Thus the result of
unilateral, stepped-up security within U.S. ports could well be to
erode the competitive position of important America ports while the
locus of the security risk simply shifts outside of our reach to
Canada, Mexico, or the Caribbean to ports such as Halifax, Montreal,
Vancouver, and Freeport.
(3) Since U.S. ports are among America's most critical
infrastructure, they should not be viewed as a primary line of defense
in an effort to protect the U.S. homeland. The last place we should be
looking to intercept a ship or container that has been co-opted by
terrorists is in a busy, congested, and commercially vital seaport.
Since, seaports are the main arteries that feed global markets by
moving commodities, cargo, business travelers, and tourists, protecting
that circulatory system from being compromised by terrorists is an
important imperative unto itself. Enhancing transport security,
therefore, is one part, about preventing terrorists from exploiting the
networks to cause catastrophic harm, and the other part about
sustaining the continued viability of international commerce. This task
can only be accomplished by moving away from ad hoc controls at the
seaports that lie within U.S. jurisdiction, and toward point of origin
controls, supported by a concentric series of checks built into the
system at points of transshipment (transfer of cargo from one
conveyance to another) and at points of arrival.
Effective maritime transportation system security must rest on a
foundation of credible risk management; i.e.; a regime that can
reliably identify the people, goods, and conveyances that are
legitimate, so their movements can be facilitated. Then regulators and
inspectors could focus on the smaller number of participants about
which they know little or for which they have specific concerns. This
requires a layered public/private approach. One such approach would be
to ensure full funding for the ``Operation Safe Commerce'' initiatives
which the Governor Jeane Shaheen of New Hampshire has championed in
northern New England, that my colleague Rick Larrabee is actively
advancing in the Port of New York and New Jersey, and for which there
is equal enthusiasm among public and private maritime leaders in
southern California.
The objective of Operation Safe Commerce is to identify appropriate
security practices to govern the loading and movement of cargo
throughout an international supply chain so as to support the
development of the following:
--Identifying secure packing requirements for loading intermodal
containers along the lines of ISO9000, Quality Assurance rules.
--Developing security standards for maintaining secure loading docks
at manufacturing plants or shipping facilities that can be
audited by public officials or accredited private firms.
--Outfitting containers with theft-resistant mechanical and
electronic seals.
--Installing a pressure, light, temperature, or other sensors in the
interior of the container, which would be programmed to set off
an alarm if the container was opened illegally at some point of
transit.
--Conducting background checks for operators that transport goods
along the intermodal transport chain and outfitting them with
biometrically-based identity cards.
--Attaching an electronic transponder (such as those used for the
``E-Z-pass'' toll payment system in the northeastern United
States) or other tracking technologies to the truck cab,
chassis, railcar, and containers and use intelligence
transportation system (ITS) technologies to monitor in-transit
movements to and within the port terminal.
--Maintaining the means to communicate with operators from their
pick-up to offload destinations.
--Providing tracking information to the appropriate regulatory or
enforcement authorities within the jurisdictions through which
it would be destined.
--Requiring all participants in the supply chain cycle to provide
advance notice of the details about their shipments, operators,
and conveyances in accordance with agreed upon protocols. This
early notice would give inspectors the time to assess the
validity of the data, to check it against any watch lists they
may be maintaining, and provide timely support to a field
inspector deciding what should be targeted for examination.
This system which advances near-real time transparency of trade and
travel flows would serve two purposes. First, to reduce the risk of
shipments being compromised in transit. Second, to enhance the ability
for enforcement officials to quickly act on intelligence of a
compromise when they receive it by allowing them to pinpoint the
suspected freight. The importance of achieving this second objective
cannot be overstated. The sheer number of travelers and volume of trade
along with the possibility of internal conspiracy even among companies
and transporters who are deemed low-risk makes critical the ongoing
collection of good intelligence about potential breeches in security.
But, that intelligence is practically useless if it helps only to
perform a post-attack autopsy. Mandating ``in-transit accountability
and visibility'' would provide authorities with the means to detect,
track, and intercept threats once they receive an intelligence alert.
Mandating that data be provided is one thing; effectively managing
and mining it so as to make a credible determination of risk is
another. The tools are at hand, though the resources to purchase them
in a timely fashion appear to be in short supply. Worthy investments
include building the ``Maritime Domain Awareness'' system being
advanced by Coast Guard Commandant, ADM James Loy. Too often front line
agencies are operating with only a narrow and outdated slice of the
information available to assess threats. They must have the means to
support the timely reporting, fusion, analysis and dissemination of
both raw intelligence and polished analytical products. Other
acquisitions that deserve stepped up funding are the International
Trade Data System (ITDS) and Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) to
replace the frail and obsolete Automated Manifest System (AMS).
Agencies also should be encouraged to explore the benefits to be
accrued by investing in ``off-the-shelf'' software products designed to
support web-based logistics and financial transactions.
Finally, resources should be made available to support the manning
needs associated with Customs Commissioner Robert Bonner's call for
``pushing borders out.'' By moving Customs, INS, and Coast Guard
inspectors overseas, the United States would be able to intercept high-
risk cargo at the point of departure before they could threaten the
American public, get transport-related intelligence into the security
system sooner, and promote closer multilateral enforcement cooperation
among our trade partners. Of course, such an approach would require
reciprocity. Accordingly, we should be prepared to adapt our inspection
facilities to accommodate the presence of foreign inspectors within our
seaports as well. A very tangible step in this direction would be to
immediately fund a new proposal prepared by the Ports of Los Angeles
and Long Beach to convert an abandoned U.S. Naval Reserve facility on
Terminal Island into a prototype interagency/multinational maritime
inspection facility. In addition to housing state-of-the-art scanning
technologies, the facility should play host to representatives from all
the federal, state, and local agencies who have an inspection mandate.
It should also play host to Customs authorities from our major Asian
trading partners such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong.
CONCLUSION
Building a credible system for detecting and intercepting
terrorists who seek to exploit or target international transport
networks would go a long way towards containing the disruption
potential of a catastrophic terrorist act. A credible system would not
necessarily have to be perfect, but it would need to be good enough so
that when an attack does occur, the public deems it to be as a result
of a correctible fault in security rather than an absence of security.
Ultimately getting seaport security right must not be about
fortifying our nation at the water's edge to fend off terrorists.
Instead, its aim must be to identify and take the necessary steps to
preserve the flow of trade and travel that allows the United States to
remain the open, prosperous, free, and globally-engaged societies that
rightly inspires so many in this shrinking and dangerous world.
Biographical Sketch of Stephen E. Flynn
Stephen Flynn is a Senior Fellow with the National Security Studies
Program at the Council on Foreign Relations, headquartered in New York
City. Currently at the Council he is directing a multi-year project on
``Protecting the Homeland: Rethinking the Role of Border Controls.'' He
has served in the White House Military Office during the George H.W.
Bush administration and as a Director for Global Issues on the National
Security Council staff during the Clinton administration. He is author
of several articles and book chapters on border control, homeland
security, the illicit drug trade, and transportation security,
including the ``American the Vulnerable'' Foreign Affairs (Jan/Feb
2002) and ``The Unguarded America'' which appears in a collection of
essays on the September 11 attacks published by PublicAffairs Books. He
was a Guest Scholar in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the
Brookings Institution from 1991-92, and in 1993-94 he was an Annenberg
Scholar-in-Residence at the University of Pennsylvania. He is a 1982
graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, has served twice in command
at sea, and retired with the rank of Commander after 20 years of active
duty service. He received a M.A.L.D. and Ph.D. in 1990 and 1991 from
the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Admiral Richard Larrabee. Admiral Larrabee was actually
inside the World Trade Center when it was hit by the planes on
September 11th. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
had its headquarters in one of the Twin Towers, as I understand
it. I believe that the Port Authority actually owned the World
Trade Center. I just want to note that for the record.
Admiral Larrabee, we are very pleased to have you before
the committee. Would you please proceed.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. LARRABEE, UNITED STATES COAST
GUARD (RETIRED), DIRECTOR, PORT COMMERCE
DEPARTMENT, PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND
NEW JERSEY
Admiral Larrabee. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I
appreciate very much the opportunity to speak to the committee
this afternoon on the need for Federal resources to improve
port security at our Nation's 361 seaports. This afternoon I
would like to touch briefly on four topics: the importance of
Congress maintaining sufficient homeland security funding
levels for our front-line Federal agencies; the importance of
Congress acting as soon as possible to set maritime security
policy; the potential cost of port security; and to follow up a
little bit on Commander Flynn's discussion about an innovative
initiative that is being taken to help support this very
important area.
Under the current manning and mission priorities, the Coast
Guard and other Federal and State agencies demonstrated the
ability quickly to respond in an intensive way to the events of
September 11th. However, there are simply not enough people and
equipment to maintain the high level of security without
seriously undermining the core missions of those agencies. Even
though the threat has not changed, the type and amount of
resources dedicated to port security since September at our
Nation's seaports have been dramatically reduced.
The issue of Federal agencies having adequate resources to
carry out a mandated task directly affects the security of our
individual ports. For example, consider one issue common among
port security legislation. Vulnerability assessments are viewed
as prerequisites for the development of plans and specific
security measures. Currently these assessments are scheduled to
take 5 years at a cost of $30 million to complete. Perhaps if
the Coast Guard was given more funding, those crucial port
assessments could be accomplished over a shorter time frame.
Mr. Chairman, I am frustrated by the fact that our port
region, which has experienced two terrorist attacks in the last
10 years, is not scheduled to have a port assessment done until
some time next year.
Like the Coast Guard, the Customs is on the front line of
port security. Even before the attacks of September, Customs
faced a growing burden as international trade has grown. The
Customs Service must be able to manage a projected doubling of
international cargo over the next 10 years as efficiently as
ever while protecting the United States against the real threat
of a cargo container being used to deliver a weapon of mass
destruction.
As Commander Flynn stated, one of the principal weapons
against terrorism is good, accurate, and timely information. In
order to do its job, Customs relies on technology and
information reporting systems and those will be key to the
future enhancements of our cargo security system. The new Cargo
Clearance Computer System, ACE, is the centerpiece for
information. I urge the committee to consider additional
supplemental funding in 2002 and 2003 budgets in order to bring
ACE on line much sooner than is scheduled.
Congress is in the process of setting maritime and port
security policy and there are crucial decisions to be made,
hopefully soon. The House and Senate bill addresses many
aspects of the maritime and port security challenges. Senator
Hollings is certainly very familiar with this issue.
Notwithstanding the existing authority of the U.S. Coast Guard
and other agencies, there is much to be decided as to how the
Federal Government will manage security in the ocean shipping
business. Those decisions will determine what Federal resources
will in turn be needed over the near future.
A central question that must be resolved in this policy
debate is simply who is in charge. With roughly 20 Federal
agencies having jurisdiction, Congress needs to address this
issue, not only in terms of responsibility to lead the response
to a terrorist incident, but also the prevention of an incident
in the first place.
Most important is the need for legislation regarding
security of cargo and data. Shipping must be held accountable
for the contents of that container. Standards for loading,
sealing, and transporting that container must also be
established. Accurate cargo documentation must be provided in a
more timely manner. International agreements should be forged
to establish standards for ports and criteria to identify high-
risk containers and conduct prescreening. We believe our goal
should be to increase our confidence that we know exactly what
is in that container before it reaches a U.S. port.
Since September 11th ports such as ours have instituted
heightened security measures and spent significant amounts of
money to increase security both with capital improvements and
additional security and law enforcement personnel. U.S. public
seaports have spent in excess of $49 million for security-
related enhancements. In short, ports plan to spend another
$312 million for additional security.
When Congress approved emergency supplemental funding as
part of the fiscal year 2002 Department of Defense
appropriation bills, $93.3 million was allocated to the
Transportation Security Administration for port security
grants, competitive grants to be awarded to critical national
seaports and terminals to finance the cost of enhancing
facilities and operational security. According to MARAD, over
$690 million was recently requested. In the New York and New
Jersey area alone, various entities submitted nearly $100
million in grant requests. Clearly, the original $93 million
appropriation for this program will fall far short of the need
of America's ports to address this very important issue.
The port security bills allocate additional resources over
a 3- to 5-year period for port security. However, it is clear
that the funding needs of local ports far exceed what these
bills will provide. The American Association of Port
Authorities estimates that it will cost about $2.2 billion for
its 90 member ports to make the security enhancements which
were suggested by the Gramm Commission.
Ensuring the safe and efficient flow of commerce without
compromising the economy or national security is a Federal
responsibility requiring Federal legislation and significant
Federal funding, and local ports need your help.
Addressing the issue of port and maritime security is an
enormous challenge, given the complexity of the international
transportation network. Devising a system that enhances our
national security while allowing the continued free flow of
legitimate cargo through our ports will not be solved by a
single answer, a single piece of legislation, or by a single
nation. It calls for a comprehensive approach that will require
the cooperation of multiple agencies, the private and public
sectors, and the international community.
Commander Flynn has briefly described Operation Safe
Commerce. We believe this innovative public-private partnership
in the next 6 to 8 months will provide some innovative answers
to looking at this question of how do we make this cargo
security system work better for us without slowing down or
bringing to a halt the movement of legitimate cargo. We ask
this committee to look at this issue in a little bit more
detail and to provide some support for us.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am obligated
to say a word of thanks on behalf of the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey. This committee responded magnificently to
the tragedy that occurred on lower Manhattan. The outpouring of
support and spirit in tangible terms from Congress and the
White House lifted us when we were down. The importance of the
commitment made by you, Mr. Chairman, and this committee to the
recovery of lower Manhattan and the people of our bistate
region cannot be overstated.
The key to the restoration of economic vitality to lower
Manhattan is transportation and vital infrastructure. On behalf
of the Port Authority, I strongly urge this committee to
support the President's request for an additional $5.5 billion
for New York's recovery. Your efforts on behalf of New York and
New Jersey and your attention to the essential infrastructure
of our country has earned our deepest thanks.
I hope my comments today have provided you with some
insight into the approaches that can be taken to improve this
whole area. We at the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
are prepared to offer any additional assistance that you may
require. Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard M. Larrabee
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the important issue of homeland security as
it relates to our nation's ports. I am Rear Admiral Richard M.
Larrabee, United States Coast Guard Retired, and I am currently
Director of Port Commerce at the Port Authority of New York & New
Jersey.
I appreciate the invitation to speak on the need for Federal
resources to improve upon security measures at our nation's 361 public
and private ports and terminals. The tragic events of September 11th
have focused our collective attention on the need to protect our
borders at major international gateways and small ports alike.
Achieving this goal will require resources beyond what has been
appropriated to date for ports and the Federal agencies charged with
the awesome responsibility of securing the nation from terrorist
activity that could enter the country at any one of the thousands of
port facilities in this country. I thank you for your willingness to
allow the nation's maritime community to be a part of this discussion.
This afternoon I would like to discuss (1) the importance of
Congress maintaining sufficient funding levels for the frontline
Federal agencies, (2) the importance of Congress acting soon to set
maritime security policy, (3) our general estimation as to the
dimension of costs that port security will entail, and (4) some
initiatives that are being taken and deserve your support. My goal
today is to give you a sense of the dimension of the need for Federal
funding, if not a specific dollar figure. Only when Congress sets
crucial policy as to what Federal agencies and ports will be required
to do to safeguard against threats as unthinkable as weapons of mass
destruction will we know the full extent of Federal funding needs.
A CONTEXT
Ninety-five percent of the international goods that come into the
country come in through a port like the Port of New York and New
Jersey. This activity accounts for 25 percent of the Gross Domestic
Product. America's consumer driven market now depends upon a very
efficient logistics chain that includes our ports. U.S. ports provide
the platform to transfer imported goods from ships to our national
transportation system--primarily trucks and trains--that ultimately
delivers those products to local retail outlets or raw goods to
manufacturing plants. That goods movement system has had one overall
objective: to move cargo as quickly and cheaply as possible from point
to point. Today, a new imperative--national security--is imposing
itself onto that system. On September 11, the world witnessed the
perversion of civilian transportation. A commercial passenger airplane
was used as a weapon. Thousands of innocent people died, including 76
of my fellow employees. The livelihoods of so many people were
destroyed and disrupted. Landmark property and essential infrastructure
was destroyed. This is a very personal matter for those of United
States at the Port Authority. In addition to the loss of valued and
irreplaceable human life, we lost America's signature urban complex and
our headquarters, built by the Port Authority only thirty years ago.
The tragic events of that day in September had immediate effects on
ocean shipping. New York Harbor and other ports were closed. Commerce
ground to a halt. Petroleum supplies came close to running out in some
Northeast markets. When the ports reopened ship arrivals had to be
announced days in advance and vessels were boarded and scrutinized.
Coast Guard resources were shifted to keep watch over shipping on a
more aggressive basis and also key infrastructure such as bridges and
energy plants. In short, we are forced to confront this new reality. If
our just-in-time logistics system is to continue to meet America's
ever-demanding transportation requirements government and industry must
work together to ensure the safety of the system and security of the
nation.
THE COAST GUARD AND CUSTOMS SERVICE
The Federal government is faced with a myriad of challenges in the
wake of September 11th. Among them is the sustainability of resources
to maintain an effective preventive force and to respond to a terrorist
event in a U.S. port. The U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Coast Guard
are among the frontline Federal agencies on which we all rely to ensure
homeland security. And they deserve the full measure of congressional
appropriations to enable them to do the work Congress requires of them.
Under current manning and mission priorities, the Coast Guard and
other Federal and state agencies are able to adequately respond in an
intensive way to these types of events and surge port protection. A
significant number of resources from various Federal and state agencies
were dispatched to the Port of New York and New Jersey in the immediate
aftermath of the attacks. Over 20 additional Coast Guard assets and
close to 1,000 reservists were brought in. But that level of deployment
can only be sustained for a short period of time. There simply are not
enough resources in terms of personnel and equipment to maintain that
level of security over an extended period within the Port of New York
and New Jersey, let alone the rest of the nation. That is, not without
the rest of these agencies' core missions being affected.
As a result, even though the threat has not changed, the type and
amount of resources that have been dedicated to port security over the
past six months have been drastically reduced. Some of the initial
security measures have also been relaxed. These decisions were made
based on available resources not a revised risk assessment. It leads to
the question: Are the Coast Guard and other Federal agencies getting
the resources they need to do the job Congress and the nation expect of
them?
The issue of an agency having adequate resources to carry out a
mandated task is not a new one for this Committee or the Congress to
consider. But consider this one area common among proposals for
improving port security. Vulnerability assessments are viewed as
prerequisites for the development of plans and specific measures,
including security enhancements, to be implemented at the local level.
The current schedule for port vulnerability assessments by the Coast
Guard runs over five years, costing $30 million. That is five years to
complete a process that will determine what ports will need to do to
reduce their vulnerability. Perhaps, if the Coast Guard was given more
funding, those crucial port assessments could be accomplished over a
shorter time frame. This issue has particular resonance to me because
the Port of New York and New Jersey, in a region that has been the
target of terrorist activity twice over the past ten years, is not
scheduled for a vulnerability assessment until next year.
Like the Coast Guard, the Customs Service is on the frontline of
port security. It has done a very effective job in our port under
trying conditions. The Customs cargo inspection operation is spread
over a wide area of New York and Northern New Jersey at the port
terminals, the airports and a major rail yard where import containers
arrive from the West Coast. Inspectors are as vigilant as ever. Even
more so. I am pleased to say that as effective as they are in screening
the containers the Customs force continues to be sensitive to the need
to keep cargo moving through at a pace that prevents port-clogging
backups. Even before the attacks in September, Customs faced a growing
burden as international trade has grown. We project a doubling of cargo
in the Port of New York and New Jersey this decade, even with the
recent recession. A comparable increase in trade nationally is also
expected. The Customs Service must be able to manage that increased
volume of cargo as efficiently as ever while protecting the United
States against threats more real than we had to confront less than a
year ago.
In order to do its job well, Customs relies on technology and
information and those will be key to future enhancements of the system.
Advanced information on incoming cargo, targeting intelligence, and
having the proper technology to detect and respond to any threat is
absolutely essential. The new cargo clearance computer system, ACES, is
the centerpiece of the information system. It is in development now
that Congress has appropriated funds over the past two years. If the
Customs Service has the capacity to speed up the delivery of ACES, I
urge you to consider supplementing the fiscal year 2002 appropriation
and fiscal year 2003 budget levels with additional appropriations.
Finally, much has been made of the fact that Customs inspectors
physically open and examine 2 percent of containers. Of course, that 2
percent is identified as worthy of physical examination after Customs
goes through an effective screening process that reviews the
information the inspectors have on the container, its reported
contents, the vessel on which it arrived in port and other pertinent
information. To put the issue in perspective as a matter of Federal
resources, if Congress were to require a higher physical inspection
rate, say 5 percent, the Customs Service at our Newark/Elizabeth Marine
Terminal Complex alone would need roughly 400 more inspectors and an
increased budget of $1.5 million each month. And, despite those added
resources, there would still be a monthly backlog of close to 6,000
containers waiting for physical examination and clogging the terminal
operations.
To support the efforts to improve upon homeland security, Mr.
Chairman, I respectfully request that the Committee give serious
consideration to additional supplemental appropriations beyond the $209
million allocated to the Coast Guard and the $393 million appropriated
for Customs last December.
PORT SECURITY POLICY
Congress is in the process of setting maritime and port security
policy and there are crucial decisions to be made, hopefully soon. The
Senate approved S. 1214, the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001,
last December. The House will soon take up H.R. 3983, the Maritime
Transportation Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002 The bills address many
aspects of the maritime and port security challenge. Notwithstanding
the existing authorities of the U.S. Coast Guard and other homeland
security agencies, there is much to be decided as to how the Federal
government will manage security in the ocean shipping system and, for
that matter, each of the other modes of our national transportation
system. And those decisions will determine what Federal resources will
be needed over the near and long term.
A central question that must be resolved in this policy debate is
``who is in charge?'' This question has become a mantra for the public
ports and maritime industry and even among America's trading partners.
Is it the U.S. Customs Service, Transportation Security Administration,
U.S. Coast Guard or the Homeland Security Office? In fact, the two
bills do not settle the issue. There are roughly 20 Federal agencies
that have a role in port security. The law is clear as to the agencies
that coordinate a response to a terrorist incident, however
coordination and direction is just as important in developing an
implementing national port security strategies.
We know that ports themselves are not the lone point of
vulnerability. Rather, the potential for terrorist activity stretches
from where cargo is stuffed into a container overseas to any point
along the cargo's route to its ultimate destination.
Our goal should be to increase our confidence that we know exactly
what is in each container before it is off loaded in a U.S. port. It is
not possible to physically examine the content of each of the 6,000
containers after they arrive in the Port of New York and New Jersey
each day. The key is finding a way of separating high-risk cargoes from
the vast majority of legitimate containers and dealing with the
exceptions. This approach requires a systematic understanding of the
logistics chain that now moves that container from any place in the
world to the distribution system in our country.
To transport a container, a typical cargo transaction will have as
many as 25 different parties involved--buyers, sellers, banks,
insurance companies, inland carriers (road and rail) on both sides of
the water, at least two seaports, often more, ocean carriers,
governments, consolidators, and others. They will generate anywhere
from 30-40 different documents, many still required in hard copy. This
is a complex process. The physical movement of a container is only one
dimension of the system. There are three other components that must be
understood. There is the flow of money, the flow of information and
data on the shipment, and, finally, the transfer of accountability that
all must occur in order for the cargo to be delivered.
Today, there are no security standards when loading a container at
the manufacturer or consolidated in a warehouse, often well inland of a
seaport. There are no security standards for the seals that are put on
containers. Cargo is transferred from one mode of conveyance to another
and there are no standards for how that is done or accountability for
the integrity of the container as it changes hands. Foreign seaports
are not held to certain security standards. An authorized shipper is
not held accountable to know exactly what is in a container, where it
is in the supply chain and to report on its contents. Shipping papers
do not have to be complete and accurate until after the cargo arrives
in the United States.
We believe that efforts must be taken to verify the contents of
containers before they are even loaded on a ship destined for a U.S.
port. The process must include certification that the container was
packed in a secure environment, sealed so that its contents cannot be
tampered with and transported under the control of a responsible party.
A chain of custody must be established that ensures the cargo's
integrity and requires that complete and accurate data be provided to
Customs well in advance of a ships arrival.
OPERATION SAFE COMMERCE
To test the validity of this theory, the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey, in cooperation with U.S. Customs, the Coast Guard,
Council on Foreign Relations, the Volpe National Transportation Center,
state agencies and numerous private sector partners, is participating
in an initiative called Operation Safe Commerce (OSC). OSC is a public-
private partnership that responds to the twin imperatives of
facilitating legitimate international commerce and increasing security
while decreasing the risk of additional congestion. The goal is to
reduce the risk of congestion within U.S. seaports by developing
dependable arrangements for verifying, securing, monitoring and sharing
information about cargo from the point of origin, throughout the supply
chain, to its final destination. Private companies have volunteered to
join with representatives from key Federal, state and local agencies to
construct prototypes of a secure international supply chain. It is our
collective hope that we can provide constructive and tested
recommendations on how to secure the supply chain without burdening the
industry with unnecessary costs or delays that reduce the flow of cargo
through the United States and impact the national economy. With modest
financial support and the involvement of key policy decision makers, we
believe we can provide some useful recommendations in the next six to
nine months. I urge this Committee to support that public-private
initiative as a promising means to bring about a significant
improvement in the shipping system.
LOCAL PORT REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERAL FUNDING
U.S. public port authorities, which are state and local government
agencies that oversee public ports, have willingly taken significant
steps to protect our seaports from the new terrorism threat. Since
September 11th, ports such as ours have instituted heightened security
measures and spent significant amounts of money to increase security,
both with capital improvements and additional security and law
enforcement personnel. In an attempt to provide you with a sense of the
scope of the challenge we face, I offer three possible indicators of
local port needs.
First, a survey conducted by the American Association of Port
Authorities (AAPA) in February, to which 60 public seaports responded,
indicated that U.S. public seaports have already spent at least $49
million for security related enhancements prompted by the September
11th attacks. That number is conservative considering that not all
ports indicated a dollar amount and several of the leading container,
petroleum and passenger ports did not respond. Ports have spent most of
the money on personnel related costs, including the hiring of new law
enforcement officers, overtime, upgrading security forces to use more
professional services and for providing extra training. Access and
detection control systems, such as fencing, identification system,
lighting and gates account for a large portion of that money as well.
The same survey indicates that in the short term ports plan to
spend another $312 million for security enhancements. Again, a
conservative number. This money will be invested in personnel, gate/
entry controls, lighting, fencing, radiation detection equipment, x-ray
equipment and surveillance systems, many of which will be used by
Customs and other law enforcement personnel. Public ports will not be
able to continue to make these critical investments without financial
help from the Federal government. We believe that ensuring the safe and
efficient flow of commerce without compromising the economy or national
security is a Federal responsibility requiring Federal legislation and
significant Federal funding.
A second indicator of local port need is the process underway to
allocate port security grants. When Congress approved emergency
supplemental funding as part of the fiscal year 2002 Department of
Defense appropriations bill $93.3 million was allocated to the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) for port security grants.
This was the first such funding of security measures at the nation's
seaports. In fact, there existed then, and now, no specific authority,
save what was in the appropriations bill, for the Department of
Transportation to allocate port security grants. It was significantly
less than what was appropriated for aviation security but it was a good
start and was welcomed by the ports and maritime sector.
In accordance with the appropriation, competitive grants are to be
awarded to critical national seaports and terminals to finance the cost
of enhancing facility and operational security. There are two
categories for grants; security assessments and mitigation strategies,
and enhanced facility and operational security, including but not
limited to facility access control, physical security, cargo security
and passenger security. Consideration will also be given to proof-of-
concept demonstration projects, which can demonstrate how port security
would be improved or enhanced by their implementation.
Not all ports, however, were able apply for grants under this
program. Eligible ports are limited to the 13 designated ``strategic
ports'', controlled ports, ports responsible for a large volume of
cargo movement that support the national economy and ports or terminals
responsible for movement of high volume of passengers. The Maritime
Administration, acting on behalf of the TSA, accepted applications last
week and grant awards are expected by June.
It's not known how much all of the ports seeking grants have asked
for. Various entities in New York and New Jersey submitted nearly $100
million in grant requests. My agency alone submitted a request for
$30.5 million. Clearly, the original $93 million appropriation for this
program will fall far short of the need America's ports will have
identified in these grant applications.
A third indicator suggests that if Congress or the Coast Guard were
to establish requirements for facility enhancements, the demand for
funding would dwarf the supply. In the Fall of 2000, the Interagency
Commission on Seaport Crime and Security outlined a series on minimum
measures that ports would need to put in place in order to harden
security. The focus at the time was primarily on crime not terrorism,
and we now have the hindsight of September 11th to know that additional
measures must be taken. At the time of that report, it was estimated
that ports would need to invest anywhere from $12 to $50 million to
secure each port. The AAPA estimates that meeting these terrorism and
crime prevention security standards would require over $2.2 billion in
security measures at the AAPA's U.S. member ports, which number fewer
than 90. (That rough billion dollar figure includes the totality of
port security measures, including what is already in place, at AAPA
member ports. It also includes hardware requirements, such as container
screening devices, for inspection activities that are the exclusive
responsibility of Federal agencies. By the same token, it does not
include the many private port terminals of all sorts--petroleum,
chemical, grain and other commodities--that are not within the
jurisdiction of the public port agencies.)
While the current grants are limited to select ports and terminals,
the port security bills, S. 1214 and H.R. 3983, allocate additional
resources over a three to five year period for port security grants.
The House version calls for $225 million over three years while the
Senate version calls for $390 million over a five-year period. Based on
what I described earlier, it is clear that the funding needs of Federal
agencies and local ports far exceed these proposed funding
authorizations.
TECHNOLOGY NEEDS
Among the areas that will require Federal funding as soon as
possible is in technology. As I indicated earlier in my testimony,
these technologies are essential tools for an agency like Customs to
carry out their responsibilities. Some equipment uses proven
technologies, such as the VACIS x-ray machine that enables Customs
inspectors to detect anomalies that warrant physical examination of
containers. However there is a great need for additional technology R&D
and I urge this Committee to consider supporting R&D activity in the
area of screening and detection devices. It would be very helpful to
have devices that can be mounted on container cranes. They could detect
biological, chemical and radiation traces and be employed in a way that
does not slow the natural flow of containers in the port. Devices are
also needed on containers. Light and motion sensors could be developed
to detect when someone tampers with a container. Similarly, smart seals
could be employed to provide greater assurance that a container is not
opened or, if it was, when it was opened. Other devices that use GPS
technology could be developed to help track en route containers. One
must remember that money spent on R&D today will take several years, at
best, before the technology is put to work in the field.
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE
I would be remiss if I did not also speak to the local law
enforcement requirements that support security and incident response at
the nation's hundreds of seaports. In addition to municipal and state
police, fire and medical responders that serve port areas, a number of
the major ports have their own sworn police forces. My agency has a
police force numbering 1,300, making it one of the largest in the
country. These trained officers have responsibility over the port,
airports, bridges, tunnels, the PATH interstate transit system and
other Port Authority facilities. As this Committee reviews the
President's $327 million supplemental request for emergency management
planning and assistance, and as you consider what additional funding is
needed at the state and local levels, please keep in mind that there
are professional law enforcement officers at the ports. There is an
unmet need for training and equipping the first responders whose job it
is to protect the nation's transportation facilities. Port agency
police forces, which are part of the frontline defense, should not be
forgotten as Congress and the Justice Department provide assistance to
the local level.
Mr. Chairman, the attacks of September 11th were not directed at a
maritime facility, but those terrible events have provided the impetus
to focus attention on our marine transportation system, which is so
essential to our national economy and defense. You and the committee
are to be commended for taking on such a daunting task. When Congress
tackled aviation security last fall it was a matter of altering an
existing regime of security at the airports and in the sky. In
contrast, the nation's seaports and related transportation systems are,
to a great extent, a blank slate.
Addressing the issue of port and maritime security is an enormous
challenge given the complexity of the international transportation
network. Devising a system that enhances our national security while
allowing the continued free flow of legitimate cargo through our ports
will not be solved with a single answer, a single piece of legislation,
or by a single nation. It will require a comprehensive approach that
will require the cooperation of multiple agencies, the private and
public sectors and the international community. Importantly, it will
require additional resources for the agencies charged with this awesome
responsibility and for the public and private ports and terminals where
the nation's international commerce takes place.
NEW YORK'S RECOVERY
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am obliged to say a
word of thanks on behalf of the Port Authority of New York & New
Jersey. This Committee, your counterparts in the House of
Representatives, indeed all of Congress, responded to the tragedy that
occurred in Lower Manhattan, and of course here in the Washington area.
The outpouring of support in spirit and tangible terms from Congress
and the White House lifted United States when we were down. The
importance of the commitment made by you, Mr. Chairman, and this
Committee to the recovery of Lower Manhattan and the people of our
bistate region cannot be overstated. I don't think it will surprise you
that the key to the restoration of economic vitality to Lower Manhattan
is transportation and other vital infrastructure. With restored public
transportation service, businesses that employ and serve hundreds of
thousands of workers will return to downtown New York City. And with
employment opportunities and a revitalized Lower Manhattan, people will
return to reside in that oldest district of the City. On behalf of the
Port Authority I strongly urge this Committee to support the
President's request for the additional $5.5 billion for New York's
recovery. Within that sum is $2.75 billion for transportation in FEMA
funding for the repair of infrastructure, $1.8 billion to
``substantially improve the mobility of commuters'' in Lower Manhattan,
$750 million to rebuild utility infrastructure and $167 million in
highway money for reconstructing Federal-aid eligible roads.
Your efforts on behalf of New York and New Jersey and your
attention to the essential infrastructure of our country have earned
our deepest thanks.
I hope my comments today have provided with you some additional
insight on approaches that are either underway or may be considered as
you continue your work. We at the Port Authority of New York & New
Jersey are prepared to offer any additional assistance that you may
require. Thank you.
Biographical Sketch of Richard M. Larrabee
Richard M. Larrabee is the Director of the Port Commerce Department
of The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. He oversees the
management and operation of the major marine terminal facilities within
the Port of New York and New Jersey, the largest port on the East Coast
of North America, which handled 65 million tons of cargo in 2000,
including more than 3 million container units. These facilities
include: the Port Newark/Elizabeth Port Authority Marine Terminal
complex in Newark and Elizabeth, New Jersey; the Red Hook Container
Terminal in Brooklyn, New York; the Howland Hook Marine Terminal in
Staten Island, New York; and the Auto Marine Terminal in Jersey City
and Bayonne, New Jersey.
Mr. Larrabee manages a multi-billion dollar port redevelopment
program that includes reinvestment in marine terminal facilities,
deepening harbor channels and berths, improving intermodal connections
and protecting sensitive marine environments. The redevelopment program
is positioning the Port of New York and New Jersey to accommodate
future growth that is projected to double over the next decade and
could quadruple by 2040.
Prior to joining the Port Authority, Richard Larrabee held the rank
of Rear Admiral in the United States Coast Guard. He served as
Commander First Coast Guard District in Boston, MA, where he oversaw
all Coast Guard operations in the Northeast United States. Over his
thirty-two year Coast Guard career, Rear Admiral Larrabee held a
variety of operational and staff assignments, including command at sea
and shore assignments. He has received two Distinguished Service Medals
and three Legion Merit awards.
Mr. Larrabee holds a Master of Science degree in Ocean Engineering
from the University of Rhode Island and a Bachelor of Science degree
from the United States Coast Guard Academy.
Senator Mikulski. I would like to welcome to the committee
Mr. Michael Errico--Mr. Chairman, do you want to temporarily
recess the committee?
Chairman Byrd. I think we ought to do that. The rollcall
has begun. Let us recess the committee for 15 minutes. Will
that be agreeable to you, gentlemen? Thank you.
Senator Mikulski. Mr. Chairman, regrettably, I will not be
able to come back, but you are going to have a treat in hearing
from Mr. Errico. He represents the professionals who run the
water supplies and he comes with 30 years experience and a
civil engineering degree and a tremendous understanding of what
it takes to keep our water supplies safe. We welcome you. I am
going to try to come back with this vote, but I am going to
have to be on the floor.
Thank you.
Chairman Byrd. The committee stands in recess, let us say
for 20 minutes. Thank you.
The committee will resume its hearing. Mr. Michael Errico,
Deputy General Manager, Washington Suburban Sanitary
Commission, Laurel, Maryland, representing the Association of
Metropolitan Water Agencies. I guess you are at bat.
STATEMENT OF P. MICHAEL ERRICO, DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER,
WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY COMMISSION,
REPRESENTING THE ASSOCIATION OF
METROPOLITAN WATER AGENCIES
Mr. Errico. Thank you, Chairman Byrd.
The Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission is a public
utility that provides drinking water and waste water service to
more than 1.6 million people in Montgomery and Prince George's
Counties, the Maryland suburbs of Washington, D.C. As Chairman
Byrd indicated, I am testifying today on behalf of the
Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies. AMWA is testifying
as the water sector liaison to the Federal Government for
critical infrastructure protection.
First, we want to express our sincere thanks for inviting
us to testify and also for appropriating $90 million in fiscal
year 2002 for vulnerability assessments and other security-
related efforts.
One of the most difficult challenges in our new high-
security world is accepting the level of uncertainty we
confront on a daily basis. The threats of interruptions in fire
protection, public health threats resulting from disruptions in
waste water treatment, and interruptions of drinking water
services are ever present. We can all imagine the carnage and
gravity of damage on our communities if our water supplies were
simultaneously attacked at the time our densely populated areas
came under fire. The ability of terrorists to gain access to
key buildings and structures via our vast underground
infrastructure should not be underestimated.
Our needs are very real and, unfortunately, they are very
costly. We hope Congress can help with this estimated $700
million water systems anticipated spending for vulnerability
assessments to identify areas for security improvements.
Systems could spend an estimated $4 billion to implement such
measures at the Nation's 54,000 public drinking water systems
and 16,000 waste water agencies. Billions more could be needed
for major security-related capital improvements to be
determined by the vulnerability assessments. We would like to
work with the committee to secure an appropriate level of
funding to cover these costs.
In particular, for fiscal year 2003 we are also asking for
$15 million for water security research, $2 million in startup
money to establish the water information sharing and analysis
center to be located here in Washington, D.C., and $2.5 million
for training and education.
Assessing security vulnerabilities is among the key
elements of the President's Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection and EPA's National Infrastructure
Assurance Plan.
Like other utilities, WSSC has worked with security
consultants to aggressively assess their vulnerabilities. We
were one of the first water utilities to use the state of the
art assessment developed by Sandia National Laboratories and
the American Waterworks Association Research Foundation. As a
result, we have identified numerous enhancements to our
security program to prevent and/or provide early detection of a
physical, chemical, biological attack on our system.
Another major expense of water systems is near-term
security improvements. Fencing around facilities and
reservoirs, intruder alert systems, surveillance cameras to
monitor entryways in sensitive facilities, and access control
and barricades around key facilities are of particular
importance. Improvements nationwide would cost, as I indicated
earlier, an estimated $4 billion.
Once our vulnerability assessments are complete, water
systems will know what capital improvements are needed to
become more safe and secure. Now, its expansion is one of the
most urgent needs facing drinking water and waste water systems
in our efforts to remain safe and secure. This is why the water
sector is asking for at least $15 million as an initial
investment for water security research, to develop
methodologies and technologies that will enable us to prevent
and respond to terrorist acts and that can be deployed in the
field as soon as possible.
Among the outstanding research needs determined by EPA are
identification and characterization of biological and chemical
agents, biological and chemical agent detectors, and security
of cyber command and control systems. Current and previous
administrations have recommended that industry establish
information sharing and analysis centers, or ISAC's. The water
ISAC's should be operational later this year. It will
disseminate early warnings and alerts concerning threats to
water systems and it will also provide a specific for reporting
risks and incidents to Federal law enforcement authorities. We
anticipate that contributions from water systems will
ultimately finance the water ISAC. Until then, since the
majority of water ISAC members will be publicly owned and
operated entities, we are requesting $2 million in seed money
to start this effort.
Access to training and education is another need of water
systems. We recommend that $2.5 million be made available to
the American Waterworks Association for education and training
on distribution system security and vulnerability assessments,
for communicating with the public in times of crisis, for legal
issues that relate to counterterrorism efforts, and a program
to assure ongoing vigilance against terrorist acts.
AMWA operates under the premise established in the report
of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection, that we should attend to our critical foundations
before we are confronted with a crisis, not after. Waiting for
disaster would prove as expensive as it would be irresponsible.
We truly appreciate the time and the consideration you have
given us to discuss this important issue today and we look
forward to working with you to help protect the Nation's
drinking water and waste water systems from terrorism.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of John R. Griffin, General Manager, Washington
Suburban Sanitary Commission
SUMMARY
Since September 11, the entire water sector has been called to
action, and many national and local water security projects are
underway. But much more needs to be done. The local investment into
security will be significant, but a strong federal contribution is
needed to meet the challenges of protecting public health and the
environment.
Among the needs and challenges facing America's 54,000 drinking
water systems and 16,000 wastewater agencies are:
--Water Security Research.--$15 million for the establishment of a
program under which the EPA Administrator shall enter into
partnerships, cooperative agreements and contracts with public
and non-profit research organizations to improve the protection
and security of water supply systems by carrying out research,
development and demonstration projects that address physical
and cyber threats to all water supply systems.
--Water ISAC.--$2 million for co-funding the start-up of the Water
Information Sharing and Analysis Center, or ``Water ISAC,'' a
secure communications network, through which federal law
enforcement agencies and the water sector will be able to share
information on potential terrorist threats to drinking water
and wastewater systems.
--Training and Education.--$2.5 million for AWWA to develop and
initiate peer-review or third party certification programs to
assure ongoing vigilance against terrorist acts; educate water
systems in distribution system security and vulnerability
assessments; and teach emergency communications and legal
issues.
--Security Improvements.--The estimated cost for immediate security
improvements at drinking water and wastewater utilities is $4
billion. Improvements include fencing around facilities and
reservoirs, security doors and locks, intruder alert systems,
better lighting, surveillance cameras to monitor entry ways and
sensitive facilities, access control and barricades around key
facilities.
--Vulnerability Assessments.--The estimated cost to small and medium
drinking water agencies to conduct vulnerability assessments is
$450 million. Wastewater systems also expect to spend $250
million for vulnerability assessments.
The Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies (AMWA), an
organization of the nation's largest publicly owned drinking water
systems, is the water sector liaison to the federal government for
critical infrastructure protection. In this capacity, AMWA's goal is to
coordinate the security programs of the federal government with the
efforts of the water sector, which includes not only drinking water
agencies, but also wastewater systems.
INTRODUCTION
Good afternoon, Chairman Byrd, members of the committee. My name is
John Griffin. I am the General Manager of the Washington Suburban
Sanitary Commission, and I am testifying today on behalf of the
Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies (AMWA).
Thank you for inviting AMWA to testify today on behalf of water
systems nationwide. In addition, thank you for appropriating $90
million in the fiscal year 2002 emergency supplemental appropriations
bill for vulnerability assessments and other security related efforts.
This funding ensures that the nation's largest drinking water systems,
plus hundreds, if not thousands, of smaller utilities will complete
security vulnerability assessments in the shortest time possible. The
funding also will help the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
develop tools to support assessments of wastewater facilities.
AMWA's membership consists of the nation's largest publicly owned
drinking water systems, which are represented in the association by
their chief executive officers. AMWA's membership serves more than 110
million Americans with clean, safe drinking water from Anchorage to
Puerto Rico.
AMWA is testifying today as the water sector liaison to the federal
government for critical infrastructure protection. In this capacity,
AMWA's goal is to coordinate the security programs of the federal
government with the efforts of the water sector, which includes not
only drinking water agencies, but also wastewater systems. Therefore,
when our testimony refers to water systems or water utilities, we mean
both drinking water and wastewater agencies.
AMWA was asked to undertake the liaison role by EPA under
Presidential Decision Directive 63. In this capacity, AMWA works
closely with EPA, small and large water utilities, the associations
that represent water utilities and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's National Infrastructure Protection Center. AMWA is also
reaching out to state water administrators, the White House Office of
Homeland Security, the Centers for Disease Control, the Department of
Defense, the Department of Commerce's Critical Infrastructure Assurance
Office and the Department of the Interior, which operates many dams and
owns sources of water for millions of people in the West.
The Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (WSSC), established in
1918, provides drinking water and wastewater service to more than 1.6
million people in Montgomery and Prince George's Counties, in Maryland.
With an annual budget of more than $650 million, WSSC's system includes
a 10,600-mile pipeline infrastructure, three dams and two reservoirs,
two water filtration plants that produce an average of 167 million
gallons of clean water per day, 63 water storage facilities, 14 water
pumping stations, six wastewater treatment plants and 43 wastewater
pumping stations.
Since September 11, WSSC has worked with security consultants to
aggressively assess the security vulnerabilities of key facilities,
especially on the water supply side. We were one of the first water
utilities that Sandia National Laboratories trained to use the
vulnerability assessment tool that was developed by Sandia and the
American Water Works Association Research Foundation. And as a result
of that effort, we have identified and implemented numerous
enhancements to our security programs to prevent and/or provide early
detection of a physical, chemical or biological attack on our systems.
Aspects of these improvements range from monitoring programs to detect
chemical or biological irregularities, to the physical ``hardening'' of
several facilities. Although we have increased the number of security
officers at our facilities and taken steps to further secure our
distribution system, we need your help to implement additional security
measures.
WSSC always has provided the finest quality drinking water using
state-of-the-art treatment and distribution systems. Likewise, we have
committed ourselves to protect the environment and our downstream
neighbors by relying on sophisticated wastewater treatment technology.
For years we have made significant investments in water infrastructure,
and those investments are fully reflected in our rates.
We have some of the highest rates in the region because we
aggressively invest in the protection of our facilities and water
supply. Now, challenged to address additional security concerns using
local resources, we are making considerable progress. But, like most
water systems, WSSC needs financial assistance to implement and
expedite a number of the security upgrades that are necessary in
response to September 11 and international events. In addition, WSSC
and thousands of other drinking water and wastewater agencies across
the states rely on the security preparedness efforts of our national
organizations and federal agencies. We hope you can support these
efforts.
Our testimony will address the security-related efforts of drinking
water and wastewater agencies and the challenges facing these
utilities. The entire water sector has been called to action, and many
national and local projects are underway. But much more needs to be
done.
The local investment into security will be significant, but a
strong federal contribution is needed to meet the challenges of
protecting public health and the environment. Please remember that
local governments, with limited budgets, run the vast majority of water
systems.
In our testimony today, we highlight the local and national needs
facing the water agencies, namely:
--Water security research.
--The Water Information Sharing and Analysis Center (Water ISAC).
--Education and training.
--Security improvements.
--Vulnerability assessments.
OVERVIEW
One of the most difficult challenges in our new high-security world
is accepting the level of uncertainty we confront on a daily basis. Are
water systems threatened by terrorism? How can water systems protect
against terrorism? White House officials have attempted to downplay the
threat of contamination of water supplies, but such threats should not
be underestimated and, what's more, water systems are also concerned
about other threats, such as interrupting drinking water service and
fire protection, polluting rivers and streams by disrupting wastewater
treatment, and gaining access to key buildings and structures via our
vast underground infrastructure.
AMWA operates under the premise established in the Report of the
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection: ``We
should attend to our critical foundations before we are confronted with
a crisis, not after. Waiting for disaster would prove as expensive as
it would be irresponsible.''
We know from the President's State of the Union address that at
least one water system was a potential target of the al Qaeda network;
we read in the newspapers that there are sleeper cells of terrorists in
the United States waiting to be called to duty; U.S. forces in
Afghanistan reportedly found instruction manuals on the manufacture and
use of chemical and biological agents; and news reports from Rome
suggest potential terrorists planned to use the city sewers to attack
the American embassy there.
Fortunately, before September 11, the water community was already
at work with EPA, security professionals and federal law enforcement to
develop methods and tools to protect water systems. This unique
partnership was established in response to Presidential Decision
Directive 63 and reinforced under President Bush's Executive Order
13231.
Since September 11, the nation's water utilities have been on
heightened alert to protect against the potential disruption of
drinking water and wastewater service and biological and chemical
contamination of drinking water supplies. What's more, water systems
nationwide are assessing their vulnerabilities, enhancing their
emergency response plans, limiting and controlling access, hardening
vulnerable facilities and coordinating with local, state and federal
law enforcement and emergency response authorities.
EPA and its Water Protection Task Force have been helping water
systems prepare against terrorism and develop emergency responses. The
agency has made grant funds available from the fiscal year 2002
emergency appropriations bill for vulnerability assessments and the
agency has begun critical research projects. In addition, EPA has
facilitated relationships among the water community and other federal
agencies and has committed energy and focus to water security.
Our relationship with the White House Office of Homeland Security
has been a limited one so far. As the representative of one of the
eight critical infrastructures named in President Bush's Executive
Order 13231, we have not had the opportunity to meet with Gov. Ridge or
his senior team members, but AMWA has met with the director of the
office working on water security issues and we have begun working with
OHS's communication and coordination staff. We look forward to working
with Gov. Ridge to ensure that water security is a high priority.
National water organizations are responding, too, by providing
strategic leadership, resources for utilities and an interface with
federal agencies. Some of the organizations' activities include:
--Water ISAC.--AMWA is developing the Water Information Sharing and
Analysis Center, or Water ISAC, which will be a secure
communication system between drinking water and wastewater
system managers and federal law enforcement agencies. It will
also be a source of information for all water system managers
on protecting against terrorism and responding to attacks.
--Training and Education.--The American Water Works Association
Research Foundation (with Sandia National Laboratories and
under grants from EPA) has sponsored vulnerability workshops, a
satellite teleconference and a primer on water utility security
and counter-terrorism. The Water Environment Federation and EPA
are hosting six workshops throughout the United States in the
spring to help educate wastewater treatment plant operators and
managers on ways to secure all assets within and surrounding
their facilities. The American Water Works Association
sponsored eight seminars across the nation on security training
for water utility managers, and the association was a partner
in the satellite teleconference.
--Vulnerability Assessment Tools.--Under a partnership between EPA,
the American Water Works Association Research Foundation and
Sandia National Laboratories, drinking water systems will have
access to a state-of-the-art vulnerability assessment tool--
Risk Assessment Methodology for Water Utilities. The
Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies has developed a
checklist, methodology and software--the Vulnerability Self
Assessment Tool--for wastewater systems, as well as a handbook
on legal issues related to security and terrorism.
WATER SECURITY RESEARCH
One of the most urgent needs facing drinking water and wastewater
systems in their efforts to remain safe and secure is knowledge. There
are many unknowns today when we consider potential threats against
water systems. This is why the water sector is asking for $15 million
water security research to help us find solutions to prevent and, if
necessary, respond to the contamination of drinking water and the
disruption of drinking water and wastewater service. We recommend that
EPA be directed to enter into partnerships, cooperative agreements and
contracts with public and non-profit research organizations to support
research, development and demonstration (RD&D) projects addressing
security at our nation's drinking water and wastewater systems.
The need for a substantial and immediate investment into water
security RD&D is paramount, and now is the time to strategically invest
in this research, so that methodologies and technologies may be
deployed in the field as soon as possible to prevent and respond to
terrorist acts.
Objective 7 of the President's Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection is an increase in the investment in
infrastructure assurance research. As the Commission notes, ``[R]eal-
time detection, identification, and response tools are urgently
needed.'' What's more, water security research is among EPA's highest
priorities. In EPA's National Infrastructure Assurance Plan, the agency
assigns itself Task 6: Develop and initiate research and development
programs.
Among the outstanding research needs determined by EPA are:
--Identification and characterization of biological and chemical
agents.
--Biological and chemical agent detectors.
--Security of cyber command and control systems.
For example, knowledge gaps for some agents include:
--The amount of an agent needed and commonly available to produce
effects in humans.
--How the agent reacts to typical conditions in surface water and
ground water.
--How the agent behaves relative to water filtration and other
treatment operations.
--How the agent behaves in a water distribution system.
--How the distribution system and other parts of the water utility
can be returned to safe use if the agent has contaminated the
distribution system.
--What symptoms might be present in the population if this agent has
been unknowingly present in the water.
Estimates run into the tens of millions of dollars to close these
knowledge gaps. To address these gaps, the American Water Works
Association Research Foundation will host an expert workshop in May to
identify, classify and prioritize all of the research needs associated
with security issues and water systems. Until these expert workshop
results are finalized, the following estimates serve as a preliminary
guide:
--Biological contaminants--$30 million over 5 years; methodology,
detection systems, molecular biosensors, treatability,
disinfection sensitivity.
--Chemical and radiological contaminants--$9 million over 5 years;
early detection systems, methodology, persistence,
treatability.
--Cyber security--$3 million over 5 years; identification of threats,
resolution techniques.
--Risk management and communications--$5 million over 5 years; method
development, alternate treatment, training aids.
--Distribution system management--$7 million over 5 years; pressure/
chemical/biological sensor testing and placement, maintenance,
flushing program, persistence.
--Global coordination of security related research in water systems--
$1 million over 2 years; cooperative, leverage, coordination,
integrated research strategy.
The Water Environment Research Foundation has also developed a
preliminary estimate of research projects:
--Treatability studies--$10 million; identify, screen, and treat
contaminants (biological, chemical, pesticides/herbicides, and
other pollutants) in water supplies and wastewater systems.
--Security measures for computerized and automated systems at
wastewater facilities--$1.5 million; wireless or wired SCADA,
remote operations, internet, etc.).
--Contingency planning, designing against terrorism and forced entry
at wastewater treatment facilities--$3.5 million.
--Develop advanced molecular biosensors for wastewater systems--$25
million.
Unfortunately, the Administration did not ask for additional funds
for water security research, either in its fiscal year 2003 budget
request or its most recent supplemental request for fiscal year 2002.
Nevertheless, all parties agree that the need for this research is
urgent and strategically important. An infusion of $15 million today
will launch many projects that will help water systems confront the
possibilities of terrorism.
WATER ISAC
Among the recommendations of President Bush's Executive Order 13231
and President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive 63 are that
industries such as the water sector voluntarily establish information
sharing and analysis centers. EPA subsequently called for the
establishment of the Water Information Sharing and Analysis Center, or
Water ISAC, as Task 1.3 in its National Infrastructure Assurance Plan.
The water sector has taken on the responsibility to develop the Water
ISAC, and in 2001 EPA provided $590,000 in seed money to AMWA to help
drinking water and wastewater agencies establish the Water ISAC, which
will be based in the District of Columbia.
The Water ISAC will be a formal communication system designed for
those who are responsible for security of water supply and wastewater
critical infrastructures. The Water ISAC will allow for dissemination
of early warnings and alerts concerning threats to the integrity and
steady operation of the infrastructure. The Water ISAC will also
provide a process for reporting risks and incidents that may be of
concern to federal authorities and others nationally.
The information shared may include:
--Threats that have been detected.
--Vulnerabilities that have been discovered.
--Viable resolutions to incidents, threats and vulnerabilities.
--Incident trends that reveal a threatening pattern.
--Reports of incidents that have occurred.
The information will be available from many sources:
--Water utility reporting of incidents.
--National, regional and local law enforcement.
--Industry associations and research organizations.
--Federal intelligence agencies.
--U.S. EPA.
--Other federal agencies.
To help cover start-up costs, the water sector is asking for $2
million. In the long run, the Water ISAC will be primarily funded by
the contributions of water agencies that choose to participate and
subscribe to its services. However, it is not likely that very many of
the 51,000 small water agencies serving fewer than 10,000 people will
be able to afford to subscribe, so there may need to be a federal
contribution to cover the costs of providing this service to the small
systems that lack the resources to participate. Also, please note that,
unlike the other sectors that have established or plan to develop
ISACs, the Water ISAC subscribers will be largely publicly owned and
operated entities, often part of city and county government.
More important for now, though, is funding the start up of the
Water ISAC, which will require:
--A highly secure information technology (IT) structure.
--A user-friendly interface.
--A database for the secure collection of incident information.
--Feeds from federal agencies.
--Secure communications to member utilities.
--A staff of terrorism and water supply experts and IT specialists.
AMWA estimates that two-year start-up expenses are $4 million, with
the majority of the funds being for the IT platform and a small
professional staff. AMWA urges the committee to provide $2 million. We
anticipate that contributions from water systems, with the exception of
the smaller agencies, will finance the Water ISAC adequately in the
future. Until that network of contributors is established, however, the
project needs $2 million in the coming fiscal year before it can become
the fully functioning resource that local water utilities need.
TRAINING AND EDUCATION
For the water sector to meet the many challenges faced by potential
terrorist attacks, utilities need access to training and educational
programs. The American Water Works Association (AWWA), whose utility
members include small and large drinking water system, both publicly
and privately owned, proposes to offer education and training on
security-related topics to drinking water systems.
AWWA proposes seminars and online courses to educate water systems
in distribution system security and vulnerability assessments;
seminars, online courses, and self-contained seminar packages to teach
utility managers how to communicate with the public in times of crisis;
web-based materials and online courses to educate utility management on
legal issues that relate to counter-terrorism efforts; and a peer-
review/third-party certification program to assure ongoing vigilance
against terrorist acts. AWWA estimates the cost for these programs to
be $2.5 million.
AWWA already has a strong track record in this field. Soon after
the terrorist attacks of September 11, AWWA conducted a number of
training conferences via satellite and in person at regional sites
across the country. AWWA was providing information to utilities on
preparing for terrorist attacks last spring, well before the attacks in
September. Since its inception, AWWA has sponsored many of the
educational programs, invested in technical studies, and developed much
of the scientific and technical information used to improve the quality
of the water we drink.
SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS
Security improvements at water systems fall into three categories:
immediate next steps, operations and maintenance, and capital upgrades.
Immediate next steps include fencing around facilities and
reservoirs, security doors and locks, intruder alert systems, better
lighting, surveillance cameras to monitor entry ways and sensitive
facilities, access control and barricades around key facilities. Some
systems already had some or all of these measures in place, while
others are in the process of installing them. The American Water Works
Association and the Water Environment Research Foundation have provided
estimates that total approximately $4 billion to implement such
measures at the 54,000 public drinking water systems and the 16,000
wastewater agencies in the United States. The average cost per utility
ranges from $8,000 for water systems serving only a few thousand people
to $700,000 for systems serving more than 100,000 people. Those serving
more than one million people expect to spend much more.
Operations and maintenance (O&M) costs are the costs related to
daily operation of water systems and include everything but security
improvements and capital improvement costs. The water community is not
asking for funding for O&M, nor have we come up with a total estimate
for increases in O&M costs related to security. However, the costs for
additional staff, security guards and security consultants will
undoubtedly mean much higher operating expenses, taking limited
resources away from other security improvements.
Capital upgrades include redundancies of water and wastewater
mains, pumps, lift stations and treatment facilities, so that water
service may continue in spite of a terrorist attack. The upgrades may
also include projects to protect facilities, including chemical
storage, and increase the use of continuous real-time monitoring for
agents in water supplies. Water systems are now in the process of
assessing their vulnerabilities to terrorism. When these assessments
are complete, water systems will know what they need to accomplish to
become more safe and secure. Only then will we know accurately what
capital construction projects are going to be needed. It is probably
safe to assume that the total costs for capital improvements will reach
into the billions.
These new expenses for immediate next steps, security-related O&M,
and capital upgrades related to security are in addition to the already
burdensome level of infrastructure needs facing nearly every utility in
the United States. As noted time and again by the Water Infrastructure
Network (WIN), the cost of replacing aging infrastructure and upgrading
infrastructure to comply with the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Clean
Water Act is estimated at $50 billion per year over the next 20 years.
Therefore, these new security costs further complicate the task of
water systems to find scarce dollars for basic infrastructure
improvement necessary to continue to provide water service and
environmental protection.
AMWA and the other members of the water sector would like to work
with the committee to determine a level of funding for security
improvements that the committee could support.
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS
In progress or in queue are hundreds of vulnerability assessments
at drinking water and wastewater systems nationwide. These assessments
attempt to determine where and how a water system could be attacked.
Recommended elements of an assessment include raw water intake
stations, ground water wells, the wastewater collection system,
treatment facilities, pumps and lift-stations, finished water tanks,
chemical storage facilities, the drinking water distribution system,
and systems that rely on information technology and cyber access. The
larger water systems are relying on state-of-the-art assessment tools
and security experts and consultants, while the smallest systems may
only require a simple visual inspection and short list of items to
check-off.
Vulnerability assessments are among the key elements of the
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection and EPA's
National Infrastructure Assurance Plan.
In spite of the $90 million that Congress generously provided in
the fiscal year 2002 emergency appropriations bill for vulnerability
assessments (and other security activities), it is estimated that
drinking water and wastewater systems will be forced to spend far more.
There are nearly 54,000 drinking water agencies and 16,000 wastewater
systems in the United States. While it may seem unlikely that the very
smallest of these agencies are vulnerable to terrorism, it would be
imprudent to assume so. That's why the vast majority of these systems
should assess their vulnerabilities.
The American Water Works Association estimates that small and
medium drinking water systems will spend approximately $450 million to
assess their vulnerabilities. In addition, the Water Environment
Research Foundation estimates that wastewater agencies will spend $250
million to assess their vulnerabilities. EPA, meanwhile, has asked for
an additional $16 million for vulnerability assessments for small and
medium drinking water systems. AMWA and the other members of the water
sector would like to work with the committee to determine a level of
funding for assessments that the committee could support.
CONCLUSION
AMWA, and indeed the entire water sector, appreciates the attention
the committee is focusing on security. The pipes and treatment plants
that provide drinking water and wastewater service are largely unseen
by the public, but we cannot underestimate the potential dangers to
those facilities.
We have provided information on a number of needs for research,
information sharing, security improvements, training and education and
vulnerability assessments. Funding these various elements will help
ensure that water systems have done everything possible to protect
against terrorism and respond if attacked. We look forward to working
with you to help make the nation's drinking water and wastewater
systems, their consumers and the environment safer from terrorism.
Biographical Sketch of John R. Griffin
John R. Griffin is General Manager of the Washington Suburban
Sanitary Commission (WSSC), which provides water and wastewater
services to Maryland's Montgomery and Price George's Counties bordering
Washington, D.C. WSSC is among the 10 largest water and wastewater
utilities in the nation, serving more than 1.6 million people.
As General Manager of the internationally acclaimed agency, Griffin
directs 1,500 employees serving a 1,000-square-mile service area. He
provides accountability for an annual budget of more than $650 million
designed to enhance, expand, operate and maintain a 10,600-mile
pipeline infrastructure, three dams and two reservoirs, two water
filtration plants that produce an average of 167 million gallons of
clean water per day, 63 water storage facilities, 14 water pumping
stations, six wastewater treatment plants and 43 wastewater pumping
stations.
Prior to joining WSSC, Griffin served five years in the Maryland
State Cabinet position of Secretary, Maryland Department of Natural
Resources, and 11 years as Deputy Secretary. There, he directed the
activities of 1,700 employees and managed a $203 million budget. His
successes in land use and preservation programs; public safety and law
enforcement on Maryland's waterways and public lands, including its
forests and parks system; Chesapeake Bay restoration; and associated
education and outreach programs, are all akin to WSSC's functions of
environmental stewardship. In the early 1980s, he served as Senior
Advisor to Governor Harry Hughes on policy development and program
implementation for environment and natural resources, economic
development and state/local relations.
A graduate of Niagara University, N.Y., Griffin earned his Master
of Arts degree from Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.
The Annapolis resident was named Conservationist of the Year by the
Chesapeake Bay Foundation in 1999 and has received Distinguished
Service Awards from the Maryland Municipal League and from the National
Governor's Association.
Biographical Sketch of P. Michael Errico
Michael Errico is the Deputy General Manager of the Washington
Suburban Sanitary Commission (WSSC), a utility that provides water and
wastewater services to Maryland's Montgomery and Prince George's
Counties. Bordering Washington, D.C., WSSC is among the 10 largest
water and wastewater utilities in the nation, serving more than 1.6
million people.
As Deputy General Manager of the internationally acclaimed agency,
Mr. Errico is generally responsible for overseeing the day-to-day
operations of the Commission. He and the General Manager provide
accountability for an annual budget of more than $650 million designed
to enhance, expand, operate and maintain a 10,600-mile pipeline
infrastructure, three dams and two reservoirs, two water filtration
plants that produce an average of 167 million gallons of clean water
per day, 63 water storage facilities, 14 water pumping stations, six
wastewater treatment plants and 43 wastewater pumping stations.
Prior to joining the Commission in 2000, Mr. Errico served for 30
years in the Prince George's County government, retiring in April of
2000. He spent the first 25 years with the County in the Department of
Public Works and Transportation, beginning as a Civil Engineer and then
completing the last eight years as Deputy Director and Director of the
Department. Mr. Errico's last five years with the County were in the
capacity of Deputy Chief Administrative Officer for the County
Executive.
In this capacity, he was responsible for overseeing most aspects of
County government operations at the highest policy level, including
transportation and public works services; solid waste; stormwater
management and all other environmental services; economic development
activities and negotiations; executive level coordination with bi-
county planning, parks and recreation and water and sewer agencies; and
construction and maintenance of all County buildings and facilities.
Mr. Errico served on the Board of Directors of the District of Columbia
Water and Sewer Authority, the Board of Directors of the Parking
Authority of Prince George's County, also serving as its Executive
Director.
Mr. Errico is a graduate of the University of Maryland receiving a
Bachelor of Science Degree in Civil Engineering in 1971. He is past
president of the County Engineers' Association of Maryland and a member
of the American Society of Civil Engineers, the American Public Works
Association, the American Water Works Association and Chi Epsilon, the
National Civil Engineering Honorary Fraternity.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you.
Mr. Lochbaum.
STATEMENT OF DAVID LOCHBAUM, NUCLEAR SAFETY ENGINEER,
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
Mr. Lochbaum. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of
the committee.
After the September 11th attacks, many Americans worried
about the nuclear power plants in their back yards.
Unfortunately, inactions by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
fanned the flames of fear when responsible actions may have
suppressed them. The NRC could have continued security tests to
demonstrate adequate preparedness. Instead they cancelled all
of those tests. They could have communicated with the public
about nuclear plant security. Instead they chose silence. They
could have pointed to the emergency plans that protect the
public in the event of a nuclear plant disaster. Instead they
chose to hide those plans.
As a direct result, State and local authorities shouldered
more of the burden than was necessary. The NRC itself has been
hampered by its policy mistakes. NRC staffers repeatedly
complain that they spend too much of their time responding to
questions from Members of Congress. The agency has not realized
that these questions represent an appetite for information that
must be fed, not starved.
The NRC must get back into the business of testing nuclear
plant security. On September 10th the NRC had plans for tests
at 14 nuclear power plant sites. The NRC cancelled all of these
tests after September 11th. As of today the NRC has no firm
plans scheduled to resume testing.
The last test performed demonstrated the need for testing.
NRC inspectors went to the Vermont Yankee nuclear plant last
August. Their testing revealed weaknesses that were
``considered generally predictable, repeatable, and indicative
of a broad programmatic problem.'' A broad programmatic problem
affecting security is unfortunate, but it would be more
unfortunate for such a problem to remain undetected. Forty-six
percent of the 81 tests conducted since 1991 have revealed
serious problems. Performance has been fairly consistent over
those years, so it is not overly speculative to assume that 7
of the 14 tests planned for this year would also have revealed
serious problems. But none of those tests have been run, thus
none of the problems have been found, and, more importantly,
none of the problems have been fixed.
In addition to fixing security problems, the tests also
provide the NRC with its best communication vehicle. The NRC
publicly releases big picture information following the
security tests. The public is much more likely to be reassured
by a simple test demonstrating adequate security than 1,000
press releases proclaiming nuclear plants to be safe and
secure.
The NRC must do a better job of public communications. The
agency has remained virtually silent on an issue troubling many
Americans. The NRC should follow the model of the recent
Olympic Games. There was extensive media coverage about
security. Reporters accompanied guards on patrols with bomb-
sniffing dogs and prowled with surveillance teams using
infrared detection equipment. This approach provided
information to reassure an anxious public without giving too
much information to anyone seeking to disrupt the games. It was
a responsible way to balance the public's right to know with
the security concept of need to know.
The NRC should emulate this model. For example, media
accounts after September 11th reported that citizens and local
officials were driving past unlocked and unmanned security
gates on the grounds of nuclear plants in Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and Maine. The NRC could have allayed concerns by
pointing out that nuclear plants are ringed by two sets of
gates, outer gates for convenience and inner gates for
security, and that the inner security gates were always manned
and locked.
Responsible communications also helps to deter attacks.
Part of the allure of The Club as an anti-car theft device is
that it can be seen through car windows. Many homes and
businesses have signs saying ``Protected by Acme Security'' in
their windows, not so burglars will know how to defeat the
security, but to deter them from even trying. Responsible
communications about nuclear plant security might dissuade
anybody from even staging an attack.
Our final example of information the public has both a
right to know and a need to know involves emergency planning.
All nuclear plants operating in the United States have
emergency plans to protect the people living around them. These
plants vary from community to community depending on the
resources and decisions of State and local authorities. Prior
to September 11th, parents could access these plans on the
NRC's web site and learn what protective measures would be
taken for their children. Emergency plans were pulled from the
public arena following September 11th and are still
unavailable. The NRC must restore public access to this
information. Parents have a right to know how their children
will be protected.
The damage to the public psyche caused by the NRC's
inactions has already been done. The NRC must begin the healing
process by resuming security tests, communicating responsibly
with the public about security matters, and by providing the
public with the information it needs regarding emergency plans.
These measures can be accomplished within the NRC's existing
budget for this year and its proposed year.
To help the NRC along this path, the Congress could expand
the scope of a report currently submitted to it each month by
the agency. These reports provide this status on a range of NRC
activities and could easily be expanded to include the security
tests, communications to the public on nuclear plant security
matters, and the availability of emergency planning
information.
On behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists, I wish to
thank the committee for conducting this hearing and for
considering our views on the matter. Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of David Lochbaum
On behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), it is my
pleasure to appear before this Committee about homeland security as it
relates to defending nuclear power plants from terrorist attack. We
believe the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) would work more
effectively with States and localities if it (a) resumed security tests
at nuclear power plants, (b) communicated responsibly to the public
about nuclear plant security, and (c) restored public access to
emergency planning information.
My name is David Lochbaum. After obtaining a degree in nuclear
engineering from The University of Tennessee in 1979, I spent more than
17 years in private industry, most of that time at operating nuclear
power plants in Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Kansas, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania. I have been the Nuclear Safety Engineer for UCS since
October 1996. UCS, established in 1969 as a non-profit, public interest
group, seeks to ensure that all people have clean air, energy and
transportation, as well as food that is produced in a safe and
sustainable manner. UCS has worked on nuclear plant safety issues for
nearly 30 years.
Nuclear plant security has been one of our key issues in recent
years. During my testimony on May 8, 2001, about the future of nuclear
power before the Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property, and Nuclear
Safety Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works, I presented the following views:
``NUCLEAR PLANT SECURITY
``The NRC's handling of physical security at nuclear reactors is
another example of regulatory ineffectiveness. The NRC began force-on-
force tests of security preparedness at nuclear power plants in the
early 1990s. These tests pit a handful of simulated intruders against a
plant's physical defenses and squadrons of armed security personnel. By
1998, these tests had revealed significant security weaknesses in about
47 percent of the plants tested. The NRC quietly discontinued the
testing, but the ensuing public outrage forced the agency to re-
institute the tests. Since the tests have been resumed, about 47
percent of the plants continue to have significant security flaws
revealed. Last year [2000], force-on-force tests at the Waterford plant
in Louisiana and the Quad Cities plant in Illinois demonstrated serious
security problems that warranted extensive repairs and upgrades. The
owner of the Waterford spent more than $2 million fixing its inadequate
security system.
``Having been foiled in its attempt to secretly deep-six the
security tests, the agency resorted to Plan B in which they will allow
the plant owners to conduct the tests themselves, grade the tests
themselves, and simply mail in the scores--virtually guaranteed to be
high marks--to the NRC. If someone like Timothy McVeigh drove to a
nuclear power plant with intentions of causing harm, the people living
near that plant would better protected by security scoring 85 percent
on a real test than 100 or even 110 percent on an open-book, take-home,
self-scored test. The public deserves and must get that better
protection than that provided by artificially inflated security test
scores.''
We thought a year ago that plant owners conducting their security
tests was a bad idea. To our consternation, the NRC developed an even
worse idea. On September 10, 2002, the NRC had plans for fourteen
security tests at nuclear plant sites. Six of these tests would have
been administered by the NRC while eight of these tests would have been
run by the plant owners and audited by the NRC. Shortly after September
11, the NRC cancelled all the tests. We understand and fully appreciate
that the events of September 11 forced the security staffs at NRC and
nuclear power plants across the nation to initially avoid anything that
might distract them. But seven months have passed and the NRC still has
no firm plans to resume the tests.
One of the last, if not the very last, security tests conducted
demonstrates why testing must be reinstated. NRC security specialists
went to the Vermont Yankee nuclear plant in August 2001 for an
Operational Safeguards Readiness Evaluation (OSRE). The NRC inspectors
discovered potential vulnerabilities in the plant's strategies for
responding to attacks. Two of the four exercises run to test the
response strategies confirmed the suspected vulnerabilities. The NRC
determined this finding to be significant ``because response strategy
weaknesses found during the conduct of the OSRE were considered
generally predictable, repeatable and indicative of a broad
programmatic problem.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Letter dated March 25, 2002, from Hubert J. Miller, Regional
Administrator, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to Michael A. Balduzzi,
Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corporation, ``Final Significance Determination for a Yellow
Findings at the Vermont Yankee Generating Station (NRC Inspection
Report 50-271/01-010).'' (Attachment 1 to this testimony)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is unfortunate that a ``broad programmatic problem'' affecting
security was detected at this nuclear plant. But it would be far more
unfortunate for such a ``broad programmatic problem'' to remain
undetected at this or any other nuclear plant. The importance of
detecting problems is embodied in this NRC statement to the plant's
owner:
``Upon identification of the finding, your staff established
immediate compensatory measures. These were taken to assure the
security program was adequate while necessary longer term corrective
actions are implemented. Before leaving the site [on August 23rd], our
inspection staff determined that the security program at Vermont Yankee
was sound, an important step given the current threat environment. The
maintenance of the completed compensatory measures were confirmed by a
NRC Security Specialist on September 27, 2001.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Letter dated November 28, 2001, from Wayne D. Lanning,
Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to
Michael A. Balduzzi, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer,
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation, ``Vermont Yankee Generating
Station--NRC Inspection Report 50-271/01-010.'' (Attachment 2 to this
testimony)
The NRC does not leave a nuclear plant site after an OSRE unless
adequate security has been demonstrated or appropriate compensatory
measures have been put in place.
The NRC began testing security with OSRE or OSRE-like tests in
1991. Approximately half of the 80-plus tests conducted since then have
revealed serious security problems. Given that performance has been
fairly consistent over the years, it is not overly speculative to
assume that approximately seven of the fourteen tests planned for
fiscal year 2002 would have revealed serious security problems. But
none of those tests have been run which means that no security problems
have been found. More importantly, it means that no security problems
have been fixed. The NRC must get back to the business of finding and
fixing nuclear plant security problems.
In addition to the inestimable benefit of fixing security problems,
the tests also provide the NRC with its best communication vehicles.
State and local authorities face difficult decisions when allocating
resources for protection. Those decisions would be aided by knowledge
that the NRC recently tested security at nuclear plants within their
jurisdictions. The tests would also help the NRC communicate with the
public about nuclear plant security. As evidenced by Attachment 2, the
NRC publicly releases ``big picture'' information following nuclear
plant security tests. The ``nuts and bolts'' details are not publicly
disseminated but are communicated clearly to the plant owner. The
public is more likely to be reassured by a single test demonstrating
adequate security than a thousand press releases proclaiming nuclear
plants to be ``hardened targets.''
The NRC needs to do a better job of communicating to the public
about nuclear plant security. The agency has remained virtually silent
on an issue troubling many Americans. We are not advocating that the
NRC divulge explicit details about nuclear plant security. Rather, we
believe the NRC should follow the model of the recent Olympic Games in
Salt Lake City. To reassure people planning to attend the games, there
was extensive media coverage beforehand about security preparations.
Reporters accompanied security details patrolling empty pavilions with
bomb-sniffing dogs and prowled with surveillance teams using infra-red
detection equipment. This approach provided enough security information
to reassure an anxious public without giving too much information to
anyone seeking to disrupt the games. It was a pro-active, responsible
way to balance the public's right-to-know with the security
specialist's concept of need-to-know.
The NRC should emulate the success of the Olympic Games model by
responsibly releasing information on nuclear plant security. For
example, there were numerous media accounts shortly after September 11
about citizens and local officials driving past unlocked and unmanned
security gates onto the grounds of nuclear power plants in Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and Maine. The public was understandably apprehensive
after reading these articles. The NRC chose not to allay the public's
concerns by pointing out that nuclear plants are ringed by two of
gates--outer gates for convenience and inner gates for security--and
the inner security gates at the facilities were always manned and
locked. The NRC's information vacuum may have forced Governors of
several states to dispatch National Guardsmen to augment perimeter
security at nuclear plant sites. The National Guard deployment did not
hurt nuclear plant security. But it represented an undue burden on
states' resources if responsible public communications on the part of
the NRC had assuaged the public's concerns.
Our final example of information withheld by the agency that the
public has both a right-to-know and a need-to-know involves emergency
planning. The Three Mile Island nuclear accident in 1979 reinforced the
importance of emergency planning. All operating nuclear power plants in
the United States have emergency plans. The fidelity of these plans
with corresponding plans on the federal, state and local levels is
tested at least once every two years by both NRC and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The plans vary from community to
community depending on the resources and decisions of state and local
authorities. School children within the 10-mile emergency planning zone
(EPZ) around some nuclear plants will be evacuated to schools outside
the EPZ in event of an accident. School children within the EPZ for
other nuclear plants will be evacuated to response centers.
Prior to September 11, the emergency plans were readily available
on the NRC's website. Parents could access the emergency plans for
their specific community and see what protective measures would be
taken for their children if an accident happened during the school day.
Emergency plans were included in the information pulled from the public
arena following September 11. Several parents in New York, New
Hampshire, and Massachusetts called me this past January complaining
that no one would tell them how their children would be protected
following a successful terrorist attack on the nuclear plant in their
backyards. I called Mrs. Patricia Norry, the NRC's Deputy Executive
Director for Management Services. Mrs. Norry explained that the public
did not need access to emergency plans for their communities because it
was sufficient that federal, state, and local authorities could access
the plans if needed. This attitude is the 21st century equivalent of
Marie Antoinette's ``Let them eat cake'' rejoinder. It does little to
enhance public confidence in the NRC or reassure people that they are
being adequately protected.
The NRC must restore the public's access to emergency planning
information. If details within the emergency plans are so explicit that
terrorists contemplating attacks against nuclear plants would learn too
much, the NRC should provide the public with basic information on what
to do when the emergency sirens wail. Lack of responsible NRC
communication now could severely impede state and local officials in
event of a nuclear plant accident by flooding them with calls from
concerned parents seeking the whereabouts of their children and
clogging roadways with caravans of parents trying to locate their
children.
The NRC, state and local authorities have vital roles protecting
public health and safety. These roles became more visible following
after September 11 as public concern over potential targets grew.
Unfortunately, the NRC's inactions fanned the flames of fear when
responsible actions may have suppressed them. They could have continued
security tests to provide tangible evidence of adequate preparedness.
Instead, they cancelled the fourteen tests that were scheduled. They
could have pro-actively communicated with the public about nuclear
plant security. Instead they opted to ``duck and cover.'' They could
have pointed to the emergency plans developed to protect the public in
event of a nuclear plant accident. Instead, they chose to hide the
emergency plans. Consequently, state and local authorities had to
shoulder more of the burden because of the NRC's absence.
Any damage to the public psyche has already been done. The NRC must
begin the healing process by resuming security tests at nuclear power
plants, communicating responsibly with the public about nuclear plant
security matters, and by providing the public with the information it
needs regarding emergency plans. All of these measures could be
accomplished within the NRC's existing fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year
2003 budgets.
To help the NRC progress along this path, the Congress could expand
the scope of a report currently submitted to it each month by the
agency. These monthly reports were initiated in the Fiscal Year 1999
Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, Senate Report 105-206.
The Fiscal Year 2002 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act,
House Report 107-258, directed the NRC to continue the reports. These
reports provide the status on a range of NRC activities and could
easily be expanded to include security tests performed at nuclear power
plants, communications to the public on nuclear plant security matters,
and availability of emergency planning information.
On behalf of UCS, I wish to thank the Committee for conducting this
hearing on nuclear plant security and for considering our views on the
matter.
Attachment 1
March 25, 2002.
Mr. Michael A. Balduzzi,
Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corporation, Brattleboro, VT.
Subject: Final significance determination for a yellow finding at the
Vermont Yankee Generating Station (NRC inspection report 50-
271/01-010)
Dear Mr. Balduzzi: The purpose of this letter is to provide you
with the results of our final significance determination for the
preliminary Yellow finding that was identified in the subject
inspection report sent to you on November 28, 2001. After careful
consideration, we have determined that the inspection finding is
appropriately characterized as Yellow. The enclosure to this letter
provides our detailed bases for this conclusion.
The finding was assessed using the significance determination
process and was preliminarily characterized as Yellow, an issue with
substantial importance to safety that will result in additional NRC
inspection and potentially other NRC action. The finding was identified
during an Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) at Vermont
Yankee between August 20-23, 2001, the results of which were discussed
with members of your staff during a final exit meeting on September 26,
2001. The OSRE consisted of observations of several aspects of the
security program, table-top drills to assess tactics and response
strategy, assessment of tactical training and firearms proficiency, and
the conduct of four challenging force-on-force exercise scenarios
designed to identify potential vulnerabilities in your response
strategy, and areas where the security program may be strengthened.
As noted in our inspection report, the finding was considered
preliminarily Yellow because response strategy weaknesses found during
the conduct of the OSRE were considered generally predictable,
repeatable and indicative of a broad programmatic problem. This
determination was based on potential response strategy vulnerabilities
that were identified during the conduct of table-top drills, and
subsequently confirmed by the results of two of the four force-on-force
exercises.
At your request, a closed regulatory conference was held on January
18, 2002. The conference was closed because it included a discussion of
Safeguards Information, which must be protected against unauthorized
disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21. In support of the
regulatory conference, you provided a written evaluation dated January
14, 2002, which also contained Safeguards Information.
At the conference and in your written evaluation, you disagreed
with the preliminary Yellow finding contending that two failures during
the force-on-force exercises were inconclusive because of various
artificialities that adversely affected the outcome of both exercises.
Accordingly, you proposed that Vermont Yankee's performance should not
be considered a Yellow finding. After carefully considering the bases
for your contentions, we determined that the inspection finding is
appropriately characterized as Yellow within the context of the NRC's
Reactor Oversight Process. In making this determination, we considered
the exercise artificialities and controller decisions that occurred
during the exercises. As discussed in the enclosure to this letter, we
acknowledge that the exercise artificialities and controller's
decisions may have had a degree of influence in the exercises, however,
it would not be practical to rerun the exercises to further assess the
issues. Nonetheless, the scenarios adequately served to confirm the
vulnerabilities (i.e., response strategy deficiencies) identified
during the table-top portion of the OSRE.
You have 10 business days from the date of this letter to appeal
the staff's determination of significance for the identified Yellow
finding. Such appeals will be considered to have merit only if they
meet the criteria given in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609,
Attachment 2.
Per the Action Matrix associated with the NRC's Assessment Process
(IMC 0305), any single Yellow issue, such as this finding, would place
Vermont Yankee in the Degraded Cornerstone Column. Therefore, we will
use the NRC Action Matrix to determine the most appropriate NRC
response. We will notify you by separate correspondence of that
determination, including any adjustments to the NRC inspection plan.
As previously acknowledged in our referenced inspection report,
your letter, dated November 21, 2001, confirmed that compensatory
measures have been taken to address the weaknesses identified during
the OSRE. Your letter also described plans, schedules, and commitments
for the establishment of long-term corrective actions, which will
include improved internal and external strategies and organizational
improvements.
You are not required to respond to this letter. In accordance with
10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's ``Rules of Practice,'' a copy of this letter
without the Safeguards Information enclosure will be available
electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or
from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document
system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ADAMS.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
RA by J.T. Wiggins,
(For Hubert J. Miller, Regional Administrator, Region I).
Attachment 2
November 28, 2001.
Mr. Michael A. Balduzzi,
Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corporation, Brattleboro, VT.
Subject: Vermont Yankee Generating Station--NRC inspection report 50-
271/01-010
Dear Mr. Balduzzi: On August 23, 2001, the NRC completed an
Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) at your Vermont
Yankee power reactor facility. The enclosed report, which is considered
as Safeguards Information, presents the preliminary results of that
evaluation. The results of this inspection were discussed on August 23,
2001, with members of your staff. Subsequently, a final exit was
conducted with Mr. Thomas Murphy and members of your staff by telephone
conference on September 26, 2001.
The OSRE was an examination of activities conducted under your
license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's
rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. Within
these areas, the evaluation consisted of a selective examination of
physical security plans, procedures and representative records; review
and walkdown of selective portions of the Vermont Yankee facility;
conduct of table-top exercises; examination and review of target sets;
observations of force-on-force response exercises and exercise
critiques; observation of firearms proficiency by security officers;
and interviews with selected personnel. The most prominent aspect of
the OSRE is the series of very challenging force-on-force exercise
scenarios that are designed to identify potential vulnerabilities in
your design basis threat response strategy, and areas where the
security program may be strengthened to assure the continuing
effectiveness of the physical protection system. Specifically, OSREs
are designed to challenge the capability of the onsite security force
to interdict a violent external assault by determined, well trained and
dedicated intruders aided by a knowledgeable insider.
During the conduct of the force-on-force exercises, response
strategy weaknesses were identified at Vermont Yankee. The enclosed
report discusses our preliminary assessment of the performance of your
security program, and includes a potential Yellow finding based on the
Interim Physical Protection Significance Determination Process. Upon
identification of the finding, your staff established immediate
compensatory measures. These were taken to assure the security program
was adequate while necessary longer term corrective actions are
implemented. Before leaving the site, our inspection staff determined
that the security program at Vermont Yankee was sound, an important
step given the current threat environment. The maintenance of the
completed compensatory measures were confirmed by a NRC Security
Specialist on September 27, 2001.
Elements of your security program, as at all other nuclear power
plants, include a substantial security fencing system and associated
intrusion detection, surveillance, and alarm systems around the plant
site; a substantial armed guard force onsite at all times; background
checks, extensive searches, and strict controls of personnel entering
the plant; external vehicle barriers; and close examination of all
materials and vehicles entering the plant. Notwithstanding deficiencies
revealed by the Vermont Yankee OSRE that are categorized preliminarily
under NRC Reactor Oversight Program as having ``substantial safety
significance'', none of the response strategy defects were of a
severity that could not be promptly addressed through compensatory
measures taken at the time of the inspection. Furthermore, it is
important to note that, on October 16, 2001, an NRC Security Specialist
conducted an audit of Vermont Yankee's security posture relative to the
NRC Safeguards Threat Advisories issued following the September
terrorist attacks, and determined that the additional actions taken at
the site, which included assistance of local law enforcement agencies,
were appropriate. In a letter dated November 21, 2001, Vermont Yankee
confirmed its commitment to continue these actions, and the
compensatory measures addressing the weaknesses revealed from the OSRE,
as described above. Your letter also described plans, schedules and
commitments for the establishment of long-term corrective actions.
We believe we have sufficient information to make a final
significance determination for this finding. However, before we make
our decision, you may provide a written statement of your position on
the significance of this finding, including any supporting information
or reference to previously submitted material. Additionally, you may
request a Regulatory Conference in order to provide your perspective on
the finding, the associated safety significance, and the bases for your
appraisal. If you chose to request a Regulatory Conference, we
encourage you to submit your evaluation of the matter, including
aspects that may differ with the facts described in the enclosed
report. Any information that you chose to submit should be controlled
as Safeguards Information and provided to our office at least a week
before the conference. A Regulatory Conference on this matter would be
closed to public observation since Safeguards Information may need to
be discussed. All Safeguards Information is required to be protected in
accordance with 10 CFR 73.21.
Please contact Mr. John R. White at (610) 337-5114 within 10
business days of the date of this letter to notify the NRC of your
intentions. If we have not heard from you within 10 days, we will
continue with our significance determination process and subsequently
inform you of the results of our deliberations on this matter.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's ``Rules of Practice,''
a copy of this letter without the Safeguards Information enclosure will
be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public
Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component
of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web
site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic
Reading Room).
Sincerely,
Wayne D. Lanning,
Director, Division of Reactor Safety.
Senator Hollings [presiding]. Thank you.
Mr. Benjamin.
STATEMENT OF JEFF BENJAMIN, VICE PRESIDENT FOR
LICENSING, EXELON CORPORATION, CHICAGO,
ILLINOIS, REPRESENTING THE NUCLEAR ENERGY
INSTITUTE
Mr. Benjamin. Thank you, Senator. My name is Jeff Benjamin.
I am the Vice President of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs for
Exelon. We operate about 20 percent of the nuclear plants in
this country, consisting of 17 reactors at 10 sites in three
different States. My background includes working at four
different reactor sites, including as the site vice president
LaSalle County Station, one of our sites within Exelon. Also,
since September 11th I have been responsible for coordinating
the security activities for Exelon.
I am also appearing today on behalf of the Nuclear Energy
Institute. NEI's 270 members represent a broad spectrum of
interests, including the owners of all of the nuclear power
plants in the United States. I thank you today for the
opportunity to appear before you.
Throughout my career in the nuclear industry, safe
operation of our plants and protecting the health and safety of
the public has always been job number 1. Part of that
responsibility has always been maintaining a robust security
program at our sites. This is not a new issue for our industry.
Maintaining security programs that meet Federal requirements is
a condition of our license by which we operate our plants.
Our nuclear reactors are among the most well-protected
industrial facilities in the world, with many businesses
turning to our industry for advice and for information on how
to adequately protect industrial and commercial facilities. Our
plants are designed with a defense in depth philosophy. We use
multiple trains of safety equipment. We use extremely robust
construction. These features, coupled with our guard force and
physical security protection, make our nuclear plants
considered to be hardened targets by security experts
worldwide.
In my written testimony I presented some background on
nuclear plant security and the actions that were undertaken by
the industry and Federal officials in response to the events of
September 11th. These actions have further increased the
security of our plants by increasing the number of armed
guards, establishing additional controls on site access, and
enhancing operational readiness in the event of a threat or
attack. Our industry has the benefit of a mature framework for
both security and emergency response, each of which undergoes
regular testing.
In my remarks before you today, I would like to focus on
recommendations for additional actions that Congress and the
Federal Government should consider to further ensure the
security of commercial nuclear facilities. First, there must be
a clear delineation of responsibility between Government and
plant licensees. Federal law currently requires NRC licensees
to protect against a variety of potential threats to commercial
power plants. But the law also considers many threats to be
outside the scope of licensee responsibility and instead relies
on law enforcement agencies and the military for protection.
Congress and the administration must decide where the line
between licensee and Government responsibility lies in light of
the new threats faced by our plants and the other facilities
that make up the Nation's critical infrastructure.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission should revise its
protocol of threat levels to conform with that proposed by the
Office of Homeland Security on March 11th of this year. Such a
system would allow the commission and licensees to distinguish
between the current generalized heightened state of alert and a
more specific threat against a plant or plants. We have been at
the NRC level 3 since shortly after the attacks on September
11th. It is the highest state of readiness defined by the NRC.
The orders recently issued by the NRC mandate additional
requirements commensurate with the continuing current threat
condition. This situation begs the question of how meaningful
the different security classifications are if the highest level
of alert becomes the only level of security.
Although a number of the changes we are making to our
security program incorporate the knowledge of a new type of
threat, we need to be able to scale our security requirements
based on changes to the level of threat that exists. This will
allow as the plant operators and emergency response officials
to develop readiness levels commensurate with the threat level
that exists.
Communication and coordination must be improved among
licensees in the various Federal, State, and local agencies
involved in responding to a potential threat situation. This
need is perhaps best illustrated by an event at the Three Mile
Island plant last year. Plant operators were notified by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission on October 17, 2001, that the
Federal Government had received information which it believed
constituted a credible threat against the plant. A number of
Federal agencies and organizations, including the NRC, the FBI,
FAA, and NORAD, were involved in the subsequent response to
what was later determined to be a non-credible threat.
As the licensee, we took immediate action to secure the
site physically and called in additional assistance from the
law enforcement community, while the Federal Government and the
military took action to protect the plant. At the same time,
TMI events also provided us with some valuable lessons learned,
including the need to work more closely with Federal officials
to clarify the nature of the threat, the need to develop
coordination procedures with multiple Federal agencies, and the
need to communicate effectively with local elected officials
and emergency services personnel.
It is also vitally important that the NRC be integrated
into the intelligence community's process for assessing threats
against commercial plants and other NRC licensees. We are
highly dependent upon receiving threat information from the
NRC. So therefore it is essential that the NRC is getting
credible and timely information itself.
Lastly, we do not have the necessary Government clearances
to facilitate the free flow of intelligence information between
us and the NRC. The NRC has taken steps to remedy this
situation, but I will say this was a contributor to some of the
communications difficulties we had between ourselves and the
offsite local officials that night on October 17.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has incurred and will
continue to incur additional costs to address new security
concerns. While the commission plans to reallocate existing
resources to support its new Office of Nuclear Security and
Incident Response, the NRC's mission with regard to security is
likely to expand as the Federal Government reassesses their
responsibilities of various parties providing nuclear security.
NRC's efforts should be coordinated with the broader
efforts of the Office of Homeland Security and Congress should
support NRC's request for additional funding to support
additional actions undertaken in support of homeland defense.
In determining the resources necessary to protect nuclear
power plants, the Federal Government should consider the
potential vulnerability of these plants relative to other
potential critical infrastructure targets and allocate limited
Federal resources to those facilities deemed to be most
vulnerable to attack. These funds would be used in conjunction
with State and local agencies to further enhance readiness.
Some in Congress have advocated federalizing our nuclear
plant security forces. We have a well-paid, highly trained work
force of security personnel guarding our plants. Many of these
people have chosen this as their career, and replacing these
forces with Federal employees is unnecessary and would
complicate the ability to respond to an event. Quite simply,
federalization solves a nonexistent problem.
Others in Congress and elsewhere have advocated placing
anti-aircraft artillery installations at nuclear plants to
protect against air attack. The industry believes that Federal
resources would be more properly focused on ensuring the skies
stay safe. In addition, we are concerned with the command and
control difficulties and potential unintended consequences such
installations may pose.
Given a strong framework of existing security and emergency
preparedness programs and the robust design and construction of
our plants, we feel confident in our ongoing ability to protect
the health and safety of the public living near our plants. The
recommendations offered here today are intended to have nuclear
plants evaluated in the context of other critical
infrastructure and to seek clarity for the nature of the threat
that we are responsible to defend against. We will continue to
work with the NRC and Congress to provide the highest levels of
protection to the public in that regard.
Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss these issues
with you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeff Benjamin
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: I am Jeff Benjamin, Vice-
President of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs for Exelon Nuclear, the
nuclear division of Exelon Generation Company. Exelon Generation is a
wholly owned subsidiary of Exelon Corporation, which was formed in 2000
by the merger of Unicom Corporation of Chicago and PECO Energy Company
of Philadelphia. Exelon Generation currently owns and operates
approximately 37,000 megawatts of diversified electrical generation,
including 17 nuclear reactors that generate 16,970 megawatts of
electricity. Exelon is the largest nuclear generation operator in the
country with approximately 20 percent of the nation's nuclear
generation capacity, and the third largest private nuclear operator in
the world. We also own 50 percent of AmerGen Energy, which is a
partnership with British Energy of Edinburgh, Scotland. AmerGen owns
three of the 17 units in the Exelon fleet.
I am also appearing today on behalf of the Nuclear Energy Institute
(NEI). NEI's 270 members represent a broad spectrum of interests,
including every U.S. electric company that operates a nuclear power
plant. NEI's membership also includes nuclear fuel cycle companies,
suppliers, engineering and consulting firms, national research
laboratories, manufacturers of radiopharmaceuticals, universities,
labor unions and law firms.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
security issues at commercial nuclear power plants.
My testimony today will focus on three areas:
First, the nuclear power industry is absolutely committed to
ensuring that our plants are operated safely and that all necessary
steps are taken to protect the health and safety of the public and our
employees. No one has a greater interest in protecting the safety and
security of nuclear plants than the owners and operators of those
facilities.
Second, commercial nuclear power plants are the most well-protected
industrial facilities in the United States today, and many businesses
are turning to the nuclear industry as a model for providing security
at industrial complexes.
Third, as the United States acts to strengthen homeland security in
light of new threats to the nation's security, it is imperative that
Federal, state, and local officials work cooperatively with nuclear
plant operators to build upon the solid foundation of emergency
response capabilities that existed prior to September 11.
The most pressing challenge facing Congress and other Federal
policymakers is how to allocate responsibility for protecting the
nation's critical infrastructure against attacks by terrorists and
other enemies of the state. Federal law currently requires Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensees to protect against a variety of
potential threats to commercial nuclear power plants. Federal law
considers many potential threats to be outside the scope of licensee
responsibility and instead relies on law enforcement agencies and the
military to protect against certain threats. The question facing
Congress and the Administration is where the line between licensee and
government responsibility lies in light of the new threats faced by
nuclear power plants and other facilities that make up the nation's
critical energy infrastructure.
The events of September 11 have presented the nation with a variety
of new challenges. Protection of the country's critical infrastructure
is among the most important of these challenges, but it is a challenge
that I am confident the nuclear energy industry can and will continue
to meet.
INDUSTRY COMMITMENT
Protection of the health and safety of the public and our employees
is of paramount importance to the nuclear power industry. The industry
has worked closely with a variety of Federal, state and local officials
to identify additional safeguards and resources that are necessary to
respond to potential threats to plant security, and we are fully
supportive of taking all reasonable and necessary steps--whether they
be by licensees or the government--to ensure that nuclear plants are
able to withstand an attack by terrorists. We look forward to
continuing to play an active role in working with emergency response
agencies and officials to develop and implement effective measures to
improve nuclear plant security.
Among the Federal agencies with whom the industry has consulted are
the Office of Homeland Security, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Department of Energy, the
Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
National Infrastructure Protection Center.
As I stated earlier, no one has a greater interest in protecting
the safety and security of nuclear plants than the owners and operators
of those facilities.
NUCLEAR PLANT SECURITY
Protection of public health and safety requires both the safe
operation of nuclear plants and the physical protection of the plant
against potential threats.
The industry today is operating the nation's 103 nuclear reactors
more efficiently and safely than ever before. The average capacity
factor for nuclear plants reached an all-time high of 91 percent in
2001 according to preliminary data from the Nuclear Energy Institute,
while the industrial safety accident rate for nuclear plants in 2000
was a record-low 0.26, compared to an average accident rate in the
manufacturing sector of 4.0.
Nuclear power today provides 20 percent of the nation's electricity
each year, and it does so without emitting any of the pollutants
associated with acid rain or global warming. In fact, nuclear power has
played a major role in allowing many regions of the country come into
compliance with Clean Air Act requirements.
The industry's commitment to safety also extends to plant security.
In fact, commercial nuclear power plants are regarded by many to be the
most well-protected industrial facilities in the United States today.
Indeed, many other industries are turning to the nuclear industry as a
model for providing security at a variety of commercial facilities. For
example, in addition to unique physical protections employed at
commercial nuclear facilities, the nuclear industry is alone among
critical infrastructure industries in using the Federal Bureau of
Investigations to run criminal background checks on applicants for
positions at sensitive facilities.
Current Law
Existing Federal statutes and regulations provide strict standards
requiring licensees to take actions necessary to protect the public
health and safety. NRC requirements and industry programs are
predicated on the need to protect the public from the possibility of
exposure to radioactive release caused by acts of sabotage.
The current design basis threat--the threat against which a plant
licensee must be able to protect--assumes a suicidal, well-trained
paramilitary force, armed with automatic weapons and explosives, that
is intent on forcing its way into a nuclear power plant to commit
sabotage. The design basis threat also assumes that the attackers will
have insider knowledge of plant systems and plant security plans and
even insider assistance.
This assumed threat forms the basis for security response plans and
training drills. These plans and drills are tested regularly by the NRC
as part of their Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) and
have confirmed our readiness to meet the design basis threat. The OSRE
program has also provided the industry with the opportunity to identify
areas where security can be improved and enhanced.
Physical Design of Plants
A number of defenses exist to counter such a threat. Nuclear
plants, by their very design, provide a redundant set of physical
barriers designed both to keep radiation and radioactive materials
inside the plant and to keep intruders outside the plant. The reactor
core is protected by a containment structure comprised of several feet
of thick reinforced concrete walls, a steel liner, additional concrete
walls within containment, and a several inches-thick high tensile steel
reactor vessel. The metal cladding on the fuel itself also serves as an
additional protective barrier. For this very reason, the FBI considers
nuclear plants to be ``hardened targets.''
Nuclear plant sites have three distinct zones, each of which has
different levels of physical and human defenses. The first zone, called
the ``owner controlled area,'' includes all of the property that is
associated with the plant. The owner controlled area typically ranges
in size from several dozen to hundreds of acres of land and serves as
an effective buffer zone around the critical areas of the plant.
The second zone, the ``protected area,'' is a physically enclosed
area surrounding the plant into which access in controlled. Physical
barriers to intrusion include barbed wire and razor wire fences,
microwave and electronic intrusion detection systems, closed circuit
television systems, isolation zones, extensive lighting, system
monitoring by redundant alarm stations, and vehicle barrier systems.
Access to the protected area is restricted to a select population of
site personnel with a need for entry. A significant portion of plant
employees work outside the protected area. To access the protected
area, plant employees and visitors must pass through a metal detector
and an explosives detector. X-ray machines are also used to screen
material brought into the protected area by employees and visitors. In
addition, employees must utilize a hand-geometry device to confirm
their identity before entering the protected area.
The third zone, the ``vital area,'' includes those areas within the
protected area containing equipment essential for operating the plant
safely and successfully shutting down in the case of an event.
Additional barriers are in place to protect vital areas of the plant,
including concrete floors, walls, and ceilings; steel locked and
alarmed doors; and key card access doors. As with the protected area,
access to the vital area is restricted to a select population of site
personnel with a need for entry. The defensive contingency plans used
by security forces are geared towards protection of these critical
areas.
Security Forces
In addition to the robust physical structures protecting the plant,
licensees maintain a highly trained, well-equipped security force to
guard each facility. Security personnel, many of whom have law
enforcement or military experience, must undergo extensive background
checks, including an FBI criminal record check; physical and
psychological testing and screening; and regular drug and alcohol
screening. The nuclear industry is unique among energy industries in
having a cooperative relationship with the FBI to facilitate such
criminal record checks.
In addition, security personnel are subject to rigorous training
requirements. Initial nuclear security officer training includes a wide
variety of topics, including NRC requirements for nuclear facility
physical security, recognition of sabotage devices and equipment,
contraband detection devices and operation, firearms training and
tactical response training. Annual supplemental training covers areas
such as weapons proficiency, physical readiness, stress fire course,
force-on-force drills, and table top drills. A significant amount of
annual training focuses on force-on-force training, which covers such
topics as threat assessment and tactical response, response force
deployment and interdiction, protection of specified vital equipment
and protected areas, multiple target acquisition and engagement, and
the use of armored body bunkers, ballistic shields, and other
specialized security equipment.
As a further protection to the public, each nuclear power plant has
an extensive and well-honed emergency response organization and systems
in place to respond to and mitigate any emergency that arises.
Emergency response plans are tightly integrated with local, state and
federal regulatory and emergency authorities and undergo regular
training and drilling. The emergency planning zone includes an area
within a 10 mile radius of the plant, an area encompassing roughly 315
square miles. Since September 11, Exelon Nuclear has conducted security
briefings for state and local officials in each of the states in which
we operate to reinforce the coordination and response plans in the
event of an emergency.
September 11 and Its Aftermath
Upon notification by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on September
11, all nuclear plants immediately increased their security to Level 3,
the highest level of security maintained at commercial nuclear
reactors. All U.S. commercial reactors remain at Level 3.
Since September 11, nuclear plants have also extended the point of
initial screening of people entering the plant site from the protected
area boundary to a point in the owner controlled area boundary. This
initial screening includes an identification check, confirmation of the
purpose for entering the site, and a thorough vehicle inspection for
all visitors. States police and, in some cases the National Guard, have
augmented this effort. In addition, armed patrols have extended their
patrols to include a larger portion of the owner controlled area. These
patrols are coordinated with onsite personnel to enhance detection and
deter potential threats.
Given the uncertain nature of potential attacks, Exelon Nuclear and
other reactor operators took a variety or protective measures in
conjunction with NRC guidance. These included actions to harden site
access, increase security resources, and improve operational readiness.
To harden site access, the industry has:
--conducted additional screening and control of all on-site
deliveries upon entry to the owner-controlled area
--barriers positioned to prevent access at several Owner Controlled
Area entrances
--restricted of visitors to those required for essential plant work
--extended background checks for outage and other contractors with
temporary unescorted access
--checked employee databases against an FBI watch list of suspected
terrorists from all known terrorist organizations (the FBI
continues to update that list and share the information with
the industry)
To improve security resources, the industry has:
--increased number of security officers
--procured additional weapons and upgraded armaments
--added armed security posts at key plant locations
--increased security presence at site entrance
--added police, and at times National Guard, posted at site entrances
To improve operational readiness, the industry has:
--enhanced plant procedures and operator training for use during an
attack or credible threat
--elevated attention to security and fire protection related
equipment
--established protocol for augmented federal and state law
enforcement assistance and intervention
Since shortly after September 11, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
has been engaged in a top-to-bottom review of the Design Basis Threat
to reevaluate its adequacy. As an interim measure, the Commission
issued Orders on February 25th of this year which imposes significant
additional requirements on licensees pending the completion of a more
comprehensive review of safeguards and security program requirements.
While many of the specifics regarding the NRC Orders are classified
as safeguards information and cannot be disclosed to the public, issues
addressed by the Orders include security officer staffing levels,
protection against potential vehicle and waterborne threats, protection
of used fuel, enhanced access authorization controls, and mitigation
efforts in the event of an attack.
ADDITIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As the United States acts to strengthen homeland defense in light
of new threats to the nation's security, it is imperative that Federal,
state, and local officials work cooperatively with nuclear plant
operators to build upon the solid foundation of emergency response that
existed prior to September 11.
In particular, there are several steps that we believe the Federal
government should take in addressing security issues at nuclear power
plants.
--There must be a clearer delineation of responsibility between
government and plant licensees. Federal law currently requires
NRC licensees to protect against a variety of potential threats
to commercial nuclear power plants, but the law also considers
many threats to be outside the scope of licensee responsibility
and instead relies on law enforcement agencies and the military
to protect against certain threats. Congress and the
Administration must determine where the line between licensee
and government responsibility lies in light of the new threats
faced by nuclear power plants and other facilities that make up
the nation's critical energy infrastructure.
--There must be improved communication and coordination among
licensees and the various Federal, state and local agencies
involved in emergency response planning. The Federal government
has a role in financially supporting many of the actions
necessary to accommodate this improved communication and
coordination.
--The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has incurred--and will continue
to incur--additional costs to address new security concerns.
Congress should support the NRC's request for additional
funding to support additional actions undertaken in support of
homeland defense.
--The Nuclear Regulatory Commission should revise its protocol of
security levels to conform with that used by the Office of
Homeland Security.
--In determining the resources necessary to protect nuclear power
plants, the Federal government should consider the potential
vulnerability of these plants relative to other potential
critical infrastructure targets and allocate limited Federal
resources to those facilities deemed to be most vulnerable to
terrorist attack.
Delineation of Government and Licensee Responsibility
Exelon Nuclear fully supports the NRC's efforts to conduct a top-
to-bottom review of security procedures at nuclear facilities. We have
completed our own review of security procedures at our plants and have
taken appropriate steps to increase security measures as a result of
the heightened state of alert.
As Congress and the Administration debate what changes in Federal
law and policies are appropriate in the aftermath of the September 11
attacks, strong consideration should be given to building upon the
existing regulatory system which distinguishes between threats for
which licensees are responsible and threats for which law enforcement
and the military are responsible.
One such approach was endorsed by the House of Representatives last
year as part of the Price-Anderson Amendments Act, which passed by the
House by voice vote. The House legislation directs the President to
conduct an assessment of potential threats against nuclear facilities
and to classify each threat as one for which the Federal government
should be responsible or as one for which NRC licensees should be
responsible. The measure also requires the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to promulgate a rulemaking to ensure that licensees address
the threats identified in the report as a licensee responsibility.
Exelon strongly supports the Price-Anderson provisions as a
reasoned approach to this very important issue. The Presidential study
will allow the White House to coordinate the efforts of a number of
Federal agencies to conduct a comprehensive threat assessment. Such an
approach will also allow personnel knowledgeable in security matters to
make decisions in coordination with intelligence officials to ensure
that nuclear facilities are treated in a manner consistent with the
protection of other critical infrastructure facilities.
Improved Communication and Coordination
The need for improved communication and coordination among
licensees and Federal, state and local government agencies is perhaps
best illustrated by an event at AmerGen's Three Mile Island (TMI) plant
last year. AmerGen was notified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on
October 17, 2001, that the federal government had received information
which it believed constituted a credible threat against the plant. A
number of Federal agencies and organizations, including the NRC, the
FBI, the FAA, and NORAD, were involved in the subsequent response to
what was later determined not to be a credible threat.
Site personnel took immediate action to secure the plant, which was
in the midst of a maintenance and refueling outage. The company also
requested--and received--additional security assistance from the
Pennsylvania State Police.
The ``threat'' against Three Mile Island showed that the regulatory
system currently in place can work effectively in response to a
potential threat. As the licensee, AmerGen took immediate action to
secure the site physically and called in additional assistance from the
law enforcement community, while the federal government and the
military took action to protect the plant against potential threats
that fell outside the design basis threat against which AmerGen is
responsible for defending.
At the same time, the TMI event also provided us with some valuable
``lessons learned,'' including the need to work more closely with
Federal officials to clarify the nature of threat information, the need
to develop coordination procedures with multiple Federal agencies, and
the need to communicate effectively with local elected officials and
emergency services personnel.
For example, different Federal agencies declared the threat to be
non-credible at different times. While the Federal Aviation
Administration lifted airspace restrictions around the plant at 1:10
a.m. on October 18, the NRC did not notify AmerGen that the threat had
been deemed to be non-credible until 7:30 a.m. that morning. In
addition, while the NRC notified the Governor of Pennsylvania, the
Commission failed to notify other state and local officials or to
advise AmerGen that the Governor had been notified.
The Commission took a step towards addressing some of these issues
last week when it established an Office of Nuclear Security and
Incident Response to consolidate and streamline selected NRC security,
safeguards, and incident response responsibilities and resources. While
this should address some coordination and communications issues, other
Federal agencies must engage in similar efforts.
Finally, it is important that the NRC be integrated into the
intelligence community's process for assessing and communicating
potential threats against commercial nuclear facilities and other NRC
licensees.
Expansion of NRC Mission
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has incurred--and will continue
to incur--additional costs to address new security concerns. While the
Commission plans to reallocate existing resources to support the new
Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, the NRC's mission
with regard to security is likely to expand as the Federal government
reassesses the responsibilities of various parties for providing
nuclear security. NRC's efforts should be coordinated with the broader
efforts of the Office of Homeland Security. Congress should support the
NRC's request for additional funding to support additional actions
undertaken in support of homeland defense.
Security Protocols and Procedures
As I noted earlier, the NRC currently uses a three level security
classification system. Each of the nation's 103 reactors have been at
the top level, Level 3, since September 11 and the Commission has
indicated that plants will remain at Level 3 for the foreseeable
future. This situation begs the question of how meaningful the
different security classifications are if the highest level of alert
effectively becomes the only level of security. Given these concerns
and the need for consistency in communicating the urgency of potential
threats, the Commission should revise its protocol of security levels
to conform with the five level classification system established by the
Office of Homeland Security. Such a system would also allow the
Commission and licensees to distinguish between the current generalized
heightened state of alert and a more specific threat against a plant or
plants.
Balancing the Need for Enhanced Security and Limited Federal Resources
In determining the resources necessary to protect nuclear power
plants, the Federal government should consider the potential
vulnerability of these plants relative to other potential critical
infrastructure targets and allocate limited Federal resources to those
facilities deemed to be most vulnerable to terrorist attack.
For example, some in Congress have advocated federalizing nuclear
plant security forces. As I mentioned earlier in my testimony, the
industry has a well-paid, highly-trained force of security personnel
guarding commercial nuclear plants. Replacing these forces with Federal
employees is unnecessary and would complicate the ability of licensees
to coordinate the response of plant and security personnel in the event
of a terrorist attack. Federalizing nuclear security forces would also
unnecessarily limit the universe of potential guards by prohibiting
retired military and other government officials who would be prohibited
from serving as Federal security personnel and continuing to draw their
Federal pension.
Others in Congress and elsewhere have advocated placing anti-
aircraft artillery installations at nuclear plants to protect against
an air attack. The industry believes that Federal resources would be
more properly focused on increased airport security to ensure that
terrorists are denied access to the large commercial airliners that are
of most concern.
Given the strong physical structures at nuclear plants and the
highly-trained guard force to protect commercial nuclear facilities,
resources may be more appropriately focused on other critical
infrastructure facilities.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to discuss these issues
with you. Let me close by reiterating that the nuclear industry
recognizes our responsibility for protecting the public health and
safety, and we are committed to taking the steps necessary to do so.
I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Biographical Sketch of Jeff Benjamin
Jeff Benjamin has over 15 years experience in management of
commercial nuclear power generating facilities and has a background in
plant recovery, licensing, engineering and nuclear oversight. He joined
the company in April 1998, as the nuclear oversight vice president for
Commonwealth Edison's Nuclear Generation Group.
As Licensing Vice President, Benjamin is responsible for directing
the strategic and tactical nuclear licensing and regulatory affairs
functions and programs, including regulatory interface and policy
setting for Exelon Nuclear. Developing and implementing strategic and
tactical direction requires routine interface with the NRC, NEI, INFO,
and state regulatory agencies. Benjamin also directs the activities of
the Emergency Preparedness Department. These activities include
processes to ensure Exelon maintains a high state of readiness for
emergencies, scenario development, local state agency interface, and
drill participation and performance.
Before being promoted to his current position, Benjamin served as
Vice President of Nuclear Acquisitions where he represented
Commonwealth Edison in PECO's and AmerGen's acquisition and development
activities, including due diligence reviews of possible transactions.
Benjamin was Site Vice President of LaSalle Station before taking
the position as Vice President of Nuclear Acquisitions. He had direct
responsibility for the successful restart of Unit 2, the return of the
site to normal operations after a lengthy shutdown and increased
regulatory scrutiny, and the best-of-a-kind Unit 1 refueling outage.
Prior to joining Commonwealth Edison, he served as director of
oversight and licensing and director of the Unit 1 recovery from 1994
to 1998, for the Salem and Hope Creek Nuclear Power Plants at Public
Service Electric & Gas Company. From 1993 to 1994, he served as the
manager of quality assessments for WNP-2 at Washington Public Power
Supply System. From 1984 until 1989 he served in engineering, as
quality audit supervisor and manager of quality programs at the Trojan
Nuclear Plant for Portland General Electric. In 1994, Benjamin was
certified on the BWR-S Reactor Plant at WNP-2.
Benjamin holds a Bachelor of Science in nuclear engineering from
Oregon State University. He is a candidate for a Master of Science in
engineering at Oregon State University, with completed course work with
the exception of his thesis.
Benjamin has served as a member of the Board of Trustees for the
Memorial Hospital of Salem County, the Executive Board of the Boy
Scouts of America, Southern New Jersey Council, and the Board of
Directors, Easter Seals, DuPage County, Illinois.
Questioning by Senator Ernest F. Hollings
Senator Hollings. Thank you, Mr. Benjamin.
Since I authored the federalization of airport security,
let me just say up front that I do not see any need for
federalization of the nuclear power plants. We do not have an
Argenbright problem like we had at all the airports over
America.
But let me ask with respect to a nuclear power plant and
the commercial liner that ran into the Trade Towers and the
Pentagon. You say hardened targets and proper construction are
needed. Suppose an airplane ran into a nuclear power plant. Are
they hardened enough to withstand that kind of hit?
Mr. Benjamin. First of all, again I will restate. We are
counting on the Government keeping the skies safe. Now, that
subject has been the matter of a lot of debate and ongoing
study. A lot of those studies are ongoing right now. When these
plants were licensed about 20 years ago and longer, several
were not licensed specific to the requirements of an airliner
crash. Some were.
Largely those designs were done in accordance with the
aircraft that were in existence back at the time. So for
example, our Three Mile Island plant was designed to withstand
a 727 impact. I think I would like to defer until the studies
get done to see what impact the larger fuel-laden aircraft of
today would be, but certainly those studies back in the
seventies demonstrated that these are very robust structures.
Senator Hollings. I have only got one more minute to make
that vote, so, Dr. Flynn, I am glad to see you back. Admiral,
we really appreciate your appearance. Each of you witnesses
here, it has been very valuable to the committee. Chairman Byrd
is on his way back, so the committee will be in recess--I
apologize, I did not see you.
Senator Murray. I just was way too quiet, Senator Hollings.
Senator Hollings. I turn it over to Senator Murray.
Questioning by Senator Patty Murray
Senator Murray [presiding]. He always ignores me. It has
been a 10-year problem.
Thank you very much to all of you for your testimony here
today. I apologize that we have been going in and out for these
votes, but I have seen all your written testimony and I really
appreciate all of you taking time and effort to come here today
to talk with what I think is a very, very critical, serious,
and difficult issue.
Dr. Flynn, in your testimony you argue that any effort to
improve port security must be done on an international basis
and that any unilateral action by the United States could just
result in more cargo entering our country overland using ports
in Canada and Mexico. Admiral Larrabee, I am sure you share the
concern since your port competes for traffic with Halifax and
Montreal, just like our ports compete with Vancouver, British
Columbia.
Just last week the Coast Guard testified before my
Transportation Subcommittee and they did not give us a lot of
hope that any international consensus on a new port security
regime could really be reached any time soon. Would both of you
share your views on the progress that the administration has
made to date in getting international cooperation to
substantially boost port security?
Admiral Larrabee. Senator, one of the projects that we both
have talked about this afternoon is a project that we have
entitled Operation Safe Commerce. It is a public-private
partnership to look at this very issue. You know that we both
believe that this is going to take more than unilateral action
on the part of the United States to solve. One of the
encouraging things that both of us have found is that there is
a great deal of interest within the private community, both
here in the United States as well as internationally, to solve
this concern for cargo security.
In my business, when I talk to shipping line presidents or
when I talk to freight forwarders or when I talk to
manufacturers in foreign countries, they all recognize that if
we have an incident in the maritime industry that the system
will again get shut down, as Dr. Flynn has suggested, and that
our ability to restart it, because we have no confidence in
that system, is something that is very much on their minds.
I believe that we are going to see cooperation within the
private sector to help find solutions to some of these
problems, whether it is packing a container in a secure
environment to some international standard, whether it is a
better system of moving with higher accountability, whether it
is providing more information. I believe the industry is ready
to step up to the plate. I think it is a leadership issue and I
think that with Federal legislation requiring more cargo
security than we presently have we will provide the incentive
for private industry to partner with the public sector and find
practical solutions.
Senator Murray. Do you see that as what compels the
international communities to work with us on this?
Admiral Larrabee. Yes, ma'am. It is a matter of economics.
Senator Murray. Dr. Flynn?
Dr. Flynn. Let me reinforce that. I think one of our
biggest allies on the international is the Canadian Government,
who has I think been quite forward-leaning. I have had a number
of conversations with folks there. Their Canadian Senate had a
report that they recently issued in February on their own
seaport security and they gave it worse marks probably than our
Inter-Agency Seaport Commission gave ours. But the problems are
the same.
Why is Canada forward-leaning on this? Forty-seven percent
of their GDP is trade. Eighty-seven percent of their trade is
with the United States. Ninety percent of Canadians live within
100 miles of the border. They got what happened on September
11th. That is, we closed down our contact between, we basically
closed trade between. A billion dollars a day of trade stopped
for a period of time at that point.
So they have gone ahead and put this on the G-8 agenda,
this issue of how do we do border management within the context
of globalization, within the context of this new threat, and
how do we sustain basically an open global economy. So I think
that provides an excellent venue for this issue to be raised
and I am hopeful that the administration will be forward-
leaning to take advantage of that to move this forward.
The other area is the International Maritime Organization,
where Admiral Loy, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, went to a
meeting in November in London and made an eloquent case that
was well received. There was a special follow-up meeting in
February. There is still some reluctance, I think, among some
players to deal with some of the cost issues they fear
associated with this proposal.
But I have also just quite recently heard, for instance,
the Government of Singapore has given its own money for pilots
for dealing with container security. Just this week, funny
world we are in, I got an e-mail from the Port of Bremerhaven
saying how could they sign up to Operation Safe Commerce.
Here is the crux of the issue for them, and this also is
true with the Port of Kingston in Jamaica. Ultimately it is
gaining access to our society. Some ports see that it could be
a competitive advantage for them for being a secure port. That
is, it will draw shipping lines to them, it will draw major
importers and exporters, if they are seen as the place they
will be able to compete against some of the other ports.
Senator Murray. Well, yes, but the other side of that
argument is that--the closer we are to September 11th, I think
the security arguments hold. The further we get away from that,
economic arguments start to stay in everybody's mind. The
competition between, I would say for sure, Canada and the U.S.
ports can be pretty extreme, and time is everything when it
comes to that.
So how do we ensure that as we move further away from
September 11th that somebody does not use lax security
requirements or less strict security requirements to attract
business because time is an issue when it comes to ports and
getting cargo through our ports?
Dr. Flynn. Well, we do need to make this--right now our
problem is our Government is not constructed to handle this
problem. There still is a feud of sorts going on between the
Customs Service, saying that they own the container problem,
the Department of Transportation who say that they have a piece
of the problem. We have not got more senior people coming in to
referee that issue.
There are efforts certainly in the inter-agency process,
but the industry, quite frankly, is confused about who is in
charge, and for good reason. I remember, I sit on a panel of
the National Academy of Sciences that was chaired by former
Deputy Secretary of Transportation Mort Downey, and I said: Mr.
Downey, when you left the Clinton administration who was in
charge of the container? He said nobody was. We had people in
charge of rail, we had people in charge of ships, we had people
in charge of trucks, but nobody--the sole reason most of those
trucks, trains, and ships existed was to move boxes, but nobody
was in charge of the box.
This is a new thing and I guess that is the tension of the
issue of the earlier panel, about how we organize to deal with
these kinds of threats. This problem has fallen between the
cracks and we need to get that leadership issue that Admiral
Larrabee just mentioned fixed quickly.
Senator Murray. I agree with all that, but I still want to
know, how do we assure that a container is just as likely to be
inspected if it comes into the Port of Seattle or the Port of
Vancouver, British Columbia?
Dr. Flynn. Well, I think the way that that is being
proposed right now is, and it is already underway, is we have
Customs agents in Vancouver and Customs agents, U.S. Customs
agents in Vancouver, in Montreal in Quebec, and we have
reciprocated by having Canadian customs agents prescreening in
Seattle-Tacoma and also in the Port of Newark.
I think that is a very exciting approach to take. It is
saying we are going to police the system, not our borders, and
it allows us to monitor the standards that we have.
But ultimately there are three things that we need to
accomplish. The first is that there has to be standards in the
loading process. We have to basically say who gets to put
something in a maritime container and send it, how do they go
about doing that. We do not have them now.
The second is the documentation issue, sent early enough,
with enough detail that we can know what the heck is coming our
way.
The third piece is what I call in-transit visibility and
accountability, that is there is a tracking of the container, a
chain of custody maintained throughout its movements.
If we do not have those three, faced with a heightened
terrorist threat, it would be quite understandable for the
Commandant of the Coast Guard or the Commissioner of the
Customs to say, turn off the switch because I cannot be
confident that I can filter the bad from the good. So it has to
be an industry-wide standard, not just for hazardous materials
or munitions or so forth. It has to be that way.
Now, we do not have right now a good command of what those
standards are, and that is why this Operation Safe Commerce
provides an opportunity that the private sector is being very
forward-leaning on, the ports are being forward-leaning on, to
flesh those out, to inform legislation. It should happen in a
6- or 9-month period.
We have had problems, though, those of us who have been
advocating this initiative, of just getting the million dollars
to get this up and running. We are spending lots of money on
other things, but this problem seems to fall through
everybody's cracks again.
Senator Murray. Admiral Larrabee, what do you think are the
major hindrances that will make Operation Safe Commerce, to
allowing it to work well?
Admiral Larrabee. Well, the first one is money. Right now
we are a little frustrated because, as Commander Flynn
suggested, we would like to get about $1 million to get it
started. That money would be used for not only looking at the
system, but looking at innovative ideas and testing those
ideas, to look at not only the feasibility of the concept, such
as more sophisticated seals or sensors that could detect
tampering in a container, but also to look at the cost, so that
we know when we provide a suggestion as a way to close up some
of these gaps that we have some sense that the industry can
absorb that cost, where it is going to be absorbed, and who is
going to pay for it.
Because that, very frankly, is one of the issues that the
industry is faced with. Today, with the low cost of
transportation of international goods, with the very thin
margins of profit for anyone in that system, the opportunity
for a shipping line or one of those components of the
transportation system to have to pay for it by themselves I
think is unreasonable.
Senator Murray. Well, realistically will there not always
be a number of shippers who cannot be depended on to
participate in a system like this?
Admiral Larrabee. But I think the issue here again, and we
have talked about this before and Commander Flynn is very
eloquent on this, if you try and inspect everything you will
see nothing. The idea is to separate the legitimate cargo, 99
percent of it, from that cargo which might be considered high
risk. That is the other principle that we have to look at, and
that we can do that someplace other than in a U.S. port like
New York and New Jersey. I do not want to open any more
containers in the port. I do not think that is the place where
we want to do those inspections.
Dr. Flynn. If I might just reinforce that point. Just
fundamentally, what we are struggling with I think in our
homeland security paradigm is how do we have sufficient
security that when we have incidents--and it is inevitable we
will have incidents--that when we do the post mortem we will
say this is a result of a correctable breach in security, not
the absence of security. If we view it as the absence of
security, we will turn systems off and say start anew, a very
costly thing to do.
If we have the capacity to do the post mortem and we have
the capacity to ultimately discern what is going on--and that
is what this transparency and getting more legitimate players
on board than we have right now. I mean, the frightening
scenario for me is not just simply that a container could be
used as a poor man's missile, but it would be that, say, we
have intelligence, we infiltrated al-Qaeda II, we had somebody
in the new network and they tell us a container has been loaded
with a chemical weapon. It is hard intelligence. It gets
flashed back here to the President.
The President convenes right now his national security team
and says, well, where is the box? And the Commissioner of
Customs has to say: Well, it could be coming in Vancouver,
Seattle-Tacoma, San Francisco-Oakland, L.A.-Long Beach, or it
could be coming through the Canal and coming in any other port.
Mr. President, I have no idea where the box is, but after it
gets here and if it came, for instance, from a non-vessel
operator, 5 days after it came up here, I will have the
paperwork to tell you.
That is the situation that he would have to then shut down,
just on the basis of the threat.
Senator Murray. I am running out of time, but I do want to
ask one other question relevant to this committee. Obviously,
whatever we do is going to cost a considerable amount of money
whenever we look at some kind of security verification system
for our ports. Have you thought about how we allocate the costs
of this? There is the Federal Government, State governments,
local ports, private U.S. companies, foreign shipping
interests, a lot of people involved in this. How do we
allocate? Everybody has got a stake. How do we allocate the
costs on this?
Dr. Flynn. Well, I think, first of all, I think industry is
ready to step up to changed business practices. But very
frankly, I think at this point, when you look at the resources
that the maritime industry brings in through tariffs, we
provide I think about $20 billion to the U.S. Treasury each
year and, as someone said earlier, most of that goes to the
general fund.
I think at least a portion of that could be looked at as a
source to close some of these gaps.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Questioning by Chairman Robert C. Byrd
Chairman Byrd [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Murray.
I note that the President has requested no funds for
seaport security. Dr. Flynn, 7 months after the most horrific
act of terrorism in the history of our Nation, the President
has requested no funds for seaport security. Do you have any
sense of a grand plan for our domestic security?
Dr. Flynn. Well, I think we are still struggling with
gaining recognition that what we are talking about with seaport
security is sustaining global commerce, that the links are that
direct, and that the investment that is required to do this
warrants obviously much more significant resources than they
have been given.
I think it reflects in part the organization problem as
well. Who is the advocate for the seaport? They are often the
local port authorities that are working through a variety of
different instruments. The agencies who have a piece of the
action are themselves limited in their resources and limited in
their access to the highest levels of Government. So it is a
problem that has fallen through the cracks.
I am dismayed that we are 7 months after the fact and we
are still not recognizing the seriousness of the vulnerability
and the need to address it quickly.
Chairman Byrd. Admiral Larrabee, have you been given any
guidance as to how to improve security at our ports, even for
just the next 6 months?
Admiral Larrabee. Mr. Chairman, I think through the Coast
Guard captain of the port and the creation of area port
security committees we have begun sort of at a grassroots level
to look at the issue of vulnerability. But very frankly, we
need Federal legislation, we need standards that we can all
adhere to. As we have discussed before, we are in a very
competitive business. If I make the movement of cargo through
my port more difficult or more costly to a shipper, that
shipper is simply going to go to another port, and it may be a
foreign port. It may be Halifax.
So I think the need for Federal legislation is clear. I
mentioned that in my testimony. That would be the first good
best step. In that, there needs to be some level of funding
that at least gets us started, and I would start with port
vulnerability studies.
Chairman Byrd. Under the President's Executive Order,
Office of Homeland Security Director Ridge is directed to
``ensure that, to the extent permitted by law, all appropriate
and necessary intelligence and law enforcement information
relating to homeland security is disseminated to appropriate
Federal, State, and local governments and private entities.''
He is also directed to coordinate efforts to improve the
security of U.S. borders and to protect our transportation
systems.
Dr. Flynn, approximately 6 million containers entered the
United States in 2001. That is a 20 percent increase from 4
years ago. This number is expected to continue to rise. You
testified that, given the vast number of containers that enter
our ports every year, law enforcement officials must be able to
act on intelligence provided by our Federal agencies to allow
them to pinpoint and investigate suspect freight containers.
To your knowledge, do our intelligence agencies currently
have adequate information regarding cargo transportation to
enable us to pinpoint suspect shipping containers?
Dr. Flynn. Mr. Chairman, the answer quite simply is no. The
paper that goes with the container movements is notoriously
vague or incorrect. It is not necessarily even for fraudulent
purposes. Sometimes this is because the carriers are trying to
hide from criminals who would steal stuff what is moving. We
have this kind of a breakdown in the system.
Essentially, you have other problems. Non-vessel operators
which account for close to 20 percent of all those container
movements are not required to indicate who the originator is of
the container or the consignee, the final destination, or
provide any details about the contents. They will list as
``FAK,'' ``Freights all kind.'' So U.S. Customs simply cannot
target effectively on a document of just such vagueness.
So the key becomes the private sector's willingness to
share information, bill of lading kind of information and
others, which is out there and is becoming electronically
transferable and finding the means to do that. But you are
dealing with in the Customs Service and the Coast Guard
agencies that have done very poorly on the information services
budgets and so forth. They do not have very good systems,
computers to even take information, never mind mine it to
target. They are trying to get better, but we are talking about
with the Automated Commercial Environment that that is a 5 year
out project. If we are 5 years from being able to give a front
line inspector a tool to differentiate good, bad, or
indifferent, we are certainly giving the terrorists ample time
to do their worst.
Chairman Byrd. Is it reasonable to expect the U.S. Coast
Guard to become the world's intelligence agency in the shipment
of cargo? Do we not need greater assistance from the
intelligence agencies that already have an overseas presence?
Dr. Flynn. I think there are really two levels when we
think about the intelligence issues that we need to come to
grips with. One is going back to my boarding officer days. I
commanded a patrol boat. The way in which I would often find
whether there was a problem would be, I would board a fishing
vessel: Good afternoon, captain; we are here to enforce all
applicable laws and regulations; what are you fishing for
today? And if he told me he is scalloping and I look up at a
fathometer and he is in 3,000 feet of water, an alarm would go
off.
So what we know is criminals, capable criminals, capable
terrorists, often try to look like legitimate players. They try
to infiltrate our legitimate society, as we know that the
terrorists of 9/11 did. The people most likely to see something
out of sorts are going to be that front-line inspector. There
is a case of a Customs bust about 10 years ago of cocaine
coming in in cement posts. What triggered that off was not a
DEA agent who infiltrated the network of the cartel. What
triggered it off was a Customs agent who said: What the heck
are we doing importing cement posts from Colombia for? It is a
very low value object and it is a lot of transportation.
So one set of it is--and this goes to the issue about do we
break pieces of the Coast Guard up if we have to move it--the
reason why I want to keep these agencies, their regulatory
authorities and their capacity, is their eyes and ears out
there in that domain, the Commandant of the Coast Guard calls
it, that allows them to pick up aberrant things and say, that
ain't right, that ferry does not move today, that charter boat
is not working at the right time, and have the authority to go
up, legitimate civil authority, to ask questions. Then they
need to have the ability to send an alarm and get
reinforcements if they need it.
Now, the other level of the intelligence clearly is who are
the bad guys and how are they operating, how are they buying
front companies, which companies are bad, where is the money
going that could then infiltrate the industry. That is a
classical human intelligence and intelligence function that
should be a first order.
But what we have right now is the worst of all worlds. When
we have intelligence, it is often non-actionable. That is, we
may have somebody who tells us that--we had a number of these
instances where we have people who infiltrated the drug cartel
and say it has been loaded on a ship in Cartagena. We do not
know where the ship is. Four weeks later we find out that it
was in Philadelphia 2 weeks before.
So part of our challenge here is getting data about the
normal behavior of flows of trade, which is a regulatory
enforcement activity, so we can mesh it up in an operational
way with the intelligence we are going to get from the
traditional intelligence sources. Right now that is broken. It
does not work.
Chairman Byrd. Senator Stevens.
Senator Stevens. I suppose we could institute a policy of
creating new Ellis Islands and have all of the cargo unloaded
somewhere and shot through an imaging system and put back on if
it was not suspect. You think that is probably far-reaching. We
have the largest cargo landing point in the United States at
our Anchorage Airport and that is precisely what is happening
to foreign cargo planes that bring in cargo now. They are being
offloaded, run through X-ray machines, and put back on.
As a result of that, one-third of those people who are
flying foreign cargo planes into Anchorage moved to Vancouver.
But then Vancouver put in an X-ray machine and they are
starting to come back.
But answer me the question, why is that not a
responsibility of the private sector? Why should the public
taxpayer pay for this system of inspecting these things that
people are making enormous amounts of money on importing them
into the United States? Why should we not say to you, you
cannot bring anything in here unless you certify that it is
terrorist and dangerous cargo-free?
Dr. Flynn. Senator, I think we could do that. I think the
challenge right now is we are not even sure what the standards
we would require on industry are because we have not done some
of the research and so forth.
Senator Stevens. You just require that there is absolute
liability if they bring it in.
Dr. Flynn. I think that is a very good tool and it is what
needs to happen. But we are going to have to get the----
Senator Stevens. You know what will happen. No one will get
insurance until a system is set up.
But I am saying, so far we are planning ahead to put every
burden of the security system on the public. Now, I understand
putting it on the public to search individuals within our
States and in the United States, and I understand the homeland
defense concept. But as we put up the homeland defense, why
should we pay the cost of bringing in, and examining what is
coming into the homeland? Why should not the people who are
bringing the goods in pay that cost?
Dr. Flynn. I am an advocate of a system that works like the
Y2K experience. We say, within a certain amount of time if a
manufacturer or an exporter cannot verify that----
Senator Stevens. Hold on just a minute.
Pardon me. Sorry. If you look behind you, there are five
lights on up there. That means they are almost finishing a
vote. We thought we might have missed one. Sorry. I beg your
pardon.
Dr. Flynn. Senator, the idea here is right now we have the
dumbest possible box. This container is 40 by 8 by 8 and there
is nothing that can tell us whether it is good, bad, or
indifferent. So most of the best thinking is how do we invest
in a smarter box that could know if it has been tampered with,
that can give information about itself.
Those technologies are available. The good news is that
that is also supply chain monitoring. That is what the private
sector wants to be able, like when you order something from
FedEx or UPS, you can track the good through. So I think there
is a market incentive out there for building this system, even
if it was regulated.
The problem right now is if you impose the burden without
going across the board in force, what you will hear the
transportation industry say: I am a good company, I will do it,
but all the other international players will not. I am a cost
leader and that is unfair. And it is unfair.
Senator Stevens. That is where I would put the public
expense, and that is to stop those at the border which have not
been certified.
You should live in Alaska and have to drive through Canada
to come back to what we call the contiguous 48 States. We go
through inspections. They go through our cars. They go through
our trucks. I can tell you some sad stories about, a friend of
mine used to ship by air his items for sale down to Juneau. One
day he decided to take a truck and drive it down, and they
inspected the truck in Canada and found out it had some furs
which were illegal under Canadian law. So they seized it and
fined him $15,000 and a few other things. He learned a lesson.
He is back flying again.
But the point of what I am saying is, those of us who use
land transportation personally, we go through this now. The
people who are commercially making billions of dollars are now
pushing off on the taxpayers the cost of bringing that stuff
into the country. I am all for a temporary system to protect
the public, but I think the long-term system ought to put the
burden on the business world.
Now, what is wrong with that? Admiral?
Admiral Larrabee. Senator, I think you said the key word
and that is ``system.'' Right now there is no security system
for cargo. I recall in the days after the Exxon Valdez
testifying in front of you, talking about what happened in that
incident and, if you recall, your actions and the actions of
Congress to create the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. We
investigated that incident. We determined where the problems
were. We fixed those problems in that system, and today with
OPA 1990 in place, with higher liabilities, we have
dramatically reduced the number of oil spills that we have seen
over the last 10 years.
I think we have a similar kind of a situation. We need to,
as Dr. Flynn has suggested, create that system with
requirements and standards. I think the industry is ready to
address those types of systems.
Then I think we ought to create some regulations and laws,
as you have suggested. Once we have got that in place, then I
think you will find that the industry will share in some of the
cost of that. It will not be borne by people here in the United
States.
The industry is very concerned about this situation and
realizes that one incident anyplace in the world could bring
this system that we have worked so hard on to a grinding halt.
So there is incentive out there and I think, at least in my
conversations with people around the world, they are ready to
participate.
Senator Stevens. Senator Rudman who preceded you made the
prediction that the next problem will be at the ports. I think
most of us believe that is the case. But I think the tankers--
Saddam Hussein has shown he can use his weapon just by denying
us the oil. I do not know who is going to use the tanker as a
weapon. It may happen one of these days.
I was with you, as you say, at the Exxon Valdez situation,
a horrendous problem by one accident. That could be repeated in
several ports of the United States at the same time if they
decided to do it, I think, because we do not have an inspection
system today. We do not have an Ellis Island for tankers,
either.
But somehow or other, I do believe that the transition here
that we ought to be talking about now is how do we deal with
this short term, but at the same time there ought to be people
out there thinking, as the Hart-Rudman group did for homeland
defense, of the long term.
I am sorry I missed your testimony. But I do hope you will
help us by thinking about the distinction between short term
and long term. Long term I think has to be financed by
commerce. This is tremendous. My friend Senator Inouye is not
here, but he points out that for every five wide-body airplanes
that leave the country carrying freight, four go West and one
goes East. That freight market coming through--and a lot of
that is coming through that cargo port of ours--is being
inspected and the people that are flying them are inspected and
paying for the cost of the inspection, in effect. They are
paying the cost of offloading the stuff and then they run it
through the machines and they are paying the cost of putting it
back on.
The time is going to come when we are going to require the
same thing of everyone of these cargo-carrying vessels unless
something is done to assure the public that the risk is not
there.
My last question would be, Senator, what about that guy
that was in the cargo container that was picked up in Italy? Do
you all know about that? You do, do you not. What do we do to
protect against that?
Admiral Larrabee. Well again, I think it has to be an
awareness on everybody that works on the waterfront. It has got
to be a partnership. In that case the longshoreman realized
that this was a container that seemed strange.
Senator Stevens. It was. It was the volunteer who made the
report.
Admiral Larrabee. Right. I think, at least speaking for the
work force that works in the Port of New York and New Jersey,
the International Longshoremen, if Mr. Bauers were here today
he would tell you that he is ready to enlist every member of
his union in helping with this problem.
I think you will find as you talk to people in our
industry, whether they are here in the United States or whether
they are around the world, they understand the criticality of
fixing this problem and they are willing to help. I believe it
is a leadership issue. I think that Federal legislation will
get it started.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much, gentlemen. Again I am
sorry I was not here for all of your testimony.
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Murray.
Questioning by Senator Patty Murray
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Errico, if I could go back to you, I wanted to ask you
a question because, like most States, Washington has some
highly populated urban centers with very large water systems,
but we also have a lot of medium and small systems in our
smaller towns and rural communities. I understand there is
already an ongoing debate in my home State about whether to
focus primarily on strengthening the protections for larger
systems, which seem to be more likely targets, or to take a
more uniform approach, to recognize that smaller systems
probably are more vulnerable.
Can you give me your thoughts on this tension between the
larger systems and smaller systems and what we should do?
Mr. Errico. I firmly believe that all systems need to be
looked at. All of them need a vulnerability assessment, because
there are so many ways to get into a system to cause damage, to
cause an uproar, to cause a problem. I think they need to be
addressed.
I think where the larger systems are particularly more
critical in some cases is when they serve a lot of at-risk
facilities. For instance, in the area we are in we serve
probably some 30 or 40 Federal facilities--Andrews Air Force
Base, Goddard, and everything else. So we are in an area that
has got high visibility. We have some unique needs and some
special things to protect to be able to provide that service.
But I think that making the distinction I do not think is
fair. I think no matter what size you are, I think you need to
be looked at and properly assessed and put the proper measures
into place to protect your infrastructure.
Senator Murray. Mr. Benjamin, Energy Northwest is a
Washington State utility that owns and operates the Columbia
generating station. They have told me that the utility has
spent $3.8 million on security since September 11th. That sum
includes $670,000 in unexpected overtime costs. Energy
Northwest's annual security budget from July of last year
through--July of 2001 through June of 2002 is $5.8 million.
In order to comply with the modifications that were
recently ordered by NRC, Energy Northwest thinks that next
year's security costs could go as much as double this year's
budget.
Do you expect increased spending on security to continue
permanently?
Mr. Benjamin. Yes. We are also experiencing increases in
our security budgets. It is really in two forms. Similar to
Energy Northwest, we have seen an increase in our staffing
costs, both in overtime as well as new security officers. For
our 10 sites, following September 11th we hired an additional
140 security officers and deployed them across our 10 operating
sites. As we are now complying with the NRC orders issued in
February, we are looking at additional capital modifications,
which essentially would be one-time costs, and some additional
hiring of individuals that will be an ongoing incurred cost on
a going forward basis.
Our issue with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is that
where we are operating right now is in a state of interim
compensatory measures which are reflective of the generalized
heightened level of threat that we are in. We are looking for
some finalization of what the end state looks like in terms of
that design basis threat that clearly delineates the
responsibility that we are responsible to defend against versus
where we would expect assistance from outside agencies.
Until that is done, I would really only be guessing in
terms of what the final cost impact is.
Just to come back a little bit on that cost in terms of our
overall infrastructure, rough numbers now, our operating budget
is around $1 billion per year. Prior to September 11th our
annualized security cost was about $45 million. Now, adding
in--which would be about, if we scale that back to Columbia
generating station, I think it would be on about the same
order. Putting in the 140 additional officers, it is roughly
about another $8 million. I think as we comply with the order,
the total cost post September 11th will be somewhere between
$20 and $30 million, again a mix of one-time capital
improvements versus increase in head count.
We are anxious to get to an understanding of the final
state so we can settle out on this, on this whole topic. So we
have gone roughly from about 4, 4.5 percent of our operating
budget to now upwards of 5.5, upwards of 6 percent of our
operating budget. That is something we recognize as our
responsibility to do and we anticipate that is a cost we will
bear going forward.
Senator Murray. Thank you.
Dr. Flynn, let me go back to you for just a second. In your
testimony you pointed out that U.S. port authorities have
underinvested in security because of the extremely competitive
pricing environment that they operate in. At the same time, you
are proposing that we attempt to ensure that manufacturers of
goods for export in foreign countries institute new security
measures so that we know no one has tampered with their
shipping containers.
Many of those foreign manufacturers can successfully export
goods to the United States only because they manufacture them
cheaper than any other international competitor. So do you
think it is reasonable to think that these low-cost foreign
manufacturers can be required to increase substantially their
own investment in security?
Dr. Flynn. I do not think we are talking substantial
increases, but I do think it is necessary that there be some,
because what we are doing is we are--what is at stake here is
the entire conveyor belt. When we have a single incident, we
will turn it off, and we cannot basically make that hostage to
the lowest player in the system.
The means of doing so are that there has got to be some
adult supervision at the loading dock. There has to be somebody
taking some authority for that. That could be audited. There
could be auditors that go through based on sectors, that could
be private, who would do that to verify that their systems are
there.
The smart container I do not think is a huge investment. We
are in a situation right now where a $100 pair of Nike sneakers
coming into the Northwest will pay only about 66 to 90 cents
for the ocean transport to get across the ocean. So that the
company, the importer of that, can afford, I would argue, to
pay more for his logistics, his transportation, because when it
is missing you will know it.
It is now such a thin profit--an average automobile is only
spending one-half to 1 percent for transportation logistics
costs. The Big Three could probably afford to pay a little bit
more to ensure the integrity of the broader system.
What we are talking about potentially is a seal, a paint
seal inside the container, with a sensor that could be built on
kinetic energy, like a self-winding watch, that if somebody
penetrated it it would set off an alarm, that would talk to an
electronic seal, that would transmit a signal. These devices
can be under $100. The technology is there today.
Senator Murray. You are coming from the mind set that I
think we all are today, that security is absolutely imperative.
We will stay there for a while, until economics and competition
come back. What I am concerned about is that foreign
manufacturers, competition is extremely important, whether it
is Canada, Vancouver, British Columbia, and Seattle, or whether
it is manufacturers who ship here like Nike shoes. How do we
ensure that that competition does not overtake the security
needs again?
Maybe, Admiral Larrabee?
Admiral Larrabee. Well, in just thinking about that
situation, one of the things that we use as sort of a lever is
this notion that if you do not meet this standard that Dr.
Flynn talked about that your cargo now gets inspected. When we
identify a container in the Port of New York and New Jersey to
be physically inspected, it takes four inspectors 4 hours to do
that job. It costs the owner of that cargo about $1,500 and
they lose about 2\1/2\ days in the normal transit of that
container.
Time is money and an extra $1,500 on top of a very thin
profit margin is an incentive to say, I do not want my
container physically inspected and taken off the system. So I
think it is those kinds of incentives that say, I have to pack
my container to that standard you suggested, I have to ensure
its visibility in its transit, I have to make sure that I
provide accurate information in a timely way so that people can
make decisions about letting my legitimate cargo go through at
the highest speed and we can identify high-risk cargo and
inspect them in a way that makes the most sense.
Senator Murray. So they will pay at one end or the other,
is what you are saying.
Admiral Larrabee. It is a pay me now or pay me later issue.
Dr. Flynn. I made a case, and I was happy to see
Commissioner Bonner has embraced the idea, but it is that most
of this trade, there are literally potentially millions of
entities out there, 1 million entities probably, who can load
into the system, but they are funneled, the overwhelming
amount, through a handful of our megaports, many of them our
allies.
So going to them and essentially creating a Y2K event,
saying, at a certain time we are no longer going to accept a
mystery box. A mystery box is one that we cannot be confident
how it was loaded, we are not sure about the documentation, we
do not know how it got here. If you are not able the satisfy
the mystery by this time, we are going to re-stuff the box, re-
load the box outside our terminal. That would create the hammer
for the market to generate the ability to make sure that
happens.
The scariest part of the system right now is from the
manufacturer to the loading port, because that is subcontracted
and sub-subcontracted out. Nobody has any control over that
right now, because the market--the regulation has not forced
the market to provide that service. I think in the balancing
act that this cost is not a large one because it will bring
this extra benefit of supply chain monitoring, the ability to
track goods, that will allow you to run a more complicated
outsourcing scheme, to run more thinner inventories, and to be
able to manage this, which is a big part of how people become
competitive, U.S. manufacturers and companies are becoming
competitive, is taking advantage of that.
They will welcome the system when they have it, I think. It
is going to be like e-mail; we will not know how we lived
without it until we get it. I am confident.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Questioning by Chairman Robert C. Byrd
Chairman Byrd. Thank you, Senator Murray.
Mr. Benjamin, during 2 days of hearings this committee has
heard a substantial amount of testimony on the poor state of
coordination between Federal, State, and local authorities. But
at our ports and nuclear facilities, private companies also
share the responsibility for security. Who is responsible for
coordinating the Government's security efforts at ports and
nuclear facilities with the efforts of the private sector?
Mr. Benjamin. I will take the nuclear plant part and let my
colleagues down there take the port part. First and foremost,
we are responsible for the security at our facilities. We work
under the auspices of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. We
count on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission being integrally
tied into the intelligence community, getting timely and
effective information that we then count on them passing on to
us.
I mentioned in my oral remarks that we still have an issue
in terms of clearances that we need to talk to, so we can talk
apples and apples on relevant intelligence matters. But we are
counting right now on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to act
as the liaison with other Federal agencies to coordinate the
gathering and transmittal of the intelligence information as
appropriate, so we may respond in kind for those threats that
we are responsible for responding to or, in the event that the
threat is larger than that, that we are coordinating with
offsite agencies as well to prevent that attack from becoming a
bigger problem.
Dr. Flynn. Mr. Chairman, there is no equivalent counterpart
in the port to the relationship of the nuclear industry in
building the system in place. The worst case probably is a
place like the Port of Long Beach, that has completely
privatized its security. It has no sworn policemen providing
patrol over the terminals and no water patrol. The problem with
that is you cannot share intelligence, law enforcement
intelligence, even law enforcement sensitive information, with
a private rent-a-cop security firm.
So we go up to better levels where, as in Admiral
Larrabee's case we will talk, he has somebody who is cleared to
the security and so forth. But this is a huge problem.
But in general the ports, as I have heard traveling around
the country, they are starved of any useful intelligence
information to allow them to plan. Admiral Larrabee I am sure
can talk to that more directly.
Admiral Larrabee. Well, first of all, in terms of security,
I think since September, particularly with the heightened
awareness, there has been what I would call sort of a
grassroots attempt to create some guidelines for security. We
are holding our tenants to a much higher standard than we were
in September, but we are doing that through more of our bully
pulpit than we are in terms of being able to really regulate
that.
That is where these Federal standards are so critical. We
need to establish minimal Federal standards for port security.
That has to do with access and this whole question of access
control. It has to do with establishing secure areas. It has to
do with minimal levels of physical security.
So I think that is the other dimension of the Federal
legislation, which we are all anxious to see. Until we do that
and until we do a reasonable standardized vulnerability
assessment, many of these questions and the actions that will
be taken are difficult to answer.
Chairman Byrd. Do you know of any effort by the Office of
Homeland Security to assess the steps required to improve this
situation?
Dr. Flynn. Yes, Mr. Chairman, there are steps. The Inter-
Agency Commission on Container Security was anointed by
Governor Ridge. The Department of Transportation and the
Customs Service were given the job of co-chairing it. It was
convened in early January and they issued a confidential
report, a classified report, in early February. I have not been
privy to what is the outgrowth of that.
There is a Rear Admiral Brian Peterman who is detailed from
the Coast Guard, who was given the responsibility in Governor
Ridge's office to manage this issue and oversee the issue.
Obviously, that office is overwhelmed by what they are trying
to cope with.
Chairman Byrd. ``That office'' meaning what office?
Dr. Flynn. The Office of Homeland Security. They are
completely overwhelmed with the challenges that confront them.
So most of these issues have been delegated back down to the
agencies, who frankly tend to put old wine in new bottles. They
to some extent dumbed down the problem so that they can fit it
within their jurisdictional control and step out quickly on it.
The concern I have about not taking the more holistic
inter-agency approach on this is that we have got a clock
ticking. One is that if we do not solve the hard problems
something bad is going to happen, but when it happens we are
going to then have two problems. One, we are going to have to
solve the hard problem after the fact, but we are going to do
it with diminished Government legitimacy as the American people
say: What have you been doing the last 8 months or 9 months, or
whatever the terrorists give us.
Chairman Byrd. Have ports or nuclear facilities been given
any time lines or benchmarks for assessing their
vulnerabilities as part of a national homeland defense plan?
Can anyone answer that question?
Mr. Benjamin. As far as nuclear facilities are concerned,
the afternoon of September 11th we went into our highest state
of security level. Again, as I mentioned in my oral remarks, we
have a mature framework in terms of our security program. In
essence, that resulted in some very quick actions being taken
to harden access to the site and to really make sure we knew
the comings and goings at the site.
Since then the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued a
number of advisories culminating in the orders we received in
February. Now, we are aware that the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission has been in consultation with Homeland Security. We,
the industry, have also been in consultation with Homeland
Security. So from that standpoint, we believe that our response
and the additional security efforts that we have undertaken
have been done in largely an integrated manner. I know it has
been done consistently across the industry.
Chairman Byrd. Would anyone else like to comment on that
question?
Admiral Larrabee. Mr. Chairman, immediately after the
attack on the World Trade Center the Port of New York and New
Jersey was closed. Over the next day and a half, through the
cooperation of Customs and the Coast Guard and INS and several
other Federal and State agencies, we established procedures to
reopen the port on the 13th, on the morning of the 13th. Those
procedures involved the inspection of all vessels, the
inspection of cargo and crew manifests, the riding of the
vessel into the port with tugs accompanying the vessel. We did
not allow any foreign crews to go ashore. A variety of these
measures put in place on the shore side with more inspections,
more container inspections.
We saw a tremendous influx in resources during that first
month. Since that period of time, those resources have pretty
much degraded back to normal levels as far as we can tell.
There have been some of those procedures kept in place, but,
very simply put, we are still waiting for Federal standards
when it comes to both the requirements and the time lines.
Again, that is where we think that Federal legislation is so
critical.
Chairman Byrd. So in answer to the question, have ports or
nuclear facilities been given time lines or benchmarks for
assessing their vulnerabilities as part of a national homeland
defense plan, I read your answer as not being very positive.
Admiral Larrabee. I am afraid that is the case.
Chairman Byrd. Admiral Larrabee, fully 25 percent of our
Nation's gross domestic product is derived from international
trade. Ninety-five percent of that trade passes through our
seaports. Over 6 million metal containers enter our ports every
year, any one of which could contain a weapon of mass
destruction or a toxic substance designed to disrupt our ports.
If one wants to disrupt our economy, our ports would seem
to be outstanding targets. Last year this committee provided
$93 million in direct grants for our public port authorities to
enhance their security efforts. We envisioned that
appropriation as an initial down payment. But the
administration is now proposing that this grant program be
terminated in 2003, despite the fact that they received $700
million in applications for that $93 million.
Admiral, do you believe that the public port authorities
can fully meet their security needs without some measure of
Federal assistance?
Admiral Larrabee. No, sir, I do not.
Chairman Byrd. Do you believe that the more than $600
million in immediate security enhancements that the
Transportation Department will not be able to fund this year
will instead be funded from State or local sources?
Admiral Larrabee. Mr. Chairman, I think many of those
initiatives will not be funded at all.
Chairman Byrd. Can the ports just increase their rates to
fund all of their security needs?
Admiral Larrabee. Right now in the Port of New York and New
Jersey, we were focused on the 10th of September and have
gotten back to a focus on building the port of the 21st
century. We have cited statistics today about cargo, but, very
simply, in the next 10 years we are going to see the amount of
cargo coming through our port doubling. In order to keep up
with that demand, we have got to dramatically increase the
capacity of our port to handle that. Right now, in our
situation, with all of the other requirements for funding,
particularly in rebuilding lower Manhattan, our financial
future is somewhat at risk. Our ability to fund redevelopment
in the port and now huge costs in security I think will
overwhelm my agency.
Dr. Flynn. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add, what we are
talking about here, just as I had proposed or it had been
proposed for the port of Long Beach and L.A., the fact that you
have to go 15 miles inland to do an inspection if you target a
container, the proposal that port has to develop, adapt a U.S.
Naval Reserve station into a combined inspection facility right
in the port, away from where people are populated--it is a 10-
acre site--is a $25 million proposal.
I suspect that it is not going to get the money that the
TSA has available to it because there are a lot of other
competing projects. But if we cannot--that is a port that 44
percent of all the boxes come in. Admiral Larrabee's port is
the number 1 port on the east coast. And we are spending $200
million a month on aviation screening.
Chairman Byrd. Mr. Errico, am I pronouncing your name
correctly?
Mr. Errico. ``AIR-ee-koe.''
Chairman Byrd. The President's fiscal year 2003 budget
includes only $20 million for water infrastructure security
vulnerability studies and nothing for actually building
security improvements. You have testified that there is a $4
billion need for security improvements for our Nation's
drinking water and waste water systems and $450 million for
vulnerability assessments.
In your opinion, does the President's 2003 budget miss the
mark by underfunding water infrastructure security, thus
risking both the safety and the cleanliness of our water
supply?
Mr. Errico. Yes, I do. There is no way the facilities can
fund what is going to be necessary as a result of the 9/11
events, either with increases in rates or any other feasible
way, without Federal assistance.
Chairman Byrd. Let me close by thanking you gentlemen for
your patience and for staying with us this length of time. You
made an excellent collective contribution. Individually each of
you has performed here admirably and you have rendered a great
service to the committee and to the American people. I hope
that we can respond on this committee accordingly.
Closing statement of Chairman Robert C. Byrd
Part of the genius of the American Constitution can be
found in its brevity. Here it is in my hand. This little book
contains not only the U.S. Constitution and all of the
signatories thereof, but it also contains the Declaration of
Independence and the signatories thereof. What a magnificent
piece of work! It is awesome.
I never hesitate to marvel at the practical genius of these
men who wrote that Constitution. It is short and its shortness
has allowed for flexibility and adaptation over the years. The
founders were not writing a bureaucratic treatise. They were
creating a framework for the ages. Their genius is underlined
by the adaptability they built into the structure of a new
Government, born of turmoil and most certainly destined to
encounter the whims of radical change in the future.
In concept, we are faced with a challenge not unlike that
of the framers as they sought to revise the Articles of
Confederation. They had lived under the Articles of
Confederation. They had experienced the shortcomings and the
weaknesses of the Articles. We need to think of restructuring
old mechanisms if we are to seriously endeavor to protect our
homeland to survive in a changed and volatile world.
September 11 raised heretofore unthinkable issues for this
Nation. Although we had been warned about the possibility of a
terrorist attack on our own soil for years by commissions,
academics, and pundits, we did not believe in our national
heart of hearts that it could happen here. We were too strong,
we were too civilized, we were too geographically distant from
the chaotic world of suicide bombers and religious iconoclasts
to ever face terrorism on our own soil. We were a rich nation,
we were well-armed, we were powerful. We were safe on our own
soil.
And then disaster struck. The Towers fell. Men and women
lost their lives. All of our preconceived notions of safety and
insulation from the capricious whims of madmen fell with them.
We had taken it all so much for granted.
I had never dreamed, almost 80 years ago when I was selling
the Cincinnati Post in a little coal town in southern West
Virginia, we had never dreamed that this could happen. We took
it all so much for granted--our prosperity, our security, our
special status in the world, our smug, egotistical opinions of
ourselves.
We responded quickly, to our credit, in the way that
Americans do respond so well, with herculean volunteer efforts
and quick infusions of cash by the Congress. Within 3 days,
this Congress, the People's Branch, appropriated $40 billion--
$40 for every minute since Jesus Christ was born. And a great
deal of confidence-building rhetoric from the White House.
Now we are 7 months out from the tragedy of September 11
and we have had time to form a clearer image of the challenges
before us. What has become apparent after the settling of the
dust of the turmoil is that we have no organized way of
actually dealing with terrorist attacks on our own soil. The
usual bureaucratic structures for running our huge Nation in
times of peace or even in times of conventional warfare do not
work when it comes to dealing with the chaos caused by terror
attacks on our homeland.
We have relied on conventional mechanisms. We have spent
little effort contemplating what must be changed. We have asked
the brave firefighters, the courageous policemen at the local
level to be at the ready to respond. Yet, we have
incomprehensibly withheld many of the essential tools that they
need to assist them.
We have seen the holes in our public health system when
faced with anthrax attacks in the mail. Yet, surge capacity in
our hospitals, personnel trained in recognizing rare diseases,
and vaccines to treat those diseases are still months, if not
years, away.
We have heard in this very room here, within these four
walls, over the past 48 hours a plethora of basic problems for
those on the ground, from incompatible broadcast and
communications systems to security clearances mired in
bureaucratic redtape to National Guard troops stretched thin
and in some cases expected to guard areas without arms.
We have heard tales of little or no real direction from the
Federal Government in assessing risk and pinpointing
vulnerabilities. We have heard from experts on terrorism that
our vulnerabilities can be easily exploited, using little money
and weapons fashioned from readily available sources. We have
been given a picture of valiant efforts by good citizens, but
little real thought from the Federal Government about
coordination, prevention of duplication and waste, or effective
use of resource sharing.
We will learn more, but one thing has begun to clearly
emerge: We are not prepared. We are still very vulnerable. In
many instances, 7 months out from the horrors of September
11th, we have not even started to spend funds placed in the
pipeline just days after the attacks. I know, because this
committee put those funds in the pipeline.
We must act and act quickly to address these new
challenges. This will mean rising above the usual bureaucratic
turf battles, figuring out how to address a problem that
crosses the jurisdictions of departments and agencies, building
a new flexibility into our solidified Government structures,
thinking about Federal, State, and local relations in a new
way.
Our challenge is huge. It is not just to prepare, it is
also to prevent. It is not just to respond, it is also to
coordinate. Our leaders will have to be wise enough to take
every step needed to protect our citizens without infringing on
their liberties. But we will also have to provide new
technological tools to guard our borders and protect our
essential infrastructure.
We on this committee are appropriators. I have been here 44
years on this committee, doing our job as appropriators. It is
not in our usual domain to legislate to repair planning and
organizational deficiencies. But it is our duty to point out
the deficiencies where we can and to offer help and to urge
action, and it is our duty to try to see that the hard-earned
tax dollar of the American taxpayer does what it is intended to
do and that it is not wasted. When the funding is of such
paramount importance as providing for the defense of our
homeland, that duty becomes sacred.
It is obvious that the Office of Homeland Security, as
crafted in the aftermath of 9/11, is not now suited to the
long-term challenge of protecting this enormous, diverse, and
very open society. I do not fault anyone for this. We are 7
months away from the most devastating domestic emergency in our
history, and we are now in a better position to more clearly
assess our needs.
You have been helpful to us, each of you. Each of you has
done your duty today in helping your elected representatives
here in the Senate to better understand our needs, and in
helping us to clearly assess our needs.
But I do have to fault the Executive Branch for digging in,
for clinging to a concept that is proving to be more and more
inadequate, for thinking that a spokesman-adviser is enough to
address an enormous managerial, tactical, and strategic
problem.
It is important to focus on defense abroad, but we have to
focus also on the defense of our own streets and alleys and
highways and waterways and nuclear facilities and the many,
many other facilities.
There is too much at stake to allow the Office of Homeland
Security to continue in an unstructured and unaccountable
fashion. Small meetings behind closed doors, individual
briefings, these are not enough. The American people have ears
and eyes and they need to see and hear what is being discussed,
what is being advised in their name, and how the taxpayers'
moneys are to be spent.
After 2 days of testimony, I think it is clear that
Congress should move forward to make this office, the Office of
Homeland Security, a Cabinet level office with clear
responsibility and authority. Senator Stevens and I have
repeatedly requested an opportunity to hear Director Ridge's
views on homeland security. There has not been any partisanship
shown here. I have not threatened any action. I have continued
to work with my colleagues on my right and left here in both
parties in an attempt to have Mr. Ridge voluntarily appear
before this Appropriations Committee.
We are not interested in hearing anything about Mr. Ridge's
private conversations with the President. There is nothing
secret that we need to hear from him. All that we ask is that
he voluntarily appear before this committee. Senator Stevens
and I have worked arm in arm in the effort to have informed
testimony recorded before our committee. Nothing has been
partisan.
After 2 days of testimony which has raised many new and
very disturbing questions, the essential nature of that formal
testimony has been underlined in red. This committee is charged
with funding the people's needs. It is clear from these
hearings that we need much more information to do that in a way
that is effective, effective in accomplishing the goal of
homeland security. Homeland security, security for whom?
Security for the American people, security for their
institutions.
The people are owed an explanation by the Director of
Homeland Security about how he would correct the glaring
deficiencies in our patchwork web of protection and response.
If the White House wants $38 billion for this effort, this
committee needs to hear much more about the way in which it is
to be spent in order to give this Nation, in order to give the
people of this country, maximum and effective protection from
terrorist attacks.
We will continue these hearings and we will renew our
invitation to Director Ridge to come before the committee. He
has been a Governor. He has been a member of the House of
Representatives. I am sure that Governor Ridge understands the
need for this testimony. I have a feeling that Governor Ridge
would be very willing to come if told to do so by the President
of the United States.
So we will continue these hearings. May this administration
have the wisdom to direct Governor Ridge to come before this
committee, and may we all have the wisdom and the courage to do
whatever is necessary to protect our homeland.
I have heard a lot of testimony during my 50 years in
Congress. I have heard a lot of testimony in my 44 years on
this Appropriations Committee, and none has exceeded in its
importance the testimony, the information that has been given
to this committee over the past 2 days. Woodrow Wilson said
that the informing function of Congress was just as important
as the legislative function, and you, the witnesses, have
contributed to that. I have been impressed by the degree of
detail in which you have enmeshed yourselves and the dedication
that you have shown.
Let me just from the bottom of my heart, on behalf of all
our committee members, we once again thank each of you for your
patience. I know you are tired. I am tired. But we are all
working in the interests of the United States of America. May
God always bless this great country. Thank you.
ADDITIONAL SUBMITTED STATEMENTS
[Clerk's Note.--Subsequent to the conclusion of the
hearings, the committee has received several statements which
will be inserted in the record at this point.]
Prepared Statement of Colleen M. Kelley, National President, National
Treasury Employees Union
Chairman Byrd, Ranking Member Stevens, distinguished members of the
Committee, I would like to thank the Committee for the opportunity to
include my written comments regarding homeland security.
As President of the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), I
have the honor of leading a union which represents over 12,000 Customs
employees who are stationed at 301 ports of entry across the United
States. Customs inspectors and canine enforcement officers make up our
nation's first line of defense in the wars on terrorism and drugs. In
addition, Customs personnel are responsible for ensuring compliance
with hundreds of import laws and regulations, as well as stemming the
flow of illegal contraband such as child pornography, illegal arms,
weapons of mass destruction and laundered money.
With a fiscal year 2002 budget of approximately $3.1 billion and
over 18,500 employees, the U.S. Customs Service continues to be the
Nation's premier border agency. The U.S. Customs Service interdicts
more drugs than any other agency and ensures that all goods and persons
entering and exiting the United States do so in compliance with over
400 U.S. laws and regulations at 301 points of entry across the
country. Customs is also a revenue collection agency, collecting an
estimated $25 billion in revenue on over 25 million entries involving
over $1.3 trillion in international trade every year.
One of the most discussed ideas being debating on the topic of
enhancing border and port-of-entry security, is the idea of border
agency consolidation. The most talked about border agency consolidation
proposal would combine the Customs Service, INS and the Border Patrol
into one agency under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice. I
find this proposal to be extremely troubling.
One of the keys to operating any government agency is sound
organization. It can ensure that problems reach their proper level of
decision quickly and efficiently. More importantly, good organization
helps assure accountability. Unfortunately, a border agency
consolidation plan that would put the Customs Service under the
jurisdiction of the Department of Justice would not improve, but
exacerbate current border problems. The Justice Department has
consistently shown that is has a poor record of accountability and
lacks a sound organizational structure with regard to the two border
security agencies currently under its jurisdiction, the INS and the
Border Patrol.
Most recently, the INS notified flight schools of the approval of
student visas for two of the September 11 hijackers six months after
the terrorist attacks. The INS also mistakenly allowed four suspected
Pakistani terrorists into the country without proper documentation and
they cannot now be found. I would have to respectfully disagree with
the view that consolidating the Customs Service with INS and the Border
Patrol will achieve the goals of sound organization, accountability and
enhanced border and port security, especially if the consolidation
takes place within the Justice Department.
Consolidating these three organizations would also cause logistical
and institutional chaos. It would take attention away from critical
homeland security priorities. Yes, all three of these organizations
deal with front line border and port security, but in very different
capacities. Each of these agency's missions are unique and should
remain in their current structure. Ignoring each agency's fields of
expertise will lead to losing that expertise.
For example, Customs is charged with preventing contraband from
entering the United States as well as preventing terrorists from using
commercial or private transportation venues of international trade for
smuggling explosives or weapons of mass destruction into or out of the
United States. Customs personnel use advanced manifest information on
goods to improve targeting systems to detect questionable shipments as
well as deploying state of the art inspection technology at land
borders, airports and seaports. Customs personnel also use advanced
computer systems to compare international passenger information against
law enforcement databases on a passenger-by-passenger basis to detect
possible terrorists or criminals.
Whereas, the Border Patrol's primary mission is the detection and
prevention of illegal entry into the United States between ports of
entry, the INS is tasked with the deterrence of unlawful entry of
persons into the United States as well as facilitating lawful entry of
persons entering the United States at ports of entry.
The Customs Service is also responsible for collecting over $25
billion in trade revenue each year. The structure of the Department of
Justice has nothing to do with revenue collection or trade
facilitation, two main missions of the U.S. Customs Service. Adding
revenue collection and trade facilitation responsibilities to the
Department of Justice's mission would create a logistical mess and make
it more difficult for U.S. companies that import and export goods.
Another popular argument in favor of consolidation involves the
perceived lack of intelligence sharing between border security
agencies. As any expert involved in law enforcement operations will
tell you, the routine sharing of tactical intelligence is critical to
all law enforcement operations, especially agencies tasked with border
security. Since September 11, Customs and INS receive FBI intelligence
briefings. These briefings should have happened on a regular basis
before September 11, but these briefings demonstrate that consolidation
isn't necessary to improve intelligence sharing.
While some work still needs to be done in the area of cooperation
and coordination of intelligence, all three agencies involved with
border security functions have been working together as part of
Intelligence Collection and Analysis Teams (ICATs). These teams have
been created throughout the country to analyze smuggling trends and
concealment methods, and to quickly disseminate intelligence to all
ports of entry and Border Patrol checkpoints. These ICATs are comprised
of Customs Inspectors and Agents, INS agents, INS analysts and, the
U.S. Border Patrol as well as local law enforcement in some cases.
In Customs' case, no one doubts that the level of conveyances,
cargo and passengers has increased dramatically over the last five
years, but unfortunately its resources have not kept pace. Traffic
volume at U.S. land ports-of-entry has steadily increased as our shared
borders with Mexico and Canada have become more open as a result of the
NAFTA and other initiatives. The steady increase in non-commercial
traffic has led to increased congestion and backups at many land ports-
of-entry, particularly those along the Southwest border. Nearly 68
percent of non-commercial vehicles that enter the United States entered
at land ports-of-entry along the Southwest border. Wait times along the
Southwest border often extend to 45 minutes or more during peak hours.
Such lengthy delays can be both irritating and costly to businesses and
the traveling public. The lack of resources at ports-of-entry is also a
problem along the Northern Border as well as seaports. The events of
September 11 brought attention to the fact that the Northern Border and
the nations' seaports have long been neglected in terms of personnel
and resources.
In fact, Customs recent internal review of staffing, known as the
Resource Allocation Model or R.A.M. shows that Customs needed over
14,7776 new hires just to fulfill its basic mission and that was before
September 11. What Customs needs in order to be successful and to
continue to carry out its recently expanded mission of homeland
security is greater funding.
For instance, with increased funding, modern technologies, such as
Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems (VACIS), which send gamma rays
through the aluminum walls of shipping containers and vehicles to
enable Customs inspectors to check for illegal drugs or weapons of mass
destruction, could be acquired. However, adequate and consistent
funding to purchase, operate and maintain these technologies has not
been forthcoming. There have been a number of instances around the
country where multi-million dollar VACIS x-ray machines have sat unused
because of the lack of funding available for Customs personnel to
operate the machines. Other technologies, coupled with proper personnel
funding, such as portable contraband detectors (a.k.a. Busters),
optical fiber scopes and laser range finders can be invaluable to
Customs personnel protecting our borders from terrorists and illegal
drugs.
The President's fiscal year 2003 budget requests a funding level of
$3.18 billion and 19,628 FTEs for the United States Customs Service.
This request represents a token increase from last year's
appropriations. NTEU feels that this budget is simply inadequate to
meet the needs of Customs personnel, especially in light of the
incidents surrounding September 11th.
In 2001, Customs Service employees seized over 1.7 million pounds
of cocaine, heroin, marijuana and other illegal narcotics--including
over 9.5 million tablets of Ecstasy, triple the amount seized in 1999.
Customs also processed over 497 million travelers last year, including
1 million cars and trucks and over $1.3 trillion worth of trade. These
numbers continue to grow annually. Over the last decade trade has
increased by 137 percent. It has become very clear that funding must be
substantially increased in order to allow Customs to meet the
challenges of the future, especially as Customs continues to have
significantly higher workloads and increased threats along America's
borders.
Yet, despite the increased threats of terrorism, the dramatic
increases in trade resulting from NAFTA, and new drug smuggling
challenges, the Customs Service has confronted its rapidly increasing
workload and homeland security mission with relatively static staffing
levels and resources. In the last ten years, there have not been
adequate increases in staffing levels for inspectional personnel and
import specialists (the employees who process legitimate trade) to
successfully conduct their missions.
The recent deployment of over 700 National Guard troops to our
borders clearly shows the need for more Customs personnel. Currently,
the National Guard troops are unarmed, which not only puts the Customs
inspectors' lives in danger but that of the National Guard as well. In
fact, a number of drug seizure cases have had to be dismissed because
of the improper discovery and handling of illegal drugs by National
Guard troops. These troops need to be removed from the borders and
quickly replaced with highly trained Customs personnel.
Last year, Congress acknowledged the shortage of staffing and
resources by appropriating $245 million for Customs staffing and
technology needs for both the Northern and Southwest Borders in the
Department of Defense appropriations. We urge this Congress to again
increase the funds available for additional inspectors and equipment in
areas around the country that are experiencing the severe shortages.
NTEU would also ask Congress to work to provide funding for the Customs
Service in the fiscal year 2002 emergency supplemental appropriation,
despite the Administration's request, which called for no
appropriations for the U.S. Customs Service.
In addition to appropriations, Customs also receives funds from the
COBRA account. This user fee account funds all inspectors and canine
enforcement officers' overtime pay as well as approximately 1,100
Customs positions across the country. This account is funded with user
fees collected from air/sea passengers except from the Caribbean and
Mexico, commercial vehicles, commercial vessels/barges and rail cars.
The history of collections and obligations for COBRA over the last
5 years shows a significant drawing down of reserve money available in
the COBRA fund for overtime and additional positions, to the point
where a significant ($40 to $60 million) shortfall could be expected in
2002. Customs anticipates collecting approximately $300 million in
COBRA fees during fiscal year 2002, well below the $350 million they
project in COBRA obligations during fiscal year 2002.
To help remedy this problem, the President's fiscal year 2003
budget proposes to temporarily increase two COBRA fees to raise an
additional $250 million for personnel overtime and resource needs. The
first involves the international air passenger fee, which would be
raised from $5.00 to $11.00. The second fee increase involves the
cruise vessel passenger fee, which would be raised from $1.75 to $2.00.
Unfortunately, Congress has been extremely reluctant to raise these
fees in the past, so it is unlikely that this additional money will
ever materialize. The Appropriations Committee must make sure that this
$250 million is appropriated so that the Customs Service can continue
its critically important work.
The COBRA fund will expire on September 30, 2003, unless it is
reauthorized by Congress before then. However, the President's fiscal
year 2003 budget does not call for the reauthorization of COBRA. COBRA
must be reauthorized or Congress must appropriate additional funds to
make up for the loss of the user fees.
Another issue that I would like to address is law enforcement
status for Customs Inspectors and Canine Enforcement. The U.S. Customs
Service Inspectors and Canine Enforcement Officers continue to be the
nation's first line of defense against terrorism and the smuggling of
illegal drugs and contraband at our borders and ports. Customs Service
Inspectors have the authority to apprehend and detain those engaged in
terrorism, drug smuggling and violations of other civil and criminal
laws. For example, it was Customs Inspectors who stopped a terrorist
attack planned for New Years Day 2000 by identifying and capturing a
terrorist with bomb making material as he tried to enter the country at
Port Angeles, Washington.
Canine Enforcement Officers and Inspectors carry weapons, and three
times a year they must qualify and maintain proficiency on a firearm
range. Yet, they do not have law enforcement officer status. They are
being denied the benefits given to their colleagues who they have been
working beside to keep our country safe. Customs employees face real
dangers on a daily basis, granting them law enforcement officer status
would be an appropriate and long overdue step in recognizing the
tremendous contribution Customs personnel make to protecting our
borders from terrorism and drugs.
There are currently bills before Congress, H.R. 1841 and S. 1935,
that would grant law enforcement status to appropriate Customs
personnel. NTEU asks all members of the committee to cosponsor these
very important pieces of legislation.
The American public expects its borders to be properly defended.
The government must show the public that it is serious about protecting
the borders by fully funding the agencies tasked with defending the
borders and laws of the United States. No organizational structure
change will be successful, no matter how good it may look on paper, if
the government does not provide proper funding for its border security
agencies.
Thank you for the opportunity to share NTEU's thoughts on this very
important issue. I look forward to working with the Committee on this
and many other issues related to homeland security.
Prepared Statement of Victor L. Lechtenberg, Chair, National
Agricultural Research, Extension, Education, and Economics Advisory
Board
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I would like to extend
my appreciation for the opportunity to submit this written testimony on
the issue of biosecurity. My name is Victor Lechtenberg and I am the
current chair of the National Agricultural Research, Extension,
Education and Economics Advisory Board (Advisory Board) created by
Congress as part of the 1996 Farm Bill and the Dean of Agriculture at
Purdue University.
The United States' agriculture sector accounts for about 20 percent
of the country's Gross National Product and 25 percent of our export
market. The system is vulnerable to biosecurity breaches such as the
introduction of a plant or animal disease, which could substantially
damage our nation's and the world's food supply and significantly
impact our economy.
There are four things that we must do to protect the United States'
agricultural production and food supply system from biosecurity
threats: (1) develop rapid detection systems, (2) determine the genetic
composition of pathogens known to have been the target of biological
warfare research, (3) develop plant and animal resistance to these
pathogens, including vaccines, and (4) implement communication and
education programs about biosecurity across the food and agricultural
system and throughout our nation's communities.
While there are limited data on the potential cost of an
intentional attack on the production and food supply system, there can
be no doubt that it would be strategically planned to create maximum
damage. USDA has estimated that a single-site outbreak of Foot and
Mouth Disease could cost $10 billion.
One thing the experts agree on is that the cost of an animal or
plant disease outbreak is directly proportional to the time it takes to
diagnose the disease. The longer diagnosis takes, the further the
disease could spread, increasing the likelihood of extensive losses in
both production and exports due to sanctions against the United States.
Rapid detection of chemical, biological, and environmental threats
is critical, whether those threats are against humans, livestock and
crops, or food. While a terrorist attack on livestock or crops may not
threaten human life, the long-term economic impact could be
devastating. And contamination of the food supply would put consumers
at risk. Work is already being done on small-scale sensors such as
protein chips, which are being developed to detect pathogenic organisms
that cause food poisoning. It will take several years to develop low-
cost, real-time sensors so we can contain and eradicate any
contamination or disease as soon as possible. We need a concentrated
effort to develop these systems as quickly as possible. Several new
technologies hold great promise in this arena.
There are a number of animal and plant diseases which have been the
target of biological warfare research since World War II, including
anthrax, brucellosis, glanders, rinderpest, Newcastle disease, fowl
plague, late blight of potato, rice blast, brown spot of rice, Southern
blight, and wheat rusts. DNA sequencing and genomic characterization of
these known biological warfare agents would be invaluable to devising
prevention strategies, developing new sensors for rapid detection, and
creating vaccines and resistant strains and hybrids. This sequencing
can be done in less than a year at modest cost. It should be undertaken
immediately.
In addition, a number of scientists across the nation are already
working on developing resistance to naturally-occurring strains of
these pathogens, and their research could be useful in developing
genetic resistance to more virulent forms of those pathogens. We should
also undertake an effort to develop broad-spectrum vaccines that would
protect against infection and help contain any disease outbreak.
Finally, it is important that we implement effective communication
and education programs on biosecurity. Industry, commodity, research
and regulatory groups told a recent Advisory Board meeting they are
mobilizing for potential terrorist threats but they need government
leadership for coordination, research, education and policy to meet the
urgent needs. We must empower Extension educators, veterinarians,
producers and others who are most likely to be able to detect and
diagnose disease outbreaks early and guide rational public response. As
local leaders they are our trusted first line of defense against a
large-scale disease outbreak that would threaten agricultural
production, exports, and the food supply.
We already have in place the Extension Disaster Education Network
(EDEN), a collaboration of Extension systems in 38 states and Puerto
Rico, with a liaison office at USDA. EDEN's mission is to help
Extension staff be better prepared to deal with all types of emergency
management issues including homeland security. Extension specialists
and educators at the local level are already active in the research and
technology transfer related to plant and animal disease management.
EDEN is encouraging these researchers and educators to be sensitive to
plant and animal biosecurity and many Extension systems are already
developing training activities.
The events of September 11 have caused all of us to take a long,
hard look at the world around us. The issues of biosecurity are not new
to agriculture, but they have taken on new meaning. Strong research and
education efforts in biosecurity will help us protect our food,
agriculture, and natural resource system. The terrorist attacks
underscore the importance of having the research, technology, education
and coordination systems in place to counter terrorism of all kinds,
including threats to the food and agriculture system.
Thank you for the opportunity to share these thoughts with you.
Prepared Statement of the National Association of State Universities
and Land-Grant Colleges
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, it is my pleasure to submit
to you testimony regarding the fiscal year 2003 budget. I am commenting
on behalf of the National Association of State Universities and Land-
Grant Colleges, Board on Agriculture Assembly.
There is one critical issue facing the United States today that
brings us before you, the need to secure the United States from a
biological attack and the attendant concerns related to the security of
the U.S. food production system. In addition to jeopardizing public
health and safety, biological attacks on the U.S. agricultural sector
would cause our nation and the world's food supply substantial damage,
and undermine the U.S. economy. U.S. agricultural exports alone reached
$50.9 billion in fiscal year 2002. As noted in a study issued by the
Department of Defense in January of 2001:
``The potential threats to U.S. agriculture and livestock can come
from a variety of pathogens and causative agents. With one in eight
jobs and 13 percent of the gross national product dependent on U.S.
agricultural productivity, economic stability of the country depends on
a bountiful and safe food supply system. Similar to the human
population, the high health status of crop and livestock assets in the
U.S. creates a great vulnerability to attack with biological agents.''
The President's fiscal year 2003 proposal provides more than $6
billion across several federal agencies to address biosecurity issues.
Unfortunately, very little of this proposed investment is targeted to
address the homeland security issues facing agriculture, our food
production, natural resources, distribution system, or our rural and
urban communities. We fully recognize that there is an immediate need
to address public health, defense and law enforcement homeland security
issues. However, it is just as important and just as urgent that
protect our food production and distribution system. It is important
not to alarm the public or our trading partners unnecessarily. It is
even more important to take the immediate and straightforward steps
that will ensure that there is no tampering with our food supply
system.
The Land-Grant University (LGU) system is unique in the world in
that it was designed to work in partnership with the federal, state and
local agencies. We were designed to address national issues at the
state and local level. This partnership is critical in providing the
science base and education outreach programs that are uniquely
important in food production and distribution. This same distributed
network will be critical in addressing homeland security needs. Our
universities provide much of the innovative research and have the
science knowledge base regarding biological pathogens that could impact
the food production system and natural resources. Our Cooperative
Extension System provides a network of personnel in every county of the
country, with staff that are already trained to work with local
community leaders to plan and respond to natural and civic disasters,
as well as years of experience designing and implementing education
programs for producers, processors, and consumers. The LGU system's
premier teaching facilities can also educate the next generation of
scientists about agro-security. It is imperative that the security
issues facing our food production system be addressed. It is essential
that the existing distributed information and outreach system that
resides within the Land-grant universities be harnessed and integrated
into the efforts of all federal agencies seeking to collaborate with
rural communities.
I respectfully offer the following testimony to describe the bridge
between land-grant research and extension activities and the health
sciences, security, and emergency management conducted by other federal
agencies. I will also offer ways in which the land-grant universities
could be a valuable resource in the federal, state, and local
government solution to coordinating and conducting the prevention and
response to biosecurity threats.
CAPABILITIES OF THE LAND-GRANT UNIVERSITY SYSTEM
The federal government created the LGU System in 1862 and is
anchored in every state and U.S. territory. In partnership with the
local, state, and federal governments, the LGU System addresses
national issues at the local level. Central to the LGU System are the
State Agricultural Experiment Stations (SAES) that conduct research and
the Cooperative Extension Service (CES) that builds provides outreach
from the university to our communities across the country.
SAES, with over 10,000 highly specialized researchers, has for
years engaged in research that is relevant to protecting the nations
food production, processing and distribution system from acts of
terrorism. CES has an established presence in communities across the
country with 3,150 local offices that continuously manages and controls
emergencies, particularly natural disasters. CES' unique capacity to
self-evaluate its program effectiveness constantly improves agriculture
and community safety. Moreover, multi-institutional/multi-state
procedures for coordinating the research of SAES and integrated
activities with CES are already in place, ready for immediate
engagement.
What must Agriculture Experiment Stations and the Cooperative
Extension System do to Enhance Agro-security?
Address Immediate Security Needs
Securing Experiment Station Research
Research results and data are often openly communicated and stored
electronically via electronic posting and web sites and could be easily
used to locate and abuse hazardous materials. SAES and federal research
laboratories must develop protocols to safeguard this information while
keeping necessary information and communication channels open.
Furthermore, it will be important for state and federal officials
to be able to locate or track the location of these materials over
time. Recent questions about the location of anthrax samples in federal
laboratories demonstrate why this new level of security will be needed.
There should be a national list of potentially dangerous materials
inventoried across agricultural research facilities that would be
maintained and updated regularly and available to appropriate federal,
state and local emergency management agencies.
While laboratories should be secured, there should also be respect
for the information sharing between scientists. Legitimate
communication mechanisms and efforts should not be thwarted as a result
of the added security. Therefore, security plans should be made in
conjunction with SAES and federal laboratories to ensure the
continuation of secure and critical agricultural research and
communication.
Training Industry to Secure Their Operations
In a natural partnership with SAES, CES provides educational
programs to the private sector on how to secure their operations. As we
have sadly learned, equipment and materials such as fertilizers and
crop dusting planes can be used as bioweapons. Appropriate protocols
for securing these materials should be developed in collaboration with
USDA's Agricultural Research Service (ARS), the Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS), the Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS),
and other appropriate federal agencies.
Secure Communities
Producers, processors, suppliers, retailers, and consumers may one
day be the ``first responders'' to an agro-terrorist attack and thus
play a pivotal role in quickly containing contamination. CES agents
need to be trained to recognize possible threats and employ the
appropriate protocols for working with local and federal law
enforcement and health agencies. CES has a unique role to play in
training community leaders to prepare and plan for potential terrorist
activity. CES can help rural and urban communities, businesses and
farms develop tools to determine points of exposure and risk, so that
they can develop programs at the local level that best meet their
needs. Because rural communities are sparsely populated, the
infrastructure may not already exist to mitigate a disaster. Many of
the mitigation strategies will deal with preparedness and training of
community volunteers. With more research on disease vectors, these
communities could better shape both prevention and containment
strategies via vaccines and agents to neutralize and treat the effects
of disease outbreaks. CES has already developed a way to communicate
with and keep on the same page as partner agencies called the Extension
Disaster Education Network (EDEN). EDEN is a clearinghouse for
educational and related materials used for disaster mitigation. The
recovery process for communities and their constituents may require
sustained presence within the communities and the mobilization of
significant research resources.
Respond to emergency outbreaks
A purposeful biological attack on our plant and animal species
would probably spread quickly and from separate locations. Immediate
recognition that there is an unnatural outbreak of a disease in
multiple locations is critical if the spread of the disease is to be
contained. Although the food and fiber production process opens up many
opportunities for purposeful contamination, most existing safeguards
were not designed to protect against intentional attacks. Modeling and
communication tools need to be developed that would facilitate early
detection and recognition of unnatural outbreaks. The private sector,
the federal government, and the LGU System will need to develop new
standards and protocols to: improve detection and monitoring practices
such as enhanced border screening practices; develop a communication
system that alerts appropriate agencies and points of entry that a
problem may exist, with guidance on appropriate actions; improve the
ability to trace contamination back to its source; and enhance
communication networks with public health agencies, law enforcement
agencies and state and local officials.
The timing of the recognition and response is also critical. If a
purposeful introduction of a biological agent is recognized quickly,
the impact can be greatly reduced. A difference of several days can
mean the difference between curtailing a viral outbreak and losing
control over the spread of a contagion. As mentioned, with a lower
population base distributed across vast areas, rural America typically
lacks the infrastructure to recognize and respond to terrorist attacks.
Educate scientists, teachers and specialists
Who will provide the expertise for these efforts in the future? We
will need people whose education concentrates on security in
agriculture and natural resources. Courses or degrees in agricultural
security will be necessary. This kind of expertise currently does not
exist in institutions and initially will require outside expertise.
Institutions will require help to design long-term educational programs
that can provide the scientists and educators the ability to address
the issues of agricultural security.
linking the land-grant system with federal agencies
The LGU System offers across the broad experience with agricultural
security research and extension that lends itself to the purposes of
other federal agencies. The attached budget summary table links funding
requests from different agencies with biosecurity activities.
United States Department of Agriculture
The LGU System has a long historic relationship with USDA in
protecting our food production system. We are recommending a $212
million increase in new funding for USDA/CSREES to address agro-
security and food safety issues. The LGU have a historic working
relationship with USDA and our recommendations for agro-security
funding have been detailed in testimony submitted to the House and
Senate Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittees. While the LGU have
worked with each of the following federal agencies, we have not done so
in a systematic way, and so we provide more detailed description of
what our expanded cooperative efforts should include.
Department Of Defense
Science and Security: Linking SAES with National Agro-
Security Efforts
The LGU System proposes to develop new ways in which to collaborate
with the Department of Defense in order to engage the SAES and CES in
providing federal, state, and local governments with rapid access to
the best information and services for eliminating, avoiding or
mitigating domestic and foreign threats to national food systems and
U.S. agricultural production. The SAES could help to provide the
Department of Defense with support services in the following areas:
National advisory service for research site security; organization of
research facilities (domestic and international); strategic planning
facilitation; document services; research outcome reporting; resource
mobilization and allocations; financial accountability; information
security and confidentiality assurances; and rapid responses for
requested information.
Moreover, we recognize that certain data collection and monitoring
activities, threat assessments; interventions, and related training
activities are necessarily classified; and therefore, we propose
forming with others a partnership that would draw upon selected
(cleared) experts from the LGUs and from pools within intelligence and
law enforcement certain expertise to provide decision makers specific
support in the following areas:
--Security firewall for engaging the LGU expert community at large;
--Conduct, oversee and/or advise on classified data collection and
monitoring activities;
--Conduct, oversee, advise and/or participate in classified research
and assessments; and,
--Education and training programs for: First responders; incident
monitoring systems; diagnostic services providers; and, risk
and threat assessment resources.
Preparing Our Civil Defense
Since World War II, CES has worked with the military in our rural
communities to coordinate civil defense needs. The CES network could
heed the call once more to increase our civil defense, and prepare it
for biosecurity aspects through volunteer training programs conducted
in collaboration with the military. Additionally, CES has ongoing
family programming designed specifically for those families living on
military bases. CES could adapt these programs to discuss and address
potential biological threats to family security on military bases.
Funding
The costs of prevention are small relative to the cost of a
terrorist attack. Severe economic disruption could result to our
production, distribution and trade system, if we do not take
responsibility to act now. We are recommending a beginning funding
level of $171 million in fiscal year 2003 from the DOD for the
following purposes:
--$136 million to link land-grant research with DOD agro-security
issues;
--$76 million to collaborate in securing research facilities and
developing a system for appropriate security screening and
background checks for individuals with access to sensitive
materials; and
--$35 million to initiate CES technology transfer and networking
activities related to improved diagnostic and testing
technologies.
Federal Emergency Management Agency
FEMA is charged with working closely with state and local
governments and agencies to ensure their planning, training, and
equipment needs are addressed and to ensure that the response to
weapons of mass destruction threats is well organized. Stepping up the
partnership between CES and FEMA could improve the management of
emergency agro-terrorism situations by employing programs for risk
awareness, risk assessment, mitigation, and recovery.
Coordinated Emergency Planning and Training
CES has collaborated with FEMA for many years to manage and control
emergencies, although to date, most disasters have been natural such as
floods, storms, droughts and disease outbreaks. In addition, CES has
almost 100 years of experience in the recruiting, training, utilization
and management of volunteers. CES works with thousands of volunteers
every day, is familiar with all aspects of volunteer training and
management and has a reputation of being a ``volunteer organization''
in the community. Many of the volunteers seek more intensive training
through one or more of the ``master volunteer'' programs which target
specific community or program needs such as agro-terrorism mitigation.
As part of its emergency management work, CES created the Extension
Disaster Education Network (EDEN), a clearinghouse for educational and
related materials used for disaster mitigation. Most recently, CES
mounted a nationwide train-the-trainer program to prepare small and
rural communities and public and private organizations for Y2K. CES
trained hundreds of thousands of individuals, families, and private and
public organizations to manage the Y2K threat in little more than one
year.
Building on EDEN, CES could assist FEMA in ensuring that first
responders at all points in the food production system are well trained
in new technologies and techniques to improve emergency response
efforts. Such a program could involve training first responders and
citizen volunteers in biosecurity risk assessment and mitigation. The
program could have four parts: (1) risk awareness to inform communities
and leaders about the potential threats of terrorist activity; (2)
self-directed risk assessment that allows for flexibility required in
given community of producers, processors, retailers, and consumers; (3)
mitigation; and (4) recovery.
Awareness.--This training would inform communities and leaders of
the potential threats of terrorist activity including: likely
approaches of terrorists, materials that may be used and their
indicators, the symptoms of affected plants and animals, how materials
might spread, the contacts to identify or verify contamination, and the
ways in which the effects of materials manifest themselves in the
community. This training could occur based on specific information
about the nature of the threat and rapidly mobilized and disseminated
through pre-organized train-the-trainers networks, the CES
communications system, and local offices. Various state and federal
agencies could also be resources for this training.
Risk Assessment.--This would involve building self-directed risk
assessment instruments. These instruments would make it possible for
the communities, organizations and households that create them to
rapidly determine and prioritize points of exposure. Risk assessment
templates could be adapted to different types of threats and be used to
monitor the progress of the communities, determine the elements of the
communities involved, and determine where those who live in the
communities feel the most susceptible. The latter information would be
valuable in adding to the strategy for intervention and additional
training.
Mitigation.--With risk assessments made, the users of the
instrument are ready to deal with mitigation. What are the major areas
of risk? How do they vary within and among communities, what are the
efficient strategies, given the ``distribution'' of perceived and
actual risk? Many of the mitigation strategies would deal with
preparedness and training of community volunteers. Training
certifications could adapt to the changing nature of terrorist threats.
Using its close link with existing state and federal programs, CES
could leverage the distribution of the mitigation materials and
training. Volunteer and community leader trainings could be delivered
cooperatively with various state and federal agency staff.
Recovery.--The recovery process for communities may require
sustained presence within communities and the mobilization of
significant research resources. The recovery process may itself be
unknown and require close cooperation between the researchers and CES
staff working ``on the ground'' in impacted communities. The land grant
model that links strong research capacity with a field presence is
likely to be of value to all agencies involved.
In addition to the risk assessment training program, CES could also
develop education programs that would mitigate public health and
economic disruptions to rural communities from terrorist attacks. A key
example of a mitigation strategy is preparing individual families for
an agro-terrorist attack. Families need to have survival kits on
constant standby that would mitigate the effects of an attack. Should
an attack occur, they may need to know how long their food will stay
fresh in the refrigerator or how they can sustain their crops if
contaminated. In partnership with appropriate federal agencies, CES
could develop proper survival kits and train the families to implement
the survival tools in the case of a disaster.
Linking Research to Extension and Asking New Research
Questions
The State Agricultural Experiment Stations (SAES) within land-grant
colleges and universities have significant research capacity. The
researchers within the land-grant system are used to working with CES
and have established communication mechanisms about new technologies
and techniques. Thus, CES and the land-grants can be supportive of the
mitigation approaches and the identification of the materials that may
have been introduced by the terrorists. SAES is engaged in a breadth of
issues relating to technologies that would mitigate a disruption to
nation's food safety and economic health from a terrorist attack.
There are many key examples of how SAES could support mitigation
the effects of an agro-terrorist attack on rural communities. One topic
could delve into the extent of a community's social capital. Is there a
network of interested non-profits to address its community's particular
piece of counter-terrorism? Another topic would be determining the
impact on security by population variables. Demographics such as
ethnicity, religious beliefs, and income levels are critical pieces of
information in developing a mitigation plan for health and economic
disruptions. Finally, research would need to be done on how to retain
consumer trust. If there is a biological attack on the crops, consumers
might question the safety of their food. SAES could determine methods
that would alleviate these real or perceived fears.
Funding
To address emergency planning and training needs, the LGU system
recommends--
--a beginning funding level of $237 million in fiscal year 2003 to
incorporate biosecurity concerns into the emergency and
disaster education network, design and implement risk
management training programs, and train community leaders and
citizen volunteers
--$87.5 million for risk management education packages and training
--$50 million for research to improve identification and
intervention strategies and technologies
--$25 million for monitoring and evaluation of training program
results
--$75 million to enhance communication and education systems.
Health and Human Services
Agriculture production is inextricably linked to food safety and
public health. There is necessary overlap between the health and
agricultural sciences that should be reflected in the budget and in
research efforts.
Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)
HRSA functions on the frontlines of public health protection in
communities and will develop programs to address the emerging need for
public health emergency response teams in the event of a biological
attack. As part of HRSA, Health Centers provide public health education
in under-served communities. The Centers' effectiveness is due in part
to their ability to train and mobilize public health volunteers in
these communities. Such training programs will need to be expanded to
address new Homeland Security aspects such as biosecurity. With nearly
100 years of experience in recruiting, training, utilizing and managing
volunteers, CES can add to the Center's capacity to meet the Homeland
Security challenge. For decades, CES has successfully partnered with
FEMA to prepare communities and families to respond effectively during
natural disasters and can draw on this experience to collaborate with
the Centers in designing biosecurity-public health emergency response
plans. Health Centers also use volunteers to help assess operational
capability at the community level and then provide on-site support to
affected communities. CES could offer additional resources to the
Centers in this area as well. In many states, CES is the public gateway
to science-based information developed in academic disciplines across
the university. CES could engage its research and evaluation tools,
community planning experience, and facilitating skills in support of
community capacity building.
National Institutes of Health (NIH)
NIH is charged with promoting biomedical research, and other
scientific inquiries that may lead to medical advances, and will be the
lead research agency in the federal government's effort to fight
bioterrorism. Within NIH, the National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases (NIAID) will lead research activities aimed at
developing biomedical tools to detect, prevent, and treat infection by
biological agents.
The State Agricultural Experiment Stations (SAES) and veterinary
diagnostic labs within land-grant universities have broad and deep
research portfolios to improve public understanding of disease vectors,
particularly for infectious diseases that can cross between animal and
human populations. They also perform critical research in applied
animal science designed to serve medical advances. With this knowledge
base, the land-grant universities can provide a critical research
foundation for the development of diagnostic technologies and treatment
of infectious diseases suitable for responding to the circumstances
surrounding purposeful exposure.
Funding
To initiate the activities described in this testimony, the LGU
system recommends funding for fiscal year 2003 of $265 million, which
would be used to support the following activities:
--A total of $165 million in support of SAES research and research
facilities--
--$100 million for basic and applied research through the NIH
--$15 million for enhanced research facility security through the
NIH
--$25 million for integrated food safety research through the FDA
--$25 million for basic and applied research through the CVM.
--A total of $100 million in support of CES education and outreach
activities, with a budget estimate of $500,000 per state per
program--
--$25 million for Extension education and outreach to general
public on food safety through FDA
--$25 million for integrated Extension for training in new food
contamination detection and containment technologies
through FDA
--$25 million for integrated Extension for farmer and rancher risk
management program through CVM
--$25 million for Extension volunteer program development and
training through HRSA.
CONCLUSION
I would like to thank the Senate Appropriations Committee for
taking the leadership to look at how our country is addressing homeland
security issues across the federal government. Only by taking this
comprehensive view can we insure that our federal, state and local
agencies are working together in the most effective way. The land-grant
university system stands ready to provide its distributed research and
education network to work in partnership with each of the federal
agencies to help them successfully address their specific homeland
security missions.
MULTI-AGENCY BIOSECURITY--AGRO-SECURITY BUDGET LAND-GRANT UNIVERSITIES
[In millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
USDA DOD HHS FEMA TOTAL
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BY FUNDING MECHANISM
Research Formula; NRI..................................... $64 $60 $100 n/a $224
Extension Formula......................................... 62 35 50 $124.5 271.5
Integrated Sec. 406; RREA................................. 28 n/a 100 87.5 215.5
Facilities................................................ 50 \1\ 76 15 n/a 141
Education................................................. 8 n/a n/a 25 33
-----------------------------------------------------
TOTAL............................................... 212 171 265 237 885
=====================================================
BY AGRO-SECURITY ISSUE
Respond to Outbreaks \2\.................................. 49 \3\ 55 75 137 316
Counteract Terrorism...................................... 30 \4\ 40 100 n/a 170
Secure Communities \5\.................................... 45 n/a 75 75 195
Address Immediate Security Needs.......................... 80 \6\ 76 15 n/a 141
Education Scientists, Teachers, and Specialists........... 8 n/a n/a 25 33
-----------------------------------------------------
TOTAL............................................... 212 171 265 237 885
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Includes funding for site security assessment, security upgrades, and background check system.
\2\ All Extension and Integrated funding split between Respond to Outbreaks and Secure Communities.
\3\ Includes $30 million for research, $25 million for extension.
\4\ Includes $30 million for research, $10 million for extension.
\5\ See reference 1.
\6\ National Association of State Colleges and Land-Grant Universities.
CONCLUSION OF HEARINGS
Chairman Byrd. The hearings will stand in recess awaiting
the call of the Chair.
[Whereupon, at 5:52 p.m., Thursday, April 11, the hearings
were concluded, and the committee was recessed, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.
-